3C Evidence Part 2

Excellence
Evidence
in
part two
A primer on codal provisions and special laws on Evidence,
Philippine and US case digests, and an comparative analysis
between the Current and the Proposed Rules of Court
By Law on Evidence
class of 2012 (Section C)
For Prof. Francis Lim
Yanee Canto
General Editing
Jamie Flores
Layout & Graphic
Bingo Telan
Formatting &
General Editing
Julie Acosta
Jori Adan
Ava Aguaviva
Austin Alcantara
Rickmon Alcantara
Kenjie Aman
Mariam Arceo
Hero Bondoc
Charm Calderini
Caloy Camacho
Yanee Canto
Jovalie Capanas
Kyle Chan
Mike Corrales
Peter dela Fuente
Chinnie dela Cruz
Rona Diaz
Tonio Reyes
Dan Roleda
Glen Rumohr
Peng Sandoval
Ayza Singzon
KC So
Aimee Tan
Talitha Tan
Roy Tancinco
Rafael Tancinco
Bingo Telan
Camille Ting
Tammy Tolentino
Kim Raisa Uy
Myra Yacapin
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Pancho Galman
JD Garcia
Paolo Go
Mickey Ingles
Kris Iranzo
JR Joaquino
Joyce Laohoo
Angel Machuca
Anmau Manigbas
Armand Morales
April Morato
Rachelle Lim
Sarah Macabare
Marck Macaraeg
Cheska Pazziuagan
Jaymie Reyes
Ateneo Law
Class of 2012-C

3C Evidence Project Batch 2010-11

(Part Two) page 1 of 140

Course Syllabus (SY 2010-11)
Part Two

X. Conduct and Character As Evidence

A. Rule 130, Secs. 34-35; 51; Rule 132, Section 14; Section 30, Rule on Examination
of a Child Witness
B. Cases:
1. U.S. v. Pineda 37 Phil. 457 (1918)
2. People vs. Irang 64 Phil. 285 (1937)
3. People v. Soliman 53 O.G. 8083 (1957)
4. People v. Babiera 52 Phil. 97 (1928)
5. U.S. v. Mercado 26 Phil. 127 (1913)

XI. Hearsay Rule

A. Testimonial Knowledge
1. Rule 130, Sec. 36
2. People v. Brioso 37 SCRA 336 (1971)
3. People v. Cusi 14 SCRA 944 (1965)
4. People v. Gaddi 170 SCRA 649 (1989)
5. Leake v. Hagert 175 N.W.2d 675 (1970)
6. U.S. v. Zenni 492 F. Supp. 464 (1980)
7. Estrada vs. Desierto 356 SCRA 108 (2001)
8. People vs. Quidato 297 SCRA 1 (1998)
B. Exceptions:
1. Dying Declaration
(a) Rule 130, Section 37
(b) People v. Laquinon 135 SCRA 91 (1985)
(c) People v. Sabio 02 SCRA 218 (1981)
(d) People v. Salison 253 SCRA 758 (1996)
2. Declaration Against Interest
(b) People v. Majuri 96 SCRA 472 (1980)
(c) People v. Toledo 51 Phil. 825 (1928)
(d) Fuentes v. CA 253 SCRA 430 (1996)
3. Pedigree
(b) Gravador v. Mamigo 20 SCRA 742 (1967)
(c) People v. Alegado 201 SCRA 37 (1991)
(d) Tison v. CA 276 SCRA 582 (1997)
4. Family Tradition
(b) Ferrer v. de Ynchausti 38 Phil. 905 (1918)
5. Common Reputation
(b) Ferrer vs. De Ichausti 38 Phil 905 (1918)
(c) City of Manila v. Del Rosario 5 Phil 227(1905)
6. Res Gestae
(b) People v. Lungayan 162 SCRA 100 (1988)
(c) People v. Putian 74 SCRA 133 (1976)
(d) People v. Tolentino 218 SCRA 337 (1993)
7. Entries in the Course of Business
(b) Palmer v. Hoffman 318 U.S. 109 (1943)
(c) Philamlife v. Capital Assurance (CA) 72 O.G. 3941
8. Official Records
(b) Africa v. Caltex 16 SCRA 448 (1966)



(c) People v. Leones 117 SCRA 382 (1982)
(d) Manalo v. Robles Trans. Co., Inc. 99 Phil. 729 (1956)
(e) People v. Cabuang 217 SCRA 675 (1993)
(f) People v. San Gabriel 253 SCRA 84 (1996)
9. Commercial Lists
(b) State v. Lungsford 400 A.2d 843 (1979)
(c) PNOC Shipping v. CA 299 SCRA 402 (1999)
(d) Estrada vs. Noble [C.A.] 49 O.G. 139
10. Learned Treatises
11. Prior Testimony
(b) Tan v. CA 20 SCRA 54 (1967)
(c) Ohio v. Roberts 448 U.S. 56 (1980)
12. Child Abuse Exception
(a) Section 28, Rule on Examination of a Child Witness

XII. Opinion Rule

A. Rule 130, Secs. 48-50
B. Rule on DNA Evidence
C. Cases:
1. Dilag & Co. v. Merced 45 O.G. 5536 (1949)
2. U.S. v. Trono 3 Phil. 213 (1904)
3. People v. Adoviso 309 SCRA 1 (1999)
4. People vs. Vallejo 382 SCRA 192 (2002)
5. State v. Garver 225 P.2d 771 (1950)
6. U.S. v. Stifel 433 F.2d 431 (6th Cir. 1970)
7. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals 113 S. Ct. 2786 (1993)
8. United States v. Bonds 12 F.3d 540 (1993)
9. Herrera v. Alba G.R. No. 148220, June 15, 2005
10. People v. Umanito, G.R. No. 172607,
October 26, 2007

XIII. Burden of Proof and Presumptions

A. Rule 131, Secs. 1-4.
B. Cases:
1. Civil Cases
(a) Pornellosa v. LTA L-14040, Jan. 31, 1986
(b) IFC v. Tobias 78 SCRA 28 (1977)
2. Criminal Cases
(a) People v. Pajenado 31 SCRA 812 (1970)
(b) U.S. v. Dube 520 F.2d 250 (1
st
Cir. 1975)
(c) People v. Verzola 80 SCRA 600 (1977)
(d) Patterson v. New York 432 U.S. 19 (1977)
3. Presumptions
(a) Pascual v. Angeles 4 Phil. 604 (1905)
(b) Ormachea v. Trillana 13 Phil. 194 (1909)
(c) People v. Padiernos 69 SCRA 484 (1976)
(d) Yee Hem v. United States 268 U.S. 178 (1925)
(e) County Court of Ulster
City v. Allen 442 U.S. 140 (1979)
(f) Sandstrom vs. Montana 442 U.S. 510 (1979)

XIV. Presentation of Evidence

A. Examination of Witnesses
(Rule 132, Secs. 1-18)



B. Rule on Examination of A Child Witness
C. REE, Rule 10
1. Examination in Open Court
(a) People v. Estenzo 72 SCRA 428 (1976)
(b) Galman v. Pamaran 138 SCRA 294 (1985)
2. Leading Questions
(a) State v. Scott 149 P2d 152 (1944)
3. Impeaching One's Own Witness
(a) Becker v. Eisenstodt 158 A.2d 706 (1960)
4. Cross-Examination
(a) Dela Paz v. IAC 154 SCRA 65 (1987)
(b) Fulgado v. CA 182 SCRA 81 (1982)
(c) Capitol Subd. v. Negros Occ. 52 O.G. 4672 (1956)
(d) U.S. v. Mercado 26 Phil. 127 (1913)
(e) U.S. v. Marshall 762 F.2d 419 (5th Cir. 1985)
5. Impeachment By Bias
(a) U.S. v. Abel 469 U.S. 45 (1984)
(b) U.S. v. Harvey 547 F.2d 720 (2d Cir.1976)
6. Impeachment By Prior Inconsistent Statement
(a) Villalon v. IAC 144 SCRA 443 (1986)
(b) People v. Resabal 50 Phil. 780 (1927)
(c) U.S. v. Webster 734 F.2d 1191 (7th Cir. 1984)
7. Impeachment By Other Means
(a) U.S. v. Mercado 20 Phil. 127 (1913)
(b) Mosley v. Commonwealth 420 SW2d 679 (1967)
(c) Coles v. Harsch 276 P. 248 (1929)
(d) U.S. v. Medical Therapy Services 583 F.2d 36 (2d Cir. 1978)
(e) Newton v. State 127 A. 123 (Md. 1924)
(f) State v. Oswalt 381 P. 2d 617 (1963)
8. Refreshing Recollection
(a) State v. Peoples 319 S.E.2d 177 (1984)
9. Recalling Witnesses
(a) People v. Del Castillo 25 SCRA 716 (1968)
(b) Victorias Milling Co., Inc. Ong Su 79 SCRA 207 (1977)
(c) People v. Rivera 200 SCRA 786 (1991)
10. Exclusion of Witnesses
(a) People v. Sandal 54 Phil. 883 (1930)
(b) State v. Bishop 492 P2d 509 (1972)
D. Authentication and Proof of Documents
1. Rule 132, Secs. 19-33; E-Commerce Act, Secs. 5, 6-15; REE, Rules 5, 6, 9
& 11.
2. Bunag v. CA 158 SCRA 299 (1988)
3. Heirs of Lacsa v. CA 197 SCRA 234 (1991)
4. Bartolome v. IAC 183 SCRA 102 (1990)
5. Pacific Asia Overseas v. NLRC 161 SCRA 122 (1988)
6. Zalamea v. Court of Appeals 228 SCRA 23 (1993)
7. People v. Monleon 74 SCRA 263 (1976)
8. Salison v. People 253 SCRA 758 (1996)
9. People vs. Lazaro 317 SCRA 435 (1999)
10. People v. Burgos 200 SCRA 67 (1991)
11. IBM Phils., Inc. v. NLRC 305 SCRA 592 (1999)
12. Aznar v. Citibank G.R. No.164273, 3/28/07
13. Nuez v. Cruz-Apao 455 SCRA 288 (2007)
14. Vidallon-Magtolis v. Salud A.M. No. CA-05-20-P,
Sept. 09, 2007
E. Offer and Objection
1. Rule 132, Secs. 34-40
2. People v. Cario 165 SCRA 664 (1988)
3. Interpacific Transit v. Aviles 186 SCRA 385 (1990)
4. De los Reyes v. IAC 176 SCRA 394 (1989)



5. People v. Yatco 97 Phil. 940 (1955)
6. PHILAMGEN v. Sweet Lines, Inc. 212 SCRA 194 (1992)
7. Catuira v. CA 236 SCRA 398 (1994)
8. Sheraton Palace v. Quijano (C.A.) 64 O.G. 9116
9. Vda. de Oate v. Court of Appeals 250 SCRA 283 (1995)

XV. Weight & Sufficiency of Evidence

A. Rule 133, Secs. 1-7
B. REE, Rule 7
C. Cases:
1. U.S. v. Lasada 18 Phil. 90 (1910)
2. People. v. Abendan 82 Phil. 711 (1948)
3. People v. Solayao 262 SCRA 255 (1996)
4. People v. Lorenzo 240 SCRA 624 (1995)

Part Two

X. Conduct and Character As Evidence

A. Rule 130, Secs. 34-35; 51; Rule 132, Section 14; Section 30, Rule on Examination of a
Child Witness

RULE 130
4. PREVIOUS CONDUCT AS EVIDENCE
Sec. 34.Similar acts as evidence. Evidence that one did or did not do a certain thing at one time is not
admissible to prove that he did or did not do the same or similar thing at another time; but it may be
received to prove a specific intent or knowledge; identity, plan, system, scheme, habit, custom or usage,
and the like. (48a)

Sec. 35.Unaccepted offer. An offer in writing to pay a particular sum of money or to deliver a written
instrument or specific personal property is, if rejected without valid cause, equivalent to the actual
production and tender of the money, instrument, or property.

RULE 132
Sec. 14.Evidence of good character of witness. Evidence of the good character of a witness is not
admissible until such character has been impeached.

RULE ON EXAMINATION OF A CHILD WITNESS
Sec. 30. Sexual abuse shield rule.
(a) Inadmissible evidence. The following evidence is not admissible in any criminal proceeding involving
alleged child sexual abuse:
(1) Evidence offered to prove that the alleged victim engaged in other sexual behavior; and
(2) Evidence offered to prove the sexual predisposition of the alleged victim.
(b) Exception. Evidence of specific instances of sexual behavior by the alleged victim to prove that
a person other than the accused was the source of semen, injury, or other physical evidence shall be
admissible.
A party intending to offer such evidence must:
(1) File a written motion at least fifteen (15) days before trial, specifically describing the evidence and
stating the purpose for which it is offered, unless the court, for good cause, requires a different time for
filing or permits filing during trial; and
(2) Serve the motion on all parties and the guardian ad litem at least three (3) days before the
hearing of the motion.
Before admitting such evidence, the court must conduct a hearing in chambers and afford the child,
his guardian ad litem, the parties, and their counsel a right to attend and be heard. The motion and the
record of the hearing must be sealed and remain under seal and protected by a protective order set forth



in Section 31(b). The child shall not be required to testify at the hearing in chambers except with his
consent.

B. Cases:
1. U.S. v. Pineda 37 Phil. 457 (1918)
2. People vs. Irang 64 Phil. 285 (1937)
3. People v. Soliman 53 O.G. 8083 (1957)
4. People v. Babiera 52 Phil. 97 (1928)
5. U.S. v. Mercado 26 Phil. 127 (1913)

UNITED STATES v. PINEDA-MORENO
37 Phil. 457 (1918)

Doctrine: The general rule is that evidence of other offenses committed by the defendant is inadmissible.
However, such evidence may be admitted where its purpose is to ascertain the knowledge and intent of the
defendant to fix his negligence.
Evidence which tends to explain or establish conduct of the accused or defendant is admissible
unless it has no legitimate bearing on the issue (irrelevant) or where it is merely calculated to prejudice the
accused.

FACTS: Santiago Pineda is a registered pharmacist and owner of a drug store in Manila. One Feliciano
Santos, having some sick horses, presented to the said drug store a copy of a prescription, which on other
occasions Santos had given to his horses with good results. Santos, under the belief that he had
purchased potassium chlorate, put two of the packages in water and gave the doses to two of his sick
horses. The two horses died shortly afterwards. Santos, took the remaining packages to Bureau of Science
for examination. Drs. Pena and Darjuan of the Bureau found that the packages contained not potassium
chlorate but barium chlorate.

The two also wcni io Pincda's drugsiorc and aslcd fron poiassiun cIloraic, lui was givcn
barium chlorate. (Barium chlorate is poison, potassium chlorate is not.) Dr. Buencamino, a veterinarian,
performed an autopsy on the horses and found that the death was due to poisoning.

ISSUE:
1. Whether the court may admit the testimony of Drs. Pena and Darjuan as to their purchase of
potassium chlorate which turned out to be poison? YES.

RATIO: Although the testimony in substance relates to similar acts of negligence of the accused at other
iincs, ii is adnissillc wIcrc iIc purposc is io asccriain dcfcndani's lnowlcdgc and inicni and io fi Iis
negligence. If the defendant has on more than one occasion, performed similar acts, accident in good faith
is possibly excluded, negligence is intensified and fraudulent intent may even be established

On the trial of a criminal case where the question relates to the tendency of a certain testimony to
throw light upon a particular fact, or to explain the conduct of a particular person, there is certain
discretion on the part of the trial judge, which a court of error will not interfere with, unless it manifestly
appear that the testimony has no legitimate bearing upon the question at issue, and is calculated to
prejudice the accused. Evidence is admissible in a criminal action, which tends to show motive, although
it tends to prove the commission of another offense by the defendant.

ANALYSIS:
The case was correctly decided under the current and proposed rules of evidence as an example of the
exception to the inadmissibility of similar acts as evidence. The case is an example where similar acts are
sought to be admitted to prove a specific knowledge or a lack thereof or a habit.



PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. BENJAMIN IRANG et al
64 Phil. 285 (1937)

Doctrine: While evidence of another crime is generally not admissible in another prosecution, it is admissible
when it is otherwise relevant, as where it tends to identify the defendant as the perpetrator of the robbery
charged, or tends to show his presence at the scene or in the vicinity of the crime at the time charged or
when it is evidence of a circumstance connected with the crime.

FACTS: Benjamin Irang appeals the judgment of the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija finding him
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the complex crime of robbery with homicide. On November 2, 1935,
between 7 and 8 pm, seven individuals with white stripes upon their faces, two of whom were armed with
guns and two with bolos went to the house of spouses Perfecto Melotonoes and Maximiniana Vicente.
Perfecto was attacked with bolos and died thereafter. The wife, who was struck in the face with the butt of
a gun, regained consciousness and saw her husband already dead. Maximiniana, gave money and jewelry
to one of the assailants, which she remembers to have pockmarks and a scar on his eyelid. That same
night, the house of Juana dela Cruz was assaulted by malefactors. All of the assailants had white stripes
upon their faces and dela Cruz noticed one of them had pockmarks and scar on the left eyelid and was
dressed in a maong-colored suit.

With the description made by Maximiniana, the police arrested and presented a group of
suspects. Benjamin Irang was identified by Maximiniana to be the one who struck her. Irang was also
identified by dela Cruz. It was alleged that the accused made an affidavit in Tagalog wherein he admitted
participation in the robbery after being coerced by a certain Fidel Estrella. The accused denied executing
the affidavit, and said that the contents thereof are not true and that he was maltreated by the soldiers.
Accused raised as his defense alibi, saying that at the time of the commission of the crime, he was in his
rice field.

ISSUE:
1. Whether Irang was identified as one of perpetrators? YES.

RATIO: The victim gave a description of one of the assailants, and on that basis, police presented
appellant three groups of persons. In the third group presented, the victim pointed at the accused as her
assailant. Testimony of dela Cruz indirccily corroloraics Maininiana's icsiinony iIai iIc nan of iIc
same description was the one who went to her house and demanded delivery of her money and jewelry.
While evidence of another crime, as a general rule, is not admissible in a prosecution for robbery, it is
admissible when it is otherwise relevant, as where it tends to identify defendant as the perpetrator of the
robbery charged or tends to show his presence at the scene of the crime at the time charged, or when it is
evidence of a circumstance connected with a crime.

The court also found that the aforementioned testimonies were corroborated by the admission of
the accused in his affidavit, which the Court found to have been made under oath. The affidavit cannot be
considered to have been made involuntary, therefore, it is admissible against the person making it.
Consequently, the defense of alibi cannot stand as it was contradicted by the testimony of dela Cruz and
the accused-appcllani's own adnission.

J. Letrel: Dissent; Justice Letrel was not convinced that appellant has been satisfactorily
identified. The widow referred to the appellant as a man with pockmarks, however a month later, she
testified that she recognized him besides by a scar on his left eyelid. A scar identifies a man more
effectively than mere pockmarks. And J. Letrel does not know why it took the witness one month to
discover this important descriptive detail. Moreover, the assailants were in disguise when they committed
the crime. This makes identification difficult, if not impossible and probably account for the fact that the
widow nadc no rcfcrcncc io iIc appcllani's scar in iIc lcginning.

ANALYSIS:
While, reservations are made as to the appreciation of the testimonial evidence as stated in the dissent,
the case was decided correctly under the current rules of evidence. The case illustrates the situation
contemplated in the exception of the rule on similar acts as evidence as circumstantial evidence to prove
a plan, system or scheme. As there are no changes made in the proposed rules on evidence, this case
would have been decided in the same manner.



PEOPLE v. SOLIMAN
53 O.G. 8083 (1957)

Doctrine: Proof of good or bad moral character as an aid to determine the probability or improbability of the
commission of an offense is allowed in cases of homicide to show that it has produced a reasonable belief of
imminent danger in the mind of the accused and a justifiable conviction that a prompt defensive action was
necessary. This rule is not applicable to cases of murder committed with treachery or premeditation.

FACTS: Ai aloui 2 o'clocl in iIc norning of April 29, 1955, wIilc Erncsio Dasa was slccping in a
pushcard along the sidewalk of Sto. Cristo Street, with Erenesto Balaktaw also sleeping in a box near the
pushcart, Balaktaw was awakened when someone kicked his hand. Balaktaw saw Sofronio Palin and
Geronimo Soliman approach Basa and stabbed him with a balisong. Thereafter, the assailants ran
away.Balaktaw took Basa to a police outpost and reported the incident to Patrolman Tolentino. They took
Basa to North General Hospital where he died on the same day.

During the trial, appellant Soliman testified that prior to the present incident and on several
occasions, the deceased Basa boxed him or beat him up when the former would not give him money. He
also testified that on the night of April 29, 1955, Basa forced Soliman to give him money and even boxed
him; that because Basa had three companions, Soliman pulled out his knife and they fought in the
course of which he stabbed him; that Palin came along and separated them; that Palin advised him to
surrender to the police so he went home and went to Meisic Station accompanied by his brothers.
Appellant Palin merely corroborated the testimony of his co-accused Soliman. The trial court convicted
Soliman and Palin of murder. On appeal, the appellants contend that the trial court erred in not allowing
the defense to prove that the deceased Basa had a violent, quarrelsome or provocative character.

ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the court erred in not allowing appellants to prove that the deceased had a violent,
quarrelsome or provocative character? NO.

RATIO: While good or bad moral character may be availed of as an aid to determine the probability or
improbability of the commission of an offense, such is not necessary in a crime of murder where the
killing is committed through treachery or premeditation. The proof of such character may only be allowed
in cases of homicide to show that it has produced a reasonable belief of imminent danger in the mind of
the accused and a justifiable conviction that a prompt defensive action was necessary. This rule does not
apply to cases of murder.

ANALYSIS:
Under the proposed rules on evidence, this case would have been decided in the same manner as there
were no substantial changes made.

PEOPLE v. BABIERA
52 Phil 97 (1928)

Doctrine: While it is true that when the accused tried to prove he acted in self-defense, he may prove the
quarrelsome and provoking character of the deceased, this proof must Ic o] tIc dcccuscd`s gcnc)u
reputation in the community, not of isolated and specific acts.

FACTS: Justo Babiera was the owner of 2 parcels of land in Iloilo. On October 19, 1922 he executed a
contract of sale with the right to repurchase them on or before August 1, 1923, in favour of Basilio
Copreros. The period of repurchase expired, after which Copreros took possession of the lands and
registered his title. That same month, he leased the lands to Severina Haro. In view of this, Justo Babiera
filed a complaint for recovery of possession of the two parcels of land, but this was dismissed for failure to
state a cause of action. On several occasions, Justo Babiera confronted Fermin Bruces, the person
plowing the lands for Haro, threatening Bruces and Haro. On August 21, 1927, while Haro was visiting



the lands, he was informed that the day before, the cow of Clemente Babiera, son of Justo Babiera, was
found grazing on that land. At that moment, Babiera happened to be passing by with Dominga Bores.
Haro told Babiera to take care of his cow in the future and not let it run loose.

In the evening, Haro and his companions were making their way back to town using a torch, as it
was already dark. Haro was walking ahead, while Pedro Tauro followed behind carrying the torch,
followed by Gregorio Torrija and Benito Carreon. Suddenly, Babiera sprang from the cogon grass and
struck Haro with a bolo. Haro turned his head to see who struck him, but got another blow on his
forehead near the right eyebrow. Later, Dominga Bores appeared and held both knees of the wounded
man. Pedro Tauro wanted to come near to help Haro but Clemente Babiera raised his bolo and kept on
brandishing it to warn off everybody. Before the assailants left, two or three revolver shots were heard.
After they left, the companions of Haro went near him. Haro told them not to fear for he did not feel he
was going io dic. TIcy iool Haro io Si. Paul's Hospiial in iIc Ciiy of Iloilo, wIcrc Ic was canincd ly Dr.
Mariano Arroyo.

In the morning of Augusi 22, 1927, Dcpuiy fiscal Ednund Piccio iool Haro's sworn siaicncni
rclaiing iIc occurrcncc and naning Iis assailanis as Clcncnic Dalicra, and Jusio Dalicra, Clcncnic's
faiIcr, and Doninga Dorcs, Clcncncic's wifc. TIc sworn siaicncni was raiificd lcforc Iim on August 27,
1927, when Haro had given up all hope of recovery. The defense tried to prove that it was Haro and his
conpanions wIo aiiaclcd iIcn aficr iIcy lcfi Clcncnic's cow grazing in Haro's land; iIai wIcn Haro
unholstered his revolver, Clemente began slashing blindly with his bolo in self defense, which resulted in
Haro falling down on the ground. The trial court held them guilty of murder.

ISSUE:
1. Whether there is sufficient evidence to hold the appellants guilty? YES.

RATIO: The defense contended that Clemente Babiera only acted in self-defense after Haro attacked and
threatened him with a revolver and fired several shots at him. This, however, was not proved by evidence.
Defense also tried to prove that Haro had a quarrelsome disposition. However, proof of such disposition
must be of his general reputation in the community and not an isolated and specific acts, such as the
accused tried to prove. Thus, the lower court was correct in not admitting such proof. But even if it was
proved by competent evidence that deceased Haro was of such disposition, it would still not be enough to
overthrow the conclusive proof that it was the accused who treacherously attacked Haro.

ANALYSIS
Under the proposed rules on evidence, this case would have been decided in the same manner as there
were no substantial changes made.

US v. MERCADO
26 Phil 127 (1913)

Doctrine: A witness cannot be impeached by the party against whom he has been called, except by showing
a) that he has made contradictory statements or b) that his general reputation for truth, honesty or integrity
is bad.

FACTS: Defendants Pio Mercado, Tomas Mercado and Catalino Mercado were charged with the crime of
coaccion (coercion) for using force and violence on the person of Claro Mercado to prevent him from
rendering aid to Maria Mateo, who was being maltreated by Santiago Mercado. During trial, Santiago
Mercado was presented as a witness. He was asked how many times had he been convicted for assault.
Tomas Mercado objected on the ground that the question was impertinent. The judge overruled the
objection on the ground that the character of the witness has an intimate relation with the facts being
investigated.

ISSUE:
1. Whether the trial court erred in allowing the question to impugn the wiincss' crcdililiiy? YES.



RATIO: Generally speaking, a witness cannot be impeached by the party against whom he has been
called, except by showing a) that he has made contradictory statements or b) that his general reputation
for truth, honesty or integrity is bad.

In this case, the question propounded by the prosecution neither attempted to show that the
witness made contradictory statements nor that his general reputation for honesty, truth or integrity is
bad. Evidence may be presented that the witness had been convicted of a high crime. However, in this
case, the offense Santiago Mercado was convicted of (assault and battery) is not a high crime. The
objection of the defense should have been sustained. Whether the witness had been convicted of other
crimes is of no matter to the present case.

ANALYSIS
Under the present rules on evidence, this case was decided erroneously. The present rules allow
inpcacIncni of iIc wiincss of an advcrsc pariy ly caninaiion of iIc wiincss., iIai Ic as lccn
convicicd of an offcnsc." TIc rulcs do noi providc for any qualificaiion.

Under the proposed rules on evidence, the question will also be allowed Rule 132, Section 12 of the
proposed rules expressly states that impeachment of a witness by previous conviction is allowed where
the conviction is 1) for a crime punishable by a penalty in excess of one year or 2) the crime involved moral
turpitude, regardless of penalty. Assault and battery is a crime involving moral turpitude, thus, proof of
such conviction may be allowed to impeach the credibility of a witness.

XI. Hearsay Rule

A. Testimonial Knowledge

1. Rule 130, Sec. 36

5. TESTIMONIAL KNOWLEDGE
Sec. 36.Testimony generally confined to personal knowledge; hearsay excluded. A witness can testify
only to those facts which he knows of his personal knowledge; that is, which are derived from his own
perception, except as otherwise provided in these rules.

2. People v. Brioso 37 SCRA 336 (1971)
3. People v. Cusi 14 SCRA 944 (1965)
4. People v. Gaddi 170 SCRA 649 (1989)
5. Leake v. Hagert 175 N.W.2d 675 (1970)
6. U.S. v. Zenni 492 F. Supp. 464 (1980)
7. Estrada vs. Desierto 356 SCRA 108 (2001)
8. People vs. Quidato 297 SCRA 1 (1998)

PEOPLE v. BRIOSO
37 SCRA 336 (1971)

Doctrine: Affidavits are generally rejected in a judicial proceeding as hearsay, unless the affiants
themselves are placed on the witness stand to testify thereon.

FACTS: Silvino Daria and his wife Susana Tumalip were in their house on December 23 1966. Daria was
making rope while Tumalip was applying candle wax to a flat iron. Cecilia Bernal, their niece and
neighbour, was alarmed by the barking of dogs. When she peeped through a crack in the wall of her
house, she saw appellants Juan Brioso and Mariao Tacza walling in iIc dircciion of iIc spouscs' Iousc,
with Brioso carrying a long gun and Taeza, a short weapon. She testified that she saw appellants point
the gun at the bamboo wall of the house and fired two shots. Tumalip testified that right after Daria was



shot, she rushed to his side and he told her it was Brioso and Taeza who shot him. He died one hour
later. After a few days, Tumalip and Bernal executed affidavits naming herein appellants as the killers.

For iIcir dcfcnsc, Drioso's alili was that during that day, he was with his cousin, Flores, milling
sugar iIc cniirc day. Florcs was prcscnicd io corroloraic Drioso's alili, lui iIcir icsiinonics varicd.
Tacza's alili, was iIai Ic was playing Iis guiiar ai iIc clinic wiiI Anionio, son of iIe deceased, along with
some other companions, around the time the shooting happened. This was corroborated by the affidavit of
Anionio. Ii nusi lc noicd, Iowcvcr, iIai Anionio's affidavii did noi coniain iIc scal of iIc Fiscal's officc.
Neither was he presented as a witness during trial. The trial court convicted the appellants for the murder
of Daria.

ISSUE:
1. Whether the court was correct in relying on the testimonies of Bernal and Tumalip? YES.
2. Whether the court was correct in not admitting the affidavit of Antonio for being hearsay? YES.

RATIO: The testimony of Bernal was corroborated by the declaration of the victim himself, who told his
wife that it was Brioso and Taeza who shot him. The declaration is admissible under the rule on ante-
mortem siaicncnis. Judging fron iIc naiurc and cicni Daria's wounds, Ic nusi Iavc rcalizcd iIc
seriousness of his condition, and it can be safely inferred that he made such statements under the
consciousness of an impending death.

Anionio's affidavii was properly rejected as hearsay evidence. The said affidavit was never
identified by the supposed affiant and there was no opportunity for prosecution to cross-examine him
because he was not presented during trial. As stated in the case of People v. Mariquina affidavits are
generally rejected in a judicial proceeding as hearsay, unless the affiants themselves are placed on the
witness stand to testify thereon.

ANALYSIS
Undcr Fulc 130, Scciion 38 of iIc proposcd rulcs on cvidcncc, Icarsay cvidcncc is dcfincd as a
statement other than one made by the declarant while testifying at a trial or hearing, offered to prove the
truth of the facts asserted therein. Thus, this case would have been decided in the same manner. The
affidavit executed without presenting the affiant for cross-examination is considered hearsay.

PEOPLE v. CUSI
14 SCRA 944 (1965)

Doctrine: The testimony of a witness regarding a statement made by another person is hearsay and is
inadmissible if offered to prove the truth of the facts stated therein. However, such may be admitted if
intended only to establish the fact that such statement was made or the tenor of such statement.

FACTS: Aracadio Puesca, Walter Appa, Jose Guistilo, Filomeno Macalinao, Ricardo Dario and Magno
Montano were charged with roberry in band with homicide. During the trial, prosecution witness Sgt.
Lucio Bano of the Police Force of Digos, Davao, testified that Puesca, aka Big Boy, made an extrajudicial
confession to him wherein he admitted his participation in the crime and named his co-conspirators.
When the prosecuting officer asked Bano to mention the names of the alleged co-conspirator as declared
by Puesca in his extrajudicial confession, the counsel of Macalinao, Gustilo and Dario objected on the
ground of hearsay. Respondent Judge Cusi sustained the objection, but allowed the witness to mention
the names of those who did not object.

ISSUE:
1. Whether Judge Cusi erred in not allowing the witness to mention all the names of those names by
Puesca as his co-conspirators on the ground of hearsay? YES.

RATIO: The testimony of a witness regarding a statement made by another person is hearsay and is
inadmissible if offered to prove the truth of the facts stated therein. However, such may be admitted if
intended only to establish the fact that the statement was made or the tenor of such statement.



In the present case, the purpose of the prosecuting officer as manifested by him, in nothing more
than to establish the fact that the accused Puesca mentioned the names of those who conspired with him
io connii iIc offcnsc cIargcd, wiiIoui claining iIai Pucsca's siaicncni would lc conpcicni and
admissible to prove that the persons named really and actually conspired with Puesca. For this limited
purpose, the question propounded should have been allowed.

ANALYSIS
Under the proposed rules on evidence, this case would have been decided in the same manner. Hearsay
evidence is inadmissible to prove the truth of the facts stated therein, however, jurisprudence allows such
for the limited purpose of showing the fact that the statements were made.

PEOPLE v. GADDI
170 SCRA 649

Doctrine: A statement is not hearsay if it is offered for the purpose of proving that the fact or assertion was
made by the declarant, and not to prove the truth of the matter asserted therein.

FACTS: Accused Gaddi was charged with the crime of murder. The facts show that witness Guzman saw
accused Gaddi and victim Esguerra drinking. In the morning of the following day, the accused told
Guzman that he killed his drinking partner and dumped his body in the toilet pit. Pursuant to the
testimony of the witness Guzman, the accused was declared guilty beyond reasonable doubt. Gaddi
appealed the decision assailing that the trial court erred in giving weight and credcncc io iIc Cuznan's
statement for the same was hearsay evidence.

ISSUE:
1. Whether the trial court erred in convicting the accused on the basis of the statement he had made to
the witness concerning the fact that he had killed the deceased? NO.

RATIO: The statement of Guzman relating that the accused had told him that he had killed the deceased
is not hearsay. A confession constitutes evidence of high order if it is supported by the strong
presumption that no person in his normal mind would knowingly confess to a crime unless he was
prompted by the truth. Proof that a person confessed to the commission of a crime may be presented in
evidence without violating the hearsay rule. The hearsay rule merely prohibits a person from testifying on
facts that he merely learned from others, but not from those which he derived of his own personal
knowledge.

In iIc casc ai lar, iIc wiincss Cuznan rclaicd iIc accuscd's confcssion for iIc purposc of
establishing the fact that such a statement was made, thus excluding the same from the coverage of the
hearsay rule.

ANALYSIS:
Under the current Rules of Evidence, the statement made was not considered as hearsay. Under the
proposed rules, the statement of the witness is also excluded from the hearsay rule because it was offered
not for the purpose of asserting the truth, but only for proving the fact that the statement was made.

LEAKE v. HAGERT
175 N.W. 2d 675 March 25, 1970

Doctrine: The statement of a person contained in the field notes of an investigator will not be admitted into
evidence if the person who gave the statement does not testify in open court, pursuant to the Hearsay Rule.

FACTS: Petitioner Leake file a complaint against Hagert, alleging that the latter negligently and carelessly
drove her vehicle into the rear of the plow towed by a tractor that he was operating, thus causing injuries



to himself and damages to his plow and tractor. Pursuant to this, Leake filed a complaint for damages for
hospital, for permanent injuries to his chest and right arm and prayed for a judgment against Hagert in
the sum of $27,600. Hagert denied that the collision was proximately caused by her negligence in the
operation of her motor vehicle, and she alleged that the sole and proximate cause of the collision was the
negligence of the Leake in the maintenance and operation of his tractor and plow, upon a public highway
after sunset, without proper lights, reflectors, or other warnings. A verdict was rendered dismissing the
complaint of Leake.

Leake filed a motion for a new trial asserting that the testimony and field notes of Gross- the
person who conducted an investigation were hearsay and erroneously admitted during the trial. The field
notes of Gross contained a statement of Allen Leake's son who related that the red lcns of Lcalc's iracior
had been out for some time.

ISSUE:
1. WIciIcr iIc ficld noics of iIc invcsiigaior coniaining iIc siaicncni of Lcalc's son wcrc Icarsay?
YES.

RATIO: The hearsay rule prohibits the use of a person's assertion unless the assertor is brought to testify
in court on the stand, where he may be probed and cross-examined as to the grounds of his assertion and
his qualifications to make it. TIc ficld noics of invcsiigaior Cross consisicd of iIc icsiinony of Lcalc's
son who was not presented nor cross-examined during the trial. Neither was his statement made under
oath. The Federal Court held that was error for the trial court to admit into evidence the testimony
concerning what Leake's son said to Edward Gross, pursuant to the fact that the son's statement was
hearsay and should have been excluded.

ANALYSIS:
If the case were decided by the Philippine courts, under both the current rules and the proposed rules,
the Ruling would have nevertheless been the same. The statement of the son of Leake indicated in the
field notes of the investigator is hearsay, and without the testimony of the son himself, the same will be
inadmissible in evidence.

US v. ZENNI
492 F. Supp. 464 July 3, 1980

Doctrine: A statement is not prohibited by the hearsay rule if it is merely offered for proving the fact that the
statement was made, and not as a means of proving the truth of the fact asserted therein.
Implied assertions, which are inferences that can be drawn from the conduct of persons, are not
covered by the hearsay rule unless they are intended to be an assertion concerning the matter in inquiry.
(Ex. Testimony that a person pointed to a person in a police line up)

FACTS: Pursuant to a search warrant, the authorities conducted a search of the premises of Ruby
Humphrey for evidence of bookmaking activity. While conducting the search, the authorities answered the
telephone several times. The unknown callers stated directions for the placing of bets on various sporting
events. Hence, the government proposes to introduce this evidence to show that the callers believed that
the premises were used in betting operations. However, defendant Humphrey objected on the ground of
hearsay.

ISSUE:
1. Whether the telephone conversations are inadmissible as hearsay? NO.

RATIO: The US Court held that not all out-of-court statements are hearsay. In fact, for instance, an
utterance offered to show the publication of a slander, or that a person was given notice of a fact, or orally
entered into a contract, is not hearsay.

In the case at bar, the utterances of the absent declarants are not offered for the truth of the
assertion. On the other hand, they were offered to show the declarants' belief in a fact sought to be
proved. The utterances of the betters telephoning in their bets were non-assertive verbal conduct, offered



as relevant for an implied assertion to be inferred from them, namely that bets could be placed at the
premises being telephoned. Hence, the objections against the telephone conversations on the basis of
hearsay must be overruled.

ANALYSIS:
This US Federal Court ruling will still be the same under the current and proposed rules of evidence in
the Philippines. Under the Philippine rules, a statement is not hearsay if it is offered merely for the
purpose of proving that the assertion was made, and not as proof of the truth of the fact asserted therein.

ESTRADA v. DESIERTO
367 SCRA 108 (2001)

Doctrine: The ban on hearsay does not cover independently relevant statements, which consist of
statements that are independently relevant of the truth asserted therein. They belong to two classes: 1.
Those statements which are the very facts in issue, 2. Those statements which are circumstantial evidence
of the facts in issue.
The second class includes the following: Statement of a person showing his state of mind;
Statement of a person showing his physical condition; Statement of a person to infer a state of mind of
another person; Statements which may identify the date, place and person in question; Statements to show
a lack of credibility of a witness.

FACTS: The case at bar stemmed from the events that transpired during EDSA II. President Joseph
Estrada pursuant to the calls for resignation, left Malacanang, and pursuant to this, Gloria Macapagal-
Arroyo, thcn iIc Vicc Prcsidcni undcr Esirada's rcign iool Iis placc. Esirada now gocs io iIc couri io
contest the legitimacy of Macapagal-Arroyo's prcsidcncy, arguing iIai Ic ncvcr rcsigncd as Prcsidcni, and
hence, claims to still be the lawful President of the Philippines. Among the pieces of evidence offered to
prove that Estrada had indeed resigned from the presidency is the Angara Diary, chronicling the last
moments of Estrada in Malacanang.

ISSUE:
1. Whether the Angara Diary is inadmissible as hearsay evidence? NO.

RATIO: The Supreme Court held that the Angara diary is not an out-of-court statement but is a part of
the pleadings of the case. Furthermore, the Court noted that the Angara diaries contained direct
statements of Estrada with respect to his proposal for the holding of a snap election, his intent to leave
his post by Monday and his exasperation over the bureaucracy, controversy and red tape. An ANALYSIS
of the same leads to the conclusion that the contents of the diary may be more accurately classified as
adnissions of a pariy. Pursuani io iIc Fulcs of Evidcncc, iIc aci, dcclaraiion or onission of a pariy as io
a rclcvani faci nay lc givcn in cvidcncc againsi Iin".

Moreover, the statements cannot be regarded as hearsay evidence because the same can be
properly categorized as independently relevant statements. Independently relevant statements are those
wIicI arc indcpcndcni" fron iIc iruiI of iIc siaicncnis. Indcpcndcnily rclcvani siaicncnis nay lc
classified into statements which consist of the very facts in issue and those which are circumstantial
evidence of the facts in issue, such as the statements of a person showing his state of mind or statements
of a person from which an inference may be made as to the state of mind of another. Pursuant to this, it
may well be said that the entries in the Angara diary may be regarded as containing statements regarding
the state of mind of Estrada, hence constituting circumstantial evidence of his intent to resign.

ANALYSIS:
Under the current rules, the decision of the Supreme Court in admitting the Angara Diary is
questionable. By virtue of its decision, does it automatically mean that any document attached to a
pleading is already considered a judicial admission? Moreover, it is noteworthy to mention that the
original of the diaries were not presented in court but merely the copies as reproduced in the newspapers.
Despite the fact that the statements in the diary were made by Angara, they were received by the court as
admissions of Estrada.



Under the proposed rules of evidence, the ruling will still be the same because even under the proposed
rulcs, indcpcndcnily rclcvani siaicncnis" arc siill rcgardcd as an cccpiion io iIc Icarsay rulc. A
statement is not hearsay unless it is made by a person other than the declarant who testifies at the trial
and is offered to prove the truth of the facts asserted therein.

PEOPLE v. QUIDATO
297 SCRA 1 (1998)

Doctrine: Unless the affiants themselves take the witness stand to affirm the averments in their affidavits,
the affidavits must be excluded from the judicial proceeding, being inadmissible as hearsay.
The voluntary admissions of an accused made extra-judicially are inadmissible against his co-
accused when the latter had not been given the opportunity to hear him testify and cross-examine him.

FACTS: The accused Bernardo Quidato was convicted of the crime of Parricide for killing his father
Bernardo Quidato Sr. The prosecution presented the testimony of Gina Quidato, who related that during
a drinking session at her house, she heard the accused along with two other hired hands (Malita
brothers) plan on going to the house of Bernardo Sr. in order to get money from the latter. However,
pursuant to the Marital Disqualification Rule, the judge did not allow the testimony of Gina against her
husband and allowed it only as to the Malita brothers.

Another piece of evidence presented by the prosecution was the confession of the Malita brothers
confessing to their participation in the crime. They submitted affidavits relating how the victim was killed.
They related that the accused proposed that they rob and kill his father. During the interrogation, the
Malita brothers signified to the police their desire to confess even in the absence of a counsel. The police
took down their testimony and presented them, along with their unsigned affidavits to a lawyer from the
Pullic Aiiorncy's Officc. TIc laiicr adviscd iIc iwo of iIcir consiiiuiional rigIis and cplaincd iIc
contents of the affidavits.

ISSUE:
1. Whether the trial court erred in giving credence to the extrajudicial confessions of the Malita brothers?
YES.

RATIO: Although the prosecution relied on the testimonies of the Malita brothers, it is important to note
that they were not presented on the witness stand to testify on their extra-judicial confessions. The failure
to present these witnesses gives the affidavits the character of hearsay. The affiants must testify on the
witness stand to affirm the averments in their affidavits. Hence, the affidavits are inadmissible for being
merely hearsay.

Furthermore, the affidavits cannot be used against the accused under the Rule on the statements
of conspirators because the statements were not made during the existence of the conspiracy, but only
after the conspiracy. The accused must be acquitted.

ANALYSIS:
The case was properly decided under the current rules. The ruling will be the same under the proposed
rules, where it is provided that a statement is NOT hearsay if the declarant testifies at the trial concerning
the statement.

B. Exceptions to the Hearsay Rule:
1. Dying Declaration



Sec. 37.Dying declaration. The declaration of a dying person, made under the consciousness of an
impending death, may be received in any case wherein his death is the subject of inquiry, as evidence of
the cause and surrounding circumstances of such death.

(b) People v. Laquinon 135 SCRA 91 (1985)
(c) People v. Sabio 02 SCRA 218 (1981)
(d) People v. Salison SCRA (1996)

PEOPLE v. GREGORIO LAQUINON, alias "JOLLY"
135 SCRA 91 (1985)

Doctrine: The declaration of the deceased is not admissible as an ante-mortem declaration since the
deceased was in doubt as to whether he would die or not. The declaration fails to show that the deceased
believed himself in extremist, "at the point of death when every hope of recovery is extinct, which is the sole
basis for admitting this kind of declarations as an exception to the hearsay rule."
It may be admitted, however, as part of the res gestae since the statement was made immediately
after the incident and the deceased had no sufficient time to concoct a charge against the accused.

FACTS: Accused Laquinon was charged with murder in CFI Davao Del Sur for killing Pablo Remonde. The
trial court found him guilty beyond reasonable doubt.

It was November 12, 1972, at around 11:30 pm, when barrio captain Sumama Buat heard
gunshots coming from the river bank 300 meters south of his house. Then, his brother Leocario arrived
and told him that a man was shouting for help at the river bank, so Sumama told him to call the
councilman and proceeded to the unidentified man. When he got there, he saw a man lying on the sand
and Ic aslcd Iin wIo Ic was. Hc answcrcd I an Pallo Fcnondc". His Iands were tied at the back and
was lying facc down. Sunana iool iIc anic noricn" siaicncni of Pallo Fcnondc wIcrc iIc forncr
asked him who he was and who shot him. To the latter question he answered Gregorio Laquinon. He also
asked Remonde if he (thinks) Ic would survivc fron Iis gunsIoi wounds io wIicI Ic rcspondcd I do noi
lnow".

Thereafter, Buat went to the municipality and reported to Vice Mayor Biran what happened. VM
Biran also then went to the scene and asked Remonde who shot him, to which he answered that he was
shot by Gregorio Laquinon. He was thereafter taken to the hospital and underwent operation but he
eventually died.Now Laquinon denies having killed Remonde. His defense is that being a KM member, he
was ordered by a certain Cabardo to bring Remonde to him. Laquinon fetched Remonde and delivered
him to Cabardo, accompanied with 10 men, in the riverbank. Laquinon got separated from the group
iIcrcaficr lui Ic Icard Calardo asl Fcnondc wIy Ic didn'i rciurn aficr lcing aslcd io luy provisions to
which Remonde answered that he spent the money gambling and drinking. Subsequently, Laquinon
heard a shot and saw Remonde on the ground.

After trial, the lower court found Laquinon guilty of murder. The conviction is based on the
statements purportedly made by Remonde to Sumama Buat at the riverbank, telling him that Laquinon
shot him. Laquinon questions the admissibility of these statements as ante-mortem declaration because
it was not executed under impendin death.

ISSUE:
1. WIciIcr iIc dying dcclaraiion" of Pallo Fcnondc is adnissillc as an anic-mortem declaration since
the deceased was in doubt as to whether he would die or not? NO.

RATIO: It is not admissible as dying declaration, but as part of res gestae. The declaration fails to show
that the deceased believed himself in extremist, "at the point of death when every hope of recovery is
extinct, which is the sole basis for admitting this kind of declarations as an exception to the hearsay
rule."

It may STILL be admitted, however, as part of the res gestae since the statement was made
immediately after the incident and the deceased Pablo Remonde had no sufficient time to concoct a



charge against the accused.

Howcvcr, iIc SC affirncd Laquinon's conviciion lccausc ai wIcn Ic allcgcdly dclivcred Remonde
io Calrado, Fcnondc's Iands wcrc alrcady iicd ai Ic lacl. And Ic was iIc onc idcniificd ly Fcnondc,
not Cabrado. Cabardo being dead already, can no longer speak in his behalf, it is not unlikely that the
accused conceived of this outlandish defense by pointing to CO Cabardo, to free himself from
responsibility.

ANALYSIS:
Under the proposed Rules of Evidence, the rule on dying declaration as an exception to the hearsay rule
remains the same. The declaration or statement of such person must be made under the consciousness of
an impending death, and may be received only when the subject of the inquiry involve the surrounding
circunsianccs of iIc dcaiI or iis causc. Hcncc, sincc Fcnondc's siaicncnis wcrc ialcn wIcn Ic was
unsure whether he will live or die, such cannot be categorized as a dying declaration, though it may be
part of res gestae.

PEOPLE v. RODULFO SABIO, alias "PAPU"
2 SCRA 218 (1981)

Doctrine: The admission of dying declarations has always been strictly limited to criminal prosecutions for
homicide or murder as evidence of the cause and surrounding circumstances of death.
That death did not ensue till three days after the declaration was made will not alter its probative
force since it is not indispensable that a declarant expires immediately thereafter. It is the belief in
impending death and not the rapid succession of death, in point of fact, that renders the dying declaration
admissible.

FACTS: Accused Rodolfo Sabio was convicted by the CFI Cebu of Robbery with Homicide. The victim is
Catalino Espina, 80 y.o. and owner of a small sari-sari store in his house. The victim was found wounded
in his house, and he died 3 days later because of the wound in his forehead.

It was around 5:00am on October 5, 1965, Witness Birondo testified that she heard a shout of
help from the house of neighbor Espina, which is just across the street from her house. She looked out
and saw Salio coning oui of iIc door of iIc siorc fron iIc viciin's Iousc. SIc icsiificd iIai sIc lncw
Sabio since his birth so she knew it was him. She shouted for help and told Sgt. Alberca about what she
heard and saw and executed a sworn statement.

Another witness, Semilla, the grand-nephew of Catalino, was at the seashore around 4:00am the
morning of the crime, he saw Sabio running pasi Iin iowards Caialino's Iousc, wiiI Iis Iands iuclcd
inside his shirt. Minutes later, someone informed him to go home because his granduncle Catalino was
crying for help. Semilla went home and saw his wounded granduncle. He was told to fetch a policeman.
He testified that he noticed the merchandise in the store were in disarray. He brought the victim to the
hospital but the latter died 3 days later.

Fuentes is the policeman assigned to receive a report about the crime. He proceeded to the
viciin's Iousc, saw Iin lying on iIc floor, woundcd and llccding on iIc forcIcad. Fucnics aslcd iIc
victim who had hacked him and the latter answered that it was "Papu" Sabio. Patrolman Fuentes asked
the victim why "Papu" hacked him and the latter answered that "Papu" had demanded money from him.
Patrolman Fuentes also asked the victim how much money he had lost but the latter was not able to
answer that question. Sensing that the wound was serious since it was bleeding profusely Patrolman
Fuentes decided to take down the statement of the victim. He detached a leaf from a calendar and wrote
down on it the questions he propounded as well as the answers of the victim. He then had it
thumbmarked by the victim with the latter's own blood as no ink was available. Present at the time were
Pedro Burgos, another police officer, and Camilo Semilla, the grandnephew. Patrolman Fuentes himself
and Pedro Burgos signed as witnesses.cProsecution also presented evidence that Sabio had previously
been convicted by final judgment and served sentences for Theft.

Rodolfo, as defense, claimed that he was at home sleeping and was awaken by his brother around
6:00 am saying that certain policemen were looking for him. Thereafter, he was arrested. The trial court



convicted Sabio of Robbery with Homicide. Hence, he appealed to the Supreme Court.

ISSUE:
1. Whether the ante-mortem declaration of the victim as presented by Patrolman Fuentes is admissible in
evidence? YES.

RATIO: The admission of dying declarations has always been strictly limited to criminal prosecutions for
homicide or murder as evidence of the cause and surrounding circumstances of death.

Counsel for Sabio contends that the ante-mortem statement is inadmissible because such was
not made under the consciousness of an impending death. However, the Supreme Court disagrees. The
seriousness of the injury on the victim's forehead which had affected the brain and was profusely
bleeding; the victim's inability to speak until his head was raised; the spontaneous answer of the victim
that "only Papu Sabio is responsible for my death"; and his subsequent demise from the direct effects of
the wound on his forehead, strengthen the conclusion that the victim must have known that his end was
inevitable. That death did not ensue till three days after the declaration was made will not alter its
probative force since it is not indispensable that a declarant expires immediately thereafter. It is the belief
in impending death and not the rapid succession of death, in point of fact, that renders the dying
declaration admissible. Further, the fact that the victim told his grandnephew Camilo Semilla to fetch the
police, does not negative the victim's feeling of hopelessness of recovery but rather emphasizes the
realization that he had so little time to disclose his assailant to the authorities. However, the crime of
Robbery was not proven and Sabio is convicted only of the crime of Homicide.

ANALYSIS:
If this case were to be decided applying the proposed Rules of Evidence, the outcome or decision would be
the same because the rule on dying declarations remain the same. The declaration or statement of such
person must be made under the consciousness of an impending death, and may be received only when
the subject of the inquiry involve the surrounding circumstances of the death or its cause.

The state of mind of the deceased during the time the statements are being made need not be expressly
said. In other words, the deceased need not say expressly that he thinks he is going to die. Such state of
mind may be implied from his acts.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. REY SALISON, JR., TIRSO ANDIENTE, RUFINO DIGNARAN and
LEONILO FEDILES, REY SALISON, JR.
G.R. No. 115690 February 20, 1996

Doctrine: In all events, assuming that declaration is not admissible as a dying declaration, it is still
admissible as part of the res gestae, if it was made shortly after the startling incident and, under the
circumstances, the victim had no opportunity to contrive.
It is true that Section 33, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court prohibits the admission of such document in
an unofficial language but the SC believes that in the interest of justice, such injunction should not be taken
literally here, especially if no objection thereto was interposed by appellant.

FACTS: Accused Rey Salison, Jr., among others, is charged with the murder of Rolando Valmoria, on
November 30, 1990, in Davao City. The trial of the case proceeded only against him because the other
accused are still at large.

It was 8:00 pm on November 30, 1990 when witness Ayola saw Salison approach victim Valmoria,
wh was then watching television in a store. Salison placed an arm around Valmoria and brought him to
iIc nango ircc lcIind a ncigIlor's Iousc. TIcrc, Ic allcgcdly locd Valnoria in iIc aldoncn. During
the fistfight, the 3 other accused arrived and joined the fight, simultaneously attacking Valmoria. Witness
Fernandez approached and separated them. However, the assailants came back and continued assaulting
the victim. Valmoria fought back, and Salison together with the others picked up pieces of wood and hit
Valmoria at the back of his nape and the rear part of his head. Valmoria fell to the ground but he was
able to stand and hun towards his house. The assailants followed him but Valmoria was able to go inside
his house. Later on, he started complaining of dizzinwss and pain in his head which was bleeding.



So Valmoria, with his parents, went to the house of purok leader Patricia Alcoseba. Valmoria
asked Alcoseba to write down his declaration regarding the incident explaining that if he should die and
no witness would testif, his written declaration could be utilized as evidence. After making the
declaration, Valmoria was brought to the hospital. He was allowed to go home after that but he died after
3 days.

On the other hand, the lone defense witness was Salison himself who merely denied having killed
the victim. He testified that on that day he was visiting his girlfriend and that he was merely pacifying a
fight between Valmoria and Andiente, one of the assailants. He claims he has nothing to do with the fight.
The trial court convicted Salison, giving full credit to the testimonies of all the witnesses for the
prosecution. Salison argues that the declaration made by the victim before the purok leader cannot be
considered as a dying declaration because it was not made by the deceased "under the consciousness of
an impending death."

ISSUE:
1. Whether the declaration made by Valmoria before the purok leader is admissible in evidence as a dying
declaration? YES.
2. Whether the declaration is admissible in evidence given that such was made in Cebuano dialect and
evidence is not accompanied with a translation in English or Pilipino? YES.

RATIO: At the time the deceased made the declaration he was in great pain. He expressed a belief on his
imminent death and the hope that his declaration could be used as evidence regarding the circumstances
thereof. A person would not say so if he believes he would recover and be able to testify against his
assailants. At all events, assuming that declaration is not admissible as a dying declaration, it is still
admissible as part of the res gestae, since it was made shortly after the startling incident and, under the
circumstances, the victim had no opportunity to contrive.

On the second issue, the general rule is that if it is not written in the official language, it is
inadmissible if not accompanied by a translation in English or Filipino. However, in this case, the records
do not disclose that the defense offered any objection to the admission of the declaration. Thus, the
defense waived whatever infirmity the document had at the time of its submission as evidence. The
declaration can be translated into English or Pilipino as it is already admitted in evidence and forms part
of the record.

Direct proof is not essential to prove conspiracy. A conspiracy may be inferred without need of
showing that the parties actually came together and agreed in express terms to enter into and pursue a
common design. Even if there is no direct evidence showing that all of the accused had a prior agreement
on how to kill Valmoria, the doctrine is well-settled that conspiracy need not be proved by direct evidence
of prior agreement to commit the crime.

ANALYSIS:
As with the other cases, the decision of the court may remain the same applying the proposed Rules of
Evidence because the rule on dying declaration remained the same. Under the proposed Rules of
Evidence, the rule on dying declaration as an exception to the hearsay rule remains the same. The
declaration or statement of such person must be made under the consciousness of an impending death,
and may be received only when the subject of the inquiry involve the surrounding circumstances of the
death or its cause.

2. Declaration Against Interest

Sec. 38.Declaration against interest. The declaration made by a person deceased, or unable to testify,
against the interest of the declarant, if the fact is asserted in the declaration was at the time it was made
so far contrary to declarant's own interest, that a reasonable man in his position would not have made



the declaration unless he believed it to be true, may be received in evidence against himself or his
successors in interest and against third persons.

(b) People v. Majuri 96 SCRA 472 (1980)
(c) People v. Toledo 51 Phil. 825 (1928)
(d) Fuentes v. CA 253 SCRA 430 (1996)

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. AIROL ALING Y MAJURI
G.R. No. L-38833 March 12, 1980

Doctrine: It was a confirmation of the maxim semper praesumitur matrimonio and the presumption "that a
man and woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of
marriage".

FACTS: This is a parricide case against accused Airol Aling, who allegedly stabbed his wife Norija
Mohamad, in the chest. Norija was brought to the hospital but later on died of the stabs she received.
Airol Aling was investigated by the police. He declared in the Chavacano dialect (his declaration was
translated into English) that he killed his wife (whom he married according to Muslim rites because e he
was informed in prison by his relatives that his wife was living with another man and fooling around with
other men.

He recounted that at about 1:00 pm, he was at the seashore, having just arrived from Jolo, Sulu.
At that time he was running away from the authorities because he just escaped from prison. He
procccdcd io Iis faiIcr's Iousc and iIcrc Ic saw Norija, Iis wifc. WIcn sIc saw Iin sIc inncdiaicly ran
away. Armed with a bolo, Airol Aling chased after her and stabbed her. When she saw her fall down and
badly wounded, he left.

Two policemen in their affidavits, affirmed that Airol admitted to Sergeant Antonio Macrohon in
their presence that he stabbed his wife because she had been going with many men.

Before arraignment, accused Airol was willing to plead guilty, however he had no lawyer so a
counsel de officio was appointed for him. At arraignment, he pleaded guilty to the accusation that he
killed his wife. He said that he was not coerced nor cajoled into entering a plea of guilty. He admitted that
he was a prisoner in the penal colony. He said that his purpose was to be reconciled with his wife but
when she saw him, instead of waiting for him, she ran away. He had information that his wife was guilty
of infidelity or had a "kabit". That was a grievous offense under Muslim customs. The trial court found
Airol guilty of parricide. By automatic review, counsel de oficio contends that the marriage of Airol and
Norija was not proven and therefore, Airol cannot be held guilty of parricide.

ISSUE:
1. Whether Airol is liable for parricide even without evidence introduced to prove marriage? YES.

RATIO: The testimony of the accused that he was married to the deceased was an admission against his
penal interest. It was a confirmation of the maxim semper praesumitur matrimonio and the presumption
"that a man and woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of
marriage".

He and the deceased had five children. He alluded in his testimony to his father-in-law. That
implies that the deceased was his lawful wife. The fact that he bitterly resented her infidelity, her failure
to visit him in prison and her neglect of their children are other circumstances confirmatory of their
marital status.

The fact that he escaped from confinement in order to kill his wife shows a high degree of
perversity and incorrigibility His being a non-Christian cannot serve to extenuate the heinousness of his
offense. He understood the gravity of his crime because he had attained some education. He reached first
year high school and he used to be a checker in a stevedoring firm. However, he was sentenced only to
reclusion perpetua, not the death penalty because of lack of one vote from the justices.



ANALYSIS:
In this case, applying the proposed Rules of Evidence, he outcome would still the same because aside
from the declaration by Airol that he killed his wife, which is an exception to the hearsay rule, being
againsi iIc dcclarani's inicrcsi, ii is also couplcd wiiI a dispuiallc prcsunpiion iIai iIc pcrson claining
that he is married to the woman, the latter not disputing, would create a presumption that they are
legally married.

PEOPLE v. EUGENIO TOLEDO and SISENANDO HOLGADO
G.R. No. L-28655 August 6, 1928

Doctrine: Where, however, the declarant is dead or has disappeared, his previous statements, out of court, if
not inadmissible on other grounds, are the best evidence. But they are not rendered inadmissible by the
mere fact that the declarant is unavailable, - something else is necessary. One fact which will satisfy this
necessity is that the declaration is or was against the declarant's interest, and this is because no sane
person will be presumed to tell a falsehood to his own detriment.

FACTS: Eugenio Toledo is charged with homicide in CFI Mindoro. The whole thing started with Holgado
and Morales, who had a long-time dispute over the occupation of a certain parcel of land in Pinamalayan,
Mindoro. On June 15, 1927, in the morning, Holgado and Filomeno met. Their argument renewed and
they agreed to fighta bolo duel.

As a result of the bolo duel, Morales died instantly. Holgado on the other hand, was seriously
wounded but he was able to go to the neighboring house and he was taken to the municipal building
where he made a sworn statement before the municipal president. He declared that only he and Filomeno
Morales fought. About one month later, Sisenando Holgado died from the wounds received in the fight.

Now the question in this case is whether the accused Eugenio Toledo intervened in the quarrel
and dealt a mortal blow to Filomeno Morales. Because prosecution presented witness Justina who
testified that Toledo was present and participated in the fight. Defense on the other hand claims that the
only participation of Toledo was when he helped Hogaldo, his landlord, to go to a nearby house. The
defense also relied upon the affidavit of Sisenando Holgado, Exhibit 1, which was identified by the
municipal president of Pinamalayan.

ISSUE:
1. Whether the affidavit made by Holgado before the municipal president, admitting that it was only him
and Morales who fought, was admissible to exonerate Holgado? YES.

RATIO: Exhibit 1 should have been admitted in evidence as part of the res gestae, and that giving it
effect, in relation with the other evidence, the accused has not been proved guilty. Exhibit 1 was made by
Sisenando Holgado on the same morning that the fight occurred and without the interval of sufficient
time for reflection. The declaration of Sisenando Holgado fulfilled the test of the facts talking through the
party and not the party talking about the facts. There was such a correlation between the statement and
the fact of which it forms part as strongly tends to negative the suggestion of fabrication or a suspicion of
afterthought. The nature and circumstances of the statement do not disclose intrinsic evidence of
premeditation as revealed in a long, coherent, closely connected story. The modern tendency is toward the
extension of the rule admitting spontaneous declarations to meet the needs of justice when other evidence
of the same fact cannot be procured.

Hearsay evidence, with a few well recognized exceptions, it has been said on high authority, is
excluded by courts in the United States that adhere to the principles of the common law. One universally
recognized exception concerns the admission of dying declarations. Another exception permits the
reception, under certain circumstances, of declarations of third parties made contrary to their own
pecuniary or proprietary interest. But the general rule is stated to be that the declarations of a person
other than accused confessing or tending to show that he committed the crime are not competent for
accused on account of the hearsay doctrine.

The purpose of all evidence is to get at the truth. The reason for the hearsay rule is that the



extrajudicial and unsworn statement of another is not the best method of serving this purpose. In other
words, the great possibility of the fabrication of falsehoods, and the inability to prove their untruth,
requires that the doors be closed to such evidence. So long therefore as a declarant is available as a
witness, his extrajudicial statement should not be heard. Where, however, the declarant is dead or has
disappeared, his previous statements, out of court, if not inadmissible on other grounds, are the best
evidence. But they are not rendered inadmissible by the mere fact that the declarant is unavailable, -
something else is necessary. One fact which will satisfy this necessity is that the declaration is or was
against the declarant's interest, and this is because no sane person will be presumed to tell a falsehood to
his own detriment.

Here the declarant is deceased and his statements were made under oath. They also read in such
a way as to ring with the truth. When Sisenando Holgado declared "When we fought, there was nobody
present," it was at the end of just such a rambling statement as a wounded man would be expected to
make. When Sisenando Holgado declared "I met one of my workers named Eugenio Toledo, who
accompanied me to the house of Dalmacio Manlisic," he did so in response to a question by the municipal
president. Exhibit 1 should have been received not as conclusive evidence of innocence, but as evidence
to be taken into consideration in connection with the other proven facts.

ANALYSIS:
TIc proposcd Fulcs of Evidcncc now cprcssly providcs iIai a siaicncni icnding io cposc iIc dcclarani
to criminal liability and offered to exculpate the accused is not admissible unless corroborating
circunsianccs clcarly indicaic iIc irusiworiIincss of iIc siaicncni." TIis ncans iIai aliIougI iIc
dcclarani is dcad, ii docsn'i ncan iIai iIc siaicncnis Ic nadc lcforc Ic died are altogether, ipso facto
inadmissible. One of the exceptions is when the statement made tends to impute criminal liability on the
declarant and exonerate another. In this case, such statements must be corroborated before it is
admitted.

FUENTES, JR. v. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 111692 February 9, 1996
Doctrine: To admit declarations against interest as exceptions to the hearsay rule: (a) the declarant must not
be able to testify due to death, mental incapacity or physical incompetence rather than mere absence from
the courts; (b) the declaration must concern a matter of fact cognizable by the declarant; (c) the
circumstances render it improbable that a motive to falsify exists

FACTS: Julieto Malaspina and his 3 friends were attending a benefit dance in Agusan Del Sur. Appellant
Alcjandro Fucnics, Jr. callcd Malaspina, pui Iis arn around iIr laiicr's sIouldcr, and said. Dcforc, I saw
you wiiI long Iair, lui now you Iavc sIori Iair." Hc iIcn siallcd iIc laiicr wiiI a Iuniing lnifc and
fled. Before Malaspina gave in, he muttered that Fuentes, Jr. was the culprit.

Alejandro was charged with murder qualified by treachery. His defense was that of mistaken
idcniiiy. Hc claincd iIai ii was, Zoilo Fucnics, Jr., alias Jonic", wIo was iIc pcrpciraior. He presented
the testimony of his uncle, Felicisimo Fuentes, who testified that Zoilo had confessed to the killing of
Malaspina and even sought help in finding a lawyer. Felicisimo also stated that upon learning of
Alcjandro's arrcsi, Zoilo flcd and could not be found since. Alejandro also presented the testimony of
Station Commander P/Sgt. Benjamin Conde who testified that after Alejandro was charged, Felicisimo
approached him and relayed the confession of Zoilo. Conde then went to the alleged home of Zoilo but he
was informed that the latter had already fled.

The trial court convicted Alejandro of murder which was affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
Alejandro appealed to the Supreme Court, arguing that the lower courts erred in ruling that he was
positively identified as the killer.

ISSUE:
1. Whether Alejandro Fuentes was indeed positively identified as the killer of Malaspina? YES.

RATIO: Declarations against interest are an exception to the hearsay rule. There are 3 essential requisites
to be met: (a) that the declarant must not be able to testify; (b) that the declaration must concern a matter
of fact cognizable by the declarant; (c) that the circumstances render it improbable that a motive to falsify



existed.

The alleged declaration against interest attributed to Zoilo is inadmissible in evidence as an
exception to hearsay. The holding of the Court in People v. Toledo is inapplicable. For all its attempts to
demonstrate the arbitrariness behind the traditional rejection of declarations against penal interest, the
Toledo case is remarkably different from the instant case. First, Zoilo is the cousin of the accused and
Felicisimo is his uncle. The alleged confession is patently untrustworthy because these two have every
motive to hedge. Second, the admission of such a statement would be shocking to the sense of justice.
Assuming that Alejandro is acquitted and Zoilo subsequently captured and put to trial, there is nothing to
prevent the latter from repudiating the statement. Legally, Zoilo cannot be bound by such statement.
Third, it has not been demonstrated that Zoilo is unable to testify. There is no showing that he is dead,
mentally incapacitated or physically incompetent. His mere absence from the jurisdiction does not make
him ipso facto unavailable under the Rules. The records show that the defense did not exert any serious
effort to produce Zoilo as a witness. An innocent declaration by the real culprit should be admissible as
evidence. But this can be open to abuse - as when the extrajudicial statement is not even authenticated,
thereby increasing the probability of its fabrication. For this case, at least, the prudent course is its
exclusion.

ANALYSIS:
Sanc. TIc qualificaiion in SEC. 41, Fulc 130 is iIai, a siaicncni icnding io cposc iIc dcclarant to
criminal liability and offered to exculpate the accused is not admissible unless corroborating
circunsianccs clcarly indicaic iIc irusiworiIincss of iIc siaicncni" ncrcly sircngiIcns iIc
inadmissibility of said statement in the case at bar.

3. Pedigree

Sec. 39.Act or declaration about pedigree. The act or declaration of a person deceased, or unable to
testify, in respect to the pedigree of another person related to him by birth or marriage, may be received in
evidence where it occurred before the controversy, and the relationship between the two persons is shown
by evidence other than such act or declaration. The word "pedigree" includes relationship, family
genealogy, birth, marriage, death, the dates when and the places where these fast occurred, and the
names of the relatives. It embraces also facts of family history intimately connected with pedigree.

(b) Gravador v. Mamigo 20 SCRA 742 (1967)
(c) People v. Alegado 201 SCRA 37 (1991)
(d) Tison v. CA 276 SCRA 582 (1997)

GRAVADOR v. MAMIGO
G.R. No. L-24989 July 21, 1967

Doctrine: While a person can have no personal knowledge of the date of his birth, he may nevertheless
testify as to his age which he learned from his parents and relatives and his testimony in such case is an
assertion of a family tradition.

FACTS: Pedro Gravador was the principal of the Sta. Catalina Elementary School in Sta. Catalina, Negros
Oriental on August 15, 1964 when he was advised by the Superintendent of Schools Angel Salazar, Jr.,
through Teodulfo Dayao, of his separation from the service on the ground that he had reached the
conpulsory rciircncni agc of 65. TIc laiicr's findings wcrc lascd on prc-war records which included
Cravador's Enploycc's Fccord Card that stated that he was born on November 26, 1897 (He was thus 66
years, 8 months and 22 days old on record).

On August 31, 1964, petitioner, through a letter, protested that the date of his birth is not



November 26, 1897, rather, it was December 11, 1901. Attached was the affidavit of Lazaro Bandoquillo
and Pedro Sienes who were their neighbors as far back as during the lifetime of the parents of petitioner.
TIcy siaicd iIai Cravador's iruc liriI daic is Dcccnlcr 11, 1901.

The Court of First Instance of Negros Oriental ruled that Gravador was born on December 11,
1901 and ordered his reinstatement, back wages and damages amounting to P52, 400. Respondent
Eutiquio Mamigo, the District Supervisor, appealed directly to the Supreme Court. Mamigo alleged that it
was error on the part of the trial court to rely solely on post-war rccords io dcicrninc pciiiioncr's iruc
date of birth - these records, respondent contends, were only manufactured since it was believed that the
original pre-war records had been lost or destroyed.

ISSUE:
1. Whether the trial court correctly relied on post-war records? YES.

RATIO: While a person can have no personal knowledge of the date of his birth, he may nevertheless
testify as to his age which he learned from his parents and relatives and his testimony in such case is an
assertion of a family tradition. In his application for back pay filed with the Department of Finance and
when he asked the GSIS and the Civil Service Commission to correct the date of his birth, he repeatedly
asserted that his birthday was on December 11, 1901.

Morcovcr, iIc inpori of iIc dcclaraiion of pciiiioncr's lroiIcr, coniaincd in a vcrificd plcading in
a cadastral survey as far back as 1924, to the effect that the petitioner was then 23 years old, cannot be
ignored. Made ante litem motam by a deceased relative, this statement is at once a declaration regarding
pedigree within the intendment and meaning of section 39 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. December
11, 1901 is established as the date of birth of the petitioner not only by evidence of family tradition but
also by the declaration ante litem motam of a deceased relative.

ANALYSIS:
The decision was correctly arrived upon by the Court using the current rules. Same decision will be
reached if the proposed rules are to be used.

PEOPLE v. ALEGADO
G.R. No. 93030-31 August 21, 1991

Doctrine: Pedigree undc) Sccton 39 Ius tI)cc )cqustcs ]o) ts udnssItu. (l) tIc)c s cont)ouc)su n
respect to the pedigree of any member of the family; (2) the reputation or tradition of the pedigree of the
person concerned existed prior to the controversy; and (3) the witness testifying to the reputation or tradition
is a member of the family of the said person.
Although a person can have no personal knowledge of the date of his birth, he may testify as to his
age as he learned it from his parents and relatives and his testimony in such case is an assertion of a
family tradition.

FACTS: At around 6:00 p.m. on April 14, 1988 at the Freedom Square inside the public market of San
Carlos City, Negros Occidental, appellant Alfredo Alegado, a 170-pound, 53 year old market watchman
took the victim Cristina Deang to the second floor of the market building which was deserted. There, the
appellant ordered Cristina to masturbate him then forcibly pushed her to the floor. He lay on top of her
and tried to insert his penis but it did not penetrate fully before he ejaculated. Alegado gave her P2.00
and then left. Fearing that he might kill her, the victim told no one.

On April 20, 1988, around 7:00 p.m., Alegado again asked Cristina to go to second floor of the
same market place. When the latter declined, the appellant shoved her toward the stairs into the upper
floor near the civic center. When she refused to take off her shorts and panty, the appellant threatened to
kill her. He then inserted his penis into her vagina. The appellant gave her P2.00 and then left.
Patrolwoman Evangeline Alfaro saw appellant coming down the stairs with the victim following a minute
later. She was pale, with blood flowing down her thighs and legs.

Accused-appellant was charged and convicted of two counts of statutory rape by the RTC of San



Carlos City and was sentenced to Reclusion Perpetua. One of the errors assigned is, that the trial court
crrcd in conviciing Iin of siaiuiory rapc as dcfincd undcr Ariiclc 335 of iIc FPC dcspiic iIc prosccuiion's
failure to prove with certainty the actual age of the offended party.

ISSUE:
1. Whether the age of the offended party was duly proven to be below twelve years old in order for the RPC
provision on statutory rape to apply? YES.

RATIO: The testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, the offended party herself and her maternal
grandfather, Cornelio Villarosa, as to the fact that the victim was born on September 5, 1976 fall under
the exceptions to the hearsay rule as provided under Section 39 and 40 of Rule 130 of the Revised Rules
on Evidence.

Pcdigrcc" undcr Scciion 39 includcs rclaiionsIip. Fanily, gcncalogy, liriI, narriagc, dcaiI, iIc
dates when and places where these facts occurred and the name of the relatives. The said provision
contains three requisites for its admissibility, namely, (1) that there is controversy in respect to the
pedigree of any member of the family; (2) that the reputation or tradition of the pedigree of the person
concerned existed previous to the controversy; and (3) that the witness testifying to the reputation or
tradition must be a member of the family of the said person. All these preconditions are obtaining in the
case at bar considering that the date of birth of the rape victim is put in issue; that the declaration of the
viciin's grandfaiIcr rclaiing io iradiiion cisicd long lcforc iIc rapc casc was filcd; and iIai iIc wiincss
testifying to the said tradition is the maternal grandfather of the rape victim.

Moreover, the offended party herself categorically stated in open court that she was born on
September 5, 1976. Although a person can have no personal knowledge of the date of his birth, he may
testify as to his age as he learned it from his parents and relatives and his testimony in such case is an
assertion of a family tradition. Inasmuch as the accused-appellant failed to present contrary evidence to
dispuic iIc prosccuiion's clain iIai iIc viciim was below twelve years old at the time of the rapes under
considcraiion, wc affirn iIc irial couri's finding iIai iIc viciin in iIcsc rapc cascs was undcr iwclvc
years old.
ANALYSIS:

TISON v. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 121027 July 31, 1997

Doctrine: Where a party claims a right to the part of the estate of the declarant, the declaration of the latter
that the former is her niece is admissible and constitutes sufficient proof of such relationship,
notwithstanding the fact that there was no other preliminary evidence thereof, the reason that such
declaration is rendered competent by virtue of the necessity of receiving such evidence to avoid a failure of
justice.

FACTS: Petitioners Corazon Tison and Rene Dezoller are the niece and nephew of the deceased Teodora
Dezoller Guerrero. Teodora died on March 5, 1983 without any ascendants or descendants, survived only
by her husband, Martin Guerrero, and herein petitioners. Hence they seek to inherit from Teodora by
right of representation. Upon the death of his wife, Martin executed an Affidavit of Extrajudicial
Settlement adjudicating to himself, allegedly as sole heir, a parcel of land with a house and apartment
thereon, located at San Francisco del Monte, Quezon City. On January 2, 1988, Martin sold said lot to
private respondent Teodora Domingo.

Martin Guerrero died on October 1988. Subsequently, petitioners filed for an action for
reconveyance claiming that they have a right to inherit one half of the property. During pre-trial, Corazon
Tison was presented as the lone witness and she offered the following evidence to prove their filiation to
their father and their aunt: baptismal certificates, death certificates, and certificates of destroyed records
of births of Teodora Dezoller and their father Hermogenes Dezoller, a family picture, affidavits of Pablo
Verzosa and Meliton Sitjar, marriage certificates of Martin and Teodora, among other documents. Tison



also testified as to her filiation to Tedorora. Private respondents filed a Demurrer to Evidence on the
ground that petitioners failed to prove their legitimate filiation under Article 172 of the Family Code. The
Trial Court granted the demurrer and dismissed the complaint. The CA affirmed.

ISSUE:
1. Whether petitioners failed to prove to establish their legitimacy and filiation to the deceased Teodora
Guerrero with evidence merely consisting of several documents and the testimony of Corazon Tison?
NO.

RATIO: They have proved their filiation. TC and CA ruling are reversed and set aside. The documentary
evidence adduced by petitioners, taken separately and independently of each other, is not per se sufficient
proof of legitimacy nor of pedigree. However, both courts failed to recognize the presumption of legitimacy.
There is no presumption more firmly established and founded on sounder morality and reason than the
presumption that children born in wedlock are legitimate. Well settled is the rule that the issue of
legitimacy cannot be attacked collaterally as in an action for reconveyance. The presumption continues to
operate in favor of petitioners.

The primary proof to be considered in ascertaining the relationship between the parties is the
testimony of Corazon Dezoller Tison to the effect that Teodora Dezoller Guerrero in her lifetime, sometime
in 1946, caicgorically dcclarcd iIai iIc forncr is Tcodora's niccc. SucI a siaicncni is considcrcd a
declaration about pedigree which is admissible, as an exception to the hearsay rule under Section 39,
Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, subject to the following conditions: (1) that the declarant is dead or unable
to testify; (2) that the declarant be related to the person whose pedigree is subject to inquiry; (3) that such
relationship be shown by evidence other than the declaration; and (4) that the declaration be made ante
litem moam, that is, not only before the commencement of the suit involving the subject matter of the
declaration, but before any controversy has arisen thereon.

There is no dispute as to the first, second and fourth requirements. As to the third, where the
party claiming seeks recovery against a relative common to both claimant and declarant not from the
dcclarani Iinsclf or iIc dcclarani's csiaic the relationship of the declarant to the common relative may
not be proved by the declaration itself, but this requirement does not apply where it is sought to reach the
estate of the declarant himself and not merely to establish a right through his declarations to the property
of some other member of the family. Where a party claims a right to the part of the estate of the declarant,
the declaration of the latter that the former is her niece is admissible and constitutes sufficient proof of
such relationship, notwithstanding the fact that there was no other preliminary evidence thereof, the
reason that such declaration is rendered competent by virtue of the necessity of receiving such evidence
to avoid a failure of justice.

ANALYSIS:

4. Family Tradition

Sec. 40.Family reputation or tradition regarding pedigree. The reputation or tradition existing in a family
previous to the controversy, in respect to the pedigree of any one of its members, may be received in
evidence if the witness testifying thereon be also a member of the family, either by consanguinity or
affinity. Entries in family bibles or other family books or charts, engravings on rings, family portraits and
the like, may be received as evidence of pedigree.

(b) Ferrer v. de Ynchausti 38 Phil. 905 (1918)



FERRER v. DE INCHAUSTI
G.R. No. L-12993 October 28, 1918

Doctrine: Requisites for admissibility of acts or declarations about pedigree, family reputation or tradition:
(1) that the declarant is dead or unable to testify; (2) that the declarant be related to the person whose
pedigree is subject to inquiry; (3) that such relationship be shown by evidence other than the declaration;
and (4) that the declaration be made ante litem moam

FACTS: Plaintiffs Rafael and Maria Angelina Ferrer filed a complaint praying for a declaration that Rosa
Matilde Viademonte, mother of the plaintiffs herein, had the right to succeed to the inheritance left by
Isabel Gonzales in the same proportion and capacity as the other four children of the latter, namely:
Ramon, Rafael, Joaquin, and Clotilde. Plaintiffs allege that they are the only legitimate heirs of Rosa
Viadcnonic and arc cniiilcd io rcccivc iIc laiicr's sIarc - one-fifth of the estate of Isabel Gonzales. They
allege that Isabel was first married to Ramon Martinez Viademonte and that their mother Rosa was the
fruit of their relationship. Isabel was then married Jose Joaquin de Inchausti, father of defendants.

Counsel for plaintiffs sought to establish that Rosa Matilde Viademonte has been treated and
considered as a daughter of Isabel Gonzales and that on instance, Gonzales remarked that the father of
Rosa Matilde was Ramon Martinez de Viademonte. Additionally, that Joaquin C. de Inchausti dedicated a
piciurc io Fosa in iIc following nanncr. To ny dcar and unforgciiallc sisicr Fosa." Collcgc rccords of
the latter at Collegio de Santa Isabel were shown to use establish filiation.

The defendants presented an entry in the notebook of Ramon Viademonte Jr. which showed that
the true name of Rosa Matilde Viademonte was Rosa Matilde Robles, born of unknown parents in
September 1, 1952. Notwithstanding the arguments of the plaintiff, Joaquin de Inchausti testified that
one day he was assured by his half brother Ramon Martinez Viademonte that Rosa Matilde was not his
sister but a mere protge and that her true name was Rosa Matilde Robles and that on occasion, said
brother showed him the certificate of birth of which Exhibit 6 is presented as a copy, which he took from
the parochial church.

ISSUE:
1. Whether or not Joaquin dc IncIausii's icsiinony and iIc diary accounis of Fanon Viadcnonic Jr. arc
admissible to prove the (lack of) filiation of Rosa Matilde Viademonte to Isabel Gonzales? YES.

RATIO: Evidence adduced at the trial to prove the origin of the cause of action indubitably shows that
Rosa was not a legitimate daughter of Isabel Gonzales. It follows that her children have no right to a
portion of the hereditary property of Isabel Gonzales.

In ligIi of Fanon Mariincz Viadcnonic's dcaiI, iIc icsiinony of Joaquin Jose de Inchausti
referring to said deceased is admissible as evidence of family tradition, for they are members of the same
family. Consequently, Rosa Matilde is the very same Rosa Matilde Robles mentioned in Exhibit 6 and
because she was born in 1952, in no manner could she be a legitimate daughter of Ramon Viademonte
and Isabel Gonzales, whose marriage was dissolved 1n 1936 by the death of the husband.

ANALYSIS:

5. Common Reputation

Sec. 41.Common reputation. Common reputation existing previous to the controversy, respecting facts
of public or general interest more than thirty years old, or respecting marriage or moral character, may be
given in evidence. Monuments and inscriptions in public places may be received as evidence of common
reputation.



(b) Ferrer vs. De Ichausti 38 Phil 905 (1918)
(c) City of Manila v. Del Rosario 5 Phil 227 (1905)

FERRER v. DE INCHAUSTI
G.R. No. L-12993 October 28, 1918

Doctrine: Requisites for admissibility of acts or declarations about pedigree, family reputation or tradition:
(1) that the declarant is dead or unable to testify; (2) that the declarant be related to the person whose
pedigree is subject to inquiry; (3) that such relationship be shown by evidence other than the declaration;
and (4) that the declaration be made ante litem moam

FACTS: Plaintiffs Rafael and Maria Angelina Ferrer filed a complaint praying for a declaration that Rosa
Matilde Viademonte, mother of the plaintiffs herein, had the right to succeed to the inheritance left by
Isabel Gonzales in the same proportion and capacity as the other four children of the latter, namely:
Ramon, Rafael, Joaquin, and Clotilde. Plaintiffs allege that they are the only legitimate heirs of Rosa
Viadcnonic and arc cniiilcd io rcccivc iIc laiicr's sIarc - one-fifth of the estate of Isabel Gonzales. They
allege that Isabel was first married to Ramon Martinez Viademonte and that their mother Rosa was the
fruit of their relationship. Isabel was then married Jose Joaquin de Inchausti, father of defendants.

Counsel for plaintiffs sought to establish that Rosa Matilde Viademonte has been treated and
considered as a daughter of Isabel Gonzales and that on instance, Gonzales remarked that the father of
Rosa Matilde was Ramon Martinez de Viademonte. Additionally, that Joaquin C. de Inchausti dedicated a
picture to Rosa in the following nanncr. To ny dcar and unforgciiallc sisicr Fosa." Collcgc rccords of
the latter at Collegio de Santa Isabel were shown to use establish filiation.

The defendants presented an entry in the notebook of Ramon Viademonte Jr. which showed that
the true name of Rosa Matilde Viademonte was Rosa Matilde Robles, born of unknown parents in
September 1, 1952. Notwithstanding the arguments of the plaintiff, Joaquin de Inchausti testified that
one day he was assured by his half brother Ramon Martinez Viademonte that Rosa Matilde was not his
sister but a mere protge and that her true name was Rosa Matilde Robles and that on occasion, said
brother showed him the certificate of birth of which Exhibit 6 is presented as a copy, which he took from
the parochial church.

ISSUE:
1. WIciIcr or noi Joaquin dc IncIausii's icsiinony and iIc diary accounis of Fanon Viadcnonic Jr. arc
admissible to prove the (lack of) filiation of Rosa Matilde Viademonte to Isabel Gonzales? YES.

RATIO: Evidence adduced at the trial to prove the origin of the cause of action indubitably shows that
Rosa was not a legitimate daughter of Isabel Gonzales. It follows that her children have no right to a
portion of the hereditary property of Isabel Gonzales.

In light of Ramon Martinez Viadcnonic's dcaiI, iIc icsiinony of Joaquin Josc dc IncIausii
referring to said deceased is admissible as evidence of family tradition, for they are members of the same
family. Consequently, Rosa Matilde is the very same Rosa Matilde Robles mentioned in Exhibit 6 and
because she was born in 1952, in no manner could she be a legitimate daughter of Ramon Viademonte
and Isabel Gonzales, whose marriage was dissolved 1n 1936 by the death of the husband.

ANALYSIS:



CITY OF MANILA v. DEL ROSARIO
5 Phil 227

Doctrine: Testimony does not constitute common reputation unless such is equivalent to universal reputation.

FACTS: This is an action to recover possession of two parcels of land located in Calles Clavel and
Barcelona, district of Tondo, filed by the City of Manila against its present occupant, Jacinto Del Rosario.
The plaintiff introduced both documentary and oral evidence, which consisted of the testimony John
Wilson, Eduardo Timoteo, Juan Villegas, Sotera Roco, Lorenzo del Rosario, and Modesto Reyes, the city
attorney. The third witness, Juan Villegas, testified that the land in question was formerly included in the
Gran Divisoria, and that all the land included in it belonged to the city. This particular testimony is at
variance with the testimonies of Wilson and Timoteo who testified that the land belonged to the Central
Government, and not the city. His testimony was based on what he had learned from the oldest residents
of that section of the city and was introduced by the City of Manila apparently for the purpose of proving
that the city was generally considered the owner of the land drawing from this fact the presumption of
actual ownership under paragraph 11, section 334 of the Code of Civil Procedure (now section 41, Rule
130 of the ROC).

ISSUE:
1. WIciIcr iIc icsiinony of Villcgas is adnissillc as proof of Connon Fcpuiaiion? NO.

RATIO: Villcgas' iestimony is mere hearsay. Since his testimony consisted of what he had learned from
some of the old residents, it was hearsay as to the court because those who said it were not even
produced in court. Such testimony does not constitute common reputation as referred to, because such
should be equivalent to universal reputation. The testimony of Villegas is insufficient to establish the
presumption referred herein. Furthermore, this witness stated that the land in Calle Azcarraga had been
partitioned between the municipality and the Central Government, share and share alike, and that the
latter (not the city), retained Calles Gabriel de Rivera and Barcelona, which are precisely the streets on
which the property at bar is situated.

ANALYSIS:
The current rules on evidence, particularly on common reputation, have not been properly applied herein.
TIc ruling of iIc couri iIai sucI icsiinony was insufficicni io csiallisI iIc Ciiy's clain ovcr iIc land is
in contrast to the provision on common reputation which states iIai ...rcspcciing facis of pullic or
gcncral inicrcsi norc iIan iIiriy ycars old", wIicI in iurn ncans iIai sucI siaicncnis of iIc old
residents in the case at bar may have been a fact of public or general interest for said years. The court
should have remanded and allowed the City of Manila to justify such contention with more evidence.
Under the proposed rules on evidence, the ruling should have been different because the proposed rules
on connon rcpuiaiion siaics iIai .....as io loundarics of or cusions affcciing lands in iIc connuniiy"
all iIc norc jusiifics an opporiuniiy for iIc Ciiy of Manila io adducc norc cvidcncc iIai indccd Villcgas'
testimony regarding its claim over the land at bar is sufficient to establish its claim. The court should
have allowed more time for evidence production.

6. Res Gestae

Sec. 42.Part of res gestae. Statements made by a person while a starting occurrence is taking place or
immediately prior or subsequent thereto with respect to the circumstances thereof, may be given in
evidence as part of res gestae. So, also, statements accompanying an equivocal act material to the issue,
and giving it a legal significance, may be received as part of the res gestae.

(b) People v. Lungayan 162 SCRA 100 (1988)
(c) People v. Putian 74 SCRA 133 (1976)
(d) People v. Tolentino 218 SCRA 337 (1993)



PEOPLE v. LUNGAYAN
162 SCRA 100

Doctrine: For a statement to be part of the res gestae, it must not only be spontaneous but also be made at a
time when there was no opportunity to concoct or develop a story.

FACTS: This appeal from the decision of the RTC arose due to the complaint filed by Agripina Juan Vda.
De Garzota, a 52 year old widow, charging the accused of rape. At about 10 in the eveining of January 20,
1980, the complainant was already asleep inside the room at their market stall when the accused, who
was then the barangay captain, awakened her by entering her room after one of her children opened the
door for him. He invited her to join him to observe the persons drinking wine in the market because they
are in violation of a barangay ordinance prohibiting such drinking after 10pm. Agripina consented. While
they were standing two meters away from the open door of the canteen, the accused suddenly grabbed
both of her hands and allegedly pointed a gun at her after she shouted loudly. He accused then pulled her
and she fell hitting her head on the pavement. When she regained consciousness, she was dragged to a
banana grove where she was allegedly raped. Thereafter, she reached home at around midnight and one
of her daughters asked her what happened.

Agripina then revealed that the accused abused her and when pressed for details, she just said
that she will tell everything in the morning, and thereafter reported the incident. She was also submitted
for medical examination. Based on the evidence presented, the accused was convicted. By way of rebuttal
during appeal, the accused emphasized the failure of the prosecution to establish involuntariness on the
part of the victim.

ISSUE:
1. Whether the trial court erred in considering the revelation of the complainant to her daughter of what
happened as part of the res gestae? YES.

RATIO: The RTC erred in considering the revelation as part of res gestae. The court stressed that in order
for the statement to be part of the res gestae, it must not only be spontaneous but also be made at a time
when there was no opportunity to concoct or develop a story. As the Court observed, she did not go home
immediately after the incident. She took a walk instead and spent sometime thinking of what to do next.
She had enough time to make a decision on what will be the nature of her story.

ANALYSIS:
The current rules on evidence were properly used in the case at bar because the essence of the res gestae
rulc was io adnii sucI siaicncnis on iIc lasis of ii lcing said wIilc a siariling occurrcncc" is ialing
place. Hence, if the victim mentioned such statements after a while from the alleged incident, it is
presumed that she was able to concoct and develop a story.

Under the proposed rules on evidence, the ruling shall have been the same, because the proposed rule on
res gestae further strengthens or restricts the admission of res gestae by requiring that statements be
nadc undcr iIc sircss of cciicncni causcd ly iIc occurrcncc". Hcncc iIc couri's ruling was siill corrcci
under this rule.

PEOPLE V. PUTIAN
74 SCRA 133

Doctrine: Although a declaration does not appear to have been made by the declarant under the expectation
of a certain and impending death, and for this reason, is not admissible as a dying declaration, such
declaration can fall squarely in the rule on res gestae.

FACTS: This is an appeal from the decision of the CFI convicting the accused of murdering Teodulo
Panimdim. On November 22, 1969 while the victim was attending a dance, he was stabbed in the left
groin. As a result, he died five days later. Putian was charged and convicted of murder on the basis of the
testimony of the doctor who treated the victim and of the policeman who arrested the accused and seized



fron Iin iIc daggcr allcgcdly uscd in iIc sialling, and also iool down iIc viciin's anic noricn
statement as part of res gestae. Such statement was not considered as a dying declaration because it was
not made under the consciousness of an impending death, the victim was even able to go home after the
ncdical ircaincni wiiIoui any assisiancc. TIc appcllani cIallcngcs now iIc irial couri's ruling iIai iIc
statement be made part of res gestae because it was not spontaneous, being made several hours after the
incident. Appellant further claims that the requisite that the declarant gave the statement even before he
had time to devise or concoct a story was not present in this case.

ISSUE:
1. Whether the trial court erred in ruling that the statement be made part of the res gestae? NO.

RATIO: TIc Suprcnc Couri rulcd iIai iIc irial couri was noi in crror in cIaracicrizing Panindin's
statement as part of res gestae and as proving beyond reasonable doubt that Putian is guilty of stabbing
the victim.

TIc rcs gcsiac rulc cnlraccs sponiancous dcclaraiions and vcrlal acis. Panindin's siaicncni
was a spontaneous one made after the commission of the crime. Although a declaration does not appear
to have been made by the declarant under the expectation of a certain and impending death, and for this
reason, is not admissible as a dying declaration, such declaration falls squarely in the rule on res gestae.
Panindin's siaicncni was given sometime after the stabbing while he was undergoing treatment at a
medical clinic. He had no time to concoct a false story or fabricate a malicious accusation against Putian.
No motive has been shown as to why he would even frame up the accused.

ANALYSIS:
The current rule on res gestae was properly applied in the case at bar because the court found out that
such statement of Panimdim was indeed made subsequent of the startling incident when he was
undergoing treatment in a medical clinic. The court affirmed that the victim was not able to have
sufficient time to even devise a falsehood.

Under the proposed rule on res gestae, the ruling shall have been more stringent because the new rule
furiIcr rcquircs iIai sucI siaicncni lc nadc undcr iIc sircss of cciicncni causcd ly iIc occurrcncc."
Hence, the victim herein must prove further that such statement was made under such stress of
excitement and not merely an afterthought, considering that he was moved to a medical clinic after the
incident.

PEOPLE v. TOLENTINO
218 SCRA 337

Doctrine: For the res gestae rule to apply, the following must be present: That the principal act, the res
gestae, be a startling occurrence; that the statements were made before the declarant had time to contrive or
devise; and that the statements made must concern the occurrence in question and their immediately
attending circumstances.

FACTS: This is an appeal from the decision of the RTC convicting all the accused of robbery with multiple
homicide and serious physical injuries. On November 8, 1983, all the accused entered into the house of a
certain Adelaida Ligad, who was at that time not home, by forcibly breaking a wooden window grill of the
confori roon and iIcn dcnandcd fron Icr cIildrcn iIc wIcrcalouis of Adclaida's money. At that time,
the children were accompanied by their cousin, Grace Paule, who was able to recognize all the accused
except for whose face was covered because Tolentino is both her uncle and barriomate. Tala is a relative
of her mother and Matawaran as a barkada of Tala. When John Doe threatened to stab the children, one
of the latter named Geraldine, got so frightened that she revealed where her mother hid the money. After
Tolentino took the money, he then stabbed Grace Paule and then stabbed the three other children. After
Grace recovered, she cried for help and was then heard by her mother and grandmother. Adelaida was
then informed of such incident and thus rushed to her house. She asked Geraldine who were responsible
for such crime and the latter answcrcd iIai ii was Dong-Dong"" and also ncniioncd Tala and
Matawaran. All the children died and Grace was the only survivor who positively identified later on the



three accused.

Tala now argues that no probative value should be given to the extrajudicial statement of Grace
taken by the fiscal while she was staying in the hospital, since his name and that of Matawaran were not
mentioned. Also, the accused assailed the admissibility of the statement of Geraldine as part of the res
gestae.

ISSUE:
1. Whether the trial court erred in admitting the statement of Geraldine? NO.

RATIO: TIc irial couri was corrcci in adniiiing Ccraldinc's siaicncni as pari of iIc rcs gcsiac. TIc irial
court also correctly applied the principle of res gestae namely: That the principal act, the res gestae, be a
startling occurrence; That the statements were made before the declarant had time to contrive or devise;
that the statements made must concern the occurrence in question and their immediately attending
circumstances. All are present in this case as Geraldine had named the accused-appellants as the
perpetrators of the crime immediately after the occurrence of the tragic incident.

ANALYSIS:
The current rules specifically on res gestae were properly applied in this case because the deceased victim
mentioned such statements before she died and immediately after she was stabbed. Also, her statement
may be considered as a dying declaration.

Under the revised rule on res gestae, the ruling shall have been the same, because aside from such
statement being made immediately after the stabbing incident, Geraldine was also a child and this further
justifies that she had no time or even an intention to devise or concoct a story.

7. Entries in the Course of Business

Sec. 43.Entries in the course of business. Entries made at, or near the time of transactions to which
they refer, by a person deceased, or unable to testify, who was in a position to know the facts therein
stated, may be received as prima facie evidence, if such person made the entries in his professional
capacity or in the performance of duty and in the ordinary or regular course of business or duty.

(b) Palmer v. Hoffman 318 U.S. 109 (1943)
(c) Philamlife v. Capital Assurance Corp. (CA) 72 O.G. 3941

PEOPLE v. HOFFMAN
318 U.S. 109, 143
Doctrine: The act which allows the admission of business entries refers only to records kept in the regular
course of business and not those kept in the regular course of conduct related to business.

FACTS: This is a petition for certiorari filed by Palmer et. al. based on the decision of the District Court in
favour of Hoffman. Howard Hoffman is the administrator of the estate of Inez Hoffman who filed an action
against Palmer, the latter being trustees of NYNHH Railroad Company. This action arose from a railroad
accident which caused the death of Inez Hoffman. The accident occurred during the night of December
25, 1940. After two days, the engineer of the train, who died before the trail, made a statement at the
freight office of petitioners where he was interviewed. During trial, such written statement was offered in
evidence. They further offered to prove its admissibility by saying that the statement was signed in the
regular course of lusincss, ii lcing iIc rcgular coursc of lusincss io nalc sucI a siaicncni. Hoffnan's
objection to this was thus sustained.

ISSUE:



1. Whether the report is admissible as an exception to the hearsay rule being an entry in the course of
business? NO.

RATIO: This is not an entry in the regular course of business. The act which allows the admission of
business entries refers only to records kept in the regular course of business and not those kept in the
regular course of conduct related to business. The petitioners are in the railroad business. In the case at
bar, the reports were not for the systematic conduct of the enterprise as a railroad business. Unlike
payrolls, account receivables, accounts payable, bills of lading and the like, the reports herein were
calculated essentially for use in the court alone. Their primary use is for litigation and not for the railroad
business.
ANALYSIS:
If such case is applied in our country using the current rules on evidence, the ruling shall have been the
same precisely because a railroad business does not usually make such reports in the regular conduct of
its affairs.

Under the proposed rules on evidence, the ruling in the case at bar shall have been the same also
because the railroad company does not usually make such reports and in this case such statement or
report was only presented to the court for litigation purposes. The proposed rules on entries in regular
course of business requires that such report or memorandum be made in the regular practice of the
business activity concerned and such was absent in this case.

PHILIPPINE AMERICAN LIFE v. CAPITAL ASSURANCE
72 O.G. 3941 March 7, 1975

Doctrine: Sec. 37, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court may not be invoked in order to justify the admission of a
statement of account identified by a witness whose office made the entries thereof but who has no personal
knowledge about how the account had arisen or of the transactions to which the entries refer.

FACTS: The Galang spouses were the agents of Philamgen for the collection of premium payments from
iIc laiicr's insurancc policy Ioldcrs. Ccriain payncnis wcrc noi rcniiicd ly iIc spouscs io PIilangcn. As
a result, the spouses, together with Capital Assurance, executed a Memorandum of Agreement with
Philamgen whereby Capital Assurance and the spouses agreed to pay jointly and severally the unremitted
premium payments to Philamgen. By virtue of a stipulation in the agreement which states that the
Galang spouses and Capital Assurance undertakes to pay Philamgen any and all obligations of the
spouses arising from the unremitted premium payments, Philamgen wrote Capital Assurance informing
the latter about the additional amounts incurred by the spouses and demanding payment therefore.
Capital Assurance answered that it cannot assume the additional liability of the Galang spouses until the
latter confirms incurring the same. Attached to this reply was the denial by the spouses of said additional
amounts. Consequently, Philamgen filed a collection suit, but only as against Capital Assurance.

The City Court of Manila and the Court of First Instance of Manila ruled in favor of Philamgen.
Capital Assurance appealed from said decisions. Capital Assurance argued that Philamgen failed to prove
the existence of the additional accounts incurred by the Galang spouses. On the other hand, Philamgen
argued that it was able to establish the same by virtue of the testimony of its Accounts Control
OfficcCIicf, Narciso Dacani, wIo icsiificd on a siaicncni of accouni wIicI sIowcd iIc spouscs'
indebtedness.

ISSUE:
1. Whether Philamgen has satisfactorily proven that the Galang spouses incurred additional accounts
arising from premium payments that were unremitten? NO.

RATIO: The statement of account is inadmissible in evidence. Sec. 37, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court on
which Philamgen based its argument specifically states that before entries in the course of business may
be received, it must be shown that they were made by a person who was in a position to know the facts
therein stated. It also requires that the entries must have been made by a person deceased, outside of the
Philippines, or unable to testify.



Bacani did not have personal knowledge of the transactions to which the entries in the statement
of account refers. He merely computed the charges which his office received from other departments of
Philamgen. Bacani is not person deceased, outside of the Philippines, or unable to testify so that the
entries made could be received in evidence as an exception to the hearsay rule. The entries in question
being so far removed from the exceptions to the hearsay rule, cannot and should not substitute for a
wiincss's pcrsonal lnowlcdgc of iIc iransaciions sougIi io lc csiallisIcd.

ANALYSIS:
The case was decided properly under the current Revised Rules of Evidence. The Supreme Court is
correct in finding the statement of account not to be within the exception to the hearsay rule as an entry
made in the official course of business having failed to meet the requisites therefore.

However, the ruling would have been different if the case were decided under the effectivity of the
Proposed Rules on Evidence. Under the suggested amended rules, the person who made the entries need
not be deceased or unable to testify. The record may be received as evidence of the facts stated therein
even though the person who made it is available as a witness. Nonetheless, it is still a requisite that such
person has personal knowledge of the facts therein stated.

8. Official Records

Sec. 44.Entries in official records. Entries in official records made in the performance of his duty by a
public officer of the Philippines, or by a person in the performance of a duty specially enjoined by law,
are prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated.

(b) Africa v. Caltex 16 SCRA 448 (1966)
(c) People v. Leones 117 SCRA 382 (1982)
(d) Manalo v. Robles Trans. Co., Inc. 99 Phil. 729 (1956)
(e) People v. Cabuang 217 SCRA 675 (1993)
(f) People v. San Gabriel 253 SCRA 84 (1996)

AFRICA v. CALTEX
16 SCRA 448 March 30, 1966

Doctrine: The report submitted by a police officer in the performance of his duties, on the basis of his own
personal observation of the facts reported, may properly be considered as an exception to the hearsay rule.

FACTS: The petitioner spouses filed an action for damages against Caltex and Boquiran, the former as
owncr of iIc gasolinc siaiion and iIc laiicr as Calic's agcni. Ncgligcncc was aiiriluicd on iIc part of the
both of them as the cause of the fire.The suit resulted from a fire that broke out in the gasoline station
while fuel was being transferred from the truck into the underground tank. The fire destroyed a number
of houses and other properties, including that of the petitioner spouses. The petitioners offered in
evidence two reports, a Police Department Report and a Fire Department Report, to bolster their claim
against the respondents. The trial court and the Court of Appeals found that petitioners failed to prove
negligence and that respondents had exercised due care in the premises and with respect to the
supcrvision of iIcir cnployccs. TIc Couri of Appcals rulcd oui iIc rcporis as doullc Icarsay" and,
hence, inadmissible as evidence.

Petitioners appealed contending that the reports in themselves, that is, without further
testimonial evidence on their contents, fall within the scope of Sec. 35,Rule 130 of the Rules of Court
wIicI providcs iIai cnirics in official rccords nadc in iIc pcrfornancc of his duty by a public officer of
the Philippines, or by a person in performance of a duty specially enjoined by law, are prima facie
cvidcncc of iIc facis iIcrcin siaicd."



ISSUE:
1. Whether not the reports in question constitute an exception to the hearsay rule? NO.

RATIO: The reports in question do not constitute an exception to the hearsay rule. The facts therein
stated were not acquired by the reporting officers through official information, not having been given by
the informants pursuant to any duty to do so.

There are three requisites for admissibility under Sec.35, Rule 130: 1) that the entry was made by
a public officer, or by another person specially enjoined by law to do; 2) that it was made by the public
officer in the performance of his duties, or by such other person in the performance of a duty specially
enjoined by law; and 3) that the public officer or other person had sufficient knowledge of the facts by him
stated, which must have been acquired by him personally or through official information. The material
facts recited in the reports as to the cause and circumstances of the fire were not within the personal
lnowlcdgc of iIc officcrs wIo conducicd iIc invcsiigaiion. To qualify siaicncnis as official infornaiion"
acquired by the officers who prepared the reports, the persons who made the statements not only must
have personal knowledge of the facts stated but must have the duty to give such statements for record.

However, the other Police Report submitted by Capt. Leoncio Mariano, having been submitted by
a police officer in the performance of his duties on the basis of his own personal observation of the facts
reported, may properly be considered as an exception to the hearsay rule.

ANALYSIS:
The case was properly decided under the Revised Rules of Evidence. For an entry in official records to
apply as an exception to the hearsay rule, the three requisites provided for in Sec.35, Rule 130 should be
complied with. In this case, the last requisite, i.e. that the public officer or other person had sufficient
knowledge of the facts by him stated, which must have been acquired by him personally or through
official information, was not satisfied. A comparison of the reports subject of the case with that of the
other police report by Capt. Mariano lolsicrcd iIc Suprcnc Couri's raiio. TIc sanc dccision will lc
reached if the proposed rules are to be used, there being no substantial amendments.

PEOPLE v. LEONES
117 SCRA 382 September 30, 1982

Doctrine: A medical certificate prepared by a government hospital doctor, even if he/she was not presented
as witness, is admissible as prima facie of the facts therein stated and is an exception to the hearsay rule.

FACTS: Irene Dulay was a salesgirl employed in the store of Mr.and Mrs. Pepito Leones in La Union
where she also resided. On a certain day when Dulay suffered from a headache, she stayed in her room
while the remaining members of the Leones family namely the siblings Joseph and Elizabeth Leones, went
to a nearby beach resort for a picnic.

Dulay filed a criminal complaint against Joseph alleging that, with the help of his sister, he
successfully had carnal knowledge of her. According to Dulay, she was made to take 3 tablets that made
her feel dizzy which the siblings claimed were aspirins. She was found without her panties on and was
immediately taken to the hospital for examination. The accused denied the allegation of Dulay arguing
that he was at the beach resort with his family at the time the alleged act happened. The trial court found
the accused guilty of having raped Dulay.

ISSUE:
1. Whether the guilt of the accused, Joseph Leones, was proven beyond reasonable doubt? NO.

RATIO: There are a number of significant facts from the recorded evidence of the prosecution which
materially and substantially debunked and derailed the theory of Dulay. The lacerations on the hymen of
Dulay would noi Iavc lccn rcgardcd as Icaling" on iIc sanc day wIcn iIc rapc againsi Icr was
conniiicd. Ii would Iavc lccn rccordcd as laccraiion frcsI". Ii was also found that Dulay was having her
menstrual period on the day of the alleged rape.



The written entries in the clinical case record are prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated,
the said entries having been made in official records by a public officer of the Philippines in the
performance of his duty especially enjoined by law, which is that of a physician in a government hospital.

ANALYSIS:
The ruling of the Supreme Court as regards the medical certificate being an exception to the hearsay rule
is in accord with the Revised Rules on Evidence. However, instead of being referred to as a public officer,
the government hospital doctor should have just been referred to as a person specially enjoined by law to
make the entries in the performance of his duty to avoid the confusion.The same decision will be reached
if the proposed rules are to be used, there being no substantial amendments.

MANALO v. ROBLES TRANS
99Phil. 729 August 16, 1956

Doct)nc. A sIc)]]`s )ctu)n s un o]]cu stutcncnt Iu a public official in the performance of his duty
specially enjoined by law and forming part of official records and is prima facie evidence of the facts therein
stated. The sheriff making the return need not testify in court as to the facts stated in his entry.

FACTS: A taxicab owned and operated by Robles Trans and then driven by Hernandez collided with a
passenger truck at Paranaque, Rizal. As a result of the accident, the taxicab ran over Armando Manalo,
an eleven year old, causing him physical injuries which caused his death several days later. Hernandez
was prosecuted for homicide through reckless imprudence. He served out his sentence but he failed to
pay the indemnity awarded to petitioners.

Two writs of execution were issued against him to satisfy the amount of the indemnity, but both
writs were returned unsatisfied by the sheriff who certified that no property, real or personal, in
Hcrnandcz's nanc could lc found. As a rcsuli, iIc pciiiioncrs filcd iIcir clain againsi Follcs Trans
pursuant to the provisions of the RPC. To prove their case, the petitioners introduced a copy of the
decision in the criminal case convicting Hernandez of homicide through reckless imprudence, the writs of
execution to enforce the civil liability, and the returns of the sheriff showing that the 2writs of execution
were not satisfied because of the insolvency of Hernandez, the sheriff being unable to locate any property
in his name. The trial court ruled in favor of petitioners and held Robles Trans liable to pay the
indemnity.

Robles Trans appealed arguing that the evidence presented was inadmissible. It claimed that in
adniiiing as cvidcncc iIc sIcriff's rciurn of iIc wriis of cccuiion io provc iIc insolvcncy of Hcrnandcz,
wiiIoui rcquiring said official's appcarancc in court, deprived it of its opportunity to cross-examine said
sheriff.

ISSUE:
1. WIciIcr iIc sIcriff's rciurn is adnissillc in cvidcncc? YES.

RATIO: A sIcriff's rciurn is an official siaicncni ly a pullic official in iIc pcrfornancc of Iis duiy
specially enjoined by law and forming part of official records and is prima facie evidence of the facts
therein stated. The sheriff making the return need not testify in court as to the facts stated in his entry.

The law reposes a particular confidence in public officers that it presumes they will discharge
their several trust with accuracy and fidelity; and, therefore, whatever acts they do in discharge of their
public duty may be given in evidence and shall be taken to be true under such a degree of caution as the
nature and circumstances of each case may appear to require.

ANALYSIS:
The ruling of the Supreme Court is in accord with the Revised Rules on Evidence. A sheriff is considered a
public officer, being an officer of the court, and thus, a return executed by him is deemed an entry in an
official record. It was made by him in the performance of his enjoined duty as an officer of the court and it
was made with his personal knowledge of the facts therein stated. The same decision will be reached if the



proposed rules are to be used, there being no substantial amendments.

PEOPLE v. CABUANG
217 SCRA 675 January 27, 1993

Doctrine: Entries in a police blotter, though regularly done in the course of performance of official duty, are
not conclusive proof of the truth of such entries. They are only prima facie evidence of the facts therein
stated since they would be incomplete or inaccurate.

FACTS: One late night, Evelyn De Vera and her cousin Maria Parana were walking home after leaving the
house of a common friend. When they passed by the rice paddies, they were suddenly met by Modesto
Cabuang, followed by Nardo Matabang. Evelyn was able to run away but Maria stayed behind and
conversed with Modesto. When Evelyn looked back, she saw Maria being dragged by Modesto and Nardo
was already pursuing her. She was able to run and hide. Before she went home, she witnessed her cousin
being taken away by the accused in a tricycle. Evelyn did not tell anyone about the incident that night.
The next day, Maria was found dead naked with stab wounds. During police investigation, Evelyn
executed a sworn statement where she identified 2 suspects namely Modesto and Nardo. On the basis of
iIc cvidcncc found ly iIc policc during iIcir invcsiigaiion and on Evclyn's sworn siaicncni which she
repeated in substantially identical terms before the trial court, Modesto and Nardo were convicted of the
crime of robbery with rape and homicide.

The accused appealed arguing that the trial court erred in finding that Evelyn de Vera had
positively identified them as the assailants of Maria. They point to an entry in a police blotter which
siaicd iIai iIc assailanis wcrc siill unidcniificd" aliIougI iIc cniry was nadc aficr Evclyn was
questioned by the police.

ISSUE:
1. Whether the accused were positively identified by Evelyn De Vera? YES.

RATIO: The police investigator who initially questioned Evelyn the next morning after the crime took
place noticed that she was in a state of shock. He accordingly chose to defer further questioning until the
afternoon of the same day when Evelyn had calmed down sufficiently to be able to give a sworn statement
to the police. Thus, there was the initial report prepared and recorded in the police blotter in the morning
stating that the assailants were still unidentified.

TIcrc was upon iIc oiIcr Iand, Evclyn's sworn siaicncni nadc and conplcicd in iIc aficrnoon
of the same day. It remains only to note that entries in a police blotter, though regularly done in the
course of performance of official duty are not conclusive proof of the truth of such entries. Testimony
given in open court during the trial is commonly much more lengthy and detailed than the brief entries
made in the police blotter and the trial court cannot base its findings on a police blotter merely, but must
necessarily consider all other evidence gathered in the course of the police investigation and presented in
court.

ANALYSIS:
The ruling made by the Supreme Court in this case is in accord with the provisions of the Revised Rules
on Evidence and with settled jurisprudential principles. Though a police blotter may be considered an
official record containing entries made by a public officer, the Supreme Court was correct in ruling that it
cannot be the sole basis of the court in granting either an acquittal or a conviction. All the facts and
circumstances of the case must be considered. The fact that Evelyn De Vera subsequently executed a
sworn statement cannot be disregarded by the court. The same decision will be reached if the proposed
rules are to be used, there being no substantial amendments.



PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. RICARDO SAN GABRIEL y ORTIZ
G.R. No. 107735 February 1, 1996

Doctrine: For entries in official record to be admissible in evidence three (3) requisites must concur: (a) The
entry was made by a police officer or by another person specially enjoined by law to do so; (b) It was made
by the public officer in the performance of his duties or by such other person in the performance of a duty
specially enjoined by law; and, (c) The public officer or other person had sufficient knowledge of the facts by
him stated, which must have been acquired by him personally or through official information.

FACTS: A fistfight ensued between Jaime Tonog on one hand and the accused Ricardo San Gabriel
together with "Ramon Doe" on the other. The fight was eventually broken up when onlookers pacified the
protagonists. Ricardo and Ramon then hastened towards Marcos Road but in no time were back with
bladed weapons. They approached Tonog surreptitiously, surrounded him and simultaneously stabbed
him in the stomach and at the back, after which the assailants ran towards the highway leaving Tonog
behind on the ground.

During the trial, the accused leans heavily on the Advance Information Sheet 6 prepared by Pat.
Steve Casimiro which did not mention him at all and named only "Ramon Doe" as the principal suspect.
However, the court still convicted him for murder.

ISSUE:
1. Whether the Advance Information Sheet is admissible in evidence as an exception to the hearsay rule?
NO.

RATIO: Entries in official records, as in the case of a police blotter, are only prima facie evidence of the
facts therein stated. They are not conclusive. The entry in the police blotter is not necessarily entitled to
full credit for it could be incomplete and inaccurate, sometimes from either partial suggestions or for want
of suggestions or inquiries, without the aid of which the witness may be unable to recall the connected
collateral circumstances necessary for the correction of the first suggestion of his memory and for his
accurate recollection of all that pertain to the subject. It is understandable that the testimony during the
trial would be more lengthy and detailed than the matters stated in the police blotter. Significantly, the
Advance Information Sheet was never formally offered by the defense during the proceedings in the court
below. Hence any reliance by the accused on the document must fail since the court cannot consider any
evidence which has not been formally offered.

Entries in official records made in the performance of his duty by a public officer or by a person
in the performance of a duty specially enjoined by law are prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated.
But to be admissible in evidence three (3) requisites must concur: (a) The entry was made by a police
officer or by another person specially enjoined by law to do so; (b) It was made by the public officer in the
performance of his duties or by such other person in the performance of a duty specially enjoined by law;
and, (c) The public officer or other person had sufficient knowledge of the facts by him stated, which must
have been acquired by him personally or through official information.

The Advance Information Sheet does not constitute an exception to the hearsay rule, hence,
inadmissible. The public officer who prepared the document had no sufficient and personal knowledge of
the stabbing incident. Any information possessed by him was acquired from Camba, the alleged eye
witness who reported the crime to the police, which therefore could not be categorized as official
information because in order to be classified as such the persons who made the statements not only must
have personal knowledge of the facts stated but must have the duty to give such statements for the
record.

ANALYSIS:
The case was decided in accordance with the current Rules on Evidence. In cases of entries in official
record, the Rules of Court requires that the person making the entry has sufficient and personal
knowledge of the facts stated therein. The evidence presented in this case is considered to be hearsay
because the person making the entry in the Advance Information Sheet does not have personal knowledge
of the facts stated therein as it was only related to him by a witness. There will be no changes even if the
proposed Rules of Evidence will be used.



9. Commercial Lists

Sec. 45.Commercial lists and the like. Evidence of statements of matters of interest to persons engaged
in an occupation contained in a list, register, periodical, or other published compilation is admissible as
tending to prove the truth of any relevant matter so stated if that compilation is published for use by
persons engaged in that occupation and is generally used and relied upon by them therein.

(b) State v. Lungsford 400 A.2d 843 (1979)
(c) PNOC Shipping v. CA 299 SCRA 402 (1999)
(d) Estrada vs. Noble [C.A.] 49 O.G. 139

STATE OF NEW JERSEY v. LAWRENCE LUNGSFORD
400 A.2d 843

Doctrine: To satisfy the threshold the judge must be convinced that the compilation is published for use by
persons engaged in that occupation and is generally considered useful and reliable. If these conditions are
met, statements from the compilation are admissible to prove the truth of the relevant matter stated.
The business record exception is predicated not only on the circumstance that the record itself is
kept in the usual course of the business but also on the circumstance that the recorded information is
obtained by the recorder from a declarant having a "business" duty to communicate it truthfully.

FACTS: Lungsford was arrested upon being found in possession of a 1968 Plymouth Road Runner two-
door hardtop. The State alleged that the Road Runner was stolen from James Wilton. The State was
unable to produce Wilton at trial to identify the vehicle or testify that it was stolen. Defendant testified at
trial that he purchased the car from James Law.

A car may be traced through any of the distinguishing numbers placed in the car at the point of
production. In this case, because the VIN, in the opinion of Detective Walsh of Newark's auto theft squad,
did not appear to have been factory-installed, the police requested the National Automobile Theft Bureau
(NATB) to factory-trace the car through the factory order number. A factory-trace provides the time of
manufacture and reveals the zone office where the car was sold, and thus permits the identification of the
first owner. From the factory-trace the proper VIN for the vehicle may also be determined. The tracing
revealed that the car was owned by Wilton and it was reported stolen.

Defendant testified to the purchase of the Road Runner. In order to attempt to prove its case the
State was required to rely on the NATB factory-trace information to establish that the car in defendant's
possession when he was arrested was the car reported stolen by Wilton. The NATB information led the
police to the Wilton car-theft incident report through the not quite perfect matchup with the Division of
Motor Vehicles' VIN information.

ISSUE:
1. Whether the NATB process of tracing the identity of a car is admissible in evidence? NO.
2. Whether the criminal investigation report of the Edison Police Department and a supplement thereto is
admissible in evidence? NO.

RATIO: The NATB procedures for tracing the identification of motor vehicles could properly be held by a
irial couri io lc cvidcniial in a crininal casc if conpliancc iIc rulc iIai siaics Evidcncc of a statement of
matters of interest to persons engaged in an occupation contained in a list, register, periodical, or other
published compilation is admissible to prove the truth of any relevant matter so stated if the compilation
is published for use by persons engaged in that occupation and is generally used and relied upon by
iIcn."



To satisfy the threshold the judge must be convinced that the compilation is published for use by
persons engaged in that occupation and is generally considered useful and reliable. If these conditions are
met, statements from the compilation are admissible to prove the truth of the relevant matter stated.

The rationale of the Rule is that the use of such materials is necessary because it is too difficult
to call to the witness stand those who have participated in their preparation or compilation. The
trustworthiness requirement is satisfied by the requirement that a finding be made by the judge that the
material is regularly published for use by persons in a given occupation who rely on it. There is no motive
to falsify; on the contrary, there is every reason to be accurate and precise since the success of a business
depends on accuracy and reliability.

The information before the trial court in the instant case concerning the modus operandi of the
NATB was inadequate to permit admissibility under the rule If the conditions of admissibility under the
rule had been established and the judge had been satisfied at a hearing that the proffer was sufficiently
trustworthy, based on the method of compilation and industry reliance, the evidence would have been
properly admissible.

The report and the reference in the supplement were admitted by the trial court pursuant to Evid.
R. 63(13), the "Business Entries" exception to the hearsay rule which states:
A writing offered as a memorandum or record of acts, conditions or events, is admissible to prove the
facts stated therein if the writing or the record upon which it is based was made in the regular course
of a business, at or about the time of the act, condition or event recorded, and if the sources of
information from which it was made and the method and circumstances of its preparation were such
as to justify its admission.

The State established that after reasonable inquiry the owner of the allegedly stolen car, James
Wilton, could not be located for trial. The report and supplement, S-6 and S-7, contained the information
that Wilton allegedly gave to the police immediately after he realized his car was stolen. This was the only
evidence in the case establishing that Wilton's car had been stolen. This hearsay of Wilton was
inadmissible under the business records exception. While police records may qualify as business records
for certain purposes and in certain respects, they are nevertheless not vehicles by which substantive
evidential status may be conferred upon the otherwise hearsay declarations of a victim of or witness to a
crime, accident or other occurrence. If the declarant is not available to testify and if the statement is not
admissible under some other exception to the hearsay rule, such as excited utterance or dying
declaration, then admissibility cannot be predicated exclusively upon the circumstance that the
statement was made to a police officer who paraphrased its content in his report.

Our reason for this conclusion lies in the essential rationale of the business records exception,
now codified by Evid. R. 63(13). The exception was "founded upon the twin principles of reliability and
necessity." But it is clear that one of the critical circumstances importing reliability is the fact that the
informant whose declaration is so recorded is under a duty, in the context of the activity in which the
record is made, to make an honest and truthful report. Thus, the business record exception is predicated
not only on the circumstance that the record itself is kept in the usual course of the business but also on
the circumstance that the recorded information is obtained by the recorder from a declarant having a
"business" duty to communicate it truthfully. Both of these criteria, namely, the recording of the
information in the usual course of the business activity and the providing of that information by a
declarant whose duty it is to supply it truthfully, must be met before the trial judge is free to exercise his
discretion in admitting or excluding the business entry based upon his ultimate evaluation of its
reliability. Here, the second of these criteria was not met.

ANALYSIS:
The case was properly decided and it was in accordance with the Rules on Evidence. On the issue of
admissibility of commercial list, this case focused on the reliability of the list for it to be considered as an
exception to the hearsay rule. On the issue of business record exception, the rule that applies in the said
issue in our jurisdiction is the entries in official record. Though the recording made by a police in the
other jurisdiction is considered as a business, if the same is done in our jurisdiction and the provision on
the entries in official record be used, the evidence will still be inadmissible as the person who made such
record has no personal knowledge of the fact stated therein. There will be no changes if the proposed
Rules on Evidence will be used.



PNOC SHIPPING AND TRANSPORT CORPORATION vs. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and
MARIA EFIGENIA FISHING CORPORATION,
G.R. No. 107518. October 8, 1998

Doctrine: A document is a commercial list if: (1) it is a statement of matters of interest to persons engaged in
an occupation; (2) such statement is contained in a list, register, periodical or other published compilation;
(3) said compilation is published for the use of persons engaged in that occupation, and (4) it is generally
used and relied upon by persons in the same occupation.

FACTS: When M/V Maria Efigenia XV, owned by private respondent Maria Efigenia Fishing
Corporation(Fishing Corp.), was navigating the waters near Fortune Island in Nasugbu, Batangas on its
way to Navotas, Metro Manila when it collided with the vessel Petroparcel which at the time was owned by
the Luzon Stevedoring Corporation (LSC). After investigation was conducted by the Board of Marine
Inquiry a decision finding the Petroparcel at fault was rendered. Based on this finding, Fishing Corp. sued
the LSC and the Petroparcel captain, Edgardo Doruelo praying for an award of P692,680.00, allegedly
representing the value of the fishing nets, boat equipment and cargoes of M/V Maria Efigenia XV, with
interest at the legal rate plus 25% thereof as attorneys fees. The Fishing Corp. amended the complaint to
include the value of the hull. PNOC acquired LSC thus making him a party to the case.

During the trial, Fishing Corp. presented evidence consisting of the testimony of its general
manager and sole witness, Edilberto del Rosario testifying on the cargo carried by the vessel at the time it
collided and the damages they suffered because of the collision. They also presented documentary
evidence which includes quotations of prices for the construction of the broken parts of the vessel.

ISSUE:
1. Whether the price quotations may be admitted in evidence? NO.

RATIO: In iIis casc, aciual danagcs wcrc provcn iIrougI iIc solc icsiinony of privaic rcspondcnis'
general manager and certain pieces of documentary evidence. In objecting to the pieces of documentary
evidence, petitioner commented that these were not duly authenticated and that the witness (Del Rosario)
did not have personal knowledge on the contents of the writings and neither was he an expert on the
subjects thereof.

Price quotations are ordinary private writings which under the Revised Rules of Court should
have been proffered along with the testimony of the authors thereof. Del Rosario could not have testified
on the veracity of the contents of the writings even though he was the seasoned owner of a fishing fleet
because he was not the one who issued the price quotations. Section 36, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of
Court provides that a witness can testify only to those facts that he knows of his personal knowledge. We
agree with the Court of Appeals that his testimony as to the equipment installed and the cargoes loaded
on the vessel should be given credence

considering his familiarity thereto. However, we do not subscribe
to the conclusion that his valuation of such equipment, cargo and the vessel itself should be accepted as
gospel truth. The price quotations presented as exhibits partake of the nature of hearsay evidence
considering that the persons who issued them were not presented as witnesses. On this point, the
exhibits do not fall under any of the exceptions provided under Sections 37 to 47 of Rule 130.

Under Section 45 of the aforesaid Rule, a document is a commercial list if: (1) it is a statement of
matters of interest to persons engaged in an occupation; (2) such statement is contained in a list, register,
periodical or other published compilation; (3) said compilation is published for the use of persons engaged
in that occupation, and (4) it is generally used and relied upon by persons in the same occupation.

Based on the above requisites, the price quotation) are not commercial lists for these do not
belong to the category of other published compilations under Section 45. The exhibits mentioned are mere
price quotations issued personally to Del Rosario who requested for them from dealers of equipment
similar to the ones lost at the collision of the two vessels. These are not published in any list, register,
periodical or other compilation on the relevant subject matter. Neither are these market reports or
quotations within the purview of commercial lists as these are not standard handbooks or periodicals,



containing data of everyday professional need and relied upon in the work of the occupation. These are
simply letters responding to the queries of Del Rosario. To be sure, letters and telegrams are admissible in
evidence but these are, however, subject to the general principles of evidence and to various rules relating
to documentary evidence. The letter was not admissible in evidence as a commercial list even though the
clerk of the dealer testified that he had written the letter in due course of business upon instructions of
the dealer.

Being mere hearsay evidence, failure to present the author of the letter renders its contents
suspect. As earlier stated, hearsay evidence, whether objected to or not, has no probative value.
Accordingly, as stated at the outset, damages may not be awarded on the basis of hearsay evidence.

ANALYSIS:
The case was properly decided using the current Rules of Court. As the Rules of Court provides,
commercial lists must be published for use by persons engaged in an occupation. In the above case, the
price quotations are not considered as commercial lists as it was not published for the use of specific
occupation and it was a private communication between the Fishing Company and the dealers of the
equipment. The same is true even if the proposed Rules of Evidence is used.

GREGORIO ESTRADA v. PROCULO NOBLE
[CA] 49 O.G. 139

Doctrine: Courts of justice could take judicial cognizance on an official document whose publication
constituted a leading event of general interest and whose provisions are widely known and have played an
important part in the contemporary political history of the country.

FACTS: Proculo Noble received from his father, Maximo Noble, a land through a public deed of sale after
payment of certain amount. The sale was subject to a condition wherein the vendor, his heirs and assigns
shall have the right to repurchase the said land in a specific time. After the lapse of the period agreed
upon, the right to repurchase is extinguished and the vendee shall be the absolute and unconditional
owner of the said land without executing an instrument. Proculo alleged that the sale entered into was an
absolute sale of land and it was only named as a sale with right to repurchase to prohibit him from
disposing the property. After some time, Maximo Noble sell the said land to Gregorio Estrada.

A case arises between Noble and Estrada. Trial court ruled in favor of Estrada and ordered
defendant to execute a deed of resale in favor of Estrada for the amount of P700 which plaintiff offered for
repurchase and in case defendant refuses to execute a deed of resale, Register of Deeds of Camarines Sur
is ordered to execute a deed of resale of the same property in favor of the plaintiff for the sum of P700 in
Philippine currency and the defendant is ordered to pay the cost of the suit. The appellant questions the
decision rendered by the Court as it the amount to be paid for the resale of the land does not
commensurate to the amount paid by the defendant at the time he bought the property.

ISSUE:
1. Whether the transaction entered into by Maximo and Proculo Noble was an absolute sale? NO.
2. Whether the court should take judicial notice of the Ballantine scale of values? YES.

RATIO: The deed which evidenced the transaction between Maximino and Proculo is clearly a deed of sale
with right to repurchase. The statement given by Proculo saying that the sale was absolute and that it
was only named a ssale with right to repurchase to prevent the disposal of the land is not corroborated by
any other evidence of record either direct or circumstantial thus cannot be given weight.

The plaintiff has acquired the right to redeem the property in question. While at the time of the
deed was executed, Maximino could not have sold and conveyed ownership of the property since a sale
with right to repurchase transfers legal title to the vendee nevertheless said deed validly conveyed all his
rights and interests in the property, which obviously included the right to repurchase to the plaintiff.
Estrada approached Proculo offering to repurchase the property for the sum of P700 but Proculo refused
the offer. Thus, Estrada made a bona fide offer to repurchase the property with tender of the redemption
price, within the period of redemption agreed upon. Filing of this complaint was equivalent to an offer to



redeem and had the effect of preserving the right of redemption. Such conversion table was submitted by
Dr. D. L. Ballantine to the President of the Philippines in his capacity as economic adviser of the
Commonwealth Government. It contained a recommendation for the adoption of measure which were
greatly needed to solve the problem created by transactions made during the Japanese occupation and to
hasten the economic recovery of the country. The table was embodied in a bill which the President of the
Philippines sent to the Philippine Congress for enactment on December 13, 1945. It is therefore, an
official document whose publication constituted a leading event of general interest and whose provisions
are widely known and have played an important part in the contemporary political history of the country
of which courts of justice could take judicial cognizance.

Computation made by the trial court was correct. Computed based on the Ballantine scale, the
value is around P538.88 thus the estimate made by the court which is P700 is sufficiently liberal and
justly compensates the appellant. He is also entitled to reimbursement of the amount of P400 which he
spent in the construction of the dam, such is considered as useful expense.

ANALYSIS:
The case was properly decided by the court. The Ballantine scale after the Japanese occupation was used
in order to offset the change in the value of the Philippine peso. Such scale was considered as a
commercial list and it is also considered as an official record. The rule on commercial list provides that
such list must be published and used for the purpose it was made. The above case complied with the
requirements stated in the Rules of Court.

There will be no change in the decision of the court if the proposed Rules on Evidence will be used as the
provision on commercial list was not revised in the proposed rules.

10. Learned Treatises

Sec. 46.Learned treatises. A published treatise, periodical or pamphlet on a subject of history, law,
science, or art is admissible as tending to prove the truth of a matter stated therein if the court takes
judicial notice, or a witness expert in the subject testifies, that the writer of the statement in the treatise,
periodical or pamphlet is recognized in his profession or calling as expert in the subject.

11. Prior Testimony

Sec. 47.Testimony or deposition at a former proceeding. The testimony or deposition of a witness
deceased or unable to testify, given in a former case or proceeding, judicial or administrative, involving
the same parties and subject matter, may be given in evidence against the adverse party who had the
opportunity to cross-examine him.

(b) Tan v. CA 20 SCRA 54 (1967)
(c) Ohio v. Roberts 448 U.S. 56 (1980)

CARMELITA TAN and RODOLFO TAN vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. L-22793 May 16, 1967

Doctrine: Subsequent failure or refusal to appear at the second trial or hostility since testifying at the first
trial does not amount to inability to testify, but such inability proceeding from a grave cause, almost
amounting to death, as when the witness is old and has lost the power of speech.

FACTS: Petitioners, thru their mother Celestina Daldo as guardian ad litem, sued respondent Tan in the
CFI for acknowledgment and support. Celestina Daldo - after petitioners had already presented oral and
documentary evidence and were about to rest their case - moved to dismiss the foregoing civil case upon



the ground that the parties had come to an amicable settlement, and prayed that the same be dismissed
with prejudice and without recourse of appeal. She also subscribed before the clerk of the CFI to an
affidavit categorically stating that respondent Francisco Tan "is not the father of my said minor children
named Carmelita and Rodolfo (herein petitioners) but another person whose name I cannot divulge"; and
that she prepared said affidavit precisely "to record what is true and to correct what misinterpretation
may arise in the future". The CFI granted the motion and dismissed the case.

Sometime after the case was dismissed - petitioners, this time thru their maternal grandfather
Servillano Daldo as guardian ad litem, commenced the present action before the Juvenile & Domestic
Relations Court for acknowledgment and support, involving the same parties, cause of action and subject
matter. The judge rendered judgment declaring that "the present case is res judicata by reason of the
dismissal with prejudice of the previous case and that, even on the merits, plaintiffs have not made out
their case with sufficient evidence," and dismissed the complaint, without costs. On MR, the court
reconsider its decision, and declares the minors Carmelita and Rodolfo Tan to be the illegitimate children
of the defendant Francisco Tan alias and orders the defendant to support said minors. On appeal, the
decision was reversed.

ISSUE:
1. Whether Exhibits H and I which contain the testimony of petitioners' witnesses in the former case are
admissible? NO.

RATIO: Rule 130 Sec. 41 provides Testimony at a former trial. - The testimony of a witness deceased or
out of the Philippines, or unable to testify, given in a former case between the same parties, relating to the
same matter, the adverse party having had an opportunity to cross-examine him, may be given in
evidence. Subsequent failure or refusal to appear thereat [second trial] or hostility since testifying at the
first trial does not amount to inability to testify, but such inability proceeding from a grave cause, almost
amounting to death, as when the witness is old and has lost the power of speech. Here, the witnesses in
question were available. Only, they refused to testify. No other person that prevented them from testifying,
is cited. Certainly, they do not come within the legal purview of those unable to testify.

The validity of the testimony of petitioners' witnesses in the present case was considerably
downgraded by the affidavit of Celestina Daldo, which deposed that petitioners were not fathered by
Francisco Tan, but, in Celestina's own words, by "another person whose name I cannot divulge." Striking
is the fact that this affidavit was executed after petitioners in the former case had finished with their oral
and documentary evidence and were about to submit their case. By then, their counsel had a grasp of the
situation. Petitioners and their guardian ad litem could have known whether they had reasonably made
out a case against respondent.

ANALYSIS:
The case was properly decided by the Court. This case defines and limits the circumstances wherein the
court may allow the use of testimony given in a previous case when a witness is unable to testify. A
person is not considered to be unable to testify if he/she is available to testify but refused to do so. No
changes will arise if the proposed Rules on Evidence will be used.

OHIO v. ROBERTS
448 U.S. 56 June 25, 1980

Doctrine: When a hearsay declarant is not present for cross-examination at trial, the Confrontation Clause
no)nuu )cqu)cs u sIoung tIut Ic s unuuuuIc. A utncss s not 'unuuuuIc` ]o) pu)poscs o] tIc
exception to the confrontation requirement unless the prosecutorial authorities have made a good-faith effort
to obtain his presence at trial.

FACTS: Local police arrested Herschel Roberts (Roberts) in Lake County, Ohio. Roberts was charged with
forgery of a check in the name of Bernard Isaacs (Isaacs), and with possession of stolen credit cards
belonging to Isaacs and his wife Amy.



During iIc prclininary Icaring, iIc Folcris' counscl prcscnicd iIc Isaacs' daugIicr, Aniia, as
iIc dcfcnsc's only wiincss. Aniia icsiificd iIai sIc lncw Folcris, and that she had permitted him to use
her apartment for several days while she was away. Defense counsel questioned Anita in an attempt to
elicit from her an admission that she had given respondent checks and the credit cards without informing
him that she did not have permission to use them. Anita, however, denied this. The prosecutor did not
question Anita. The country grand jury indicted Roberts for forgery, for receiving stolen property
(including the credit cards), and for possession of heroin. Between November 1975 and March 1976, five
sulpocnas for four diffcrcni irial daics wcrc issucd io Aniia ai Icr parcnis' OIio rcsidcncc. TIc lasi iIrcc
carricd a wriiicn insiruciion iIai Aniia sIould call lcforc appcaring." SIc was noi ai iIc rcsidcncc wIcn
these were executed. She did not telephone and she did not appear at trial.

In March 1976, the case went to trial before a jury in the Court of Common Pleas. Roberts
testified that Anita gave him her parents' checkbook and credit cards with the understanding that he
could use them. Relying on Ohio Code which permits the use of preliminary examination testimony of a
witness who "cannot for any reason be produced at the trial," the prosecution, on rebuttal, offered the
transcript of Anita's testimony. Asserting a violation of the Confrontation Clause of the Constitution, the
defense objected to the use of the transcript.

The trial court conducted a voir dire hearing as to its admissibility. Amy Isaacs, the sole witness
at voir dire, was questioned by both the prosecutor and defense counsel concerning her daughter's
whereabouts. According to Amy, Anita left home for Tucson, Arizona soon after the preliminary hearing.
About a year before the trial, a San Francisco social worker called the Isaacs about a welfare application
Anita had filed there. Through the social worker, the Isaacs reached their daughter once by telephone.
Since then, Anita had called her parents only one other time and had not been in touch with her two
sisters. When Anita called, some seven or eigIi noniIs lcforc irial, sIc iold Icr parcnis iIai sIc was
iravcling" ouisidc OIio, lui did noi rcvcal iIc placc fron wIicI sIc callcd. Mrs. Isaacs siaicd iIai sIc
lncw of no way io rcacI Aniia in casc of an cncrgcncy nor did sIc lnow of anylody wIo lnows where
sIc is." TIc irial couri adniiicd iIc iranscripi inio cvidcncc. Fcspondcni was convicicd on all counis.

The CA of Ohio reversed and concluded that the prosecution had failed to make a showing of a
good-faiiI cffori" io sccurc iIc alscni wiincss' attendance. The CA held that unavailability would have
been established if the State demonstrated that its subpoenas were never actually served on the witness
and that they were unable to make contact in any way with the witness. The Supreme Court of Ohio
affirncd, lui did so lascd on oiIcr grounds lui Icld iIai Aniia's icsiinony was inadnissillc as ii
violated the Confrontation Clause.

ISSUE:
1. WIciIcr Aniia Isaacs' prior icsiinony ai iIc prclininary Icaring lorc sufficicni indicia of rclialiliiy"?
NO.
2. WIciIcr iIc iniroduciion in cvidcncc ai Folcris' irial of Aniia's prclininary Icaring icsiinony is
constitutionally permissible? YES.

RATIO: Lilc in California v. Crccn, Aniia's prior siaicncni ai iIc prclininary Icaring is adnissillc
because the allcgcd dircci caninaiion of Aniia ly Folcris' counscl aciually pariool of cross-
examination. It afforded substantial compliance with the purposes behind the confrontation requirement
which is cross-examination. Although Ohio law may have authorized objection by the prosecutor or
intervention by the court, this did not happen. As in Green, Folcris' counscl was noi significanily liniicd
in any way in the scope or nature of his cross-caninaiion." TIc Suprcnc Couri of OIio crrcd in Iolding
iIai Aniia's icsiinony is inadnissillc undcr iIc iIcory of indicia of rclialiliiy" sincc iIcrc was an
adequate opportunity to cross-examine Anita and counsel availed himself of that opportunity. Thus, the
iranscripi (Aniia's icsiinonyi lorc sufficicni indicia of rclialiliiy" and affordcd iIc irial couri sufficicni
basis for evaluating the truth of the prior statement.

When a hearsay declarant is not present for cross-examination at trial, the Confrontation Clause
nornally rcquircs a sIowing iIai Ic is unavailallc. A wiincss is noi 'unavailallc' for purposcs of iIc
exception to the confrontation requirement unless the prosecutorial authorities have made a good-faith
cffori io oliain Iis prcscncc ai irial." TIc uliinaic qucsiion is wIciIcr iIc wiincss is unavailallc despite
good-faith efforts undertaken prior to trial to locate and present that witness. The prosecution bears the
burden of establishing this predicate.



On the facts presented we hold that the trial court and the Supreme Court of Ohio correctly
concluded that Anita's unavailability, in the constitutional sense, was established. At the voir dire
hearing, it was shown that the Isaacs had last heard from Anita during the preceding summer; that she
was not then in San Francisco, but was traveling outside Ohio; and that the Isaacs and their other
children knew of no way to reach Anita even in an emergency. This is not a case of parents abandoning all
interest in an absent daughter.

The evidence of record demonstrates that the prosecutor issued a subpoena to Anita at her
parents' home, not only once, but on five separate occasions over a period of several months. In addition,
ai iIc voir dirc arguncni, iIc prosccuior siaicd io iIc couri iIai rcspondcni wiincsscd iIai I Iavc
attempted to locate, I have subpoenaed, iIcrc Ias lccn a voir dirc of iIc wiincss'" parcnis, and iIcy Iavc
noi lccn allc io locaic Icr for ovcr a ycar." Civcn iIcsc facis, iIc prosccuiion did noi lrcacI iis duiy of
good-faith effort. The judgment of the Supreme Court of Ohio is reversed, and the case is remanded for
further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.

ANALYSIS:
This foreign case was properly decided under the current and proposed Rules of Evidence.

14. Child Abuse Exception
(a) Section 28, Rule on Examination of a Child Witness

Sec. 28. Hearsay exception in child abuse cases. A statement made by a child describing any act or
attempted act of child abuse, not otherwise admissible under the hearsay rule, may be admitted in
evidence in any criminal or non-criminal proceeding subject to the following rules:
(a) Before such hearsay statement may be admitted, its proponent shall make known to the
adverse party the intention to offer such statement and its particulars to provide him a fair opportunity to
object. If the child is available, the court shall, upon motion of the adverse party, require the child to be
present at the presentation of the hearsay statement for cross-examination by the adverse party. When
the child is unavailable, the fact of such circumstance must be proved by the proponent.
(b) In ruling on the admissibility of such hearsay statement, the court shall consider the time,
content and circumstances thereof which provide sufficient indicia of reliability. It shall consider the
following factors:
(1) Whether there is a motive to lie;
(2) The general character of the declarant child;
(3) Whether more than one person heard the statement;
(4) Whether the statement was spontaneous;
(5) The timing of the statement and the relationship between the declarant child
and witness;
(6) Cross-examination could not show the lack of knowledge of the declarant
child;
(7) The possibility of faulty recollection of the declarant child is remote; and
(8) The circumstances surrounding the statement are such that there is no
reason to suppose the declarant child misrepresented the involvement of the
accused.
(c) The child witness shall be considered unavailable under the following situations:
(1) Is deceased, suffers from physical infirmity, lack of memory, mental illness,
or will be exposed to severe psychological injury; or
(2) Is absent from the hearing and the proponent of his statement has been
unable to procure his attendance by process or other reasonable means.
(d) When the child witness is unavailable, his hearsay testimony shall be admitted only if
corroborated by other admissible evidence.

XII. Opinion Rule
A. Rule 130, Secs. 48-50



7. OPINION RULE
Sec. 48.General rule. The opinion of witness is not admissible, except as indicated in the following
sections. (42)

Sec. 49.Opinion of expert witness. The opinion of a witness on a matter requiring special knowledge,
skill, experience or training which he shown to posses, may be received in evidence. (43a)

Sec. 50.Opinion of ordinary witnesses. The opinion of a witness for which proper basis is given, may be
received in evidence regarding
(a)the identity of a person about whom he has adequate knowledge;
(b)A handwriting with which he has sufficient familiarity; and
(c)The mental sanity of a person with whom he is sufficiently acquainted.
The witness may also testify on his impressions of the emotion, behavior, condition or appearance
of a person.

B. Rule on DNA Evidence

C. Cases:
(1) Dilag & Co. v. Merced 45 O.G. 5536 (1949)
(2) U.S. v. Trono 3 Phil. 213 (1904)
(3) People v. Adoviso 309 SCRA 1 (1999)
(4) People vs. Vallejo 382 SCRA 192 (2002)
(5) State v. Garver 225 P.2d 771 (1950)
(6) U.S. v. Stifel 433 F.2d 431 (6th Cir. 1970)
(7) Daubert v. Merrell Dow 113 S. Ct. 2786 (1993)
(8) United States v. Bonds 12 F.3d 540 (1993)
(9) Herrera v. Alba G.R. No. 148220, June 15, 2005
(10) People v. Umanito G.R. No. 172607, October 26, 2007

DILAG & CO v. MERCED
45 O.G. 5536 (1949)

Doctrine: Generally speaking, any person who by study or experience has acquired particular knowledge or
experience may be allowed to give in evidence his opinion upon matters of technical knowledge and skill
relating to such business or employment.

FACTS: Dilag & Co. purchased from International Harvester Company an International truck model 1938
with motor No. HD-232-22265 for P 2,400. The truck was entrusted to Pablo Dilag, secretary-treasurer of
the corporation.

During the Japanese occupation, the truck was stolen while it was parked in Laguna. After
liberation, Dilag saw the truck parked in front of City Lunch in San Pablo Laguna. Dilag had it seized by
the police and filed a complaint for theft against Vicente Merced who had in possession of such truck, and
against Lim Ben, Sy Pua and Sixto Zandueta.

When the criminal complaint was dismissed, Dilag & Co. filed this action against the same
parties for the recovery of the truck in question and for damages. Merced filed a counterbond and was
able to retain possession.

Merced claims he purchased the truck from Lim Ben. The latter claimed they bought the truck in
good faith from Zandueta. But Zandueta did not appear and was declared in default. The trial court ruled
in favor of Dilag & Co. and absolved Lim Ben and Sy Pua from liability for damages as purchasers in good
faith and ordered defendants Merced and Zandueta to pay plaintiff sum of P5,000 as damages and costs.
Hence, this appeal.

ISSUE:



1. Whether Jose Aguilar of the Bureau of Public Works was qualified as an expert witness to prove the
alleged tampering of the motor number? YES.

RATIO: Witness Aguilar was presented as witness to testify on the alleged tampering. Aguilar has been
with the Bureau of Public Works since 1930 having occupied the position of inspector in charge of
weighing and measuring trucks and verifying their motor numbers, chief of the registration division for 8
years and is presently a chief investigator charged with investigating conflicting claims on motor vehicles.
A person with these qualifications is amply qualified for the simple task of determining whether the
number appearing on the motor of a particular vehicle is genuine or not.

There is no precise requirement as to the mode in which skill or experience shall have been
acquired. Scientific study and training are not always essential to the competency of a witness as an
expert. A witness may be competent to testify as an expert although his knowledge his knowledge was
acquired through the medium of practical experience rather than scientific study and research.

Generally speaking, any person who by study or experience has acquired particular knowledge or
experience may be allowed to give in evidence his opinion upon matters of technical knowledge and skill
relating to such business or employment.

Dilag was able to prove that the motor number of the truck has been tampered in that the
number now appearing on its motor is (HD-232-22158) is not the original.

ANALYSIS:
The decision of the Court is consistent with the current rules of evidence, but it indirectly recognizes
education or scientific study or training as a mode of acquiring competency as an expert witness in a
particular field (which is not present under the current rules). Education as a mode of acquiring
competency is now recognized under the proposed rules of evidence.

US v. TRONO
G.R. No. 1344 January 19, 1904

Doctrine: Expert testimony constitutes evidence worthy of meriting consideration, although not exclusive, on
questions of a professional character. Courts, however, are not bound to submit their findings necessarily to
such testimony; they are free to weigh them, and they can give or refuse to give them any value as proof, or
they can even counterbalance such evidence with the other elements of conviction which may have been
adduced during the trial.

FACTS: Trono (subinspector of the municipal police of the town of Hagonoy) and 2 other policemen (Jose
and Agustin) were charged for the killing of Benito Perez (Perez). Perez and his 2 companions (Guevarra
and Bautista) were suspected of stealing the revolver belonging to Maximo Angeles. Perez, Guevarra, and
Bautista were arrested in their respective houses by Trono, et al. When Perez was arrested, he was in
good health and not suffering from any disease. Perez, Guevarra, and Bautista were taken to a place
called Sapang-Angelo where they were beaten and illt reated.

WIilc lcing illircaicd, Pcrcz was Icard io lcg Maino io pardon Iin, uiicring Maino, Iavc piiy
on nc or clsc lill nc ai oncc." Dui Perez was severely ill treated that in order to reach the municipal
building of Hagonoy, to which the prisoners were taken after the ill treatment was inflicted upon them,
Perez as obliged to lean upon the policeman Jose for the whole distance because he was unable to stand
and complained of sharp pains in the abdomen.

The following day, prisoners were brought before the municipal president who discharged them
lccausc noiIing canc oui of iIc invcsiigaiion conccrning iIc iIcfi of Maino's rcvolvcr. Howcvcr, due to
his condition, Perez was unable to return to his house alone so that his brother Estanislao was obliged to
take him from the municipal building to his home in a boat. Upon arrival at his home, Perez went to bed.
His mother Candelaria de los Santos found his condition to be so serious that she immediately reported
the facts to the justice of peace of the town, denouncing the persons who had ill treated Perez. During the



short time that Perez was in bed, he was unable to eat, urinated with great difficulty, and expelled blood
with his urine. HE also complained of intense pains in the stomach and told his family that the pains
were the result of blows inflicted upon him with a gun and other ill treatment received by him, and that
his injuries would be the death of him.

Perez died on the morning of the next day. At the time Perez and his companions were arrested
each of the defendants was armed with a revolver and that Jose and Agustin were armed with guns. The
defense contends (among others) that the death of Perez was not due to the wounds inflicted, which were
not serious, but to hepatic colic brought on by hypertrophic cirrhosis, from which the deceased had been
suffering for a long time, basing such allegation on the certificate and testimony of the physician,
Icasiano.

ISSUE:
1. Whether the testimony of Icasiano can be admitted as a testimony of an expert, and thus serve as the
basis for the acquittal of the accused? NO.

RATIO: The court cannot give any credit to the testimony of this physician because the facts which would
serve as a foundation to his conclusion are manifestly inexact.

First, in his certificate on folio 18 it is stated that the body of the deceased only showed two small
bruises on the superior part of the left iliac region. The witness Esteban Perez testified that the deceased
had bruises and swellings on the superior part of the left hand, on the neck, on the ribs, and on the
abdomen; Raymunda Perez affirms having seen bruises on the abdomen on both sides, on the left arm,
and on the left side of the neck; and Candelaria de los Santos likewise saw them on the upper part of the
left hand on the left side of the neck and on the ribs. Second, the physician affirms that the deceased
devoted himself on the night of the occurrence to his customary libations. Nothing is shown in the case to
corroborate this illegal habit, and especially nobody testified to having seen the deceased drunk on the
night of the occurrence. Lastly, it is stated in said certificate of the physician that the deceased, after the
blows the effects whereof are being inquired into went on foot to the town from a distant barrio, and vice
versa. This is manifestly untrue, because the proof in this case shows that from the place where the
deceased was ill treated he was compelled to walk, being supported by a policeman until he reached the
town, and in order to take him from the town to his home it was necessary to use a boat. These last
statements are so unjustified that the physician, Icasiano, when testifying, withdrew them during the
trial.

There is also nothing in the case to show that the deceased had ever suffered from hypertrophic
cirrhosis. The ailment which the deceased had at the time referred to by the physician, Icasiano, was
cholera. It likewise appears from the testimony of Raymunda Perez that said physician is an intimate
friend of the accused, Maximo Angeles.

Expert testimony constitutes evidence worthy of meriting consideration, although not exclusive,
on questions of a professional character. Courts, however, are not bound to submit their findings
necessarily to such testimony; they are free to weigh them, and they can give or refuse to give them any
value as proof, or they can even counterbalance such evidence with the other elements of conviction
which may have been adduced during the trial. The guilt of the accused is fully established in this case.

ANALYSIS:
This case is consistent with the present rules of evidence, wherein the opinion of an expert witness is
admissible. The Courts, however, retain the discretion in giving such testimony the proper weight.

PEOPLE v. ADOVISO
G.R. No. 116196-97 June 23, 1999

Doctrine: As with other jurisdictions, the Philippines also rejects the results of polygraph tests as evidence of
establish the guilty or innocence of a person for the reason that polygraph has not as yet attained scientific
acceptance as a reliable and ascertaining truth or deception.



Visibility is a vital factor in determining whether or not an eyewitness could have identified the
perpetrator of a crime. However, it is settled that when conditions of visibility are favorable, and the
witnesses do not appear to be biased, their assertion as to the identity of the malefactor should normally be
accepted.
Funu)tu utI uppcunt`s ]ucc und uppcu)uncc nnimized if not erased the possibility that they
could have been mistaken as to his identity.

FACTS: The spouses Emeterio and Anastacia Vasquez had 2 adjacent houses in Sitio Tan-agan,
Barangay Casugad, Bula Camarines Sur. One of the houses was a camalig where they stored harvested
rice. The spouses preferred to live in the camalig. The living area, which was elevated from the ground,
had walls of bamboo called salsag. Three steps led down to an awning (suyab) walled with bamboo slats.
A portion of the awning was used as a kitchen but another portion had a papag where their grandson,
Fufino Agunos, son of daugIicr Virginia. TIc spouscs' son Donifacio occupicd iIc oiIcr Iousc, 8 ncicrs
away from the camalig with his own son Elmer.

At around 8:00 in the evening of February 18, 1990, Emeterio Vazquez was preparing coffee as
his wife was about to retire for the night. Their grandson Rufino had already gone to sleep in the papag.
Anastacia had just finished spreading the sleeping mat when she heard three or four gunshots. Emeterio
then uttered that he had been shot. A lamp near the stairs where Emeterio drank coffee illuminated the
camalig but Anastacia failed to recognize the persons who fired their guns at her husband. Bonifacio, who
was in the bigger house, heard the gunshots. He and his son Elmer immediately went down the front yard
to investigate. From a distance of 8 meters, Bonifacio saw Rufino, who was inside the camalig, being shot
by several persons from the outside. Bonifacio recognized one of the assailants, with a large built and long
hair, as Pablo Adoviso because of the gas lamp that was lighted inside the camalig. Of Fufino's
assailants, only Adoviso was not wearing a mask. Adoviso was holding a long firearm wrapped inside a
sack with its muzzle protruding and directed where Rufino was sleeping. He then fired hitting Rufino. At
iIai noncni, Donifacio Icard Iis faiIcr Encicrio sIoui Pino," (rcfcrring io Iis Fufinoi and saw Iis
father go down the stairs carrying a gas lamp. Adoviso fired again, hitting Emeterio at the stomach.

Elmer, who rushed towards the camalig with his father Bonifacio, saw 5 persons aiming their
firearms at the camalig. Elmer saw these 5 persons shoot his cousin Rufino who was lying down on
the papag. Although his back was hit, Rufino was able to crawl under the papag. Elncr's grandfaiIcr
was also hit on the stomach but he managed to go up the camalig. When appellant and his companion
by the camalig door saw Elmer, they fired at him then, with the three others at the ditch, escaped to the
banana plantation. Elmer, on the other hand, fled towards the coconut plantation.

While Elmer tended to both his grandfather and cousin, Bonifacio went to the municipal building of
Bula to fetch the police. Inspector Lopez and Senior Police Officer Ballevar returned to the scene of the
crime with him. The police brought Emeterio and Rufino to the municipal hall of Bula and then to the
Bicol Regional Hospital. Both Emeterio and Rufino died early the next morning. The certification dated
March 7, 1990 and signed by Dr. Janice Nanette Estrada, resident physician of the Bicol Regional
Hospital in Naga City, states that 35-year-old Rufino died of 4 gunshot wounds, The wounds at the
inguinal area and the thigh bore contusion collars. The same physician certified that Emeterio Vasquez,
88 years of age, sustained 7 gunshot wounds. Four of these gunshot wounds had contusion collars.
Adoviso interposed alibi and denial as his defense.

ISSUE:
1. Whether Aldoviso was properly identified by the 2 eyewitnesses? YES.

RATIO: A polygraph is an electromechanical instrument that simultaneously measures and records
certain physiological changes in the human body that are believed to be involuntarily caused by an
examinee's conscious attempt to deceive the questioner. The theory behind a polygraph or lie detector test
is that a person who lie deliberately will have rising blood pressure and a subconscious block in
breathing, which will be recorded on the graph. However, American courts almost uniformly reject the
results of polygraphs tests when offered in evidence for the purposes of establishing the guilt or innocence
of one accused of a crime, whether the accused or the prosecution seeks its introduction, for the reason
that polygraph has not as yet attained scientific acceptance as a reliable and ascertaining truth or
deception. The rule is no different in this jurisdiction. Thus, in People v Daniel, stating that much faith
and credit should not be vested upon a lie detector test as it is not conclusive. Appellant, in this case, has
not advanced any reason why this rule should not apply to him.



Visibility is a vital factor in determining whether or not an eyewitness could have identified the
perpetrator of a crime. However, it is settled that when conditions of visibility are favorable, and the
witnesses do not appear to be biased, their assertion as to the identity of the malefactor should normally
be accepted. Illumination produced by kerosene lamp or a flashlight is sufficient to allow identification of
persons. Wicklamps, flashlights, even moonlight or starlight may, in proper situations be considered
sufficient illumination, making the attack on the credibility of witnesses solely on that ground
unmeritorious.

First, there were 2 gas lamps illuminating the place - the one placed inside the camalig and that
held by Emeterio as he descended from the stairs after the first volley of gunfire. Second, the bamboo
slats of the camalig could not have effectively obstructed the eyewitnesses' view of appellant, considering
that the slats were built 4 meters apart. In addition, it is the natural reaction of relatives of victims to
strive to observe the faces and appearance of the assailants, if not ascertain their identities, and the
manner in which the crime is committed. A relative will naturally be interested in identifying the
malefactor to secure his conviction to obtain justice for the death of his relative(s). Third, Adoviso was not
a complete stranger to the eyewitnesses. Bonifacio had known him for 10 while Elmer had been
acquainted with him for 4 years. Familiariiy wiiI appcllani's facc and appcarancc nininizcd if noi
erased the possibility that they could have been mistaken as to his identity. Conviction affirmed.

ANALYSIS:
The case was decided according to the current and proposed rules of evidence. Thus, the opinion of
Elmer/Bonfacio for which proper basis was given (as seen in the facts) may be received in evidence
regarding the identity of the Adoviso which Elmer/Bonifacio had adequate knowledge of.

PEOPLE v. VALLEJO
G.R. No. 144656 May 9, 2002

Doctrine: The testimony of an expert DNA analyst is necessary to explain the results of DNA testing and to
determine whether the findings can sustain a conviction based on DNA evidence.

FACTS: At around 1 pm of July 10, 1999, Nida Diolola sent Daisy Diolala to their neightor Aimee
Vallcjo's (Aincci Iousc for Icr iuiorials. Aincc's Iousc was aloui 4-5 ncicrs away fron Daisy's Iousc.
Nida saw that Daisy was wearing pink short pants and a white sleeveless shirt. An hour later, Daisy came
back with Gerrico Vallejo (accused) to look for a book Daisy could copy to make a drawing or poster.
Daisy and Vallcjo wcni lacl io iIc laiicr's Iousc.

After her afternoon nap Nida noticed that her daughter was not yet home. Hence, she started
looking for her and proceeded to Aincc's Iousc. Daisy was noi iIcrc lccausc Aincc was noi fccling wcll
as she had her menstrual period. At about 7:00 o'clock that evening, Nida went back to her neighbor's
house. There she saw Vallejo who who told her that Daisy had gone to her classmate's house to borrow a
book. But when Nida went there, she was told that Daisy had not been there. Nida, her brother, and
sister searched for Daisy the whole evening of June 10, 1999, until the early morning of the following day.
Their search proved fruitless. Then, at about 10am of June 11, 1999, she was informed that the dead
lody of Icr daugIicr was found iicd io iIc rooi of an arona ircc ly iIc rivcr aficr iIc conpucria" ly a
certain Freddie Quinto. The body was already in the barangay hall when Nida saw her daughter. Daisy
was wearing her pink short pants with her sleeveless shirt tied around her neck.

Barangay Councilmen Raul Ricasa and Calring Purihin reported the incident to the Rosario
police. The other barangay officers fetched accused-appellant from his house and took him to the
barangay hall. At the barangay hall, Ma. Nida pointed to Gerrico Vallejo as the probable suspect since he
was with the victim when she was last seen alive. One witness proclaimed that around 3:30 of the day
when the crime was committed, Daisy was approached by Gerrico Vallejo after which the two left the area
iogciIcr. AnoiIcr wiincss icsiificd iIai Ic saw Ccrrico ncar iIc conpucria" wiiI wci cloiIcs lui Iis facc
and hair were not and that Gerrico was looking uneasy and troubled. Dr. Antonio Vertido (Vertido),
medico-legal officer of the NBI, testified that at about 9pm of July 11, he conducted a physical



examination of Vallejo. At 10pm, Vertido conducted a post-mortem autopsy on Daisy. As the probable
suspect for he was the one last seen with the victim when she was still alive, Gerrico Vallejo was charged
with rape and homicide. Before the trial Vallejo made an oral confession with the municipal mayor and
his counsel, and also executed an extra-judicial confession in the presence of his counsel. On the
strength of the ANALYSIS and the other circumstantial evidence, the accused was convicted of the crime
as charged and was sentenced with death penalty. On appeal, Vallejo assails the sufficiency and
credibility of the samples and findings of the DNA ANALYSIS, alleging that samples were already
contaminated for being soaked in smirchy waters. Vallejo also denies the voluntariness of the confessions
made by him.

ISSUE:
1. Whether the trial court erred in convicting Vallejo based on the DNA ANALYSIS? NO.
2. Whether the oral and extrajudicial confessions are admissible? YES.

RATIO: In assessing the probative value of DNA evidence, the courts should consider among other things
the following data: how the samples were collected, how they were handled, the possibility of
contamination, the procedures followed in analyzing the samples, whether the proper standards and
procedures were followed in conducting the tests, and the qualification of the analyst who conducted the
test. In this case, it is true that the bloodstains taken from the clothing of the victim and of the accused
as well as the hair strands and nails taken from Daisy tested negative for the presence of human DNA.
However, while the DNA analyst found that the specimens submitted were soaked in smirchy waters, the
test on the nails and hair samples rendered negative results because of the inadequacy of the specimen
submitted and not the possibility of contamination.

But the vaginal swabs taken from the victim yielded positive for the presence of human DNA.
Upon ANALYSIS by the experts, they showed the DNA profile of Vallejo. In conclusion, the totality of
cvidcncc poinis io Vallcjo's guili. On iIc oiIcr Iand, iIc adnissililiiy of Vallcjo's cirajudicial confcssions
of attacked on the ground that these were extracted from him by means of torture, beatings, and threats
to his life. The bare assertions of maltreatment by the police authorities in extracting confessions from the
accused are not sufficient. The standing rule is iIai wIcrc iIc dcfcndanis did noi prcscni cvidcncc of
compulsion, or duress nor violence on their person; where they failed to complain to the officer who
administered their oaths; where they did not institute any criminal or administrative action against their
alleged intimidators for maltreatment; where there appeared to be no marks of violence on their bodies;
and wIcrc iIcy did noi Iavc iIcnsclvcs canincd ly a rcpuiallc pIysician io luiircss iIcir clain," all
these will be considered as indicating voluntariness.

The bare assertions of Vallejo cannot be given weight. Vallejo testified that he was made to stay in
the municipal hall for 13 hours, during which time he was boxed, tortured, and hit with a piece of wood
by policemen to make him admit to the crime. However, accused-appellant was physically examined by
Dr. Vertido at about 9PM in the evening of the same day. While the results show that accused-appellant
did sustain injuries, the same are incompatible with his claim of torture. If the account of accused-
appellant that he was beaten up is true, Dr. Vertido would have found more than mere abrasions and
hematoma on his left finger. Dr. Vertido's findings are more consistent with the theory that accused-
appellant sustained physical injuries as a result of the struggle made by the victim during the
connission of iIc rapc in iIc conpucria." Ai all cvcnis, cvcn if accuscd-appellant was truthful and his
assailed confessions are inadmissible, the circumstantial evidence, as already shown, is sufficient to
establish his guilt beyond all reasonable doubt.

ANALYSIS:
The admission of expert testimony of the DNA experts in the DNA ANALYSIS and the opinion of Dr.
Vcriido rcgarding Vallcjo's injurics is consisicni wiiI iIc prcscni and proposcd rulcs of cvidcnce.

STATE v. GARVER
225 P.2d 771 December 19, 1950

Doctrine: Generally, a lay witness may testify only to facts and not to opinions or conclusions, but may be
permitted to use so-called short hand descriptions, in reality opinions, in presenting to court their



impressions of the general physical condition of a person.

FACTS: Robert Garver met his accomplices Norman Andrus and Leland Marshall in tavern in downtown
Portland, and proposed that they rob one Ancell Abbott, who was a janitor in the Fred Meyer Store.
Garver claimed to have information that Abbott would be leaving the store late in the evening carrying
aloui $5,000 in a sIopping lag. Aciing upon Carvcr's suggcsiions, Andrus and MarsIall siolc an
automobile, secured two guns, and rejoined Garvcr ai aloui ninc o'clocl in iIc cvcning in iIc viciniiy of
the store. Garver armed himself with one of the guns. They waited until Abbott appeared carrying the
shopping bag, and followed him several blocks in the stolen automobile. Andrus remained in the car while
the other two got out and held up Abbott with guns in hand. The defendant Garver shot Abbott three
times. The three fled, carrying with them the shopping bag, which, as it turned out, contained no money
but only some clothes.

Garver raised the defense of insanity. It was shown during the trial that Garver was admitted
iwicc in ncnial insiiiuiions, nancly iIc Vcicran's Hospiial ai Fosclurg, Orcgon and iIc Orcgon Siaic
Hospiial, as a ncnially discascd pcrson. A provisiona diagnosis of 'pyscIoncurosis Iysicria" was nadc.
Laicr wIilc on parolc, ai Iis noiIcr's rcqucsi, Ic was canincd ly Dr. CcrIard D. Haugcn, a
psycIiairisi. Dr. Haugcn rcporicd iIai iIc lasic paiicrn prcscni in PyscIopaiIic Infcrioriiy". In addiiion
io Dr. Haugcn's icsiinony, iIc dcfcnsc also prcscnicd iIc icsiinony of Carvcr's noiIcr Mrs. MiicIcll, and
lay icsiinonics of oiIcrs icnding io sIow iIc dcfcndani's cIronic condiiion of ncnial alnornaliiy.

Mrs. Mitchell related to the jury the history of her son from infancy to the day of the alleged crime
including his illnesses, both mental and physical; his hospitalizations; his moral delinquencies; and his
crimes wIaicvcr nigIi iIrow ligIi on Iis ncnial condiiion. SIc uscd iIc cprcssion 'in sucI icrrillc
sIapc' and 'pIysically ill'. TIc couri sirucl iIcscs pIrascs on iIc iIcory iIai iIcy wcrc opinions or
conclusions of the witness. Garver was later convicted of murder by the lower court.

ISSUE:
1. Whether Mrs. Mitchell can testify as to the mental condition of the defendant Garver? YES.

RATIO: The general rule is that a lay witness may testify only to facts and not to opinions or conclusions.
But lay witnesses are frequently permitted to use so-callcd 'sIori Iand' dcscripiions, in rcaliiy opinions,
in presenting to the court their impression of the general physical condition of a person. The court has
held it proper in a personal injury case to permit laymen, who were intimately acquainted with the
plaintiff prior to her injury and observed her condition thereafter, to testify that her health and general
physical condition had materially changed for the worse. It leaves the witness free to speak his ordinary
language, unbewildered by admonitions from the judge to testify to facts, when all the while the witness is
sure in his own mind that he is testifying to facts. The jury understands that what the witness means,
and the right of cross-examination removes the likelihood of harm to the other side. Too strict adherence
io iIc 'opinion' rulc is undcsirallc.

ANALYSIS:
The ruling will be the same if decided in the Philippine courts. The doctrine in this case is similar to the
opinion rulc undcr iIc Fulcs of Evidcncc, wIicI siaics iIai TIc opinion of iIc wiincss for wIicI propcr
basis is given, may be received in evidence regarding xxx (c) the mental sanity of a person with whom he
is sufficiently acquainted." TIc sanc dccision will lc rcacIcd if iIc proposcd rulcs arc io lc uscd, iIcrc
being no substantial amendments.

UNITED STATES v. STIFEL
433 F.2d 431 October 29, 1870

Doctrine: On questions of science, skill, or trade, or others of like kind, persons of skill, sometimes called
experts, may not only testify to facts, but are permitted to give their opinions in evidence.

FACTS: Appellant Orville Stifel was indicted for murdering Daniel Ronec by sending him a bomb through
the United States mails. The bomb exploded when Ronec opened the package containing it. Records



sIowcd iIai Siifcl and onc CIcryl Joncs, wIo was cngagcd io Foncc ai iIc iinc of iIc laiicr's nurdcr,
had previously during 1965 and 1966 had a somewhat tempestuous romance which she sought to end in
the fall of 1966. Subsequently, Stifel wrote Jones two letters which contained language jury could have
regarded as threats. In 1967, Jones became engaged to Ronec and their wedding was set for 1968. Stifel
learned of both these facts from Jones. It was only a few weeks before the wedding day that Ronec as
killed by the explosion. A postman had just delivered a package addressed to him consisting of a mailing
tube with a screw-on iop. TIc cplosion iorc opcn Foncc's aldoncn and iorc off Iis arns.

Prosccuiion cvidcncc lorc prinarily upon Siifcl's possillc noiivc for scnding iIc lonl, upon Iis
capability in relation to fashioning it, and upon the availability to him of the materials, being an employee
of Procter & Gamble, from which government evidence sought to establish that the bomb and bomb
package were made. The prosecution also introduced the expert testimony of one James Scott, a chemist
and microanalyst attached to the Identification Bureau of the Post Office Department Inspection Services.
He testified pertaining to his study of various fragments of the bomb package by the method of neutron
activation analysis. By this means, Scott sought to establish whether the pieces of cardboard, vinyl tape,
metal top, and paper gummed label were or could have been from the same manufacturer and same
batches as similar items found in the Procter & Gamble inventory. Employing neutron activation analysis,
Scott testified that in his opinion the mailing label, the cardboard tube fragments, vinyl tape fragments
and ncial cap wcrc of iIc sanc 'clcncnial conposiiion' as iIcir Procicr & Canllc counicrparis and iIai
'wiiIin rcasonallc scicniific ccriainiy' iIcy wcrc of iIc sanc iypc and same manufacturer.

TIc appcllani conicnds iIai iIc ncuiron aciivaiion analysis icsi rcsulis and Scoii's opinion
testimony derived therefrom were inadmissible because the test is too new and unreliable and has not yet
been generally accepted by scientists in its particular field. The lower court, however, admitted the
testimony and, upon which, convicted Stifel.

ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the lower court erred in admitting the testimony of Scott? NO.

RATIO: On questions of science, skill, or trade, or others of like kind, persons of skill, sometimes called
experts, may not only testify to facts, but are permitted to give their opinions in evidence. Whether a
witness is shown to be qualified or not as an expert is a preliminary question to b determined in the first
place by the court; and the rule is, that if the court admits the testimony, then it is for the jury to decide
whether any weight is to be given to the testimony.

In Frye v. United States, iIc couri Icld iIai. Jusi wIcn a scicniific principle or discovery crosses
the line between the experimental and demonstrable stages is difficult to define. Somewhere in this
twilight zone the evidential force of the principle must be recognized, and while courts will go a long way
in admitting expert testimony deduction from a well-recognized scientific principle or discovery, the thing
from which the deduction is made must be sufficiently established to have gained general acceptance in
iIc pariicular ficld in wIicI ii lclongs."

The decision as to whether the state of technology in this field was such as to render testimony
based on neutron activation analysis admissible was, of course, a decision for the judge. Any disputes
aloui iIc iccIniquc cnploycd ly iIc govcrnncni's cpcri or iIc rcsulis of Iis test went to the quality of
the evidence and were for consideration by the jury.

ANALYSIS:
The decision may change if decided in the Philippine courts depending on whether the neutron activation
analysis test will pass the relevance and reliability test under the Daubert case. The Frye test is no longer
controlling since it was already repealed by the Federal Rules of Evidence. The decision will be the same if
decided under the proposed Rules of Evidence since no change was introduced with respect to the rule on
admissibility of the opinion of a witness.



DAUBERT v. MERRELL DOW PHARMACEUTICALS, INC.
509 U.S. 579 June 28, 1993

Doctrine: Under the Federal Rules of Evidence, the trial judge must ensure that any and all scientific
testimony or evidence admitted is not only relevant but reliable.

FACTS: Petitioners Jason Daubert and Eric Schuller are minor children born with serious birth defects.
They and their parents sued respondent in California state court, alleging that the birth defects had been
causcd ly iIc noiIcr's ingcsiion of Dcndcciin, a prcscripiion aniinausca drug narlcicd ly Mcrrcll Dow
Pharmaceuticals. After extensive discovery, respondent moved for summary judgment, contending that
Bendectin does not cause birth defects in humans and that petitioners would be unable to come forward
with any admissible evidence that it does. In support of its motion, respondent submitted an affidavit of
Steven H. Lamm, physician and epidemiologist, who is a well-credentialed expert on the risks from
exposure to various chemical substances. Doctor Lamm stated that he had reviewed all the literature on
Bendectin and human birth defects-more than 30 published studies involving over 130,000 patients. No
study had found Bendectin to be a human teratogen (i.e., a substance capable of causing malformations
in fetuses). On the basis of this review, Doctor Lamm concluded that maternal use of Bendectin during
the first trimester of pregnancy has not been shown to be a risk factor for human birth defects.

Petitioners responded to respondent's motion with the testimony of eight experts of their own,
each of whom also possessed impressive credentials. These experts had concluded that Bendectin can
cause birth defects. TIcir conclusions wcrc lascd upon in viiro" (icsi iulci and in vivo" (livci aninal
studies that found a link between Bendectin and malformations, and pharmacological studies of the
chemical structure of Bendectin that purported to show similarities between the structure of the drug and
that of other substances known to cause birth defects.

TIc Disirici Couri granicd rcspondcni's noiion for sunnary judgncni. TIc couri siaicd iIai
scientific evidence is admissible only if the principle upon wIicI ii is lascd is 'sufficicnily csiallisIcd io
Iavc gcncral acccpiancc in iIc ficld io wIicI ii lclongs.' TIc couri concludcd iIai pciiiioncrs' cvidcncc
did not meet this standard, and that the expert opinion which is not based on epidemiological evidence is
not admissible to establish causation.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed. Citing Frye v. United States, the
court stated that expert opinion based on a scientific technique is inadmissible unless the technique is
gcncrally acccpicd" as rcliallc in iIc rclcvani scicniific connuniiy. TIc couri dcclarcd iIai cpcri
opinion lascd on a nciIodology iIai divcrgcs significanily fron iIc proccdurcs acccpicd ly rccognizcd
auiIoriiics in iIc ficld ... cannoi lc sIown io lc 'gcncrally acccpicd as a rcliallc iccIniquc.' "

ISSUE:
1. WIciIcr iIc 'gcncral acccpiancc icsi' is iIc propcr siandard for adniiiing cpcri icsiinony? NO.

RATIO: The Federal Rules of Evidence, not Frye, provides the standard for admitting expert scientific
testimony in a federal trial. Frye's gcncral acccpiancc" icsi was supcrscdcd ly iIc Fulcs' sulscqucni
adoption. The Rules occupy the field, and, although the common law of evidence may serve as an aid to
their application, respondent's assertion that they somehow assimilated Frye is unconvincing. Nothing in
the Rules as a whole or in the text and drafting history of Rule 702, which specifically governs expert
testimony, gives any indicaiion iIai gcncral acccpiancc" is a ncccssary prccondiiion io iIc adnissililiiy
of scientific evidence. Moreover, such a rigid standard would be at odds with the Rules' liberal thrust and
their general approach of relaxing the traditional barriers to opinion" icsiinony.

The Rules place appropriate limits on the admissibility of purportedly scientific evidence by
assigning to the trial judge the task of ensuring that an expert's testimony both rests on a reliable
foundation and is relevant to the task at hand. The reliability standard is established by the requirement
iIai an cpcri's icsiinony pcriain io scicniific...lnowlcdgc," sincc iIc adjcciivc scicniific" inplics a
grounding in scicncc's nciIods and proccdurcs, wIilc iIc word lnowlcdgc" connotes a body of known
facts or of ideas inferred from such facts or accepted as true on good grounds.

Faced with a proffer of expert scientific testimony under Rule 702, the trial judge, must make a
preliminary assessment of whether the testimony's underlying reasoning or methodology is scientifically
valid and properly can be applied to the facts at issue. Many considerations will bear on the inquiry,



including whether the theory or technique in question can be tested, whether it has been subjected to
peer review and publication, its known or potential error rate and the existence and maintenance of
standards controlling its operation, and whether it has attracted widespread acceptance within a relevant
scientific community. The inquiry is a flexible one, and its focus must be solely on principles and
methodology, not on the conclusions that they generate. The appropriate means by which evidence based
on valid principles may be challenged is through cross-examination, presentation of contrary evidence,
and careful instruction on the burden of proof, rather than wholesale exclusion under an
unconpronising gcncral acccpiancc" siandard.

ANALYSIS:
The ruling will still be the same if decided in the Philippine courts considering that our Rules of Evidence
do not provide particular standards for the admissibility of opinion of a witness. In this jurisdiction, the
courts adopt the Daubert ruling. The same decision will be reached if the proposed rules are to be used,
there being no substantial amendments.

UNITED STATES v. BONDS
12 F.3d 540 December 15, 1993

Doctrine: Standard for admission of expert scientific testimony requires determination of whether it is
)ccuunt und )cuIc, utI )ccuuncc )cqu)cncnt stcnnng ])on uppcuIc )uc`s )cqu)cncnt tIut
testimony assist trier of fact to understand evidence or determine a fact at issue, and with reliability
requirement being based on )uc`s )cqu)cncnt tIut suI]cct o] cxpc)t`s tcstnonu Ic sccnt]c Inoucdgc,
and this entails preliminary assessment of whether reasoning or methodology underlying testimony is
scientifically valid and whether the reasoning and methodology can properly be applied to facts at issue.

FACTS: David Hartlaub as gunned down in his van as he topped at a bank near the Sandusky Mall in
Ohio, where he planned to make a night deposit of cash from the music store he helped manage. The
killers apparently had no interest in robbery. Three individuals Wayne Yee, Mark Verdi and John Ray
Bonds were indicted in connection with the crime, tried, and convicted of conspiracy and federal
fircarns offcnscs. Ai iIc irial, iIc Covcrnncni's iIcory for iIc sIooiing was iIai the gunmen, members of
iIc Hcll's Angcls noiorcyclc gang, Iad nisialcn Harilaul's ycllow van for an idcniical van drivcn ly a
local ncnlcr of a rival noiorcyclc gang, iIc Ouilaws, wIon iIc gunncn Iad allcgcdly planncd io 'Iii' in
retaliation for the shooting of a Hcll's Angcls ncnlcr ly an Ouilaw iIc prcvious ycar in Illinois.

The police later found the getaway van abandoned with its engine still running and the lights still
on. The gun used in the shooting, a MAC-11 9-mm semi-automatic pistol fitted with a homemade
silcnccr. DoiI iIc gun and iIc van's carpci wcrc splaiicrcd wiiI llood. Scrology icsis sIowcd iIai iIc
llood was noi Harilaul's, lui rarc cnzyncs idcniificd in iIc splaiicrcd llood, wIicI only appcar in aloui
1% of Caucasian males, matched thosc found in Donds's llood. Mosi of iIc llood in iIc van Iad drippcd
between the front seats; shortly after the murder, Bonds wore his right arm in a sling, and it was later
established that he had serious ricochet wound which evidently bled between the seats as he drove the
van that night.

Agents prepared an affidavit seeking to obtain a search warrant for blood and hair samples from
Bonds. The federal magistrate judge of Toledo issued a warrant based on the finding of probable cause.
The agents seized the samples from Bonds. These samples were the basis for evidence that the DNA in
Donds's llood naicIcd iIc DNA fron iIc llood found in iIc lacl scai of iIc van. All iIrcc dcfcndanis crc
eventually tried and convicted. The defendants question the judgment. They contended that the testimony
about the DNA evidence was not based on principles generally accepted in the scientific community (Frye
test).

ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the DNA evidence was properly admitted as evidence? YES.

RATIO: The Supreme Court in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. has already rejected Frye's
general acceptance test as the exclusive test and has redefined the standard for the admission of expert



scientific testimony. The Supreme Court found that the Frye test was superseded by Federal Rule of
Evidence 702, which makes expert testimony admissible if the scientific or specialized knowledge will
assist the trier of fact and if the witness is qualified as an expert. The Court explained that the trial judge
must ensure that scientific testimony is "not only relevant but reliable."

While the Daubert Court did not explicitly define scientific validity or apply its new teaching to the
evidence at issue in that case, it did begin to draw the parameters of this inquiry by providing the
following non-exclusive list of factors: (1) whether a theory or technique can be (and has been) tested, (2)
whether the theory or technique has been subjected to peer review and publication, (3) the known or
potential rate of error in using a particular scientific technique and the existence and maintenance of
standards controlling the technique's operation, and (4) whether the theory or technique has been
generally accepted in the particular scientific field.

The Court held that although the findings of the magistrate judge and the district court were
based only on the pre-Daubert Frye hearing and the general acceptance test, these findings are relevant to
our examination under a Daubert analysis, first because, as the district court noted, neither the
defendants nor the Government challenge the magistrate judge's findings regarding the substance of the
expert testimony presented at the Frye hearing or his characterization of the testimony, and second,
because general acceptance is still one factor the Supreme Court has said can impact on a court's
scientific validity determination and the defendants' arguments on appeal focus on these findings and
their general acceptance determination. After a thorough review of the record, we hold that these findings
are not clearly erroneous, and we adopt the magistrate's findings as conclusive. The Court held that the
expert testimony meets the "relevance" prong of the admissibility test: that the evidence or testimony
assists the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue. This requirement
merely looks at whether the evidence and testimony is relevant to any issue in the case. The testimony
must be "sufficiently tied to the facts of the case that it will aid the jury in resolving a factual dispute."
The evidence that Bonds's DNA matched at least to some extent the DNA found in the crime-scene sample
clearly is relevant to whether defendant Bonds was present in the victim's van on the night of the murder.
Thus, the DNA evidence was helpful to the jury in determining whether defendants were guilty of the
charges. With respect to the reliability of the technique used by the FBI, the court held that the FBI's
principles and methodology have in fact been tested. The FBI performed internal proficiency testing as
well as validation studies and environmental insult studies to determine whether the lab could produce
reliable, reproducible results from samples that had been mixed with contaminants or subjected to
environmental insults such as sun.

Finally, the Court said that when reviewed in light of the four Daubert factors (testing, peer
review, rate of error, and general acceptance), the underlying principles and methodology used by the FBI
to declare matches and make statistical probabilities are scientifically valid. The methodology was valid in
that it resulted from sound and cogent reasoning, and was well-grounded or justifiable and applicable to
the matter at hand. Thus, the methodology clearly had "a grounding in the methods and procedures of
science" and was based on "more than subjective belief or unsupported speculation."

ANALYSIS:
There is nothing in the Rules of Evidence which refer to particular standards which allow the testimony of
an expert witness to be admitted to evidence. So long as the matter to which the witness is testifying to
requires special knowledge, skill, experience or training and the witness is shown to possess them, the
testimony may be received in evidence. In our jurisdiction, the Supreme Court follows the Daubert
principle rather than the Frye test. The same decision will be reached if the proposed rules are to be used,
there being no substantial amendments.

HERRERA v. ALBA
G.R. No. 148220 June 15, 2005

Doctrine: DNA analysis that excludes the putative father from paternity should be conclusive proof of non-
paternity. If the value of W is less than 99.9%, the results of the DNA analysis should be considered as
corroborative evidence. If the value of W is 99.9% or higher, then there is refutable presumption of paternity.



FACTS: Rosendo Alba, represented by his mother Armi Alba, filed before the trial court a petition for
compulsory recognition, support and damages against petitioner Rosendo Herrera. Petitioner filed his
answer with counterclaim where Ic dcnicd any pIysical coniaci wiiI rcspondcni's noiIcr and iIai Ic is
not the biological father of respondent. Respondent filed a motion to direct the taking of DNA paternity
testing to abbreviate the proceedings.

To support the motion, respondent presented the testimony of Saturnina C. Halos, Ph.D. Dr.
Halos was an Associate Professor at De La Salle University where she taught Cell Biology. She was also
head of the University of the Philippines Natural Sciences Research Institute, a DNA analysis laboratory.
In her testimony, Dr. Halos described the process for DNA paternity testing and asserted that the test had
an accuracy rate of 99.9999% in establishing paternity.

Petitioner opposed DNA paternity testing and contended that it has not gained acceptability. He
further argued that DNA paternity testing violates his right against self-incrimination. The trial court
granicd rcspondcni's noiion io conduci DNA paicrniiy icsiing on pciiiioncr, rcspondcni and Arni Alla.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision.

ISSUE:
1. Whether a DNA test is a valid probative tool in this jurisdiction to determine filiation? YES.

RULING: The case of People v. Vallejo states that in assessing the probative value of DNA evidence,
therefore, courts should consider, among other things, the following data: how the samples were
collected, how they were handled, the possibility of contamination of the samples, the procedure followed
in analyzing the samples, whether the proper standards and procedures were followed in conducting the
tests, and the qualification of the analyst who conducted the tests.

In a paternity test, the forensic scientist looks at a number of these variable regions in an
individual to produce a DNA profile. Comparing next the DNA profiles of the mother and child, it is
possible to determine which half of the child's DNA was inherited from the mother. The other half must
have been inherited from the biological father. The alleged father's profile is then examined to ascertain
whether he has the DNA types in his profile, which match the paternal types in the child. If the man's
DNA types do not match that of the child, the man is excluded as the father. If the DNA types match, then
he is not excluded as the father.

It is not enough to state that the child's DNA profile matches that of the putative father. A
complete match between the DNA profile of the child and the DNA profile of the putative father does not
necessarily establish paternity. For this reason, following the highest standard adopted in an American
jurisdiction,
[53]
trial courts should require at least 99.9% as a minimum value of the Probability of
Paternity (W') prior to a paternity inclusion. W is a numerical estimate for the likelihood of paternity of a
putative father compared to the probability of a random match of two unrelated individuals. An
appropriate reference population database, such as the Philippine population database, is required to
compute for W. Due to the probabilistic nature of paternity inclusions, W will never equal to 100%.
However, the accuracy of W estimates is higher when the putative father, mother and child are subjected
to DNA analysis compared to those conducted between the putative father and child alone.

DNA analysis that excludes the putative father from paternity should be conclusive proof of non-
paternity. If the value of W is less than 99.9%, the results of the DNA analysis should be considered as
corroborative evidence. If the value of W is 99.9% or higher, then there is refutable presumption of
paternity. This refutable presumption of paternity should be subjected to the Vallejo standards.

ANALYSIS:
The case was properly decided by applying Section 9 of the Rule on DNA Evidence.



PEOPLE V. UMANITO
G.R. No. 172607 April 16, 2009

Doctrine: A disputable presumption, not contradicted is sufficient evidence of the fact presumed, and no
other evidence need be introduced.

FACTS: This case involves a complaint for rape by accused Rufino Umanito. The alleged rape of the
conplainani, AAA in 1989 rcsulicd in prcgnancy and Icr sulscqucni liriI of a cIild, DDD. Unaniio's
defense of alibi, together with his specific assertion that while he had courted AAA they were not
sweethearts, lead to a general theory on his part that he did not engage in sexual relations with the
complainant.

(In an SC Resolution dated 26 October 2007, the Court resolved, for the very first time, to apply
the then recently promulgated New Rules on DNA Evidence (DNA Rules). This case was remanded to the
RTC for reception of DNA evidence.)

TIc FTC and CA Icld iIai. WiiI iIc advancc in gcnciics and iIc availaliliiy of ncw iccInology, ii
can now be determined with reasonable certainty whether appellant is the father of AAA's child. If he is
not, his acquittal may be ordained. We have pronounced that if it can be conclusively determined that the
accused did not sire the alleged victim's child, this may cast the shadow of reasonable doubt and allow
his acquittal on this basis. If he is found not to be the father, the finding will at least weigh heavily in the
uliinaic dccision in iIis casc."

The RTC upon receiving the Resolution of the Court to ascertain the feasibility of DNA testing
with due regard to the standards set in the DNA Rules. DNA samples were thus extracted from AAA and
BBB. DNA samples consisted of buccal swabs and blood samples taken from the parties by the forensic
chemists who adopted reliable techniques and procedure in collecting and handling them to avoid
contamination. The method that was used to secure the samples were safe and reliable. The samples were
taken and handled by an expert, whose qualifications, integrity and dedication to her work is
unquestionable, hence, the possibility of substitution or manipulation is very remote. The procedure
adopted by the DNA section, Forensic Chemistry Division of the National Bureau of Investigation in
analyzing the samples was in accordance with the standards used in modern technology. To ensure a
reliable result, the NBI secured two (2) DNA types of samples from the parties, the buccal swabs as
primary source and blood as secondary source. Both sources were separately processed and examined
and thereafter a comparative analysis was conducted which yielded the same result.

Using the Powerplex 16 System, Deoxyribonuncleic acid analysis on the Buccal Swabs and Blood
stained on FTA paper taken from AAA, [BBB], and Rufino Umanito y Millares, to determine whether or not
Rufino Umanito y Millares is the biological father of [BBB], showed that there is a Complete Match in all
of the 15 loci tested between the alleles of Rufino Umanito and [BBB]; That based on the above findings,
there is a 99.9999% probability of paternity that Rufino Umanito is the biological father of [BBB]

The Public Prosecutor offered in evidence the Report of the Chemistry Division of the National
Bureau of Investigation, Manila on the DNA analysis to determine whether or not Rufino Umanito is the
biological father of [BBB] and the enlarged version of the table to establish that on the DNA examination
conducted on [AAA], [BBB] and the accused Rufino Umanito for the purpose of establishing paternity, the
result is 99.9999% probable. The defense did not interpose any objection, hence, the exhibits were
admitted.

ISSUE:
1. Whether Umanito is the father of BBB as this is the determinative question, the answer to which will of
the appeal of Umanito from the decision of the RTC and CA, finding him guilty of rape? YES.

RATIO: Under Section 9, A.M. No. 06-11-5-SC, if the value of the Probability of Paternity is 99.9% or
higher, there shall be a disputable presumption of paternity, the instant case was set for reception of
evidence for the accused on April 29, 2008 to controvert the presumption that he is the biological father
of [BBB]. During the hearing the accused who was in court manifested through his counsel that he will
not present evidence to dispute the findings of the Forensic Chemistry Division of the National Bureau of
Investigation. The accused did not object to the admission of evidence containing testimony and result of
DNA testing. He did not also present evidence to controvert the results of the DNA analysis.



Section 6. A.M. No. 06-11-5-SC provides that: "If the value of the Probability of Paternity is 99.9%
or higher, there shall be a disputable presumption of paternity. DNA analysis conducted gave the
following result:

There is a COMPLETE MATCH in all the fifteen (15) loci tested between the alleles of Rufino
Umanito y Millares and [BBB]. Based on the above findings, there is a 99.9999% Probability of Paternity
that Rufino Umanito y Millares is the biological Father of [BBB]"

Disputable presumptions are satisfactory if uncontradicted but may be contradicted and
overcome by other evidence (Rule 131, Section 3, Rules of Court). The disputable presumption that was
established as a result of the DNA testing was not contradicted and overcome by other evidence
considering that the accused did not object to the admission of the results of the DNA testing nor
presented evidence to rebut the same. Based on the result of the DNA analysis conducted by the National
Bureau of Investigation, Forensic Division, RUFINO UMANITO y MILLARES is the biological father of
[BBB], and is found guilty of rape.

ANALYSIS:
The case was decided properly and in accordance with the current rules on disputable presumptions.
Under the proposed revised rules, the ruling would still be the same that disputable presumptions are
satisfactory if not contradicted but may be contradicted and overcome by other evidence. If no evidence is
offered to contradict it, the presumption will stand. The presumption in this case was rightfully upheld.

XIII. Burden of Proof and Presumptions

A. Rule 131, Secs. 1-4.

Burden of Proof and Presumptions

SECTION 1.Burden of proof. Burden of proof is the duty of a party to present evidence on the facts in
issue necessary to establish his claim or defense by the amount of evidence required by law. (1a, 2a)

Sec. 2.Conclusive presumptions. The following are instances of conclusive presumptions:
(a)Whenever a party has, by his own declaration, act, or omission, intentionally and deliberately led to
another to believe a particular thing true, and to act upon such belief, he cannot, in any litigation arising
out of such declaration, act or omission, be permitted to falsify it:
(b)The tenant is not permitted to deny the title of his landlord at the time of commencement of the relation
of landlord and tenant between them. (3a)

Sec. 3.Disputable presumptions. The following presumptions are satisfactory if uncontradicted, but may
be contradicted and overcome by other evidence:
(a)That a person is innocent of crime or wrong;
(b)That an unlawful act was done with an unlawful intent;
(c)That a person intends the ordinary consequences of his voluntary act;
(d)That a person takes ordinary care of his concerns;
(e)That evidence willfully suppressed would be adverse if produced;
(f)That money paid by one to another was due to the latter;
(g)That a thing delivered by one to another belonged to the latter;
(h)That an obligation delivered up to the debtor has been paid;
(i)That prior rents or installments had been paid when a receipt for the later one is produced;
(j)That a person found in possession of a thing taken in the doing of a recent wrongful act is the taker and
the doer of the whole act; otherwise, that things which a person possess, or exercises acts of
ownership over, are owned by him;
(k)That a person in possession of an order on himself for the payment of the money, or the delivery of
anything, has paid the money or delivered the thing accordingly;
(l)That a person acting in a public office was regularly appointed or elected to it;



(m)That official duty has been regularly performed;
(n)That a court, or judge acting as such, whether in the Philippines or elsewhere, was acting in the lawful
exercise of jurisdiction;
(o)That all the matters within an issue raised in a case were laid before the court and passed upon by it;
and in like manner that all matters within an issue raised in a dispute submitted for arbitration were
laid before the arbitrators and passed upon by them;
(p)That private transactions have been fair and regular;
(q)That the ordinary course of business has been followed;
(r)That there was a sufficient consideration for a contract;
(s)That a negotiable instrument was given or indorsed for a sufficient consideration;
(t)That an endorsement of negotiable instrument was made before the instrument was overdue and at the
place where the instrument is dated;
(u)That a writing is truly dated;
(v)That a letter duly directed and mailed was received in the regular course of the mail;
(w)That after an absence of seven years, it being unknown whether or not the absentee still lives, he is
considered dead for all purposes, except for those of succession.
The absentee shall not be considered dead for the purpose of opening his succession till after an
absence of ten years. If he disappeared after the age of seventy-five years, an absence of five years
shall be sufficient in order that his succession may be opened.
The following shall be considered dead for all purposes including the division of the estate among the
heirs:
A person on board a vessel lost during a sea voyage, or an aircraft with is missing, who has not been
heard of for four years since the loss of the vessel or aircraft;
A member of the armed forces who has taken part in armed hostilities, and has been missing for four
years
A person who has been in danger of death under other circumstances and whose existence has not been
known for four years;
If a married person has been absent for four consecutive years, the spouse present may contract a
subsequent marriage if he or she has well-founded belief that the absent spouse is already death. In
case of disappearance, where there is a danger of death the circumstances hereinabove provided, an
absence of only two years shall be sufficient for the purpose of contracting a subsequent marriage.
However, in any case, before marrying again, the spouse present must institute a summary
proceedings as provided in the Family Code and in the rules for declaration of presumptive death of
the absentee, without prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the absent spouse.
(x)That acquiescence resulted from a belief that the thing acquiesced in was conformable to the law or
fact;
(y)That things have happened according to the ordinary course of nature and ordinary nature habits of
life;
(z)That persons acting as copartners have entered into a contract of co-partneship;
(aa)That a man and woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract
of marriage;
(bb)That property acquired by a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each other and who live
exclusively with each other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or under void
marriage, has been obtained by their joint efforts, work or industry.
(cc)That in cases of cohabitation by a man and a woman who are not capacitated to marry each other and
who have acquire properly through their actual joint contribution of money, property or industry,
such contributions and their corresponding shares including joint deposits of money and evidences of
credit are equal.
(dd)That if the marriage is terminated and the mother contracted another marriage within three hundred
days after such termination of the former marriage, these rules shall govern in the absence of proof to
the contrary:
(1)A child born before one hundred eighty days after the solemnization of the subsequent marriage is
considered to have been conceived during such marriage, even though it be born within the three
hundred days after the termination of the former marriage.
(2) A child born after one hundred eighty days following the celebration of the subsequent marriage is
considered to have been conceived during such marriage, even though it be born within the three
hundred days after the termination of the former marriage.
(ee)That a thing once proved to exist continues as long as is usual with things of the nature;
(ff)That the law has been obeyed;



(gg)That a printed or published book, purporting to be printed or published by public authority, was so
printed or published;
(hh)That a printed or published book, purporting contain reports of cases adjudged in tribunals of the
country where the book is published, contains correct reports of such cases;
(ii)That a trustee or other person whose duty it was to convey real property to a particular person has
actually conveyed it to him when such presumption is necessary to perfect the title of such person or
his successor in interest;
(jj)That except for purposes of succession, when two persons perish in the same calamity, such as wreck,
battle, or conflagration, and it is not shown who died first, and there are no particular circumstances
from which it can be inferred, the survivorship is determined from the probabilities resulting from the
strength and the age of the sexes, according to the following rules:
1.If both were under the age of 15 years, the older is deemed to have survived;
2.If both were above the age sixty, the younger is deemed to have survived;
3.If one is under fifteen and the other above sixty, the former is deemed to have survived;
4.If both be over fifteen and under sixty, and the sex be different, the male is deemed to have
survived, if the sex be the same, the older;
5.If one be under fifteen or over sixty, and the other between those ages, the latter is deemed
to have survived.
(kk)That if there is a doubt, as between two or more persons who are called to succeed each other, as to
which of them died first, whoever alleges the death of one prior to the other, shall prove the same; in
the absence of proof, they shall be considered to have died at the same time. (5a)

Sec. 4.No presumption of legitimacy or illegitimacy. There is no presumption of legitimacy of a child born
after three hundred days following the dissolution of the marriage or the separation of the spouses.
Whoever alleges the legitimacy or illegitimacy of such child must prove his allegation.

B. Cases:
1. Civil Cases
(a) Pornellosa v. LTA L-14040, Jan. 31, 1986
(b) IFC v. Tobias 78 SCRA 28 (1977)

PORNELLOSA V. LTA
G.R. No. L-14040 January 31, 1961

Doctrine: A party claiming a right granted or created by law must prove his claim by competent evidence. A
plaintiff is duty bound to prove his allegations in the complaint. He must rely on the strength of his evidence
and not on the weakness of that of his opponent.

Facts: The Santa Clara Estate was acquired by the Government under the provisions of Commonwealth
Act No. 539, authorizing The President of the Philippines is authorized to acquire private lands or any
interest therein, through purchase or expropriation, and to subdivide the same into home lots or small
farms for resale at reasonable prices. Petitioners allege that they and their predecessor Vicenta San Jose,
(from whom they bought the residential lot in litigation) containing an area of 200 sq. m. more or less,
had been for many years in actual possession thereof, and that following the avowed policy of the
government to sell the lots acquired from the Santa Clara Estate the defunct Rural Progress
Administration agreed to sell to them the said residential lot.

The evidence tends to show that the plaintiffs acquired by purchase the rights of occupation of
the lot in question on the strength of a document selling the right of occupancy. The vendor, Vicenta San
Jose, was an old tenant thereof. After the purchase of the Santa Clara Estate, the plaintiffs were allowed
to make payments on account of the purchase price of the lot which, as fenced, included 200 square
meters. All the amounts so paid were duly receipted. Following these payments the plaintiffs sent a check
in the amount of P200.00 but it was not accepted. The plaintiffs found out that the lot, the right of
occupancy of which they had purchased from Vicenta San Jose, had been subdivided into two smaller
lots, Nos. 44 and 78, Block 12. Lot No. 44 had been sold to Herminio Guzman. This is an action to compel
the Director of Lands to execute a deed of sale of a residential lot in favor of the petitioners upon payment



of the purchase price and to declare null and void a deed of sale of the lot executed by the then Minister
of Agriculture and Natural Resources in favor of the respondent Herminio Guzman.

ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the plaintiffs are entitled to purchase from the Government the lot formerly held by San
Jose, allegedly including about 200. square meters? NO.

RATIO: The plaintiffs are relying mainly on the deed of sale executed by San Jose in their favor. The deed
of sale allegedly executed by Vicenta San Jose in favor of Pornellosa is a mere private document and does
not conclusively establish their right to the parcel of land. While it is valid and binding upon the parties
with respect to the sale of the house erected thereon, yet it is not sufficient to convey title or any right to
the residential lot in litigation.

In the deed of sale relied upon, the area of the lot on which San Jose's house stood had not been
specified, nor had the boundaries thereof been mentioned. Any receipt for the rentals paid San Jose to the
old management of the Santa Clara Estate would have given us an idea of the extent of her holding on the
basis of the amount of the rent paid, but none was presented. Significantly, the plaintiffs cannot show a
contract whereby the Rural Progress Administration has sold or promised to sell them a lot of 200 sq m. It
is true that they hold receipts for payments made on account of the purchase price of a lot, but in none of
them are the number of the lot and its area stated. On the contrary, a note was visible in all the said
receipts, except two, which reads: "subject to further re-adjustment."

Moreover, the petitioners have not presented any document or evidence showing that the defunct
Rural Progress Administration had agreed to sell to them the residential lot in litigation. Granting that the
respondent Herminio Guzman is not entitled to acquire by purchase the said residential lot, still that fact
does not relieve the petitioners from the duty of proving by competent evidence the allegations of their
complaint. The petitioners having failed to prove their right to acquire lot 44 under Commonwealth Act
No. 539 cannot compel the respondent, the Land Tenure Administration, to convey the lot to them.

ANALYSIS:
This case was correctly decided by the court under the current rules because the party claiming relief
should prove with clear and convincing evidence his right to that which he prays for, lacking in which, the
court cannot arbitrarily grant without basis. Under the proposed revised rules the party alleging certain
facts still has the burden of proving his or her assertions. The burden of proving facts alleged has not
shifted.

IFC V. TOBIAS
G.R. No. L-41555 July 27, 1977

Doctrine: A negative allegation, not being an essential part of the statement of the right on which the cause
of action is founded, needs no evidence to support it.

FACTS: Tobias bought on installment 1 Dodge truck from Leelin Motors, Inc. To answer for his obligation
he executed a promissory note in favor of the latter, for the sum of P29.070.28 payable in 36 equal
installments with interest at the rate of 12% per annum payable in the amounts and dates indicated in
said promissory note. To secure payment of the promissory note, respondent Tobias executed in favor of
Leelin Motors, Inc. a chattel mortgage on the Dodge truck. Leelin Motors, Inc. indorsed the promissory
note and assigned the chattel mortgage to Industrial Finance Corporation. As a consequence respondent
Tobias paid 6 installments on the promissory note directly to the petitioner Industrial Finance
Corporation.

IFC'S counscl wroic io Tolias siaiing iIai IFC Ias rcfcrrcd Tolias' accouni for appropriaic lcgal
action which is in arrears in the amount of P4,254.65 and a balance of P25,249.65. In view of his default
in the payment of his installments due demand was made to pay the amount of P25,249.65 or to
surrender within the same period the Dodge truck which was a security for the loan. Tobias replied
saying that he was willing to surrender the truck and the truck has been with Leelin motors ever since it
met an accident and that he is not satisfied with the repair of the finished portions.



Upon learning that the truck had been in an accident, IFC decided not to get the truck anymore
and instituted this action to recover the unpaid balance on the promissory note.

ISSUE:
1. Whether or not IFC can still choose to exact payment for the obligation, instead of foreclosing the truck
(because Tobias insists that IFC is now estopped from claiming balance when it demanded the surrender
of the truck securing the obligation)? NO.

RATIO: To hold the petitioner in estoppel, it must be shown that when it gave the respondent the choice
of either paying the balance of the purchase price or of surrendering the truck, it had already knowledge
of the accident and the consequent damage to the truck.

Petitioner claims it had no knowledge of the accident when it gave the respondent the choice of
either paying the balance of the promissory note or of surrendering the truck.

Besides the allegation of petitioner that it had no knowledge of the accident is a negative allegati
on and needs no evidence to support it, not being an essential part of the statement of the right on which
the cause of action is founded. It is therefore the respondent Tobias who has the burden of disproving the
claim of petitioner that he has no knowledge of the accident when it made the offer to respondent either to
pay the balance on the promissory note or to surrender the truck. Respondent failed in this.
Aside from the fact that the truck being surrendered met an accident petitioner was not satisfied
with the repair of the finished portion of the truck in question. Petitioner therefore was justified refusing
to accept such surrender and in bringing suit to recover the balance of the purchase price.

ANALYSIS:
The ruling of this case is correct and in accordance with our current rules on evidence. A negative
averment only needs to be proved by the party alleging it if it is an element of a criminal offense charged.
Averment of having no knowledge in civil cases need not be proved by the party asserting it. Under the
proposed revised rules, the burden of going forward with the evidence will still fall on the party alleging
the positive of a fact, in this case, one asserting presence of knowledge.

2. Criminal Cases
(a) People v. Pajenado 31 SCRA 812 (1970)
(b) U.S. v. Dube 520 F.2d 250 (1
st
Cir. 1975)
(c) People v. Verzola 80 SCRA 600 (1977)
(d) Patterson v. New York 432 U.S. 19 (1977)

PEOPLE V. PAJENADO
G.R. Nos. L-27680-81 February 27, 1970

Doctrine: in criminal cases the burden of proof as to the offense charged lies on the prosecution and that a
negative fact alleged by the prosecution must be proven if "it is an essential ingredient of the offense
charged", the burden of proof was with the prosecution in this case to prove that the firearm used by
appellant in committing the offense charged was not properly licensed.

FACTS: Epifanio Cabe was walking along one of the streets of barrio Dapdap, North Samar, and arrived
in front of the house of one Pablo Jazmines, he saw appellant holding the now deceased Carlos Tapong by
the neck. As the two were apparently wrestling with each other, Pajenado, appellant's cousin, intervened
and the two Pajenados were able to throw Tapong to the ground. Pajenado held Tapong by the shoulder
and pinned him down to the ground, while appellant held him by one leg. As they thus held Carlos
Tapong helpless, appellant drew his gun and fired at him. Thereupon, Carlito Pajenado stood up and ran
away, while appellant remained at the scene of the crime with his drawn gun until a policeman, another
Pajenado (Ernesto), arrived and took the firearm from him. Carlos Tapong, mortally wounded, was
thereafter carried home by his father and other relatives.



Carlos Tapong died as a result of the gun-shot wound inflicted upon him on that occasion the
deceased sustained three gun-shot wounds which, in his opinion, were caused by a single shot from a .45
caliber pistol. Considering the presence of powder burns in the body of the deceased, he must have been
shot at a distance of less than one meter, and that the cause of his death was shock due to external and
internal hemorrhage.

ISSUE:
1. Whether upon the evidence of record, he should also be found guilty of the crime of illegal possession of
a firearm (in addition to murder or homicide)? NO.

RATIO: Under the provisions of Section 2, Rule 131 of the Rules of Court which provide that in criminal
cases the burden of proof as to the offense charged lies on the prosecution and that a negative fact alleged
by the prosecution must be proven if "it is an essential ingredient of the offense charged", the burden of
proof was with the prosecution in this case to prove that the firearm used by appellant in committing the
offense charged was not properly licensed. It cannot be denied that the lack or absence of a license is an
essential ingredient of the offense of illegal possession of a firearm. The information filed against appellant
specifically alleged that he had no "license or permit to possess" the .45 caliber pistol mentioned therein.
Thus it seems clear that it was the prosecution's duty not merely to allege that negative fact but to prove
it. The mere fact that the adverse party has the control of the better means of proof of the fact alleged,
should not relieve the party making the averment of the burden of proving it. This is so, because a party
who alleges a fact must be assumed to have acquired some knowledge thereof, otherwise he could not
have alleged it. Familiar instance of this is the case of a person prosecuted for doing an act or carrying on
a business, such as, the sale of liquor without a license. How could the prosecution aver the want of a
license if it had acquired no knowledge of that fact? Accordingly, although proof of the existence or non-
existence of such license can, with more facility, be adduced by the defendant, it is, nevertheless,
incumbent upon the party alleging the want of the license to prove the allegation. Naturally, as the
subject matter of the averment is one which lies peculiarly within the control or knowledge of the accused
prima facie evidence thereof on the part of the prosecution shall suffice to cast the onus upon him.

Appellant is found guilty of murder, with the aggravating circumstance of use of superior
strength, without any mitigating circumstance to offset the same, but is hereby acquitted on charge of
illegal possession of firearm.

ANALYSIS:
The case was properly decided under the current rules one evidence. If the proposed revised rules were in
effect, the ruling would still be the same since there is no revision regarding the burden of the prosecution
in proving the negative element of an offense.

UNITED STATES V. DUBE
520 F.2d 250 June 30, 1975

Doctrine: Every man is presumed sane. To rebut this presumption, evidence bearing equal weight of that
establishing sanity must be introduced to prove insanity.
In the Philippines, the quantum of proof required to overcome this presumption is proof beyond
reasonable doubt (more stringent).

FACTS: Dube was tried and charged of robbing of a federally insured bank. He did not deny that he
committed the robbery, but introduced the testimony of a psychiatrist and a psychologist that he was
insane when he committed the offense. The prosecution did not present expert opinion evidence but relied
instead on cross-examination and the lay testimony of two bank tellers and Dube's accomplice to rebut
his case. Dube moved for a judgment of acquittal on the ground that the prosecution had failed as a
matter of law to sustain its burden of proving his sanity beyond a reasonable doubt.

Dube's girl friend's narrated that she had lived with Dube for several weeks and was in his
company when he fled. While the defense argues that by selecting a bank to rob on the spur of the



moment, Dube behaved in a bizarre manner, this behavior does not necessarily compel an inference of
mental abnormality; and his conduct during and after the robbery, including precautions to avoid
detection such as discarding the gun and driving to a city where he felt the police were less likely to be on
the lookout, seems rational enough. The two tellers, who saw him briefly during the robbery, observed
nothing bizarre, and the jury was able to add to this evidence its own observations of Dube while in the
courtroom. Thus, there was evidence that Dube at certain times had behaved in a way which, to the
average eyes, might seem normal

ISSUE:
1. Whether Dube was able to prove his insanity at the time he committed the robbery? YES.
2. Whether or not the introduction of evidence to prove insanity was sufficient to rebut the presumption of
sanity? NO.

RATIO: The burden of proof to introduce evidence strong enough to rebut the presumption of sanity must
be produced by the one alleging insanity. The evidence in this case was NOT such that a reasonable man
must necessarily have entertained doubts as to defendant's sanity. Both Dr. Voss, the psychiatrist, and
Dr. Bishop, the psychologist, testified that in their opinion defendant was a schizophrenic and
substantially incapable of conforming his conduct to the requirements of the law at the time of the crime.

They arrived at those diagnoses nearly five months after the robbery and only a week before trial. Dr.
Voss's opinion was based on two hours of interviews and Dr. Bishop's on a one-hour interview and three
hours of intelligence and personality testing. Diagnoses based on such minimal observation are suspect.
Neither had any prior acquaintance with defendant nor did either treat him at any time. In fact, in
contrast to most of the cases defendant cites, he had no organic manifestations, had never received any
psychiatric treatment and had experienced no earlier abnormal episodes of any kind. Some of the factors
the experts relied on in reaching their diagnoses were contradictory or unconvincing.

Dr. Voss's diagnosis was based almost entirely on the subjective history narrated by defendant
and his counsel and Dr. Bishop undoubtedly interpreted the test results in light of the history he
received. Indeed the factual assumptions they derived from Dube's narrative, on which they predicated
their conclusions, did not comport with the testimony at trial. On the basis of defendant's statements,
both regarded the robbery as compulsive and irrational, but the testimony of Mrs. Kyllonen, the
accomplice, furnished abundant evidence of a carefully planned and executed crime. Mrs. Kyllonen
testified that she was in love with defendant, that they had lived together for as long as three weeks
before the robbery and that they had arranged to get back together after defendant disposed of some
stolen checks in New York. She also testified that during the period immediately after the robbery she
did not notice anything peculiar about defendant's activities. Since expert opinion rises no higher than
the reasons on which it is based, we cannot say that it would be unreasonable to discount the
testimony of Drs. Voss and Bishop heavily. On all the evidence we think the court correctly allowed the
case to go to the jury. The presumption of sanity stands.

ANALYSIS:
In the Philippines, the rule is the presumption of sanity has to be rebutted by proof beyond reasonable
doubt of insanity. If this case were decided here, the ruling would be the same because the quantum of
evidence required in the Philippines is more stringent to overturn the presumption of insanity. Since
insanity is an exempting circumstance and is a defense in criminal prosecutions, the person alleging the
defense of insanity has the burden of producing the evidence of proving insanity. This presumption of
sanity is not written in the current or proposed revised rules on evidence but is a presumption accepted
in general especially in relation to the exempting circumstance of insanity.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. RICARDO VERZOLA & JOSEFINA MOLINA
L-35022 December 21, 1977

Doctrine: There can be no question that once an accused has admitted the killing of a human being, the
burden is on him to establish the existence of any circumstance which may justify the killing or at least
attenuate the offense committed.



FACTS: Bernardo Molina was clubbed to death by Ricardo Verzola in the presence of appellant Josefina
Molina insidc Molina's Iousc. TIc lod of iIc viciin was sulscqucnily carricd ly iIc iwo appcllanis io iIc
ground and left at the foot of the stairs. Verzola then went to his house, changed his clothes and threw
his bloodstained clothes. He then went to the municipal building and reported to the police authorities
about what had transpired. When Josefina was questioned by the police, she gave an extra-judicial
statement saying that the assailant of her husband was Verzola and she had another version of what had
transpired. Verzola also gave a statement which was an extra-judicial confession. Verzola later denied
having made the extra-judicial confession claiming that they were not aware of the contents of their extra-
judicial confessions as they were made to sign them by the police authorities without being able to read
their contents.

ISSUE:
1. Whether the extra-judicial confession shifts the burden of proof (or burden of evidence) to establish
exculpatory evidence? YES.

RATIO: There can be no question that once an accused has admitted the killing of a human being, the
burden is on him to establish the existence of any circumstance which may justify the killing or at least
attenuate the offense committed. To establish his exculpation, or the justification for the act, he must
prove such affirmative allegation by clear, satisfactory and convincing evidence. In this case Verzola
presented no such proof. To begin with, the conduct of appellant Verzola immediately after he committed
the crime is incompatible with the reaction of one who killed another in legitimate self-defense. Although
he claims the he brought the victim down the stairs in order to bring him to the hospital, yet when he was
able to get a jeep he did not utilize it for that purpose but instead used it in going to town. Josefina also
testified about the perpetration of the crime, and confessed freely to the police authorities while Verzola,
even attempted to conceal his participation in the crime by hiding the bloodstained clothes. Although
Josefina admitted in her extra-judicial statements that she was the paramour of her co-appellant for over
a year, there is no proof that she had knowledge of the criminal designs of her co-appellant.

ANALYSIS:
This case is still applicable. The burden of proof is the duty of a party to present evidence on the facts in
issue necessary to establish his claim or defense by the amount of evidence required by law. Also, the
accused in this case was not able to rebut circumstantial evidence that proves his guilt.

GORDON PATTERSON V. STATE OF NEW YORK
432 U.S. 197 (1977)

Doctrine: it is incumbent upon defendant to show that his actions were caused by a mental infirmity not
arising to the level of insanity, and that he is less culpable for having committed said crime, does not serve
to negative any facts of the crime which the State is to prove in order to convict of murder. It consti tutes a
separate issue on which the defendant is required to carry the burden of persuasion.

FACTS: In this case, Gordon Patterson became estranged from his wife, Roberta. Roberta resumed an
association with John Northrup, a neighbor to whom she had been engaged prior to her marriage to
appellant. One night, Patterson borrowed a rifle from an acquaintance and went to the residence of his
father-in-law. There, he observed his wife through a window in a state of semi-undress in the presence of
John Northrup. He entered the house and killed Northrup by shooting him twice in the head. Patterson
was charged with second degree murder. In New York there are two elements of this crime: 1) intent to
cause the death of another person 2) causing the death of such person. Malice is not an element of the
crinc. Howcvcr, iIc siaic pcrniis a pcrson accuscd of nurdcr io raisc an affirnaiivc dcfcnsc iIai Ic
acted under the influence of extreme emotional disturbance for which there was a reasonable explanation
or ccusc". TIe state also recognizes the crime of manslaughter. A person is guilty of manslaughter if he
inicniionally lills anoiIcr pcrson undcr circunsianccs wIicI do noi consiiiuic nurdcr lccausc Ic acis
undcr iIc influcncc of circnc cnoiional disiurlancc." TIc jury thereafter found Patterson guilty of
nurdcr. WIilc appcal io iIc Ncw Yorl couri was pcnding, iIc Suprcnc couri dcclarcd Mainc's nurdcr
statute unconstitutional. Under the Maine statute, a person accused of murder could rebut the statutory
presumption that he committed the offense with malice by proving that he acted in the heat of passion on
sudden provocation. The court held that this scheme improperly shifted the burden of persuasion from



the prosecutor to the defendant and was therefore a violation of due process. Patterson thereafter used
this as a ground to reverse the decision rendered against him.

ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the burden of proof improperly shifted as to be a violation of due process? NO.

RATIO: The crime of murder is defined by the statute as causing the death of another person with intent
to do so. The death, intent to kill, and causation are the facts that the State is required to prove beyond a
reasonable doubt if a person is to be convicted of murder. No further facts either presumed or inferred in
order to constitute the crime. The statute does provide an affirmative defense-that the defendant acted
under the influence of extreme emotional disturbance for which there was a reasonable explanation-
which, if proved by preponderance of evidence, would reduce the crime to manslaughter. It is plain
enough that if the intentional killing is shown, the State intends to deal with the defendant as a murderer
unless he demonstrates the mitigating circumstances.

In this case, the guilty verdict confirms that the State successfully carried its burden of proving
the facts of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Nothing in the evidence, including any evidence that
nigIi Iavc lccn offcrcd wiiI rcspcci io Paiicrson's ncnial siaic ai iIc iinc of the crime, raised a
reasonable doubt about his guilt as a murderer, and clearly the evidence failed to convince the jury that
Paiicrson's affirnaiivc dcfcnsc Iad lccn nadc oui. Ii sccns io us iIai iIc Siaic saiisficd iIc nandaic of
Winship that it proved lcyond a rcasonallc douli cvcry faci ncccssary io consiiiuic a crinc wiiI wIicI
Patterson was charged.

The New York law on extreme emotional disturbance follows this patter. This affirmative defense,
which the CA described as permitting the defendant to show that his actions were caused by a mental
infirmity not arising to the level of insanity, and that he is less culpable for having committed said crime,
does not serve to negative any facts of the crime which the State is to prove in order to convict of murder.
It constitutes a separate issue on which the defendant is required to carry the burden of persuasion.

ANALYSIS:
Under the proposed rules of evidence, the burden of proof cannot be changed to the party who has the
original burden of evidence to prove the same.

3. Presumptions
(a) Pascual v. Angeles 4 Phil. 604 (1905)
(b) Ormachea v. Trillana 13 Phil. 194 (1909)
(c) People v. Padiernos 69 SCRA 484 (1976)
(d) Yee Hem v. United States 268 U.S. 178 (1925)
(e) County Court of Ulster City v. Allen 442 U.S. 140 (1979)
(f) Sandstrom vs. Montana 442 U.S. 510 (1979)

PASCUAL v. ANGELES
G.R. No. L-4957 April 2, 1909

Doctrine: The lessee, evidenced by a contract of lease, cannot acquire the land of the lessor by means of
prescriptive acquisition based on uninterrupted possession for any number of years.

FACTS: Miguel Pascual is suing Macario Angeles for the recovery of the possession of a certain tract of
land unlawfully occupied by Angeles, and for the payment of rent due, damages and costs. It was alleged
in the complaint that Angeles held under a lease a certain tract of land, belonging to Ciriaca Pascual, the
sister of Miguel Pascual and that Angeles owes Miguel P30 for the rental dues thereon. Angeles entered a
general denial to the complaint, and denied specifically under oath the genuineness and due execution of
the lease attached to the complaint, alleging as a special defense that he was the actual occupant of the



land claimed, and had been in adverse, quiet, peaceful, public and uninterrupted possession of the land
for more than 30 years. However, it was showed in evidence that there in fact exists a lease contract,
written in tagalog, therein it is stated that Ciriaca Pascual leased to Macario Angeles the same tract of
land in dispute for the sum of P10 per year, that the lessee could build thereon a nipa but not a stone
house, and could not devote the land to any other purpose but residential, that the lessee cannot sell,
mortgage, sublet, nor make any alterations or improvements upon the lot, that the wife and the children
of the lessee could not succeed him in the occupation of the land under the lease. Angeles admitted that
the signature that bears him name in the lease is genuine.

ISSUE:
1. Whether the lessee can claim title to land for having possession of the same for more than 30 years?
NO.

RATIO: The existence of the lease under which Macario Angeles held that land in question having been
proved, and it appearing that he failed to pay rent for several years, a sufficient cause existed for the
ejectment of the defendant. The contract between the defendant and Pascual proves that the defendant
indeed failed to pay him three years worth of rent . The general denial did not work because he himself
recognized the genuineness of his signature in the contract. The presumption, without any proof the
rebut the claim is enough to hold Angeles liable.

It is an indisputable fact that Marcelo Jiongco has been in the possession of the lot which is the
subject of the opposition filed by him, by virtue of a lease contract entered into on January 2, 1886,
between himself and the applicant, the latter in his capacity of attorney-in-fact of said Ciriaca Pascual.
This contract was drafted in Tagalog and signed by said objector, the attorney-in-fact of the landowner,
and two witnesses. He can not, therefore, be regarded as owner, and his acts, as possessor, performed in
his capacity of mere tenant and by permission of the lessor and pursuant to the stipulations of the
contract will not help him to establish his possession.

ANALYSIS:
TIis is docirinc is siill applicallc. Fulc 131 providcs iIai conclusivc prcsunpiions includc. 'iIc icnani is
not permitted to deny the title of his landlord at the time of the commencement of the relation of landlord
and tenant between them.

ORMACHEA TIN-CONGCO V TRILLANA
G. R. No. 4275 March 23, 1909.

Doctrine: A debt can only be presumed to have been paid and an obligation fulfilled when the proof of their
existence has been delivered to the debtor, and not when the documents showing the existence of the debt
are still in the hands of the creditor

FACTS: Ormachea Tincongco presented an amended complaint against Trillana, alleging that Ormachea
and Ong Queco were engaged in business and that in the course thereof Trillana purchased from the
merchandise to the value of P4,000. The indebtedness is proven by the documents signed by Trillana in
favor of Ormachea or Ong Queco and their agents. The documents of indebtedness are inserted in the
complaint and duly numbered. Trillana on the other hand claims as a special defense that he had already
settled his accounts and obligations by means of periodical payments in tuba, and that if any accounts
are still pending, the same should, owing to their character and the manner in which they were
constituted, be paid in kind and not in money as Ormahea claims. After having heard the evidence, trial
court held that Trillana should pay Ormachea the sum of P2,800 in tuba under the same conditions
stipulated between the parties for the working of the distillery. Trillana then introduced a document
containing the testimony of an agent of the co-partnership stating that Trillana no longer has any debts to
the co-partnership. The agent however qualifies this testimony by saying that Trillana does not own
anything to him personally but he is still indebted to the Ormachea.

ISSUE:
1. Whether the document which effectively released the debtor from the obligation is valid? NO.



RATIO: It appears that the partnership was dissolved in 1901 hence the agent also ceased to have
authority to act on behalf of the co-partnership during that time, the document appears to have been
issued in 1903. If the document was issued by the agent while he still acted as such, and within the
existence of his official capacity, it might have been used as a ground for placing said claim. In this case,
it appears that such document cannot be held to be binding.

A debt can only be presumed to have been paid and an obligation fulfilled when the proof of their
existence has been delivered to the debtor, and not when the documents showing the existence of the
debt are still in the hands of the creditor. In this case, it is a fact that documents evidencing Trillancs'
indebtedness is still within the possession of Ormachea and was thus the basis of his current claim.

ANALYSIS:
This case is still applicable. The disputable presumption that the debtor has not discharged his debts
subsists when the letter evidencing the credit is still in the hands of the creditor.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES V. NONA SALAZAR PADIERNOS
G.R. No. L-37284 February 27, 1976

Doctrine: one who admits the infliction of injuries which caused the death of another has the burden of
proving self-defense with sufficient and convincing evidence

FACTS: The accused in this case, Nona Padiernos, and the deceased, Rodolfo Padiernos, were husband
and wife. The deceased is a tall, and robust man and an agent of the Bureau of Customs, and as such
was issued a gun, which he keeps under the mattress of their bed. On the fateful night, the accused
waited for the deceased until 4 a.m. in the morning-the deceased was drunk. The next day, after having
driven the children to school, the accused suddenly stabbed the deceased with a knife, shortly thereafter
the accused and the deceased came out of the room and the accused called for the driver and they
thereafter were on the way to the hospital. It appears that Rodolfo never made it alive to the hospital and
was declared dead on arrival. The accused, instead of surrendering to the police, went into hiding. Dr.
Brion of the N.B.I. then performed an autopsy on the cadaver of the deceased, to which discovery was
made regarding 3 stab wounds which was the cause of death. The accused admitted that she killed the
deceased. However, she also claims that she did it in self-defense. According to the accused, the deceased
accused her of stealing P1,000 and started to beat her, to which she reacted by closing her eyes and
swinging the knife around and suddenly she noticed that Rodolfo had already been bloodied. The trial
court refused to give credence to this claim of self-defense.

ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the plea of self-defense is tenable? NO.

RATIO: The evidence that was obtained by the autopsy reveals the presence of stab wounds. If the claim
of the accused is to be believed, there should only have been slash wounds and not stab wounds.
Furthermore, the appellant instead of surrendering to the authorities after the incident, fled and went
into hiding surrendering almost 4 years later. It is now well-settled that one who admits the infliction of
injuries which caused the death of another has the burden of proving self-defense with sufficient and
convincing evidence. If such evidence is of doubtful veracity, and is not clear and convincing, the defense
must necessarily fail, for having admitted that he was the author of the death of the deceased, it was
incumbent upon appellant to prove the justifying circumstance claimed by him without relying on the
weakness of that of the prosecution but on the strength of his own evidence.

ANALYSIS:
This case is still applicable. The burden of proof is the duty of a party to present evidence on the facts in
issue necessary to establish hi claim or defense by the amount of evidence required by law. In this case
the claim of a justifying circumstance must necessarily be proven by the accused as a positive fact that is
in existence. The accused cannot merely claim exculpatory grounds without sufficient proof.



YEE HEM v. UNITED STATES
268 U. S. 178 April 27, 1925

Doctrine: In order that a legislative presumption of one fact from evidence of another may not constitute a
denial of due process of law or a denial of the equal protection of the law, it is only essential that there shall
be some rational connection between the fact provided and the ultimate fact presumed, and that the
inference of one fact from proof of another shall not be so unreasonable as to be a purely arbitrary mandate.

FACTS: Yee Hem was arrested for possession of and concealing a quantity of smoking opium. In relation
to this, the Act of February 9, 1909, 1 and 2 prohibited the importation of smoking opium after April 1,
1909, made it an offense to conceal such opium knowing it to have been imported contrary to law, and
provided that possession by the defendant "shall be deemed sufficient evidence to authorize conviction
unless the defendant shall explain the possession to the satisfaction of the jury." Section 3 provided that,
on and after July 1, 1913, all smoking opium within the United States should be presumed to have been
imported after April 1, 1909, and that the burden of proof should be on the claimant or accused to rebut
the presumption.

The lower court instructed the jury that the burden of proof was on the accused to rebut such
presumptions, and that it devolved upon him to explain that he was rightfully in possession of the
smoking opium. The lower court also stated that Yee Hem is presumed to be innocent until the
government had satisfied the minds of the jurors of his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The jury then
convicted Yee Hem based on the former presumption. Yee Hem challenged the Act as unconstitutional, on
the ground that they contravene the due process of law and the compulsory self-incrimination clauses of
the Fifth Amendment of the federal Constitution.

ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the presumption found in the Act is unconstitutional? NO.

RATIO: The presumptions thus created are reasonable, and do not contravene the due process of law and
the compulsory self-incrimination clauses of the Fifth Amendment. The law of evidence is full of
presumptions either of fact or law. The former are, of course, disputable, and the strength of any
inference of one fact from proof of another depends upon the generality of the experience upon which it is
founded.

In order that a legislative presumption of one fact from evidence of another may not constitute a
denial of due process of law or a denial of the equal protection of the law, it is only essential that there
shall be some rational connection between the fact provided and the ultimate fact presumed, and that the
inference of one fact from proof of another shall not be so unreasonable as to be a purely arbitrary
mandate. So also it must not, under a guise of regulating the presentation of evidence, operate to
preclude the party from the right to present his defense to the main fact thus presumed.

Furthermore, it was already 14 years since the law was passed, one can reasonably presume that
the opium was imported after the law was passed was illegally imported. Therefore, that possession of
such opium in the absence of a satisfactory explanation shall create a presumption of guilt, is "so
unreasonable as to be a purely arbitrary mandate", is unavailing.

ANALYSIS:
Though the case was decided in an American court, the ruling will still be the same under the current
and proposed rules of Evidence in the Philippines.

COUNTY COURT OF ULSTER COUNTY V. ALLEN
442 U. S. 140 June 4, 1979

Doct)nc. Fo) u stututo)u p)csunpton to Ic consttutonu, tIc p)csunpton nust puss tIc ')utonu
connccton` tcst us to tIc Iusc ]ucts p)oucd und tIc utnutc ]ucts p)csuncd. TIc p)osccuton Icu)s tIc



burden of establishing guilt, and it may not rest entirely on a presumption unless the facts proved are
sufficient to support the inference of guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

FACTS: Several defendants (Allen was one of them) and a 16 year old girl were stopped and searched by
police, who found weapons and heroin in the car and its trunk. A charge for illegal possession was filed
against them based on a New York Statute stating that the presence in an automobile of any firearm is
presumptive evidence of its possession by all persons occupying such automobile at the time such
weapon is found and were jointly tried for the same.

Defendants objected to the introduction of the guns into evidence, arguing that the State had not
adequately demonstrated a connection between the guns and the defendants. The trial court overruled
the objection, relying on the presumption of possession created by a New York statute providing that the
presence of a firearm in an automobile is presumptive evidence of its illegal possession by all persons
then occupying the vehicle. The defense lawyer questioned the constitutionality of the presumption as it
would deny them due process as the presumption has no rational connection with facts proved and that
the fact that the handguns were found inside the car does not show that they are all liable for illegal
possession. The trial court denied this contention and the intermediate appellate court and the New York
Court of Appeals, and US Court of Appeals affirmed the convictions.

ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the New York State statute allowing a presumption against all the passengers of the car
of illegal possession of firearm was constitutional? YES.

RATIO: For a siaiuiory prcsunpiion io lc consiiiuiional, iIc prcsunpiion nusi pass iIc 'raiional
conncciion' icsi as io iIc lasic facis provcd and iIc uliinaic facis prcsuncd. TIc prosccuiion lcars iIc
burden of establishing guilt, and it may not rest entirely on a presumption unless the facts proved are
sufficient to support the inference of guilt beyond reasonable doubt. In this case, the US Supreme Court
held that there was a rational connection between the presumption and the facts proved. (e.g. unlikely
that a 16 year old girl, in a company of men would carry the guns; the handbag was in plain view and
within easy access to the others; the others were fully aware of the guns as it was in plain view)

Also, the State advanced a permissive presumption that is constitutional and did not deprive
Defendants of due process. The instruction (to the jury) merely allowed a permissive inference to be made.
It was not a mandatory presumption. As such, it is constitutional as long as there is a rational connection
between the basic facts that the prosecution actually proved, and the ultimate fact presumed, and that
the presumed fact is more likely than not to flow from the basic facts proved.

ANALYSIS:
Despite being decided in a US court, the ruling will be the same both under the current and proposed
rules of Evidence in the Philippines.

SANDSTROM v. MONTANA
442 U.S. 510 June 18, 1979

Doctrine: In a case in which intent is an element of the crime charged, a jury instruction, that "the law
presumes that a person intends the ordinary consequences of his voluntary acts," violates the due process
requirement.

FACTS: Sandstrom confessed to the slaying of Annie Jessen and was subsequently charged for deliberate
Ionicidc, in iIai Ic "purposcly or lnowingly causcd iIc dcaiI of Annic Jcsscn". Ai irial, Sandsiron's
attorney informed the jury that, although his client admitted killing Jessen, he did not do so "purposely or
knowingly," and was therefore not guilty of "deliberate homicide" but of a lesser crime. The prosecution
requested the trial judge to instruct the jury that "[t]he law presumes that a person intends the ordinary
consequences of his voluntary acts." Sandstrom's counsel objected, arguing that "the instruction has the
effect of shifting the burden of proof on the issue of" purpose or knowledge to the defense, and that "that
is impermissible under the Federal Constitution, due process of law." The trial judge overruled the



objection and instructed the jury of the presumption as requested by the prosecution. The jury convicted
Sandstrom for deliberate homicide.

Sandtsrom appealed the conviction with the Supreme Court of Montana stating the same
objection citing various jurisprudence. The Montana SC however affirmed the ruling stating that although
the jurisprudence mentioned did prohibit shifting the burden of proof to the defendant by means of a
presumption, the same cases "do not prohibit allocation of some burden of proof to a defendant under
certain circumstances." As such, the instruction of the lower court does not violate due process.
Sandstrom appealed to the US Supreme Court.

ISSUE:
1. Whether or noi iIc insiruciion givcn ly iIc irial judgc io iIc jury was violaiivc of Sandsiron's rigIi io
due process? YES.

RATIO: In a case in which intent is an element of the crime charged, a jury instruction, that "the law
presumes that a person intends the ordinary consequences of his voluntary acts," violates the due
process requirement that the State prove every element of a criminal offense beyond a reasonable doubt.
Since the jury may have interpreted the challenged presumption as conclusive, or as shifting the burden
of persuasion, either interpretation would have violated the due process (14
th
Amendment) requirement.
The juries were not told that the presumption could be rebutted by the defendant's simple presentation of
"some" evidence; nor even that it could be rebutted at all. A reasonable juror could well have been misled
by the instruction given, and could have believed that the presumption was not limited to requiring the
defendant to satisfy only a burden of production. Thus, this effectively shifts to Sandstrom the burden of
persuasion to prove that he lacked the requisite element of intent.

ANALYSIS:
and proposed rules of Evidence in the Philippines.

XIV. Presentation of Evidence

A. Examination of Witnesses (Rule 132, Secs. 1-18)

A. EXAMINATION OF WITNESSES
SECTION 1.Examination to be done in open court. The examination of witnesses presented in a trial or
hearing shall be done in open court, and under oath or affirmation. Unless the witness is incapacitated to
speak, or the questions call for a different mode of answer, the answers of the witness shall be given
orally. (1a)

Sec.2.Proceedings to be recorded. The entire proceedings of a trial or hearing, including the questions
propounded to a witness and his answers thereto, the statements made by the judge or any of the parties,
counsel, or witnesses with reference to the case, shall be recorded by means of shorthand or stenotype or
by other means of recording found suitable by the court.
A transcript of the record of the proceedings made by the official stenographer, stenotypist or recorder
and certified as correct by him shall be deemed prima facie a correct statement of such proceedings. (2a)

Sec. 3.Rights and obligations of a witness. A witness must answer questions, although his answer may
tend to establish a claim against him. However, it is the right of a witness:
(1)To be protected from irrelevant, improper, or insulting questions, and from harsh or insulting
demeanor;
(2)Not to be detained longer than the interests of justice require;
(3)Not to be examined except only as to matters pertinent to the issue;
(4)Not to give an answer which will tend to subject him to a penalty for an offense unless
otherwise provided by law; or



(5)Not to give an answer which will tend to degrade his reputation, unless it to be the very fact at
issue or to a fact from which the fact in issue would be presumed. But a witness must answer to the fact
of his previous final conviction for an offense. (3a, 19a)

Sec. 4.Order in the examination of an individual witness. The order in which the individual witness may
be examined is as follows;
(a)Direct examination by the proponent;
(b)Cross-examination by the opponent;
(c)Re-direct examination by the proponent;
(d)Re-cross-examination by the opponent. (4)

Sec. 5.Direct examination. Direct examination is the examination-in-chief of a witness by the party
presenting him on the facts relevant to the issue. (5a)

Sec. 6.Cross-examination; its purpose and extent. Upon the termination of the direct examination, the
witness may be cross-examined by the adverse party as to many matters stated in the direct examination,
or connected therewith, with sufficient fullness and freedom to test his accuracy and truthfulness and
freedom from interest or bias, or the reverse, and to elicit all important facts bearing upon the issue. (8a)

Sec. 7.Re-direct examination; its purpose and extent. After the cross-examination of the witness has
been concluded, he may be re-examined by the party calling him, to explain or supplement his answers
given during the cross-examination. On re-direct-examination, questions on matters not dealt with during
the cross-examination, may be allowed by the court in its discretion. (12)

Sec. 8.Re-cross-examination. Upon the conclusion of the re-direct examination, the adverse party may
re-cross-examine the witness on matters stated in his re-direct examination, and also on such other
matters as may be allowed by the court in its discretion. (13)

Sec. 9.Recalling witness. After the examination of a witness by both sides has been concluded, the
witness cannot be recalled without leave of the court. The court will grant or withhold leave in its
discretion, as the interests of justice may require. (14)

Sec. 10.Leading and misleading questions. A question which suggests to the witness the answer which
the examining party desires is a leading question. It is not allowed, except:
(a)On cross examination;
(b)On preliminary matters;
(c)When there is a difficulty is getting direct and intelligible answers from a witness who is ignorant, or a
child of tender years, or is of feeble mind, or a deaf-mute;
(d)Of an unwilling or hostile witness; or
(e)Of a witness who is an adverse party or an officer, director, or managing agent of a public or private
corporation or of a partnership or association which is an adverse party.
A misleading question is one which assumes as true a fact not yet testified to by the witness, or
contrary to that which he has previously stated. It is not allowed. (5a, 6a, and 8a)

Sec. 11.Impeachment of adverse party's witness. A witness may be impeached by the party against
whom he was called, by contradictory evidence, by evidence that his general reputation for truth,
honestly, or integrity is bad, or by evidence that he has made at other times statements inconsistent with
his present, testimony, but not by evidence of particular wrongful acts, except that it may be shown by
the examination of the witness, or the record of the judgment, that he has been convicted of an offense.
(15)

Sec. 12.Party may not impeach his own witness. Except with respect to witnesses referred to in
paragraphs (d) and (e) of Section 10, the party producing a witness is not allowed to impeach his
credibility.
A witness may be considered as unwilling or hostile only if so declared by the court upon
adequate showing of his adverse interest, unjustified reluctance to testify, or his having misled the party
into calling him to the witness stand.
The unwilling or hostile witness so declared, or the witness who is an adverse party, may be
impeached by the party presenting him in all respects as if he had been called by the adverse party,
except by evidence of his bad character. He may also be impeached and cross-examined by the adverse



party, but such cross-examination must only be on the subject matter of his examination-in-chief. (6a,
7a)

Sec. 13.How witness impeached by evidence of inconsistent statements. Before a witness can be
impeached by evidence that he has made at other times statements inconsistent with his present
testimony, the statements must be related to him, with the circumstances of the times and places and the
persons present, and he must be asked whether he made such statements, and if so, allowed to explain
them. If the statements be in writing they must be shown to the witness before any question is put to him
concerning them. (16)

Sec. 14.Evidence of good character of witness. Evidence of the good character of a witness is not
admissible until such character has been impeached. (17)

Sec. 15.Exclusion and separation of witnesses. On any trial or hearing, the judge may exclude from the
court any witness not at the time under examination, so that he may not hear the testimony of other
witnesses. The judge may also cause witnesses to be kept separate and to be prevented from conversing
with one another until all shall have been examined. (18)

Sec. 16.When witness may refer to memorandum. A witness may be allowed to refresh his memory
respecting a fact, by anything written or recorded by himself or under his direction at the time when the
fact occurred, or immediately thereafter, or at any other time when the fact was fresh in his memory and
knew that the same was correctly written or recorded; but in such case the writing or record must be
produced and may be inspected by the adverse party, who may, if he chooses, cross examine the witness
upon it, and may read it in evidence. So, also, a witness may testify from such writing or record, though
he retain no recollection of the particular facts, if he is able to swear that the writing or record correctly
stated the transaction when made; but such evidence must be received with caution. (10a)

Sec. 17.When part of transaction, writing or record given in evidence, the remainder, the remainder
admissible. When part of an act, declaration, conversation, writing or record is given in evidence by one
party, the whole of the same subject may be inquired into by the other, and when a detached act,
declaration, conversation, writing or record is given in evidence, any other act, declaration, conversation,
writing or record necessary to its understanding may also be given in evidence. (11a)

Sec. 18.Right to respect writing shown to witness. Whenever a writing is shown to a witness, it may be
inspected by the adverse party.

B. Rule on Examination of A Child Witness
C. REE, Rule 10

RULE 10
EXAMINATION OF WITNESSES
SECTION 1. Electronic testimony. After summarily hearing the parties pursuant to Rule 9 of these Rules,
the court may authorize the presentation of testimonial evidence by electronic means. Before so
authorizing, the court shall determine the necessity for such presentation and prescribe terms and
conditions as may be necessary under the circumstance, including the protection of the rights of the
parties and witnesses concerned.

SEC. 2. Transcript of electronic testimony. When examination of a witness is done electronically, the
entire proceedings, including the questions and answers, shall be transcribed by a stenographer,
stenotypes or other recorder authorized for the purpose, who shall certify as correct the transcript done
by him. The transcript should reflect the fact that the proceedings, either in whole or in part, had been
electronically recorded.

SEC. 3. Storage of electronic evidence. The electronic evidence and recording thereof as well as the
stenographic notes shall form part of the record of the case. Such transcript and recording shall be
deemed prima facie evidence of such proceedings.

1. Examination in Open Court



SECTION 1. Examination to be done in open court. The examination of witnesses presented in a trial or
hearing shall be done in open court, and under oath or affirmation. Unless the witness is incapacitated to
speak, or the questions calls for a different mode of answer, the answers of the witness shall be given
orally.

a. People v. Estenzo 72 SCRA 428 (1976)
b. Galman v. Pamaran 138 SCRA 294 (1985)

PEOPLE v. JUDGE ESTENZO
G.R. No. L-41166 August 25, 1976

Doctrine: The reasons for requiring a witness to appear and testify orally at a trial is: a) to secure for the
adverse party the opportunity of cross-examination; b) it is only when the witness testifies orally that the
judge may have a true idea of his countenance, manner and expression, which may confirm or detract from
the weight of his testimony; c) the Rules governing the examination of witnesses are intended to protect the
rights of litigants and to secure orderly dispatch of the business of the courts.

FACTS: In another Criminal Case (People vs. Ojoy) in the CFI, after the accused himself had testified in
his defense, his counsel manifested that for his subsequent witnesses he was filing only their affidavits
subject to cross-examination by the prosecution on matters stated in the affidavits and on all other
matters pertinent and material to the case. Petitioner (a private prosecutor) objected to the proposed
procedure but Judge Estenzo gave his conformity thereto and subsequently issued the questioned Order.
Petitioner filed a case against Judge Estenzo in the SC stating that the latter gravely abused his
discretion because the Orders violates Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of Court, which
requires that the testimony of the witness should be given orally in open court.

ISSUE:
1. Whether or not Judge Estenzo abused his discretion when he allowed the defense witnesses to file their
affidavits instead of testifying in open court, and subjecting the same to cross-examination? YES.

RATIO: Sections 1 and 2, Rule 132 and Section 1, Rule 133 of the Revised Rules of Court clearly require
that the testimony of a witness shall be given orally in open court. The main and essential purpose of
requiring a witness to appear and testify orally at a trial is to secure for the adverse party the opportunity
of cross-examination. Another reason would be that it is only when the witness testifies orally that the
judge may have a true idea of his countenance, manner and expression, which may confirm or detract
from the weight of his testimony. Furthermore, Section 1 of Rule 133 of the Rule requires that in
determining the superior weight of evidence on the issues involved, the court, aside from the other factors
therein enumerated, may consider the "witness manner of testifying" which can only be done if the
witness gives his testimony orally in open court".

Another advantage of in requiring that the direct testimony of the witness be given orally in court
is that the Rules governing the examination of witnesses are intended to protect the rights of litigants and
to secure orderly dispatch of the business of the courts. Under the rules, only questions directed to the
eliciting of testimony which, under the general rules of evidence, is relevant to, and competent to prove,
the issue of the case, may be propounded to the witness. A witness testifies only on those facts which he
knows of his own knowledge. Thus, on direct examination, leading questions are not allowed, except or,
preliminary matters, or when there is difficult in getting direct and intelligible answer from the witness
who is ignorant, a child of tender years, or feebleminded, or a deaf mute.

ANALYSIS:
The ruling was correctly decided under the current rules of evidence and it would be the same under the
proposed rules.



GALMAN v. JUSTICE PAMARAN
G.R. Nos. 71208-09 August 30, 1985

Doctrine: The right not to be compelled to be a witness against himself has consistently been held to extend
to all proceedings sanctioned by law and to all cases in which punishment is sought to be visited upon a
witness, whether a party or not. it is not the character of the suit involved but the nature of the proceedings
that controls.

FACTS: In order to determine the facts and circumstances surrounding the killing and to allow a free,
unlimited and exhaustive investigation of all aspects of the killing of Sen Aquino at MIA, PD 1886 was
promulgated creating an ad hoc Fact Finding Board aka the Agrava Board. The board conducted public
hearings wherein various witnesses appeared and testified and/or produced documentary and other
evidence either in obedience to a subpoena or in response to an invitation issued by the board. Among
those who testified and produced evidence before the board are the respondents in this petition.

Respondents contend that their individual testimonies before said board should not be admitted
in evidence and prayed that the same be rejected as evidence for the prosecution. However, said prayer
was denied by the Sandiganbayan contending that their testimonies could not be excluded because the
immunity was not available to them because of their failure to invoke their right against self-incrimination
before the ad hoc Fact Finding Board.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the testimonies given by the 8 respondents who did not invoke their rights against self-
incrimination before the Agrava Board is admissible in evidence and that such failure to claim said
constitutional privilege amounts to a waiver? NO.
2. Whether or not the right to remain silent available only to a person undergoing custodial investigation?
NO.
3. Whether or not the giving of testimonies by the respondents be construed as a waiver of their rights to
remain silent and not be compelled to be a witness against themselves? NO.
4. Whether or not the right against self incrimination extends to testimonies given before the Agrava
board and not to an investigating officer? YES.

RATIO: In the course of receiving evidence, persons summoned to testify will include not merely plain
witnesses but also those suspected as authors and co-participants in the tragic killing. And when
suspects are summoned and called to testify and/or produce evidence, the situation is one where the
person testifying or producing evidence is undergoing investigation for the commission of an offense and
not merely in order to shed light on the facts and surrounding circumstances of the assassination, but
more importantly, to determine the character and extent of his participation therein.

This notwithstanding, the testimonies of the respondents are not admissible as Presidential
Decree No. 1886 denied them the right to remain silent. They were compelled to testify or be witnesses
against themselves. Section 5 of P.D. 1886 leaves them no choice. They have to take the witness stand,
testify or produce evidence, under pain of contempt if they failed or refused to do so. The jeopardy of
being placed behind prison bars even before conviction dangled before their very eyes. Similarly, they
cannot invoke the right not to be a witness against themselves, both of which are sacrosantly enshrined
and protected by our fundamental law. Both these constitutional rights to remain silent and not to be
compelled to be a witness against himself) were right away totally foreclosed by P.D. 1886. And yet when
they so testified and produced evidence as ordered, they were not immune from prosecution by reason of
the testimony given by them.

The privilege has consistently been held to extend to all proceedings sanctioned by law and to all
cases in which punishment is sought to be visited upon a witness, whether a party or not. If in a mere
forfeiture case where only property rights were involved, "the right not to be compelled to be a witness
against himself" is secured in favor of the defendant, then with more reason it cannot be denied to a
person facing investigation before a Fact Finding Board where his life and liberty, by reason of the
statements to be given by him, hang on the balance.

The deletion of the phrase "in a criminal case" connotes no other import except to make said
provision also applicable to cases other than criminal. Decidedly then, the right "not to be compelled to
testify against himself" applies to the herein private respondents notwithstanding that the proceedings



before the Agrava Board is not, in its strictest sense, a criminal case.

Additional: Immunity Statutes (just in case)

1. Onc wIicI granis Use Immunity" - prohibits use of witness' compelled testimony and its fruits in any
manner in connection with the criminal prosecution of the witness.
2. Onc wIicI granis Transactional Immunity" - grants immunity to the witness from prosecution for an
offense to which his compelled testimony relates.

It is beyond dispute that said law (PD 1886) belongs to the first type of immunity statutes (Use
Immunity). It grants merely immunity from use of any statement given before the Board, but not
immunity from prosecution by reason or on the basis thereof. Merely testifying and/or producing evidence
do not render the witness immuned from prosecution notwithstanding his invocation of the right against
self-incrimination. He is merely saved from the use against him of such statement and nothing more.
Stated otherwise, he still runs the risk of being prosecuted even if he sets up his right against self-
incrimination. The dictates of fair play, which is the hallmark of due process, demands that private
respondents should have been informed of their rights to remain silent and warned that any and all
statements to be given by them may be used against them. This, they were denied, under the pretense
that they are not entitled to it and that the Board has no obligation to so inform them.

The provision on self incrimination renders inadmissible any confession obtained in violation
thereof. As herein earlier discussed, this exclusionary rule applies not only to confessions but also to
admissions, whether made by a witness in any proceeding or by an accused in a criminal proceeding or
any person under investigation for the commission of an offense.

ANALYSIS:
The ruling was correctly decided under the current rules of evidence and it would be the same under the
proposed rules.

2. Leading Questions

Sec. 10.Leading and misleading questions. A question which suggests to the witness the answer which
the examining party desires is a leading question. It is not allowed, except:
(a) On cross examination;
(b) On preliminary matters;
(c) When there is a difficulty is getting direct and intelligible answers from a witness who is ignorant, or a
child of tender years, or is of feeble mind, or a deaf-mute;
(d) Of an unwilling or hostile witness; or
(e) Of a witness who is an adverse party or an officer, director, or managing agent of a public or private
corporation or of a partnership or association which is an adverse party.
A misleading question is one which assumes as true a fact not yet testified to by the witness, or
contrary to that which he has previously stated. It is not allowed.

a. State v. Scott 149 P2d 152 (1944)

STATE v. SCOTT
149 P2d 152 (1944)

Doctrine: Even though the question may call for a yes or no answer, it is not leading for that reason unless i t
is so worded that by permitting the witness to answer the yes or no, he would be testifying in the language
of the interrogator rather than his own.



FACTS: Jack Scott was tried before a jury upon the charge that he had carnal knowledge with a female,
which he knew to be only fourteen years of age. A verdict of guilty was returned and from the judgment
entered, this appeal has been taken.

ISSUE:
1. Whether or not it was error for the trial court to allow leading questions to be asked of the complaining
witness, and consequently for the jury to consider it? NO.

RATIO: The questions claimed by the appellant to have been leading in character are what are known as
alicrnaiivc forns of qucsiions."

The principal test to a leading question is: Does it suggest the answered desired? In order to elicit
the facts, a trial lawyer may find it necessary to direct the attention of the witness to the specific matter
concerning which his testimony is desired, and if the question does not suggest the answer, it is not
leading. Even though the question may call for a yes or no answer, it is not leading for that reason unless
it is so worded that by permitting the witness to answer the yes or no, he would be testifying in the
language of the interrogator rather than his own.

TIc alicrnaiivc forn of qucsiions, wIicI siaics wIciIcr or noi you said." is frcc fron iIis dcfcci
of forn lccausc loiI iIc affirnaiivc and ncgaiivc answcrs arc prcscnicd for iIc wiincss's cIoicc.
Nevertheless, such a question may become leading, in so far as it rehearses lengthy details, which the
witness might not otherwise have mentioned and thus supplies him with full suggestions which he
incorporaics wiiIoui any cffori, ly iIc sinplc answcr, I did" or I did noi." Accordingly, iIc sound view is
that such a question may or may not be improper according to the amount of palpably suggestive detail,
which it embodies.

The questions, thus propounded and quoted above are not leading. The rulings made by the trial
court upon the objections made are further supported by the fact that the answer to the 1
st
question are
fully explanatory as would have been the case as any other form of question been used, and shows a total
lack of suggestion.

ANALYSIS:
If the case were to be decided locally, the decision will be the same under the current rules of evidence.
Because the principal test to a leading question used in the case at bar is substantially the same to the
provision under the current rules of evidence which states that a leading question is a question which
suggests to the witness the answer which the examining party desires. If he case were to be decided
under the proposed revised rules of evidence, the decision will still be the same because the provision on
leading question is not part of the proposed changes.

3. Impeaching One's Own Witness

Sec. 12.Party may not impeach his own witness. Except with respect to witnesses referred to in
paragraphs (d) and (e) of Section 10, the party producing a witness is not allowed to impeach his
credibility.
A witness may be considered as unwilling or hostile only if so declared by the court upon
into calling him to the witness stand.
The unwilling or hostile witness so declared, or the witness who is an adverse party, may be
impeached by the party presenting him in all respects as if he had been called by the adverse party,
except by evidence of his bad character. He may also be impeached and cross-examined by the adverse
party, but such cross-examination must only be on the subject matter of his examination-in-chief.

a. Becker v. Eisenstodt 158 A.2d 706 (1960)



BECKER v. EISENSTODT
158 A.2d 706 (1960)

Doctrine: If a witness is called on the part of the plaintiff who swears what is palpably false, it would be
cxt)cncu Iu)d ] tIc punt]]`s cusc sIoud ]o) tIut )cuson Ic suc)]ccd. TIc cou)t Inous o] no )uc o] uu
by which the truth is on such an occasion to be shut out and justice to be perverted. A party must not be
obliged to receive everything which a witness called by him may swear to, If his witness has been false or
mistaken in his testimony, he may prove the truth by the testimony of others.

FACTS: Arlene Becker went to see Lester Eisenstodt, a physician and surgeon, because she wanted to
have the shape of her nose changed to eliminate a bump. Arlene, accompanied by her mother went back
io iIc docior's officc io undcrgo posi-operative treatment. Eisenstodt took a pledget of cotton and with a
tweezer dipped in into one of the bottles standing on the tray. He then pushed the cotton all the way up
Arlcnc's nosirils. Laicr on, Arlcnc conplaincd of pain as Ic noiIcr noiiccd sonciIing silvcry liquid ran
down Arlcnc's nosirils and down io Icr lips. WIcn iIc iwo rciurncd io iIc docior's officc iIc nci day,
Arlcnc's nosc and uppcr lips wcrc swollcn, iIc flcsI raw and slin was coning off. MoniIs aficr, iIc rigIi
nostrils had already contracted as if it had closed. Hence, William Becker, individually and as a guardian
ad litem of his daughter Arlene, now 19 years old, brought this action against Lester Eisenstodt, a
physician and surgeon. Becker charged Eisenstodt of negligence in administering a caustic during a post-
operative treatment of Arlene, following a rhinoplasty, thereby severely burning and disfiguring her face.

During iIc irial, Dcclcr's counscl prcscnicd Eiscnsiodi as wiincss, and aslcd Iin if Ic inscricd a
cotton saturated with a 10% solution of cocaine on Arlenc's nosirils during iIc posi-operative treatment.
Eisenstodt answered positively. Later on, two medical experts were also presented as witness. First, Dr.
Ehrlich, the one who saw Arlene two days after the incident, testified that he has often used the 10%
cocaine solution, and believes that such solution could not have produced the condition which he saw
when he examined Arlene. A demonstration was then made to the jury regarding the application of said
solution, which did not produce any harmful effect on Arlcnc's facc. Sccond, Dr. Pccr, wIo icsiificd iIai
he saw Arlene when the wound was already starting to scar and further testified that a 10% solution of
cocaine could not reasonably cause such condition because the only function of such solution was to
deaden the pain the mucous membrane, nothing more.

The trial court dismissed the case on the ground that there was no prima facie evidence of
negligence and that the plaintiff called the defendant as his own witness, hence they are bound by his
testimony because a party by calling a witness, represents him to be worthy of some credit, and is
therefore bound by his testimony.

ISSUE:
1. Whether or not a party by calling a witness, represents him to be worthy of some credit, and is
therefore bound by his testimony? NO.

RATIO: According to Wigmore, the notion that a party is morally bound by what his witness says no
longer finds defenders. If a witness is called on the part of the plaintiff who swears what is palpably false,
it would be extremely hard if iIc plainiiff's casc sIould for iIai rcason lc sacrificcd. TIc couri lnows of
no rule of law by which the truth is on such an occasion to be shut out and justice to be perverted. A
party must not be obliged to receive everything which a witness called by him may swear to, If his witness
has been false or mistaken in his testimony, he may prove the truth by the testimony of others.

Therefore, the case was reversed and remanded for trial taking into account the testimony of the
two expert witnesses concerning the use of the 10% cocaine solution that impeaches the testimony of the
defendant.

ANALYSIS:
If the case were to be decided locally, the decision would be the same. Under the current rules of
evidence, a party may not impeach is own witness, except if he is declared by the court as unwilling or
hostile. A witness may be considered as unwilling or hostile only if so declared by the court upon
into calling him to the witness stand. If the case were to be decided under the proposed revised rules of
evidence, the decision will be the same because the provision on the said subject matter is not part of the



proposed amendments.

4. Cross-Examination

Sec. 6.Cross-examination; its purpose and extent. Upon the termination of the direct examination, the
witness may be cross-examined by the adverse party as to many matters stated in the direct examination,
or connected therewith, with sufficient fullness and freedom to test his accuracy and truthfulness and
freedom from interest or bias, or the reverse, and to elicit all important facts bearing upon the issue.

a. Dela Paz v. IAC 154 SCRA 65 (1987)
b. Fulgado v. CA 182 SCRA 81 (1982)
c. Capitol Subd. v. Negros Occ52 O.G. 4672 (1956)
d. U.S. v. Mercado 26 Phil. 127 (1913)
e. U.S. v. Marshall 762 F.2d 419 (5th Cir. 1985)

EMILIO DE LA PAZ JR. v. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT
G.R. No. 71537 September 17, 1987

Doctrine: The right of a party to confront and cross-examine opposing witnesses in a judicial litigation, is
fundamental right which is part of due process. Until such cross-examination has been finished, the
testimony of the witness cannot be considered as complete and may not be allowed to form part of the
evidence to be considered by the court in deciding the case. But the right to cross-examine is a personal one
which may be waived expressly or impliedly by conduct amounting to a renunciation of the said right.

FACTS: Loreto de la Paz filed a complaint against petitioners for a judicial declaration of ownership of a
land registered in the name of Ponciano de la Paz, alleging that the land was among the properties
adjudicated to her and her mother as a result of a partition submitted by the heirs of Ponciano de la Paz.
On the other hand, petitioners claimed that the land was not accounted for in the probate proceedings of
Ponciano de la Paz, but is actually community property of the parties.

Loreto took the witness stand and was last on cross-examined, but it was not completed.
Pciiiioncr's counscl aslcd for posiponcncni of iIc coniinuaiion of iIc cross-examination twice, which
was granted by the court. On the scheduled hearing set for cross-examination, the petitioners counsel
failcd io appcar. Pciiiioncrs' counscl rcsuncd Iis rcpcaicdly posiponcd cross-examination of Loreto. The
cross-caninaiion was, Iowcvcr, cui sIori and rcscIcdulcd again on noiion of iIc pciiiioncrs' counscl.
Unfortunately, Loreto died. At the resumption of the trial, petitioners moved to strike off the record the
entire testimony of Loreto, which was denied.

ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the testimony of Loreto should be stricken off the record due to lack of cross-
examination of the adverse parties? NO.

RATIO: The right of a party to confront and cross-examine opposing witnesses in a judicial litigation, is
fundamental right which is part of due process. Until such cross-examination has been finished, the
testimony of the witness cannot be considered as complete and may not be allowed to form part of the
evidence to be considered by the court in deciding the case. But the right to cross-examine is a personal
one which may be waived expressly or impliedly by conduct amounting to a renunciation of the said right.

In iIc casc ai lar, pciiiioncrs' failurc io cross-examine Loreto is due to its own fault of repeatedly
postponing the cross-examination and failing to appear during scheduled hearings. Under these
circumstances, the Court ruled that the petitioners had waived their right to cross-examine Loreto.
Through their own fault, they lost their right to cross-examine Loreto. Her testimony stands.



ANALYSIS:
The case was decided properly under the current rules of evidence because the right of the petitioner to
cross-examine Loreto is impliedly waived due to its own actions of repeatedly postponing the cross-
examinations. If the case were to be decided under the proposed revised rules of evidence, the decision
will still be the same because the provision on cross-examination was not changed.

FULGADO v. COURT OF APPEALS
181 SCRA 81 February 12, 1990

Doctrine: The right to cross-examine is a personal right which may be forfeited by failure of a party to avail
of the ample opportunity given him. Where the failure to obtain cross-examination was imputable to the
cross-cxunnc)`s ]uut, tIc ucI o] c)oss-examination is no longer a ground for exclusion according to the
general principle that an opportunity, though waived, will suffice.

FACTS: Ruperto Fulgado filed a case against the defendants for the annulment of certain contracts of
sale and partition with accounting. After several deferments, the pre-trial conference was set. However,
the defendants and their counsel failed to appear on the said date. Hence, they were declared in default
and Ruperto Fulgado was allowed to present his evidence ex parte. The defendants filed a motion to lift
the order of default but such motion was denied by the trial court. The defendants then filed an appeal
with the Court of Appeals, who ruled in their favor, lifted the order of default, and remanded the case to
the trial court.

The case was again set for hearing. Unfortunately, the presiding judge went on official leave and
the hearing was postponed anew. Ruperto Fulgado died, and his sole witness, Jose Fulgado, which was
presented ex parte, migrated to the United States. When the hearing resumed, the defendants moved to
strike the testimonies of Ruperto Fulgado and Jose Fulgado off the record on the ground that they were
deprived of their right to cross-examine. The counsel for Fulgado opposed the motion but the trial court
ruled in favor of the defendants and ordered the testimonies of Ruperto Fulgado and Jose Fulgado be
stricken off the record. Since the plaintiff had no more witnesses to present, apart from Ruperto and
Jose, the trial court dismissed the case. The Court of Appeals affirmed the ruling of the lower court.
Hence, this appeal.

ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the testimonies of the deceased, Ruperto Fulgado, and his witness, Jose Fulgado,
should be stricken off the record? NO.

RATIO: The right to cross-examine is a personal right which may be forfeited by failure of a party to avail
of the ample opportunity given him. Where the failure to obtain cross-examination was imputable to the
cross-canincr's fauli, iIc lacl of cross-examination is no longer a ground for exclusion according to the
general principle that an opportunity, though waived, will suffice.

In the case at bar, the defendants had enough opportunity to cross-examine Ruperto Fulgado
lcforc Iis dcaiI, and Josc Fulgado, lcforc Iis nigraiion. Dcspiic iIcir lnowlcdgc of Fupcrio Fulgado's
failing IcaliI and Josc's innincni iravcl, iIc dcfcndanis did noi novc swifily io cross-examine the said
plaintiff and his witness. As a matter of fact, it took them more than one year from the finality of the
judgment of the Court of Appeals lifting the order of default before they asked the trial court to resume
the hearing of the case. Further, the tasked of recalling a witness for cross-examination is in law,
imposed on the party who wishes to exercise the said right because of the fact that it is a personal right
and can be waived. In addition, even though Jose Fulgado is out of the country, the defendants should
have resorted to the various modes of discovery to cross-examine Jose. Defendants even disclosed the
fact that they had knowledge that Jose was in the country for a visit and yet they did not exert any effort
to have him subpoenaed. The acts of the defendants constitute a waiver of their right to cross-examine.
The Court ordered the trial court to reinstate the case and allow the direct testimonies of Ruperto Fulgado
and Jose Fulgado to remain in the record.



ANALYSIS:
The case was decided properly under the current rules of evidence because the right of the defendants to
cross-examine Ruperto and Jose Fulgado is impliedly waived due to its failure to cross-examine them
immediately. If the case were to be decided under the proposed revised rules of evidence, the decision will
still be the same because the provision on cross-examination was not changed.

CAPITOL SUBDIVISION, INC. v. PROVINCE OF NEGROS OCCIDENTAL
52 O.G. 4672 July 31, 1956

Doctrine: The adverse party may, on cross-exunnuton, cct ])on tIc punt]]`s utncss u npo)tunt ]ucts
Icu)ng on tIc ssuc und uIcI uc)c not tuIcn up n tIc utncss` d)cct cxunnuton.

FACTS: The Provincial Hospital of Occidental Negros was erected on a parcel of land in Bacolod, whose
ownership is claimed by the Province of Negros Occidental by virtue of a Deed of Sale with Donation
executed in its favor by Jose Benares, as a result of expropriation proceedings. Although the transfer
certificate of title had not been issued to the province, the parcel of land stood in the records of the
assessment office as the property of the province and enjoyed exemption from realty tax.

Capitol Subdivisions Inc. claims to be the owner of the land and instituted an action in the Court
of First Instance against the province for recovery of the possession of the said land and collection of
reasonable rents for its use. Capitol Subdivisions Inc. alleged that the lot was foreclosed by the Philippine
National Bank from Jose Benares due to the failure of the latter to pay his debts to the former. Later on,
PNB signed a contract with Carlos Benares wherein the latter would purchase the lot. Carlos Benares
assigned his rights to the said contract to Capitol Subdivisions, Inc. and the plaintiff, after full payment of
the purchase price, obtained a deed of absolute sale from PNB and as a result, it was issued a transfer of
certificate of title for the lot.

The Province of Negros Occidental put up the defense that it had acquired the lot from Jose
Benares through an expropriation proceeding, which was amicably settled by the parties thereby resulting
to the execution of a deed of absolute sale and donation in favor of the province. However, all the records
of the expropriation proceeding were totally destroyed during World War II. The province further alleged
that Capitol Subdivisions Inc. had constructive notice of the expropriation proceedings, hence not an
innocent purchaser. Furthermore, the controlling stockholder, president and general manager of Capitol
Suldivisions Inc, Mr. Alfrcdo Moniclilano, also Iad lnowlcdgc of iIosc facis. During Mr. Moniclilano's
incumbency as mayor of Bacolod, the city was contributing a large sum annually for the support,
operation, and maintenance of the hospital.

During the trial, Mr. Montelibano testified that Capitol Subdivisions Inc. had no knowledge of the
expropriation proceedings nor the Deed of Sale with Donation at the time it bought the land. The Province
of Negros Occidental failed to cross-examine Mr. Montclilano on naiicrs duc io Capiiol Suldivisions'
objection and the trial curt sustained the objections. The trial court ruled in favor of Capitol Subdivisions
Inc on the ground that Mr. Montelibano was on the witness stand as a witness for Capitol Subdivisions
Inc, hence the province cannot cross-examine him on any matter that would elicit all important facts
bearing on the issue which was not taken up in the direct examination of the said witness.

ISSUE:
1. Whether the Province may elicit all important facts on matters which were not taken in the direct
examination of the witness for Capitol Subdivisions Inc., during cross-examination? YES.

RATIO: The adverse party may, on cross-caninaiion, clicii fron iIc plainiiff's wiincss all inporiani facis
bearing on iIc issuc and wIicI wcrc noi ialcn up in iIc wiincss' dircci caninaiion. CIicf Jusiicc Moran
stated that the adverse party may cross-examine a witness for the purpose of eliciting all important facts
bearing upon the issue. Hence, a party may cross-examine a witness on matters not embraced in his
direct examination, but it does not mean that a party by doing so is making the witness his own. The
Court set-aside the decision of the trial court and remanded that case to the court of origin for further
proceedings.



ANALYSIS:
The case was decided properly using the current rules on cross-examination. If the case were to be
decided under the proposed revised rules of evidence, the decision will still be the same. Because the
provision on cross-examination in the proposed revised rules of evidence is substantially the same, except
for iIc addiiion of iIc words on any rclcvani naiicr." TIc addiiion of iIis words, will noi affcci iIc ruling
of the case at bar.

US v. MERCADO
G.R. No. L-8332 November 13, 1913

Doctrine: While you cannot impeach the credibility of a witness, except by showing that he has made
contradictory statements or that his general reputation for truth, honesty, or integrity is bad, yet,
nevertheless, you may show by an examination of the witness himself or from the record of the judgment,
that he has been convicted of a high crime.

FACTS: A complaint against the accused was filed stating that iIc accuscd willfully and crininally,
without legitimate authority therefore, and by means of violence or force employed upon the person of
Claro Mercado, prevent the latter from rendering aid to Maria R. Mateo in order that Santiago Mercado
nigIi ai Iis plcasurc nalircai iIc said Maria F. Maico, in a violaiion of law". During the trial, Atty.
Lloret, attorney for the private prosecutor, asked the witness for the defense (Santiago Mercado), the
following qucsiion. How nany iincs Iavc you lccn convicicd of assauli upon oiIcr pcrsons?" To this
question, the defendant Tomas Mercado objected on the ground that the question was impertinent. Atty.
Llorci cplaincd iIc purposc of Iis qucsiion ly saying. I wisI io dcnonsiraic iIai Ic Ias a pugnacious
disposiiion. I Iavc Iad occasion io dcfcnd Iin in various causcs for assauli".

Upon the question and the objection, Judge Barretto ruled that "the character of the witness has
an intimate relation or may have a strong relation with the facts being investigated in the present cause.
The objection is overruled." (In other words, since the objection of the defense was overruled, the Judge
uoucd tIc uccuscd, Suntugo Mc)cudo, to unsuc) tIc p)osccuton`s qucston on ]I]ou nunu tncs ]Ic Ius]
Iccn conuctcd o] ussuut upon otIc) pc)sons). The only argument which the accused presents is that the
question had no relation to the question which was being discussed by the court and it did not tend to
show that the defendants were either guilty or not guilty of the crime charged; that questions tending to
disclose the character of a witness are immaterial. In reply to the argument of the accused, the
prosecution contends that the question was a proper question, because it tended to impugn the credibility
of the witness and that such questions were for that purpose material and pertinent.

ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the lower court erred in overruling the objection? YES.

RATIO: It will be remembered that the complaint charged that on the occasion when the alleged crime
was committed Santiago Mercado was attempting to and did assault and illtreat one Maria Mateo. In
answer to said question, the witness (Santiago Mercado) admitted that complaint had been presented
against him for the offense of assault and battery.

The prosecution, in order to show the circumstances under which the crime charged here was
actually committed, showed that this witness, Santiago Mercado, had assaulted and illtreated Maria
Mateo, under the circumstances described in the complaint. That was an important fact. If the said
assault did not actually take place, then the theory of the prosecution must fail. If there was no assault or
attempted assault, there was no occasion for the alleged interference on the part of the said Claro
Mercado to prevent it, and the probability of the guilt of the defendants is greatly lessened. If the witness
who had committed the alleged assault, had assaulted other persons and had been prosecuted therefor,
may that fact be considered by the court in weighing the proof and in testing the credibility of the
witness? It was an important fact to prove that Santiago Mercado, at the time and place mentioned in the
complaint, had assaulted or attempted to assault or illtreat Maria R. Mateo, in order to show that there
was occasion for the inference of Claro Mercado.



Generally speaking, a witness cannot be impeached by the party against whom he has been
called, except by showing (a) that he has made contradictory statements: or (b) by showing that his
general reputation for the truth, honesty, or integrity is bad. The question to which the defendant
objected neither attempted to show that the witness had made contradictory statements nor that his
general reputation for truth, honesty, or integrity was bad. While you cannot impeach the credibility of a
witness, except by showing that he has made contradictory statements or that his general reputation for
truth, honesty, or integrity is bad, yet, nevertheless, you may show by an examination of the witness
himself or from the record of the judgment, that he has been convicted of a high crime. (Sec. 342, Act No.
190.) In the present case, the other offense to which the question above related was not a high crime, as
that term is generally used, and we assume that the phrase "high crime," as used in section 342, is used
in its ordinary signification. High crimes are generally defined as such immoral and unlawful acts as are
nearly allied and equal in guilt to felonies. We believe that the objection to the above question was
properly interposed and should have been sustained. [In other words, the SC is saying that in order for a
cun tIut tIc uccuscd Ius Iccn conuctcd o] u p)cuous c)nc to p)ospc), sucI c)nc nust Ic cuss]cd us
u IgI c)nc. Hut sncc n tIs cusc, tIc p)cuous o]]cnscs o] tIc uccuscd u)c not IgI c)ncs, tIcn tIc
claim of the prosecution would not prosper. Hence, the objection earlier made should have been sustained
und tIc uccuscd sIoud Iuuc Iccn tod not to unsuc) tIc p)osccuton`s qucston on ]I]ou nunu tncs ]tIc
uccuscd Ius] Iccn conuctcd o] ussuut upon otIc) pc)sons).

ANALYSIS:

If the case was decided under the present Rules of Evidence, the claim of the prosecution would prosper.
Under Rule 132, Sec. 11 of both the present and proposed Rules, Sec. 11. Impeachment of adverse
party's witness. A witness may be impeached by the party against whom he was called, by
contradictory evidence, by evidence that his general reputation for truth, honestly, or integrity is bad, or
by evidence that he has made at other times statements inconsistent with his present, testimony, but not
by evidence of particular wrongful acts, except that it may be shown by the examination of the
witness, or the record of the judgment, that he has been convicted of an offense. (Emphasis
supplied)."

As can be observed, the present Rules do not distinguish whether the previous offense is a high crime or
not. Hence, in this case, with regards to the objection of the defense when the prosecution asked the
accused, I|ow nany iincs Iavc you lccn convicicd of assauli upon oiIcr pcrsons?", iIc oljcciion of iIc
defense should be overruled and the accused should answer. However, the proposed Rules of Evidence
have a new provision: Section 12. IMPEACHMENT BY EVIDENCE OF CONVICTION OF CRIME. FOR
THE PURPOSE OF IMPEACHING A WITNESS, EVIDENCE THAT HE HAS BEEN CONVICTED BY FINAL
JUDGMENT OF A CRIME SHALL BE ADMITTED IF: (A) THE CRIME WAS PUNISHABLE BY A PENALTY IN
EXCESS OF ONE YEAR, OR (B) THE CRIME INVOLVED MORAL TURPITUDE, REGARDLESS OF THE
PENALTY. HOWEVER, EVIDENCE OF A CONVICTION IS NOT ADMISSIBLE IF THE CONVICTION HAS
BEEN THE SUBJECT OF AN ABSOLUTE PARDON OR ANNULMENT OF THE CONVICTION. (n)"

Hence, the proposed rules set the requirements for the kind of conviction necessary for impeachability: 1)
it must be serious (punishable by a penalty exceeding one year imprisonment), or 2) if it involves moral
turpitude. But it expressly excludes those convictions subject of an absolute pardon or annulment of
conviction.

In this case, the decision would be the same (objection of the defense sustained and the accused should
not answer the prosccuton`s qucston on ]I]ou nunu tncs ]tIc uccuscd Ius] Iccn conuctcd o] ussuut
upon otIc) pc)sons) using the proposed Rules, if the defense could show that the previous assaults made
by the accused were not serious or if the previous offense did not involve moral turpitude.

US vs MARSHALL
762 F.2d 419

Doctrine: The cross-examination of a witness as to the inadmissible evidence, or the introduction by the
ruling's opponent of rebutting evidence, does not waive the vitality of his continuing objection, for the party



is entitled to rely upon the trial judge's ruling as the law of the case, without waiving his rights under the
continuing objection to question subsequently on appeal the admission of any evidence of the nature
specifically objected to by him initially.

FACTS: Marshall was convicted of the offense charged, the theft of a lawn mower. Marshall appeals,
contending that over his objection hearsay evidence was improperly admitted to prove an essential
element of the crime, namely, that in fact a lawn mower had been stolen or was missing from the military
post exchange where he worked.

As a background, the lawn mower was allegedly stolen from the Four Seasons Retail Store. At the
time, the defendant Marshall was supervisor (assistant manager) of that store. The manager of the entire
posi ccIangc" is Lcc. TIc incidcni upon wIich the criminal charge was based arose during a
pronoiional salc of Lawn Doy" lawn nowcrs ly iIc Four Scasons siorc. Onc iinc, wIilc off-duty,
nanagcr Lcc noiiccd onc of iIc posi ccIangc vans" procccding on iIc sircci Ic was driving on. Dcing
curious as to why the van was in this locality, Lee followed it until it backed up into a driveway to a
carport of a residence on Frederick Street. Lee saw the driver, whom he testified he recognized as the
defendant Marshall, who alighted and lifted two large boxes from the. The van then drove off. Lee drove
up io iIc drivcway and rccognizcd iIc wriiing on onc of iIc locs as sIowing iIai ii was a Lawn Doy"
packing box. Believing that he had recognized the driver to be Marshall, Lee telephoned the Four Seasons
store from a nearby convenience shop at about 11:15 a.m. and asked for Marshall; he was informed that
Marshall was at B-Bay, a storage warehouse. Moreover, the prosecution relies upon the testimony of Ms.
Terri Stanlin, an investigator, who testified that, on the basis of her review of the records of the post
exchange store, three lawn mowers were unaccounted for and missing during the period of Four Seasons'
promotional sale. To determine how many lawnmowers were missing, the court first sought to determine
the total number of lawnmowers at the start of the promotional sale, then determined how many were
sold. The difference would then be the alleged missing lawn mowers.

Hence, on cross-examination, Ms. Stanlin was asked to explain how she had arrived at her
conclusion that three lawn mowers were missing. Ms. Stanlin stated that, since the lawn mowers were a
promotional item, she could determine how many were on hand before the promotional sale, because a
special form called a Promotional Merchandise Worksheet was prepared for these promotional sales,
telling how many on hand at the beginning, how many sold, and how many remaining at the end of the
sale. The defense counsel then presented her with the worksheet for the promotional sale in question.

The worksheet showed that 15 lawn mowers were on hand at the start of the sale. However, Ms.
Sianlin adniiicd iIai aliIougI iIc docuncni so sIowcd 15", ii sIould lc scvcniccn (17i lawn nowcrs
instead. This is because, as Ms. Stanlin stated, the original document (not introduced into evidence)
sIowcd 17 lawnnowcrs, unlilc iIc pIoiocopy wIicI sIowcd 15. TIis cIangc fron 15" io 17" in iIc
record was allegedly made by one Mrs. Newell (who was never called as a witness). Thus, to establish her
beginning count, Ms. Stanlin did not rely on the actual record of the store showing only 15 lawn mowers
on hand at the start of the period. Instead, she relied upon her own out-of-court investigation, including
hearsay information received by a declarant (Mrs. Newell) who did not testify, to conclude that the record
should have shown 17 lawn mowers on hand- as corrccicd" ioial nunlcr of lawnnowcrs ai iIc siari of
the sale. Next, Ms. Stanlin testified on her method of determining how many lawn mowers had been sold.
In order to determine how many lawn mowers had been sold during the promotional sale, Ms. Stanlin
examined the cash register tapes.

These tapes did not describe the merchandise sold; they merely listed dollar figures for each sale.
Ms. Stanlin determined how many lawn mowers had been sold during the period by going through the
tapes and counting the number of $335.95 figures that appeared (that being the sales price of the lawn
mower) and identified that as a lawnmower on sale being sold. By her methodology, she testified she
found iIai iIc pricc $335.95" appcarcd 14 iincs (indicaiing iIai 14, oui of iIc 17, lawnnowcrs wcrc
sold), hence she concluded that she could positively testify that only three lawn mowers were missing.

ISSUE:
1. Whether evidence of the prosecution (documents presented and testified by Ms. Stalin) is admissible in
evidence? NO.

RATIO: The US law provides-



Requirement of Original
To prove the content of a writing, recording, or photograph, the original writing,
recording, or photograph is required, except as otherwise provided in these rules or by Act of
Congress.

Hearsay Exceptions; Availability of Declarant Immaterial
The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule, even though the declarant is available
as a witness:
(6) Records of regularly conducted activity. A .. rccord. in any forn, of acis, cvcnis...
made at or near the time by, or from information transmitted by, a person with knowledge, if
kept in the course of a regularly conducted business activity, and if it was the regular practice
of iIai lusincss aciiviiy io nalc iIc. rccord. all as sIown ly iIc icsiinony of iIc cusiodian
or other qualified witness, unless the source of information or the method or circumstances of
prcparaiion indicaic lacl of irusiworiIincss .|.
The testimony of a custodian or other qualified witness is ordinarily essential to prove the
nature of such record and what it purports to show if not self-cvidcni .|.

When Ms. Stanlin was asked to state her opinion how many lawn mowers were missing, as basis
on her review of a generalized description of the exchange records, Marshall's defense counsel objected
that the witness was relying on information (the records) that cannot be confronted, and that her
testimony as to the contents of the documents, or without the documents being introduced into evidence,
deprived him of a basis to question the accuracy of the documents. Marshall correctly urges that, under
the circumstances, this overruling of his timely specific exception, was a continuing objection that need
not be repeated to preserve the objection to subsequent evidence admitted within the scope of the ruling.
The objection as formulated by Marshall was both to the hearsay nature of Ms. Stanlin's testimony when
based on statements in records outside the evidence, and to the admission of evidence as to the contents
of a record without production of the document itself into evidence, with moreover a failure to
authenticate the record by showing that it was what the proponent claims, which, in the case of a
business record such as was involved, further required a showing of its trustworthiness for the purpose
offered.

In such case, the evidence is clearly hearsay and some exception to the hearsay rule must be
involcd if iIc rccord is io lc adniiicd." Hcrc, iIc govcrnment did not offer the record itself into evidence
but, rather, evidence as to the contents of these records as showing that three lawn mowers were missing.
However, the hearsay objection was clearly good as to the witness's testimony as to the contents of the
record, although the objection also was based upon testimony as to contents of the record without
producing the record itself. The issue as to whether the district court would have abused its discretion if
it had admitted the records is not presented; for instead of the record itself the district court permitted
iniroduciion of Ms. Sianlin's faci" icsiinony iIai Icr gcncralizcd rcvicw of iIc rccords sIowcd iIai iIrcc
lawn mowers were missing from the store. This evidence was clearly inadmissible and constituted
reversible error.

With regard to the cash register tapes, the inadequacy in these respects of using the $335.95
figure on cash register tapes, even had all tapes been properly kept, was confirmed by Bitner, the
manager of the store. He admittcd iIai ii was noi an unconnon siiuaiion" io scll sligIily danagcd
equipment at a lower price, which would thus not have been reflected on the cash register tapes at the
$335.95 [In other words, if certain lawn mowers were defective, it was possible that they were sold for a
price lesser than $335.95. Hence, it was possible that all 17 of them were sold but that the cash register
tupcs dd not )c]cct tIut p)cc $335.95" 17 times because it was possible that some were sold at a
discounted price].

Bitner also admitted that several of the tapes were missing from the period of the promotional
sale, perhaps because the clerks sometimes forgot to change the tapes after they ran out, and that it was
possillc iIai iIcrc could Iavc lccn salcs nadc during iIis period of time on cash registers that did not
Iavc a iapc propcrly placcd on iIcn." Hcncc, Ms. Sianlin's posiiivc conclusory opinion as io iIc nunlcr
of lawn mowers missing was based upon a flawed methodology. For a starting figure of lawn mowers on
hand, sIc Iad rclicd upon a Icarsay corrcciion" of iIc aciual siorc rccord; in dcicrnining iIc nunlcr of
lawn mowers sold during the period, she had relied upon cash register tapes that were incomplete for the
period in question (with the missing tapes quite possibly indicating other lawn mower sales that would
make up the shortage she found).



ANALYSIS:
The decision would be the same if it were decided using the present Rules of Evidence or Proposed Rules
of Evidence.

5. Impeachment By Bias
a. U.S. v. Abel 469 U.S. 45 (1984)
b. U.S. v. Harvey 547 F.2d 720 (2d Cir.1976)

US vs ABEL
469 US 45

Doctrine: Hus s u tc)n uscd n tIc connon uu o] cudcncc to dcsc)Ic tIc )cutonsIp Ictuccn u pu)tu
and a witness which might lead the witness to slant, unconsciously or otherwise, his testimony in favor of
or against a party. Bias may be induced by a witness' like, dislike, or fear of a party, or by the witness' self-
interest.
Proof of bias is almost always relevant because the jury, as finder of fact and weigher of credibility,
has historically been entitled to assess all evidence which might bear on the accuracy and truth of a
witness' testimony.

FACTS: Respondent Abel and two cohorts were indicted for bank robbery. The cohorts pleaded guilty but
respondent went to trial. One of the cohorts, Ehle, agreed to testify against respondent Abel. Respondent
Abel informed the District Court that he would seek to counter Ehle's testimony with that of one Mills [in
other words, Mills is testifying for the accused Abel]. Mills was no a participant in the robbery but had
spent time with Abel and Ehle in prison. Mills planned to testify that after the robbery Ehle admitted to
Mills that he (Ehle) intended to implicate respondent Abel falsely, in order to receive favorable treatment
from the Government. The prosecutor in turn disclosed that he intended to discredit Mills' testimony by
calling Ehle back to the stand to testify that respondent, Mills, and Ehle were all members of a secret
prison gang that was sworn to perjury and self-protection on each member's behalf. The gang required its
members always to deny the existence of the organization and to commit perjury, theft, and murder on
cacI ncnlcr's lcIalf.

Upon being cross-examined by the prosecutor, Mills denied knowledge of the prison gang. Hence
the prosecutor, as permitted by the District Court, recalled Ehle. Ehle testified that he, respondent Abel,
and Mills were members of the prison gang and described the gang and its tenets. The jury convicted
respondent Abel. The CA reversed, holding that Ehle's rebuttal testimony was admitted not just to show
that respondent's and Mills' membership in the prison gang might cause Mills to color his testimony, but
also to show that, because Mills belonged to the gang, he must be lying on the stand. The court further
held that Ehle's testimony implicated respondent as a member of the gang, but that since respondent
Abel did not take the stand, the testimony could not have been offered to impeach him (Abel) and
prejudiced him (Abel) "by mere association."

ISSUE:
1. Whether the testimony of Mills was sufficiently probative of bias toward defendant Abel to warrant its
admission into evidence? YES.

RATIO: The evidence showing Mills' and respondent's membership in the prison gang was sufficiently
probative of Mills' possible bias towards respondent to warrant its admission into evidence. Thus it was
wiiIin iIc Disirici Couri's discrciion io adnii EIlc's icsiinony, and iIc CA was wrong in concluding
otherwise.

While the Federal Rules of Evidence do not by their terms deal with impeachment for "bias," it is
clear that the Rules do contemplate such impeachment. It is permissible to impeach a witness by showing
his bias under the Rules. Here, Ehle's testimony about the prison gang certainly made the existence of
Mills' bias towards respondent more probable, and it was thus relevant to support that inference. A



witness' and a party's common membership in an organization, even without proof that the witness or
party has personally adopted its tenets, is certainly probative of bias. The District Court did not abuse its
discretion under Federal Rule of Evidence in admitting Ehle's full description of the prison gang and its
tenets, since the type of organization in which a witness and a party share membership may be relevant
to show bias. The attributes of the prison gang bore directly not only on the fact of bias but also on
the source and strength of Mills' bias.

It was not error under Federal Rule of Evidence- which allows a cross-examiner to impeach a
witness by asking him about specific instances of past conduct- to cross-examine Mills about the prison
gang to show, in addition to Mills' bias, his membership in the gang's past conduct bearing on his
veracity. Nor was it error to admit Ehle's rebuttal testimony concerning the gang. The proffered testimony
with respect to Mills' membership in the gang sufficed to show potential bias in respondent's favor, and
such extrinsic evidence is admissible to show bias. It is true that, because of the gang's tenets that the
testimony described, the testimony might also have impeached Mills' veracity directly. But there is no rule
of evidence that provides that testimony admissible for one purpose and inadmissible for another purpose
is thereby rendered inadmissible.

ANALYSIS:
TIc prcscni Fulcs of Evidcncc and iIc Proposcd Fulcs do noi spccifically ncniion iIai lias" is onc of iIc
ways in wIicI an advcrsc pariy's wiincss nay lc inpcacIcd. Howcvcr, iIis case may be decided similarly
in the Philippines since Rule 132 of both the present and proposed Rules state: Sec. 11. Impeachment of
adverse party's witness. A witness may be impeached by the party against whom he was called, by
contradictory evidence, by evidence that his general reputation for truth, honestly, or integrity is
bad, or by evidence that he has made at other times statements inconsistent with his present, testimony,
but not by evidence of particular wrongful acts, except that it may be shown by the examination of the
witness, or the record of the judgment, that he has been convicted of an offense. (Emphasis supplied)."

US vs HARVEY
547 F.2d 720

Doctrine: Bias of a witness is not collateral issue and extrinsic evidence is admissible to prove that witness
has motive to testify falsely.

FACTS: Defendant Ronald William Harvey was found guilty with bank robbery. In an afternoon, the Main-
High branch of the Marine Midland Bank-Western was robbed by a man dressed as a woman. Mrs.
Strickland, a teller at the bank, described the robber as a medium complexioned black male in his early
twenties, 5'11 to 6' in height, 160 lbs., slender build with broad shoulders, and a prominent Adam's
apple. According to Mrs. Strickland, the robber was wearing a straight-haired wig pulled back into a bun,
a blue denim hat, which did not obstruct a full view of the robber's face, gold wire framed dark glasses,
lipstick, rouge, a dark coat, and was carrying a 10 wide red print cloth shoulder bag. Mrs. Strickland was
not able to make a positive identification of the robber.

The sole identification witness at the trial was a Priscilla Martin who testified that on the
afternoon of that day of the robbery, while passing by on a bus, she observed a man she identified as
appellant (Harvey) walk down the steps of the Salvation Army and touch one of the two doors of the Main-
High branch of the Marine Midland Bank. Mrs. Martin described the man as wearing red pants, a black
coat, black platform shoes and a black floppy hat whose brim obstructed a view of his face from the nose
up. She described his hair style as a frizzled bush, "an afro," but could not say whether it was a wig. Mrs.
Martin stated that the man was not wearing glasses and that she could not recall lipstick but did
remember seeing rouge.

Mrs. Martin had been acquainted with appellant Ronald Harvey for a number of years. She
testified that she knew the appellant for 19 years and at one time had lived in the same house with him.
On cross-examination, defense counsel questioned Mrs. Martin on whether she had ever had any trouble
with appellant or ever had any arguments or disagreements with him, and specifically whether she ever
accused appellant of fathering her child and then failing to support this child. Mrs. Martin denied these



charges and further denied that appellant visited her in the hospital after birth of the child. Mrs. Martin
also denied that she confided in appellant's mother, Mrs. Catherine Harvey, that appellant was the father
of the child or that she stated that she would "take revenge" on appellant for not "owning up" to this child.

Following Mrs. Martin's testimony, appellant sought to introduce testimony of Mrs. Harvey which
would have shown that Mrs. Harvey was a long-time acquaintance of Mrs. Priscilla Martin, and that while
Mrs. Harvey was on duty as a nurse in a Buffalo hospital, she encountered Mrs. Martin, who was there
for treatment of a broken leg. Mrs. Harvey would have testified that during this encounter Mrs. Martin
accused appellant of fathering her child and refusing to support it and that Mrs. Martin further explained
that when her husband learned of this he beat her and broke her leg, necessitating the hospital
treatment.

The trial judge refused this proffer of testimony of Mrs. Harvey, considering it "collateral" and
inadmissible under Federal Rule of Evidence.

ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the trial court erred is refusing the testimony of Mrs. Harvey? - YES.

RATIO: Bias of a witness is not a collateral issue and extrinsic evidence is admissible to prove that a
witness has a motive to testify falsely. The law of evidence has long recognized that a cross-examiner is
not required to "take the answer" of a witness concerning possible bias, but may proffer extrinsic
evidence, including the testimony of other witnesses, to prove the facts showing a bias in favor of or
against a party. A proper foundation must be laid before extrinsic evidence of bias may be introduced.
Because the testimony of Mrs. Harvey would have impeached Mrs. Martin's credibility by bringing before
the jury prior inconsistent statements as well as demonstrate a possible bias on Mrs. Martin's part, Rule
613(b), in effect at the time of trial, required that a proper foundation be laid by appellant's counsel. The
Rule provides that the witness be provided an "opportunity to explain or deny a prior inconsistent
statement." In cross-examining Mrs. Martin, defense counsel clearly asked her whether she had ever
accused defendant of fathering her child, whether she had ever stated she would "take revenge" on the
defendant and whether she had confided in Mrs. Harvey that defendant was the father of her child. To
each of the questions, Mrs. Martin answered no. Thus, on at least three occasions, the witness was
afforded an opportunity to explain or deny circumstances suggesting prejudice.

Identity (of the accused) was a principal issue in the trial. The appellant was denied an important
opportunity to raise a reasonable doubt about his participation in the bank robbery by undermining the
credibility of Mrs. Martin. Although Federal Rule of Evidence vests trial courts with discretion to exclude
evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of prejudice, confusion, or delay,
the trial court apparently did not exclude Mrs. Harvey's testimony on the basis of this consideration.

We now must consider whether the trial court's error in refusing to admit the testimony of Mrs.
Harvey was so prejudicial as to require reversal of appellant's conviction. Exercise of this right is
particularly crucial where the witness offers damaging identification testimony, for in the absence of
independent contrary evidence, a defendant must rely upon impeachment of the witness's credibility. The
record reveals that appellant's conviction rests on the testimony of Mrs. Strickland as to a description of
the robber, bank surveillance photos which the jury had an opportunity to review and compare to
appellant's appearance, and the identification of Mrs. Martin. We are not convinced that Mrs. Martin's
testimony was an insignificant part of the case against appellant and therefore find that denial of the
opportunity to raise a reasonable doubt as to identification by showing possible bias was prejudicial to
appellant's right to a fair trial. Accordingly, we reverse appellant's conviction and remand for a new trial.

ANALYSIS:
TIc prcscni Fulcs of Evidcncc and iIc Proposcd Fulcs do noi spccifically ncniion iIai lias" or
noiivc" arc onc of iIc ways in wIicI an advcrsc pariy's wiincss nay lc inpeached. However, this case
may be decided similarly in the Philippines since Rule 132 of both the present and proposed Rules state:
Sec. 11. Impeachment of adverse party's witness. A witness may be impeached by
the party against whom he was called, by contradictory evidence, by evidence that
his general reputation for truth, honestly, or integrity is bad, or by evidence that
he has made at other times statements inconsistent with his present, testimony, but
not by evidence of particular wrongful acts, except that it may be shown by the
examination of the witness, or the record of the judgment, that he has been convicted



of an offense. (Emphasis supplied).

6. Impeachment By Prior Inconsistent Statement

Sec. 13.How witness impeached by evidence of inconsistent statements. Before a witness can be
impeached by evidence that he has made at other times statements inconsistent with his present
testimony, the statements must be related to him, with the circumstances of the times and places and the
persons present, and he must be asked whether he made such statements, and if so, allowed to explain
them. If the statements be in writing they must be shown to the witness before any question is put to him
concerning them.

a. Villalon v. IAC 144 SCRA 443 (1986)
b. People v. Resabal 50 Phil. 780 (1927)
c. U.S. v. Webster 734 F.2d 1191 (7th Cir. 1984)

VILLALON v IAC
G.R. No. 73751 September 24, 1986

Doctrine: The defense tool sanctioned by Sections 15 and 16 of Rule 132 is that witnesses have given
conflicting testimonies, which are inconsistent with their present testimony and which would accordingly
cast a doubt on their credibility.

FACTS: Previous to this present case, a Civil Case was filed against Atty. Villalon for "Annulment of Deed
of Absolute Sale, Recovery of Possession and Damages". It was filed by private respondent Catalina
Ebuiza, mother of the private respondents all surnamed Ebuiza for the recovery of a parcel of land. The
property involved was also the subject of a Disbarment Case previously filed by private respondent
Francisco Ebuiza, charging petitioner Villalon with falsification of a deed of absolute sale of that property
in his favor, but which petitioner Villalon claimed to have been his contingent fee for the professional
services he had rendered to (Francis) Ebuiza's parents in another case. In the course of the trial of the
Civil Case (case at bench), petitioners introduced in evidence the testimonies of some of the private
respondents in the Disbarment Case for the purpose of impeaching their testimonies in the Civil Case.

Private respondents filed a Motion to Strike from the records of the Civil Case all matters relating
to the proceedings in the Disbarment Case. The RTC granted the prayer of the respondent. The Trial
Court opined that the admission of the contested evidence would violate Section 10, Rule 139 of the Rules
of Court providing that "proceedings against attorneys shall be private and confidential". It maintained
that petitioner Villalon "is not at liberty to waive the privilege of confidentiality" of the proceedings in the
Disbarment Case considering the public interest involved "even if it would serve his interest," and that
Section 10, Rule 139 provides no exception. The CA affirmed the RTC.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not it was proper for the lower courts to grant the Motion to Strike? NO.
2. Whether or not the admission of the contested evidence (testimonies of the respondents in the
Disbarment case) would violate Section 10, Rule 139 of the Rules of Court providing that "proceedings
against attorneys shall be private and confidential"? NO.

RATIO: Petitioners introduced the testimonies of private respondents' witnesses in the Disbarment Case
for purposes of impeaching their credibility in the Civil Case. Petitioners claim that private respondents'
witnesses "have given conflicting testimonies on important factual matters in the disbarment case, which
are inconsistent with their present testimony and which would accordingly cast a doubt on their
credibility." That is a defense tool sanctioned by Sections 15 and 16 of Rule 132. By issuing its Order to
strike, the Trial Court deprived petitioners of their right to impeach the credibility of their adverse parties'
witnesses by proving that on former occasions they had made statements inconsistent with the
statements made during the trial, despite the fact that such statements are material to the issues in the



Civil Case. The subject matter involved in the disbarment proceedings i.e., the alleged falsification of the
deed of absolute sale in petitioners' favor, is the same issue raised in the Civil Case wherein the
annulment of the said deed of absolute sale is sought.

While proceedings against attorneys should, indeed, be private and confidential except for the
final order which shall be made public, that confidentiality is a privileged/ right which may be waived by
the very lawyer in whom and for the protection of whose personal and professional reputation it is vested,
pursuant to the general principle that rights may be waived unless the waiver is contrary to public policy,
among others. In fact, the Court also notes that even private respondents' counsel touched on some
matters testified to by Neval (one of the respondents herein) in the disbarment proceedings and which
were the subject of cross examination.

ANALYSIS:
This case was decided properly both under the present and proposed rules.

PEOPLE v. RESEBAL
G.R. No. 26708

Doctrine: The apparent contradictions which may be noted in the declarations made during preliminary
investigation and the testimony before the court may not be used to impeach the credibility of the witness
because the witness was not given ample opportunity, by reading to him of his declarations during the
preliminary investigation, to explain the discrepancies. The mere presentation of the transcript showing the
prior testimony, without said declaration having been read to the witness while he testified in court, is no
ground for impeaching his testimony.

FACTS: The Accused Alejo Resebal was charged and convicted for the murder of Primo Ortiz. The facts
of the case show that one Glicero Ortit testified that the Accused, armed with a revolver, invited him to
Primo Ordiz's house in order to kill the latter. Ortit further testified that upon arriving at the said house,
the accused went into the ground, approached one of the windows of the house less than a meter and a
half in height, opened it and looked in. At that moment the witness left the place, and at a distance of 15
brazas heard an explosion. Glicerio Orit's testimony as to the explosion is corroborated by the declaration
of the boy Jose Ordiz, who slept with his uncle Primo Ordiz, to the effect that early in the morning of that
day he was awakened by the noise of an explosion and saw his uncle Primon Ordiz vomiting blood and
unable to speak. The prosecution also presented a revolver which was proved to have been used by the
Accused in the commission of the crime, and a piece of cloth from his trousers. The Accused was
convicted of murder beyond Reasonable Doubt. The Accused challenged the said decision, claiming that
they were unable to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

ISSUE:
1. Was the guilt of the Accused proved beyond reasonable doubt? YES.

RATIO: The guilt of the Accused beyond reasonable doubt was shown by the testimony of the witnesses
and the other evidences presented in the case, particularly of by the finding of the revolver used in the
commission of the crime. This revolver was hidden by the accused on the land cultivated by the witness
Carmelo Ordiz, to whom the accused revealed it, and who, through fear of the police, transferred it to the
neighboring lot, burying it at the foot of a tree called "mabago." By following the directions of this witness,
Carmelo Ordiz, the chief of police, who investigated the case, found the revolver wrapped in two pieces of
cloth Exhibits C and C-1. The revolver was loaded with two bullets and an empty shell, and had a rusty
barrel. It must be noted that Exhibit C-1 appears to be a piece of cloth from a pair of drawers, and the
chief of police who searched the house where the accused lived, found a piece of a pair of drawers in a
trunk that was in the kitchen. Upon examination of said Exhibits F and C-1 by this court, it was found
that these two pieces of cloth Exhibit F and C-1 made a complete pair of drawers, all of which shows that
the accused tore the piece of cloth Exhibits C-1 from an old pair of drawers in order to wrap up the
revolver before putting it in the place indicated by the witness Carmelo Ordiz.



ANALYSIS:
The case was decided correctly under the current rules of evidence. The evidence presented by the
Prosecution did not exclude the possibility of error but was sufficient to form a conviction in an
unprejudiced mind. The ruling will still be the same under if the proposed rules of evidence were used
because it maintained the standard of evidence required for a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.

UNITED STATES v. LAMAR WEBSTER
No. 09-30173

Doctrine: When an object is relevant to a fact in issue, it may be exhibited to, examined or viewed by the
court. In this case, the object need not have been presented before the court because it was irrelevant to the
fact in issue, because it could not be connected in any way to the defendant, and the jury in the case was
already informed of such fact.

FACTS: Lamar Webster was charged and convicted for the crimes of (1) conspiracy to possess with intent
to distribute methamphetamine, (2) possession with intent to distribute over 500 grams of
methamphetamine, and (3) money laundering conspiracy. During the trial, three other co-accused in the
case pleaded guilty and agreed to cooperate with the authorities. Consequently, two of the co-accused
named Richard Todd and Kelly Mayes testified that they sent wire transfers to Webster. Todd averred that
Ic scni a wirc iransfcr on Dcccnlcr 23, 2003, in rcsponsc io iIc laiicr's request. Kelly Mayes, Todd's
then-wife, further testified that she wired Webster $300 on one occasion per Todd's request. The
prosecution also sought the admissibility of a proposed exhibit, whose presentation into evidence they
subsequently objected to, because it could not be directly linked to the Accused. Webster was found
guilty of the crimes and was duly sentenced. He filed an appeal questioning the propriety of the decision
of the court not to consider proposed exhibit as evidence, at the motion of the prosecution and the
adnissililiiy of iIc icsiinonics of Todd and Maycs. Wclsicr conicndcd iIai iIc rccipicni's nanc, Lanar
Wclsicr," is an oui-of-court statement by the sender and is inadmissible hearsay within hearsay. He
concedes, however, that thc rcnaindcr of EIilii 14A is adnissillc undcr iIc lusincss rccords
cccpiion" io iIc Icarsay rulc. Hc furiIcr claincd iIai iIc lowcr Couri crrcd in susiaining iIc oljcciion
concerning the proposed exhibit, because Webster did not object to the admission of the exhibit into
evidence.

ISSUE:
1. Did iIc Couri alusc iis discrciion in susiaining iIc prosccuiion's oljcciion io iIc proposcd cIilii?
NO.
2. Were the testimonies of Todd and Mayes concerning the wire transfers admissible? YES.

RATIO: There was no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Court because the proposed exhibit was
never shown to the jury and was excluded from evidence. The jury was informed that the drugs
mentioned in the exhibit were not connected to Webster. The line of questioning pertaining to the exhibit
was directed at educating the jury about the various forms of methamphetamine and not at making a
connection between the drugs mentioned in the exhibit and Webster.

The recipient's name is admissible under Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2)(E) as an admission
by a party-opponent-a co-conspirator statement made in the course and furtherance of the conspiracy.
Testimony established that the senders of the wire transfer were Webster's co-conspirators and the wire
transfer was relevant to the conspiracy. However, even if the admission of the recipient's name was error,
the error was harmless in light of corroborating evidence that Webster was the recipient. In particular,
Exhibit 14B, the Western Union check payable io Lanar Wclsicr," involvcd iIc sanc anouni, issucd
from the same place of origin, and was cashed at the same store on the same date. Furthermore, the
payee's signature on that check was comparable to Webster's signature on his driver's license-an exhibit
also admitted into evidence.

ANALYSIS:
rules of Evidence in the Philippines. The first section of rule 130 provides that when an object is relevant



to a fact in issue, it may be exhibited to, examined or viewed by the court. In this case, the object need
not have been presented before the court because it was irrelevant to the fact in issue, because it could
not be connected in any way to the defendant, and the jury in the case was already informed of such fact.

The ruling will still be the same under the proposed rules of evidence because evidence presented for the
presentation and examination and view of the Court is still object evidence under the same. Furthermore,
the out of court statements of Todd and Mayes will not be considered hearsay under the proposed rules
because they gave their testimony concerning such statements in open court.

7. Impeachment By Other Means

a. U.S. v. Mercado 20 Phil. 127 (1913)
b. Mosley v. Commonwealth 420 SW2d 679 (1967)
c. Coles v. Harsh 276 P. 248 (1929)
d. U.S. v. Medical Therapy Services 583 F.2d 36 (2d Cir. 1978)
e. Newton v. State 127 A. 123 (Md. 1924)
f. State v. Oswalt 381 P. 2d 617 (1963)

US v. MERCADO
26 Phil 127 (1913)

Doctrine: A witness cannot be impeached by the party against whom he has been called, except by showing
a) that he has made contradictory statements or b) that his general reputation for truth, honesty or integrity
is bad.

FACTS: Defendants Pio Mercado, Tomas Mercado and Catalino Mercado were charged with the crime of
coaccion (coercion) for using force and violence on the person of Claro Mercado to prevent him from
rendering aid to Maria Mateo, who was being maltreated by Santiago Mercado. During trial, Santiago
Mercado was presented as a witness. He was asked how many times had he been convicted for assault.
Tomas Mercado objected on the ground that the question was impertinent. The judge overruled the
objection on the ground that the character of the witness has an intimate relation with the facts being
investigated.

ISSUE:
1. Whether the trial court erred in allowing the question to impugn the credibility of the witness? YES.

RATIO: Generally speaking, a witness cannot be impeached by the party against whom he has been
called, except by showing a) that he has made contradictory statements or b) that his general reputation
for truth, honesty or integrity is bad. In this case, the question propounded by the prosecution neither
attempted to show that the witness made contradictory statements nor that his general reputation for
honesty, truth or integrity is bad. Evidence may be presented that the witness had been convicted of a
high crime. However, in this case, the offense Santiago Mercado was convicted of (assault and battery) is
not a high crime. The objection of the defense should have been sustained. Whether the witness had been
convicted of other crimes is of no matter to the present case.

ANALYSIS
Under the present rules on evidence, this case was decided erroneously. The present rules allow
inpcacIncni of iIc wiincss of an advcrsc pariy ly caninaiion of iIc wiincss., iIai Ic as lccn
convicted of an offensc." TIc rulcs do noi providc for any qualificaiion.

Under the proposed rules on evidence, the question will also be allowed Rule 132, Section 12 of the
proposed rules expressly states that impeachment of a witness by previous conviction is allowed where
the conviction is 1) for a crime punishable by a penalty in excess of one year or 2) the crime involved moral
turpitude, regardless of penalty. Assault and battery is a crime involving moral turpitude, thus, proof of



such conviction may be allowed to impeach the credibility of a witness.

MOSLEY V. COMMONWEALTH
420 S.W. 2d 679 November 10, 1967

Doctrine: Proffered testimony of clinical psychologist as to mental condition of prosecuting witness at time of
alleged rape was relevant and competent in rape prosecution and should have been received, not in
extenuation of rape, but for its bearing upon question of weight to be accorded to prosecuting witness'
testimony, and exclusion of the psychologist's testimony constituted prejudicial error.
Although, generally, a witness may be impeached only as specified by the rules of civil procedure,
the modern trend is to permit the jury to consider expert testimony in the field of mental disorders and relax
the rule in sex offense cases.

FACTS: Defendant Mosley, was convicted in the Circuit Court, Fayette County, Joseph J. Bradley, J., of
rape. During the trial, Dr. Gay a clinical psychologist testified that the complainant was schizophrenic
and was receiving treatment for the said disease. The witness obtained a Ph D degree in psychology and
has been licensed by the state of Kentucky as a clinical psychologist. He is a member of the American and
Kentucky Psychological Associations and is presently the psychologist in charge of the Fayette County
Program, a special program at Eastern State Hospital for outpatient treatment. In his testimony he
claimed that the complainant entered a state hospital for mental treatment during October 1961. At that
time she was complaining that her father and brothers had molested her sexually during her adolescence.
She was discharged from the hospital in January 1962 and readmitted for treatment on a voluntary basis
during 1964. She has been treated by Doctor Gay since September 1965. The lower court disregarded his
testimony and found the defendant guilty. However on appeal, the decision was reversed. It held that the
proffered testimony of clinical psychologist as to mental condition of prosecuting witness at time of alleged
rape was relevant and competent and should have been received, not in extenuation of rape, but for its
bearing upon question of weight to be accorded to prosecuting witness' testimony, and exclusion of
psychologist's testimony constituted prejudicial error.

ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the testimony of Dr. Gay be admitted in evidence? YES.

RATIO: The proffered testimony of Doctor Gay was relevant and competent and should have been
received, not in extenuation of rape, but for its bearing upon the question of the weight to be accorded to
iIc conplainani's icsiinony. For iIis rcason iIc couri sIould admonish the jury that the expert
testimony should be considered by it only for the purpose of affecting the credibility of this witness, if it
does so. Generally a witness may be impeached only as specified in our Rules of Civil Procedure.
However, the modern trend is to permit the jury to consider expert testimony in the field of mental
disorders and relax the rule in sex offense cases. McCormick in his treatise on Evidence, Section 45 at
page 99, observes:

'Nutu)uu, tIc usc o] psucIut)c tcstnony as to mental disorders and defects suggests itself
as a potential aid in determining the credibility of crucial witnesses in any kind of litigation. In one type of
case, namely that of sex offenses, the indispensible value of this kind of testimony has been urged by
Vgno)c, und otIc) conncntuto)s, und sucI tcstnonu Ius Iccn udcu )cccucd Iu tIc cou)ts.

ANALYSIS:
The decision would be the same under the rules of evidence in the Philippines because the opinion of an
expert witness is admissible when the issue involves special knowledge, skill or experience which he is
shown to possess. In this case, medical psychology is a form of special knowledge and skill which not all
persons possess. The ruling will also be the same under the proposed rules because it has not omitted or
altered the admissibility of the testimony of an expert witness.



COLES v. HARSCH
129 Or. 11, 276 P. 248 (1929)

Doctrine: When questioning a witness about a prior inconsistent statement, the statement must be shared
with the witness so he may deny or explain it.

FACTS: Dcfcndani was iniiially narricd io Plainiiff's sisicr and Iung oui in iIc sanc social circlcs as
Plainiiff. Onc aciiviiy of iIc social circlc was iIc wrcsiling of ncn wiiI cacI oiIcr's wivcs. Plainiiff
introduccd cvidcncc iIai Dcfcndani's aiicniion io Plainiiff's wifc was lcyond iIc norn for iIcir circlc, and
it led to the divorce of Plaintiff and his wife, whom Defendant married shortly thereafter. Coles sued
Harsch for $50k, charging that Harsch had maliciously shown "improper affection" to Coles wife, resulting
in her becoming alienated and leaving him. At trial, Harsch called a guy named Thompson as a witness.
Thompson testified that Harsh wrestled with a lot of people's wives and it was totally harmless. Later,
Coles testified that Thompson once told him that Harsch's behavior was disgraceful. Harsch objected on
the grounds that the testimony was hearsay. Coles argued that the testimony was meant to impeach the
credibility of Harsch as a witness, not to prove the truth of the matter asserted. Harsch argued that Coles
never asked Thompson about the incident while cross-examining him, and therefore it was improper to
introduce Coles' testimony to impeach Thompson. The Trial Judge allowed the testimony to be admitted
and found for Coles and awarded $17.5k in damages. Harsch appealed.

ISSUE:
1. WIciIcr a propcr foundaiion was laid for Plainiiff's inpcacIncni of a dcfcnsc wiincss? NO.

RATIO: The foundation was not proper and was irreversible error. The witness was only asked whether he
remembered a conversation without any additional foundation. The Court found that the exclusion of
evidence to further demonstrate the wrestling activities was no error or harmless error. The court
reasoned that a juror would typically understand that the conduct would inflate the likelihood that
Defendant and the wife would bond. The court held that Plaintiff can not question Defendant on a
collateral matter just to catch Defendant in a lie. Further the admission of affidavits was not admissible.
Furthermore, Oregon Supreme Court looked to Oregon State rules of evidence and found that in order to
introduce a prior statement impeaching a witness, you must ask the witness about the alleged prior
statement during cross-examination, and give them the opportunity to explain the prior statement.
Therefore, when questioning a witness about a prior inconsistent statement, the statement must be
shared with the witness so he may deny or explain it.

ANALYSIS:
The ruling of the court in this case will be the same even under the proposed rules of evidence.

US V. MEDICAL THERAPY SCIENCES, INC., AND STANLEY BERMAN
583 F.2d 36 (1978)

Doctrine: A witness may always be impeached by proof of a prior conviction if the crime involved
dsIoncstu o) ]usc stutcncnt .c. c)ncs sucI us pc)]u)u o) suIo)nuton o] pc)]u)u, ]usc stutcncnt,
criminal fraud, embezzlement, or false pretense, or any other offense in the nature of crimenfalsi, the
commission of which involves some element of deceit, untruthfulness or falsification bearing on the
accused's propensity to testify truthfully.
There is a vast difference between putting that witness' veracity in issue by eliciting the impeaching
facts and merely revealing the witness' background. Indeed, even in jurisdictions where a party may not
discredit his own witness, it has been held that the fact of prior convictions may be brought out on direct
examination for non-impeachment purposes.
When such convictions are used for impeachment purposes, as they were on cross-examination
here, we think that the door is opened to evidence in support of truthfulness.

FACTS: Stanley Berman and his company, Medical Therapy Sciences, Inc. ("Medical Therapy"), are under
trial for having filed false claims to obtain Medicare payments during the period of 1971-1976, in
conspiracy with others, including one Barbara Russell, formerly a trusted employee and personal intimate



of Berman.

Medical Therapy was a Connecticut company, which had a New York branch, Respiratory
Specialties. Under the Medicare program, Medical Therapy was to be reimbursed by the Department of
Health, Education and Welfare, for a certain percentage of the cost of supplies to patients. At trial,
Berman was shown to have devised a fraudulent scheme to wrongfully obtain payments from both the
Connecticut and New York carriers. Aside from double billing the two companies for the same patients, he
also sought reimbursement for more expensive equipment than had actually been provided, and billing
for supplies neither delivered nor needed. Barbara Russell was the witness for the prosecution. During
her direct examination, the Government revealed that she had had two prior convictions and that she had
been accused by Berman of having embezzled money from Medical Therapy. She was cross-examined only
as to matters brought out during the direct examination. Thereafter the judge permitted, over defense
objection, character witnesses to be presented in order to strengthen Russell's credibility.

While Berman does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence as to the substantive counts, he
claims on appeal that his conviction should be reversed because the trial court erred in allowing the
Govcrnncni io lolsicr Fusscll's crcdililiiy. Hc argucs iIai Fulc 608(ai of iIc Fcdcral Fulcs of Evidcncc
provides that character evidence may be used to support a witness, but limits its use in that "evidence of
truthful character is admissible only after the character of the witness for truthfulness has been attacked
by opinion or reputation evidence or otherwise." He claims that the foundation for admissible character
evidence was not present in this case as Russell's character for truthfulness had not been attacked within
the meaning of the Rule, and that his counsel did not open the door to character evidence as the cross
examination of Russell did not constitute an "attack on veracity". He claims that a new trial is in order as
the question of her credibility was crucial under the defense theory of the case -that it was Russell alone
who had perpetrated the frauds.

ISSUES:
1. Whether the Government, in questioning Russell on direct as to her prior convictions, is impeaching its
own witness, and if it is allowed to do so? - YES, and YES.
2. WIciIcr Fusscll's cIaracicr or vcraciiy for iruiI was so aiiaclcd io allow prcscniaiion of cIaracicr
evidence. - YES.

RATIO: The Government argues that the prosecutor was only anticipating defense impeachment, as it
had the right to do, so that the jury would not gain the impression that the Government was attempting
to hide information from them. The Supreme Court agrees.

Rule 608 itself contains no limitation that precludes a party from offering character evidence
under circumstances where it anticipates impeachment. Rather, the event that triggers the applicability of
the Rule is an "attack" on the witness' veracity. Under the Federal Rules, a party may impeach his own
witness. However, putting that witness' veracity in issue through eliciting impeaching facts should be
distinguished from merely revealing the witness' background. Indeed, even in jurisdictions where a party
may not discredit his own witness, it has been held that the fact of prior convictions may be brought out
on direct examination for non-impeachment purposes. The Supreme Court held that the trial judge has
the discretion to permit the use of character witnesses. His proximity to the situation allows him to make
the determination of when, and by whom, an attack is made. Were the rule to be otherwise, a party would
have to choose between revealing, on direct, the background of a witness and its right to use character
evidence if the witness' veracity is subsequently impugned.

The cross examination of Russell included sharp questioning about her prior convictions for
fraudulent activities (i.e. obtaining amphetamines), and her character was also attacked by "specific act"
evidence, namely, allegations that she had embezzled money and stolen patients from Berman's company.
Berman argues that such evidence bore solely on her bias against him, and as such did not constitute an
attack on character.

However, the Court did not agree. Evidence of corrupt conduct on the part of a witness should be
regarded as an attack on his truthfulness warranting supportive evidence. Certainly, the embezzlement
and theft of which Russell was accused can be said to fall within the category of corrupt conduct, within
the contemplation of Rule 608(a). Thus, the Court held that decision to permit the character evidence
must be affirmed. However, discretion in this area must be exercised with caution so that the jury's
attention is not diverted from the main issues to be tried. Not every cross examination should trigger the



authority of Rulc 608(ai's provision for supporiing cIaracicr cvidcncc. As iIc 'aiiacl' in iIis casc wcni
even beyond cross examination, and since Berman's guilt was established not solely by Russell's
testimony but also by other supporting evidence, conviction is affirmed.

ANALYSIS:
If the case was decided locally, the ruling would have changed, for in contrast to the Federal Rules,
parties in this jurisdiction are not allowed to impeach their own witnesses. Should the fact of prior
convictions should be elicited in the direct examination, it should be for purposes of non-impeachment,
i.c. rcvcaling iIc wiincss' laclground. Howcvcr, iIc advcrsc pariy nay inpcacI sucI wiincss duc io prior
convictions of an offense. The Proposed Rules however, provide further qualifications, to wit: For iIc
purpose of impeaching a witness, evidence that he has been convicted by final judgment of a crime shall
be admitted if: (a) the crime was punishable by a penalty in excess of one year, or (b) the crime involved
moral turpitude, regardless of the penalty. However, evidence of a conviction is not admissible if the
conviciion Ias lccn iIc suljcci of an alsoluic pardon or annulncni of iIc conviciion."

NEWTON v. STATE
127 A. 123 (1924)

Doctrine: In impeachment of witness by showing previous conviction of crime, counsel should ask witness
the question directly, and not by indirect question, as to whether he had not given same testimony during
previous trial at which he had been convicted.

FACTS: Emory M. Newton appeals his conviction for the offense of criminal conspiracy to defraud existing
and prospective customers of common-law irusi opcraiing llind pools."

It is charged that coconspirators, Gillespie and Dickey, as public accountants, gave fictitious
value to certain stock when making audit of the Union Finance Company. In their audit, they stated that
the company was solvent and capable, and that shares were valued at 50 cents a share, though originally
bought at 20 cents a share.

The relevant issue in this case involves the action of the court in permitting certain questions to
be asked in the cross-examination of Harold R. Dickey, Jr., a witness for the defense. In the cross-
examination, he was asked:

You icsiificd conccrning iIcsc iransaciions in ihe case of the state against Dickey and the state
againsi Cillcspic, giving iIcn iIc sanc cplanaiions iIai you Iavc givcn us Icrc, did you noi?"
He was directed over objection to answer that question, and the following discussion took place:
A. Wcll, I can't remember exactly all that I said in the last case.
Q. Now, don't split hairs with me. Did you testify in this same way in the trial of your own case?
x x x
A. Practically.
Q. And you were convicted were you not?
Q. (By Mr. Leach). Go on and answer me? You were convicted in your trial before Judge Gorter
and Judgc Dond and Judgc Sianion, wcrc you noi?"
In answer to the last question the witness replied that he had been so convicted.

ISSUE:
1. Whether such manner of questioning and the answers elicited therefrom are admissible? NO.

RATIO: This method of cross-examining the witness was held by the court to be highly objectionable. If
the purpose of the examiner was to impeach the credibility of the witness by showing that he had been
convicted of crime, he should have asked him that question directly; or, if he had intended to show that
he had in some other case sworn to statements contrary to his testimony in the instant case, he could
have been asked whether he had made such conflicting statements.

However, these questions had no such object. In addition to intimidating the witness, their only



apparent purpose was to bring to the attention of the jury the fact that Dickey had made in his own case
when he was tried for the same crime, the same statement as that to which he testified in this case, and
that the three judges before whom he was tried discredited that statement and convicted him. The obvious
purpose was to induce the jury to believe that, as the testimony of the witness as given before them had
already been discredited by three judges sitting in the same court in another case, therefore they should
discredit it in this case. This is a wholly unwarranted conclusion unsupported by any authority. Case is
remanded for new trial.

ANALYSIS:
If the case was decided here, such manner of questioning would still NOT be allowed. First, Section 47 of
Rule 130 provides that for the testimony or of a witness in a former case to be admissible, the witness
should be deceased or unable to testify. Further, it is merely discretionary on for judges to take judicial
notice of other cases, as provided by Rule 129, Section 2.The Proposed Rules do not make any
substantial revisions with respect to the aforementioned provisions.

STATE v. OSWALT
31 P.2d 617 (1963)

Doctrine: A witness cannot be impeached upon matters collateral to the principal issues being tried. The
purpose of the rule is basically two-fold: (1) avoidance of undue confusion of issues, and (2) prevention of
unfair advantage over a witness unprepared to answer concerning matters unrelated or remote to the issues
at hand.
The test of collateralness is: Could the fact, as to which error is predicated, have been shown in
evidence for any purpose independently of the contradiction?

FACTS: Two armed men entered the King Country Residence of Frank Goodell in Seattle, on July 14,
1961. As one stood on guard over a number of people at the home, the other man took Goodell to a
Tradewell store, forced him to open the safe and turn over the money. Oswalt was identified as one of the
two men.

Oswali's dcfcnsc was alili. Hc callcd on Augusi Ardiss fron Poriland, Orcgon io icsiify for Iin.
Ardiss testified that Oswalt was a regular patron at his restaurant. At the time of the alleged offense, it
was impossible for Oswalt to be in Seattle, as he had accompanied a restaurant employee to work,
assisted in a part of her work, and escorted her home.

On cross-examination, Ardiss was asked whether Oswalt had been in everyday for the past few
months or missed occasional periods of 3-4 days. Ardiss replied that to the best of his knowledge, Oswalt
was there every day. In rebuttal, a police detective was permitted to testify, over the objection of the
defense. The detective answered that he talked to Oswalt on June 12, 1961 in Seattle and that Oswalt
had told him that he had arrived in Seattle a couple of days before the detective talked with him, and that
Oswalt came from Portland. Oswalt was convicted of armed robbery and first-degree burglary.

On appeal, Oswalt contends that the trial court erred in admitting the rebuttal testimony of the
detective, which constituted impeachment on a collateral matter. The State contends that such testimony
is admissible not only lccausc ii cIallcngcs iIc crcdililiiy of Ardiss lui also csiallisIcs Oswali's
presence in Seattle preparatory to the offense.

ISSUE:
1. WIciIcr iIc dcfcndani Oswali's wIcrcalouis a noniI lcforc iIc connission of iIc crinc is an
irrelevant and collateral mattcr, and is iIus inadnissillc io inpcacI Ardiss' icsiinony? - YES.

RATIO: TIc dcicciivc's inpcacIing icsiinony is inadnissillc. WIilc rclcvani and prolaiivc cvidcncc of
preparations by an accused for the commission of a crime is admissible, the state's argument requires us
to speculate that the defendant could not readily commute between Portland and Seattle, and that his
presence in Seattle and acquisition of adhesive tape, upon an isolated occasion a month before the



offense in question, constituted significant evidence of planning and preparation for the offense in
question, the particular mechanics of which are unrevealed by the record. This we decline to do.

It is an established rule that a witness cannot be impeached upon maters collateral to the
principal issue being tried. The purpose of the rule is two-fold: (1) to avoid undue confusion of issues; and
(2) to prevent unfair advantage over a witness unprepared to answer concerning matters unrelated or
remote to the issues at hand.

The TEST for collateralness is: could the fact, as to which error is predicated, have been shown in
evidence for any purpose independently of the contradiction?

Applying this test to the present case, it can be seen that the impeaching testimony of the
detective was upon maiicrs collaicral io iIc principal issuc lcing iricd. TIc solc issuc raiscd ly Oswali's
dcfcnsc of alili, iIrougI Ardiss' icsiinony was wIciIcr or noi Oswali could Iavc lccn in Scaiilc ai iIc
time of the offense on July 14, 1961. Oswalt did not contend or seek to prove by this witness that he had
not been in Seattle before such date. Thus, for the purpose of impeaching this witness, whether or not
Oswalt was in Seattle one month before July 14 was irrelevant and collateral. While a cross-examiner is
within the sound discretion of the trial court, permitted to inquire into collateral matters testing the
credibility of the witness, he does so at the risk of being concluded by the answers given. Thus, the court
erred in admitting the questioned testimony.

ANALYSIS
If the case was decided here, it would fall under Rule 130, Section 34 which provides: Evidcncc iIai onc
did or did not do a certain thing at one time is not admissible to prove that he did or did not do the same
or a similar thing at another time; but it may be received to prove a specific intent or knowledge, identity,
plan." However the presence of Oswalt in Seattle a month before the offense would still be insufficient to
prove, even circumstantially, his participation in the offense. The Proposed Rules does not make any
change with respect to such provision.

8. Refreshing Recollection

Sec. 16.When witness may refer to memorandum. A witness may be allowed to refresh his memory
respecting a fact, by anything written or recorded by himself or under his direction at the time when the
fact occurred, or immediately thereafter, or at any other time when the fact was fresh in his memory and
knew that the same was correctly written or recorded; but in such case the writing or record must be
produced and may be inspected by the adverse party, who may, if he chooses, cross examine the witness
upon it, and may read it in evidence. So, also, a witness may testify from such writing or record, though
he retain no recollection of the particular facts, if he is able to swear that the writing or record correctly
stated the transaction when made; but such evidence must be received with caution.

a. State v. Peoples 319 S.E.2d 177 (1984)

STATE V. PEOPLES
319 SE2d 177 (1984)

Doctrine: Given the problems inherent in the hypnotic process, such as the enhanced suggestibility of the
subject, his tendency to confabulate when there are gaps in his recollection, his increased confidence in the
truthfulness and accuracy of his post-hypnotic recall which may preclude effective cross-examination, and
the inability of either experts or the subject to distinguish between memory and confabulation, hypnotically
refreshed testimony is simply too unreliable to be used as evidence in a judicial setting.
Adopting a series of procedural safeguards would not be effective in combating the dangers we see
in hypnotically refreshed testimony. We hold, therefore, that hypnotically refreshed testimony is
inadmissible in judicial proceedings.



Our rule of inadmissibility does not, however, render all testimony of a previously hypnotized
witness inadmissible. A person who has been hypnotized may testify as to facts which he related before the
hypnotic session. The hypnotized witness may not testify to any fact not related by the witness bef ore the
hypnotic session.

FACTS: Bruce Crocket Miller was arrested on March 27, 1981 for armed robbery unrelated to this case.
Pursuant to a plea agreement, he gave police a statement concerning the armed robbery of the Borden
Chemical Plant, in Fayetteville, North Carolina which he had privy to, last May 26, 1980 (which was never
iniroduccd in Pcoplc's irial nor includcd in iIc rccord on appcali. In connivancc wiiI scvcral oiIcrs, iIcy
had succeeded in taking several buckets of almost pure silver, used by the plant in its production of
formaldehyde, which was worth over $90,000.

Miller testified against a Robert Peele, the third man in the robbery of the chemical plant. Miller
outlined, in considerable detail, the planning and robbery of the plant. He related that Elmer Leroy
Peoples, the defendant in this case, was the one who recruited him into the heist and that after their first
meeting they met several other times to plan the robbery. After consummating the robbery in the
chemical plant, they sold the silver and the proceeds divided among them.

An eyewitness to the robbery, a shift supervisor whom the perpetrators forced to open the
building, named Peoples as one of the robbers. He was arrested on April 29, 1981. On October 8, 1981,
Detective S.C Sessoms, Jr. of the Fayetteville Police Department, having undergone a two-week training
course at the North Carolina Justice Academy, conducted a hypnotic session with Miller so that he may
remember details of the robbery which he would not otherwise remember in an ordinary state. Before
Iypnoiizing Millcr, Scssons rcad nonc of Millcr's siaicncnis conccrning iIc casc.

Miller was successfully hypnotized, which lasted for about an hour, and in that state, related
facts corresponding to his subsequent testimony. Miller also testified that he did not believe he had been
hypnotized. Peoples was convicted.

ISSUE:
1. Whether the testimony of a witness who undergoes hypnosis before testifying to refresh his recollection
is admissible? NO.

RATIO: TIc Couri rulcd iIai a wiincss' Iypnotically refreshed testimony and video recording of the
hypnotic session was inadmissible, expressly overruling the doctrine laid down in State vs. McQueen.
State vs. McQueen held that the effect of prior hypnosis goes only to the weight and credibility, not the
adnissililiiy of a wiincss' icsiinony. TIc couri olscrvcd iIai Iypnosis, as a iool io rcfrcsI or rcsiorc
memory, was inherently problematic.

Hypnosis involves more than the mere retrieval of stored or suppressed information. What often
seems to be recalled is in reality a process through which information received after an event is
iransforncd ly iIc suljcci's nind inio a ncnory of iIai cvcni. Esscniially iIc apparcni rccollcciion of a
hypnotized subject may actually be a view, which he has created subconsciously. Such a situation raises
a question as to the reliability or the potential accuracy or recall stimulated by hypnosis. The possibility
iIai a pcrson's icsiinony nigIi lc iIc rcsuli of suggcsiion fron anoiIcr pcrson prcscnis a firn
indictment of the reliability of such testimony.

TIc proccss of Iypnosis also icnds io cnIancc iIc suljcci's confidcncc in Iis ncnory, wIciIcr
genuine or invented. When the subject leaves the hypnotic session, he remembers not only the content of
Iis ncw" ncnory but forgets its source that he acquired it during the hypnotic session. In short,
Iypnosis noi only irrcvocally nasls wIciIcr a suljcci's rccall induccd ly ii is iruc, ii also crcaics a
barrier to the ascertainment of its truthfulness through cross-examination-the method normally relied
upon in the courtroom to determine truthfulness.

Thus, McQueen should be overruled in so far as it permits the admission of hypnotically
refreshed testimony. Give the problems inherent in hypnotically refreshed testimony, it is simply too
unreliable to be used as evidence in a judicial setting.



ANALYSIS:
If the case was decided locally, the Supreme Court would rule the same way. IN the same way that the
Court has disallowed the use of polygraph testing, our jurisdiction has not taken judicial notice of
methods which have yet to be scientifically validated and tested, and appropriately neither can it sanction
its use in the court. The case will be decided the same way by the Proposed Rules on Evidence.

9. Recalling Witnesses

Sec. 9.Recalling witness. After the examination of a witness by both sides has been concluded, the
witness cannot be recalled without leave of the court. The court will grant or withhold leave in its
discretion, as the interests of justice may require.

a. People v. Del Castillo 25 SCRA 716 (1968)
b. Victorias Milling Co., Inc. Ong Su 79 SCRA 207 (1977)
c. People v. Rivera 200 SCRA 786 (1991)

PEOPLE vs. MATEO DEL CASTILLO
G.R. No. L-16941 October 29, 1968

Doctrine: The court may grant or withhold leave to recall a witness, in its discretion, and as the interests of
justice may require.
Where there are circumstances tending to show insidious attempts to tamper with the witnesses for
the prosecution and would only encourage the perversion of the truth and make a mockery of the
proceedings, the judge is correct in denying leave to recall a witness.

FACTS: Lt. Alcantara and his men, members of the HUKBALAHAP, wanted to kidnap somebody from the
town of Gumaca for ransom. As they had no definite person in mind they called on Jose Estrada, a
councilor and prominent citizen of the place, for his cooperation in the matter of selecting and pointing to
the prospective victim. Estrada suggested the wealthy Principes as the most suitable object of their
criminal design, pinpointing Elvira, as the ideal victim. Thereafter the band of Huks did succeed in
kidnapping Elvira and consequently obtaining P50,000 as her ransom.

Estrada vehemently denied that he was in connivance with the Huks by showing that he could
not have been in Barrio Biga, nor conferred with Lt. Alcantara at the place in February,1956, because he
never left the town of Gumaca during the said month, but once when he went to Lucena City to renew
the plates of his trucks. He sought to destroy the credibility of the witnesses for the prosecution. He tried
hard to convince the trial court that a man of his stature and character an elective official of social
prominence and with substantial income, and commended by a ranking PC officer for "his exploits and
undertakings" as an "informer" of the Army could not have been in league with the Huks in the
mountains, and propose to them a neighbor and family friend as an object of the heinous crime of
kidnapping for ransom.

In support of this defense, there was also an attempt to put back on the stand, prosecution
witness Ceribo in order that he could explain why he testified falsely when he testified for the prosecution.
However, this was disallowed by the trial court. Having failed to convince the trial court of his innocence,
Estrada now appeals.

ISSUE:
1. Whether the trial court erred in disallowing the defense the right to call back witness Ceribo, thereby
denying Estrada of due process? NO.

RATIO: Appellant charges that the trial court had abused its discretion when it denied the defense the
right to call back witness Ceribo who, it is claimed, was then ready to retract his previous testimony for



the prosecution, and then testify for the defense. This, it is pointed out, was a denial of herein appellant's
right to due process. The Court cannot agree.

Section 14, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court explicitly provides that the court may grant or
withhold leave to recall a witness, in its discretion, as the interests of justice may require. We believe that
it was the better part of discretion and caution on the part of the trial court to have denied as it did, the
request of the defense to recall Ceribo. The record is loaded with circumstances tending to show insidious
attempts, too obvious to be overlooked, to tamper with the witnesses for the prosecution. Under the
circumstances, to allow such a procedure would only encourage the perversion of truth and make a
mockery of court proceedings.

ANALYSIS:
The case was properly decided by the present Rules of Evidence. Rule 132, Section 9 provides: Aficr iIc
examination of a witness by both sides has been concluded, the witness cannot be recalled without leave
of couri. TIc couri will grani or wiiIIold lcavc in iis discrciion, as iIc inicrcsis of jusiicc nay rcquirc."
Under the Proposed Rules of Evidence, the case will be decided in the same way as such provision has
been retained with respect to recalling witnesses.

VICTORIAS MILLING CO. INC. v. ONG SU
79 SCRA 207 September 30, 1977

Doctrine: if a witness who has already testified and who has been cross-examined extensively about his
citizenship, alien certificate of registration and the other name being used (an alias) and the only purpose for
the recall on rebuttal was to determine if such witness had the authority to use the alias, the court may
refuse to admit such witness on recall.

FACTS: This case was a trademark infringement case allegedly committed by Ong Su alias Mariano Ang
when he used the same diamond logo of Victorias Milling. Victorias Milling filed a petition to the Director
of Patents to nullify the patent of Ong Su. The petition was denied since the alleged infringing trademark
of Ong Su (Valcniinci did noi aciually infringc Vicioria's iradcnarl. Vicioria's plcadings rclicd Icavily on
iIc dianond" dcsign of iIc logo, wIicI in iisclf did noi consiiiuic infringcncni sincc connon gcometric
shapes and the color patterns are not in themselves patentable. Moreover, the case was an unfair
competition case of which the Director of Patents had no jurisdiction. Petitioner then filed a petition for
review of the decision of the Director of patents.

ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the Director of Patents erred in not allowing Ong Su to testify as a rebuttal witness in
favor of Petitioner Victorias Milling? - NO.

RATIO: The refusal of the Director of Patents to allow respondent Ong Su and witness Emesto Duran to
testify on rebuttal is not a reversible effort. The only purpose of the petitioner in proposing to call Ong Su
as a witness on rebuttal is to ask the latter if he had judicial authority to use the alias 'Mariano' Ang. It
appears, however, that the counsel of petitioner had already extensively cross-examined Ong Su as to a
citizenship, alien certificate of registration and the other name Mariano Ang. It seems immaterial whether
or not Ong Su has judicial authority to use Mariano Ang as an alias. There is evidence that even before
the last World War, the trademark 'Valentine' and design had been used under the name of either Ong Su
or Mariano Ang.

ANALYSIS:
Under the proposed rules of evidence, this is still applicable since the rule on recall of witness has not
cIangcd and iIai undcr iIis casc, Viciorias Milling's counscl was ncrcly rciicraiing wIai Ias alrcady
been testified by Ong Su.



PEOPLE v. RIVERA
200 SCRA 786 August 16, 1991

Doctrine: The discretion of a judge to exercise discretion in recalling witnesses must rely on something more
than the bare assertion of the need to propound additional questions is essential before the court's
discretion may rightfully be exercised to grant or deny recall. There must be a satisfactory showing of some
concrete, substantial ground for the recall.
A Judge cannot strike out testimony of a witness who did not show up under recall especially when
if the defense did not file a motion to strike such testimony from the records and most importantly if the
defense had already crossed examined and re-cross examined such witness.

FACTS: This case was an arson case filed against accused Wilfredo L. Sembrano. It is the prosecution's
theory that he willfully caused the fire in the early morning of May 21, 1987 which totally burned and
destroyed the second and third floors of the "I Love You Restaurant and Sauna Bath" owned by Juanita L.
Tan. The prosecution relied on the testimony of Benjamin Lee, a room boy of the restaurant and bath.
Lcc's icsiinony was csscntially that Sembrano had run out of the VIP room where the fire had started
and refused to heed his (Lee's) call to stop. Lee took the witness stand again on April 26, 1987 during
which he was cross-examined by defense counsel, gave additional evidence on redirect examination, was
again questioned on recross-examination by the same defense counsel, and thereafter allowed to step
down.
The prosecution completed presentation of its evidence-in-chief in due course. But before it could
rest its case, and two (2) months or so after Benjamin Lee had completed his testimony, the defendant's
original counsel, Benjamin Formoso, withdrew his appearance and was substituted by another attorney,
Eduardo S. Rodriguez. The latter then filed a motion on June 8, 1988 to recall Benjamin Lee for further
examination. The ground relied upon by Atty. Rodriguez was simply that after he had reviewed the record
of Benjamin Lee's testimony, he came to the conclusion that " there seems to be many points and
questions that should have been asked but were not profounded (sic) by the other defense counsel who
conducted.. (the cross-examination). It was on this averment, and counsel's reference to "the gravity of the
offense charge (sic)" and the need "to afford the accused full opportunity to defend himself," that Lee's
recall for further cross examination was sought to be justified.

Over objections of the prosecution, the Court granted the motion. But since the witness could no
longer be located, the lower court struck out the entire testimony of Benjamin Lee, reasoning that it was
not the fault of the defense that Benjamin Lee could no longer be located. From this the prosecution filed
the present petition on certiorari against the order of the judge.

ISSUE:
1. Whether the lower court erred in striking out of the testimony of Benjamin Lee? YES.

RATIO: There is no doubt that a Trial Court has discretion to grant leave for the recall of a witness. But
obviously that discretion may not be exercised in a vacuum, as it were, entirely, isolated from a particular
set of attendant circumstances. The discretion to recall a witness is not properly invoked or exercisable by
an applicant's mere general statement that there is a need to recall a witness "in the interest of justice," or
"in order to afford a party full opportunity to present his case," or that, as here, "there seems to be many
points and questions that should have been asked" in the earlier interrogation. To regard expressed
generalities such as these as sufficient ground for recall of witnesses would make the recall of witness no
longer discretionary but ministerial. Something more than the bare assertion of the need to propound
additional questions is essential before the Court's discretion may rightfully be exercised to grant or deny
recall. There must be a satisfactory showing of some concrete, substantial ground for the recall. There
must be a satisfactory showing on the movant's part, for instance, that particularly identified material
points were not covered in the cross-examination, or that particularly described vital documents were not
presented to the witness whose recall is prayed for, or that the cross-examination was conducted in so
inept a manner as to result in a virtual absence thereof. Absent such particulars, to repeat, there would
be no foundation for a trial court to authorize the recall of any witness.

In the case at bar, the respondent Trial Court granted the defendant's motion for recall on
nothing more than said movant's general claim that certain questions unspecified, it must be stressed
had to be asked. In doing so, it acted without basis, exercised power whimsically or capriciously, and
gravely abused its discretion.



So, too, the respondent Court gravely abused its discretion, in ordering the striking out of the
entire testimony of Benjamin Lee after it appeared that he could no longer be found and produced for
further examination. In the first place, the Court acted unilaterally, without any motion to this effect by
the defense and thus without according the prosecution a prior opportunity to show why the striking out
should not be decreed. More importantly, the striking out was directed without any showing whatever by
the defense of the indispensability of further cross-examination, what it was that would have been elicited
by further cross-examination rendering valueless all that the witness had previously stated. It should be
stressed that Lee was subjected both to cross-examination and recross-examination by former counsel of
the accused Sembrano. Obviously the latter was satisfied that there had been sufficient cross-
examination of the witness. Absence of cross-examination may not therefore be invoked as ground to
strike out Lee's testimony (as being hearsay). And there is no showing whatever in this case that it was
the prosecution that placed the witness beyond the reach of the Court, much less of the expected nature
or tenor of his additional testimony which, because not presented, would necessarily cause the evidence
earlier given by Lee to become hearsay or otherwise incompetent, and therefore, amenable to being
stricken from the record.

ANALYSIS:
Under the proposed rules, this case is still applicable since it basically held that a judge may not
arbitrarily grant a recall of a witness on mere bare assertions and he may not strike out a testimony of a
non-appearing witness on recall especially if such testimony was not opposed on any motion by the
defense. Another point is that the witness was already subjected to cross and re-cross examination, hence
the defense had every opportunity to strike out the testimony of the Benjamin Lee.

10. Exclusion of Witnesses

Sec. 15.Exclusion and separation of witnesses. On any trial or hearing, the judge may exclude from the
court any witness not at the time under examination, so that he may not hear the testimony of other
witnesses. The judge may also cause witnesses to be kept separate and to be prevented from conversing
with one another until all shall have been examined.

a. People v. Sandal 54 Phil. 883 (1930)
b. State v. Bishop 492 P2d 509 (1972)

PEOPLE v. SANDAL
54 PHIL 883 September 5, 1930

Doctrine: If the Court gives the order that certain witnesses should not be present during the hearing, and
despite that order such witness was present, his testimony should be excluded unless the proponent of the
witness show cause that such statement affected the cause of the proponent.

FACTS: This case was a murder case committed by four moro persons against a certain Eleno Lamorena.
The following facts of record explain the motive of the assault: When Tomas Permites went to Manila to
look after certain matters he left Eleno in charge of his interests in Monungan. While Permites was in
Manila, the appellants caused some injuries to his carabaos, as a result of which Eleno had a dispute
with them. Eleno sent word of what had happened to Permites in Manila, and when the latter returned to
Monungan, he verified the facts and filed a complaint against the appellants. Eleno was to be the
principal witness, and the defendants knew it. They presented an alibi as a defense. They were convicted.
They then appealed their case, stating that the lower court failed to admit the testimony of a witness for
the defense.

ISSUE:



1. Whether or not the lower court erred in not including the testimony a witness for the defense who was
present in the court despite the order of the court that all witnesses leave the court room? NO.

RATIO: An assignment of error alleged by the appellants in this instance deals with the trial court's
refusal to admit a certain witness presented by the defense. The court took this stand for the reason that
this witness had been present during the hearing notwithstanding the court's order that all witnesses
leave the court room. Under such circumstances it lies within the court's discretion to admit or reject the
testimony of the witness. And although we are of opinion that the court below should have admitted the
testimony of this witness, especially when he stated that he did not hear what the other witnesses
testified, yet there is nothing to show that this error has affected the appellants' defense. There is nothing
to show what this witness would have testified if admitted, and so it cannot be held that his failure to
testify has materially affected the appellants' defense.

ANALYSIS:
Under the circumstances of the case, the proposed rule on evidence may no longer be applicable since the
wiincss is a pcrson wIosc prcscncc is csscniial io iIc prcscniaiion of iIc pariy's causc. Especially since
the witness in this case testified that he did not hear what the other witnesses testified, even if this did
noi affcci iIc appcllani's dcfcnsc. Howcvcr, iIc docirinc iIai if a couri givcs an ordcr io iIc cffcci iIai all
witnesses, except the ones not allowed under the rules to be excluded, should leave, then such testimony
of witnesses who defied such order should be stricken out.

STATE v. BISHOP
492 P2d 509 (1971)

Doctrine: When one party moves to exclude witnesses and the other party voices no objection, the motion
sIoud uuuus Ic g)untcd. Hut uIcn tIc noton s opposcd, tIc t)u cou)t`s dsc)cton concs nto puu.
Judicial discretion is to be exercised in conformity with the spirit of the law and in a manner to subserve
and not defeat the ends of justice. The trial court must weigh the good cause shown.

FACTS: Bishop was charged and convicted of sale and possession of dangerous drugs. When the case
was called for trial, defense counsel requested all witnesses be excluded. The prosecutor stated that most
of his witnesses were police officers. The defense counsel argued that his client would be prejudiced by
allowing the officers to remain. He further stated that the only advantage for them being in the courtroom
is to hear the cross-examination by the defense counsel, to determine what theory of the defense is in this
case and to determine these things instead of coming in on the questions cold.

The trial judge denied the motion and explained that is highly desirable from the public
standpoint that officers have an opportunity to learn what it is about their police practice that is being
questioned and to give careful thought to their own practices. Furthermore, some of the police officers
were involved in motions to suppress in this group of cases and should be allowed to see the trails that
involve the efforts that they have made.

ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the witness should not be excluded on the grounds of educational experience and for
them to be able to see the fruits of their labor? YES.

RATIO: The witness should be excluded. As held in State v. Wilson and State v. Ede, it suggests that a
motion to exclude normally should be granted. It was further held in the Wilson case that the practice of
excluding witnesses in the courtroom except while each is testifying is to be strongly recommended,
particularly where the testimony of the witnesses is in any measure cumulative or corroborative. The
exclusion is a time-honored practice designed to prevent the shaping of testimony by hearing what other
witnesses say.

These authorities mean that when one party moves to exclude witnesses and the other party
voices no objection, the motion should always be granted. But when the motion is opposed, the trial
couri's discrciion concs inio play. Judicial discretion is to be exercised in conformity with the spirit of the



law and in a manner to subserve and not defeat the ends of justice. The trial court must weigh the good
cause shown.

In this case, the trial court wanted the police officers who would be witnesses to be able to view
the trial as an educational experience and wanted them to be able to see the fruits of their labors. These
reasons, while undoubtedly salutary as an educational device, were not relevant to the purpose of the
trial, namely wIciIcr iIc dcfcndani was guiliy or noi. Dalancc againsi iIc dangcr iIai iIc wiincsscs'
memories might be confused by other testimony, the reasons advanced by the court were insufficient.
Lastly, it is the State that has the burden to prove the lack of prcjudicc fron iIc dcnial of iIc dcfcndani's
motion to exclude.

ANALYSIS:
Under the proposed rules of evidence on exclusion of witnesses, the case is still applicable. Under the
proposed rules, the police officers in this case did not fall under the exception for the court to exclude
certain witnesses. Hence, the doctrine is still applicable.

D. Authentication and Proof of Documents
1. Rule 132, Sec. 19-33; E-Commerce Act, Sec. 5, 6-15; REE, Rules 5, 6, 9 & 11.

RULE 132
B. AUTHENTICATION AND PROOF OF DOCUMENTS
Sec. 19.Classes of Documents. For the purpose of their presentation evidence, documents are either
public or private.
Public documents are:
(a)The written official acts, or records of the official acts of the sovereign authority, official bodies and
tribunals, and public officers, whether of the Philippines, or of a foreign country;
(b)Documents acknowledge before a notary public except last wills and testaments; and
(c)Public records, kept in the Philippines, of private documents required by law to the entered therein.
All other writings are private. (20a)

Sec. 20.Proof of private document. Before any private document offered as authentic is received in
evidence, its due execution and authenticity must be proved either:
(a)By anyone who saw the document executed or written; or
(b)By evidence of the genuineness of the signature or handwriting of the maker.
Any other private document need only be identified as that which it is claimed to be. (21a)

Sec. 21.When evidence of authenticity of private document not necessary. Where a private document is
more than thirty years old, is produced from the custody in which it would naturally be found if genuine,
and is unblemished by any alterations or circumstances of suspicion, no other evidence of its authenticity
need be given. (22a)

Sec. 22.How genuineness of handwriting proved. The handwriting of a person may be proved by any
witness who believes it to be the handwriting of such person because he has seen the person write, or has
seen writing purporting to be his upon which the witness has acted or been charged, and has thus
acquired knowledge of the handwriting of such person. Evidence respecting the handwriting may also be
given by a comparison, made by the witness or the court, with writings admitted or treated as genuine by
the party against whom the evidence is offered, or proved to be genuine to the satisfaction of the judge.
(23a)

Sec. 23.Public documents as evidence. Documents consisting of entries in public records made in the
performance of a duty by a public officer are prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated. All other
public documents are evidence, even against a third person, of the fact which gave rise to their execution
and of the date of the latter. (24a)



Sec. 24.Proof of official record. The record of public documents referred to in paragraph (a) of Section
19, when admissible for any purpose, may be evidenced by an official publication thereof or by a copy
attested by the officer having the legal custody of the record, or by his deputy, and accompanied, if the
record is not kept in the Philippines, with a certificate that such officer has the custody. If the office in
which the record is kept is in foreign country, the certificate may be made by a secretary of the embassy
or legation, consul general, consul, vice consul, or consular agent or by any officer in the foreign service of
the Philippines stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept, and authenticated by the seal
of his office. (25a)

Sec. 25.What attestation of copy must state. Whenever a copy of a document or record is attested for
the purpose of evidence, the attestation must state, in substance, that the copy is a correct copy of the
original, or a specific part thereof, as the case may be. The attestation must be under the official seal of
the attesting officer, if there be any, or if he be the clerk of a court having a seal, under the seal of such
court. (26a)

Sec. 26.Irremovability of public record. Any public record, an official copy of which is admissible in
evidence, must not be removed from the office in which it is kept, except upon order of a court where the
inspection of the record is essential to the just determination of a pending case. (27a)

Sec. 27.Public record of a private document. An authorized public record of a private document may be
proved by the original record, or by a copy thereof, attested by the legal custodian of the record, with an
appropriate certificate that such officer has the custody. (28a)

Sec. 28.Proof of lack of record. A written statement signed by an officer having the custody of an official
record or by his deputy that after diligent search no record or entry of a specified tenor is found to exist in
the records of his office, accompanied by a certificate as above provided, is admissible as evidence that
the records of his office contain no such record or entry. (29)

Sec. 29.How judicial record impeached. Any judicial record may be impeached by evidence of: (a) want
of jurisdiction in the court or judicial officer, (b) collusion between the parties, or (c) fraud in the party
offering the record, in respect to the proceedings. (30a)

Sec. 30.Proof of notarial documents. Every instrument duly acknowledged or proved and certified as
provided by law, may be presented in evidence without further proof, the certificate of acknowledgment
being prima facie evidence of the execution of the instrument or document involved. (31a)

Sec. 31.Alteration in document, how to explain. The party producing a document as genuine which has
been altered and appears to have been altered after its execution, in a part material to the question in
dispute, must account for the alteration. He may show that the alteration was made by another, without
his concurrence, or was made with the consent of the parties affected by it, or was otherwise properly or
innocent made, or that the alteration did not change the meaning or language of the instrument. If he
fails to do that, the document shall not be admissible in evidence. (32a)

Sec. 32.Seal. There shall be no difference between sealed and unsealed private documents insofar as
their admissibility as evidence is concerned. (33a)

Sec. 33.Documentary evidence in an unofficial language. Documents written in an unofficial language
shall not be admitted as evidence, unless accompanied with a translation into English or Filipino. To
avoid interruption of proceedings, parties or their attorneys are directed to have such translation
prepared before trial.

E-COMMERCE ACT
Sec. 5. Definition of Terms. - For the purposes of this Act, the following terms are defined, as follows:
a. Add)csscc refers to a person who is intended by the originator to receive the electronic data message
or electronic document. The term does not include a person acting as an intermediary with respect to that
electronic data message or electronic document.
b. Conputc) refers to any device or apparatus which, by electronic, electro-mechanical or magnetic
impulse, or by other means, is capable of receiving, recording, transmitting, storing, processing,



retrieving, or producing information, data, figures, symbols or other modes of written expression
according to mathematical and logical rules or of performing any one or more of those functions.
c. Ecct)onc Dutu Mcssugc refers to information generated, sent, received or stored by electronic, optical
or similar means.
d. In]o)nuton und Connuncuton Sustcn refers to a system intended for and capable of generating,
sending, receiving, storing or otherwise processing electronic data messages or electronic documents and
includes the computer system or other similar device by or in which data is recorded or stored and any
procedures related to the recording or storage of electronic data message or electronic
document. chanrobles law firm
e. Ecct)onc Sgnutu)c refers to any distinctive mark, characteristic and/or sound in electronic form,
representing the identity of a person and attached to or logically associated with the electronic data
message or electronic document or any methodology or procedures employed or adopted by a person and
executed or adopted by such person with the intention of authenticating or approving an electronic data
message or electronic document.
f. Ecct)onc Docuncnt refers to information or the representation of information, data, figures, symbols
or other modes of written expression, described or however represented, by which a right is established or
an obligation extinguished, or by which a fact may be proved and affirmed, which is received, recorded,
transmitted, stored, processed, retrieved or produced electronically.
g. Ecct)onc Kcu refers to a secret code which secures and defends sensitive information that crosses
over public channels into a form decipherable only with a matching electronic key.
h. Intc)ncdu)u refers to a person who in behalf of another person and with respect to a particular
electronic document sends, receives and/or stores or provides other services in respect of that electronic
document.
i. O)gnuto) refers to a person by whom, or on whose behalf, the electronic document purports to have
been created, generated and/or sent . The term does not include a person acting as an intermediary with
respect to that electronic document.
j. Sc)ucc P)oudc) refers to a provider of
(i) On-line services or network access, or the operator of facilities therefor, including entities
offering the transmission, routing, or providing of connections for online communications, digital or
oiIcrwisc, lciwccn or anong poinis spccificd ly a uscr, of clccironic docuncnis of iIc uscr's cIoosing; or
(ii) The necessary technical means by which electronic documents of an originator may be stored
and made accessible to a designated or undesignated third party;
Such service providers shall have no authority to modify or alter the content of the electronic data
message or electronic document received or to make any entry therein on behalf of the originator,
addressee or any third party unless specifically authorized to do so, and who shall retain the electronic
document in accordance with the specific request or as necessary for the purpose of performing the
services it was engaged to perform.

CHAPTER II
LEGAL RECOGNITION OF ELECTRONIC WRITING
OR DOCUMENT AND DATA MESSAGES
Sec. 6. Legal Recognition of Data Messages. - Information shall not be denied legal effect, validity or
enforceability solely on the grounds that it is in the data message purporting to give rise to such legal
effect, or that it is merely referred to in that electronic data message.

Sec. 7. Legal Recognition of Electronic Documents. Electronic documents shall have the legal effect,
validity or enforceability as any other document or legal writing, and -
(a) Where the law requires a document to be in writing, that requirement is met by an electronic
document if the said electronic document maintains its integrity and reliability and can be authenticated
so as to be usable for subsequent reference, in that -
(i) The electronic document has remained complete and unaltered, apart from the addition of any
endorsement and any authorized change, or any change which arises in the normal course of
communication, storage and display; and
(ii) The electronic document is reliable in the light of the purpose for which it was generated and
in the light of all the relevant circumstances.
(b) Paragraph (a) applies whether the requirement therein is in the form of an obligation or whether the
law simply provides consequences for the document not being presented or retained in its original form.
(c) Where the law requires that a document be presented or retained in its original form, that requirement
is met by an electronic document if -



(i) There exists a reliable assurance as to the integrity of the document from the time when it was
first generated in its final form; and
(ii) That document is capable of being displayed to the person to whom it is to be
presented: Provided, That no provision of this Act shall apply to vary any and all requirements of existing
laws on formalities required in the execution of documents for their validity.
For evidentiary purposes, an electronic document shall be the functional equivalent of a written
document under existing laws.
This Act does not modify any statutory rule relating to the admissibility of electronic data messages or
electronic documents, except the rules relating to authentication and best evidence.

Sec. 8. Legal Recognition of Electronic Signatures. - An electronic signature on the electronic document
shall be equivalent to the signature of a person on a written document if that signature is proved by
showing that a prescribed procedure, not alterable by the parties interested in the electronic document,
existed under which -
(a) A nciIod is uscd io idcniify iIc pariy sougIi io lc lound and io indicaic said pariy's acccss io iIc
electronic document necessary for his consent or approval through the electronic signature;
(b) Said method is reliable and appropriate for the purpose for which the electronic document was
generated or communicated, in the light of all the circumstances, including any relevant agreement;
(c) It is necessary for the party sought to be bound, in order to proceed further with the transaction, to
have executed or provided the electronic signature; and
(d) The other party is authorized and enabled to verify the electronic signature and to make the decision
to proceed with the transaction authenticated by the same.

Sec. 9. Presumption Relating to Electronic Signatures. - In any proceedings involving an electronic
signature, it shall be presumed that -
(a) The electronic signature is the signature of the person to whom it correlates; and
(b) The electronic signature was affixed by that person with the intention of signing or approving the
electronic document unless the person relying on the electronically signed electronic document knows or
has notice of defects in or unreliability of the signature or reliance on the electronic signature is not
reasonable under the circumstances.

SEC. 10. Original Documents. - (1) Where the law requires information to be presented or retained in its
original form, that requirement is met by an electronic data message or electronic document if:
(a) the integrity of the information from the time when it was first generated in its final form, as
an electronic data message or electronic document is shown by evidence aliunde or otherwise; and
(b) where it is required that information be presented, that the information is capable of being
displayed to the person to whom it is to be presented.
(2) Paragraph (1) applies whether the requirement therein is in the form of an obligation or whether the
law simply provides consequences for the information not being presented or retained in its original form.
(3) For the purposes of subparagraph (a) of paragraph (1):
(a) the criteria for assessing integrity shall be whether the information has remained complete
and unaltered, apart from the addition of any endorsement and any change which arises in the normal
course of communication, storage and display; and
(b) the standard of reliability required shall be assessed in the light of the purpose for which the
information was generated and in the light of all relevant circumstances. chanrobles law firm

SEC. 11. Authentication of Electronic Data Messages and Electronic Documents. - Until the Supreme Court
by appropriate rules shall have so provided, electronic documents, electronic data messages and
electronic signatures, shall be authenticated by demonstrating, substantiating and validating a claimed
identity of a user, device, or another entity in an information or communication system, among
other ways, as follows:
(a) The electronic signature shall be authenticated by proof that a letter, character, number or other
symbol in electronic form representing the persons named in and attached to or logically associated with
an electronic data message, electronic document, or that the appropriate methodology or security
procedures, when applicable, were employed or adopted by a person and executed or adopted by such
person, with the intention of authenticating or approving an electronic data message or electronic
document;
(b) The electronic data message and electronic document shall be authenticated by proof that an
appropriate security procedure, when applicable was adopted and employed for the purpose of verifying
the originator of an electronic data message and/or electronic document, or detecting error or alteration



in the communication, content or storage of an electronic document or electronic data message from a
specific point, which, using algorithm or codes, identifying words or numbers, encryptions, answers back
or acknowledgment procedures, or similar security devices.
The Supreme Court may adopt such other authentication procedures, including the use of
electronic notarization systems as necessary and advisable, as well as the certificate of authentication on
printed or hardcopies of the electronic document or electronic data messages by electronic notaries,
service providers and other duly recognized or appointed certification authorities.
The person seeking to introduce an electronic data message and electronic document in any legal
proceeding has the burden of proving its authenticity by evidence capable of supporting a finding that
the electronic data message and electronic document is what the person claims it to be.
In the absence of evidence to the contrary, the integrity of the information and communication
system in which an electronic data message or electronic document is recorded or stored may be
established in any legal proceeding -
(a) By evidence that at all material times the information and communication system or other similar
device was operating in a manner that did not affect the integrity of the electronic data message and/or
electronic document, and there are no other reasonable grounds to doubt the integrity of the information
and communication system;
(b) By showing that the electronic data message and/or electronic document was recorded or stored by a
party to the proceedings who is adverse in interest to the party using it; or
(c) By showing that the electronic data message and/or electronic document was recorded or stored in the
usual and ordinary course of business by a person who is not a party to the proceedings and who did not
act under the control of the party using the record.

SEC. 12. Admissibility and Evidential Weight of Electronic Data Message and Electronic Documents. - In
any legal proceedings, nothing in the application of the rules on evidence shall deny the admissibility of
an electronic data message or electronic document in evidence -
a. On the sole ground that it is in electronic form; or
b. On the ground that it is not in the standard written form and electronic data message or electronic
document meeting, and complying with the requirements under Sections 6 or 7 hereof shall be the best
evidence of the agreement and transaction contained therein.
In assessing the evidential weight of an electronic data message or electronic document, the
reliability of the manner in which it was generated, stored or communicated, the reliability of the manner
in which its originator was identified, and other relevant factors shall be given due regard.

SEC. 13. Retention of Electronic Data Message and Electronic Document. - Notwithstanding any provision
of law, rule or regulation to the contrary -
(a) The requirement in any provision of law that certain documents be retained in their original form is
satisfied by retaining them in the form of an electronic data message or electronic document which -
i. Remains accessible so as to be usable for subsequent reference;
ii. Is retained in the format in which it was generated, sent or received, or in a format which can
be demonstrated to accurately represent the electronic data message or electronic document generated,
sent or received;
iii. Enables the identification of its originator and addressee, as well as the determination of the
date and the time it was sent or received.
(b) The requirement referred to in paragraph (a) is satisfied by using the services of a third party, provided
that the conditions set forth in subparagraphs (i), (ii) and (iii) of paragraph (a) are met.

SEC. 14. Proof By Affidavit. - The matters referred to in Section 12, on admissibility and Section 9, on the
presumption of integrity, may be presumed to have been established by an affidavit given to the best of
the deponent's knowledge subject to the rights of parties in interest as defined in the following section.

SEC. 15. Cross-Examination. - (1) A deponent of an affidavit referred to in Section 14 that has been
introduced in evidence may be cross-examined as of right by a party to the proceedings who is adverse in
interest to the party who has introduced the affidavit or has caused the affidavit to be introduced.
(2) Any party to the proceedings has the right to cross-examine a person referred to in Section 11,
paragraph 4, sub-paragraph c.

RULES ON ELECTRONIC EVIDENCE



RULE 5
AUTHENTICATION OF ELECTRONIC DOCUMENTS

SECTION 1. Burden of proving authenticity. The person seeking to introduce an electronic document in
any legal proceeding has the burden of proving its authenticity in the manner provided in this Rule.

SEC. 2. Manner of authentication. Before any private electronic document offered as authentic is
received in evidence, its authenticity must be proved by any of the following means:
(a) by evidence that it had been digitally signed by the person purported to have signed the same;
(b) by evidence that other appropriate security procedures or devices as may be authorized by the
Supreme Court or by law for authentication of electronic documents were applied to the document; or
(c) by other evidence showing its integrity and reliability to the satisfaction of the judge.

SEC. 3. Proof of electronically notarized document. - A document electronically notarized in accordance
with the rules promulgated by the Supreme Court shall be considered as a public document and proved
as a notarial document under the Rules of Court.

RULE 6
ELECTRONIC SIGNATURES

SECTION 1. Electronic signature. An electronic signature or a digital signature authenticate din the
manner prescribed hereunder is admissible in evidence as the functional equivalent of the signature of a
person on a written document.

SEC. 2. Authentication of electronic signatures. An electronic signature may be authenticate in any of the
following manner:
(a) By evidence that a method or process was utilized to establish a digital signature and verity the same;
(b) By any other means provided by law; or
(c) By any other means satisfactory to the judge as establishing the genuineness of the electronic
signature.

SEC. 3. Disputable presumptions relation to electronic signature. Upon the authentication of an electronic
signature, it shall be presumed that:
(a) The electronic signature is that of the person to whom it correlates;
(b) The electronic signature was affixed by that person with the intention of authenticating or approving
iIc clccironic docuncni io wIicI ii is rclaicd or io indicaic sucI pcrson's conscni io iIc iransaciion
embodied therein; and
(c) The methods or processes utilized to affix or verity the electronic signature operated without error or
fault.

SEC. 4. Disputable presumptions relating to digital signatures. Upon the authentication of a digital
signature, it shall be presumed, in addition to those mentioned in the immediately preceding section,
that:
(a) The information contained in a certificate is correct;
(b) The digital signature was created during the operational period of a certificate;
(c) The message associated with a digital signature has not been altered from the time it was signed; and
(d) A certificate had been issued by the certification authority indicated therein

RULE 9
METHOD OF PROOF
SECTION 1. Affidavit of evidence. All matters relating to the admissibility and evidentiary weight of an
electronic document may be established by an affidavit stating facts of direct personal knowledge of the
affiant or based on authentic records. The affidavit must affirmatively show the competence of the affiant
to testify on the matters contained therein.

SEC. 2. Cross-examination of deponent. The affiant shall be made to affirm the contents of the affidavit
in open court and may be cross-examined as a matter of right by the adverse party.

RULE 11
AUDIO, PHOTOGRAPHIC. VIDEO AND EPHEMERAL EVIDENCE



SECTION 1. Audio, video and similar evidence. Audio, photographic and video evidence of events, acts or
transactions shall be admissible provided is shall be shown, presented or displayed to the court and shall
be identified, explained or authenticated by the person who made the recording or by some other person
competent to testify on the accuracy thereof.

SEC. 2. Ephemeral electronic communication. Ephemeral electronic communications shall be proven by
the testimony of a person who was a party to the same or has personal knowledge thereof. In the absence
or unavailability of such witnesses, other competent evidence may be admitted.
A recording of the telephone conversation or ephemeral electronic communication shall be
covered by the immediately preceding section.
If the foregoing communications are recorded or embodied in an electronic document, then the
provisions of Rule 5 shall apply.

2. Bunag v. CA 158 SCRA 299 (1988)
3. Heirs of Lacsa v. CA 197 SCRA 234 (1991)
4. Bartolome v. IAC 183 SCRA 102 (1990)
5. Pacific Asia Overseas Shipping v. NLRC 161 SCRA 122 (1988)
6. Zalamea v. CA 228 SCRA 23 (1993)
7. People v. Monleon 74 SCRA 263 (1976)
8. Salison v. People 253 SCRA 758 (1996)
9. People vs. Lazaro 317 SCRA 435 (1999)
10. People v. Burgos 200 SCRA 67 (1991)
11. IBM Phils., Inc. v. NLRC 305 SCRA 592 (1999)
12. Aznar v. Citibank G.R. No.164273, 3/28/07
13. Nuez v. Cruz-Apao 455 SCRA 288 (2007)
14. Vidallon-Magtolis v. Salud A.M. No. CA-05-20-P, Sept. 09, 2007

BUNAG v. CA
158 SCRA 299

Doctrine: the validity and authenticity of the execution of an unnotarized deed of absolute sale must be
proven, more so if such was signed by a mere thumbmark and that there were no instrumental witnesses.

FACTS: The core of the controversy in this case is a thumb-marked, non-notarized and non-witnessed
deed of sale of a parcel of unregistered land, which on its face cannot but cause a prudent man to doubt
its due execution and authenticity. The plaintiff alleged that the lot was owned by his father, Apolonio
Bunag and that the defendant was a nephew-in-law of his father. He admitted that there was an
agrccncni lciwccn Iis faiIcr and dcfcndani's faiIcr, Josc Dauiisia, io iIc cffcci iIai dcfcndani was
allowed to build a house on said lot on condition that he would pay for the land taxes as compensation for
the use of the land. He admitted, however, that be only learned about this agreement from his father.

The evidence for the defendant consist of the testimony of defendant Bruno Bautista who testified
that he is the owner of the land in question by virtue of a deed of sale, of January 3, 1941, signed by
Apolonio Bunag with his thumbmark; that Bunag first offered it for sale to his brother Jose Bautista, but
as the latter had no money, he referred the matter to his father; that after he was contacted in Baguio by
his father, he sent the P100.00 as consideration of the sale and so the sale was consummated between
his father and Bunag; that he came down from Baguio and had the house repaired and he stayed there
with his family until liberation when they left the house and allowed his sister Estrudes Bautista to live
therein. Estrudes Bautista also testified to this matter and stated that she was present during such
affixation of signature. The lower court ruled in favor of plaintiff. CA reversed.

ISSUE:
1. Did the Court of Appeals err in ruling in favor of the defense, in that there was a valid execution of deed
of absolute sale? YES.

RATIO: At the outset, it must be emphasized that the deed of sale was not acknowledged before a notary
public and neither are there any signatures in the blank spaces for the signatures of attesting witnesses.



The document is typewritten in English and over the similarly typewritten words "APOLONIO BUNIAG" is
a thumbprint.

The deed of sale is not notarized and is, therefore, a private writing whose due execution and
auiIcniiciiy nusi lc provcd lcforc ii can lc rcccivcd in cvidcncc. TIc SC adopicd iIc irial couri's
findings. It stated that:

TIc icsiinony of iIis wiincss (Drigida Dauiista) has to be received with caution, coming as it
does from a sister of the defendants. The circumstances other alleged presence during the "execution" of
the deed of sale was not related. Neither does she give any light as to whether Apolonio Bunag understood
the document. It should be noted that (Exhibit "1") was written in English. Since it appears that said
document was merely thumb-marked, it could reasonably be inferred that Apolonio Bunag, the supposed
vendor, was illiterate. Under the stances, the minimum proof necessary to establish due authenticity
should, in the least, include evidence that the document (Exhibit "1") was duly read, explained and
translated to Apolonio Bunag. Unfortunately, no such evidence was presented. Another fact which
compels this Court to proceed with caution is the fact that there are no instrumental witnesses in the
document. The mischief that lurks behind accepting at face value a document that is merely thumb-
marked. without any witnesses to it, and not acknowledged before a notary public could be one of the
reasons behind the requirement of the rules on evidence that a private writing must be shown to be duly
executed and authenticated. The probative value of the testimony of Brigida Bautista, who did not furnish
us with any details surrounding the execution of Exhibit "l," coming as it does from a person whose
partisanship can not, and should not, be overlook (sic), falls short from (sic) the minimum requirements
of credibility. Indeed it has been said that the testimony of an eye-witness as to the execution of a private
document must be positive. He must state that the document was actually executed by the person whose
name is subscribed thereto. It is not sufficient if he states in a general manner that such person made the
writing, more so if the document was merely thumb-marked. Regretably, this Court cannot accept, for
failure of proof as to its due execution and authenticity, the probative value of Exhibit "1"

ANALYSIS:
Despite the rewording of the proposed rules of evidence on proving the authenticity of private documents,
the doctrine under this case is still good jurisprudence since the surrounding circumstances of the
present case clearly showed that the alleged signature was of highly questionable nature and
circumstances.

HEIRS OF LACSA v. CA
G.R. No. 79597-98 May 20, 1991

Doct)nc. TIc )cqu)cncnts ]o) tIc uppcuton o] tIc unccnt docuncnt )uc s tIut tIc docuncnt nust Ic.
1) at least 30yrs old; 2) is produced from the custody in which it would naturally be found if genuine; and 3)
unblemished by any alteration or circumstances of suspicion. Also, when the copy of a document is certified
as an exact copy by a public office in which the original is located, said copy is considered as compliant
with the 2
nd
requirement mentioned above.

FACTS: This case had its origin from 2separate cases filed by the heirs of Demetria Lacsa. In the 1
st
case,
ii is allcgcd iIai iIc pciiiioncrs' prcdcccssor-in-interest, Demetria Lacsa, owned a parcel of land
consisting partly of a fishpond and partly of uncultivated space and that respondent Songco and his
predecessor-in-interest, not being co-owners nor tenants, occupied the said lands through stealth, fraud
and other forms of machinations.

The 2
nd
case alleges that tIrougI a TFADUCCION AL CASTELLANO DE LA ESCFITUFA DE
PAFTICION EXTFAJUDICIAL" and ESCFITUFA DE VENTA ADSOLUTA," prcscnicd io iIc rcgisicr of
deeds, Inocencio Songco (predecessor in interest) succeeded in transferring the titles to the property into
his name.

TIc rcspondcnis allcgc on iIc oiIcr Iand iIai pciiiioncrs' OCT Iad long lccn canccllcd and
supcrscdcd ly a TCT in iIc nanc of Allcria Cucvarra and Juan Linpin ly viriuc of a TFADUCCION AL



CASTELLANO DE LA ESCRITURA DE PARTICION EXTRA-JUDICIAL" cnicred into by the heirs of
Demetria Lacsa. In turn, that TCT was superseded by another TCT in the name of Inocencio Songco by
viriuc of a ESCFITUFA DE VENTA ADSOLUTA" cccuicd ly Juan Linpin and Allcria Cucvarra in favor
of Songco.

The Lower Court held thai iIc land lclongcd iIc rcspondcnis. CA affirncd iIc lowcr couris'
dccision. TIc appcllaic couri applicd io Ancicni Docuncni Fulc" io iIc docuncnis prcscnicd ly iIc
respondents.

ISSUE:
1. WIciIcr iIc Ancicni Docuncni Fulc" was corrccily applicd? YES.

RATIO: Undcr iIc ancicni docuncni rulc," for a privaic ancicni docuncni io lc ccnpi fron proof of
due execution and authenticity, it is not enough that it be more than 30yrs old. It is also necessary that it
is produced from the custody in which it would naturally be found if genuine, and that it is unblemished
by any alteration or circumstances of suspicion.

The 1
st
docuncni wIicI is iIc Traduccion Al Casicllano dc la Escriiura dc Pariicion
Eirajudicial" was cccuicd on April 7, 1923 wIcrcas iIc 2
nd
docuncni, Escriiura dc Vcnia Alsoluia"
was executed on Janury 20, 1924. These documents are clearly more than 30yrs old. Both copies were
certified as exact copies of the original on file with the office of the register of deeds. The documents being
certified as copies of the originals on file with the RD can be said to be found in the proper custody.
Hence, the first 2 requirements of the Ancient Document Rule have been met.

As to the last requirement, petitioners did not present any conclusive evidence to support their
allegations that the documents were falsified. Besides, this requirement of being unblemished refers to
the extrinsic quality of the document. The lack of signatures on the first pages, absent any alterations or
circumstances of suspicion cannot be held to detract from the fact the documents in question are genuine
and free from any blemish.

ANALYSIS:
The decision was proper under the current rules. In fact, the definition of the ancient document rule
provides for the 3requisites mentioned above. The decision would be the same under the proposed rules
because no change was made regarding this particular provision.

BARTOLOME v. IAC
G.R. No. 79597-98 May 20, 1991

Doct)nc. TIc )cqu)cncnts ]o) tIc uppcuton o] tIc unccnt docuncnt )uc s tIut tIc docuncnt nust Ic.
1) at least 30yrs old; 2) is produced from the custody in which it would naturally be found if genuine; and 3)
unblemished by any alteration or circumstances of suspicion.

FACTS: Epitacio Batara owned a parcel of land. Before he left to settle in Isabela, he entrusted his land
io Iis cousin Doroico Dariolonc wIo owncd iIc propcriy lounding souiI of Epiiacio's. Epiiacio and
Doroteo died a while after.

Thereafter, the Director of Lands instituted cadastral proceedings over the said land. Ursula Cid,
the widow of the son of Doroteo Bartolome, filed an answer claiming ownership over the land. It is alleged
that she acquired it through inheritance from Doroteo Bartolome, the father of Ursula's deceased
husband, Bernabe. More than three months later Resurreccion Bartolome, the grandchild of Epitacio
Batara, also filed an answer in the same cadastral case claiming ownership over a portion of land alleging
that he acquired it by inheritance from his grandfather and grandmother, Epitacio Batara and Maria
Gonzales. It should be noted, however, that from the time Ursula Cid and Resurreccion Bartolome filed
their answers to the petition in the cadastral case, there had been no progress in the proceedings. A year
later Maria J. Bartolome a motion to admit answer in intervention, alleging that she is one of the children
of Doroteo Bartolome and that she and her co-heirs had been excluded in Ursula Cid's answer to the



petition. She therefore prayed that the answer of Ursula Cid be amended so as to include the rightful
heirs of Doroteo Bartolome alleging that they were co-owners of the said Lot which they inherited from
Doroteso Bartolome.

To buttress her claim that she and her husband purchased Lot No. 11165, Ursula Cid presented
at the trial three deeds of sale: [a] one dated March 1, 1917 showing that Bernabe Bartolome and Ursula
Cid bought a 374-square meter lot for fifteen pesos from the spouses Domingo Agustin and Josefa
Manrique (Exhibit 2); [b] another document dated February 18, 1913 executed by Ignacia Manrique in
favor of Bernabe Bartolome evidencing the sale of another lot also for fifteen pesos (Exhibit 3); and [c] still
another deed executed by Maria Gonzales (wife of Epitacio Bitara) on February 9, 1917 in favor of
Bernabe Bartolome and Ursula Cid ceding to the latter 772 square meters of land for P103.75 (Exhibit 4).
The last-mentioned piece of land is the one being claimed by Resurreccion Bartolome. The RTC rendered
a decision which held that the deed of sale executed by Maria Gonzales (Exhibit 4) has no probative value
as the same is incomplete and unsigned. Ursula Cid appealed to the then Intermediate Appellate Court.
In its decision reversing the lower court, the appellate court held that the deeds of sale presented by
Ursula Cid are ancient documents

ISSUE:
1. Whether the deed of sale executed by Maria Gonzales is an ancient document? NO.

RATIO: The SC agreed that the first 2requirements of the ancient document rule was met by Exhibit 4.
The document was executed in 1917, hence, it is more than 30yrs old when offered in evidence in 1983. It
was presented in court by the proper custodian thereof who is an heir of the person who would naturally
keep it. However, the third requirement, that no alterations or circumstances of suspicion are present
was not conformed with.

According to Dominador Bartolome (son of Ursula Cid), he first saw Exhibit 4 in the possession of
his mother when he was just eleven years old. He noticed that the document had a fourth page containing
the signature of Maria Gonzales and that all four pages were sewn together. However, when the document
was entrusted to him the document's fourth page was already missing. He stated that his mother told
him that the fourth page was lost during the Japanese occupation while they were evacuating from Davao
City.

On its face, the deed of sale appears unmarred by alteration. However, the missing page has
nonetheless affected its authenticity. It is important because it allegedly bears the signature of the
vendor of the portion of Lot No. 11165 in question and therefore, it contains vital proof of the voluntary
transmission of rights over the subject of the sale. Without that signature, the document is incomplete.
Verily, an incomplete document is akin to if not worse than a document with altered contents. Since
Exhibit 4 is not an ancient document proofs of its due execution and authenticity are vital and necessary.

ANALYSIS:
The decision was proper under the current rules. In fact, the definition of the ancient document rule
provides for the 3requisites mentioned above. The decision would be the same under the proposed rules
because no change was made regarding this particular provision.

PACIFIC ASIA OVERSEAS SHIPPING CORPORATION v. NLRC
161 SCRA 122 (1988)

Doctrine: A copy of a decision of a foreign court sought to be enforced in the Philippines must be attested of
the legal custodian of the original with a certificate from the Philippine embassy and authenticated by the
seal of his office.
Documents written in an unofficial language must be accompanied by a translation into English of
Filipino made by an official court interpreter, an interpreter competent in both languages whose identity is
revealed, or a translator agreed upon by the parties. The translation may also be one sworn to by translator
as an accurate translation of the original or the translation may be agreed upon by the parties as a true and
faithful one.



FACTS: Rances worked as a radio operator in a vessel owned by the foreign principal of petitioner Pacific
Asia Overseas Shipping Corporation (Pascor). Rances was terminated because of his alleged poor work
performance and incitement of others to insubordination. Later, Pascor was able to obtain a judgment
from the POEA upholding Fanccs' disnissal, iIc dccision was silcni on iIc counicrclain of Fanccs.

Rances subsequently filed a complaint with the POEA against Pascor to enforce an award
oliaincd ly Iin in Dulai allcgcdly againsi Pascor's principal, iIis was plcadcd as a counterclaim in the
previous POEA case. Rances claimed that the action which he filed in Dubai was for US$9,364, which
was conproniscd io $5,500 plus a rciurn iiclci wiiI a proviso iIai iIc opponcni" would pay an
additional $1,500 if the wife of Rances would not accept the money sent to her. Rances alleged that he is
entitled to the additional $1,500 because his wife did not agree to the 3-month allotment to her. As
evidence of the foreign award, Rances presented a purported original copy of the Dubai decision, written
in Arabic, accompanied by an English translation made by an unidentified translator and a copy of a
iransniiial lciicr signcd ly onc MoId. Din SalcI Honorary Consul for PIilippincs."

Pascor argued that the copy of the Dubai decision is not properly authenticated; that it was a
party to the Dubai decision; that POEA does not have jurisdiction; that the counterclaim had already
been decided on. POEA held Pascor liable for $1,500. NLRC denied the appeal as it was filed one day late.

SC relaxed the rules since the appeal appears to be meritorious on its face and the interests of
justice would be served by permitting the appeal. SC proceeds to decide on the merits in favor of Pascor.

ISSUES:
1. Whether the copy of the Dubai decision was properly authenticated? NO.
2. Whether the translation was effective? NO.

RATIO: Primarily, the POEA has no jurisdiction over this case which seeks to enforce a foreign judgment.
Such suit must be brought before the regular courts.

Assuming that the POEA has jurisdiction, the Dubai decision was not properly proved. The Dubai
decision purports to be the written act or record of an act of an official body or tribunal of a foreign
country, and therefore a public writing. Sections 25 and 26 provide the manner of proving a public official
record of a foreign country.

Here, Rances failed to submit any attestation, issued by the proper Dubai official having legal
custody of the original, that the copy presented is a faithful copy of the original decision. Further, the
attestation must be authenticated by a Philippine Consular Officer having jurisdiction in Dubai.

The other problem with the Dubai decision is that the translation which accompanies it is legally
defective. A translation must be made: by an official court interpreter; by an identified person whose
competence in both languages is shown; a translation sworn to as an accurate translation of the original;
or by a translation agreed upon by the parties as a true and faithful one.

ANALYSIS:
The case was decided correctly under the current and proposed rules of evidence.

ZALAMEA v. COURT OF APPEALS
228 SCRA 23 (1993)

Doctrine: Written law may be evidenced by an official publication thereof or by a copy attested by the
officers having the legal custody of the record, or by his deputy, and accompanied with a certificate that
such officer has custody. The certificate may be made by a secretary of an embassy or legation, consul
general, consul, vice-consul, or consular agent or by any officer in the foreign service of the Philippines
stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept, and authenticated by the seal of his office.

FACTS: Zalamea and his wife and daughter purchased, in Manila, three tickets 3 for a flight from New



York to Los Angeles on TransWorld Airlines.

WIilc in NY, Zalanca's rcccivcd confirnaiion of iIcir rcscrvaiions on iIc said fligIi. Howcvcr,
when they checked-in at the airport, they were placed on the wait-list because all the seats were already
taken. Mr. Zalamea was allowed to board because he was holding the full-fare ticket of his daughter. On
the other hand, Mrs. and daughter Zalamea were not allowed to board. The two were contrained to
purchase 2 different tickets on an American Airlines flight which cost them $918.

Upon arrival in the Philippines, Zalamea filed an action for breach of contract of carriage. The
Regional Trial Court awarded actual and moral damages. The Court of Appeals deleted award of moral
damages because there was no bad faith. The Supreme Court modifies and award actual, moral,
ccnplary danagcs.TWA asscris iIai ii is noi guiliy of lad faiiI in noi allowing iIc Zalanca's io loard
despite their confirmed tickets because the Code of Federal Regulations of the Civil Aeronautics Board
allows overbooking. TWA solely relied on the testimony of its customer service agent to prove the existence
of such law.

ISSUES:
1. Whether the U.S. Law allegedly allowing overbooking was proven? NO.

RATIO: Foreign laws do not prove themselves nor can the courts may take judicial notice of them. Like
any other fact, they must be alleged and proved. TWA cannot solely rely on the testimony of its customer
service agent.

Written law may be evidenced by an official publication thereof or by a copy attested by the
officers having the legal custody of the record, or by his deputy, and accompanied with a certificate that
such officer has custody. The certificate may be made by a secretary of an embassy or legation, consul
general, consul, vice-consul, or consular agent or by any officer in the foreign service of the Philippines
stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept, and authenticated by the seal of his office.

Existing jurisprudence states that overbooking amounts to bad faith, entitling the passengers to
an award of moral damages. And even if US law allows overbooking, TWA is in bad faith in not informing
its passengers that despite their confirmed seats there is a possibility that they will not be able to board.

ANALYSIS:
The case was decided correctly under the current and proposed rules of evidence.

PEOPLE v. MONLEON
74 SCRA 263

Doctrine: Affidavits written entirely in local dialects must be accompanied by a translation for it to be
admitted in court.

FACTS: Monleon was charged with parricide. He was accused of killing his wife by squeezing her neck,
pressing her head againsta post, and kicking her in the abdomen while he was in a drunken stupor.
Aficr Iis wifc's dcaiI, Monlcon iIunlnarlcd a confcssion, wriiicn cniircly in Ccluano and sworn io
before the town mayor. During trial, Monloen denied that he inflicted violence on his wife. He also said
that some persons threatened to kill him if he did not affix his thumbmark to his confession, which he
said he merely signed because one Lt. Bongo asked him to sign it so that the latter would take care of
Monlcon's cIildrcn. His son, Marciano, also cccuicd an affidavii wIicI was cniircly in Ccluano. TIis
affidavit implicated Monleon for the death of his wife. This affidavit was admitted by the court over the
objection of Monleon. Monleon argues that the trial court erred in admitting the confession and affidavit
of the son.

ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the extrajudicial confession should be given weight? YES.
2. Whether or not the affidavit, written entirely in Cebuano, was admissible? YES.



RATIO: On the first issue, the Court found that the extrajudicial was corroborated by evidence of the
corpus delicti. Moreover, the Court found that the confession was voluntarily executed by the accused.

On the second issue, the Court stated the trial court erred in admitting the affidavit since it was
not accompanied with the corresponding translation. The Rules of Court provides that documents written
in an unofficial language shall not be admitted as evidence, unless accompanied with a translation into
English, [Spanish] or the national language.

However, due to the overwhelming evidence against Monleon, he was still found guilty. However,
the Court issued a certification to the Chief Executive recommending that his penalty be reduced.

ANALYSIS:
Under the current rules of evidence, the case was correctly decided by the Supreme Court. Under the
proposed rules of evidence, the case will still be decided in the same way, given that the rule on
translations was not changed.

PEOPLE v. SALISON
253 SCRA 758

Doctrine: If a party does not object to the admission of a document written in an unofficial language which
does not have a corresponding translation, then the objection is waived, and the said document is
admissible in evidence.

FACTS: Salison, along with his co-accused, was charged with the murder of Valmoria. The evidence
revealed that the Valmoria was mauled to death by the 4 accused. He was hit on the rear part of his head
with wood. Feeling he was close to death, Valmoria went to the house of the purok leader and wrote down
a dying declaration wherein he identified the accused. He died 3 days later.

This declaration was written entirely in Cebuano. Salison brings this as an error by the trial
court; however, he did not object to its admission in evidence during trail.

ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the declaration should be admitted? YES.

RATIO: The records do not disclose that the defense offered any objection to the admission of the
declaration. Thus, the defense waived whatever infirmity the document had at the time of its submission
as evidence.

Moreover, while it is true that the Rules does not allow the admission of documents in an
unofficial language without a translation, the Court believed that the interest of justice would be
preserved since no objection was made and that the parties, judicial authorities, and the personnel
concerned appeared to be familiar with or knowledgeable with Cebuano anyway. Also, the written
declaration was duly presented and the person who reduced the declaration in writing was thoroughly
questioned by the court, the prosecutor, and cross-examined by the defense counsel. More importantly,
everything written in the declaration of the victim was confirmed by the eyewitnesses.

ANALYSIS:
Under the current rules of evidence, the case was correctly decided by the Supreme Court. It also follows
the rule that objections can be waived, and since no objection was raised here, the contentious
declaration was correctly allowed.Under the proposed rules of evidence, the case will still be decided in
the same way, given that the rule on translations was not changed.



PEOPLE v. LAZARO
317 SCRA 435 (1999)

Doctrine: Official records made in the performance of duty by a public officer of the Philippines or by a
person in performance of a duty specifically enjoined by law are prima facie evidence of facts stated. A
written statement signed by the officer having custody of official record or by his deputy that after diligent
search no record or entry of specified tenor is found to exist in records of his office accompanied by
certification is admissible as evidence that records of office contains no such record or entry.

FACTS: Apolinar Lazaro, while driving a yellow Toyota Tamaraw jeep, was stopped by P/Sgt. Bonnet
along Ccn. Luna Si. Donnci's aiicniion was caugIi ly lysiandcrs wIo wcrc sIouiing iIai said vcIiclc
had a bloodied passenger. Bonnet instructed Lazaro to follow mobile patrol to Bicol Regional Hospital. Pol.
Maj. Tuazon, who got a tip by a phone call regarding the incident, was waiting for them in the hospital.

Tuazon, knowing that driver was armed, ordered driver to step out of jeep. He saw that the driver
had a handgun tucked in his waist. Driver pulled out handgun from its holster & dropped it at the back
of drivcr's scai. Tuazon iIcn pullcd Lazaro oui of vcIiclc and goi Iold of gun wIicI was a .38 calilcr
revolver containing 6 empty shells. Lazaro did not respond when he was asked why he had a gun and
whether he had license to possess such. Lazaro was later on brought to police headquarters and the gun
was turned over to investigator. Supt. Antonio Sierra, Chief of Firearms & Explosives Office (FEO) at
Camp Crame issued a certification that Lazaro was not a licensed or registered firearm holder of any kind
or caliber.

Lazaro claims that on the day of incident, he had a drinking spree with his nephew Manolo
Lazaro & Ricardo Ronquillo in Camarines Sur. They left the place at around 3 pm. While traveling,
Manolo stopped the jeep to urinate. Lazaro then saw Ricardo draw a gun and point it at him. Lazaro and
Ricardo then grappled for possession of gun. After some time, Lazaro realized that Manolo was hit and he
was asking his uncle to bring him to hospital. He could not do anything because he was still grappling
with Ricardo. When Ricardo weakened and stopped moving, he then brought Manolo to hospital. He left
Ricardo who later on died. He claims that he does not know if gun found in his possession was the same
gun he was grappling with Ricardo. He further claimed that he and Ricardo fell from the jeep and he
cannot recall who was holding gun when it was fired. Thus claiming that shooting of Ricardo was an
accidcni. Prosccuiion prcscnicd Dr. Jurado's icsiinony claining iIai lascd on iIc autopsy, injuries were
not inflicted accidentally since more than one shot was inflicted on victim.

ISSUES:
1. Whether the elements of illegal possession of firearms was proven by the prosecution? YES.
2. Whether the certification from Firearms & Explosives Section Chief is admissible? - YES
3. Whether Lazaro should only be convicted of simple illegal possession of firearms? NO.

RATIO: The existence of firearm is beyond dispute because it is recovered from the Tamaraw and
confirncd ly Tuazon's icsiinony. FuriIer, the fact that the accused who possessed the gun does not
have corresponding permit to possess the same is confirmed by the certification from Firearms and
Explosives Section Chief.

The certification from Firearms & Explosives Section Chief is adnissillc as cvidcncc sincc ii's a
public document procured in the line of duty. The fiscal himself witnessed its signing. The official who
issued it is the proper custodian of records of firearms in the Philippines. Under Rule 130, Sec. 44, Rules
of Court, official rccords nadc in pcrfornancc of duiy ly a pullic officcr of iIc PIilippincs or ly a pcrson
in pcrfornancc of a duiy spccifically cnjoincd ly law arc prina facic cvidcncc of facis siaicd." A wriiicn
statement signed by the officer having custody of official record or by his deputy that after diligent search
no record or entry of specified tenor is found to exist in records of his office accompanied by certification
is admissible as evidence that records of office contains no such record or entry.

In the case at bar, the Certification issued by the Commanding Officer of the PNP Firearm and
Explosive Office, which is the repository of all records regarding firearms in the Philippines is competent
and admissible evidence to prove that the accused Lazaro was not a licensed holder or possessor of a
firearm of any kind or caliber. Indeed, the certificate of a custodian that he has diligently searched for a



document or an entry of a specified tenor and has been unable to find it should be sufficient evidence of
its non-existence in his office as though he made such testimony on the stand.

The Court cited the cases of People vs. Molina & People vs. Feloteo which held that illegal
possession of firearm will only be an aggravating circumstance and no longer punishable as a separate
offense. The amendments of Republic Act 8294 took effect on July 6, 1997, while the crime in the case at
bar is committed on May 5, 1991. Although penal laws generally have prospective application,
retroactivity is allowed if such would be advantageous to accused. Hence, the amendment that the use of
unlicensed firearm as an aggravating circumstance in a murder case, should be applied to Lazaro. In the
case at bar, homicide and illegal possession of firearms were tried separately. By virtue of retroactivity,
this is no longer possible. Lazaro is acquitted of illegal possession of firearms.

ANALYSIS:
The case was decided properly using the current rules of evidence and if it were to be decided under the
proposed revised rules of evidence, the decision will be the same because the provision on authentication
and proof of documents of official records were not changed.

PEOPLE V. BURGOS
200 SCRA 67 (1991)

Doctrine: The lack of confidence in the prosecution witness should not in any way affect the integrity of the
diskettes or the right of the prosecution to show the contents of the diskettes.

FACTS: An information for violation of Republic Act No. 1700 was filed against Deduro et.al by the City
Prosecutor of Cebu. No bail was recommended on the ground that the offense charged was non-bailable
and the respondents were allegedly leaders of the Communist Party of the Philippines.

Private respondents filed their petitions for temporary release on bail pending trial. Such petitions
were opposed except for that of Catalina Paras because she was then pregnant. While the prosecution was
still presenting evidence, Judge Burgos issued the assailed order fixing bail for five of the eight
respondents. Furthermore, Judge Burgos disallowed the prosccuiion's rcqucsi for iis wiincss, Eulogio
Llego, a computer programmer, to print out in open court the materials encoded in certain diskettes
seized from private respondents by virtue of a search warrant. Judge Burgos reasoned out that the
contents of the said diskettes could have been manipulated which would be prejudicial to the rights of the
accused, because the prosecution has possession prior to the hearing of the diskettes. Hence, this
petition for certiorari.

ISSUE:
1. Whether or not Judge Burgos committed grave abuse of discretion in disallowing the prosecution
witness from holding an actual demonstration in court of the contents of the diskettes seized from private
respondents? YES.

RATIO: There was neither testimonial nor physical evidence to support the conclusion of Judge Burgos
that the diskettes might have been tampered with or their contents altered in order to secure the
conviction of the accused. The mere fact that the diskettes had been in possession of the prosecution does
not necessarily imply that it had altered or tampered with the evidence to suit its prosecutorial objective.
The presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty prevails in the absence of evidence to
contrary.

TIc judgc's apprcIcnsion iIai iIc cvidcnce might have been tampered with could be relieved by
designating a competent person agreeable to both parties who can perform the task of printing out the
contents of the said diskettes. The lack of confidence in the prosecution witness should not in any way
affect the integrity of the diskettes or the right of the prosecution to show the contents of the diskettes.

ANALYSIS:



This case was decided properly using the current rules and if it were to be decided under the proposed
revised rule, the decision will still be the same because there are no proposed changes for the provisions
covered by the subject matter of this case.

IBM PHILIPPINES v. NLRC
G.R. No. 117221 April 13, 1999

Doctrine: The decisions of the Supreme Court, while adhering to a liberal view in the conduct of proceedings
before administrative agencies, have nonetheless consistently required some proof of authenticity or
reliability as condition for the admission of documents.

FACTS: On April 1, 1975, private respondent Angel D. Israel commenced employment with IBM as Office
Products Customer Engineer. For the next 16 years, he occupied two other positions in the company and
represented the company in various seminars and conferences in and out of the country.

On June 27, 1991, he was handed a letter by his team supervisor Reyes, informing him that his
employment in the company was to be terminated effective July 31, 1991 on the ground of habitual
tardiness and absenteeism.

The letter stated that he had been habitually absent and tardy and that he has not changed his
ways despite opportunities given to him. And so he was dismissed. Israel filed a case with the Arbitration
branch of DOLE alleging that he was illegally dismissed, without just cause or due process. He claimed
that he was not given the opportunity to be heard and that he was summarily dismissed from
employment based on charges which had not been duly proven.

IBM allege that several conferences were held by the management with Israel and that he was
given sufficient warning and opportunity to reform but he failed. It was alleged that Israel was constantly
told of his poor attendance record and inefficiency through the companys internal e-mail system.
According to IB<, this system allows paperless or telematic communication among IBM personnel in the
company offices here and abroad. An employee is assigned a User ID and the corresponding password.
Employees are then expected to turn on their computers everyday, log in to the system by keying in their
respective IDs and passwords in order to access and read the messages sent to and stored in the
computer system. To reply, an employee types in or encodes his message-response and sends the same to
the intended recipient, also via the computer system. The system automatically records the time and date
each message was sent and received, including the identification of the sender and receiver thereof. All
messages are recorded and stored in computer disks.

Through these computer print-ouis calling Isracl's aiicniion io Iis allcged tardiness and
absenteeism, petitioner sought to prove that private respondent was sufficiently notified of the charges
against him and was guilty thereof because of his failure to deny the said charges.The Labor Arbiter
found the dismissal legal and jusiificd. Prior io iIc rclcasc of iIc LA's dccision, Isracl filcd a Manifisiaiion
and a motion to admit new evidence, which was comprised of Daily Time Records (DTRs) for the period
June 1, 1990 to August 31, 1990 and pay slips for the period January 1990 to June 1991 showing that
private respondent did not incur any unexcused absences, that he was not late on any day within the
period and that no deduction was made from his salary on account of tardiness or absences. The NLRC
reversed and said that dismissal was illegal.

ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the computer print outs presented by IBM is sufficient proof to justify the alleged
tardiness and absenteeism by Israel? NO.

RATIO: It is indeed true that administrative agencies, such as the NLRC, are not bound by the technical
rules of procedure and evidence in the adjudication of cases. However, the liberality of procedure in
administrative actions is subject to limitations imposed by basic requirements of due process. While the
rules of evidence prevailing in the courts of law or equity are not controlling in proceedings before the
NLRC, the evidence presented before it must at least have a modicum of admissibility for it to be given



some probative value.

The computer print-outs, which constitute the only evidence of petitioners, afford no assurance of
their authenticity because they are unsigned. The decisions of the Supreme Court, while adhering to a
liberal view in the conduct of proceedings before administrative agencies, have nonetheless consistently
required some proof of authenticity or reliability as condition for the admission of documents.

The evidence upon which said decision is professedly based does not come up to that standard of
substantiality. Even if the computer print-outs were admissible, they would not suffice to show that
privaic rcspondcni's disnissal was jusiificd. TIc lurdcn of proving iIai iIc disnissal was for jusi causc
is on IBM. They cannot simply rely on any admission by Israel implied from his failure to deny the alleged
computer messages to him which he denied he had ever received. On the other hand, Israel presented
additional evidence, consisting of DTRs and pay slips, show that he did not incur unexcused absences or
tardiness or that he suffered deduction in pay on account of such absences or tardiness. Had he
accumulated absents, it was not reflected in the DTRs. The print-outs likewise failed to show that private
respondent was allowed due process before his dismissal.

ANALYSIS:
The proposed Rules of Evidence does not repeal the other Supreme Court Circulars on evidential matters
such as these electronic evidence. In order to prove the authenticity and due execution of these
documents, as with regular documents, it must be substantially proven as reliable through
authentication and signatures by the persons in charge.

EMMANUEL B. AZNAR vs. CITIBANK, N.A., (Philippines)
G.R. No. 164273 March 28, 2007
Doctrine: The prevailing rule at the time of the promulgation of the RTC Decision is Section 20 of Rule 132 of
the Rules of Court.It provides that whenever any private document offered as authentic is received in
evidence, its due execution and authenticity must be proved either by (a) anyone who saw the document
executed or written; or (b) by evidence of the genuineness of the signature or handwriting of the maker.

FACTS: Emmanuel B. Aznar, a known businessman in Cebu, is a holder of a Preferred Master Credit
Card with a credit limit of P150,000.00.As he and his wife, Zoraida, planned to take their two
grandchildren, Melissa and Richard Beane, on an Asian tour, Aznar made a total advance deposit of
P485,000.00 with Citibank with the intention of increasing his credit limit to P635,000.00.

With the use of his Mastercard, Aznar purchased plane tickets to Kuala Lumpur for his group
worth P237,000.00.On July 17, 1994, Aznar, his wife and grandchildren left Cebu for the said
destination.Aznar claims that when he presented his Mastercard in some establishments in Malaysia,
Singapore and Indonesia, the same was not honored. He tried to use the same in Ingtan Tour and Travel
Agency (Ingtan Agency) in Indonesia to purchase plane tickets to Bali, it was again dishonored for the
rcason iIai Iis card was llacllisicd" ly Ciiilanl. SucI disIonor forccd Iin io luy iIc iiclcis in casI.
He further claims that his humiliation caused by the denial of his card was aggravated when Ingtan
Agency spoke of swindlers trying to use blacklisted cards.On August 26, 1994, Aznar filed a complaint for
damages against Citibank, claiming that Citibank fraudulently or with gross negligence blacklisted his
Mastercard. He further claimed that he suffered mental anguish, serious anxiety, wounded feelings,
besmirched reputation and social humiliation due to the wrongful blacklisting of his card.

To prove that Citibank blacklisted his Mastercard, Aznar presented a computer print-out,
denominated as ON-LINE AUTHORIZATIONS FOREIGN ACCOUNT ACTIVITY REPORT, issued to him by
Ingtan Agency with the signature of one Victrina Elnado Nubi (Nubi) which shows that his card in
question was DECL OVERLIMIT or declared over the limit. Citibank denied the allegation that it
blacklisted Aznars card. To prove that they did not blacklist Aznars card, Citibanks Credit Card
Department Head, Dennis Flores, presented Warning Cancellation Bulletins which contained the list of its
canceled cards covering the period of Aznars trip.

The trial court ruled in favor of Citibank, and it held that as between the computer print-out
presented by Aznar and the Warning Cancellation Bulletins presented by Citibank, the latter had more



weight as their due execution and authenticity were duly established by Citibank. Aznar got the first
judge to re-raffle the case because of imputation of bias because the judge was also a Citibank card
holder. The next trial court judge ruled in favor of Aznar.

The CA reversed and ruled for Citibank. It held that Aznar had no personal knowledge of the
blacklisting of his card and only presumed the same when it was dishonored in certain establishments.
Such dishonor is not sufficient to prove that his card was blacklisted by Citibank. Also, Exhibit G is an
electronic document which must be authenticated pursuant to Section 2, Rule 5 of the Rules on
Electronic Evidence or under Section 20 of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court by anyone who saw the
document executed or written. Aznar, however, failed to prove the authenticity of Exh. G, thus it must be
excluded.

ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the electronic the OnLine Authorization Report, executed and signed by Nubi was
admissible in evidence in accordance with the requirements under the REE? NO.

RATIO: In the complaint Aznar filed before the RTC, he claimed that Citibank blacklisted his Mastercard
which caused its dishonor in several establishments in Malaysia, Singapore, and Indonesia, particularly
in Ingtan Agency in Indonesia where he was humiliated when its staff insinuated that he could be a
swindler trying to use a blacklisted card. As correctly found by the RTC in its May 29, 1998 Decision,
Aznar failed to prove with a preponderance of evidence that Citibank blacklisted his Mastercard or placed
the same on the hot list. Aznar in his testimony admitted that he had no personal knowledge that his
Mastercard was blacklisted by Citibank and only presumed such fact from the dishonor of his card. Aznar
puts much weight on the ON-LINE AUTHORIZATION FOREIGN ACCOUNT ACTIVITY REPORT, a computer
print-out handed to Aznar by Ingtan Agency, marked as Exh. G, to prove that his Mastercard was
dishonored for being blacklisted. As correctly pointed out by the RTC and the CA, however, such exhibit
cannot be considered admissible as its authenticity and due execution were not sufficiently established by
petitioner.

The prevailing rule at the time of the promulgation of the RTC Decision is Section 20 of Rule 132
of the Rules of Court.It provides that whenever any private document offered as authentic is received in
evidence, its due execution and authenticity must be proved either by (a) anyone who saw the document
executed or written; or (b) by evidence of the genuineness of the signature or handwriting of the maker.
Aznar, who testified on the authenticity of Exh. G, did not actually see the document executed or written,
neither was he able to provide evidence on the genuineness of the signature or handwriting of Nubi, who
handed to him said computer print-out. Aznar's testimony that the person from Ingtan Agency merely
handed him the computer print-out and that he thereafter asked said person to sign the same cannot be
considered as sufficient to show said print-outs integrity and reliability.As correctly pointed out by Judge
Marcos in his May 29, 1998 Decision, Exh. G does not show on its face that it was issued by Ingtan
Agency as Aznar merely mentioned in passing how he was able to secure the print-out from the agency.
Aznar also failed to show the specific business address of the source of the computer print-out because
while the name of Ingtan Agency was mentioned by Aznar, its business address was not reflected in the
print-out.

ANALYSIS:
The burden of proving the authenticity of the electronic document is upon the person presenting it as
evidence. He must prove its due execution and authenticity as provided for in the Rules on Electronic
Evidence.

NUEZ v. CRUZ-APAO
442 U.S. 62 May 29, 1979
Doctrine: The Confrontation Clause does not bar admission into evidence of every relevant extrajudicial
statement by a nontestifying declarant simply because it in some way incriminates the defendant. And an
instruction directing the jury to consider a codefendant's extrajudicial statement only against its source is
generally sufficient to avoid offending the implicated defendant's confrontation right.



FACTS: This involves an administrative case for Dishonesty and Grave Misconduct against Cruz-Apao,
Executive Assistant II of the Acting Division Clerk in the CA. The complaint arose out of Cruz-Apao's
solicitation of P1M from Nuez in exchange for a speedy and favorable decision of her case in the CA. It
was alleged that during their first telephone conversation and thereafter through a series of text
messages, Nuez informed Cruz-Apao of his pending case. Nuez thought that Cruz-Apao would be able to
advise him on how to achieve an early resolution of the case, but he was informed that in order to hasten
the disposition of the case, he had to pay said amount.

Nuez initially lodged a complaint with Imbestigador of GMA Network, the crew of which
accompanied him to PAOCC-SPG in Malacanang where he filed a case of extortion against Cruz-Apao.
Together with the agents of the PAOCTF, an entrapment operation was planned. When Nuez and Apao-
Cruz met at the place where the operation was set, the former was accompanied by an Imbestigador
researcher, who posed as his sister-in-law, and 3 PAOCTF agents were seated a few tables away. They
negotiated for almost an hour and when Apao-Cruz finally touched the unsealed envelope to look at the
money inside, the PAOCTF agents converged and invited her to the Western Police District HQ. During the
hearing of the case, the text messages sent by Cruz-Apao to Nuez was admitted as evidence.

ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the ephemeral electronic evidence, in this case, the text messages, were properly proven
so as to make then admissible? YES.

RATIO: Under Section 2, Rule 11 of the Rules on Electronic Evidence, 'Ephemeral electronic
communications shall be proven by the testimony of a person who was a party to the same or who has
personal knowledge thereof . . . . In this case, complainant who was the recipient of said messages and
therefore had personal knowledge thereof testified on their contents and import. Respondent herself
admitted that the cellphone number reflected in complainant's cellphone from which the messages
originated was hers. Moreover, any doubt respondent may have had as to the admissibility of the text
messages had been laid to rest when she and her counsel signed and attested to the veracity of the text
messages between her and complainant. It is also well to remember that in administrative cases,
technical rules of procedure and evidence are not strictly applied. We have no doubt as to the probative
value of the text messages as evidence in determining the guilt or lack thereof of respondent in this case.

ANALYSIS:
In applying the Rules on Electronic Evidence, the Supreme Court was correct in admitting the ephemeral
electronic communications in the form of text messages. Said Rules state that ephemeral electronic
communications shall be proven by the testimony of a person who was a party to the same or has
personal knowledge thereof. In the case at bar, it was Nuez who testified as to the authenticity of the text
messages. Since she was a party to the communication, being the recipient of such messages, her
testimony proving it made the messages admissible.

VIDALLON-MAGTOLIS v. SALUD
A.M. No. CA-05-20-P September 9, 2007

Doctrine: Ephemeral electronic communications shall be proven by the testimony of a person who was a
party to the same or who has personal knowledge thereof.

FACTS: In a criminal case, Lagua was found guilty by the RTC of homicide. On appeal, Lagua filed a Very
Urgcni Pciiiion for Dail, wIicI iIc CA granicd upon posiing iIc rcquircd lond. Lagua's lond was
approved in a Resolution which was brought to the Office of the Division Clerk of Court, Atty. Madarang,
for promulgaiion. Around iIai iinc, rcspondcni Salud's unusual inicrcsi on iIc casc lccanc noiiccallc
and he started making inquiries about the case. When Atty. Madarang finally directed the typing of the
Ordcr of Fclcasc Upon Dond, Salud wcni io iIc forncr's officc and assisted in arranging and stapling of
the papers for release. It was he who ultimately serve the resolution and order of release in the Lagua
case to the National Penitentiary. In the meantime, Atty. Madarang received a telephone call from a
certain MelcIor, wIo iniroduccd Icrsclf as Lagua's rclaiivc, asling Icr Iow nucI norc would iIcy Iavc
io givc io faciliiaic Lagua's rclcasc. TIc callcr also inforncd Icr iIai iIcy Iad sougIi iIc Iclp of a ccriain



Valdez of the RTC where the criminal case originated, but were told that they still had a balance to be
paid to Justice Magtolis and Atty. Madarang through Salud.

TIcn, Aiiy. Madarang callcd iIc FTC, prcicnding io lc Lagua's rclaiivc, and aslcd for Valdcz,
who turned out to be the Process Server of the RTC. She was informed that Valdez was not there at the
time and reminded her about the her outstanding balance. After making the call, she coordinated with
iIc Aciing CIicf of iIc Mailing Scciion, Ms. Sccarro. SIc goi Salud's nunlcr fron Sccarro and siaricd
texting him about the same time Sacarro did. Again, she represented herself as a relative of Lagua. Most
of Salud's ici ncssagcs wcrc siorcd in Aiiy. Madarang's ccllpIonc. Aficr discovcring iIc corrupi acis of
Salud, Atty. Madarang accompanied him to Justice Magtolis, where out of the confrontation, it was
discovered that Salud did not properly serve the copies of the Resolution and Order of Release upon
Lagua and his counsel. An administrative complaint was thus filed by Justice Magtolis against Salud.
During the hearing, the text messages stored by Atty. Madarang were submitted as evidence.

ISSUE:
1. Whether admitting ephemeral electronic evidence against Salud violates his right to privacy? NO.

RATIO: The respondent's claim that the admission of the text messages as evidence against him
constitutes a violation of his right to privacy is unavailing. Text messages have been classified as
ephemeral electronic communication under Section 1(k), Rule 2 of the Rules on Electronic Evidence, and
'shall be proven by the testimony of a person who was a party to the same or has personal knowledge
thereof. Any question as to the admissibility of such messages is now moot and academic, as the
respondent himself, as well as his counsel, already admitted that he was the sender of the first three
messages on Atty. Madarang's cell phone.

As ratiocinated in Nuez v. Cruz-Apao, Ephemeral electronic communications shall be proven by
the testimony of a person who was a party to the same or who has personal knowledge thereof ' . In this
case, complainant who was the recipient of the said messages and therefore had personal knowledge
thereof testified on their contents and import. Respondent herself admitted that the cellphone number
reflected in complainant's cellphone from which the messages originated was hers. Moreover, any doubt
respondent may have had as to the admissibility of the text messages had been laid to rest when she and
her counsel signed and attested to the veracity of the text messages between her and complainant.

ANALYSIS:
In applying the Rules on Electronic Evidence, the Supreme Court was correct in admitting the ephemeral
electronic communications in the form of text messages. Said Rules state that ephemeral electronic
communications shall be proven by the testimony of a person who was a party to the same or has
personal knowledge thereof. In the case at bar, it was Atty. Madarang who testified as to the authenticity
of the text messages. Since she was a party to the communication, being the recipient of such messages,
her testimony proving it made the messages admissible. In fact, the testimony of Atty. Madarang proving
the messages was actually unnecessary since the respondent Salud actually admitted to being the sender
of the first three text messages presented.

E. Offer and Objection
1. Rule 132, Secs. 34-40

C. OFFER AND OBJECTION

Sec. 34. Offer of evidence. The court shall consider no evidence which has not been formally offered.
The purpose for which the evidence is offered must be specified. (35)

Sec. 35. When to make offer. As regards the testimony of a witness, the offer must be made at the time
the witness is called to testify.
Documentary and object evidence shall be offered after the presentation of a party's testimonial evidence.
Such offer shall be done orally unless allowed by the court to be done in writing. (n)



Sec. 36. Objection. Objection to evidence offered orally must be made immediately after the offer is
made.
Objection to a question propounded in the course of the oral examination of a witness shall be
made as soon as the grounds therefor shall become reasonably apparent.
An offer of evidence in writing shall be objected to within three (3) days after notice of the unless a
different period is allowed by the court.
In any case, the grounds for the objections must be specified. (36a)

Sec. 37. When repetition of objection unnecessary. When it becomes reasonably apparent in the course
of the examination of a witness that the question being propounded are of the same class as those to
which objection has been made, whether such objection was sustained or overruled, it shall not be
necessary to repeat the objection, it being sufficient for the adverse party to record his continuing
objection to such class of questions. (37a)

Sec. 38. Ruling. The ruling of the court must be given immediately after the objection is made, unless
the court desires to take a reasonable time to inform itself on the question presented; but the ruling shall
always be made during the trial and at such time as will give the party against whom it is made an
opportunity to meet the situation presented by the ruling.
The reason for sustaining or overruling an objection need not be stated. However, if the objection
is based on two or more grounds, a ruling sustaining the objection on one or some of them must specify
the ground or grounds relied upon. (38a)

Sec. 39. Striking out answer. Should a witness answer the question before the adverse party had the
opportunity to voice fully its objection to the same, and such objection is found to be meritorious, the
court shall sustain the objection and order the answer given to be stricken off the record.
On proper motion, the court may also order the striking out of answers which are incompetent,
irrelevant, or otherwise improper. (n)

Sec. 40. Tender of excluded evidence. If documents or things offered in evidence are excluded by the
court, the offeror may have the same attached to or made part of the record. If the evidence excluded is
oral, the offeror may state for the record the name and other personal circumstances of the witness and
the substance of the proposed testimony.

2. People v. Cario 165 SCRA 664 (1988)
3. Interpacific Transit v. Aviles 186 SCRA 385 (1990)
4. De los Reyes v. IAC 176 SCRA 394 (1989)
5. People v. Yatco 97 Phil. 940 (1955)
6. PHILAMGEN v. Sweet Lines, Inc. 212 SCRA 194 (1992)
7. Catuira v. CA 236 SCRA 398 (1994)
8. Sheraton Palace v. Quijano (C.A.) 64 O.G. 9116
9. Vda. de Oate v. Court of Appeals 250 SCRA 283 (1995)

PEOPLE v. CARINO
G.R. No. 73876 September 26, 1988

Doctrine: Evidence not formally offered cannot be considered by the court.

FACTS: Accused-appellants Cario and Diaz (and one Balingit who is still at large) were charged with the
crime of Robbery with Homicide and Frustrated Homicide. The victims in this case are Lolito Talistic
(deceased) and Melencio Talistic. The eyewitness was Rosalia Talistic, wife of Melencio.

According to the prosecution, while Lolito Talisic was tending their store, accused Cario and
Diaz, who were armed with knives, stoned the store and attacked Lolito Talisic. Meanwhil, Rosalia Talisic,
who was cooking at the time near the store, upon seeing what happened, called for her husband,
Melencio Talisic, to help Lolito. Melencio rushed to the scene and tried to pacify the protagonists. While
he placed his arms on the shoulders of Diaz, Balingit suddenly stabbed Melencio at the back with a knife,
thereby wounding Melencio. After being stabbed, Melencio got a bolo from the kitchen of his house, but



Diaz grabbed it from him, and he (Melencio) ran to a room in his store. Diaz then entered the room and,
upon seeing Melencio, he hacked him on the head, wounding Melencio and causing him to fall to the
floor. Meanwhile, the bleeding Lolito tried to run away from the store, but he was intercepted on the way
by Cario, who stabbed him on the chest, causing him to fall to the ground, dead. Diaz then destroyed
the showcase of Melencio's watches and took away watches and money from the store. While he was
doing this, his co-conspirators waited for him outside the store. Afterwards, the accused hurriedly fled
from the crime scene. Melencio's wife (Rosalia), eyewitness to the incident, then called for help.

On the other hand, the accused Carino raised the defense of alibi. He said that on the day of the
incident, he was walking home. On the way, he met one Ricardo Sibay who was walking in zigzag manner
and he (Sibay) suddenly stabbed Carino. Carino then went to a hospital to be treated and to the police
station to report the incident. In the police station, he was informed that he was a suspect in the killing of
Lolito and wounding of Melencio.

ISSUE:
1. Whether the lower court erred in considering that there was conspiracy in killing Lolito Talisic and
wounding Melencio Talisic and robbery? NO.

RATIO: It is the contention of accused-appellant Cario that conspiracy has not been established in the
case at bar. Appellant made reference to the failure of the trial court to consider the sworn statements of
Jenny Arceo, Ricardo Sibay and victim Melencio Talisic which contradicted the finding of conspiracy. We
find such argument meritless. A perusal of the entire records of the case shows that the defense did not
formally offer in evidence such sworn statements and evidence not formally offered cannot be considered
by the court. The trial court only considered what was formally offered to it. From the testimonies of the
prosecution's witnesses, the trial court established that the three accused acted in concert and with a
common design and purpose as shown by their simultaneous arrival at the scene of the crime, mutually
helping one another in the killing of Lolito Talisic and in the stabbing of Melencio Talisic and in the
robbing of the store and by their simultaneous flight from the scene of the crime.

Appellant Lauro Cario also averred that the trial court committed grave error in not giving
weight to the statement of co-accused Diaz confirming the absence of the accused Cario at the time
when the incident started. Again, We cannot sustain such argument. A cursory reading of the testimony
reveals that Diaz did not actually and categorically state that Lauro Cario was not at the scene of the
crime. Witness was merely silent on this point. Such silence did not negate Cario's presence at the scene
of the crime especially when the latter was positively Identified as the malefactor by prosecution witness
and the victim himself, Melencio Talisic.

ANALYSIS:
This case was decided properly under the present rules. The case would be decided similarly under the
Proposed Rules of Evidence.

INTERPACIFIC TRANSIT v. AVILES
G.R. No. 86062 June 6, 1990

Doctrine: Objection to documentary evidence must be made at the time it was formally offered, and not
when the particular document is marked is identified and marked as an exhibit.

FACTS: This case hinges on the proper interpretation and application of the rules on the admissibility of
documentary evidence. Petitioner is the employer of respondents. Petitioner alleges that respondent
(Aviles), being then sub-agents of Interpacific, and as such enjoying its trust and confidence, collected
fron iis various clicnis' payncnis for airway lills wIicI, insicad of rcniiiing it to their principal, they
unlawfully converted to their own personal use and benefit.

At the trial, the prosecution (Interpacific) introduced photocopies of the airway bills supposedly
received by the accused for which they had not rendered proper accounting. This was done in, the course
of the direct examination of one of the prosecution witnesses. The defense objected to their presentation,
invoking the best evidence rule. The prosecution said it would submit the original airway bills in due



time. Upon such undertaking, the trial court allowed the marking of the said documents. However,
contrary to its promise, the prosecution did submit the original airway bills nor did it prove their loss to
justify their substitution with secondary evidence. Nevertheless, when the certified photocopies of the said
bills formally were offered, in evidence, the defense interposed no objection.

The RTC acquitted the accused. The RTC held that the certified photocopies of the airway by were
not admissible under the rule that "there can be no evidence of a writing the content of which is the
subject of inquiry other' than the writing itself." Loss of the originals had not been proved to justify the
exception to the rule as one of the prosecution witness had testified that they were still in the ITI bodega.
Neither had it been shown that the originals had been "recorded in an existing record a certified copy of
which is made evidence by law." Because the accused was acquitted, petitioner seeks to press the civil
liability of the respondents, on the ground that the dismissal of the criminal action did not abate the civil
claim for the recovery of the amount.

ISSUE:
1. Whether he certified photocopies of the airway bills should be considered to prove the civil liability of
the respondents? YES.

RATIO: The Court agreed with the petitioner. The certified photocopies of the airway bills should have
been considered. In assessing this evidence, the lower courts confined themselves to the best evidence
rule and the nature of the documents being presented, which they held did not come under any of the
exceptions to the rule. There is no question that the photocopies were secondary evidence and as such
were not admissible unless there was ample proof of the loss of the originals; and neither were the other
exceptions allowed by the Rules applicable. The trouble is that in rejecting these copies under Rule 130,
Section 2, the respondent court disregarded an equally important principle long observed in our trial
courts and amply supported by jurisprudence. This is the rule that objection to documentary evidence
must be made at the time it is formally offered as an exhibit and not before. Objection prior to that time is
premature.

It is instructive at this paint to make a distinction between Identification of documentary evidence
and its formal offer as an exhibit. The first is done in the course of the trial and is accompanied by the
marking of the evidence an an exhibit. The second is done only when the party rests its case and not
before. The mere fact that a particular document is Identified and marked as an exhibit does not mean it
will be or has been offered as part of the evidence of the party. The party may decide to formally offer it if
it believes this will advance its cause, and then again it may decide not to do so at all. In the latter event,
the trial court is, under Rule 132, Section 35, not authorized to consider it.

Objection to the documentary evidence must be made at the time it is formally offered, not earlier.
The Identification of the document before it is marked as an exhibit does not constitute the formal offer of
the document as evidence for the party presenting it. Objection to the Identification and marking of the
document is not equivalent to objection to the document when it is formally offered in evidence. What
really matters is the objection to the document at the time it is formally offered as an exhibit.

In the case at bar, the photocopies of the airway bills were objected to by the private respondents
as secondary evidence only when they, were being Identified for marking by the prosecution. They were
nevertheless marked as exhibits upon the promise that the original airway bills would be submitted later.
it is true that the originals were never produced. Yet, notwithstanding this omission, the defense did not
object when the exhibits as previously marked were formally offered in evidence. And these were
subsequently admitted by the trial court. The time for objecting the evidence is when the same is offered.
The objection of the defense to the photocopies of the airway bins while they were being Identified and
marked as exhibits did not constitute the objection it should have made when the exhibits were formally
offered in evidence by the prosecution. No valid and timely objection was made at that time.

In addition, it is no argument to say that the earlier objection should be considered a continuing
objection under Sec. 37 of Rule 132, for that provision obviously refers to a single objection to a class of
evidence (testimonial or documentary) which when first offered is considered to encompass the rest of the
evidence. The presumption is, of course, that there was an offer and a seasonable objection thereto. But,
to repeat, no objection was really made in the case before us because it was not made at the proper time.
It would have been so simple for the defense to reiterate its former objection, this time seasonably, when
the formal offer of exhibits was made. However, it did not. The effect of such omission is obvious. The rule



is that evidence not objected to is deemed admitted and may be validly considered by the court in arriving
at its judgment. This is true even if by its nature the evidence is inadmissible and would have surely been
rejected if it had been challenged at the proper time.

The Court held therefore that it was erroneous for the lower courts to reject the photocopies of the
airway bills to prove the liability of the private respondents to the petitioner. With the admission of such
exhibits pursuant to the ruling above made, we find that there is concrete proof of the defendant's
accountability.

ANALYSIS:
This case was decided properly under the present rules. The case would be decided similarly under the
Proposed Rules of Evidence.

JUANA DE LOS REYES v. IAC
G.R. No. 74768 August 11, 1989

Doctrine: Formal offer of evidence is hardly applicable in summary proceedings where no full-blown trial is
held in the interest of a speedy administration of justice.

FACTS: The petitioner obtained a loan from the Rural Bank of Bauan and secured the payment thereof
with a real estate mortgage on a piece of land belonging to her. For her failure to pay the debt, the
mortgage was extrajudicially foreclosed and the land was sold at public auction to the private
respondents. The certificate of sale was registered with the Register of Deeds of Batangas

Later, the private respondents filed a complaint with the CFI asking the petitioner to vacate the
property and remove her improvements thereon. The petitioner countered that the auction sale was
irregular and void and asked that the complaint be dismissed.

While this case was pending, the petitioner wrote a letter to the Provincial Sheriff of Batangas
tendering the amount of P4,925.00 plus interest as the redemption price for the subject land. In a reply
the said officer refused to accept the tender on the ground that the period of redemption had already
expired. He added, though, that the petitioner's request was "being seriously considered."

ISSUE:
1. Whether the petitioner's letter tendering the redemption price to the sheriff and the latter's reply
thereto may be taken into account in determining the timeliness of the redemption? YES.

RATIO: The private respondents insist that the two letters had never been offered in evidence as required
by Section 35, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court. This provides that:
Offer of evidence. - The court shall consider no evidence which has not been formally offered. The purpose
for which the evidence is offered must be specified.

The letters, however, were formally submitted during the hearing of the petitioner's motion to
dismiss, at which counsel for both parties were present. Judge Benjamin Relova took cognizance of the
correspondence and even noted in his order of the same date that "the defendant tendered payment to the
Provincial Sheriff of Batangas, which tender is still under consideration by said officer. The same posture
was taken by the respondent court, which observed from the petitioner's letter that "what was tendered to
the sheriff was only the amount of the bid, P4, 925,
13
and held this to be insufficient.

While the above-cited provision must be strictly interpreted in ordinary trials, such a policy is
hardly applicable in summary proceedings where no full-blown trial is held in the interest of a speedy
administration of justice. It is noted that when the two letters were presented at the hearing, the private
respondents did not object to their admission. They did so only when the case was already on appeal.
Furthermore, the rule on summary judgments is that the judge must base his decision on the pleadings,
depositions, admissions affidavits and documents on file with the court. This is what the trial judge did,
presumably after examining the authenticity and credibility of the evidence before him.



ANALYSIS:
The Rules on Evidence was applied in this case. This case provided for a proceeding wherein offer of
evidence may be dispensed with as in the case of summary proceeding where no full-blown trial takes
place. This doctrine will remain unchanged if the proposed Rules on Evidence will be used.

PEOPLE v. JUDGE YATCO
G.R. No. L-9181 November 28, 1955

Doctrine: The right to object is a mere privilege which the parties may waive; and if the ground for objection
is known and not reasonably made, the objection is deemed waived and the Court has no power, on its own
motion, to disregard the evidence.

FACTS: In amended information filed by the City Attorney, Juan Consunji, Alfonso Panganiban, and
another whose identity is still unknown, were charged with having conspired together in the murder of
one Jose Ramos. During the progress of the trial, while the prosecution was questioning one of its
witnesses, Atty. Arturo Xavier of the NBI, in connection with the making of a certain extra-judicial
confession (allegedly made before him) by defendant Juan Consunji to the witness, counsel for the other
defendant Alfonso Panganiban interposed a general objection to any evidence on such confession on the
ground that it was hearsay and therefore incompetent as against the other accused Panganiban. The
Court below ordered the exclusion of the evidence objected to, but on an altogether different ground: that
the prosecution could not be permitted to introduce the confessions of defendants Juan Consunji and
Alfonso Panganiban to prove conspiracy between them, without prior proof of such conspiracy by a
number of definite acts, conditions, and circumstances. The prosecution then moved in writing for a
reconsideration of the order of exclusion, but again the motion was denied. Wherefore, this petition for
certiorari was brought before this Court by the Solicitor General, for the review and annulment of the
lower Court's order completely excluding any evidence on the extrajudicial confessions of the accused
Juan Consunji and Alfonso Panganiban without prior proof of conspiracy.

ISSUE:
1. Whether the lower Court erred in excluding from evidence the alleged confession? YES.

RATIO: Section 14, Rule 123, Rules of Court, is specific as to the admissibility of the extrajudicial
confession of an accused, freely and voluntarily made, as evidence against him.

SEC. 14. Confession. The declaration of an accused expressly acknowledging the truth of his
guilt as to the offense charged, may be given in evidence against him.

Under the rule of multiple admissibility of evidence, even if Consunji's confession may not be
competent as against his co-accused Panganiban, being hearsay as to the latter, or to prove conspiracy
between them without the conspiracy being established by other evidence, the confession of Consunji
was, nevertheless, admissible as evidence of the declarant's own guilt (U. S. vs. Vega, 43 Phil. 41; People
vs. Bande, 50 Phil. 37; People vs. Buan, 64 Phil. 296), and should have been admitted as such.

The rule cited by the Court below in support of its exclusion of the proffered evidence is Sec. 12 of
Rule 123. The rule refers to statements made by one conspirator during the pendency of the unlawful
enterprises ("during its existence") and in furtherance of its object, and not to a confession made, as in this
case, long after the conspiracy had been brought to an end. Besides, the prosecution had not yet offered
the confessions to prove conspiracy between the two accused, nor as evidence against both of them. In
fact, the alleged confessions (both in writing and in tape recordings) had not yet even been identified (the
presentation of Atty. Xavier was precisely for the purpose of identifying the confessions), much less
formally offered in evidence. For all we know, the prosecution might still be able to adduce other proof of
conspiracy between Consunji and Panganiban before their confessions are formally offered in evidence.
Assuming, therefore, that section 12 of Rule 123 also applies to the confessions in question, it was
premature for the respondent Court to exclude them completely on the ground that there was no prior
proof of conspiracy.



It is particularly noteworthy that the exclusion of the proferred confessions was not made on the
basis of the objection interposed by Panganiban's counsel, but upon an altogether different ground, which
the Court issued motu proprio. By so doing, the Court overlooked that the right to object is a mere
privilege which the parties may waive; and if the ground for objection is known and not reasonably made,
the objection is deemed waived and the Court has no power, on its own motion, to disregard the evidence
(Marcella vs. Reyes, 12 Phil., 1). There is greater reason to adhere to such policy in criminal cases where
questions arise as to admissibility of evidence for the prosecution, for the unjustified exclusion of evidence
may lead to the erroneous acquittal of the accused or the dismissal of the charges, from which the People
can no longer appeal.

ANALYSIS:
The Rules on Evidence is properly used in this case. It should be noted that the right to object is a mere
privilege and the court has no power to exercise such right in behalf of a party to a case. In this case, the
judge, on its own disregarded the evidence on the ground different from what the party who objected gave.
The proposed Rules on Evidence will not change the doctrine in this case.

PHILIPPINE AMERICAN GENERAL INSURANCE CO., INC. v. SWEET LINES, INC.
G.R. No. 87434 August 5, 1992

Doctrine: When the due execution and genuineness of an instrument are deemed admitted because of the
adverse party's failure to make a specific verified denial thereof, the instrument need not be presented
formally in evidence for it may be considered an admitted fact.

FACTS: The vessel SS "VISHVA YASH" belonging to or operated by the foreign common carrier, took on
board two (2) consignments of cargoes for shipment to Manila and Davao consisting of bags Low Density
Polyethylene consigned to the order of Far East Bank and Trust Company of Manila with arrival notice to
Tagum Plastics. These goods were covered by bills of lading and insured with PhilAmGen. The vessel
arrived in Manila and discharged its cargoes for transshipment to Davao. Upon arrival, a survey of the
cargo upon its discharge revealed that the same contained shortages, damages and losses to the cargoes.
Thereafter, a maritime suit was instituted by Tagum Plastics to recover the cost of the lost and damaged
shipment. PhilAmGen paid the claims of Tagum and was subrogated the right to recover the same with
Sweet Lines Inc. RTC ruled in favor of Petitioners. Sweet lines to indemnify for lost shipment. The CA
reversed, dismissed complaint due to prescription.

Note: There was a stipulation in the Bill of Lading which prescribes the length of time to which the shipper
may bring an action for breach of contract. The action was filed beyond that time and Sweet Lines put up
prescription as a defense in their Answer. But the Bills of Lading were not formally offered in evidence to
prove the existence of such period.

ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the action has prescribed notwithstanding the fact that the bills of lading said to
contain the shortened periods for filing a claim and for instituting a court action against the carrier were
never offered in evidence? YES.

RATIO: The issue at hand may accordingly be taken cognizance of by the court even if not initially raised
as a defense so long as its existence is plainly apparent on the face of relevant pleadings. In the case at
bar, prescription as an affirmative defense was seasonably raised by SLI in its answer, except that the
bills of lading embodying the same were not formally offered in evidence.

As Philamgen is suing upon Sweet Lines' contractual obligation under the contract of carriage as
contained in the bills of lading, such bills of lading can be categorized as actionable documents which
under the Rules must be properly pleaded either as causes of action or defenses, and the genuineness
and due execution of which are deemed admitted unless specifically denied under oath by the adverse
party. Therefore, when the due execution and genuineness of an instrument are deemed admitted
because of the adverse party's failure to make a specific verified denial thereof, the instrument need not
be presented formally in evidence for it may be considered an admitted fact.



Furthermore, PhilAmGen failed to plead the non-presentation of the bills of lading in their brief
and earlier on in the appellate proceedings in this case, hence it is too late to plead the same now. Hence,
the non-inclusion of the controverted bills of lading in the formal offer of evidence cannot, under the facts
of this particular case, be considered a fatal procedural lapse as would bar respondent carrier from
raising the defense of prescription.

ANALYSIS:
Under the current Rules of Evidence, Section 34 of Rule 132 states that evidence is inadmissible unless it
is formally offered in evidence. But an exception to this is when the defendant failed to object. Section 36
states that for written evidence, objection should be made within three (3) days after notice unless a
different period is allowed by the court.

Under the proposed Rules of Evidence, the ruling would be the same as no substantial changes were
made in the mentioned provisions. Although previously it was mandatory to object within 3 days, under
iIc proposcd rulcs, sucI oljcciion is only dircciory as cvidcnccd ly iIc word 'nay' in iIc following
provision Oljcciion io a wriiicn offcr of cvidcncc nay lc nadc wiiIin 3 days fron noiicc of iIc offcr." TIc
cccpiion io iIc currcni provision unlcss a diffcrcni pcriod is allowcd ly iIc couri" is rcnovcd and
incorporated into the directory nature of the proposed provision.

CATUIRA v. CA
G.R. No. 105813 September 12, 1994

Doctrine: Where the proponent offers evidence deemed by counsel of the adverse party to be inadmissible
for any reason, the latter has the right to object. But such right is a mere privilege which can be waived.
Necessarily, the objection must be made at the earliest opportunity, lest silence when there is opportunity to
speak may operate as a waiver of objections.

FACTS: 2 Informations for estafa were filed against petitioner Catuira with the RTC for issuing 2 checks
in to Maxima Ocampo without sufficient funds to cover it, which were dishonored by the bank upon
presentment for payment. After the prosecution had presented its evidence, Catuira filed a Motion to
Dismiss contending that the testimony of private respondent Ocampo was inadmissible in evidence since
it was not properly introduced when she was called to testify (as mandated in Sec. 35, Rule 132). Catuira
also argued that even if the testimony of private respondent was considered, the evidence of the
prosecution still failed to prove that the checks were issued in payment of an obligation.

RTC: Denied motion for lack of merit. CA: Affirmed.

Catuira claims that the Court of Appeals erred: When it accepted the testimony of Ocampo
despite it was not offered at the time she was called to testify and iIai Ocanpo's icsiinony sIould Iavc
been stricken off the record pursuant to Sec. 34, Rule 132, which prohibits the court from considering
evidence which has not been formally offered and when it declared that Catuira's objection was not done
at the proper time since under Sec. 36, Rule 132, objection to evidence offered orally must be made
immediately after the offer is made.

Evidently, petitioner could not have waived her right to object to the admissibility of the testimony
of private respondent since the rule requires that it must be done only at the time such testimony is
presented and the records plainly show that the opportunity for petitioner to object only came when the
prosecution attempted, albeit belatedly, to offer the testimony after it has rested its case.

ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the testimony of a witness inadmissible in evidence if not formally offered at the time
the witness is called to testify, as required in Sec. 35, in relation to Sec. 34, Rule 132, of the Revised
Rules on Evidence? NO. (But Catuira waived right to object so inadmissible)

RATIO: The reason for requiring that evidence be formally introduced is to enable the court to rule



intelligently upon the objection to the questions which have been asked. Where the proponent offers
evidence deemed by counsel of the adverse party to be inadmissible for any reason, the latter has the
right to object. But such right is a mere privilege which can be waived. Necessarily, the objection must be
made at the earliest opportunity, lest silence when there is opportunity to speak may operate as a waiver
of objections.

Thus, while it is true that the prosecution failed to offer the questioned testimony when private
respondent was called to the witness stand, Catuira waived this procedural error by failing to object at the
appropriate time, i.e., when the ground for objection became reasonably apparent the moment private
respondent was called to testify without any prior offer having been made by the proponent.

But even assuming that Catuira's objection was timely, it was pointless as the testimony of
complaining witness is relevant and material in the criminal prosecution of petitioner for estafa. Even if
the offer was belatedly made by the prosecution, there is no reason for the testimony to be expunged from
the record. On the contrary, the unoffered oral evidence must be admitted if only to satisfy the court's
sense of justice and fairness and to stress that substantial justice may not be denied merely on the
ground of technicality.

ANALYSIS:
Under the current Rules of Evidence, Section 34 of Rule 132 states that evidence is inadmissible unless it
is formally offered in evidence. Section 35 of the same rule the offer of a testimony of a witness must be
made at the time the witness is called to testify. Section 36 states that an objection to evidence offered
orally must be made immediately after the offer is made. But the question arises when there is a lack of a
formal offer of the testimony of a witness. How can a person object to the supposedly inadmissible
testimony if no offer was made? This is answered by the proposed wording of Section 36 rule 132 in the
proposed rules.

Under the Proposed Rules of Evidence, an additional sentence was added in Section 36, which states that
Oljcciion io iIc icsiinony of a wiincss for lacl of a fornal offcr nusi lc nadc as soon as iIc wiincss
lcgins io icsiify". TIcrcforc, cvcn if iIcrc is a lacl of offcr of icsiinonial cvidcncc, a pariy can now oljcci
to such evidence. This is go with the principle in this case that the objection must be made at the earliest
possible opportunity lest it be considered as a waiver as the act of objection is only a privilege.

SHERATON-PALACE HOTEL v. CRISTINA QUIJANO
G.R. No. 32128-R June 20, 1967

Doctrine: The admission of the said affidavit without any objection on the part of the defendant merely
means that the same was admitted for the purpose for which it was offered but such admission does not
mean that the defendant is precluded from presenting evidence to contradict the facts in the said Exhibit
including the statement therein that the defendant is indebted to plaintiff.

FACTS: Defendant Cristina Quijano had met in Japan one Fred Devine. At that time, defendant had been
awarded a contract by the Philippine government to salvage 36 sunken vessels in the Philippines. Devine
offcrcd io dcfcndani iIc scrviccs of Iis diving conpany io undcrialc Ouijano's salvaging opcraiions in iIc
Philippines. Devine invited defendant to go to the United States in connection with their transaction, with
Dcvinc undcrialing io pay for dcfcndani's Ioicl lills. TIis inviiaiion was acccpicd. Dcfcndani procccdcd
to Sheraton Palace Hotel where Devine had previously made accommodation arrangements for her with
all bills charged against Devine or his diving company. When the time came for Quijano to check, she
found out that Devine refused to pay for her hotel bills due to the fact that the proposed transaction
between Devine and the defendant about the salvaging work in the Philippines failed to push through.
Hence, the plaintiff in this case filed the present action for collection against the defendant in the CFI of
Manila.

ISSUE:
1. Whether or not Exhibit B, which is the affidavit of Edward Brown, Comptroller of plaintiff stating the
defendant is indebted to plaintiff for unpaid hotel accommodations constitutes unrebuttable evidence of
dcfcndani's lialiliiy? NO.



RATIO: The defendant had established her contention that she is not liable for her hotel bills with
plaintiff through testimonial and documentary evidence. The admission of the said affidavit without any
objection on the part of the defendant merely means that the same was admitted for the purpose for
which it was offered but such admission does not mean, as the plaintiff claims, that the defendant is
precluded from presenting evidence to contradict the facts in the said Exhibit including the statement
therein that the defendant is indebted to plaintiff in the sum of $1,257.34.

ANALYSIS:
Even if the case was decided under the proposed revised rules on Evidence, the decision would still be the
same.

VDA. DE ONATE v. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 116149 November 23, 1995

Doctrine: Evidence not formally offered may be admitted and considered by the trial court provided the
following requirements are present, viz .: first, the same must have been duly identified by testimony duly
recorded and, second, the same must have been incorporated in the records of the case.

FACTS: The controversy involves a riceland located at Toran, Aparri. An action for specific performance
with damages was filed. Deceased Leonor Taguba bought the subject parcel of land from Elvira Mato Vda.
de Oate sometime in 1976 for a consideration of P5,000.00 payable in four (4) instalments. After full
payment was made on July 29, 1976, the parties however failed to reduce their contract in writing. On
December 30, 1976, Leonor Taguba died. The instant complaint was filed when demand was made upon
Elvira Mato Vda. de Oate to execute a public document of sale in favor of the deceased and her heirs and
she refused

The trial court rejected the petitioners' defense that Elvira Mato Vda. de Oate contracted a verbal
loan from Leonor Taguba in the amount of P12,000.00 payable within a period of 4 years with 12%
interest. Also disbelieved was the allegation that two (2) parcels of land in dispute) were mortgaged by
Elvira Mato Vda. de Oate to Leonor Taguba as security for the payment of the loan and that only
P5,000.00 of the P12,000.00 loan was given by Taguba.

The trial court ruled that what the parties had was a contract to sell and ordered petitioners to
execute the necessary documents. Court of Appeals affirmed. Motion for reconsideration was denied,
hence this petition.

ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the lower courts erred in admitting Exhibits F, F-1, F-2 and F-3 although these were
never formally submitted in evidence? NO.

RATIO: It is clear that for evidence to be considered, the same must be formally offered. Corollarily, the
mere fact that a particular document is identified and marked as an exhibit does not mean that it has
already been offered as part of the evidence of a party. In Interpacific Transit, Inc. v. Aviles, we had the
occasion to make a distinction between identification of documentary evidence and its formal offer as an
exhibit. We said that the first is done in the course of the trial and is accompanied by the marking of the
evidence as an exhibit while the second is done only when the party rests its case and not before. A party,
therefore, may opt to formally offer his evidence if he believes that it will advance his cause or not to do so
at all. In the event he chooses to do the latter, the trial court is not authorized by the Rules to consider
the same.

However, in People v. Napat-a, citing People v. Mate , we relaxed the foregoing rule and allowed
evidence not formally offered to be admitted and considered by the trial court provided the following
requirements are present, viz .: first, the same must have been duly identified by testimony duly recorded
and, second, the same must have been incorporated in the records of the case.



In the case at bench, we find, as respondent court did, that these requisites have been satisfied.
Likewise, extant from the records is the witness' explanation of the contents of each of the said exhibits.
Also telling is petitioners' counsel vigorous cross-examination of the said witness who testified on the
exhibits in question. Herein subject exhibits were also incorporated and made part of the records of this
case.

Finally, petitioners' allegation that an action for specific performance cannot be availed of in this
case because the parties did not agree on a fixed price is likewise devoid of merit. Private respondent's
evidence and testimony remain unrebutted that the contract price for the parcel of land in question is
P5,000.00.

ANALYSIS:
The proposed rules of Evidence still do not contain the exceptions to the general rule that evidence not
formally offered shall not be admitted. Thus, resort to jurisprudence such as the above case must still be
done if relaxation of the abovestated rule is to be intended.

XV. Weight & Sufficiency of Evidence

A. Rule 133, Secs. 1-7

Weight and Sufficiency of Evidence

SECTION 1.Preponderance of evidence, how determined. In civil cases, the party having burden of proof
must establish his case by a preponderance of evidence. In determining where the preponderance or
superior weight of evidence on the issues involved lies, the court may consider all the facts and
circumstances of the case, the witnesses' manner of testifying, their intelligence, their means and
opportunity of knowing the facts to which there are testifying, the nature of the facts to which they testify,
the probability or improbability of their testimony, their interest or want of interest, and also their
personal credibility so far as the same may legitimately appear upon the trial. The court may also
consider the number of witnesses, though the preponderance is not necessarily with the greater number.
(1a)

Sec. 2.Proof beyond reasonable doubt. In a criminal case, the accused is entitled to an acquittal, unless
his guilt is shown beyond reasonable doubt. Proof beyond reasonable doubt does not mean such a degree
of proof, excluding possibility of error, produces absolute certainly. Moral certainly only is required, or
that degree of proof which produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind. (2a)

Sec. 3.Extrajudicial confession, not sufficient ground for conviction. An extrajudicial confession made by
an accused, shall not be sufficient ground for conviction, unless corroborated by evidence of corpus
delicti. (3)

Sec. 4.Circumstantial evidence, when sufficient. Circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction if:
(a)There is more than one circumstances;
(b)The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and
(c)The combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond
reasonable doubt. (5)

Sec. 5.Substantial evidence. In cases filed before administrative or quasi-judicial bodies, a fact may be
deemed established if it is supported by substantial evidence, or that amount of relevant evidence which a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion.

Sec. 6.Power of the court to stop further evidence. The court may stop the introduction of further
testimony upon any particular point when the evidence upon it is already so full that more witnesses to
the same point cannot be reasonably expected to be additionally persuasive. But this power should be
exercised with caution. (6)



Sec. 7.Evidence on motion. When a motion is based on facts not appearing of record the court may hear
the matter on affidavits or depositions presented by the respective parties, but the court may direct that
the matter be heard wholly or partly on oral testimony or depositions.

B. REE, Rule 7

RULE 7
EVIDENTIARY WEIGHT OF ELECTRONIC DOCUMENTS
SECTION 1. Factors for assessing evidentiary weight. - In assessing the evidentiary weight of an electronic
document, the following factors may be considered:
(a) The reliability of the manner or method in which it was generated, stored or communicated,
including but not limited to input and output procedures, controls, tests and checks for accuracy and
reliability of the electronic data message or document, in the light of all the circumstances as well as any
relevant agreement;
(b) The reliability of the manner in which its originator was identified;
(c) The integrity of the information and communication system in which it is recorded or stored,
including but not limited to the hardware and computer programs or software used as well as
programming errors;
(d) The familiarity of the witness or the person who made the entry with the communication and
information system;
(e) The nature and quality of the information which went into the communication and information
system upon which the electronic data message or electronic document was based; or
(f) Other factors which the court may consider as affecting the accuracy or integrity of the
electronic document or electronic data message.

SEC. 2. Integrity of an information and communication system. In any dispute involving the integrity of
the information and communication system in which an electronic document or electronic data message
is recorded or stored, the court may consider, among others, the following factors:
(a) Whether the information and communication system or other similar device was operated in a
manner that did not affect the integrity of the electronic document, and there are no other reasonable
grounds to doubt the integrity of the information and communication system;
(b) Whether the electronic document was recorded or stored by a party to the proceedings with
interest adverse to that of the party using it; or
(c) Whether the electronic document was recorded or stored in the usual and ordinary course of
business by a person who is not a party to the proceedings and who did not act under the control of the
party using it.

C. Cases:
1. U.S. v. Lasada 18 Phil. 90 (1910)
2. People. v. Abendan 82 Phil. 711 (1948)
3. People v. Solayao 262 SCRA 255 (1996)
4. People v. Lorenzo 240 SCRA 624 (1995)

THE UNITED STATES v. AGAPITO LASADA
G.R. No. L-5324

Doctrine: The law presumes that a defendant is not guilty of any crime, and this presumption stands until it
is overturned by competent and credible proof. It is incumbent upon the prosecution to establish the guilt of
the defendant beyond a reasonable doubt, and if there remains a reasonable doubt as to his guilt or
innocence this doubt must be resolved in his favor and he must be acquitted.

FACTS: Pedro Sopriengco, a Chinaman, left his house to visit his coconut grove or rice fields, with the
intention of returning early that same afternoon. His body was found the next day about 100 brazas from
the bridge which crosses the River Balacoue. The provincial fiscal of the Province of Leyte filed a
complaint against Agapito Lasada, Santiago Lasado, Macario Lasada, and Panfilio Closa, charging them
for the crime of murder. The accused Agapito Lasada, upon his own application, was granted a separate



trial, which commenced on that day. On being arraigned on this charged he plead not guilty. After
hearing and considering the proofs and arguments presented the trial court found this accused, Agapito
Lasada, guilty of the crime of homicide.

ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the prosecution has established the guilt of accused? YES.

RATIO: The Chinaman's body was found at a certain place near the river is not questioned, neither is it
questioned that when he left home the day before he was enjoying reasonably good health. In the opinion
of this witness the round in the side would not, necessarily, have caused the death of the Chinaman, but
the blow on the forehead would have caused his death.

Julia Sopriengco, daughter of the deceased, gave about the same description of the wounds on
the body. The blow on the forehead was evidently caused by some heavy blunt instrument, and we are
fully satisfied that this blow, together with the other wounds, was the direct cause of the death of this
Chinaman.

The law presumes that a defendant is not guilty of any crime, and this presumption stands until
it is overturned by competent and credible proof. It is incumbent upon the prosecution to establish the
guilt of the defendant beyond a reasonable doubt, and if there remains a reasonable doubt as to his guilt
or innocence this doubt must be resolved in his favor and he must be acquitted.

The Chinaman was killed near the river on that day. Two witnesses saw the defendant and his
companions commit this murder. The testimony of these two witnesses is corroborated by the witnesses
Gonzaga and Margate. It is also corroborated to a certain extent by Mandia. The testimony of all these
witnesses is reasonable. The motive on the part of the defendant for killing the deceased is clearly shown.

ANALYSIS:
The ruling of the court in this case will be the same even under the proposed rules of evidence since the
latter rule was not amended regarding the weight and sufficiency of evidence.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. MARIO ABENDAN
G.R. No. 132026-27 June 28, 2001

Doctrine: Alibi becomes unworthy of credit when it is established mainly by the accused himself and his
relative, and not by credible persons.

FACTS: Olimpia Caeda and her daughter Carmelita slept on one bed while a relative, one Samuel
Tardin, a barangay tanod, slept on another bed. About seven (7) meters from the said nipa house was an
unfinished house where Carmelita's younger brother, Pedro, slept. Pedro was awakened by the barking of
the dogs. He noticed the presence of several armed persons, one of whom he recognized as Mario
Abendan, while the others were just familiar to him. Mario gave a good evening greeting and
simultaneously kicked open the GI sheet door. Mario stepped inside the house and shot the sleeping
Samuel Tardin once in the head and another in the chin. Mario then held Olimpia and was overheard
saying, 'Nang, isog kaayo ka Nang Ha' (Nang, you are very brave, Nang ha). Carmelita darted towards the
door and when she turned her head back, she saw Julian Padigos shoot her, hitting her in the right thigh.
Carmelita fell into the cow pen where she stayed to hide as she heard more gunshots. From the attic of
the unfinished house, Pedro saw her mother pleading for her life, to no avail, as Mario shot Olimpia
anyway on the head. After the shooting, Pedro reported the incident to the police and sought assistance
from them. The trial court gave credence to the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses. The trial court
also found the existence of conspiracy among accused-appellants.

ISSUE:
1. Whether prosecution impugned the guilt of appellants with proof beyond reasonable doubt? YES



RATIO: To prove appellants' guilt, the prosecution presented Carmelita who positively and consistently
identified the three appellants as the persons who had entered their house armed with guns. On the other
hand, to substantiate their claim of innocence, appellants simply denied that they had anything to do
with the deaths of Olimpia Caeda and Samuel Tardin. They presented alibis to prove that at the time the
victims were killed, they were not at the scene of the crime but somewhere else.

In the present case, Mario has been positively and categorically identified as the person who had
shot Samuel and Olimpia. As against this positive identification, Mario's alibi, which was supported only
by a relative, cannot prevail. Alibi becomes unworthy of credit when it is established mainly by the
accused himself and his relative, and not by credible persons. The denial and alibi of Primitivo and Julian
cannot be given weight either. Like Mario, they were positively identified as having been at the Caeda
residence -- at the time Olimpia, Samuel and Carmelita were shot. It was Carmelita who, aside from
corroborating Pedro's testimony on the identity of Mario as one of the assailants, also positively and
categorically identified Primitivo and Julian as the other malefactors.

ANALYSIS:
The ruling of the court in this case will be the same even under the proposed rules of evidence since the
latter rule was not amended regarding the weight and sufficiency of evidence.

PEOPLE v. SOLAYAO
G.R. No. 119220 September 20, 1996

Doct)nc. VIcn u ncgutuc s uuc))cd n u pcudng o) u punt]]`s cusc dcpcnds upon tIc cstuIsIncnt o] u
negative, and the means of proving the fact are equally within the control of each party, then the burden of
proof is upon the party averring the negative.

FACTS: SPO3 Nino together with two CAFGU members went to Brgy. Caulangohan, Biliran to conduct an
intelligence patrol to verify reports on the presence of armed persons roaming around the barangays of
Caibiran. From there, the team proceeded to Brgy. Onion where the met the group of accused appellant
Nilo Soliyao numbering 5. The former became suspicious when they observed that the latter were drunk
and that accused-appcllani Iinsclf was wcaring a canouflagc uniforn or a junglc suii. Soliyao's
companions fled upon seeing the government agents. Police Officer Nino told Soliyao not to run away and
iniroduccd Iinsclf as PC" aficr wIicI Ic scizcd iIc dricd coconui lcavcs wIicI iIc laiicr was carrying
and found wrapped in it a 49inch long homemade fircarn lnown as laiong." WIcn Ic aslcd Soliyao wIo
issued him a license to carry said firearm or whether he was connected with the military or any
intelligence group, the latter answered that he had no permission to possess the same. Thereupon, SPO3
Nino confiscated the firearm and turned him over to the custody of the policeman of Caibiran who
subsequently investigated him and charged him with illegal possession of firearm. RTC found Soliyao
guilty of illegal possession of firearm.

ISSUE:
1. Whether or not trial court erred in admitting in evidence the homemade firearm? NO.

RATIO: The case at bar constitutes an instance where a search and seizure may be effected without first
naling an arrcsi. TIcrc was jusiifiallc causc io siop and frisl" accuscd appellant when his companions
fled upon seeing the government agents. Under the circumstances, the government agents could not
possibly have procured a search warrant first.

Thus, there was no violation of the constitutional guarantee against unreasonable search and
seizures. Nor was there error on the part of the trial court when it admitted the homemade firearm as
evidence. It is incumbent upon a person charged with illegal possession of firearm to prove the issuance
to him of a license to possess the firearm but under the provisions of Sec. 2, Rule 131 of the Rules of
Court which provide that in criminal cases the burden of proof as to the offense charged lies on the
prosecution in this case to prove that the firearm used by appellant was not properly licensed. It is the
prosccuiion's duiy noi ncrcly io allcgc iIc ncgaiivc faci lui io provc ii. WIcn a ncgaiivc is avcrrcd in a
plcading or a plainiiff's casc dcpcnds upon iIc csiallisIncni of a ncgaiivc, and iIc ncans of proving iIc



fact are equally within the control of each party, then the burden of proof is upon the party averring the
negative.

In this case, a certification from the Firearms and Explosives Unit of the PNP that accused-
appellant was not a license of a firearm of any kind or caliber would have sufficed for the prosecution to
prove beyond reasonable doubt the second element of the crime of illegal possession of firearm. And while
the prosecution was able to prove by testimonial evidence that Soliyao admitted before Police Officer Nino
at the time he was accosted that he did not have any authority or license to carry the firearm such
admission is insufficient to authorize conviction. An admission in criminal cases is insufficient to prove
beyond reasonable doubt the commission of the crime charged.

Moreover, said admission is extra-judicial in nature and as such it does not fall under Sec. 4 of
Rule 129 of the Revised Rules of Court. Not being a judicial admission, said statement by Solayao does
not prove beyond reasonable doubt the second element of illegal possession of firearm. It does not even
establish a prima facie case. It merely bolsters the case for the prosecution but does not stand as proof of
the fact of absence or lack of a license.

ANALYSIS:
The decision of the Court is in accordance with the Rules of Court that an extra-judicial confession made
by an accused shall not be sufficient ground for conviction unless corroborated by evidence of corpus
dclicii. Hcrc, iIc Couri rulcd iIai Solayao's adnission could noi rcplacc as proof Iis lack of license
because the burden of proof in this case lies with the prosecution. Because the prosecution failed to meet
the burden of proof, it was correct for the SC to dismiss the case against Solayao.

The Proposed Revised Rules of Court, did not change the wording nor the tenor of the provision relating to
extra-judicial confession. However, it changed Sec.1, Rule 131 relating to the burden of proof by adding a
provision relating to the burden of evidence. This however cannot affect the decision in this case because
what it dealt with is failure of the prosecution to meet the burden of proof and not the failure of one party
to meet the burden of evidence.

PEOPLE v. LORENZO
G.R. No. 110107 January 26, 1995

Doctrine: What must be corroborated (under Sec. 3, Rule 133 of the Revised Rules of Court) is the
extrajudicial confession and not the testimony of the person to whom the confession is made, and the
corroborative evidence required is not the testimony of another person who heard the confession but the
evidence of corpus delicti.

FACTS: SPO1 Eclipse of the Tuguegarao PNP Station was in his post for the night when at about a little
past 10pm, a tricycle driver went to Policemen Eclipse and reported a stabbing incident. Eclipse rushed to
the crime scene. On his way he met PO1 Dolores Lorenzo, a policewoman of his own Station who
inncdiaicly surrcndcrcd io Iin a llood siaincd lolo and a fan lnifc and iold Iin I lillcd ny Iusland."
The two then proceeded to the front of the store of Brgy. Captain Liban where the body of Agapito
(Dolorcs' Iuslandi was sprawlcd. Eclipsc callcd for Drgy. Capiain Lilan io conc oui of Iis Iousc. In iIc
prcscncc of and wiiIin iIc Icaring of iIc Drgy. Capiain, Policcwonan Lorcnzo again said I'n
surrendering because I killed ny Iusland." FTC found Policcwonan Lorcnzo guiliy of parricidc and Icld
that her confession was admissible.

ISSUE:
1. WIciIcr FTC was corrcci in adniiiing Policcwonan Lorcnzo's confcssion inio cvidcncc? - YES.

RATIO: What must be corroborated (under Sec. 3, Rule 133 of the Revised Rules of Court) is the
extrajudicial confession and not the testimony of the person to whom the confession is made, and the
corroborative evidence required is not the testimony of another person who heard the confession but the
evidence of corpus delicti. Except when expressly required by law, the testimony of a single person, if
credible and positive and if it satisfies the court as to the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, is
sufficient to convict.



Corpus delicti is the body (material substance) upon which a crime has been committed e.g. the
corpse of a murdered man or the charred remains of a house burned down. In a derivative sense, it
means the substantial fact that a crime was committed. It is made up of two elements: a. that a certain
result has been proved, for example a man has died or a building has been burned and b. that some
person is criminally responsible for the act. Sec. 3, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court does not mean that
every element of the crime charged must be clearly established by independent evidence apart from the
confession. It means merely that there should be some evidence tending to show the commission of the
crime apart from the confession Otherwise, the utility of the confession as a species of proof would vanish
if it were necessary, in addition to the confession, to adduce other evidence sufficient to justify conviction
independently of such confession. Otherwise stated, the other evidence need not, independently of the
confession, establish the corpus delicti beyond reasonable doubt.

ANALYSIS:
TIc Couri's dccision in iIis casc is pursuani io Scc. 3, Fulc 133 of iIc Fcviscd Fulcs of Couri, as sucI,
the court was correct in admitting the extrajudicial confession of Policewoman Dolores since it was
corroborated by corpus delicti (in this case the body of her husband). Thus, the court correctly held that
SPO3 Eclipsc's icsiinony did noi nccd corroloraiion sincc wIai is rcfcrrcd io in Scc. 3, Fulc 133 of iIc
Revised Rules of Court is the extrajudicial confession itself.

The Proposed Revised Rules of Court, did not change the wording of Sec. 3, Rule 133 and thus it can be
inferred that the Committee did not intend to change the current interpretation of the Court relating to
the same provision.

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