Heavy Cruisers of the Admiral Hipper Class: Warships of the Kriegsmarine

Preface

This volume introduces the heavy cruisers of the Admiral Hipper class. It begins with the developmental stages of the type, providing details of design and construction and comprehensive technical tables covering armament, machinery and equipment. The full service history of each of the five ships of the class is brought to life by War Diary extracts and battle reports from various shipboard divisions, together with sketches elucidating sea actions in which the three units actually to be commissioned—Admiral Hipper, Blücher and Prinz Eugen—were involved. The text concludes with a critical epilogue reviewing the development of the class.

A short biography of the personality after whom each ship was named is followed by a comprehensive selection of photographs, preference being given to those rarely seen previously or appearing in a publication for the first time.

Without the support and assistance of third parties this book could not have been compiled. Valuable references were provided by A. Didrichs and Werner F. G. Stehr, and Herr F. Bavendamm rendered his usual help with the reproduction of photographs. Further assistance was given to me by Fregattenkapitän (retired) A. Schmolke, who served aboard Blücher to the last, and to the Chairman of the Cruiser Blücher Veterans’ Association, A. Dietzsch. I extend my thanks to all these people.

I also owe special thanks to my co-author Klaus-Peter Schmolke. He patiently prepared all the drawings and plans and responded to all my suggestions with encouragement. His work exhibits great skill, and is a valuable component of the whole presentation.

A large number of photographs were obtained from Admiral Hipper crew members and Blücher survivors. Unfortunately, there is room in this volume to reproduce only a small selection from the large Prinz Eugen collection, covering the period from the ship’s commissioning to the capitulation. On 26 May 1945, when the cruiser put into Wilhelmshaven, this collection, with a few exceptions, was given by a crew member (the ship’s war correspondent?) into the safekeeping of the German photographer employed by the occupation authorities controlling the shipyard with the observation that it ‘should not fall into the wrong hands’. It was kept hidden for several decades before passing into the possession of the author.

Except where otherwise stated, all plans and sketches were prepared by Klaus-Peter Schmolke. Photograph sources were: PK/Koop Collection 216; Wilhelmshaven City Archives 1; Dressier 3; Gogg 2; RAF/RN 11; US Navy 5; Urbahns 2; Deschimag Bremen 11; Krupp Germaniawerft Kiel 4; Dietzsch 16; Schmolke 6; Deutsche Werke Kiel 3; Schafer 1; and Schlossmuseum Riegersburg – Foto Ritter 1.

Gerhard Koop

Development and Construction

The term ‘heavy cruiser’ came into use as a result of the post-World War I Washington Conference held by the victorious naval powers in an attempt to end the naval arms race. The talks were aimed primarily at restricting not only the number of capital ships and future aircraft carriers but also their displacement and armament, with an upper limit of 35,000 tons for battleships and 27,000 tons for carriers. Agreement was also reached that no cruiser should exceed 10,000 tons nor mount a calibre greater than 8in (20.3cm).

The participating powers were the United States, Great Britain, Japan, France and Italy. Germany, as the loser in the Great War, was not represented since the provisions of the 1919 Versailles Treaty were deemed to remain in force. The Washington Agreement was signed on 6 February 1922 and thus came into existence the heavy (or ‘Washington’) cruiser created by its terms.

In retrospect, it seems almost to have been the purpose of the Agreement to encourage cruiser-building worldwide, for beyond the displacement and calibre limit there was no restriction on the number which could be built, and accordingly many navies headed at full speed along this avenue. Accordingly, the United States pressed for a new limitation treaty, and in 1927 the Coolidge Conference convened in Geneva, its purpose being to limit the ‘cruiser race’. Neither France nor Italy attended, and the talks failed.

In 1928 there were separate negotiations between France and Britain, and in 1929 between Britain and the United States, as a result of which aggregate heavy cruiser tonnage limits were introduced. Unfortunately it was overlooked at the time that light cruisers with an armament of up to 15.5cm (6.1 in) calibre might also be allowed a displacement of up to 10,000 tons, and the naval powers met again in 1930 to modify the existing treaties. The London Naval Agreement signed on 22 April 1930 created two cruiser Types—‘A’ (heavy) cruisers with 15.5cm to 20.3cm guns, and ‘B’ (light) cruisers, with an armament up to 15.5cm, both on a 10,000-ton displacement.

The heavy cruiser came into existence because the Washington Agreement seemed to consider the size important, but the reason why they should be built at all was not clear. All navies wanted the type, and once one nation had them, the others copied. Underlying it all was the mutual mistrust of Italy towards France, of Britain and the USA towards Japan, and vice-versa. The Japanese had even built their light cruisers from the outset in such a manner that they could upgrade the gun calibre and so exceed the aggregate tonnage limit for heavy cruisers should the occasion demand it, examples being the Mogami class and the Tone class.

In Germany, the Reichsmarine looked favourably on the heavy cruiser but was limited by the terms of the Treaty of Versailles to light cruisers of 6,000 tonnes and a 15cm calibre; not until 18 June 1935, when the Naval Treaty between Germany and Great Britain was signed and sealed, were these restrictions removed, allowing Hitler a free choice of ship types and checked only by the Naval Agreement itself, under which Germany voluntarily accepted a limit to the size of her fleet of 35 per cent of Royal Navy warship tonnage. A second Anglo-German Naval Agreement, and the parallel Anglo-Russian Agreement, were signed on 17 July 1937. These introduced details and modifications and allowed the construction of two heavy cruisers in addition to the three which Germany had already announced.

At the time when the 1935 Naval Agreement was ratified, the Royal Navy had twelve battleships, three battle-cruisers, eight aircraft carriers, 19 heavy cruisers, 35 light cruisers, 169 destroyers and 54 submarines, totalling about 1.2 million tonnes. The German Navy had in being three new Deutschland class ‘pocket-battleships’, six light cruisers, twelve torpedo-boats, two old pre-dreadnought battleships and about 20 training and special craft, totalling 144,000 tonnes. By virtue of the London Naval Agreement, Germany’s aggregate permitted tonnage was 35 per cent of 1.2 million tonnes—i.e. 421,000 tonnes, or three times what she currently had. The Agreement also gave Germany sufficient latitude to plan a homogeneous fleet: as a whole—pro rata 35 per cent of the Royal Navy’s inventory—Hitler was allowed:

which, after deducting existing units (the three ‘pocket battleships’ being counted as battleships), left capacity for:

In compliance with the terms laid down in the Treaty, the German Government notified its treaty partner that it was proceeding with the construction of the following warships:

Two Panzerschiffe (the later Scharnhorst class) of 26,000 tonnes with 28cm guns

Two cruisers of 10,000 tonnes with 20.3cm guns

16 destroyers of 1,625 tonnes with 12.7cm guns

Twenty 250-tonne U-boats

Six 500-tonne U-boats

Two 750-tonne U-boats

plus minesweepers, escort vessels, E-boats and other miscellaneous craft.

The heavy cruisers envisaged in the outline specification in early 1934 were to be the equal of the strongest foreign type (the particular example in mind being the French Algérie) and faster than the French battleships of the Dunkerque class. They were to be suitable for Atlantic operations, and would thus require great range and capacious magazines. The armament was to be either twelve 15cm (5.9in) or eight 20.3cm guns, adequate Flak (antiaircraft) guns, two quadruple torpedo mountings, four aircraft and two catapults, and the armour would be the best possible for the weight allowance remaining. Displacement would be 9,000–10,000 long tons, the maximum sustainable speed 33 knots, and the proposed radius of action 12,000 nautical miles at 15 knots.

A major problem was the selection of calibre for the main guns, and this gave rise to lively discussion. Calculations had shown that the 20.3cm armament would increase the weight by 550 tonnes. This calibre of shell penetrated 100mm of armour at 23km, whereas the 15cm gun could not achieve that beyond 10km. The smaller calibre had a better rate of fire, with eight rounds per barrel per minute as opposed to six for the 20.3cm. The proven twin-mounted Flak and 100mm–200mm for side armour were agreed upon. In addition, there would be adequate horizontal armour. Four to six aircraft would be carried. These piecemeal decisions so expanded the size of the future ship that discussions were held on the feasibility of introducing a 19cm (7.58in) compromise calibre to save 85 tonnes of weight!

As regards the ships’ machinery, I-Amt, the Office of Marine Propulsion, offered two alternatives, steam turbines or a steam installation combined with diesel motors, but K-Amt, the Office of Naval Construction, pleaded for the former exclusively on the grounds that diesel plants so far installed aboard warships had not, it was alleged, proved satisfactory. The argument went that, on manoeuvres, the cruising speed of the all-diesel Deutschland class Panzerschiff was ascertained to be 19 knots while the light cruiser Leipzig (which had a combination of steam turbine and diesel machinery) could only manage 13 knots. This implied that light cruisers required a steam plant to make up the six knots’ deficit, which limited their radius of action. (In fact, the diesel in Leipzig drove the centre shaft—for cruising—and was a completely different type from the engines with which the Panzerschiffe were equipped. No useful comparison of performance was possible on this basis. Operationally, it was never planned that the Deutschland class ships and the light cruisers should form raiding groups, and they were not suitable for the purpose.)

It could be argued, more reasonably, that diesels were less economical in terms of space and were heavier than high-pressure steam plant. The advantages of steam were said to be:

1.  Simple refuelling, especially in war, since fuel mixes were possible (the contrary proved to be the case).

2.  Shorter shaft connections.

3.  Lower noise levels underwater and quieter engine rooms.

4.  In an emergency, steam could be used to extinguish fires.

5.  Up to 30 per cent more bunkers could be carried.

6.  Better damage control; for example, provided all stuffing boxes remained intact, the turbines would continue to run in flooded engine rooms (in reality a weakness propagated as an advantage).

7.  Simplified training and less financial expenditure on personnel (nevertheless, the use of steam turbines required training for qualification).

The disadvantages were listed as:

1.  Smaller radii of action.

2.  The use of steam turbines was not without its dangers (high pressure; high temperatures).

3.  Boilers were liable to salt up.

4.  Poor system of watertight subdivision (referring to the boiler rooms of the heavy cruisers, but already evident on board Schamhorst and Gneisenau).

I-Amt and K-Amt discussed turbo-electric drive, but the latter authority was not convinced of the hoped-for advantages. As the question of full diesel drive was not entertained, steam turbines won the day, and from this the following amended specifications emerged: construction displacement 10,160 tonnes; speed 33 knots (32 knots on displacement of 10,000 tonnes); and steam turbine drive. The first of the final designs submitted had a ship of 10,700 long tons with a speed of 32 knots and an output weight of 18kg/hp. The weight of armour was 2,140 tonnes and that of engines 1,980 tonnes. On account of the exacting space requirements for the machinery, one longitudinal torpedo bulkhead had had to be dispensed with, its function being taken over by an 85mm wing passage bulkhead set vertically instead of on the slant in the normal manner. The barbettes were to be clad with 85mm armour plate and the armour deck with 30mm–50mm, the thicker layers protecting the steering machinery.

Further modifications ensued when the C-in-C, Generaladmiral Raeder, insisted on a slope to the armour deck, on the turrets having 120mm–140mm and on the magazines having 100mm side armour, these to be compensated for by an overall reduction in weight in other areas. Deck armour above the magazines was to be 50mm.

The final design was characterised by four twin turrets, steam turbines driving three shafts and ‘sufficient’ AA mountings and torpedo tubes. The poor range had been acknowledged.

Contracts were placed in 1935–36 for three ships, Admiral Hipper, Blücher and Prinz Eugen. Officially they displaced 10,000 tonnes but actually they were at least 14,050 tonnes. Two further units were ordered in 1936 as light cruisers ‘K’ and ‘L’. The pair were to be armed with either eight 15cm guns in four twin turrets or twelve 15cm in four triple turrets. Four 10.5cm Flak would be supplemented by 3.7cm and 2cm singles plus eight torpedo tubes in two banks. The armour could withstand 20.3cm shells arriving from a range of 15–18km. The maximum sustainable speed would be 35 knots. Calculations showed that a ship of these specifications would displace about 18,000 tonnes.

The major sea powers had agreed on a moratorium on heavy cruiser construction at the 1936 London Naval Conference, but France, Italy and Japan had all exempted themselves from the restriction. In the 1935 Anglo-German Naval Treaty, Germany had left the back door open for the possible construction of two further heavy cruisers if necessary, in addition to the three in respect of which their intentions had already been announced. When reports were received in 1938 that the Soviet Navy was building cruisers with a 19cm armament, the German light cruisers ‘K’ and ‘L’, on the stocks, were re-designed to become the hulls launched as the heavy cruisers Seydlitz and Lützow, but ultimately neither was completed.

The Hull

The plans for heavy cruisers ‘H’ (Admiral Hipper), ‘G’ (Blücher) and ‘I’ (Prinz Eugen) were dated 1934/35, those for ‘K’ (Seydlitz) and ‘L’ (Lützow) 1934/36. Senior Naval Architectural Adviser Hermann Burckhardt was in charge of the project. (In German tradition, the class was originally named after the ship bearing the name that occurred first in alphabetical order; accordingly these heavy cruisers were intended to be the Blücher class. However, as with the Schamhorst class battleships, it was later decided that the class would be named after the first of the ships to be launched.)

For each new ship ordered, the dockyard would receive a Bauvorschrift (Building Specification) drawn up by the Naval Architects’ Department and its associated offices. For these cruisers, the building steel was ST52, with ST42 for less vulnerable areas. There was a central keel and a flat keel. In the hull the proven longitudinal frame system was used. Six continuous frames were situated either side of the central keel to the ship’s side, the fourth frame being a bulkhead. The connecting transverse frames were positioned 1.2–1.7m apart according to the size of the space. Thirteen transverse bulkheads divided the hull into fourteen compartments (I to XIV) and extended between the outer plating and up to the armour deck. Although the Bauvorschrift was identical for each ship, Schmalenbach noted a variation in the measurements between frames V to XIV and the stem for Prinz Eugen, which resulted in a slight shortening of her hull to 205.9m compared to 212.5m for her sister-ships.

From the upper deck downwards were the battery deck, armour/’tween deck, upper and lower platform deck, and compartmented double bottom. The armour deck was a horizontal deck amidships set at an incline downwards about four metres inboard from the outer plating. It was not a true deck, but formed part of the ‘tween deck. The decks extended between the ship’s sides or wing passage bulkheads, depending on the level. The double bottom ran for about 72 per cent of the ship’s length. During rebuilding the ships were given a prominent clipper bow and a typical cruiser stem.

A characteristic of German heavy units was the similarity of their outlines based on the Turmmast (literally, ‘tower mast’, i.e. the foremast superstructure) and funnel group amidships. At long range or from the air in unfavourable atmospheric conditions it was difficult to identify the ships. For example, near dawn on 24 May 1941, in the Denmark Strait, Admiral Holland aboard his flagship Hood mistook Prinz Eugen for Bismarck and initially concentrated his fire on the cruiser—a grave error which may have cost him the battle.

The Admiral Hipper class were all fitted with waterline bulges which increased stability and provided additional space besides improved protection against underwater hits. A bulge at the foot of the stem had a favourable effect on speed and was found useful for retrieving the extensible poles of the bow protection gear.

Technical Specifications

SEYDLITZ: DETAILS OF CONVERSION TO AIRCRAFT CARRIER

Displacement (designed) 17,139tons. Length overall 217m; flight deck length 197m; flight deck usable width 23m; flight deck maximum width 30m. Hangar length 148m approx, maximum hangar width 18m. Steam turbines driving three shafts; 132,000shp; speed 32 knots; bunkerage 4,250m³. Armament: ten twin 10.5cm, ten twin 3.7cm, 24 quadruple 2cm. Aircraft: 10–12 Bf 109G, 8 Ju 87D; two catapults. Rebuilding at Deschimag Yard, Bremen, was expected to last fifteen months to completion, but the project was abandoned on 30 January 1943.

WEIGHT GROUPING

Note: The ‘weight groups’ are based on details for Admiral Hipper, Blücher and Prinz Eugen per Gröner, Hadeler and Witte, ignoring individual variations (which are mentioned separately if necessary). No account has been taken of the effect of conversions and refits after commissioning.

Individual construction groups have an identification letter used initially for calculation purposes in the design stages but ultimately retained throughout the period of the ship’s useful life.

S = Weight of compartmented hull, comprising S1 (building materials, e.g. steel ST52, excluding waterline armour), SII (metal workers), SIII (carpenters) and SIV (painters); A (armament and armour with equipment); T (torpedoes with equipment); F (aircraft installation with equipment); Spr (mines with equipment); I (general equipment); Ta (masts and spars); and N (nautical gear). MI = main machinery and connections, condensers, gears, couplings, shaft connections, propellers, auxiliary machinery, conduits and piping used in connection with the operation of the main machinery, exhaust/funnel cap, equipment etc., boilers with armatures, oil and water in the main engine plant. MII = auxiliary boiler plant, ship’s heating system, washing and drinking water desalination plant, laundry, ablutions, kitchen gear etc., ship’s pumps, primary electrical plant, lighting, cables, steering assembly, capstans, boats’ windlasses, room fans, weapon systems, refrigerating plant, searchlights, signalling lamps, command elements, gyro compass, mileage logs, sirens and workshops.

All weights are in metric tonnes.

Note: Details per Schmalenbach relate exclusively to Prinz Eugen, those per Witte to the class in general.

Construction Weights as Percentages of Designed Displacement (per Witte)