CONFLICT OF LAWS-CASE DIGESTS ON JURISPRUDENCE

1. ADONG VS. CHEONG SENG GEE, 43 PHIL 43

FACTS Cheong Boo, a native of China, died intestate in Zamboanga and left property worth nearly P100,000. The estate of the deceased was claimed by Cheong Seng Gee, an alleged legitimate child by a marriage contracted by Cheong Boo with Tan Dit in China in 1895. On the other hand, Mora Adong, the alleged lawful wife of the deceased who married him in 1896 in Basilan, and her daughters are also claiming as heirs of the decedent. The conflicting claims to the estate were ventilated in the CFI of Zamboanga. The trial judge reached the conclusion that the proof of the marriage of Tan Dit to the decedent was not sufficient. Cheong Seng Gee should share in the estate as a natural child. On the other hand, the trial judge reached the conclusion that the marriage between the Mora Adong and the deceased had been adequately proved, but, under the laws of the Philippine Islands, it could not be held to be a lawful marriage; thus, the daughters Payang and Rosalia would inherit as natural children. The order of the trial judge, following these conclusions, was that there should be a partition of the property of the deceased Cheong Boo between the natural children, Cheong Seng Gee, Payang, and Rosalia. Thus, both parties appealed.

ISSUE: 1. W/N the marriage between Tan Dit and the decedent is valid. 2. W/N the marriage between Mora and the decedent is valid considering that it is a Mohammedan marriage. RULING First issue: SC ruled that to establish a valid foreign marriage pursuant to this comity provision, it is first necessary to prove before the Philippine courts the existence of the foreign law as a question of fact, and it is then necessary to prove the alleged foreign marriage by convincing evidence. THE PROOF PRESENTED IN COURT DID NOT SUSTAIN THE VALIDITY OF THE MARRIAGE OF TAN BIT AND THE DECEDENT. The Court noted a strong inclination on the part of the Chinese witnesses, especially the brother of Cheong Boo, to protect the interests of the alleged son, Cheong Seng Gee, by overstepping the limits of truthfulness. The Court also noted that reliable witnesses stated that in the year 1895, when Cheong Boo was supposed to have been in China, he was in reality in Jolo, in the Philippine Islands. The immigration documents only go to show the relation of parent and child existing between the deceased Cheong Boo and his son Cheong Seng Gee and do not establish the marriage between the deceased and the mother of Cheong Seng Gee.

ALSO THERE IS NO COMPETENT TESTIMONY AS TO WHAT THE LAWS OF CHINA IN THE PROVINCE OF AMOY CONCERNING MARRIAGE WERE IN 1895. As in the Encarnacion case, there is lacking proof so clear, strong, and unequivocal as to produce a moral conviction of the existence of the alleged prior Chinese marriage. Substitute twenty-three years for forty years and the two cases are the same.

AS TO THE TESTAMENTARY RIGHTS OF CHEONG SENG GEE AS AN ACKNOWLEDGED NATURAL CHILD, SUCH WAS NOT PRONOUNCED AS AN ERROR SINCE THE OPPOSITORS FAILED TO ASSIGNED IT AS AN ERROR AND MERELY KEPT SILENCE.

second issue: YES. MARRIAGE MAY BE SOLEMNIZED BY EITHER A JUDGE OF ANY COURT INFERIOR TO THE SUPREME COURT, JUSTICE OF THE PEACE, OR PRIEST OR MINISTER OF THE GOSPEL OF ANY DENOMINATION . . ." "Priest," according to the lexicographers, means one especially consecrated to the service of a divinity and considered as the medium through whom worship, prayer, sacrifice, or other service is to be offered to the being worshipped, and pardon, blessing, deliverance, etc., obtained by the worshipper, as a priest of Baal or of Jehovah; a Buddhist priest. "Minister of the Gospel" means all clergymen of every denomination and faith. A "denomination" is a religious sect having a particular name. A MOHAMMEDAN IMAN IS A "PRIEST OR MINISTER OF THE GOSPEL," AND MOHAMMEDANISM IS A "DENOMINATION," WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE MARRIAGE LAW. "NO PARTICULAR FORM FOR THE CEREMONY OF MARRIAGE IS REQUIRED, BUT THE PARTIES MUST DECLARE, IN THE PRESENCE OF THE PERSON SOLEMNIZING THE MARRIAGE, THAT THEY TAKE EACH OTHER AS HUSBAND AND WIFE." The law is quite correct in affirming that no precise ceremonial is indispensable requisite for the creation of the marriage contract. The two essentials of a valid marriage are capacity and consent. The latter element may be inferred from the ceremony performed, the acts of the parties, and habit or repute. In this instance, there is no question of capacity. Nor do we think there can exist any doubt as to consent. While it is true that during the Mohammedan ceremony, the remarks of the priest were addressed more to the elders than to the participants, it is likewise true that the Chinaman and the Mora woman did in fact take each other to be husband and wife and did thereafter live together as husband and wife. IT WAS SHOWN BY EVIDENCE THAT THE DECEDENT WAS MARRIED TO THE MORA ADONG ACCORDING TO THE CEREMONIES PRESCRIBED BY THE BOOK ON MARRIAGE OF THE KORAN, BY THE MOHAMMEDAN IMAN (PRIEST) HABUBAKAR. THAT A MARRIAGE CEREMONY TOOK PLACE IS ESTABLISHED BY ONE OF THE PARTIES TO THE MARRIAGE, THE MORA ADONG, BY THE IMAN WHO SOLEMNIZED THE MARRIAGE, AND BY OTHER EYEWITNESSES, ONE OF WHOM WAS THE FATHER OF THE BRIDE, AND ANOTHER, THE CHIEF OF THE RANCHERIA, NOW A MUNICIPAL COUNCILOR. The groom complied with Quranic law by giving to the bride a dowry of P250 in money and P250 in goods. From the marriage day until the death of Cheong Boo, twenty-three years later, the Chinaman and the Mora Adong cohabited as husband and wife. To them were born five children, two of whom, Payang and Rosalia, are living. Both in his relations with Mora Adong and with third persons during his lifetime, Cheong Boo treated Adong as his lawful wife. He admitted this relationship in several private and public documents. Thus, when different legal documents were

executed, including decrees of registration, Cheong Boo stated that he was married to the Mora Adong while as late as 1918, he gave written consent to the marriage of his minor daughter, Payang. THE COURT RULED THAT THE MARRIAGE WAS VALID. THE LAW OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS HAS LONG RECOGNIZED THE RIGHT OF THE PEOPLE TO THE FREE EXERCISE OF RELIGION. VARIOUS RESPONSIBLE OFFICIALS HAVE SO OFT ANNOUNCED THE PURPOSE OF THE GOVERNMENT NOT TO INTERFERE WITH THE CUSTOMS OF THE MOROS, ESPECIALLY THEIR RELIGIOUS CUSTOMS. Other digested version: FACTS: Estate of Cheong Boo is claimed by two parties (1) his alleged legitimate child from a marriage contracted in China in 1895, and (2) his alleged legitimate spouse from a marriage in Basilan in 1896. ISSUE: WON a marriage contracted in China and proven mainly by a matrimonial letter is valid in the Philippines HELD: NO; o o o To establish a valid foreign marriage, it is first necessary to prove before the courts of the Islands the existence of the foreign law as a question of fact, and it is then necessary to prove the alleged foreign marriage by convincing evidence. There is a need for proof that is clear, strong and unequivocal so as to produce a moral conviction of the existence of such impediment (prior marriage).

2. LIM VS. COLLECTOR 36 PHIL 472

FACTS: The real question raised on this appeal is whether the Insular Collector of Customs denied entry into the Philippine Islands two children aged 8 and 14 years, respectively, under and by authority of the Chinese Immigration, Laws, it appearing that the children arrived at the Port of Manila accompanied by and in the custody of their mother, a Filipino woman; The children were born in China, out of lawful wedlock; and that their father was Chinese.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Insular Collector of Customs may lawfully deny entry into the Philippines to the 2 children? RULING The Court by analogous reasoning to that upon which the Supreme Court of the United States held that the wives and minor children of chinese merchants domiciled in the united states may enter that country without certificates, these children must be held to be entitled to enter the philippine islands with their mother, for the purpose of taking up their residence here with her, it appearing that she is natural guardian, entitled to their custody and charged with their maintenance and education. (U. S. vs. Gue Lim, 176 U. S. 459.) SC is not aware of any chinese law which differentiates the status of infant children, born out of lawful wedlock, from that of similar children under the laws in force in the philippine islands. SC ASSUMES THAT IN CHINA AS WELL AS IN THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS SUCH CHILDREN HAVE THE RIGHT TO LOOK TO THEIR MOTHER FOR THEIR MAINTENANCE AND EDUCATION, AND THAT SHE IS ENTITLED TO THEIR CUSTODY AND CONTROL IN FULFILLING THE OBLIGATIONS TOWARDS THEM WHICH ARE IMPOSED UPON HER, NOT ONLY BY THE NATURAL IMPULSES OF LOVE AND AFFECTION, BUT ALSO BY THE EXPRESS MANDATE OF THE LAW. SC OPINED THAT CHINESE IMMIGRATION LAWS SHOULD NOT BE CONSTRUED SO AS TO EXCLUDE INFANT CHILDREN OF A FILIPINO MOTHER, BORN OUT OF LAWFUL WEDLOCK, SEEKING ENTRANCE TO THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS FOR THE PURPOSE OF TAKING UP THEIR RESIDENCE WITH HER IN HER NATIVE LAND. We conclude, therefore, that, IT APPEARING THAT THE RESPONDENT COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS IS DETAINING THE PETITIONERS UNDER AN ERRONEOUS CONSTRUCTION OF THE IMMIGRATION LAWS, AND IT APPEARING FROM THE FACTS DISCLOSED BY THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS THAT THESE CHILDREN ARE ENTITLED TO ADMISSION INTO THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, THE ORDER ENTERED IN THE COURT BELOW SHOULD BE REVERSED, AND IN LIEU THEREOF AN ORDER SHOULD BE ENTERED DIRECTING THE DISCHARGE OF THESE CHILDREN FROM THE CUSTODY OF THE INSULAR COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS, WITH THE COSTS IN BOTH INSTANCES, DE OFFICIO.

3. HASEGAWA V. KITAMURA, 538 SCRA 26, (2007)

FACTS Nippon is a Japanese consultancy firm providing technical and management support in the infrastructure projects national permanently residing in the Philippines. The agreement provides that Kitamaru was to extend professional services to Nippon for a year. Nippon assigned Kitamaru to work as the project manager of STAR project. When the STAR project was near completion, DPWH engaged the consultancy services of Nippon, this time for the detailed engineering & construction supervision of the BBRI Project. Kitamaru was named as the project manger in the contract. Hasegawa, Nippons general manager for its International Division, informed Kitamaru that the company had no more intention of automatically renewing his ICA. His services would be engaged by the company only up to the substantial completion of the STAR Project. Kitamaru demanded that he be assigned to the BBRI project. Nippon insisted that Kitamarus contract was for a fixed term that had expired. Kitamaru then filed for specific performance & damages w/ the RTC of Lipa City. Nippon filed a MTD. Nippons contention: The ICA had been perfected in Japan & executed by & between Japanese nationals. Thus, the RTC of Lipa City has no jurisdiction. The claim for improper pre-termination of Kitamarus ICA could only be heard & ventilated in the proper courts of Japan following the principles of lex loci celebrationis & lex contractus. The RTC denied the motion to dismiss. The CA ruled hat the principle of lex loci celebrationis was not applicable to the case, because nowhere in the pleadings was the validity of the written agreement put in issue. It held that the RTC was correct in applying the principle of lex loci solutionis. ISSUE W/N the subject matter jurisdiction of Philippine courts in civil cases for specific performance & damages involving contracts executed outside the country by foreign nationals may be assailed on the principles of lex loci celebrationis, lex contractus, the state of the most significant relationship rule, or forum non conveniens. RULING NO. IN THE JUDICIAL RESOLUTION OF CONFLICTS PROBLEMS, 3 CONSECUTIVE PHASES ARE INVOLVED: JURISDICTION, CHOICE OF LAW, AND RECOGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT OF JUDGMENTS. Jurisdiction & choice of law are 2 distinct concepts. Jurisdiction considers whether it is fair to cause a defendant to travel to this state; choice of law asks the further question whether the application of a substantive law w/c will determine the merits of the case is fair to both parties. The power to exercise jurisdiction does not automatically give a state constitutional authority to apply forum law. While jurisdiction and the choice of the lex fori will often coincide, the minimum contacts for one do not always provide the necessary significant contacts for the other. The question of whether the law of a state can be applied to a transaction is different from the question of whether the courts of that state have jurisdiction to enter a judgment. In this case, only the 1st phase is at issuejurisdiction. Jurisdiction, however, has various aspects. For a court to validly exercise its power to adjudicate a controversy, it must have jurisdiction over the plaintiff/petitioner, over the defendant/respondent, over the subject matter, over the issues of the case and, in cases involving property, over the res or the thing w/c is the subject of the litigation. In assailing the trial court's jurisdiction herein, Nippon is actually referring to subject matter jurisdiction.

Jurisdiction over the subject matter in a judicial proceeding is conferred by the sovereign authority w/c establishes and organizes the court. It is given only by law and in the manner prescribed by law. It is further determined by the allegations of the complaint irrespective of whether the plaintiff is entitled to all or some of the claims asserted therein. To succeed in its motion for the dismissal of an action for lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the claim, the movant must show that the court or tribunal cannot act on the matter submitted to it because no law grants it the power to adjudicate the claims.

In the instant case, Nippon, in its MTD, does not claim that the RTC is not properly vested by law w/ jurisdiction to hear the subject controversy for a civil case for specific performance & damages is one not capable of pecuniary estimation & is properly cognizable by the RTC of Lipa City. What they rather raise as grounds to question subject matter jurisdiction are the principles of lex loci celebrationis and lex contractus, and the state of the most significant relationship rule. The Court finds the invocation of these grounds unsound.

Lex loci celebrationis relates to the law of the place of the ceremony or the law of the place where a contract is made. The doctrine of lex contractus or lex loci contractus means the law of the place where a contract is executed or to be performed. It controls the nature, construction, and validity of the contract and it may pertain to the law voluntarily agreed upon by the parties or the law intended by them either expressly or implicitly. Under the state of the most significant relationship rule, to ascertain what state law to apply to a dispute, the court should determine which state has the most substantial connection to the occurrence and the parties. In a case involving a contract, the court should consider where the contract was made, was negotiated, was to be performed, and the domicile, place of business, or place of incorporation of the parties. This rule takes into account several contacts and evaluates them according to their relative importance with respect to the particular issue to be resolved.

Since these 3 principles in conflict of laws make reference to the law applicable to a dispute, they are rules proper for the 2nd phase, the choice of law. They determine which state's law is to be applied in resolving the substantive issues of a conflicts problem. Necessarily, as the only issue in this case is that of jurisdiction, choice-of-law rules are not only inapplicable but also not yet called for.

Further, Nippons premature invocation of choice-of-law rules is exposed by the fact that they have not yet pointed out any conflict between the laws of Japan and ours. Before determining which law should apply, 1st there should exist a conflict of laws situation requiring the application of the conflict of laws rules. Also, when the law of a foreign country is invoked to provide the proper rules for the solution of a case, the existence of such law must be pleaded and proved.

It should be noted that when a conflicts case, one involving a foreign element, is brought before a court or administrative agency, there are 3 alternatives open to the latter in disposing of it: (1) dismiss the case, either because of lack of jurisdiction or refusal to assume jurisdiction over the case; (2) assume jurisdiction over the case and apply the internal law of the forum; or (3) assume jurisdiction over the case and take into account or apply the law of some other State or States. The courts power to hear cases and controversies is derived from the Constitution and the laws. While it may choose to recognize laws of foreign nations, the court is not limited by foreign sovereign law short of treaties or other formal agreements, even in matters regarding rights provided by foreign sovereigns.

Neither can the other ground raised, forum non conveniens, be used to deprive the RTC of its jurisdiction. 1st, it is not a proper basis for a motion to dismiss because Sec. 1, Rule 16 of the Rules of Court does not include it as a ground. 2nd, whether a suit should be entertained or dismissed on the basis of the said doctrine depends largely upon the facts of the particular case and is addressed to the sound discretion of the RTC. In this case, the RTC decided to assume jurisdiction. 3rd, the propriety of dismissing a case based on this principle requires a factual determination; hence, this conflicts principle is more properly considered a matter of defense.

Other version: FACTS: Kitamura, initiated an action for specific performance and damages against Hasegawa and Nippon with the RTC of Lipa City. Nippon and Hasegawa moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of jurisdiction, contending that the contract being enforced by Kitamura had been perfected in Japan, between and among Japanese nationals. They assert that the action shall be heard in the proper courts in Japan following the principle of lex loci celebrationis and lex contractus. Thus, petitioners posit that local courts have no substantial relationship to the parties following the state of the most significant relationship rule in Private International Law. RTC denied the MTD, and subsequently denied petitioners motion for reconsideration. On a petition for certiorari to CA, it dismissed the petition. CA ruled that the principle of lex loci celebrationis was not applicable to the case, because nowhere in the pleadings was the validity of the written agreement put in issue. CA declared that the trial court was correct in applying instead the principle of lex loci solutionis. Having their motion for reconsideration denied, the petitioners interposed this petition for review. ISSUE: 1. Whether the trial court validly exercised jurisdiction over the instant controversy, despite the fact that the contract subject matter of the proceedings was entered into by and between Japanese nationals, written wholly in the Japanese language and executed in Japan? 2. Whether the subject matter jurisdiction of Philippine courts in civil cases for specific performance and damages involving contracts executed outside the country by foreign nationals may be assailed on the principles of lex loci celebrationis, lex contractus, the state of the most significant relationship rule, or forum non conveniens? RULING: 1. YES, THE TRIAL COURT VALIDLY ACQUIRED JURISDICTION OVER THE INSTANT CASE. In the instant case, petitioners, in their MTD, do not claim that the trial court is not properly vested by law with jurisdiction to hear the subject controversy for, indeed, an action for specific performance and damages is one not capable of pecuniary estimation and is properly cognizable by the RTC of Lipa City. What they rather raise as grounds to question subject matter jurisdiction are the principles of lex loci celebrationis and lex contractus, and the state of the most significant relationship rule. The Court finds the invocation of these grounds unsound. The Court is not inclined to deny this petition merely on the basis of the change in theory, as explained in Philippine Ports Authority v. City of Iloilo. 2. Forum non conveniens cannot be used as a ground to deprive the trial court of its jurisdiction herein. it is not a proper basis for a MTD because Section 1, Rule 16 of the Rules of Court does not include it as a ground. whether a suit should be entertained or dismissed on the basis of the said doctrine depends largely upon the facts of the particular case and is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court. the propriety of dismissing a case based on this principle requires a factual determination; hence, this conflicts principle is more properly considered a matter of defense. Accordingly, since the RTC is vested by law with the power to entertain and hear the civil case filed by respondent and the grounds raised by petitioners to assail that jurisdiction are inappropriate, the trial and appellate courts correctly denied the petitioners motion to dismiss.

NOTES: The Court notes that petitioners adopted an additional but different theory when they elevated the case to the appellate court. In the MTD filed with the trial court, petitioners never contended that the RTC is an inconvenient forum. They merely argued that the applicable law which will determine the validity or invalidity of respondent's claim is that of Japan, following the principles of lex loci celebrationis and lex contractus. While not abandoning this stance in their petition before the appellate court, petitioners on certiorari significantly invoked the defense of forum non conveniens. On petition for review before this Court, petitioners dropped their other arguments, maintained the forum non conveniens defense, and introduced their new argument that the applicable principle is the [state of the] most significant relationship rule. To elucidate, in the judicial resolution of conflicts problems, three consecutive phases are involved: 1. jurisdiction, 2. choice of law, and 3. recognition and enforcement of judgments. Corresponding to these phases are the following questions: (1) Where can or should litigation be initiated? (2) Which law will the court apply? and (3) Where can the resulting judgment be enforced? A. JURISDICTION: Analytically, jurisdiction and choice of law are two distinct concepts. Jurisdiction considers whether it is fair to cause a defendant to travel to this state; choice of law asks the further question whether the application of a substantive law which will determine the merits of the case is fair to both parties. The power to exercise jurisdiction does not automatically give a state constitutional authority to apply forum law. While jurisdiction and the choice of the lex fori will often coincide, the minimum contacts for one do not always provide the necessary significant contacts for the other. The question of whether the law of a state can be applied to a transaction is different from the question of whether the courts of that state have jurisdiction to enter a judgment. Jurisdiction, however, has various aspects. For a court to validly exercise its power to adjudicate a controversy, the following should be present: 1. it must have jurisdiction over the plaintiff or the petitioner, over the defendant or the respondent, 2. over the subject matter, 3. over the issues of the case and, 4. in cases involving property, over the res or the thing which is the subject of the litigation. In assailing the trial court's jurisdiction herein, petitioners are actually referring to subject matter jurisdiction. Jurisdiction over the subject matter in a judicial proceeding is conferred by the sovereign authority which establishes and organizes the court. It is given only by law and in the manner prescribed by law. It is further determined by the allegations of the complaint irrespective of whether the plaintiff is entitled to all or some of the claims asserted therein. To succeed in its motion for the dismissal of an action for lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the claim, the movant must show that the court or tribunal cannot act on the matter submitted to it because no law grants it the power to adjudicate the claims.

B. CHOICE OF LAW Since these three principles in conflict of laws make reference to the law applicable to a dispute, they are rules proper for the second phase, the choice of law. They determine which state's law is to be applied in resolving the substantive issues of a conflicts problem. Necessarily, as the only issue in this case is that of jurisdiction, choiceof-law rules are not only inapplicable but also not yet called for. It should be noted that when a conflicts case, one involving a foreign element, is brought before a court or administrative agency, there are three alternatives open to the latter in disposing of it: 1. dismiss the case, either because of lack of jurisdiction or refusal to assume jurisdiction over the case; 2. assume jurisdiction over the case and apply the internal law of the forum; or 3. assume jurisdiction over the case and take into account or apply the law of some other State or States. The courts power to hear cases and controversies is derived from the Constitution and the laws. While it may choose to recognize laws of foreign nations, the court is not limited by foreign sovereign law short of treaties or other formal agreements, even in matters regarding rights provided by foreign sovereigns.

4. RAYTHEON INTERNATIONAL V. STOCKTON W. ROUZIE, JR., G.R. NO. 162894, (FEBRUARY 26, 2008), 546 SCRA 555
FACTS Brand Marine Services, Inc. (BMSI), a corporation duly organized & existing under the laws of Connecticut, & Stockton Rouzie, Jr., an American citizen, entered into a contract BMSI hired Rouzie as its representative to negotiate the sale of services in several government projects in the Philippines for an agreed remuneration of 10% of the gross receipts. Rouzie secured a service contract w/ the Rep. of Phil. on behalf of BMSI for the dredging of rivers affected by the Mt. Pinatubo eruption & mudflows. Rouzie filed before the NLRC a suit against BMSI and Rust International (Rust) for alleged nonpayment of commissions, illegal termination, & breach of employment contract. The Labor Arbiter ordered BMSI & Rust to pay Rouzies money claims. Upon appeal, the NLRC reversed & dismissed Rouzies complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. Rouzie filed an action for damages before the RTC of La Union (where he was a resident) against Raytheon International. He reiterated that he was not paid the commissions due him from the Pinatubo dredging project w/c he secured on behalf of BMSI. The complaint also averred that BMSI, RUST and Raytheon had combined & functioned as 1 company. RAYTHEON SOUGHT THE DISMISSAL OF THE COMPLAINT ON THE GROUNDS OF FAILURE TO STATE A CAUSE OF ACTION & FORUM NON CONVENIENS & PRAYED FOR DAMAGES BY WAY OF COMPULSORY COUNTERCLAIM. THE RTC DENIED RAYTHEONS MOTION. THE CA AFFIRMED. Raytheons contention: The written contract between Rouzie & BMSI included a valid choice of law clause, that is, that the contract shall be governed by the laws of the State of Connecticut. It also mentions the presence of foreign elements in the dispute, namely that the parties & witnesses involved are American corporations & citizens & the evidence to be presented is located outside the Philippines, that renders our local courts inconvenient forums. The foreign elements of the dispute necessitate the immediate application of the doctrine of forum non conveniens. ISSUES (a) W/N the RTC had jurisdiction. (b) W/N the complaint should be dismissed on the ground of forum non conveniens. RULING (a) YES. On the matter of jurisdiction over a conflicts-of-laws problem where the case is filed in a Philippine court and where the court has jurisdiction over the subject matter, the parties and the res, it may or can proceed to try the case even if the rules of conflict-of-laws or the convenience of the parties point to a foreign forum. This is an exercise of sovereign prerogative of the country where the case is filed. Jurisdiction over the nature and subject matter of an action is conferred by the Constitution and the law & by the material allegations in the complaint, irrespective of w/n the plaintiff is entitled to recover all or some of the claims or reliefs sought therein. The case file was an action for damages arising from an alleged breach of contract. Undoubtedly, the nature of the action and the amount of damages prayed are w/in the jurisdiction of the RTC.

As regards jurisdiction over the parties, the RTC acquired jurisdiction over Rouzi upon the filing of the complaint. On the other hand, jurisdiction over the person of Raytheon was acquired by its voluntary appearance in court. That THE SUBJECT CONTRACT INCLUDED A STIPULATION THAT THE SAME SHALL BE GOVERNED BY THE LAWS OF THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT DOES NOT SUGGEST THAT THE PHILIPPINE COURTS, OR ANY OTHER FOREIGN TRIBUNAL FOR THAT MATTER, ARE PRECLUDED FROM HEARING THE CIVIL ACTION.

JURISDICTION & CHOICE OF LAW ARE 2 DISTINCT CONCEPTS. Jurisdiction considers whether it is fair to cause a defendant to travel to this state; choice of law asks the further question whether the application of a substantive law which will determine the merits of the case is fair to both parties. The choice of law stipulation will become relevant only when the substantive issues of the instant case develop, that is, after hearing on the merits proceeds before the trial court.

(b) NO. UNDER THE DOCTRINE OF FORUM NON CONVENIENS, A COURT, IN CONFLICTS-OF-LAWS CASES, MAY REFUSE IMPOSITIONS ON ITS JURISDICTION WHERE IT IS NOT THE MOST CONVENIENT OR AVAILABLE FORUM AND THE PARTIES ARE NOT PRECLUDED FROM SEEKING REMEDIES ELSEWHERE. Raytheons averments of the foreign elements are not sufficient to oust the RTC of its jurisdiction over the case and the parties involved. Moreover, the propriety of dismissing a case based on the principle of forum non conveniens requires a factual determination; hence, it is more properly considered as a matter of defense. While it is w/c the discretion of the trial court to abstain from assuming jurisdiction on this ground, it should do so only after vital facts are established, to determine whether special circumstances require the courts desistance.

5. MANILA HOTEL CORP AND MANILA HOTEL INTL LTD. VS. NLRC G.R. NO. 120077, (OCTOBER 13, 2000), 343 SCRA 1
FACTS Marcelo Santos was employed as a printer in a printing press in Oman when he received a job offer from Palace Hotel in China for the same position and a higher pay. Santos remained in correspondence with Palace Hotel while he was still in employed in Oman. After negotiations, Santos accepted the offer and signed the contract with Palace Hotel (while still in Oman). His contract provided that he will receive a monthly salary of $900 and the employment contract should last for two years. After he resigned from his Oman job, he went back to the Philippines. Thereafter, he left for China. When Santos arrived in China, he signed an amended employment agreement (terms were not stated in the case), and the agreement was also signed by Mr. Schmidt of Palace Hotel and noted by the VP of Manila Hotel International Company Limited (MHICL). Santos commenced employment immediately. After a short vacation leave, Santos returned to Palace Hotel and he was informed that he was going to be terminated due to business reverses suffered by the company. After a month, he was indeed terminated and all his benefits were paid to him. When Santos came back to the Philippines, he filed a suit in the NLRC, naming Manila Hotel Corporation (MHC) and MHICL as defendants. To clarify the relationship of Palace Hotel and MHICL and MHC:

The NLRC awarded damages to Santos, but MHC and MHICL assailed NLRCs jurisdiction over the case.

ISSUE Did the NLRC have jurisdiction over the case at bar? RULING NO. The main aspects of the case transpired in two foreign jurisdictions and the case involves purely foreign elements. The only link that the Philippines has with the case is that Santos is a Filipino citizen. THE PALACE HOTEL AND MHICL ARE FOREIGN CORPORATIONS. NOT ALL CASES INVOLVING OUR CITIZENS CAN BE TRIED HERE. The employment contract. SANTOS WAS HIRED DIRECTLY BY THE PALACE HOTEL, a foreign employer, through correspondence sent to the Sultanate of Oman, where respondent Santos was then employed. HE WAS HIRED WITHOUT THE INTERVENTION OF THE POEA OR ANY AUTHORIZED RECRUITMENT AGENCY OF THE GOVERNMENT. UNDER THE RULE OF FORUM NON CONVENIENS, A PHILIPPINE COURT OR AGENCY MAY ASSUME JURISDICTION OVER THE CASE IF IT CHOOSES TO DO SO PROVIDED: (1) that the Philippine court is one to which the parties may conveniently resort to; (2) that the Philippine court is in a position to make an intelligent decision as to the law and the facts; and (3) that the Philippine court has or is likely to have power to enforce its decision. THE CONDITIONS ARE UNAVAILING IN THE CASE AT BAR. NLRCs jurisdiction fails because of the following reasons:

1. NOT CONVENIENT. NLRC is not a convenient forum given that all the incidents of the case from the time of recruitment, to employment to dismissal occurred outside the Philippines. The inconvenience is compounded by the fact that the proper DEFENDANTS, THE PALACE HOTEL AND MHICL ARE NOT NATIONALS OF THE PHILIPPINES. Neither are they "doing business in the Philippines." Likewise, the main witnesses, Mr. Shmidt and Mr. Henk are non-residents of the Philippines. 2. NO POWER TO DETERMINE APPLICABLE LAW OR DETERMINE THE PROPER FACTS. Neither can an intelligent decision be made as to the law governing the employment contract as such was perfected in foreign soil. This calls to fore the application of the principle of lex loci contractus (the law of the place where the contract was made). 3. NEITHER CAN THE NLRC DETERMINE THE FACTS SURROUNDING THE ALLEGED ILLEGAL DISMISSAL AS ALL ACTS COMPLAINED OF TOOK PLACE IN BEIJING, PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA. The NLRC was not in a position to determine whether the Tiannamen Square incident truly adversely affected operations of the Palace Hotel as to justify respondent Santos' retrenchment. 4. PRINCIPLE OF EFFECTIVENESS, NO POWER TO EXECUTE DECISION. Even assuming that a proper decision could be reached by the NLRC, such would not have any binding effect against the employer, the Palace Hotel. The Palace Hotel is a corporation incorporated under the laws of China and was not even served with summons. Jurisdiction over its person was not acquired. This is not to say that Philippine courts and agencies have no power to solve controversies involving foreign employers. Neither Philippine courts do not have power over an employment contract executed in a foreign country. IF SANTOS WERE AN "OVERSEAS CONTRACT WORKER", A PHILIPPINE FORUM, SPECIFICALLY THE POEA, NOT THE NLRC, WOULD PROTECT HIM. HE IS NOT AN "OVERSEAS CONTRACT WORKER" A FACT WHICH HE ADMITS WITH CONVICTION.

6. PHILSEC. INVESTMENT V. COURT OF APPEALS, 274 SCRA 102 (1997)

FACTS Ducat obtained two separate loans from Ayala and Philsec in the sum of $2.5M secured by shares of stock owned by Ducat. In order to facilitate the payment of the loans, 1488 Inc. undertook the obligation to pay by virtue of a Warranty Deed with a Vendors Lien. Through the latter, 1488 Inc. sold to Athona Holdings (Athona) a parcel of land in Texas while Philsec and Ayala extended a $2.5M loan to Athona to partially cover the value of the $2.8M lot. Athona executed a promissory note in favour of 1488 Inc. worth $.3M to complete the payment for the lot. After all these transactions, Ducat was released by Philsec and Ayala of his loan. Athona failed to pay the $.3M promissory note. 1488 Inc. sued Athona, Philsec and Ayala for the payment of the $.3M. The case was filed in Texas. While the Texas case was pending, Philsec filed a complaint to recover a sum of money with damages in a Makati RTC against Ducat. Ducat, on the other hand, filed and was granted a MTD on the basis of litis pendentia and forum non conveniens. The trial court also held that it had no jurisdiction over 1488 Inc. because the action was neither in rem nor quasi in rem, accompanied by the fact that the said defendant was a non-resident. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision.

ISSUES 1. Does a judgment in a US court bar actions to be instituted in Philippine courts? (i.e. Can the foreign judgment constitute res judicata?) 2. Did CA err in dismissing the case based on the principle of forum non conveniens? RULING 1. It depends. The FOREIGN JUDGMENT CANNOT BE GIVEN THE EFFECT OF RES JUDICATA WITHOUT GIVING THE ADVERSE PARTY AN OPPORTUNITY TO IMPEACH IT ON GROUNDS STATED IN RULE 39, 50 of the Rules of Court, to wit: WANT OF JURISDICTION, WANT OF NOTICE TO THE PARTY, COLLUSION, FRAUD, OR CLEAR MISTAKE OF LAW OR FACT. While this Court has given the effect of res judicata to foreign judgments in several cases, it was after the parties opposed to the judgment had been given ample opportunity to repel them on grounds allowed under the law. IT IS NOT NECESSARY FOR THIS PURPOSE TO INITIATE A SEPARATE ACTION OR PROCEEDING FOR ENFORCEMENT OF THE FOREIGN JUDGMENT. WHAT IS ESSENTIAL IS THAT THERE IS OPPORTUNITY TO CHALLENGE THE FOREIGN JUDGMENT, IN ORDER FOR THE COURT TO PROPERLY DETERMINE ITS EFFICACY. This is because in this jurisdiction, with respect to ACTIONS IN PERSONAM, as distinguished from actions in rem, a FOREIGN JUDGMENT MERELY CONSTITUTES PRIMA FACIE EVIDENCE OF THE JUSTNESS OF THE CLAIM OF A PARTY AND, AS SUCH, IS SUBJECT TO PROOF TO THE CONTRARY. In the case at bar, it cannot be said that petitioners were given the opportunity to challenge the judgment of the U.S. court as basis for declaring it res judicata or conclusive of the rights of private respondents.

The proceedings in the trial court were summary.

Neither the trial court nor the appellate court was even

furnished copies of the pleadings in the U.S. court or apprised of the evidence presented thereat, to assure a proper determination of whether the issues then being litigated in the U.S. court were exactly the issues raised in this case such that the judgment that might be rendered would constitute res judicata. 2. Yes. First, a MTD is limited to the grounds under Rule 16, 1, which does not include forum non conveniens. The propriety of dismissing a case based on this principle requires a factual determination, hence, it is more properly considered a matter of defense. Second, while it is within the discretion of the trial court to abstain from assuming jurisdiction on this ground, it should do so only after vital facts are established, to determine whether special circumstances require the courts desistance. In this case, the TRIAL COURT ABSTAINED FROM TAKING JURISDICTION SOLELY ON THE BASIS OF THE PLEADINGS FILED BY PRIVATE RESPONDENTS IN CONNECTION WITH THE MOTION TO DISMISS. IT FAILED TO CONSIDER THAT PHILSEC IS A DOMESTIC CORPORATION AND DUCAT IS A FILIPINO, AND THAT IT WAS THE EXTINGUISHMENT OF THE LATTERS DEBT WHICH WAS THE OBJECT OF THE TRANSACTION UNDER LITIGATION. The trial court arbitrarily dismissed the case even after finding that Ducat was not a party in the U.S. case.

7. PIONEER CONCRETE PHILIPPINES V. TODARO, 524 SCRA 153 (2007)

FACTS Antonio D. Todaro (Todaro) filed with the RTC a complaint for Sum of Money and Damages with Preliminary Attachment against Pioneer International Limited (PIL), Pioneer Concrete Philippines, Inc. (PCPI), Pioneer Philippines Holdings, Inc. (PPHI), John G. McDonald (McDonald) and Philip J. Klepzig (Klepzig). Todaro alleged that PIL is a corporation duly organized and existing under the laws of Australia and is principally engaged in the ready-mix concrete and concrete aggregates business; PPHI is the company established by PIL to own and hold the stocks of its operating company in the Philippines; PCPI is the company established by PIL to undertake its business of ready-mix concrete, concrete aggregates and quarrying operations in the Philippines; McDonald is the Chief Executive of the Hongkong office of PIL; and, Klepzig is the President and Managing Director of PPHI and PCPI; Todaro has been the managing director of Betonval Readyconcrete, Inc. (Betonval), a company engaged in pre-mixed concrete and concrete aggregate production; he resigned from Betonval in February 1996; in May 1996, PIL contacted Todaro and asked him if he was available to join them in connection with their intention to establish a ready-mix concrete plant and other related operations in the Philippines; Todaro informed PIL of his availability and interest to join them; subsequently, PIL and Todaro came to an agreement wherein the former consented to engage the services of the latter as a consultant for two to three months, after which, he would be employed as the manager of PIL's ready-mix concrete operations should the company decide to invest in the Philippines; subsequently, PIL started its operations in the Philippines; however, it refused to comply with its undertaking to employ Todaro on a permanent basis. Instead of filing an Answer, PPHI, PCPI and Klepzig separately moved to dismiss the complaint on the grounds that the complaint states no cause of action, that the RTC has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the complaint, as the same is within the jurisdiction of the NLRC, and that the complaint should be dismissed on the basis of the doctrine of forum non conveniens. RTC dismissed the MTD which was affirmed by the CA. ISSUE W/N the RTC should have dismissed the case on the basis of forum non conveniens due to a presence of a foreign element RULING NO. Whether a suit should be entertained or dismissed on the basis of said doctrine depends largely upon the facts of the particular case and is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court. In the case of Communication Materials and Design, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, this Court held that "xxx [a] Philippine Court may assume jurisdiction over the case if it chooses to do so; provided, that the following requisites are met: (1) that the Philippine Court is one to which the parties may conveniently resort to; (2) that the Philippine Court is in a position to make an intelligent decision as to the law and the facts; and, (3) that the Philippine Court has or is likely to have power to enforce its decision."

The doctrine of forum non conveniens should not be used as a ground for a motion to dismiss because Sec. 1, Rule 16 of the Rules of Court does not include said doctrine as a ground. This Court further ruled that while it is within the discretion of the trial court to abstain from assuming jurisdiction on this ground, it should do so only after vital facts are established, to determine whether special circumstances require the courts desistance; and that the propriety of dismissing a case based on this principle of forum non conveniens requires a factual determination, hence it is more properly considered a matter of defense.

Note: the case was also being dismissed on the ground that there was no cause of action but SC held that there was cause of action, to sustain a motion to dismiss for lack of cause of action, the complaint must show that the claim for relief does not exist, rather than that a claim has been defectively stated, or is ambiguous, indefinite or uncertain. And it was also argued in this case that jurisdiction is with the NLRC and not with the RTC. SC held it was with RTC, SC has consistently held that where no employer-employee relationship exists between the parties and no issue is involved which may be resolved by reference to the Labor Code, other labor statutes or any collective bargaining agreement, it is the RTC that has jurisdiction.

8. LAUREANO V. CA, 324 SCRA 414 (2000)

FACTS Laureano, Director of Flight Operations and Chief Pilot of Air Manila, applied for employment with Singapore Airlines [herein private respondent] through its Area Manager in Manila. He was then accepted. In 1982, Singapore Airline, hit by a recession, initiated cost-cutting measures. Seventeen (17) expatriate captains in the Airbus fleet were found in excess of the defendant's requirement. Consequently, defendant informed its expatriate pilots including plaintiff of the situation and advised them to take advance leaves. Realizing that the recession would not be for a short time, defendant decided to terminate its excess. It did not, however, immediately terminate it's A-300 pilots. It reviewed their qualifications for possible promotion to the B-747 fleet. Among the 17 excess Airbus pilots reviewed, twelve were found qualified. Unfortunately, Laureano was not one of the twelve. Laureano instituted a case for illegal dismissal before the Labor Arbiter. Singapore Airline moved to dismiss on jurisdictional grounds. Before said motion was resolved, the complaint was withdrawn. Thereafter, Laureano filed the instant case for damages due to illegal termination of contract of services before the RTC. CA reversed the decision of the RTC, it held that the action has already prescribe, the prescriptive period was 4 years and action was filed beyond the prescriptive period. ISSUES (a) W/N Philippine law must be applied and not Singaporean law. (b) W/N action has already prescribe. RULING a. PHILIPPINE LAW MUST BE APPLIED. SC quoted the findings of the RTC, it says: "Neither can the Court determine whether the termination of the plaintiff is legal under the Singapore Laws because of the defendant's failure to show which specific laws of Singapore Laws apply to this case. As substantially discussed in the preceding paragraphs, the Philippine Courts do not take judicial notice of the laws of Singapore. The defendant that claims the applicability of the Singapore Laws to this case has the burden of proof. The defendant has failed to do so. Therefore, the Philippine law should be applied." Also Respondent Court of Appeals acquired jurisdiction when defendant filed its appeal before said court. On this matter, respondent court was correct when it barred defendant-appellant below from raising further the issue of jurisdiction. b. YES. Neither Article 1144 nor Article 1146 of the Civil Code is here pertinent. What is applicable is Article 291 of the Labor Code.

In the light of Article 291, aforecited, we agree with the appellate court's conclusion that petitioner's action for damages due to illegal termination filed again on January 8, 1987 or more than 4 years after the effective date of his dismissal on November 1, 1982 has already prescribed.

Where the money claim was based on a written contract, the Collective Bargaining Agreement, the Court held that the language of Art. 291 of the Labor Code does not limit its application only to 'money claims specifically recoverable under said Code' but covers all money claims arising from an employee-employer relations"

9. WILD VALLEY V. CA, 342 SCRA 213 (2000)

WRITTEN & UNWRITTEN LAW
FACTS In February 1988, the Philippine Roxas, a vessel owned by Philippine President Lines, Inc., private respondent, arrived in Venezuela, to load iron ore. Upon the completion of the loading and when the vessel was ready to leave port, Mr. Ezzar del Valle Solarzano Vasquez, an official pilot of Venezuela, was designated by the harbour authorities in Puerto Ordaz to navigate the Philippine Roxas through the Orinoco River. He was asked to pilot the said vessel on February 11, 1988 boarding it that night at 11:00 p.m. Captain of the Philippine Roxas, Captain Nicandro Colon, was at the bridge together with the pilot Vasquez, the vessel's third mate, and a helmsman when the vessel left the port at 1:40 a.m. on February 12, 1988. Captain Colon left the bridge when the vessel was under way. The Philippine Roxas experienced some vibrations. It was then that the watch officer called the master to the bridge. At around 4:35 a.m., the Philippine Roxas ran aground in the Orinoco River, thus obstructing the ingress and egress of vessels. As a result of the blockage, the Malandrinon, a vessel owned by Wildvalley Shipping Company, Ltd., was unable to sail out of Puerto Ordaz on that day. Subsequently, Wildvalley Shipping Company, Ltd. filed a suit with the RTC of Manila against Philippine President Lines, Inc. and Pioneer Insurance Company (the underwriter/insurer of Philippine Roxas) for DAMAGES in the form of unearned profits, and interest. The trial court rendered its decision on October 16, 1991 in favor of the petitioner, Wildvalley Shipping Co., Ltd. Both parties appealed: the petitioner appealing the non-award of interest with the private respondent questioning the decision on the merits of the case. After the requisite pleadings had been filed, the Court of Appeals judgment is reversed

ISSUE Whether or not Venezuelan law is applicable to the case at bar RULING foreign laws do not prove themselves in our jurisdiction and our courts are not authorized to take judicial notice of them. Like any other fact, they must be alleged and proved. A distinction is to be made as to the manner of proving a written and an unwritten law. WRITTEN LAW falls under Section 24, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court. Where the foreign law sought to be proved is "UNWRITTEN," the oral testimony of expert witnesses is admissible, as are printed and published books of reports of decisions of the courts of the country concerned if proved to be commonly admitted in such courts. Section 24 of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, as amended, provides: "Sec. 24. Proof of official record. -- The record of public documents referred to in paragraph (a) of Section 19, when admissible for any purpose, MAY BE EVIDENCED BY AN OFFICIAL PUBLICATION THEREOF OR BY A COPY ATTESTED BY THE OFFICER HAVING THE LEGAL CUSTODY OF THE RECORD, OR BY HIS

DEPUTY, AND ACCOMPANIED, IF THE RECORD IS NOT KEPT IN THE PHILIPPINES, WITH A CERTIFICATE THAT SUCH OFFICER HAS THE CUSTODY. If the office in which the record is kept is in a foreign country, the certificate may be made by a secretary of the embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice consul, or consular agent or by any officer in the foreign service of the Philippines stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept, and authenticated by the seal of his office." (Underscoring supplied) The court has interpreted Section 25 (now Section 24) to include competent evidence like the testimony of a witness to prove the existence of a written foreign law. For a copy of a foreign public document to be admissible, the following requisites are mandatory: (1) It must be attested by the officer having legal custody of the records or by his deputy; and (2) It must be accompanied by a certificate by a secretary of the embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice consular or consular agent or foreign service officer, and with the seal of his office. The latter requirement is not a mere technicality but is intended to justify the giving of full faith and credit to the genuineness of a document in a foreign country. It is not enough that the Gaceta Oficial, or a book published by the Ministerio de Comunicaciones of Venezuela, was presented as evidence with Captain Monzon attesting it. It is also required by Section 24 of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court that a certificate that Captain Monzon, who attested the documents, is the officer who had legal custody of those records made by a secretary of the embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice consul or consular agent or by any officer in the foreign service of the Philippines stationed in Venezuela, and authenticated by the seal of his office accompanying the copy of the public document. No such certificate could be found in the records of the case. With respect to proof of written laws, parol proof is objectionable, for the written law itself is the best evidence. According to the weight of authority, when a foreign statute is involved, the best evidence rule requires that it be proved by a duly authenticated copy of the statute. There being no contractual obligation, the private respondent is obliged to give only the diligence required of a good father of a family in accordance with the provisions of Article 1173 of the New Civil Code, thus: The law does provide that the master can countermand or overrule the order or command of the harbor pilot on board. The master of the Philippine Roxas deemed it best not to order him (the pilot) to stop the vessel, mayhap, because the latter had assured him that they were navigating normally before the grounding of the vessel. Moreover, the pilot had admitted that on account of his experience he was very familiar with the configuration of the river as well as the course headings, and that he does not even refer to river charts when navigating the Orinoco River.

10. SANTOS III VS. NORTHWEST ORIENT LINES, 210 SCRA 256 (1992)
FACTS This case involves the Proper interpretation of Article 28(1) of the Warsaw Convention, reading as follows: Art. 28. (1) An action for damage must be brought at the option of the plaintiff, in the territory of one of the High Contracting Parties, either before the court of the domicile of the carrier or of his principal place of business, or where he has a place of business through which the contract has been made, or before the court at the place of destination. The petitioner is a minor and a resident of the Philippines purchased from NOA a round-trip ticket in San Francisco. U.S.A., for his flight from San Francisco to Manila via Tokyo and back. The scheduled departure date from Tokyo was December 20, 1986. No date was specified for his return to San Francisco. On December 19, 1986, the petitioner checked in at the NOA counter in the San Francisco airport for his scheduled departure to Manila. Despite a previous confirmation and re-confirmation, he was informed that he had no reservation for his flight from Tokyo to Manila. He therefore had to be wait-listed. Petitioner sued NOA for damages in the RTC. NOA moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. it contended that the complaint could be instituted only in the territory of one of the High Contracting Parties, before: 1. the court of the domicile of the carrier; 2. the court of its principal place of business; 3. the court where it has a place of business through which the contract had been made; 4. the court of the place of destination. The private respondent contended that the Philippines was not its domicile nor was this its principal place of business. Neither was the petitioner's ticket issued in this country nor was his destination Manila but San Francisco in the United States. ISSUE (1) The constitutionality of Article 28(1) of the Warsaw Convention; and (2) The jurisdiction of Philippine courts over the case. RULING On the issue of Constitutionality: The Republic of the Philippines is a party to the Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International Transportation by Air, otherwise known as the Warsaw Convention. It took effect on February 13, 1933. The Convention was concurred in by the Senate, through its Resolution No. 19, on May 16, 1950. The Philippine instrument of accession was signed by President Elpidio Quirino on October 13, 1950, and was deposited with the Polish government on November 9, 1950. The Convention became applicable to the Philippines on February 9, 1951. On September 23, 1955, President Ramon Magsaysay issued Proclamation No.

201, declaring our formal adherence thereto. "to the end that the same and every article and clause thereof may be observed and fulfilled in good faith by the Republic of the Philippines and the citizens thereof." The Convention is thus a treaty commitment voluntarily assumed by the Philippine government and, as such, has the force and effect of law in this country. On the issue of Jurisdiction: By its own terms, the Convention applies to all international transportation of persons performed by aircraft for hire. International transportation is defined in paragraph (2) of Article 1 as follows: (2) For the purposes of this convention, the expression "international transportation" shall mean any transportation in which, according to the contract made by the parties, the place of departure and the place of destination, whether or not there be a break in the transportation or a transshipment, are situated [either] within the territories of two High Contracting Parties . . . Since the flight involved in the case at bar is international, the same being from the United States to the Philippines and back to the United States, it is subject to the provisions of the Warsaw Convention, including Article 28(1), which enumerates the four places where an action for damages may be brought. Whether Article 28(1) refers to jurisdiction or only to venue is a question over which authorities are sharply divided. While the petitioner cites several cases holding that Article 28(1) refers to venue rather than jurisdiction, there are later cases cited by the private respondent supporting the conclusion that the provision is jurisdictional. In other words, where the matter is governed by the Warsaw Convention, jurisdiction takes on a dual concept. Jurisdiction in the international sense must be established in accordance with Article 28(1) of the Warsaw Convention, following which the jurisdiction of a particular court must be established pursuant to the applicable domestic law. Only after the question of which court has jurisdiction is determined will the issue of venue be taken up. This second question shall be governed by the law of the court to which the case is submitted. Notably, the domicile of the carrier is only one of the places where the complaint is allowed to be filed under Article 28(1). By specifying the three other places, to wit, the principal place of business of the carrier, its place of business where the contract was made, and the place of destination, the article clearly meant that these three other places were not comprehended in the term "domicile."

11. NATIONAL RENTAL VS. SZUKHENT ET AL., 375 U.S. 311 (1964)
FACTS Petitioner, a corporation with its principal place of business in New York, sued respondents, residents of Michigan, in New York, claiming that respondents had defaulted in payments due under a farm equipment lease. The last paragraph of the contract provided that "the Lessee hereby designates Florence Weinberg as agent for the purpose of accepting service of any process within the State of New York." The respondents were not acquainted with Florence Weinberg, and she had not expressly undertaken to transmit notice to them. The Marshal delivered two copies of the summons and complaint to Florence Weinberg. That same day she mailed the summons and complaint to the respondents, together with a letter stating that the documents had been served upon her as the respondents' agent. The petitioner itself also notified the respondents by certified mail of the service of process upon Florence Weinberg. The District Court quashed service of the summons and complaint, holding that, although Florence Weinberg had promptly notified the respondents of the service of process and mailed copies of the summons and complaint to them, the lease agreement itself had not explicitly required her to do so, and there was therefore a "failure of the agency arrangement to achieve intrinsic and continuing reality." The Court of Appeals affirmed. ISSUE Whether the person upon whom the summons and complaint were served was "an agent authorized by appointment" to receive the same, so as to subject the respondents to the jurisdiction of the federal court in New York RULING Yes. We need not and do not in this case reach the situation where no personal notice has been given to the defendant. Since the respondents did in fact receive complete and timely notice of the lawsuit pending against them, no due process claim has been made. The question presented here is whether a party to a private contract may appoint an agent to receive service of process within the meaning of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4 (d) (1), where the agent is not personally known to the party, and where the agent has not expressly undertaken to transmit notice to the party. The purpose underlying the contractual provision here at issue seems clear. The clause was inserted by the petitioner and agreed to by the respondents in order to assure that any litigation under the lease should be conducted in the State of New York. Florence Weinberg's prompt acceptance and transmittal to the respondents of the summons and complaint pursuant to the authorization was itself sufficient to validate the agency, even though there was no explicit previous promise on her part to do so. We deal here with a Federal Rule, applicable to federal courts in all 50 States. But even if we were to assume that this uniform federal standard should give way to contrary local policies, there is no relevant concept of state law which would invalidate the agency here at issue. In Michigan, where the respondents reside, the statute which validates service of process under the circumstances present in this case contains no provision requiring that the appointed agent expressly undertake to notify the principal of the service of process. Similarly, New York law, which it was agreed should be applicable to the lease provisions, does not require any such express promise by the agent in order to create a valid agency for receipt of process.

It is argued, finally, that the agency sought to be created in this case was invalid because Florence Weinberg may have had a conflict of interest. This argument is based upon the fact that she was not personally known to the respondents at the time of her appointment and upon a suggestion in the record that she may be related to an officer of the petitioner corporation. But such a contention ignores the narrowly limited nature of the agency here involved. Florence Weinberg was appointed the respondents' agent for the single purpose of receiving service of process. An agent with authority so limited can in no meaningful sense be deemed to have had an interest antagonistic to the respondents, since both the petitioner and the respondents had an equal interest in assuring that, in the event of litigation, the latter be given that adequate and timely notice which is a prerequisite to a valid judgment. Dissent: The record on the motion to quash shows that the Szukhents had never had any dealings with Mrs. Weinberg, their supposed agent. They had never met, seen, or heard of her. She did not sign the lease, was not a party to it, received no compensation from the Szukhents, and undertook no obligation to them. In fact, she was handpicked by the New York company to accept service of process in any suits that might thereafter be filed by the company. Only after this suit was brought was it reluctantly revealed that Mrs. Weinberg was in truth the wife of one of the company's officers. I disagree with that holding, believing that: (1) Whether Mrs. Weinberg was a valid agent upon whom service could validly be effected under Rule 4 (d) (1) should be determined under New York law and that we should accept the holdings of the federal district judge and the Court of Appeals sitting in New York that under that State's law the purported appointment of Mrs. Weinberg was invalid and ineffective. No federal statute has undertaken to regulate the sort of agency transaction here involved. It is to the law of New York - the State where this action was brought in federal court, the place where the contract was deemed by the parties to have been made, and the State the law of which was specified as determining rights and liabilities under the contract - that we should turn to test the validity of the appointment. I agree with the district judge that this agency is invalid under the laws of New York. The highest state court that has passed on the question has held that, because of New York statutes, the designation by a nonresident of New York of an agent to receive service of process is ineffective; the court, in denying an order for interpleader, held that only residents of New York can make such an appointment, and even then only in compliance with the terms of the controlling statute.; (2) if, however, Rule 4 (d) (1) is to be read as calling upon us to formulate a new federal definition of agency for purposes of service of process, I think our formulation should exclude Mrs. Weinberg from the category of an "agent authorized by appointment . . . to receive service of process." If Rule 4 (d) (1) is to be read as requiring this Court to formulate new federal standards of agency to be resolved in each case as a federal question, rather than as leaving the question to state law, I think the standards we formulate should clearly and unequivocally denounce as invalid any alleged service of process on nonresidents based on purported agency contracts having no more substance than that naming Mrs. Weinberg. State courts in general quite properly refuse to uphold service of process on an agent who, though otherwise competent, has interests antagonistic to those of the person he is meant to represent.

12. INTERNATIONAL SHOE CO. VS. WASHINGTON, 326 U.S. 310 (1945)
FACTS Appellant is a Delaware corporation, having its principal place of business in St. Louis, Missouri, and is engaged in the manufacture and sale of shoes and other footwear. It maintains places of business several sales units or branches located outside the State of Washington. Appellant has no office in Washington and makes no contracts either for sale or purchase of merchandise there. It maintains no stock of merchandise in that state and makes there no deliveries of goods in intrastate commerce. During the years from 1937 to 1940, now in question, appellant employed 11 to 13 salesmen under direct supervision and control of sales managers located in St. Louis. These salesmen resided in Washington; their principal activities were confined to that state; and they were compensated by commissions based upon the amount of their sales. The authority of the salesmen is limited to exhibiting their samples and soliciting orders from prospective buyers, at prices and on terms fixed by appellant. The salesmen transmit the orders to appellants office in St. Louis for acceptance or rejection, and when accepted, the merchandise for filling the orders is shipped f.o.b. from points outside Washington to the purchasers within the state. All the merchandise shipped into Washington is invoiced at the place of shipment from which collections are made. No salesman has authority to enter into contracts or to make collections. The Supreme Court of Washington was of opinion that the regular and systematic solicitation of orders in the state by appellants salesmen, resulting in a continuous flow of appellants product into the state, was sufficient to constitute doing business in the state so as to make appellant amenable to suit in its courts. But it was also of opinion that there were sufficient additional activities shown to bring the case within the rule frequently stated, that solicitation within a state by the agents of a foreign corporation plus some additional activities are sufficient to render the corporation amenable to suit brought in the courts of the state to enforce an obligation arising out of its activities there. The court found such additional activities in the salesmens display of samples sometimes in permanent display rooms, and the salesmens residence within the state, continued over a period of years, all resulting in substantial volume of merchandise regularly shipped by appellant to purchasers within the state. Appellant also insists that its activities within the state were not sufficient to manifest its presence there and that in its absence the state courts were without jurisdiction, that consequently it was a denial of due process for the state to subject appellant to suit.... And appellant further argues that since it was not present within the state, it is a denial of due process to subject it to taxation or other money exaction. ISSUES 1. 2. Does the Washington court have jurisdiction over International Shoe? Does International Shoe have presence in Washington? in several states, other than Washington, at which its manufacturing is carried on and from which its merchandise is distributed interstate through

RULING Historically, the jurisdiction of courts to render judgment in personam is grounded on their de facto power over the defendants person. Hence his presence within the territorial jurisdiction of a court was prerequisite to its rendition of a

judgment personally binding him. But now that the capias ad respondendum has given way to personal service of summons or other form of notice, due process requires only that in order to subject a defendant to a judgment in personam, if he be not present within the territory of the forum, he should have certain minimum contacts with it such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. Since the corporate personality is a fiction although a fiction intended to be acted upon as though it were a fact, it is clear that unlike an individual, its presence without, as well as within, the state of its origin can be manifested only by activities carried on its behalf by those who are authorized to act for it. To say that the corporation is so far present there as to satisfy due process requirements, for purposes of taxation or the maintenance of suits against it in the courts of the state, is to beg the question to be decided. For the terms present or presence are used merely to symbolize those activities of the corporations agent within the state which courts will deem to be sufficient to satisfy the demands of due process. Those demands may be met by such contacts of the corporation with the state of the forum as to make it reasonable, in the context of the federal system of government, to require the corporation to defend the particular suit which is brought there. An estimate of the inconveniences which would result to the corporation from a trial away from its home or principal place of business is relevant in this connection. Presence in the state in this sense has never been doubted when the activities of the corporation there have not only been continuous and systematic, but also give rise to the liabilities sued on, even though no consent to be sued or authorization to an agent to accept service of process has been given. Conversely, it has been generally recognized that the casual presence of the corporate agent or even his conduct of single or isolated items of activities in a state in the corporations behalf are not enough to subject it to suit on cause of action unconnected with the activities. To require the corporation in such circumstances to defend the suit away from its home or other jurisdiction where it carries on more substantial activities has been thought to lay too great and unreasonable a burden on the corporation to comport with due process. There have been instances in which the continuous corporate operations within a state were thought so substantial and of such a nature as to justify suit against it on causes of action arising from dealings entirely distinct from those activities. We are likewise unable to conclude that the service of the process within the state upon an agent whose activities establish appellants presence there was not sufficient notice of the suit, or that the suit was so unrelated to those activities as to make the agent an inappropriate vehicle for communicating the notice. It is enough that appellant has established such contacts with the state that the particular form of substituted service adopted there gives reasonable assurance that the notice will be actual. Nor can we say that the mailing of the notice of suit to appellant by registered mail at its home office was not reasonably calculated to apprise appellant of the suit. Appellant having rendered itself amendable to suit upon obligations arising out of the activities of its salesmen in Washington, the state may maintain the present suit in personam to collect the tax laid upon the exercise of the privilege of employing appellants salesmen within the state. For Washington has made one of those activities, which taken together establish appellants presence there for purposes of suit, the taxable event by which the sate brings appellant within the reach of its taxing power. The stat thus has constitutional power to lay the tax and to subject appellant to a suit

to recover it. The activities which establish its presence subject it alike to taxation by the state and to suit to recover the tax.

13. PERKINS VS. BENGUET CONSOLIDATED MINING CO 342 U.S. 437, 72 S. CT. 413 96 (1952)
FACTS Perkins, a non-resident of Ohio, filed two in personam cases in an Ohio court. Among those he sued is Benguest Consolidated (Benguet), a sociedad anima organized in the Philippines where it owns and operates gold and silver mines. Perkins sued to collect an amount in dividends and damages she claimed to be due her as a stockholder of Benguet.

Benguet has been carrying on in Ohio a continuous and systematic, but limited, part of its general business. Its president, while engaged in doing such business in Ohio, has been served with summons in this proceeding. Benguet, for its part, sought to quash the summons served upon their president. The courts have sustained the motions to quash.

ISSUE Whether the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States precludes Ohio from subjecting a foreign corporation to the jurisdiction of its courts in this action in personam

RULING No. Ohio is free to decline or take jurisdiction over the corporation. To begin with, Benguet is a foreign corporation according to Ohio law. The Federal Constitution does not compel Ohio to open its courts to such a case, even though Ohio permits a complainant to maintain a proceeding in personam in its courts against a properly served nonresident natural person to enforce a cause of action which does not arise out of anything done within the State.

As a matter of federal due process, the business done by the corporation in Ohio was sufficiently substantial and of such a nature as to permit Ohio to entertain the cause of action against it, though the cause of action arose from activities entirely distinct from its activities in Ohio.

14. MCGEE VS. INTERNATIONAL LIFE INS. CO.355 U.S. 220 (DECEMBER 16, 1957)
FACTS Lulu McGee, was the mother of Lowell Franklin who purchased a life insurance policy from Arizona-based Empire Mutual Insurance Company that named McGee as the beneficiary. In 1948, International Life Insurance Co. ("International"), a Texas corporation, agreed to assume Empire's insurance obligations.

International mailed a reinsurance certificate to the Franklin in California, offering to insure him according to the terms of the Empire policy. Franklin accepted the offer and paid premiums from California until his death in 1950. When Franklin's mother tried to collect on the policy, the insurance company refused to pay, claiming Franklin had committed suicide. McGee brought suit in California, and sought to enforce it in Texas. The Texas Court, however, refused to enforce the judgment by the California Court for the collection of the proceeds of the life insurance policy.

Note that International had conducted no other business in California except for this one policy.

ISSUE Can California exercise jurisdiction over a International, whose contacts with that state are limited to a single act or contract?

RULING Yes. A state may exercise jurisdiction over a party whose contacts with that state consist of only a single act, provided that that act is what gave rise to the claim for which jurisdiction is being sought, and was deliberately directed toward the state.

The court relied on the fact that the suit was based on "substantial connection" with California, particularly the facts that the contract was delivered to McGee's son while he was a resident of California, International continued to maintain a financial relationship with McGee's son by collecting his premium payments, and that the policy holder was a resident of the state when he died.

The court also gave weight to California's interest in protecting its residents as consumers of insurance policies, and validated the long arm statute which gave the California courts their power of jurisdiction over out of state companies by declaring that California had a "manifest interest in providing effective means of redress for its residents.

15. WORLD-WIDE VOLKSWAGEN CORP. VS. WOODSON 444 U.S. 286 (1980)
FACTS Spouses Harry and Kay Robinson, residents of New York, who had purchased a car from Seaway Volkswagen, a retailer in New York, brought a suit against the retailer and its wholesale distributor, in the District Court for Creek county, Oklahoma. The Robinsons claimed that the injuries which they suffered in a car accident in Oklahoma were caused by the defective design and placement of their automobiles gas tank and fuel system. Seaway Volkswagen and Worldwide Volkswagen both incorporated and doing business in New York, asserted that Oklahomas exercise of jurisdiction over them would violate the limitations on state jurisdiction imposed by the due process clause. Seaway and Worldwide Volkswagen sought a writ of prohibition in the Supreme Court of Oklahoma to prevent the trial judge from exercising in personam jurisdiction over them. The writ was denied on the ground that personal jurisdiction was authorized by Oklahomas long-arm statute allowing an Oklahoma courts exercise of in personam jurisdiction over a tortfeasor who causes injury in Oklahoma by an act or omission outside Oklahoma if he regularly does or solicits business or engages in any other persistent course of conduct, or derives substantial revenue from goods used or consumed or services rendered in Oklahoma.

ISSUE W/N Oklahoma has jurisdiction over the controversy? NONE

RULING As has long been settled, and as we reaffirm today, a state court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant only as long as there exist minimum contacts between the defendant and the forum state. The concept of minimum contacts, in turn, can be seen to perform two related, but distinguishable, functions. It protects the defendant against the burdens of litigating in a distant or inconvenient forum. And it acts to ensure that the States, through their courts, do not reach out beyond the limits imposed on them by their status as coequal sovereigns in a federal system. The protection against inconvenient litigation is typically described in terms of reasonableness or fairness. We have said that the defendants contacts with the forum State must be such that maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.

Thus, the Due Process Clause does not contemplate that a state may make binding a judgement in personam against an individual or corporate defendant with which the state has no contacts, ties, or relations. Even if the defendant would suffer minimal or no inconvenience from being forced to litigate before the tribunals of another State; even if the forum State has a strong interest in applying its law to the controversy; even if the forum state is the most convenient location for litigation, the Due Process Clause, acting as an instrument of interstate federalism, may sometimes act to divest the State of its power to render a valid judgement. Apply these principles to the case at hand, we find in the record before us a total absence of those affiliating circumstances that are a necessary predicate to any exercise of state-court jurisdiction. Petitioners carry on no activity whatsoever in Oklahoma. They close no sales and perform no services there. They avail themselves of none of the privileges either through salespersons or through advertising reasonably calculated to reach the State. Nor does the record show that they regularly sell cars at wholesale or retail to Oklahoma customers or residents or that they indirectly, through others, serve or seek to serve the Oklahoma market. In short, respondents seek to base jurisdiction on one, isolated occurrence and whatever inferences can be drawn therefrom: the fortuitous circumstance that a single Audi automobile, sold in New York to New York residents, happened to suffer an accident while passing through Oklahoma.

It is argued, however that because an automobile is mobile by its very design and purpose it was foreseeable that the Robinsons Audi would cause injury in Oklahoma. Yet foreseeability alone has never been a sufficient benchmark for personal jurisdiction under the Due Process Clause.

Because we find that petitioners have no contacts, ties or relations with the State of Oklahoma the judgement of the Supreme Court of Oklahoma is reversed.

16. CALDER VS. JONES, 465 U.S. 783 (MARCH 20, 1984)
Brief Fact Summary. Respondent, Shirley Jones, brought a libel suit in a California state court against Petitioners, Calder et al. Petitioners South and Calder are Florida residents who argue that California courts lack personal jurisdiction over them.

Synopsis of Rule of Law. A state has personal jurisdiction over any party whose actions intentionally reach another party in the state and are the basis for the cause of action.

Facts. Petitioners South is a reporter, and Petitioner Calder is president and an editor, of Petitioner National Enquirer. South wrote an article that accused Respondent of a drinking problem that was so severe that it affected her acting career. Calder reviewed the article and edited it to its final form for publication. Respondent brought a suit for libel, and South and Calder challenged Californias personal jurisdiction since neither had any physical contacts with California, particularly as it pertained to this article. South did rely on sources from California, and Respondents life and career were centered in California. The district court cited Petitioners rights under the First Amendment to the United States Constitution as trumpeting Due Process Clause concerns. The appellate court reversed because First Amendment arguments are irrelevant to jurisdictional analysis.

Issue. The issue is whether California has personal jurisdiction over South and Calder through their targeting of Respondent with this article. Held. The United States Supreme Court held that California had personal jurisdiction over Petitioners. The first step in the analysis is to determine the focal point of the harm suffered, and that was in California. The Court then determined that Petitioners actions intentionally aimed at a California resident, and the injuries suffered would be in that state. Discussion. Petitioners argued that, because they were merely employees of the libelous newspaper, their case was analogous to a welder who works on a boiler in Florida that subsequently explodes in California. The Court distinguishes this by noting that unlike the welder they intentionally targeted the California contact.

Other version Calder v. Jones 465 U.S. 783, 104 S.Ct.1482, 79 L.Ed.2d 804 (1984)

Plaintiff/Respondent: Shirley Jones Defendant/Petitioner: Calder

Rule of Law: A state has personal jurisdiction over any party whose actions intentionally reaches another party in the state and is the basis for the cause of action.

Facts: -Defendant South is a reporter, and defendant Calder is president and an editor, of National Enquirer. -South wrote an article that accused P of a drinking problem that was so severe that it affected her acting career. Calder reviewed the article and edited it to its final form for publication. -P brought a suit for libel in CA. South and Calder challenged Californias personal jurisdiction since neither had any physical contacts with California, particularly as it pertained to this article. -Ds are Florida residents who argue that California courts lack personal jurisdiction over them. -South did rely on sources from California, and Ps life and career were centered in California. -The district court cited Ds rights under the First Amendment to the United States Constitution as trumpeting Due Process Clause concerns. -The appellate court reversed because First Amendment arguments are irrelevant to jurisdictional analysis

Issue: Whether California has personal jurisdiction over South and Calder through their targeting of Respondent with this article?

Holding: California had personal jurisdiction over Petitioners

Reason: The first step in the analysis is to determine the focal point of the harm suffered, and that was in California. The Court then determined that Petitioners actions intentionally aimed at a California resident, and the injuries suffered would be in that state

17. KEETON VS. HUSTLER MAGAZINE, INC. ET AL, 465 U.S. 770 (MARCH 20, 1984)
FACTS Keeton (NY) brought a libel suit against Hustler Magazine (Ohio) in New Hampshire, alleging jurisdiction by reason of diversity of citizenship. Keetons only connection with New Hampshire is the circulation there of a magazine that she assists in producing. Hustler Magazines contacts with New Hampshire consist of monthly sales of some 10,000 to 15,000 copies of its nationally published magazine.

ISSUE Whether or not New Hampshire has jurisdiction

RULING YES. Hustler Magazines regular circulation of magazines in the forum State is sufficient to support an assertion of jurisdiction in a libel action based on the contents of the magazine. The fact that Keeton has very limited contacts in New Hampshire does not defeat jurisdiction, since a plaintiff is not required to have minimum contacts with the forum State before that State is permitted to assert personal jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant.

Here, where Hustler Magazine has continuously and deliberately exploited the New Hampshire market, it must reasonably anticipate being haled into court there in a libel action based on the contents of its magazine, and since Hustler Magazine can be charged with knowledge of the single publication rule, it must anticipate that such a suit will seek nationwide damages. There is no unfairness in calling Hustler Magazine to answer for the contents of its national publication wherever a substantial number of copies are regularly sold and distributed.

18. ASAHI METAL INDUSTRY CO VS. SUPERIOR COURT, 480, U.S 102 (FEBRUARY 24, 1987)
FACTS Asahi Metal Industry Co. was an international corporation based in Japan, which manufactured a valve used in the manufacture of motorcycle wheels. These valves were bought by Cheng Shin Rubber Industrial Co., a Taiwanese distributor. One of these valves was alleged to have failed, causing an accident in the State of California. As a result of the accident the driver of the motorcycle sustained serious injuries and his wife, who was riding on the motorcycle as a passenger, was killed. The accident victim sued Cheng Shin in a California state court, and Cheng Shin in turn filed a third-party complaint (impleader) seeking indemnification from Asahi. Asahi contested California's personal jurisdiction over Asahi, but the California courts found jurisdiction based on Asahi's alleged awareness of the international distribution of its products. Specifically, Asahi moved to quash Cheng Shin's summons. The California Superior Court and the California Supreme Court both denied the motion, leading Asahi to appeal to the United States Supreme Court. ISSUE Does Asahi have minimum contacts with California such that the exercise of personal jurisdiction would not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantive justice? RULING NO The Supreme Court applied a five-factor test in determining whether "traditional notions of fair play" would permit the assertion of in personam jurisdiction over a foreign (meaning out-of-state) defendant: 1. What is the burden on the defendant? 2. What are the interests of the forum state in the litigation? 3. What is the interest of the plaintiff in litigating the matter in that state? 4. Does the allowance of jurisdiction serve interstate efficiency? 5. Does the allowance of jurisdiction serve interstate policy interests? The Court finds that fair play would be violated because: o o The burden on the defendant is severe because the corporation would have to travel from Japan to California and defend itself under the laws of a foreign country. The plaintiff is not a California resident, and thus Californias interests in the case are diminished. California can enforce its interest in having safe products in its state indirectly by applying pressure to direct suppliers of goods to California, who in turn will apply commercial pressure to their suppliers. o o o Cheng Shin has not shown that California is a more convenient forum than Japan or Taiwan in which to pursue its claim. Jurisdiction is not necessarily in the best interests of the other countries involved. Jurisdiction is not warranted by any international policy considerations, if they even exist.

Because an assertion of jurisdiction would disturb the "traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice," the decision of the California Supreme Court was reversed and the judgment of California Court of Appeal (California's intermediate appellate court) was effectively reinstated.

19. BENSUAN RESTAURANT CORPORATION VS. RICHARD B. KING, DOCKET NO. 96-9344, (SEPTEMBER 10, 1997)
Bensusan Restaurant Corporation, the plaintiff, owned the Blue Note jazz club in New Yorks Greenwich Village, and owned a federal trademark registration for the mark THE BLUE NOTE. The defendant, Richard King, operated The Blue Note, a small club in the college town of Columbia, Missouri, and had used that mark on a local basis since 1980 several years prior to use of Blue Note by the now-famous New York club. Although the New York jazz club had obtained a federal registration for the Blue Note mark in 1985, the Missouri club could continue to use the name within its local area based on the Missouri club's prior use of the name. In April 1996, the Missouri club began operation of a website (http//www.throughport.com/cyberspot) that offered general information about Kings club, including a calendar of events and ticketing information. Tickets could not be ordered via the Internet; instead, one could order tickets for an advertised event by telephone and then pick-up the tickets in person at a box office in Columbia, Missouri. The Missouri clubs website also included a hyperlink to the website for Greenwich Villages Blue Note club, while also offering a disclaimer that "The Blue Notes Cyberspot should not be confused with one of the worlds finest jazz clubs, the Blue Note, located in the heart of New Yorks Greenwich Village. If you should find yourself in the Big Apple give them a visit.

The New York jazz club viewed the Missouri club's website on the Internet as an expansion of use of the Blue Note name outside of the local area, and raised this objection with King. In response, King removed the second sentence of the disclaimer and the hyperlink from his website.

The operator of the New York jazz club sued the operator of the Missouri jazz club for trademark infringement in New York.

Trial Court Proceedings Edit Looking to New Yorks long-arm statute, the court inquired whether Kings operation of a website on a server in Missouri represented the commission of a tort in New York. Although a New York user could access the Missouri Clubs website to obtain event ticket information, a purchase of tickets required calling the Missouri club via its website-advertised telephone number and picking up the tickets at the Columbia, Missouri box office. The court stated that "[t]he mere fact that a person can gain information on the allegedly infringing product is not the equivalent of a person advertising, promoting, selling or otherwise making an effort to target its product in New York." Consequently, the district court concluded that any tortious action of trademark infringement would arise in Missouri rather than in New York.

In examining whether the exercise of jurisdiction over King would satisfy due process, the court asserted that creating a site, like placing a product into the stream of commerce, may be felt nationwide or even worldwide but, without more, it is not an act purposefully directed toward the forum state. The court distinguished the CompuServe v. Patterson case based on the observation that the facts in CompuServe v. Patterson,[1] were vastly different from the present action. Unlike the software developer in CompuServe, King did not direct any contact to or have any contact with New York, nor did he intend to avail himself of the benefits of New York.

Thus, the court held that King's operation of the website was not sufficient to satisfy the requirements of New York long-arm statute, and that the exercise of personal jurisdiction would violate the precepts of constitutional due process. Significantly, the court found that the owner of the Missouri club was only trying to attract local patrons by the club's operation of its website, and dismissed the action for lack of personal jurisdiction.

20. COMPUSERVE INC. VS. RICHARD PATTERSON, NO. 95-3452, (JULY 22, 1996)
FACTS CompuServe is a computer information service headquartered in Columbus, Ohio. It contracts with individual subscribers, such as the defendant, to provide, inter alia, access to computing and information services via the Internet. Defendant, Richard Patterson, is a resident of Houston, Texas who claims never to have visited Ohio. He subscribed to CompuServe, and he also placed items of "shareware" on the CompuServe system for others to use and purchase. When he became a shareware "provider," Patterson entered into a "Shareware Registration Agreement" ("SRA") with CompuServe. The SRA incorporates by reference two other documents: the CompuServe Service Agreement ("Service Agreement") and the Rules of Operation, both of which are published on the CompuServe Information Service. Both the SRA and the Service Agreement expressly provide that they are entered into in Ohio, and the Service Agreement further provides that it is to "be governed by and construed in accordance with" Ohio law. The SRA asks a new shareware "provider" like Patterson to type "AGREE" at various points in the document, "[i]n recognition of your online agreement to all the above terms and conditions." Thus, Patterson's assent to the SRA was first manifested at his own computer in Texas, then transmitted to the CompuServe computer system in Ohio. From 1991 through 1994, Patterson electronically transmitted 32 master software files to CompuServe. These files were stored in CompuServe's system in Ohio, and they were displayed in different services for CompuServe subscribers, who could "download" them into their own computers and, if they chose to do so, pay for them. Patterson's software product was, apparently, a program designed to help people navigate their way around the larger Internet network. CompuServe began to market a similar product, however, with markings and names that Patterson took to be too similar to his own. Thus, in December of 1993, Patterson notified CompuServe (appropriately via "E-mail" message) that the terms "WinNAV," "Windows Navigator," and "FlashPoint Windows Navigator" were common law trademarks which he and his company owned. Patterson stated that CompuServe's marketing of its product infringed these trademarks, and otherwise constituted deceptive trade practices. CompuServe changed the name of its program, but Patterson continued to complain. After Patterson demanded at least $100,000 to settle his potential claims, CompuServe filed this declaratory judgment action in the federal district court for the Southern District of Ohio, relying on the court's diversity subject matter jurisdiction. Patterson responded pro se with a consolidated motion to dismiss on several grounds, including lack of personal jurisdiction. Patterson also submitted a supporting affidavit, in which he denied jurisdictional facts, including his having ever visited Ohio. ISSUE Did CompuServe make a prima facie showing that Patterson's contacts with Ohio, which have been almost entirely electronic in nature, are sufficient, under the Due Process Clause, to support the district court's exercise of personal jurisdiction over him? RULING

Yes. Personal jurisdiction may be either general or specific in nature, depending on the nature of the contacts in a given case. In the instant case, because CompuServe bases its action on Patterson's act of sending his computer software to Ohio for sale on its service, CompuServe seeks to establish such specific personal jurisdiction over Patterson. The crucial federal constitutional inquiry is whether, given the facts of the case, the nonresident defendant has sufficient contacts with the forum state that the district court's exercise of jurisdiction would comport with "traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice." This court has employed three criteria to make this determination: First, the defendant must purposefully avail himself of the privilege of acting in the forum state or causing a consequence in the forum state. Second, the cause of action must arise from the defendant's activities there. Finally, the acts of the defendant or consequences caused by the defendant must have a substantial enough connection with the forum to make the exercise of jurisdiction over the defendant reasonable. "Purposeful availment" requirement: The question of whether a defendant has purposefully availed itself of the privilege of doing business in the forum state is "the sine qua non for in personam jurisdiction." The "purposeful availment" requirement is satisfied when the defendant's contacts with the forum state "proximately result from actions by the defendant himself that create a substantial connection' with the forum State," and when the defendant's conduct and connection with the forum are such that he "should reasonably anticipate being haled into court there." This requirement does not, however, mean that a defendant must be physically present in the forum state. There is no question that Patterson himself took actions that created a connection with Ohio in the instant case. He subscribed to CompuServe, and then he entered into the Shareware Registration Agreement when he loaded his software onto the CompuServe system for others to use and, perhaps, purchase. Once Patterson had done those two things, he was on notice that he had made contracts, to be governed by Ohio law, with an Ohio-based company. Then, he repeatedly sent his computer software, via electronic links, to the CompuServe system in Ohio, and he advertised that software on the CompuServe system. Moreover, he initiated the events that led to the filing of this suit by making demands of CompuServe via electronic and regular mail messages. The real question is whether these connections with Ohio are "substantial" enough that Patterson should reasonably have anticipated being haled into an Ohio court. Patterson entered into a written contract with CompuServe which provided for the application of Ohio law, and he then purposefully perpetuated the relationship with CompuServe via repeated communications with its system in Ohio. Patterson was a third-party provider of software who used CompuServe, which is located in Columbus, to market his wares in Ohio and elsewhere. This was a relationship intended to be ongoing in nature; it was not a "one-shot affair." Patterson sent software to CompuServe repeatedly for some three years, and the record indicates that he intended to continue marketing his software on CompuServe. Cause of action arising from Patterson's activities in Ohio Requirement: The cause of action in the instant case concerns allegations of trademark or trade name infringement and unfair competition. Patterson's contacts with Ohio are certainly related to the operative facts of that controversy. He used that system to advertise his software and sell it. The proceeds of those sales flowed to him through Ohio. It is uncontroverted that Patterson placed, marketed, and sold his software only on Ohio-based CompuServe. Thus, any common law trademark or trade name which Patterson might have in his product would arguably have been created in Ohio, and any violation of those alleged trademarks or trade names by CompuServe would have occurred, at least in part, in Ohio.

The reasonableness requirement: A court must consider several factors in this context, including "the burden on the defendant, the interest of the forum state, the plaintiff's interest in obtaining relief, and the interest of other states in securing the most efficient resolution of controversies." It may be burdensome for Patterson to defend a suit in Ohio, but he knew when he entered into the Shareware Registration Agreement with CompuServe that he was making a connection with Ohio, and presumably he hoped that connection would work to his benefit. Further, Ohio has a strong interest in resolving a dispute involving an Ohio company, which will involve the Ohio law on common law trademarks and trade names. CompuServe alleges that more than $10 million could be at stake in this case, and it also contends that this case will have a profound impact on its relationships with other "shareware" providers like Patterson, who also directed their activities toward Ohio-based CompuServe.

21. RUSH VS. SAUCHUK, 444 US 320 (1980)

FACTS While a resident of Indiana, Savchuk was injured in an accident in Indiana while riding as a passenger in a car driven by Rush, also an Indiana resident. After moving to Minnesota, Savchuk commenced this action against Rush in a Minnesota state court, alleging negligence and seeking damages. As Rush had no contacts with Minnesota that would support in personam jurisdiction, Savchuk attempted to obtain quasi in rem jurisdiction by garnishing the contractual obligation of State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. (State Farm) to defend and indemnify Rush in connection with such a suit. State Farm, which does business in Minnesota, had insured the car, owned by Rush's father, under a liability insurance policy issued in Indiana. Rush was personally served in Indiana, and after State Farm's response to the garnishment summons asserted that it owed the Rush nothing, Savchuk moved the trial court for permission to file a supplemental complaint making the garnishee, State Farm, a party to the action. Rush and State Farm moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of jurisdiction over the defendant.

ISSUE May Minnesota courts obtain jurisdiction over both Rush and State Farm by virtue of a quasi in rem jurisdiction? RULING No. A STATE MAY NOT CONSTITUTIONALLY EXERCISE QUASI IN REM JURISDICTION OVER A DEFENDANT WHO HAS NO FORUM CONTACTS BY ATTACHING THE CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATION OF AN INSURER LICENSED TO DO BUSINESS IN THE STATE TO DEFEND AND INDEMNIFY HIM IN CONNECTION WITH THE SUIT. A State may exercise jurisdiction over an absent defendant only if the defendant has certain minimum contacts with the forum such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. In determining whether a particular exercise of state court jurisdiction is consistent with due process, the inquiry must focus on "the relationship among the defendant, the forum, and the litigation." Here, the only affiliating circumstance offered to show a relationship among Rush, Minnesota, and this lawsuit is that Rush's insurance company does business in the State. However, the fictional presence in Minnesota of State Farm's policy obligation to defend and indemnify Rush -derived from combining the legal fiction that assigns a situs to a debt, for garnishment purposes, wherever the debtor is found with the legal fiction that a corporation is "present," for jurisdictional purposes, wherever it does business -cannot be deemed to give the State the power to determine Rush's liability for the out-of-state accident. The mere presence of property in a State does not establish a sufficient relationship between the owner of the property and the State to support the exercise of jurisdiction over an unrelated cause of action, and it cannot be said that the defendant engaged in any purposeful activity related to the forum that would make the exercise of jurisdiction fair, just, or reasonable merely because his insurer does business there. Nor does the policy provide significant contacts between the litigation and the forum, for the policy obligations pertain only to the conduct, not the substance, of the litigation.

22. BANCO ESPAOL FILIPINO VS. PALANCA, 37 PHIL. 921 (1918)

FACTS Engracio Palance Tanquinyeng y Limquingco mortgaged various parcels of real property in Manila to El Banco Espanol-Filipino. Afterwards, Engracio returned to China and there he died without returning again to the Philippines. The mortgagor then instituted foreclosure proceeding but since defendant is a non-resident, it was necessary to give notice by publication. The Clerk of Court was also directed to send copy of the summons to the defendants last known address, which is in Amoy, China. It is not shown whether the Clerk complied with this requirement. after publication in a newspaper of Manila, the cause proceeded and judgment by default was rendered. The decision was published and afterwards sale by public auction was held with the bank as the highest bidder. This sale was confirmed by the court. About seven years after the confirmation of this sale, a motion was made by Vicente Palanca, as administrator of the estate of the original defendant, wherein the applicant requested the court to set aside the order of default and the judgment, and to vacate all the proceedings subsequent thereto. The basis of this application was that the order of default and the judgment rendered thereon were void because the court had never acquired jurisdiction over the defendant or over the subject of the action. ISSUE Did the lower court acquire jurisdiction over the defendant and the subject matter of the action? RULING Yes. Jurisdiction may refer to (1) to the authority of the court to entertain a particular kind of action or to administer a particular kind of relief, or it may refer to the power of the court over the parties, or (2) over the property which is the subject to the litigation. JURISDICTION OVER THE PERSON IS ACQUIRED BY THE VOLUNTARY APPEARANCE OF A PARTY IN COURT AND HIS SUBMISSION TO ITS AUTHORITY, OR IT IS ACQUIRED BY THE COERCIVE POWER OF LEGAL PROCESS EXERTED OVER THE PERSON. JURISDICTION OVER THE PROPERTY WHICH IS THE SUBJECT OF THE LITIGATION MAY RESULT EITHER FROM A SEIZURE OF THE PROPERTY UNDER LEGAL PROCESS, WHEREBY IT IS BROUGHT INTO THE ACTUAL CUSTODY OF THE LAW, OR IT MAY RESULT FROM THE INSTITUTION OF LEGAL PROCEEDINGS WHEREIN, UNDER SPECIAL PROVISIONS OF LAW, THE POWER OF THE COURT OVER THE PROPERTY IS RECOGNIZED AND MADE EFFECTIVE. For properties the court may not physically take into custody, the court may exercise an in rem jurisdiction over such, at the instance of the person claiming to be the owner, in order to adjudicate the title of the owner against the world. THE ACTION TO FORECLOSE A MORTGAGE IS SAID TO BE A PROCEEDING QUASI IN REM, by which is expressed the idea that while it is not strictly speaking an action in rem yet it partakes of that nature and is substantially such.

THE ACTION QUASI IN REM DIFFERS FROM THE TRUE ACTION IN REM IN THE CIRCUMSTANCE THAT IN THE FORMER AN INDIVIDUAL IS NAMED AS DEFENDANT, AND THE PURPOSE OF THE PROCEEDING IS TO SUBJECT HIS INTEREST THEREIN TO THE OBLIGATION OR LIEN BURDENING THE PROPERTY.

The judgment entered in these proceedings is conclusive only between the parties. The action being quasi in rem, the court has acquired jurisdiction over the defendant and the subject matter. The failure of the clerk to mail the notice, if in fact he did so fail in his duty, is not an irregularity that amounts to a denial of due process of law and even if proved, would not avoid the judgment in this case. Notice was given by publication in a newspaper and this is the only form of notice which the law unconditionally requires. This is all that was absolutely necessary to sustain the proceedings.