ON PHILOSOPHY AND ITS METHOD,'
‘HE ultimate basis on which all our cognitions and
T is tho inexplicable, Every explanation
is by means of more or less intermediate
stages ; as in the sea tho plummet finds the bottom, now
in greater, now in lesser depths, but must nevertheless
everywhore reach it af last. ‘This inexplicable falls to the
share of Metaphysios,
Almost all men unceasingly think they are this and this
man (rg dySownoe), together with the corollaries which re-
sult therefrom, On the other hand, that they are Man in
general (5 dvSpwros), and the corollaries which follow from
this, soarecly ever occurs to them, but is nevertheless the
main point. The few who pay more attention to the lattor
than to the former proposition are philosophers. But the
tondency of the others is reducible to the fact that they
ever see anything in the things except the particular ond,
individual, and not their universality. Only the more
highly gifted see more or less, according to the degreo of
their intell ‘the universal in particular things. This
important distinction interpenetrates the whole faculty of
knowledge so far indeed that it extends itself down to the
intuition of the most every-day objects ; hence, in the highly
The following essays are from the second volume of the
“Parerga and Paralipomens,” and are headed “Detached yet
systematically arranged thoughts on many different subjects.”
ON PHILOSOPHY AND 17s METHOD. ~ 168
gitted head these are other than in tho ordinary head,
This grasp of tho universal in the particular, which always
presents itself, is coincident with that which I have called
the pure Will-less Subject of Knowledge, and hare postue
Istod as the subjective correlate of the Platonic Tdea. ‘This
proved because, when directed on the universal, the intol-
gence may remain will-less, while, on the contrary, the
objects of the Will ie in particular things; for which reason
the intelligence of animals is strietly limited to theso par-
iculars, and sceordingly their intellect remains exclusively
tho service of their will. The above direction of tho
mind to the universal is the indispensable condition of
genuine achievements in philosophy, poetry, and in the arts
For the intellect in the service of the Will, that is, in
practical use, there are only particular things. or the
intellect which pursues art and science, in other words,
which is active for its own sake, there are only universalitics,
whole kinds, species, classes, Ideas, of things, for even the
rentive artist wishes to present the Idea, that is, the kind
in the individual. This comes aboub because the Will is
tumed directly merely to individual things; theso aro,
properly speaking, its objects, for these alone have empiric
eal reality. Concepts, classes, species, can, on the contrary,
become objects only very indirectly. Henee the common
‘man hes no seno for universal truths, But genius over-
looks and misses the individual element. ‘The compulsory
ceoupation with the particular, as such, in so far as it
constitutes the matter of practical life, is an irksome
bondage,
‘The two first conditions of philosophizing aze these:
firstly, to have the courage to sct one's heart upon no
question ; and, secondly, to bring sll that which is obvious
in itself to clear consciousness in order to comprehend it as
Se NSMUHUPENAUBR'S ESSAYS,
problem, Fi order, proporly-speaking, to phil
phize, the mind must be truly at leisure, Tt must
no purposes, and thus not be led by the Will, but givo
itself over undividedly to the teaching which the parveptive
world and its own consciousness impart to it. Now pro-
fessors of philosophy are concerned as to their personal
use and advantage, and what leads thereto; thero the
Serious point for them lies, For this reason they fi
altogether to seo so many obvious things, indeed do not
50 much as once come to reflection on the problems of
philosophy.
The poet brings pictures of life, human character, and
situations before the imagination, sets everything in motion,
and leaves it to everyone to think into these pictures, us
tauch as his intellectual power will find for him therein,
On this account he can satisfy men of tho most diverse
» even fools and -wiso men at the same time,
Now the philosopher doos not bring in the same way life
itself, but the completed thoughts which he has absiracted
from it, and demands that his reader should think: just in
‘the same way, and just as far as he himself, and his public
4s, im consequence, very small. ‘Tho poot may therefore
be compared to him who brings the flowers, the philosopher
to him who brings the quintessence,
Another grest advantage which poctical achievements
have over philosophical is this, that all poetieal works can
stand without hindrance to each other side by aide; while
4 philosophical system has hardly come into the wor
but it contemplates the destruction of all its brother:
an Asiatic sultan on ascending the throne. For as there
can only be one quoen in a beehive, so there ean only bo
one philosophy on the order of the day. Systoms are of
as unsociable a nature as spiders, of which each sits alone
in ite web, and soes how many ‘lies will let themselves be
OW PATLOSOPHY AND ITS aerHOD, 165
caught in it, but ouly approaches auother spider in order
to fight it. “Thus, while the works of posts
fully noxt each other like lambs, those of
born ravening beasts, and their destructive
oven directed primarily against their own speci
of scorpions, spiders, and the Jarve of ceriain insects,
‘They come into the world like the armed men from the
seed of Jason's dragons’ teeth, and have till now like
‘these mutually exterminated each other. ‘This battle has
slready lasted mote than 2,000 years, Will a final victory
‘and lasting peace ever result from it?
Tn consequence of its essentially polemical nature, this
Zellum omninm contra omnes of the philosophical ayatems,
itis infinitely more dificalt to obtain recognition aa phi,
losopher than as post. 'The work of the poet demands
nothing further from the reader than to enter. into the
series of the writings which amuse or elevate him, and the
devotion of some few hours to them. ‘The work of the
philosopher, on the contrary, is intended to revolutioniee
his whole mode of thought; it requires of him that he
shall acknowledge all ke has learnt and believed in this
department to be orror, his time and trouble to be lost,
and sholl begin egain from tho beginning. Tt, at most,
leaves some rudimonts of its predecossor standing in order
to build its foundation upon them, To this is added that,
in overy teacher of an already existing system, it hos ¢
professional opponent, and that sometimes even tho state
{ekes a philosophical system that pleases it under its pro.
tection, and by the help of its power!
‘want to be taught to those who want to be amused, and
ove will be able to judge, quibus auspiciis a philosopher
makes his entry. Tt is indeed true, on tho other hand,SCHOPENHAUER'S ESSAYS,
the applause of thinkers of the elect of all poriods
countries without difference of nation which re-
e philosopher ; the multitude gradually learns to
wme on the strength of authi
the foregoing, and on acco
‘but deep effect of the progross of philosophy on which tho
‘whole human race proceeds, since thousands of years the
history of philosophers goes with that of Ings, and counts
a hundred timos fowor names than the latter. Henco it is
‘& great thing to procure for one’s own name an enduring
place therein,
‘The philosophical writer is the guide, and his reader is
the wanderer. If they are to arrive together thoy must,
above all things, start together; that is, the author must
take his reader to a standpoint which they ave in
common} but this can bo no other than that of the om-
pirical consciousness which is common to all of us. Let
hhim, then, grasp him firmly by the hand, and see how
high above the clouds he can attain, step by step, along
the mountain path, This is how Kant proceeds. He
starts from common experience, as
as of other things. How mistalvn it is, on the other hand,
to seek to start from the standpoint of am assnmed intel.
Jectual intuition of hyperphysical relations, or processes,
oreven of a reason which perceives the supersensible, or
of an absolute, self-thinking Reason, For all this means
starting from tho standpoint of not directly communicable
cognitions, when therefore even at starting the reader does
not know whether he is near his author, or miles distant
from him,
Conversation with another, and serious moditation and
inward contemplation of tho things, is asa machine to «
living organism. For only in the latter ease is everything
OW PHILOSOPHY AND 175 METHOD, 167
cut from ono piece, or as it were pla
one key, whereby
igibility, and true co-
hherenc>—in fact, unity, Othorwiso, heterogeneous pieces
of very different origin are stuck together, and a certain
unity of movement is forved, which often unexpectedly
stops. It is only oneself that one undorstands perfectly ;
others only half, for one can at most attain to community
of concepts, but never to the perceptual point of view
ying at their foundation. Hence deep philosophical truths
are never brought to light by way of common thinking in
dialogue. Such, however, is very sorviooable as practice to
the hunting up of problems, to their ventilation, and after
wards to the testing, controlling, and criticising of the
proposed solution, Plato's dialogruos are composed in this
sense, and accordingly the second and third weademios which
ed from his school took on a more and moro sooptical
direction, As form for the communication of philosophical
leas the written dialogue is only serviceable where the
subject admits of two or more wholly different or even
opposite views respecting which the judgment of the reader
shall either remain suspended or which, taken together,
shall lead to a complete and acourate understanding of the
matter, To the frst case belongs the refutation of objec.
tions raised. The dialogue form chosen for this purpose
must, however, be genainely dramatic; in that the ditfe-
ences of opinion are laid bare to their foundations and
‘thoroughly worked out. ‘Thor must really be two spoak-
ing. Without this, itis, as is mostly the ease, mere idle
play.
Neither our knowlodge, nor our insight, will be ever
specially increased by the comparison and discussion of
hab has been said by others; for that is always like
pouring water from one vessel into another. Only hy the
contemplation of things oneself, can insight and knowledge