CORNELIA MATABUENA vs.

PETRONILA CERVANTES L-2877 (38 SCRA 284) March 31, 1971 FACTS: In 1956, herein appellants brother Felix Matabuena donated a piece of lot to his common-law spouse, herein appellee Petronila Cervantes. Felix and Petronila got married only in 1962 or six years after the deed of donation was executed. Five months later, or September 13, 1962, Felix died. Thereafter, appellant Cornelia Matabuena, by reason of being the only sister and nearest collateral relative of the deceased, filed a claim over the property, by virtue of a an affidavit of self-adjudication executed by her in 1962, had the land declared in her name and paid the estate and inheritance taxes thereon. The lower court of Sorsogon declared that the donation was valid inasmuch as it was made at the time when Felix and Petronila were not yet spouses, rendering Article 133 of the Civil Code inapplicable. ISSUE: Whether or not the ban on donation between spouses during a marriage applies to a common-law relationship. HELD: While Article 133 of the Civil Code considers as void a donation between the spouses during marriage, policy consideration of the most exigent character as well as the dictates of morality requires that the same prohibition should apply to a common-law relationship. As stated in Buenaventura vs. Bautista (50 OG 3679, 1954), if the policy of the law is to prohibit donations in favor of the other consort and his descendants because of fear of undue and improper pressure and influence upon the donor, then there is every reason to apply the same prohibitive policy to persons living together as husband and wife without the benefit of nuptials. The lack of validity of the donation by the deceased to appellee does not necessarily result in appellant having exclusive right to the disputed property. As a widow, Cervantes is entitled to one-half of the inheritance, and the surviving sister to the other half. Article 1001, Civil Code: Should brothers and sisters or their children survive with the widow or widower, the latter shall be entitled to one-half of the inheritance and the brothers and sisters or their children to the other half.

G.R. No. L-57499

June 22, 1984

Ponente: MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:

MERCEDES CALIMLIM- CANULLAS, petitioner, vs. HON. WILLELMO FORTUN, Judge, Court of First instance of Pangasinan, Branch I, and CORAZON DAGUINES, respondents. FACTS: Petitioner MERCEDES Calimlim-Canullas and FERNANDO Canullas were married on December 19, 1962. They begot five children. They lived in a small house on the residential land in question with an area of approximately 891 square meters, located at Bacabac, Bugallon, Pangasinan. After FERNANDO's father died in 1965, FERNANDO inherited the land. In 1978, FERNANDO abandoned his family and was living with private respondent Corazon DAGUINES. During the pendency of this appeal, they were convicted of concubinage in a judgment rendered on October 27, 1981 by the then Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, Branch II, which judgment has become final. On April 15, 1980, FERNANDO sold the subject property with the house thereon to DAGUINES for the sum of P2,000.00. In the document of sale, FERNANDO described the house as "also inherited by me from my deceased parents." Unable to take possession of the lot and house, DAGUINES initiated a complaint on June 19, 1980 for quieting of title and damages against MERCEDES. The latter resisted and claimed that the house in dispute where she and her children were residing, including the coconut trees on the land, were built and planted with conjugal funds and through her industry; that the sale of the land together with the house and improvements to DAGUINES was null and void because they are conjugal properties and she had not given her consent to the sale, In its original judgment, respondent Court principally declared DAGUINES "as the lawful owner of the land in question as well as the one-half of the house erected on said land." Upon reconsideration prayed for by MERCEDES, however, respondent Court resolved:
WHEREFORE, the dispositive portion of the Decision of this Court, promulgated on October 6, 1980, is hereby amended to read as follows: (1) Declaring plaintiff as the true and lawful owner of the land in question and the 10 coconut trees; (2) Declaring as null and void the sale of the conjugal house to plaintiff on April 15, 1980 (Exhibit A) including the 3 coconut trees and other crops planted during the conjugal relation between Fernando Canullas (vendor) and his legitimate wife, herein defendant Mercedes CalimlimCanullas;

ISSUES: 1) Whether or not the construction of a conjugal house on the exclusive property of the husband ipso facto gave the land the character of conjugal property; (2) Whether or not the sale of the lot together with the house and improvements thereon was valid under the circumstances surrounding the transaction. HELD: The determination of the first issue revolves around the interpretation to be given to the second paragraph of Article 158 of the Civil Code, which reads: xxx xxx xxx Buildings constructed at the expense of the partnership during the marriage on land belonging to one of the spouses also pertain to the partnership, but the value of the land shall be reimbursed to the spouse who owns the same. We hold that pursuant to the foregoing provision both the land and the building belong to the conjugal partnership but the conjugal partnership is indebted to the husband for the value of the land. The spouse owning the lot becomes a creditor of the conjugal partnership for the value of the lot, which value would be reimbursed at the liquidation of the conjugal partnership. It is true that in the case of Maramba vs. Lozano, relied upon by respondent Judge, it was held that the land belonging to one of the spouses, upon which the spouses have built a house, becomes conjugal property only when the conjugal partnership is liquidated and indemnity paid to the owner of the land. We believe that the better rule is that enunciated by Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes in Padilla vs. Paterno, 3 SCRA 678,

691 (1961), where the following was explained:

As to the above properties, their conversion from paraphernal to conjugal assets should be deemed to retroact to the time the conjugal buildings were first constructed thereon or at the very latest, to the time immediately before the death of Narciso A. Padilla that ended the conjugal partnership. They can not be considered to have become conjugal property only as of the time their values were paid to the estate of the widow Concepcion Paterno because by that time the conjugal partnership no longer existed and it could not acquire the ownership of said properties. The acquisition by the partnership of these properties was, under the 1943 decision, subject to the suspensive condition that their values would be reimbursed to the widow at the liquidation of the conjugal partnership; once paid, the effects of the fulfillment of the condition should be deemed to retroact to the date the obligation was constituted (Art. 1187, New Civil Code) ...

The foregoing premises considered, it follows that FERNANDO could not have alienated the house and lot to DAGUINES since MERCEDES had not given her consent to said sale. Anent the second issue, we find that the contract of sale was null and void for being contrary to morals and public policy. The sale was made by a husband in favor of a concubine after he had abandoned his family and left the conjugal home where his wife and children lived and from whence they derived their support. That sale was subversive of the stability of the family, a basic social institution which public policy cherishes and protects. Article 1409 of the Civil Code states inter alia that: contracts whose cause, object, or purpose is contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order, or public policy are void and inexistent from the very beginning. Article 1352 also provides that: "Contracts without cause, or with unlawful cause, produce no effect whatsoever. The cause is unlawful if it is contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order, or public policy." Additionally, the law emphatically prohibits the spouses from selling property to each other subject to certain exceptions. Similarly, donations between spouses during marriage are prohibited. And this is so because if transfers or con conveyances between spouses were allowed during marriage, that would destroy the system of conjugal partnership, a basic policy in civil law. It was also designed to prevent the exercise of undue influence by one spouse over the other, as well as to protect the institution of marriage, which is the cornerstone of family law. The prohibitions apply to a couple living as husband and wife without benefit of marriage, otherwise, "the condition of those who incurred guilt would turn out to be better than those in legal union." Those provisions are dictated by public interest and their criterion must be imposed upon the wig of the parties. That was the ruling in Buenaventura vs. Bautista, also penned by Justice JBL Reyes (CA) 50 O.G. 3679, and cited in Matabuena vs. Cervantes. We quote hereunder the pertinent dissertation on this point: We reach a different conclusion. While Art. 133 of the Civil Code considers as void a donation between the spouses during the marriage, policy considerations of the most exigent character as when the dictates of morality require that the same prohibition should apply to a common-law relationship. As announced in the outset of this opinion, a 1954 Court of Appeals decision, Buenaventura vs. Bautista, 50 OG 3679, interpreting a similar provision of the old Civil Code speaks unequivocally. If the policy of the law is, in the language of the opinion of the then Justice J.B.L. Reyes of that Court, 'to prohibit donations in favor of the other consort and his descendants because of fear of undue influence and improper pressure upon the donor, a prejudice deeply rooted in our ancient law, ..., then there is every reason to apply the same prohibitive policy to persons living together as husband and wife without benefit of nuptials. For it is not to be doubted that assent to such irregular connection for thirty years bespeaks greater influence of one party over the other, so that the danger that the law seeks to avoid is correspondingly increased'. Moreover, as pointed out by Ulpian "It would not be just that such donations should subsist, lest the conditions of those who incurred guilt should turn out to be better." So long as marriage remains the cornerstone of our family law, reason and morality alike demand that the disabilities attached to marriage should likewise attach to concubinage (Emphasis supplied). Susan Nicdao Cario vs. Susan Yee Cario

GR No. 132529

February 2, 2001

FACTS: SPO4 Santiago Cario married petitioner Susan Nicdao on June 20, 1969, with whom he had two children, Sahlee and Sandee. On November 10, 1982, SPO4 Cario also married respondent Susan Yee. In 1988, SPO4 Cario became bedridden due to diabetes and tuberculosis, and died on November 23, 1992, under the care of Susan Yee who spent for his medical and burial expenses. Both Susans filed claims for monetary benefits and financial assistance from various government agencies pertaining to the deceased. Nicdao was able to collect P146,000 from MBAI, PCCVI, commutation, NAPOLCOM and Pag-ibig, while Yee received a total of P21,000 from GSIS burial and SSS burial insurance. On December 14, 1993, Yee filed for collection of money against Nicdao, praying that Nicdao be ordered to return to her at least one-half of the P146,000 Nicdao had collected. For failing to file her answer, Nicdao was declared in default. Yee admitted that her marriage to the deceased took place during the subsistence of and without first obtaining a judicial declaration of nullity of the marriage between Nicdao and Cario. But she claimed good faith, having no knowledge of the previous marriage until at the funeral where she met Nicdao who introduced herself as the wife of the deceased. Yee submitted that Carios marriage to Nicdao was void because it was solemnized without the required marriage license. ISSUES: (1) Whether or not the subsequent marriage is null and void; (2) Whether or not, if yes to above, the wife of the deceased is entitled to collect the death benefits from government agencies despite the nullity of their marriage. HELD: Under Article 40 of the Family Code, the nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such marriage void. Meaning, where the absolute nullity of a previous marriage is sought to be invoked for purposes of contracting a second marriage, the sole basis acceptable in law, for said projected marriage to be free from legal infirmity, is a final judgment declaring the previous marriage void. However, for purposes other than remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to declare a marriage an absolute nullity. For other purposes, such as but not limited to the determination of heirship, legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child, settlement of estate, dissolution of property regime, or a criminal case for that matter, the court may pass upon the validity of marriage even after the death of the parties thereto, and even in a suit not directly instituted to question the validity of said marriage, so long as it is essential to the determination of the case. Under the Civil Code which was the law in force when the marriage of petitioner and the deceased was solemnized in 1969, a valid marriage license is a requisite of marriage, and the absence therof, subject to certain exceptions, renders the marriage void ab initio. It does not follow, however, that since the marriage of Nicdao and the deceased was void ab initio, the death benefits would now be awarded to Yee. To reiterate, under Article 40 of the Family Code, for purposes of remarriage, there must be a prior judicial declaration of the nullity of a previous marriage, though void, before a party can enter into a second marriage; otherwise, the second marriage would also be void. One of the effects of the declaration of nullity of marriage is the separation of the property of the spouses according to the applicable property regime. Considering that the two marriages are void ab initio, the applicable property regime would be not absolute community nor conjugal partnership of property, but governed by the provisions of Articles 147 and 148 of the Family Code, on Property Regime of Unions Without Marriage. Liyao Jr vs Tanhoti-Liyao

G.R. No. 138961 March 7, 2002 FACTS: On November 29,1976, William Liyao, Jr., represented by his mother Corazon G. Garcia, filed Civil Case No. 24943 before the RTC of Pasig, Branch 167 which is an action for compulsory recognition as the illegitimate (spurious) child of the late William Liyao against herein respondents, Juanita TanhotiLiyao, Pearl Margaret L. Tan, Tita Rose L. Tan and Linda Christina Liyao. The complaint was later amended to include the allegation that petitioner was in continuous possession and enjoyment of the status of the child of said William Liyao, petitioner having been recognized and acknowledged as such child by the decedent during his lifetime. It must be stated at the outset that both petitioner and respondents have raised a number of issues which relate solely to the sufficiency of evidence presented by petitioner to establish his claim of filiation with the late William Liyao. Unfortunately, both parties have consistently overlooked the real crux of this litigation: May petitioner impugn his own legitimacy to be able to claim from the estate of his supposed father, William Liyao? HELD: We deny the present petition. Under the New Civil Code, a child born and conceived during a valid marriage is presumed to be legitimate. The presumption of legitimacy of children does not only flow out from a declaration contained in the statute but is based on the broad principles of natural justice and the supposed virtue of the mother. The presumption is grounded in a policy to protect innocent offspring from the odium of illegitimacy. The presumption of legitimacy of the child, however, is not conclusive and consequently, may be overthrown by evidence to the contrary. Hence, Article 255 of the New Civil Code provides: Article 255. Children born after one hundred and eighty days following the celebration of the marriage, and before three hundred days following its dissolution or the separation of the spouses shall be presumed to be legitimate. Against this presumption no evidence shall be admitted other than that of the physical impossibility of the husband having access to his wife within the first one hundred and twenty days of the three hundred which preceded the birth of the child. This physical impossibility may be caused: 1) By the impotence of the husband; 2) By the fact that husband and wife were living separately in such a way that access was not possible; 3) By the serious illness of the husband. Petitioner insists that his mother, Corazon Garcia, had been living separately for ten (10) years from her husband, Ramon Yulo, at the time that she cohabited with the late William Liyao and it was physically impossible for her to have sexual relations with Ramon Yulo when petitioner was conceived and born. To bolster his claim, petitioner presented a document entitled, Contract of Separation, executed and signed by Ramon Yulo indicating a waiver of rights to any and all claims on any property that Corazon Garcia might acquire in the future. The fact that Corazon Garcia had been living separately from her husband, Ramon Yulo, at the time petitioner was conceived and born is of no moment. While physical impossibility for the husband to have sexual intercourse with his wife is one of the grounds for impugning the legitimacy of the child, it bears emphasis that the grounds for impugning the legitimacy of the child mentioned in Article 255 of the Civil Code may only be invoked by the husband, or in proper cases, his heirs under the conditions set forth under Article 262 of the Civil Code. Impugning the legitimacy of the child is a strictly personal right of the husband, or in exceptional cases, his heirs for the simple reason that he is the one directly confronted with

the scandal and ridicule which the infidelity of his wife produces and he should be the one to decide whether to conceal that infidelity or expose it in view of the moral and economic interest involved. It is only in exceptional cases that his heirs are allowed to contest such legitimacy. Outside of these cases, none even his heirs can impugn legitimacy; that would amount o an insult to his memory. It is therefor clear that the present petition initiated by Corazon G. Garcia as guardian ad litem of the then minor, herein petitioner, to compel recognition by respondents of petitioner William Liyao, Jr, as the illegitimate son of the late William Liyao cannot prosper. It is settled that a child born within a valid marriage is presumed legitimate even though the mother may have declared against its legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an adulteress. We cannot allow petitioner to maintain his present petition and subvert the clear mandate of the law that only the husband, or in exceptional circumstances, his heirs, could impugn the legitimacy of a child born in a valid and subsisting marriage. The child himself cannot choose his own filiation. If the husband, presumed to be the father does not impugn the legitimacy of the child, then the status of the child is fixed, and the latter cannot choose to be the child of his mothers alleged paramour. On the other hand, if the presumption of legitimacy is overthrown, the child cannot elect the paternity of the husband who successfully defeated the presumption. Do the acts of Enrique and Bernadette Yulo, the undisputed children of Corazon Garcia with Ramon Yulo, in testifying for herein petitioner amount to impugnation of the legitimacy of the latter? We think not. As earlier stated, it is only in exceptional cases that the heirs of the husband are allowed to contest the legitimacy of the child. There is nothing on the records to indicate that Ramon Yulo has already passed away at the time of the birth of the petitioner nor at the time of the initiation of this proceedings. Notably, the case at bar was initiated by petitioner himself through his mother, Corazon Garcia, and not through Enrique and Bernadette Yulo. It is settled that the legitimacy of the child can be impugned only in a direct action brought for that purpose, by the proper parties and within the period limited by law. Considering the foregoing, we find no reason to discuss the sufficiency of the evidence presented by both parties on the petitioners claim of alleged filiation with the late William Liyao. In any event, there is no clear, competent and positive evidence presented by the petitioner that his alleged father had admitted or recognized his paternity.