CENTRE FOR ASIA MINOR STUDIES

FOUNDERS: MELPO AND OCTAVE MERLIER

ALEXIS ALEXANDRIS
THE GREEK MINORITY
OF ISTANBUL
AND
GREEK -TURKISH RELATIONS
1918-1974
ATHENS 1992
tSTANBUL BtLOt
UNIVERSITY LIBRARY
First Edition: 1983
Second Edition: 1992
ISBN 960-85021-4-4
Centre for Asia Minor Studies and Alexis Alexandris, 1992.
To Louise and Nicholas
FOREWORD TO THE FIRST EDITION
Since its foundation by Melpo and Octave MerZier in 1930 the Centre for
Asia Minor Studies has concentrated its research on the collection ofmater-
ialon the Greek communities of Asia Minor in an effort to build an archive of
basic information on the heritage, culture, language and mode of life in the
ancestral hearths of h ellen ism in the peninsula through the exodus oj 1922-
1924. The publications of the Centre until now reflect this general re-
search orientation and have been intended as contributions to the knowledge
of an important section of hellenic civilization and of the Greek tradition that
came to an abrupt and tragic end amidst the upheavals of historical change
and world conflict. One of the permanent objectives of the Centre is to
continue this line of research and to utilize its rich archive of oral history with
the publication of scholarly studies dealing with Greek tradition and com-
munallife in particular regions and communities of Asia Minor.
With the publication of Dr. Alexis Alexandris's book on the history of the
Greek community of Istanbul from 1918 to 1974, the Centre for Asia Minor
Studies is inaugurating a new series of monographs which while contributing
essentially to the promotion of the subject of the Centre's specialised res-
earch, appeal at the same time to a wider academic public as case studies of
more general issues. It is our hope that in this manner the Centre will have its
own distinct contribution to make as a living research organization to
scholarship on the Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East.
The present study is of direct interest to the research subject matter of the
Centre in that it examines the political behaviour and choices of the leader-
ship of hellenism in the dying Ottoman Empire during the critical period
1918-1922 which sealed the fate of hellenism in Turkey. It is therefore an
essential contribution to the understanding of the historical destinies of Asia
Minor hellenism of which Constantinople had always been the capital.
Furthermore it is of interest to our research programmes for another substan-
tive reason: it considers the historical sequel to the centuries-old Greek
presence on the eastern shores of the Aegean and in the hinterland of Asia
Minor, after the extinction of the Christian Orthodox communities in the rest
of Turkey with the exchange of minority populations between Greece and
Turkey in 1923-1924.
7
In the urban environment of the ancient imperial city of the Byzantines
and the Ottomans survived to our own days the forms of communal alld
social organization, the' varieties of cultural experience and economic
activity, the special premium on education and the intimate involvement
of the Church in the life of the community that constituted the essence
of the historical experience of Asia Minor hellenism under Ottoman
rule. From this point of view Dr. Alexandris's book by studying a still
living sequel to an older tradition. contributes to a fuller understanding
of a whole cultural configuration and of a mode of historical existence.
The consideration of these concrete historical problems however has
another aspect to it as well. It examines them as the experience of an ethnic
minority in a highly nationalist society. As a case study in minority behaviour
and minority treatment it is of interest to those concerned with this important
problem in contemporary international relations and it constitutes a can ..
tribution to the comparative social history of the Near East where the role
and fortunes of minorities and the coexistence of diverse ethnic elements
under often explosive conditions has been a dynamic factor in political and
social change. The whole history of Asia Minor hellenism under Ottoman rule
constitutes an aspect of this broader feature of Middle Eastern society. The
present study, by examining this problem in depth, places the historical
destiny of hellenism in Turkey in its appropriate political perspective.
PASCHALIS M. KITROMILIDES
Director
Centre for Asia Minor Studies
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Some Place Name Variants 13
Abbreviations 15
Preface 17
Chapter I: The position of the Greeks, in istanbul before 1918
1. The,Millet System. 21
2. Ottoman Reform and the Greeks. 25
3. The Economic Position of the Constantinopolitan Greeks. 31
4. The Question of the Millet Privileges. 32
5. The Megali Idea and the Constantinopolitan Greeks. 36
6. Greek educational and cultural institutions in istanbul. 45
7. The Constantinopolitan Greek population. 49
Chapter II: The Constantinopolitan Greek factor during the
Anatolian war 1918-1922
The Debate on the Future of istanbul. 52
The Patriarchate: Spokesman of Unredeemed Greeks. 54
The Growth of Turkish Nationalist Movement. 63
4. The Patriarchal Mission to London and the Death of Dorotheos. 66
5. Patriarch Meletios Metaxakis. 69
Chapter III: The Lausanne negotiations, 1922-1923
1. The Mudanya Armistice and the Refet Bele Mission to istanbul. 77
2. The First Exodus of Constantinopolitan Greeks, October-
December 1922. 79
3. The Lausanne negotiations and the future of the Greeks
in istanbul. 83
4. The Question of the Patriarchate at Lausanne. 87
5. The Work of the Subcommission on the protection of minorities. 95
6. The Questions of the Military Service and Amnesty. 98
7. The Signing of the Treaty of Lausanne and the Return of
istanbul to Full Turkish Control. 103
Chapter IV: The new legal position of the Greek Orthodox com-
munity in republican Turkey, 1923-1929
1. Turkish Economic Nationalism and the Greeks. 105
9
2. The Campaign Against Professional Greeks. 108
3. The Question of the Etablis. 112
4. The Dispute over the Greeks Absent from
istanbul. 117
5. Turkish Grievances About the Treatment of Muslims in
Western Thrace. 120
6. Greek-Turkish Negotiations and the Agreements of 1925-1926. 124
7. Prolonged Greek-Turkish Negotiations. 129
8. Turkey and Greek Educational and Cultural Institutions. 131
9. The Civil Code and the Greek Reaction. 135
10. Various Anti-Greek Measures and the Decline of istanbul. 139
Chapter V' The Resumption of relations between the Turkish
Government and the Ecumenical Patriarchate, 1923-1929
1. Patriarch Meletios and the Anti-Phanar Riot of 1 June 1923. 144
2. The Turkish Orthodox Challenge. 149
3. The Election of Patriarch Gregory VII. 154
4. The Exchangeability of the Archbishops and the Expulsion
of Patriarch Constantine VI. 159
5. The Reign of Basil III. 167
6. Restrictions on the Ecumenical Role of the Patriarchate. 170
Chapter VI: The Greek minority during the Greco-Turkish
rapproch'ement,
1. The Greco-Turkish Agreements of 1930. 174
2. Persistence of Greek Grievances. 181
3. Greek Foreign Policy on the Minority Question. 185
The Position of the Constantinopolitan Greek Minority. 190
Chapter VII: Relations between secular Turkey and the Patriarchate,
the establishment of a modus vivendi, 1930-1946
I. The Official Recognition of the Patriarch and the Visit of
Venizelos to the Phanar. 194
2. Attempts to reinforce the Ecumenical Character of the
Patriarchate and Turkish Secular Reform. 196
3. Patriarch Benjamin I. 203
Chapter VIII: The Varlrk Tax and its impact on the Greek
community
1. The Position of Turkey During, 1939-1942.
The Enactment of the Varllk Tax.
o Discriminatory Traits of the Varllk Tax.
10
207
211
215
@ The Effect of the Varl'lk Episode on the Greco-Turkish
Friendship.
The abolition of the tax on wealth.
Chapter IX: Cordial Greco-Turkish relations and the revival
of the Ecumenical Patriarchate, 1944-1954
225
229
1. The Strengthening of Greco-Turkish Relations. 234
2. Rapprochement and the Ecumenical Patriarchate. 237
3" The Election of Patriarch Athenagoras I. 244
4. Improvernent in the Position of the Greek Minority. 248
Chapter(p. The effects of the Cyprus dispute on the Greeks in
istanbul 1954-1964.
1. The Emergence of the Cyprus Dispute and the Greek Minority. 252
2. The Anti-Greek Riots of 1955 and the Yasslada Trials. 256
3. The Minority Question and the Greco-Turkish Crisis, 1956-59. 266
4. The Patriarchate During the Settlement of the Cyprus Question,
1959-64. 274
Chapter XI." The final exodus of the Constantinopolitan Greek
community, 1964-1974.
Expulsions of the Hellenes of istanbul. 280
The Patriarchate During the Final Years of Athenagoras
and the Election of his Successor Dimitrios. 298
3. The Muslim Minority of Greece. 307
Summary and Conclusions. 316
Appendices
A. The Minority Clauses of the Treaty of Lausanne" 320
B. Greek parishes and associations in istanbul. 324
C. Constantinopolitan Greek Schools. 326
D. Patriarchs and members of the Holy Synod. 332
Bibliography. 337
Index. 368
II
SOME PLACE NAME VARIANTS
The same place often has a different name in Turkish and Greek. The
following table may help those readers who are used to the one version
and find another in the text. The first column gives the Turkish version,
while the second gives the Anglicized Greek version. Throughout this
work, the modem Turkish version has been adopted for place names.
However, in cases where these cities constitute a diocese or a bishopric
the Greek has been preferred. The Turkish words follow the official
Turkish orthography.
Philadelphia
Ankara Angora
Aydin Thyateira
Balat Xyloporta
BalikIi Valoukii
Beyoglu Pera
Bursa Broussa
Biiyiikada Prinkipos
<;anakkale Dardanelles
<;atalca Metra/Chataldja
<;orlu Tyroloi
Edime Adrianople
Enoz Enos
Erdek Cyzicus
Eregii HeracIea
Fener Phanar
Galata/Karakoy Galata
Galatasaray Stavrodromi
Heybeliada Chalki
lskenderun Alexandretta
lstanbul Constantinople
lzmir Smyrna
lzmit Nicomedia
lznik Nicaea
I3
Kadlkoy Chalcedon
Kayseri Caesarea
Tatavla
Xyrokrini
Langa Vlaga
Mac;ka Rodopolis
Niksar N eocaesarea
Pendik Panteichi
Samatya Ipsomatheion
Sigi Sigrni
Silivri Silivria
Tarabya Therapeia
Terkoz Dercos
Trabzon Trebizond
Vize Vyzia
Yedikule Eptapyrgos
14
AT:
BMAEV:
BMAIP:
BS:
BTTD:
CR:
D.B.F.P:
DP:
E.A.:
ECR:
FO:
GOThR:
HFD:
IJMES:
iy:
JEH:
JMH:
LCNEA:
LNOJ:
LNTS:
LPA/DvP:
LPA/DgP:
MEA:
MEJ:
MES:
OM:
RPP:
RyP:
SBFD:
SIA:
TBMM:
TL
UNSC:
ABBREVIATIONS
AYln Tarihi
Benaki Museum, Archive of Eleftherios Venizelos
Benaki Museum, Archive of Ioannis Politis
Balkan Studies
Belgelerle Turk Tarih Dergisi (Journal of Documented
Turkish History)
Contemporary Review
Documents on British Foreign Policy
Democrat Party
'EKKATlcrtacrnKTt 'AAiJgeta (Ecclesiastical Truth)
Eastern Churches Review
Foreign Office
Greek Orthodox Theological
Hukuk Faciiltesi Dergisi/Ankara Universitesl (Journal
of the Faculty of Law of Ankara University)
International Journal of Middle East Studies
istatistik Ylmgl (Annual Statistics)
Journal of Economic History
Journal of Modern History
Lausanne Conference on Near Eastern Affairs
League of Nations, Official Journal
League of Nations, Treaty Series
Lambeth Palace Library, Davison Papers
Lambeth Palace Library, Douglas Papers
Middle Eastern Affairs
Middle Eastern Journal
Middle Eastem Studies
Oriente Moderno
Republican Peoples Party
Ryan Papers
Siyasal Bilgiler FakuItesi Dergisi, Ankara Universitesl
(Joumal of the Faculty of Political Science of
Ankara University)
Survey of International Affairs
Turkiye Buyuk Millet Meclisi (Turkish Grand National
Assembly)
Turkish lira/Turkish pound
United Nations Security Council
15
PREFACE
This book, originally a doctoral thesis, traces the changing fortunes of the
Constantinopolitan Greek community. Throughout the Tourkokratia (Otto-
man rule), this community, with the Ecumenical Patriarchate at its head,
provided leadership for Asiatic Hellenism. But as the Ottoman capital was
transformed from age-old, cosmopolitan Constantinople into present day
istanbul during the last sixty years, the traditional status of the Greeks
underwent remarkable changes. Together with the Cypriot Greeks, the
dwindling communities of istanbul and Egypt, have, since 1923, provided the
last chapter in the history of the classical Greek diaspora.
Faithful to the belief that they descended directly from the citizens of
Romano-Byzantine Constantinople, the istanbul Greeks considered them-
selves as Romioi. The Turks, too, acknowledged this fact by addressing the
Greek Orthodox community as Rum Milleti. Since 1821 the term Rum was
used as an ingenious device to distinguish a Greek of the Ottoman empire
from one of the independent Greek state, whose citizens are known to the
Turks as Yunanll.
Since the Ecumenical Patriarchate acted as a focal point of the Constanti-
nopolitan Greek community, special attention is paid to the position of this
institution within the nationalist and secular political structure of modern
Turkey. Further, in the process of this study it became clear that the destiny
of the Greek minority, as well as that of the Ecumenical Patriarchate, were
greatly influenced by the political relations between Greece and Turkey.
Conversely, these relations were, to some extent, shaped by the treatment
accorded to the respective minorities (Greeks of Turkey and Muslims of
Western Thrace). In view of this interaction, an assessment of Greco-Turkish
relations and their impact on the Greek minority was deemed essential.
Again passing reference has been made to the Muslim minority of Greece,
which like the Constantinopolitan Greeks survived the exchange of popula-
tions between Greece and Turkey in 1922 -1923.
On the other hand I have omitted from this study the Greek island com-
munities of Imbros and Tenedos, which like the Constantinopolitan Greeks,
survived the compulsory Greek -Turkish population exchange in 1922 -23.
Although these islanders experienced similar political and social changes,
nevertheless due to their geographical position, they form a separate unit
17
with their own particular problems. I have dealt with this question in an
article, Imbros and Tenedos: A Study in Turkish Attitudes Toward Two
Ethnic Greek Island Communities Since 1923, published in Journal of the
Hellenic Diaspora, vol. VII, no. 1, 1980, pp. 5-3l.
For the term Rum used by the Turks to denote the Greek Orthodox
minority in the Ottoman empire and later in modem Turkey, I have adopted
the English equivalent of Ottoman Greek or simply Greek; while for the term
Yunan applied by the Turks to Greeks of Greece, as well as the Constan-
tinopolitan Greeks with Greek nationality, I have utilized the terms Hellene,
Hellenic Greek, Constantinopolitan Hellene etc. For place names I have
adopted the modern Turkish version and have given in a separate table the
Greek equivalents. But, in cases where Anatolian or Thracian cities consti-
tute a diocese or a bishopric the Greek name has been preferred. For the
names ending with oglu two forms have been adopted: oglll for the Turkish
names as in Orhan Eyliboglu and OglOli for the Greek names as in Alexander
Siniosoglou.
While working on this study I received the welcome support of numerous
individuals. Mr Richard Clogg, of London University, provided guidance
through his unparalleled knowledge of modern Greek history. Miss Julian
Chrysostomides, of London University, was unstinting in her encourage-
ment and judicious in her criticism as the manuscript first took shape. The
manuscript was read by Professor George K. Tenekides, Dr. John Cambell,
and benefitted from their careful comments. I would like to thank in particular
Dr. William Hale, of Durham University whose intimate knowledge of Tur-
key sensitized me tojmp,prtant considerations that had escaped my attention.
My special thanks are due to Dr. PaschalL<; Kitromilides, Mr Donald Sedwick,
Dr. Paul Hidiroglou and Mrs Valentini Tselika for their valuable assistance.
This book is largely based on the British Public Record Office archives and
the archives of the Greek Foreign Ministry. My thanks are due to the staff of
these archives. I am indebted also to Miss Iphigenie Anastasiadou, director of
the archive at the Benaki Museum, Athens, who alerted me to the rich
archives of Eleftherios Venizelos and John Politis. Her recent untimely death
was a serious blow to Greek scholarship. My thanks are also due to the
custodian and staff ofthe archive at Lambeth Palace, London. Likewise, I am
grateful to the librarians at the British Museum, BUITOWS Library, King's
College, the School of Oriental and African Studies, St. Antony's College,
Oxford, the Islamic Library at McGill, Montreal, the Gennadius, Vouli and
National libraries of Athens. I welcome this opportunity to thank a great
number of Constantinopolitan Greeks who furnished me with documents ,
rare books and information. The publication of this book has been made
18
possible thanks to a decision of the governing board of the Centre for Asia
Minor Studies to include my work in the distinguished publication series of
their institution. I wish to express my appreciation to them for honouring me
with this decision.
Finally, I reserve for special mention and thanks my parents who provided
me with ample moral and material support. But. ultimately, lowe my greatest
debt of gratitude to my wife, who not only translated a large number of
documents. but also tolerated. encouraged and helped me during my five year
long courtship with the book. The faults of the book burden only the author.
19
ALEXIS P. ALEXANDRIS
Montreal 1982
CHAPTER I
THE POSITION OF THE GREEKS IN ISTANBUL BEFORE 1918
I. The Millet System.
The Greeks have been one of the leading ethnic groups to have inhabited
istanbul. They alone can justifiably claim kinship with the original founders
of the city who colonized it in 658 B.c. Similarly. members of this community
are considered as Romioi, the direct descendants of the citizens of classical
Constantinople (or New Rome). the capital of the Byzantine empire. With the
appearance of the Turkish element. after the Ottoman capture of istanbul in
1453. one of history's most intensive cultural symbioses was inaugurated.
Under Ottoman rule istanbul became the centre of Muslim-Christian co-
existence which lasted for over five hundred years.
This was mainly the outcome of a remarkable system of government. the
millet system. adopted by the Ottoman state machinery. Faced with the
administration of a large cosmopolitan empire, the Islamic Ottoman ruling
class granted a substantial degree of self-government to the non-Muslim
religious minorities. Perhaps the most striking feature of the millet structure
was its formation on religious. rather than racial or linguistic affilia-
tions. Thus. there were no Turkish. Kurdish or Arab millets but a single
Muslim nation which embraced all adherents to the Islamic religion in the
empire. On the other hand, despite their ethnic and linguistic homogeneity,
the Ottoman Armenians were divided along religious lines into Gregorian and
Catholic nations. Likewise all the Orthodox peoples of the Balkans. Asia
Minor and the Arab provinces of the empire were deemed to belong to the
Greek Orthodox community (Millet-i Rum or Rum Milleti). Other non-
Islamic millets were those of the Jews. and later on, the Frankish and
Lutheran nations.
1
The concept of national entities transcending religious
distinctions was not established until a comperatively late date. The influence
of the Western idea amongst the Ottoman Christians began to
1 By 1914. there were seventeen separate /Ilillets For a general treatment of this system of
government see. K H Karpal..-\n /11</llin il1lo the Social Foundations in the
0110/ll{/1/ State. Princeton 1973
21
gain ground during the nineteenth century. Perhaps the most dramatic illust-
ration of this phenomenon was the struggle of the Bulgarians to establish an
independent Orthodox church. Although the Ottoman government officially
recognized the Bulgarian Exarchate in 1870, the Greek Orthodox Patriar-
chate of Constantinople strenously resisted the secession of the Bulgarians,
whose demand for ecclesiastical autonomy it regarded as political and there-
fore schismatic.
2
It was only in 1945 that the Patriarchate agreed to grant-
autocephality to the church of Bulgaria.
The traditional jurisdiction of the Greek patriarch of Constantinople over
the Bulgarians, as well as the other Orthodox of the empire, derived from the
!n!llet system, which remained in force from 1454 until 1923. Accordingly, the
leader of each millet was the highest ecclesiastical office-holder of the
respective community and was directly accountable to the head of the Otto-
man government for the management of the internal affairs concerning his
particular flock (reaya). Throughout the Ottoman period, the Greek Or-
thodox patriarch of Constantinople bore the title of the spiritual and ethnic
leader of the Greek Orthodox nation (Milletbas)/,EevapX1lC.J This title was
originally bestowed upon Gennadios_II Scholarim;, the first
patriarch, by Sultan Mehmet II in 1454. By a charter,3 formalizing relations
between state and church, the Greek patriarch became a recognized inember
of the sultan's bureaucracy enjoying extensive rights over his flock. Through
the religious privileges (imtiyazat-i mezhebiye !nPOVOj1la) , inserted in this
charter, the Greek patriarch, in addition to his traditional spiritual powers,
assumed a fairly extensive civil authority over matters of internal millet
administration. As the chief of the millet-i Rum, therefore, he controlled not
only the ecclesiastical, educational and charitable institutions of the Ottoman
Orthodox, but also the regulation of matters relating to personal status, such
as marriage, divorce and inheritance. The Phanar clergy had jurisdiction over
all legal cases involving members of the millet except in criminal matters,
which the Ottoman government reserved for its own courts. The ethnarch
imposed taxes on his people for the maintenance of his vast millet organiza-
tion.
To fulfil his extensive responsibilities, the ethnarch was assisted not only
by the holy synod but also by a number of lay officers with high-sounding
2. See M. I. Gedeon, X;vYl'parpa [JaTpzaPXIKo. Ka! L'VVO&Ko. rou BovJ.yapiKou
18521873, Constantinople 1908.
3. This charter has been lost, though the text of the document has been recorded by
George Phrantzis and other writers. The earliest surviving charter is that of Patriarch
Dionysos III Vardalis (1662). See M. I. Gedeon, 'EniO"'lf.1a Tprif.1f.1ara TOVPKIKri, dvarpepof.1el'a
de; TO. eKK).J7O"zaO"TlKd (jiKaIa. Constantinople 1910. pp. 9-14.
22
titles, recalling the splendour of the Byzantine court. These were the grand
logothete (M kya(,; A oyoeerrr;) , grand treasurer (M eyae; I Keuorpv).a!;) , grand
orator (Merar;; Ptjrwp) and grand archivist (Meyae; Xaprorpv).a!;). Each millet
was granted the privilege of electing its own religious head. Such election,
however, had to be confirmed by a government decree, the berat (deeret
d'investiture), authorizing religious leaders to exercise their functions. Pat-
riarch Germanos V (1913-18) was the last Greek Orthodox patriarch to
receive such a berat. Paradoxically, the sultan, though non-Christian, acted
in some ways like a Byzantine emperor. Thus, after the election of a pat-
riarch, he would personally install the newly elected religious leader to his
throne, although in the years 1657-1834 the patriarchs appeared before the
grand vezir (sadrazQm) rather than the sultan. Even the priVilege of using
Greek as the official language in its relations with the Sublime Porte was
granted to the Patriarchate.
4
These rights and privileges conferred upon the Orthodox, as well as the
other non-Muslim communities of the empire, became synonymous with the
existence of the millet system. But from the Greek patriarch's point of view,
the most far-reaching aspect of his position was probably the extension of his
authority to the non-Greek Orthodox Ottoman subjects, thus spreading his
jurisdiction over many different races. For the first time since the heyday of
the Byzantine empire, the Orthodox Christians of the Near East were actual-
ly brought together under a single religious authority. As a result the tradi-
tional ecumenical character of the Patriarchate was considerably enhanced.
Under these circumstances, the patriarch co-operated with the civil authority,
with whom his interests were usually allied.
The official seat of the Ecumenical Patriarchate has been in the Fener
district of istanbul since 1599. Throughout the Ottoman history, the Patriar-
chate was also referred to by the Greek name of this district, Phanar
(rJ>avaplov). There, amid a group of modest buildings - mainly constructed
by Patriarch Joachim III5 at the turn of the century- stands the patriarchal
cathedral of St. George. Another residence of the patriarch was in
4. M .. 1. Gedeon, I'd (jiKaza Ka! npovof.1za .-au OiKOVf.1eviKOU TlarpzaPXelOV, (memorandum pre-
pared for Patriarch Joachim III), Constantinople 1909. part I. pp. 7-64; C. G. Papadopoulos, Les
Privileges du Patriarchat oecunu?nique dans I'Empire ottoman, Paris 1924.
5. Joachim Devetzis (1834-1912). Born in the Bosphorus suburb of Boyaclkoy
(Vaphaiochorion). Studied in Bucharest and Vienna. After serving as metropolitan of Thes-
saloniki. he was elected patriarch in 1878. He resigned in 1884 over a disagreement with the Porte
on the question of millet privileges. He was returned to patriarchal throne in 1901. He reigned
until his death in 1912. One of the most celebrated patriarchs. Joachim was noted for his strong
leadership ana dynamic personality"
23
tSTANBUL BtLOl
UNIVERSITY LIBRARY
by the Bosphorus. while at present his summer residence is in the
theological school of Chalki (Heybeli). Between 1453 and 1600 the pat-
riarchal residence followed the wanderings of the patriarchal cathedral
churches of the Holy Apostoles (1453-55), Pammakaristos (1455-87), Panagia
Paramythias at Wallach Saray (1587-97), and St. Dimitrios Kanavi at Xylo-
porta/Balat (1597-99).6
The immediate results of the millet structure were advantageous to both
parties. For. while the Ottoman sultans assumed the responsibility of protect-
ing the life and property of their subject races. the heads of the millets, in
return. ensured the fidelity and obedience of their flocks to the Sublime
Porte. All the same there were two fundamental long-term flaws in this
system. First. as the general quality of government in the Ottoman empire
deteriorated. particularly after the humiliating treaty of Karlowitz (1699). the
millet system fell prey to increasing abuse. The Ottoman rulers and senior
officials, as well as a great number of unscrupulous Greek Orthodox clerics
and lay members. indulged in undignified acts of corruption. The device. for
instance. of putting ecclesiastical positions up for auction was traditionally a
convenient way of increasing the sovereign's revenues. On the other hand.
the acquisition of berats led to acute competition among rival factions within
the non-Muslim communities leading to frequent instances of abuse. The
Greek Orthodox millet was particularly susceptible to such scrambles for
power since. because of its vast wealth. key ecclesiastical positions offered
an abundance of lucrative possibilities. Nor did the arbitrary manner with
which various sultans. as well as government officials. deal with the politi-
cally inferior non- Muslim citizens assisted in reinforcing the Ottoman system
of government.
7
Second, the wide authority on internal affairs granted to the millets
ultimately proved fatal to the effective incorporation of the non-Muslims into
the Ottoman body politic. Further, the continued existence of these distinct
religious communities offered a convenient opportunity to the Great Powers
of Europe for intervention and intrigue among the minorities. Significantly.
the concept of secular Ottoman citizenship never gained whole-hearted sup-
port. despite a number of attempts by notable Ottoman reformers during the
second half of the nineteenth century. Dissatisfaction with Ottoman rule and
6. See A. Pasadaios. '0 fJa7pIaPX1KO:; O1Ko:; rou O1KovpEl'lKOU epOI'OIJ. Thessaloniki 1976. pp.
83-104: Germanos (Sardis). <<'0 'Ev <I>avapicp narptapXlK()<; 011(0<; roD 'Ayiou lc:copyiou.
16 (1941) 19.
7. It has been estimated that 101 patriarchs served 162 Patriarchates (one of them, Cyril I
Loukaris was elected six times to the patriarchal throne). See Germanos (Sardis). LVJlfJoi.l; d:;
TlJlj; Karai.oioV:; KWl'ural'T/\'ovnoi.Ew; dna Hi:; Ai.wuEW:; Kai istanbul 1935-38.2 vols.
24
the maintenance of a strong ethnic-religious consciousness by the non-
Muslim millets precipitated the genesis of the spirit of Balkan nationalism
during the nineteenth century. The modern doctrine of nationalism which
began to seize the imagination of the minorities proved disastrous for the
preservation of the Ottoman empire.
s
2. Ottoman Reform and the Greeks.
Meanwhile, as the declining Ottoman empire became the bone of conten-
tion among the Great Powers, the Ottoman Christian factor was utilized by
such nations as a pretext for intervention in the internal affairs of the empire.
The increasing European interest in the fortunes of the Ottoman Christians
was illustrated by the inclusion in the treaty of Kutchuk-Kainardji (KiiC;iik
Kaynarca. 1774) of an Ottoman commitment to protect the Christian relig-
ion and the churches of that religion (article 7). In addition, thanks to this
treaty Russia was granted the right to build an Orthodox church in Istanbul,
and to make representations on behalf of those who served it.1 This article
had far-reaching effects for it provided the basis for a Russian right of
intervention in the Near East and gradually growing into a virtual protector-
ate over Ottoman Orthodox Christians. This right of intervention was often
abused by Russia, who on many occasions incited the Orthodox to rebellion
in order to use such outbreaks as a pretext for attacking and for annexing
portions of the sultan's territory. At other times, however, when anxious to
placate the Turks, the czar cynically neglected his proteges abandoning them
to the visitations of Ottoman wrath.
More significant, from the non-Muslim point of view, was the establish-
ment of the doctrine of equality as official Ottoman policy. Sultan Mahmud II
(1808-39) declared that in his view all his subjects, of whatever creed, were
equal. But it was during the Tanzimat (Reorganization) period of 1839 to
1876, an era of unprecedented internal structural change, that the doctrine of
equality of Muslims and non-Muslims was solemnly proclaimed. The driving
force behind this age of great reforming edicts was a number of western
educated liberal Ottoman politicians and Sultan Abdiilmecid (1839-1861).
Seeking to modernize and westernize the political and administrative institu-
tions of the empire, the reformers espoused a new concept of Ottomanism
(OsmaniUik), the concept of a common Ottoman citizenship and loyalty,
irrespective of religion or origin. The reformers' commitment to egalitarian
principles was manifested by the enactment of a reform rescript on 3
8. R. H Davison. Reform in the Ottoman Empire 1856-1876. Princeton 1963. pp. 13-19 ..
I M. S. Anderson. The Eal"lern Quellioll 1774-1923. London 1968. p. xL
25
November 1839 (Hatt-i Serif of Giilhane). While the Hatt-i Serifpromised the
protection of life, liberty and property, its most novel aspect was its official
declaration of equality. Quite unequivocally the hatt affirmed that the impe-
rial concessions would be extended to all our subjects, of whatever religious
sect they may be.2
The new policy was confirmed in a more extensive reform edict, the Hatt-i
Hiimayun (islahat, Ferman/), which granted equal treatment for adherents of
all creeds in such matters as educational opportunity, appointment to gov-
ernment posts, and the administration of justice, as well as in taxation and
military service. This edict - prepared under strong pressure from the
British, French and Austrian ambassadors- was promulgated by Sultan
Abdiilmecid on 18 February, 1856.
3
These efforts at modernization were
carried on by the succeeding sultan, Abdiilaziz (1861- 1876), who on many
occasions stated his willingness to respect the privileges of the non-Muslim
communities and to regard all his subject as children of the same
fatherland. Even more significant was the promulgation of the first written
Ottoman constitution in December, 1876, establishing a limited constitutional
monarchy (mes,rutiyet) whose subjects were considered Ottoman, whatever
religion or creed they hold. Further, article 17 of the constitution affirmed
that all Ottomans are equal before the law ... without distinction as to
religion .4
These far-reaching changes in the Ottoman empire were closely watched
by the Great Powers and in particular the Hatt-i Hiimayun of 1856 assumed
international character by its inclusion in the treaty of Paris (1856), as article 9
of this treaty expressed European approval of this crucial hat!. Further,
progress on the question of Ottoman minority rights was achieved during the
Berlin Congress in 1878, the most significant of all international bodies prior
to 1919 attempting to deal with the question of minorities in the Ottoman
empire. While the Armenian millet sent an official delegation to Berlin, a long
memorandum drawn up by the patriarchal authorities on the question of the
Orthodox privileges was read at the conference. Articles 61 and 62 of the
treaty of Berlin dealt with the principle of religious toleration. Accordingly,
paragraph four of article 62 stipulated:
The freedoms and outward exercise of all forms of worship are as-
sured to all, and no hindrance shall be offered either to the hierarchical
2. For a full copy of the original decree published in the official gazette see Stefanos
. Yerasimos, Azge/is,mililik Siirecinde Turkiye. istanbul 1977, ii/pp. 1116-26.
3. Ibid" pp. 1127-36.
4, R. H. Davison, Turkish Attitudes Concerning Christian-Muslim Equality in the
Nineteenth Century. American Historical Review. 59 (1954) 847 ff.
26
organization of the various Communities or to their relations with the
various spiritual chiefs. 5
Notwithstanding the inclusion of assurances for the protection of Ottoman
minorities, the treaty of Berlin lacked the necessary mechanisms to ensure
the implementation of these clauses.
Although genuine equality was never attained in the Ottoman empire, the
reforms of 1839 to 1876 undoubtedly served well the non-Muslim subjects of
the sultan. Members of the Armenian, Greek and Jewish communities started
to be assigned to administrative ,judiciary ,economic and educational posts of
the government immediately after the reform act of 1856. An important
aspect oflocal administrative councils (idare meclisleri) set up in 1840 was the
considerable representation ofthe non-Muslim communities. Christians and
Muslims were accepted together as students in the newly established imperial
lyeee of Galatasaray in 1867, while a number of prominent non-Muslims,
mainly residents in the capital, reached influential positions in the Ottoman
government. Thus, eminent minority members were appointed to such high
offices of state as the Council of the Judicial Ordinances (Meclis-i Viilii-Yl
Ahkiim-l Adliye) in 1856,6 and later on the Council of State (Sllray-l Devlet)
founded in 1868.7 Similarly out of a total of twenty-eight experts in the
constitutional drafting committee two were Greeks,8 and from the fifty-one
senators who served during the constitutional period (1877 - 78) six were
Greeks.
9
But the most visible non-Muslim presence was at the diplomatic
missions of the Ottoman empire in such key European capitals as London,
Paris, Vienna, Brussels, Berlin and St. Petersburg. By the late 1860s mem-
bers of the minorities formed tht> bulk of the diplomatic corps who handled
Ottoman missions abroad.
The position of the Greeks, therefore, though profoundly shaken by the
outbreak of the Greek revolt in 1821, was to a considerable extent restored by
5. On the Armenian delegation see M. K. Krikorian, Armenians in the Sen'ice of the Ottoman
Empire 1860-1908. London 1978, pp. 7-8.
6. Greek member Stephen Vogoridis (1773-1859). Vogoridis, a hellenized Bulgarian from
Kotek, received his training at the Phanariot circles in Bucharest and between 1812-1819 served
as assistant to the Phanariot ruler of Moldavia, Skarlatos Kallimachis. In 1832 he was appointed
prince of the autonomous island of Sam os, a position he hold until 1850. He was a close friend of
the liberal Ottoman vezir Mustafa Reid and was favoured by Sultan Abdiilaziz.
7. Greek members: Constantine Karatheodoris (1802-79), Constantine Mousouros (1807-91)
and Stavros Aristarchis (1834-1925).
8. Alexander Karatheodoris and John Savas, the director of the Galatasaray lycee.
9. Markos Pasha, Stavros Aristarchis, Constantine Mousouros. Constantine Anthopoulos,
Spyridon Mavroyenis and Karatheodoris, a full list in R. Deveneux, The First
Ottoman Constitutional Period. Baltimore 1963, pp. 276-82.
27
the middle of the nineteenth century. Together with a few surviving members
of the Phanariot noblesse de robe, 10 a new class of Ottoman senior civil
servants and diplomats established themselves in positions of power and
influence. The most well-known istanbul Greek families of the late
nineteenth century were those of the Mousouros, Aristarchis, Karatheodoris
and Vogoridis.
Thus, despite the execution of their father, Stavros Aristarchis
(1770-1822), the last Greek dragoman of the Porte, during the anti-Greek
reprisals in the 1820s, Nicholas (1799-1866), Miltiadis and John
(1811-97) succeeded in gaining access to government office. NIcholas became
the private tutor of sultans Abdiilmecid and Abdiilaziz, Milti.adis served
as governor of Sam os from 1861 to 1866. But itwas John Anstarchls who
a service of over fifty years, mainly as the Ottoman ambassador to Berlm,
distinguished himself as a senior diplomat of the Porte. The son of Nicholas,
Stavros Aristarchis (1834-1925) was appointed to the senate on 17 March 1877
and was one of the three surviving members to be brought back to the senate
when it was reopened in 1908. Another member of the family, Gregory
Aristarchis headed the Ottoman mission in Washington and was the author
of a work, Legislation Ottomane, which appeared in seven
volumes (Constantinople 1873 - 88). In token of his appreciation for the ser-
vices of this family, Sultan Abdiilmecid received in audience the disting-
uished Greek lady, Sophia Aristarchi and gave her his portrait in diamonds. It
was the first decoration ever given by an Ottoman sovereign to a lady. 11
Perhaps the most well-known Ottoman Greek diplomat of the nineteenth
century was Alexander Karatheodoris (1833 -1906).J2 A close friend of re-
former Mithat Pasha, he acquired prominence as Sultan Abdiilhamid
II'advisor on foreign affairs. In 1874 Karatheodoris was appointed ambas-
sador to Rome and in 1876 he became undersecretary at the ministry of
foreign affairs. But his international reputation stems from his outstanding
performance, as a leading Ottoman delegate, during the congress of Berlin
(1878). Because of his considerable diplomatic abilities, he was promoted to
minister of foreign affairs (1878), but he soon resigned from this post, when
the sultan rejected the reform proposals recommended by the liberal Vezir
10. For a comprehensive list of the Phanariots who ruled the princely thrones of Walla chi a and
Moldavia (l711-1821) see E.Z. Karal, Osmanll Tarihi, Ankara 1959, iv/pp. 42-77. After the death
of Sultan Mahmud II (1839) few Phanariots, such as Kallimachis and Karatzas, returned to the
Ottoman capital from abroad where they had found refuge after Greek revolt:
1 L See C. Hamlin, Among the Tlaks, New York, p. 372. For a list of non-Muslim Ottoman
officials, ibid, pp.
12. A career diplomat. A very cultivated man well-acquainted with ancient Greek, Persian and
Arabic literature
28
Tunuslu Hayreddin Pasha. After serving as governor of Samos (1885 - 95), he
became the first Christian governor of Crete (1895 - 96) and for a short while,
he also served as minister of public works. Alexander was the son of Stephan-
Karatheodoris, the personal physician of Mahmud II and Abdiilmecid: Be-
side his long services to the royal family (1827-61), Stephen Karatheodoris
was also instrumental in the foundation of the first medical school in 1828,
where he taught for nearly forty years.
13
Other members of this family were
employed in various depmtments of government throughout the nineteenth
and early twentieth centuries.
14
Notwithstanding their ethnic origin, these technocrat Greeks were mem-
bers of the Ottoman establishment and were closely tied to Tanzimat spirit.
They were working for Ottoman goals and strongly defended the empire
against European encroachments and minority separatism. Aware of their
political stand, the Sublime Porte was even prepared to appoint Ottoman
Greeks to the Ottoman Embassy in Athens. Thus. Mousouros
strongly defended Ottoman positions during his eight year term as the Porte's
ambassador to the Greek kingdom (1840-1848) and did not even hesitate to
break off relations with Greece in 1847, when he felt that the interests of the
empire were threatened. Another Constantinopolitan Greek diplomat, John
Photiadis served as the Ottoman ambassador in Athens throughout the Cre-
tan crisis-and on 17 December 1868, he departed from Athens in protest
against the Greek position on Crete. Another important post which was held
by Constantinopolitan Greeks for most of the later part of the nineteenth
century was the Ottoman ambassadorship to Great Britain. The distinguished
diplomat, Constantine Mousouros served as ambassador to London for thir-
ty-five years (1856-91)15 and was succeeded by Constantine Anthopoulos
(1891-1902)16 and Stephen Mousouros (1902-07)Y But Ottoman Greeks
13. 1789-1867. Born in a village near Edirne (Adrianople). Studied medicine in the university of
Pisa and settled in the Ottoman capital in 1826. A distinguished polyglot he was noted to have
been able to communicate in sixteen languages. One of the founders of the Constantinopolitan
Greek Literary Society (1861), he served for many years in the patriarchal council.
14. For details on the Constantinopolitan Greeks who served the Porte see my own, Oi
cr'tl'lv lJ1tllPEcria 1850-1922, Lle).riol' rii:; '/awPlla7:;
Kai 'E'Ol'o}.O"/II<.7;:; 'Era/peia;; Iii:; 'E}.I.6.r5o:;, 23 (1980) 365-404.
15. 1807-91.. A Constantinopolitan Greek, he began his career as Ottoman commissioner to the
principality of Samos. He served in Athens, Vienna, Turin and London and representated the
empire in the conferences of Paris (1869) and London (1871). For more details see S. Kuneralp,
Bir Osmanll Diplomatl: Kostaki Musurus 1807-1891", Belletell, 34 (1970) 427-30.
16. 1835-1902. A Constantinopolitan Greek served as senator and member of the court of
justice.
17. 1841-1907. Son of Constantine Mousoums .. He also served as ambassador to Rome and
governor of Sam os (1896-97).
29
also filled top positions at a number of other embassies in Europe.
IS
As
members of a class closely linked to the state service, these Ottoman Greeks
behaved as loyal subjects of the sultan and did not act as formal or informal
spokesmen of the Greek millet. Notwithstanding their identification with
Ottoman elite, however, almost all of them paid considerable attention to the
internal affairs of their community, particularly on such matters as education
and reform in the millet structure.
Meanwhile many of these notables enjoyed close relationships with the
Ottoman sovereigns during the second half of the nineteenth century. These
ties were amply demonstrated when Sultan AbdiiImecid took the unpre-
cedented step of attending the Greek Orthodox wedding of Stephen Vogo-
ridis' younger daughter to John Photiadis in 1851.
19
A close relationship also
existed between Abdiilhamid II and his chief physician the Phanariot Spyri-
don Mavroyenis, whose son Alexander, also acted as the sultan's private
secretary. 20
A visible growth in the number of non-Muslim employees during the
Hamidian era suggests that the palace service became increasingly more
accessible to members of the minorities who sometimes functioned as senior
palace administrators. Thus, while Abdiilhamid II employed a number of
Armenian experts in the administration of the Privy Council, he maintained a
large body of Greek physicians at his palace. In fact these Greeks, as well as a
number of notable families from the Armenian and Jewish millets, were the
nearest that the Ottoman government got in developing a concept of
OsmanlUlk (Ottomanism) among the various elements in the empire. A na-
tionality law of 1869 was intended to encourage the Ottoman subjects to
develop primarily an alIegiance to the state and only secondarily to their
specific millets. Yet the concept of secular Ottoman citizenship never gained
whole-hearted support from non-Muslims and Muslims alike, and the great
majority of the people preferred to exist as separately defined communities.
18. For details on some other eminent Constantinopolitan Greeks see Alexandris. op. cit .. pp.
368-75.
19. The three distinguished Constantinopolitan Greek families - Vogoridis, Mousouros and
Photiadis- had in fact close family ties through intermarriages, see Kuneralp. op. cit .. p. 425.
20, Spyridon Mavroyenis (1816-1902). A distinguished Constantinopolitan Greek doctor. He
exerted considerable influence on Abdiilhamid. He served as a senator in 1878 and was also a
founder of the Constantinopolitan Greek Literary Society (1861). His son Alexander was a
career diplomat. He served in Washington and Vienna as well as in the island of Samos. From
1908-22, he was a senator in the Young Turk parliament. He donated his extensive library to the
Greek Literary Society. He died in lstanbul in 1925.
30
3.. The economic position of the COflstantinopolitan Greeks.
The increasing importance of the Ottoman Greeks was largely due to the
marked economic. social and demographic upsurge of the Greek element in
the empire half of the nineteenth century. A cohesive class
of Greek - and Armenian- enterpreneurial bourgeoisie oftLf!ders.qrokers,
and commissioners appeared in istanbul. as well as the other
centres of the empire. This was particularly so after the Anglo-
'Ottoman commercialtrealYih J838which ushered in a large influx offoreign
qlpital in the Ottoman empire."iOttoman Christians participated actively in
those sectors of the economy that expanded most rapidly in the post-1838 era:
foreign trade with Europe, the various branches of finance;'mecharlized
trasport. export-orientated agriculture and modern industries. 2 The Christian
presence most pronounced in finance. The famous Galata bankers
(sarrafs) were predominantly Greeks and Armenians. The bigsarrafs of the
capital wielded great power as lenders to the Sublime Porte and various other
ministries. particularly during the Hamidian periocf(f876-1909). Thus, in an
attempt to bailout the government. which through improvident measures and
extravagant palace_spending brought to near bankruptcy. the Galata
bankers. in cooperation with a number of European businessmen, fumisned
the-Porte with 8.725.000 Ottoman liras in 1879.
3
But even the financial
adVisors of-many sultans belonged to fhe minorities. Sultan Abdtilhamid: II
regularly consulted the Greek banker Zariphis and the Armenian broker
Assan! on his business transactions. -1 Another Greek financier. Christaki
Zographos. was the banker of Sultan Murad V. S
Christian minority members soon became local agents of foreign capital
(mainly British and French). Along with this commercial middle class.
Greeks and Armenians staffed the liberal professions, namely physicians,
pharmacists. engineers, lawyers. bank managers. and teachers. They also
formed an important sector of the salaried middle class employed mainly by
the large European enterprises such as banks. railways, public utilities and
industries. But even a greater part of the skilled urban working class in
I D. Avclogiu. Tlirk(lenin Dii:eni. Ankara. 1979. i p, 202 f.
2 V. Eidem OSIIl{[lillllllpal"{[lm/II/;lIlilllilklisadi HaH/Iii/a hir Telkik, Ankara 1970.
chapter ix
3. Yerasimos., "p .. cil, ii p, 894 .. The Istanbul Greek financiers who participated in this
enterprise were: Zariphis. Evgenidis. Stephanovik-Skylitzis. Th Mavrokordatos. A Vlastos.
Koronaios. Negrepontis
t Avcloglu. op. (il. i p .. 212,
.5 On the SUltan's friendship with Zographos see M.e Kuntay. Nalllik I\elll{[r Istanbul
1944-56, ii (part I) p 738 ..
31
3
istanbul was in fact made up of Greeks.
6
The powerful economic position of
the Greeks is illustrated by the actual capital investment in the Ottoman
in 1914.7
'!-- Nationality
Greek
Armenian
Turkish
Foreign nationals
Jewish
Percentage of capital investment
50
20
15
10
5
Evidently, the Christians had been quite successful in absorbing a large'
share of the fruits of economic progress. The matter was put succinctly by a
British diplomat and scholar in 1900: One may criticize the Turkish charac-
ter, but given their idiosyncrasies, one must admit that they derive little profit
from such blessings of civilization as are introduced into their country.
Foreign syndicates profit most, and after them native Christians, but not the
Osmanli, except insofar as he can make them disgorge their gains.8 Paradoxi-
cally, therefore, economic growth was not only responsible for stimulating .
the Ottoman economy, but also for intensifying social differentiation among
the various ethnic elements in the empire. This economic imbalance helped
divide Muslims and non-Muslims into increasingly hostile groups, and ulti-
mately undermined the multi-ethnic and multi-religious foundations of the
Ottoman empire. The control of commercial activity by the Ottoman Chris-
tian groups stimulated to a large extent the economic nationalism of Young
Turks.
4. The Question of the Millet Privileges (Ilpov0f.1.zaKo ZftT1Jf.1.a).
This growing influence of the Greek element in the empire in general
and in istanbul in particular jeopardized the power and authority traditionally
exerted by the Orthodox clergy over the Greek mille t. Soon the economic and
political aspirations of the secular intelligentsia and the enterpreneurial elites
in istanbul came into conflict with the traditionalist ideological position of the
Orthodox Patriarchate and the organization of the mille t. Joining forces wi th
. Muslim reformers, the Greek middle class pressed for the democratization of
6. This work deals exclusively with the Constantinopolitan Greek community and thus not
adequate attention has been paid to the other important non-Muslim minorities in Istanbul. For
those millets see Abraham Galante. Role Economique des luifs d'/stanbul, Istanbul 1942, p. 4 f.;
Edward C. Clark, The Ottoman Industrial Revolution, IJMES 5 (1974) 65-76.
7. Yerasimos, op. cit., ii/po 929.
8. Sir Charles Eliot. Turkey in Europe, New York 1965. p. 153.
32
the oligarchic millet structure.
1
The Greek ecclesiastical hierarchy, however,
resisted changes which were intended to increase lay participation in the
communal administration. Nor did they appear enthusiastic about the whole
reform movement in the Ottoman empire.
2
Likewise they tacitly opposed the
principle of Ottomanism which they correctly feared would have ultimately
undermined clerical authority over the millet. Instead they advised Greeks to
continue with their support for the established system of gerondismos, which
assured an overwhelming clerical dominance on all affairs regarding the
millet. This system took its name from the gerondes, (metropolitans of high
rank) and remained in operation from mid-eighteenth to mid-nineteenth cen-
tury. Gerondes with neighbouring sees to istanbul were able to be present
continuously in the holy synod, to elect their candidates to the patriarchal and
other sees, to act as delegates of other metropolitans, and thus to assume a
greater power. Gerondes were the archbishops of Caesarea, Ephesos,
Heraclea, Cyzicus, Nicaea, Nicomedia, Chalcedon and Dercos.
Notwithstanding the apprehensions of the gerondes, reform became
inevitable with the enactment of the Hatt-i Humayun in 1856. As a result,
conforming to the wishes of the government, an assembly composed of seven
metropolitans and twenty-one lay members (ten from the capital and eleven
from the provinces) met in istanbul in April 1857.
3
Reacting to the recom-
mendations of this assembly, five senior archbishops resigned in July 1859. A
year later Patriarch Cyril VII also resigned. Nor was his successor Joachim II
(1860-63) favourably disposed to the reform movement.
4
Finally, a reformed
constitution was provided by the Greek millet and was presented to the Porte
in 1862. The Ottoman government ratified the general/national ordinances
(r8VIK'oij'Ef)vIK'oi KaVOVl(jf.1.0i) , the following year.
5
From 1863 onwards, the
patriarch wa.s assisted by the permanent mixed national council (To LlzapKec;
'Ef)vIKOV MIK'TOV LVf.1.(30U}.lOV) consisting of four senior bishops and eight lay
members elected by and from the Constantinopolitan Greeks. Together with
L The Armenian community demanded reforms in the millet structure with even greater
vigour, see for details in Vartan Artinian, A Study of the Historical Development of the
Armenian Constitutional System in the Ottoman Empire, 1839-1863, unpublished Ph. D .
dissertation, Brandeis University 1969.
2. Davison, Turkish Attitudes, p. 854.
3. This assembly was also entitled national (iOVlKOV) council, see Young. Corps, ii/po \3.
4. He too, resigned over this question see M. I. Gedeon, IlarpzaPXlKoi IlivaKl'x;;, Constantinople
1885-90, pp. 669-70.
5. Also known as Ko.TaaTarzKoe; xdpnle; (statutory charter). See reVlKOi Kal'OVla/loi Ilepi riie;
dlWOerljaewc; rwv iKKi.lJalaOrIKWI' Kai 'E()VlKWI' IlpaY/ldrwl' rwv uno rou OiKOVJleVlKOU 6Jpovov
,Jzarei.ouvrWl' XjJlorzavwv 'YnlJKoWv Tlic; AVTOU Me;'ai.elOTlJro;;; TOU Eovi.rdvov, Con-
stantinople 1862. For a French translation see Young. Corps, ii/pp. 21-34.
33
the twelve senior archbishops of the holy synod ('!epa L'vvoboc;) , these two
patriarchal councils formed the two bodies of the Church (TO. Avo L'wf.1ara
vje,; 'EKKhw{aeJ The mixed national council assumed responsibility over
different philanthropic and educational establishments, parish church
nances, and matters relating to wills, deeds of consecration and donation. In
contrast with the reformed constitution of the Armenian millet, which intro-
duced a lay dominated general assembly. the Greek General Ordinances
were not wide-ranging. The representation, for instaD:ce, of the provinces at
the Phanar remained pitifully inadequate even after 1863.
The constitutional issue did not only cause a relative diminution of the
clerical power but also provoked a deep rift within the Constantinopolitan
Greek community. This was to last until 1923 . While the great majority of the
senior clerics remained firmly attached to the status quo, an articulate lay
group (l.ai"Koi rcapayovTu,;) , assisted by a small number of progressive
bishops, pressed for a more modern approach towards community affairs,
particularly in education. A decisive change soon took place at the Phanar
when the charismatic and able archbishop of Thessaloniki, Joachim, decided
to side with the advocates of reform. With the a niimber of
influential notables, such as Zariphis, Zographos and Evgenidis, Joachim
was elected to the patriarchal throne in 1878. He immediately ushered in a
remarkable programme for the modernization of the community institutions
in Istanbul and the provinces. His first reign, however, was short-lived and in
1884 he was forced to resign over a serious disagreement with the Porte on the
issue of millet privileges.
6
Taking advantage of his resignation, the ecclesias-
tical party succeeded in maintaining power at the Phanar until 190 1. The most
aynamic personality amongst the anti-Joachimites was the archbishop of
Chalcedon, who enjoyed the friendship of some powerful per-
sonalities as the financier Paul Stephanovik-Skylitzis and the prominent
journalist Stavros Voutyras.
8
Notwithstanding these endeavours, Joachim
6. K. Spanoudis, '[OroPIKi:; Lei.i&:;, '[waKeIp a r, Constantinople 1902, pp. 2 ff.
7. Germanos Kavakopoulos (1835-1920). A native oflstanbul, he entered the Patriarchate after
completing his theological education in Jerusalem. Athens and Chalki. He was appointed bishop
of Kos in 1866 and was subsequently translated to Rodos and Heraclea (1888). In 1897 he was
promoted to the see of Chalcedon. Finally, in 1913 he was elected patriarch but had to resign from
this post in 1918. He was a bitter opponent of Joachim III and staunchly supported thegerOlldis-
mos tradition.
8. Stavros Voutyras (1841-1923). A Constantinopolitan Greek and a distinguished journalisL
He was one of the founders of the Neologos in 1866. He gained prominence with his articles
concerning the Bulgarian schism. He championed the rights of the Ottoman Greeks and was
34
III succeeded in regaining the patriarchal throne in 1901, and remained in
power until his death in 1912.
In essence, these factional squabbles heralded the day when the patriarchal
leadership would have to make the crucial choice of either conforming to the
nascent outlook and aspirations of the community or fighting to preserve the
status quo that implied association with the Ottoman government. Tradition-
ally, the Patriarchate strongly adhered to this association and readily es-
poused voluntary submission to the Ottoman rulers. This passive attitude of
the gerondismos tradition was described by critics as ethelodouleia. But this
submissiveness to the Porte became the subject of mounting criticism and a
contemporary British observer went so far as to describe the Patriarchate as
an instrument of Turkish Imperialism and an obstacle to all
nationalism, including even that of the Greeks .. 9
With similar vehemence the eminent Greek historian of the nineteenth cen-
tury, Constantine Papanigopoulos judged the determination of the Patriar-
chate to maintain a low political profile. He was particularly critical of the
Phanar's inability to hellenize the non-Greek peoples of the Orthodox millet,
despite the innumerable opportunities afforded under the Ottoman rule.
10
The position of the adherents to the status quo became even less tenable
when the Porte attempted to curtail the traditional privileges of the millets. If
the government was to bring about a more uniform state, it had to limit the
jurisdiction of the clergy to strictly religious affairs. Thus when the govern-
ment took steps to standardize education and to restrict the powers of
religious courts, Patriarch Joachim III resigned in protest (1884). Despite this
resignation, the question of the millet privileges escalated and soon degener-
ated into a religious conflict between Muslims and Christians culminating in
1890, when the Patriarchate resorted to the extreme measure of closing the
Greek churches in Istanbul. 11 This demonstration of protest attracted inter-
national attention and as a result Sultan Abdiilhamid II was obliged to issue a
proclamation restoring the traditional privileges of the Greek millet. 12 Not-
expelled from Turkey during the Greek- Turkish war of 1897. Returning to his native city carried
on with his pro-Greek activities. He was instrumental in the foundation of a number of educa-
tional institutions (5yl/ogoi) in Istanbul A supporter of the puristic Greek language
(katharf\Ollsianos). he campaigned for the dismissal of all teachers who taught in the demotic
language See also ch .. II::! ..
9. G .. Young. Nationalism and the War in the Near East. Oxford 1915. pp. '26-7.
10.. c.. Paparrigopoulos. '/owpia wi! 'Eii'll'IKOli "EOl'ov:; (History of the Greek Nation), Athens
1932. viip 409.
II D. Mavropoulos. llaTplapI.IKi;; '::ci.i&:;, Athens 1960. pp .. 14-22 ..
12.. For the text of this document see Ch .. Karykopoulou. To LilcOl'i:; KaOf.rrniJ:; TOI)
3S
withstanding this notable success, the millet privileges were attacked even
more vigorously by the Young Turks. Embarking upon a policy which re-
flected the cultural and religious aspirations of the Muslim majority, the
Young Turks challenged once again the authority of the Patriarchate. From
June 1909 onwards the Young Turks began to introduce legislation whose aim
was to curb the political and cultural autonomy of the millets. By taking over
these activities, the Young Turks believed, the state would be able to create a
common Ottoman culture, mainly through a common educational system. By
means of two educational laws (1908/1915), the ministry of education was
made responsible for the supervision of all school curricula in the empire. The
teaching of Ottoman Turkish (Osman/lca), as well as a common history
designed to encourage unity, was stipulated by the law of 1909. While on
16 February 1912 a law regulating the evkaf (pious foundations) was
promulgated,13 another government decree abolished the collective and na-
tional representation of the different ethnic/religious communities of the
empire (1916). The term millet was now replaced by the word cemaat
(community). Continuing with their determination to secularize the empire,
the Young Turks passed a legislation establishing civil marriage as the only
legal binding ceremony for all Ottoman subjects, regardless of religious affi-
liations (1 January 1918). Religious marriage was to remain optional. 14 At
first the ageing patriarch Germanos V (1913-18) tried to combat the
icalism of the Young Turk administration but with little success, He soon,
however, resigned to the progressive weakening of the Patriarchate's influ-
ence in the empire.
5. The Megali Idea and the Constantinopolitan Greeks.
The biggest challenge to the clerical authority came from the Ottoman
Orthodox intelligentsia. which became increasingly disenchanted with the
Phanar's submissive approach in its dealings with the Porte. The misgivings of
the Ecumenical Patriarchate towards the timing of the Greek revolt of 1821 is
well-known. Patriarch Gregory V (1818-21. his third patriarchate) was an
ecumenist and an opponent of secular nationalism. I Likewise the Phanar
Ofh"OUWl'I/ioij flarpwPlf.iolJ, Athens 1979. pro 73-77. On government encroachments upon the
past mil/I'I privileges see Kallinikos Delikanis. TO. iJih'aw h'ai fl pOl'Opla TOV Oih"OIJ!le\'lh"OU flarpwp-
If.iolJ. Constantinople 1909, p. 98.
13. H. Giineri. Azlnllk Vaklflarlnln Incelenmesi. Vaklj/ar Dergisi, 10 (1970) 88.
14. Avcloglu. up. cil .. i;pp. 277-78: B. Stavridis. '[aTOpia roil Oih"OVpet'Ih"OV flarpwPldov.
Athens 1967. p. 14.
I D. Dakin, The /770-/923. London 1973, p. 38: Karpat.lnqllir\,. p. 74.
36
reacted unfavourably to the unilateral emancipation of the church of Greece,
which it only recognized in 1850. True to its Byzantine tradition, the
Ecumenical Patriarchate appealed to the universalist religious loyalties of the
Orthodox Christians rejecting the parochial, ethnic tendencies embodied in
the various Balkan nationalist movements. Suspicious of the secular and
rationalist currents originating in Western Europe, the Patriarchate opposed
their infiltration in the Ottoman empire as best as it could. 2 More significant-
ly, the existence of an independent Greek state produced a cleavage in the
fabric of the Orthodox Christian millet since it gave to ethnicity and language
higher priority than religion. Hitherto the Orthodox of the Balkans regarded
the Greek language as a non-national medium of religious communication.
Inevitably, the Ottoman Slavs would follow the Greek example and initiate
their own secular nationalist movements, thus putting in grave jeopardy the
Phanar's leading position in the Orthodox millet. Already during the 1850s a
Bulgarian ethnic renaissance was under way and by 1860 the Bulgarian Ex-
arch ate was established - though it was not officially recognized before the
publication of an imperial decree in 1870.
3
This inability of the communal leaders and the clergy to control their
dissatisfied flock had, to a large extent, prompted the reform era of 1839-76 in
the Ottoman empire. Unable to face the challenge of Balkan nationalism by
force, the Ottoman government tried to appease the non-Muslim com-
munities through socio-political reform. It was clear that the contract made
between the conquering Sultan Mehmed II and Patriarch Gennadios II was
antiquated by the second half of the nineteenth century. In fact, the Patriar-
chate never recovered from the events of 1821, although officially it remained
a leading Ottoman institution until 1923. Faced with the challenge of secular
nationalism, the clerics and community leaders of the Phanar adhered to the
status quo, while at the same time they kept alive the wish to restore the
Byzantine empire. Encouraged by the decline of the Islamic Ottoman state,
the hope of achieving a Greek/Christian take-over of the empire, a long
cherished Greek dream, was revived. The Phanar clerics shared the view,
widely held in the Greek world, that a general historical tendency was at work
in favour of Greece. The anticipated regeneration of the nation it was to
materialize gradually, though it was only a question of time and patience.
Despite their confidence in the future of the nation, the goals of the Greek
clerics remained fundamentally vague and obscure. There are indications
On the response of the Patriarchate to the ideas of Enlightment see R. Clogg. The
Didaskalia Patriki (1798): An Orthodox Reaction to the French Revolutionary Propaganda.
\15 5 (1969) 10208.
3. On the Bulgarian schism see H .. lnalclk. Twdmal I'e BII/gar Mese/esi, Ankara 1943. pp .. 17 f
37
that they would have, on the whole, welcomed the evolution of a Christian -
and preferably Orthodox - dominated, multinational and theocratic regime,
in which the Ecumenical Patriarchate would assume a leading role, But no
member of the Phanar hierarchy ever succeeded in giving any concrete ideas
as to how this new order would be established or operate. The Patriarchate, it
appears. while cautiously awaiting a gradual transfer of power in istanbul,
chose to remain loyal to its traditional policy of low political profile and
sought to maintain cordial relations with the Porte.
At the tum of the century, some Greek intellectuals, mainly from the Greek
Kingdom, went some way in articulating and expanding this gradualist
approach. They closely identified the future of Hellenism with the promotion
of a Turkish-Hellenic understanding, which was to be followed by an agree-
ment among the various nationalities in the Ottoman empire. They en-
visioned the ultimate formation of an Eastem Empire embracing all the
Ottoman nationalities. By progressive erosion and by the assumption of
co.ntrol of the empire, the Greeks would gradually succeed in fulfilling their
national idea (megali idea) which, according to this group, amounted to the
ressurection of Hellenic civilization in the Balkans and Asia Minor. The most
distinguished exponents of this ideal were Ion Dragoumis (1878-1920) and
Athanasios Souliotis-Nikolaidis (1878-1945), both mainland Greeks, who
during their stay in istanbul of Constantinople in
1908. The major aim of this organization was to promote the concept of
Greek-Ottoman cooperation.
4
Although they did not deny a leading role to
the Turkish element, both Dragoumis and Nikolaidis were confident that,
given the dynamism of the Ottoman Greeks, Hellenism would become the
dominant factor in their envisaged empire. According to Dragoumis,
Souliotis believed that:
,<As in the case of the Roman state, when equality of rights was
accorded to all peoples. the Greeks had succeeded gradually in turning
the eastern part of the Empire into a Greek state ... so with the Turkish
state ... now that equality of rights is granted to all peoples, the Greeks
will take over the political power. 5
Articulating the same views before the Ottoman parliament (7/20 July 1909),
4. On the 'Op;-avw(i/:; KwvaTavTlvOvno).Ew;;, D. Xanalatos, The Greeks and the Turks on the
Eve of the Balkan Wars: A Frustrated Plan, BS 2 (1962) 277-96: D.H. Chamoudopoulos. 'H
Nwripa <PI).IK" 'Era/pda, Athens, 1946.
5. Ion Dragoumis. 'OaOl (wVTavoi, Athens 191 I. quoted in Xanalatos. op. ciL, p. 282. On
Dragoumis' ideas see also B. Laourdas. '0 "Irov L',payouJlT]<; Kat TJ enOXTJ taU, 'Emraqna LTljiJl
(mil "/wra tJpai'OVW/. Athens 1978. pp .. 39-53
38
the Smyrniot Greek deputy, declared that the national idea of
the Greeks consisted of an effort
to contribute with all the moral and material capital of our Nation to
the Civilization of the East; and to protect and cultivate our resources
for the interests and Civilization of the East (11 ohnoj.[(x;; tv 'A varo)Jj). 6
The gradualist solution gained some credibility among the Greeks with
the Greek defeat in the Greek-Ottoman war of 18.97. The Greek reverse had
demonstrated the inability of the Greeks to capture the Ottoman empire by
force. As it was impossible to conquer the Ottoman empire from without,
many Greeks were attracted by the gradualist approach which offerred the
hgpe to conquer it from within. Meanwhile, an alliance - and eventually a
federation- between istanbul and Athens would prevent, the Greeks hoped,
the partition of the empire among the various Slavic nations. Greece was
particularly alarmed by the Bulgarian ambitions in Macedonia and Thrace
and as a result Helleno-Bulgarian rivalry was intensified during the 1890s and
1900.
7
A sincere Greco-Turkish rapprochement, the gradualists suggested,
would not only preserve the empire but also would prevent the irrevocable
loss of Macedonia and Thrace to Hellenism.
In this light one may view the positive reaction of the majority of the
Ottoman Greeks to the Young Turk revolution in 1908. While putting an end
to Hamidian despotism, the Young Turks restored the constitution of 1876
and called for an election in which the Christian population was to take part.
From the very first, however, the Young Turks were divided between two
tendencies. The more powerful section of the movement, consisting mostly
of patriotic officers, formed the Committee of Union and Progress (ittihat ve
Terakki Cemiyeti), whose primary aim was to restore full sovereignty to the
Ottoman state. To achieve this end, they came out more and more clearly for
the central authority and Turkish dominion. This group seems to have en-
joyed the support of the Turkish urban petty bourgeoisie, composed of minor
officials, school teachers, artisans, and tradesmen, who as aclass, to a certain
extent, formed a politically conscious class. Resenting the strong economic
6. Karolidis (1849- 1930) A distinguished Ottoman Greek intellectuaL He had been professor
of history in the university of Athens. He served in the Ottoman parliament from 1908-13.
Because of his wide knowledge and genuine desire for a Greek-Turkish understanding. he was
invited to stand as a candidate of Union and Progress in the election of 1912. His deep
understanding of and sympathy for the Turks won him a number of enemies in the Greek
nationalist circles of Athens and Istanbul. He represented izmir at the parliament. see P.
Karolidis. AOi'ol Kai . Yno;.mi;,wTa , Athens 1913. p. I I I.
7. On the Macedonian issue see D .. Dakin. The Greek struggle in Macedonia. 1897-1913,
Thessaloniki 1966. passim.
39
position of the minorities, this class supported the Unionists' call for an
assault against the privileges of both foreigners and their non-Muslim
intermediaries.
8
In contrast to the Unionists, the liberals espoused the ideas
of Prince Sabahattin, their unofficial leader, who advocated a decentralized
state in which people of various creeds and races were to find freedom in
equality of citizenship.9 The liberal proposals went counter to the secular
ideas of the Unionists. Nor did the liberals' adherence to a laissez-faire
economic system - which by guaranteeing the status quo was to perpetuate
the economic superiority of the non-Muslim elements - endear them to the
Unionists. Quite diverse elements, whose only rallying point seems to have
been their intense dissatisfaction with Unionist policies, flocked to the ranks
of the liberal opposition.
Members of the nobility, remnants of the pre-Hamidian era of Ottoman
liberalism, wealthy Muslim landlords, leading politicians of the old regime
who out of necessity joined the Young Turks in 1908, conservative religious
leaders and members of the ethnic minorities were all united in a loose
association. Lacking, however, any cohesion the liberals did not accomplish
much and were only able to form various ephemeral parties most notable of
which were the Osmanl'i Ahrar Flrkas'f (the Ottoman Liberal Union) in 1908
and the Hiirriyet ve itila! Ftrkas'f (Entente Liberale) in 1911.
The liberal proposals for administrative decentralization and personal
initiative were welcomed by the majority of the Ottoman Greeks. The main
exponent of these views Prince Sabahattin was particularly popular with the
Greeks as well as the other ethnic communities. A nephew of Sultan Ab-
diilhamit II, Sabahattin closely co-operated with a number of eminent
Greeks. such as Vasilaki Mousouros-Gkikis J () and George Skalieris, J J who
helped him formulate his ideas. Mousouros-Gkikis followed Sabahattin into
8.. For a general account see E. Ahmad. The YOllllg TllrkL The Committee of Ullioll alld
Pmgress ill Tllrkish Politics 1908-191-1. Oxford 1969 .. On the aims and programme of the party,
T.Z .. Tunaya. Tiirkiye'de Siyasi Partilf'!" 1859-1952. Istanbul 1952. pp. 174-232.
9 .. On Sabahattin (18771948) see C Kutay. Prell.l Saha/llIttill Bf'\'. Istanbul I 964passim and S.
Mardin. Jiin Tiirklf'!"in Siyasi Fikirleri. Ankara 1964. pp. 215 ft.
10 .. Vasilaki Mousouros-Gkikis. A member of the distinguished Mousouros family. He started
his career as a government employee and by the time he left Istanbul for Paris he was a member of
the Council of State .. His return to Istanbul. however. was short-lived. Disillusioned with the
failure of the Liberals to prevail during the 1912 election. he once again left for Paris. Lateron he
joined forces with various Greek irredentist societies (1917-22) see below.
II. Son of Kleanthis Skalieris. he was a member of the Ahrar party and the author of an
influential study (Georges C Scalieri. La decentralisation etla refimlleadministratile. Constan-
tinople 1911. On his father's political career see LH. "v Murad'! Tekrar
Yapmak Isteyen K. Skaliyeri ve Aziz Bey Komitesi. Belleten. no 30 (1944) 245-328.
40
exile (1899) and had been the leader of the Greek delegation at the first Young
Turk congress in Paris (February 4/9, 1902). Recommended by his close
friend Prince Sabahattin. Mousouros-Gkikis was appointed by the Young
Turks to the newly formed senate immediately after the revolution of 1908.
During the administration of Kamil Pasha (1908-1909), he became minister of
the posts and telegrams.
The tacit alliance which soon developed in the parliament between Otto-
man liberals and the majority of the Greek deputies should be seen against
this background of long-established relations. Many of the twenty-six Greek
deputies elected in the 1908 parliament had previously collaborated with
liberal organizations. Following the example of other ethnic minorities, six-
teen Greek deputies formed a Greek party during the 1909-1910 parliamen-
tary session. These deputies voted collectively on all issues and supported
the opposition between 1909-1912. The remaining ten, who were either
Unionist members or independents, refused to take part in such a grouping. 12
But the anti-Unionist alliance culminated with the electoral pact of 1911 when
conservative and liberal Turks, Arabs, Albanians, Armenians and Greeks
harnessed their energies in order to defeat the government in the elections of
1912. In return for their support, the newly formed Entente Liberale promised
to make important concessions to the Greeks. The traditional privileges of
the Patriarchate were to be restored and administrative decentralization was
to be granted to the provinces of the empire.
Inevitably, the electoral pact of 1912 had disastrous effects on the relations
between the Unionists (the principal political organization in the country) and
the Greek community. In vain did some of the more far-sighted Greek
deputies, such as Paul Karolidis (izmir) and Emmanuel Emmanouilidis
(AydIn), strive to dissuade their colleagues from an all-out confrontation with
the ruling Unionists. Thus, while pointing out that the opposition lacked any
homogeneity of principles, Karolidis advised an understanding with the
Unionists. This act would have probably mitigated the increasing alienation
of the Greek community from the Turkish leadership. Further, there were
some visible signs that the Unionists sought an agreement with the Greek
community. This desire to accomodate the minorities first became apparent
during the Turco-Italian war which broke out in September 1911. Responding
to a co-ordinated demand of the non-Muslim communities, the government
officially recognized once again the privileges of the religious heads. In fact,
12. Similar Bulgarian. Armenian and Albanian parties were also in existence. For a list of the
Ottoman deputies see E Ahmad & D,A, Rustow. Ikinci Doneminde Mec[isler
1908-1918 in Giilley-Dol?1I AI'I'lIpa Araytlrmalarf Dergisi. 415 (1976) 250-83
41
with a government order of 4 November 1911, the status of the non-
Muslim millets was restored to what it had been in 1908.13 As they prepared
for an early election during the spring of 1912. the Unionists took some
further steps to placate the Greeks. Thus after appointing Senator Alexander
Mavroyenis ambassador to Vienna, the Unionists expressed their desire to
come to a comprehensive electoral pact with the Patriarchate. According to
the Smymiot deputy Karolidis, during these negotiations the Unionists went
so far as to promise an increase in the number of Greek deputies to forty-five
and the appointment of Senator Aristeidis Georgantzoglou to the ministry of
justice and religions, an unprecedented step in Ottoman history. In return,
the Unionists demanded the patriarch's support in the forthcoming
elections. I.! Under the pressure of the Greek party,IS which was then in the
process of concluding a separate electoral pact with the Entente Liberate,
Patriarch Joachim remained politically aloof. But this Greek unresponsive-
ness to Li nionist proposals backfired after the abysmal electoral pelformance
of the Liberals in the 1912 elections.
Ever since 1908 the Unionists had expected that the subject peoples of
the empire would willingly accept their leadership and cooperate in the
task of making Ottomanism viable. Instead they found themselves con-
fronted with parties aiming at local autonomies. Fearing that the drive for
Ottomanism would ultimately undermine the jealously guarded millet
privileges, the heads of the non-Muslim communities adopted a negative
attitude towards Unionist policies. Thus, in order to implement their cen-
tralist programme, the Young Turk government had to resort to the introduc-
tion of legislation whose aim was to curb the political and cui tural autonomy
of the Greek, as well as the other ethnic communities. Meanwhile, the
number of the Greek deputies in the new parliament (1912-14) was reduced to
fifteen and almost all of these were elected on the Unionist ticket. 16
Communal tensions increased further with the outbreak of the Balkan
wars in 1912. The isolation of the Turkish element in the empire and the
humiliating reverses in the Balkan wars coincided with the growing aware-
ness of Turkish nationalism. The embittered Turks were steadily trans-
\3. Y.H .. Bayur. Tiirk ink/hibi Tarihi. Ankara 1943. ii:1 pp .. 245-47.
14 Karolidis. op .. cil .. pp .. 334-35 ..
15 It was formed by sixteen Ottoman Greek deputies .. They. in turn. took directions from the
Political League / [/oi./w:o; which was closely identified with the Hellenic embassy
in [stanbul and Dragoumis' Organization of Constantinople The leaders of the League.were
the Ottoman deputies Chonaios. Bousios. Vamvakas and Kosmidis. On their views see G.
Eousios. To [/Oi.lrlh() [/po;'I'!l!l11ll TOii "Ei.i.l)I/(JllOli it T(J/)/wifl Constantinople 1912.
16.. Karolidis. up .. cit.. PI' 368-71: Ahmad & Rustow. up. cll. Pl'. 250-83
42
formed from Ottoman patriots into ardent Turkish nationalists. Greek for-
tunes in the Ottoman empire deteriorated rapidly during World War I when
the istanbul government joined the Central Powers. Not only did the Union-
ists refuse to negotiate with such groups as the Political League or the
Organization of Constantinople, but, suspecting them of being instruments of
the Hellenic government. took steps to drive them out of Istanbul. Young
Turk suspicions were intensified when Greece, under the leadership of the
irredentist Cretan Eleftherios Venizelos, threw in its lot with the Entente
Powers (1917). Regarding the Ottoman Greeks as being sympathetic to the
Entente Powers. the Istanbul government took draconian measures against
them. Large scale deportations of Greeks from strategically sensitive areas,
such as Thrace, western Anatolia and the Black Sea coast, took place. while
the privileges of the Patriarchate were once again severely curtailed
(1914-18).17 By the end of the First Balkan war the Ottoman Greek adminis-
trative and diplomatic appointments were also terminated and in October
1912 the ambassador to Vienna. Alexander Mavroyenis, was recalled to
Istanbul. Similarly, from January 1913 no Greek served in the cabinet. The
practice of appointing a Greek to the cabinet was established when the Young
Turks took power in 1908 and a Greek usually occupied such posts as public
works. forests. mines and agriculture or posts and telegrams. IS
Probably the greatest resentment was aroused by the Unionist econ-
omic policies. From the very beginning the Unionists demonstrated a
determination to bring their own social class, the Turkish petty bourgeoisie,
at the helm of economic affairs. They resented the Greek and Armenian
refusal to participate in Ottoman regeneration and, therefore, sought to
destroy the virtual monopoly of commerce, industry and urban professions
exercised by these elements. The traditional ethnic division of labour 19
had, according to the Unionists, undermined Ottoman sovereignty and to
remedy this theformation ofa national economy and a Turkish bourgeoisie
was essential. These Unionists ambitions, however. were not fulfilled before
the outbreak of World War I. It was after they sided with the Germans that the
Young Turks were at liberty to take measures against the established Otto-
[7. E. Emmanouilidis. TO. Tci.cvTai!lEn) vi:; 'OOwpal'lr:li:; Avwr:pawpfa:;. Athens [924. pp.
285-337.
18. The Greek senators between 1908-13 were: Mousouros-Gkikis. Aristeidis Georgantzog-
lou. D. Mavrokordatos. Georgiadis. Vayiannis and Alexander Mavroyenis.
19. This is the appropriate formula used by Sussnitzki to describe the allocation of economic
activity among different ethnic groups. This article was first published in 1917 see AJ. Suss-
nitzki. Ethnic Division of Labour in Ch. Issawi (ed.). The Eeonolllie HislDlY oflhe Middle
Ea.1I /800-19/4. (/ book (dreadings. Chicago 1966. pp. 114-125.
43
man Christian bourgeoisie which was closely associated with Anglo-French
capital. The four war years exhibit a frantic pace of economic activity by
Turkish - and] ewish - capital. which gained new advantages through the
encouragement of the government. and government-sponsered banks. At the
same time the Unionists assisted Turkish entrepreneurs by adopting measu-
res, such as the anti-Greek economic boycotts and expulsions directed
against the Greek and Armenian elements. It appears that the basis of an-
tagonism waS rooted primarily in class conflict in so far as the Unionist
scheme to transform Ottoman society undermined the position of the
privileged classes. Thus the elevation of the petty bourgeoisie to the centre of
political and economic affairs engendered as much hostility among the upper
class Muslims as among the Greeks.
Despite the hostile climate after 1913, the Ottoman Greek community was
still too powerful to be disrupted by Unionist pressures. Far from being de-
moralized by the general state of affairs, Ottoman Hellenism received a new
impetus with the successful issue of the Greek-Ottoman hostilities in 1912.
While between 1908-1912 the advocates of Greek-Turkish rapprochement,
who at best hoped for a long-term prevalence of the Greek element in the
empire, commanded considerable support, by 1913 sympathy with Venizelos
and his irredentist policies at the expense of Turkey began to gain ground. As
relations between the istanbul government and the Ottoman Greeks deterior-
ated beyond repair, dissatisfied middle class Greeks espoused the vision of a
Greater Greece (Megali Ellada) embracing all the Greek populations of
Thrace, Anatolia and Northern Epirus. Thus, the national idea (megali idea)
of the Greeks came to be identified with the aspiration to unite the entire
Greek race under a single Hellenic government. Adherents of the megali idea
soon gained influence at the Phanar and began to challenge the authority of
Patriarch Germanos V Kavakopoulos. An aged and sick man, the patriarch
had failed to exhibit effective resistance when the traditional millet privileges
came under serious threat in 1913-1918. Nor did the Phanar protest against
the Istanbul government when Anatolian and Thracian Greeks were deported
in great numbers during World War I. Finally in October 1918, revolting
against the traditional subservience of the Phanar gerondes, a dynamic and
predominantly lay faction engineered the fall of patriarch Germanos. En-
couraged by the victory of the Entente Powers, these mainly middle class
Constantinopolitan Greeks backed Venizelos in his diplomatic efforts to
achieve the vision of megali idea in the years 1918-20.
44
6. Greek educational and cultural institutions in istanbul.
The ranks of Ottoman Greek irredentists were bolstered by an immensely
successful educational system developed by the Greek millet. Since the
second half of the nineteenth century, Greek schools in the Ottoman empire
strove to improve the cultural level of the community. At the same time,
unhampered by any serious government interference, these schools dissemi-
nated Hellenic influences. Numerous litera!L and cultural
societies( syllogoi) were founded in AnatoiTa-and Thrace. In the capital alone
there appears to have been some twenty-six such syllogoi in the early 1870s. 1
By far the most important of those was the Greek Literary Society ('0 'Ev
KWl'uTavT/l'ovrroi.cl 'Ei.i.111'IKO; cfJli.oi.o"1 KO;' Lui).Oi'O:;) , established in 1861 by
a number of eminent Constantinopolitan Greeks (of i.o/abc; roil fj(}vov::;j2
Amongst its founders were Spyridon and Alexander Mavroyenis, Constan-
tine Kalliadis (director of the press bureau at the Sublime Porte) and A.
Palaiologos, the Greek ambassador in istanbul. But it was primarily Dr
Iroklis Vasiadis (1821 90), who played a major role in the expansion of a
associations in the city as well as in other Ottoman
domains. Because of his remarkable cultural and educational activities, Va-
siadis soon acquired, within Ottoman Hellenism. the title of the permanent
minister of education of the unredeemed Greeks ('/uOfJIO:; 'Yrrovpi'o;' Tif:;
II a/(5da;' roil 'A i.vrpuJrov 'E)J'lV1uJlOV). Another key figure in the expansion of
the syl/ogos institutions was 1923), the editor of
Neologos.
This sophisticated educational system reflected the highly-developed cor-
porate life of the Greek millet. During and after the Hamidian regime, the
network of Greek schools spread rapidly and as early as the 1870s the
__al()ne tla(:l105 _schools withJ5,OOO p!lpjl,3 }3Y
number of schools To of
private lycees should also in languages and business
studies, such schools catered exclusively for the children of wealthy Greek
L See appendix B. For details on the subject see K. Mamoni, Les associations pour la
propagation de l'instruction grecque a Constantinople (18611912)>>, BS 16/1 (1975) 10312; H.
Belia, Le Syllogue pour la propagation des lettres grecques et les ecoles de Thrace, Actes du
lIe COllgres International des ttl/des dusud-est Europeell (Athenes 7- I3 Mai 1970). tome IV, pp.
369-76.
2. See P. Moraux, Bibliotheqlle de la Societe TlLrqlle d'Histoire, Catalogue de Manuscrits
Grecs (Fonds du Syllogos) , Ankara 1964; T. Stavrou. '0 'EI' KWl'aral'T/l'oVTiOi.el 'Ei.iJll'lKO:;
<Pli.oi.Oi'IKO:; Lvi.i.Oi'O:;. Athens 1967. passim.
3. A. Synvet, Les Grecs de ['Empire Ottomafl, Constantinople 1878. pp. 32-33.
4. See appendix C
45
families in the capitaL As early as the 1860s and 1870s, a boom in the number
of these schools was experienced.
s
But communal Greek education was
generally supported by the endowments and subscriptions, and administered
by committees representing benefactors and beneficiaries. Each local com-
munity managed its own Greek school while the central agency was located at
the Ecumenical Patriarchate. In most of the Greek schools the motivating
ideal was the Helleno-Christian tradition. In the curriculum and in the values
sought. the Greeks aimed at transmitting their Hellenic heritage and instilling
the Orthodox faith. Little. if any. Turkish was taught in the Greek schools
until 1895, when the Ottoman government made Turkish a required subject.
In fact. during the second half of the nineteenth century Ottoman Greek
education relied heavily upon Greece. Those Ottoman Greeks who studied in
Athens returned horne eager to spread the ideas of Greek nationalism and
Hellenic culture.
6
The growth of Greek activism amongst the intelligentsia was indissolubly
linked to the effectiveness of the educational system in inculcating Hel-
lenism. As early as the 1850s, the acute observer of the Ottoman empire.
Abdolonyme Ubicini, noted the existence of a small circle of Greeks who
desired the expansion of Greece at the expense of the Ottoman empire.
Although narrow, he went on to acknowledge, this circle comprised the
most enlightened and liberal class of the nation; namely the members of the
medical, legal and literary professions,7 However, while in the 1850s the
great majority of the Greeks were inclined to favour Ottoman rule, by the
1910s Ottoman Greek self-assertion had become one of the most visible
aspects of life in the empire. With their overwhelming emphasis on Hellenic
studies, Ottoman Greek schools overlooked the ideas of liberal Ottoman
modernizers who envisaged a multiracial and cohesive Pan-Ottomanic state.
By far the oldest of the Greek educational establishments in istanbul is the
Patriarchallycee at the Phanar. claiming to have been in continuous operation
since the Byzantine era. This linkage with the Byzantine patriarchal
academy. however, has been questioned and the {ycee was certainly in
abeyance during 1664- 1668. With the support of its powerful protectors, the
Phanariot Greek aristocracy, the school was transferred to the Bosphorus
5. fli\,wa;; EmTllJT1Iwi nih' iI' KW\'Gml'T/I'Ovnoi.el Kai KarrL Hi npoaGTela Gxoi.ciw\' reV\' OpOoSo
sWA' Constantinople 1870. pp. 56-6L
( 6. For additional information see the impressions of the British traveller. Stanley Lane Poole.
i'fli/People (d7I/rkey. TH'enty Years' Residence Among Bulgarians, Greeks, Albanian5, Tllrks
and Armenians, London 1878. i/pp. 187. See also A .A. Bryer. "The Pontic Revival and the New
Greece in Hellenism and the First Greek War of Liberation (1821-1830;: Call1inl/ity lind
Change, eds N. Diamandouros et al. Thessaloniki 1976. pp. 185-88.
7 A. Ubicini. Leiters Oil Turke\, tr Lady Easthope. London 1856, ii/pp. 237-38,
46
suburb of (EI1POKpliwl) in 1803 where the school soon acquired
great celebrity. Yet. like the other Greek schools in the empire, it suffered
greatly from the Greek insurrection of 182 I. With the disappearance of the
Phanariot nobility, the school was deprived of funds and steadily declined
until 1850/52 when it was once again transferred to the Phanar. It was
annexed to the Patriarchate under the name of great school of the nation
([J arpIap 11/\7) M 8;'0.1.11 rou nl'OU:,; Llol.lf). The building curTently in use was
constructed in 1881 with the donations of wealthy Constantinopolitan Greeks
such as Zariphis. Zapheiropoulos and Evgenidis.
s
The largest Greek {ycee for girls was founded in 1857 with the gene-
rous contributions of Constantine Zappas. who wished to construct an edu-
cational institution in istanbul comparable to the 'Apoo.K81Ol' of Athens.
The school was named after him as the ZaTCTwOI' 'EO\'lKOl' [Jap08\'ai'wi'eiol'
(Zapyofl Rum Lisesi).9 In 1890. with the donations of banker Christaki
Zographos another {ycee for boys, the ZWi'parp8101' Rum Erkek
Lisesi) was opened at Beyoglu (Pem). The energetic Patriarch Joachim III
played a pivotal role in the foundation of a great number of Greek educational
establishments in istanbul. He was. for instance, instrumental in setting up a
multiracial school. largely for Europeans, which taught French, Greek. Tur-
kish. English and German. In requesting permission from the sultan. he
argued that such a school would train officials who would take up positions in
the government and business enterprises especially those connected with
European transactions. The school,. [JarpIaPllKII 2101.17 Tl.w(J(J(Vl' Kai
'E;17ropiou, was opened at Beyoglu (1909) and was used both as a language
school and a commercial {yete. It continued to function until the republican
regime, when it was replaced by a Turkish elementary school. 10 Earlier, in an
attempt to turn the mainly Greek inhabited island of Heybeli (Chalki) into a
fs:\rhe transfer of the patriarchal academy to Kurm;eme where many of the Phanariots
iede'd indicates the desire to move this historic educational establishment away from the restric-
tive atmosphere of the Phanar. Many Phanariots, the initiators of this move, had been educated
in the West and were strongly affected by rationalism. They were also instrumental ill the
introduction of modernist ideas in the academy in the post-1803 period, On the general history of
the school see, 'LA Gritsopoulos, flarpIapxlKli Mei'ai.1/ roB rivOl!:; Athens 1971. It is
worthwhile noting the background of the students enrolled in 1882, From the 673 students
enrolled 271 came from Istanbul, 155 from Thrace and Macedonia, 135 from Anatolia, 59
Hellenic nationals and 53 from the Aegean island see EA 2 (1882) 560-62, M. 10 Gedeon,
Tpafllwm IlarpIapX1Ka flepi vj:;; Mci'ai.l/:;; roli rivol!:; LXoi.1j:;;, Constantinople 1903.
9. The title national (i8vlh'Olj was dropped in 1923. See A.S. Karanikolas. Td flap8sl'ai'W'
;'da nj:; KW\'GTaI'rll'o!Jnoi.e(V;, Athens 1975. pp,
10. For additional information see O. Ergin, Tlirki\'e ,\Ia{/rifTarihi, istanbul 1939-43. iii/pp.
841-5 L
47
centre of learning, important educational institutions were constructed.
These were: a college furnishing the Phanar with well-educated clerics, the
Theological academy ('Jepa X6)X17C,) founded in 1844, and
the Commercial college Xa}x1JC;) built in 1892. Both build-
ings were occupied by the Young Turks during World War I, but while the
Theological school was later returned to the Greek community, the commer-
cial college was transformed into a Turkish naval academy. 11
Graduates of these better known secondary schools could enter any Euro-
pean or Greek university without entrance examinations. Because of their
competence, many Greeks (and Armenians) were invited to participate in the
Ottoman attempt to create a westernized and secular system of education
during the Tanzimat era. At various times, Greeks presided at the famous
Galatasaray Iycee, a multiracial Ottoman school founded in 1868.
12
Probably
the most outstanding Greek director of this French-inspired Iycee. was John
Savas, who later on served as minister offoreign affairs (1879-80) and gover-
nor of Samos and Crete. A considerable number of Greeks, such as John
Aristoklis (1828-99) and Minas Chamoudopoulos (1851-1908), served in the
ministry of public instruction.
The private donations of wealthy Constantinopolitan Greeks did not only
finance the establishment of a wide educational network in the capital.
Benefactors generously contributed to the foundation and maintenance of a
sizeable number of churches and philanthropic organizations in the city. The
single most important community concern was (and still is) the Ballkll hospi-
tal at Yedikule ('E()vzKa <Pz),al'()pWnlKa KararJ'njtLaTa KWI'(Jwl'Tll'ovno),ewc,).
comprising some forty buildings with a 2,000 bed capacity. Erected in
1753, Ballkll was considered to be one of the most advanced hospitals in the
Balkans until the 19IOs.!3 The community also maintained a number of
orphanages, amongst which the one situated in the island of Buyukada
(Prinkipo) was the largest. The Prinkipo orphanage ('E()VZK(Jl' 'OprpavoTpo-
rpeiov II pIYK1jnov). first built in 1853, accomodated 773 boys in 1921. 14
The socio-political differentiation and educational developments among
the Ottoman Greeks had given them a qualitative edge, manifested in social
mobilization, communal activity and political consciousness. The highly
I L For details M. Theotokas. Nopllai ,wi "JawplKa Mei.ETlittara. Athens 1947. pp. 135-46.
12. L Sungu, Galatasaray Lisesi'nin Belletell 7 (1943) 315-47 ..
13. See 'EOI'II,a rpli.al'OpWTI:lKa KaraaTllpara iiI' KWl'aral'TlI'Ovn:oi.el 'Hpepoi.Oi'IOI' WU cwv:; /905,
Constantinople 1904, i/pp. 82 f.
14. In 1921 there were four Greek orphanages with 1,548 children, see C.R. Johnson (ed.),
COll5talllinople Today, New York 1922, pp. 246, 256. See also '/awplKo AeiiKwpa /853/95816n'
'Oprpal'orporpsiwl' pa:;. Istanbul 1958.
48
developed corporate life with its capacity for teamwork, may be illustrated by
the Greek parish organizations in the (Tatavla) suburb. In this
almost exclusively Greek district the community maintained three churches
and two schools. An athletic and musical club was attached to a philanthropic
society (<Pzi.onTwxo:; 'A&i.rpor1J;' Taravi.a). Apart from charity, the centre
was engaged in neighbourhood work, such as evening classes, and social,
literary, and political symposia, George and Nicholas Alibrantis were two
celebrated Tatavliot wrestlers who won a golden medal in the Olympic games
held in Athens in 1906. Endowments to support and expand the rapidly
improving communal institutions were not solely the prerogative of the very
wealthy Greek families. Having to rely on their own efforts and impregnated
with a strong sense of community pride, the Ottoman Greeks collectively
participated in the development of educational, communal and welfare in-
stitutions. Not surprisingly such activities were most pronounced in istanbul,
since the Ottoman capital continued to be the centre par excellence of the
Greek millet.
7. The Constantinopolitan Greek population.
The immense socio-economic progress achieved by COrlstantinopolitan
Greeks during the second half of the nineteenth century should be seen
against the background of a steady demographic resurgence. The urbaniza-
tion which followed the increase of trade and economic relations with Europe
after 183.8 produced a shift of popUlation from the rural interior towards the
coastal towns. The censuses of 1844 and 1857, for instance, indicate that the
majority of migrants in the Ottoman capital were non-Muslims, who moved
into the urban areas to become involved in the expanding commercial activi-
ties.! Significantly, Greek emigration to Istanbul, as well as the other coastal
towns of the empire, was not confined to Ottoman Greeks from the interior.
An acceleration of Hellenic migration from the independent kingdom of
Greece also took place soon after the reforming decrees of 1839 and 1856.
Motivated largely by economic considerations, Hellene Greeks emigrated to
the Ottoman empire which offered far greater scope for entrepreneurial ta-
lent than did the impoverished and restricted markets of the independent
state.
2
L K.H. KarpaL Ottoman Population Records and the Census of 1881/82-1893, IJMES 9
(1978) 254.
2" According to the account of A. W. Kinglake, Eothen or Traces o/Travel brought Home/rom
the East, London 1844, p. 74, there are indications that such a migratory movement was already
taking place as early as 1835, Similarly, the existence of a number of syl/ogoi in lstanbul formed
and maintained by Greeks natives ofPelopennese, Thessaly, continental Greece and the Aegean
49
Owing to a lack of trustworthy statistics an attempt to estimate accurately
the population of istanbul is almost impossible. Notwithstanding the notable
Ottoman effort of 1881/82- 1893 and that of the Ecumenical Patriarchate in
1910- 1912. nothing approaching a scientific census had been conducted prior
to 1927. Likewise the overwhelming majority of ethnographic studies on the
Ottoman empire undertaken by Western observers demonstrate a distinctive
bias and sometimes an appalling lack of information. As a result contempor-
ary statistical accounts are amusing in their variety.3 But according to the
official Ottoman population records. six censuses were conducted in the
capital between 1844 and 1914. These were:-l
NOIl-
Year Muslims Muslims Total
1844 102.532 111.160 213.692 (males only)
1857 112.162 124.162 236.092 (males only)
1882 (incomplete) 118.535 101,410 381.376
1885 384.410 488.655 873,565
1896 520.190 510,040 1,030,234
1914 520.434 389,553 909,987
There was also a large group of Hellene Greeks living in the city whose
numbers. according to patriarchal statistics reached 65,000 in 1912.5 A more
concise evaluation of the actual size of the Constantinopolitan Greek com-
munity is given by another Turkish writer who divides the popUlation on
religious lines. Thus from 1.052,000 residents. there were 236.000 Greek
Orthodox in the city (the Muslim community: 581.000).6 Although Grosvenor
seems to agree with the above figure quoted for the Greek community (he
gives it as 225.000). he states that the overall popUlation in 1895 was little less
than a million of whom 450.000 were Muslims.
7
Another estimate put the
number of the Greeks in the capital at 230.000.
8
thus making it highly probable
and Ionian islands. points to the existence of such a movement from the Greek Kingdom to the
major Ottoman ports. see K. Mamoni. Les associations pour la propagation de I'instruction
grecque it Constantinople (1861-192:2)>>. BS 16:1 (1975) 107.
3. FOI' varying estimaIes throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth century see Johnson ..
lip eil. pp .. 14-19
4. Karpat. op. cit .. p .. 267.
5. Polybius. Greece Befi"'e the COllfere/1( e. London 1919. pp. 44-5 .. See also Appendix E.
6. Eidem. Ollllllllil. p. 55. A copy of the entire census of 1882 can be found in the Istanbul
University library. The figure given for the Istanbul Greeks is 182.847. see Dar lIS Saw/aile
Biltid-i Sele.\e Nidils Say/mi. p. 2
7. E. Grosvenor. COl1.lIl1lllillople. London 1895. iipp 8-9.
R. Synvet. np .. (il p. 1
50
that the Constantinopolitan Greeks between the 1870s and 1890s ranged
between 180.000 and 230.000.
h is perhaps fortunate that the estimates of the Constantinopolitan Greek
population in the Turkish return of 1910 and the Greek Patriarchate figures
for 1912 are not greatly at variance. The Turkish statistics give a total figure of
330.906 Greeks (260 in the European and 70,906 in the Asiatic shore of the
city). while patriarchal estimates for both shores amount to 309.657 Greeks.
In addition there were 65.000 Hellene Greeks classified in the category of
foreign nationals in the city. 9 On the basis of these two statistical accounts it is
probably safe to assume that on the eve of the Balkan wars. the Greek
population of greater Istanbul was about 330.000 to 350.000. A comparison of
this figure with that of the 1844 census. quoted by A. Ubicini as 132.000.
would illustrate the dramatic increase in the Constantinopolitan Greek popu-
lation during the post-Tanzi mat era. IU One of the characteristic features of
Ottoman istanbul at the turn of the century was that while it had become a
principal Turkish centre it had also retained its Greek complexion. As
ence R Johnson observed in 1921
. .if the visitor goes from one school to another. if he visits their
churches. their clubs, their banks and business houses. their steamship
offices and hotels. if he makes the acquaintance of Greek editors.
artists, clergymen. educators. literary. and professional men. he will
gain a truer impression of the Greek community in the city. I I
While the Turks remained the predominant element. the Greeks preserved
their position as the second most important ethnic group in the cosmopolitan
mosaic that made up the Ottoman capital. As Turks and Greeks continued to
co-exist. each perfectly distinct and each perfectly at home. there was re-
markably little assimilation of one element by the other. This extraordinary
symbiosis had. in fact. lasted for than five hundred years.
9. D. Pentzopoulos. The Balkan Exchange of Minorities and its Impact upon Greece. The
Hague 1962. pp. 29-32. In a recent article Dr Justin McCarthy (<<Greek Statistics on Ottoman
Greek Population. International Journal of Tllrkish SlIIdies. 1/2 (1980) 66-76) questions the
existence of a patriarchal census in 1912. For a rebuttal based on the actual findings of the
patriarchal census of 1910-1912. now housed at the Greek Foreign Office archive in Athens see
P. Kitromilides and A. Alexandris. Ethnic Survival. Nationalism and Forced Migration: The
Historical Demography of the Greek Community of Asia Minor at the close of the Ottoman era.
L'lgAtio Ktvtpou M1KpacnatlKWV L1tOUOWV (Bulletin of the Centre for Asia Minor Studies). V
(Athens. 1984- 1985).
10. Ubicini. op .. cit . i/p, 24.
II. Johnson. op. cir.. p .. 85I,
51
CHARTER II
THE CONSTANTINOPOLITAN GREEK FACTOR
DURING THE ANATOLIAN WAR 1918-1922
1. The Debate on the future of istanbul.
The signing of the Mudros armistice on 30 October 1918 heralded the
partition of the Ottoman empire among the victorious Entente nations.!
Seeking to benefit from the virtual paralysis of the Ottoman military and
political machine, the subject nationalities, particularly the Arrnenians, the
Greeks, and the Kurds, put forward lavish territorial claims at the expense of
the Ottoman empire. Coupled with this, the encouraging statements of vari-
ous Allied leaders during and immediately after the war stimulated Ottoman
Christian political activities.
Among these Ottoman Christian ethnic groups, the Greeks were in a
particularly favourable position, for the Hellenic kingdom had been a minor
member of the Entente alliance during the latter stages of the war but had
contributed substantially to the final Allied victory on the Balkan front. As a
result, the highly esteemed Greek prime minister, Eleftherios Venizelos, was
invited to the Paris peace conference (1919-20) to put forward the territorial
claims of his country. It was common knowledge, moreover, that Venizelos'
ultimate vision was the unification of Hellenism in a powerful Greater
Greece.
Despite the city's historic Byzantine associations and its large Greek
population, Venizelos refrained from extending his demands to istanbul. In
his famous memorandum, Greece at the Peace Conference, dated 30 De-
cember 1918, Venizelos laid claims to Northern Epirus, the Aegean islands,
Izmir and its hinterland and the whole of Thrace. In this memorandum and
later on when he personally appeared before the Supreme Council of the
Conference on 3-4 February 1919, the Greek prime minister confined him-
self to expressing the view that istanbul and the Straits should be
L On the Armistice see G. Dyer, The Turkish Armistice of 1918, ME'S 8,2(1972) 143-78 and
8,3 (1972) 313-48; A. Tiirkgeldi, Mondros ve Mudanya Miitarekelerinin Tarihi, Ankara 1948, pp.
23 ff.
52
internationalized.
2
Interviewed by a correspondent of the Manchester Guar-
dian, the Greek leader went on to propose that istanbul should be declared
the capital of the League of Nations.
3
In fact, as early as June 1918, he
informed Lord Granville, the British ambassador in Athens, that the best
solution for istanbul was its internationalization. The Powers, he urged,
should
appoint jointly a Governor for a certain term of years; that system to
be continued until possibly in the course of time the country had
developed to such an extent as to make it capable of self-government as
an independent State.4
Evidently, Venizelos did not believe that the time was ripe for the Greek
acquisition of istanbul. He was certain, however, that once the Thracian
hinterland was translated to Greece, the huge Greek minority within Kons-
tantinoupolis would dominate that city. Expressing his conviction that the
Ottoman capital would be conquered from within once Greece acquired
Thrace and Western Anatolia, Venizelos reassured King Alexander that:
I do not forget the promise I have made you. We shall take the City.
5
In the long run the Venizelist foreign policy hoped to achieve a relatively
homogenous Greek population in Western Anatolia and Thrace through
voluntary intermigration of populations. The accomplishment of such a plan,
Venizelos believed, would bring about the fulfilment of megali idea and the
creation of Greater Greece.
The practicality of such an ambitious scheme was not only questioned by
European observers but also by such eminent Greek figures as General John
Metaxas.
6
Such criticism gains further credibility when it is remembered that
the British reflected upon offering to Greece the whole of European Turkey,
including Istanbul. 7 Thus, on 14 April 1919, the British experts Toynbee and
Nicolson proposed that istanbul and the European shores of the Straits,
2. For an excellent treatment on the Greek territorial claims see N. Petsalis-Diomidis, Greece
at the Paris Peace Conference 1919, Thessaloniki 1978, pp. 67 ff.
3. The Manchester Guardian, 25 Jan. 1919.
4. Granville to Balfour, Athens, 9 June 1918, FO 371/3156/109933.
5. D. Kitsikis, Propagande et Pressions en Politique Intemationale, Paris 1963, p. 28 n. 3.
6. For the difficulties that Venizelos' scheme was bound to face see M. Llewellyn Smith,
Ionian Vision, London 1973, pp. 4 f. Also FO 608/88/4604, Greek Irredentism in Anatolia and
the Case against Partition by Professor Calder, 17 March 1919.
7. H. Nicolson, Peacemaking, 1919, London 1964, p. 322. On Curzon's determination to eject
the Turks from Europe, CAB 29/2/P/85, The Future of Constantinople, memorandum by
Curzon, 2 Jan. 1918. It was circulated to the British Cabinet in January 1919.
53
instead ofizmir, should be given to Greece. 8 Similar views were expressed by
Crowe, the British undersecretary of foreign affairs.
9
This alternative was
apparently supported by Lloyd George, who on 5 May 1919 informed Ven-
izelos that if the United States refused to take the mandate, the only solution
acceptable to Britain would be for istanbul to go to Greece. 10 But the Greek
prime minister went ahead with the Anatolian venture without giving a
serious thought to the Constantinople alternative. If conceded, a sea fron-
tier would have separated Greece and Turkey and would have secured the
whole of Thrace, including European istanbul, for Greece.!l But in the
euphoric days of 1919 Venizelos was determined to bring about a Greater
Greece whose frontiers extended over two continents and five seas. Mean-
while, most of the Greeks, and particularly the Greeks of the Ottoman
empire, shared Venizelos'dream.
2. The Patriarchate: spokesman for unredeemed Greeks.
Despite their admiration for Venizelos, it was to the Ecumenical Patriar-
chate that the Ottoman Greeks traditionally turned for religious as well as
political guidance. The Patriarchate was the national centre around which the
spiritual, political and social life of the Ottoman Greeks converged. But by
1918 the dual responsibilities of the Phanar as a high-ranking functionary of
the Ottoman administration and the supreme ecclesiastico-political institu-
tion of the Rum Milleti came into serious conflict. The traditional universalist
position of the Greek Orthodox Patriarchate of Constantinople was inevita-
bly incompatible with the basically secular nationalist principles, whose
impact on the Ottoman society was dramatic at the beginning of the twentieth
century.
Ideally the Patriarchate ought to have continued to approach the rise of
nationalism among ethnic groups in the Empire with great caution. During the
crucial years of 1918 to 1922, however, the Phanar was unable to carryon its
responsibilities as a senior member of the Ottoman administrative apparatus.
This was mainly the outcome of the traumatic experiences during World War
I. The Young Turk experiment in forging a uniform Ottoman identity among
the various ethnic groups of the empire after the 1908 revolution had
8. Memorandum prepared by Toynbee and Nicolson, Peace with Turkey, 14 April 1919, FO
608/110/7335.
9. Minute by Crowe, 16 April 1919, Fo 608/110/7335.
to. Venizelos' Diary, 9 May 1919, TaXuapo/lOr;. no. 79,23 May 1969.
II. For more details on the Constantinople altemative see N. Petsalis-Diomidis, 1919: Tit
L!!UPVll il ,itv ITOA.ll; MUI eVaA.A.alCnK1'! A.uOi] ltOl> 6 O:ltEppt,!,E !!UI..A.OV
Me).e7:1/-tam rvpw alto TOV BevICO.o Kai !7/v bcox1 TOU. Athens 1980, pp. 101-18.
54
failed abysmally. As the regime's ideals of equality and brotherhood
deteriorated into outright persecution - especially during the war- the
Ottoman Greek leadership came to believe that Muslim-Christian co-
existence, based on equal political and civil rights, was impossible under
Turkish rule.! By 1919, moreover, like the majority of the Hellene and
Ottoman Greeks, the Phanar was convinced that the cherished vision of the
megali idea was about to become a reality. As a result, the Phanar felt that it
had to fulfil its historic role by providing leadership to the unredeemed
Greeks(,AAlYrpO:)'t'm
Immediately after the signing of the Mudros armistice, the patriarchal
authorities decided to elect a more energetic and politicized leadership. The
ageing incumbent of the patriarchal throne, Germanos V (Kavakopoulos)
was accused of having compromised with the Young Turks on such matters
as education and marriage. In addition a number of scandals concerning
financial laxity were ventilated to discredit the ailing patriarch.
2
This cam-
paign resulted in the resignation of Patriarch Germanos and his entire pat-
riarchal mixed council on 25 October 1918.
3
The fall of the fundamentalist
Germanos put an end to the gerondismos tradition and to the Phanar policy of
voluntary submission to the Turkish masters.
After agreeing to the postponement of a new patriarchal election until a
definite peace settlement was concluded, the Phanar elected the archbishop
of Brussa Dorotheos Mammelis, locum tenens (Tonory/py/T1/C;) of the Patriar-
chate on 28 October able and dynamic man, the acting patriarch
was determined to playa vigorous role and so were the new members of the
patriarchal mixed council. 5
Immediately after its election the patriarchal council espoused whole-
L At the Paris Peace Conference, Venizelos maintained that over 380,000 Ottoman Greeks
had fallen victims to the Young Turk outrages, see Neo).oyor;. 18/31 January 1919.
2. Memorandum on the Ecumenical Patriarchate, Andew Ryan, Cons., 26 December 1922,
FO 371/4156/E516. For a biographical account of Germanos see EA 40-41 (1920) 472-73.
3. For the anti-Germanos campaign of the powerful Venizelist Grecophone press of lstanbul
see II pooaor:; 18 N ovember/l December 1918. For a text of the patriarch's letter of resignation see
Mavropoulos, op.cit . pp. 95-96.
4. Dorotheos Mammelis (1851-1921). An Anatolian Greek, he was first appointed archbishop
of Grevena in 1897 and was translated to the see of Nikopolis four years later. During this period
became a staunch supporter of Greek rights in Macedonia. In 1903 he was transferred to Anatolia
as archbishop of Brussa.
5. Details on the election in Memorandum on the Ecumenical Patriarchate, Andrew Ryan,
Cons., FO 371/4156/ESI6 .. See also Mavropoulos, op. cit . p. 97. The lay members of patriarchal
council were: Charalambidis, Pappas, Karatheodoris, Kioseoglou, Spatharis, Adosidis,
Kasanovas and Chatzopoulos.
55
heartedly the cause of Greek irredentism, providing leadership to an umbrella
organization, the national committee (,EevllOl 'Enrrponefa). This committee
sought primarily to articulate and promote the aspirations of the nationalist
Ottoman Greeks. At first it succeeded in making a considerable impact and on
:2 December 19 I 8, a delegation of the national committee met with the British
high commissioner, admiral Arthur Calthorpe. During this interview the
British admiral expressed his personal sympathy with Ottoman Christian
aspirations. (,
Soon, the national committee established official branches in most of the
major European centres and in the cities of the Ottoman empire. A prominent
Anglo-Greek banker, Sir John Stavridi, headed the London branch, while in
Paris the irredentist movement was represented by a number of eminent
Constantinopolitan and Smyrniot Greeks. 71t has already been shown that the
central committee of the umedeemed Greeks worked closely with the Greek
Foreign Ministry, even though Athens endeavoured to belittle its direct links
with the whole movement.
8
Meanwhile, the Patriarchate, arguing that the Sublime Porte was not able
to administer the country satisfactorily, refused to communicate directly with
the Ottoman government. While under the physical protection of a Greek-
Cretan regiment since November 1918, the Phanar proceeded to abolish the
teaching of Turkish in Greek schools on 21 January 1919.
9
But the activities of
the patriarchal council culminated on Sunday 16 March 1919, when the
resolution for Union with Greece was taken in Constantinopolitan Greek
churches. The official declaration stated:
The Greeks of Constantinople and the neighbourhood assembled
today in their churches ... and proclaimed their unshakeable wish to
obtain complete national re-establishment. They regard Union with the
mother-country Greece as the only firm basis for natural development
in the future ... and entrust the Ecumenical Patriarchate, their supreme
national authoritY,with the task of transmitting the present resolution to
6. Also known as the central committee of the unredeemed Greeks ('H KeVrpl1l.7! 'Emrpomi rwv
'A).vrpwrwv ')).JjI'WI').
7. Stavridi controlled the Ionian Bank Ltd. whose central branch was in London. He was
closely connected with the British Establishment and was a personal friend of Lloyd George.
The most active members of the Paris committee were Spanoudis, TriandaphyJIidis and
Sepheriadis, see npoooor;. 19 November/2 December 1918 and 'AOiivGI. 20 November/3 De-
cember 1918.
8. Kitsikis, Propagande, p. 398.
9. Information on the attitude of the Patriarchate in Kanellopoulos to Diomidis, Cons., 19
January and 19 February, both in YE/A/5VL
56
the representatives of England, France, the United States, Italy and
Greece at the Peace Conference. 10
Thus, the Ottoman Greeks were released from their civic responsibilities as
Ottoman citizens and the Patriarchate assumed unilaterally complete
sovereignty over the community. From March 1919 onwards the Phanar
refused to communicate directly with the Sublime Porte and the Greeks were
urged to abstain from municipal, communal or general elections.!! The Greek
decision to refrain from participation in the general elections of November-
/December 19 19 coupled with the March proclamation releasing the Otto-
man Greeks from their Ottoman civil responsibilities, mark perhaps the
formal demise of the Rum Mil/eli. For all practical purposes the status
accorded to the patriarchal leadership under the millet system, which had
survived for almost a century after the outbreak of the Greek War of In-
dependence, was dead.
The Phanar's new policy coincided with the popular mood of the Constan-
tinopolitan Greeks. The majority of the members of the community missed
no opportunity to manifest their adherence to Venizelism.
12
The sentiments
of the Greeks in the city were reflected in the panegyric welcome which they
accorded to the Allied fleet when it entered the Bosphorus on 13 November
1918. The non-Muslim sectors of the city were bedecked with flags and a
feu de joie flashed in every street. 13 The Greek battleship Averaf!. a member
of the Allied fleet, provoked the unbounded enthusiasm of the Greek and
Armenian population. Five thousand such Constantinopolitans were esti-
mated to have visited A veraff during its first fortnight in istanbul harbour.!4
The Greek representative in istanbul John Alexandropoulos and naval com-
mander Kakoulidis, as well as the Greek sailors, who started patrolling
sections of the city, were treated as liberators by the Ottoman Christians in
generaLIs Meanwhile, Greek-Armenian co-operation had acquired a mass
basis among the Constantinopolitan Christians immediately after World War
I. Joint conferences, like the one held in the Imperial Hotel on the island of
Buyukada (Prinkipo) in January 19 I 9, were organized in order to co-ordinate
10. Despatches by Admiral Calthorpe, Cons., FO 371/4165/55059, 55144, 88756,96959.
1 L General Staff Intelligence report, Cons., 23 October 1919, FO 371/4160/EI49600.
12. For a vivid description see H.E. Adivar, The Turkish Ordeal. London 1928, ch. I.
13. Nw).ol'o;. 31 OcL/13 Nov. 1918; Petsalis-Diomidis, Greece arrhe Peace Conference. p. 95.
14. 'A OijVaI. 22 Nov./5 Dec. 1918.
15. Nw).ol'o;. 21 Nov./4 Dec. 1918. Similar jubilant welcome was given to Greek Commander-
in-Chief Leonidas Paraskevopoulos when he visited istanbul on March 30, 1919.
57
the activities of these two groupsY' The existence of a Greek-Armenian
Committee in London also illustrates the extent of the co-operation achieved
bv the two communities.
17
. But the Constantinopolitan Christians reserved the most enthusiastic wel-
come for the French General Franchet d' Esperey, the supreme commander
of the Allied forces. On 8 February 1919, like the Ottoman conqueror Sultan
Mehmet II over four centuries ago, he rode into the city on a white horse, the
gift of a local Greek.
ls
Again. when two weeks later, the French general
visited Biiyiikada (Prinkipo), he was greeted by a most cordial Greek crowd.
A large Persian carpet was spread over the main road and the Greek school
children were assembled holding French and Greek flags. 19 Evidently, the
Ottoman Christians did not miss any possible occasion to express their
gratitude towards the Allies who, it was widely believed. were at least partly
in istanbul to protect them and promote their ultimate political emancipation.
Euphoric. if not over-optimistic, editorials appeared frequently in the local
non-Muslim press. The Greek language newspapers. and particularly the
pro-Allied Nwi.6;'o:;, went so far as to urge the Entente to proceed as swiftly
as possible with the emancipation of the Constantinopolitan Christians who,
Nwi.6;'o:; asserted. had no confidence in either the Young or the Old
Turks.2() Incidents. like the temporary closure of Nwi.6;'o:; and the harass-
ment of its editor Stavros Voutyras, were publicized in the Greek press in an
attempt to vindicate the assertion that the Turks were incapable of justly
administering a multi-ethnic social structure.
21
As a remedy they proposed a
fundamentally radical solution for the future of Istanbul which. in effect,
amounted to the ousting of the Turkish administration from the city.
The Greeks expressed their views not only in press campaigns, but also in
massive public meetings, As the acting British high commissioner, Admiral
Richard Webb observed during the customary Greek feast of Tatavla
(IIal'tll'Vpl reVl' Taravi.(JJI'):22
the streets of the capital have for the past fortnight or more seen
scenes of constant processions consisting of musical instruments, fol-
lowed by dancers in all kinds offantastic costumes and these dancers,
16. Neoi.oi'o;;, 14/27 Dec. 1918 and 19 Jan./l Feb. 1919. For a Turkish doc. see TJ. TK a r ~ i v i
10/2694, 18 Nov. 1919, in Atatiirk'iin Tamim, Telegrafve Beyannameleri, 1917-1938, Ankara
1964, vip. 126.
17. Kitsikis, Propagande, pp .. 339-346.
18. Neoi.oyo;;, 28 January/lO February 1919.
19. Ibid., 10/23 February 1919.
20 .. Ibid., 12/25 November 1918.
21. The Manchester Guardian, 3 January 1919.
22. Webb to Balfour, Cons., 1 March 1919, FO 371/4164/E42765 ..
58
no doubt out of pure exuberance of spirits, have constantly molested
passers-by navaL military and civilian, myself among the numbers.
Noisv demonstrations continued to take place culminating on Sunday, 16
M a r ~ h 1919, when in almost all the Greek Orthodox churches of the capital
tributes of allegiance to Greece were paid. While a Hellenic flag was hoisted
in the Patriarchate. a great picture of Venizelos was set up at the Taksim
square.23 Greek flags flew everywhere and inscriptions praising Venizelos
were displayed in various Greek quarters of the city.
Immediately after the March incidents representatives of the patriarchal
council met with Admiral Webb and insisted that:
2
-1
this demonstration had been spontaneous and had not been organized
by the Patriarchate. It had got about amqng the Greeks that interested
parties were saying in Paris (Peace Conference) that the Greeks of
Constantinople were passive and had no aspirations. It was in order to
give the lie to this aspersion that the Greek popUlation had. of their own
motion. decided to give expression to their desires. They had met in the
churches rather that in any public place and there had been no
disorder.
Indeed, at the Paris peace conference there was a general feeling that the
Constantinopolitan Greeks were content with the s{a {us quo. 25 This view was
mainly derived by the absence of any large scale Greek uprising in istanbuL
At first such a rising was considered a strong possibility for ever since
November 1918 the Greeks showed their will with great animation. 26 Further.
their subjection to Turkish rule for more than four centuries coupled with the
spectacular defeat of the Ottomans during World War I offered all the historic
and psychological prerequisites for such a revolt. Yet the Constantinopolitan
simply sought their emancipation from Turkish rule. This. it was hoped,
would come about through peaceful means as soon as the Allies took up their
cause.
It was certainly not a coincidence that this increasing Greek activity took
place while the Entente Powers were debating the future of the Ottoman
dominions in Paris. A patriarchal delegation ( II arpzaPllr:1 'A TCOaWJJj) , con-
sisting of acting Patriarch Dorotheos. Chysanthos Philippidis (archbishop of
Trebizond) and Patriarchal Counsellor Alexander Pappas. arrived in Paris
23. Turkish press cuttings on the incident given in Calthorpe to Balfour. Cons., 9 April and 29
May 1919. FO 371/4165/55144 and /88756 respectively.
24. Webb to Balfour, Cons .. 21 March 1919, FO 371/4164/E55111
25. Venizelos to Repoulis, Paris, 3 March 1919, YE/A/5.
26. Alexandropoulos to Diomidis, Cons., 27 December 1918 and Kanellopoulos to Diomidis,
Cons, 10 and 16 March 1919. both in YE/A/5VL
59
early in March 1919. While at the French capital, these principal exponents of
Hellenic irredentism held regular meetings with the French, British, Ameri-
can and Greek representatives at the conference. On 20 March 1919, they
submitted a memorandum outlining their demands.
27
Declaring the purpose
of his visit to the French press, Dorotheos stated that he wished
to draw the attention of the Peace Conference to the sufferings in-
flicted by the Turks on the Greek populations in the Turkish Empire.
After giving an account of these atrocities he explained that
the main object of his mission ... was to ask the Peace Conference to
assign Constantinople to the 450,000 Greek inhabitants and to set up as
independent states the large Greek settlements which were at a consid-
erable distance from Constantinople. 28
The endeavour of the Patriarchate to influence public opinion abroad
continued throughout this period. With the revision of the status quo in the
Near East after World War I, the Phanar contended, there was nothing
illegitimate or treacherous in the struggle of Ottoman Greeks to emerge from
their second class citizenship. It was the inability of the Ottoman govem-
ments to fulfil their raison d' etre of guaranteeing the safety of their citizens
rather than Christian treachery which had brought destruction to the
Ottoman empire.
29
It was as a result of this contention that the Patriarchate
chose to encourage the development of Greek separatist organization in
Anatolia, particularly in the periphery of the Black Sea.
30
Again disregarding
Turkish reaction the Patriarchate addressed an official communique on 24
May 1919 expressing its gratitude for the Greek landing in Anatolia.
31
Nor did Dorotheos hesitate to voice publicly his conviction that the only
future for Hellenism in Turkey rested with the materialization of the
Byzantine solution. Despite his disillusion with the Allied dilatoriness in
coming to a decision on the Turkish question, Dorotheos tirelessly fumished
27. Memoire Soumis a la Conterence par Ie Patriarchat Oecllmeniqlle: Les Grecs de ['Empire
Ottoman, Paris 1919.
28. Interview quoted in L'Echo de Paris, 13 March 1919.
29. Dorotheos to Venizelos, Cons., 14 February 1920, YE/B/3S. See also E.A. 40-41 (1920)
473-74 and 41 (1921) 2S-26.
30. See A. Alexandris, 'H "toG 'E9vtlcoG "t&V 'EAt.:flvrov "toG II6v"tou
1918-1922: 'EnT]VlKTt IIoAlTlKTt Kai ToupKlKTt ' Av"tiopacrrp>, M e}.eT/lliara TUpw dno
,OV &vl,iAo Kai nlv 'EnoX'; rov, Athens 1980, pp. 427-74.
31. Full copy of the letter sent by Kanellopoulos to Politis, Cons., 2S May 1919, BMAEV/18;
Dorotheos to the British High Commission, Cons., 24 May 1919, FO 371//4218/E8S639.
60
the peace conference with memoranda and appeals.
32
By far the most il-
luminating piece of evidence on the prelate's views concerning the future of
istanbul was a letter addressed to Lloyd George on 14 February 1920.
Claiming that neither in origin, culture or population istanbul was a Turkish
centre, Dorotheos asselted that to the Greeks it had remained the most sacred
city. He then went on to explain that:
The idea of a Greek nation will not be realised so long as Constantino-
ple is not united to Greece by a strong tie ... We, therefore, ask for the
union of Constantinople with the Mother Country, and we propose this
argument, together with the internationalization of the Straits, as the
best solution, because it guarantees the right of self-determination and
the interests of the Powers concerned. If for reasons which we can
appreciate, this solution appears to be of too radical a nature we should
propose that Greece should receive a mandate to govern the state of
Constantinople.33
This document was followed by many other ones.
34
Meanwhile, Dorotheos'
claims were endorsed by many influential Greek organizations. In February
1919, the prestigious Greek Literary Society terminated its long-standing
non-political character by addressing a memorandum to the peace confer-
ence. It once again reiterated the wish to incorporate istanbul into an en-
larged Greece.
35
Expressing the same desire, the influential body of the
Ottoman Greek deputies submitted an appeal to the Allied representatives in
Paris on 30 April 1919.
36
A year later a petition signed by no less than 154
Greek associations, parish councils and other community organizations in
the capital demanded a radical solution for the future of istanbul. 37
Besides his correspondence with the Allied political leaders Dorotheos
sought the support of the Anglican church, with whom the Patriarchate had
already developed good relations. From 1919, Dorotheos showed keen in-
32. De Robeck to Curzon, Cons., 19 October 1919, FO 371/41S9/EI43405. See also OM 1
(1921-22) 136.
. 33. Dorotheos to Lloyd George, Cons., 14 February 1920, FO 370/5190/EI990 (partly printed
In D.B.F.P.(7) no. 19).
34. Dorotheos to Lloyd George, Cons., FO 371/SI90/ES50 (18 February 1920), FO
371/S190/EI883 (7 March 1920), FO 371/5190/EI698 (1S March 1920).
35. Memorandum by the Syllogos Litteraire Grec de Constantinople to the Peace Confer-
ence, signed by M. Afthentopoulos and E. Mavridis, tstanbul, Feb. 1919, given in M. Afthen-
topoulos, Aoyot5oaim M'll'u AliBel'ronov).ov JIpoet5pov 1"06 BV Kwvaravrlvovno}.81 'E)).'lVIKOU
<PI}.O).OYIKOU L'vUoyov 19181922, Athens 1972, pp. 11S-20.
36. Text of memorandum in Emmanouilidis, op.cit., p. 393.
37. FO 371/SI90/E2785, 29 Jan. 1920.
61
terest in promoting the union of the churches and he went so far as to issue an
encyclical on the fellowship of churches.
38
Besides purely religious consider-
ations. Dorotheos may have also had in mind the political benefits that the
Patriarchate would reap from such a union with the Anglican church. He
certainly endeavoured to make the most of his ecclesiastical connections to
further Greek political aspirations. From 1918 to 1921, an extensive corres-
pondence took place between the Phanar and Lambeth Palace. As early as
May 28, 1919, Dorotheos was drawing the attention of the archbishop of
Canterbury to the possibility of ... leaving the Sultan at Constantinople.
Such an act, he claimed, would be a crime before God and before
Mankind.39 In a characteristic appeal the Orthodox leader requested from
the Anglican church:
We pray you to fortify in energetic fashion the Government of Bri-
tain ... in their efforts to drive out the Turks (i.e. from istanbul). By this
complete and final expulsion, though by no other means can the res-
surection of Christianity in the Near East and the restoration of the
Church of St. Sophia be secured. 40
A year later, on 26 January 1921, Dorotheos again reminded Davison that the
Ottoman capital was indubitably Christian.
41
This intense diplomatic activity on the part of the acting patriarch may well
be attributed to the gradual change of the Entente policy on the issue of
istanbul and the Straits. While in 1918-19, there was an overall agreement
among the Allies that an international regime should be installed in istanbul,
by 1920 the Entente, and particularly the French, appeared willing to allow
the Turks to rule istanbul. Thus, by exerting all the influence that he could
have possibly mastered, Dorotheos strove to prevent any change of the initial
Entente policy on the Turkish question.
38. He even envisaged the creation ofa League of Churches on the model of the League of
Nations, LPA(DvP(65(3.
39. Dorotheos to Davison, Paris, 28 May 1919, LPA(DvP(98 (Greece). The Phanarenjoyed the
support of the archbishop of Canterbury, R T. Davison, and that of the Anglican church in
general. With the encouragement of the archbishop of Canterbury the St Sophia redemption
committee was formed in London. This committee urged that St Sophia should be reverted to
the Orthodox church.
40. Dorotheos to Davison, Cons., 24 February 1920, FO 371(5190(E690.
41. Dorotheos to Davison, Cons., 21 January 1921, LPA(DvP(32(2. A number of similar
documents can be found in LPA(DvP(65(3.
62
3. The growth the Tlirkish nationalist l7Io\'('l7Ient
The acting patriarch's misgivings were well justified. At first, the- Turkish
population of Istanbul appeared rather depressed, tired and reserved. The
post-armistice palace government of Tevfik Pasha (11 November 1918-
3 March 1919) even tried to placate the Ottoman Greeks. The portofolio of
the ministry of commerce and agriculture was offered to the former governor
of Samos and senator. Kostaki Vayianis while by December 1918 a number of
Greeks were appointed to senior government positions. 1 In accordance with
this policy of conciliation. the Porte sent the president of the senate, Ahmet
Rlza. to the Phanar to communicate his government's good-will towards the
Ottoman Greeks.
2
Again. in October 1918. when the newly elected acting
patriarch. Dorotheos. paid a visit to the palace, Sultan Mehmet VI Vahdettin
welcomed him cordially and affirmed his intention to treat all Ottoman
citizens as equal. regardless of religion or race.
3
To the Greeks. however. these gestures were simply window dressing. In
the Ottoman parliament the Greek deputies demanded action and in particu-
lar the punishment of the members of the Young Turk government which
committed atrocities against the Armenians and Greeks during World War
In January 1919. moreover. the patriarchal council requested from the Greek
ministers. senators. deputies and civil servants to resign from their position.
Thus. when Vayianis resigned from his ministerial position. another Greek.
Aristeidis Georgantzoglou refused the offer to replace him.5
As the atmosphere became increasingly polarized. the Turkish press in
istanbul complained bitterly aboLlt the recent ostentatious display of the
city's Greek character. 6 The manifes.tations of national independence over-
L Constantine Vayianis (1846-1919) Member of the court of appeals. He was appointed
undersecretary of the ministry of justice and religion immediately after the Young Turk revolu-
tion. Between 18981900 he served as governor of Samos .. For details on the other appointments
see S. istanbul Hlikiimeti I'e Milli ,'flicadele. Istanbul 1976. pp. 78. 139-42. 161.
2. [JpOO()o:; 18 November: I December 1918.
3.. Mavropoulos. op.cit .. p. 98.
4 .. For the speeches of the Ottoman Greek deputies. Emmanuilidis and Charalambidis in the
parliam-ont see Emmanuilidis. op .. cit.. pp .. 376-91
5 .. Kanellopoulos to Diomidis. Cons .. 30 January 1919. YEA; 5VL See also op .. cil.. p ..
163
6 .. Turkish press articles quoted in [JpOO()o;, 13.26 November 1918 and 'A OliVa!, 13.26 January
1919.
63
5
tly displayed by the Patriarchate on behalf of the Ottoman Greek community
were strongly resented by the 7
It has been argued that the Turkish reproaches were unfounded since, with
the Mudros armistice, the Ottoman empire had entered upon an intelTegnum.
In the resulting political vacuum, the argument asserts, no appropriate au-
thority, apart from the Allied military forces, was in position to enforce its
dictates.
s
This view coincided with the Phanar's interpretation of the state of
affairs in the N ear East after October 1918. Yet. the clauses of the armistice
were vague, containing little which foresaw or prejudiced the eventual peace
settlement. Despite their sympathetic disposition towards the Christians, the
Allies were not prepared to alter radically the Turkish status quo. for such an
action would have inevitably entailed commitment of a large Allied military
force. Unwilling to face an all-out military confrontation with the Turkish
people, the Entente, at least in principle, held fast to the continuity of the
sultan's government. Thus, although the Allied troops disembarked in
istanbul, the Allies carefully avoided using the word occupation Even
when on 20 March 1920, istanbul was placed under an official military
occupation, the Allies stressed the temporary character of this operation.
Similarly, despite their serious encroachments on the sultan's authority, the
Entente continued to pay him lip-service.
Authoritative observers like Andrew Ryan, a senior official of the British
High Commission in Istanbul, tried in vain to persuade Dorotheos to refrain
from committing himself in the Greco-Turkish antagonism.
9
On 21 March
1919, the acting British high commissioner Webb drew the attention of a
patriarchal delegation to the dangers of over-enthusiastic Greek demon-
strations in Istanbul. He advised them to trust their leaders (Greek delegates
in Paris) and avoid manifestations which would not effect the ultimate
issue. 10 Self-restraint was also recommended to the patriarchal counsellor,
Ch. Charalambidis by General Franchet d'Esperey. II But even the Greek
commissioner in Istanbul, Efthymios Kanellopoulos cautioned on numerous
occasions the Constantinopolitan Greek leadership against provocative acts
7. In his meeting with the British high commissioner Damad Ferid Pasha complained of the
conduct of the Greeks. in Cal thorpe to Balfour, Cons" 19 March 1919, FO
8. F.W. Fernau, Patriarch en am Goldenen Horn: GeMenll'art und Tradition des Ort/lOdaxell
Orients, Opladen 1%7, p. 112.
9. A. Ryan, The Last of the Dragomans, London 1951. 153-54.
10. Webb to Balfour, Cons., 21 March 1919, FO 371/4165/E55111.
II. Mavropoulos, op.cit .. , p. 115.
64
which exceeded the limits ofprudence.'2 Nor did Venizelos approve of the
despatch of a patriarchal delegation to the Paris peace conference in March
1919.
13
But, the Ottoman Greek leadership, aware that the future of Hellen-
ism was being debated in Paris, declined to moderate its stance.
The position of the Constantinopolitan Greeks became more uncertain
after the establishment of Greek rule in the Smyrna periphery on 15 May
1919. The Greek landing in Anatolia provided the impetus for the emergence
of a vigorous and cohesive Turkish nationalist movement. l-l With the con-
gresses of Erzurum (7 August 1919) and Sivas (9 September 1919), the Tur-
kish nationalists laid down the foundations of a well-organized resistance
movement. 15 In the Ottoman capital, too, reaction to the Greek landing in
Izmir was vigorous. Mass meetings and demonstrations took place in
Istanbul. 16 The Constantinopolitan Christians were terrified. Their fears
were further intensified when the anti-nationalist government of Damad Ferit
Pasha was forced out of office on 1 October 1919. The new government of Ali
Riza adopted a tougher line towards Constantinopolitan Christians. Describ-
ing this new attitude, the Istanbul press pointed out that the Turkish police
had pulled down Greek flags flying over various institutions in
Constantinople. 17 Meanwhile, the British intelligence staff in Istanbul re-
ported that impelled by the Turkish nationalist, Moslem religious func-
tionaries... urge the population to resist any attempt to occupy the
country. 18 Increasingly the resurgence of Turkish self-confidence in Istanbul
expressed itself in a lethal bitterness towards the Ecumenical Patriarchate and
the non-Muslim popUlation. Clandestinely distributed nationalist pamphlets
became extremely popular in the Turkish quarters of the city. Unhampered
by Allied censorship, these pamphlets criticized in the most vigorous manner
the activities of the Constantinopolitan Christians. They repeatedly urged the
12. A. Pallis, Eel''1Tef1iI'OIEi.i.l/l'e:;, Athens 1953, p. 173.
11. Mavropoulos, op.cit., pp .. 107-08.
14. For a treatment of the Greek occupation of Western Anatolia see Llewellyn Smith, ap .. cit .. ,
pp. 86-101; M.L. Rodas, 'H :Di.d6a arr,1 MII ..pd 'Aaia 19181922. Athens 1950.
15. On the Turkish nationalist movement see, M. K. Atatiirk, A Speech Delil'ered IHustafa
Kemal Atatiirk; S.R. Sonyel. Turkish Diplomacy 1918-1923. London 1975.
16. On the great demonstration of 23 May 1919 in Sultan Ahmet see K. Arlburnu. Milli
Miicadele'de istanbul mitingleri. Istanbul 1951. p. 212 f. Also Cal thorpe to Balfour, Cons., 31
May 1919, FO 371j4227/E82458
17. Turkish press cuttings in FO 37Ij4159!EI44747, I October Report by Webb to
Curzon on the dramatic events in the city, 10 October 1919, FO 406/41/251-56.
18.. General Staff Intelligence report, Cons., 23 October 1919, FO 371/4160/149600.
65
Muslim population to boycott commercial exchanges with Greeks and
Armenians. 19
By October 1919, the Constantinopolitan Christians became increasingly
apprehensive about the future. A strong proof of the anxiety which the
situation inspired in the heads of the Christian communities was given when
on 17 October 1919, the Greek and Armenian religious leaders, in an un-
paralleled instance of fraternity in the history of their churches, called
jointly upon the British high commissioner, J .M. de Robeck. After expressing
their profound disillusionment with the indecisive treatment of the Eastern
Question at the Paris peace conference, they warned that:
The situation was so grave that the Patriarchs might have no alterna-
tive but to resign their functions and leave it to the Entente to look after
the interests of their flocks. 20
4. The patriarchal mission to London and the death of Dorotheos.
After a long delay, the Allies managed to produce a peace formula which
was duly signed at Sevres on 10 August 1920. Despite its harsh terms for
Turkey, the treaty of Sevres acknowledged the sovereignty of the sultan over
his capital. Article 36 of this treaty, which was never ratified by the Turks,
stipulated that:
Subject to the Provisions of the present Treaty, the High Contracting
Parties agree that the rights and title of the Turkish Government over
Constantinople shall not be affected, and that the said Government and
His Majesty the Sultan shall be entitled to reside there and maintain
there the capital of the Turkish State.
Nevertheless, in the event of Turkey failing to observe faithfully the
provisions of the present Treaty or of any treaties or conventions
supplementary thereto, particularly as regards the protection of the
rights of racial, religious or linguistic minorities, the Allied Powers
expressly reserve the right to modify the above provisions, and Turkey
thereby agrees to accept any dispositions which may be taken in this
connection. I
19. The text of such a pamphlet is given in T. Duran. Milli Miicadele YllIarlnda Yunan ve Rum
Katliamlarl Karslslnda Anadolu' dan IstanbUl" daki Tiirklere bir 9agrl. BITD 79-SI (1974) 12-16.
20. See D.B.FP. (4) no. 522 and for more detailed reports De Robeck to Curzon, Cons . 19
October 1919, FO 371/41 59/EI43405; Webb to Curzon. Cons., IS October 1919. FO
371/4160/EI46634.
I. The whole text of the Treaty ofSevres, which was never ratified by the Turks, can be found
in British and Foreign State Papers. Treaty Series no. II (1920), cmd. 964.
66
Notwithstanding the retention of istanbul by the Turks, the treaty of
Sevres marked a formidable triumph for Greek diplomacy. Yet to make
Greater Hellas effective, the Greek army would have had to impose the peace
terms upon the Turkish nationalists by force of arms. In this they were not
successful, for the Anatolian resistance movement had by now developed
into a formidable force. Greek military inability to prevail in Anatolia led to an
Allied conference which met in London in February-March 1921 to debate
the modification of the treaty of Sevres. The increasing political and military
muscle of the Turkish nationalist movement was clearly visible when the
conference recognized Bekir Sami, the foreign minister of the Ankara gov-
ernment, as the sole effective spokesman of all the Turkish parties, including
the sultan and his ministers. This was a major diplomatic success marking yet
another significant step towards the complete international recognition of the
Ankara regime.
2
In these changing circumstances, the Ecumenical Patriarchate did not
remain idle. In an appeal to Lloyd George the acting patriarch requested that
the Ottoman Greeks should be given the opportunity of placing their views
before the London conference. 3 Despite the adamant refusal of the Entente of
any official or semi-official Ottoman Greek representation in the peace
negotiations, a patriarchal delegation did arrive in London on 1 March 1921.
It was headed by acting Patriarch Dorotheos who was accompanied by the
patriarchal counsellors Angelos loannidis and Paul Karatheodoris, as well his
secretary Germanos Athanasiadis.
4
During his stay in London, Dorotheos
endeavoured to elicit the support ofleading British personalities, in particular
the influential archbishop of Canterbury. 5 Thanks to the mediation of the
Anglican church, the patriarchal delegation had even succeeded in obtaining
an interview with the king of England on 11 March 1921.6 Dorotheos had also
a private talk with Lord Curzon to whom he appealed against any modifica-
tion of the treaty of Sevres.
7
The intense diplomatic activity by the patriarchal delegation produced
2. On the London negotiations see Sonye!. op.cit" pp. 91-112.
3.. Dorotheos to Lloyd George, Cons., 31 January 1921, FO 371/6565/EI492 See an Ottoman
Greek appeal to the Entente against any modification of the treaty of Sevres. The Times. 30
December 1920 ..
4. Rumbold to Curzon. Cons., 16 February 192!. FO 371/6565/E2191. See also Mavropoulos,
Op.ciL. pp. 133-34.
5 .. Minutes of Dorotheos'interview with the archbishop of Canterbury on 2 March 1921 in
LPAjDvP/32!2.
6. E.A. 41 (l92!) 73-76.
7. Dorotheos to Curzon. London, 7 March 192!. FO SOO/CurzP.
67
no practical results. Furthermore, the mission received a further blow when
on 18 March 1921, acting Patriarch Dorotheos Mammelis died in
from a heart failure. 8 The prelate's death did not only put an end to the Phanar
mission in London but also deprived the inedentist Greek cause of one
of its principal exponents. After championing the Greek rights in Macedonia,
Dorotheos Mammelis devoted all his energies for the realization of megali
idea. A wholehearted supporterofVenizelos, this prelate was instrumental in
reversing the established Phanar policy of neutrality. 9 Thus, by his une-
quivocal opposition to Turkish rule, the acting patriarch committed the
Patriarchate to the political antagonisms between Turkey and Greece. His
policy of involving the Patriarchate in politics came under fierce criticism not
only by the but also by those Constantinopolitan Greeks who advo-
cated a policy of neutrality for the Phanar. Since no definite mandate over
istanbul was officially given to any Power or Greece, Dorotheos propounded
a very precarious course. His policy exposed not only the Ecumenical Pat-
riarchate (as an institution) but also the large Constantinopolitan Greek
community to Turkish hostility as soon as the Allies decided to withdraw
from the city. But in the heady days that followed the Mudros armistice.
Dorotheos' irTedentist policy was quite popular with the Ottoman Greeks:
The possibilities for expansion in 1918 had captured the imagination of most
of the Greeks and enabled them to consider the extension of the Greek
frontier to the Bosphorus and beyond as feasible.
Their optimism was quite premature. As racial relations deteriorated in
istanbul, it was the policy of low political profile and compromise
(gerondismos), upheld by the deposed patriarch Germanos, which began to
reveal its wisdom. Although a minority, some extremely influential Cons tan-
tinopolitan Greeks adhered to this policy of seeking an lJnderstanding with
the Sublime Porte. Prominent Ottoman Greeks with long political and ad-
ministrative experience, such as senators Aristeidis Georgantzoglou Pasha
and Mavrokordatos Pasha, istanbul deputy Basil Orphanidis and senior
officials Zdiros Pasha, Lambikis Pasha, Christidis, and Aristeidis Skouros
were included in this group. An eminent ecclesiastic, the archbishop of
Chalcedon, Gregory Zervoudakis, headed these advocates of moderation.
Refusing to endorse the decision of the patriarchal council to sever relations
with the Porte, Gregory resigned his senior position in the holy synod in
8. Letters by the new acting patriarch, Nicholas, the archbishop of Caesarea, to Canterbury
and another by the chaplain of the British embassy in lstanbul both dated on 23 March 1921,
LPA/DgP/32/2.
9. Rumbold to Curzon. Cons., 13 April 1921, Fo 371/6566/E4611; Borough to Douglas, Cons ..
nd., LPAjDgP/17/14-16.
68
March 1919.
10
After the Greek defeat in Anatolia and the signing of the
Lausanne treaty in 1923, it was these distinguished Constantinopolitan
Greeks who took up the difficult task of rehabilitating the Ecumenical Pat-
riarchate in the Turkish republic. Characteristically, the repUblican Turkish
government approved the election of Archbishop Gregory to the Patriarchal
throne on 6 December 1923.
11
5. Patriarch Meletios Metaxakis
In the meantime crucial political changes had taken place in Greece. In an
historic election on 14 November 1920. Venizelos and his Liberal party
suffered a stunning defeat. The ascendency of the royalists was further
manifested when, in a national referendum, the Greek people voted over-
whelmingly for the recall of King Constantine on 5 December 1920.
1
The
pro-royalist mood in Greece, however, was not shared by the Ottoman
Greeks, who continued to regard Venizelos as the leader of the nation (0
apxr!"!(X; riir;; rpv),iicJ With the exception of the Il arpic;, the Constantinopolitan
Greek press continued to support Venizelos whole-heartedly. So did most of
the influential professional and commercial middle class. 2 Among the leading
business figures of the Greek community, only the two wealthy banking
families of Zariphis and Evgenidis were credited with royalist leanings.
3
Yet political affiliations among the prelates at the Phanar were more
divided. There was a growing dissatisfaction among the ecclesiastics with the
deep involvement of the church in politics. Hoping that the royalists would
adopt a more conciliatory policy in Anatolia, a number of prelates sympath-
ized with the political changes in Athens. Others, like the archbishop of
Cyzicus, Constantine Araboglou, had strong royalist leanings.
Immediately after the defeat of the Liberal party, Venizelist circles in
istanbul formed the 'E()V1Kit "AJlUm Kwvamvrzvovn6}.ewc; (Constantinopolitan
National Defence League). In its first meeting, which attracted large
crowds, the organization declared its fidelity to the person ofVenizelos, to
the Allies and to the cause of Hellenism.
4
In an expression of their support,
mass celebrations were held by Constantinopolitan Greeks on the nameday
of Venizelos on 28 December 1920.
5
10. Mavropoulos, op.cit .. p. 127.
I L See below, chapter V:3.
L OniOI'IKo:; r51XaO'jlo:; see D. Dakin. The Unification of Greece. 1770-1923. London 1972, pp.
205 ff.
2. Inten'iew with Palll Palaiologos, Athens 1979. Palaiologos was one of the owners of JIarpi:;
until 1922.
3. Rumbold to Curzon, Cons., I3 December 1920, FO 371/4685/CI4290.
4. Ibid.
5 .. That is the day of SL Eleftherios. see 'Ei.uOspOl; Tuno:;, 16/29 December 1920.
69
L
Irredentist Ottoman Greek circles strongly believed that Venizelos was the
only Greek politician able to pursue the case of Greater Greece at the
diplomatic bargaining table with success. Not without justification. they
feared that the political changes in Athens would lead to a European demand
for the modification of the treaty of Sevres at the expense of Greece.
1i
For it
was widely acknowledged that King Constantine and his close associate
Dimitrios Gounaris were antipathetic to the Entente leaders.7 The Greek
claims in Anatolia and Thrace, the Constantinopolitan and SmyrniotAmyna
groups stressed, were dependent on the goodwill and support of the Entente.
As a result the indignation of the irredentist Greeks against their compatriots
for jeopardizing the realization of the megali idea and for betraying the
Venizelist foreign policy was immense.
8
The anti-royalist activities of the Amynites were encouraged by a group of
Venizelist officers who had found refuge in istanbul after November 1920.
These officers had either refused to serve in the Constantinist armies or were
dismissed by the new regime. Most prominent among them were the generals
E.Zimbrakakis, D.Ioannou, A.Mazarakis, G.Katechakis and Colonel
G.Kondylis. Many generals, as well as the Venizelist politician Pericles
Argyropoulos, established their quarters at the luxurious Pha Pa/as hotel of
Bodosakis-Athanasiadis, a prosperous Ottoman Greek businessman. 9
Amongst these officers, Colonel Kondylis was the most active and outspoken
opponent of the royalist regime and through the Constantinopolitan daily,
JIpwfa, he launched a systematic campaign against Athens.
With the support of Venizelos, the Amyna movement attempted to obtain
international recognition and financial assistance from Britain. For this pur-
pose and through his intermediary in London Sir John Stavridi, Venizelos put
in touch a delegation of the ConstantinopolitanAmyna with Lloyd George. 10
On 10 January 1921, this delegation met Philip Kerr, the prime minister's
secretary. While requesting British financial assistance, the Amynites elabo-
rated a number of ambitious plans. They even envisaged the formation of a
6. Thus, in the London conference (26 Nov./6 Dec. 1920) the French representatives de-
manded such a revision of the treaty see D.B.F.P. (8) no. 95 to 98.
7. A memorandum prepared by the Constantinopolitan Amyna 14 Jan. 1921 in Stavridi P./file
6.
8. For an appraisal of the international implications of the political changes in Greece see LL
Smith, Ionian Vision, pp. 162 If. On the various Amyna organizations and the Mikrasiatic
movement see Rodas, op.cit., pp. 270 If.
9. See Th. Veremis, Of 'Emi/l{Jdael:;; TOU Irpawu ani\' 'Ei.i.l/vlIai IJoi.lwai, 1916-1936, Athens
1977, pp. 71-96; D.B.F.P., (12) no. 472.
10. Venizelos to Stavridi, Nice, 29 December 1920, Stavridi P./file 5. The delegates were:
Constantine Spanoudis, T. K. Stavridis and Leonidas Iasonidis.
70
purely Ottoman Greek army which would consist of 45,000 men. Once British
approval for the establishment of an autonomous Ionian (or Mikrasiatic)
regime was assured, the delegation pointed out, the Ottoman Greeks would
be in a position to defend themselves.
ll
The British government not only
refused to commit itself to such a basically divisive force but it also adopted a
tough line against the Amyna. Thus in March 1921, the British discouraged
the representation of the Ottoman Greeks at the London conference by a
separate patriarchal delegation.
In fact virtually nothing came out of Amyna's grandiose plans. Further,
despite their apprehensions about the ability of the royalist Greek govern-
ment to protect the Anatolian Greeks against the Turks, the Amynites them-
selves fell victim to the domestic schism of the Greek nation (,E()V1KOs
i111.aop.oc;). As a result, the concept of an autonomous Ionian state had a
serious divisive effect on the overall Greek political and military effort during
the crucial years of 1921-22. By undermining the legitimate Hellenic govern-
ment, they naively aided the demise of the Greek military enterprise in
Anatolia.
12
The first official demonstration against Constantine on the part of the
Venizelist leadership of the Phanarwas an appeal to the king, who was then in
Switzerland, on 5 November 1920. By that appeal Constantine was exhorted
to resign his rights over the Greek throne for the sake of the Hellenic nation.
13
Soon relations between Athens and the Phanar were at such a low ebb that the
holy synod even considered the excommunication of King Constantine.
14
Prelates with royalist leanings were recalled from their provincial sees in
Anatolia and Thrace and were compelled to remain at the Phanar.
15
Athens
retaliated by discontinuing all financial assistance. Faced with acute money
difficulties, the Patriarchate was in fact maintained through the private con-
tributions of wealthy businessmen, such as Bodosakis-Athanasiadis and John
Kehayioglou.
16
This financial backing was yet another illustration of the
close ties which existed between Venizelism and the Ottoman Greek middle
class.
II. Details on the ideological stand of the movement in a memorandum prepared by Amyna
dated on 14 Jan. 1921, Stavridi P./file 6; LL Smith, Ionian Vision, pp. 185-89.
12. D.B.F.P., (17) no. 601, n. 3. It has also been pointed out that some of the Venizelist officers
in istanbul, particularly George Kondylis, were motivated by pure fanaticism, see S. Mar-
kezinis, IJO).lTlIO'! 'Iaropfa riir; L"Vi'XP0I'OV 'Ei.i.(u50:;; 1920-22, Athens 1973, i/p. 290.
13. It was signed by acting Patriarch Dorotheos. For the text see E.A., 40-41 (1920) 437-38.
14. Rumbold to Curzon, Cons., 23 February 1921, FO 371/6565/E2733.
15. Ibid.
16. ''i.eu8epo:;; Tuno:;. 1/13 and 7/20 December 1920: Markezinis. op.cit., p. 253.
71
With the death of the acting Patriarch Venizelism was deprived of one of its
most prestigious exponents. His successor Nicholas, the archbishop of
Caesarea, who assumed the responsibilities of the patriarchal office on 19
March 1921, was less enthusiastic in pursuing the Phanar's established Ven-
izelist line. Nor did he possess Dorotheos' dynamismY As a result, with the
initiative of a number of prelates whose dioceses were situated within the
Greek-held zone, the policy of hostility towards the Constantinist govern-
ment was gradually modified. Thus, in May 1921 the grand vicar of the
Patriarchate, Athenagoras, prayed publicly for the king at a service. The
apparent pro-Amynite unity of the holy synod sustained a severe blow when
senior prelates, such as the archbishops Constantine (Cyzicus) and Joachim
(Enos), openly declared their pro-royalist sentiments. IS Together with the
newly-arrived royalist Greek high commissioner, Nicholas Votsis, these
prelates were striving for the establishment of a Constantinist movement in
istanbul.
Faced with this challenge, the Venizelists at the Phanar tried to stave off
opposition by electing a sympathetic patriarch. Thus, after being in abeyance
for almost three years, the issue of a patriarchal election was brought up in
September 1921. The local agitation for an election was launched by the
overwhelmingly Venizelist Constantinopolitan Greek press. Notwithstand-
ing the bitter opposition of the Athens government, the patriarchal authorities
went ahead with the election on 6 December 1921.1
9
The election was trans-
formed into a power struggle between the two factions and after two days of
intense deliberations Meletios Metaxakis, a Cretan in origin, Venizelist in
politics, liberal and progressive in church affairs, was elected patriarch.20
With good reason Athens viewed the whole affair as a political manoeuvre
designed to undermine the authority of the Greek government. Meanwhile,
the majority of the senior eccleciastics condemned the predominance of the
lay element in the election. Seven out of the twelve members of the holy
17. Rumbold to Cur-zon, Cons., 28 March 1921, FO 371/6566/E4063.
18. Votsis to Foreign Ministry, Cons., 23 November 1921, YE/B/35; Rumbold toCunon,
Cons., 3 June 1921, FO 371/6566/E6774.
19. Votsis to Foreign Ministry, Cons., 7 and 8 December 1921, both in YE/B/35; Rumbold to
Curzon, Cons., 10 December 1921, FO 371/6566/EI3900.
20. Meletios Metaxakis (1871" 1935). After holding the see of Kitium in Cyprus, he succeeded
the deposed Theoclitos as archbishop of Athens and was himself deposed in tum when the
royalists returned to power in November 1921. After his dismissal, he went to the United States
to uphold the Venizelist cause among the Greek communities there. While the leader of the
Venizelist faction in the Orthodox church, in ecclesiastical matters he promoted the ecumenical
movement, showing keen interest in Anglicanism.
72
synod resigned in a protest against the irregularities which had apparently
taken place during the election.
21
On 12 December 1921, after hearing the
testimonies of two dissenting archbishops, Joachim (Enos) and Eirinaios
(Dardanelles), a council of ministers in Athens declared the election null and
void in view of the irregularities which had taken place during the
proceedings.
22
Unable to come to terms with Meletios' return to prominence,
Athens employed every available means to undermine the authority of the
Patriarchate, particularly in the newly acquired territories of Thrace and
western Anatolia. The whole affair was yet another reminder of the Greek
obsession with personal feuds and party politics. Embroiled in their feuds,
both Constantinists and Venizelists exhibited a disregard for the fundamental
needs of the Patriarchate. Above all, by bringing domestic Greek politics into
what after all was a supranational institution. beyond the jurisdiction of the
Hellenic government, Greek political leaders undermined the prestigious
position of the Ecumenical Patriarchate as an international religious centre.
Norwas the new patriarch in a conciliatory mood. To Meletios, his election
to the patriarchal throne would usher in a change in political attitudes. A
swing back to Venizelism which was to culminate with the return of the
Liberal leader to the centre of Greek politics. Thus as soon as he arrived in
istanbul, he allied himself with the Amynites placing the moral force of the
Patriarchate behind Amyna' s efforts the support of eminent political
figures.
23
Although the project for a Mikrasiatic state never materialized,
with the arrival of Meletios in the Phanar the Amyna movement gathered
considerable momentum among the Constantinopolitan and Smyrniot
Greeks.
24
It is evident therefore that the election of an intensely political
figure to the patriarchal throne and the maintenance of the Phanar as a
stronghold of Venizelism frustrated any possibility of a national reconcilia-
tion.
21. The dissenting prelates were: Constantine (Cyzicus). Joachim (Enos), Eirinaios
(Dardanelles), Chrysostomos (Tyroloi), Evgenios (Silyvria), Anthimos (Vyzia) and Gerassimos
(Pisidia). Votsis to Foreign Ministry, Cons, 14 December 1921, YE/B/35. Also a detained
memorandum on the election in Stavridi P./file 6, nd.
22. Copy of the letter sent by the seven dissenting prelates to Meletios in Votsis to Foreign
Ministry, Cons., 14 December 1921, YE/B/35.
23. He played an active role in the task of enlisting the support of the governor of tzmir,
Aristeidis Stergiadis, and the commander-in-chief of the Greek forces in Anatolia, Anastasios
Papoulas, see LD. Passas. 'H 'Ai'wvia Eva.; "EOvQv:;. Athens 1925, pp. 151 ff; LL Smith, op.cit .
pp. 248 f.
24. Venizelos was delighted with the election of Meletios. In a letter to the new Patriarch
Venizelos wrote: I need not tell you how glad I was to hear of your election as Oecumenical
Patriarch, Stavridi P./file 6,26 Dec. 1921
73
Despite his opposition to the Athens regime. Meletios continued to stand
firmly for Greek irredentism. Soon Patriarch Meletios proved to be a more
articulate protagonist of the Greek cause than even his dynamic predecessor
Dorotheos Mammelis. On his way from America to take up his new post at the
Phanar. the new patriarch visited London and Paris where he discussed
political and ecclesiastical issues with European leaders. On 17 January 1922.
he was received by Lloyd George and a week later he proceeded to Paris for
talks with French leaders.15 Addressing 100 senators and a delegation of the
French Foreign Ministry on 25 January 1922. the patriarch affirmed his
adherence to the creation of a Mikrasiatic state. In this speech the Greek
prelate even hinted at the inclusion of Istanbul in the proposed Ottoman
Greek state.
1h
Meletios did not conceal his elaborate scheme of recruiting Greek-
American volunteers.17 After his enthronement. the patriarch visited regu-
larly the Greek parishes in the city appealing for volunteers and financial help
to resist the Turkish nationalists in Anatolia. But. while substantial financial
assistance appears to have been forthcoming. the Constantinopolitan Greeks
were extremely reluctant to join the Hellenic forces in Anatolia.
18
Between
March 1921 and March 1922. a mere 2.850 Constantinopolitan volunteers had
passed through the recruitment bureau at the Hellenic military mission in
I stanbul. Addressing a delegation of prominent Constantinopolitan Greeks at
Bursa. King Constantine bitterly complained of the very limited number of
recruits obtained from istanbul. Efforts to recruit Greek-American volun-
teers were equally disappointing.
By contrast. it was in the diplomatic field that the irredentist Constan-
tinopolitan Greeks chose to play an active role. When. therefore. the Greek
evacuation of the Smyrna enclave was debated at the Paris negotiations (22 to
26 March 1922). the Ottoman Greek leadership exercised once again moral
pressure on the Entente. In his interview with Andrew Ryan on 17 April 1922.
the patriarch. after striking a very grim picture of the future of Ottoman
Hellenism. asserted that the Turks would never respect the rights of the
25. Rangavis to Foreign Ministry. London. 18 January 1922 and Votsis to Foreign Ministry.
Cons .. 22 January 1922. both in YE.B.35
26. His interview with Lloyd George was published by 'Ei.{;/j1Jopo:; Tuna:; 2; 15 February 1922.
On 30 January he met in Paris the French leaders Poincare and Clemenceau. Minutes kept by the
patriarch's secretary can be found in Stavridi P. file 7. Kallimachos to Stavridi. Paris. 26 January
1922. See also Markezinis. op.cit.. pp. 426-30.
27. Lindley to Curzon. Athens. II March 1922. FO 371 7882/E2722
28 .. Details on the patriarchal fund raising organization. K{;I rplh'lj 'Ennpomj 'Epa I CUI see E..A . .,
41 (1921) 420-21.
74
minorities. He then went on to express his firm opposition to the Greek
evacuation of Anatolia.
29
By 1922, however, the Allies made major readjustments in their policy
towards the Christian minorities in Turkey. They had established a clear
distinction between the issue of minority safeguards and the question of
Ottoman Greek aspirations. Thus, during the Paris conference, in March
1922, the Entente delegates were ready to propose a series of provisions for
the full security of the minorities. The appointment of a special League of
Nations commissioner to supervise the execution of these provisions was
also debated. But declining to discuss Greek irredentist aspirations, the
conference flatly refused the representantion of the Ottoman Greeks by
Venizelos or any other personality. 30
But Patriarch Meletios did not give up. On 7 August 1922, he forwarded yet
another letter to Lloyd George appealing for help on behalf of Ottoman
Hellenism. However, the British found the content of this letter embarras-
sing, for the patriarch treated as one the issue of minority safeguards and
Ottoman Greek emancipation. These two points had been firmly separated at
the Paris conference of March 1922 and the British were not prepared to
change their position on this matteL
31
Unable to obtain any Allied commit-
ment, Meletios turned to the archbishop of Canterbury. But even he could
offer little practical help.32 In despair, Meletios admitted to Venizelos that his
people had been abandoned to the wrath of the nationalist Turks. He bitterly
accused the Entente of exploiting the aspirations of the subjected Ottoman
Christians to suit their own interests and aggrandizement.
33
Yet it should have been a basic precept of the Ottoman Greeks not to rely
entirely on the Allies. Further, the discontinuation of relations with the Porte
may well be described as suicidal. The election of Meletios Metaxakis, for
instance, contravened the rules laid down by the Ottoman charters of 1454
and 1856. These regulations stipulated that the Sublime Porte had the right to
remove any names displeasing to it from the preliminary list of patriarchal
candidates. Once this formality was fulfilled the elected patriarch assumed
officially his administrative functions. But most significantly, the regulations
29. Rumbold to Curzon. Cons . 3 May 1922. FO 371/7882/E4705.
30. The idea of entrusting Venizelos to represent Ottoman Hellenism at the international
conferences was suggested to Ryan by the political advisor of the Patriarchate. Mousouros-
Gkikis. FO 371/7882/E7830, Ryan interview with Mousouros-Gkikis. Cons . 29 July 1922. Later
on Venizelos denied any prior knowledge of such an idea.
3 J. Meletios to Lloyd George. Phanar. 7 August 1922. FO 371/7870/E8287.
32 .. Meletios to Davison. Phanar. 28 July/7 August 1922. LPA/DvP/148/7.
33. Meletios to Venizelos. Phanar, 6 May 1922. text can be found in Markezinis. op.cit .. p. 435.
75
of the 1856 charter for the patriarchal nominations (art. 3, ch. 2) stated
unequivocally that eligible candidates had to be Ottoman nationals. The
former archbishop of Athens, Meletios, was a Hellenic national.
Immediately before the patriarchal election in December 1921, however,
the Phanar declared that all regulations and agreements were not only forced
on their ancestors by the Muslim conquerors, but had also bet';,;'. repeatedly
violated in the past by the very Ottoman rulers themselves. This in itself,
according to the Phanar, had rendered the laws invalid. Infuriated by this
spirit of independence, the Turks contested the validity of Meletios' electi.on
from the very start. As a Hellenic subject, the Turks asserted, MeletIOs
Metaxakis could not qualify for the pOSt.
34
At the same time, the Porte issued
a circular instructing all official departments to consider the patriarchal
election as null and void.
35
But if the Porte refused to recognize the new
patriarch the Turkish nationalists looked upon him as their
Notwithstanding this strong Turkish reaction, Meletios enjoyed consIderable
popularity among the Constantinopolitan Greek community which seemed to
be proud of having such a distinguished personality as patriarch. 36
As the Anatolian confrontation was reaching a climax, neither the Greeks
nor the Turks in istanbul were in a mood for compromise. Between 1918-22,
the Allied-occupied Ottoman capital became as much a theatre of Greek as of
Turkish political activity.
34. Copy of a letter transmitted to Rumbold by the Ottoman foreign minister, 19 December
1921, FO 371/6566/EI3956,
35. Meletios was never furnished with an official berat without which no Olthodox prelate
could be declared lawfully patriarch.
36. On his popularity see reports of the Constantinopolitan press, 6 February 1922
and Neo).oyor;, 7 February 1922.
76
CHAPTER III
THE LAUSANNE NEGOTIATIONS (1922-23)
1. The Mudanya armistice and the Relet Bele mission in istanbul
The Greco-Turkish military confrontation was brought to an abrupt end
when the Turkish forces began a general offensive on all fronts on 26 August
1922. Deserted by their allies and deprived of the vital financial and military
assistance, without which the Asia Minor campaign could not have been
contemplated, the Greeks met with utter defeat. The conclusive Turkish
victory in Anatolia produced a new situation in the Near East. Not only did
the new state of affairs generated far-reaching political and military changes
but it also ushered in an unprecedented demographic upheaval. Believing
non-Muslims to represent trouble and disloyalty Ankara forcefully expelled
them from Turkey. Thus, the mass uprooting of Greeks and Armenians from
Anatolia and Eastern Thrace in September/October 1922 was the outcome of
the racial hostilities which plagued Near East during 1918-1922.1
Anxious to complete the liberation of the territories envisaged by the
Misak-i Millf (National Pact), the triumphant Turks threatened to invade the
Allied-held zone of the Straits and occupy istanbul and <;;anakkale. This
precipitated the well-known Chanak crisis, which almost caused an Anglo-
Turkish war during late September and early October 1922.2 By making a
stand against the Turks, the British succeeded in maintaining the Allied
military presence in istanbul, thus avoiding a probable repetition of the
Smyrna massacre of September 1922. At the same time, they averted hos-
tilities by persuading the Turks to attend a conference at Mudanya. These
negotiations between the Entente and the Ankara government were success-
fully concluded with the signing of the Mudanya armistice on 11 October
1922.3
I. Foreign Office memorandum on Smymaevents, 10 October 1922, FO 371/7955/E I 1040. See
also M. Housepian, Smyrna 1922: The Destruction of a City, Berkeley 1967, passim.
2. D.B.F.P. (I 8) chap. I deals with the crisis. See also D. Walder, The Chanak Affair, London
1969, pp. 198-280.
3. For the text of Mudanya Convention see Turkey no.l (1922), cmd. 1570 and a copy of the
77
To the nationalist Turks the Mudanya armistice represented a spectacular
diplomatic victory marking the end to European attempts to carve up their
homeland. At Mudanya, Ankara, now the only official government of Tur-
key, forced the Entente to make significant territorial concessions, particu-
larly in Eastern Thrace. Anxious to maintain the momentum gained at
Mudanya the Turkish government focused its attention to the early re-
establishment of Turkish sovereignty in istanbul and Eastern Thrace. To
achieve this, General Refet Bele was despatched to istanbul on 19 October
1922. He was assigned to negotiate the full details of the Greek evacuation
and the transfer of European Turkey to the Ankara government. In reality,
however, the Refet mission aimed at pushing the Allies out ofIstanbul before
the opening of peace negotiations at Lausanne. In fact, Refet and his 126
gendarmes were to form the nucleus of the future nationalist administration in
istanbul .. ~
The old Ottoman capital provided a favourable ground for nationalist
activity. As a Greek diplomat pointed out by that stage about seventy per cent
of the Turkish population in istanbul supported the nationalist cause.
5
With
the arrival of the Refet delegation various nationalist organizations, which
had hitherto languished underground, came out into the open. While for the
first time since 1918 the cosmopolitan element appeared subdued. the Tur-
kish section of the population took great pains to emphasize the Turkishness
of the city and by giving a tremendous reception to Refet, they proclaimed
their adherence to the nationalist cause.
n
Without delay Refet brought about the overthrow of the discredited palace
government. On 5 November, the vezir Tevfik Pasha offered his resignation
and handed over his seal of office to Refet. The resignation of the istanbul
government was followed by the flight of Sultan Mehmet Vahidettin on 17
November.7 With the old palace government out of the way, Refet took over
the administration of the city now degraded to the status of an ordinary
province (vilc(vet).
Meanwhile. Refet established official relations with the Allied authorities.
He was quick to sense the reluctance of the British. now that the Mudanya
armistice was signed. to maintain their former firm control over the city.
Taking full advantage of this disposition. he brought about the gradual
Greek declaration to the Mudanya conference on 1O/l1 OcL 1922 in FO 371 '7905/E 11487. See
also A. Tiirkgeldi, Mondr05 l'e Mudanya Miitarekeleri Tarihi. Ankara 1951. pp .. 158-92.
4. Henderson to Curzon. Cons. 7 December 1922. FO 371j7918/EI4185.
5. Mavridis to General Staff, Cons., ~ November 1922. YE/A/5.
6. Harington to War Office. Cons .. 20 October 1922, FO 371j7905/EI138L
7. Rumbold to Foreign Office. Cons .. 5 November 1922. FO 371/7908/EI2097.
78
weakening of the once-powerful occupation machinery. The Allied author-
ities, on the other hand, satisfied most of Refet's demands short of a request
for the complete Allied military and naval withdrawal.
8
By November 1922,
therefore, a dual de Jacto regime - the Allied military and the Turkish
civilian - emerged in istanbul.
9
The division of the city's population for policing purposes into Ottoman
and European was the inevitable sequel of this dual administration. On 25
November, the thorny question of maintenance of law and order was settled
by a compromise. Under this agreement all Ottoman subjects, Muslim and
Christian, were placed under the care of Turkish police, while foreign nation-
als, including the Hellenic subjects, continued to enjoy Allied protection. 10 In
fact, the 25 November agreement constituted a further step in Refer's deter-
mination to undermine Allied authority over the Christian population of
istanbul. Finally, on 5 December, by allowing the Turks to take over passport
control, the Allied authorities relinquished all rights over Constantinopolitan
Christians. The Turks demanded that every Ottoman subject who wished to
leave Turkey had to obtain a Turkish passport. 11 Up to that date passport
control had remained solely in the hands of the Allied authorities, who had by
that means been able to send out of the country all those who for various
reasons were considered well-advised to leave. But by December 1922, as the
acting British High Commissioner Nevile Henderson remarked,
all claims on the part of the Allies to protect the native Christians were
abandoned except as a moderating influence against the grosser forms
of excesses .12
2. fJhe first exodus of Constantinopolitan Greeks, October-December
/1922.
Throughout the Chanak crisis communal relations in istanbul were ex-
tremely tense. A large number of what Lieut. Gen. Charles Harington, the
commanding officer of the Allied forces in the East, described as very
8. Two notes addressed by the Ankara representative in Istanbul Hamit Hasancan to the Allied
high commissioners, 5 November 1922, FO 371j7908/EI4185.
9. Henderson to Crowe, Cons., 28 November 1922, FO 371j7916/E13334 ..
10. Text of agreement in FO 371j7917/E13634; Kanellopoulos to Foreign Ministry, Cons., 25
November 1922, YE/A/5.
II. Helm to Ryan, Cons., 4 December 1922, FO 800/RyP; Henderson to Foreign Office, Cons.,
5 December 1922, FO 371/7919/EI3664; Kanellopoulos to Foreign Ministry, Cons., 5 December
1922, YE/A/5.
12. Henderson to Curzon. Cons, 7 December 1922. FO 371j7918/EI4185.
79
dangerous had managed to infiltrate istanbul. 1 About 20.000 Turks
and. a number of Christians were reckoned to have been armed
this penod.
2
Well aware of the Smyrna events, which had taken place
despite of consuls in the town and numerous European
and anchored at the port, the Constantinopolitan
were terrified. Their alarm was further aggravated by the pitiable
condItI?n.of the Thracian and Pontian Greeks, who had found tem orar
refuge III Istanbul. 3 p Y
These fears were not misplaced. Unable to tolerate the attitude of the
minorities, who for three years made no secret of their delight in the Allied
occupation of Ot!oman territory, the Turks demanded the expulsion of the
Christians from Istanbul. The Turkish mob became increasingly bold and
u?ruly. threats of an approaching massacre were freely aired by Tur-
kish bulhes. On 7 November, the Armenian Patriarch Zaven protested to the
Allied high commissioners against the tactics applied by nationalist Turks to
the Christians in order to force them to leave Turkey.4 Turkish officials
accord!n
g
. the Greeks and Armenians, exacted large sums of mone;
from ChnstIan buslIlessmen under the pretext of gathering subscription for
the reconstruction of territories returned to Turkish rule in Thrace. 5
The presence of the Allied forces in istanbul at this crucial juncture
prevented a very probable mass exodus of Constantinopolitan Christians,
whose numbers were estimated to have been around 500,QQQ in 1912. While
the overriding Allied consideration was the preservation of Allied prestige,
the. of the minorities was linked to this prestige factor. Again the
Allies believed that the question of the min .. ir
bargaining position at th . tions.
6
As a result the Allied
authorities did their best to prevent a repetition of the Smyrna massacre. The
tense in istanbul relaxed somewhat with the signing of the Mudanya
ConventIOn on 11 October. The armistice pre-empted, at least temporarily, a
march of the Turkish into istanbul. On the other hand, at Mudanya the
eventual orderly evacuatIOn of Istanbul by the Allied forces was ratified.
Constantinopolitan Christians were aware that, given the fervent anti-Greek
L Harington to War Office, Cons., 18 September 1922, FO 371/7892/E9679.
2. Ibid.
3. About 30,000 starving and disease-infested refugees from Pontus were stranded in lstanbul
between January and August 1923.
4. The text of partriarch's /lote verbale in FO 371j7959/EI2924.
5. Liatis to Politis, Cons., 29 October 1922, YE/A/5.
6. Reports by Harington to War Office, Cons., FO 371/7913/EI2670 (11 Nov. 1922) and FO
371/7916/E13201 (23 Nov. 1922); Minute by Rendel, 13 November 1922, FO 371/7958/EI2667
80
and anti-Armenian sentiments of the Turks, the decline of the cosmopolitan
character of the city was inevitable.
This decline was only too visible. After the Smyrna debacle and the
political changes in Athens,? the Constantinopolitan Greek political and
community organizations, so active during 1920-22, had simply disappeared.
The confusion within the community was compounded by the ineffectiveness
ofthe Greek High Commission in istanbul. Capt. K. Mavridis, Greek liaison
officer to the British forces in istanbul, sent a thorough but disquieting report
to the Greek General Staff on 2 November 1922. He bitterly complained
about the lack of any organized defence by the 400,000 Constantinopolitan
Greeks. In a state of panic they appeared totally paralyzed. He had harsh
words for the Amyna, which did so much to alienate the Greek community
from the Turks. TheAmyna officers had all escaped to Greece and left behind
the Greek population leaderless and defenseless. Despite his courage Pat-
riarch Meletios was also unable to organize effectively the defence of the
local Greeks. 8 On 9 November, Capt. D. Meletopoulos, who commanded one
of the Greek battleships stationed in istanbul, advised the recall of acting
Greek High Commissioner S. Liatis, and his replacement by a competent
diplomat with the necessary qualifications to evaluate the situation in
istanbul.
9
By late November 1922, Athens despatched to istanbul Efthymios
Kanellopoulos who was well acquainted with Turkish affairs.
Meanwhile, the Turks did not remain idle. Arrests of Christians who
supported overtly the Allied and Greek administrations started with the
establishment of the Refet mission in istanbul. As early as July 1922 Haring-
ton expressed concern over the ultimate fate of the so-called compromised
Ottoman subjects estimated then to be 700 Christian employees in his
administration. 10 This contingent was increased during and after the Chanak
crisis to no less than 2,500 Christians, all employed in non-combative
capacities. In the meantime, the Turks had declared that they would not
recognize a post-war protection of Ottoman subjects. I I
N or was the future of the Turkish followers of the Entente Liberale, who
worked with the occupation forces and who desired the establishment of a
multi-national state under the government of the sultan, any less precarious.
7. On the overthrow of the government by young officers with Venizelist and antidynastic
loyalties on 26 September 1922 see Llewellyn Smith, op. cit., pp. 31316.
8. Mavridis to General Staff, Cons., 2 November 1922, YE/A/5.
9. Meletopoulos to Ministry of Marine, Cons., 9 November 1922, YE/A/5.
10. Harington to War Office, Cons., 13 July 1922, FO 371j7949/EI0997.
11. In September 1922 there were 1,500 Ottoman Greek employees serving in the occupation
forces, Harington to War Office, Cons., 5 September 1922, FO 371/9161/E8986; D.E-F.P. (18)
no. 308 fn. 2.
81
Thus, in November 1922, Ali Kemal, an outspoken antinationalist and a
former high-ranking minister in the sultan's government, was arrested by the
Turkish police and sent to izmit where he was lynched by a nationalist
crowd.
l
:!
With the conclusion ofthe police agreement on 25 November the number of
such anests increased considerably. After reporting that anests at the first
advent of the nationalist administration were numerous, Harington singled
out the Ottoman Greeks who are being tried and condemned of high
treason .13 Systematic aITests of Constantinopolitan Greeks were also re-
ported by the acting Greek high commissioner, S. Liatis,14 Earlier, on 10
November, the Greek representative in London, Dimitrios Kaklamanos re-
quested that the British government give protection to all those who had
served in the Allied and Greek ranks or at least facilitate their departure from
istanbul. Otherwise they would certainly be condemned to death by the
Kemalist authorities once they have control of the town .15
His assessment of the situation may have had some foundation for Refet
Bele, in a conversation with Henderson, anathematized the Greeks who
lived in palaces while the Turks lived in huts. The Turkish notable went on
to point out that the Greeks would be well-advised to leave istanbul, for in the
future Turkish state there would be no room for them in the city. The Turks
themselves had every intention of taking commerce into their own hands and
they no longer needed the services of foreigners. 16 A large number of Greeks
followed his advice. Dreading a nationalist attack against the city or even a
possible Turkish coup from within, many Greeks decided to leave temporar-
ily, at least until order was restored. Between October and December 1922,
Gsome 50,000 non-Muslims, comprising the wealthiest section of the popula-
tion, fled Istanbul. The British high commissioner, Harold Rumbold, re-
ported that native Greeks were departing at the rate of no less than 3,000 a
day. Some 15,000 Constantinopolitan Greeks left the city during October
alone.
17
In vain did the Patriarchate try to restrain the wealthier and influen-
tial Greeks from leaving. Patriarch Meletios resorted even to moral argu-
ments claiming that their flight might create a wholesale panic among the
12. Sonyel, op. cit .. p .. 30.
13. Henderson to Curzon, Cons., 28 November 1922, FO 371/7919/EI3642.
14. Liatis to Foreign Ministry, Cons., 13 November 1922, YE/A/SVI.
15. Kaklamanos to Curzon, London, IO November 1922, FO 371/79II/EI2S22.
16. Henderson to Curzon. Cons., 28 November 1922, FO 371/7917/EI3642.
17. Reports by Rumbold. Cons., FO 371/7959/EI2845 (17 Nov.), FO 371/79S9/EI3044 (20
Nov.); Meletios to Henderson, Phanar, I December 1922, FO 371/7960/EI3850; Liatis to Foreign
Ministry. Cons .. 13 November 1922. YE/AISVL
82
mass of the Greek population in Istanbul.
I8
But to no avail. Nor did
Harington's assurances abate this exodus. 19 Carrying special interallied
visas on laissez-passer passports, almost all these 50,000 fugatives headed for
Greece.
Constantinopolitan Greeks with Hellenic nationality became equally
vulnerable when on 12 December the Greek High Commission in Istanbul
was shut down. From then on the interests of the estimated 80,000 to 90,000
Hellene Greeks were entrusted to SpaiD.
20
The closure of the Hellenic High
Commission was yet another demonstration of the Turkish determination to
eject all Greek and foreign influence from istanbul. To the nationalist Turks,
the continued occupation of the Straits zone and the Allied pretention to
protect the minorities was a clear indication that the Great Powers still
interfered in Turkish internal matters. To terminate this state of affairs the
Turks demanded the expUlsion of the non-Muslim minorities who had readily
rendered themselves as instruments to the anti- Turkish designs of foreign
nations. One of Refet's main missions in istanbul was to turkify the city as
soon as possible.
21
Meanwhile, Turkish public opinion urged the removal of
the Greeks, together with the Patriarchate, from Turkish soil. For otherwise,
the Turks warned, they would continue to constitute a grave source of
political danger to the Turkish nation. 22
,,,,",
1
. i
3. The Lausanne negotiations and the future of the Greeks in Istanbul.
The issue of the Patriarchate and the Constantinopolitan Greek commun-
ity, however, had international implications and could not therefore be sol-
ved in the same manner as that of the Anatolian Greeks. The mere fact that
the old Ottoman capital was still under Allied military occupation made it
physically impossible for the Turks to oust the Greek population en masse.
1
18. Liatis to Foreign Ministry, Cons., 13 November 1922, YE/A/5VI. Patriarchal proclama-
tion of 30 September 1922, prot. no. 5666 in EA., 42 (1922) 373-75.
19. Kanellopoulos to Foreign Ministry, Cons., 19 November 1922, YE/A/5VI; KaneIIopoulos
to Venizelos, Cons., 7 December 1922, YE/A/SVI.
20. Henderson to Curzon, Cons., 14 December 1922, FO 371/7919/EI4492; Meletopoulos to
General Staff, Cons., 9 December 1922, YE/A/5; Anninos to Foreign Ministry, Cons., 21
December 1922, YE/A/SVI.
21. KanelIopoulos to Foreign Ministry, Cons., 7 December 1922, YE/A/5VI.
22. Translation of editorial article by Ahmet Emin Yalman in Vakil, 2 December 1922 in FO
371/7966/EI3859; Liatis to Politis, Cons., 29 October 1922, YE/A/5.
1. KanelIopoulos to Foreign Ministry, Cons, 22 November 1922 and Kanellopoulos to Foreign
Ministry, Cons., 7 December 1922, both in YE/A/5VL
83
Quite wisely therefore Ankara decided to find a solution to this thorny
question at the negotiating table at Lausanne.
2
Immediately after the Greek defeat in Anatolia in September 1922, the
League of Nations entrusted Dr Fridtj Nansen with the question of relieffor
the refugees from the Greek-Turkish war. 3 After visiting istanbul and
Athens, Nansen proposed the adoption of a separate convention for the
of Greek and Turkish populations. Meanwhile, through its dip-
lomatIc representative in Istanbul Hamit Hasancan, the Turkish government
informed Nansen on 31 October that the entire Constantinopolitan Greek
population must be included in the proposed exchange ofpopulations.4 The
reply of the Greek government to Hamil's communication was clearly
unfavourable. Athens declared that it
could not contemplate taking into Greece the enormous Greek popu-
lation of Constantinople or admit the principle that the Turks should
expel it.5
Alarmed by these developments, the Greek foreign minister, Nicholas
Politis, asked Venizelos to stress at Lausanne the inability of the Greek state
to absorb yet another group of urban refugees. Lacking shelter and food the
huge Greek community from istanbul would be exposed to great misery and
even famine. Further, such a social cleavage, Politis feared, would provide
excellent ammunition for the communist organizations in Greece. He then
suggested that the Great Powers might consider providing accomodation, at
least temporarily, to these refugees in Egypt, Cyprus or Tunisia.
6
Following
Politis' suggestion Venizelos made privately a powerful appeal to the
Allies on behalf of the Constantinopolitan Greek community. 7 The Allies,
however, were reluctant to commit themselves.
s
Having little faith in the
2 .. The peace conference at Lausanne opened on 20 November 1922 .. Many months of di-
wrangling followed until the final treaty was signed on 24 July 1923. For a general
analYSIS of the Lausanne negotiations see KH. Davison. The Turkish Diplomacy from Mudros
to Lausanne in The Diplomats, G .. A. Craig and F. Gilbert (eds.). Princeton 1953. pp. 277-92;
Sonyel. op. cit. pp. 190-226 ..
3. LNO]. (November 1922) 1140-41.
4. Two reports by Dr Nansen. with annexes. to the council of the League of Nations. 16
October and 15 November 1922. LN/C. 729 M. 441. 1922. LNOI. (January 1923) 126-32.
5. 2 November 1922. Ibid.
6. Politis to Venizelos. Athens. 22 November 1922, BMAEV/3L
7. Curzon to Crowe. Lausanne. 25 November 1922, FO 371j7960/EI3190.
8. Cyprus High Commission to Colonial Office. 27 November 1922, FO 371j7960(EI3448;
Kanellopoulos to Foreign Ministry. Cons .. 7 December 1922. YE(A(5VL
84
Allies Patriarch Meletios proposed that Greece should provide facilities in the
island of Limnos in the event that the Greek community was suddenly
compelled to evacuate istanbul. Y
The question of the future of the Constantinopolitan Greeks was first raised
on 1 December 1922 when the British chief delegate and president of the
territorial and military commission of the conference. Curzon. read a state-
ment prepared by Nansen. suggesting a mutual exchange of Greek and
Turkish populations under the supervision of the League of Nations. In the
ensuing debate, Venizelos declared that while he was ready to consider an
exchange of populations either obligatory or voluntary, he was opposed to
the departure of Greeks from istanbul. Raising objections to this view, ismet
inonii, president of the Turkish delegation, demanded the expUlsion of the
Greeks as a painful necessity, but logicaj".10 In response, the chief Greek
delegate, Eleftherios Venizelos. reiterated the unprecedented political.
economic and social catastrophe that such an expUlsion would bring to
Greece.
11
On his part. Curzon, the chief British delegate, pointed out that the
large Greek popUlation
was vital to the existence of Constantinople as a great city of com-
merce and industry, and that without it Constantinople would be in
danger of losing its authority. wealth and trade. 12
Notwithstanding the sound economic imperatives, the Turks insisted on the
complete expulsion of the Greeks from istanbul. On 29 November. ismet
inonO had privately told to Richard Washburne Child, a member of the
American delegation. that
we will not have Armenians and Greeks remaining as the means of
importing corruption and disloyalty into our country. J3
As this issue proved controversial from the very start, it was referred to
the subcommission on the exchange of populations for a detailed examina-
tion. The Turkish delegation, basing their claim on statistics. maintained that
it was impossible to retain a Greek population in istanbul since it was
necessary to establish in its place apart of the Muslim population coming from
Greece. The Greek delegation advanced counter-statistics demonstrating
that Greece. already invaded by rather more than 1.000,000 refugees from
Anatolia and Eastern Thrace. was not in a position to receive in addition the
9. Lialis 10 Foreign Ministry. Cons. 13 November 1922. YEiAi 5VI
10. L(NEA. p 207 ..
II Ihid. p. 121
12 .. Ihid .. p .. 122.
13. R.. WashhourneChild. A Diplomat Looky at Europe. New York 1925. p 97
85
Greeks from istanbul. Taking the Turkish statistics as a basis, the Allied
delegations were able to prove mathematically that it was not necessary for
Turkey to remove the Constantinopolitan Greek community in order to
establish the exchangeable Hellenic Muslims on its territory. 14 Explaining
that the expulsion of the Constantinopolitan Greek community would add up
to a major catastrophe, the president of the exchange of populations
subcommission, G.M. Montagna cautioned the Turks of their grave respon-
sibilities if they went ahead with their demand. Both the British and French
delegates declared that the Turkish pretentions were inadmissible,15 Evi-
dently, the Allies were also aware that with the final expulsion of the Greeks
the extensive Anglo/French commercial interests in istanbul would suffer
severely. For the overwhelming majoIity of managerial and administrative
positions in the major concessionary foreign companies were occupied by
Constantinopolitan Greeks,16 But, on 10 December, the subcommission ap-
peared to have come to a standstill as the Turkish delegate Rlza Nur de-
manded not only the expulsion of the istanbul Greeks but also the exemption
from the exchange of the Muslims established in Greek Thrace.
17
Finally faced with the united opposition of the Allied and Balkan delega-
tions, the Turks were forced to end this controversy. Thus, at the meeting of
the main (territorial and military) commission, on 13 December, ismet inonii
accepted in principle to allow both Constantinopolitan Greeks and Thracian
Turks to remain in situ. 18 Notwithstanding this major concession, the Turks
raised an issue of proportionality of the two non-exchangeable minOIities.
Demanding the maintenance of approximately an equal number of minority
populations ismet inonii proposed a limitation in the size of the Constan-
tinopolitan Greek community to match the numerically smaller Muslim
minority of Thrace. To achieve this, the Turks laid down the following
exceptions and conditions:
(a) The removal from Constantinople of all Greeks who are not Turkish
subjects.
(b) The removal from Constantinople of all Greeks who are Turkish sub-
jects but not natives of Constantinople.
14. LCNEA" p. 331.
15. Kaklamanos to Foreign Ministry, Lausanne, 8 December 1922, YE/A/5VI.
16. Kanellopoulos to Foreign Ministry, Cons., 22 November 1922, YE/A/5VI.
17. SeeD.B.FP. (18) no. 268. This subcommission was appointed on 2 December to draft an
agreement on the exchange of popUlations. For details see Report addressed to Lord Curzon,
President of the First Commission, by M. Montagna, President of the Subcommission on the
Exchange of Populations, 8 January 1923, LCNEA., pp. 328-37.
18. Kaklamanos to Foreign Ministry, Lausanne, 14 December 1922, YE/A/5VI; LCNEA., pp.
207, 211; The Times. I3 December 1922.
86
(c) The removal from Constantinople of all societies or associations which
had adopted an attitude hostile to Turkey during the last three years.
(d) The exemption in favour of the Greeks of Constantinople to apply only
to the Greek inhabitants in Pera, Stamboul and Scoutari.
(e) The removal from Constantinople of the Ecumenical Patriarchate with
all its organisations and constituent bodies. 19
The question of proportionality, which caused the decrease of the Constan-
tinopolitan Greek community from over 300,000 in 1922 to about 100,000 in
1927, has been raised once again in the recent years. This resulted from the
dramatic decrease of the Greeks in istanbul during the last three decades.
20
4. The question of the Patriarchate at Lausanne.
As the negotiations progressed the Turks consented to the modification of
some of the initial conditions. I Yet they adamantly refused to discuss their
demand for the removal of the Ecumenical Patriarchate from istanbul. Speak-
ing before the exchange of populations subcommission on 16 December, Rlza
Nur declared that the Turkish government intended to grant non-Muslims in
Turkey
rights identical with those which had been granted to the minorities in
the States enlarged or newly constituted as a result of the Great Waf.
2
He reiterated the Turkish determination not to yield on the question of the
Patriarchate. His government, he explained. desired to get rid of it, for the
Phanar was an antithesis to the policy of turkification and secularization. He
asserted that:
... by separating the Caliphate and the State and by establishing a
democratic regime, the government had suppressed the privileges
which had been granted in the Ottoman Empire to the non-Muslim
communities. The relations between the charitable, educational and
philanthropic institutions of the minorities and the State must hence-
forth be carried on directly; the clergy and its hierarchical chiefs must
not in the future concern themselves with any but purely spiritual
matters. The Patriarchate, which had hitherto been a political institu-
tion, ought to be removed outside Turkey; for its past activities will
prevent it from adapting itself to the new situation which, by eliminat-
19. LCNEA .. p. 331.
20. See chapter IX: I.
I. Kaklamanos to Meletios. Lausanne, 17 December 1922, YE/A/SVI.
2. LCNEA .. p. 333.
87
ing the political privileges of the Patriarchate and of the organisations
dependent on it, will remove all grounds for its continued existence.
These conditions show that the necessity of abolishing the temporal
privileges of the clergy and transferring the Ecumenical Patriarchate
outside the country is just as inevitable for Turkey as it is salutary for
the community concerned.
3
This view was repeated by Mustafa Kemal Atatiirk who on 25 December
declared to Le J oumal that by abolishing the Caliphate and by expelling the
Patriarchate his government sought to reinforce the secular character of the
new Turkish republic.
4
On 4 January 1923, at a meeting of the subcommission, Rlza Nur demanded
once again the removal, of the Patriarchate from Turkish soil and its transfer
to Mt. Athos. The hostile attitude adopted by the Phanar and Patriarch
Meletios towards the regime in Ankara had intensified this Turkish desire to
get rid of the Patriarchate. Finally, he stressed that the Turks had laid down
the removal of the Patriarchate as the principal condition for their consenting
to the retention of Greeks in istanbul. If, however, the conference continued
to persist with their opposition on the question of the Patriarchate, the Turks
threatened to respond by expelling the entire Constantinopolitan Greek
community.
5
- At the meeting on 26 the Greek delegation presented to the
subcommission a written declaration in which they refuted the claims made
by the Turks. They maintained that the recent change of regime in Turkey
could not affect the rights which had been recognized from the earliest times
as belonging to the Christian minorities in the Ottoman empire. Nor could it
justify the removal of the Ecumenical Patriarchate. The recognition of the
rights granted to the Greeks arose solely from the difference of religion which
existed between the Islamic conquerors and the conquered Christian nation.
Family law being governed exclusively in the Ottoman state by the Serial
(religious law), it was impossible to apply Islamic canons to Christians. For
these reasons the sultans had recognized the right of the Christians to pre-
serve the use of their ancient canonical law , which could only be applied to
them by their legitimate spiritual authority, the Ecumenical Patriarchate.
This religious institution, whose historic seat was in istanbul, had been set up
by the decrees of the 2nd and 4th Ecumenical councils, which formed the
30 Ibid., po 3330 See also H.JoPsomiades, The Eastern Questiono' The Last Phase, Thessaloniki
1968, pp. 87-80
4. Interview quoted in Atatiirk'iin Soylev ve Demer;leri, Ankara 1954, po 68.
50 Cemil, Lozan, Ankara 1933, ii/po 296; LCNEA., po 336'0
88
basis of the canonical law of all churches. It was immovable, and only a new
council could give a decision on its maintenance or removal. The decisions of
a political conference in such a matter could have no legal effect. As a result,
the Greek delegation considered themselves unable to take part in a discus-
sion concerning the removal from istanbul of the Ecumenical Patriarchate.
Even if he was forced to leave the city, the patriarch would retain his title.
6
Meanwhile, the Greek government appeared equally determined to resist
the expUlsion of the Patriarchate. On numerous occasions Greek leaders
declared their intention of going to war over this issue.
7
After being compel-
led to cede Eastern Thrace, Imbros and Tenedos, as well as thefail accompli
of a compulsory exchange of populations, the Greek government could not
afford to make yet another major concession to the Turks. Apart from their
concern with the reaction of Greek public opinion, they feared that the
expUlsion of the Patriarchate would trigger off a major panic resulting in a
large-scale exodus of Constantinopolitan Greeks. While struggling to ac-
comodate some 1,000,000 refugees from Anatolia and Eastern Thrace,
Athens dreaded the expUlsion of another 300,000 urban Greeks from
istanbul. Thus, on 17 December, the Council of State informed Venizelos
that Greece could not sign a treaty which did not provide ample safeguards for
the maintenance of the Patriarchate and the Greek community in istanbu1.
8
In
a second telegram to the Greek delegation at Lausanne on 21 December,
Foreign Minister Apostolos Alexandris expressed his government's readi-
ness to accept some restrictions on the non-ecclesiastical privileges of the
Patriarchate. Yet Greek resolution to preserve the Patriarchate in its histori-
cal seat remained intact. Alexandris asserted that world opinion was favour-
able to the Greek point of view on this issue. Further, Greek public opinion
felt strongly about the fate of the Patriarchate arid the regrouped Greek forces
in Thrace could reach the <;atalca (Chatalja) lines if hostilities were resumed.
Unable, therefore, to put up with any further humiliations, Athens would be
forced to respond to Turkish intransigence by declaring war.
9
On 5 January
1923, Venizelos reiterated his government's detemlination on the question of
the Patriarchate. 10
6. LCNEA., p. 333-34; Kaklamanos to Foreign Ministry, Lausanne, 27 December 1922,
YE/A/5VI.
70 For the declarations of the leaders of the Greek government, Plastiras and Gonatas, in
Bentinck to Curzon, Athens, FO 371/9123/E363 (28 December 1922) and FO 371/9099/E79 (1
January 1923).
8. Alexandris to Venizelos, Athens, 4/17 December 1922, YE/A/5.
9. A1exandris to Greek delegation at Lausanne, Athens, 8/21 December 1922, YE/A/50
100 Venizelos to Foreign Ministry. Lausanne. 5 January 1923. BMAEV/35.
89
Yet the diplomatic skills exhibited by the Greek delegates at Lausanne on
the question of the Patriarchate were not always beyond criticism. Thus, in
an attempt to emphasize Turkey's responsibilities towards the Phanar, Ven-
izelos argued that Greece had no direct say on the matter since the Patriar-
chate was not a Greek but a Turkish institution. 11 Venizelos did not observe
the awkward corollary of this argument, that if the Patriarchate did eventually
remain in istanbul, the Turks would have grounds in the future for undermin-
ing the international character of that institution.
Sensing the implications ofVenizelos' line of argument, Curzon expressed
privately his dissatisfaction with the way the Greeks were handling the issue.
The British delegation had from the first maintained that this ancient institu-
tion was a symbol of Orthodox religion, and that the removal of the Ecumeni-
cal Patriarchate from istanbul would offend the religious sentiments not only
of the Orthodox, but of the whole Christian world.
12
The American delega-
tion, too, adopted the same view while the French, somewhat less energeti-
cally, spoke against the removal of the Patriarchate. 13
Given these diametrically opposed views the president of the subcommis-
sion on the exchange of populations, Montagna, was unable to find a solution
to the Impasse. Nor was his attitude on the issue of the Patriarchate abso-
lutely impartial. Thus, according to Rlza Nur, who had developed a special
relationship with Montagna during the Lausanne negotiations, the Italian
diplomat strongly disliked the Greeks.
14
Regarding the fate of the Patriar-
chate, Montagna considered the Greek position as unreasonable and thought
that
the removal of the Patriarchate would not be too high a price to pay for
the conclusion of an agreement in other respects satisfactory to both
sides.15
Turkey, he publicly declared, had the right to abolish the Patriarchate while
the Greek delegation had no authority to oppose Turkish action on this
matter. 16 During a private meeting, he was noted to have even encouraged
ismet in6nii to carryon with the expulsionY
II. Meeting of 16 December 1922, see LCNEA, p. 333.
12. LCNEA., p. 333. Kaklamanos to Foreign Ministry, Lausanne, 2/15 December 1922,
YE/A/5VL
13. LCNEA., pp. 333-34.
14. R. Nur, Hayat ve Hatiratim, 1stanbul 1%768, iii/po 1047.
IS. Memorandum on the Ecumenical Patriarchate, Andrew Ryan, Lausanne, 26 December
1922, FO 371/7923/EI4576.
16. Kaklamanos to Foreign Ministry, Lausanne, 6/19 December 1922, YE/A/5VI.
17. Kaklamanos to Foreign Ministry, London, 9 January 1925, YE/A/35.
90
Montagna, it appears, regarded this, a matter of interest to the Italian
policy as such that the Patriarchate should leave Constantinople.18 Nor did
the Vatican take an altogether disinterested attitude towards the fate of the
Phanar. As the archbishop of Canterbury pointed out to Curzon, the paralysis
of the Patriarchate might have been welcomed rather than deplored by the
Vatican. Finally, the archbishop of Canterbury concluded his letter by
claiming that the share of the Catholic Church in these far-reaching con-
troversies ... is a sad one.19 The same view was voiced by l.A. Douglas, a
high-ranking member of the Anglican church and advisor of the archbishop of
Canterbury on the Near Eastern questions, when he wrote:
no one with the slightest knowledge of the Near East can doubt that
Rome is bitterly hostile to the Phanar, and reckons that a disaster to it as
an institution to be a great thing. 20
Montagna must have been influenced to a considerable degree by the
Vatican's ambitions in the Near East while shaping his attitude on this
question. But it is also possible that the Turks had privately given the
impression that in return for the expUlsion of the Patriarchate, Ankara would
be prepared to allow a greater number of Greeks to remain in istanbul.
Montagna appears to have hoped that the Turkish delegation would agree to
the return of some 30,000 Ottoman Greeks who had fled istanbul during the
upheavals in September and October 1921. Again, he felt that if the Turkish
demands on the issue of the Patriarchate were satisfied, the Turks might be
willing to allow the 15,000 Greek residents of Pendik Cllav!eixt) to stay
behind. While being outside the actual boundaries of the prefecture of
istanbul. this Greek populated suburb was inseparable from the socio-
economic life of the city.21 Whatever his reasons Montagna showed a notice-
able impatience with the Greek point of view on the question of the Patriar-
chate.
Finally, on 26 December, in an effort to finding a conciliatory formula, the
French delegation proposed that the Patriarchate should renounce all non-
religious privileges and concentrate on its purely religious functions in its
historical seat at the Phanar. The Patriarchate would also maintain its pos-
18. Memorandum on the Ecumenical Patriarchate. Andrew Ryan. Lausanne. 26 December
1922. FO 371/7923/EI4576 ..
19. Davison to Curzon. London. 30 October 1922. LPA/DvPj32/3 ..
20. Douglas to Bell. London. 1 January 1923. LPAjDvP/l48j4 ..
21. Eventually these Greek were included in the exchange for details see S.H. Meray. Lo;:al/
Barli KOl/feral/51: TllflIllaklar, Belgeler, Ankara 1969-70. i:iijpp. 314 fL
91
ition as the spiritual head of Orthodoxy. Both British and Greeks went along
with this proposal only to be rejected by the Turks.
22
With the Turkish persistence on their point of view negotiations were
deadlocked at the subcommission and the matter had to be refen'ed to the
main commission of the conference. The question of the Patriarchate was
taken up once again on 10January 1923. It was during that meeting of the main
commission that the Turkish delegates faced a united Allied opposition. In
addition, an Orthodox/Balkan bloc appeared on so important an issue. Thus,
Rumanian delegate Diamandy reminded the Turks that the Rumanian
Church, being independent and autocephalous, was connected with the
Ecumenical Patriarchate by spiritual bonds. He then added that the religious
conscience of his people would be wounded if summary methods were
employed against the Patriarchate, which had been establishedin istanbul for
centuries.
23
The Yugoslavian delegate, Rakitch, too, employed similar ar-
guments against the removal of the Patriarchate from its traditional seat. 24
Finally, Curzon warned that if the seat of the Patriarchate was removed
from Constantinople, a shock would be delivered to the conscience of the
whole civilized world. 25 At the end of the meeting, the Turkish delegation
had to withdraw their original demand. ismet inonii gave a verbal undertak-
ing to allow the Patriarchate to remain at the Phanar. In return it would be
shorn of all political and non-ecclesiastic attributes.
26
Thus, the question,
which according to Rlza Nur became the single most emotional issue at
Lausanne was finally solved. 27 Sharing this view Montagna claimed that the
fate of the Patriarchate gave rise to the greatest amount of difficulty to the
subcommission on the exchange of populations, monopolizing the discus-
sions of no fewer than twenty out of twenty-six sessions.
28
This was mainly the result of Turkish bargaining tactics at Lausanne.
Thus, ismet inonii even when authorized to compromise, bargained until the
last moment. Having told the conference at 10: 30 in the morning of 10 January
that the Phanar could under no circumstances remain in Turkey, quite unex-
pectedly half an hour later he backed down stating to Curzon that he would
22. Kaklamanos to Meletios, Lausanne, 14/27 December 1922, YE/A/5VI; LCNEA., pp.
334-37; The Times, 27 December 1922.
23. LCNEA., pp. 320-21.
24. Ibid., p. 32 L
25. Ibid., p. 319.
26. Ibid., pp. 326-27; Kaklamanos to Foreign Ministry, Lausanne, 10 January 1923,
YE/A/5VI; Nicolson to Foreign Office, Lausanne, 10 January 1923, FO 371/10191/E1l529;
Curzon to Crowe, Lausanne, 10 January 1923, FO 371/9058/E462.
27. Nur, op.cit., iii/po 1076.
28. The Times, II January 1923.
92
after all withdraw his demand for the removal of the Patriarchate.
29
This
declaration also throws interesting light on the practical results of the whole
affair. Although the preservation of the Ecumenical Patriarchate was
achieved, the stipulations necessary to secure the relative success of the
Greek side were not ensured. Owing to their weak bargaining position, the
Greek delegates refrained from pressing for a written Turkish commitment on
the future status of the Phanar.
30
Nor did they press for the precise con-
ditions under which this institution was to continue its existence in modem
Turkey. As Riza Nul' points out in his memoirs, the Turks, by demanding
from the very start the expUlsion of the Patriarchate, had managed to appear
conciliatory by simply withdrawing their initial demand at the later stages of
the negotiations. By that stage, the Turkish negotiator claims, the Greeks
were so worried lest they might suffer a further diplomatic humiliation that
they even contented themselves with a purely verbal Turkish undertaking.
3
!
Thus, by keeping the form of this undertaking general the Turks succeeded in
retaining the freedom of interpreting their pledge in its narrowest possible
sense. In retrospect the oral Turkish assurance as to the immovability of the
Patriarchate proved inadequate for the preservation of the privileges of that
institution. The eventual enfeeblement of the Ecumenical Patriarchate was
brought about by the ommission of any direct reference to it in the final treaty
of Lausanne.
Notwithstanding their firm stand on the question of the Patriarchate, it
appears that the British delegates, too, did not entirely escape criticism.
Doubts about Andrew Ryan's loyalties, for instance, were raised when he
recommended the disestablishment of the Ecumenical Patriarchate and the
restriction of its functions to purely ecclesiastic and spiritual matters. In fact,
British policy on the Patriarchate derived largely from two reports drawn
up by Ryan, an expert on Turkish affairs. 32 The Anglican church, on the other
hand, strongly opposed the Ryan proposals. In a detailed memorandum
forwarded to the Foreign Office on 10 November 1922, Lambeth Palace even
elaborated the idea of granting extra-territorial status to the Phanar. 33 Resent-
ing the influence exerted by Andrew Ryan, a Roman Catholic, on the ques-
tion of the Patriarchate, Rev. J.A. Douglas, the advisor of the archbishop of
Canterbury on the Near East, predicted that since
29. See Davison, Turkish Diplomacy, p. 202.
30. Kaklamanos to Meletios, Lausanne, 4/17 December 1922, YE/A/5VL
31. Nur, op. cit., iii/pp. 1076-77, 11I3.
32. FO 371/4156/E516, 17 December 1922 and FO 371f7923/EI4576, 26 December 1922.
33. Lambeth Palace to Foreign Office, London, 10 November 1922, LPA/DvP/32/3.
93
Lord Curzon only sees through Mr Ryan's eyes, I think there will be a
surrender (on the question of the Patriarchate) with a certain amount of
paper guarantees which will be valueless" 34
This assessment coincided with the viewpoint of Patriarch Meletios, who,
through his representative in Great Britain, archbishop of Thyateira, Ger-
manos Strinopoulos, communicated his views to Lambeth Palace. Further,
Germanos was present at Lausanne throughout the negotiations, advising the
Greek delegation on the question of the Ecumenical Patriarchate.
35
It is clear
that Meletios not only wished to maintain the Patriarchate in the Phanar with
all its traditional privileges but also wanted to shield its position through the
inclusion of stringent safeguards at the Lausanne treaty.36 As the Greek
delegate at Lausanne, Dimitrios Kaklamanos pointed out, Greece, the loser
of the Anatolian war, could not impose on victorious Turkey a Patriarchate
with wide temporal powers. Such untenable demands would only intensify
Turkish determination to expel the Patriarchate.
37
Curzon, on the other
hand, appeared to have been willing to make concessions on such questions
as the Christian minorities in Turkey and the Patriarchate provided a face
saving formula was agreed upon. He reserved exercising tangible pressure on
the Turks for bargaining on the big questions, vital to British interests such
as MosuL French support for the Patriarchate was at best lukewarm. While
making a firm stand on matters concerning French interests, such as the
Ottoman Public Debt, the French appeared accomodating on issues they
regarded secondary" Given the Allied position and wishing to avoid another
Greco-Turkish confrontation, the Greeks contented themselves with ismet
Inonu's verbal undertaking.
Turkish public opinion was dissatisfied with the arrangement of 10
January. The Tevhid-i Ejkar expressed surprise at the Turkish delegation's
action. Asserting its confidence that the Turkish government would soon
reverse this decision, it went on to add that
"". neither the Lausanne Conference nor the Anglican Church nor any
other power can prevent its (the Patriarchate) being sent away or save
the Greeks from the punishment 'they deserve. 38
34, Douglas to Bell. London, I January 1923. LPAjDvPjl48j4,
35 An assessment of Germanos' career in LPA/DgP/33/37-38 ..
36, Meletios to Venizelos. Cons., IS December 1922. BMAEV/34; Meletios to Germanos,
Cons" 6 January 19D. BMAEV/35; Meletios to Germanos, Cons" 13 January 1923,
BMAEV/35; Ecumenical Patriarchate to the Allied High Commissioners in Constantinople,
Const, 2 January 1923, BMAEV/35
37. Kaklamanos to Meletios, Lausanne, 17 December 1922, YEjA/5VL
38. Tevhid-i Ejka,.. 13 Jan 1923 quoted in FO 371!9123/E7603
94
Tanin provided the only exception as it viewed the prospect of maintaining
the Patriarchate with more or less satisfaction.
39
But it was the Greek-
speaking press of istanbul which rejoiced at the Lausanne undertaking. In
common with the rest of the Greek press, the organ of the Patriarchate, the
'EKKbwzaaTlKYt 'AbjBeza, approved wholeheartedly of the just decision
(,1 iKaza arcorpaazc,;) 40 Yet so great was the indignation of the Turkish public
opinion that ismet inonu felt obliged to make a reference to the settlement of
the Patriarchate during a press conference given in istanbul on 16 February
1923. He justified his action by pointing out that Turkey had reserved the
right to expel the Phanar should that institution continued to engage itself in
political activities.
41
5. The work of the subcommission on the protection of minorities.
With the settlement of the question of the Patriarchate and of the non-
exchangeable minorities the way was paved for a bilateral Greek-Turkish
agreement on the thorny issue of the exchange of populations. On 30 January
1923 the Convention between Greece and Turkey concerning the exchange
of Greek and Turkish populations was signed by Eleftherios Venizelos and
ismet inonli.1 Article 2 of the exchange convention stipulated that:
The following persons shall not be included in the exchange provided
for in Article 1: (a) The Greek inhabitants of Constantinople (b) The
Moslem inhabitants of Western Thrace. All Greeks who were already
established before October 1918, within the areas under the prefecture
of the City of Constantinople, as defined by the law of 1912, shall be
considered as Greek inhabitants of Constantinople. All Moslems estab-
lished in the region to the east of the frontier line laid down in 1913 by
the Treaty of Bucharest shall be considered as Moslem inhabitants of
Western Thrace.
Further, article 16 authorized that:
7
... No obstacle shall be placed in the way of the inhabitants of the
districts exempted from the exchange under Article 2 exercising freely
their right to remain in or return to those districts and to enjoy to the full
their liberties and rights of property in Turkey and Greece. 2
With these stipulations the future of the Greek community in istanbul, as
39. Ibid.
40. E.A., 43 (1923) 12.
41. A.N. Karacan, LOZGn Konferansl ve ismet Pasa, istanbul 1943, pp. 218-20.
1. Ratified by Turkey, Aug. 23, 1923, by Greece, Aug. 25, 1923.
2. LeTS., pp. 175-85.
95
well as the Muslim minority in Western Thrace, was officially guaranteed.
Nonetheless, in order to reduce the size of the large Constantinopolitan
Greek community and thus satisfy the Turkish demand for proportionality
between the two ethnic minorities, the exemption clause was made retroac-
tive. It excluded from the benefits of article 2 a substantial number of Greeks
who had settled in istanbul after the date of 30 October 1918. A conservative
estimate put the Greeks in this category to 38,000.
3
As it has been pointed out,
the Greek numerical presence in istanbul reached a peak during the Allied
occupation of the city. According to British estimates, the Constantinopoli-
tan Greek population amounted to about 300,000 in 1914 and had risen to
almost 400,000 by 1922.4 Since the Turks refused to tolerate the presence of
such a large minority, the right to exemption was extended to only certain
categories of Constantinopolitan Greeks.
After agreeing on the principle of excluding the Thracian Muslims and
certain categories of istanbul Greeks, the subcommission for the protection
of minorities took up the difficult task of defining the status of these
minorities. Because of their significance for the future of the Greek minority
in Turkey, the Greek delegates - Venizelos, Kaklamanos, Theotokas
5
and
Dendramis- paid particular attention to the issues debated at this subcom-
mission. On the other hand, aware that public opinion throughout the western
world had not forgotten the Armenian massacres, the Turkish delegates felt
themselves called upon to defend past Ottoman attitudes towards Christian
minorities. This they thoroughly resented. They felt that the Allies were
using the emotive issue of the Christian minorities in order to embarrass and
ultimately weaken Turkish determination on more important questions such
as the abolition of the capitulatory system in Turkey, reparations, the Straits
and Mosu1.
6
Early in the proceedings, the Turkish delegates declared that, in accor-
dance with article five of the Misak-f Millf (National Pact), Turkey was ready
to guarantee full protection of life and libeIty of worship to every citizens of
the country without distinction of language, race or religion. They were also
3. By December 1924 these Greeks were transferred to Greece, LN/C'.775.273. 1924. II, Lara
to the League of Nations, 8 Dec. 1924.
4. LCNEA., p. 122. Also in FO 371/7959/E13044, memorandum prepared by FO, 20 November
1922.
5. Michail Theotokas (1872-1951). Constantinopolitan lawyer before 1922. He acted as the
judicial expert of the Greek delegation at Lausanne. His contribution on the issue of the
Patriarchate and on the question of the minorities was particularly noteworthy. Another Con-
stantinopolitan, Angelos Ioannidis, too, acted as advisor.
6. Karacan, op. cit., p. 127. The Turkish representatives at this subcommission were: Riza
Nul', Miinir Ertegiin, Mustafa ~ e r e f Ozkan and ~ i i k r i i Kaya.
96
prepared to extend equal rights and treatment to all religious minoIities.
7
Both ismet inonii and Rlza N ur claimed that Christians had rewarded Muslim
toleration by lending themselves as instruments to the predatory designs of
the enemies of the Turkish nation. It was this disloyalty rather than the
religion they professed that caused their sufferings. They both advised the
non-Muslim minorities that their best hope lay in their compliance with the
liberal and democratic laws of the Turkish republic. They, however,
strongly objected to further discussion on the issue of non-Muslim minorities
in Turkey. This they considered it to be an excuse for interference in the
internal affairs of Turkey.s
Faced with such an attitude, the Greek and Allied delegations were soon
forced to make a number of concessions as regards to the protection of
minorities.
9
One such concession concerned the appointment of a representa-
tive of the League of Nations in Turkey to ensure the application of the
minority clauses. It was regarded essential by the circles close to the Patri-
archate that such a representative should see that there was no interference
with holding of Synod and Canonical elections, public and private worship,
instructions, the access of bishops to their people and so forth.1 0 Rlza Nur,
however, stressed that Turkey was only prepared to accept similar clauses to
those signed by European states. Thus, only when other nations were pre-
pared to allow in their midst a League representative would his government
consider to follow suiLl1
Another important question debated at the subcommission concerned the
freedom of movement (liberte de circulation} of non-Muslims in Turkey. On
20 December, Venizelos demanded that the Turkish delegate
declarer que la Turquie ne mettra aucune entrave aux ceremonies
religieuses des orthodoxes de Noel et de Paques qui ont lieu la nuit,
sous pretexte qu' il y aurait menace de l'ordre public.12
After some initial reluctance to discuss the issue on the grounds that it was a
purely internal Turkish matter, Rlza Nur gave a verbal assurance with regard
to the freedom of movement during the religious processions at Christmas
7. For details see chapter II.
8. On Turkish views about the minority question see LCNEA., pp. 190-204; Cemil, op. cit.,
ii/pp.2n74.
9. Nicolson to Foreign Office, Lausanne, 27 December 1922, FO 371/9085/E2.
10. Lambeth Palace to Foreign Office, London, 10 November 1922, LPA/DvP/32/3.
11. Meetings of 22, 23 and 26 December 1922, minutes kept YE/A/5. Kaklamanos to Foreign
Ministry, Lausanne, 22 December 1922, YE/A/5VI. See also Meray, op. cit., i:ii/pp. 186-91,200
f.
12. Minutes of the meeting held on 20 December 1922 kept in YE/A/5VI.
97
and Easter .13 This paved the way for the discussion on the legal position of
non-Muslims vis-a-vis the state (statut personnel et statut familial). Once
again, the Turkish side informed the subcommission that like other secular
western states, Turkey had accepted civil marriage, and although it did not
object to religious mamage as such, all marriage had to be registered with the
civil authorities.
14
What the state wished, according to Rlza Nur, was to
prevent the ecclesiastical authorities from assuming any administrative func-
tions. For with the disestablishment of the churches in Turkey, he concluded,
the state had taken over all civil powers from the religious heads
(milletba!)Jarl).
Yet, as Rlza Nur points out in his memoirs, the Turks had also taken into
consideration a rather more intricate factor while shaping their policy on this
issue. A total secularization would inevitably allow mixed marriages between
Muslims and Christians. This practice would be ultimately beneficial to
Turkey, for the children of such marriages were bound to have a stronger
Turkish national conscience. Another additional benefit was that conserva-
tive Greek-Orthodox would rather move to Greece than face the possibility of
marrying their children to Muslim Turks.
1s
After tough negotiations, a com-
promise was reached on the issue of statut personnel on 2 January 1923.
Accordingly, a commission consisting of equal numbers of Muslims and
representatives of the minorities should be created to consider the incorpora-
tion of the clauses concerning personal status in the Turkish civil code. In
case of failure to agree, an arbitrator chosen from among European jurists
was to be jointly nominated by the Turkish government and the League of
Nations.
16
6. The questions of the military service and amnesty.
By far the most intractible issues concerning the minorities proved to be the
exemption of Christians from compulsory military service in return for the
payment of an equitable tax (taxe d' exoneration) and the agreement on a
reciprocal amnesty declaration. They were first raised by Curzon on 12
December when he invited both the Turkish and Greek governments to
13. Kaklamanos to Foreign Ministry, Lausanne, 22 December 1922, YE/A/5VI. See also
Meray, op. cit., i:ii/pp. 176-79.
14. Miinir Ertegiin's speech at the subcommission on 30 December 1922, minutes kept in
YE/A/5VI. See also Meray, op. cit., i:ii/pp. 227-33.
15. Nur, op. cit., iii/pp. 1056-58.
16. Kaklamanos to Foreign Ministry. Lausanne, 3 January 1923, and the minutes of the
meeting in YE/A/5VL See also The Times, 3 January 1923.
98
proclaim a general amnesty, and suggested that the Christians in Turkey and
the Muslims in Greek Thrace should have the right of opting out from
military service by the payment of a reasonable fixed tax.
1
On the exemption
of Christians from military service the Allied delegations proposed the follow-
ing formula:
La Turquie s'engage a inserer dans sa legislation une disposition
permettant aux ressortissants turcs non-musulmans d'etre exemptes
du service militaire moyennant Ie paiement d'une taxe. Cette taxe
d' exoneration devra etre moderee et sera la meme pour les musulmans
comme pour les non-musulmans, au cas OU la Turquie accorderait la
meme exemption a tous ses ressortissants.2
The Turks vetoed this proposal. Since all Turkish subjects were to be equal
before the law, Rlza N ur reasoned, the responsibility of protecting the demo-
cratic order of new Turkey fell equally upon every Turkish citizen regardless
of his religion. He then maintained that Turkey could not be induced to create
special classes enjoying particular privileges. If, however, the Turkish
government in the future decided to exempt any Turkish national in return
for a given amount of payment (bedel), then non-Muslims, like Muslims,
would benefit from this law.
3
While accepting in principle the Turkish arguments, Venizelos stressed
that he found them of a very broad nature. He specifically pointed out that the
Turkish government had already practised widely the bedel system. Greece,
too, followed the same system for the benefit of the Hellene Muslims. He
therefore urged the Turks to follow this precedent. The Greek leader even
went so far as to suggest that non-Muslims might be exempted from military
service in return for the limitation of their political rights.
4
Andrew Ryan said that when discussing this question, the attitude of the
Turkish people towards the minorities, rather than fine general principles,
should be examined. The Turks, he assessed, had never trusted their
minorities, and as a result of this mistrust the infamous labour battalions
(amele taburlar'l) for non-Muslims, in which the death toll was extremely
high, had been formed.
s
Speaking before the main commission, Curzon
1. Venizelos to KaneUopoulos, Lausanne, 12 December 1922, BMAEV/34.
2. D.B.F.P. (18) no. 290.
3. Minutes of the meeting held on IS December in YE/A/5VI and Meray, op. cit., i:ii/p. 157.
The issue was also debated on 22 December, Kaklamanos to Foreign Ministry, Lausanne, 22
December 1922, YE/A/5VL
4. Kaklamanos to Foreign Ministry, Lausanne, 22 December 1922, YE/A/5VI. See also
Meray, op. cit., i:ii/pp. 156-57.
5. Meray, op.cit .. i:ii/p. 157.
99
stated that Ankara had already passed a law in February 1922 exempting
non-Muslims from military service upon payment of a tax varying from 300
TL to 1,000 TL. As a result, he asserted, the Turkish government had already
recognized that these people could not be usefully incorporated into the
armed forces in time of war. On the other hand, a tax on exemption would
provide the state with a substantial revenue. After stating that this law was
simply a temporary measure, ismet inonii went on to elaborate yet another
argument. A privilege of this kind, he explained, might increase the economic
and numerical strength of the minorities in Turkey to the detriment of the rest
of the population. Venizelos retaliated indignantly by reminding that the
Turkish arguments of equal treatment pronounced so often at the conference
were inaccurate, for non-Muslims were not even permitted to become offic-
ers or non-commissioned officers.
6
Finally, on 9 January 1923, the issue of military service, together with the
question of the amnesty declaration, the only other unresolved point, were
referred to the territorial and military commission. Three days later a com-
promise was reached whereby in return for the ommission of the article about
military service the Turks accepted in principle the amnesty clauses prop-
osed by the Allies.
7
Content with the compromise, Andrew Ryan wrote that
at least a large number of Ottoman Christians were to be protected by the
amnesty clauses.
8
This compromise constituted a clear diplomatic victory for the Turks.
Thus, in a self-congratulatory spirit, Rlza Nur mentions that the successes
on the questions of military service and the Patriarchate had destroyed the
Ottoman Greek identity (Rllmiligu oldiirdii)>>.9 Aware that Christians still
associated the excesses of the labour battalions with military service, the
Turks knew that non-Muslim conscription would serve as a useful tool in
their compaign for the reduction of the Christian element in Turkey. Riza Nur
makes it abundantly clear that his principal reason for resisting Allied pres-
sure on this issue was his belief that through compulsory military service
Turkey would be able to get rid of most of the young Greeks who had been .
exempted from the exchange of populations. 10 It seems that Ryan, too, was
apprehensive of such an eventuality. He noted that an exemption from the
military service would have been one of the best things we could have done
6. LCNEA., pp. 291-93; D.B.F.P. (IS) no. 315.
7. Curzon to Henderson, Lausanne, 12 January 1923, FO 371/9095/E5S7; Kaklamanos to
Foreign Ministry, Lausanne, 10 January 1923, YE/A/5VI.
S. Ryan to Henderson, Lausanne, 15 January 1923, FO SOO/RyP.
9. Nur, op. cit., iii/pp. 1114-15.
10. Ibid., pp. 1049-50.
100
for the non-Muslims. 11 In vain bib Meletios and the representatives of the
Patriarchate in Switzerland, Michael Kepetzis, implore the Greek govern-
ment to press further with the exemption of Christians from military
service. 12
On the question of the amnesty there were also serious difficulties. Article
1 of the amnesty declaration stipulated that:
No person who inhabits or who had inhabited Turkey, and reciproc-
ally no person who inhabits or who had inhabited Greece, shall be
disturbed or molested in Turkey and reciprocally in Greece, under any
pretext whatsoever, on account of any military or political action taken
by him, or of any assistance of any kind given by him to a foreign Power
signatory of the Treaty of Peace signed this day, or to the nationals of
such Power, between 1st August 1914 and 20th November 1922.13
Notwithstanding the acceptance of the amnesty clauses by the Turkish
delegation on 11 January, the issue was debated once again during the later
part of the Lausanne negotiations. On 19 May, the Allied delegations referred
to the difficulties produced by the Turkish authorities in connection with the
return to istanbul of non-exchangeable Christians. These people had left
istanbul temporarily during the critical period of October-December 1922.
Since they could not have procured regular Turkish passports in the then
prevailing circumstances, these Constantinopolitan Greeks and Armenians
had left the country with Allied traveling documents.
14
The head of the
British delegation, Horace Rumbold pointed out that according to a recent
decree passed by Ankara no Turkish subject who had left Turkey without a
proper Turkish passport was to be allowed to return. Many influential and
wealthy Greeks and Armenians were included in this category. Their prop-
erty, Rumbold went on, was being treated as abandoned owing to the inability
of the owners to return. 15
Venizelos and Montagna drew attention to articles 2 and 16 of the exchange
convention of 30 January 1923, which fully provided for the right of all
non-exchangeable Greeks to return to istanbul. United on this issue the Allies
strongly urged the Turks to repair this injustice and interpret the amnesty in
the widest possible sense. ismet inonii reassured the conference that Tur-
11. Ryan to Henderson, Lausanne, 15 January 1923, FO SOO/RyP.
12. Kepetzis to Venizelos, Lausanne, 12 and IS January 1923, BMAEV/320; Meletios to the
Greek delegation at Lausanne, Cons., 12 March 1923, YE/A/5VI.
13. LCTS., pp. 111-14.
14. Details in reports by the British delegation at Lausanne, FO 371/907S/E5119 (16 May 1923)
and FO 371/9078/E5128 (IS May 1923).
15. D.B.F.P. (IS) no. 533.
10l
key intended to interpret the amnesty dans un bon sens d'apaisement
general. 16
In the meantime at the drafting committee the Turkish delegation ob-
structed any concrete discussion on the insertion of a clause in the amnesty
declaration concerning those Turkish nationals who had left istanbul without
regular passports. This attitude gave rise to a long debate during the confer-
ence meeting on 4 June 1923. After declaring that the Turkish government
reserved the right to prevent the return to Turkey of all suspects, spied and
evil-doers, Rlza Nur added that peaceful citizens without a political record
would be allowed to return. He did not, however, elaborate as to how that
large category of non-Muslims, now living abroad, would be given the oppor-
tunity of proving their innocence before the Turkish courts. Finally, the
Turks argued that the amnesty referred only to persons resident in Turkey
and this in no way affected Ankara's right to prevent those minority members
who had fled the country from returning.
l7
Public opinion in Turkey demanded the punishment of all those elements
who opposed the Turkish national struggle. To avoid offending the sus-
ceptibilities of the public, the Turkish government not only barred the
return of absent non-exchangeable Constantinopolitan Christians but also
began to arrest local Greeks. In July 1923, nine prominent Greeks from
Istanbul, who had been accused of sending funds to the Greek military
mission at Bursa in 1919-20, were imprisoned. ArTests of ordinary Constan-
tinopolitan Greeks, charged with aiding the Greek forces in istanbul,
followed. IS Meanwhile, the Turkish representative in istanbul, Adnan
Adivar, informed Henderson that all Turkish subjects who had served in the
British occupation force were to be expelled. 19 In a last effort, during the final
meeting at Lausanne on 17 July, Rumbold raised once again the case of
Christians who had served the British in non-combative capacities. Their
arrests, he remarked, were contrary to the spirit of the negotiated general
amnesty.20 Finally, realizing that the Turks would not compromise on this
issue, the British were forced to facilitate the departure of 1,500 Greeks and
500 Armenians, as well as their dependents.
16. Ibid.; The Times. 21 May 1923.
17. For the declaration of tsmet inonii made on 4 June 1923 D.B.F.P. (18) no. 590.
18. The names of Greek political prisoners who. according to Athens, had been executed by
the Turks were furnished by Kaklamanos to the Foreign Office on 21 September 1923, FO
371/9161/E9467. See also The Times. 23 July 1923.
19. Henderson to Curzon, Cons., 10 July 1923, Fo 371/9160/E7148
20. Rumbold to Foreign Office, Lausanne, 17 July 1923, FO 371/9088/E7479. Sir Horace
Rumbold had replaced Curzon as the president of the British delegation during the second phase
of the talk (April to July 1923).
102
7. The signing of the treaty of Lausanne and the return of Istanbul to full
Turkish control.
The treaty of Lausanne was signed on 24 July 1923 and was ratified by the
Turkish Grand National Assembly a month later. This treaty was generally
acclaimed as the greatest diplomatic victory of nationalist Turkey. Through-
out the negotiations the Turkish delegation manifested a rigid determination
to abolish all foreign controls over the finance, economy, judicial system,
minorities and territory of Turkey. Almost all the Turkish objectives were
attained and as a result a sovereign, republican, secular and homogenous
Turkish state was acknowledged by the international community. The Tur-
kish determination to preserve absolute sovereignty over domestic matters
was amply demonstrated during the debate on the minorities. At Lausanne
Turkey agreed to grant equal treatment for all religious and racial minorities
mainly because it regarded such an undertaking to be in accordance with its
political philosophy. As a result the minority clauses concerning the future
position of non-Muslims in Turkey and Muslims in Greek Thrace were
inserted in the final text of the Lausanne treaty. These clauses, together with
article 16 of the exchange of populations convention, constituted the Magna
Carta of non- Muslims in Turkey. 1 By virtue of these clauses the inherent
right of the indigenous Greeks to exist in istanbul, separate from strictly
political considerations and arra.ngements, was recognized. Although the
Ecumenical Patriarchate was also allowed to remain in Turkey, the Greek
minority had to seek a separate rationale from the Orthodox church for its
continued existence. For the political status and duties of the members of this
community as Turkish citizens placed them under a different set of impera-
tives than the internationally based Ecumenical Patriarchate. The latter was
stripped of all its non-religious attributes while its exact position vis-a-vis the
state was never defined at Lausanne. Concurrently, with the exchange of
populations and the disestablishment of the Patriarchate, the Turkish govern-
ment succeeded in putting an end to the millet system.
On 2 October 1923, as it was agreed in the Mudanya convention and
confirmed during the Lausanne negotiations, the Allied forces left istanbul
and the rest of the neutral zone. This caused the exodus of yet another
substantial group of Constantinople Christians who decided to leave with the
Allies. With the entry of the Iron Division into the city on 6 October 1923,
amid the enthusiastic Muslim population of istanbul, the Turkishness of the
old Constantinople was consolidated. Not without justification the press
described the event as the second conquest of istanbul. The once self-
I. See appendix A.
103
assertive and demonstrative Greeks and Armenians of Pera (Beyoglu) now
recognized that if they wished to remain citizens of the Turkish republic they
had to adapt themselves to the rise of Turkish nationalism. To enjoy their
livelihood and property, the prosperous Christian middle and lower middle
class in istanbul not only had to act discreetly in such a way as not to give
offense to Turkish sensibilities but also to pledge loyalty to the Ankara
regime. For the Greeks in particular this meant the surrender of the cherished
dream of megali idea and the ultimate recovery of Konstantjnoupolis by a
Greater Greece. Yet, aware that Christians were the undesirable citizens
of modern Turkey, a large group of Constantinopolitan Greeks chose to move
voluntarily to Greece. Significantly, emigration was widespread among the
members of the professional middle class who formed the cultural and intel-
lectual backbone of the community. According to rough Patriarchal estimates
in March 1923, there were 250,000 Greeks in Constantinople and about
150,000 Greeks are going.2 Certainly, some 60,000 Hellene Greeks, about
40,000 non-exchangeable Greeks, 38,000 Greeks established in the city after
1918 and about 20,000 Greeks from the suburbs left istanbul during the period
1922-24.
2. Germanos to Davison, London, 9 March 1923, LPA(DvP(32(3,
104
CHAPTER IV
THE NEW LEGAL POSITION OF THE GREEK ORTHODOX
COMMUNITY IN REPUBLICAN TURKEY, 1923-29
1. Turkish economic nationalism and the Greeks.
The exchange of populations solved the grave problems involved in the
presence of a powerful and numerically strong Greek ethnoreligious group,
whose business acumen placed it in a very influential position in Anatolia and
Eastern Thrace. With the elimination of the Greek population, Turkey had
managed to form a nationally homogenous state. This in turn constituted the
most effective way of robbing any solid basis for remounting a future Greek
irredentist programme at Turkish expense. In effect, at Lausanne the idea of
a Greater Greece became an anachronism. I
With the exemption of Constantinopolitan Greek Orthodox and Thracian
Muslims from the exchange, a last"remnant of mixed populations was main-
tained in both Turkey and Greece. Given the strained Greek-Turkish re-
lations in the aftermath of the Anatolian war, these minorities, inspite of their
relatively insignificant numbers, continued to constitute a source of conflict
and suspicion. Thus, the insistence of the Turks to retain a minority in Greece
was interpreted in Athens as a long-term Turkish covert design over Greek
Thrace. Likewise, the Turks suspected that, with the Patriarchate and a
sizeable minority remaining in situ, the Greek urge towards the city might
once again become irresistable. As a result, during the post-Lausanne period,
Turkey strove to consolidate its position in cosmopolitan Constantinople.
While tolerating the existence of a Greek minority, the Turks :vere de-
termined to reduce the pronounced non-Turkish presence in Istanbul.
Nowhere did this presence manifest itself more vividly than in the economic
life of the city. As previously remarked, during the Ottoman rule, local
Christian businessmen accumulated large fortunes by acting as inter-
I. For details on the exchange of popUlations see D. Pentzopoulos, The Balkan Exchange of
Minorities and its Impact upon Greece, The Hague 1962; C.B. Eddy, Greece and the Greek
Refugees, London 1931; J.A. Petropoulos, The Compulsory Exchange of Populations:
peacemaking, 1922-1930", Byzantine and Modern Greek Studies, 2 (1976) 135-60.
105
mediaries of foreign capital. After Lausanne, however, the republican
government was determined to develop a national (milll) economy through
a rapid progress of embourgeoisement of Muslim Turks. With the help of a
loyal Turkish bourgeoisie Ankara hoped to drive towards economic self-
sufficiency. One of the chief components of economic nationalism was the
eradication of the European capitulations and the foreign debt accumulated
during the Ottoman era. Towards the turn of the twentieth century, the
feeling was that the capitulations and the debts were instruments used by
foreign powers to infringe upon Ottoman sovereignty.2 Turkish nationalists
intended to change this state of affairs.
As a result, a sustained assault against local Christian business interests
and commercial institutions was inaugurated with the reestablishment of
Turkish authority in istanbul. The first step towards the turkification of the
economy was the foundation of the National Turkish Commercial Union
(Millf Turk Tiearet Birligi) in 1923. Enjoying the backing of the government,
the Union aided the gradual take over of the finance and banking business by
a number of Turkish businessmen. It also played a major role in the purchase
of commercial establishments and shops owned by the outgoing Christians,
particularly Greeks.
3
Eager to fill the gap produced by the departing Greeks,
Turkish merchants made use of their newly acquired political muscle to
improve their economic position at the expense of local Christian business-
men. Thus, according to N.S. Roberts, the acting commercial secretary of
the British High Commission in istanbul,
in some cases, deliberate attempts are made to frighten Greek mer-
chants into leaving the country and disposing of their property for
whatever price they may be able to obtain.
4
The president of the Commercial Union was ibrahim P a ~ a z a d e Kavalall
Hiiseyin who, like many of its members, was of donme origin. By providing
them with ample business opportunities, Ankara hoped to win over the
support of the powerful donme Turks, who had played an important role
during the Young Turk revolution.
s
In fact, the links between the government and the Commercial
2. O. Okyar, Development Background of the Turkish Economy, 1923-73,lJMES 10 (1979)
330.
3. D. Avcioglu, Tiirkiye'nin Diizeni, istanbul 1979, i/pp. 340-44.
4. Roberts to Dept. of Overseas Trade, Cons., 11 December 1922. FO 371/9113/E280.
5. Henderson to Curzon, Cons., 13 January 1923, FO 371/9113/E824. Donmes were descen-
dants of the Jewish followers of Sabbatai Zevi (1632-75), who ostensibly became converts to
Islam with him in 1666. They long maintained their identity as a sect but in recent years they have
done their outmost to be assimilated into the Turkish society.
106
Union were quite apparent. The Union was financed by Ankara and a number
of deputies were personally involved in the enterprise.
6
By March 1923, the
active participation of Turkish deputies in the economic life of the country
increased substantially. They initiated and financed a number of companies,
such as the Turkish National Import and Export company (Turkiye Millf
ithalat ve ihracat Anonim Sirketi) which was founded by 50 deputies and high
bureaucrats.
7
Indeed, there were gigantic opportunities for Turkish merchants not only
in Anatolia but also in istanbul. According to information compiled by the
commercial secretary of the British High Commission, H. Woods, 110 impor-
tant Greek firms and 21 Armenian commercial houses had been closed in the
city between November 1922 and March 1923. In addition, hundreds of
smaller businesses ceased to operate owing to the flight of their owners.8
Based on a report by the ministry of the interior, the Eeonomiste d'Orient
gave some revealing figures on the flight of Constantinopolitan Christians
since the introduction of the nationalist regime in the city. According to the
same report, 188,681 Greeks from the city (together with another 61 ,094 from
the suburbs) and 150,076 other non-Muslims had abandoned istanbul. The
property, left behind by these 399,856 non-Muslims amounted to 143 million
TL.9 At the same time, constant official harassment involving threats of
instant seizure of goods undermined confidence amongst those Greeks who
were determined to stay in the city. Often Greek traders, like the wealthy
tobacco merchant Nicholas Sepheroglou, were charged with malpractice. 10
Particularly susceptible to official interference were those Greek companies
involved in business transactions with the Allied administration of 1918-23.
11
To retain their competitiveness and avoid official interference many such
companies went into partnership with Muslims and foreign nationals. It has
been demonstrated by a recent study that foreign investment in Istanbul
during 1923-30 was considerable. 12 It largely concentrated on purchasing a
6. Roberts to Dept. of Overseas Trade. Cons., 11 December 1922, FO 371/9113/E280.
7. Roberts to Dept. of Overseas Trade, Cons., 28 March 1923, FO 371/9114/E3460. For the
emergence of a new Turkish economic class see S. Mardin, Historical Determinants of
Stratification: Social Class Consciousness in Turkey, SBFD 22/4 (1967) 142.
8. Roberts to Dept. of Overseas Trade. Cons., 28 March 1923, FO 371/9114/E3460.
9. Ibid.
10. KwvaraVrlVOv110J.u;:, 14 February and 14 March 1926.
II. The Kendros brother case and that of Emmanouilidis-Bekakis cit. in FO 371/9159/E5809 (4
June 1923) and FO 371/9159/EI2250 (23 December 1923). Also another letter by the British
Chamber of Commerce in istanbul to Henderson, Cons., 9 February 1924.
12. See A.G .. Okc;:iin, 1920-1930 Ylllarl araslnda kuru/an Tiirk Anonim !}irket/erinde Yaband
Sermaye. Ankara 1971. pp. 117-18.
107
major share of the lucrative businesses abandoned by the departing Greeks.
For example, the Fabriques Unies de Ciment Arslan et Eski-Hissar, founded
by the Siniosoglou brothers and Alexander Kioseoglou in 1921 (capital
367,500 TL) was taken over by foreign nationals and Muslim Turks. Another
two Siniosoglou-Kioseoglou concerns, the Bazar du Levant and Minoterie
d'Orient suffered a similar fate.
I3
Meanwhile, Constantinopolitan Greeks
with foreign nationality, like George Rallis who had acquired Italian citizen-
ship, also benefited from the Greek exodus.
I4
Nor was the increasing government intervention in business and the
emergence of state monopolies welcomed by local non-Muslim entre-
preneurs. Greek interests were particularly affected by the establishment of
alcohol monopoly in March 1926. Although the government allowed some
private companies to manufacture and distribute wine, few Greek concerns,
which had hitherto dominated the market, survived. IS The policy of
economic nationalism coupled with bureaucratic restrictions persuaded
many Greeks to pack their bags and head for Greece.
2. The campaign against professional Greeks.
The sustained effort to achieve a national economy in istanbul did not
limit itself to the commercial field. Soon the government sought to bring
about greater Muslim participation in the lucrative foreign concessionary
companies. Until 1923, ninety per cent of all managerial and clerical positions
in such companies were occupied by non-Muslims and foreigners. Soon all
European firms operating in the city were urged to employ, whenever possi-
ble, Muslim Turks (,en disponibilite .1 Such pressures on foreign companies
13. Ibid, pp. 28-29.
14. Ibid., pp. ISS-S6.
IS. In 1921 out of 2S7 restaurants in Istanbul 171 were owned by Greeks and out of 4'l1
beerhalls 444 were again Greek-owned. Similarly out of6S4 wholesale concerns S28 were Greek,
see C. Johnson, Constantinople today, New York 1922, p. 263.
L Henderson to Curzon, Cons., 24 April 1923, FO 371/91 14/E4314. The precentage of Greek
employees in the major commercial establishment in 1923 was as follows:
Names of
companies
Registered foreign concessionary companies
Commercial Bank of Near East ............................................ .
Orosdi Bank ............................................................. .
Deutsche Orientbank
Proportion
of Greek
employees
90%
60%
SO%
Credit Lyonnais .. .. ................ ..... .................. . .... .. ......... SO%
Compagnie d'Assurances Generales. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . 99%
108
continued throughout 1924 and were renewed with vigour in 1926-27 under
the stewardship of ~ i i k r i i Kaya, minister offinance, and Ali Cenani, minister
of commerce. -
Unwilling to displease Ankara, the foreign firms complied with the wishes
Names of
companies
Banco di Roma
Proportion
of Greek
employees
SO%
Banca Commerciale Italiana . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . SO%
Banque hollandaise pour la Mediterranee .................................... SO%
Banque Fran9aise des Pays d'Orient ........................................ SO%
Ionian Bank .............................................................. SO%
The Adriatic Petroleum ............ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . SO%
Assicurazioni Generale .................................................... SO%
Union de Paris. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20%
Helvetia (insurance) ....................................................... 20%
Bank and Manson Insurance Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2S%
Halcyon Line . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25%
Khedivial Mail Steam Ship ................................................. 25%
Messageries Maritimes. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2S%
Paquet................................................................... 2S%
Gelchrist Walker and Co ........... ,....................................... 2S%
Lloyd Triestino ........................................................... 2S%
Walter Seager Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20%
Orienta Societe des Tabacs 10%
Registered Turkish companies
Societe cooperative des marchands de fromage de Constantinople... .. ..... .. .. 100%
Minoterie d'Orient ........................................................ 60%
Minoteries Unies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60%
Compagnie d' Assurances Generales de Constantinople ........................ 60%
Banque de Salonique ...................................................... SO%
Industrie Chimique et OliIere .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40%
Balia-Karaidin ............................................................ 40%
Banque Nationale de Turquie.................... ........................... 2S%
Societe de Glace de Constantinople ......................................... 25%
Fabriques Unies de Ciment Arslan et Eski-Hissar . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25%
Fabriques Unies de Conserves Hermes et Confiance Cartal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25%
Societe Nationale d'Assurance Turque ...................................... 20%
Mines d'HeracIee ......................................................... 20%
Cine-Magic ............................................................. . . 20%
Docks et Chantiers de Stenia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20%
These statistics were given in a letter of the Turkish government addressed to the League of
Nations on 6 March 1925, LN/C. 135. 1925. VII.
109
of the government. Thus, according to Douglas Watson, the manager of
the Constantinople Telephone company, his fIrm replaced Christian
telephonists with Muslims whenever possible and since 1923 it had not
engaged a single Christian girl. In many cases preference was given to
non-French speaking Muslims rather than to French speaking Christian girls
with Turkish nationality, despite the fact that up to then a foreign language
was a necessary qualifIcation for the job. 2 Asked by the manager of the Ionian
Bank, Wyatt, whether the authorities demanded the engagement of Muslims
at the expense of Christian employees with Turkish nationality, the inspector
gave him a choice of either substituting his non-Muslim staff or employing a
fIxed number of Muslims in addition to the Christians already employed.
Identical options, the Turkish inspector claimed, were offered to most of the
other foreign companies and had been already accepted.
3
As the obligatory
employment of Muslims was uneconomical, it inevitably led to the gradual
dismissal of Christian employees. Thus, by 1929, the Foreign Office consi-
dered that the local Christian employees have already to a very large extent
been replaced by Muslims.
4
But the dismissal of Constantino po lit an Hellene
Greeks was even more rapid. As early as April 1923, both the Ottoman Bank
and the Regie des Tabacs were obliged to replace all their Hellenic employees
with the exception of a very few who were regarded as indispensible.
5
According to Greek estimates by 1926 over 5,000 Hellenes were dismissed
from such European companies operating in istanbul alone.
6
Meanwhile, the disposition of the government to lump together non-
Muslim Turkish citizens with foreign nationals was quite apparent. Notwith-
standing their legal right to Turkish citizenship, non-Muslims were still
considered by the majority of Muslim Turks as an alien element. Such
feelings were even publicly expressed by senior members of the Turkish
Cabinet. Thus, on 19 October 1923, during a press conference, the minister of
public works, Fevzi Bey, declared that
7
2. Lindsay to Chamberlain, Cons., 18 November 1924, FO 371(10207(EI0203.
3. Ionian Bank to Undersecretary of State, London, 5 March 1926, FO 371(Il540(EI540;
Lindsay to Foreign Office, Cons., 4 March 1924, FO 37I(Il540(EI512.
4. Knight to Chamberlain. Ankara. 21 May 1929, FO 371(138Il(E2514.
5. Kollias to Oliphant, London, 21 March 1923, FO 371(9114(E3133; Henderson to Curzon,
Cons., 24 April 1923, FO 371(9144(E4314. While there were 500 Greek employees in the Regie
des Tabacs in 1922 there were only 2 or 3 left five years later, in Comparative examination of the
application of the minority clauses of the Lausanne treaty in Greece and Turkey, memorandum
prepared by the Greek Foreign Ministry for Venizalos, 1930, BMAEV(58.
6. Kwva!avrlvovno).z;;, 7 February 1926.
7 .. Henderson to Curzon, Cons., 23 October 1923. FO 371(911 6(EI 0547.
110
According to the arrangements concluded with the foreign com-
panies, the latter must engage Turkish employees only. This does not
mean that they can employ all subjects of the GrandNational Assembly
of Turkey indiscriminately. They must employ Moslem Turks only. If
the foreign companies do not shortly dismiss their Greek, Armenian
and Jewish servants, I shall be compelled to cancel the privileges under
which they are authorized to function in Turkey. This decision is
irrevocable .
Such a decision, however, went counter to article 39 of the Lausanne treaty
which extended to non-Muslim minorities equal treatment and opportunities.
As the British representative in istanbul pointed out,8
the persistent unofficial pressure brought to bear on foreign com
panies and institutions to employ Muslims at the expense of non-
Muslim Turkish nationals is in flagrant contradiction with the minority
clauses of the Lausanne Treaty.
Replying to a demarche by the Allied high commissioners, the Turkish
authorities in istanbul asserted that:
9
Les dispositions des articles 37 et 39 ne derogent en rien ,11 droit, ni
diminuent Ie devoir du Gouvernement turc de veiller sericli 'llllcnt a ce
que les elements appartenant a la majorite de la population ne soient pas
prives de la possibilite de participer a un domaine important de travail
dans Ie pays. Par consequent, les mesures prises a regard devraient
etre envisagees non pas comme une tendance hostile a regard des
minorites, mais bien comme des moyens legitimes de contrecan'er la
pratique d'exclure systematiquement les majorites de toute
cooperation aux activites economiques.
In a similar tone a Turkish memorandum addressed to the League of Nations
dismissed claims that Turkey was violating the minority clauses of the
Lausanne treaty. 10
Similar official interference also affected members of the liberal profes-
sions. Thus. a government commission investigating the morality of istanbul
barristers disqualified 350 out of 960 members of the bar in September 1924.
They were prohibited from practising law either on moral grounds or for
engaging in business incompatible with the profession of the barrister, such as
8. Ibid.
9. Notes exchanged between Henderson and Adnan Adlvar. 16 February and 17 March 1924.
FO 37LI0207/E3317
10. Turkish memorandum on the situation of the Greek minority in Turkey.
LN/C.135.1925 .. VII.
III
8
commerce. As this decision affected two-thirds of the Greek members of the
bar, the Greek government protested to the League of Nations. 11 Dismis-
sing charges of discrimination against Greek lawyers the Turkish govern-
ment outlined that: 12
Cette mesure n'a jamais vise une categorie detenninee.Il y a
aujourd'hui quarante-deux avocats grecs inscrits au barreau de Con-
stantinople et exer9ant leur profession. Quant a ceux a qui cet exercice
a ete interdit, comme les Turcs musulmans qui sont dans Ie meme cas,
c'est qu'ils ne remplissaient pas les conditions premieres determinees
par les lois necessaires a leur metier. Chaque expulse a Ie moyen d'en
appeler a la justice de son pays, et de faire reviser son cas.
Notwithstanding such Turkish assertions, the disproportionately high
number of disqualified Greeks, as well as anti-Kemalist Turks, threw some
doubt on the motives of the Ankara government. Following the example of
numerous businessmen and employees of foreign companies, many Greek
members of the liberal professions chose to practice their skills in more
congenial atmosphere in other countries.
Dismissals of Christians were by no means confined to these better paid
professions. Members of the working class were as severely hit. Thus, when
the postal services were nationalized non-Muslims and foreigners were pre-
vented from carrying on their professions, such as pilotage, ship chandling
and diving. Further, the general anti-left drive in Turkey also affected the
active Greek trade unions in the city. Non-Muslim labour leaders like Serafim
Maximos, Nicholas Asimakopoulos, !lias Zacharias and Ronald Gensberg
fled to Greece and the United States. Thus, the Constantinopolitan Greek
trade union 'Evwalc,;), founded by Maximos and his associates
in 1920, was doomed to oblivion.13
3. The question of the etablis.
Meanwhile, the inability of Greece and Turkey to solve all outstanding
issues arising from the exchange of populations prolonged the strained rela-
tions between the two governments. Amongst these unresolved matters the
interpretation of article 2 of the exchange of population convention, signed in
I!. LN/C. 13 L 1925. VII, 6 March 1925.
12. LN/C.135. 1925. VII, 6 March 1925.
13. In !925 an end was put to all socialist and trade union activities in Turkey. On the
in the.Otto.man working-class movement see G.S. Harris, The Origins
of COllllllUfllsm III Turkey, CalIfornia 1967, pp. 105, 118-19, 125; M. Tuncay, Turkiye'de Sol
Aklmlar 1908-1925. Ankara 1967. pp, 155 f.
112
Lausanne on 30 January 1923, provided a potent source of conflict. Article 2
defined the categories of Greeks who were recognized as established in
Constantinople.l As Greek and Turkish interpretations of this article dif-
fered widely a sharp divergence of views between Athens and Ankara de-
veloped leading to prolonged negotiations lasting until 1930.
There is little doubt that those who drafted the clauses of the treaty
intended to exclude from the exchange all Greek residents settled in the city
before 30 October 1918. From the statement made by the chief Turkish
mediator ismet inonii during the Lausanne negotiations, it is quite clear that
the Turks also agreed with that position. The formula, however, employed in
the final draft of the treaty quoted the categories of Constantinopolitan
Greeks who were entitled to remain in Turkey, rather than, as it was origi-
nally intended, to specify the groups of Greeks who would have to depart.
This inverted formula created ambiguity.
2
Wishing to reduce to a minimum
the number of non-exchangeable Greeks, the Turks reopened the issue as
soon as the mixed commission was convened in October 1923.
3
In a
memorandum forwarded to this commission in August 1924 the Turks main-
tained that the term established (in the French .text etablis) could only
apply to Greeks registered as citizens of Stamboul with the civil authorities,
under the Ottoman law of domicile of 1914.4 In this way the Turks attempted
to define the term etablis as being equivalent to domicile. As registration
was not an essential condition for residence in the pre-1923 period and only a
small minority of Greeks had taken the trouble to register, this interpretation
would have added another large group of Constantinopolitan Greeks to the
category of exchangeables. Seeking to maintain the largest possible number
of Constantinopolitan Greeks, the Greek side contested vigorously the Tur-
kish definition. In a memorandum to the neutral members of the mixed
commission, the Greek delegation observed that, according to the stipUla-
tions of the exchange convention, the term etablis referred to any Greek
inhabitant registered on the record books of the municipality before 1918.
Again Greeks who had a fixed residence or exercised any trade or industry in
L See chapter III:3.
2. Cf. S. Seferiades, "L'echange des populations, Academie de Droit International, ReclIeil
des Cows, 4 (1928) 388-89,
3, Article 11 of the exchange of popUlations convention provided for the creation of a mixed
commission for the supervision of the exchange of populations and the liquidation of properties
of the exchanged. The commission consisted of four Turkish, four Greek and three neutral
members appointed by the League of Nations, for details see S. Ladas, The Exchange of
Minorities Bulgaria, Greece and Turkey, New York 1932, pp. 353-76.
4. Copies of Turkish and Greek memoranda to neutral members of the commission, Cons., 4
September 1924, FO 371/I0184/E7886,
113
the area prior to the signing of the Mudros armistice were to be considered as
etablis. S
Initially, the neutral members of the mixed commission appeared to have
favoured the Greek thesis. Soon, however, the Spanish member, General
Manrique de Lara shifted his position claiming that some new evidence, a law
on census, brought up by the Turks threw new light on the question. The
inconsistency of General de Lara on this and on several other issues not only
impeded the Greco-Turkish dialogue, but it also demonstrated the inability of
the neutral members to act decisively when there was a serious divergence of
opinion between the two interested sides. Criticizing the inconsistent and at
times biased approach of General de Lara, the British ambassador in Turkey,
Sir George Clerk stated that the Spanish general's patent incapacity would
delay the solution of the simplest problem. 6 Both the Turkish and Greek
delegations were not slow at taking advantage of such a weakness. Thus, the
Turkish delegate Tevfik R i i ~ t i i Aras declared during a press conference that
he regarded the commission incompetent to interpret the term eta b lis . He
then went on to threaten that the Turkish government was determined to
exchange all non-etablis Greeks regardless of the outcome of the discussions
at the commission.
7
By September 1924 negotiations at the mixed commission were
deadlocked.
s
In an attempt to find a way out of this impasse, the question of
the etablis was referred to the judicial subcommittee. On 1 October 1924, the
subcommittee advised that the registration under the law of domicile of 1914
should not constitute the only criterion of the intention to remain established
in istanbu1.
9
This pronouncement coincided largely with the Greek interpre-
tation. Dissatisfied with these developments Tevfik R i i ~ t i i Aras tendered his
resignation on 3 October, only to announce a week later that he was to resume
his duties as head of the Turkish delegation at the commission. 10 Meanwhile,
taking advantage of this state of affairs, the Turkish government proceeded to
arrest 4,452 Greeks whom it considered exchangeables and interned them
prior to deportation. This action was contrary to the terms of the exchange
convention, which specifically provided for the mixed commission to make
all the arrangements for the exchange of populations. The Turks justified
their action by pointing to the delay in the departure of a number of Greeks,
5. Ibid" Kaklamanos to Foreign Office, London, 24 October 1924, FO 371(10184(E869L
6. Turkey: Annual Report, 1927, FO 371(13096(E1149. See also Ladas, op. cit., pp. 360-63.
7. The Orient News, 6 September 1924.
8. The Orient News, 9 September 1924.
9. Text in LNO] (November 1924) 1676-78.
10. Ibid., pp. 167'2-73: Lindsay to MacDonald, Cons .. 16 October 1924, FO 371(10184(E9538.
114
whose exchangeability was unquestionably stipulated by the exchange con-
vention. 765 of those detained were clearly non-exchange abies having estab-
lished themselves in istanbul before 30 October 1918. The rest were ex-
changeable Greeks to whom the competent subcommittee had not yet deli-
vered the necessary passports. 11 The whole affair and the hardships endured
by those interned in the monastery of Ballkll (Ba}.oVldit) caused panic
among the Greeks in Constantinople .12
The Greek government appealed immediately to the League of N ations.
13
This appeal prompted the Turks to refrain from further arbitrary action. On
24 October, the Turkish delegation agreed to free all non-exchangeables and
to await the decision of the commission before it took measures against
persons whose exchange was in dispute. When the Council of the League of
Nations met to debate the developments in istanbul on 31 October the Greek
representative, Nicholas Politis, stated that although the immediate tension
between Greece and Turkey had been alleviated, a sharp divergence of
opinion continued to exist on the issue of the etablis. 14 The president of the
mixed commission, General de Lara, expressed surprise at the Greek action
of appealing directly to the League. Although a settlement over this question
was not as yet reached, he had no reason to believe that the Turkish govern-
ment had encroached upon the duties of the mixed commission. IS Given the
tensions and the sharp disagreement on the question of the etablis, M. de
Lara's contention was a gross underestimation of the serious deadlock faced
by the mixed commission. Encouraged by M. de Lara's declaration, Fethi
Okyar, the Turkish representative, responded by expressing Ankara's anxi-
ety over the wretched position of the Muslims in Greek Thrace. He
added that the Turks would welcome with lively satisfaction an enquiry on
the position of the Turks in Western Thrace as well as that of the Greeks in
Constantinople .16 Unwilling to commit itself, the Council communicated its
hope that the outstanding points would be settled by the commission. In the
event of another deadlock, the Council suggested the possibility of an appeal
to the Permanent Court of International Justice at the Hague.
17
1 L 18-22 October 1924. LNO] (November 1924) 1673.
12. Henderson to MacDonald, Cons., 18 October 1924, FO 371(10185(E9538.
13. Dendramis to League of Nations, LN(C. 614. 1924. VII, 22 October 1924 in LNO]
(November 1924) 1678; Politis to League of Nations, LN(C.645.1924. VII, 29 October 1924 in
LNO] (November 1924) 167273.
14. LNO] (November 1924) 1663.
15. Ibid" pp. 1666-67.
16. Ibid., pp. 1665-66.
17. Ibid., pp. 1669-70. According to a minute by Osborne, a member of the Eastern Dept. of the
115
i
!
But the mixed commission proved once again unable to tackle the thorny
issue of the erablis and on 16 November 1924, had no choice but to ask the
Court at the Hague for an advisory opinion on the interpretation of the term
erablis .18 Meanwhile, the Turkish authorities promised to refrain from taking
measures against the Constantinopolitan Greeks. On 13 December 1924, the
Council of the League of Nations, at the request of the mixed commission,
decided to ask the Permanent Court to pronounce an advisory opinion on the
question of the erab/is > 19
On 21 February 1925, the Permanent Court of International Justice an-
nounced its opinion regarding this issue:
2o
1. That the purpose of the word established in Article 2 of the
Convention of Lausanne of January 30th, 1923, regarding the exchange
of Greek and Turkish populations, is to indicate the condition in point
of time and place on which depends the liability to exchange Greek and
Moslem who respectively inhabit Constantinople and Western Thrace;
that this refers to a situation of fact constituted, in the case of the
persons in question be residence of a lasting nature;
2. That, in order that the persons referred to in Article 2 of the Conven-
tion of Lausanne as Greek inhabitants of Constantinople under the
terms of the Convention and exempted from the compulsory exchange,
they must reside within the boundaries of the Prefecture of the City of
Constantinople, as defined by the law of 1912; have arrived there, no
matter whence they came, at some date previous to October 30, 1918,
and have had, prior to that date the intention of residing there for an
extended period.
The Court had favoured the Greek view, for it opined that the whole matter
was one of international law and that questions of national legislation had no
bearing on the interpretation of the exchange convention of30 January 1923.
It did not, however, attempt to give an exact definition of the stability of
residence which determined establishment. Finally, it reassured the Tur-
Foreign Office, the Council did not directly advance a settlement, since they only passed the
buck back to the Commission. 31 October 1924, FO 371/10185/E9489.
IK Lindsay to Foreign Office, Cons>, 16 November 1924, FO 371/10185/E11277;
LN/C.694> 1924>1, 16 November 1924.
19. Greek memoranda on the Muslim minority of Thrace (5 December 1924) and on that of
Constantinople (10 December 1924). Also a Turkish document dealing mainly with the Turks in
Thrace, LN/C .774.1924.1 in LNGJ (February 1925) 155-56, 283>
20. Publication a/the Permanent Court a/International Justice, Series B, 21 February 1925>
Collection of Advisory Opinions no. 10, Exchange of Greek and Turkish Populations, pp>
25-26.
116
kish government that the mixed commission derived its authority from an
international agreement and in no way constituted an infringement on Tur-
kish sovereignty.21 In order to avoid upsetting Turkish susceptibilities, the
Court did not also give an opinion on the exchangeability of the senior clerics
of the Ecumenical Patriarchate. 22
Since the opinion of the Court was acceptable to both parties, negotiations
at the mixed commission proceeded with greater smoothness. The immediate
reaction to the Court ruling in Athens and in the Greek circles in istanbul was
one of relief. The dispute had intensified Greek suspicions that the Turks
simply employed the erablis question as a pretext to achieve the complete
exchange of Constantinopolitan Greeks and Thracian Muslims.
23
Such a
prospect was an anathema to Greece for the Greek mainland, saturated with
Ottoman Greeks, was unable to absorb more urban refugees.
4. The dispute over the non-exchangeable Greeks absent from istanbul>
While the Turks agreed to resolve the question oftheerablis at the negotiat-
ing table and to refrain from unilateral action at the expense of the Constan-
tinopolitan Greeks, the controversy over the status of the Greek population
continued down to the year of 1930. Another knotty problem confronting
Greek and Turkish mediators was the future of about 30-40,000 Constan-
tinopolitan Greeks and their property. Although they fulfilled the conditions
of article 2 of the exchange convention, these Greeks had fled istanbul during
the panic of September/October 1922. After the establishment of political
stability in Turkey these absent non-exchangeable Greeks wished to return to
istanbul and regain their abandoned property. Further, by the provisions of
article 16 of the exchange convention Greeks established in the city in
October 1918, but who departed thereafter, were free to return. Non-
exchangeable absent Constantinopolitan Greeks could also benefit from the
provisions of the amnesty convention signed at Lausanne.
1
The Turkish government, however, was at no time willing to consent to the
return of absent Greeks unless they were in possession of passports issued by
the Turkish republic (proclaimed on 29 October 1923). These Greeks, the
Turkish government maintained, were undesirables for they had demon-
strated their antipathy towards the new regime by fleeing rather than welcom-
ing the nationalist order of modem Turkey. As a result, they were considered
2L Ibid., pp. 20-22.
22. See chapter V:4>
23. Cheetham to Foreign Office, Athens, 29 October 1924, FO 371/10185/E9739.
L See chapter IlI:4.
117
"
"
I
I
as having forfeited their right to Turkish citizenship. In addition, they com-
prised the wealthier and more articulate section of the Greek population in
istanbul. By obstructing their return, the Turks not only freed themselves of
many prominent members of the community but they also delivered a severe
blow to the economic power of the Constantinopolitan Greek community.
The property of the absent Greeks, estimated at between 200,000 and
400,000 sterling, were at first simply registered by the authorities.
2
But after
the enforcement of the abandoned property law of 20 April 1922 in istanbul,
the Turks began to confiscate it. The seizure of such abandoned properties
alarmed the Constantinopolitan Greek community and Patriarch Meletios
Metaxakis addressed protest letters to the Allied high commissioners. After
expressing his indignation Meletios compared the law to the acts of the
Bolchevico-Communisme de Moscou.3 The confiscations were intensified
when Ankara passed a more detailed law on 23 April 1923. The new legis-
lation hit particularly hard the absent Greeks, for it provided for the confis-
cation of property transferTed by owners immediately before their
departure.-l Before leaving their homes the absent Greeks had invariably
authorized a relative or a friend to take care of their possessions. By the end
of 1924 the more valuable properties of the absent and Hellene had
been largely distributed amongst ministers and notables of whom Ismet
Pasha is one.
5
More modest accomodation was used for housing the incom-
ing exchangeable Muslims from Greece.
It appears that 50 out of approximately 250 properties belonging to non-
exchangeable absent Greeks were of considerable value. These were:
6
a. The Leonidas Zariphis property next to the British Embassy at
Galatasaray (ITaVpoJp0J11r
b. The Chatzopoulo commercial house (han) in Stamboul (Mahmut-

c. The Siniosoglou property; a block of newly built apartments at Grand
Rue de Pera (istiklc11 Caddesi), including the Kallivrousi commercial
house initially valued at 207,856 TL.
d. Shares of Alexander Siniosoglou in six large business concerns. He also
owned the stadium of Taksim .
2, Anninos to Foreign Ministry, Cons., 28 December 1922 and 4 January 1923, YE/A/5VI.
3. Meletios to Henderson, Cons., 7 January 1923, FO 371/9128/E630; Meletios to Venizelos,
Cons., 8 January 1923, YE/A/5VL
4. Text of the law in FO 371/9128/E4676. Also Henderson to Curzon, Cons., 30 April 1923, FO
371/9128/E4313.
5. Lindsay to MacDonald, Cons., 8 October 1924, FO 371/10172/E8863.
6. Sakellaropoulos to Foreign Ministry, Cons" 28 October 1928, YE/A/5VI.
118
e. A block of flats at Pera which was bought by Hamit Kadirzade for
252,203 TL in February 1926.
f. Property of the Iliaskou family, particularly a private house in the island
of Chalki (Heybeli) which was donated to ismet inonii.
g. A block of flats at Grand Rue de Pera (istiklc11 Caddesi) owned by
Tsaousoglou.
h. The Sismanoglou property.
j. Pera Palas hotel, the most luxurious hotel in istanbul.
k. The Olivo Pasaj with all its offices and shops as well as the Stamboul
han at Sultanhamam, both owned by Xanthopoulos.
1. Property of the Portokaloglou family.
m. Company shares and property of Alexander Kioseoglou.
In Greece, the condition of the majority of the non-exchangeable absent
Greeks became intolerable. For instance, the eminent publisher of the oldest
newspaper in istanbul, Neo},oyoC; (founded in 1866), Stavros Voutyras died
penniless in Athens in 1923. Unable to receive any revenue from their
property in istanbul, the absent Greeks found inadequate accomodation in
the refugee districts of Athens. Because the Greek government treated them
as temporary political exiles rather than permanent immigrants, they were
unable to even benefit from the various resettlement schemes. Meanwhile,
realising that Greece might be forced to sign away their rights for the sake of
an .overall agreement with Turkey, they organized themselves into a rela-
tively powerful pressure group. They then strove to publicize their cause.
Accordingly, in a meeting held at the Athenian theatre Kvpt}'lJ on 12 April
1925, the absent Greeks reiterated their desire to return to istanbul and urged
the Greek government to refrain from signing away their legitimate rights.
The meeting made a considerable impact for it was attended by 1,200 absent
Greeks. Calling itself the Commission Executive chargee de la defense des
Grecs, sujets turcs, etablis a Constantinople et sejournant provisoirement en
Grece, it addressed lengthy memoranda to the League of Nations and the
mixed commission requesting assistance for their claims.7 In an attempt to
convey the wishes of the committee to the League of Nations, Paul
Karatheodoris, former patriarchal counsellor and now a leading absent
Greek, was despatched to Switzerland in October 1925.
8
Yet, the Turkish
determination to prevent the return of the non-exchangeable Greeks absent
7, Copies of four such memoranda addressed to the League and dated on I June, 14 July, 20
August 1925 and 18 March 1926 in FO 371/10865jE4857, FO 371/10860/E6294 and
LN/CA02.1926.I.
8, Letter of Karatheodoris to Foreign Office forwarded by Cambell, 23 October 1925, FO
371/10860/E6385.
119
from istanbul did not waver. In addition on 23 May 1927 the Turkish assem-
bly authorized that:
9
those Ottoman subjects who did not take part in the national struggle
and remained outside Turkey during the War of Independence and
have not returned to Turkish territory during the period between July
24, 1923 and the promulgation of the present law, be deprived of
Turkish nationality.
5. Turkish grievances about the treatment of Muslims in Greek Thrace.
The Turks, too, accused the Greeks of violating article 16 of the exchange
convention. As noted earlier, on 31 October 1924, Fethi Okyar took the
opportunity to draw the attention of the Council of the League of Nations to
the non-exchangeable Muslims in Greek Thrace. More than 50,000 Turks in
Western Thrace, the Turkish representative asserted, whose property has
been confiscated by the Greek Government, are not able to resume pos-
session of their property and are in a state of lamentable destitution.1 This
was followed up by demands of the Turkish press that retaliatory action be
taken against Constantinopolitan Greeks for the illegal behaviour of the
Greeks in Greek Thrace.
In this the Turkish side had a legitimate grievance. Destitute and homeless
refugees from Eastern Thrace had crossed the Maritza river in the autumn of
1922 and found refuge in Greek Thrace. While freely seizing property and
livestock, the refugees set up villages on lands owned by Thracian Muslims.
2
Although local Greek homes and property were also requisitioned for the
same purpose, the impact of these intrusions on the Muslim community was
far greater. Forced sharing of habitations was particularly resented by the
Thracian Muslims, a deeply religious community. Because oftheir religious
and family traditions, the Muslim home was quite unsuitable for the dwelling
together of people of different religions. Further, given the national hatred
and animosities aroused by the war and by the personal misfortunes of the
refugees, no friendly and peaceful cohabitation could have existed between
the local Muslims and the dispossessed refugees from Turkey. Forced
cohabitation, therefore, was such a serious inconvenience that there was a
disposition among the Thracian Muslims to leave their region and go to
Turkey. There was also a basic psychological factor at work. With the arrival
9. See CA. Macartney, National States and National Minorities. London 1934, p. 392.
L LNO] (November 1924) 1666.
2. Memorandum of the president of the Thrace subcommittee, Tchazman (Komotini) to the
president of the mixed commission (Cons .. ). 5 November 1924. YEjA.
120
of tens of thousands of Greek refugees in the region, the hitherto dominant
Muslim element of Greek Thrace was now reduced to a mere minority.3
While admitting that the situation was far from satisfactory, the Greek
government pointed out that Greek Thrace was the first region on the way of
the refugees coming by land Turkey. Since Macedonia was filled with re-
fugees from Anatolia, the refugees coming by land were retained in Greek
Thrace until Macedonia was cleared. The measures taken in Greek Thrace,
Athens reassured. affected all natives. Greeks and Muslims alike. Finally, the
Greek government promised to pay indemnity for the requisitions and seiz-
ures of Muslim property. Accordingly. the evacuation of Muslim property
began in 1924. In a telegram dated 10 February 1924, Greek Prime Minister
George Kaphandaris communicated to the governor ofThrace the decision of
the government to transfer gradually 40,000 out of the 100,000 refugees of
Greek Thrace to other parts of Greece. Concurrently with this gradual
evacuation, the government intended to purchase large Muslim properties for
the settlement of the remaining refugees.'; As George Roussos, the Greek
foreign minister, revealed on 29 November 1924, 16,000 refugees were re-
moved from Greek Thrace.
5
Likewise. the government began to return
seized properties to their Thracian Muslim owners.1> Conditions had some-
what improved by April 1925. when the neutral members of the mixed
commission carried out a thorough investigation in Greek Thrace. Thus, out
of 13.833 rooms seized in 1922 only 5,927 were still under the occupation of
the refugees. From the 127 requisitioned schools and mosques 85 were
returned to the Muslim community, while the occupied area of land was
reduced from 100,153 stremmata to 22.159.
7
This improvement was brought
about by the construction of new dwellings for the refugees, erected on land
expropriated from the natives of Greek Thrace, including Muslims. Accord-
ing to the findings of this inquiry a total of 6,506 houses were either con-
structed or were in the process of construction, on land of which 1896
stremmata had been expropriated for this purpose from Muslims. The pay-
ment of indemnities on these expropriations was in progress. Large rural
3. The results of an extensive inquiry carried out in Western Thrace (MarchjApriI1925) by the
neutral members of the mixed commission were outlined in a memorandum by M. de Lara
entitled Minorite Turque en Thrace Occidentale, 28 May 1925, YEjA.
4. Kaphandaris to Kourtidis, Athens, 10 February 1925, YEjA
5. Roussos to Greek Consulate in Cons., 29 November 1924, YEjA.
6. Kourtidis (Komotini) to Greek delegation at the mixed commission (Cons.), 19 November
1924, YEjA; Report by the department of colonisation, Komotini, no. 128212, nd., and
memorandum entitled Assistance to the Muslims, Didymoteichon, 16 October 1924, YEjA
7. A stremma is equivalent to about a quarter of an acre. Only lands of small rural properties
included in this figure. Large estates are excluded.
121
estates comprising land of an area above 300 stremmata, and aban-
doned properties were also occupied by the government. An area of 204,331
streml7lata from a total of 467, 191 (or about 11/25) classified as large rural
estates were occupied. Moreover, an area of 82,392 stremmata of small
properties was also seized as abandoned property.8 Another report drawn by
a similar team of investigation in November 1928 indicated a decisive im-
provement of the lot of the Thracian Muslims. Gradually permanent settle-
ment was provided for 17,000 refugees families in 208 villages. Of these only
53 villages were constructed on land partially evacuated by its Muslim
farmers.
Y
If the occupation of houses and small properties had come almost to an end,
Turkish discontent with the treatment of their minority in Greek Thrace
continued. The Turkish press launched an intensive campaign against the
Greek treatment of the Muslim minority in Greek Thrace.
lo
Relations be-
tween Greece and Turkey reached a low ebb when, during the enquiry carried
on by the mixed commission in Greek Thrace in November 1928, the Turkish
member. Cemal Hiisnii, claimed to have discovered grave irTegularities in the
treatment of Muslims. He informed journalists attending the commission on
its tour that he heard of a Turkish boy who was refused schooling by the
Muslim school committee because he wore a hat instead of the traditional fez.
From this, the Turkish representative deduced that the Greek authorities
favoured the conservative element in the community, which was opposed to
the secular ['efomls introduced by the Ankara regime.
11
The Greek side
strongly objected to the attitude of the Turkish delegate accusing him of
deliberately trying to prejudice relations between the two countries. His
indignation, the Greeks assessed, was not due to the maltreatment of this
minority but rather to the marked indifference of Thracian Muslims to the
innovations introduced by the nationalists in Turkey. Their favouring of the
fez and their ignorance of the new Latin alphabet was, according to the
Greeks, the result of the inherent religious conservatism of the Thracian
Muslim community.12
8. Minorite Turque en Thrace Occidentale drawn by M. de Lara on behalf of the neutral
members of the mixed commission, 28 May 1925, YE/A.
9. Special report by Holstad to the mixed commission, 17 November 1928, YE/A. By May
1927, only for the purchase of 47 large estates the Greek government paid to Muslim owners
45,042,915 drachmas, see Ladas, op. cit., p. 520.
10. Cumhuriyet, 5 July 1928; Milliyet, 19 January and 13 November 1928, press cuttings in
YE/B/37.
1 L Clerk to Chamberlain, Ankara, 29 November 1928, FO 371/I3097/E5859; Ladas, op. cit.,
pp.494-95.
12. Loraine to Chamberlain, Athens, 27 November 1928, FO 371/13085/E5868.
122
Nor did the neutral members of the inquiry share the misgivings of the
Turkish delegate,13 Indeed, there is no concrete evidence to suggest that the
Greek government tried to destabilize its Muslim minority. Such an action
would have clearly been against Greek interests, for Greece was quite vul-
nerable on the issue of minorities. If Greece attempted to use its Muslim
minority as a bargaining tool, the Turks might have retaliated by expelling the
prosperous Constantinopolitan Greek community en masse. Nor the re-
ciprocal expUlsion of the Muslim farmers of Greece would have remedied the
situation. Turkey had all along welcomed the exchange of the entire Greek
minority in return for the Muslim farmers of Thrace. Such a population would
have been absorbed easily in sparsely populated Anatolia. In Greece, how-
ever. the arrival of about 120,000 urban refugees from istanbul would have
meant chaos. As a result, the Greek government tried to appease its Muslim
minority. Three fl1lijlis (Xanthi, Komotini and Didymoteichon) continued to
be responsible for the administration of the community and govern it through
the Islamic law. These were nominated by the leadership of the Muslim
community and were paid a salary by the Greek government. Three Muslim
deputies were elected to the Greek parliament and in 1927. there were 15
Muslim mayors ((jllpaplol). 5 assistant-mayors (nap8(jpol) and 175 local
councillors. By 1928. the National Bank of Greece had advanced large sums
of money as loans to the Muslim farmers.
14
Similar assistance was made
available in the educational field. Thus, in 1929- 30, the Greek government
forwarded 4,489.000 drachmas for the maintenance of Muslim religious,
educational. and cultural institutions.
ls
Nor did the authorities interfere in the
administration of the Muslim/Turkish schools. From 305 such schools in
Thrace only 28 included Greek language courses in their curriculum during
the academic year of 1928-29. Cultural organizations with strong Kemalist
leanings. as the Turkish Youth Hearth (Tiirk Genr;lik YlIrdll) , were also
tolerated. I (, While the anti- Kemalist Muslim Thracians were on the whole
satisfied with the Greek administration a small but vociferous group of
Panturkists pressed for the turkification of the ethnologically heterogeneous
minority. Perhaps the most tangible proof of an improvement in conditions
was the actual increase of the Muslim population of Thrace during the 1920s.
13. Special report by Holstad to the Mixed commission. 17 November 1928. YE/A.
14. Comparative examination of the application of the minority clauses of the Lausanne
treaty in Greece and Turkey, memorandum produced by the Greek Foreign Ministry for
Venizelos, 1930, BMAEVj58.
15. Ibid.
16. Ibid.
123
Thus, while there were 86,793 Muslim during an interallied census of 30
March 1920,17 this had reached to 126,017 at the official Greek census of
1928.
18
To the Turks, however, such measures were inadequate. Responding to
the expropriations of 1922-23 in Greek Thrace, the Turkish government
retaliated by seizing Hellenic and abandoned property in istanbul. Such
requisitions and counter-requisitions were frequent in the post-Lausanne
period. As a result the position of both minorities was made precarious by the
persistently strained Greek-Turkish relations. Difficulties over the treatment
of the minorities were of such a serious nature as to cause both parties to
appeal repeatedly to the League of Nations.
19
In turn, by debating the
minority question in an inernational forum and by undertaking inquiries in
istanbul and Greek Thrace, the League provided a safety-valve for the
growing ill-feeling in both countries.
6. Greek-Turkish negotiations and the agreements of 1925-26.
The strained relations between Greece and Turkey during 1924- 25 were in
part due to the instability of both governments concerned. A series of some-
what ineffective republican governments in Athens were unable to corne to an
17. This was the first scientific census of the area taken by the interallied authorities who
governed Thrace in 1919-20, The division of the population was as follows:
Turks (Muslims) , , , .. , 0 , , 0 , , .. , ' , . 73,220
Bulgarians 0' .. "., .... , .. 0 , , , , , .. 69,154
Greeks "" .... " ...... ,'," 0 ... , 51,706
Pomaks (Muslims) . 0 ..... '" 0 0 .. 0' 11,739
Jews ",000.' 0 0 , , . , 0 , , .. , . 0 , , . 0 , 3,000
Armenians, .. , ..... ". 0 ... "', 0" 1,969
Gypsies (Muslims) , " , , , , , '0,00", 1,834
Total 0, ,. ,0" "'00,0 '0'0."" ", 212.622
For details about this census see D. Mitrany, The Effects of the War in South Eastern Europe,
Yale 1936. pp. 224-26.
18. This figure includes the whole Muslim population of Greece. But since the exchange of
populations the overwhelming majority of the Hellenic Muslims (with the exception of some
25.000 Albanian Muslims in Epirus) lived in Thrace. For the 1928 census see Statistical results of
the population census of Greece conducted in 15116 May 1928, Athens 1935. table II, p. 246 ff.
19. Memorandum by the Greek government to the General-Secretary of the League ofN ations
on the situation of the minority of Turkish race in Western Thrace 5 March 1925,
LN/C.130, 1925. VII, and on the situation of the Greek minority at Constantinople, 6 March 1925,
LN IC. 131, 1925. VII Two corresponding memoranda communicated by the Turkish government
to the League of Nations on6 March 1925, LN/C.134.1925.VII and LN/C, 135, 19250 VII. On the
expulsion of Patriarch Constantine and the Greek appeal to the League see chapter V:4.
124
agreement with Ankara on the sensitive outstanding Greek-Turkish ques-
tions. In Ankara, on the other hand, the government of liberal Fethi Okyar,
supported by the newly formed Progressive Republican Party (Terakkiperver
ClIInlzuriyet Firkasi), faced strong Kemalist pressure. To strengthen his
position in the assembly, Fethi Okyar took a number of anti-foreign
The suppression of the Orient News, an anglophone newspaper of
Istanbul, was one instance; another and more important one was the expul-
sion of the patriarch from Turkey on 30 January 1925. 1 But both the Fethi
Okyar government and the opposition party were short-lived and on 3 March
1925, ismet inonu returned to power. The new Turkish government adopted
a less instransigent attitude towards Greece. The end of political isolation,
the Kurdish revolts, the problem of internal reform, and the general senti-
ment that the western world and the League were hostile to Turkish interests
especially in Mosul and iskenderun (Alexandretta) were factors which
tributed to this new attitude;:!
Faced with constitutional and economic difficulties, the government of
Andreas Michalakopoulos welcomed the new Turkish attitude. An im-
provement in political relations was reported by the Greek charge d'affaires
in Ankara, John Politis in late March 1925.
3
By early April 1925 negotiations
were resumed and were successfully concluded on 21 June 1925, when
George Exindaris and Hamdi, presidents of the Greek and Turkish del-
egations to the mixed commission respectively, signed the Ankara accord.
This agreement attempted to solve the intractable financial and legal ques-
tions arising from the exchange of more than 1.500,000 The second
section of the agreement dealt specifically witl) the interpretation of articles 2
and 16 of the exchange convention. It dealt with the status and property of
non-exchangeable Greeks with Turkish nationality and Muslims of Greek
Thrace with Hellenic nationality. Under the terms of the agreement the Turks
recognized as etablis all the Greeks present in Constantinople prior to
October 30, 1918 and now present there, without any examination into the
intention of permanence of residence. E.'tablis both Greeks and Turks should
b: free to return to their homes in istanbul and Greek Thrace respectively,
WIth the exception of those who left these localities without regular pass-
ports. Such persons had the right to dispose freely of their property. Where
actual restitution was impossible, fair compensation was to be paid by the
I. For a detailed analysis see chapter V.
2. See Psomiades, Eastern Question, pp. 102-103.
3. Lindsay to Chamberlain, Cons., 23 March 1925, FO 371/10868/E1927.
4. For a detailed analysis of the financial stipUlations of the Exindaris-Hamdi agreement see
Ladas, op.cit., pp. 506-07.
125
government in whole territory the properties were situated. Greece, there-
fore. was not required to evacuate Greek refugees settled on Muslim property
in Thrace. so long as the recognized minority rights of Muslims there were
upheld. These provisions of the agreement were advantageous to the Greek
side. In return, however, Greece had to make a major concession over the
issue of non-exchangeable absent Greeks. Article 4 of the Ankara accord
stated that:
5
the Greek and Turkish governments have the power respectively to
refuse the right of return to absent persons who had left the country
without a regular passport, respectively Greek or Turkish.
Despite the reciprocal character of the clause, it was intended to restrict the
return of 30-40,000 non-exchangeable Greeks who had left istanbul without
regular Turkish passports, Persons in this category, however, were permitted
to liquidate their estates in istanbul through agents within a fixed period of
four years. Quite clearly the major beneficiary of the accord were the Con-
stantinopolitan Greeks with Turkish nationality and Thracian Muslims with
Hellenic nationality, who were allowed to remain undisturbed in their re-
spective districts with full property rights,
The Ankara accord was hailed as the beginning of a new era of close
political co-operation between Ankara and Athens. In the following month
Greece and Turkey exchanged ministers, establishing normal relations for
the first time since the Balkan wars of 1912-13. Despite the willingness ofthe
two governments to establish cordial relations, the Ankara accord was never
put into effect. At first the neutral members of the mixed commission refused
to endorse the draft agreement signed at Ankara. This was because the new
provisions, and especially the restrictions imposed on the rights ofthe absent
non-exchangeable Greeks, were in disagreement with the exchange conven-
tion. The attitude of the mixed commission was to a large extent the result of
pressure exerted by the commission executive chargee de la defense des
Crees, slIjets tllres, etablis d Constantinople et sejollrnant provisoirement
en Crece, More significantly. despite their willingness to establish full
diplomatic relations, both governments had some misgivings about the stipu-
lations of the agreement. In the hope of achieving better terms, they appeared
ready to renegotiate.
6
In addition, the fall of the democratically elected
Michalakopoulos government and the establishment of a military dictator-
ship put an end to the diplomatic work done during March-June 1925. Greek
dictator, General Pangalos came to power on 25 June 1925, four days after the
5.lbid .. pp, 507-08.517.
6 .. Politis to Rentis, Cons .. 24 September 1925 and Politis to Roufos, Cons .. 16 March 1926.
both in BMAIP/228/14.
1 ~ 6
signing of the Ankara accord. He refused to take positive action and practi-
cally ignored Turkey, failing to send instructions to Pericles Argyropoulos,
the Greek representative in Turkey, He prolonged the ratification of the
Ankara accord to such an extent that the Turks asked for renegotiations.
7
The spirit of conciliation achieved during the Michalakopoulos govern-
ment was further undermined by the revanchist and undiplomatic speeches of
Pangalos. Aspiring to occupy Eastern Thrace and istanbul, he strove to find
ways of allying himself with Britain and Italy, who both had outstanding
questions with Turkey at that time.
s
His ill-conceived overtures, however,
produced no benefit to Greece. With the settlement of the Mosul question,
the British sought stability in the Near and Middle East. 9 Considering that the
foreign policy objectives of Pangalos would have a destabilizing effect in the
area, the Foreign Office now frowned at Pangalos. Nor did the Greek dictator
score a lasting understanding with Rome. 10 Consequently, the ensuing Greek
political isolation turned his outworn objectives into embarrassing phantoms
that stalked the brief remainder of his term in office. Hardly equipped to deal
with questions of diplomacy, Pangalos, a man of small political and moral
stature, managed to antagonize most of Greece' s Balkan neighbours, giving
the impression of pursuing a revisionist policy.
The dictator's public provocations created new psychological barriers
against any meaningful dialogue with Turkey. In the light of decades of
territorial wranglings between the two countries, a prompt Turkish reaction
was inevitable. Accusing Pangalos of harbouring revisionist designs against
Turkey. Ankara moved troops to the Thracian frontier. Similarly, at the
negotiating table, the Turks shattered the glassy cordiality achieved in June
1925 by making new and intractable demands, At the same time, the Turks
launched a new wave of confiscations of abandoned Greek property in
istanbul. On 12 March 1926, the Turkish assembly passed a law stipUlating
that immovable property of non-exchangeable persons, seized by the auth-
orities as abandoned, should pass to the full ownership of refugees housed in
them since 1923. Incidently, it was during this period that the authorities
seized and removed to Ankara the famous library of the Greek literary society
(E)i.lll'IKO:;; <Pli,oi.o}'lKO; Lvi.i.ol'o:'; Kwvuravrzvoun6i.ew;) with all its valuable
7, H.I. Psomiades, "The diplomacy of Theodoros Pangalos, 1925-1926, BS 13 (1972) 7.
8, Ibid., pp, 11-2-
9. The Council of the League of Nations decided to attach the disputed Mosul to Iraq on 16
December 1925, This persuaded the Turks to conclude a treaty with Great Britain and Iraq on 5
June 1926 accepting the League's decision,
10. A Kyrou, 'Owpa Kai npaj'f.1aTlKoT'lre:;. Athens 1972, pp. 73-74,
127
collections of manuscripts. archives and books. Thus, Pangalos' irrational
approach to Greek-Turkish problems not only proved an obstacle to a fruitful
dialogue between the two countries but also harmed considerably the Greek
financial interests in Turkey.11
Meaningful negotiations between the two governments began only after the
fall of the Pangalos dictatorship in August 1926. Finally, on 1 December 1926,
an agreement was signed in Athens by Pericles Argyropoulos and
Sara<;:oglu for Greece and Turkey respectively. It was ratified in February
1927 and ratifications were exchanged in Athens on 23 June 1927.
12
The first
part of the Athens accord dealt with the thorny question of properties in
Greece owned by Muslims who were not subject to the terms of the exchange
convention, and who had left Greece before 12 October 1912, or who had
always resided outside Greece. By signing the Declaration Relating to
Moslem Properties in Greece at Lausanne on 24 July 1923, the Greeks
accorded to these Muslims complete freedom as regards the disposition of
their property.13 Now with the Argyropoulos-Sara<;:oglu agreement, the
terms of the 1923 declaration were redefined and expanded. It included as
beneficiaries not only the Muslims and Greeks who had left Greek and
Turkish territory before 18 October 1912, or who had resided all the time
outside of the two states, but also Greek and Turkish subjects owning
property in Turkey and Greece whose nationality was not changed as a result
of the exchange convention. Such properties were to be purchased by each
government on agreed conditions of valuation and then balance accounts.
The Greek government conceded to earmark 500,000 to cover at least part of
its anticipated debit. All Muslim properties in Greek Thrace and urban
properties in the rest of Greece, and all Hellenic and
properties in istanbul were exempted from the new arrangement. PropertIes
included in such categories were to be restored to their owners within a month
of the enforcement of the Athens agreement.
Undoubtedly, the Athens accord was less favourable to Greece the
one concluded a year earlier in Ankara. In contrast, Turkey emerged WIth the
lion's share, since it was almost inconceivable that the property of some
400,000 Hellene Muslims should be worth 500,000 more than the property
of about 1,500,000 prosperous Anatolian and Thracian Greeks. Greece
seemed on the whole prepared to accept these rather unfavourable terms in
11. P. Argyropoulos, 'ArrojJ.I''ljJ.ovevjJ.ara, Athens 1970, pp. 359-60.
12. Original text in LNTS lxviii/pp. 12-34; Ladas, op.cit .. pp. 799-S16.
13. It was also known as Declaration IX, for details see Psomiades, Eastern Question, pp.
TJ.SL
128
return for the settlement of the emotive issue of the etablis. As a result, article
2 of the Athens agreement confirmed the definition of the term etablis agreed
upon in the unratified Ankara accord of June 1925. Summerizing the Greek
considerations, the British ambassador in Turkey, Sir George Clerk, exp-
lained that the Greek delegation made special sacrifices to secure the
maintenance of the protocol of 1925. He then went on to disclosed that
according to his calculations 35,000 Constantinopolitan Greeks were to be-
nefit from the settlement of the etablis problem. 14
7. Prolonged Greek-Turkish negotiations.
Despite the initial goodwill of both governments which followed the over-
throw of Pangalos, the property question was so hopelessly entangled that
there was little progress in the execution of the Athens accord throughout
1927 and 1928. The evaluation of properties which were to be acquired by the
two governments proved a matter of immense complication. The Greek
government contended that the value of land in Greece, where land was
scarce and labour plentiful, was greater than in Turkey, where land was
plentiful and labour scarce.
l
Recriminations over the appraisal, liquidation
and restoration of properties blocked any meaningful progress in the ex-
ecution of the Athens agreement. Pressured by powerful refugee organiza-
tions. the democratically-elected coalition government of Athens refused to
restore the properties of 119 Turkish claimants who were recognized as
non-exchangeables by the mixed commission.
2
As it might have been ex-
pected, the Turkish government retaliated with further confiscations of
Greek property in istanbul. Nor did the Turks show any genuine interest in
restoring Hellenic and abandoned non-exchangeable Greek property in
istanbul.
the mixed commission reopened the whole issue of the etablis. This was
brought about, when M. de Lara tried to disregard the text agreed upon in the
Ankara accord of 21 June 1925. As previously remarked, the definition given
to the term etablis in the Ankara accord was later on confirmed by the Athens
agreement. A decision taken by the mixed commission on 19 March 1927
stipulated that all Greeks present in the city were to be considered as etablis
within the meaning of article 2 of the exchange convention, provided that they
14. Clerk to Chamberlain, Cons., IS February 1927, FO 371/12318/E988. See also Ladas, op.
cit., pp. 4OS-IL
1. Clerk to Chamberlain, Cons., IO May and 21 June 1925 in FO 371/13085/E2547 and FO
371/13096/E3223 respectively.
2. Ibid. This intransigence was later char'acterized by Venizelos as a serious political
mistake. see Le Messager d'Athelles. IS and 19 June 1930.
129
were there before 30 October 1918. Their establishment there prior to that
date can be proven by any means of evidence. Thus, with this decision, the
mixed commission endorsed the broad definition of the term etablis bestowed
by the Ankara accord.
3
Despite these explicit provisions, General de Lara
on 16 June 1927. continued to claim that Greek presence in istanbul before
October 1918 could at best be regarded as a presumption in favour of their
intention to establish themselves in that city and not necessarily as a proof of
their right to be included in the etablis category.4 Taking advantage of the
confusion aroused by the Spanish General's statements, the Turks hinted
that they might expel 20.000 Constantinopolitan Greeks because they could
not prove their intention of establishment. The Greek government im-
mediately warned the Turks against the <<indiscriminate and unjust expul-
sion of the Greeks from the city.
5
Such animosities obstructed the work of the
mixed commission and by January 1928 only 20.000 cases of native Constan-
tinopolitan Greeks had been examined, all other cases being postponed.
1i
By 1928 negotiations between Greece and Turkey had broken down. As
the president of the mixed commission requested an advisory opinion
on the property question on 4 February 1928, a new anti-Greek cam-
paign began in Turkey. Ninety estates owned by the Zariphi family, in-
cluding the property which had since 1924 housed the Greek delegation at
the mixed commission, were seized by the Turkish authorities. This, accord-
ing to the Turks, was a response to the Greek reluctance to comply with the
payment of the 500,000 agreed upon in the Athens accord.
7
At the same
time, the Turkish press demanded a sweeping solution to the etablis question.
The influentialjournalist and deputy Mahmut Esat Bozkurt proposed that the
issue should be settled by agreeing on a number of exchangeables and
treating the rest as etablis. 8 Such a rough numeIical aITangement would have
caused the expulsion of a great number ofConstantinopolitan Greeks entitled
to remain in the city under the exchange agreement of 1923. Greece dismissed
such suggestions as preposterous. On 18 July 1928, the Greek delegate at the
mixed commission called once again attention to the pitiful situation of the
Greek community in Istanbul. 9 In response, the Cumlzuriye t of 30 December
3. This was Decision XXVII. cf. Ladas, op.cit., pp. 362, 409-10.
4. Ibid, pp. 410-11.
5. Loraine to Chamberlain. Athens, 2 March 1928, FO 371/13085/EI29L
6. Three reports by the president of the Greek delegation in the mixed commission, A.
Neophytos to Diamandopoulos, Cons., 16,22 August and 7 September 1927, BMAIP/228/14.
7 .. Clerk to Foreign Office. Cons., 19 June 1928. FO 371/13085/E3127.
8. Clerk to Chamberlain, Cons .. 30 January 1928, FO 371/13085/E472.
9. Ladas. op.cit., p. 491.
130
1928 hinted that an exchange of populations between Constantinopolitan
and Thracian minorities would ease Greek-Turkish differences. Such an
exchange, it went on to conclude, could be completed within six months and
the Patriarchate would then be removed to a Greek town, such as Thes-
saloniki. According to the former Greek minister in Ankara Pericles Ar-
gyropoulos similar views were expressed by the Foreign Minister Tevfik
R i . i ~ t U Aras. who on several occasions proposed an exchange of minorities
between Greece and Turkey.l 0
Although eager to reduce the size of the Constantinopolitan Greek com-
munity, there is no conclusive evidence to support the belief that Turkey
aimed at an immediate and complete exchange of minorities. Instead, the
Turks used the threat of expulsion as a lever in their negotiations with
Greece. For Ankara was convinced that Greece, in order to maintain its
minority and the Patriarchate in istanbul, would ultimately be more ac-
comodating on such outstanding questions as Muslim properties in Greece.!!
The Greek government, on the other hand, was clearly unable to counter-
balance these tactics by retaliatory measures against the Muslim minority in
Greece. This might have prompted an expUlsion of Greeks from istanbul, an
eventuality which was repugnant to all Greek leaders.12 Ever since 1922,
Athens had repeatedly intimated that such an expUlsion of the Constan-
tinopolitan Greeks would trigger off a Greek-Turkish war. Indeed, by 1929
relations reached such a low point that Foreign Minister Andreas
Michalakopoulos did not conceal from Sir Percy Loraine, the British ambas-
sador in Athens, that a crash between Greece and Turkey was not
impossible. 13 Sharing the same view the Cumhuriyet of 5 March 1929 pre-
dicted that a Greek- Turkish war was unavoidable.
8. Till'key and Greek educational and cultural institutions.
The inability of both governments to resolve their differences exposed the
Greek minority in Turkey to considerable harassment and inconvenience. In
their drive for the turkification of istanbul, the Turkish authorities managed
to impair irrevocably the once flourishing cultural and educational establish-
10. Harvey to Henderson. Athens, 1 August 1929. FO 371/13811/E3902.
11. As Argyropoulos indicated because of the superior wealth and numbers of the Greek
community in istanbul. the Greek card will always be trumped (at the Greek-Turkish
negotiations>. ibid.
12. Loraine to Chamberlain. Athens, 4 February 1929, FO 371/13810/E812.
13. Loraine to Chamberlain. Athens, 17 May 1929, FO 371/13811/E2514.
131
ments of the Constantinopolitan Greek community. A notable example in this
context was the seizure of the building and the contents of the Greek literary
society ( ')).rj VlK(X; cfJlJ.oi.oI'IKO; Lvi.i.ol'o:; Kwvara\'T/\'ovn:oi.cw:;). At first, the
Turkish authorities ordered its closure under the law concerning societies in
Turkey. In 1925, however, the Turks seized officially the actual premises of
the society and confiscated its movable property. In vain did the Greek
delegates of the mixed commission point out that this action was contrary to
the exchange convention of 1923. This agreement provided that movable
property should either be taken by the exchangeables to Greece (article 8) or
retained by the non-exchangeable Constantinopolitan Greek community
(article 16).1 But the Turks were not prepared to let the rich archives and
library of the Syllogos go. Instead, they transferTed part of the material to the
newly founded cultural and literary associations in Ankara, while the rest was
distributed amongst the Turkish libraries in istanbuL2 The impressive build-
ing of the Syllogos was at first transformed into party headquarters of the
RPP, then it was used as a Turkish orphanage and finally as a court of justice. 3
Other famous Constantinopolitan Greek associations, such as the society of
Greek lawyers and doctors, suffered similar fate.
4
At the same time, the
creation of new minority non-political associations was strictly discouraged.
Nor were the Greek schools immune from such government restrictions.
Further. restrictive laws enacted by Ankara often went counter to the educa-
tional freedom guaranteed by article 40 of the minority clauses of the treaty of
Lausanne. As previously remarked. non-Muslims enjoyed wide educational
autonomy under the Ottoman millet system, but this system was first chal-
lenged by the Young Turk administration which aimed at the establishment of
a more uniform educational order. Thus, thanks to the laws of 1908 and 1915,
I. Article 8 stipulated that the members of each community (including the personnel of
mosques, tekkes, medresses, churches, convents. schools, hospitals, societies, associations and
juridical persons, or other foundations of any nature whatever) which is to leave the territory of
one of the Contracting States under the present Convention, shall have the right to take away
freely or to arrange for the transport of the movable property belonging to their communities ..
The fullest facilities for transport shall be provided by the authorities of the two countries.
2. Societies which are currently in possession of material belonging to the Syl/ogos are the
Turkish Historical Association ITiirk Tarih Kurt/mu), the Turkish Language Society (Tiirk Dil
KlIrumll) , the Public Library of Ankara, the Siileymaniye library in istanbul and various other
literary associations, see P. Moraux. Bibliotheqlle de la Societe TlIrqlle d'Histoire. Catalogue de
Manuscrits Grecs (Fonds du Syl/ogos). Ankara 1964, pp. 3-24.
3. By 1941 this building fell in disuse and was bought by a Greek, Nicholas Tsitouris, in an
attempt to save it from total destruction. But Turkish public opinion reacted unfavourably to this
transaction and the state rebought it a year later .. By September 1955, Syl/ogos was entirely
abandoned and vandalized. It was subsequently demolished.
4. Anninos to Foreign Ministry. Cons .. 4 July 1923. YE/A/5 ..
132
the ministry of public instruction became responsible for the supervision of
all, Muslim and non-Muslim, school curricula in the country. Concurrently,
the teaching of the Turkish language and Ottoman history were made com-
pulsory by an educational law in 1909. Such regulations were somewhat
relaxed during the Allied occupation ofistanbul, but were renewed in a more
vigorous manner after the reestablishment of Turkish rule in istanbul in 1923.
Not only the Turkish language and history, but also geography, patriotic
studies and lessons of physical fitness were now taught in Turkish. 5 To obtain
a teaching certificate all Greek teachers had to pass a Turkish language
examination.
6
An investigation on the past political activities of Constan-
tinopolitan Greek teachers was undertaken by Salih Zeki, general-secretary
of the ministry of public instruction. Together with the Hellene Greeks, a
substantial number of experienced teachers were found unfit to teach in the
schools of the Turkish Republic. 7
Not only did the Ankara government appoint Turkish teachers in the Greek
minority schools, but it also regulated their salaries. Thus, the monthly salary
for Turkish teachers in minority schools were fixed at 40 to 60 TL. Non
compliance with these regulations, the authorities cautioned, would result in
the closure of schools. 8 By 1926 salaries of Turkish teachers alone accounted
for 2/5 of the entire community school budget. 9 With limited resources and
unable to obtain any government subsidies, the community schools tried to
meet their grave financial difficulties through donations from parishioners.
Such contributions however proved insufficient, and in 1925 the authorities
shut down four Greek primary schools at Yenimahale, Altlmermer, Hask6y
and Salmatombruk on the pretext that the Turkish teachers were not paid
regularly. I
0
The parish school of Tatavla (Kurtulu) followed suit a year later.
As early as 10 November 1922, Patriarch Meletios warned E. Kanellopoulos,
the Greek representative in istanbul, that without the moral and material
assistance of the Greek government, the community schools were doomed
to vanish.
11
The Greek consul-general in the city, K. Diamandopoulos,
5. Diamandopoulos to Roussos, Cons., 18 November 1924, YE/B/33.
6. Turkish government encyclical, no. 3109/2110, Politis to Foreign Ministry, Ankara, 30 April
and 8 May 1925, both in YE/B/33.
7. By 1924, 156 teachers (104 with Turkish and 52 with Greek nationality) were dismissed. A
detailed memorandum by Stylianopoulos, Cons., 2 February 1924, YE/B/33.
8. Government encyclical to the minority schools, printed in Tevhit. 23 December 1923.
9. Vryzas to Foreign Ministry, Cons .. 30 October 1926, YE/B/33.
10. Diamandopoulos to Foreign Ministry, Cons., I December 1925, YE/B/33. Cf.
LN/C.!31.1925.VII, 6 March 1925.
II. Meletios to Kanellopoulos, Cons., 10 November 1922, YE/B/33: Parish council of Dercos
(fiVe signatures) to Foreign Minister, Therapeia. 7 December 1922.
133
shared this dim view. In an appraisal of the situation in 1925, he reported that
the Greek exodus, uncertainty about the future, Turkish restrictions and
financial difficulties posed a grave threat to the future of the minority schools.
Without Greek government assistance, he predicted, the Greek schools in
istanbul would be soon turkified.
12
Faced with little choice, Athens increased
its annual subsidy to Constantinopolitan Greek community institutions to
100,000 TL. 13
Turkish pressures against Greek schools were manyfold. The chief
Greek high-school for girls, Zappeion was closed for the academic year
1925-26, because of a statue in the building presenting the founder in the
classical Greek cheiton. Reporting to Ankara that the founder was depicted in
the Hellenic national costume, the local Turkish inspector recommended the
closure of the school. 14 The patriarchal college of languages and commerce
and the commercial school in Chalki (Heybeli) were also shut when technical
education became a state monopoly. The Apostolidis lycee suffered a similar
fate in 1926 because it received subsidies from the French government. 15 Of
all these high-schools only Zappeion survives today. The closure of such
schools that provided the best specialized training in foreign languages and
commerce, had a detrimental effect on the education of Constantinopolitan
Greek students. According to Samuel Hoare, the British representative in
istanbul, the real motive (of these closures) doubtlessly was to deprive
Greek children of a very good education .16 Measures against Greek schools
and the falling standards of education contributed significantly to the flight of
the Greeks from the city. Thus, while there were 24,296 students in the 166
Greek schools in istanbul, in 1920-21 their number was down to 15,766 during
the academic year of 1923 - 24. J7 The number of students continued to dim-
inish even after the panic of 1922- 23 and according to official estimates, there
were 8.515 students in the Greek schools of Istanbul in 1925. Three years later
this number was down to 5 . 9 2 3 . ' ~
12. Diamandopoulos to Roufos. Cons . 23 December 1925. YE/B/33 ..
13.. Vryzakis to Foreign Ministry. Cons .. 30 October 1926. YE/B/33.
14. It remained closed for 18 months. Sakellaropoulos to Foreign Ministry. Cons", 3 October
1928. YEiBj33; Hoare to Chamberlain. Cons. 24 March 1926. FO 371/11541/E2055
15 Comparative examination of the application of the minority clauses of the Lausanne
treaty in Greece and Turkey. memorandum prepared by the Greek Foreign Ministry for
Venizelos. 1930. BMAEV/58.
16. Hoare to Chamberlain. Cons .. 24 October 1926. FO 371/11541/E2055.
17. Statistical table of Greek minority schools in Constantinople. memorandum prepared by
Stylianopoulos. YE/B/33; Diamandopoulos to Foreign Ministry. Cons .. 20 February and 18
November 1924. both in YE/B/33.
18. Statistical table of the minority schools in Constantinople. memorandum by Sake 1-
134
To the charges that Turkey violated article 40 ofthe minority clauses of the
Lausanne treaty, Ankara responded by pointing out that the Orthodox could
still receive an excellent education in the numerous Greek educational estab-
lishments. By contrast. the Turks claimed, Greece impeded the dissemi-
nation of modern Turkish education in Greek Thrace, by encouraging religi-
ous conservatism among members of the Muslim minority. It is true that a
number of anti-Kemalist Turks. headed by the former S,eyhiilislam Mustafa
Sabri, found refuge in Komotini after the Anatolian war. But they appear to
have been well-received by the deeply religious Muslim community of Greek
Thrace. An overwhelmingly agricultural community, the Thracian Muslims
concentrated on the cultivation of their estates and generally shied away from
the secular revolution which was taking place, at the time, in Turkey. They
also lacked the considerable equcational facilities erUoyed by the Constan-
tinopolitan Greek community. though the Greek government allocated funds
to Muslim schools in Thrace and paid the salaries of Greek language teachers
in such schools. During the academic year of 1928- 29, responding to the
provisions of article 41 of the minority clauses of the Lausanne treaty, the
Turkish government. too, made available to the Greek minority schools in
istanbul a small grant of 4,050 TL. This token subsidy was finally shared
between 28 of the 50 Greek minority schools in the city.
1
9
9. The Civil Code and the Greek reaction.
Another controversy concerning the religious minOritIes arose during
1925 -26 when the Turkish government went ahead with the adoption of the
Swiss civil code. The wholesale abandonment of the sacred Islamic law in
favour of this western code was in accordance with the Kemalist program
of secular reform. Already by 192'6, thanks to the well-reported Atatiirk
reforms, many of the outward signs of Islam in Turkey had been done away
with. Within a span of three years the Turkish assembly had abolished the
Caliphate (1924), dissolved the religious colleges and religious courts, en-
forced the adoption of western headgear (1925), outlawed the wearing of the
veil and adopted the Gregorian calender for all purposes.
1
To accelarate the
laropoulos. 1928 YE/Bj33; Diamandopoulos to Roufos. Cons., 23 December 1925, YE/B/33. See
appendix C.
19 .. Comparative examination of the application of the minority clauses of the Lausanne
treaty in Greece and Turkey. memorandum prepared by the Greek Foreign Ministry for
Venizelos. 1930. BMAEV/58.
L D.A. Rustow. "Politics and Islam in Turkey. 1920-1935 in R.N. Frye (ed.), Islam and the
West. The Hague 1957, pp. 69-107.
135
pace of westernization Ankara abolished the old Ottoman M ecelle (code) and
replaced it with the Swiss civil code on 17 February 1926. This code, together
with a new penal code, based chiefly on that of Italy, came into effect on 4
October 1926. These reforms, however, were not universally welcomed by
the Turkish people. The hacas (Muslim teachers) were bitterly antagonistic
to the government's laicist policies and many prominent Turks were ir-
redeemably opposed to such a radical break with the past. To deal with
Islamic conservatism, the independence tribunals - the vanguards of
Kemalism- went into action with ruthless efficiency executing a large, and
as yet undefined, number of adversaries.
2
Unlike most of the other anti-clerical legislation, the new civil code af
fected the religious minorities of Turkey. It aimed at the adoption of a
universal secular system as regards personal and family status. As had been
said, under the millet system non-Muslim Ottoman citizens involved in
disputes over such matters as marriage, divorce and inheritance applied to
their separate religious courts for settlement. The continuance of this state of
affairs for the minOIlties was to some extent guaranteed by the provisions of
article 42 of the Lausanne treaty, which regulated the personal and family
status of non-Muslim citizens in Turkey. By this article, Turkey had under-
taken to permit the settlement concerning family law and personal status in
accordance with the customs of non-Muslim minorities.
3
This provision,
however, was in direct conflict with the new code on family and personal
status for it made civil marriage compulsory. To overcome this difficulty the
authorities urged the religious heads of the communities to renounce fOImally
the first paragraph of article 42 of the Lausanne treaty in favour of the new
civil code.
The reaction of non-Muslim religious leaders paralleled that of Muslim
clerics. At first, the religious leaders tried to avoid commitment by offering
alternatives and the Jewish grand rabbi suggested a plebiscite, hoping that the
impracticality of such a measure would deter the authorities from further
action. Instead, Ankara continued to press the communities. In May 1925,
the government appointed three mixed committees, each with a Turkish
chairman, two other Turkish members and two non-Muslims belonging re-
spectively to the Greek, Armenian and Jewish communities. This was an
attempt to comply with the second paragraph of article 42 of the Lausanne
treaty; though contrary to the stipulations the minority representatives were
not appointed by the communities but by the government itself. The Jewish
2. G.L Lewis, Modern Turkey, London 1974. pp. 104-07.
3. For the complete text see appendix A.
136
committee first met on 23 May 1925 and signed a declaration complying with
the wishes of the government on 10 September. The Armenians soon fol-
lowed suit and endorsed a similar renunciation of article
With the Greek community, which was by far the most numerous, the
Turks faced serious problems. The Greeks felt that the Lausanne provisions
about personal and family status were the most important part of the minority
clauses. It was not so much a privileged position that they sought as some-
thing to differentiate them individually and collectively from the Turks. This,
they felt, was crucial at a time when the Turks endeavoured to turkify every
trace of Greek influence in Turkey. Sensing resistance in the Greek commun-
ity, the committee of two Turkish' officials and two Greek representatives
decided to appoint a new body, composed of some half-dozen Greeks. This
so-called camite d'initiative was asked to draw up a petition for the renuncia-
tion of the minority privileges stipulated by article 42 and then present it to the
community. When the camite showed a tendency to resist the Turkish
demand, the authorities brought its members up to twenty-two by adding a
number of Greeks whose interests in Turkey made them particularly suscep-
tible to official pressure. This committee was considerably influenced by a
speech of A vrilios Spatharis, during a meeting at the Greek lycee of Zog-
rapheion. Despite the presence of the police, this Greek lawyer subtly de-
nounced the proposal as an attempt to bring into disrepute so sacred an
instrument as the National Pact (Misak-i MillO whose fifth article guaranteed
the rights of the minorities. He also argued that the recommendation to
renounce article 42 would place Turkey in the embarrassing position of
violating an article which had become law through the ratification of the
Lausanne treaty by the Ankara assembly.
5
Instructed by the government, the
camite added to itself twenty-six more members who were reluctantly elected
by the various parishes and as reluctantly came to the discussions. The
Turkish police, moreover, arrested three delegates who had manifested
opposition to the Ankara recommendation a day before the crucial vote. This
action had the desired effect and at the meeting of 27 November 1925 the
camite, complying with the wishes of the government, renounced article 42 of
the Lausanne treaty in view ofthe forthcoming introduction of the civil code.
From the total of 72 members of the camite and parish representatives 55
signed the petition for the renunciation and the three arrested notables were
4. Official declarations of the Armenian and Jewish committee are given in the letter of Tevfik
Aras to the League of Nations, 9 March 1927, LN/C. 185. 1927J.
5. Lindsay to Chamberlain, Cons., 8 December 1926. FO 371/1 0866/E7712; two memoranda on
the Turkish attitude towards article 42 of the Lausanne treaty, prepared by the Greek Foreign
Ministry, 5 and 30 November 1925. YE/A/24; OM 6 (1926) 22-23.'
137
only released after the meeting of 27 N ovember:6 Two days later the initial
mixed committee, composed of two Turks and two Greeks, approved
unanimously the Ankara recommendation concerning the renunciation of the
Lausanne guarantees of minority family and personal status.
7
The realization that with the new civil code they no longer had a separate
legal standing caused considerable apprehension amongst members of the
religious minorities. The crux of the problem centred on the question of the
civil marriage for the Greek Orthodox. According to the new law, civil mar-
riage was established as the only legally binding ceremony, while religious-
marTiage was to remain optional.
8
The Greeks, however, explained that
their canon law recognized only religious marTiage and therefore they re-
quested the government to regard as legal both civil and religious marTiage.
Articles in the Greek press voiced the anxiety and fears of the community.
The implementation of the new code, it was argued, would undermine the
ethnic traditions of the minority. 9 At first the Greek government reacted by
making friendly representations to Ankara, mainly on the imprisonment of
the three delegates at the eve of the voting day. But by September 1926,
Athens decided to approach the League of Nations. In two consecutive
memoranda, the Greeks outlined the Turkish violations of articles 42 and 44
of the Lausanne treaty. 10
On 9 March 1927, the Turkish government replied by asserting that:
11
Le Gouvernement n'avait nullement en vue les minorites, et leur
statut familial ou personnel n'etait point en cause, son unique souci
ayant ete celui de doter Ie pays d'une des legislations democratiques les
plus parfaites.
With the enforcement of the new code there was no need to maintain article 42
of the treaty of Lausanne. The minorities, it was claimed, were satisfied by
6. A copy of the petition and 55 signatures in Tevfik Aras to the League of Nations, 9
March 1927. LN(CI85. 1927. LN(C.185.1927.I. and a copy of the Greek petition to the minister
of justice Mahmut Esat, YE(A/24.
7. The Greeks members were Dr Aristeidis Pasha Skouros, professor at the faculty of medicine
at the university of Istanbul, and Vasilakis Orphanidis, a former deputy of Istanbul.
8. Article 110 decreed that religious marriage may take place after the celebration of the civil
ceremony, see La Legislation Turque: Code Civil Ture, Istanbul 1926.
9 .. See the analysis of the effects of the civil code on the Greek minority by the former legal
advisor of the Greek delegation at Lausanne, Michael Theotokas in KWVI7TaVTIVolm;o;.IC;, 16 and 23
May 1926.
10. Argyropoulos to the League of Nations. II September 1926, LN/C.566.1926.I; Dendramis
to the League of Nations, 10 October 1926, LN(CS88.1926.L
II. Tevfik Aras to the League of Nations. 9 March 1927, LN/CI85.1927.L
138
the Turkish assurances about the universal and indiscriminate application of
the new code for the benefit of all Turkish citizens. 12 This view was reiterated
by $iikrii Saras;oglu 13 Despite these reassurances. both Muslim and non-
Muslim religious conservatives viewed with dismay the intermarriage of
persons of different creeds which was made possible by the civil code. But,
on the whole, traditional religious divisions were maintained even after the
enactment of the code. Thus. after 1926, the Greeks celebrated their religious
marriage after fulfilling their legal obligations at the state registration office.
10. Various anti-Greek measures and the decline of Istanbul.
The adoption of the civil code. however. did not bring about a sudden
change in the attitudes of Muslim Turks towards the religious minorities.
Already the new republican constitution. adopted on 20 April 1924.
nized all the inhabitants of the country as Turkish citizens (Turk vatandas)).
More specifically, under article 88 of the constitution. all former religious
minorities were guaranteed full rights as Turkish citizens. 1 Yet
an article inserted in the constitution in 1928 abolished the concept of state
religion in Turkey. Islam as a factor in Turkish society survived. None but
Muslims could aspire to office in government, the defence forces, the civil
service or other posts at the disposal of the state. Thus, despite written
international and Turkish guarantees. the participation of non-Muslims in the
public life of Turkey decreased dramatically after the establishment of the
Turkish republic. The deep-seated perception that Muslim equals Turk and
non-Muslim equals non-Turk persisted.
2
Notwithstanding the constitution'S
specific interpretation of the term Turk (Ttirkiyeli) to embrace all the
children of the fatherland. non-Muslims continued to be regarded as untrust-
worthy subjects.
Because of this mistrust discrimination against the religious minorities
continued unabated throughout the 1920s. While non-Muslims were called up
for l"T!ilitary service. they did not bear arms and were not commissioned. For
the Greeks in particular the political and social climate in Turkey appeared to
12. Ibid.
13. Declarations by Siikrii Sara.;oglu. Greek Legation Cons.. YE/A/24. 1925; Th.
Athanasiadis-Novas. Luil' TOlJph"ia pi: 6'7Jwl7w;'paqJlh",j rpaJ,,j, 19::5 19::6, Athens 1967. pp. 21-66.
224-25.
1 Text given in the Ti:tnit{ of 17 to 23 February 1924 .. See also AS G6ziibiiyiik and Z. Sezgin.
1924 Ana\'asasl Hakklndaki ,'>feclis Goni!jmeleri. Ankara 1957. pp .. 437-39: E..C Smith Debates
on the Turkish Constitution of 1924 SBFD 13 (1958) 103
:: B. Lewis. The Emer/?ence tvlodern Turkey, London 1968. pp. 356-57..
139
be rather claustrophobic" On 26 February 1925, the government announced
restrictions on the movement of Greeks beyond the prefecture limits of
istanbul. 3 In an attempt to justify this restriction, Ankara maintained that
Greeks with Turkish nationality would be able to visit the interior of the
country after obtaining permission for each journey. But as the issue of such
documents was subject to long bureaucratic delays, it affected seriously
those Greek enterpreneurs with commercial establishments and property
outside istanbul. Even more devastating to the Greek business community
were the effects of the unresolved etabUs question. Because of the uncer-
tainty about their status, Greek merchants could not obtain credits or loans.
N or were they allowed to sell their property. As about 80 per cent of the
Constantinopolitan Greeks were engaged in commerce, the effects of these
restrictions were far-reaching"
4
Concurrently, fear of persecution under the law against insulting
Turkism (Turkliige hakaret) forced severe constraints upon the Grecophone
press of istanbul. Most of the pro-Allied and pro-Greek press of the armistice
period had disappeared by 1923, leaving behind several Greek newspapers
which adopted a non-committal line" Notwithstanding their moderate tone,
Greekjournalists in the city continued to suffer harassment and persecution.
Thus, Eugenopoulos was condemned to death and subsequently hanged in
1926,5 while three years later XPOVIIUJ., one of the grecophone newspapers in
istanbul was closed after being charged with insulting Turkism. Encouraged
by the imprisonment of the owner of this paper, nationalist Turkish students
wrecked the printing office of XPOVIKG. on 10 July 1929.
6
Incidents were also
created by the Citizens Speak Turkish (vatanda!f. Turkfe konu!f.) move-
ment. This movement was founded by the nationalist Tur-
kish Hearth (Turk Ofag/) with the purpose of applying pressure on the ethnic
minorities to adoptthe-Turkish language.
7
Nor did the Greek minority have
3. Text of the law entitled Les Deplacements des non-Musulmans dans la Banlieu de
Constantinople in FO 371/1 0866/EI388" For earlier application of this law to Armenians see Le
Journal d'Orient, 29 March 1924"
4" Politis to Rentis, Cons", 14 October 1925 and Politis to Roufos, Cons., 19 March 1926, both
in BMAIP/228/14"
5" Expose sur la situation actuelle de la minorite Grecque de Constantinople, memorandum
prepared by the Greek Foreign Ministry, Athens, 1930, YE/B/37"
6. This was the so-called MIle Eleni affair (the imprisoned proprietress of the XpovIKa),
Clerk to Chamberlain, Ankara, 18 July 1929, FO 371/13818/E3656; Clerk to Chamberlain,
Ankara, 21 November 1929, FO 371/13818/E6101; OM 9 (1929) 116"
7. The observations of the British consuls in tzmir and Edirne in FO 371 /i3096/EI581 (9 March
1928) and FO 371/13096/E2120 (II April 1928); Annual Report on Turkey by Loraine, 1935,
Ankara, FO 371/20091/E933.
140
available to protest against such harassment. The religious
mmontIes were barred from electing their own representatives to the central
and local government Even on the Princes islands (K'lz'll adalar) where the
overwhelming majority of the popUlation was Christian the local governor
was a Muslim Turk.
On their part, the Constantinopolitan Greeks desired to remain in the
country of their birth as subjects of an alien state while preserving their racial
and r.eligious individuality. Yet, the drawbacks of such a system, from the
TurkIsh point of view, were considerable. It ran counter to the nationalist
ideals and aims of turkification. Notwithstanding their verbal manifestations
of to Ankara, the majority of the Greeks, as well as the other non-
communities, could hardly conceal their nostalgia for the ancien
regIme of the sultans. The nationalist Turks considered this attitude as
a tangible proof of Greek resistance to the creation of a strong
and mdependent Turkey. As a result they introduced measures which eroded
the traditional Greek influence in istanbul. Further, the position of the
Con.stantinoP?Iitan Greek community became even more precarious by the
stramed relatIOn between Ankara and Athens during 1922-30.
Given these conditions the size of the Greek minority in Turkey dwindled
!hroughout the 1920s. The deliberate attack on the wealth and trade of
undermined Greek confidence in the new republican order. Dis-
taxation and the creation of state monopolies forced many old-
Greek firms to bankrupty and prompted discontented Greek
busmessmen to depart. Likewise, faIling standards to Greek education forced
many Greeks to move to Greece while youths left the country rather than face
the prospect of military service in the Turkish army. It was because of this
exodus that the Greek community seriously contemplated shutting down
most <;>fthe Greeklycees in istanbul and maintaining only one such school for
bo.ys and another for girls.s Areas inhabited almost exclusively by Greeks
pnor to 1923 were gradually taken over by Anatolian and Balkan immigrants.
The most notable example of this marked demographic transformation took
place in (Fener), the traditionally Greek quarter of the city. Another
overwhelminglY Greek quarter of the city, Tatavla, experienced a similar
in its ethnic composition as a result o(thegreat fire of January 1929.
ThIS devastating fire bumt down 400- 500 houses dispossessing 2,000 to 3,000
Greeks .. The fire ushered in a period of decline for Tatavla reducing its
to 7,000. Although the Athenian press claimed that the fire was
dehberately set by the Turks in order to destroy one of the surviving Greek
8" Tsamados to Foreign Ministry, Cons", 19 August 1927, YE/B/33"
141
districts of istanbul, we have no conclusive evidence to this effect. 9 How-
ever, the Turkish press showed remarkably little sympathy for the victims of
the devastating fire and the authorities rushed to change the official name of
the district from Tatavla to (liberation) immediately after this
event. I
0
All the same, despite the considerable decrease in the number of Greeks in
istanbul, the community as a whole managed to survive the adverse years of
1922- 29. This was partly because of their great capacity for and experience in
business. Together with the other non-Muslim minorities, they were able to
continue controlling a substantial portion of the trade in istanbul, thus making
it harder to uproot them en masse. Again, notwithstanding official pressure, a
sizeable section of the minority genuinely desired to remain in the city of their
birth. With their roots, families, properties and connections in the city, these
Greeks were determined to stay behind. Nor was Turkey prepared to abro-
gate the Lausanne agreement by expelling the Greek minority in toto. Rather
they aimed at the gradual turkification of the religious minorities in Turkey.
The continued presence of the Greek community in istanbul throughout
the 1920s is borne out by the Turkish statistical data. According to the official
statistics compiled in June 1924, istanbul had 1,065,866 inhabitants of whom
656,281 were Muslims, 279,788 Greeks, 73,407 Armenians, 56,390 Jews.
ll
This figure, however, drops dramatically at the general census of October
1927. The population of the vilayet of istanbul was calculated at 806,993 (the
city proper was only 699,602). Of these 100,214 inhabitants informed the
authorities that they professed the Greek Orthodox faith while 91,902 were
Greek-speaking. 12 There were also 26,419 Greeks with Hellenic
nationality.13 These figures roughly coincide with the statistics of the four
9. Clerk to Camberlain, Cons., 31 January 1929, FO 371/13824/E627; The Times, 23 January
1929.
10. Thus, when some practical assistance was offered to the victims by the wife of the British
ambassador, Lady Clerk. a tremendous campaign was launched in the press against the British
embassy for interfering in the internal matters of Turkey. The campaign was initiated by
Necmettin Sadik on 25 January. Clerk to Chamberlain. Ankara, 3 March 1929, FO
371/13833/EI259; Turkey: Annual Report (1929). Clerk, Ankara, FO 371/14578/E729.
II. Direction de l'Etat Civil du Vildyet de Constantinople, quoted also in E. Mamboury,
Constantinople, Cons. 1926. p. 19.
12. 8.312 Greek-Orthodox who did not declare Greek as their mother tongue were karaman-
!ides and Orthodox of Albanian origin. Thekaraman!ides (karaman/1) were Orthodox who spoke
Turkish which they wrote in Greek characters. The bulk of these Orthodox arrived in the city
from central Anatolia during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. In istanbul they attended
Greek schools and by 1923 they had been largely hellenized.
13. iY, 4 (1930-31) 61-64.
142
Greek Orthodox parishes ofistanbul, according to which there were 110,000
Greeks with Turkish nationality in the city,14 Finally, a report drawn by the
neutral members of the mixed commission in 1934 estimated the number of
Greeks in Turkey as 111,200. Of these 73,000 were Greeks with Turkish
nationality residing in istanbul. Another 30,000 were non-exchangeables
Greeks with Hellenic nationality and 8,200 were the Greek inhabitants of
Imbros (Gokgeada) and Tenedos (Bozcaada) who were also exempted from
the exchange of populations in 1923.
15
14. Memorandum on the Greek community of Constantinople prepared by the Greek
Foreign Ministry, 1930, YE/B/37.
IS. On those Greeks see my article Imbros and Tenedos: A Study in Turkish Attitudes
Toward Two Ethnic Greek Island Communities since 1923 ,Journal of the Hellenic Diaspora,
7/1 (1980) 531
143
10
CHAPTER V
THE RESUMPTION OF RELATIONS BETWEEN THE TURKISH
GOVERNMENT AND THE ECUMENICAL PATRIARCHATE.
1923-29.
I. Patriarch Meletios and the anti-Phanal' riot of 1 June 1923.
Even before the defeat of the Greek armies in Anatolia, Patriarch Meletios
Metaxakis was considered as an enemy of Turkey. But after the Smyrna
deb[lcle anti-Greek resentment in Turkey focused on the patriarch. Soon
after his arrival in the city the nationalist governor, Refet Bele. made a
vitriolic speech against Meletios and the Turkish press followed suit. 1 His
safety was only assured by the Allied presence in the city. Because of the
widespread international concern about the patriarch's safety. 2 Curzon made
General Charles Harington personally responsible for the life of Meletios. 3
Following Curzon's instructions, Harington obtained a personal guarantee
from Refet Bele regarding the safety of the patriarch .. On his part, Meletios
tried to placate Turkish public opinion as best as he could. In an interview
with the press. he appealed to the Turks to forgive and forget, quoting the
magnanimit:, to his predecessors in office by the Caliph Omar and
Sultan Mohammed the Conqueror. 5 At the same time. Meletios displayed a
'ipirit of independence and courage. Disregarding the dangers, he remained at
his post and continued to provide leadership to the dispirited Cons tan-
tinopolitan Greek community and did not hesitate to protest to the Allied high
commissioners when the rights of the community were threatened.
6
Notwithstanding these qualities, the continued presence of Meletios at the
Phanar weakened the position of the Patriarchate. Not only was he hated by
1. Kanellopoulos to Foreign Ministry, Cons., 29 December 1922, BMAEV(34.
2. Archbishop of Canterbury to Curzon, 23 October 1922 and to Bonar Law, 24 October 1922,
LPA(DvP(32 .. Also Patriarch of Jerusalem Damianos to the Colonial Office, Jerusalem, 27
November 1922, Fo 371(9109(EI7.
3. D.E.F.P. (18) no. 252.
4. Harington to War Office, Cons., 2 December 1922, FO 371(7917(E3623.
5. Interview published in Journal d' Orient and Stamboul, 2 December 1922.
6. Meletios to Henderson, Cons., 7 January 1923, FO 371(9128(E630.
144
the Turks, but also since they never acknowledged his as patriarch negotia-
tions between the Turkish authorities and the Phanar could not take place.
Given the irregular position of the Patriarchate vis-a-vis the Turkish govern-
ment such negotiations were crucial for its rehabilitation in modern Turkey.
More significantly, at Lausanne ismet inonii demanded a firm commitment
from Venizelos as to Meletios' withdrawal from the Phanar, before consent-
ing to the maintenance of the Patriarchate in Turkey. Venizelos agreed to
such an arrangement and advised the patriarch to tender his resignation.
7
He
even gave an interview to the JIarpir;; on 20 January asserting that since
Meletios found himself in such an opposition to the Turkish government he
should relinguish the patriarchal throne. The resignation of the patriarch,
Venizelos underlined, would placate the Turks and improve the position of
the Patriarchate, whose maintenance in the Phanar was of major importance
to the Hellenic race and to the Orthodox world.B Although he consented to
his eventual resignation, Meletios cautioned that his immediate departure
was untimely for it would trigger off a major exodus of Constantinopolitan
Greeks. He therefore suggested to postpone his departure until the con-
clusion of a peace agreement.
The patriarch's position was further exacerbated by dissention within
the Constantinopolitan Greek community. After the Greek defeat in Anato-
lia, the more extreme elements of the anti-Meletios faction intensified their
campaign for the removal of the patriarch. Aware of the changing political
climate in the city, they hoped that such a campaign against an avowed enemy
of Turkey would enjoy the encouragement, if not the cooperation, of the
Turkish authorities. The most outspoken members of this group was
Damianos Damianidis, a trustee (brirpo'TCoc;) of the Galata district and the
general-secretary of the church Panagia Kaphatiani. 9 Since 1921, Damianidis
had staunchly opposed the election of Meletios. In a display of his anti-
Venizelism, he had invited the representatives of the royalist Greek govern-
ment in istanbul to a reception at Kaphatiani during the early months of
1922.10 In May 1923, however, the opponents of Meletios suffered a severe
setback when Damianidis, together with his associate, bishop of Myra
Philaretos, were implicated in the embezzlement of church funds. The bishop
7. Venizelos to Arthur Crosfield. Lausanne. 2 July LPAjDvPjI48;4.
8 The text of this interview is also given in Ollef
9 .. This church was founded in 1462 by Greek immigrants from Kefe/Kaffa in the Crimean. for
more details see 'Opllo()o:;ia, (1948) 111-12.
10. Mavropoulos. Op .. cil, p. 187 ..
145
was duly removed from Galata to the monastery of BaIlkIl and Damianidis
was dismissed from his post. 11
His dismissal, however, did not put an end to his activities. Regarding
Meletios as the main obstacle to a dialogue between the authorities and the
Patriarchate, a number of dissatisfied prelates at the Phanar encouraged
Damianidis to carryon with his anti-Meletios campaign.12 Thus, on 1 June
1923. in an attempt to force the abdication of Meletios. a crowd of about 100
demonstrators, headed by Damianidis, gathered outside the Phanar. At the
time the patriarch was presiding over a Pan-Orthodox conference which was
then sitting at the Phanar. This conference was abruptly intenupted when the
demonstrators invaded the Patriarchate. Despite the protests of the represen-
tatives of the Serbian and Rumanian churches, the invaders entered the
private chambers of the patriarch and demanded his immediate abdication.
On his refusal to abdicate, Meletios was dragged down the stairs and was
badly maltreated only to be rescued by an Allied police force which an'ived at
the Phanar and dispersed the agiratorsP
It is clear that the riot took place with the full knowledge of the Turkish
authorities since Damianidis had notified the chief of police Vehbi of his
intention to invade the PhanarY Further, the Turkish police was present
throughout the incident. Yet, claiming that the dispute concerned only the
Orthodox community, the police did not attempt to protect the Patriarchate.
Similarly, since the government had not recognized Meletios as a legitimate
patriarch, the Turkish police did not consider him or his entourage as the
lawful occupants of the patriarchal premises.
15
According to t h ~ patriarc? '.s
own account, however, members of the Turkish police force actIvely partIcI-
pated in the demonstration. Ultimately, Meletios claimed, the Turks planned
to hurry him to Izmit (Nicomedia) or Thrace where he would have been
executed by the nationalist authorities.
16
Commenting on the role of the
Turkish police, the acting British high commissioner, Nevile Henderson,
noted that
17
II .. Borough to Douglas. Cons", 19 May 1913. LPA/DgPjI 7 !lOS: Henderson to Curzon. Cons ...
29 Mav 1923. FO 371;9123!E6067
12. Anninos to Alexandris. Cons .. 7 June 1923. YE/Bi35. Mavropoulos. op.ci!., p. 188.
13. Rapport .1111' les edllelllen!s dll I 111ill 1923. Meletios to Henderson. Phanar. FO
371:9123 E6309; Holy Synod to Venizelos. Phanar. 4 June 1923. YEIB/35: Helm to Ryan. Cons ..
6 June 1923. FO 800jRyP.
14. This was publicly admitted by Vehbi. Henderson to Curzon. Cons", 6 June 1923. FO
37Ii9123!E6967.
15. Declaration of Vehbi published in the Allrore of IS June 1923. press cutting in FO
800jRyP/l79 ..
16. Major J .A.Codringtons interview with Meletios. 6 June 1923. LPA/DgP/ISjl99,
17. Henderson to Curzon. Cons. 2 June 1923. FO 37Ij9123/E5721
146
it was not unlikely that they were cognisant of, if not responsible for
the demonstration which was carTied out by the worst Greek
elements .
The agitators, he went on to inform, were in fact hired by the Turks in order to
achieve the replacement of obnoxious Meletios with a more agreeable
Patriarch. 18
The first reaction of the Patriarchate was to pronounce sentences of ex-
communication against three leaders of the demonstrators, Damianos
Damianidis, John Tsirigotis and Stergios Polykritos, on 9 June. 19 Concur-
rently, the patriarch addressed a telegram to Venizelos requesting the reopen-
ing of the question of the Patriarchate at Lausanne. Pointing to the campaign
waged by Damianidis, he asked for the insertion of a clause in the Lausanne
treaty which defined the status of the Patriarchate in an unequivocal manner.
Without strong safeguards his resignation would cause irreparable damage to
the prestige of the Patriarchate. He strongly doubted that his abdication
would pave the way for the rehabilitation of the Patriarchate in Turkey.20
Similar views were expressed in a note by the holy synod to Venizelos on 4
June 1923.
21
In a rather abrupt response, Venizelos explained that he was
unable to demand the inviolability of the Patriarchate at Lausanne. He also
cautioned the patriarch against jeopardizing vital Greek interests by postpon-
ing his decision to resign. Reminding him of the Greek promise to Ismet inonii
at Lausanne in January 1923, Venizelos strongly urged Meletios to abdicate
as soon as possible.
22
He also warned the members of the holy synod that
they would have to adapt themselves to the new circumstances. Only by
acting in a pragmatic manner could the Greek community and the Patriar-
chate hope to survive in Turkey.23 In a discussion with Sir Horace Rum-
bold, the British chief delegate at Lausanne, Venizelos intimated his desire to
bring the issue of the Patriarchate at a head while the Allies were still in the
city. In this way the Greek government would be able to ascertain the
intentions of Ankara concerning the recognition of the Patriarchate as a
spiritual institution.
24
IS. Henderson to Curzon. Cons", 5 June 1923. FO 371/9123/E5906,
19. E.A .. 43 (1923) 109-10. Tsirigotis and Polykritos were soon pardoned when they asked
forgiveness from the Phanar.
20, Meletios to Venizelos. Phanar. 4 and 7 June 1923. YE/B/35.
21. Holy Synod to Venizelos. Phanar. 4 June 1923. YE/B/35.
22. Venizelos to Meletios. Lausanne. 6 and 10 June 1923. YE/B/35,
13. Venizelos to Holy Synod. Lausanne. 10 June 1923. YEjBj35 A resume of the correspon-
dence between Venizelos and Meletios is given in Anninos to Alexandris. Cons,. 16 June 1923.
YE/B/35.
14,19 June 1923, Rumbold to Curzon. Lausanne. FO 371/9113/E6524,
147
At this conjuncture the patriarch's views were in sharp divergence with the
objectives of Greek foreign policy. Viewing the whole issue in a long-term
manner, Meletios was reluctant to abdicate. Because of the exchange of
populations and the national reorganization in Turkey, he reasoned, the
Patriarchate would gradually decline and take the shape of an ordinary
archbishopric representing 200,000 people. Given the nationalist and secu-
larist tendencies in modem Turkey, he remarked, the position of the Patri-
archate would be intolerable.
25
This state of affairs would undermine its
standing as the centre of Orthodoxy. As a remedy, Meletios strongly advo-
cated the transfer of the Patriarchate to Thessaloniki or to Mount Athos.
The majority of the Greeks took a different view. The Greek government
did not seem prepared to accept any change in the patriarchal seat so long as
there was a Greek community in istanbul. Nor did the holy synod endorse the
removal of the Patriarchate. Most of them opposed the radical proposal of
Meletios and favoured an international role for the Patriarchate. A fresh
Pan-Orthodox and non-national image, it was hoped, might be less objection-
able to the Turks. They further maintained that the transfer of the Patriar-
chate to Greece would inevitably bring it under Greek national influence and
thus result in the loss of its ecumenical character. Already by February 1923,
the synod had made notable steps towards enhancing the ecumenical charac-
ter of the Patriarchate by appointing representatives to many major European
centres.26 Likewise in June 1923, a Pan-Orthodox conference was held at the
Phanar.
Finally, the debate about additional rights for the Patriarchate or its trans-
fer to Greece ceased when Meletios announced his departure from the Phanar
on 27 June. He did not, however, resign. Instead, he declared his wish to go
abroad for reasons of health and asked leave of absence from the mixed
council of the Patriarchate. He then appointed Nicholas, the archbishop of
Caesarea, as his loculll tenens and instructed to seek negotiations with
the Turkish authorities.
27
His decision to leave Istanbul was partly prompted
by two strongly worded letters by Venizelos.
28
Likewise his was
hastened by a Turkish court order charging him with entering Istanbul with-
out a regular passport.29 Through Alexander Pallis, the director ofthe Greek
25 .. Details on his interview with Meletios. Anninos to Alexandris. Cons ... 13 June 1923.
YE B 35
The Tillles. 8 February 1923.
27. Henderson to Foreign Office, Cons .. 27 June 1923. FO 371;9113/E6665; Henderson to
Ryan. Cons .. 3 July 1923. FO 800. RyP 185.
28. Telegrams of 6 and 10 June 1923. in YE B.35
29 Helm to Ryan. Cons. 27 June FO SOO RyP 176.
148
Red Cross in Turkey, he informed the British high commission of his decision
to retire from istanbul.
30
Finally, on 10 July ,Meletios Metaxakis left Turkey
aboard a British steamship Famaka and withdrew to a monastery on Mount
Athos.
3J
Yet, in Greece he continued to campaign for the transfer of the
Patriarchate to Greek soiL It is also interesting that before his departure,
Meletios gave a long interview to a correspondent of Tan in , Ali Zeki, on 2
July. After claiming that he had never been an enemy of Turkey, he hinted
that. if the Turkish government did neit object to his continued patriarchate,
he would be prepared to return to istanbul when his leave of absence was
over.
32
Although his concern for the Orthodox church was real, his ambition
to retain the patriarchal throne often marred Meletios'good judgement.
2. The Turkish Orthodox challenge.
Notwithstanding his personal aspirations, uppermost in the patriarch's
mind was the interests of the church when he 4ecided to depart without
abdicating. He had all along maintained that he would resign as soon as the
legal position of the Patriarchate in Turkey was defined.! By withdrawing
from istanbul, Meletios hoped to enable the holy synod to open negotiations
with the authorities. He also stressed that he would resign as soon as the
Patriarchate was allowed to elect a successor in accordance with the declara-
tion made by Rlza Nur on 16 December 1922 at Lausanne.
2
If, however,
Ankara proved intractable, it would still be possible for the holy synod, rather
than submitting to unjustified interference by the Turks, to join Meletios at
Mount Athos and continue to recognize him as patriarch.
3
In the meantime the departure of the patriarch refueled the debate on the
issue of the Patriarchate. Several local Turkish newspapers expressed ap-
proval ofthe attitude taken by the holy synod. Significantly, there were also
some indications that the government, too, was prepared to modify its at-
titude towards the Phanar. Determined to take advantage of the momentum
generated with the departure of Meletios, the holy synod tried to approach
the authorities in istanbul. Employing Vasilaki Orphanidis, a former Otto-
30. Henderson to Foreign Office. Cons .. 27 June 1923. FO 371/9113/E6658 ..
31. Anninos to Foreign Ministry. Cons .. IOJuly 1923. YE/B/35; Borough to Douglas. Cons .. II
July 1923. LPAjDgP/17;121.
32 .. 7ll/lin. :. July 1923. The next day. he gave another interview to the Vatan and expressed his
hope that his departure would enable the Patriarchate to negotiate with the authorities. press
cuttings in YE/B/35.
I. Anninos to Alexandris. Cons .. 13 June 1923. YE/B/35.
2 See chapter III:4.
1 Henderson to Ryan. Cons,. 3 July 1923. FO 80OjRyP/185.
149
man deputy, the Patriarchate contacted the viili of istanbul, Ali Haydar.
4
Meanwhile, with the occasion of the bayram (Muslim religious holiday) a
patriarchal delegation, headed by locum tenens Nicholas, paid visits to
Turkish military and civil dignitaries in istanbul. These highly placed officials
assured the delegation that the rights of minorities would be respected in
modern Turkey.s Again Germanos Athanasiadis, the secretary of the holy
synod, together with the patriarchal counsellor on political affairs, D. Phytos,
went to welcome Ismet inonii on his arrival to istanbul from Lausanne on 10
August.o Ankara also responded to a congratulatory letter addressed by the
Phanar to the Turkish assembly on the ratification of the Lausanne treaty.
7
Anxious to placate the Turkish authorities and to proceed with a new
patriarchal election, the Phanar issued a statement setting out the principles
on which relations between the Patriarchate and the authorities might be
conducted. In this statement the Patriarchate declared its readiness to aban-
don all former political and administrative privileges and to remain a purely
religious institution of Pan-Orthodox character. In accordance with the
statement of Rlza Nur at Lausanne, the relations between the Turkish
government and the Patriarchate would be similar to those existing between
state and church in England, France and the USA. While communal educa-
tional and charitable institutions were to be administered by popularly
elected representatives, marTiage and cognate questions would fall within
ecclesiastical jurisdiction. Finally, the election of the patriarch would take
place according to canon law. Locum tenens Nicholas, who made this state-
ment to the press, concluded by stressing that the Greek minority desired
nothing better than to live on friendly terms with the Turks.s Likewise in an
article in the official organ of the Phanar', 'EKKbwzaawol 'AbjOeza, the bishop
of Skopelos, Gennadios Arabatzoglou, emphasized that the Patriarchate
would be a major moral factor in the reconstruction and transformation of
modern Turkey.9
While welcoming such expressions of goodwill, the Turkish goverrunent
chose to ignore such statements. Nor did the viili of istanbul, Ali Haydar,
consent to discussing the question of a new patriarchal election with the
representatives of the Phanar.! 0 In addition, the central government would
4. Anninos to Foreign Ministry. Cons .. 6 July 1923. YEjB;35.
5 .. E.A .. 43 (19:23) :272-73.
6. Ibid., p .. 294 ..
7. This was signed by Prime Minister Fethi Okyar. dated 20 August 1923. E.A .. 43 (1923) 314 ..
8. Henderson to Curzon, Cons .. 17 July 19:23. FO 371/9123/E7603; The Time5, 13 July .1923.
9. E.A .. 43 (1923) 267-68.
10. Anninos to the Greek delegation at Lausanne. Cons . 23 and 24 July 1923; Anninos to
150
not negotiate so long as Meletios remained the official head of the church.
Making use of the government's ambivalent attitude towar'ds the Patriarch-
ate, Damianidis continued his campaign against the Phanar. After reestab-
lishing himself at the church of Kaphatiani with the assistance of the auth-
orities, he published a long address to the Orthodox community in the Vatan
of 14 June 1923. Characterizing all the prominent Constantinopolitan Greeks
of the armistice period as traitors, he concluded:!!
Oh you ignoramuses ... if you desire to continue living in Turkey you
must abandon those who imbued you in errors and repent for your
mistakes ... It is only thus that you can win the favour of your Turkish
fellow-countrymen .
Notwithstanding such patriotic utterances, there is conclusive evidence cast-
ing serious doubts on the sincerity of his motives. His signature, for instance,
is clearly visible in a document sent by the Constantinopolitan Greek parishes
to the British Foreign Office and dated 29 January 1920, demanding the union
of Istanbul with the mother country Greece.!2 His name was also impli-
cated in the feud between Constantinists and Venizelists in the city during
1920- 22. Darnianidis had been an active adherent of the former clique and his
conversion to a Turkish patriot appears to have taken place after the collapse
of the Greek forces in Anatolia.
The anti-Phanar activities of Damianidis were fervently supported by Papa
Eftim (Efthymios Karahissaridis), an Anatolian priest of Keskin. Papa Eftim
was a Karamanll Greek Orthodox from Akdagmadeni, nearYozgat. He was
ordained in 1915 and when Gervasios Sarisitis, the archbishop of Angora,
moved to the Phanar in March 1918, he assumed the title of locum tenens for
the parish of Keskin.
13
During the Anatolian war he appears to have been in
close contact with many Turkish nationalist figures. Relying on his Kemalist
connections, Papa Eftim managed to coerce three Greek Orthodox prelates,
who were stranded in the nationalist-held zone, into convening a congress at
the monastery of St. John at Zincirdere, Kayseri (Caesarea). This congress
proclaimed the foundation of a Turkish Orthodox church in Anatolia on 15
Foreign Ministry, Cons., 3 August 1923; Nicholas to Gonatas, Cons., 15 September 1923, all
these documents in YE/B/35.
II. Statement is also given in The Orient News, 14 June 1923.
12. Damianidis signed the petition as the president of the central parish community of Galata
(llpofx5por; vir; /(evrpllc'iir; emrporcfir; Fai.arii) , in FO 371/5190/E2785.
13. On the background of Papa Eftim (1884-1968) see G. Jaschke, Die Ttirkisch-Orthodoxe
Kirche, De,. Islam 39 (1964) 95-129; T. Ergene, lstikliil Harbinde Tiirk Ortodokslarl, istanbul
1951. pp. 1-6.
151
Septemper 1922. While declaring its hostility towards the Phanar, the Turkish
Orthodox church proposed working for the establishment of harmonious
relations between the Muslims and the Orthodox of Anatolia.
14
It was also
tolerated by the Turkish nationalists for it was compatible with the Kemalist
desire to turkify the Anatolian Christians. The basis of this church, however,
was destroyed when the karamanl'l Greeks were included in the exchange of
populations. Although Eftim should have also been included in the exchange
of popUlations, he was able to secure his exemption on the grounds of his
pro-Turkish activities during the Anatolian war. 15
Papa Eftim, who remained the main champion of a nationalist church,
appeared to have been in close contact with Damianidis. In fact, the whole
movement of Damiani dis, who was also ofkaramanll origin, can be seen as an
attempt to publicize in Istanbul the concept ofa nationalist Turkish Orthodox
church. Initially, the followers of Eftim tried to establish links with the
ka/'{fJ1l11nll communities residing in the city particularly in the quarter of
Samatya CY\Vwlla9tfa) and Kumkapl (KOV'WO'KUA.lOV). But the karamanl'l
Orthodox had been largely integrated into the mainstream of the Constan-
tinopolitan Greek community. Throughout the late nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries they became increasingly susceptible to Hellenic influ-
ences channelled through the ecclesiastic, educational and even commercial
institutions. They married into socially established Constantinopolitan
Greek families and adopted the Greek language. Not only were they totally
integrated within the Greek community at large, but the karamanl'i Orthodox
felt intensely attached to Patriarchate and the Phanar tradition. A very
substantial number of karamanll Greeks, such as Siniosoglou, Sismanoglou
and Kehayioglou, achieved eminence for their commercial, philanthropic
and community activities.
Given these circumstances both Eftim and Damianidis were aware that
their movement could have little impact on the karamanl'i Constantinopolitan
Greeks. Instead they attempted to take advantage of the vacuum generated
by the withdrawal of Meletios. As speculation for a new patriarchal election
instensified, Eftim, accompanied by Saffet Arlkan, an inspector of the de-
partment of public order, and Hilmi Fehmi, a Turkish officer, arrived in
istanbul and took up residence in the Tokatllyan hotel at Pera.
16
He im-
14. Memorandum on the Turkish Orthodox church, 24 December 1922 and another 10 January
1923, in YE/B/35. A British report on this movement, 10 May 1922, FO 371/7923/EI2002.
IS. Eftim also secured the exemption of his associate lstamat Zihni Ozdamar (Stamatis
Pulloglou), an karamallil lawyer.
16. Henderson to Curzon, Cons., 26 September 1923, FO 371/9123/E9775; The Times, 3
October 1923.
152
mediately got in touch with the Phanar through the mediation of CyriL
archbishop of Rodopolis. During his meeting with theioclim tenens Nicholas
on 26 September, Papa Eftim claimed that he solely intended to restore the
Orthodox church to its former place of honour with the assistance of its
priests. As a panacea he advocated the election of a turcophone patriarch
who had a Turkish heart. The new patriarch should have neither shown
treacherous sympathy for the British nor spoken rebelliously against the
Turkish state. Above all, he demanded the immediate official abdication of
Meletios as well as the dismissal of six members of the holy synod with
dioceses outside Turkey.17 Offended by his patronizing attitude and particu-
lar'Jy by the insulting statements to the press against the Patriarchate, the holy
synod decided to sever all links with Papa Eftim on 28 September.
18
Anxious to put across his views, the determined Anatolian priest soon
resorted to violence. On 2 October, an hour before the Allied evacuation of
Istanbul, Eftim and his Turkish associates invaded the Phanar. Under duress,
the ten'ified synod deposed Meletios and satisfied the demands of the in-
vaders. Eftim than expelled six members of the holy synod along with the
locum tenens Nicholas, who was replaced by Kallinikos Delikanis, the ar-
chbishop of Cyzicus (Erdek). At first, Eftim declared that he would remain in
the Phanar until a patriarch and seven new members of the synod were
appointed. But he soon changed his mind and after appointing himself the
representative of the Patriarchate in Ankara, he proceeded to the capital to
present his letter of credence to the minister of Justice on 8 October. 1 9 He did
not leave, however, before extorting from the financially plagued Phanar
3,500 TL ostensibly fOf the relief of the karamanil community in Anatolia. In
addition, he took care to have his salary fixed at the rate of 500 TL monthly .20
There is little doubt that the Turkish authorities fully supported Eftim's
while the press gave him a very sympathetic hearing. Some news-
papers went so far as to demand the appointment of Papa Eftim as patriarch.
11
At first. Papa Eftirn claimed that his visit to istanbul had an official
17. Memorandum presented by Eftim to the holy synod, 26 September 1923, YE/B/35.
18. Minutes of the extraordinary meeting of the holy synod on 28 September 1923, YE/B/35.,
19. Minutes of the meetingofthe holy synod on2 October 1923, YE/B/35; Memorandum on the
invasion of the Patriarchate by Papa Eftim. 6 October 1923, YE/B/35; Henderson to Curzon,
Cons., I3 November 1923. Fo 371/9123/EII126.
20. Anninos to Foreign Ministry. Cons .. 10 October 1923. YE/B/35; 'Hpep,juza ma. 9 October
1923.
21. Articles in the Vakil. Tel'hid and Tallill of 4 October 1923 given in YE/B/35.
153
character.
22
Nonetheless, when the authorities urged him against involving
the government in intercommunal matters of the Orthodox, he disclosed that
he had simply acted in a private capacity. It should be remembered that one of
his associates, Saffet, was the brother of Dilaver Arlkan, the police com-
mander in AnkaraP A leading Kemalist, Saffet Arlkan became the general
secretary of the Republican People's party during the late 1920s. There is also
evidence to suggest that Eftim' s trip to istanbul was initiated by Rlza N ur, the
prominent Turkish delegate at Lausanne.
24
Evidently, any challenge to the
power of the Phanar was congenial to the Turkish government. But the
violent methods of Eftim and his arrogant declarations offended Ankara.
Turkey undertook certain obligations towards the religious minorities and
Eftim's excesses were bound to make an unfavourable impression on world
opinion. Consequently, the authorities publicly dissociated themselves from
Eftim's actions. On 12 October, the semi-official press bureau (Anadolu
ajans/) reported that the government refused to accept Eftim as an official
representative of the Phanar since the Patriarchate, a purely religious institu-
tion, had no right of formal representation in Ankara.
25
Likewise, the Turkish
press became less enthusiastic about Papa Eftim. Tanin, moreover, went so
far as to describe Eftim's actions as the product of a komitac'f mind and
summarized the whole affair as theatrical and incompatible with the
dignity of the government .26
3. The election of Patriarch Gregory VII.
After these setbacks suffered by Eftim, the provisional holy synod at the
Phanar was able to free itself from external control and pressure. Meanwhile,
the Greek government renewed its pressure on Meletios to declare publicly
his resignation. 1 This he eventually did and on 12 October the Greek govern-
ment reported to the press that it was desirous of reestablishing friendly
relations with Turkey. When, moreover, Athens announced that it would
recognize a new patriarch in istanbul provided his election was carried out in
12. He introduced himself as such to the Patriarchate. see minutes of the extraordinary
meeting of the holy synod. 26 September 1923. YE/B/35.
23. liischke. Die Tiirkisch-Orthodoxe Kirche, p. 119.
24. Memorandum on the invasion of the Patriarchate by Papa Eftim, 6 Octwer' 1923, YE/B/35.
25 .. Henderson to Curzon, Cons., 13 November 1923, FO 37119123/E1I126. A;1icles in the
Ak!jalll of 12 and Va kit of 13 October 1923. in YE/B/35.
26. hillin, 5 October 1923. Full text in YE/B/35.
L Lambros to the Prime Minister. Thessaloniki. 12 October 1923: Archbishop Kallinikos to
Alexandris. 22 November 1923. forwards an official copy of the letter of resignation. both in
YE/B/35
154
accordance with Orthodox rules, Ankara adopted a relatively lenient attitude
towards the Patriarchate. As a result, on 6 December 1923, the authorities
instructed the synod to make ready for an election. Concurrently, they
furnished the Phanar with an official document outlining the regulations for
the patriarchal election. Signed by assistant governor, Fahrettin, it decreed
that:
2
Aux elections a des fonctions spirituelles et religieuses, ayant lieu en
Turquie, il faut que les electeurs soient des sujets Turcs et exercent lars
de i'election leurs fonctions spirituelles en Turquie, et que la personne
elue reunisse les memes qualites.
Heartened by these developments, the synod proceeded with the election on
6 December and elected Gregory Zervoudakis, the archbishop of Chalcedon
(Kadlkoy) to the patriarchal throne.
3
The new patriarch had a reputation of caution and moderation. A staunch
adherent of the gerolldismos tradition he was closely identified with Patriarch
Germanos V during 1913-18. After Germanos' abdication and the ascend-
ancy of pro-Allied faction at the Phanar, Gregory lost all influence. He was
opposed to the rupture of relations between the Phanar and the Sublime
Porte, and he carried his objection to the point of resignation from the holy
synod. Retiring in his diocese at Chalcedon, he shied away from befriending
the Allies.
4
Because he had refrained from displaying any anti-Turkish senti-
ments during the armistice, Gregory was reckoned to be persona grata at
least with the liberal Turks. Immediately after his election the patriarch
praised the president of the Turkish republic and declared to the press that he
felt sincere loyalty towards the Turkish government. 5 The election of
Gregory caused a great deal of joy in the Greek community and the patIiarch
retired to his see at Chalcedon to await his official enthronement a week later.
Meanwhile, Papa Eftim, who had supported the candidacy of Cyril, the
archbishop of Rodopolis (Ma9ka), declared that he would not abide by the
result of the election. Encouraged by press reports, which alleged that Greg-
ory served Hellenic (Yullan) interests, Papa Eftim and forty armed Turks
once again invaded the Phanar on 7 December. 6 During the take-over a
number of prelates, notably the archbishops of Nicaea (iznik) and Cyzicus
2. Tezkere no. 1092, istanbul vi/dyeti, 6 December 1923.
3. Gregory Zervoudakis (1855-1924). He served as archbishop of Serres and Cyzicus before his
appointment to the seat of Chalcedon in 1909.
4. See chapters 1 and 2.
5. Akram, 6 December 1923. the text was reproduced in The Orient News, 7 December 1923 as
well as the local Greek newspapers.
6. Ergene. op.cit., pp. 87-96; Ak!ja/1l, 7 December 1923.
155
(Erdek), were seriously maltreated by the invader. 7 Immediately after estab-
lishing himself at the Phanar, he announced to the press that he ascribed the
defeat of his protege Cyril to Hellenic intrigue orchestrated by John Politis
(the newly appointed Greek representative in Turkey>. Since the govern-
ment would not accept the new patriarch, Eftim asserted, he occupied the
Patriarchate in the name of the nation. He then hinted that he would remain
in the Phanar until the government declared the election invalid.
s
At the same
time, he addressed a letter to the patriarch ascribing himself as the general
representative of all the Orthodox communities (Biitiin Ortodoks
Cemalitlari Vekil Ulllllllllllisi).
Once again the government thwarted Eftim' s plan to establish himself per-
manently at the Phanar. On 9 December, the authorities ousted Eftim and
his associates from the patriarchal premises.
9
Evidently, while it was pre-
pared to tolerate Papa Eftirn's harassment of the Phanar, the Turkis.hgov-
ernrnent could not allow him to stamp out the Greek Orthodox Patriarchate of
Constantinople. Not only would it have been against the Turkish pledge at
Lausanne to maintain it as a religious institution in its historical seat, but also
it would have violated article 38 of the Lausanne treaty which guaranteed
freedom of religious practice to the non-Muslim minorities. Thus, on 17
December, Seyyid, the minister of justice, declared before the Turkish as-
sembly that the election of Gregory was in order and that Eftim was not acting
with the authorization of the Turkish government.
IO
Further, on 25 De-
cember, President Mustafa Kemal Atatiirk sent a personal telegram to the
patriarch thanking him for his favourable expressions towards the republic. II
This note by the president of the republic was interpreted as a recognition of
Gregory by the Turkish government. Ankara once again reiterated its inten-
tion to allow the operation of the Patriarchate so long as it refrained from
meJdling in politics. Meanwhile, the actual enthronement of Patriarch Greg-
ory took place on 13 December without any serious incident. 12
Using this relative improvement in its relations with the Turkish govern-
ment, the Phanar endeavoured to stern the tide of the Eftimite challenge.
7. Borough to Douglas. Consn 8 December 1923. LPA)DgP; 17/127. For an unconvincing
attempt to justify the violence used by Eftim. see Ergene. o{J.ciL, pp .. 98-100 ..
X. Text of the announcement in The Orielll Nl'Il'I, 8 December 1923: 0:1,[ 4 (1924) 29-30.
'! Henderson to Curzon. Consn II December 1923, FO 371/9124/E9124,
HI. Politis to Foreign Ministry. Cons .. 19 December 1923. YE;Bj35: Henderson to Curzon.
COllSn 19 December 1923. FO 371/9124/EI2138,
11 Borough to Douglas. Cons .. '27 December 1923. LPA/DgP;l7(137; OM 4 (]924) 31
12. Borough to Douglas. Cons ... 14 December 1923. LPA/DgP/17/135; The Times. 14 De-
cember 1923,
156
But, Eftim reacted with equal vehemence. By now he was completely alien-
ated from the Greeks and there was no hope of rehabilitating him in the
Patriarchate. Thus, on 12 December, he laid charges of high treason against
certain members of the synod and in particular against the patriarch. 13 Once
again, however, the tribunal of independence (Istiklal Mahkemesi) , the high-
est court in the country, refused to take action against the Phanar. 14 Realiz-
ing, therefore, that the government would not tolerate a take over of the
Patriarchate, Papa Eftim now campaigned for the transfer of the provisional
centre of the Turkish Orthodox church of the east from Kayseri to Istanbul.
After a coup on 12 February 1924, P a p ~ Eftim established himself as the
priest of the church of Kaphatiani at Galata.
15
On 6 June 1924, in a congress
held at Galata, Eftim and his associates took a resolution to sever all relations
with the Patriarchate. A month later the foundation statutes of the Turkish
Orthodox movement were adopted. 16
To these provocations, the Phanar reacted by defrocking Eftim on 19
February. Then in direct appeals to President Atatiirk and Prime Minister
Ismet tnonu, they requested the intervention of the authorities.
17
But the
Patriarchate was officially informed that the authorities would not interfere in
the Kaphatiani affair for they considered it a matter concerning only the
Orthodox. IS Again when a patriarchal delegation expressed the Phanar's
intention to send a bishop to Kaphatiani to hold a service on 15 August, the
governor (l'{IIi) of Istanbul rebuked the delegates for this decision and
added: 19
l see that you want to disturb the public order; your people must not
set foot in the church unless they want to face machine guns.
Encouraged by the government's tacit acquiescence to the Kaphatiani coup,
Eftim renewed his attack against the Patriarchate. In a long statement to the
press on 3 March he claimed that the Phanar continued to be a hotbed of
11. Politis to Foreign Ministry, Cons., 19 December 1923, YE/B/35; The Orient News, 13 and
14 December 1923.
14. Henderson to Foreign Office, Cons., 2 January 1924, FO 371/10191/EI85.
15 .. Diamandopoulos (Cons.) to Politis (Ankara), J3 February 1924, YE/B/35; Ergene, op.cit, ,
pp. 105-13.
16. Ergene, op.cit., pp. 185-89.
17. Diamandopoulos to Foreign Ministry, Pera, 15 February 1924, YE/B/35; Politis to Foreign
Ministry, Ankara, 14 March 1924, YE/B/35.
18. Borough to Douglas, Cons., 21 July 1924, LPAjDgP/17/203; Jiischke, Die Tiirkisch-
Orthodoxe Kirche, pp .. 122-23.
19. Borough to Douglas, Conso, 20 August 1924. LPA/DgP/17/213.
157
intrigue and reiterated his determination to fight against the treacherous
Greek priests.
2o
He then brought suit against Gregory and the synod claiming
30,000 TL compensation for the patriarchal sentence of excommunication. 21
Finally, Eftim won his case and was awarded 500 TL compensation. The
prestige of the Patriarchate was further undermined when the authorities
proceeded with the seizure of Phanar property in execution of the court's
decision.
22
The second major crisis during the reign of Gregory came about when the
Turkish government abolished the Caliphate on 2 March 1924.
23
The Turkish
press demanded that the non-Muslim religious establishments must also
follow suit and be suppressed as a sequel to the establishment of secularism in
Turkey. 24 The local Greek press rebutted this claim by arguing that there was
no analogy between the Patriarchate, a minority religious institution, and the
caliph who held the most influential position in the Ottoman government. 25 In
this the grecophone press was supported by the Tanill which stressed that
such an act would be contrary to the Lausanne undertaking.
26
At first, it
appeared that the government might be also favourably disposed towards the
abolition of the religious heads of the minorities. Further, on 23 March, the
New York Herald published an interview with the president of Turkey who
allegedly stated that Turkish public opinion could no longer tolerate the
existence of non-Muslim patriarchates,27 Throughout this debate the position
of Patriarch Gregory as the head of the Ecumenical Patriarchate remained
precarious. Anxious to rally support against the suppression of the Patri-
archate, the Greek government sounded its disquiet about these
developments.
28
Finally, the Turkish government announced that it had not
wavered its stand on the non-Muslim patriarchates. Further, on 6 May, the
semi-official Anatolian press agency (Anadolu Ajans/) circulated a categori-
20. See Ergene, op.cit., pp. 144-85.
21. Ibid., p. 111: The Orient News, 14 March 1924.
22 .. Lindsay to Foreign Office, Cons., 7 May 1924. FO 371/10191/E4101; Borough to Douglas,
Cons" 7 April 1924. LPA/DgP/17/178
23. Law 431/1924, see Lewis. Emergence, pp. 262-71.
24. Particularly vocal were the istanbul papers Vatan, Tevhid-i EftaI' and Aks,am see The
Orient News, 12 March 1924.
25. c[Jw; and 'H/1P1(J/a Nia, 12 March 1924: The Orient News 12 and 13 March 1924.
26. Psomiades, The Eastern Question, p. 97.
27. Full text of the interview in Lindsay to Foreign Office, Cons., 7 May 1924, FO
371/10191/E410L
28. Melas to Roussos, Paris, 24 April and 3 May 1924. Kaklamanos to Roussos, London, 30
April 1924, Tsamados to Roussos, Washington, 8 May 1924. For the action taken by the Serbian
government on behalf of the Patriarchate. 3 April 1924, all documents in YE/B/35.
158
cal dementi announcing that the alleged New York Herald interview had not
taken place. Another government organ. the Cumhuriyet. disclosed that
Ankara had not as yet come to a final decision regarding the patriarchates.
29
At the same time, the government conducted an investigation on the past
activities of the Phanar prelates. ~ ( ) While this investigation was carried out,
the authorities adopted an ambivalent attitude towards the Phanar. Not only
was Gregory never officially recognized as patriarch, but also it was with the
connivance of the authorities that Eftim managed to transfer successfully his
Turkish Orthodox church to the city. After establishing himself illegally at
the wealthy Greek Orthodox parish of Galata, Eftim remained a constant
irritant to the Patriarchate. Despite these setbacks, Gregory succeeded in
enjoying a relatively peaceful but short reign. After a reign of over eleven
months, Gregory died on 16 November 1924. As Arnold Toynbee remarked,
by dying in harness, Gregory achieved the feat equalled by few of his
predecessors.31
4. The c.\c!lilngc{[hilit\ ( ~ r thc archhishop, alld thc exPlllsion of Patriarch
COllstalltillc \/1.
By late 1924, the dispute over the status of the Phanar clerics had pro-
foundly unsettling effects on the Patriarchate and at one moment threa-
tened to lead to Greek-Turkish hostilities. As early as June 1924, Patriarch
Gregory expressed his anxiety about the status of the archbishops who had
come to the city later than 1918 and were therefore technically exchange-
able under the terms of the exchange convention. I He then asked the Greek
consul in Istanbul. Kimon Diamandopoulos, to inquire as to the Turkish
intentions on the matter." While at first the Turkish authorities adopted an
evasive attitude, by October 1924 they began to register all the archbishops at
the Phanar," On 16 December. the Turkish authorities requested the mixed
commission for the exchange of populations to issue passports for three
prelates on the grounds that they were exchangeable, The archbishops were
then escorted to the police station and were not released until a Greek
29. Text of this statement of 6 May in Lindsay to Foreign Office, Cons .. 14 May 1924, FO
371/l0191/E437L
30. Stylianopoulos to Foreign Ministry. Cons .. 12 January 1924, YE/B/35 ..
31. SIA, 2 (1925) 269.
L Gregory to Roussos. Cons .. II June 1924, YE/B/35.
2 .. Diamandopoulos to Foreign Ministry, Pera, 9 June 1924. YE/B/35.
3. Diamandopoulos to Foreign Ministry, Pera, 16 October 1924. YE/B/35. A list on the status of
the Phanar prelates compiled by Minister of the Interior Recep Peker on I October 1924.
Y'EjB/35
159
t1
member of the commission, Antony Siotis, and the proprietors of the local
Greek papers, 'HpepfWza Nia and <1>(0:; made strong protests.4 One of the
three detained archbishops was Constantine Araboglou, the strongest con-
tender to the patriarchal throne after the death of Gregory. Meanwhile, the
Turks, both officially and through the press, cautioned the prelates against
electing a patriarch who was considered to be exchangeable. 5 Notwithstand-
ing these explicit warnings, the holy synod proceeded with the election of
Constantine on 17 December. In doing so the Phanar probably wished to
clarify once and for all the ambiguity arising out of the exchange convention
which did not specifically define the position of the prelates of the Patriar-
chate,
Not only did the Turks refuse to recognize the new patriarch, but they also
pressed the mixed commission to speed up Constantine's exchange
procedures.
6
It appears that the new patriarch was rather antipathetic to the
Turks, A religious conservative, Constantine had been the leader of the
anti-Meletios group and had close ties with the royalist Greek government
during 1920-22, A native of Slgl (Sigrni) near Bursa (Brussa), Constantine
arrived in the city in 1921 as archbishop of Cyzicus (Erdek), He was then
translated to Brussa and in 1924 he became archbishop of Dercos (Terkoz).
But Turkish indignation was mainly due to the election of a patriarch who was
clearly objectionable to them. By electing an exchangeable patriarch, the
authorities felt, the Phanar tried to force upon the government the view that
members of the synod should be. exempted from the exchange because of
their position,
When the Turks requested once again the expulsion of Constantine, the
Greek member at the commission asserted that despite the fact that the
prelate had come to Istanbul after 1918, he, like all the other archbishops
forming the holy synod, was not exchangeable,7 After many private discus-
sions, the mixed commission adopted on 28 January 1925 a resolution in the
following terms:
8
The mixed commission, while noting the facts contained in the report
4. Mavropoulos, op.cit., p. 207.
5. Diamandopoulos to Foreign Ministry, Pera, 27 November 1924, YE/B/35; Memorandum on
the events at the Patriarchate proceeding the election, 24 December 1924, FO 371/10859/E55.
6. Copy of the letter addressed by the vlili oflstanbul, Siileyman Sami, to the president of the
mixed commission, 16 December 1924 and another letter from the local authorities to the
subcommission, 3 January 1925, both in YE/B/35; Diamandopoulos to Foreign Ministry, Pera, 18
December 1924. YE/B/35.
7. Souidas to Foreign Ministry, Cons., 9 January 1925, YE/B/35.
8. LNO] (April, 1925) 483; Ladas, op.cit., p. 414.
160
of the sixth subcommission, no. 2360, dated December 17, 1924, in
regard to the possibility of exchanging Mgr. Constantine Araboglou,
former metropolitan of Dercos, according to which Mgr. Constantine
having been born in Asia Minor and having gone to Constantinople
after October 30, 1918, fulfilled in his person all the conditions neces-
sary for the purpose of the exchange, holds that it is beyond its compe-
tence to take decision in regard to the case of this prelate in view of his
status as a metropolitan.
This resolution implied, as it was expressly stated, that the mixed commis-
sion or its agencies were to take no subsequent action. The decision satisfied
the Greek circles in the city and the local Grecophone press expressed its
approval of the resolution.
9
Evidently, with their non-committal pronounce-
ment the neutral members of the commission hoped to prevent the expUlsion
of the patriarch since, according to the exchange convention, no individual
could be exchanged without a passport issued by the mixed commission. At
the same time with their evasive pronouncement, the commission tried to
satisfy Turkish sensibilities by admitting the exchangeability of Constantine
under the terms of the exchange convention and by refraining from even
addressing the prelate as patriarch. Equally, the commission shunned its duty
of interpreting the Turkish undertaking given at Lausanne to maintain the
Patriarchate in relation with the exchangeability of the prelates who formed
the holy synod.
This, however, was precisely what the Greeks urged them to do. The
Greeks stressed that it was inconceivable that the Patriarchate could con-
tinue to exist and function without its organs, namely the individuals of which
it was composed. The Turkish delegation at Lausanne, the Greeks under-
lined, had on 10 January 1923 consented to the retention of the Patriarchate
with all its organizations and constituent bodies in Turkey. Since only two
members of the synod were established according to the Turkish require-
ments, the extention of the exchange clause to the Phanar archbishops would
be tantamount to the abolition of the Patriarchate.
10
Concurrently, the
Greeks asserted that under the canon law all the clerical members of the
Patriarchate were also members of the monastery ofSt. George at the Phanar.
This was acknowledged by the official berats issued by the Ottoman govern-
ment to the Phanar archbishops. Thus, such prelates were subject to the
9. Diamandopoulos to Foreign Ministry, Pera, 29 January 1925, YE/B/35 ..
10. See the 'E}.evBepov Bfjf.1a of28 December andLe Messagerd'Athenes, 29 and 30 December
1924 for the views of Michael Theotokas, a legal expert on the Patriarchate. Alexander Pallis,
too, elaborated the Greek viewpoint in The Times, 3 February 1925.
161
jurisdiction of the courts in Istanbul irTespective of their place of origin. As a
result, the archbishops staying in the Phanar were known as ev6rtllOUVTEX;
_ residing in the community - while the prelates who were sent by the
Patriarchate to administer the ecclesiastical districts outside Istanbul were
called anoollllOUVTEX;;, or those residing outside the community. From this the
Greek thesis concluded that the Phanar archbishops were in fact domiciled in
the city even when they were despatched to the Anatolian dioceses.
l1
The Turks dismissed emphatically such arguments. While acknowledging
the Lausanne engagement, the Turks insisted that this had only been em-
bodied in the proceedings and not in the actual treaty, precisely because of
the domestic nature of the Patriarchate. Because of that, the Turks under-
lined, Turkey did not undertake any treaty obligations with regard to the
Patriarchate and thus no foreign power could interfere in such an internal
matter. Since the Turks considered the Patriarchate a purely Turkish institu-
tion, they felt that it was within their jurisdiction to refuse as one of its
officials a person who, according to their criteria, was ineligible for the
patriarchal position.
12
In speeches at the assembly as well as in memoranda to
the mixed commission, the Turks reiterated this thesisP
On 30 January 1925, moreover, the Turks brought matters to a head by
abruptly expelling Constantine Araboglou from Turkey without even await-
ing the settlement of the issue of a passport by the mixed commission: The
discourteous manner with which the patriarch was removed at 6.30 tn the
morning, without even being given sufficient time to pack his belongings, had
an adverse effect throughout Europe. 14 The reaction in Greece was vigorous.
The patriarch was received by thousands of people in Thessaloniki who
demanded vengeance upon the Turks. While similar demonstrations took
place in Athens, the Anglo-Hellenic society and other philhellene
tions in Europe staged protest meetings. IS The Greek press adopted a belh-
I L :'.Iemorandum by Constantine VI to the League of Nations. 23 February 1925. LN:C.
.. 1925VII The Greek thesis on this issue was supported by a prominent European legal
expert. Dr Karl Strupp. A copy of his expose Le difRrelld greco-llIrc slir /' eloigllell1ellt dll
Patriarche de COlIStalltiJlopie (I March 1925) in YE;B;35.
12 It is. however. interesting that although they argued that the patriarch was a Turkish
officiaL the Turks not only continued to be extremely hostile to the head of the Orthodox church
but they also did not pay him any salary .
13. Copy ofa memorandum addressed by the Turkish minister of Affairs to the Greek
legation in Ankara. 5 February 1925: text of the speech of Premier Fethl Okyar (4 February) and
Minister Sukrli Kaya (10 February). in YErBj35
to Foreign Ministry. Pera. 30 January 1925. YE/Bj35, for details on the
expulsion ..
15. Michalakopoulos to Venizelos. Athens. 6 February 1925. YEB!35: Cheetham to Chamber-
lain. Annual Report on Greece. 1925. FO 371 '11357'C5755
162
cose attitude and the organ of General George Kondylis, the '0)'11(17 <Jj(l)l'lj,
was in favour of the resumption of hostilities.
16
The m;:uor European news-
papers condemned the expUlsion and even the hitherto turcophil Le Temps
strongly criticized the Turkish behaviour.
17
Aft.er addressing a strongly
worded letter to the mixed commission, George Exindaris, the Greek
member at the commission, tendered his resignation on 1 February. 18 The
treatment of the patriarch by the TllIkish authorities. Exindaris protested,
was worse than that accorded to the /wmal.., (porters) of Istanbu\.19
Faced with the expUlsion of the patriarch, the Michalakopoulos govern-
ment found itself in a very awkward position. Acceptance of this Turkishf{Lit
accompli would have weakened considerably the Greek bargaining position
on the other outstanding questions. For the Turks might be encouraged to act
unilaterally whenever a difference of opinion arose between the two
countries.
20
In addition. the issue of the Patriarchate threatened seriously the
stability of the Greek government. Many Greek military leaders felt that
Greece had to respond to the humiliating treatment of the Patriarchate by
declaring war on Turkey, Most outspoken in his statements was General
Theodore Pangalos. who referring to the execution of the six ministers in
1922. warned that the government would suffer the same fate if it com-
promised vital Greek interests. As the Greek premier disclosed to Sir Milne
Cheetham. the British ambassador in Athens. popular excitement might offer
the opportunity to the more extreme element in the military to stage a coup
c/' drat and proclaim a dictatorship.21 While expressing its profound indigna-
tion against the Turkish action. Athen" sought to exhaust all peaceful means
before resorting to hostilities over the patriarchal question.
22
Finally. in an
attempt to placate the refugee section of the population and to reconcile the
militarist group. the Greek government decided to internationalize the
issue. When. therefore. attempts at mediation by France and England failed
to bear results. the Greek government requested. under the provisions of
paragraph 2. article II of the Covenant. that the League of Nations consider
16. The Times, 2 and 3 February 1925: The Dail" Telegraph, 4 February 1925.
17. Diamandopoulos to Foreign Ministry, Pera. 14 February 1925. YE/B/35.
18. Exindruis to De Lru'a, Cons., 30 January 1925: Exindaris to Foreign Ministry, Cons., 31
January 1925, YE/B/35
19. OM 5 (1925) 94-95. 122-23.
20. Politis to Foreign Ministry. Ankara, 9 and 12 February 1925, both in YE/B/35.
21 Cheetham to Chamberlain, Annual Report on Greece, 1925. FO 371/11357/C5755.
22. Cheetham to Chamberlain, Athens, 30 January 1925. FO 371/10859/E560. See also D.
Gatopoulos. 'Al'Jpia:; MI1.a).ar:071ov).O; 1875-1938, Athens 1947, p. 228.
163
the question of the Patriarchate.
23
On 23 February, the expelled patriarch
addressed his own memorandum to the League.
24
At first, the Turkish press demonstrated a naive surprise at the Greek
indignation over the question of the Patriarchate, but soon adopted a
threatening tone accusing the Patriarchate of being an instrument for foreign
interference in Turkish domestic affairs.
25
Thus, the Cumhuriyet of 4 Feb-
ruary went so far as to propose that a complete exchange of the Constan-
tinopolitan Greeks and the Thracian Turks would ipso facto abolish the
raison d' erre of the Phanar. Speaking before the assembly on 4 February,
Premier Fethi Okyar reiterated the Turkish stand. The expulsion of Constan-
tine was brought about because the government was unable to give
preferential treatment to any specific categories of exchangeable Greeks.
He underlined that his government would honour the pledge given at
Lausanne and advised the Orthodox to proceed with the election of a new
patriarch from among those prelates who were not liable to exchange. He also
begged Greece to adopt a reasonable attitude and refrain from menacing
Turkey. Ifnot, he warned, the Turkish people would know how to defend
themselves.26 On numerous occasions, Foreign Minister Kaya re-
peated this warning. The campaign, moreover, against the Patriarchate was
intensified and many deputies accused the Phanar of being a political rather
than a spiritual institution. 27 Strained relations between the two governments
were also accentuated by the attitude of the Fethi Okyar government which
adopted an uncompromising stand on both the Patriarchate and etablis ques-
tions. As Arnold Toynbee pointed out the expUlsion of Constantine was
another example of the autocratic manner of the (Fethi Okyar)
government .28 Ankara also dealt summarily with the two grecophone
papers, 'H /18p1la/a N ia and II o}.zrda, who had been unduly critical of
the treatment accorded to the patriarch.
29
Unlike his predecessor lsmet
inonii, who always handled Greek-Turkish differences with studied restraint,
Fethi Okyar brought the two countries to the brink of yet another war.
30
Nor did the Turks consent to appear before the council of the League of
Nations. Instead, a communique, signed by Turkish Foreign Minister
Kaya, was addressed to the League on 1 March. In it the Turkish government
23. II February. See document LNjC57.M30.1925. VII given in LNO] (April, 1925) 579.
24. LNjC 129.1925. VII.
25. See Mahmut Esafs articles in Hakimiyet-i Milliye 2, 4, 5 and 10 February 1925.
26. See Psomiades, The Eastern Question, p. 61.
27.. Text of speeches in the Turkish assembly on 10, 11 and 19 February 1925 in YEjBj35.
28. A.J. Toynbee and K.P. Kirkwood, Turkey, London 1926, pp. 190-91.
29. Diamandopoulos to Foreign Ministry, Cons .. 10 June 1925, YEjBj35.
30. Politis to Foreign Ministry, Ankara, 4 February 1925, YEjBj35. For details on the etablis
question see chapter IV.
164
the council not to consider the Greek government's application. It
demed having failed to respect the powers conferTed upon the mixed commis-
sion by the convention of Lausanne. Again, it asserted that it had not failed to
conform to the declarations made in Lausanne by its representative ismet
Inonii, when he withdrew his demand that the Patriarchate be removed from
Turkey. It reiterated that the Patriarchate was a domestic Turkish institution
its constitution and administration being subject to Turkish laws and
tions: was, moreover, no clause giving one or several foreign powers
the nght to rotervene on behalf of this The same letter accused the
Greek government of trying to present the Patriarchate as an international
institution and thus interfere in Turkish domestic affairs.31
Notwithstanding the Turkish attempt to challenge the council's compe-
tence, on 14 March the question of the Patriarchate came before the League
of Nations. Dimitrios Kaklamanos, the Greek representative, argued before
the council that the maintenance of the Patriarchate was by no means a
Turkish domestic question. He reminded the council that the question of the
Patriarchate had not only given rise to long discussions at Lausanne, but that
Turkey itself had placed the question of the Patriarchate on the agenda of the
Lausanne conference. By SUbmitting the question of the Patriarchate to an
international conference, he argued, Turkey had in fact acknowledged the
international character of that institution. Kaklamanos further explained that
Greece did not want to deny the fact that the Patriarchate was an institution of
an internal character. The maintenance of the Patriarchate in Turkey had,
however, been the subject of the provisions of international agreements. Any
departure from what had been decreed was a matter of interest to Greece, one
of the states signatory to the treaty of Lausanne, and at the same time an
Orthodox state. Greece would no longer have any reason to concern itself
with the affairs of the Patriarchate once the principles laid down at Lausanne
were confirrned. 32
Because of the Turkish objections, however, the council declined to pro-
ceed with the question. Instead, by a resolution of 14 March, and after a
report by Viscount Ishii, the secretary-general of the council, it decided to
ask the Permanent Court of International Justice for an advisory opinion on
the following question:
33
Do the objections of the competence of the Council raised by the
31. Full text of the letter, LNjC. 160. 1925. VII is given in LNO] (April, 1925) 579.81.
32. LNO] (April, 1925) 482-84. For a memorandum by the Greek government in reply to the
Turkish communique of I March 1925, 3ubmitted to the council on 14 March 1925, LNjC 21 L
M.70.1925.VII in ibid., pp. 637-39.
33.. Ibid., pp. 578-79.
165
Turkish Government in its letter of March 1st, which is communicated
to the Court, preclude the Council from being competent in the matter
brought before it by the Greek Government by its letter to the
Secretary-General of the League of Nations dated February I I,
1925?.
At the same time. the council expressed the hope that it would be possible for
the question at issue to be settled by private negotiations between the two
governments. To this end. the council suggested, they might use the good
offices of the neutral members of the mixed commission.).! Earlier. the
Permanent Court of International Justice had declined to make a pronounce-
ment on the exemption of the Phanar prelates from the exchange when it gave
its advisory opinion on the issue of erablis on 21 February.35
Notwithstanding its indignation with the abrupt expUlsion of the patriarch.
Athens realized that it would reap few concrete benefits by internationalizing
the issue. Thus. the Greek government agreed to follow the advice of the
League and enter into direct negotiations with the Turks. A similar desire for
a satisfactory settlement was also expressed by the Turks. particularly after
the resumption of premiership by Ismet inonu on 4 March. On II April. the
Turkish delegate at the mixed commission withdrew the demand for the
expUlsion of the rest of the Phanar prelates.
36
Concurrently. the nili of
Istanbul offered a qllid pro qllo to the holy synod, according to which the
government would arrange a non-exchangeable status for the archbishops
provided that they proceeded immediately with the election of a new
patriarch.J7 On the government level. too, the Exindaris-Aras negotiations
were resumed and achieved satisfactory results on the question of the
Patriarchate.
38
As previously remarked. these negotiations resulted in the
conclusion of the Ankara accord of 21 June 1925.
Meanwhile. the pro-government press in Athens urged the election of a
new patriarch. The 'EI.cIJ(}r;pol' B1lpa even went so far as to suggest that the
whole affair was brought about by the monkish pig-headedness of the
,:. nod. which persisted in electing Constantine in spite of a waming by the
34. Ibid.
35. Publication of the Permanent Court of International Justice, Series B, No. 10,21 February
1925, Collection of Advisory opinions, Exchange of Greek and Turkish Populations, p. 28.
36. Souidas to Foreign Ministry, Pera, 1l April 1925; Exindaris to Foreign Ministry, Ankara,
12 April 1925, both in YE/B/35.
37. Such meetings between the wlli and members of the synod started in February 1925,
Diamandopoulos to Foreign Ministry, Pera, 24 February and 2 June 1925, both in YE/B/35.
38. Exindaris to Foreign Ministry, Pera, 4 March 1925, YE/B/35.
166
Turkish governmenLJ9 Eleftherios Venizelos, too, was highly critical of the
way the holy synod handled the whole question of the patriarchal election.40
Finally, on n May, Constantine, who initially opposed abdication, for-
warded his resignation to the Phanar from Thessaloniki.
41
This conciliatory
move eased the way for a solution to the question of the Patriarchate. On 29
May, the Turks assured George Exindaris that the election of a new patriarch
would be orderly and that the eight exchangeable archbishops could stay at
the Phanar. In return, the Greek side agreed to recognize that the new
patriarch had to be a persol/a grata with the Turkish government. 42
With the positive outcome of these negotiations, Greece withdrew its
appeal to the League of Nations on I June. In a letter to the League, it stated
that, since the question of the Patriarchate had been successfully concluded,
there was no need for an advisory opinion on the subject by the Permanent
Court of International Justice.
43
Notwithstanding the immediate advantage
of fhis agreement, the withdrawal of the Greek appeal to the League had
far-reaching implications. During the Constantine affair the Turks success-
fully portrayed the Patriarchate as a purely Turkish institution without being
seriously contradicted by any of the western powers. By not awaiting the
pronouncement of the international court on the question of the competence
of the League to discuss the Ecumenical Patriarchate, Greece, too, implicitly
undermined the international character of the Phanar.
5. The reign of Basil III.
Instructed by the government to go ahead with a new election, the holy
synod proceeded with great caution to choose a successor to Constantine.
During a formal meeting with the archbishops of the Phanar at the beginning
of June 1925, the viili oflstanbul, Slileyman Sami, advised them to proceed in
accordance with the precedent of the 1923 patriarchal election. He also
informed them that the election of the archbishop of Chalcedon, Joachim,
would be viewed with displeasure in Ankara. I Conforming with the govern-
ment's wishes, Joachim, the most prominent figure at the Phanar, withdrew
39. Cheetham to Chamberlain, Athens, 8 February 1925, FO 371/10859/E932
40. Venizelos to Foreign Office 12 and 26 February 1925, both from Paris, YE/B/35 ..
41. Once again, Nicholas, the arcbishop of Caesarea (Kayseri) was appointed locum tenens of
the Patriarchate, Keeling to Chamberlain, Athens, 27 June 1925.
42. Politis to Foreign Ministry, Ankara, 7 June 1925, YE/B/35. See also Psomiades, The
Eastern Question, pp. 102-3.
43. LNOJ. (July, 1925) 895.
L Diamandopoulos to Foreign Ministry, Pera, 2 June 1925. YE/B/35; Borough to Douglas,
Cons., 3 June 1925, LPAjDgP/321209.
167
his candidature.
2
The election took place on 13 July and the archbishop of
Nicaea, Basil Georgiadis was duly declared patriarch. The election was con-
ducted in a free atmosphere and when Damianidis and few of his followers
attempted to create an incident the Turkish police intervened and dispersed
the intruders.
3
Basil III, a man of very old age, was a distinguished doctor of canon law and
an eminent liturgist caring more for scholarly pursuits than politics. He came
from an eminent Constantinopolitan family which apparently traced its des-
cent back to the days of the Komninoi. Before being appointed archbishop of
Nicaea (iznik), Basil served at the metropolitan of the trouble striken epis-
copy of Anchialus between 1894 and 1909. Born in the Asiatic suburb of
istanbul, Oskildar (Scoutari) in 1846, the new patriarch was regarded as
acceptable by the Turkish authorities.
4
Soon after the election, George
Exindaris and Tevfik R i l ~ t i l Aras agreed on a formula which recognized as
non-exchangeables eleven senior clerics of the Phanar. This new arrange-
ment was immediately communicated to the authorities in istanbul. 5
Notwithstanding the recent orderly election of a new patriarch, relations
between the authorities and the Phanar could at best be described as tolera-
ble. Although proud of its laicism, repUblican Turkey considered it unwise to
ignore the political record of the archbishops. Endemic suspicion of the
Phanar impeded all attempts to mitigate hardened attitudes. The press con-
tirmed to remind the Turkish people of the past treacherous activities of the
Greek Orthodox and warned them to beware of the Phanar's present ac-
tivities. As a result, intercommunal relations, though modified, remained
tense. Under these circumstances, Basil's tenure of office (1925-29) coin-
cided with one of the most crucial periods in the history of the Ecumenical
Patriarchate.
During this time, Papa Eftim, assisted by his prominent friends in the
government, continued to antagonize the Patriarchate. Above all he
capitalized on the Turkish suspicions of the Phanar. Thus, he inaugurated a
new press campaign against Basil whose election, he alleged, was only
brought about by an intense propaganda financed by the Greek government.
As with previous patriarchs, he accused Basil of publishing anti-Turkish
articles during the armistice. 6 In order to extend his influence in istanbul, the
2. Diamandopoulos to Foreign Ministry, Pera 29 June 1925; YE/B/35; The Times, 9 July 1925.
3. Diamandopoulos to Foreign Ministry, Pera, 13 July 1925; YE/B/35; Hoare to Chamberlain,
Cons., 15 July 1925, FO 371/10860/E3450.
4. Diamandopoulos to Foreign Ministry, Pera, 22 July 1925, YE/B/35.
5. Mavropoulos, op.cit., pp. 214-15.
6. Ergene, op.cit., pp. 201-2.
168
power thirsty Anatolian priest made use of existing rivalries amongst various
groups within the Greek community. Likewise some local Greeks. including
f e ~ Phanar dignitaries. sought to advance their careers -by fraternizing with
EftlrTL The timely invasions of the Phanar in October and December 1923
could not have been staged without the assistance of a couple of opportunist
prelates - Cyril Chatzidimitriou. the archbishop of Rodopolis (Maqka) and
Ambrosios Stavrianos. the archbishop of Neocaesarea (Niksar). Nor could
he have taken over the Galata church of Kaphatiani without the active
participation of a number of local parish trustees. such as Damianos
Damianidis. By using the same means. Papa Eftim managed to occupy Christ
Church of Galata, on 2 April 1926.
7
Another attempt to prevail upon the
church of St Nicholas in May 1926 proved unsuccessful. mainly because of
the vigorous reaction of the parish trustees. The reaction of the local Greek
press was equally vehement. Indignant members of the community accused
Eftim of seeking to erode the distinct ethnic identity of the Greek minority. 8
At the same time. the Patriarchate retaliated by suing Eftim for his arbitrary
occupation of Orthodox churches. During the court hearings. which went on
until 1928. the Greeks rallied to express their profound aversion to the tactics
of Eftim. Anti-Eftim feeling reached such a high pitch that the authorities
were forced to move the court hearings to the Anatolian town of Izmit
(Nicomedia).9
The divisive tactics of Eftim surfaced once again in April 1928 during the
communal election of the Pera ephori, the richest of all the Greek Orthodox
parishes. The administration of the Greek communal property was somewhat
regulated in 1927 when a committee of Turks and a Greek Orthodox (Avri-
lios Spatharis) drew up a statutory charter (KaraaTaTlKo:,; Xapryt:;). In accord-
ance with the Lausanne agreement, this charter handed over the administra-
tion of parish property to the lay members of the community (miitevveli
heyetleri). These lay administrative councils were elected by the members of
the community for periods of four years. IO When therefore the stipulated
period elapsed, the authorities instructed the election of a new ephori at
Beyoglu (Pera). whose membership was made up of forty-four local and six
central trustees.
7. This church was built in 1760 by a group of Greek immigrants from Cephalonia Details on
Ef"tim's attempts against the Galata churches in Borough to Douglas. Cons., 4 April and 5 May
1926. in LPA;DgP/17/271 and LPAiDgP/17/279 respectively. "
8. Ergene, op.cit. pp. 208-9
9. Ergene, op.cit .. pp. 208 f.
10. For the treatment of the administration of non-Muslim communal property see Giineri.
op.ci!, pp 79-108. See also Kw\'ara\,r1\'olJ7wi.I;. 10 April 1927.
169
The smooth execution of the elections was disrupted when two associates
of Papa Eftim, Kotsos Papadopoulos and Michael Ioannidis, were named
members of the central committee. Their election was only made possible by
the interference of the authorities who supervised the parish voting. The
election of two unpopular figures coupled with the unwarrented interference
of the Turkish authorities caused new excitement among the Greeks. A
deputation appealed directly to the viili explaining that both Papadopoulos
and loannidis did not enjoy the confidence of the community. When, how-
ever, their request was refused, the forty-eight remaining members resigned
in protest against the irregularities which had taken place during the
election. 11 Unmoved by this reaction, the two Eftimite trustees, accom-
panied by the police, entered the central church of Panagia at Pera on 6 May
and placed seals on the safe. 11 By June 1928, however, tensions were some-
what relieved when the forty-eight trustees withdrew their resignations.
Consequently, they assumed their duties and, together with Papadopoulos
and loannidis, took up the administration of the Pera ephori. 13
Evidently, the interference of the police during the election, and particu-
larly the removal of the ballot boxes to the local police station, was contrary
to the minority clauses of the Lausanne treaty. The Greek community viewed
the whole affair as an attempt to erode their separate identity. The fact that
the government used strong anti-Phanar figures as Papadopoulos and loan-
nidis intensified this gloom. A Greek of Pontic origins and an exchangeable,
Papadopoulos managed to remain in Turkey thanks to the intervention of
Papa Eftim. Again, with the assistance of the latter, he published the daily
newspaper, McrappUe/llGl:;;, which adopted a strong anti-Phanar stance.
14
By
favouring dubious elements, the Greeks feared, the government would en-
deavour to undermine the authority of the elected parish councils. Impotent
councils, the Greek leaders opined, would have neither the power to repres-
ent effectively the community nor the strength to administer the immensely
valuable properties of the parishes.
b. Restrictions on the eCl/menical role the Patriarchate.
Unable to intervene on behalf of the Greek minority, the Patriarchate
remained an impotent observer throughout the Pera ephori affair. But the
II Sakellaropoulos to Foreign Ministry. Cons. 22 April 1928. YE;Bj37: Memorandum b,
R. H Hadow .. 28 May 1928: FO 13096/E2845
12. DalielOs 10 Foreign Ministry .. Cons .. 10 May 1928 and Dalietos 10 Michalakopoulos. Cons ....
15 \Ia) 1928 both in YE B 37
Clerk 10 Chamberlain. Ankara. 27 June 1928. FO 371 13097'E3314; Sakellaropoulos to
Cons .. 16 July 1928. YEo B.37
14. Ifl:ra/,/,,;(Ijllm; 10 June 1925
170
impotence of the Phanar was even more visible in the international sphere.
Since 1923. the Turkish government remained consistent in its determination
to play down the ecumenical character of the Patriarchate. Thus the head of
the Patriarchate was simply addressed as the archpriest (h(qpapa::). as op-
posed to patriarch. of the Orthodox that happened to live within the bound-
aries of Turkey. Contacts viith the rest of the Orthodoxy were frowned upon
and any such initiative was described as detrimental to Turkish sovereignty.
Extremely sensitive on the activities of the Patriarchate, Turkish public opin-
ion labelled as treacherous any dealings of the Phanar with foreign Orthodox
religious heads. Consequently the authorities assumed an obstructive attitude
towards the visits of the Rumanian and Polish patriarchs in 1927. I Official
sensitivity was best manifested when on 10 December 1925, the Patriarchate
initiated the convening of an Orthodox ecumenical council. The government
flatly refused permission for such an undertaking and when the Phanar sug-
gested the convocation of a pro-synod on Mt Athos to deal with pressing
ecclesiastical questions, such as the calender reform, the press accused the
Patriarchate of intrigue and political activities.
2
Under these adverse circumstances a certain inevitable stagnation per-
meated the Phanar. This was strongly felt among the communities which
came under the ecclesiastical jurisdiction of the Ecumenical Patriarchate.
Thus after an attempt to placate the Soviet Living church in 1925. the
representatives of the White Russian church in exile (established in Kar-
lowitz. Yugoslavia). denounced the Patriarchate for bargainino with the
enemies of Orthodoxy. There were repercussions in the of Ser-
bia and Rumania, which were bitterly hostile to the anti-clericalism of the
Soviet Union. Meanwhile, thE' Greek Orthodox patriarchs of Alexandria,
Jerusalem and Antioch prepared themselves to act on their own account and
convened an ecumenical council in Jerusalem in May 1925.
1
Encouraged by
such reactions. Turkish efforts to weaken the international prestige of the
Patriarchate went on unabated. Thus the police seized the archives of the
Phanar and documents of cardinal importance. such as the decree recogniz-
ing the autonomy of the Serbian church. were leaked to the press. This
'iparked off a campaign against the Patriarchate accusing the patriarch of
anti-Turkish activities.
4
Faced with the visible enfeeblement of the Phanar,
I See CUllliIuriyu, 15 April 1927: !\W\(7T!1\lIln/i;roil; 17 April and 29 May 1927 ..
2 Patriarchal encyclical. no .. 2957 inOpOo()o:;ill 1 (1926) 24
3 OA/' 5 (1925) 80-81
4 Archbishop Germanos Strinopoulos to the archbishop London .. 10 lanum,
171
the Albanian church demanded autonomy. Following this example the tiny
Albanian Greek Orthodox community in Istanbul asked for a separate church
in 1927.
5
International isolation. however. was not the only consequence of having
to operate from within a secular, nationalist and
important was the Patriarchate's moral and financIal detenoratlOn durmg
1922-29. Patriarchs. like Meletios Metaxakis and Constantine Araboglou,
who possessed the ability to steer an independent line, were declared undes-
irable and forced to leave Turkey. Likewise. forceful personalities, like the
archbishop of Chalcedon (Kadik6y). Joachim were kept away from the
patriarchal throne.
6
The patriarchs who were allowed to reign (Gregory
Zervoudakis and Basil Georgiadis) were of advanced age and not equipped to
deal with the extremely sensitive conditions of the post-Lausanne period.
Furthermore. the Phanar's fortunes were greatly affected by the political
relations between Athens and Ankara. The latter was not slow in realizing
that the Phanar could prove an invaluable bargaining tool in their deals with
the Greek government. Given these conditions, many prominent Greeks
propagated the removal of the Patriarchate to another country. Taking into
account the susceptibilities of the other Orthodox churches, some proposed
the island of Cyprus as a possible future location of the Patriarchate. 7 Others,
headed by the former patriarch Meletios Metaxakis, favoured its transfer to
Mt Athos.8 To overcome the canonical objections, the precedent of the
Patriarchate's temporary transfer to N icaea in the thirteenth century and that
of the Vatican in the fourteenth were cited.
Furthermore. conditions in the Phanar seemed to have justified such a
transfeL The expulsion of the Anatolian and Thracian Greeks deprived the
Orthodox Patriarchate in Turkey of its traditional recruitment ground. Al-
ready the Patriarchate began to face difficulties in filling vacant sees with
prelates of the required calibre.
9
The Ecumenical Patriarchate faced an
imminent danger of being reduced to an ordinary parochial church. In addi,
1925: Diamandopoulos to Foreign Ministry. Cons,. 17, 22 and 23 December 1924 all in
YEiB;35,
5 Hoare to Chamberlain. Cons .. I December 1927. FO 371/12318/E5193.
6. Diamandopoulos to Foreign Ministry, Pera 23 June 1925. YE/B/35.
7, The British government. for reasons of its own. strongly discouraged any such proposals.
Colonial Office to Foreign Office, London. 20 February 1925. FO 371' I 0859/El 059
8, Lindsay to Chamberlain. Cons" 3 February and II March 1925 in FO 371;10859(E777 and
FO 371.10859jE1616 respectively. See also 'HJlCf)]im(1 Nia, 31 January 1925.
9" Thus. one of the ablest metropolitans of the Patriarchate Jacob of Durrazzo was trans-
lated to Mitylene and left the Phanar. Borough to Douglas. Cons" 17 February 1925.
LPA DgP!I7i246
172
tion, the Turkish government sought to establish in the patriarchal throne a
sympathetic patriarch. Thus they pressed for the election of Cyril Chat.
zidimitriou, the archbishop of Rod opolis, who had apparently given substan-
tial proof of his Turkish patriotism during World War I. There is evidence to
suggest that this prelate was also sympathetic to the ideas of Papa Eftim.lO
Yet during 1923-29, the patriarchal authorities succeeded in upholding the
separate identity of the Greek Orthodox Patriarchate. Despite a considerable
loss of international and domestic prestige, the Phanar proved resilient
enough to survive the adverse post-Lausanne period.
10 Diamandopoulos to Foreign Ministry. Pem. 2 and 9 July 1925. both in YE/B;35,
173
CHAPTER VI
THE GREEK MINORITY DURING THE GRECO-TURKISH
RAPPROCHEMENT, 1930-40
1. The Greco-Turkish agreements of 1930.
Ever since the Lausanne negotiations the Turks had suspected that Athens
was opposed to the exchange of the Constantinopolitan Greeks because such
a move would have severed their last link with the legacy of the Byzantine
empire. Likewise, the Greeks were inclined to view with suspicion the
Turkish insistence to maintain a minority in Greek Thrace. Both govern-
ments reproached each other not only for desiring to perpetuate a rival
tradition in their respective territories but also for being influenced by a
political arriere pel/See. In the aftermath of the Lausanne treaty, a period of
intense distrust and acrimonious dispute, the minorities suffered substan-
tially. The steady deterioration of relations brought Greece and Turkey to the
edge of yet another armed conflict during the late 1920s. These melancholy
prospects, however, were obviated by a number offactors, among which the
most significant was the outstanding statesmanship of the Greek and Turkish
leaders, particularly that of Eleftherios Venizelos and Mustafa Kemal
Atatiirk.
Decisive political changes took place in Greece when the Liberal party
received an overwhelming vote of support in the parliamentary and senatorial
elections of 1928 and 1929.
1
As a result Greece, for the first time since 1922,
acquired a strong government able to shoulder the responsibility of taking
far-reaching decisions. An additional asset of the new government was Ven-
izelos himself - a politician of national repute and international standing who
was literally idolized by the Asia Minor refugees. The experiences of the
Anatolian war and the Lausanne settlement had radically transformed Ven-
izelos' irredentist aspirations. By 1928 the Greek leader came to symbolize
the idea of peaceful Greek-Turkish co-existence. As soon as he returned to
I H.J. Psomiades. The Diplomacy of Eleftherios Venizelos. 1928-1930" in Essays ill the
\I(,lIIory ofBasii Laollrdas, Thessaloniki 1975. pp. 556-57.
174
office, Venizelos, by emphasizing repeatedly that the notion of megali idea
was dead and buried, strove to proclaim his peaceful intentions. We desire,
he characteristically declared during his first major speech on foreign policy,
to establish with Republican Turkey .. , as friendly relations as possible. 2
?n 30 August 1928, only ten days after his stunning electoral victory, Ven-
lzelos addressed a personal letter to lnonii, with whom he had de ..
vel oped a rapport during the Lausanne negotiation in 1922-23. He explained
to the Turkish prime minister that:
3
Au moment ou Ie peuple heIlene vient de me confier, par une forte
majorite. la direction de son gouvernement pour une periode de quatre
ans, je tiens a vous affirmer mon vif desir de contribuer a un reglement
des rapports de nos deux pays qui leur assurerait une amitie etroite que
viendrait consacrer un pacte d'amitie, de non et d' arbitrage,
d' une etendue aussi large que possible.
rai pleinement conscience du fait que la Turquie n 'a point de vi sees sur
nos territoires, et il m 'a ete donne maintes fois au cours de la periode
electorale de declarer pUbliquement que la Grece n 'a aucune visee sur
les territoires turcs et qu' elle accepte les traites de paix sincerement et
sans reserve. Je ne puis donc douter que Ie reglement de nos relations,
tel que je r entends, corresponde aussi au desir de Votre Excellence.
A la realisation de ce desir commun ne s'oppose aucun obstacle si ce
n' est les questions en suspens entre les deux pays du fait de la conven-
tion d'echange des populations et des accords qui I'ont suivie.
He elaborated the same view in another letter to Tevfik Aras, the
Turkish foreign minister.
4
The response of the Turkish premier was very positive indeed. He wrote
that:
5
("est avec un vif plaisir que j'ai pris connaissance ... du contenu de
cette lettre repondant entierement ames propres vues et marquant dans
I'histoire des rapports helleno-turcs I'ouverture d'une nouvelle ere de
tendance franchement et loyalement amicale.
After expressing his strong wish for an improvement in Greco-Turkish rela-
tions, the Turkish foreign minister, too, concentrated on making practical
2 .. Le MessaRer d'Athelle.\, 23 July 1928. For the full text ofVenizelos' speech in Thessaloniki
lin 22 July 1928 see BMAEV/173
3.. Venizelos (Athens) to Ismet Pacha (Ankara). 30 August 1928. BMAEV;50 See D .. Kitsikis.
Les Projets d'Entente Balkanique. 1930-1934" in Reme Historiqlle, 241 (1969) 118.
12
4 .. Venizelos (Athens) to Tewfik Ruschdy Bey (Ankara). 30 August 1928. BMAEV/50.
5. Ismet (Ankara) to Venizelos (Athens). 27 September 1928. BMAEV;50.
175
suggestions as to how a detente between the two countries could be
achieved.
6
Speaking before the national assembly on 14 September, ismet
tnonil stressed that there was no obstacle in the way of a Turco-Greek
understanding.7
Given the sober approach of the two governments, Greek-Turkish nego-
tiations were resumed in December 1928. In July 1929, a new Greek represen-
tative, Spyridon Polychroniadis, was accredited to Ankara, with personal
instructions from Venizelos to intensify the peace efforts.s Likewise, Presi-
dent Atatlirk directed the Turkish foreign office to eliminate all obstacles
hindering a treaty with Greece.
9
The attendance, for the first time in history,
of the Turkish minister in Greece, Mehmet Enis Akaygen, at the official Te
Deul11 on the anniversary of the Greek independence was a sign of Turkey's
new conciliatory mood. I 0 The positive Turkish response to the Greek pre-
mier's peace initiative was largely facilitated by the spectacular transform-
ation that had taken place in Turkey during the 1920s. After an initial period of
inward, anti-European and ultra-nationalistic stance, Turkey steadily
evolved into a state with a western approach ready to stay outside the Soviet
sphere of influence. Turkey now wished to resolve its differences with the
West and especially with its Balkan neighbours.
11
Given the revisionist
designs of Bulgaria, Turkey, like Greece, welcomed an alliance between
states that adhered to thestatlls quo. Again, a Greek- Turkish rapprochement
was bound to have a favourable impact in Western Europe, and particularly
in Britain.
l
.:! This in turn would help Turkey decrease its dependence on the
Soviet Union. Clearly, the Greek - Turkish endeavour for a rapprochement
was purely political and was primarily dictated by common defense consider-
ations.
The breakthrough in the Greek-Turkish talks was largely influenced by the
major foreign policy speech delivered by Venizelos before the Greek parlia-
ment on 10 February 1930. Having accepted in good faith all the treaties that
had followed the World War, Venizelos declared, Greece was attached to
6 .. Dr Ruschdy (Ankara) to Venizelos (Athens). 27 September 1928. BMAEVj50.
7 .. See SIA 6 (1928) 221: K.D. Svolopoulos. H Ti.i'II'IKI; 'Ec,oJ!EplIa; 17oi.lTlKli IIW] nil' EVl'OljK1l
(Ii; ;lw(d\'l'1/;, 'H KpiaIllO; Kajlm; 'lovi.lO;-dEKSjlfJpW; 1928, Thessaloniki 1977, pp. 141-52.
8. On the talks. Po1ychroniadis to Foreign Ministry. Ankara. 2 March 1930: Polychroniadis to
Venizelos, Ankara, 3 June 1930, both in BMAEV/57 ..
9 .. Psomiades. The Diplomacy of Eleftherios Venizelos, p. 564.
10. Ibid. and for more details in Ramsey to Henderson. Athens. 26 March 1930. FO
371 IJ4575jEI 570 ..
I L A.H. Ulman and 0_ Sander. TUrk Politikasina Yon Veren Etkenler 0923-1968) II in
SBFD, 27: 1 (1972) 3-4.
12. [IIOIII/'lIiill Soy/e!' I'e Istanbul 1946. pp. 198-99,.
176
peace with the world at large and particularly with Turkey. He predicted that
the exchange of population negotiations would soon be brought to a success-
ful conclusion. This, he opined, would be foIIowed by a treaty offriendship
between Greece and Turkey and as a result a naval understanding regarding
the balance of power in the Aegean would be possible.1
3
Such an agreement was first signed on 10 June 1930 by Turkish Foreign
Minister Tevfik Aras and Spyridon Polychroniadis, the Greek minister
in Ankara. Consisting of twelve chapters, this convention was divided into
thirty-four articles. It dealt almost exclusively with the liquidation of ques-
tions arising from the application of the Lausanne treaty and of the agreement
on the exchange of populations. On the thorny issue of property belonging to
exchangeables. both governments came to the conclusion that it was impos-
'iible to arrive at a just and accurate estimate on its value. Consequently, they
agreed to consider both Greek and Turkish claims as balancing one another.
While the property of the exchangeables was transferred without compen-
sation to the Greek and Turkish governments, each party undertook to
compensate its own refugees. A notable exception to this rule was prop-
erty seized in Istanbul and Greek Thrace. Such properties were to
be restored to their rightful owners within two months. Further, the Greek
government agreed.to place at the disposal of the mixed commission the
sum of 425,000 to be used for the compensation of three categories.
Firstly, 150,000 was to be paid to those Muslims of Greek Thrace whose
properties were requisitioned by the Greek governmenL Another 150,000
was allocated for the Constantinopolitan Greek etablis who were to lose their
properties in Turkey outside the vitayet ofistanbul. FinaIIy, 125,000 was to
be paid to the Turkish government, one half immediately and unconditionally
and the other half (in two instalments) on Ankara's fulfilment of its obliga-
tions under the convention. The first half of this sum was to be paid to those
former Turkish owners of property in Greece who were now living in Turkey
and whose property was confiscated by the Greek governmenL The second
half was to be made available. if necessary, for the compensation of the
Constantinopolitan etab/is and Hellenic nationals in cases where the Turkish
authorities were able to satisfy the mixed commission that restitution was
impossible.
14
Initially the sum agreed upon was 150,000 but Turkey agreed
to diminish it by 25,000 in order to compensate part of the estimated value of
13.. P Pipinelis. 'luTOpia vi:; 'E:;'WrcPIKlj; 170i.lTlh7j; ni; Eii.d6o; 19231941, Athens 1948. pp
51-53..
14 .. The official text of the Ankara convention of 10 June 1930 appears in French in Ladas.
op.cil., appendix VIII, pp_ 817-30. For an analysis and evaluation of its terms. see idem .. pp
567-n
177
properties left behind by the non-exchangeable absent Greeks of istanbul. 15
It is beyond doubt that Greece considered such payments unjust. Athens
felt that the properties of some 1.,200,000 thriving Ottoman Greeks were much
greater in value than the properties left behind by about 400,000 Hellene
Muslims. Thus in view of its financial terms, the Ankara convention was
regarded as yet another Turkish triumph and yet another major Greek con-
cession for the sake of stabilizing Greco- Turkish relations. The Greek gov-
ernment was also anxious to mitigate the precarious position of the Greek
minority whose numbers steadily decreased because of the adverse political
climate during the 1920s. Financial sacrifice, as Venizelos pointed out on
numerous occasions, was the price Greece had to pay in order to safeguard
the future of the Greek minority in Turkey. The treatment, he emphasized
during a speech in the Greek chamber, that the Greeks of Turkey will get is
directly analogous to the state of Greco- Turkish relations .16 The interests of
that minority were also championed by five influential former Constan-
tinopolitan Greeks (Alexander Pappas, Alexander Voutyras, Basil Var-
dopoulos, Anastasios Misiriglou and Frankiskos Sarantis) who since 1928
had been members of the Venizelist government.
Indeed, with the Ankara convention the vexed question of the etablis was
finally settled in a way which proved satisfactory to the Greek side. Under the
agreement, Turkey recognized all Greek Orthodox who were actually pres-
ent in istanbul as Turkish citizens (Turk vatanda:{l) regardless of the date of
their arrival in the city or the place of their birth. In principle, this provision
was more comprehensive than that contained in the earlier agreement of 1
December 1926, since it did away with the additional requirement of proof of
their presence in istanbul prior to 30 October 1918,17 Overall, the major
beneficiaries from this provision were the Phanar archbishops and on 23
September 1931, the patriarch received a certificate, signed by the mixed
commission, acknowledging his etablis status.1
8
According to the official
Turkish census of 1935, there were 125,046 etablis Greek Orthodox of whom
17,642 were Hellenic nationals .19
15.. Clerk to Henderson. Ankara. 16 January 1930. FO 37I/I4575/E463; Ladas. op.cil., pp.
582-81.
16 .. Text of this speech in Ramsey to Henderson. Athens. 18 June 1930, FO 371/14576/E3403;
Le MessageI' d'Atl!i:Jles, I7 June 1930.
17. The first paragraph of article ten (chapter V) of the convention stipulated that:
La Turquie reconnalt la qualite d'etablis a tous les grecs orthodoxes ressortissants
lUrcs, actuellement presents dans la zone d'Istanbul et Ie lieu de leur naissance ..
18. 'Op80ooia, 6 (1931) 547.
19. IY 9 (1936/37) 41-43
178
The thorny question of the non-exchangeable Constantinopolitan Greeks
who fled the city without regular Turkish passports in 1922 was also dealt
with by the Ankara convention. Greece renounced their claim to non-
exchangeable status and their properties in Turkey were officially recognized
as state property. In return Turkey consented to give up 25,000, to which an
equal amount was added by the Greek government, for the compensation of
the non-exchangeable absent Greeks.
20
The latter strongly opposed these
clauses and they even staged a protest demonstration on the eve of the signing
of the agreement.
21
With the settlement of questions arising from the ex-
change of popUlations the way for a closer understanding between the two
countries was paved. On 26 October 1930, the Greek premier, accompanied
by his foreign minister, Andreas Michalakopoulos, arrived in Turkey for a
five day official visit. During this visit Greek and Turkish leaders signed a
comprehensive treaty of friendship whose aim was to lay the cornerstone for
a lasting Greco- Turkish detente. Thus on 30 October a treaty of neutrality,
conciliation and arbitration, a protocol of parity and naval armaments and a
commercial convention were signed. 22 The October pact was hailed through-
out the world as a major contribution to the cause of peace, comparable to the
Locarno agreement signed by the western European nations. The Greco-
Turkish Entente Cordiale was, in fact, to prove one of the most durable
diplomatic engagements concluded during the interwar period.
Not only did the diplomatic relations between the two countries enter a
more propitious phase but also the attitudes of both Greeks and Turks
towards one another gradually began to mollify. Thus while in 1930 a consid-
erable section of the Greek opposition, and particularly the refugee organiza-
tions, were hostile to the June 1930 agreement, a year later there was a
unanimous approval of the policy of reconciliation. This was reflected in the
cordial reception accorded to the Turkish leaders, ismet inonii and
Aras, who visited Athens in October 1931. Interestingly, the enthusiastic
crowds which welcomed the Turkish leaders were largely made up of
Anatolian refugees.
Turkish public opinion, too, welcomed the new spirit of conciliation. Thus,
in August 193 I, 300 Greeks from Crete visited Istanbul and were received
20. Article 28 of chapter X, see Ladas, op.cit .. p .. 828.
21 Ramsey to Henderson. Athens. 26 May 1930. FO 371/14575/E2869.
22 .. For the text of the pact. see 'IfJI/Jlpi::; ni:; K/Jppl'1aew:;, IS April 1931. p .. 655 ff .. After its
approval by the Turkish assembly the pact became law (no. 1758;1931), see Resl/li Gll::ele, 15
March 1931, The best analysis of the Greco- Turkish agreement is given in I. Anastasiadou. '0
Kat TO 'Et,l,llvOTOUPK1KO LUJ.!CjlWVO TOU 1930, .I{c;.cniJlara rlJjJw c17l{) TOI'
&1/(,1;)0 h'lli nil '7101'; TO/J, Athens 1980. pp. 309-426.
179
cordially by the Cretan Muslims now living in Turkey.23 Given the long and
bitter enmities between Muslims and Christians in Crete during the late
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the significance of the new entente
may be realized. Throughout the 1930s a stepping up of exchanges between
Greeks and Turks was experienced. University students, journalists, football
teams, theatrical companies as well as political and military leaders ex-
changed frequent visits. After the fall of the Venizelos government in 1932,
both the Tsaldaris and Metaxas administrations followed the policy of
rapprochement. With new political agreements in 1933 and 1938, as well as
commercial pacts in 1933, 1934 and 1938, the two countries consolidated the
policy of friendship inaugurated by Atatiirk and Venizelos.
24
Inevitably, this new approach in Greco-Turkish relations was reflected in
the treatment of minorities. Both the Greek and Turkish governments
adopted a more broad-minded attitude towards their respective minor-
ities. Indeed, the spirit of reconciliation gave a psychological boost to the
Greek business community in Istanbul. Aware that close relations between
the two nations would improve their lot, the Constantinopolitan Greeks
adhered wholeheartedly to the Greco-Turkish friendship.25 Thus soon after
the signing of the Ankara convention, Greeks were allowed to travel freely in
the interior of Turkey, a privilege hitherto enjoyed only by the Muslim and
Jewish Turkish citizens. Members of the Greek minority would need a special
permission from the local authorities only when they wished to remain in
Anatolia for more than three months.
26
Again, with the ratification of the
Ankara convention, the Turkish government raised the sequestration on
property and bank deposits owned by Constantinopolitan GreeksY In ac-
cordance with the sllme agreement, the wives, minors and unmarried daugh-
ters whose family heads were established in istanbul were allowed to return
in the city. Another step reflecting goodwill of the Turkish government
was the inspection of conditions by the minister of the interior in the mainly
Greek inhabited islands of Imbros (G6kgeada) and Tenedos (Bozcaada) in
230 The Times, 3 October 1931; Wo Miller, The Greco-Turkish Friendship, Contemporary
Rel'iel\', 140 (1931) 7IS-19.
24. On 9 February 1931 Greece and Turkey granted each other reciprocal treatment of most
favoured nation and in October 1935 a new company. Sociere Anonyme Hella-Tlnk was inaugu-
rated in Athens to foster Greco-Turkish trading relations. .
25. In 1929. the Constantinopolitan Greek business community had requested from Venizelos
to put an end to Greco-Turkish bickerings, see I. K, Vogiatsidis, To 'Ei.;,'l\'OroVpnll{(J I' LUJUPW\,Ol
<P/iia:;, 19301933, Thessaloniki 1937. pp .. SO-S2,
26. OM, 12 (1932) 142,
27, The Times, 25 July 1930 ..
180
August 193 J.28 Further, in February 1935, the Turkish government took the
unprecedented step of inviting members 9f the minorities to sit the Turkish
assembly. The Greek member, Dr Nicholas Taptas was a prominent istanbul
throat specialist with European repute.
29
Taptas was nominated as an inde-
pendent deputy for Ankara and as he himself stressed in an interview with
VILIS, he was not just a representative of an ethnic minority but of the
Turkish nation at large.3o Encouraged by this remarkable consolidation of
Greco-Turkish relations, many prominent Greeks even envisaged the found-
ation of a Greek-Turkish confederation.
31
L Persistence of Greek grievances.
Despite the remarkable change of attitude towards the Greek minority,
Turkish public opinion remained consistent with the initial Kemalist prin-
ciples of nationalism and secularism. Turkish nationalism remained a promi-
nent feature of political life throughout the 1930s and new impetus was given
to the attempts of creating a Turkey run by Muslim Turks. Further, Turkish
nationalism was still a rather recent phenomenon and, despite changing
political circumstances, retained its insecure and volatile characteristics.
While, therefore, the basis for a Greco- Turkish symbiosis, was present, there
was a tendency for past prejudices and enmities to re-emerge. At the same
time, as part of its westernization and modernization program, the Turkish
government wished to display a liberal image to the international public
opinion. Thus Turkey's decision to join the League of Nations on 18 July
1932.1 Yet this liberal image often went counter to the fundamental Kemalist
principle of Muslim Turkish self-sufficiency, particularly in the political and
economic fields. Ankara, therefore, had to steer a very delicate course
between these two expediencies.
28. In these two Turkish-owned islands there is still an indigenous Greek popUlation which
survived the exhange of popUlations in 1923, Although these Greeks shared a common destinv
with tho,e oflstanbul. due to their geographical position and occupational composition
the Constantinopolitan Greeks this was an overwhelmingly agricultural population). they formed
a separate unit with their own particular problems. For a treatment of this community, see my
own lmbros and Tenedos: A Study in Turkish Attitudes Toward two Ethnic Greek Island
Communities since 1923. journal (d' the Hellenic Diaspo/'{/, 7: I (19S0) 5-31.
29, The other three were: the Armenian banker Keresteclyan. the Jewish member Dr Ab-
ravaya MarmaraH and the Eftimite Istamat Zihni Ozdamar. ostensibly elected together with Dr
Taptas as member of the Orthodox community.
30. Speech quoted in Loraine to Simon. Ankara. 15 February 1935. FO 371/19034/EI20S.
31 Do Kitsikis. 'Ei.i.a:; gai .::c\'o/ 1919,1967, Athens 1977. pp .. SO-S5,
I For details see M. Giinliibiiyiik. Atatiirk Devrinde Tiirkiye'nin Dl Politikask Turkish
Yearbook of International Relation.l, 2 ( 1961) 210; D . E.. Webster. The Turkey ofAwtiirk: Social
Proce.ls in the Turkish Reformation, Philadelphia 1939, pp. I17-IS.
181
This dilemma was well demonstrated during the municipal elections held in
Istanbul in 1930. The newly formed Free Republican party (Serbest
Cllmhllriyet Firkas'i), led by Fethi Okyar, courted the suppOIi ofthe religious
minorities. The new party, though adhering to the Kemalist principles, made
a number of promises such as a reduction in taxation, emphasis in laissez-
faire economic policies, freedom of the press and other liberal measures.
Such policies were largely attractive to the non-Muslim urban bourgeoisie
and many members of the minorities took a prominent part in the municipal
elections.
2
By inviting the minorities to take an active part in the elections,
the moderate Fethi Okyar was in accordance with the policy of west-
ernization, as well as with the new spirit of Greek-Turkish co-existence
adhered to by Ankara.
Yet Okyar' s attitude was sharply criticized by the organs of the ruling RPP.
Attacking the timing of such a collaboration with the non-Muslim minorities,
they stressed that only a few years had elapsed since Greeks and Armenians
were the mortal enemies of the Turks. The view that the minorities had the
right to assume public responsibilities and even be elected as deputies,
expounded by the Free Republicans, was strongly opposed by the ruling
party. The minorities, too, incurred severe criticism for involving themselves
in Turkish politics. Even Premier Ismet Inonil seemed to have disapproved of
the line adopted by Fethi Okyar. Commenting on the policies of the opposi-
tion he remarked that
the new party is providing a rallying ground for all sorts of discon-
tented and disgruntled politicians and that such a nucleus can not form
the basis for a really strong progressive party.3
By discontented elements, Ismet Inonil did not only refer to non-Muslims.
Above all it was the widespread anti-Kemalist Muslim support enjoyed by the
newly-founded party which worried the government. Through the infiltration
of the Free Republican party organization, the government strongly sus-
pected, social and religious reactionaries would once again attempt to chal-
lenge the secular principles of the Turkish republic. There were indeed signs
to justify these fears. Fethi Okyar's speeches were often followed by
bances and even riots while there were ominous stirrings in the eastern
provinces. Faced with the possibility of widespread agitation, the Free Re-
pUblican party was induced to abolish itself and by November 1930 Turkey
2. See interview of Okyar to an Amlenian paper in OM. 10 (1930) 439-40; The Times. II
October 1930.
3. The Times. 26 August 1930.
182
had returned to one party rule.
4
Despite the marginal importance of the
minority issue during this affair, it is interesting that the government was still
opposed to any direct non-Muslim involvement in Turkish politics.
The urge of Turkish nationalism, perhaps partly influenced by the formid-
able nationalist movements in Germany and Italy, led on several occasions to
expressions of anti-minority and anti-Semitic feeling during the 1930s. Thus
in 1934, the authorities had all Jews forcibly deported from the strategically
sensitive zones of Edirne (Adrianople) and the Straits.s Again, after the
obligatory adoption of surnames by every Turkish citizen in 1935, pressure
was brought to bear upon the minorities to adopt Turkish sounding surnames.
This applied particularly to the Greeks who were urged to drop from their
surnames such endings as dis and pOlllos. 6 Of similar significance were the
activities of the citizens speak Turkish (I'atallda!'j Turkr;e kOl1l1!'j) movement
during the 1930s. In order to compel the minorities to adopt the Turkish
language. this organization campaigned for the enactment of stringent meas-
ures. Sporadic attempts to enforce such views were made during 1938 and the
British ambassador in Turkey, Sir George Clerk, reported that local Greeks
and Jews were fined or blamed for speaking a non- Turkish language. 7 A bill
was even put fOIward to compel the Jewish minority to speak only Turkish,
but it was defeated at the assembly. It is clear that the government tried to
contain these extreme expressions of nationalist zeal. As the British ambas-
sador to Turkey, Sir Percy Loraine remarked in December 1938, there was no
widespread anti-Semitism in Turkey except in so far as discriminations may
be made against all the non-Muslim elements - for example, restriction of
residence in certain areas, entry into government service and the like. 8 In
particular President Atatilrk officially dissociated himself from such attitudes
and, mindful of international opinion. was careful to avoid even the slightest
taint of anti-minority sentiment. This moderation was greatly appreciated by
the minorities and the Turkish president enjoyed an enormous popularity
among the non-Muslim Turkish citizens.
But the single most serious grievance of the Greek minority was against the
so-called Turkish Orthodox movement. Barely a month before the signing of
4. Fora general treatment of the Free Republican party see Tunaya. Tiirkiye'de Partiler.
pp. 622 ff. For a reference on the minority involvement in the new party. W.E Weiker, Political
Tlltelage alld Democracy ill Turkey: The Free Party al1d its Aftermath. Leiden 1973. p. 113.
5. AT. 8 (1934) 50-54: The Times. 5 July 1934.
6. Ei.cliOcpol' Blipa. 30 September & 25 December 1934.
7. Annual Report: Turkey 1938. Clerk to Eden, Ankara, FO 371/23301/EI214. See also OM 17
(1937) 226: The Tillles. 31 March 1937.
8. Loraine to Eden. Ankara. 31 December 1938, FO 371/23290/EI50.
183
the Ankara convention, istamat Zihni Ozdamar, a close associate of Papa
Eftim and a leading member of the Turkish Orthodox, managed to get him-
self appointed the chief trustee of the historic Greek hospital of B all kll.9 This
notorious Anatolian lawyer enjoyed the close friendship of a large number of
eminent Turkish political figures and thanks to his strong connection in the
government he was appointed deputy in 1935. He was also instrumental in the
promotion of a movement entitled the association of lay Christian Turks.
On 14 July 1935. the association held its inaugural meeting, attended by 35
people. at one of the People's Houses (Halkevleri) in istanbul. In a statement
published in the local press. the association declared that their aim was to put
an end to the economic and political ostracism suffered by the minorities.
Since it is impossible for us to live as minorities, they argued, let us
declare once and for all our readiness for fusion. Thus the association
expressed its readiness to break away from the Greek and Armenian com-
munities. give up their maternal tongues and be assimilated in the mainstream
of Turkish society. They intended to begin their program by closing down all
minority schools. In this appeal to the Christian minorities, the association
expressed its abhorrence for the word minority (ekalliyet) and claimed 69
members. 10 The president and the majority of its members appeared to have
been Armenians. though the secretary of the association was an Eftimite
Greek called Triandaphyllos. Likewise, it was supported by another notori-
ous figure, Kotsos Papadopoulos. the owner of the grecophone daily.
,v!;;wPPV()/-IlUl;'. 11 While it is not clear whether the association acted on its own
initiative. there was sufficient evidence to indicate that it enjoyed the encour-
agement of the ruling RPP. 12 Like all similar movements, however, the
association of lay Christian Turks failed to win the support of the religious
minorities and soon faded into obscurity.
Without access to the Turkish archives it is impossible to estimate the
dearee of Government involvement in organizations, such as the Turkish
'" '"
Orthodox movement. the citizen speak Turkish movement and the associ-
ation oflay Christian Turks. It is. however, clear that although committed to
the concept of Greco- Turkish co-existence, the Turkish government did not
let detente interfere with crpcial Kemalist policies such as the Turkification
of commerce and the seculariza,tion of the state. While, therefore, in accor-
dance with the Greco-Turkish agreement, Ankara renewed the work permits
of the Constantinopolitan Hellenic subjects in 1930, it concurrently pursued
9 .. For more details see chapter VII:2.
10. Loraine to. Hoare. Cons .. 2 August 1935. FO 37IjI9037/E4806 ..
II ,IIcrappl'l()p{(n:;, 16 July 1935.
12 .. Ibid
184
vigorously the policy of Turkish economic self-sufficiency . When, moreover.
economic difficulties, provoked mainly by the world-wide general de-
pression, affected Turkish trade, the Ankara assembly reacted by reserving a
wide range of professions and trades for Turkish nationals in 1932,13 By a
later enactment, the measure was to be enforced gradually, in six periods of
three months ~ a c h , commencing on 1 December 1933.
This measure mostly affected the Hellenic nationals who, estimated at
26,431, formed the largest single foreign community in Turkey. In addition,
Hellene Greeks specialized mainly in handicrafts and small trades which
were actually included in the bill. Likewise, Hellene Greeks were well-
represented in such professions as chemists, dentists, surgeons, lawyers
and engineers, all now reserved to Turkish nationals.
14
Despite some delay
the Turkish government proceeded with application of the new law which
went into effect on 26 July 1934. Immediately, the first group of 150 Constan-
tinopolitan Hellenes. mainly chauffeurs, tailors and shoem'akers with their
families. left Istanbul for Greece.
15
Shortly after, a marked exodus of
Hellenic subjects followed reaching the figure of 2,000 within a few months
from the enforcement of the law.
16
Thus while there were 26,431 Hellenes,
according to the official Turkish census of 1927, this figure was down to
17.642 in 1935,17 The calculations of the British embassy, which estimated
that some 10.000 Constantinopolitan Hellenes were affected by the act.
coincided with the Turkish figures. 18
The expUlsion of such a great number of Constantinopolitan Greeks.
almost all of them born and brought up in Istanbul, angered Greek public
opinion. A certain amount of resentment was also expressed in the Greek
parliament while the Athenian press protested vigorously against the Turkish
measure which threw thousands of Hellenes out of work.
19
'. Greekf(Jreign policy on the minority question.
Unable to influence the Turkish government in favour of the Cons tan-
tinopolitan Hellenes, the Greek government was left with no other choice but
'to conceal its indignation and start resettling the thousands of newly arrived
13. Law no. 2007/4 June 1932 .. The text can be found in ReslIliGa;:ele, no. 21260f 16June 1932.
14. Clerk to Simon. Ankara. 3 February 1933. FO 37I!16984/E826.
15. The Tillles, 27 July 1934.
16. Waterlow to Simon. Athens. 18 July 1934. F037 I;I 8396/R41 79 .. See also OM 14 (1934) 279.
17. IY no. 380 (1959) 84.
18.lbid
19.. Annual Report: Turkey 1954. Loraine to Simon. Ankara, FO 37IjI9037/E854.
185
Greek citizens. The whole affair, in fact, illustrates a problem which was first
elaborated by the Greek diplomatic corps in Turkey at the height of the
Greco-Turkish rapprochement. The Greek envoys in Turkey strongly ques-
tioned the accuracy of V enizelos' evaluation that a Greco-Turkish agreement
would automatically ensure the improvement of the position of the Constan-
tinopolitan Greek community. Given the Turkish disposition towards the
ethnic minorities and the policy of Turkification, they found grave shortcom-
ings in Venizelos' approach. Thus in a series of detailed and informative
reports, the Greek vice-consul in istanbul, A. Dalietos drew a realistic picture
of the difficulties encountered by the Greek minority in Turkey. He outlined
the pressures applied by istamat Zihni Ozdamar on the community institu-
tions and his illegal appointment, with the connivance of the authorities, to
the ephori of BallkIl. The Turkish restrictions on the Greek communal and
educational institutions, he stressed, went on unabated even after the signing
of the Ankara convention.
1
While he did not doubt the beneficial effects of the
Greco-Turkish understanding, he urged that Greece should adopt a friendly
but firm policy on the question of the minorities. Otherwise, he predicted,
the Greek community as well as the Hellenic character of Constantinople
would be sacrificed on the altar of Greco-Turkish friendship.
2
So con-
cerned was the Greek vice-consul with the future of the Constantinopolitan
Greek community that he even ventured to inquire as to whether the Greek
premier would contemplate altering Greek foreign policy on the question of
the minorities. 3 Similar views were expounded by the Greek representative in
Ankara, Spyridon Polychroniadis. In a letter to Venizelos on 28 July, the
Greek diplomat stressed that the Constantinopolitan Greek community, to-
gether with the Muslims in Thrace, should be a uniting link (avvOe"ClI)C;
KpzKor,;) between the two nations. The minorities should be a help, mstead of a
hindrance in the development of friendly relations between Athens and
Ankara.
4
On the eve of the Greek premier's visit to in October 193?,
Constantine Sakellaropoulos, the consul-general in Istanbul, hIS
efforts to impress upon Venizelos the problems of the Constantmopohtan
Greeks. First of all he reassured Venizelos that:
s
L Dalietos to Foreign Ministry. Cons .. 1 I June 1930, BMAEVj228jI4.
1 .. Dalietos to Foreign Ministry. Cons .. 13 August 1930, BMAEVj228jI4. See also Anas-
tasiadou. op.cit .. pp. 418-10.
3. Dalietos to Foreign Ministry. Cons .. 23 August 1930. BMAIPj228jI4.
4. Polychroniadis to Venizelos. Therapeia, 28 June 1930, BMAEVj57.
5.. Sakellaropoulos to Venizelos, Cons .. 16 October 1930. BMAEV/58.
186
I t is certain that no one of those who form our co-national (OIlO;'[;l'Ij:,;)
minority in Turkey questions the necessity of absolute loyalty to the
sovereign state (i. e. Turkey). Aware of this presupposition, the Greeks
in Turkey simply ask the fulfilment of those indispensable conditions
under which they will be able to develop as a law-abiding yet self.
sufficient element in accordance with their distinctive traditions and
customs.
These conditions, he stressed, could be insured through the organization of
the forty Greek community parishes and the free election of community
representatives and administrators of parish properties. Above all. he em-
phasized the recognition of minority rights - particularly in the field of
education - stipulated by the Lausanne treaty. Comparing the respective
minorities in Greece and Turkey, Sakellaropoulos reported that Ankara
showed a considerable interest in the fortunes of the Thracian Muslims. As a
result. he assumed, Turkey would not hesitate to sacrifice Papa Eftim and
his associates in return for a Greek undertaking to remove some objectiona-
ble elements from Western Thrace. He then advised that Greece must de-
mand that Turkey offset. by mutual action in IstanbuL any Greek conces-
sions to the Thracian Muslims. Otherwise the Greek consul warned
we would be creating a state within a state in the most strategically
sensitive province (Thrace) of Greece.6
Venizelos not only did not take heed of these warnings. but during his trip
to Turkey he promised the removal of certain anti-Kemalist Muslim religious
leaders. After being banished from Turkey in 1923. these prominent adher-
ents of the ancien regime found refuge in Greece. Greek Thrace, with its
traditionalist Muslim society, proved to be a fertile ground for their anti-
Kemalist activity. This state of affairs carne to an end in 1930-31, when in
accordance with Venizelos' promise, the Greek government deported the
core of these objectionable Muslims from Greek Thrace. Thus in April
1931, Mustafa Sabri, the last Ottoman se,,!zli{is{am and leader of the
traditionalist element. left Greece for
During his negotiations with the Turkish leaders Venizelos got the impres-
sion that Turkey would also take reciprocal action and hand back the oc-
cupied churches of Galata to their rightful Owners. 8 President Ataturk himself
6 .. Ibid .. Dalietos. too. sent a detailed memorandum to Venizelos on 12 October 1930 outlining
the needs of Constantinopolitan Greek minority. in BMAEVj228/I4
7. Annual Report: Greece 1931. Ramsey to Simon. Athens. FO 371/15970;CI611: Clerk to
Henderson. Ankara. 17 December 1930. FO 37IjI4576/E6858.
8. Views of Polychroniadis expounded during an interview with the British ambassador. Clerk
187
reassured Venizelos that he would keep Papa Eftim out of the affairs of the
Patriarchate. 'i It is quite clear however that Venizelos did not specifically
insist on a Turkish guarantee which would keep Papa Eftim out of the affairs
of the Greek minority. Again ignoring a memorandum written by Polychro-
niadis on the eve of the visit of ismet inonii to Athens in which he urged the
official recognition of minority right in Greece and Turkey, Venizelos did nor
press the issue of the Greeks.1 0 Further, it is evident fro.m
the minutes kept during the Venizelos-Inonii talks in October 1931 that, whIle
the Turkish side demanded and got further concessions in favour of the
Muslims in Thrace, the Greeks hardly mentioned the various problems facing
the Greek element in Turkey. Instead, Venizelos expressed his readiness to
entrust the Turkish government to respond to the needs of the Constan-
tinopolitan Greek minority. I I .'
The Turkish government was not inclined to expel Papa EftIm or to restnct
the activities of the Turkish Orthodox movement. While remaining cordial
towards Greece, the Turks felt themselves in a position to pursue a socio-
economic policy of Muslim Turkish self-sufficiency. In vain did the Greek
ambassador in Turkey try to persuade Foreign Minister Aras to alter
the policy of favouring disreputable figures such as Papa Eftim and lstamat
Zihni. This created, the ambassador asserted, the impression among the
law-abiding members of the Greek community that they were persecuted. I Z
At the same time, the expUlsion of the Muslim religious leaders from Greek
Thrace had far-reaching effects. It marked the beginning of a gradual trans-
formation of the Muslim community in Thrace from a religious to a national
minority. In the healthier atmosphere of the Greco-Turkish detente, Thra-
cian turcophones with strong sympathies for the nationalist and
regime in Turkey managed to fill the vacuum created by the
some 150 religious conservatives. Already by October 1931, dunng theIr VISIt
to Athens, the Turkish leaders informed Venizelos that with the removal of
the undesirables, 50 per cent of the Muslims in Greek Thrace adopted the
Latin characters.13 It appears that by approving a Greco-Turkish rap-
to Henderson. Ankara. 17 December 1930. FO 371 14576,E6858. Also in Ramsey to Henderson,
\lhens. 19 December 1930. FO 371 14576 E6928 .
9, See H ,1. Psomiades. The Ecumenical Patriarchate under the Turkish Republic: The Fllst
'len Years in BS II (1961) 68
10, Polychroniadis to Venizelos. Ankara, 16 September 1931. BMAEV/228/14 , ,
II Minutes kept at the discussion of the premiers and foreign ministers of Greece and Turkey
durin" the meetings of 56 October 1931. BMAEV!61
12"KG Andr;adis. The ,\J(II/elll ,\lillori!.\' ill Western Thrace. Thessaloniki 1956. pp. 48.
67-68: ,\nastasiadou. opcil.. pp., 370-75
13 '.linutes kept .. during the meetings of 56 October 1931. BMAEV/6\.
188
prochement, Venizelos hoped to avert a massive expUlsion of the large
Constantinopolitan Greek community which would have perforce come to
increase the urban population of Greece. Once he achieved that, Venizelos
paid little attention to the minority question. Again, in seeking a friendship
with Turkey, uppermost in V enizelos' mind was the wish to put an end to the
armed truce of 1920s. A policy of confrontation with Turkey necessitated a
ruinous military, and especially naval, expenditure to the detriment of the
Greek budget. Likewise, through a rapprochement with Turkey, Venizelos
hoped to avert the risk of a Turco-Bulgarian alliance at the expense of Greek
territory in Thrace and Macedonia.
14
Even though the Greek archives for the post-1930 period are stilI closed,
there is some evidence to support the idea that successive Greek govern-
ments based their policy on the minority question along the lines established
by Venizelos during 1928-32. Faced by restrictive legislation against the
Greek minority, the Athens government reacted with caution and cir-
cumscription. While the Athenian press was encouraged to adopt a concili-
atory attitude. Again, as with the law 2Q07/1932, which threw several
!housands of Hellenic, as well as other foreign, citizens out of work in
Istanbul, Turkey would not let Greco-Turkish friendship interfere with its
domestic policies. Repeated Greek representations on this and other ques-
tions involving the minority bore no fruit.
IS
While aware of the detrimental
effects of a number of legislative and administrative measures in Turkey,
Athens was reluctant to allow this issue to cloud in any way the Greco-
Turkish understanding. This view coincides with the evaluation of the British
Foreign Office which held that:
16
It has been an axiom in Greek foreign policy that, while recognizing
the existence of a minority question between Greece and Turkey, this
question should not be allowed to introduce a discordant note into the
harmony of Greco-Turkish friendship.
14. Cf. Anastasiadou. up. cil.. pp., 385-93.
15., This question was discussed during the negotiations which resulted in the-Greco-Turkish
commercial agreement of May 1933 and in the pact signed on 14 September 1933. Ramsey to
Simon. Athens. JO May 1933. FO 371!16985jC4369; Clerk to Simon. Cons .. 17 September 1933.
FO 37IjI6775!C8375. For other examples see chapter VII:2.
16. For the Greek foreign policy on the minority question between 1936-39 details can be found
in Brief for the Secretary of State in conversation with the Greek Prime Minister E.
Tsouderos. prepared by the Southern Dept. of the Foreign Office, 27 February 1943. in FO
.'1 1;37401fR 1552,
189
.:t. The position of the ConstGntinopolitln Greek minority.
Reacting to the Turkish measures, as well as to the compliant attitude of the
C.ireek government, Constantine Spanoudis, a prominent former Constan-
tinopolitan Greek, vigorously protested against the precarious position of the
Greeks in Turkey. In a series of articles in the 'EhUBepOl' Biff.1a of 14, 15 and 16
February 1935, Spanoudis claimed that the disposition of Ankara towards
the Greek minority and the Ecumenical Patriarchate has not ceased to be
hostile even after 1930".1 He placed particular emphasis on the indirect
pressure exerted upon the Greek minority schools in lstanbul. These schools,
he intimated, operated under pitiable conditions. Not only was the ap-
pointment of Turkish co-directors obligatory, but also the finances of such
minority schools were scrutinized by Turkish officials.
2
He complained
about the imposition of a very large number of Turkish state teachers (230
Greeks as opposed to 190 Turks) who had to be paid by the Greek community
itself. The Pera (Beyoglu) parish, he disclosed, had to pay 35,000 TL out of its
total budget of75,000 TL to meet the salaries of the Turkish teachers during
1934. By contrast Greek teachers had to content themselves with reduced
salaries as the schools found themselves in serious debt.
3
He also referred to
38 Constantinopolitan Greek lawyers graduates of Turkish universities and
with impeccable qualifications who nonetheless were not allowed to practise
their profession. Nor was the Greek community represented in the Turkish
a ... "embly since Nicholas Taptas was appointed specifically deputy for Ank-
ara. a city without any Greek popUlation . ..! Spanoudis then contrasted these
gloomy conditions with those enjoyed by the Turks in Thrace. The Muslim
minority, he maintained. sustained 311 schools, partly subsidized by the
Greek state. which were directed by the community leaders. The Thracian
\luslims. he went on. possessed 300 mosques and sent four deputies and two
senators to the Greek chamber. While the Turcophone press and cultural
association operated freely, the Muslim minority of Greece was a thriving
community whose numbers were increasing.
5
This gloomy appraisal of condition in lstanbul was shared by a number of
neutral observers. In a memorandum prepared for the southern department
tl!" the Foreign Office on 6 May 1936, A.E. Lambert listed several instances
when the Turkish government failed to observe the minority clauses of the
Lausanne treaty. As a result, the author of this report concluded,
LEi.cll/cpol' B1iIW, 14 February 1935.
2. fhid", 15 February 1935.
J. fhid.
4. fhid", 16 February 1935 ..
S IIJid.
190
non-Moslem minorities in Turkey have suffered considerable hardship. 6 In
another memorandum dated in May 1937, Rev. Austin Oakley, the chaplain
the Memorial church in lstanbul, referred specifically to the
dIfficultIes encountered by Greek religious and educational institutions bet-
ween 1935 and 1937.
7
Describing the continued emigration of Constan-
tinopolitan Greeks, the 'Ei.e150epov Bifpa of 30 September 1934 observed that
while the Greek minority schools in Beyoglu (Pera) had 1817 students in the
academic year of 1932-33, a year later their number was reduced to 1444.
This decrease on the number of students was largely due to the exodus of
some I O,?O? Hellenic nationals who were affected by the law 2007 concerning
the restnctlon of employment. Likewise, Spanoudis was perhaps painting
too gloomy a picture of conditions in Turkey. For, notwithstanding the
d:tnmental effects of legislation on the community, the policy of
detente had a favourable Impact on the Greek minority as a whole. This
improvement can only be conceived when conditions in the 1930s are com-
with those of the post-1922 period, when the Constantinopolitan
Greeks were regularly subjected to the visitations of Turkish wrath. There
were also some tangible improvements in the treatment of the minorities
during the 1930s. Thus on his election as the president of the republic in
November 1938, Ismet inonii expressed his goodwill towards the minorities. 8
Further, the Turkish record on the treatment of minorities during the 1930s
compares admirably with other central and eastern European nations.
Thus the Greeks continued to constitute the largest single non-Muslim
group in Istanbul. This presence remained fairly stable throughout the inter-
war period. Accordingly, while there were 125,046 Greek Orthodox - of
whom 108,725 were Grecophone- in 1935, during the next Turkish census
ten years later the Constantinopolitan adherents of the Greek Orthodox
religion were estimated at 103,839. Of these 88,680 declared Greek as their
mother tongue. In addition, there were 8,124 Greeks in the islands of Imbros
Tenedos (Bozcaada) as well as 13,598 Constantinopolitan
subJects.
9
The continued Greek presence was partly due to a fairly
sophIstIcated community infrastructure which was able to respond to the
personal and family needs of its individual members, providing them with a
6. Note on Minorities in Turkey and the application to Turkey of the Minorities procedure of
the League, by A.E.Lambert. 6 May 1936, FO 371/20093/E251
7. General conspectus of events during the period January 1935 to May 1937, memorandum
prepared by Oakley, Cons., 27 May 1937, LPA/DgP/22/l04-7.
8 .. Letter by H. and Foreign Office minutes, 18 November 1938 in FO
7 1/2 I 927/E7381.
9. Forthe census of 1935 seeiY9(l936/37)41A3 and for that of 1945 idem. no 380(1959) 81-83.
191
13
satisfying self-identily. During 1933/34, the Greek community at large main-
tained 6/ycees and 38 schools with 7667 students, 252 Greek and 182 Turkish
teachers. These, together with 54 churches, were administered by 48 Greek
parishes.
10
Concentrated in the few remaining cosmopolitan quarters of the
city, such as Beyoglu (Pera), the Constantinopolitan Greeks were able to
remain a cohesive and distinct body. Thus, during the great cultural and
institutional metamorphosis of the Turkish majority in the 1920s and 1930s,
the Greek minority preserved at least part of its traditional urban culture in
istanbul. Yet, while Greek involvement in commerce continued to be worth-
while, the cultural and social participation of the minority in modern Turkish
society was minimal.
This was partly the outcome of Ottoman/Kemalist ideology which drew a
clear line between Muslim Turks and non-Muslim minorities. Traditional
Ottoman society classified men essentially into Muslim and Zimmi .- the
believer and the subjugated unbeliever- with appropriate codes of conduct
for each group. As previously remarked, the very structure of the Ottoman
state, in the millet system, institutionalized differences between subjects into
a distinctive form of governmental administration. The influence of this
Islamic heritage, and the millet system in particular, has been to make
second-class citizens of the non-Muslim Turkish populace during the
interwar period, despite the secularism and formal legal protections of the
Turkish republic. 11 This bias has been reflected in such things as the tacit
refusal to accept non-Muslim but otherwise qualified girls as Red Crescent
nurses or accept non-Muslim boys as military officers.
The exclusion of non-Muslims, and particularly the Greek minority, from
the body of the Turkish nation can be partly explained by their ignorance of
the Turkish language. Constantinopolitan Greeks - with the exception of the
karamanl'is- born before the 1910s did not, as a general rule, speak Turkish.
With the inclusion of Turkish lessons in the curricula of the minority schools
this changed dramatically. But during the interwar years the inadequate
knowledge of the Turkish language by many of the Constantinopolitan
Greeks acted as a psychological barrier for a better rapport between Turks
and Greeks. Nevertheless, as the national self-confidence of the Turkish
people increased, the vestiges of discrimination began to diminish in propor-
tion. Thus during the 1930s, a handful of Greeks, like Th. Makridis, the
director of the Byzantine museum in Istanbul, were highly esteemed by the
Turkish majority. 12 Another distinguished figure was Theologos An-
10. S.N. Zervopoulos, 'Ei'n:vn:i.o71a/(511.:!JI' HjlEpoi.Oi'IOI', Istanbul 1934, i/p. 233.
II 1.H. Psomiades, Turkey: Progress and Problems in MEA 8/3 (1957) 94-95.
12. Requested by Venizelos and with the expressed permission of Kemal Atatiirk, Th.
192
thomelidis, a linguist and a Turcologue, who was invited on 26 September
1934 to speak on the different phases of the language question and the recent
language reforms initiated by President Kemal Atatiirk.
13
Significantly, this
lecture was given at one of the city's people's houses (Halkevleri). Founded
by the ruling RPP, the purpose of these houses was avowedly to inculcate in
the Turkish people the principles of republicanism. nationalism and laicism.
Makridis (1872-1940) was sent to Athens to organize the Benaki museum. For more details on the
career see A. Ogan, Th. Makridi'nin hatlraslna. Bel/eten, 5/17-18 (1941) 163-69.
13.. Zervopoulos, op. cit .. iv/pp. 190-92.
193
CHAPTER VII
RELA nONS BETWEEN SECULAR TURKEY AND THE
PATRIARCHATE, THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A MODUS VIVENDI
1930-46
L The official recognition of the patriarch and the visit of Venizelos to
the Phanal".
The Greco-Turkish rapprochement also had a favourable impact on the
Ecumenical Patriarchate. By placing no obstacles to a visit to the Phanar by
Venizelos, the Turks gave a spectacular example of their newly adopted
goodwill towards the Patriarchate. Thus after being informed that such a visit
would arouse no misgivings, Venizelos accompanied by a number of Greek
and Turkish senior officials paid a formal call to Patriarch Photios II on 1
November 1930. This was an unprecedented event in the history of the
Phanar, for never before was a Greek prime minister allowed to visit the
Ecumenical Patriarchate.
1
With the prevalence of detente, however, a meet-
ing in the Phanar between the head of the Greek Orthodox church and the
leader of the Greek state no longer carried an ominous significance.
The Turkish approval of such a meeting not only underlined the success of
the Greco-Turkish understanding, but it also demonstrated Ankara's satis-
faction with the conduct of the Phanar authorities. Since 1923, the Patriar-
chate followed strictly the guidelines laid down by the Lausanne agreement.
Renouncing all politico-cultural responsibilities, the Phanar concentrated on
purely religious functions. It refrained from any political activities which
could in any way be interpreted as inimical to Turkish interests.
The Greek premier's visit ushered in a healthier atmosphere for the Pat-
riarchate. But this change in Turkish policy can be traced to as early as 29
September 1929, when Patriarch Basil III died. According to Canon
Whitehouse, who represented the British Embassy at the patriarch's funeral,
the conduct of the Turkish police, responsible for the maintenance of order at
the Phanar, was exemplary from the point of view of courtesy and
L Clerk to Henderson, Ankara. 1 November 1930, FO 371/14576/E6088; Ramsey to Hender-
son, Athens, 5 November 1930, FO 371/14576/E6199
194
helpfulness.1 Likewise, the Turkish authorities kept a low profile during the
election of a new patriarch on 7 October 1930. Thus after a free and canonical
election, the archbishop ofDercos, Photios Maniatis, was declared patriarch.
Not only was the new patriarch a native ofIstanbul, but also, having joined
the holy synod in 1924, he was largely untainted by the events of the turbulent
years of 1919- 1922,3
On the occasion of the seventh anniversary of the Turkish republic con-
gratulatory telegrams were exchanged between Atatiirk and Photios II. In his
response to the Phanar, the Turkish leader addressed Photios as the pat-
riarch of the Orthodox in the Phanar.
4
This was a major shift from the
hitherto official appelation of the Orthodox leader in Turkey as archpriest
(Bawapaz). Since 1923, the local authorities had refused to service any
documents which addressed the Orthodox leader as patriarch. When,
. moreover, the authorities in istanbul declined to recognize the title of pat-
o 'riar'ch even after the telegram of Atatiirk to the Phanar in November 1930,
Spyridon Polychroniadis, the Greek ambassador in Turkey, appealed di-
rectly to the Foreign Minister Tevfik R i i ~ t i i Aras. In a detailed memorandum,
dated 2 March, the Greek envoy outlined the reasons why the patriarch was
entitled to keep his historic title. Since this title, Polychroniadis stressed, did
not necessarily involve jurisdiction outside Turkey, the Turkish government
should not have any interest in declining to recognize it. 5 With the Greek
archives still closed for the post 1930 period, the text of the foreign minister's
response is not available. Yet, from a report sent to the Foreign Office by one
of the senior members of the British Embassy in Ankara, J. Morgan, we learn
that R i i ~ t i i Aras recognized the claim of the Greek ambassador to make
friendly representations on behalf of the Patriarchate. He was not, however,
prepared to admit that Turkey was bound by any international obligation in
this respect.
6
Soon after Yunus Nadi, a leadingjoumalist and a deputy, intervened to put
an end to the controversy over the title of the patriarch. In a leading article in
the Cumhuriyet of 9 March, he reported that the Turkish government had
agreed at Lausanne to maintain the Patriarchate in Turkey, on condition that
2. Clerk to Henderson, Ankara, 8 October 1929, FO 371/13828/E5265. On the election of
Photios see Sakelaropoulos to Foreign Ministry, Cons., 9 October 1929, YE/B/35.
3. Born in the island of Prinkipo (Biiyiikada) in 1874, Photios served in Bulgaria during the
turbulent years of 1902 to 1914 as vicar at Philippoupolis (Plovdiv). Recalled to lstanbul he was
first appointed bishop of Eirinoupolis and was then promoted to archbishop of Philadelphia
(1924) and Dercos (1925).
4. The Times, 6 November 1930; Anastasiadou, op.cit., p. 368.
5. Polychroniadis to Tevfik R i i ~ t i i , Ankara, 2 March 1931, BMAEV/59.
6. Morgan to Henderson, Ankara, 25 March 1931, FO 371/15378/EI583.
195
the latter would no longer enjoy temporal rights. Provided that this condition
was observed, he went on to stress, it would be unprofitable on the part of
individuals or government departments to raise the question of the pat-
riarchal title. The institution maintained at the .Phanar, the account con-
cluded. was a Patriarchate and no decision was taken at Lausanne to alter the
title ofthe patriarch. 7 According to the information given to J. Morgan by the
Greek ambassador, the article on the defense of the Patriarchate was written
on the instructions of Premier Ismet Inonii who had himself supplied the
arguments used. This, Polychroniadis remarked, was a response to his meet-
ing with Aras on 2 March. Throughout the Patriarchate affair, Ambas-
sador Polychroniadis disclosed, his advice was freely and regularly taken by
the Turks.s Finally. on 16 March, ClImhllriyet allowed the publication of an
anonymous letter, probably written by a member of the Greek community,
reiterating the views of the Patriarchate on the issue.
9
Meanwhile, the local
authorities received orders to accept all documents forwarded by the Patriar-
chate. Later on, in September 1931, the patriarch. along with the rest of the
members of the holy synod were furnished with a document acknowledging
their etabli status (Iliifus ciizdan'l). 10
2. Attempts to reinforce the ecumenical character of the Patriarchate
and Tllrkish secular reform.
Venizelos paid another brief visit to the patriarch on 23 August 1931, while
on his way back from Rumania.
1
This set a precedent and throughout the
1930s a number of Greek visitors to Turkey, including the prime ministers,
Panagis Tsaldaris (1933, 1934) and John Metaxas (1937), paid customary calls
to the Phanar. Apart from Greek officials, important European political
leaders, such as the premiers of Rumania and Yugoslavia, also visited the
Patriarchate. Similar calls were paid by eminent religious personalities like
the archbishop of Canterbury Cosmo Long. 2 Meanwhile, a delegation headed
by Germanos Athanasiadis, the archbishop. of Sardis, visited Poland on an
ecclesiastical mission.
3
Likewise, the Rumanian government invited the
Phanar to consecrate a new basilica, while in 1934 a patriarchal delegation, on
the request of the Yugoslavian government, held the official requiem mass for
7. Ibid. See also OM II (1931) 177.
8 .. Morgan to Henderson. Ankara. 31 March 1931. FO 371/15378/EI725.
9. Ibid.
10. 6 (1931) 547.
I Clerk to Reading. Conso> 26 August 1931. FO 371/15232/06712: 7 (1932) 449-52.
2. Oakley (0. Douglas. Cons .. 16 April 1939. LPA/DgP/22/112-2: The Times, 15 April 1939.
3. 23 (1948) 118-20. gives of this visit which took place in December 1930.
196
the murder of King Alexander.
4
As a result the hitherto isolated Patriarchate
was able to enhance considerably its ecumenical image.
The new patriarch, moreover, was committed to drawing the various
Orthodox churches into a closer spiritual union. Resting on his position as
primus inter pares between the heads of the fourteen autocephalous churches
that made up the Orthodox communion, Photios did much to reestablish the
unshakable dignity of his throne. Thus in 1930, he convened a Pan-Orthodox
conference, in which all the churches, save the Russian and Bulgarian,
participated. This conference held fifteen meetings at the monastery of
Vatopedion on Mt Athos during which a number of purely ecclesiastical
questions were discussed.
s
The Ecumenical Patriarchate was represented by
Chrysanthos Philippidis, the archbishop of Trebizond and representative of
the Phanar in Greece, and Germanos Athanasiadis, the archbishop of Sardis.
The patriarch also sought closer relations with the Anglican church and,
together with the archbishop of Canterbury, initiated the two Orthodox-
Anglican theological conferences in Lambeth in 1930 and 1931. All Orthodox
delegations, present in various international theological conferences, were
headed by the far-sighted ecumenist Germanos Strinopoulos, the archbishop
of Thyateira.
6
At first the Turkish authorities did not discourage the increasing interna-
tional activity of the Patriarchate. The Phanar delegate at the Athos confer-
ence Germanos Athanasiadis was permitted to travel with a regular Turkish
passport. This constituted a marked departure from the previous Turkish
stance in 1926, when the authorities warned the Phanar that any archbishop
who left Turkey in order to participate in an international conference would
not be allowed to return. But soon the Turks realized that the Phanar, despite
its considerable loss of power and prestige, still played a crucial role in the
Orthodox world. Further, the patriarch's enthusiasm for a union of the
Orthodox and Anglican denominations worried the Turks. In an interview
with the n pwfa of 21 October 1931, Photios reiterated his support for this
movement and on another occasion talked of his wish to bring about the
reunion with the Anglican church during his Patriarchate.7 The Turkish
disapproval of such activities was manifested wht!' the authorities turned
down a request for the representation of the Phanar in the first Pan-Orthodox
congress on theology in Athens (November-December 1936).
4. Oakley (0 Douglas, Cons .. 6 February 1936. LPA/DgP/22/83-88..
5. B. Stavridis. The Ecumenical Patriarchate, GOThR 16 (1969) 210.
6. Ibid, pp. 213-15.
7. Pollard to Douglas. Conso> 12 January 1930, LPA/DgP/22/144-145.
197
By seeking to enhance. the prestige of the Patriarchate Photios tried to
reverse an eclipse of the historic church. The latter, relying exclusively on
some 100,000 Greeks in Turkey, was unable to find competent clerical and
academic personnel. This decline was visible in the Theological school of
Chalki (Heybeli) which, barred from employing eminent theologians from
outside Turkey, was transformed into a basically training college for bishops
and priests. This trend was accelerated after the deaths of the distinguished
theologians, Pandeleimon Komninos and Basil Andoniadis. With their loss,
the college was unable to maintain its traditional standards, thanks to which it
had met effectively the needs of the Patriarchate by providing a succession of
outstanding prelates between 1884 and 1923.
8
In a letter to Rev. J.A. Douglas,
Edward Every, an Anglican priest studying Greek and theology at Chalki,
described vividly the declining standards of the Theological school.
9
Be-
tween 1932 and 1937, the college had only 65 students with 15 teachers of
which three were Turks.IO
Equally serious were the severe financial difficulties encountered by the
Phanar during the 1930s and 1940s. Deprived of its extensive estates in
Anatolia, Macedonia and Thrace, the Phanar became increasingly dependent
on the subsidies from abroad. Consequently, in 1934, according to the official
patriarchal accounts, the Phanar was 281,397 TL. in debt. I I Faced with such
a serious lack offunds, Photios took a number of austerity measures including
the abolition of the traditional distribution of free meals for the poor students
of the Phanar schools (IIa'lpzaPXIKa Iuaairza).
N or were the Turks prepared to allow the Greco-Turkish detente to inter-
fere with their wish to regulate the position of religious institutions - both
Muslim and Christian - in accordance with the Kemalist program of secu-
larization. Part of this general program was the law forbidding individuals to
wear religiously significant clothing. Introducing the new law in the assembly
on 3 December 1934, the minister of the interior, .sukrii Kaya, declared that
this measure was part of the policy of secular reform. In a private conver-
sation with the British ambassador, .sukrii Kaya explained that since Muslim
clerics (hocalar) were forbidden to wearing their religious garb outside the
actual place of worship, it would cause justifiable discontent if non-
Muslims were exempted from such restriction.
12
Commenting on the ban,
8. B. Stavridis, 'loropio. rou OiKOUf./f:l'/KOU flGTPlapl.dou, (Athens 1967) p. 120 f.
9. Every to Douglas, Chalki, 24 September 1933. LPA/DgP/19/291.
10.. Zervopoulos, op.cit., ii/pp. 138-41.
II. Mavropoulos. op.cit .. , p. 227 ..
12. Loraine to Simon, Ankara, 5 December 1934, FO 371/17962/E7432. Law no. 2596/1934 is
given in Resmi Gazete no. 2879, 31 December 1934.
198
Cllmhllriyet opined that Turkey was simply following the example of other
secular European states such as France. The abolition of the clerical gar'-
ment, it went on to suggest, would be beneficial to clerics who would be able
to do away with their awkward garb and long hair which had caused them
unnecessary duress in the past. 13 On 8 December, appealing directly to Greek
public opinion, Milliyet explained that the new measure was part and parcel
of the general Turkish transformation. It was certainly not directed against
the Orthodox clergy in Turkey. The Greek press, Milliyet hinted, might have
been provoked by certain elements residing in Turkey who endeavoured to
misinterpret the scope and aims of the law.14 Finally, the Yeni Giin of 20
December reaffirmed the Turkish commitment to peaceful co-existence with
its neighbours, and particularly with Greece, and concluded by asserting that
modern Turkey treated its minorities fairly. I
5
As early as 29 November, the Greek foreign minister, Dimitrios Maximos,
in an interview with the Turkish ambassador in Greece, requested the exemp-
tion of the Greek Orthodox clergy from the ban. But in a telegram from
Geneva. Foreign Minister R u ~ t i i Arasdeclined to make such a concession. 16
The Turkish rejection of this request wounded Greek susceptibilities and
created a widespread feeling of disappointment. The Greek press argued that
the law, which was part of a wider plan to create a uniform population,
seriously compromised the cultural traditions of the Orthodox community in
Turkey. 17 Pointing to the oppressive nature of the law, some papers went so
far as to wonder whether the friendship of Turkey was not almost as inconve-
nient as its hostility. 'E)).llVI/":O\, Me;).ov, a paper closely in touch with the
Greek prime minister, declared that not even the worst enemies of the
Greco-Turkish friendship could have dealt it a deadlier blow. 18 The treat-
ment received by the Greeks in Turkey was regularly contrasted with the
privileged position of the Turkish minority in Western Thrace.19 So great
was the bitterness against the Turkish government that the president of the
Greco-Turkish league in Athens, formed to develop friendly relations bet-
13. ClIm/llIrivet, 6 December 1934. text given in AT 13 (1935) 93.
It. Ibid .. p. 94.
10. 'EhvOr.pov Blif.lG. 9 December 1934.
17.. Walker to Simon. Athens. I December 1934, FO 371/17962/E7322.
18. Quoted in Walker to Simon, 6 December 1934, FO 371/17962/E7397.
19. Ibid.
199
ween the two countries, resigned and the secretary called a meeting to
consider whether the league should continue to exist.
Among the Constantinopolitan Greeks it was the patriarch who seemed to
have resented most this latest attempt of secularization. At first Photios
appealed directly to Premier ismet inonii requesting the exemption of the
Orthodox from the law, but he did not even receive a reply.:!o With the
eventual application of the law in June 1935, he was noted to have cancelled
all public audiences save those taking place after liturgy and to have regarded
himself in mourning over the ban.
21
Apparently, he even contemplated the
transfer of the patriarchal see to Mt Athos.22 His strong feelings on this issue
were somewhat balanced by the majority of the members of the holy synod
who took a more realistic view and were ready to comply with the new
regulations. On the whole, the Greek community, too, adopted a reasonable
attitude and disapproved of the intransigent attitude of the conservative body
centered around the patriarch.:!3
The almost hysterical reaction of the higher echelons of the Phanar clergy
illustrated that the Greek Orthodox church in Turkey was as reluctant as the
conservative Muslim Turks to accept the principle of secular nationality
pursued by the Kemalist regime. It should be emphasized that the ban on
clerical garb was aimed primarily at reducing the prestige of the Muslim
clergy. If there were any single conclusion to be drawn from the whole affair it
was the enthusiastic anti-clericalism of the Turkish regime, the extent of
which could perhaps be compared with that of the Soviet leadership in
Moscow. It should be remembered that only few months later, the govern-
ment converted St Sophia. the most visible symbol of Ottoman Muslim
victory over Christian Byzantium, to a museum. On the other hand, by
forbidding the wearing of ecclesiastical garb outside the places of worship,
Ankara was pushing forward with its avowed aim of bringing about a
homogenous population - both culturally and emotionally. This, however,
coupled with the interference in the purely spiritual affairs of the religious
minorities. engendered by the act of 1934, constituted at least a technical
violation of the Lausanne clauses.
Alarmed by these developments liberal Greek politicians did not think that
Orthodox ecclesiastical susceptiblities should be allowed to influence the
.. Mavropoulos. op.ciL, p.
Oakley to Douglas. Cons .. n January 1935, LPA/DgP/22/65.
Mavropoulos. op.cit .. p.
Cited in The Times, [8 January [935.
200
close friendship between Greece and Turkey.24 Venizelos was particularly
critical of the way the Tsaldaris government dealt with the whole affair. He
complained that, instead of trying to come to an understanding with the
Turks, the Tsaldaris government allowed a highly emotive press campaign
whose only impact was to harden attitudes both in Greece and Turkey. The
Turkish measure, he insisted, was not introduced in a spirit of hostility
towards the Patriarchate.
25
Even Meletios Metaxakis, the patriarch of Alex-
andria, warned that it was foolish to upset Greco-Turkish friendship on
account of such a relatively minor matter. The Greek government, too, had to
give priority to wider commercial, military and political considerations and
thus come to terms with the new Turkish measure in the same manner as it did
a year earlier when some 10,000 Hellene Greeks in Turkey were forced out of
their jobs. On its part, the Turkish government agreed to exempt the head of
the Orthodox church, together with another seven leaders of other religious
orders in Turkey, from the ban. 26 Ankara also consented to the wearing of the
clerical garb during the meeting of the holy synod.27
The view that the Turkish government would not desist from its course of
secular uniformity was further reinforced when Ankara adjusted the legal
position of religious foundations (evkaf or vaklflar) in Turkey. On 5 June . _!
1935, in accordance with the stipulations of the civil code of 1926, the Turkish Yn t-I r[,.1I;t!--
government introduced a far-reaching law covering the entire issue of vak/f
property. 28 Stating that all religious establishments - Muslim and
non-Muslim- were Turkish institutions, the law made all religious founda-
tions accountable to the Turkish government. As a result, the department of
Religious Foundations (EvkafGenel Miidurlugu) was instructed to supervise
the property owned by religious, cultural and benevolent institutions of all
creeds. Such property was divided into two categories. The first, the mazbut
property, was administered directly by the state through the department of
Evkaf All Muslim property was included in this category. By contrast,
24. A. Papanastasiou. Ml:i.iTI::;, AOi'Ol, "ApOpa, Athens [957, p. 789.
.. Anastasiadou. op.cit .. p. 4[4; 'EhvOl:pol' Blitw, 8 and 9 December [934. Tsaldaris and his
Populist party came to power after the elections of March [933.
Annual Report: Greece, [935. Waterlow to Hoare, Athens, FO 371/20392/RI432.
27. The order of the exemption received by the Phanar on June 1935 (prot. no. 1 1322) can be
found in 'OpOoooi")a, 10 (1935) 211- 13. The other seven leaders who benefitted from the exemp-
tion were: Rlfat Bey (Muslim). Mesrup Naroyian (Armenian/Gregorian). Vahan Kocarian
U\rmenian!Uniate). Vaton Mighirdich (Armenian/Protestant). Ishaq Shaki (Jewish). Dionysios
Varougas (Greek/Uniate) and Eftim Karahissaridis (Turkish/Orthodox).
28. The law no. is published in the Resmi Gazete, no. 3027. I3 June 1935.
201
non-Muslim communal foundations were attached to themulhak (dependent)
category. Property belonging to this category was to be administered by
committees of trustees (miitevelli heyetleri/Koll'OTlKai rpopeiaz) elected by the
members of each parish. The trustees would fulfil their responsibilities under
the overall control of the department of Evkaf
The non-Muslim minorities viewed the 1935 law with suspicion. In particu-
lar they were apprehensive about the wide powers given to the department of
E\'kaf Accordingly no transaction of property could take place without the
approval of this department and the money acquired from such sales had to be
deposited in the Vakljlar Bank. The capital was then frozen and the com-
munal organizations could not get it back. Instead they were allowed a
nominal interest on the actual capital. But of more serious nature was the take
over by the Evkaf department of eight churches and a hospital belonging to
the Uniate Armenian community on the ground that they were not adminis-
tered in accordance with the new law.
29
The Greek community, though subjected to sporadic official interference,
did not suffer any permanent confiscation of property. On 5 August 1929, the
Patriarchate furnished the authorities with a list outlining all the estates
registered under its name in the Ottoman title deeds (tapular). The rest of the
Constantinopolitan Greek parishes followed suit. Yet the Greek community
did not receive an official acknowledgement on their'title deeds before April
1949.
30
Thus during an interval of some twenty years, the Greek community
had to live with the uncertainty as to whether the government would recog-
nize its property rights. This uncertainty culminated in 1936-37 when the
appointment of a single trustee (tek lI1iitevelli) for every communal establish-
ment was made obligatory. Further, the right of the department of Evkaf to
appoint directly such trustees deprived the community of all effective partici-
pation in the administration of their institutions. Taking advantage of this
law, the authorities appointed Istamat Zihni Ozdamar, a man with a notorious
reputation and a close associate of Papa Eftim, as the trustee of the Ballkll
hospital. The future of the minority institutions looked so bleak that the
Phanar appealed, through the chaplain of the British Embassy in Turkey
Austin Oakley, to the Foreign Office. The Phanar asked Britain to try to
dissuade the Turkish government from carrying through the religious founda-
tions law of 1935. This measure, it was maintained, did not only create
tremendous difficulties for the minority but also threatened Greco-Turkish
29. The Times. 26 September 1936.
30. Document no. 2470/978 given in Glineri. op.cit., p. 90.
202
relations.
31
Legally, however, there was little that the Patriarchate could do
on behalf of the Greek minority. With the Lausanne settlement, the pat-
riarchal authorities were stripped of all administrative functions and the
Greek minority had to seek a separate rationale from the church for its
dealings with the Turkish government.
Under these circumstances, and pending the appointment of a thoroughly
objectionable character as the trustee of Zappeion, the Greek government
protested to Ankara. This intervention was successful and no other Greek
minority establishment received a government appointed trustee. In fact, the
Greek parish committees, elected in 1928, remained in office with the tacit
consent of the government throughout the 1930s and 1940s. This irregularity
was finally settled in 1949, when the system of government appointed trustees
was abolished. Instead, community institutios were to be administered by
persons elected by the members of the minority.32
Quite clearly, the whole question of seeking an appropriate code for the
administration of non-Muslim, as well as Muslim, religious trust property
stemmed from the government's wish for centralization. A reduction in the
influence of non-secular institutions in Turkey was a major component of the
Kemalist policy of secularism (layikllk). Inevitably, the pursuit of such a
policy went counter to the freedom of religious minorities to manage their
communal affairs without any interference from the Turkish authorities.
During the Lausanne negotiations, the Turkish delegation had wholehear-
tedly subscribed to the freedom of minorities in the running of their com-
munal institutions. Further, this right was enshrined in the minority clauses of
the Lausanne treaty. As a result, throughout the interwar period, Turkey had
to compound two mutually exclusive policies - i.e. to create freer conditions
for the minorities in accordance with the Lausanne and Greco-Turkish ag-
reements and to persist with the secular reforms.
3. Patriarch Benjamin I.
The desire to achieve this delicate balance was reflected in the
government's decisions to send the vdli of Istanbul as its official representa-
tive to the funeral of Patriarch Photios II. With his moderation and quiet
dignity Photios, who died on 29 December 1935, appeared to have gained the
sympathy of the Turkish government. Accordingly the presence of a highly
placed Turkish official in a patriarchal funeral was indeed an unprecedented
31. Oakley to the archbishop of Canterbury. communicated to the Foreign Office by Dr Don. 0
February 1940. FO 371/25021/R210L
32 .. Law no 5404/1949 for details see chapter IX:3.
203
event in the history of the Patriarchate and epitomized the healthier atmos-
phere in which the Phanar was allowed to operate during the 1930s. Expres-
sing satisfaction with the Turkish attitude, the Greek press interpreted this
gesture as a sign of Ankara's respect for this ancient religious institution
which is held in veneration by every Greek.1
To find a successor favourable to both Turkey and Greece, however.
proved a rather complicated task. From the very beginning Ankara hinted at
the suitability of Jacob Papapaisiou, the archbishop ofImbros and Tenedos.
In particular, the Turks approved of the prelate's proficiency in Turkish and
his lack of enthusiasm for the movement for the union of the Christian
churches.
2
The Greeks, on the other hand, favoured the archbishop of
Chalcedon, Maximos Vaportzis. Only thirty-eight years old and with out-
standing abilities, Chalcedon was popular with the Constantinopolitan
Greeks. Having worked closely with Photios, the archbishop of Chalcedon
shared the patriarch's concern about the declining international position of
the Patriarchate. Just before the new election, the authorities stated that the
election of Chalcedon and Dercos - the two most likely contestants - would
be unpalatable to the Turkish government. Doubting the administrative
capacities of Jacob, the Greek government opposed his election and endorsed
the candidature of Maximos Vaportzis.3
On 19 January 1936, unable to elect the energetic Chalcedon, the holy
synod compromised by elevating to the Patriarchal throne Benjamin Christ-
odoulou, the aged archbishop of Heraclea.
4
The mixed feelings of the Greek
Orthodox about the new patriarch became only too obvious when a demonst-
ration of disapproval took place at the church of the Phanar, while the results
of the election were being announced. Subsequently the Turkish police had to
intervene in order to prevent a free fight and the new patriarch, visibly shaken
and unable to make himself heard, left the church immediately after his
election.
Equally resentful were the Greeks with the Turkish effort to influence the
outcome of the election and the independence exhibited by the patriarchal
authorities. The renewed interest of the Turkish government in the internal
affairs of the Patriarchate was probably due to the feeling in Ankara that,
L Waterlow to Hoare, Athens. 9 January 1936, FO 371/20087/E227,
2. Oakley to Douglas, Cons .. 6 February 1936. LPA/DgP/22/83-88. See also Mavropoulos.
"p.cit .. pp. 241-42.
3. For details on this prelate see chapter IX:3.
4. Loraine to Hoare, Ankara, 3 February 1936. FO 371/20087/E766. See also The Times, 20
January 1936.
204
despite a considerable loss of power, the Phanar still played an important role
in the Orthodox world. The Turks associated this upsurge of the Phanar's
prestige with the ecumenist policies of Patriarch Photios. After his death they
appeared determined to step in and discourage the persistence of Photios'
policies. But unlike his predecessor, Benjamin was reluctant to pursue an
active ecumenist program. Perhaps the most important international step
taken during the Benjamin reign was the granting of autonomy to the Alba-
nian (1937) and Bulgarian (1945) churches.
s
Of some importance was also the
visit of the British ambassador, Sir Hughes Knatchbull-Hugessen, to the
Phanar on 14 October 1940. This was the first official contact between the
British Embassy and the Phanar since 1923.
6
The Patriarchate was quite
content with the reestablishment of official relations with Britain for it en-
hanced the Phanar' s aspiration to remain an international institution. While at
first it raised no objection to the ambassador's visit, later on the Turkish
government expressed its annoyance with the whole affair. 7
Notwithstanding the Turkish displeasure with the visit of the British am-
bassador to the Phanar, the fact that such a meeting could take place at all
indicates the freer conditions under which the Patriarchate was allowed to
operate during the 1930s and 1940s. This was also reflected in the success
with which the Phanar was able to contain the challenge of Papa Eftim. Ever
since 1927 Eftim was unable to make any serious impact. Not only was he
boycotted by the Constantinopolitan Greeks, but even Turkish public opin-
ion was increasingly impatient with the behaviour of the Anatolian priest.
With sarcastic comments about the pompous titles that he had assumed, the
Turkish press ridiculed Eftim' s opportunism and arrogance. The Vakil of 8
April 1926 even questioned the sincerity of his Turkish nationalist sentiments
and wondered why a patriot sent his daughter to a Greek school (Zappeion).
Under these circumstances Papa Eftim entered a period of obscurity which
culminated with the establishment of Greco-Turkish co-existence. Unable to
obtain government encouragement after 1930, he adopted a cautious attitude.
He thus postponed the occupation of another Galata church, St Nicholas and
kept a low profile during the patriarchal elections of 1929, 1936 and 1946.8
As the Eftimite movement faded into obscurity, Eftim faced yet another
challenge. During the Greek-Turkish negotiations in 1930-31, the Greek
government attached considerable importance to the pacification of Papa
5, Mavropoulos, op,cit., pp. 245-46: 12 (1937) 111-18.
6. Nicols to Hugessen. London, 19 April 1940, FO 371/25021/R541.
7. Morgan to Halifax, Ankara, 16 October 1940, FO 371/25021/R8626.
8. Ergene, Op.cil., pp .. 214-21.
205
Eftim and some other twenty-six militants. As previously remarked, Athens
was ready to reciprocate by expelling from Greece the leaders of the anti-
Kemalist core in Greek Thrace. Thus in a gesture of goodwill, in 1931 Athens
expelled from Greece the leader of the conservative Muslims in Thrace,
Mustafa Sabri. Although prepared to discourage further anti-Phanar activity
in istanbul, the Turkish government did not wish to see the total elimination
of the Turkish Orthodox movement. Thus as had been said, Papa Eftim was
one of the eight religious leaders allowed to wear the ecclesiastical habit in
public after the ban of 1934.
9
Evidently, the Ankara government continued to
regard the Turkish Orthodox church as one of the major religious orders in
Turkey. Further, while Papa Eftim was encouraged to keep a low profile, his
one time lieutenant istamat Zihni OZdamar gained considerable prominence
during the 1930s. Not only did he enter the Turkish parliament in 1935, but he
was also appointed by the government as trustee of the Ballkll hospital. When
between 1935- 37, istamat Zihni brought to the administrative council a
number of Eftimite partisans, the Patriarchate warned that the hospital would
soon fall into the hands of the Turkish Orthodox. These fears, however, did
not materialize and by May 1937, the influence of Istamat Zihni on Greek
parish affairs was on the wane. I 0 This was mainly due to Greco-Turkish
cordial relations which, in turn, obliged Turkey to pay attention to Greek
susceptibilities. The Turkish concern with Greek sensibilities was illustrated
by Ankara's willingness to take the advice of the Greek Embassy on matters
affecting the Patriarchate. I I From 1930, therefore, the Turks allowed the
Patriarchate to operate in a freer atmosphere which corresponded to the spirit
of Greco- Turkish friendship, while on the other hand they strove to contain
any growth in the Phanar's ecumenical character. To achieve this delicate
balance, the Turkish government on numerous occasions demonstrated its
goodwill towards the Patriarchate and at the same time, in pursuit of its
secular policies, it promulgated some far-reaching measures courtailing the
powers of the religious institutions in Turkey.
9. Jiischke, Die Ti.irkische-Orthodoxe Kirche, pp. 126-27.
10. General conspectus of events during the period January 1935 to May 1937, memorandum
prepared by Oakley, Cons., '27 May 1937, LPA/DgP/22/104-7.
11. Minutes by Helm, 25 March 1933. FO 371/16986/1534.
206
CHAPTER VIn
THE V ARLi K TAX AND ITS IMPACT
ON THE GREEK COMMUNITY.
1. The position of Turkey during 1939-1942.
During the first months of World War II, Turkey had more to fear from the
USSR than Nazi Germany, as Soviet-Turkish relations appeared rather
shaken. Turkish apprehensions were further intensified when on 23 August
1939 the Germans signed a pact of non-aggression with the Soviets. Fears of
Soviet intentions and the expansionist ambitions of Germany and Italy
pushed Turkey into an alliance with the anti-revisionist Anglo-French block.
Thus, the successor of Atatiirk, Ismet Inonii entered a mutual assistance
agreement with Great Britain and France on 19 October 1939. Yet after the
fall of Rumania and the expansion of the Axis influence to the Thracian I
border of Turkey in May 1941, Ankara began to reconsider its policy. Declin-;=:;-i
ing to participate actively in the war, Turkey embarked upon a policy of.
neutrality.
1
Isolated from the Allies, an increasingly nervous Turkey sought
to avoid provoking a German invasion. To secure German goodwill, the
Turkish government signed on 18 June 1941 an agreement of friendship and
commerce with the Nazis. At this early stage of the war the Turkish govern-
ment seriously questioned the ability of the British to provide them with
adequate military assistance. In this Ankara was influenced by the Greek
experience. After six months of heroic resistence to the Italians, Greece
capitulated to the Axis Powers. Despite its commitments to Greece, Britain
did little to prevent the fall of Athens to the German forces on 27 April 1941.
Nevertheless, the Turks were able to reconcile their recent agreement with
the Nazis, with their continued alliance with Great Britain by exempting from
the Turco-German pact any obligations previously assumed. Through this
device and by their continued affirmation that they would resist attacks
against Turkish territory, Turkey appeased its hard-pressed British ally. By
1 .. For an excellent treatment of Turkish foreign policy during World War II see F.G. Weber ..
The El'Gsil"e Neutral, Columbia 1979.
207
14
counterbalancing the pressures exerted upon them by both blocks, the Turks
successfully maintained a somewhat uneasy position of non-belligerence
throughout the war. 2 Given the sensitive strategic position of Turkey, the
avoidance of an active commitment to the war was a remarkable achievement
of Turkish foreign policy.
Although Turkey avoided direct involvement in the war, it was unable to
escape the severe economic strains felt throughout Europe during 1939-44.
Despite notable efforts at industrialization, the Kemalist vision of economic
self-sufficiency was far from being accomplished. On the eve of World War
II, Turkey was still dependent on Europe for its basic commodities such as
raw materials and spare parts. War activity and blockades in the Mediterra-
nean dramatically curtailed the volume of Turkish imports, and although
Turkish export trade retained its vitality, the disruption of commercial ex-
changes with the Axis had particularly severe consequences.
3
Under these
circumstances essential imported commodities, which had long been taken
for granted by Turkish consumers, became grossly inadequate. Dissatisfac-
tion in the urban centres was particularly strong among the civil servants with
fIxed incomes and the working class.
4
The Turkish peasant, who still made up
over 75 per cent of the population, was also discontented.
Meanwhile, because of the imminent threat of invasion fIrst by the USSR
and then by Germany, the Turkish army had been on a war footing since 1939
and a force of about one million men was mobilized. The mobilization was a
tremendous burden on the economy exceeding the sum of 1,000,000 TL per
day. Thus, while Turkish national defence expenditure was 163,941,000 TL
in 1939, it was increased to 542,516,000 TL by 1943.
5
Only one third of this
expenditure could have been covered by the existing taxatiOl,l. Coupled with
2. Ibid.
3. Annual values of foreign trade ($ 1000).
VoluJIle of
Year IlIlporrl Erport5 Difference foreign trade
1938 118899.:2 115018.7 - 3880,4 233917,8
1939 92497,6 99647,2 + 7149,6 192144,8
1940 50034,6 80904,9 + 30870,3 130939,5
1941 55348,9 91056,3 + 35707,4 146405,2
1942 112878,8 126115,3 + 13236,5 238994,1
1943 155340,2 196734,5 + 41394,3 352074,7
1944 126230,1 177952,4 + 51722,3 304182,5
M.. Tiirkiye'de Toplumsal VI' Ekollomik Geli:Wlenin 50 ym, Ankara 1973, p. 3:26
4. Text of the speech by the Turkish prime minister. Refik Saydam, 2 February 1942, in FO
371/33375/R810; Jordan to Foreign Office, Ankara, I December 194:2. FO 371/33389/R8684.
5. F. Okte, Varllk Vergisi Facias!. istanbul 1951, p. 23 f[
208
this, the withdrawal of hundreds of thousands of active men from productive
capacities adversely affected the agricultural output and industrial produc-
tion of the country. The mobilization not only engendered a severe labour
shortage but also the huge armed force provided a new source of competition
on the market. consuming goods and foodstuffs needed by the civilian popu-
lation. As supplies were unable to meet demand, severe shortages in such
staple articles as wheat, sugar and coal became commonplace. The scarcity
of basic commodities in turn resulted in a steep rise in prices.
6
Owing to the upward tendency of the price index hoarding and speCUlation
became rampant. Both speculators and consumers indulged extensively in
such practices aggravating the market trends. A number of retailers,
wholesalers. agents. brokers, middlemen, exporters and importers, known as
the war-rich (harp zenginleri). in the larger cities were able to dominate a
flourishing blackmarket and amass large fortunes in a short space of time.
Nor was speculation and hoarding restricted to the urban capitalist and
commercial classes. The government policy of offering progressively higher
values for wheat and other cereals led a section of the farmers to hold onto
their stocks in the hope of benefiting from the ever-increasing prices. Describ-
ing the condition of the peasants, the British ambassador, Sir Knatchbull-
Hugessen remarked that
the peasants who are hoarding grain and selling at high prices are
virtually as well off as are many numbers of peasants in the North
(Black Sea region)>>. 7
6 .. The wholesale price index:
Foodstuffs Raw materials General
Year \egetable.l meat industrial index
1938 100 100 100 100
1940 123..3 12L8 1345 126.6
1941 179.8 IR8 1763 175.3
1942 424.9 386 .. 6 26L2 339 .. 6
1943 8945 752.8 319 590.1
1944 539..4 520.9 355.6 458
7. Hugessen to Foreign Office. Ankara, '27 April 1942, FO 371/33388/R2814. An index of
agricultural production in Turkey based on the most important crops gives the (1938: 100)
1935 .. "'. 72
1936 ..... 93
1937 ... ,95
1938 ..... 100
1939 ..... 105
1940 ..... 106
209
He also noted that in the Adana district, the cotton farmers and textile
manufacturers were prosperous, and that is:el enjoys a local prosperity. 8
At the same time heavy expenditure occasioned by mobilization and the
constant rise of the price index resulted to a considerable increase in note
circulation. During the month of October 1942 alone note circulation had
increased by 35,500 TL. Increased money circulation indicated inflation and
all indices affirmed that Turkey was in the midst of a serious economic crisis. 9
1941.. ... 95
1942 ..... 103
1943 ..... 90
1944 ..... 86
1945 ..... 74
1946 ..... 96
According to a wheat price index cmpiled by the Turkish statistics department (istatistik Umum
Miidur/iigu) prices fluctuated as following
1935 ..... 5.50 (kg/Kuru:j)
1936 .... 5.72
1937 ..... 5.47
1938 ..... 5J6
1939 ... " 508
1940 ...... 6.05
1941 .... JO.58
1942 .... .30.76
1943 .... .47.23
1944 ..... 28.40
V. Eidem, Mill! Gelir, jstanbul Univesitesi jktisat Fakultesi Mecmuasl. 9/1-2 (1948) 82-83.
8. Hugessen to Foreign Office, Ankara, 27 April 1942, FO 371/33389/R2814.
9. Money supply and wholesale prices, 1936-1944. (TL million)
Bank notes ill Sight deposits Total jstanbul wholesale
Years circulation at banks (1 +(2) price index
(1)
1936 170 133 303 101.4
1937 180 157 337 105.5
1938 194 205 399 100.0
1939 281 201 482 100.9
1940 404 202 606 123.1
1941 512 285 797 166.5
1942 733 399 1,132 325.9
1943 802 400 1,202 699.4
1944 960 500 1,460 486.7
(1938: 100)
These estimates are based on the nearest available data. See Anlluaire Statistique. 193536,
Ankara 1937, p. 275; Annuaire Statistique, 1942-45. Ankara 1945, p. 299.
210
On 24 October 1942, the British ambassador in Turkey expressed his anxiety
about the economic situation in Turkey. In a telegram to the Foreign Office,
he reported that he anticipated a more or less complete breakdown in the
Turkish economy by the end of the present year (1942)>>.1
0
Turkish leaders were equally alarmed by the gloomy prospects of the
economy. This nervousness was expressed by the president, ismet inonii,
when on 1 November 1942 he condemned the widespread profiteering and
hoarding practices. He accused such unscrupulous traders of attempting to
undermine the national life.l1 The new Turkish prime minister, -5iikrii
shared the views of President inonii.
12
2. The enactment of the varl'ik tax.
-/ By drawing a deliberately depressing picture of the economy, the president
hoped to prepare his countrymen for the drastic legislation against war-
profiteering contrived by the Saras:oglu government. As early as 1 January
1940, the government attempted to check the situation through rationing
wheat, imposing rent controls and finally by giving extensive emergency
powers to the authorities with the promulgation of the National Emergency
law. On the whole, these measures proved ineffective and speculators were
able to circumvent government controls.
1
Now, on II November 1942, a new
emergency tax measure was promulgated in order -to curb the galloping
inflation. Claiming that the sole purpose of the new emergency measure was
to put some order in the economy, Prime Minister Saras:oglu declared before
the Turkish assembly that
we are neither the pupils of Adam Smith nor the apprentices of Karl
Marx. We are the children of a political party whose social religion is
populism and whose economic doctrine is etatisme.
He concluded his account by stressing that an emergency act was necessary
for the control of the unabated inflation as well as for the assessment of the.
hitherto untaxed wealth.
2
Thus, the varl'ik vergisi (capital tax) was duly
approved by 350 out of 429 deputies in the Turkish assembly. Among the 76
who abstained (three seats were vacant), there were the Greek and Jewish
deputies, Nicholas Taptas and AbravaYl1 MannaralP
10. Hugessen to Foreign Office, Ankara, 24 October 1942, FO 371/33389/R7117.
11. AT lOS (1942) 21-24 for the complete text of the speech.
12. Ibid .. pp. 39-41.
1. E. Clark, The Turkish Varllk Vergisi Reconsidered, MES 8/2 (1972) 206.
2. He called the tax a revolutionary step, for the text of the 11 November speech seeAT 108
(1942) 25-41. See also TBMM Zablt Ceridesi, 28-29 (1942) 33-35.
3. Official translation Loi de l' Impot sur fa Fortune, no. 4305/1942.
211
This extraordinary levy was mainly designed to tax the abnormally high
profits amassed by a number of individuals and companies since the outbreak
of the war. Four categories of the population seemed to have been largely
affected by the new levy. These were:
(a) companies and individuals engaged in business since 1939
(b) middlemen and commissionaires
(c) owners of immovable property, and
(d) salaried private employees (government employees were ex
empted).
Through a fiscal measure, the government intended to deflate the economy
by providing the treasury with funds. Deflation, it was hoped, by withdrawing
surplus purchasing power in circulation would cause a fall in prices. Given the
extensive profiteering and tax evasion which had taken place since 1939, the
proposed tax was in principle legitimate. It was also desirable for the pur-
poses of both revenue and social justice, for a relatively small section of the
population had been able to profit from the economic crisis at the expense of
the Turkish people.
While, therefore, the necessity of a drastic fiscal measure was indisputable,
certain traits of the new bill created apprehension from the very start. Such
misgivings were widespread among Turkish citizens who wished to see the
establishment of democratic values and civil freedoms in Turkey. Thus,
although taxes were to be levied in proportion to wealth and ability to pay, no
declarations of resources were sought by the assessment boards. Such com-
mittees (mahallf takdir komisyonlarl) were comprised of high-ranking gov-
ernment officials and influential personalities in each district, who conducted
their inquiries in well-guarded secrecy.
4
Equally disconcerting were the
almost unlimited powers bestowed upon these committees to estimate the
amount of tax imposed upon every individual. Further, a clause forbidding all
appeals except through the assembly was also inserted in the tax. The
payments were to be deposited within fifteen days of assessment and, al-
though fIfteen days grace was granted, this was subject to high interest
payments of one per cent on the value of the original tax during the first week
and two per cent during the second. Those who were unable to pay off the tax
within the prescribed month were liable to immediate confiscation and public
auctioning of their property. If the price obtained was still insufficient,
defaulters were liable to forced labour on non-military projects under the
direction of the ministry of public works.
A ware that a large body of opinion in Turkey associated the prevailing
40 kE, Yalman. Turkey in My Time. Norman 1956, p. 205.
212
economic crisis with their business practices, the non-Muslims were particu-
larly worried by the unlimited powers vested with the assessment commit-
tees. They strongly feared that they would be treated less favourably than
their Muslim counterparts. The Turkish press had launched an extensive
campaign against Christian and Jewish businessmen accusing them of specu-
lation, blackmarketing and stockpiling. In a characteristic article entitled
Yorgi, you will no longer be allowed to do what you wish, the Ulus of 24
Novembei:1942 accused the Yorgis, Salamons,Kyriakos, Artins, in other
words, the non-Muslims in general, for bringing about the economic ills
which had befallen the country. Finding the liberties enjoyed by the
minorities in Turkey too wide, the press demanded restriction. Before long,
the campaign took a distinctive anti-Jewish character.
5
Stimulated by the
adverse economic conditions, historical prejudice and mistrust of non-
Muslims in Turkey surfaced once again.
The renewed antipathy towards religious minorities was shared by the
Turkish government. Notwithstanding the lip-service paid about the equality
of all Turkish citizens, Ankara manifested a willingness to place the responsi-
bility for the economic crisis on the shoulders of the minorities. Thus, in a
conversation with the British envoy Sterndale Bennett, the Germanophil
Turkish Foreign Minister Numan Menemencioglu claimed that
the minorities were a rich commercial community. They did nothing
for the country. They lived extremely sumptuously and well, while the
Turkish peasants were half starving and even the Turkish officials lived
like the proletariat in comparison with the rich merchants of istanbul
and izmir. 6
By portraying Turkey as the victim of a number of unscrupulous entrep-
reneurs, the government sought to conceal its shortcomings in the economic
field. Chanelling discontent to an unpopular target such as the non-Muslim
minorities would, the government felt, divert criticism and satisfy emotion-
ally the hard-pressed Turkish masses.
Even before the varllk taxation, the Turkish government had shown signs !
of sympathy with discriminatory attitudes towards the minorities. An early
manifestation of this inclination was the decision to mobilize all non-Muslims
between the ages of 18 and 45. Just about the time of the signing of the
Turco-German agreement in June 1941, these men were sent to special c a m p ~
in Anatolia each containing about 5,000 men. There, the men were instructed
5. For a resume of Turkish press repOIts, Hugessen to Foreign Office, Ankara, 29 January
1943, FO 371/37401/RI212.
6. Sterndale Bennett to Foreign Office, Ankara, 10 March 1943, FO 371/37403/R3391.
213
to engage themselves in non-combative capacities such as roadbuilding.
7
The
concentration of all non-Muslim males in such camps aroused great ap-
prehension in minority circles in Istanbul. 8 Their fears were intensified when
reports of harsh conditions and high mortality rate reputed to have prevailed
in the camps reached Istanbul.
9
On 8 December 1941, however, those men
between the ages of38 and 45 were allowed to return to their homes: The rest
spent another six months before they were eventually released. It is reasona-
. ble to assume that the whole operation was a device engineered to get the
minorities out of the strategically sensitive area of istanbul and the Straits.
There is also some evidence to suggest that the Turkish government sus-
pected a number of non-Muslims, almost all Armenians, to be involved in
fiftp column activities against Turkey. 10
The mistrust of the government towards the minorities was best illustrated
during the varlik episode. There is no doubt that a section of the non-Muslim
businessmen deserved this mistrust. For they did accumulate large fortunes
out of the economic difficulties in the years 1939-42. This was particularly so
with those who were in a position to exploit both the highly valued Turkish
exports and the scarcity of essential imports. Non-Muslim merchants also
showed a particular aptitude for transmuting their profits into goods, real
estate and gold, thus making full use of the inflationary market conditions.
Speculation and hoarding was by no means restricted to non-Muslims.
Turkish businessmen were as prone to such activities as their minority
counterparts. It was during these inflationary market conditions that a con-
siderable number of Turkish merchants managed to expand substantially
their business concerns. Yet both the government and the press chose to
direct their frustration with the economic ills against the minorities. Reduced
to mere scapegoats, the latter found themselves accused of disloyalty, tax
evasion and exploitation. Anticipating the foml of a future tax measure, A. K.
Helm, an experienced observer of Turkish affairs and a British diplomat in
I
Ankara, predicted that
it need not cause surprise if in a few years ... a violent campaign is
7. Cornwallis to Eastern Dept., Bardad, 2j4 Novembe 1941, FO 371j30031jRlOO81.
8. Hugessen to Foreign Office, Ankara, 19 May 1941, FO 371j30031jR5357.
9. Interviews with twenty Constantinopolitan Greeks who served in such camps. There are,
however, no reliable statistics as to the overall mOitality rate in these camps. More information is
given in the Ankara Chancery to Southern DepL, 4 June 1941, FO 37Ij30031jR58I3.
10. As pointed out in Foreign Office minute dated 19 May 1941, the Armenians are extremely
fruitful ground for German activity. The non-Muslim elements with their pre-Kemalist mentality
are always viewed with mistrust by the Turkish authorities, in FO 371j30031jR5357.
214
directed against the Jews or if the minorities are again mulcted of the
profits which they have been buildingup in the recent years of relative
tolerance .11
3. Discriminatory traits of the varl'lk tax.
When the varl'lk assessments were eventually made public the discrimina-
tion feared by many was not only established but it even exceeded all
expectations.
1
The majority of the assessments levied on non-Muslims was
set at confiscatory figures bearing no relation to declared profits or capacity
to pay. In the case of firms they amounted from four to seven times the
nominal capital of the company or four to five times the declared profits in
1941. Likewise, taxes imposed on property owners often exceeded the total
value of their estates as registered with the government department. 2 Influ-
enced by the commonly held view that non-Muslims evaded paying taxes, the
assessment boards taxed the minorities over their declared wealth.
Defending the wholly Muslim local assessment boards, the director of
finance (defterdar) in istanbul, Faik Okte presented evidence indicating that
the tax rates were ordered by Ankara. He also attributes the conception of the
bill to the prime minister, ~ i i k r i i Sara<yoglu, who had assumed office in July
1942.
3
This view coincides with that of Ailmet Emin Yalman who strongly
objecte<i to the arbitrary and discriminatory application of the tax levy. In
successive editorials in Vatan, the prominent Turkishjournalist attacked the
injustices caused by the tax. On 1 October 1943 in an article under the
headline, The varl'lk vergisi must be wounded up: it has become a chronic
disease, the prominent Turkish journalist publicly voiced his opposition to
the tax. The varl'lk, he stated, was a result of a contagious disease, anti-
Semitism, that was raging in Europe and had produced a wound which
needed healing. Almost a year later, on 25 September 1944, Yalman des-
cribed the bad disturbance (berbad bir rahats'lzl'lk) created by the varl'lk
tax, and in the Vatan of 26 and 27 September he proposed ways of cancelling
the bill. Angered by this criticism levelled against the varl'lk tax, the au-,
II. Memorandum prepared by Helm on the situation in Turkey, Ankara, 11 August 1942, FO
371j33376jR5552.
I. Memorandum by Roberts on the Capital Levy, I January 1943, FO 371j37400jR645. See also.
The New York Times, II September 1943.
2. Bennett to Foreign Office, Ankara, 28 December 1942, FO 37Ij33389jR9020.
3. In his book which constitutes the main Turkish source on the tax, Okte displays a marked
objectivity and thoroughness, see Varllk Vergisi Faciasl, pp. 73-76.
215
thorities suspended Vatan on 30 September for not complying with the
policy of the government.
4
President Ismet Inonii and his administration had certainly to bear the
responsibility for the infamous tax on wealth. The biographer of Inonii,
Siireyya Aydemir, who defends the tax as an unavoidable need,
admits that even today the tax remains as an accusation against Inonii's
career. He also reveals that the president paid particular attention to the
implementation of the tax, for he was aware that he would ultimately be
accountable for it.
5
Yalman, too, states that, given the strong influence
exercised by the president on all public matters during this period, his
approval, if not his initiation, of the.tax was indisputable.
6
From the evidence provided by Faik Okte, it has been established that
taxpayers were divided into two main categories, the M category for those
of the Muslim faith and the G category, for the non-Muslim Turkish
citizens (gayrimiislim). Subsequently, two further categories, the D categ-
ory for the 750llme Turks and the E category for the foreign nationals
(ecnebi), were instituted. In general those in the G list were taxed about ten
times the amount levied from Muslims of the same wealth. The D category
paid twice as much as Muslims. Since international law dictated that a state
may not tax foreign subjects more heavily than its own nationals, local
assessment boards were instructed to treat foreign residents like the M
group, except for the Jewish subjects of the Axis powers. In practice, how-
ever, owing to the defective system of identification records then in operation
many foreign nationals ended up being lumped together with non-Muslim
Turkish citizens. 7 This was particularly so in the case of the ethnic Greek and
Levantine residents with foreign passports.
The largest levies were imposed in the main urban centres of Turkey:
Thus, Istanbul was assessed at 344,000,000 TL, Izmir at 27,000,000 and
Ankara at 16,000,000. In the case of the capital many assessments were a
simple paper transaction as the largest amounts were those levied on the
Turkish banks, which continued to owe the money or, if they did pay it,
borrowed it back again from the Treasury. 8 Considering the overall assess-
ment estimated at 42S,000,000 TL, the share ofIstanbul - 77 per cent ofthe
total- was indeed very high. Further, the non-Muslim element was assessed
4. A.E. Yalman. Yaklll Tarilzte Cordi/klerilll \'e Cer;irdikierilll, istanbul nd., pp. 381-83.
5. Aydemir. Wllci Adam, istanbul, 1975-76. pp. 228-30.
6 .. Yalman. Yak/II Tarillte, p, 381.
7. Okte. op,cit, , pp. 49. 77-82: G.L. Lewis. Modern Turkey, London 1974. pp. 134-35.
8. Memorandum on the Capital Levy, prepared by the commercial counsellor, N.S.
Robert. I January 1943. FO 371j37400jR645.
216
at 233.000.000 TL (or nearly 52 per cent) while the Muslim share was
122.500,000 (or 29 per cent) and that of the foreigners 79,SOO.OOO (or 19 per
cent).9 The extent that the Turkish government expected the minorities to
contribute to the var/lk tax is better illustrated when Turkish population
statistics are considered. From a total population of 16.188,767 in 1935. the
non-Muslim population of Turkey did not exceed 300,000 persons.
Beside Okte' s account. reports from the British Embassy in Turkey pro-
vide further conclusive evidence of the harsh and often prohibitive rates of
taxation imposed on the minorities. Thus. a survey conducted by British
businessmen of some 100 of the largest profit-making enterprises in Istanbul
showed that in the case of the Armenian firms the assessments were 232 per
cent of the capital. of the Jewish 184 per cent. of the Greek IS9 per cent and of
the Muslim Turkish 4.9 per cent. 10 The ratios are almost identical with the
findings of the foreign Chamber of Commerce in Turkey whose survey results
are quoted in the Nell' York Times of 11 September 1943.
:\ comparative study of some assessments with regards to non-Muslim
iTurkish and foreign) citizens and their ethnic Turkish counterparts reveals:
faxes fixed on the clients of the British Tucker company. 11
G. Mavroudis (Turkish citizen/Greek origin)
Stavropoulos Bros. (Turkish citizens/Greek origin)
Anavi Fils (Turkish citizens/Jewish origin)
Crespi Fils (Turkish citizens/Jewish origin)
Stileyrnan (Turkish citizen/Muslim)
Lm\'yers:
Gad Franco (Turkish citizen/Jewish)
Sekib Adut (Turkish citizen/Jewish)
A.A. Mango (British citizen/Chiot Christian)
Hlkmet Mekki (President of the Istanbul Bar/Turkish)
Rafet (Vice-President of the Istanbul Bar/Turk)
9. Clark. op.cit" pp. 208-09.
IOS,OOO TL
220,000 TL
500,000 TL
95,000 TL
9,000 TL
taxed
377,000 TL
375,000 TL
21,000 TL
2,00S TL
1,000 TL
10. British businessmen to the Prime Minister's Office, Cons .. 3 March 1943, FO
371j37402jR2809.
II. These businessmen were in the paint and colour trade and were considered to be on the
same footing as far as capital was concerned. in Tucker to Mander. Cons .. 10 January 1943. FO
371;37401(R 1163 ..
217
Automobile spare parts
Ototlirk (Turkish citizen/Jewish)
Christos Amand (Turkish citizen/Greek)
Bedri Tok Uvluslim Turk)
Nihat Bozkurt (Muslim Turk)
Wollen Merchants
J. Eskenazi (British citizen/Jewish)
J. Eskenazi Fils (British citizens/Jew)
S. Souraski (British citizen/Jewish)
Hussameddin Eren (Turkish Muslim)
Mustafa Yucat (Turkish Muslim)
Shipowners
estimated
capital
65,000 TL
25,000 TL
60,000 TL
60,000 TL
estimated
capital
20,900 TL
70,000 TL
229,379 TL
500,000 TL
300,000 TL
Barsilay & Benjamin (Turkish Jewish) tonnage: 19,300
taxed
150,000 TL
75,000 TL
2,000 TL
10,000 TL
taxed
90,000 TL
120,000 TL
750,000 TL
30,000 TL
20,000 TL
five ships, taxed: 2 million
Kalkavanzade (Turkish Muslim) tonnage: 21,550
five ships, taxed: 60,000 TL
General Merchants
Isaac Modiano (British citizen/Jewish)
Vehbi K09 (Turkish citizen)
Restaurants in Beyoglll (Pera)
estimated
capital
97,000 TL
2,000,000 TL
Kimon Pavlovich (British citizen/Greek origin)
owner of the Majestic Restaurant
Abdullah Restaurant (Turkish-owned)
Narin Restaurant (Turkish-owned)
Commission Agents
Leon N. Stelianides (British citizen/Greek)
Facil Verdi (Turkish Muslim)
Hilmi Nail Barlo (Turkish Muslim)
taxed
2 million TL
60,000 TL
taxed
15,000 TL
5,000 TL
3,000 TL
10,000 TL
4,500 TL
5,000 TL
Both Turkish agents were involved in a much larger way in bussiness than
Stelianides.
218
Real Estate
Mary Rizzos (British citizen/Greek)
Agopian & heirs (British
citizen/ Armenian)
Said Karamanoglou (Turkish Muslim)
Appx. value
73,000 TL
176,000 TL
1,000,000 TL
taxed
25,000 TL
100,000 TL
20,000 TLI:!
It was not only the large non-Muslim business concerns that the tax on
wealth aimed to cripple. Many other small shopowners and artisans of non-
Muslim origin were also taxed at exorbitant rates. Had they been of the
Turkish race, such persons would have certainly escaped taxation altogether.
Detailed evidence forwarded by the Association of British Women in lstanbul
amply demonstrates this point. In a letter dated on 23 December 1942, the
association revealed some of the most unjust aspects of the tax. It concen-
trates on the hardships caused by the tax on the low income non-Muslim
families who were assessed sums far beyond their powers to pay. Thus, while
members of the minorities working at the lstanbul branch of His Master's
Voice were taxed at 500 TL, Muslim employees paid nothing. Again out of
five women workers at the American Girl's school at Oskiidar (Scoutari) an
Armenian with an income of 100 TL was taxed at 750 TL and a Greek earning
28 TL was assessed 500 TL. The three Muslim workers earning 28 TL each
were not taxed at all. 13 The practice of taxing non-Muslims of the lower
income groups the minimum levy of 500 TL was widespread.
14
The flagrant differentiation shown in the assessments invites the charge
that the varllk tax had a dual purpose. Apart from purely fiscal considera-
tions, the tax sought to transfer to Turkish control many of the commercial
establishments in lstanbul which had survived the policy of economic
nationalism during the 1920s and managed to expand during the relatively
tolerant conditions of the 1930s. As Nadir Nadi, the owner of the influential
Cumhuriyet, pointed out
according to a more specific explanation which was whispered from
earto ear, or even at times voiced out loud, a second objective of the tax
was to free the market from the control of the minorities and open it to
12. Documents with such comparative examples. Hugessen to Foreign Office. Ankara. 29
January 1943. FO 371/33389/RI425; Bennett to Foreign Office. Ankara. '27 December 1942. FO
37 1/33389/R9004.
13. This letter carries 38 signatures and was addressed to Bennett. Cons q 23 1942.
FO 371j37399jR270.
14. The author interviewed many low income Constantinopolitan Greekl;. including a
widow with three children and no pension. who were invariably taxed at 500 TL. Victoria Rizas.
interview with the author. London. 1978.
219
the Turks ... Thus, our Jewish, Greek Orthodox, Catholic and Gre-
gorian subjects who were proud of being Turkish citizens had to sell out
their property and wealth for nothing. 15
For non-Muslim Turkish citizens the tax became nothing less than a small-
scale bloodless financial massacre.
Commenting on the bill many observers of Turkish affairs contended that
the influence of Nazi ideology in Turkey stimulated considerably the build-up
of a general anti-minority feeling in 1941-43 which culminated with the impo-
sition of the infamous tax on wealth.
16
In addition, a recent study has clearly
shown that at the early stages of World War II, at least a portion of the
Turkish leadership flirted with Berlin.17 The influence of racist ideology in
Ankara may be illustrated by the imposition of discriminatory taxes on the
DUI/me Turks. Faik Okte reveals that past family records were investigated in
o l ~ d e r to determine which Turks were of Jewish origin. Encouraged by the
government's attitude a bitter anti-Dol1me campaign was inaugurated in the
large urban centres. These Muslims of Oriental Jewis origin were bitterly
denounced by the press for being worse than the Jews, because they pre-
tended to be Turks and wanted to have the best of both worlds.18 This
campaign presented a radical break with past Turkish attitudes. While play-
ing a prominent part in the Young Turk revolution, the Donme Turks con-
tinued to be active in the Kemalist movement. The American educated
journalist Ahmet Emin Yalman, a DOl/me Turk, was a leading Turkish
publicist. So was the author of Le Kemalisme, Tekin Alp (Moise Cohen).
Apart from their contribution in the intellectual and professional spheres of
Turkish life. the DOl/me Turks also distinguished themselves in commerce,
filling the vacuum created by the departure of Greek and Armenian
businessmen in 1922-23. Again the official inclusion of Jews from the Axis
countries in the non-Muslim category indicated Turkish desire to curry
favour with the Germans by following anti-Semitic policies.
19
In turn the
Nazis wholeheartedly approved of the I'arll" episode.
20
If the assessment of the tax rates was discriminatory, the enforcement of
the var/ik was equally ruthless. 2,563 members of the minorities forming
the extraordinary non-Muslim class (jel'kafade gayrimiislim) were charged
with the astronomical sum of 189,969,980 TL, or 27 per cent of the whole
15.. N .. Nadi. Perde Arkalarlndan, Istanbul 1964. p. 178.
16. Yalman. Yak/n Tari/zle, p. 375: Lewis. Modern Tllrkey, p. 134.
17.. Weber. op .. cit., p. 20 f[
18. Bennett to Foreign Office. Ankara. 12 December 1942. FO 371/33376/R8573. For a general
treatment see Lewis. Emergence, pp. 295-96.
19 .. Okte. op. cil., p. 81.
20. Lewis. Emergence, p. 300. n .. 10.
220
currency circulation in Turkey.21 Further, as the law stipulated, they had to
produce this large sum in cash on a short notice of fifteen days. In the event of
non-payment at the end of thirty days beginning from 17 December 1942,
when the list for Istanbul was issued, the entire property of the taxpayers was
to be confiscated and publicly auctioned. Tax officials (talIsifat miidiirleri)
appeared to have shown great zeal in confiscating merchandise and property,
particularly in Beyoglu, a district inhabited mainly by non-Muslims. 22 Al-
together 885 immovable property auctions were recorded in Istanbul, reach-
ing a tax value of 2,700,883 TL. Another 73 properties were entrusted to the
Treasury.23 Much more property and personal belongings, however, were
sold privately. The total magnitude of forced sales has not yet been exactly
determined, but there is ample evidence to prove that it was of such a scale as
to cause widespread hardship and bitterness.
Although Faik Okte argues that the auctioned property fetched reasonable
prices, he also hints that details of the sales were in some cases not even
published in the press.
24
By concealing such auctions the authorities must
have kept many potential buyers in ignorance of these transactions. It is such
official behaviour that prompted the Greek ambassador in Turkey, Raphail
Raphail to warn the British envoy Sterndale Bennett, that agreat racket was
going on. From reports received from Embassy staff, sent out to observe the
property auctions, the Greek ambassador concluded that the police together
with tax officials shared the spoils. He went on to assert that
in very many cases the public is excluded and the goods were bought
up by the police and the tax officials themselves at extremely low prices
and afterwards sold at profit outside.25
Such activities, the Greek ambassador maintained, were particularly com-
mon in the auction of goods. Seizures and sales of property forced the closure
of many long established non- Muslim enterprises in istanbul despite the fact
that such sales produced somewhat less than one per cent of the total tax
collection.
26
Closures of businesses in turn resulted in throwing into unemp-
loyment several hundreds of employees who had the additional difficulty of
21 Okte.op. cil., p. 102 ..
y) IhhL. pp" 105-06.
23. Ibid., pp. 163-66. 233 (list of confiscated property).
X Ibid, pp. 166.
25, Details of the intervie\v in SterndaJe Bennett to Foreign Office, Ankara, 18 March 1943. FO
37 I ;37403jR3392,
26. Okte. Op.cil., p .. 233.
221
finding their own \'{[rl'lk assessments which usually ranged from 500 to 750
TLY
Intercommunal bitterness was further intensified when a number of is tan-
bul and Anatolian Turks took advantage of the harsh varlik measure and
bought up minority property and businesses. The tax did not touch the
landowners who owned textile factories, commission collectors who did
business with the government, and the contractors, though they also had
managed to amass large fortunes during 1939-43. These Turks, and particu-
larly prosperous farmers from the Adana district, began to take over the
istanbul market as established Constantinopolitan commercial houses faded
away because of the varl'lk taxation.
28
As a last resort, a large number of Turkish citizens used their constitutional
right and directly petitioned the Turkish parliament. Of the 24,316 appeals
against the tax on wealth 16,816 were connected with excessive assessments.
thus establishing this tax as causing the greatest number of complaints
(ittiraz) in the history of the Turkish republic.
29
But in the absence of a
procedure for investigation of such appeals by the assembly, the deportation
of those who did not discharge themselves of their liabilities was put into
effect. On 7 January 1943 regulations concerning forced labour for non-
payment of the varl'lk tax were approved by the Turkish government.
30
Ostensibly internees were to engage themselves in compulsory labour for
public works and were to be paid two TL per day, one of which was to be
credited to their tax account. They were supposed to remain in such camps
until they had paid off their entire tax debt. Considering the large amounts of
their tax, in practice. the decree was equal to life imprisonment. It has been
estimated that defaulters would have had to work for more than 250 years in
order to pay their entire tax debts. 31 But forced labour camps were primarily
to act as a deterrent.
By 27 January 1943, thirty-two non-Muslim businessmen with tax debts of
over 50,000 were convicted of unwillingness to support their country in its
hour of need and were duly arrested. They were first interned in the Asiatic
suburbs of istanbul and later sent to a labour camp at An inaccessible
spot in the mountainous area west of Erzurum, in the minds of city
27. Bennett to Foreign Office. Ankara. 18 March 1943, FO 371/37403/E3392.
28. D.A. Rustow. Politics and Development Policy in F. C. Shorter (ed.). FOllr 5tl1dies Oil
the Economic Del'e/opment of Tllrkey, London. 1967. p. 12
29. Okte. op. cit., pp. 109-11. 129.
30. Law no. 19288/1943 given in Resmi no. 5302. 12 January 1943.
31. Okte. op.cit., p. 57.
222
dwellers was thought of as the Turkish Siberia. With fair regularity at inter-
vals of ten to fifteen days, other groups of defaulters were deported to labour
camps at and and few other locations in Anatolia.
32
Of the 1,869
persons arrested in istanbul 640 paid their tax (25,908,695 TL) and the rest
were deported. Altogether 1,400 persons were interned of whom 1,229 came
from istanbul.3
3
There are conflicting reports as to the conditions in the
internment camps. Yalman, who was himself sent to described the
camp as a healthful place. The people who were forced to be there had a
good time, although most resented their exile deeply.34 This view was
adopted by other western observers of Turkish affairs, who compared
favourably the treatment of the varl'tk internees with the inhuman punish-
ments then being applied in much of the rest of Europe. Internees, it was
argued, lived the life of political exiles rather than political prisoners. Life in
the camps was boring rather than intolerable.
35
Yet, there is conclusive
evidence to suggest that the varllk victims suffered considerable harassment
particularly during their transportation to the internment camps. After visit-
. ing an internment camp in the middle of February 1943, the British Colonel
Binns described the treatment which was meted out to defaulting taxpayers.
This morning I visited the barn at Demirkapl where some forty mer-
chants, lawyers and others have been imprisoned for the last ten days
and are being despatched this evening to to join the 32 already
there.
The room in which they are imprisoned is some fifteen yards in length
by eight yards in width ... There was not a stick of furniture of any kind
with the exception of one stove. The room was full of weeping men,
women and children who had come to say goodbye and to bring the
deportees odd parcels of food and clothing. A most depressing and
wretched picture. 36
The original upper age-limit of 55 was not respected as fourteen out of the
thirty-two deportees sent to on 27 January 1943 were over the age of
55. Nor were the sick and ailing spared. Amongst those defaulting taxpayers
despatched to the internment camp there was a 70 year old partly paralyzed
32. Hugessen to Eden. Ankara, 29 May 1943. FO 371/37404/R5055.
33. Ankara Chancery to Southern Dept.. 6 June 1943. FO 371/37406/R8832: Okte, op.cit., PI-
157-58.
34 .. E. Weisband. 71lrkish Foreign Policy 1943-1945, Princeton 1973, pp. 234-35.
35. Cf. L. V. Thomas & R.N. Frye (eds.l. The United States and 71lrkey and Iran, Cambridge
Mass. 1951. pp. 97-98: Clark, op.cit.. p .. 208.
36. Memorandum on conditions in the assembly camp of Demirkapl, Colonel Binns to the
British Consul-General in istanbul. FO 371/37402/R2416.
223
15
Jew, Shaban, while another, Behar, aged 65, was According
G k report
dated 19 May 1943 and based on mformatIon smuggled out
to a ree , l' . th
periodically by the internees, the level of nutrition and clean m e
camps was extremely low, while medical assistance w.as very
obtain and had to be paid for. Conditions in these camps, It was mamtamed 1Il
the report, were responsible for several deaths among the deportees. T.hus, a
Jewish businessman named Romano died on 28 March, after a s?ort Illness
suffered lying on some straw in a stable at On 1 May BaSIl Konstan-
tinidis a Constantinopolitan Greek, died at Erzurum from a heart attack after
his from compulsory labour. He, the account concluded, was
any medical attention. 38 Overall, the human casualties ofthis sad affair
f WhI
'ch eleven were Greeks 39 Reflecting on the hardshIps
twenty-one, 0 .
caused by the varllk affair, Sir Knatchbull-Hugessen that the treat-
ment and handling of the deportees have been charactensed by roughness
and inconsiderateness. He then went on to conclude that ..
there is unfortunately every reason to believe that the. condItIOns
under which the,se unfortunate people have to pass theIr days and
nights are unworthy of a modern civilised country .40 . .
Meanwhile, the application of the wealth tax and its impact on mmonty and
foreign business drew the interest of the diplomatic circles in Ankara. Before
long the discriminatory character of the varllk was recognized by the
Allied nations. The racist and arbitrary charactenstlcs of the tax were
tainly contrary to the Anglo-American principles. Yet they face.d a
dilemma. Any attempt to intervene on behalf of the mmoIlties
would irritate Ankara, since the Turks viewed the varl'lk ,affair as a. purely
internal matter. Further as the ambassador of the U Stemhardt
. t d out the Axis Powers might well attempt to alienate 1 urkey from the
pOUl e , I
O
k'l 41 Tl
Allied block by capitalizing on any trouble created by the var I aw.. lUS,
the Allies considered it inadvisable to make formal representatIOns on
behalf of the aggrieved non-Muslim Turkish nationals. As G.L. Clutton of the
British Foreign Office remarked, the Allied attitude .
may be cynical and disregard moral rights and wrongs, but I submIt
that it is good politics. 42
37. Ibid.
38. Raphail to Hugessen, Ankara, 19 May 1943, FO 371/37404/R5055.
39. B. Konstantinidis, C. Iatrou, L Antoniadis, B. Kyriatzis, Z. Doxakis, J. Topaloglo
u
, G"
Sismanoglou. G. Tsorbatzoglou, D. Esnafoglou, A, Sakkopoulos, C. Dimakopoulos.
40. Hugessen to Eden, Ankara, 29 May 1943, FO 371/37404/R5055.
41. Bennett to Eden, Ankara, 23 Desember 1942, FO 371/33389/R8885. . . .
42. Minute by Clutton in FO 371/33389/R8837. For another document on the Bntlsh
towards the tax, Bennett to Foreign Office, Ankara, 28 December 1942, FO 371/33389/R90_0.
224
As a result, official action was confined to individual representations by
each embassy on behalf of its own nationals. Indeed, such representations
were frequent and placed Ankara in an embarrassing position. During a
conversation with Foreign Minister Numan MenemenciogIou, the British
envoy J.C. Sterndale Bennett, speaking in an unofficial capacity, observed
that
the Turkish Republic has taken its stand on justice and equality of
treatment of its nationals and on friendly relations with foreign coun-
tries, including reasonable treatment of their nationals; that world
opinion still counts for a great deal and that great injury may be done to
Turkey's good name and her wider interests by carrying through the
law on present lines.
He then went on to reason that
foreign opinion would regard the manner of levying the tax as akin of
Axis methods and misinterpret it accordingly as reflecting Turkey's
attitude towards the war. 43
Faced with a sustained clamour against the tax from foreign diplomats, Axis
and Allied alike, the Turkish govenunent decided to revise the assessments
of foreign nationals and new lists with modified levies were received by the
embassies.
44
4. The effects of the varl'lk episode on the Greco-Turkish friendship.
There was, however, a notable exception. As late as 30 August 1943, the
Greek ambassador complained bitterly that he was the only foreign represen-
tative who did not receive a list of modified levies for the Hellene nationals.
1
Ever since the publication of the tax, it was evident that the harsh treatment
accorded the Greek Orthodox Turkish nationals was equally extended to the
Hellene Greeks, the largest single foreign group in Turkey. Up to January
1943, there were 3,000 Hellene subjects who had declared to the Greek
consular authorities their varl'lk assessments. The total amount of tax asses-
sed for this group reached 8,705,412 TL. Discrimination was particularly
visible in the case of employees in banks and other similar institutions.
2
43. Bennett to Foreign Office, Ankara, 23 December 1942, FO 371/33389/R8890.
44. Okte, op.cit., pp. 121-26.
1. Helm to Eden, Ankara, 30 August 1943, FO 371/37406fR8574.
2. The sum of 18,705,412 is divided by professions as follows:
Clerks
Small artisans
225
1460
354
896,695 TL
660,225 TL
Hellenes were the only foreign group whose property was confiscated and
auctioned extensively. As a result, by August 1943,6,500,000 TL tax debts of
Hellene nationals had been collected by the Turkish authorities.
3
Comment-
ing on the stringent measures against the Hellenes, on 23 December 1942,
Sterndale Bennett remarked that all indications go to confirm the victimiza-
tion of Greek nationals.4 The concern of the Greek Embassy was particu-
larly pronounced in the case of Constantinopolitan Hellene wage earners
whose aggregate tax amounted to no less than 500,000 TL.5 According to a
comparative list by professions, prepared by the Greek Embassy in January
1943, the difference between the amounts of tax claimed from the Hellenes
and Muslim Turkish was tremendous. Accordingiy:6
Professions
Importers
Exporters
Merchants
Industrialists
Grocers
Shopkeepers
Agents
Merchant tailors
Furniture merchants
Hellenes
10,000/75,000
60,000/400,000
15,000/1,000,000
75,000/262,500
6,000/150,000
12,000/160,000
10,000/120,000
15,000/75,000
6,000/140,000
Muslim Turks
1,000/10,000
5,000/25,000
1,500/100,000
500/35,000
500/10,000
500/15,000
1,000/10,000
1,500/17,000
1,200/ 3,000
Such discriminatory evaluations were contrary to the principle of inter-
national law which forbade a state to tax its foreign residents more heavily
than its own nationals.
Greek resentment towards the Turkish action was immense. In a con-
versation with the British diplomat, Sterndale Bennett on 21 December,
Greek Ambassador Raphail expressed the view that the tax was a savage
Artisans & small shopkeepers
Shopkeepers & small traders
Merchants
Landlords with no other income
Professional men
708
315
139
15
9
3,722.885 TL
4.728.800 TL
8,359,807 TL
303.000 TL
34.000 TL
Memorandum prepared by the Greek consular authorities in Istanbul. 27 January 1943. FO
37Ij37401/RIII0 .. Turkish estimates give the tax imposed on the Hellenes as 19.861.350 TL.
Okte. op.cit .. p. 125.
3. Hugessen to Eden. Ankara. 8 August 1943. FO 371/37228/R7387.
4. Bennett to Foreign Office. Ankara. 23 December 1942. FO 371/33389/R8890.
5. Bennett to Foreign Office. Ankara. 31 December 1942. FO 371/37399/RI2.
6. Memorandum prepared by the Greek consular authorities in Istanbul. 27 January 1943. FO
371/37401/RIIIO
226
attack on the Greek community as a whole with political rather than fiscal
objectives. The taxation demands, he insisted, meant nothing less than the
complete extermination of the Greek community, and represented a precon-
certed plan to drive the Greeks out of business and take over their trade. 7
This view was shared by the British commercial counsellor in the Ankara
Embassy, who was sent to istanbul to collect information on the tax. After a
thorough research, he concluded that in the case of the minorities and the
Greek nationals the taxation is absolutely crushing.8 The Foreign
too, believed that
The Turks are determined to eliminate the Greeks from Turkish
national life, whether they form part of the Greek minority or are
Hellene Greeks who played a large part in the commercial and cultural
life of istanbul. 9
Although no exact figures on the share of the tax levied on the Greek
community itself are available, the Greek consular authorities estimated it to
be at least 60,000,000 TL.l 0 The tax imposed on Greek minority institutions
alone was calculated at 400,000 TL. Greek Orthodox priests, schools, hospi-
tals and other philanthropic institutions were held liable to pay the so-called
tax on war-profits. Concurrently, whereas the American
hospital ofIstanbul, a large and flourishing modem establishment charging 10
TL a bed per night, was assessed at 2,000 TL (another account puts it at 1,500
TL), the Ballkll hospital, a much more modest concern, was down for 68,000
TL.ll Together with the Hellenes, the Greek element as a whole was asses-
sed to no less than 80,000,000 TL. In other words, the Constantinopolitan
Greeks, although constituting a very small proportion of the total population
in Turkey (approximately 0,55 per cent), was called upon to shoulder just
under 20 per cent of the total varllk taxation.
The Greek charge d'affaires, Kapetanidis, a staunch supporter of Greco-
Turkish friendship, described his six month stay in istanbul as consul-general
(September 1942 to March 1943) as a nightmare owing to the tax.12 The
deportation of Greeks to Anatolia and the daily auction of Greek property and
merchandise shocked the community as a whole. The tax did not only
7. Details of this conversation in Bennett to Foreign Office, Ankara, 21 December 1942, FO
371,33389; R8837.
8 .. Bennett to Foreign Office. Ankara, 23 December 1942. FO 371/33389/R8928 ..
9. Minute by G.L Clutton. 23 December 1942. FO 371/33389/R8837.
10. Memorandum prepared by the Greek consular authorities in Istanbul. 27 January 1943. FO
371/37401: Rill 0 and information forwarded by the Patriarchate to Lambeth Palace. Archbishop
of Canterbury to Eden. London. 18 January 1943. FO 371/37400/R616.
II. Archbishop of Canterbury to Eden. London. 28 January 1943. FO 371/37400/R935.
12. For Kapetanakis' views. Hugessen to Eden. Ankara. 8 April 1943, FO 371/37228/R3658.
227
embitter the Greeks against the Turkish government but also against the
evasiveness of the Great Powers. Thus, the varl'ik episode was hushed up in
the Anglo-American press. The only exception to this was the New York
Times correspondent in Turkey, C.L. Sulzberger, who in three long and
detailed articles, drew attention to the punitive tax on wealth.
13
Later on, the
New York Times took up the issue editorially and stressed:
America and Britain cannot dictate tax laws to Turkey any more than
they can to each other. But they could certainly view with some
uneasiness the development in Turkey of a narrow nationalism re-
miniscent, even in a milder way, of that which Germany has imposed on
Europe. We hope that as Turkey turns more and more away from the
Nazis in other respects she will turn from them in this respect too .14
Faced with the refusal of the United Nations block to intervene on behalf of
the minorities, the Greek Embassy took upon itself to negotiate a better deal
for the Constantinopolitan Greeks. Thus, the Greek ambassador, Raphail
Raphail, as well as the consul-general in Istanbul, made frequent represen-
tation to members of the Turkish government, but with little practical re-
sults.
IS
A bitter Greek government viewed the varl'ik affair as another Turkish
effort to redefine Greek-Turkish relations. Old suspicions were once again
revived and the Turkish failure to assist Greece against the Axis Powers in
April/May 1941 was now described as the treachery of an enemy who posed
as a friend . At the same time, the Greeks were painfully aware of their feeble
international position. The removal of the Greek government-in-exile to
London and then to Cairo, after the German occupation of Greece, decreased
Hellenic diplomatic leverage in Ankara. After the German invasion, the
Greeks complained bitterly, Turkey found favourable conditions for the
elimination of the Constantinopolitan Greek element.
Clearly, relations between the two countries showed severe strains, de-
spite Ankara's lip-service to Greek-Turkish friendship" The Greeks feared
that the Turks would seek a predominant position in the Aegean by raising
their old demands for territorial compensation in the Dodecanese and in the
eastern Aegean islands. Thus, in his conversation with the British foreign
secretary, Antony Eden, on 1 March, Greek Premier Emmanuel Tsouderos
stressed the fact of the comparative weakness of the Greek navy and the need
130 The Nell' York Times. 9 to 12 September 1943.
14. The Nell' York Times. 17 September 1943.
150 Interview with Greek Ambassador Raphail, Bennett to Eden. Ankara, 18 March 1943, FO
371/37403/R3392.
228
for it to be of greater strength than the Turkish.
16
It was mainly because of the
deterioration of Greek-Turkish relations that the planned visit of Tsouderos
to Ankara was cancelled,17 Earlier, on 3 March, in a direct appeal to the
Turkish premier, ~ i i k r i i Sara90glu, Tsouderos reaffirmed that he did not
question Turkey's right to impose any tax measures on its citizens, including
those of Greek origin" However, it appears, Tsouderos remarked, that the
new law struck the Greek inhabitants of Turkey with singular vigour causing
widespread ruin and misery. He then went on to stress
Le Gouvernement et Ie peuple grecs pourront difficilement com-
prendre qu'a un moment OU l'hellenisme subit les dures vicissitudes
d'une triple occupation ennemie la Turquie amie et alliee n'aura pas a
coeur de donner des instructions nettes aux organes administratifs
turcs pour que ceux-ci apportent les temperaments necessaires a
I'application d'une loi qui sans cela risque de mener a la misere un
element dont la loyaute a la cause greco-turque est hoI'S de doute.18
In his answer Sara90glu, after addressing Greece as Turkey's friend and ally,
insisted that all taxpayers had been treated equally. 19 Similarly, on 16 May, in
a speech at the opening of the Institute ofInternational Law at the University
of lstanbul, Foreign Minister Menemencioglu reiterated his government's
commitment to Greco-Turkish friendship.20 It appears that the Turks failed
to conceive the profound bitterness that the l'(lrllk taxation engendered in
official Greek circles. This was made clear by the Turkish prime minister
who, while reassuring the British that Greco-Turkish friendship was one of
the main pilars of his country's Balkan policy, he disclosed that when the tax
was imposed its effects on this friendship were not considered.
21
The Greeks,
however, were not satisfied with such explanations. Perturbed by the puni-
tive character of the tax, they felt that this reflected a change of policy on the
part of the Turkish government.
5. The abolition of the tax on wealth.
From the very beginning, the Turkish government endeavoured to play
16. Details of conversation with Greek Premier Tsouderos, Eden to Palairet. London, I March
1943, FO 371;37228;R 1873 .. On fears of Turkish designs in the Aegean see Weber. opo cit .. p. 60.
170 According to Raphail the tax was the immediate cause of this cancellation, Hugessen to
Eden. Ankara. 22 May 1943. FO 371/37403/R4609.
180 Tsouderos to Sara90glu. 3 March 1943. FO 371/37402/RI957"
19 .. Sarac;oglu to Tsouderos. Ankara. 7 March 1943. FO 371/37402/RI957"
20. Hugessen to Eden. Ankara. 16 May 1943. FO 371/37468/R4362"
2L Memorandum on Greco-Turkish relations prepared by the Southern Dept." 2 March 1943.
FO 371;37228iR2128.
229
down the discriminatory aspects of the tax. If the varllk affected a small
proportion of the population, Ankara asserted, it was simply because this
particular section of the society had amassed the national wealth. This view
was expressed on 15 June by Premier Sara<;:oglu who declared that the
minorities should contribute to the state finances in the same manner as did
the loyal Turks. Ifa large portion of the levies collected so far had been paid
by members of the minorities this, he argued, was because they owned all the
real estate and had the sources of wealth in their hands. While at pains to point
out that it was not the intention of the government to crush the minorities,
his whole attitude and tone, according to Knatchbull-Huggessen, indicated
that the government expected from non-Muslims in Turkey something more
than a mere desire for equal sacrifice. 1 Likewise, Presidentlsmet Inonii was
noted to have regarded the \'([r/'ik as a tax on all the Turks.2 Despite the
lip-service of equal treatment paid by the Turkish leadership, the tone and
actions of the government were probably responsible for a renewed wave of
anti-minority feeling during 1941-44.
At the same time, the Turkish government attempted to reopen old ques-
tions, such as the seat of the Ecumenical Patriarchate. Thus, early in January
1943, during a conversation with his Greek colleague A. Agnidis, the Turkish
ambassador to London, Rauf Orbay, asked why the Patriarchate was not
abolished in the same way as Turkey had done with the Caliphate.
3
In
addition, the archbishops of Chalcedon and Imbros were removed from the
Phanar and sent to exile in Bursa. This was followed by: the arrest of the
mayor of the island of Imbros and another three Greek notables.
4
A few
months later, on 5 May, Rauf Orbay cautioned the Greek ambassador in
Britain, Agnidis, to refrain from encouraging the Patriarchate to believe that
it has a political mission in favour of Greece and to the prejudice of Turkey.
Secondly, he stressed, the Greeks should not seek British intervention in
favour of their compatriots in Turkey. Thirdly, Orbay concluded, Greece
should not encourage its compatriots in Turkey, who were Turkish subjects,
to look towards the Hellenic authorities for protection.
s
Taken aback by
these recommendations, the Greek ambassador insisted that there was no
justification for such remarks. With Greece occupied by the Axis Powers, the
L Hugessen to Eden. Ankara. 21 June 1943. FO 371/37470/R5698.
2 .. Weisband. op.cit., p. 235.
3. Minutes of Sir A. Cadogan's conversation with Agnidis. London. 15 January 1943. FO
37 1/37224/R52L
4. Arrested in January 1943. the prelates remained in exile for four months. ibid. and British
Embassy Chancery to Foreign Office. Ankara. 9 April 1943. FO 371/37228/R3747.,
5. Greek aide-III1?lIloire to the British government. Cairo. 7 June 1943. FO 371/37228/R5373.
230
Greek government-in-exile had to consider more pressing issues than inter-
ference in the internal affairs of Turkey.6 In an aide-memoire to the British
government, the Greeks observed that the Turks chose this conjunction to
uproot the Greeks in Turkey becauce they were aware of Greece's inability to
exercise its own rights. At any other time the Muslims of Thrace would have
constituted in themselves a guarantee against the persecution of Constan-
tinopolitan Greeks. But, with the occupation of Greek Thrace by German and
Bulgarian forces, this deterrent was lost and Greece could do very little to
reverse the Turkish policy towards the Greek minority.7
Public opinion in Turkey backed the anti-Greek and anti-minority
measur:es. One of the things that impressed Ambassador Raphail during a
visit in Istanbul in March 1943 was the growth of an aggressive nationalism.
In a conversation with Sterndale Bennett, he disclosed that he himself had
been the subject of insulting epithets for talking in Greek in the street while
the wife of the Greek naval attache had been stopped in the street and insulted
for the same reason.8 Meanwhile the Turkish press, headed by the pro-Axis
Cllmlzllriyet, accused the non-Muslims of being unpatriotic, disloyal and of
alien blood.'! In a speech in June 1943, the former justice minister and
deputy, Mahmut Esat Bozkurt, warned the minorities that they should
e ~ t h e r become Turks or leave the country.l 0 Overnight, Atatiirk's attempts
to Incorporate the minorities into Turkey, in so far as such attempts had had
some measure of success, were undone. Greek, Armenian and French (the
street language of most of Turkey's educated Jews) were suddenly to be
heard on lips which had previously spoken Turkish in pUblic. Resentment and
discrimination dwelled everywhere. RepUblican istanbul lapsed into Otto-
man Constantinople. With the varlfk episode it became clear that despite the
republic's principle oflaicism, the Islamic concept of what makes a first-class
citizen remained paramount. As a result, the tax undermined the confidence
which the minorities had gradually built up towards the Turkish government
during the 1930s.
Neither did the tax achieve its economic objectives. On the contrary, it
resulted in the collapse of the price policy that had inspired it in the first place.
While Turkey needed all the expertise and potential available in the country
to overcome the economic crisis, thanks to the tax it managed to drive out of
trade the most experienced section of the business community.
A Ihid.
7.lhid
H. Interview with RaphaiL Bennett to Eden. Ankara. 18 March 1943. FO 371j37403;R3392.
lJ Lewis. Emergellce, p .. 299.
I(L Hugessen to Eden. Ankara. 21 June 1943. FO 371/37470;R5698.
231
But the diplomatic implications of the act were also considerable. As the
mr/'ik. incident deeply offended the sensibilities of Western democracies, the
international reputation of Turkey suffered a serious setback. Likewise, by
unfairly taxing its foreign residents, Turkey invited foreign interference in its
internal affairs. In vain did Premier Sara90glu claim to be impervious to
outside influences through such emotive phrases as I am not an Ottoman
\'ezir. 11 After all, under strong diplomatic pressure, the Turkish government
was forced to reevaluate the taxes imposed on foreign nationals. Equally
significant were the political implications of the varllk. taxation. This act
constituted the single most visible violation of the minority clauses of the
Lausanne treaty. Yet none of its signatories was prepared to challenge
Turkey to respect them, and as the Foreign Office reasoned a direct appeal
to the Lausanne treaty is to be deprecated because it would certainly offend
the Turks and make them more obstinate. 12 But the concluding remarks of
the report reveal the reasons behind the British reluctance to intervene.
The tax is probably the most serious breach of the minority provisions
of the Lausanne Treaty, since that instrument was signed, but the fact
remains that at any rate since 1930, we have accepted the position that
these provisions are a dead letter. Strong Allied action undoubtedly
represent in Turkish eyes a derogation of their sovereignty analogous
to the Capitulations.13
The inaction of the Great Powers, despite article 44 of the Lausanne treaty,
illustrated the vulnerability of the non-Muslim minorities in Turkey.
The end of the varl'lk. taxation coincided with the realization that Germany
had lost the war. But the repeal of the tax on wealth came in a series of steps.
The first concrete step towards its abolition was taken on 17 September 1943,
when the government relieved from payment those persons who were asses-
sed at sums not exceeding 2,500 TL.14 It has been estimated that 22,000
non-Muslims benefited from these remissions. Minority communal institu-
tions were also cleared of their debts.ls Eventually, in December 1943, a
week before President Inonu was scheduled to meet Churchill and Roosevelt
in Cairo. the remaining 1,400 deportees were allowed to return to their
homes. When the tax was cancelled on 15 March 1944,315,000,000 TL had
I L Aydemir. op. cit" ii/po 233.
12. Brief for the Secretary of State in conversation with the Greek Prime Minister E.
Tsouderos prepared by the Southern Dept, 27 February 1943, FO 371/37401/RI552.
13. Ibid,
14. Okte, 222. 231: AT 118 (1943) 7.
15. Bentlett to Eden. Ankara, 20 September 1943, FO 371/37402/R9796.
131
Of this amount 280,000,000 TL had come from the wealthy
mInOritIes .16
16" Resllli Ga;;,ele. no. 5657. 17 March 1944: Okte. Op.ciL, pp. 127-28.
133
CHAPTER IX
CORDIAL GRECO-TURKISH RELATIONS AND THE REVIVAL OF
THE ECUMENICAL PATRIARCHATE, 1944-54.
1. The strengthening of Greek-Turkish relations.
Throughout the 1930s friendship between Greece and Turkey was a mutual
and vital interest not only for the security of these two natios but also for that
of the entire south-eastern MediterTanean. The conditions necessary for its
fulfilment had been provided for by the Lausanne treaty which had radically
solved the most intractible questions, such as the terTitorial and minority
issues, between the two countries. The same conditions that prevailed in the
halcyon days ofVenizelos and Atatiirk still existed in 1945. Moreover, Soviet
expansion in the Balkans, prompted Greece and Turkey to act in concert in
their external relations during the immediate postwar period. An axis bet-
ween Ankara and Athens was essential to counter-balance the weight of the
other Slav components in the Balkans, more especially as these were now
dominated by the Soviet Union.
The Communist revolt in Greece (1946-49) had been a cause of serious
concern in Turkey, where the spectre of a Soviet-dominated government in
Athens aroused great fears. As the revolt gained momentum the award of the
Italian-held Dodecanese to Greece caused considerable apprehension in
Turkey, particularly in military circles, because of the proximity of several of
these islands to the Turkish shores. Despite these Turkish misgivings their
transfer to Greek sovereignty was implemented by the treaty of Paris of
February 1947; and the decision of the council of foreign ministers that the
Dodecanese were to be demilitarized somewhat alleviated Turkish fears.
The announcement of the Truman Doctrine, with its implied assumption
that Greece and Turkey were the targets of the same international forces,
paved the way for the strengthening of ties between the two countries. In May
1947 a committee for Greek-Turkish co-operation was formed in Athens
under the then deputy prime minister, Sophocles Venizelos, while in Ankara
President tnono spoke of the urgent need for close consultation and unity. In
the course of the following months negotiations were held between represen-
234
tatives of the two General Staffs. By now the Turks appeared to have given up
their misgivings about the cession of the Dodecanese to Greece and began to
view the Aegean islands as convenient bridges between Greece and Turkey
over which exchange of goods and currents of friendly feelings were to flow
unhampered. Athens shared these views. The prime minister and foreign
minister, Constantine Tsaldaris, in an interview to the Turkish Anatolian
agency, declared that he wished to promote Greek-Turkish co-operation not
only in the political sphere but also in social, economic and cultural matters. I
Accordingly, in September 1948 a commercial treaty was concluded, fol-
lowed by a number of cultural exchanges.
Gradually, the ground was prepared for closer co-operation. In June 1950
the two governments solemnly pledged to promote unity actively and confi-
dence between their two nations. 2 The two governments also worked closely
together to present their cases for joining the Atlantic Alliance. Similarly,
their applications were viewed as one, and a single protocol, signed in
London on 22 October 1951, turned them into NATO's eastern flank.
3
Separate military commands were subsequently established to co-ordinate
their armed forces with those of the Alliance. A feeling of cO'mradeship soon
developed between Greek and Turkish officers serving in these NATO
headquarters. Finally, on 15 February 1952, Turkey and Greece officially
became members of NATO.4
Meanwhile, closer political ties were discussed at length when Prime
Minister Sophocles Venizelos visited Ankara early in February 1952. During
his talks with the Turkish leaders it was decided that a permanent mixed
Greek-Turkish commission should be established to deal with questions of
common interest, such as encouraging trade relations; common marketing
abroad of Turkish and Greek tobacco; fishing in territorial waters between
the Greek islands and the Anatolian mainland; abolition of visas and the
possibility of a customs union. But the main topics of discussion were the;'
questions of security and integration to NATO while there was a generC'
agreement that both sides would seek to induce the Yugoslav government to
join them in a regional defense agreement. 5
On 26 April 1952, a Turkish delegation headed by Premier Adnan Men-
I Kelly to Bevin, Ankara, 15 July 1946, FO 371/58868/RI0674.
2. J .0. Iatrides, Balkan TJ-iangle: Birth and Decline of an Alliance Across Ideological BOllnd-
arie.l. The Hague 1968, pp. 76-78.
3. Ibid.
4. The Times. 18 February 1952. Early in April 1952, the president of the United States,
General Eisenhower visited both Ankara and Athens.
5. Iatrides, op.cit .. pp. 78-79; The Times. 26 April 1952.
235
deres, and including Foreign Minister Fuat K6prtilil and Chief of Army Staff
General $iikrti Kanatll, arTived in Athens on an official visit. The visit was in
return for that paid by Venizelos in February and it aimed at strengthening
Greek-Turkish relations after the integration of the two countries into the
NATO. The discussions were concluded on 2 May, on which day a
communique issued in both capitals stated that the talks embraced all
international problems of interest to the two countries. It was emphasized
that there had been complete agreement on all subjects, and that the Greek
and Turkish peoples could look to the future with optimism.
6
At a press
conference on 2 May, before his departure from Athens, Menderes refeITed
to a proposal by the Greek prime minister, General Plastiras, for a union of
Greece and Turkey and declared that such a development would benefit the
West European nations. He then expressed the hope that Yugoslavia would
appreciate the value of such a union.
7
The most formal of a series of Greek-Turkish exchanges came when
King Paul of the Hellenes and Queen Frederika paid a s,tate visit to the
president of Turkey early in June 1952. This was reciprocated in November
1952 by President Celal Bayar. Significantly, King Paul was the first Greek
sovereign to have set foot on Turkish soil since the days of the Byzantine
empire. This was also the king's first official visit to a foreign capital since his
accession to the Greek throne. Speaking at a banquet given by President
Bayar on 9 June, King Paul recalled the centuries of dispute between the two
countries and then refeITed to the complete reconciliation which had taken
place. He described this friendship as a useful example of political
maturity, citing their common effort in Korea as symbolic of their present
feelings towards each other. 8
The secret talks between Greece and Turkey continued during the six-day
official visit to Athens of President Ceral Bayar on 27 November. During
these talks special consideration was given to the growing rapprochement
with Yugoslavia. 9 Negotiations during the winter of 1952-53 resulted in the
signing in Ankara, in February 1953, of a treaty offriendship and co-operation
between Yugoslavia, Greece and Turkey. This was followed by the conclu-
sion of a formal treaty of alliance of the three countries in August 1954 at Bled
in Yugoslavia. 10 These developments represented a partial attempt to revive
the Balkan Entente of the 1930s and provided for a substantial degree of both
6. The Times. 3 May 1952.
7 .. lhid.
8. The Times. 11 June 1952.
9 .. Ihid .. 28 November 1952.
10 For the text of the agreement see Iatrides. op.cit.. pp. 187 ff.
236
military and political co-operation. Closer relations in the economic and
cultural.fields followed. True to the spirit of detente, a prominent Greek
economIst, Athanasios Sbarounis, proposed the idea of Turkish-Hellenic
customs and economic union.
II
2. Rapprochement and the Ecumenical Patriarchate.
In. 1945,just before the high level contacts between Greece and Turkey, the
tensIOns engendered by the varl'lk episode were still visible in istanbul. This
was attested by the remarks on 13 October 1944 by Turkish Foreign Minister
to Peterson, the British ambassador in Turkey.
Expr essmg the vIews of hIs government, the foreign minister disclosed that
Greek minority in istanbul constituted the only unresolved issue between
hIs and Greece. 1 On another occasion, in a conversation with Peter-
s?n, PremIer Sara90glu admitted that his government seriously con-
sIdered the possIbIlIty of requesting Greece to transfer the Patriarchate.
2
As
however, Greco-Turkish relations assumed a cordial character, Ankara
came more accomodating on the minority question, while the postwar politi-
cal and ?liIitary liaison between Ankara and Athens had a favourable effect
on the Constantinopolitan Greeks and the Patriarchate.
the Turkish desire to get along with the Greeks, in view of the
SovIet ambItIOns at the expense of Turkey,3 a new factor had now emerged.
that the Russian Orthodox church offered an admirable vehicle for
op!nion th:oughout Near East, the Stalin government sought
to re:lve the pOSItIOn of the Russian Patriarchate. Thus, the
of the church as the largest, wealthiest and strongest of all
the Orthodox patnarchates, was deliberately fostered abroad.
4
Meanwhile,
11: A. Sbarounis. Project ofa 1llrkish-Hellenic Customs and Economic Union. istanbul 1954,
passim.
I. J3 October 1944. Chancery to the Southern Department Ankara 3 April 1945, FO
371j48349jR6606. ' ,
2. Ibid.
3. In 1.945. the Soviet Union refused to renew the 1925 treaty offriendship without substantial
c?nc:sslOns from Turkey .. Before such a treaty could be negotiated, the Soviets stressed, the
dIstrIcts of Kars and Turkish since i921, would have to be surrendered to the USSR.
Also the Montreux StraIts Convention would have to be revised so as to give control over the
waterways :0. the Black Sea powers. When Turkey refused to capitulate, Ankara became the
ofa VICIOUS wa:ofnerves which lasted until 1953. For details see G.S. Hams, The Soviet
UnIOn and Turkey. In LV. Lederer and W.S. Vucinich (eds.), The Soviet Union and the Middle
East. The Post-World War 11 Era. California 1974, pp. 2528.
4. H.J. Psomiades, Soviet Russia and the Orthodox Church in the Middle East MEl 2 (1957)
,71-81. ",
237
the patriarchal throne of Moscow. which had vacant ever since
1924 was filled in 1943 when Sergius was elected patnarch. In 1945. he was
by Patriarch Aleksei.
5
In addition. the Soviets cultivated an
interest in the Orthodox communities and institutions in Syria. the Lebanon,
Palestine. Egypt and the Balkans. A number of Orthodox patri.archs in the
Middle East were encouraged to visit the Soviet Union/' Resummg, to some
extent. the traditional Tsarist role of protector of the Christians in
the East. Moscow showed an increasing interest in the affairs of the Or-
thodoxy outside Russia.
Soviet foreign policy did not overlook the Ecumenical Bet-
ween 1945-47. the Patriarchate of Moscow displayed a tendency to
the position of the Ecumenical Patriarchate. particularly in
under the influence of the USSR and in the Middle East. In Isolatmg the
Phanar. the Russian patriarch hoped to take over the primacy in the Orthod?x
Eastern church. These tendencies were also voiced in the Greek commUnIst
press as well as in Bulgaria. The gist of these publications was that since the
Phanar had lost its former authority and prestige. the best way to remedy the
situation was to elect to the ecumenical throne a patriarch chosen by all the
Orthodox churches. Such a patriarch - who might be Russian. Bulgarian or
belong to any other nationality - should be assisted by a permanent Pan-
Orthodox holy synod and should reside in a specially selected part of Istanbul
enjoying the privileges of extra-territoriality similar to those the
Vatican. This. in fact. would have amounted to the gradual subordmatlOn of
the Phanar to Moscow. Given the traditional political control of the state over
the Russian church. the extension of Soviet influence in the Phanar becomes
clearer. The political ambitions of the state. moreover. coincided with the
historical objective of the Russian church to acquire the primacy of the
Orthodox world.
Turkish and Greek circles considered these proposals as a thinly veiled
attempt at establishing a Russian ecclesiastic-dl basis". in the
purpose of investing the patriarch of Moscow with the right of junsdlctlon and
protection over all the Orthodox peoples of the Middle .and N ear The
emergence of the Russian factor. therefore. altered radIcally the pOSItIOn of
the l'is-ti-l'is the Turkish government. Ever since 1923. the Turks
endeavoured to weaken the authority of the Ecumenical Patriarchate. for
they regarded it an agent of the Greek government. By 1945. however. the
5. British Embassy to the Southern Dept.. Moscow. 10 August 1945. FO 371/48349/RI4255.
See also M. Spinka. The Church ill the SOl'iet Vnion, New York 1956, p. 121. .,
6. British Embassy to the Southern Dept.. Damascus, 18 January 1945. FO 371/48349/R_188:
Killearn to the Southern Dept.. Cairo. :2 March 1945. FO 37Ij48349/R50:2:2.
238
(jreek influence in Istanbul was not a matter of great significance and Greece
had repeatedly assured the Turks that it entertained no territorial ambitions at
the expense of Turkey. The new danger to Turkey came from the Soviet
Union and its Balkan allies. Further, given the strained Turco-Soviet rela-
tions in 1945-46, Turkey feared that the Patriarchate might offer Moscow a
pretext for intervention in Istanbul as the champion of the Orthodox church.
As the British ambassador in Turkey, Sir Maurice Peterson pointed out, at
this juncture the Soviets appeared only to be anxious to find sticks with.
which to beat the Turks. 7 As a result, the Turkish government felt that. at
this stage, not only would it have to tolerate the presence of the Patriarchate
but also prevent it from dying of inanition. On the other hand, to the Turkish
mind the Phanar had been associated in the past with the megali idea and the
majority of the Turks opposed the revival of the Ecumenical Patriarchate. To
avoid playing into the hands of either the Russians or the Greeks. therefore,
Ankara was prepared to support the Phanar to such an extent as to preclude
all pretext for Russian intervention, but without allowing it to become a
possible champion of Greek nationalism in the future.8
Aware of the fragile international position of the Ecumenical Patriarchate,
however, Greek ecclesiastic and political circles demanded a major
revitalization of the Phanar. Alarmed by the Soviet overtures, they ap-
proached the British and American governments alerting them to the serious-
ness of the new situation. Alexander Pallis, a member of the Greek embassy
in London. drew the attention of the British government to:
the plight of the Oecumenical Patriarch now that his province is
reduced in practice to the city of Istanbul. .. Even in Istanbul the
community has steadily declined until it numbers only about 80.000. No
doubt the Patriarchate has lost not only the contributions of the faithful
but also the revenues formerly derived from properties all over Turkey.
The Holy Synod consists of the Patriarch and twelve members. a far
greater number of bishops than the reduced Greek community of
Istanbul can hope to produce or support". 9
He went on to underline that the Patriarchate had retained its canonical
importance as the head of the whole Orthodox church. Its irreversible
eclipse. he went on. would act as a catalyst to Communist penetration in the
7. Chancery to the Southern Dept., Ankara. 25 March 1945. FO 371/48349/R625L
8. Memorandum on the Ecumenical Patriarchate prepared by the Research Dept. of the
Foreign Office. 6 February 1946. FO 371/58860/R2379.
9 .. Text of this interview in Edmonds to McDermott. London. 6 February 1945. FO
371/48349/R3009
239
16
other independent Eastern Orthodox churches. He finally stressed that at this
juncture it might be vital to Turkish interests to strengthen the international
position of the Phanar.
1o
Elaborating this thesis, Germanos Strinopoulos, the archbishop of
Thyateira and the ex arch of Central and Western Europe, in a letter to the
archbishop of Canterbury, made a number of suggestions as to how the
Patriarchate could be rejuvenated. Seeking ways to avoid Phanar's
domination by the Russians, Archbishop Germanos proposed that all secular
restrictions, impeding the fulfilment of the Patriarchate's historic mission
as the supreme authority of the Orthodox churches, should be eliminated.
Instead, the Patriarchate should only be amenable to the laws concerning
public order. The Germanos thesis also envisaged the provision of interna-
tional safeguards which would have transformed the Phanar into a powerful
bastion against any Soviet penetration.11 An international definition of the
religious status of the Ecumenical Patriarchate, determined by an interna-
tional body, would not, according to Germanos, conflict with Turkish in-
terests. To justify this view he maintained that Turkey would acquire in a
strengthened Patriarchate a potent ally against a danger threatening both
. l?
parties. -
Likewise, on 20 April 1945, in a conversation with the archbishop of York,
Archbishop-Regent Damaskinos put forward another two suggestions on the
issue:
(a) that a quorum of high ranking Hellenic clerics should be transferred
to the Phanar with the view of permanent service and residence there
assuming Turkish nationality, and/or
(b) that young men should be allowed to come from Greece to study for
priesthood at the Theological college ofChalki, thus swelling the ranks
of the patriarchal clergy and ultimately the episcopate. 13
Lambeth Palace which had always shown great interest in the fortunes of the
Patriarchate communicated these views to the British Foreign Office. 14
While reluctant to support openly the notionof a revitalized Phanar that
10. Ibid.
II. Archbishop Germanos to the Archbishop of Canterbury, London, 9 December 1945, FO
371/58860/R2589.
12. Ibid.
I3. The minutes of this interview in British Chancery to. the Southern Dept., Athens, 13 June
1945, FO 371/48349/RI0615.
14. Hayter's interview with the archbishops of Canterbury and York on 12 February 1946,
London, FO 371/58860/R2379.
240
was to act as a bulwark against Soviet ecclesiastical policies, the British
government approached the Turks informally. Thus, on 2 April 1945, Am-
bassador Peterson succeeded in impressing on the value to Turkey
of any institution, like the Patriarchate, which commanded worldwide res-
pect. Turkish sovereignty over istanbul and the Straits, Peterson remarked,
would be confirmed by the existence of international organizations in that
city. Citing the example of Switzerland, he reminded the Turkish prime
minister that Swiss neutrality had gained a great deal ever since the estab-
lishment of the League of Nations in Geneva. He then suggested that Greece
and Turkey should come to an agreement about the future of the Phanar.
1s
Likewise, on 27 February 1946, the Foreign Office addressed identical letters
to the British ambassadors in Ankara and Athens instructing them to urge
informally the Turkish and Greek governments to unite on this question. It
warned that Greek- Turkish dissension would lead to the eclipse of the Ecu-
menical Patriarchate which would result in the ascendancy of a Soviet-
controlled Russian church. 16
By 1946 the Turks were persuaded that it was to their advantage to main-
tain good relations with the Patriarchate. The death of the aged Patriarch
Benjamin I on 17 February 1946 provided the Turkish authorities with an
opportunity to express their goodwill towards the Phanar. Special courtesies
were shown during the funeral and, for the first time in the history of the
republic, the viili of Istanbul personally attended a patriarchal funeral.
17
No
names of objectionable archbishops were put forward prior to the patriarchal
election and the holy synod was instructed to vote for a new patriarch with
perfect liberty of conscience. As a result, on 21 February 1946, Maximos
Vaportzis, the archbishop of Cha1cedon, who had been declared objection-
able by the Turkish authorities in the previous election in 1936, was brought
to the patriarchal throne. 18
Meanwhile, Greek-Turkish talks, which started soon after the arrival in
Ankara of the new Greek ambassador, Pericles Skepheris, in early 1946,
began to bear fruit. The issue of the Greek minority and its institutions in
istanbul was debated at length during the Greek-Turkish negotiations at the
15. Details of this conversation in British Chancery to the Southern Dept., Ankara, 3 April
1945, FO 371/48349/R6606.
16. Letters of Sir Orme Sargent of 27 February 1946 are given in the minutes of FO
371/58860/R3886.
17. Peterson to Bevin, Ankara, 2 March 1946 and Peterson (Ankara) to Norton (Athens), 2
April 1946, in FO 371/58860/R3886 and FO 371/58860/R5685 respectively.
18. Memorandum on the election of the new patriarch, Cons., 13 March 1946,
LPAfDgP/32/328; 'OpOoboc,ia, 21 (1946) 37-147.
241
end of June and early July 1946. During these talks, Skepheris raised four
main grievances. First, the elective committees with which the Greeks were
accustomed to administer their charitable organizations, had during the
1930s, been arbitrarily replaced by single designated officials (tek
miitevelli). 19 During the negotiations in 1946, the Turks promised a new law
which would enable the elective committees to function once again. At the
same time, the single government appointed representatives were to be re-
placed provisionally by small approved committees. Secondly, a law imposing
a tax on sporting and similar associations had been applied to the churches
and non-paying minority hospitals.
20
The Turks agreed to settle this grie-
vance, too. Again, Turkish officials had, some time before, threatened to
seize on the island of Heybeli (Chalki), not only the Greek commercial
college but also the Theological seminary situated there. Likewise, two old
Byzantine chapels in the premises of the commercial college had been
threatened with being put to secular use. It was now agreed that the Turks
could retain the commercial college (which was deemed too large for the use
of the Greek minority) but would leave the Theological seminary to the
Patriarchate. Meanwhile, the two historic chapels were to be classed as
national monuments. Finally, the Turks agreed to allow the teaching of the
Greek language in the Greek schools in the islands of Imbros and Tenedos. 21
Earlier, a delegation of the Patriarchate visited Ankara on 13-15 May 1946,
and furnished the government with a list of requests . 22 Soon after this visit the
press in istanbul announced that the authorities had decided to hand over the
administration of the Ballkll hospi tal to a special committee representing the
Greek minority. At the same time, it appears that Prime Minister Sarar;oglu
asked Papa Eftim and the administrator of the hospital istamat Zihni Oz-
damar to renounce all claims over the Ballkll property. 23 On 17 July, Ankara
radio announced that the authorities had already handed the hospital back to
the Greek community and hinted that the two occupied churches in Galata
might be also returned to the Greeks.
24
A month later, in a conversation with
19 .. See chapter VII:L
20. This was the II1l1klltall taxation payable to the Department ofEI'kllf<Pious Foundations).
21. On the improvement in the living conditions of the Greek popUlation in these islands see
Alexandris. Imbros and Tenedos. pp. 24 fL
22. Consisting of three archbishops and the first secretary of the Patriarchate. this delegation
was also received by the prime minister. Details on these talks can be found in Kelly to Bevin.
Ankara. 3 July 1946. FO 371/58868/RIOO99; Helm to Bevin. Ankara. 20 May 1946. FO
371/58868/R8004; OpOo6of,ia. 21 < 1946) 250. 253. A month later another such delegation revisited
the capital
23. Ergene. lifci! .. pp. 230-32; Jaschke, op.ci! .. p. 126.
24. Minute by Edmonds in FO 371/58868/RIOO99 ..
242
the prominent journalist Hiiseyin Yal<;ln, the new prime minister, Recep
Peker, was noted to have stated that his government would show extreme
tolerance towards the minorities. Moreover, he singled out the Patriarchate
which he said he would protect. 25
Contacts between Ankara and the Phanar continued to take place and on
12-16 May 1947 another patriarchal delegation paid a visit to the capital. In a
meeting with the new prime minister, they produced yet another list of
requests. They primarily asked for the abolition of the vaklflaw of 1935 and
the lifting of the l11ukataa taxation on the minority institutions.
26
Soon after
by registering the Theological seminary of Chalki as a property owned by the
Patriarchate, the authorities satisfied one of the long-standing grievances of
the Greek community. On 18 May, the patriarchal authorities formally took
over the entire administration of the Ballklp7 Earlier, the Turkish police
returned to the Greeks one of the two Galata churches held by Papa Eftim.
28
As a result, a substantial section of the Greek minority showed its apprecia-
tion by voting for the RPP during the general elections of 1946. In contrast all
the other minority groups had gone solidly to the newly formed liberal
Democrat party (DP).29
At first the election of Maximos was welcomed, for the new patriarch was
known for his dynamism and administrative abilities. He had also exhibited
ample diplomatic skills during the settlement of the Bulgarian schism in 1945.
He was, in fact, instrumental in bringing about the repeal of the schism which
resulted in the recognition of the Bulgarian church as an autocephalous body
under the presidency of the archbishop of Sofia with the title of exarch. 30 As
the overriding influence at the Phanar during the reign of the aged Patriarch
Benjamin, Maximos had chaired various synodical committees, which dealt
not only with internal administrative matters but also with issues concerning
relations with other Christian churches. Curiously enough, his diplomatic
skills endeared him to both Greeks and Russians, without annoying the
Turks. The fifty-two year old patriarch had a reputation of being ambitious
and superior to the other archbishops at the Phanar in character and intellect.
But, not long after his accession to the throne, Maximos fell victim to
25. British Chancery to the Southern Dept., Ankara, 16 August 1946, FO 371/58868jRI2280.
26. 'OpOorJoc,ia, 22 (1947) 156-57.
27. The Patriarchate had already, on 17 September 1946, appointed Gerasimos Kalokairinos,
the bishop of Pamphilos, to the monastery of Ballkll, 'OpOorJoc,ia, 21 (1946) 359.
28. This was Christ Church. Kaphatiani however remained under the control of Papa Eftim,
ibid., pp. 158-59; Ergene, op.cit., pp. 239-40.
29. Minute by Edmonds, 19 July 1946, FO 371/58868/RlOO99.
30. British Chancery to the Southern Dept., Ankara, 30 June 1945, .FO 371/48349/RI1782.
243
periodical fits of morbid melancholia, which appear to have been due to
hereditary causes.
31
With the illness of the patriarch a new period of uncertainty, lasting for
almost two years, permeated the Phanar. During this period the Greek and
Turkish governments were once again faced with a vulnerable Patriarchate.
It was widely held that with Maximos as its head the Patriarchate would not
be able to resist the Russian attempt to gain influence on the Greek Orthodox.
Alarmingly, such efforts intensified by late 1946. Thus, in January 1947,
the archbishop of Leningrad, accompanied by a politically-minded
Archimandrite, made a series of important visits to the patriarchs of An-
tioch, Alexandria and Jerusalem.
32
During his tour in the Middle East, the
Russian prelate proposed the convocation of a new Pan-Orthodox council.
Disregarding the ancient prerogatives of the ecumenical patriarch who alone
possessed the right to convoke, with the concurrence of other Orthodox
churches, such a council, Moscow addressed an official invitation to all the
autocephalous Orthodox churches to attend a Pan-Orthodox conference to
be assembled in Moscow. This initiative caused great consternation at the
Phanar. It was feared that such a council would enable the Soviet-backed
Russian Patriarchate to take over the spiritual supremacy of the Patriarchate
of Constantinople. Thus, in its reply to the invitation of Patriarch Aleksei, the
Phanar declared that it did not consider the present moment as propitious for
the convening of a Pan-Orthodox conference. But, if and when a favourable
opportunity arose the Ecumenical Patriarchate, exercising its ancient pre-
rogative, would gladly take note of the Moscow proposition and, provided
that the other autocephalous churches agreed, would convoke such a
council. 33
3. The election of Patriarch Athenagoras [.
By this stage many leading personalities in Turkey agreed that a
strengthened Ecumenical Patriarchate was compatible with Turkish n ~ t i o n a l
interests.
1
As a result, together with Athens, the Turkish government tried to
enhance the position of the Phanar. Reluctant to elect a local ecclesiastic,
3 L Kelly to Bevin, Ankara, 23 December 1946, FO 371/59330/RI8526. See also Mavropoulos,
op.cit., pp. 25()"51.
32. Kelly to Bevin, Ankara, 15 January 1947, FO 371/67293/R867.
33. Text of the patriarchal reply is given in the detailed article of the distinguished Cons tan
tinopolitan Greek journalist and correspondent of The Times, Constantine Mavroudis, The
Oecumenical Patriarchate: Religious and Political Cross-Currents, Slavs and Greeks, 23 June
1947. A copy of the text in FO 371/67293/RI1242.
L Some of those who had expressed this view to the British ambassador were Hiiseyin Yals:ln,
Feridun Erkin, H. S. Tann6ver, Kelly to Bevin, Ankara, 15 January 1947, FO 371/67293/R867.
244
both governments favoured the patriarch's replacement by a prestigious
leader with international repute.
2
The Greek government announced im-
mediately that they favoured the candidature of Chrysanthos Philippidis, a
former archbishop of Athens and a strong anticommunist figure. Because of
his past anti-Turkish record as archbishop of Trebizond in 1918-22, however.
Chrysanthos was a persona non grata in Turkey. There was also little hope of
securing Turkish approval for another candidate, Germanos Strinopoulos.
the archbishop of Thyateira. Nor was the archbishop of Athens, Damas-
kinos. acceptable to the Turks on the grounds that as a former Regent of
Greece, he was a political figure. and thus unsuitable for the patriarchal posP
The Turks favoured the archbishop of North America, Athenagoras
Spyrou. This was expressed by a number of Turkish leaders, while the press
in Istanbul addressed him as the loyal friend ofTurkey.4 Athenagoras was
indeed a commendable figure combining genuine piety with an appropriate
measure of political astuteness. As archbishop of Kerkyra (1924-30),
moreover. he was conspicious for his ecclesiastical liberalism. Since his
transfer to the United States in 1931, Athenagoras managed to heal the
political feuds which had bitterly divided the members of the Orthodox
church in North America. While respected in the ecclesiastical circles of New
York, he had also earned the friendship of President Roosevelt and was
highly regarded by his successor President Truman. Finally, although he had
an excellent record as an opponent of Soviet ecclesiastical infiltration. his
relations with the Russian church had been correct.
S
Both London and
Washington appeared to uphold his candidature, even though they preferred
to keep a low profile throughout the affair. 6
On the other hand, strongly desiring the election ofChrysanthos, the Greek
government was at first reluctant to support Athenagoras.
7
Athens also felt
that it would be rather difficult to replace Athenagoras in the United States.
But soon the Greeks realized that he was the only possible solution to the
2. Ibid.; Mavropoulos, op.cit., pp. 251-52.
3. Eyres to Bevin, Ankara, 7 May 1947, FO 371/67293/R6224.
4. Mavropoulos, op.cit., p. 262. Appraisals of the Turkish positions in Kelly to Bevin, Ankara,
15 January 1947, FO 371/67293/R867; Eyres to Bevin, Ankara, 3 June 1947, FO
371/67293/R7415.
5. Inverchapel to Foreign Office, Washington, 6 May 1947, FO 371/67293/R60%.
6. Foreign Office to Athens embassy, London, 18 April 1947, FO 37 1/67293/R5 130; Norton to
Bevin, Athens, I May 1947, FO 371/67293/R5982.
7. In an interview with Dimitrios Tsakonas, Panayiotis Pipinelis, the undersecretary at the
ministry of foreign affairs, admitted that the Greek government initially did all they could to
frustrate the election of Athenagoras, see D. Tsakonas, 'A (Jl/vay6pa; 6 OiKOVJlBV1KO; nvv Newv
'Ic5ewv, Athens 1976, p. 57.
245
Phanar question.
s
Nonetheless the most determined opposition to Athe-
nagoras came from the patriarchal synod itself, whose task it was to elect the
new patriarch. They were primarily opposed to Athenagoras because he was
not one of them and also because of his liberal religious tendencies. The
Phanar prelates favoured Joachim Pelekanos, the archbishop of Dercos and
appeared committed to oppose the election of an outsider to the patriar-
chal throne. The situation was further complicated by the attitude of Pat-
riar'ch Maximos, who refused to resign unconditionally, despite strong press-
ure from Athens. The patriarchal crisis lasted until 18 October 1948 when,
after a long journey to Athens, he was at last persuaded to step down.
9
Finally, on 1 November 1949, the holy synod too, under strong pressure from
Athens and Ankara, consented to elect Athenagoras to the patriarchal
throne. 10
On 26 January 1949 the new patriarch arrived from the United States in one
of President Truman's private planes. He was accompanied by Colonel
Charles Mara and a number of eminent Greek Americans. A very large and
enthusiastic crowd of Constantinopolitan Greeks and Turkish journalists
welcomed Athenagoras at the airport in istanbul.
ll
A speech of
welcome in Greek was delivered by the patriarchal delegation, to which
Athenagoras replied in Turkish thereby pleasing and surprising the Turkish
officials and journalists present. 12 From the airport he drove straight to the
Taksim square where he placed upon the Atatiirk monument (Cllmhllriyet
An'idl) a wreath of flowers brought from the garden of the White House. He
then proceeded to the Phanar where he was greeted by the holy synod and
Greek embassy officials.
13
The symbolic significance of the patriarch's first gestures in istanbul was
enormous. From the very start, Athenagoras made his position, as a genuine
friend of Turkey, clear. Accordingly, during the patriarchal sermon on his
enthronement on 27 January 1949, he expressed his devotion to President
ismet inonii and to the Turkish people as a whole. 14 Throughout his tenure of
office, Athenagoras manifested' his detachment from the traditional Phanar
suspicions towards the Turkish secular authorities which had hitherto
8. A resume of the whole affair in a memorandum prepared by the Foreign Office research
department, 14 October 1947. FO 37Ij67293jR7578.
9. For an interesting account of the pressures exerted on Maximos to resign see Mavropoulos,
op.cit .. pp. 253 f. For the patriarch's visit to Greece, 22 (1947) 142-49.
10. For the patriarchal encyclical see 23 (1948) 335-36.
II. 24 (1949) 19-43.
12. Pipper to Douglas, Cons., 26 January 1949, LPAjDgPj32j338.
13. Ibid. See also AT 182 (1949) 9.
14. The Times. 28 January 1949.
246
characterized his predecessors ever since 1453. Despite the adverse political
climate which was brought about by the emergence of the Cyprus conflict, the
patriarch did not diverge from his initial aim of being a loyal Turkish citizen.
Thus, soon after his arrival in Turkey, the eminent prelate renounced his
United States citizenship and adopted the Turkish nationality. 15 In the days
of detente in the early 1950s, the Turkish press had nothing but praise for
Athenagoras. This was amply demonstrated when on his arrival, the istanbul
papers unanimously stated their
extremely warm expressions, goodwill and friendship on behalf of the
Turkish people for the arrival of Athenagoras .16
A new era of euphoria captured the minds of both Turks and Greeks in
istanbul. A month after his arrival in Turkey, the patriarch visited Ankara
and called upon President inonii to whom he delivered a personal message
from President Truman. He then had private meetings with Premier
Giinaltay and Emin the minister of the interiorY This
was the first visit of its kind since the foundation of the Turkish republic. The
impression created by the charismatic patriarch in the capital was excellent.
Soon, he was able to win the sympathy and appreciation not only of the
Constantinopolitan Greeks but also of the Turkish public opinion. Mean-
while, he pursued with great eagerness his wish to transform the Patriarchate
and the Greek minority in Turkey into promoters of Greco-Turkish co-
existence. This was reflected in his insistence that the Greeks should fully
integrate in the modern Turkish society.18 He thus ordered that the Ecumeni-
cal Patriarchate, like every other official institution in Turkey, be decorated
on Sundays by a Turkish flag. While he visited many Ottoman-Turkish holy
places and historical monuments he did not hesitate even to pray in a Muslim
mosque. He kept in touch with many prominent Turkish political figures and
his relationship with the distinguished politician and man of letters Hamdul-
lah Suphi Tanrlover was particularly cordial. I 9 His popularity with the Mus-
lim public was equally considerable. In the streets, Turks frequently stopped
to kiss his hand and respectfully addressed him as father-patriarch (Patrik
Baba).20
15. His loyalty to the Greco-Turkish friendship and to the Turkish state is also apparent in his
correspondence with his friend and eminent Greek journalist Paul Palaiologos. See also
Tsakonas, op.cit . pp. 62-65.
16. Quoted in The Times. 18 Februaty 1949.
17. 24 (1949) 59-64.
18. This comes out clearly in the correspondence of Athenagoras with Paul Palaiologos.
19. M. Baydat, Hamdullah Suphi Tanrlover ve AnUarl, lstatlbul 1968, pp. 69 &182.
20. O. Clement, Dialogues avec Ie patriarche Athenagoras, Paris 1969, p. 99.
247
4. Improvement ill the position of the Greek minority.
Meanwhile, the patriarch pressed the government to respond to a number
of long-standing grievances of his community. Encouraged by the liberal
attitude of Athenagoras and by the spirit of Greco-Turkish friendship, Ank-
ara responded by making several concessions to the Greeks in Istanbul.
Thus, for the first time since 1923, a patriarch was allowed to visit the Greek
minority schools in the city and interest himself directly with the affairs of the
community. Ever since the Lausanne treaty, the members of the Greek
minority were placed under a different set of imperatives and under a separate
rationale from the Patriarchate for its continued existence in Turkey. As a
result. the community was administered by lay representatives and the Pha-
nar officials were discouraged from involving themselves in the internal
affairs of the Greek minority. This state of affairs, however, was modified
when the Greek Orthodox parishes were permitted to select their principal
clerical spokesmen, with the approval of the government. The Patriarchate
was also allowed' to reestablish its own press bureau and a second weekly
theological journal, the 'Anouro).o;' 'A \'()pea;' - in addition to the
which had first appeared in 1926 - began to be printed in 1951. Two ar-
chbishops with Hellenic nationality, Jacob Tsanavaris (lkonionjKonya) and
Aimilianos Zacharopoulos (SelevkiajSilifke) entered the patriarchal service
after acquiring Turkish citizenship in 1949 and 1951 respectively. Further, the
vexed question of ownership of Greek community property was also settled
in April 1949 and all the estates of the Ballkll va kif were declared patriarchal
property.
1
Thanks to another law, promulgated a month later, the system
whereby community (cemaat) property was administered by elected lay
council was reinstated. Likewise, the mukatan tax on community concerns
was also abolished.
2
According to the Directory of the Evknf (Pious
Foundations), the Greek Orthodox community in Istanbul maintained 106
communal establishments in 1949 with a yearly revenue of 663,378 TL.3
Again. the Turkish authorities received favourably, Athenagoras' desire to
rebuild the sector of the Patriarchate destroyed in the fire of September 1941.
Academic and administrative restrictions on the Greek minority schools
were also lifted. This was particularly so in the case of the Theological college
of Chalki which was once again allowed to receive students from Greece as
well as other Christian countries. Thus, in the academic year of 1951, this
L Law no 978/2470 of 9 April 1949, see O.F. Berki & H. Ergiiney, Yabandlar Hukuku ve
Kanun ihtilaflarl i1e ilgili Yargltay Kararlarlnln Tilhlil ve hah/arl, Ankara 1963, pp. 29-31.
2. Law no 5404 of 31 May 1949. in Resmi Gazete of 4 June 1949.
3. See A.K Berki. Vaklflar, Ankara 1950. pp. 62-65.
248
college had twenty-five teachers - five of them Turkish- and seventy stu-
dents of whom forty-seven were foreign nationals.
4
Altogether the commun-
ity maintained 61YCf?es, 7 secondary schools, 1 theological academy, 51
primary schools and 5 nursery schools. Special organizations of
enlightment (M op((JWTlIwi Lr)).i.Oi'OI) , catering to the educational needs of
the Greek schools, were formed. Standards in these schools were further
improved with the Greek-Turkish educational agreement in 1 954. Under the
terms of this pact a fixed number of Hellenic teachers was allowed to teach in
Greek minority schools, while the same number of Turkish teachers was
despatched to Greek Thrace to meet the educational needs of the Muslim
minority. Again, each government was to supply its own minority with school
books. Thus, immediately after this agreement an abundant supply of Greek
books and magazines was sent to Turkey from Greece in 1955, with the
approval of the Turkish Ministry of Education. Similarly, both governments
agreed to provide financial help to the minority educational establishments.
Patriarch Athenagoras continued to cultivate cordial relations with the
Turkish leaders, even after the victory of the DP in the general elections of
1950. He first met the new Turkish president, Celiil Bayar and his prime
minister, Adnan Menderes in istanbul on 27 July 1950 and then again two
years later in Ankara.
5
On 10 November 1953, he was invited to Ankara to
participate in the funeral procession that accompanied the remains of Atatiirk
to the monumental mausoleum that had been built on a hill in the outskirts of
the capital. A year earlier Premier Menderes paid an official visit to the
Phanar, the first of its kind in history.6 Likewise, political and religious fi-
gures from Greece and the West invariably paid their respects to Athenago-
ras when visiting Turkey. Perhaps the most important of such visitors were
King Paul and the Queen Frederika of Greece who met the patriarch on 13
June 1952.
7
Reflecting the tolerant attitude adopted by the Turkish author-
ities towards the Phanar, patriarchal officials were allowed to travel freely
and regularly abroad. As a result, between 1949 and 1955, the patriarch not
only succeeded in enhancing considerably the prestige of the Ecumenical
Patriarchate but also in staving off the Russian challenge to the supremacy of
the Orthodox church.
4 .. There were 29 Hellenes. 16 Constantinopolitan Greeks with Turkish nationality. 6 Ethio-
pians. 5 Cypriots. 2 British. 6 Irnbriots and I Tenediot with Turkish nationality. 2 Syrians. 1
Egyptian. I South African. and I Lebanese. see 26 (1951) 396-400.
5. 25 (1950) 28285,
6. Tsakonas. op.cit .. pp. 68-69.
7.. The Times, 13 June 1952. After attending a thanksgiving service held at the Sr.. George
cathedral. the royal visitors had a luncheon with the patriarch.
249
As Muslim-Orthodox relations in istanbul reached their highest point since
the beginning of the twentieth century, the .Greek community, too, experi-
enced a distinct cultural and commercial revival. From 1950, the DP, not only
repudiated the varl'ik tax but also made available large credit facilities to
independent businessmen.
s
Further, Greek businessmen were satisfied with
the laissez-faire economic policies of the new government. Once again,
Greeks together with the Armenians and Jews, established a strong hold over
the import-export trade as well as in the chocolate and tanning industries.
9
The spirit of Greco-Turkish symbiosis and the efforts of Athenagoras to
promote good intercommunal relations help the Constantinopolitan Greeks
to regain confidence about their future in Turkey. The abolition of visas
between Greece and Turkey in August 1952, brought an unprecedented
number of Greek tourists to istanbul, while cultural exchanges between the
two countries intensified. Meanwhile, some political responsibilities were
extended to the Greek members of the Turkish parliament. Thus, in April
1951, Achilleas Moschosjoined a parliamentary committee investigating the
growth of anti-KemalistpropagandainTurkey.1OIn 1955, another Greek
deputy of istanbul, Alexander Chatzopoulos was appointed member of a
parliamentary committee despatched to Teheran to promote Turco-Iranian
economic ties. The same deputy acted as a liaison between the Turkish and
Greek leaders, when Greek Premier Constantine Karamanlis and his foreign
minister Averoff-Tossitzas paid an official visit to Ankara in May 1959, soon
after the settlement of the first phase of the Cyprus problem. 11
As already remarked, during the mid-1930s, two representatives of the
Greek minority and one each of the Armenian and Jewish communities, were
appointed by the ruling RPP to the parliament as independent deputies. The
first two Orthodox to enter the parliament were Nicholas Taptas and istamat
Zihni Ozdamar (or Stamatis Poulloglou). The latter, though of Anatolian
Greek origin, became a fanatical anti-Phanar figure and was associated
closely with Papa Eftim. Dr. Taptas, on the other hand, remained an inde-
pendent deputy for ten years. He was then replaced, for a short while, by a
8. Interviews with former Istanbul Greek businessmen, Athens 1976-79.
9. Though after the mrlik experience, non-Muslims severely curtailed their investment in a
number of commercial fields. such as the manufacturing industry. see Clark. op.cit., pp. 214-15.
10. K. Arlburnu. Milli Miicadele I'e Inkilaplarlllllgi/i Kanllnlar, Esbabi Mllcibeler l'e Mec/is
Ankara 1957. pp. 270-71.
1 L Alexander Chatzopoulos (1911-1980), Born in Istanbul. Graduated from the Faculty of
Economics of the University of Istanbul. Taught in the Greek minority lycees and became the
headmaster of Zappeion (1946-62). Served in the Turkish parliament as a member of the DP
government and deputy for Istanbul (1954-60). Interview with A. Chatzopoulos, Athens 1979.
250
Greek lawyer, Michael Kayioglou. In 1945, another Constantinopolitan
Greek doctor, Nicholas Fakatchellis, the sole regular member of the Republi-
can party among the non-Muslim deputies, was elected in a by-election and
served until 1950. During the 1946 elections, a psychiatrist from istanbul,
Basil Konos was also elected to parliament as member of the DP opposition.
The sweeping victory of the DP in the elections of 1950 brought two istanbul
Greeks to Ankara - Basil Konos and Achilleas Moschos, a lawyer. The
former was replaced by Alexander Chatzopoulos in the elections of 1954 and
the latter by the lawyer Christos Ioannidis in 1958.
251
CHAPTER X
THE EFFECTS OF THE CYPRUS DISPUTE ON THE GREEKS
IN iSTANBUL, 1954-1964
1. The emergence of the Cyprus dispute and the Greek minority.
Athenagoras' genuine cordiality towards the Turkish government was part
of his strong desire to consolidate Greco-Turkish union and friendship. He
strongly upheld the Atatiirk-Venizelos doctrine of rapprochement. It was
perhaps partly due to this consideration that he had abandoned the comforts
of North America for the Phanar. He envisaged the ultimate transformation
of the Patriarchate into a bulwark of Greek-Turkish goodwill and communi-
the continued existence ofa substantial Greek minority in Turkey
as a tangible example of the symbiosis between the two This he
championed with immense eagerness. For long periods of time since 1453, the
patriarch underlined, the two races had shared a common political and
economic destiny. If they had also waged hard and destructive wars against
each other, this was mostly over the legacy of Byzantium. Since this legacy
was now dead, he reasoned, there was no obstacle to the brotherly existence
between Greeks and Turks. Further, as a keen political animal, he was well
aware of the postwar political and military polarization, that had rendered a
Greek-Turkish entente absolutely essential for the survival of the two
national-states.
1
In his enthusiasm for such an alliance, however, the patriarch grossly
underestimated the persistence of deeprooted animosities between the two
peoples. Thus, from late 1954 an increasingly bitter antagonism took place as
Greek Cypriot national aspirations gathered momentum in Cyprus.
2
While
L The patriarch's correspondence with Paul Palaiologos. See also Tsakonas, op.cit., p, 64.
2. The vexing question of the Cyprus conflict remains outside the scope of this work. For
details see S. Xydis, Cyprus: Conflict and Conciliation, 195458, Ohio 1967 and CypT'lls:' Reluc-
talll Republic, The Hague 1973; V. Couphoudakis, (ed.), Essays on the Cyprus Conflict, New
York 1976; N. Crawshaw, The Cvprus Revolt: An Account of the Struggle for Vnion with
Greece, London 198. For the Turkish viewpoint see H.I. Salih, Cyprus: The Impact of Diverse
252
Greeks and Turks found themselves deeply embroiled in the Cyprus conflict,
the Patriarchate of Constantinople and the Greek minority in Turkey faced
their second major crisis since 1922. As Turkish public opinion assumed that
the Constantinopolitan Greek minority would identify with the Greek Cypriot
cause, the happy chapter of intercommunal relations in istanbul of the previ-
ous decade (1945-55) came to an abrupt end.
The first attempt to implicate the Phanar in the Cyprus dispute took place in
..J. September 1954, when the Committee for the Defence of Turkish Rights in
Cyprus addressed a letter to the patriarch requesting him to take disciplinary
measures against Greek prelates under his jurisdiction who had meddled in
politics in connection with Cyprut
3
This rather vague request ushered in a
Turkish press campaign seeking to involve the Patriarchate in the Cyprus
dispute.'L.Thus, on 2 July 1955, Terciiman demanded the direct intervention of
the patriarch against the leader of the Greek Cypriots, Archbishop
Makarioi:
4
The patriarch could not have taken such a political stance, for this
would have clearly(violated the strictly spiritual, non-political character of
the Patriarchate established at Lausanne in 192f Ironically, the Turks, who
had initially demanded the restriction of the patriarch's functions to purely
ecclesiastical matters, were now inviting Athenagonis to involve himself in a
controversial political issue. Further, the archbishop of Cyprus was popu
larly elected by the Greek Cypriots and, as the head of an autocephalous
church, he was linked to the Patriarchate of Constantinople with no adminis-
trative ties. Unwilling and unable, therefore, to play an active role in the
dispute, Athenagoras assumed a neutral stance.
n?n-wmmittal infuriated the Headed by Terciiman
and Humyet, the Turkish press attacked the patnarch personally for his
failure to discipline Archbishop As this campaign gained
momentum, in a leading article in the Terciiman of 24 August, a prominent
journalist, Baban demanded the expulsion of the Patriarchate from
Turkey. Claiming to articulate Turkish public opinion, he accused the pat-
riardl, among other things, of conspiring in the Cyprus conflict and of acting
as an agent of the megali idea. A few days later, Cumhuriyet implied that the
Nationali.1111 ofa State, Alabama 1978: K.H. Karpat. (ed.), Tllrkey's Foreign Policy ill T/'allSition
1950-1974, Leiden 1975.
3. The Times, 4 September 1954. This committee was formed on the initiative of the National
Federation of Turkish Students and was soon renamed as the Cyprus is Turkish (Klbris
Tiirktiir) society.
4, AT 260 (July 1950) 55.
5 Hiilrivet, 18July 1955 quoted in F.. Armaoglu. Klbrls Meselesi 1954-1959.' Tiirk Hiikiimeti I'e
Kall/u 0-"1111/1/1 D(l\'ranl!jlarl, Ankara 1963. p 124.
253
Patriarchate harboured agents of anti-Turkish activities and intrigue.
Going even further, the artiClealleged that some archbishops had secretly
collected donations from the Greeks in istanbul amounting to millions of
liras with the objective of assisting financially the EOKA activities in
Cyprus.
6
Such reports should be treated circumspectly since none of these
newspapers produced any evidence to support their allegations. They did,
however, prove of immense propagandistic value and managed to revive the
hitherto dormant Turkish suspicions and dislike of the Greeks-feelings that
had all along moved beneath the surface of outwardly friendly appearances.
As reports of anti- Turkish demonstrations in Greece and increase of ter-
rorism in Cyprus were widely circulated in Turkey public discussion of the
Cyprus issue became permeated with intense sentiments of anger and frustra-
tion. Such emotions were deliberately stimulated by a group of extreme
nationalists headed by Hikmet Bil, the president of the Cyprus in Turkish
society.7 This campaign-was discreetly aided by Ankara, which felt that some
pressure on the Patriarchate would make Greece more accomodating over
the Cyprus dispute.
8
While at first the Menderes government maintained
official silence on the issue, by J955, encouraged by Britain to consider itself
as having an interest in the island comparable to that of Greece, it decided to
play an active role in the Cyprus affair. Further, with the consolidation of
NATO coupled with the death of Stalin, Turkish fears of a Russian attack
diminished considerably. A.s a result, Turkey lost interest in placating the
Patriarchate.
Meanwhile, reacting to the press polemics against the Phanar, the Greek
newspapers of istanbul demanded an end to the anti-Greek hysteria. 9
Andreas Lambikis, the most outspoken Constantinopolitan Greekjournalist,
in an editorial in his weekly 'E),c:vBC:P1l <l>wvr, declared that this press campaign
was based on purely imaginative speculation. He concluded by challenging
his Turkish colleagues to produce concrete evidence to support these
allegations. 10 On 29 August, the daily 'EpTCPOC,; reiterated the frustration of the
community in a long article entitled it is enough (apKc:ni). 11 Disregarding
the delicate position of the Greek minority, the Turkish press replied by
demanding that Greek journalists in istanbul should wholeheartedly support
the Turkish position on Cyprus. Directing its attacks primarily against Lam-'
6. ClImllllriyet, 28 August 1955.
7. Armaog1u, op.cit., pp. 7172.
8. See for instance a speech by Menderes on 30 August. quoted in AT 261 (1955) 17()"73.
9 .. 'Ei.ev8eplJ (/JWI'I/ (EleJtheri Pholli /Free Voice), 28 August 1955.
10. Ibid.
I L Quoted in ClImhllriyet, 30 August 1955.
254
bikis and his 'E),c:vBC:P1l <l>WVlj, Clll1lhuriyet described his articles as unpatriotic
and divisive.
12
Meanwhile, realizing the seriousness of the situation, Alexan-
der Chatzopoulos, one of the two Greek deputies of the ruling DP govern-
ment, endeavoured to clarify the position of the Greek minority. In an
interview on 27 August, he expressed the immense anguish and anxiety of the
Greek community. He stressed that the views of the minority on the Cyprus
issue coincided with those of the government. In agreement with Ankara, the
Constantinopolitan Greeks, Chatzopoulos explained, did not wish to see a
change in the status of Cyprus. Finally, commenting on the patriarch's
silence over Cyprus, he pointed out that Athenagoras was a religious leader
and in that capacity he refrained from indulging in politics. He did,however,
ernphasize that the patriarch remained a friend of Turkey. 13
Athenagoras was indeed disturbed by the turn of events. Like Venizelos in
the 1930s, he sensed the potential damage that a disagreement over the future
of Cyprus might inflict on the friendship between Greece, Turkey and Bri-
tain. He, therefore, appeared in favour of the status quo in Cyprus. He was
noted to have commented:
Looking at the Cyprus affair realistically I cannot believe that Greece
could possibly overcome the Ottoman, British and American empires.
And you know how much I love Greece. 14
On another occasion, speaking again on Cyprus, he stated:
Chypre est sous Ie ventre de la Turquie ... Jamais la Turquie n'aurait
pu courir ce risque ... .15
In retrospect the political far-sightedness of the patriarch can be easily
appreciated: though his outspoken statements won him few friends in
Greece. Likewise, he was known to be critical of Makarios' attitude and in an
interview with Olivier Clement he remarked that II (Makarios) n'a pas
mesure ses responsibilites. II n'aurait pas dujouer ce role politique.16 Yet,
anxious not to impair pan-Orthodox cordiality, Athenagoras carefully re-
frained from public criticism or condemnation.
The Constantinopolitan Greeks, too, were apprehensive about the struggle
of the Greek Cypriot enosists. Above all, the Greek-Turkish antagonism over
C .. For instance. it objected to the motto of the 'Ei.ev8eplJ (/JW1'I7 which was justice for the
ROlllios),lli" (To OiKUlO Ita. rr,v PCOJ.llOmJVTJ), see Cumhllriyet, 29 August and 5 September 1955.
13. Ibid., 27 August 1955.
14. Tsakonas, op .. cit., p. 69 ..
15. Clement. op.cit., p. 100.
16. Ibid. On the patriarch's views see also B.. Ohse. Der Patriarclz Atlzellagoras I \'011
l\ollstal1til1opeL Ein oikllmenisclzer visionar, G6ttingen 1968, pp. 143-58.
255
17
Cyprus brought back to the fore their schizoid nature of being on the one hand
Turkish citizens and on the other a Greek ethnic enti ty. Sooner or later, they
would be asked to clarify their position vis-a-vis the Greek-Turkish differ-
ences.'Ii:If the Greeks did not endorse the Turkish position by
Greek Cypriot aspirations, the Turks would label them as disloyal elements
and demand their expulsio&. Few prominent Greeks, however, readily volun-
teered to declare their position. Only one eminent member of the community,
Dr Phaidon Skouros, a member of the DP and a local councillor, declared
publicly his conviction that Cyprus should be given to Turkey. On the other
hand, the great majority of the Constantinopolitan Greeks remained non-
committal and discreetly carried on with their everyday lives. The gre-
cophone press of istanbul, too, avoided comment on controversial political
issues and mainly concentrated on publishing the facts as they appeared in the
Turkish press. The only exception was 'E).evOep17 rpwvr, which continued to
uphold the rights of the minority and protest vehemently against the anti-
Phanar press campaign.!7
2. The anti-Greek riots of 1955 and the Yasslada trials.
As the Cyprus crisis approached a climax during the Tripartite London
conference on 6 September."the position of the Greeks in istanbul became
this conference was still in session. news of violent anti-
Greek riots in istanbul and izmir reached London and caused the immediate
withdrawal of the Greek representativefrom the talks and a complete break-
down of Greco-Turkish relations. C?l'jensiblY. the 6/7 September riots were a
reaction to two widely circulating stories In the Turkish prest. According to
the first the Greek Cypriots were preparing to attack the Turkish minority on
28 August While in a speech on 25 August, Premier Menderes gave official
credence to this rumour. Hiirriyet threatened that <<it: the Greeks dare touch
our brethren. ther her lent of Greeks in istanbul to retaliateupon.l
In this way. the Greeks were clearly pinpointed as possible targets 0 anti-
Greek feeling in Turkey. \"fhe second story was first reported in a news
bulletin in the state radio at 4 p.m. on 6 September and it was repeated in the
pro-government afternoon daily. istanbul Ekspres. According to this ac-
count:1:he birthplace of Kemal Atatiirk in Thessaloniki had been bombed:'
The paper aiso carried photographs of Atattirk' s house purporting to show
extensive damage.
2
17. I would like to thank Andreas Lambikis for allowing me to consult some of the old issues of
'Ei.sv8sP'l <PWI'II.
L Hiirriyet, 28 August 1955.
2. At 12,: 10 in the morning of 6 September an explosion did occur in the courtyard of the
256
This unconfirmed report sparked off peaceful anti-EOKA demonstrations
in the major cities of Turkey. Soon, however the demonstration in Istanbul
was transformed into widespread riots against the property of the Gree.k
el;;nent in the city. The over-enthusiastic students of the Cyprus IS
Turkish association, who initially organized the demonstrations, were in
fact a minor element in the huge crowds that gathered in the city centres on
the night of 6 September. Discontented villagers. who had travelled in 100:'ies
the previous day (before the announcement about the bomb attack agaInst
Atatiirk's birthplace in Thessaloniki) from the nearby Anatolian and Thra-
formed the bulk of the demonstrators. They by the
city's lumpenproletariat, the bootblacks, porters, .apartment Jamtors and.
mendicants.3 Thanks to these-elements the demonstration was soon trans-
a detructive riot. Mass hysteria prevailed. There was much
looting but mor;deliberate destruction. istiklJ Cad\iesi, the famous Grand
Rue de Pera and the city's main shopping street with many Christian-owned
shops, was littered with wreckage of furniture , refrigerator, and other.
goods. In the commercial centres of the ci ty, looting and destructIOn was
confined to Greek property but also to that of the other non-MuslIm
minorities.
4
The few human casualties and rape cases occurred in the suburbs. The
priest of the monastery of Ballkll, Chrysanthos Mantas, who was
was burnt alive while the bishop of Pamphilos suffered fatal InJunes. Al-
though no statistics of casualties were released by the police auth-
orities, it is generally accepted that they were negligible. In the suburbs along
the Bosphorus and the coast of Marmara, the real anti-Greek character of the
riot was evident. According to Greek evidence, 200 Greek women were raped
Turkish Consulate in Thessaloniki, a building located adjacent to Atatiirk's house. A number
windows of both buildings were shattered. There was, however, no other damage. On the
ofthe marks of the explosion and offragments of the fuse, officers of the Greek determtned
that the explosive material could not have been thrown into the courtyard, whIch IS surroun?ed
by a high wall, but Iiad in fact been placed on the site of the explosion and,then setoff. At,the t.lme
of the explosion. the Consulate'S watchman. a Turk, was InSide the Consulate. A Tnraclan
Muslim student attending the University of Thessaloniki was arrested a week later after a fuse
similar to the one which had set off the explosion was found at the lodgings of the Both
suspects were formally charged and provisionally released pending tri;;tL The Th:aclan student,
who was believed to have been responsible for the explosion, fled to Turkey, drIven across the
border in the official car of the Turkish consul in KomotinL It was subsequently shown that the
photographs which had appeared in the Turkish press had faked. .
3. F. Tachau, The Face of Turkish Nationalism as Reflected In the Cyprus DIspute, MEl 13
(1959) 270. .
4. Cumhuriyet. 7 September 1955; The New York Times, 17 September 1955.
257
in such remote parts of istanbul. Similarly, the greatest destruction was
infiLcteciJJpo_n churches and other Greek institutions in the outskirts of the
--
city.s --
Although the riots received wide publicity, there has not been any earnest
effort to determine their actual cause. Turkish writers were inclined to give a
socio-economic interpretation to the episode. Thus, in a long article in the
Ulus of 14 September, the eminent Turkishjournalist, Hiiseyin Cahit Yal91n,
in an article entitled The Most Dangerous Front (En Tehlikeli Cephe)
observed:
6
Here the enmity was not directed against the Greeks who threw the
bomb into Atatiirk's house, but against a group which they envied and
considered gUilty of being rich and living in comfort. Greek or Jew or
Armenian or Turk were all the same from this point of view . The enmity
was social and not political. It was the upheaval of poverty against
richness. This was the birth in our streets of the same enmity and revolt
of which we have seen examples throughout the history.
No doubt the riots were also a demonstration of serious social and economic
grievances. The presence in istanbul of a large, floating, unemployed and
dissatisfied male population acted as valuable recruits for a clique of religious
and racial fanatics who incited methodically communal violence. Economic
distress and inflation - estimated at thirty per cent annually-- partly deter-
mined the violent character of the outbreaks. Unlike the salaried classes the
business community in Turkey was able to keep up with inflation and a
comfortable living. Minorities traditionally represented the well-to-do sec-
tion of the population in istanbul and the rioters attacked not only Greek-
. owned premises but also Jewish, Armenian and foreign-owned commercial
establishments.
7
While a limited number of Muslim-owned property was
attacked probably by mistake, the rioters deliberately avoided inflicting
damage on Turkish premises. Nevertheless, the material destruction caused
5. The patriarchal photographer, Dimitrios Kaloumenos went around the city immediately
after the riot and photographed in detail the damage inflicted on the Greek Orthodox churches
and communal property. He later compiled a photographic account in a book entitled, The
Crucifixion of Christianity. Though the accompanying text is written in a highly emotive
language, the pictures in the book provide valuable documentary evidence on the exent of the
catastrophe. Kaloumenos is also in possession of an invaluable collection of photographs of
Byzantine art treasures which were destroyed during the September riots, Kalollmenos inter-
riew. Athens 1977.
6. Trans. quoted in K. Karpat, Tllrkey's Politics:' 11re Transition to a Multi-Party System,
Princeton 1959, p. 422, n. 72.
7. The New York Times, 17 September 1955.
258
by the rioters did considerable damage to overall Turkish economic
interests.8
Although no official figures as to the total destruction were ever given.
Greek sources assessed the damages to private property and property owned
by religious and charitable institutions as $ 60,000,000 (or 16S,000,000 TL).9
Statistics show that 1004 houses, 4348 shops, 27 pharmacies and laboratories,
21 factories, 110 restaurants, cafes and llOtels were destroyed during the night
oIoSeplembef:I3Ui:-O;'eek sustalne,fthe-greatestdam-
age. I fie mob of istanbul gutted 73 churches,1O 26 schools and 5 athletic
clubs. 11 Likewise, the two principal Greek cemeteries and Kinall) were
desecrated. Some damage was also inflicted in izmir (headquarters of the
NA TO South-East Command) when on 6 September a mob attacked houses
occupied bv Greek officers and wrecked a Greek pavilion at a trade fair.
Expressing deep regret for the widespread damage done to Greek
property, the Turkish government promptly promised compensation. 12
Within a month 4433 Greeks applied for payment of damages claiming a total
;f69,SiS,74-4TL 13 But soon Greek victims began to complain that the
actually paid represented only a tiny fraction of thedarnage.
Thus, the Patriarchate initially requested 12,000,000 TL indemnities. But,
the Department of Religious Affairs (Vakif GCllcl Miidiirliigii) handed
4,000.000 TL in bonds for the restoration and repair of ..
communal institutions.
14
According to by an inde-
pendent mission offellowship sponsored by the World Council of Churches
which visited istanbul in November 1955, the damage to the Greek Orthodox
churches alone stood at $ 150,000.000 (or 412.500,000 TL).IS In April 1957,
the Greek government protested that only 3.000,000 TL had in fact been paid
to the churches while indemnification to individuals was insignificant.
Altogether, the Turkish government appears to have granted indemnities
8. The Turkish press tried to minimize as far as possible the damage inflicted by the riots
Thus.Hiirrhet, which thanks to a series of highly emotive anti-Greek articles played a major role
in inciting the riots. stated on 17 September that only 862 shops and stores were in fact suffered
any damage in Istanbul. quoted in Armaoglu. op.cir.., p. 82.
9. Tire Greek Millority ill Tlldel and the Turkislr l\clilloritl in Greece: How TII'o GOI'ernlllellts
Treat Tlreir Minorities, Greek Information Service. Athens 1965. p" 6,
10" 29 completely destroyed. 34 badly damaged and 10 partially damaged.
II. Tire Nel\' York Til/WI, 17 September 1955.
12 Cumlrur(I'et, 16 September 1955"
13. fhid", 16 October 1955: AT 264 (]955) 84-85.
14 Cumlruri\'et, 19 January 1957: Armaoglu. op .. cit"' pp .. 82-83.
15 The Time.l, 7 & 14 November 1955. Estimates of the damages vary considerably. Thus.
another authoritative source assesses it at S 300.000.000, Iatrides. op.cit", p. 169.
259
amounting to between 50 and 60,000,000 TL, though the Greeks complained
that payments were delayed or nullified through various administrative
subterfuges. I
6
Refusing any involvement,'-fhe Menderes government, in a statement is-
sued on 7 September, attributed responsibility for the riots to communist
agitators and described the disturbances as a communist plot. The Left,
according to this communique, had profited from the existing tense condi-
tions and succeeded in transforming a peaceful demonstration into a largse
with the ultimate aim of undermining the state. The statement
went on to conclude by expressing deep regret for the damage done to Greek
propertyY On 9 September, Ankara radio announced that persons
suspected of:lcts()f provocation had been arrested in Istanbul and Izmir.
assembly met in an emergency session on 13 September and
decided to extend maI!i5lLJaw - which was imposed by President Bayar
immediately after in the three main cities for six months. Premier
Menderes, in a statement to the assembly, expressed his deepest regret for
the widespread damage on Greek property and admitted that the Istanbul
police was slow to take action against the rioters.
18
On 15 Seprember, the
military police padlocked all Trade Union headquarters in IstanbuI.I9 Since
communist organizations had already been rigorously suppressed for many
years in Turkey, Ankara suggested that a group based in Beirut could be
responsible.
20
The Turkish press widely upheld the government thesis of a
communist plot and Milliyet argued that
there can be no connection whatsoever between the Turkish nation
and the 6;7 September incidents.ll
Meanwhile, the army set up three special military tribunals in Istanbul to
try the ringleaders whose numbers by the beginning of 1956 were swollen to
3813. They were accused of destruction of property, looting, spread of
communist propaganda, theft, sabotage, rape, murder, attacks against religi-
ous and sacred establishments and revolting against the government. 22 All
trials took place in camera and the Nelv York Times correspondent drew
attention to the rigorous censorship that had been in ope rat on during and in
16. The Greek Millority ill Tllrkey alld the Tilrkish Minoritv ill Greece. p. 6.
17 .. AT 262 (1955) 68-69: The Tillles, 8 September 1955.
18. 12 September. AT 262 (1955) 69-72.
19. After the declaration of martial law , Istanbul was placed under the command of General
Niirettin Aknoz. ClIlIlhllrivet, 8 September 1955.
20. Ibid., 9 September 1955.
21. AT 262 (1955) 87: Armaoglu, op.cit., pp. 159-61.
22. Similar courts were set up in Izmir and Ankara, see Cllmllllriyet, 8 September 1955..
260
the immediate aftermath of the riots. Reporters were warned that anything
but purely objective reports could lead to trouble.23 Most of the foreign
journalists in Turkey were forbidden to report the events to their papers and
all telegrams mentioning the riots were confiscated before they could be
despatched. Departing correspondents were also' searched for notes and
photographs. Noel Barber of theDaily Mail (London) apparently eluded
search by hiding his notes in his shoes.
24
It was because of his insistence on reporting the events that the outspoken
Constantinopolitan Greekjournalist Andreas Lambikis found himselfin seri-
ous trouble with the military authorities. Immediately after the riots, in a
highly charged editorial, he described the 6/7 September incidents as the St
Bartholomew's Day of the Christians in Turkey. Still in a defiant mood, on
14 September he elaborated the feelings of the Greek minority. 25
The only natural and human request that we make is a guarantee for
the security of our children and our homes. We are tired of the historical
repetitions of anti-Greek measures and outbursts which take place at
regular intervals of every fifteen years.
The military authorities did not take kindly Lambikis' articulate protests and
on 16 September his newspaper was banned.
26
Subsequently, Lambikis was
arrested and was detained at the Harbiye military prison where he was
interrogated about his articles. On one occasion, was questioned for three
consecutive days as to whether the Patriarchate or the Greek embassy had
instructed him to campaign on behalf of the minority,27 Although 'E).evOepYf
ct>Wl'll was allowed to resume publication on 21 October, Lambikis was
detained in a military prison for three months.
Reacting to the manner in which the government dealt with the episode, the
Greek deputy of Istanbul, Alexander Chatzopoulos, made an emotional
speech at the Turkish assembly on 12 September. He directed his attack
primarily against the performance of the police during the night of the riots,
giving evidence that demonstrated the refusal of the police to deal with the
rioters. Thus. they allowed five boats with about 200-300 rioters to land in the
23. The Nell' York Times. 17 September 1955. By 1957, thirteen m.embers .of the
"Cyprus is Turkish society were released. The president of the aSSOCIatIOn. Hlkmet BII:
even despatched to Beirut as the Turkish press representative to the Lebanon. The aSSOCIatIon
itself was back in action by 1957. Cllmllllrivet, 25 January 1957.
24. Quoted in Iatrides, op.cit., p. 170.
25. 'EhveePl/ <PWI'lj, 14 September 1955.. . .
26 .. A number of Turkish newspapers, too. was temporarily closed, see The Nell' York TI/nes,
17 September 1955,
27. Lambikis interview, Athens 1978,
261
island of Biiyiikada (Prinkipo) soon after midnight. According to Chat-
zopoulos, the rioters appeared to have fraternized with the police just before
indulging in outrages. Nor, he stressed, did the police try to detain them when
they decided to embark on their boats and return to their villages on the
Anatolian coast. Similar toleration, the Greek deputy underlined, was shown

to the mob in Beyoglu, which vandalized the Zappeion lycee and the adjacent
church of Per a, both situated at the centre of the city. He then described to the
assembly the attack against his own house. His parents, Chatzopoulos re-
ported, botl;t in to the strests in the middle
of the night, while rioters proceeded to ransack his house,)iIis house inci-
dently was next door to a police station, but the gendarmes stoo'didTy by
28 Afterthese-exampl es ,-newenton to hint that
the-\\Thole incident planned by some powerful and efficient
body. Otherwise, he reasoned, how would seventy out of seventy four
,
Greek Orthodox churches, in places as far apart as te two sides of the
the city and the Princes islands, have been subjected, at precisely
tQe same time, to the wrath of the rioters. Concluding his account, Chat-
zopoulos expressed his hope that the government would punish severely
those responsible for the outrages.
29
The leader of the opposition, ismet
inonii, too, after describing the riots as a national disaster, underlined that
the Menderes government was responsible for not taking the necessary
measures to contain the rioting mob.
30
The circumstances sun'ounding these acts of violence and particularly the
speed and precision with which the mob went about its destructive work,
convinced many foreign observers that they had been organized and carefully
planned in advance. Thus, on the night of6 September, the American consul
general in istanbul telegraphed the State Department that the
Extensive destruction and situation appears completely out of hand
with no evidence of police or military attempt to control. I personally
witnessed the looting of many shops while the police stood idly by or
cheered on mob . .31
A British correspondent who witnessed the 6/7 September episode reported
that:
32
all evidence points to an exact, perfectly co-ordinated attack. The
28.. Charzopollios inteITieH". Athens 1979. The text of his speech in the assembly can be found
in TBMM Zablt Ceridesi (Proceedings 0 the 28th meeting), voL 7. pp. 675-77.
29. Ibid.
30. Ibid .. pp. 692-93.
31. Quoted in The Nell' York Times. 17 September 1955.
E. The Daily Mail. 14 September 1955.
262
flame that swept the city was ignited at a hundred different points at
precisely the same zero hour.
According to the same account, in lzmir the rioters carried lists of names and
addresses, including those of the Greek officers serving with the NATO
headquarters in that city. 3.3
Today, it is almost universally agreed that a demonstration was initiated by
DPIeaders and-local party bosses, as a means of emphasizing the strong
TurkIsh interest in the future of Typrus. The demonstration, however,
rapIdly got out of hand. This involvement of the DP government in the riots
was partly vindicated during the Yasslada trial of 1960-61. This took place
soon after the Turkish revolution of 27 May 1960 which resulted in the
overthrow of the Menderes government. 34 Although, four years had elapsed
from the time of the anti-Greek riots, considerable evidence was produced to
implicate at least Adnan Menderes and his foreign minister, Fatin Zorlu.
Initially, Bayar, Menderes, Zorlu, Hadlmll (the governor of izmir) and
seven other persons were charged with direct responsibility for the Sep-
tember 1955 riots, in which, according to the authorities three people were
killed, 30 injured and over 5000 properties were destroyed.
35
The anti-Greek
riot trials started on 19 October 1960 and lasted until 5 January 1961. The
prosecution alleged that the accused were responsible for a bomb explosion
at the Turkish consulate in Thessaloniki and the adjoining birthplace of
Kemal Atatiirk, which had provoked the riots. Hasan U<;ar, a former emp-
loyee of the consulate, and Oktay Engin, a university student from Western
Thrace, who were among the accused, had been convicted by a Greek court
of causing the explosion. But {he accused alleged that they had framed by
Greek justice. Unable to produce concrete evidence, the prosecution was
eventually forced to drop the charges concerning the Thessaloniki bombing.
@ The riots were said to have been organized by the extreme nationalist
"Cyprus is Turkish society, of which Menderes was a patron, although he
denied that he had been responsible for its formation. Hikmet Bil, who was
33. Ibid.
34. For a detailed analysis of the militarry coup and the fall of the DP government, see W.F.
Weiker. The nlrkish Rel'ollllion /960-196/: Aspects of Military Politics. Washington 1963,
passim.
35. Cllmhllriyet. 20 October 1960. On 14 October, Menderes, his former cabinet and a number
of senior officials were placed on trial on the Marmara island of Yasslada (Oxia), charged with
violating the constitution, corruption and a variety of other crimes, such as the September 1955
anti-Greek riots. The trials were, on the whole, fairly conducted. but the consequent execution
of Menderes and two of his ministers provoked lasting bitterness on the part of millions of
ordinary Turks who still supported him.
263
the president of the association at the time of the riots stated in evidence that
Menderes had told him on the morning of 6 September 1955: -
Zorlu's job at London is to push the Turkish case and torpedo the
conference. Zorlu wants us to be active in Turkey.
Again, Klrca, a former member of the Turkish delegation to NATO
in Paris, told the court about a coded telegram which, he claimed, the Turkish
foreign minister, Zorlu, sent from London to Ankara stating that The British
seem to be inclining towards self-determination for Cyprus ... It is necessary
that the premier takes appropriate steps to support my position36. Zorlu did
not deny sending this telegram, but claimed that appropriate steps merely
meant demarches with the British and American ambassadors in Ankara.
Further, it was stated in the court that the text of this telegram had not been
found in the records.
A score of witnesses gave evidence that the police had watched the rioters
attacking Greek property in Istanbul without making any attempt to inter-
vene: that a policeman had assured a Greek woman that there would be no
bloodshed, as only shops and buildings are to be destroyed; that the army
had intervened only three or four hours after being ordered to do so; and that
over 3000 persons arrested at the time of the riots were released soon after. 37
A member of the Istanbul police testified that he had been ordered not to
intervene by a superior officer, while another police official revealed that he
had been dismissed after arresting a local DP leader who had taken a promi-
nent part in the riots. A retired military judge, Arif Onat, stated that he was
absolutely convinced that the riots had been deliberately engineered.
During a walk through the city on the night of 6 September he had noted that
neither the police nor the troops had taken any steps to check the rioters.
J8
Refik Turga, a former aide-de-camp to President Bayar and later the military
governor of Istanbul, could not state categorically as to whether he himself
had heard of any official plan for the riots. He was, however, of the opinion
that both Bayar and Menderes had prior knowledge of the plans for a smaller
demonstration.
39
A farm owner on the outskirts of Istanbul declared that
truckloads of villagers bound for the city were shouting there will be fun in
the city tonight. 40
Major Hayrettin Sumer, who in 1955 was the premier's personal assistant,
36. The Nell' York Times, 25 October 1960: The Times, 25 October 1960: Weiker, op.cit., p. 34.
37. The Nell' York Times, 4 November 1960.
38. The Times, 26 October 1960; Cumhllriyet, 26 October 1960.
.19. Cllmhw'i),et, 25 October 1960; Weiker, op.ciL, p. 35.
-10. The Nell' York Times, 4 November 1960.
264
described how he heard a minister of state, Mukerrem Sarol, say on the
morning of the riots:
41
We told them to do it, but not to do it in this way. If you tell Turks to
smash up property they may easily start killing.
On 25 October, Ekrem Allcan, finance minister in the revolutionary govern-
ment and a former member of the DP, gave evidence that at a meeting of the
Democratic parliamentary party, Menderes had done his outmost to prevent
discussion on the riots. To achieve this, he went on to point out, Menderes
had resorted to completely irregular methods and had finally ordered the
termination of the meeting.42 Significantly, wfessor KgpriiJii deputy
Rrime minister at the time of the riots and one of the accused, in his testimony
on 21 October, stated his conviction that the violent demonstrations had been
inspired by Zorlu and organized by Menderes, in whose hands all power
resided. This demonstration, he affirmed, had later degenerated into a riot.
Referring to the official theory that the riots were a communist plot.
Koprulii revealed that the idea was originally suggested by Allen Dulles, head
of the US Central Intelligence Agency, who was in Istanbul at the time
attending a criminology congress. Unable to provide supportive evidence
however he was eventually forced to modify his charges and declare simply
that it is possible that the Menderes government did inspire the riots .43
Even in its modified form, such a statement made by one of the leading
members of the Menderes government was of immense significance.
On I November, the former DP deputy, Alexander Chatzopoulos stressed
that although he could not prove that the government had planned the riots,
he was certain that they were pre-arranged and that the police tolerated the
excesses.
44
Perhaps the most significant and symbolic testimony on the
question of the riots was that of Patriarch Athenagoras. He confirmed that a
few hours before the riots he was visited by senior police officials who had
informed him about the demonstration, who then went on to reassure him that
he should not be worried, for nobody would be hurt. He had also received a
telephone call from Fahrettin Gokay, the governor of Istanbul, two hours
before the riots, who told him that there be some trouble, but you are not to
-II. The Times, 10 November 1960.
-12 .. Cumhurivet and The Times, 26 October 1960.
43. Cumhuri;'et, 21 October 1960; The Ne\\' York Times, 22 October 1960. A former Harvard
professor and a founding member of the DP. KoprUlU had by 1956 turned critic of Menderes and
resigned from the party long before the 1960 revolution .
44. CUlllhllriyet, :! November 1960.
265
be worried.4 5 The patriarch reaffirmed that he had addressed a letter to
Menderes on 15 November 1955. in which the riots were described as:
40
clearly organized according to a plan and programme beginning in a
number of different places at pre-arranged signals.
He refused, however. to uphold the inference drawn by the prosecution that
the planned demonstration was only a cover for sinister designs.
47
All the accused denied their guilt and maintained that the riots were the
spontaneous result of popular emotion aroused by the Cyprus question. But
in his final speech. on 4 December, the prosecution insisted that the DP
government had deliberately contrived the anti-Greek riots. Thus, the pro-
secutor asked for the maximum penalty offour and a half years imprisonment
for all the eleven accused.
48
But a month later the Yasslada court found
Menderes, Zorlu and Hadlmll (the former governor ofIzmir, who was appar-
ently carried on the shoulders of a mob just before it set fire to the Greek
consulate in that city) guilty of inciting the Turkish population against the
Greek and other minorities in Turkey at a time when relations between
Turkey and Greece were particularly tense on account of the Cyprus dispute.
The other accused were. however. acquitted.
4Y
Finally. the court upheld the
view that the Menderes government had organized an anti-Greek demonstra-
tion in Istanbul in order to press the Turkish cause on Cyprus. Yet, from the
legal point of view, the evidence produced in the court to implicate the DP
leadership in the affair had been based on circumstantial evidence and per-
sonal accounts. Most of the incriminating evidence was obviously destroyed
and after five years the prosecution had no alternative but to base its case on
personal testimonies of the events of 617 September 1955.
3. The minority question and the Greek-Turkish crisis, /956-59.
Back in 1955, the outbreak of anti-Greek riots in Turkey left the Greek
government and public opinion so stunned that the breakdown of the Cyprus
conference in London passed almost unnoticed. On 7 September, the inner
Greek cabinet met to consider the situation and the deputy prime minister,
Panayiotis Kanellopoulos. made a strong verbal protest to the Turkish charge
d'affaires. He informed the Turkish representative that Greece would ask for
a special meeting of the North Atlantic council to investigate reports of the
45. Ibid., 26 October 1960: The Times, 26 October 1960 ..
46. Ibid.
47. Weiker, opcit., p. 35: The Nel\' York Times, 26 October 1960.
48. Cumhuriyet. 5 December 1960.
49. ibid" 6 January 1961.
266
ill-treatment of Greek officers attached to NATO headquarters in izmir. A
written protest, couched in strongly-worded terms, was despatched to the
Turkish government on 9 September. Three days later, the Turkish charge
d'affaires called upon Foreign Minister Stephanopoulos and expressed his
government's deep regret at the anti-Greek riots, together with assurances
that the victims would be compensated. He also reassured that measures had
been taken to avert similar outbreaks of violence in the future.
1
It appears that the Greek government was surprised by the strong Turkish
r<;,.action to the Greek Cypriot call for enosis. Perhaps for the first time they
realized the strong feelings that this issue aroused in Turkey. At first the
Greeks felt that Turkey, as in the case of the Dodecanese, would accept the
numerical superiority of the Greek element in the island and would, albeit
reluctantly, consent to the cession of Cyprus to Greece. Thus, in May 1954,
Premier Papagos expressed his belief that the Greek-Turkish friendship
rests on solid foundations and has its roots deep in the hearts of the two
peoples so that it is in no way endangered. We believe, he declared, that
the Greek-Turkish friendship cannot be threatened or disturbed by the Cyp-
I'US question.2
The riots in Turkey shattered Greek confidence. While the opposition
demanded the resignation of the Papagos government, Athens declared its
intention to re-examine the future of Greco- Turkish relations. As relations
between the two countries reached their lowest point in the past thirty years,
the permanent representatives of NA TO met in a special session on 8 Sep-
tember to consider the situation. On 18 September, the alarmed US secretary
of state, John Foster Dulles, in identical notes, urged both the Greek and
Turkish premiers to refrain from allowing these unhappy events destroy
the partnership of the two nations. 3 Meanwhile, the events of September 1955
brought for all practical purposes, the Balkan entente between Yugoslavia,
Turkey and Greece to an end.
4
The summer of 1956 saw a further aggravation
of Greek-Turkish relations. In August the Greek embassy in Ankara was
ransacked and a number of important documents, some bearing on defence
matters, were reported missing.
s
The Greek government blamed the incident
on the Turkish authorities and filed several notes of protest. At this juncture,
I. For details see Xydis. Cyprus, p. 620, n. 30.
2. To Br7f.w, 30 May 1954 quoted in Iatrides, op.cir.., p. 165.
3. Full text is given in Documents on international Affairs, 1955, London 1958, pp. 178-79.
4. As early as 9 September. The Times had reported that the entente had suffered a
"deathblow.
5. ibid, 28 & 29 August 1956.
267
the two countries, as subsequently admitted by the Greek foreign minister,
had corne at the brink of war. 6
Nor did the excesses of the September riots put an end to the
campaign in Turkey. By April 1957, the Turkish press renewed its vigorous
polemics against the Patriarchate alleging that the patriarch was involved in
anti- Turkish activities. While demands for the expulsion of the Patriarchate
intensified, Yeni istanbul published a series of statements by Turkish intel-
lectuals and public figures on the Phanar issue. The results of the survey
tended to confirm that there was a strong current of opinion against the
continued presence of the Ecumenical Patriarchate in Turkey.7 No news-
paper or other agency, however, succeeded in producing evidence proving
the Phanar's involvement in politics. There are strong indications, moreover,
supporting the view that the anti-Phanar campaign between 1954-59 was
based on speculation and was guided by emotion with the ultimate aim of
undermining the authority which the Patriarchate had regained during the
first years of Athenagoras' tenure of office.
The Turkish government, too, altered its attitude towards the Phanar. In a
letter addressed to Premier Menderes on 15 November 1955, Patriarch
6. During the Greek elections of October 1961, a campaign pamphlet reliably attributed to
Foreign Minister Averoff and reviewing the Cyprus conflict, contained the following passage:
Early in the summer of 1956, Turkey contemplated military operations. threatened Greece
with war, and towards the end of the summer prepared another plan - a surprise attack against
the large islands of the (Aegean) Archpelago near the Asiatic coast, to be accompanied by a
declaration that it (Turkey) does not intend to retain the islands; secondly, it had undertaken the
operation so that the Greeks and everyone else may realize how important the Cyprus issue was
for Turkey; and. thirdly, that it would evacuate the Archpelago as soon as it had been agreed that
the Cyprus issue would be settled in a way that was acceptable to all three (governments)
concerned .... In response to these threats, whatever form they might actually take, Greece
would not have confined itself to proforma political and military actions. our plans were ready,
detailed. and justified optimistic expectations .. In the political sphere, a 48-hour deadline would
have been issued for the enforcement of international law by the evacuation (by Turkey) of the
Greek islands. If this were not done within 48 hours, ... the Greek army would have been ordered
to attempt to advance to Constantinople. Since a Turkish attack upon us would have in fact
severed all bonds of alliance between us, since our allies, through their indifference, would have
torn up the NATO pact, since Greece's honour would have been at stake, and as the military
undertaking against Constantinople would have been difficult, the Greek government would
have sought assistance from any party that might be interested to see Turkey removed from the
Straits .... . Greek text in To Bl1f10, 22 October 1961, trans. in Iatrides, op.cit., pp. 172-73.
7. These articles appeared between 9 and 17 April 1957, quoted in Armaoglu, op.cit., pp.
Writers, journalists, lawyers and other professional men canvassed by the newspaper did
not all assert directly that the Phanar was involved in politics, but all indicated that they
suspected this to be the case. They then agreed that if it was so, the Patriarchate should be
expelled from Turkey.,
268
Athenagoras gave details of the vandalism caused by the Turkish mobs. Art
treasures dating back to the Byzantine period, the patriarch stated, were
destroyed, the most sacred Orthodox shrines profaned, graves in Greek
cemeteries ransacked while a Greek Orthodox priest was murdered.
8
The
Turkish prime minister did not answer this letter. His attitude underlined the
radical change in the relations between the government and the patriarch.
Hitherto, Ankara exhibited enormous respect towards the person of the
patriarch. This respect, however, was gradually transformed into relentless
hostility. Particularly after the visit of Makarios to Athens in April 1957, the
Turkish government went so far as to suggest that Turkey could abrogate the
Lausanne agreement and seek the removal of the Patriarchate from Turkish
soil.
9
Such attitudes bedevilled Greek-Turkish relations to the extent that a new
crisis situation was reached by April 1957.
10
Fearing a repetition of the
anti-Greek riots, Athens urged the United States to act as a restraining
influence on the Turks,11 On 15 April, the new Greek prime minister, Con-
stantine Karamanlis informed Washington that if the events of 1955 were to
recur, or if the Patriarchate were to be expelled, Greece would retaliate. 12 A
day earlier, the Greek foreign minister, Averoff Tossitzas warned the Tur-
kish ambassador that the indignation of Greek public opinion had reached
such a point that tactics of tooth for tooth and eye for eye would become
unavoidable if the Greek minority and the Patriarchate were harassed
again. 13 As the rift between Greeks and Turks deepened, the Greek ambas-
sador in the United Nations, Christos Palamas, drew attention to the vicious
campaign that had been launched against the Patriarchate and the Gree"
minority in Turkey. 14
The Turkish government rebuffed these charges by proclaiming that the
Greek minority in Istanbul was a contented and prosperous community .15 It
is beyond doubt that the Constantinopolitan Greeks, on the whole, elljoyed a
high standard ofliving though their grievances were not economic, but social
and political. They complained about their insecure status in Turkey. Point-
8., This letter was read during the Yassiada trials, see The Times, 26 October 1960.
9. Ibid., 22 April 1957.
10. Xydis, Cyprus, pp. 80-86.
II. At this crucial juncture, the American government sent a timely demarche to Ankara
helping to avert Turkish action, Tlze Times, 22 April 1957.
12. Xydis, Cyprus, pp. 84-85.
13. Ibid., pp. 83-84.
14. Letter to Hammarskjold, 17 !,>Jay 1957, Xydis, Cyprus, p. 113.
15. AT 265 (1955) 85-90, quoting Zafer, 23 December 1955 and Diinya, 25 December 1955.
269
ing to the 1955 riots and the press campaign against the patriarch, who as the
archbishop of Constantinople was also their spiritual leader, they expressed
their resentment against the deliberate attempts to implicate them in the
Cyprus conflict. They repeatedly expressed their strong desire to keep aloof
from Greek-Turkish antagonisms. Responding to Turkish accusations the
patriarch himself voiced his loyalty to the Turkish government stressing that
the Patriarchate was a religious institution outside political significance.
Archbishop Aimilianos, the religious assistant of Athenagoras, in a press
conference on 14 April 1957, reiterated the loyalty of the Patriarchate of
Constantinople to Turkey. 16
The Turkish side played down the Greek grievances. Expounding his
views to an Athenian correspondent, Premier Menderes took pains to em-
phasize that no discrimination whatsoever against any minority group took
place in TurkeyY The Turkish press, while occasionally hinting at the
possibility of an exchange of populations , 18 paid lip-service to the equality of
all Turkish citizens in Turkey. By pressing for the transfer ofthe Patriarchate
to Greece the Turks, according to three consecutive articles in Yeni istanbul,
wished to strengthen Greek-Turkish relations. The maintenance of such an
institution in Turkey, it explained, had a negative effect on the friendship
between the two countries.
19
Under these circumstances, the Greek minor-
ity, who recalled the disasterous riots of 1955, feared that the build-up of
anti-Greek feeling might lead to a renewed wave of attacks against them.
From bitter experience, they were also aware that neither Athens nor Ank-
ara, nor any other power for that matter, would be able or willing to protect
them from the fury of the Turkish masses. As a result a considerable exodus
of Constantinopolitan Greeks was engendered.
It can be safely argued that the riots of 6/7 September 1955 and the
persistence of an anti-Greek campaign marked the beginning of the end of the
historic Greek community in Turkey. Nor was this exodus confined to the
Constantinopolitan Hellenes. An increasing number of Greeks with Turkish
nationality sold their property and moved abroad. Even the former deputy,
Dr Nicholas FakatseIlis decided to move to Greece, leaving behind his
pension as a member of the Turkish parliament as well as his clientele in
istanbul.
20
Although the majority of these people moved to Greece, a sub-
stantial section chose to emigrate to Australia, Canada and the United States.
16. The New York Times, 15 April 1957.
17. Interview published in To Bij/w, 7 JanUluy 1956.
18. See, for instance, Cumhuriyet, 28 December 1957 and 28 January 1958.
19. Articles of Habib Edib Torehan in the Yeni istanbul of 26, 28 & 29 April 1957.
20. Cumhuriyet, 20 December 1957.
270
In an attempt to play down this visible exodus, Fuat K6priilii contended that
the trend was not a sign of maltreatment but of prosperity enjoyed by the
Greeks under Turkish rule. These people, he opined, went abroad in order to
expand their businesses and fortunes.
21
Such utterances, however, showed
little understanding of the real desires and aspirations of the minority. The
Constantinopolitan Greeks, being brought up in Turkey for generations, had
their roots, families, businesses and connections in istanbul. Despite the
adverse conditions of 1922-30 and 1942-44, they manifested a strong desire to
continue their distinctive way of life, along with their traditional language,
religion and culture, in Turkey. It was only when the Turks systematically
eroded this distinct way of life that the Constantinopolitan Greeks decided
reluctantly to abandon the banks of the Bosphorus. Away from istanbul, the
Constantinopolitan Greeks exhibited a strong attachment to their native city.
Demonstrating many characteristics of displaced people and remaining faith-
ful to their distinctive traditions, the Constantinopolitan Greeks even today,
whether in Greece or elsewhere, form closely-knit communities and in gen-
eral shy away from the host societies. .
As bitterness over Cyprus intensified, a renewed outburst of TurkIsh
nationalism often found expression against the Greek community. Notices
warning all Turkish citizens to speak Turkish and instructing them to urge
those who did not, reappeared all over istanbuL In particular, such notices
were hung in Greek and Armenian-owned shop-windows in Beyoglu and
Galata. 22 This upsurge of nationalism was initiated by the National Turkish
Student Federation and was strongly supported by the press. The authorities,
too, tacitly encouraged the spread of such feelings. Thus, as late as 27 August
1960, General Refik Tulga explained at a press conference that foreign
languages which grate on the Turkish ear should not be spoken in loud
voices in public places.23 Such declarations were not only a blatant violation
of the Lausanne treaty but also of the Turkish constitution itself.
Meanwhile, the Turkish press rediscovered the notorious Papa Eftim and
once again gave wide coverage to his anti-Phanar utterances. In repeated
statements he accused Patriarch Athenagoras of anti-Turkish activities. On
15 June 1958, Eftim pledged full material and moral support to the Turkish
CypriotsY In 1957 the press dug deep into the past of the Phanar, recalling
that the main gate ofthe Patriarchate had never been opened since 1821 when
21. Armaoglu, op.cit., p. 198.
22. Cumhuriyet, 29 August 1957.
23. The Times, 29 August 1960.
24. Papa Eftim' in Klbrls hakklndaki gorii:jleri. (The Views of Papa Eftim Concerning Cyprus),
istanbul 1958, p. 3. That he was protected by the government can also be deduced from the fact
271
18
Patriarch Gregory V was hanged on the gate by order of the vezir who held
him responsible for the Greek War of Independence. At the same time, the
municipal planning committee of the city threatened to tear down the pat-
riarchal buildings and St George cathedral to make room for a new highway. 25
While this did not take place Christ church was demolished in May 1958 to
make room for a similar road between Tophane and Karakoy.26
Perhaps the impact of the expulsion of a number of notable Constan-
tinopolitan Greeks with Hellenic nationality on the community was even
greater. The majority of those belonged to the professional middle class
(journalists, teachers and doctors). They were charged with publishing mat-
erial injurious to the Greco-Turkish friendship and harmful to Turkish na-
tional interests. A number of prominent Hellene businessmen were also
expelled after being accused of smuggling foreign cUITency, spying and other
anti- Turkish activitiesY No right of appeal was granted to these people and
almost all were expelled within a day's notice. Reacting to the deportations,
the Greek ambassador in Ankara, George Pesmazoglou, on 6 December 1957,
filed a formal protest. 28 The Athenian press, too, strongly disapproved of the
Turkish action describing the expulsions as arbitrary and vindictive. 29
Meanwhile, in April 1958, the authorities shut down the Hellenic Union of
Constantinopolitans ('E)).'7v1Kit Evwal:'; KwvaravTlvOvno).lTwV) , after a court
decided that its activities were detrimental to Turkish national interests.
3o
The incident had arisen after the conviction and imprisonment for twelve
years of the secretary of the association, Lambros Goulakis (a Cons tan-
that during the September 1955 events. his church at Galata suffered no damage whatever., See
also CUll/huriyet. I ~ . 13 and 16 June 1958.
25. The Nell' York Times, 17 April 1957; Clement, op.cit .. pp. 101-102.
26 .. ClIIllhurivet. II May 1958.
~ 7 . The deportations started on 9 August 1957 with the expulsion ofa prominent journalist
Theodore Markouizos, This was followed by the expulsion of journalists, Stephen
Papadopoulos and George Patriarcheas as well as that of the Tsitouris brothers. both Cons tan-
tinopolitan businessmen and publishers. Early in January 1958. the patriarchal photographer and
journalist Dimitrios Kalloumenos was also expelled for publishing <<injurious stories to Greek-
Turkish friendship. Another distinguished journalist, Constantine Kombodekras, a correspon-
dent of a number of Greek. American and Egyptian newspapers. was deported a month later.
Other deportations, mainly of Hellene businessmen followed.
28. Xydis, Cyprus, p, 293.
29, See editorial in To Brif.1a, 8 February 1958.
30 .. Founded in 1933, this society organized cultural and community activities, such as
lectures. dances and dinners, Prominent Greek personalities. including Stratis Myrivilis, D.,
Zakynthinos and Constantine Tsatsos. were invited to lecture. Information about the society
was furnished to me by one of its leading members. Nicholas Damtsas, Damtsas interl'iew.
Athens 1977.
272
tinopolitan Hellene). On 6 June 1957, a Turkish court found him guilty of
espionage, namely of supplying military information to the Greek military
attache in Turkey. 31 At the same time, Turkey threatened to review the
whole Greco-Turkish convention of establishment of 1930 which enabled
some 12,500 Constantinopolitan Hellenes to remain in istanbul.
Bearing in mind the suffocating conditions under which the dwindling
Greek community had to live in Turkey, the Greek government considered
alternative solutions to the minority question. Thus, Foreign Minister Ave-
roff Tossitzas suggested to the American ambassador in Greece, George
Allen the possibility of an exchange of the Cypriot Turks against the Constan-
tinopolitan Greeks. This, he asser1ed, would help to solve both the Cyprus
and minority questions.
32
Such a proposition, however, was not palatable to
the Turks, since Ankara's main interest in Cyprus was based on strategic
rather than demographic criteria. Instead, the Turks were prepared to con-
sider an exchange of populations between the Constantinopolitan Greeks and
the Thracian Turks. The Turkish Cypriots, Ankara stressed, had nothing to
do with such a bargain.
33
Faced with the exodus of the Greeks, the patriarch strove to slow down this
trend by using all means possible.
34
But he had little success. Some Greeks,
moreover, were dissatisfied with the conciliatory attitude adopted by the
patriarch towards the Turks. Instead of presenting himself as an outspoken
champion of Greek minority rights, the patriarch continued to appeal to the
better nature of the Turks and, through moderation, he hoped to persuade
them to treat his community with greater compassion. He always took pains
to emphasize his attachment to the Turkish Fatherland and his respect for
the laws of Turkey, while he absolutely refused to indulge in any kind of
political statement. Thus, exhibiting great moderation during the 1960-61
Yasslada trials, Athenagoras told the court that he did not have concrete
evidence to state positively that Menderes and his entourage had organized
the 1955 riots. Dismissing the argument that he should have used his interna-
tional reputation to challenge the Turkish behaviour towards the Greek
3 I, The Times, 7 June 1957. It appears that from all the Hellenes expelled ostensibly on charges
of spying. Goulakis was perhaps the only one who could legitimately be regarded as having
engaged himself in anti-Turkish activities. Goulakis died in a Turkish prison a few years later,
Dallltsas illten'iew, Athens 1977.
32, Xydis. Cyprus, pp. 81-82.
33. Cumhuriyet, I December 1957 and 28 January 1958 giving the views of deputy and
professor Osman Turan (DP) who strongly advocates such an exchange.
34. Ibid., 24 May 1958. This view was confirmed by Nicholas Damtsas, a senior Greek
embassy employee in istanbul.
273
minority, the patriarch stressed that such an attitude would have been detri-
mental to both the Patriarchate and the community. As past experience
revealed, he reasoned, such an approach would have only resulted in enrag-
ing the Turks even further. An able student and of the art of
diplomacy, Athenagoras had acquired a deep understanding of the Turkish
mentality. Unlike many Greek leaders in Athens and Nicosia, he was aware
that an intemational appeal would most probably result in the expulsion of the
Patriarchate; for it would give the Turks the opportunity to consider such an
appeal an example of the Phanar's involvement in politics. Further, such
an event would, in turn, have widened the rift between the two countries. As a
staunch believer in Greco-Turkish friendship, the patriarch was thoroughly
opposed to this state of affairs.
35
On the other hand. nationalist circles in
Greece resented his moderate stance and the patriarch was frequently criti-
cized by certain Athenian newspapers.36 Taking advantage of this situation.
religious conservatives. like Dimitrios Mavropoulos. the editor of 'H i[Jw\'Ij
vi:.; 'EKKi.1Wfa:;;. who disliked the patriarch's religious liberalism. encouraged
the anti-Athenagoras trend.37
4. The Patriarchate during the settlement of the Cyprus Question,
/959-64.
The treatment accorded to the Greeks and their institutions in Turkey was
directly analogous to the relations between the govemments of Ankara and
Athens. To the Turkish govemment the Greek minority and particularly the
Patriarchate had a hostage value; a tool through which Athens could be
forced to adopt a more accomodating line when Greek-Turkish differences
arose. This attitude was readily accepted by many prominent Turks on a
number of occasions. Dr Fahir Armaoglu, for instance, explained that the
Greek government was reluctant to confront Turkey in a vigorous manner
on the Cyprus conflict because the Turks held significant trump cards
(kozlar). He went on to categorize as such, the Patriarchate and the Greek
minority, including the Orthodox communal institutions in istanbuJ.1
Further, there were some Turkish intellectuals, such as Miimtaz Soysal, who
had serious reservations about the need to involve the Patriarchate and the
Greeks in Turkey in the Cyprus question. In an article in the Yeni istanbul of
35. Athenagoras correspondence with Paul Palaiologos; Clement, op.cito. p. 101.
36. Tsakonas, op.cir.. pp. 161-63; Cumhurivet. 12 December 1956.
37. Opposing his ecumenical views, Greek religious conservatism even accused him
of favouring Protestantism, see Greek press reports reproduced in the Cumhuriyet of 12 De-
cember 1956.
L Cumhuriyet. 8 March 1964.
274
2l April 1957, he asserted that the Turkish point of view on the Cyprus
question was strong enough on its own merit and did not require the re-
examination of bilateral Greco-Turkish issues settled at Lausanne.
Greek-Turkish relations improved in 1959 as both parties agreed to the
establishment of the republic of Cyprus in which the rights of the Turkish
minority would be safeguarded and guaranteed jointly by the United King-
dom, Greece and Turkey. Thus, after the success of the Zurich and London
negotiations, the three governments signed in London the Cyprus agreement
in February 1959.
2
Thus, since World War II, Turkey and Greece were allied
under three separate pacts: NATO, the Balkan alliance, and the Cyprus
accords.
In May 1959, in an attempt to repair the damage caused to their relations by
the Cyprus affair, the Greek and Turkish governments held high-level talks in
Ankara. Thus, on 7 May, Premier Karamanlis, accompanied by his foreign
minister, Averoff Tossitzas, arrived in Ankara for a six day visit. It was the
first time an explicitly harmonious atmosphere had existed since the visit of
Marshall Papagos in 1953. The fact that the Greek prime minister decided to
visit Turkey merely four years after the ugly antiGreek riots in lstanbul
illustrates the willingness to forget the unpleasant events of the past. There
was goodwill on both sides, and a growing realization that as the two peoples
were neighbours, squabbles and quarrels, far from promoting their national
interests, were obstacles to peace and prosperity in southestem Europe. In
particular they wanted to discuss the outstanding questions concerning the
civil, educational and economic status of the minorities in both countries, the
Patriarchate of Constantinople and fishing limits. The Greek leaders felt that,
despite the Cyprus settlement, the Constantinopolitan Greek minority did not
regain that feeling of confidence to which they were entitled under the
minority provisions of the Lausanne treaty. There were questions of confis-
cations, of indemnities, expUlsions and unwarranted press campaigns against
the Patriarchate which, in the view of Greek officials, had to be settled before
the feeling of trust and security could retum.
3
Despite their initial reluctance to raise the minority question, the Turks did
agree to discuss the subject. Thus, the two prime ministers agreed on all main
issues and Karamanlis declared that he had full confidence in the sincerity
and spontaneity of Turkey's desire to strengthen friendship and co-operation
with Greece.
4
It was also agreed to appoint a senior official to study bilateral
2. Great Britain, Conference on Cyprus. Documents Signed and Initialed at Lancaster House.
London 1959, Cmnd 679, no. 4.
3. The Times. 7 & 8 May 19590
4. Ibid .. 11 May 1959.
275
issues and recommend solutions to outstanding problems. Talks between
Dimitri Bitsios, the Greek representative, and his Turkish counterpart Zeki
Kuneralp took place in the summer of 1959 and concentrated on the issue of
the minorities and the Patriarchate of Constantinople. 5 It was expected that
by the time Menderes would pay his return visit to Athens, the two govern-
ments would be ready to sign an accord.
Such a visit, however, did not materialize. Faced with serious internal
difficulties, Menderes postponed his visit to the Greek capital. Finall y, on 27
May 1960, he was toppled by a military coup d' etat. The far-reaching political
changes in Turkey delayed the dialogue between the two governments. But,
the willingness of the military government to bring up the issue of the
anti-Greek riots during the Yasslada trials was interpreted as a guarantee of
the future well-being of the Greek minority in Turkey by Athens. The trials
coincided with the visit, in October 1960, of the new Turkish foreign minister,
Selim to Greece.
6
This was the first high level contact between
Turkish and Greek leaders since the military coup in Turkey. On 22 October,
a joint statement issued in Athens reaffirmed Greek-Turkish agreement on
international questions, as well as on matters concerning the Balkans, Cyprus
and the Middle East. 7 A few months later, an agreement, aimed at improving
and increasing the flow of reliable news and views between Greece and
Turkey, was reached at a meeting of twelve newspaper editors and publishers
from both countries in Rhodes. In a statement the participants announced
that they had decided to do their utmost to keep any possible misunderstand-
ings out of the press of their countries. 8 This was a significant step in view of
the part hitherto played by the press in fanning the old fires of Greco- Turkish
antipathy. Earlier. on 25 December 1960, President Giirsel appointed
Kaloudis Laskaridis, a Constantinopolitan lawyer, who had fought as an
officer during World War I and had lost an arm at Dardanelles, to the newly
formed Senate.
9
Beyond ascertaining mutual goodwill, however, little progress had been
made in settling outstanding bilateral problems, such as the rights of
minorities and the avoidance of border incidents. To discuss such issues,
5. IbicL 29 July and 9 November 1959. According to the information furnished to the author by
a member of the Greek embassy in Turkey. the issue of Papa Eftim was also discussed during
these negotiations. Damtsas inter1'iew, Athens 1977.
6. CUIIl/zuriyet. 21 October 1960.
7. Ibid., 23 October 1960; The Times, 24 October 1960.
8. Ibid., 14 March 1961.
9 .. Laskaridis was the last Constantinopolitan Greek to be or elected to the Turkish
parliament. On the appointments to the Senate. Cumhurivet. 25 December 1960.
276
Greek Foreign Minister A veroff Tossitzas paid a brief visit to Turkey in
August 1962. In Ankara, he met with Premier ismet inonii and his foreign
minister, Feridun Erkin and discussed the Cyprus developments, relations
between the two countries, questions related to the minorities, the disposal of
Greek assets frozen in Turkey, cultural issues, tourism, fisheries and com-
mon defence within the framework of NATO. In a joint communique on 5
August, it was announced that the discussions had been conducted in a spirit
of greatest cordiality and that relations between the two countries were
further strengthened. The setting-up of a mixed commission to resolve those
minority issues which could not be settled through administrative action was
also announced.
10
Before returning to Greece, A veroff stopped briefly in
istanbul where he was received by President Giirsel and had talks with
representatives of the Constantinopolitan Greek community.
Given these cordial relations between 1959-64, the Constantinopolitan
Greeks were once again able, at least partially, to recover their position. In
particular, during this period the Patriarchate sought to regain its ecclesiasti-
cal influence within the Orthodoxy. In this it was able to achieve striking
successes. Thus, the visits of the Phanar of Russian Patriarch Aleksei and of
Bulgarian Patriarch Cyril ushered in a spirit of co-operation between the
Ecumenical Patriarchate and two most influential Orthodox churches. In a
sense, moreover, these visits were an acknowledgement of the spiritual
supremacy of the Phanar.
ll
Soon after, the patriarch initiated a Pan-
Orthodox conference representing all the Orthodox churches. As all the
patriarchates and autocephalous churches accepted the invitations sent out
by Constantinople, the first conference of its kind for more than thirty years
was held in Rhodes from 24 September to 1 October 1961. A delegation of six
representatives of the Patriarchate of Constantinople, four metropolitans and
two professors of theology, left istanbul on 21 September with regular Tur-
kish passports.
12
About 130 delegates were present at the conference, the
official languages of which were Greek, Russian, and Arabic, with English,
French and German as secondary languages. Presided over by Metropolitan
Chrysostomos, the Rhodes conference discussed a wide range of theological
issues, including faith and doctrine, consideration of a common Orthodox
confession of faith, a possible new translation of the Bible, participation of
the laity in the liturgical life of the church, and adaptation of the monastic life
of the church to the modern world. In addition, there was discussion of such
10. Ibid .. 6 August 1962.
11. The Times. 5 May 1962.
12. Ibid .. 22 September 1961.
277
ethical issues as euthanasia, cremation, birth control and family planning,
marriage, fainily life and divorce.
Although the patriarch himself did not go to Rhodes, the conference was a
result of his visit in 1959 to the Greek Orthodox patriarchates of the Middle
East-Alexandria, Jerusalem and Antioch. 13 The Rhodes conference was the
first in a series of inter-Orthodox exchanges aimed at reasserting the spiritual
leadership of the Orthodox church in the modern world. It was followed by
another two Pan-Orthodox conferences (September 1963, November 1964)
that took place again on the island of Rhodes.
Apart from the unity of the Orthodox church, these conferences paid a
great deal of attention to inter-church relations. A champion of the ecumenist
movement, Athenagoras was determined to make use of his prerogative as
ecumenical patriarch to represent Orthodoxy in its relation with the
heterodox. Traditionally, Orthodox-Anglican relations had been excellent,
but during the reign of Athenagoras they were strengthened even further. Of
great importance were the visits to the Phanar of the two archbishops of
Canterbury, G. Fisher (1960) and M. Ramsey (1962). During these visits and
the ensuing correspondence between the two sees an agreement had been
reached to appoint a joint doctrinal commission between the two churches.
Meanwhile, Anglican delegates were present in Rhodes (1961) and at the
festivities on the millennium of Mt Athos (1963).14
Perhaps of greater importance were the efforts of Athenagoras to achieve
an ecclesiastical rapprochement with the Vatican. In the Pan-Orthodox con-
ference of 1963, it was decided to start with Rome a dialogue on equal
terms, with the understanding that the ecumenical patriarch take the initiat-
ive on the Orthodox side.
ls
With the election ofa new pope, Paul VI, in 1963,
a regular con'espondence started between the two prelates. These common
efforts culminated in the historic meeting of Pope Paul and Patriarch
Athenagoras in Jerusalem in the first week of 1964.
16
More dramatic was the
visit of the pope to the Phanar on 25/26 July 1967. He was the first pontiff of
the Roman Catholic church to visit the former Byzantine and Ottoman capital
for more than 1250 years. He was met at the airport of istanbul by
President Sunay and Prime Minister Demirel. The pope was also greeted at
13. B. Stavridis, '0 OlKOUlleVIKO<; ilaTpuipXl]<; 'A9l]vay6pa<; A, Ki.t/poI'opla, 4/B (July,
1972) 453-63.
14. The dialogue with the Anglican church continued and in February 1965, a Phanardelega-
lion, headed by Archbishop Meliton Chatzis, held ecclesiastical talks at the Lambeth Palace.
15. B. Stavridis, The Ecumenical Patriarchate, GOThR 16 (1969) 211-12-
16. G. Konidaris, The Importance of the Meeting Between The Ecumenical Patriarch and the
Pope in January 1964, International Relatiolls 7-S (1964-65) IS-24.
278
the airport by Patriarch Athenagoras, with whom he exchanged the kiss of
peace. But the main object for this visit was to strengthen the bond between
the two churches. A few months iater, Athenagoras returned this visit by
travelling to Rome. After three days of discussions, the two ecclesiastical
leaders issued, on 28 October, ajoint declaration reiterating their intention to
strive for Christian unity. Prior to this historic visit to the Vatican,
Athenagoras paid visits to Sofia, Belgrade and Bucharest where he met the
leaders of the Orthodox churches in these countries. During the first week of
November, the patriarch visited Geneva and met the leaders of the World
Council of Churches while from 9 to 13 November he stayed in Britain for
talks with the archbishop of Canterbury, Dr. Ramsey.17 Assisted by his able
lieutenant, Archbishop Meliton of Chaicedon,18 the patriarch assumed a
leading role in the ecumenist movement. In May 1969, he visited Sofia for the
1 lOOth anniversary of the death of St Cyril. I
9
17. The Times. IO November 1967.
IS. Meliton Chatzis (1913- ) was born in Istanbul. In 1934, after completing his post-
graduate studies at the Theological seminary of Chalki, he entered a distinguished ecclesiastical
career. In 1950, he was appointed archbishop of Imbros and Tenedos, For the next I3 years,
Meliton endeavoured to revitalize the educational and cultural life of the islands. Under his
strong leadership, the islands, and particularly the largely Greek inhabited Imbros, flourished. In
1963, he was promoted to Archbishop ofHeliopolis, and, in 1966, he occupied the senior position
of Chalcedon, Twice, in 1970 and 1972, when the ageing patriarch was too ill to perform his
functions, Meliton was put in charge of the Patriarchate. Sharing the patriarch's strong commit-
ment to the union of the churches, Meliton represented the Phanar in a number of international
ecclesiastical conferences; see XaplO'rqpza d::; TIll' TzWII' rou M1lrponoi.irov ripol'ro;; X ai.1olr5ol'o;;
Mei.irwl'o::;, Thessaloniki 1972 passim. On his outstanding achievements on the islands ofImbros
and Tenedos, see Alexandris, Imbros and Tenedos, pp. 24-25.
19. The theological dialogue between the Phanar and Vatican continues. The successor of Paul
VI, Pope John Paul II paid a visit to the Phanar in November 1979. Together with the successor of
Athenagoras, Dimitrios I, the pope declared his commitment to the union of the Christian
churches.
179
CHAPTER XI
THE FINAL EXODUS OF THE CONSTANTINOPOLITAN
GREEK MINORITY. 1964-74.
I. The expulsions of the Hellenes of Istanbul.
Despite its temporary settlement. the Cyprus problem continued to plague
Greek -Turkish relations. In fact the constitution of Cyprus. formulated
under the terms of the 1959 agreements. accentuated the antagonism dividing
the two ethnic groups by granting to the Turkish Cypriots political powers far
exceeding their numerical strength. As the Turks used their constitutional
rights. amounting to a veto power over all important legislation. the govern-
ment of Cyprus was unable to perform its functions. As a result Makarios,
stating that the constitution was unworkable. proposed certain amendments.
to this. the Turkish government warned against amending the
constitution and once again pressed for the partition of the island. When
attempts to achieve a compromise failed. fighting broke out across the un-
happy island at Christmas 1963. The presence of Turkish and Greek troops on
the island. authorized by the 1959 treaties, threatened to involve those two
countries in the hostilities. In August 1964. moreover. the Turkish airforce
carried out a surprise strike on Greek Cypriot positions at Kokkina. resulting
in some loss of life. Meanwhile. Turkey found itself in a diplomatic isolation.
for hardly anyone. not even its NATO and CENTO allies. supported the
Turkish thesis of partition or was prepared to condemn the Makarios
government. I
It was at this juncture that Turkey decided to employ once again the
Constantinopolitan Greek factor in its diplomatic confrontation with Greece.
Amidst reports of Greek Cypriot atrocities against their brethren. the Turkish
press demanded anti-Greek measures.
1
Holding Greece responsible for en-
couraging Makarios in trampling upon the constitution of 1960. the Turks.
unilaterally denounced the 1930 Convention of Establishment. Commerce
I. For an excellent analysis of the post-1964 crisis. see S .. Xydis. C\,prtLL' Reillclant Repllhlic.
The Hague 1973. passim
2. OIllII1I1/"(\'el. 27 December 1963.
280
and Navigation on 16 March 1964.
3
This affected over 10,000 Constan-
tinopolitan Hellenes who were established there under the provisions of the
Lausanne Treaty and the 1930 convention. Unlike the majority of the Greeks
in Turkey, who held Turkish passports, less than a third of the Constan-
tinopolitan Greek hablis held Greek nationality. Like all the Greek hablis,
they were established in istanbul prior to October 1918, and thus they were
allowed to remain in Turkey by virtue of the Lausanne exchange of popu-
lations convention of 30 January 1923. Likewise in accordance with the
Lausanne convention respecting conditions of residence, business and juris-
diction foreign nationals residents in istanbul were permitted to remain in
Turkey for a seven years period (article 20).4 Further, in October 1930, the
right of the Hellenes to remain in their native city was extended with the
signing of a new agreement. Despite this agreement, under a law forbidding
foreign residents in Turkey to practise a variety of professions, many Hel-
lenes found themselves out of work during the mid-1930s. Some of them had
no choice but to emigrate to Greece while others changed professions.
s
According to official Turkish estimates, there were 26,431 Hellenes in Istan-
bul in 1927. Their numbers, however, decreased steadily to 17,672 in 1935,
13,598 in 1945, 11,879 in 1955 and 10,488 in 1960.
6
Together with the Greeks
of Turkish nationality. the Constantinopolitan Hellenes comprised a single
ethnic group in Turkey. Nor were they any less indigenous than those with
Turkish nationality. Many had never even been to Greece. They held the
Hellenic nationality because their ancestors had come from the provinces of
the Ottoman empire that were incorporated in the Greek kingdom in 1830 and
later.
On 24 March 1964, the list of the first Hellene deportees was announced in
the Turkish press.
7
On 29 March, the first five Hellene families left istanbul
for Greece.
s
With the abrogation of the 1930 treaty, the Hellenes were
subjected to article 35 of the tapll (title deed) law which prohibited the
ownership of immovable property, by foreigners.
9
At first the Turks claimed
that the expulsions were individual measures aimed at those Hellenes
involved in activities dangerous to the internal and external security of
1. Ibid .. 17 March 1964. The arbitrary measures taken against the Greek popUlations ofImbros
and Tenedos have not been included in this study .. For a detailed account of the Turkish attempts
to de-hellenize these islands see my own Imbros and Tenedos. pp. 25 ff.
4 .. LCIS. pp. 139-41.
5. See above chapter VI:::!.
6. jy .. no. 380 (1959) 84 and no. 460 (1960-61) 78-79.
7. ClIlIIl1l1riyel. 24 March 1964.
8. Ibid. 30 March 1964.
9. Ibid .. 19 March 1964.
281
Turkey. 10 Accusations against the expelled ranged from smuggling foreign
currency to having sent money to the Greek terrorists in Cyprus. Soon,
however, it became evident that the deportees comprised highly respected
individuals, who until that moment had never been involved with the
authorities. 11 As a result the Turkish government had to admit to the collec-
tive character of the deportations. Accordingly, on 27 April, the director of
the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs told the counsellor of the Greek
embassy that the measures against the Greeks in istanbul
were the natural consequences of the fact that the Turkish govern-
ment regarded the question of Cyprus and that of Greco- Turkish rela-
tions as forming a single whole, and therefore was unable to continue to
grant Greek nationals favoured treatment, at a moment when Greece
displayed an attitude of hostility towards Turkey by lining up on the
side of Makarios' views.12
Later on, the Turkish government spokesman, Miimtaz Soysal reiterated this
view when he rebuffed Greek protests against the expulsions. On 31 July, he
declared that:
as the result of the unfriendly policy of the Greek government towards
Turkey, the Turkish government was terminating the privileged treat-
ment unilaterally accorded in the past to the Greek nationals. 13
The spokesman added that the measures of expUlsion were in accordance
with the convention of 1930. On another occasion the same official warned
the Greek representatives in Ankara that:
unless the Greek government changed its attitude in regard to the
question of Cyprus, all the Greek nationals in istanbul might be expel- '
led en masse.14
10. Another term used by the Turkish government was Greek national who was engaged in
harmful activities against Turkey, Eralp to the Secretary-General, 29 September 1964,
UNSCjSj6728 ..
II. The claim that those expelled supported the EOKA was discredited when the authorities
issued deportation orders for individuals who had been dead for some time. Thus lraklis
Pamphilos died in 1963; Dimitrios Avgoustakis and Panayiotis Panayiotou in 1%2; Georges
Rossopoulos in 1959 and Constantine Kimoliatis in 1948. Again among those expelled
- ostensibly because they were involved in anti- Turkish activities- there were eight paralytics,
three blind persons, one deaf-mute, two crippled persons, four insane and nine patients stricken
with incurable illness, Photographs of such handicapped Hellenes boarding the airplane in
istanbul were widely circulated in the Athenian press.
12. Explanatory memorandum, Dimitrakopoulos to the Secretary-General, 10 September
1964, UNSCjSj595L
13. Ibid.
14. Ibid.
282
As the expUlsions mUltiplied, Greece asked for an emergency meeting of
the United Nations Security Council to consider the mass expulsion of
Greek citizens from Turkey in September 1964.
15
By mid-August. the
number of persons mentioned by name as expelled amounted to 1073. In his
speech to the Security CounciL the Greek ambassador to the United Nations,
Dimitri Bitsios stated that an increasing number of hostile and provocative
acts by Turkey against Greece had created a state of acute tension in the
relations between the two countries. This led to an explosive situation which
had forced the Greek government to appeal to the Security Council. Focusing
on the expulsions, Ambassador Bitsios stressed that the Turkish authorities
had openly stated that the treatment of Greek nationals in Turkey was in
retaliation for Greece's support to Makarios. If open hostilities did not break
out, the Greek representative concluded. it was due to the Greek
government's restraint. I " In reply Orhan Eralp. the Turkish ambassador to
the United Nations, alleged that those expelled had been guilty of criminal
subversive activities against Turkey's security.17 Faced. however. with
concrete evidence submitted to the Council by the Greek side. the Turkish
representative was forced to admit. that
As for the deceased whose names may have appeared by error on the
list of those who were asked to leave, if in fact there were such cases, it
could mean that the Greek citizens of Istanbul have been careless in
reporting vital statistics to the local authorities.
Despite his admission that the lists carried dead persons. Eralp insisted that
the expUlsions were not vindictive measures against Greek nationals in
Turkey.18
Neutral members in the Council. including the Soviet member and presi-
dent of the Council Marazov, condemned <<the mass deportation of Hellenes
and referred to the humanitarian aspects of the affair. I <J Although foreign
diplomats did not conceal their own criticisms and objections over the
heavy-handed Turkish action. no western influence had been exerted to
persuade the Turks to ease the lot of Constantino pol it an Greeks. As a result.
by September 1965. over 6,000 Hellenes were deported from Turkey.20 By
15. Bitsios to the Secretary-General. UNSCjSj594L
16. UNSC/Official Records (1146) 1-13.
17. Ibid .. pp .. 13-24.
18. Ibid.
19. Ibidoo (1147). I ff.
20 .. For the Turkish and Greek arguments see Liatis to the Secretary-General. 27 September
1965 (UNSC/Sj6723) and I October 1965 (UNSCjSj6734) and Eralp to the Secretary-General. 29
September 1965 (UNSCjS/6728) and 7 October 1965 (UNSCjS(6758)..
283
late 1960s. there were only few hundred Hellenes. mainly women married to
Greeks with Turkish nationality and persons over sixty-five. left in Istanbul.
Public opinion in Greece resented the refusal of the Turkish authorities to
allow the orderly departure of the expelled, Further. the expulsions were
accompanied by measures aiming at the virtual confiscation of the property of
those expelled, The fiscal authorities had already taken a series of measures
intended to ensure that Greek nationals were deprived of all possibility of
liquidation of their interests. Thus the banks received instructions to refuse
all credit to businesses entirely or partly owned by Hellenes. Property belong-
ing to Greek nationals was seized by the fiscal authorities as a precautionary
measure against possible default on taxes. the assessments being calculated
at several times what would have been required in the past. The amounts so
assessed included future fines of the businesses concerned; bank accounts
were blocked. goods seized and even furniture and personal effects im-
pounded in order to guarantee the Treasury against any future failure to pay
taxes. Meanwhile. instructions were given to the Land Registry department
not to register transfers of Hellenic property.21 Indignant with the Turkish
treatment meted out to the Hellenic Greeks. the Athenian press compared
these measures to the I'arllt; taxation during the war.
The expulsions were carried out with extreme harshness. The deportees
were allowed to take out with them no more than 200 TL (or $ 22) and one
suitcase containing only clothing. Before leaving. they were forced to sign a
declaration of the content of which they were not allowed to take cognizance.
According to the information obtained by the Greek consular authorities in
Istanbul. by signing this declaration the expelled Hellenes admitted: (a)
having committed currency offences; (b) having been a member of the dissol-
ved Hellenic Union of Istanbul. which had been accused of political
activities inimical to Turkey; (c) having sent money to the Greek terrorists in
Cyprus; (d) finally. that he was leaving Turkey of his own free will.
22
The
plight of the Constantinopolitan Hellenes who arrived penniless in Greece
moved Greek public opinion, An association. the Society of the Hellenes
expelled from Turkey (LwIWrdol' 'Ei.i.ljl'Wl' Y7T.IlhOWl' A7[{;i.aOi1'Twl' b;,
TOIJphia;' J. was founded in Athens in 1965.
21 Explanatory memorandum. Alexander Dimitropoulos to the Secretary-General. IO Sep-
tember 1964. UNSCS!5951 .. These draconian measures were provided forby the law no. 6183 on
tax evasion .. The example of a Constantinopolitan Hellene businessman. Constantine Vasileiadis
illustrates the arbitrary nature of the taxation. A paper manufacturer. Vasileiadis had hitherto
paid an annual income tax ranging between 25 and 28.000 TL. But in 1964 he was arbitrarily
f<)I"ced to pay 165.000 TL
22. Ihid,
284
Many of the expelled Hellenes were well-to-do businessmen with long-
established commercial institutions providing employment for many local
Greeks and Turks. During 1964-65, about 100 such businesses were reported
to have been closed down and Turkish estimates of Constantinopolitan
Hellenic wealth had gone as high as $ 500,000,000; though this figure was
subsequently reduced to $ 200,000,000. The Greeks, who found the latter
figure too low, argued that the Turkish authorities reduced their estimates
when they realized that some day they might have to settle for properties
taken by the expelled Hellenic nationals. 23 Sensitive to public indignation and
fearing t h ~ t the Turks were about to abrogate the Lausanne treaty, the Greek
foreign minister, Stavros Kostopoulos advised the Turkish ambassador in
Athens, Turan Tiiliiy, on 22 April 1965, that diplomatic exchanges between
the two countries would be discontinued. For a while, it appeared that
relations between Ankara and Athens had reached yet again a crisis point.
By mid-May, however tensions somewhat eased when Turkey refrained
from pressing any charges of subversive activities against the Patri-
archate.
24
On 31 May. a goodwill message from Premier Suat Hayd Urgiiplii
was presented to his Greek counterpart George Papandreou by Ambassador
TiHily.25
Meanwile, the Cyprus question served to obscure internal political and
economic problems in Turkey. Throughout 1964 and 1965, Cyprus mon-
opolized attention, enabling weak coalition governments (first by Inanii
and then by Urgilplii) to demand from the opposition national solidarity in
the face of an external problem. In this way the assembly was able to pass a
number of fiscal measures. The Cyprus question also exposed Turkish iso-
lation in foreign affairs making the Turks feel particularly bitter against their
allies in NATO and the Turkish press attacked the United Nations for the first
time.
21i
No member-state had supported the Turkish thesis at the United
Nations. The Turks expressed their frustration by holding big demon-
strations, demanding an end to the Greek treachery and to the deceitful
Makarios. They urged the Turkish army and the Turkish youth to invade
CyprusP
23 .. See article by Jay Waltz. entitled Turks Expelling Istanbul Greeks, in The Nell' York
Times. 9 August 1964. According to The Observer (London) of II July 1964, Hellenic immovable
property in the city confiscated by the authorities amounted to 80,000,000.
24. A threat of an investigation of the Phanar's political activities and the immediate
expUlsion of the remaining 5000 Hellenes was announced on 19 April, after a cabinet meeting in
Ankara. by Interior Minister, Ismail Hakk! Akdogan, see CUl/lhuriyet, 20 May 1965 ..
25. Ibid., 1 June 1965.
26. F. Ahmad. The Turkish E\-perimellt ill Democracy. 1950-1975. London 1977, pp, 188 & 221
D. For details on such a demonstration in Istanbul see Cumhuri?et. 16 March 1964.
285
Given the intense antagonism between Greece and Turkey, the Greek
element of Turkey found itself in an unenviable position. Firstly, the re-
percussions of the expulsions of the Hellenic subjects on the Greeks with
Turkish nationality were decisive. Although they held different passports,
the family links which bound them were so close that in practice the expulsion
of the Constantinopolitan Hellenes led to the elimination of almost as many
members of the Greek minority with Turkish nationality. Sensing their pre-
carious future. the latter too began to leave Istanbul in great numbers.
Affirming this trend. the ClImhllriyet of II October 1964 announced:
<<30.000 Turkish nationals of Greek descent have left Turkey perrna-
nently. in addition to the Greek subjects already expelled.
A series of restrictive measures newly adopted and immediately put into
effect by the Turkish authorities with regard to minority educational and
charitable institutions reinforced the apprehensions of the Greek community.
Thus, Greek elementary and secondary schools were compelled to accept the
appointment of Turkish assistant headmasters recruited by the Ministry of
Education in contravention of the educational clauses of the treaty of
Lausanne. These assistant headmasters deliberately followed a policy in-
tended to render the task of the Greek headmasters and staff as difficult as
possible and to provoke the intervention of the Turkish educational au-
thorities on charges of breaking the regulations and of anti-Turkish
conduct. 28 As a result within the months of March-April 1964 alone the
Turkish authorities dismissed three headmasters and eleven teachers while in
a renewed campaign against Greek minority schools in 1967. thirty-nine
teachers were expelled and six primary schools were closed down. In 1983.
of the five Greek /ycees, Zographeion (Phrangopoulos) has a Greek head-
master. As the authorities refused to appoint new Greek headmasters. the
management of the Greek minority schools fell into the hands of Turkish
deputy-headmasters. Likewise. applications for the appointment of new
teachers were turned down by the Ministry on the grounds that the applicants
did not possess an adequate knowledge of Turkish, although the Greeks
argued that this was not the case.
1LJ
Official inspectors not only paid frequent
28. This information has been forwarded by a number of retired Greek teachers. including the
last Greek headmaster of the historic patriarchalll at Phanar ([]urpulp/Jhli .'v!c;rii.l/ roij nl'OlJ;
John Karayiannis. In an interview with the author in 1977. this distinguished Constan-
tinopolitap educationalist stated that he was twice discharged from his duties during the late
1 960s and early 1970s. Ironically. the Greek I.n of the Phanar. which traces its origins to the
Byzantine period. is today administered by a Turk. a direct contravention of the Lausanne
treaty. The appointment of deputy headmasters was enforced in April 1963 (protocol no. 2467).
29 .. Such a test for Greek teachers was made compUlsory in October 1964. for details see
Ei.D/;lhpl/ C/1(,Jlli 8 May 1965
286
visits to Greek schools, but also by behaving in a hectoring manner terrorized
the staff and pupils.3o While refusing permission for the repair of dilapidated
school-buildings, the authorities withdrew recognition of a number of elected
school-boards of the Greek community. 31 Earlier, by virtue of law 222 of
1961, the government placed all the minority schools under the department of
private schools of the Turkish Ministry of Equcation, which meant that Greek
minority schools were no longer recognized as Communal Schools entitled
to the minority clauses of the treaty of Lausanne. On 27 March 1964, a
government encyclical (protocol no. 410/16) prohibited Orthodox clerics
from entering the premises of Greek minority schools. Another encyclical
(protocol no. 3885), dated on 15 September, banned morning prayer in the
Greek schools and Greek textbooks and encyclopedias in the schools were
strictly prohibited.
31
The result was that the whole level of education in the Greek minority
schools. which were once renowned for their high standards, declined
dramatically. The fear that their children would be inadequately educated
was, and still is. one of the many reasons compelling the Constantinopolitan
Greeks to leave their city. This is reflected in the following official figures.
Number of pupils
Number of secondary schools
Number of elementary schools
Number of kindergardens
1923 1964 1970 1978 19803
3
15,000 5000 3930 1147 816
8 6 6 6 6
85 42 42 22 20
70 4
30. Interview with John Karayiannis, Athens 1977 ..
31. Interviews with members of the (Tatavla) school board trustees. Naum. Tolaros
and Alexandris, who asked permission for the repair of the parish school in 1964. Such permis-
sion was never granted. But perhaps the most blatant case of official harassment was the closure
of the Prinkipo orphanage in April 1964 on the pretext that there was a danger of fire in the
building housing iL At the same time. the school located on those premises was closed and
sealed. although the school building was ofa recent constructiorL Thus 165 Greek orphans were
deprived of their lodgings and their schooling. The arbitrary character of this measure lies in the
fact that for several years the same authorities had stubbomly and without cause refused
permission to rebuild. which the administration of the establishment had repeatedly requested.
This information was communicated to the author by the trustee and teacher of the school,
Christos Mavrophrydis. The author of 'JaroplKo AEUKWJLa rwl' 'Oprpal'orporpdwv Jlar;; 1853-1958.
Istanbul 1958. Mavrophrydis is an able Turkish linguist and taught at the Theological seminary of
Chalki. at the Prinkipo orphanage and at the school of Galata. He was a member ofthe RPP and
he narrowly missed being elected to the parliament in the elections of 1946. Mavrophrydis
interl'iew, Athens 1980.
32. 'Ehu8EPI/ C/1wl'lj. 8 May 1965.
33. This information has been fumished by the former deputy and educationalist, Alexander
Chatzopoulos. For more analytical information see appendix C.
287
19
Reacting to this state of affairs, the outspoken Constantinopolitan jour-
nalist Andreas Lambikis, in May 1965, published a long open letter to the
minister of education, Cihat Bilgehan, requesting an end to the restrictive
legislation which crippled Greek minority schools in istanbul. 34 When, how-
ever, his appeal remained unanswered, he tried to publish yet another open
letter this time addressed to President GOrsel. Prevented by the authorities
from doing so, the 'E},8v()8Pfl f/Jwwl of 19 July 1965 appeared with a blank
editorial space, indicating that the main article was censored. Nor were the
authorities prepared to put up with Lambikis for very long. On 11 September,
he was arrested and hun-ied by the police to the Greek border where he was
told to cross over into Greece. It is worth mentioning, moreover, that L ~ l f l l
bikis was a Turkish national. Just before his expulsion a court found Lam-
bikis guilty of violating articles 141 and 142 of the penal code and charged him
with making Greek propaganda inimical to the national unity (Millf birligi
bozarak !iekilde Rumluk propagandasl yaplyordu). The premises of
'E).8V08Pfl f/Jwvft were subsequently ransacked and the old issues of the
newspaper destroyed. With its suppression, the Greek minority lost the only
instrument willing to voice their grievances and champion the minority rights
enshrined in the Turkish constitution and in the Lausanne treaty.35 As the
Greek popUlation in Turkey diminished, the Constantinopolitan Grecophone
press, too, declined dramatically. Today, 'ArcOY8Uj.laTlVft is the only daily
Greek newspaper while since 1976 Charalambos Rombopoulos, a former
school teacher, has published the weekly 'Hxw (Echo).
Linking the Cyprus problem to the minority question and the territorial
balance established in Lausanne, the Turkish government continued to put
pressure on the Constantinopolitan Greeks. Thus, on 16 October 1965, Pre-
mier Suat Hayri Urgiiplii warned:
I cannot guarantee what might happen in istanbul if one Turk was
killed in Cyprus. Additional security measures have been taken to
prevent riots and possible attacks. Such measures, however, have been
taken before, as'during the riots of 6/7 September 1955 .36
Profoundly disturbed by the implications of this statement, the Greek deputy
premier and foreign minister, Elias Tsirimokos, in an interview to the press
stated
34. Under the title An Open Letter to the Minister of Education, His Excellency Cihat
Bilgehan ('A l'o/KUI emaroi.i! npo:; Tal' 'Ynoup?ol' ITu/(5eiur;; 'Ec,oxcinurov nl1.dr Mmi.YKexuv). this
article appeared in three consecutive issues, I. 8 and 15 May 1965.
35. Settled in Athens, Lambikis publishes the monthly KcvvamvTlvovnol.lr;;. which first ap-
peared in 1975.
36. CIIIII!JlIriyet, 16 October 1965.
288
Greeks are stunned by the declarations of Mr Urgiiplii because we
sincerely believed that no Turkish statesman would ever make such a
reference to the events of September 1955 which not only provoked the
indignation of world public opinion but also the conviction by a Turkish
tribunal of those responsible, a fact which we believe Mr Urgiiplii
would not have forgotten.
His declaration confirms my statement in the General Assembly to the
effect that the persecution in Turkey of Greeks and the Ecumenical
Patriarchate are not mere police measures nor are they caused by the
behaviour of the Greeks in istanbul. but are used in a policy of reprisals
and to bring pressure on the Greek people as a whole to make it
renounce its national aspirations .37
Concun-ently, the Greek representative in the United Nations, Dimitri Bi-
tsios, addressed a letter to the secretary-general protesting against the
ominous tone of the head of the Turkish government and his outspokenness
which verged on cynicism.
Realizing that his prime minister's statement would only have an adverse
effect on world public opinion, the Turkish president, Cemal Giirsel, has-
tened to express his indignation with Urgiiplii. Thus, early in November
1965, he declared:
Such words could only have been uttered by a person labouring under
stress. I cannot understand otherwise how the prime minister could
have spoken in this way. Turkey is not a tribe but a state: she honours
her obligations and takes when necessary forcible action. The mere
recollection of the events of 6/7 September 1955 is painful. I reject the
prime minister's words. 38
Despite the reassuring statement of the president, the Greek minority
continued to be apprehensive about its future in Turkey. Nor did these
misgivings disappear after the electoral victory of Siileyman Demirel and his
Justice party in October 1965.
39
The Demirel administration, following the
37. Bitsios to the Secretary-General, 18 October 1965, UNSC;S(6820, The quote by
Tsirimokos is given in the same document.
38. This quote is given in G. Lewis, op. cit., p. 148. Already in an interview to the Athenian
daily To Bfif1u on 19 March, the Turkish premier hinted that if the Turkish Cypriots were forced
to leave Cyprus. Turkey would welcome them. "but such a turn of events would compel us to
take similar measures, This evidently was a reference to the Greek minority in Turkey.
39. The Constantinopolitan Christians voted en masse for the Justice party, for statistics
indicating this trend see M. Sencer, Turkiye'de Slnlfsal Yapl ve Siyasal Davranl:jlar, istanbul
1974, pp .. 115-16.
289
policies of his predecessors, continued with the expulsions of Cons tan-
tinopolitan Greeks. Further, through new legislative action, the Demirel
govemment sought to curb the rights of the non-Muslim minorities over their
communal property. Thus, in the summer of 1967, a new act (no. 903/1967)
replaced the earlier vakiflaw of 1949 (no. 5404).40 According to the second
paragraph of article 74 of the new law, communal property founded by a
group and aiming at the reinforcement of a certain race or minority would
not be recognized as a vakifby the authorities. Evidently, with this article the
govemment made clear its intention to put an end to the formation of new
minority-owned communal concems. This view was subsequently upheld by
the Supreme Court (Yarg'itay) of Turkey, when on 12 January 1971 it decreed
that the minorities would no longer possess the right to found new vakif
property.41 Commenting on the vak'i/law of 1967, Dr Ahmet maintained
that by imposing restriction on the right of the minorities, with Turkish
citizenship. to own communal property, the new legislative act was contrary
to the Turkish constitution."!:! The new law did not only go against the
fundamental principle of equal treatment stipulated by the Turkish consti-
tutions, but it also violated the minority clauses of the treaty of Lausanne.
Paragraph two of article 42 of this treaty decreed that
All facilities and authorisation will be granted to the pious founda-
tions, and to the religious and charitable institutions of the non-Muslim
minorities at present existing in Turkey, and the Turkish govemment
will not refuse, for the formation of new religious and charitable institu-
tions, any of the necessary facilities which are granted to other private
institutions of that nature.
Further, the 1967 law decrees the levy of a five per cent surtax upon the
income of communal organizations, which had already paid their proper
govemment and municipal taxes. This was the so-called mukataa tax that
was abolished by the earlier vakiflaw of 1949. Finally, in another law in 1978
(no. 502/1978), the BallkU hospital was singled out. Accordingly, the Ballkll
parish was informed that no donations to the hospital after 1936 would be
registered by the govemment, for such a transaction would have disturbed
public order. In this way, the hospital was deprived of the large endowent
made by a wealthy Constantinopolitan Greek in 1964. Meanwhile, the central
committees of the large BeyogJu (Pera), Galata and Kadlk6y (Chalcedon)
40. Resmf Gazete, no. 12655, 24 July 1937.
41. Giineri, op.cit., p. 98.
42. Iiirk MedenfKanununa Gore Vak/f(Tesis), Ankara University doctoral thesis
1968, p. 48.
290
parishes, which co-ordinated the administration of community concems
within each parish, were abolished.
These legislative onslaughts convinced many Constantinopolitan Greeks
to move out of Turkey. The dramatic decline of the Greek element in Turkey
is clearly visible in the following official population statistics:
43
Date 0/ census Greek-speaking Greek Orthodox
1935 108,725 125,046
1945 88,680 103,839
1955 80,000 86,655
1960 65,000 106,611
1965 48,096 76,122
Despite this palpable exodus, the Turkish govemment continued to maintain
that the maltreatment of the Greek minority in Turkey was a myth. As the
Turkish ambassador to the United Nations argued, the Greek minority in
Istanbul, according to Ankara, <<is one of the happiest and most prosperous
minorities anywhere in the world.44
Notwithstanding the Turkish rhetoric, an increasing number of displaced
Constantinopolitan Greeks found refuge in the Greek urban centres. To-
gether with the Greeks of Imbros, and Tenedos, they soon managed to
organize powelful pressure groups and publicized the plight of their brethren
in Turkey. It was partly because of this pressure that the Athens junta sought
to achieve a new rapprochement with Turkey. As early as May 1967, Premier
Constantine Kollias, in an interview with the istanbul daily Yeni Gazete,
expressed his wish to bring about an understanding with Turkey. He also
insisted on the improvement of conditions for the Greeks in Turkey. By July,
it became evident that the junta, wishing to counterbalance somewhat its
growing international isolation, was intent on making a major effort to ap-
pease Greek-Turkish relations. Thus, the military regime welcomed a Tur-
kish proposal for a conference at and Alexandroupolis on the Thracian
border. This Greek-Turkish conference took place on 9-10 September 1967
and ended in a diplomatic disaster for Prime Minister Kollias, Foreign Minis-
ter Oikonomou-Gouras and Minister to the Prime Minister Colonel
Papadopoulos, who were the chief Greek delegates. Being more consistent
diplomats, the Turks not only were able to make far-reaching gains on the
43. The figures of 1960 and 1%5 are interesting. While there was a group of Turkish-speaking
Greek Orthodox (Karamanlides), in 1955 their number had decreased to 6655. Yet in 1960 and
1965, there were 41,611 and 28,026 respectively who declared themselves to be Turcophones.
This marked change within a short period of time may be indicative of the reluctance of many
Greeks in Turkey to come out with the fact that their mother tongue was Greek.
44. Eralp to the Secretary-General. 19 June 1964, UNSC/Official Record (1138) 13.
291
Cyprus issue,45 but they also managed to improve their position on other
points of the Greek- Turkish nexus, i.e. the minority question and the Patriar-
chate of Constantinople. The fate ofImbros and Tenedos Greeks was sealed
then. The Turkish determination to empty these islands of their Greek
majority population became clear during the crisis of 1964-65, when taking
advantage of the circumstances Ankara colonized Imbros and Tenedos with
convicts from mainland jails. Submitted to ever-growing pressures, the Im-
briot and Tenediot Greeks fled the islands. Since the late 1960s, little has been
heard of them, except when one reads of a boat coming in from one of those
islands carrying a few desparate refugees. 46
After the far-reaching Greek concessions on the Cyprus question during
the conference, Ankara appeared willing to improve
bilateral relations. Thus, on 20 January 1968, Turkey recognized the Greek
military regime, the only country to do so besides Congo-Kinshasa. Follow-
ing earlier rounds of talks in 1959 and 1962, Greece and Turkey agreed, to
hold talks on the outstanding minority questions in February 1968. The first
stage of these negotiations took place a month later in Athens. The Greek
delegation was headed by John Tzounis, chief of the Turkish desk at the
Greek Foreign Ministry and the Turkish by Adnan Bulak, director-general of
the Greek and Cyprus affairs department in the Turkish Foreign Ministry.
The second stage of the talks was held in Ankara in April and the third in
Vienna ending on 3 I May. As a result, the two sides succeeded in concluding
an educational agreement permitting the Muslim minority in Greece and the
Greek Orthodox minority in Turkey to have their children taught in their own
language without restrictions.-l
7
This agreement was endorsed by the foreign
45. These negotiations can be considered as a cornerstone in the future developments in
Cyprus. In November 1967, after bloody collisions in the island which brought threats of Turkish
intervention, Cyrus Vance was rushed to Athens, Nicosia and ankara. He was successful in
forestalling a Greek-Turkish confrontation and the main outcome of his effOlt was an agreement
to withdraw from the island all Greek and Turkish forces other than those allowed by the Zurich
and London agreements. As a result, by agreeing to withdraw some twelve thousand soldiers
introduced to the island in 1964 by the Papandreou government to defend it against Turkish
threats of intervention, the junta deprived Greece of its military foothold on the island. On the
other hand, the Turks were able to camouflage the two or three thousand Turkish soldiers
whohad been introduced as Turkish Cypriots. With the withdrawal of the Greek troops, the
Athens regime lost even the relative freedom it had to conduct its own policy in Cyprus. It
became wide open to pressures from Ankara and Washington. For details see A.G. Xydis, The
Military Regime's Foreign Policy in R. Clogg and G. Yannopoulos (eds), Greece Under Military
Rule, London 1972, pp. 191-209.
46. See for details Alexandris, Imbros and Tenedos, pp. 2331.
., 47. The Greek delegation included Peter Molyviatis and Panayiotis Oikonomou, as well as
292
ministers of the two countries. Panayiotis Pipinelis and ihsan Sabri
<:;aglayangil. during a meeting in the Turkish embassy in London on 27 July.
In a communique issued on 3 September it was announced that the agreement
concerning the educational issues of minorities would be put into effect
during the academic year of 1968-69. The formation of a mixed Greek-
Turkish commission to examine ways of implementing the stillborn cultural
agreement of 195 I was also announced. The commission duly met in Ankara
(2 I October to 9 November) and then in Athens (IO to 20 December) resulting
in the signing of a new instrument on minority education."!! Seeking to
improve teaching conditions in the minority schools this agreement affirmed
the exchange of teachers and text-books while facilitating the wide use of the
minority language in such institutions. As a result a number of Constan-
tinopolitan Greek teachers. including the headmaster of the Ioakeimeion
/yeee. Dimitrios Pandelaras. were reinstated. Satisfied with the results of
these negotiations. Greek Foreign Minister Pipinelis expressed optimism
about the future of the Greek minority schools in Turkey. Likewise. in a
statement to the istanbul daily Mil/iyet on 30 May 1971. Premier George
Papa90poulos quite naively proclaimed his belief in a Greco-Turkish feder-
ation.
This optimism, however, was rather premature. By August 1971. the
Theological seminary of Chalki, still the principal training school for the
clergy of the Greek Orthodox world outside Greece itself, was closed down
by the authorities following a law against all private institutions of higher
learning.
49
Notwithstanding the reappointment of a number of Greek
teachers in Istanbul, pressure against Constantinopolitan Greek schools con-
tinued while the teaching of the Greek language continued to be prohibited in
the islands of Imbros and Tenedos. By May 1973. the two governments
exchanged notes complaining about the maltreatment of their respective
minorities. A few months later during a conversation with Turkish Premier
TaW. the Greek foreign minister. Xanthopoulos Palamas referred to the
gradual disappearance of the Greek element in Turkey. 50
Nicholas Damtsas. a member of the Greek consulate in istanbul with a wide knowledge of
Turkish affairs, and Nicholas Kephalidis, an advisor on educational issues. Damtsas interview,
thens 1977.
48. Bilgen Kitsaras agreement. Cllmhllriyet, 21 December 1968.
49. For more details on the closure of the seminary see below.
50. Nairn Talii to George Papadopoulos. 5 May and George Papadopoulos to Nairn Talii, 24
May 1973. quoted in Ch. Sazanidis. Of D.i.l/\'OTOVPK/Ki::; Eliael:; au;\' ilenaeria, 19731978,
Thessaloniki 1979. p. 65 ..
293
The almost complete disappearance of the Greek element in Turkey was
finally brought about by the Turkish invasion of northern Cyprus in 1974
which brought Greece and Turkey nearest to an armed conflict since 1922.
Given the near cold war atmosphere that has characterized relations between
Athens and Ankara since 1974 the exodus of the remaining Constantinopoli-
tan Greeks from Turkey is quite understandable. According to a survey
conducted by the editor of the grecophone weekly 'H xeO , Charalarhbos Rom-
bopoulos and two IDeal Greek lawyers in October 1978, there were barely
7822 Greeks remaining in istanbul. A large number of those expressed their
intention of leaving Turkey soon.51
Preoccupied by the pressing questions of Cyprus, the Aegean continental
shelf and the air space, the governments of Greece and Turkey have not
forcefully raised the issue of the minorities as yet. However, politicians and
the press in both countries often return to this question. Both sides continue
to complain about the treatment of these minorities. Greece has also raised
the issue of proportionality and reciprocity of the two minorities, which,
according to Athens, is built in the Lausanne treaty. Thus, during the par-
liamentary session of2 February 1976, fifteen deputies submitted a petition to
the government concerning the fate of the Greek minority in Turkey. They
argued that article 45 of the Lausanne agreement called for the maintenance
over time of approximately an equal number of minority populations in
istanbul and Greek Thrace. In view of the mass exodus of the Greek element
from Turkey, the petition asked the government to seek ways for the resto-
ration of the minority balance. 52 During the same session deputy Hippocrates
Savouras wanted to know the position of the government on the minority
question. In response, a government spokesman reported that just in 1975,
Greece had made forty-one representations to the Turkish government con-
cerning the Greek minority in Turkey. 53 The opposition, and in particular the
Centre Union, raised on several occasions the issue demanding the settle-
ment of the minority question on the basis of the principle of inter-state
reciprocity (apPl v7,;; JzaKparzKlj:,; a/loz{Ja.z0T11Tar;;).54 On 31 May 1978, the
undersecretary of the Foreign Ministry, Andreas Zaimis revealed that the
issue of proportionality was raised by the Greeks on four different occasions.
51. 27 October 1973.
52 . .dei.riov Ksnpou Kwvawl'rIvoun:o}.crwv, Athens 1978, p. 19.
53. 18 of those representations protested against the imposition of the five per cent surcharge
on the minority establishments, 17 against the plight of the Greeks in Imbros and Tenedos and six
against restrictions on Greek education, ibid, pp. 29-31.
54. Ibid., pp. 33-34. The Central Union has shown great deal of sensitivity to the fate of the
Greek minority. In this it is assisted by a Constantinopolitan Greek, Neoklis Sarris, a university
lecturer.
294
Firstly, during the Tzounis-Bulak negotiations in 1968, and then during the
exchange of notes, on 31 May 1974, on the unresolved issues between the two
countries. Thirdly, in a long memorandum forwarded to the Turkish govern-
ment on 3 February 1976 by the Greek embassy in Ankara. Finally, the issue
of reciprocitY'was raised on 13 January 1977, in a demarche to the Turkish
government by the Greek ambassador in Turkey.55
The Turks, however, while bitterly complaining against the treatment of
the Muslim minority in Greece, refused to debate the grievances of the
Greeks in Turkey. Instead they insisted that the Constantinopolitan Greeks
were a privileged minority. With the return of Biilent Ecevit to power in
January 1978, there was a renewed interest in resolving differences between
the two countries. Thus, before the summit meeting between the Greek and
Turkish prime ministers in Montreux on 10-11 March, Ecevit approached the
Phanar expressing its wish to reopen a dialogue between the government and
the minority. A patriarchal delegation met Ecevit in Ankara on 7 March and
was followed a month later by a representation of the Ballkll ephori.56 A
sympathetic Ecevit listened to the grievances of the minority and patricularly
the difficulties created by the five per cent surcharge on the financially
troubled communal institutions. The premier appointed Orhan Eyuboglu, the
minister to the prime minister. to investigate the grievances of the Greek
minority. But little tangible progress was made. By January 1979 most of the
Greek parishes were furnished with their mukataa surcharge. When,
moreover, the authorities confiscated some property of the Phanar /ycee for
boys and auctioned it, in an attempt to raise the tax, Patriarch Dimitrios
addressed a protest note to Premier Ecevit. In it he bitterly complained of the
harassment caused by this tax and warned that surtax may force the Greek
communal institutions into bankruptcyY In April 1979, the patriarch sent yet
another such note. 58 This precipitated some international reaction and the
archbishop of North and South America, Jacob Koukouzis, sent letters to
President Carter and Cyrus Vance, the US foreign secretary. Earlier, the
London based Minority Rights Group took an interest in the condition of the
Constantinopolitan Greeks and invited Erica Dai, a legal expert on interna-
55. Ibid.
56. The patriarchal delegation consisted of Meliton of ChaIcedon. Chrysostom of Myra and
Bartholemew of Philadelphia .. The representatives of BalikIl who met Ecevit on 6 April were
Miltiadis Tzambazoglou, Miltiadis Kourtesoglou. Dimitrios Karayiannis and the legal advisor
Platon Christidis .. They were accompanied by the deputy of istanbul. K<izim Ozeke.
57. The full text of this note. dated on 29 January. can be found in [Joi.ir'l:;. 13 (May 1979). The
patriarch had already sent a similar letter to Ecevit on 4 March 1978.,
58. Ibid.
295
tional relations and former Greek representative in the UN and Council of
Europe, to elaborate on the subject. In her speech, Dai referred to the plight
of the Greek minority in Turkey and the legal harassment of the minority by
the Turkish authorities. 59 Anxious to avoid any adverse publicity, the Ecevit
government renewed the dialogue with the Greek communal leaders. Thus,
on 29 August, the patriarch, accompanied by Archbishop Meliton of Chalce-
don, held a meeting with Eyiiboglu, the vice premier, during which they once
again voiced the apprehensions of the minority about the five per cent
surcharge. A month later, Eyiiboglu met with the president of the BaIlkU
parish, Miltiadis Tzambazoglou.
60
Notwithstanding these meetings, the gov-
ernment did not alter its policy on the mllkataa surcharge with the result that
most of the Greek minority establishments have to operate under the constant
threat of bankruptcy.
The exodus of the Constantinopolitan Greeks, clearly indicates that the
Muslim-Orthodox symbiosis in istanbul, that began in 1923 with the
Lausanne agreement, has failed. The Turkish mistrust of their Greek fellow
citizens was partly due to the persistence of the millet mentality, which
continued to determine relations between Muslims and non-Muslims in Tur-
key. Accordingly, Turkish-speaking Muslims remained the only citizens
who, in practice, held full political and civil rights. On the other hand, the
Greeks, particularly bthe religious Orthodox circles, resented the introduc-
tion offar-reaching cultural and institutional changes in Turkey. The majority
ofthe Constantinopolitan Greeks appeared perturbed by the Kemalist deter-
mination to put the principle of secular nationality into practice. This policy,
they feared, would ultimately impair their distinct ethnic and religious
character. Their opposition to secular reform, coupled with their nostalgia for
the ancien regime did not endear them to the Ankara government.
The Greek in republican Turkey lived simultaneously at two levels of
experience. On the one hand, he conducted his everyday life as a Turkish
citizen and loyally observed the responsibilities that his citizenship entailed.
But, there was another level of experience closely connected with his tradi-
tional ethnic Greek/Rum identity and customs which he was not prepared to
abandon. Often, these two levels of experience, particularly duting the Cyp-
rus crisis, diverged sharply, placing the Greeks in a very awkward position.
Aware of this dichotomy, nationalist Turks mistrusted the Greek minority
and continued to treat them as aliens. Significantly, the ethnic origin and/or
religion still appears on the Turkish identity documents (nilflls be-Igesi) ancfin
59, The text of the speech is given in the KaOTTIlBpmi of II January 1979_
600 Ilo).iTTTr;. 13 (October 1979)"
296
the case of the Greeks the termSRllln Ortodoks is being utilized. In this way it
is emphasized that such minority groups, though Turkish citizens, are not
pure Turks. The essential basis of Turkish suspicions about the Greeks
appears to have been religious-cum-racial prejudice. Further, although there
were Turkish misgivings concerning the use of the Constantinopolitan Greek
minority as a pretext for an attempt by Greece to incorporate istanbul in the
Greek state, given the small number of Greeks in Turkey, this threat had by
1930 become non-existent.
Again, the extrusion of the Greek minority from the body ofthe nation can
be partly explained by the Greek isolation from the social and cultural world
of the Turks. Yet, there has recently been a distinct change in the cultural and
linguistic attitudes of the Constantinopolitan Greeks. The post-1950s genera-
tion of Greeks spoke Turkish fluently and exhibited signs of integration into
the Turkish culture. This change was primarily brought about by the heavy
concentration in the curriculum of the minority schools on the Turkish
language and culture. This trend was also encouraged by Patriarch
Athenagoras, who was influenced by his experience in the United States
where the Greek Americans had been able to integrate successfully into the
American society. There is evidence to suggest that without constant pres-
sure and discrimination this last generation of Constantinopolitan Greeks
might have indeed identified itself with the Turkish nation at large
61
On the
other hand, an increasing number of Turks, particularly in the business
circles, developed close ties with members of the Greek minority. Thus,
during the 1950s and 1960s, there was a visible intensification in the interrela-
tions between the two groups. Thus, many Turks expressed sympathy for the
predicament of the Constantinopolitan Hellenes in 1964-65.
62
The Turkish government failed to appreciate this marked change of at-
titudes. Instead, Ankara continued to view the Greek minority in Turkey as a
mere pawn in its deals with Athens_ Further, with the emergence of a new
Turkish professional and managerial class after World War II, the Constan-
tinopolitan Greek element acquired a marginal character in the contemporary
socio-economic life of istanbul. Unlike the 1920s therefore, the Greeks in
Turkey were now a dispensible element. Their mass exodus, Ankara be-
lieved, would have little, if any, adverse effects on the performance of the
istanbul economy.
610 Today, in areas of Athens, like Palaio Phaliron and Kalamaki, where there is a high
concentration of former Constantinopolitan Greeks, it is not uncommon to hear youths convers-
ing among themselves in the Turkish language.
62" See article entitled Turkey Deports Hundreds of Greek Nationals by Phillip Noel-
Barker, in The Christian Science Monitor. 27 July 1964.
297
2. The Patriarchate during the final years of Athenagoras and the elec-
tion of his successor Dimitrios.
During the post-1964 period, while exhibiting little sympathy for the needs
of the Greek minority, the Turkish government adopted an illiberal attitude
towards the Patriarchate. In an attempt to improve its bargaining position in
the long-standing Greek-Turkish antagonism, Ankara began to put severe
pressure on the Phanar. As most of the Turks continued to regard the Phanar
as an unwelcome residue of Greek influence in what had become an over-
whelmingly Islamic istanbul, Turkish public opinion stood firmly behind
the position of the Ankara government.
1
Thus, on 16 April 1965, a Foreign
Ministry spokesman stressed that the Turkish government linked the
problem of Cyprus with that of the Patriarchate, as part of the same question.
The Turkish government accordingly indicated that, if the Greeks did not
modify their Cyprus policy, Ankara would not hesitate to reexamine its
engagements towards the Greek minority in Turkey and the Ecumenical
Patriarchate.
2
To demonstrate its determination, the Turkish government adopted a
number of restrictive measures against the Phanar. Thus, as early as 1962, the
Bureau of Political Police in istanbul informed the patriarchal authorities that
the government would not tolerate the Phanar's involvement in the affairs of
the Greek minority. Likewise, the authorities refused permission for the
reconstruction of the section of the Patriarchate burnt in September 1941.
Nor did they allow the Greeks to repair several churches, including the
cathedral building ofDercos archbishopric at Tarabya (Therapeia), damaged
during the September 1955 riots. Instead, the Byzantine church ofSt. George
on the banks of the Bosphorus was demolished to make room for the con-
struction of the luxurious Tarabya hoteJ.3
The campaign against the Phanar was intensified as intercommunal hos-
tilities erupted in Cyprus. Thus, from the academic year of 1963-64, only
L In an interview with Spyros Markezinis in 1972, the distinguished soldier and politician
tsmet Inonii, who headed the Turkish delegation at Lausanne, expressed his open dislike for the
Phanar, see Markezinis, op. cit . p. 333.
2. The Turkish press urged repeatedly the government to use the Phanar as a trump card (koz)
inits deals with Greece, see Cumhuriyet. 8 March 1964. See also another article by the disting-
uished professor, Ismet Giritli, entitled Patrikhane (Patriarchate), in the Cumhuriyet of 22 April
1964.
3. Anonymous. 01 1tOV lCU'Eliucpicr9l]lCUV mi)v Kcov(rtuvnvou1toA.l] lCui m1')v
'\flPPO flE,a ,1') Luv9i]lCl] Acoscivvl]<; (1923)>> 'E"").'1u1a. 1981, pp. 5-21.
298
Turkish citizens were permitted to study at the patriarchal seminary of
ChaDd, resulting in the expulsion of Hellenic as well as all other foreign
theology students. On 10 April 1964, the Bureau of Political Police ordered
the closing of the patriarchal printing-house on the grounds that under law
5681 only legal entities and legal persons were allowed to operate a printing
press. Since the Patriarchate was apparently not recognized as such, the
authorities shut down the patriarchal press which was first established during
the patriarchate of Cyril in 1672. This resulted in the discontinuance of two
religious publications, 'OpBo6oC:Ja and 'A n60"w},oc,; 'A v6piw;;, through which
the Phanar had performed its spiritual activities.
4
Even more significant was the expulsion, on 21 April 1964, of two senior
members of the holy synod, Aimilianos Zacharopoulos, archbishop of Selef-
kia and grand vicar of the Patriarchate, and Jacob Tzanavaris, archbishop of
Philadelpheia. Accused of engaging in political, administrative, educational
and social activities of a subversive nature, the metropolitans were divested
of their Turkish citizenship and asked to leave the country.s Similar action
was taken against a number of priests with Hellenic nationality, one of whom ,
Father Anastasios Xenos, was even sentenced to a prison term for harmful
activities against the Turkish state. A year later, on 8 April, the Patriarchate
was accused by President Giirsel of behaving illegally, hinting that the
Phanar had failed to confine itself to purely religious functions. Likewise,
Premier UrgiipIi.i. after claiming that the Phanar was engaged in political
activities, warned that the government could take several legislative and
administrative measures to curb such anti-Turkish activities.
6
three inspectors, representing the Ministry of Finance, the police and the
Department of Religious Foundations (evkaf). During a brief talk with
Athenagoras, they demanded an investigation of the accounts and adminis-
trative functions of the Phanar, despite the inviolability of the patriarchal
premises guaranteed by article 80 of the Turkish civil code. A thorough and
well-publicized investigation of the Phanar started on 28 April and resulted in
the repeal of the patriarch's right of ownership ofthe cathedral of St. George
at the Phanar. The estate, including its movable property (priceless ikons and
other religious objects), were thus declared to be without recognized legal
4. Cumhuriyet, II April 1964.
5. Ibid . 22 April 1964.
6. The Times. 8 April 1965. For more examples of anti-Phallar statements by Turkish leaders
see M.S. Sahin, Pener Patrikhanesi ve Tiirkiye, Istanbul 1980, pp. 217-18, 233-35,
299
ownership. Later in the same year, the government placed at the doors of the
Patriarchate a police contingent, both uniformed and plainclothed, ostensibly
to protect the patriarch. On 4 October however a number of visitors, includ-
ing the bishop of Dafnousia, were not allowed to enter the Phanar premises.
Two days later a group of German tourists was discouraged from visiting the
Patriarchate and the authorities announced that no foreign diplomatic rep-
resentations would be allowed to enter the patriarchal grounds. Indignant at
this state of affairs, the Greek Consul-General Karandreas expressed to the
governor of Istanbul his government's displeasure with the attempt to
isolate the head of Greek Orthodoxy. While restrictions were somewhat
relaxed after this demarche, the authorities officially forbade the Phanar
archbishops to use the Greek names of their Anatolian and Thracian dio-
ceses.
Apprehension in Greece with the renewed Turkish pressure against the
Patriarchate was acute. The Greek foreign minister, Stavros Kostopoulos,
accused Turkey of violating the provisions of the treaty of Lausanne concern-
ing the rights of the Patriarchate in anote verbale delivered on 20 April 1%4 to
the ambassadors of Britain, France, Italy, Yugoslavia, Rumania and Japan
(the other signatories of the treaty). After referring to the closing of the
patriarchal printing-house and the expulsion of several priests, Kostopoulos
maintained that such measures ran counter to the obligations assumed by the
Turkish government during the negotiations at Lausanne. In 1923, the Greek
foreign minister recalled, the Turks had pledged not only to maintain the
Patriarchate but also to allow the unhindered performance of its lofty
religious mission. 7 Likewise the measures were in flagrant contradiction to
the guarantee given at Lausanne concerning the free exercise, whether in
private or in public, of any creed, religion or belief. Referring specifically to
the deportation of two senior Phanar metropolitans, he cautioned that this
measure opens the way for action to decimate the Holy Synod by adminis-
trative means and to invalidate a Church institution.
In a letter to the Council of the United Nations, date on 21 May, the
permanent representative of Greece, Dimitri Bitsios, concentrated on the
arbitrary nature of the expulsion of the metropolitans stressing:
It is all too easy to make vague accusations a posteriori of political,
administrative, educational and social activities of a subversive nature.
An elementary sense of justice demands that such accusations should
be made known to the persons concerned and that the latter should
have an opportunity to refute them and the right to appeal from them to
7. The text of the note verbale was communicated to the United Nations, see document
UNSC/S/5665.
300
a higher authority. Yet the two Metropolitans were divested of Turkish
nationality and summarily expelled by a simple administrative act; no
accusation was made against them and they were not even permitted to
exercise any right of appeal. The administrative authority which
notified them of the decision even refused them the opportunity to
acknowledge, without prejudice of their rights, receipt of the
notification.
8
At the same time, the restrictions imposed on the Phanar, provoked a
reaction from the Christian churches all over the world. On 16 April, the
World Council of Churches in Geneva called upon the Turkish government to
follow generally accepted principles of religious freedom in its relationship
with the Patriarchate.
9
Another telegram forwarded by the US Protestant
leaders expressed deep concern about the measures taken against the
Patriarchate. It urged Ankara to preserve the Patriarchate inviolate and to
view the position of the Ecumenical Patriarchate in both its ecclesiastical
freedom, and in the light of the generally accepted principles of religious
freedom allowing it to perform its functions.1 0 The leades of the Anglican
church also sent an appeal to the Turkish government stating that the injury
to the Patriarch himself will give great distress to the Churches in ;:tIl our
different countries. I I Similar appeals in this connection were also sent from
France, as well as from 54 religious leaders representing six Protestant
denominations, who were meeting at Princeton university to discuss
Christian unity.12 Finally, on 24 April, the Imbros-born Greek Orthodox
archbishop of North and South America, Jacob, addressed a detailed
memorandum to the president of the US, Lyndon B. Johnson elaborating on
the measures taken by the Turkish government against the PatriarchateP
Faced with a concerted outcry against its policies towards the Phanar, the
Turkish government chose to make a reassuring statement. Thus, on 20
April, in a telegram transmitted by the Turkish ambassador in Washington,
8. Bitsios to the Secretary-General, 12 May 1964, UNSCfS/5702.
9. Signed by Dr. Franklin Clark Fry, chairman of the World Council of Churches Policy
Committee and the general secretary, Dr. Visser't Hoofe The text of the letter can be found in
International Relations, 7-8 (1964-65) 136-37.
10. This telegram, addressed on 15 April and caITying four signatures, can be found in ibid., pp.
133-34.
II. It is signed by the archbishops of Canterbury, Uppsala, Philippines, Canada, Melbourne,
India and Jerusalem, see ibid., p. 134.
12. Ibid., p. 141
13. Ibid., pp. 138-41.
301
Turgut Menemencioglu, to the director of the commission on international
affairs of the World Council of Churches, Dr. O. Frederick Nolde, Turkish
Foreign Minister Feridun Cemal Erkin gave an assurance that both the
Patriarchate and the person of the Patriarch shall remain fully inviolate .14
Justifying the expulsion of the two metropolitans, the permanent representa-
tive of Turkey to the United Nations, in a letter to the secretary-general, U
Thant, elaborated his government's position:
They (the two metropolitans) have been acting as officials and agents
of the Greek Government entrusted with the task of conveying the
wishes and orders of that Government to Turkish Orthodox citizens.
Furthermore they have interfered with the educational cun"icula of the
Greek minority schools and have propagated hellenistic doctrines sap-
ping the loyalty of Turkish citizens of Greek origin. Nor have they
failed to indulge in large-scale subversive activities within the Greek
minority of a nature to jeopardize the prestige and security of
Turkey. 15
He finally accused the two Phanar clerics of having acted as a fifth column
for the expansionist ambitions of the Greek Government .16 Ambassador
Eralp, however, produced no evidence whatsoever to substantiate these
accusations.
The anti-Phanar measures coincided with a violent campaign against the
Patriarchate and Patriarch Athenagoras in the Turkish press. The National
Federation of Turkish Students staged mass demonstrations outside the
patriarchal premises shouting anti-Greek slogans. Meanwhile, Papa Eftim
renewed his campaign against the Phanar. In a press conference as early as
September 1963, he alleged that the Phanar is working in the service of
Hellenism and predicted that the clerics of the Patriarchate would son leave
Athenagoras and join his Turkish Orthodox church, which, he claimed, was
the only officially recognized Patriarchate.
17
With the worsening of the
situation in Cyprus, Papa Eftim regained prominence and when he fell ill his
son, Turgut Erenerol, became the defacto leader of the church. Significantly,
on 28 Febrary 1964, the Council of Ministers decided to allow Turgut to wear
the ecclesiastical dress outside the church. This in fact was an official ack
14. See Th. Agnidis, The Ecumenical Patriarchate ill the Light a/the Lausanne Treaty, New
York 1964, p. 7.
15. Eralp to the Secretary-General, I May 1964, UNSCjS/5677.
16. Ibid.
17. X. Jacob, An Autocephalous Turkish Orthodox Church, Eastern Churches Review, 3
(1970-71) 66-67.
302
nowledgement of Turgut as Papa Eftim' s successor and head of the Turkish
Orthodox movement.
Turgut was determined to oppose the Patriarchate with equal tenacity. In a
statement to the press in May 1965, he accused Athenagoras of being a traitor
and of working for Hellenic interests. He then went on to propose that all the
schools, churches and the hospital of the Greek community ought to be
handed over to the Turkish Orthodox Church since this was necessary for
the nati?nal integrity of Turkey .18 At the beginning of September, he took
posseSSIOn of the remaining two Greek-controlled churches of Galata, St.
John and St. Nicholas. To justify his action, he alleged that the title-deeds of
these churches, together with the adjoining Greek school of Galata, belonged
to the Turkish Orthodox Church. Resorting once again to his violent polemics
against the Phanar, he declared that according to the liturgical laws Papa
Eftim had the right to depose the patriarch and to dissolve the holy synod.
We make known to the Christian world, he said, that henceforth the
Eastern Orthodox Church is placed under the protection of the Turkish
Orthodox Church. 19 Finally, on 24 September 1965, with the connivance of
the authorities, Turgut became the legal owner of the Galata churches.
While the Constantinopolitan Greek community petitioned the legal au-
thorities, the Patriarchate reacted by taking Turgut Erenerol to court. The
Greek government immediately addressed a letter to the United Nations
protesting against the activities of the Erenerol family at the expense of the
Greek community. 20 In this letter, Athens underlined that although it lacked a
congregation outside the immediate Erenerol family, the Turkish Orthodox
church enjoyed subsidies and support from the Turkish government. It
explained that:
The Orthodox churches of istanbul belong since time i m m e m o r i ~ l to
the Ecumenical Patriarchate. Only in recent years did Turkey intro-
duce a European system of real-estate registration, but the Land Office
defeated arbitrarily all the steps of the Patriarchate to register its
churches ... There is no such thing as a Turkish Orthodox Church let
alone Patriarchate. There is only the notorious Erenerol family, c;ea-
tures and tools of the Turkish Government, to whom the Turkish
authorities find it convenient to issue title-deeds to Greek churches, in
IS. Ibid., p. 67.
19. Ibid., For his statements to the Turkish press see Sahin, ap.cit., pp. 222-23.
20. Papa Eftim changed the Greek form of his name, Karaltisaridis, into the Turkish HisarogJu;
but finding this to be still too Greek in sound, he officially adopted the surname Erenerol.
303
20
order to despoil the Ecumenical Patriarchate and the Greek community
which erected them at its own expense.21
This appeal brought no success and Premier Urgiiplii warned that his gov-
ernment would not give in to outside pressure, especially since this matter
was considered to be an internal question.
22
Finally, in 1973, a high court
decreed that the Galata churches were the legal property of the Turkish
Orthodox Church and dismissed the appeal of the Patriarchate.
23
Earlier, on
14 March 1968, Papa Eftim I died at the age of eighty-four. Having been
excommunicated by the Patriarchate, the Greeks refused to allow his burial at
the main Orthodox cemetery. By special order of President Sunay. the
authorities forced the patriarch to give his consent to Eftim's burial at the
Greek cemetery. The presence of several senators. deputies and other dig-
nitaries. including an official representative of the government. at his funeral
illustrated the high respect enjoyed by Papa Eftim in certain influential
Turkish circles. Concurrently. his son Turgut. succeeded him with full rights.
and with all the titles and privileges enjoyed by his father. The autonomous
Turkish Orthodox church still exists. under its new head Turgut Erenerol
who also assumed the title of Eftim
The Turks, however, did not show equal tolerance to the Greek Orthodox
Church. Fearing that the Phanar's improving relations with the Vatican might
enhance the ecumenical character of the Patriarchate, the Turks applied new
pressures against the patriarch. Thus, the Turkish press reported that the
rapprochement with the Vatican had an anti-Turkish and political
character and warned the Phanar against such activities. Again, when the
patriarch attempted to improve relations with the Bulgarian Exarchate, the
press charged him with Communist intrigue.25 On 27 April 1965, the
Turkish ambassador in Paris declared that:
21. Letters by Liatis to Secretary-General. 29 September and 14 October 1965. in
UNSCjS/6723 and /6783 respectively.
22, For a Turkish defense of its position on this question see Eralp to Secretary-General. 7
October 1965. UNSC/S/6758.
23, dei:riov Kivrpov KWVO"Wl'TlI'OVlroi.miiv. p, 27.
24. Going even fulther than his father. he gave up his Christian Orthodox name George
Karahisaridis, by adopting the name Turgut. Born in Ankara in 1920, he graduated from the
medical faculty ofIstanbul university. He went to the America for postgraduate studies, and on
his return to Turkey he got married. Despite his marital status and his rudimentary theological
knowledge, he claims to be an Orthodox patriarch. Lacking a congregation, Turgut and his
brother Selyuk run the Galata churches, including the substantial property of the parish, as a
private family business.
25 op .. cil. pp. 218-19.
304
The Patriarchate may stay in Turkey as long as it remains a national
religious institution whose activities are strictly and modestly confined
within the frontiers of the country. 26
This statement, implying a threat to expel the Patriarchate if it persisted in
exercising its ecumenical functions, raised a wave of rebuttal from churches
and religious leaders in the West.
27
The Greek government, too, in a letter to
the United Nations warned that Ankara was bent on eroding the position
and the ecumenical character of the Christian Orthodox Church. 28 Earlier,
on 11 September 1964, the Greek delegate in Geneva, Dimitri Bitsios, in his
opening remarks at a meeting ofthe Council of the United Nations referred at
length to the harassment of the Patriarchate only to be rebuffed by his Turkish
counterpart, Ambassador Orhan Eralp.
Turkish legal and administrative measures against the Patriarchate how-
ever continued unabated. In July 1971, the Turks shut down the theology
department of the Chalki seminary on the grounds that, under the provisions
of a new law. higher education became a government reserve. The closure of
the theological academy creates new problems for the clergy, for it is now
impossible to train locally younger members of the community for the senior
posts of the Patriarchate. This restriction coupled with the dramatic dwin-
lHing of the Greek community places the future of the Patriarchate as a
religious institution in jeopardy. Today, with only few thousand Orthodox
left in Turkey. any boy who chooses to become a priest is quite likely to reach
the rank of archbishop - if, of course , he does not follow the example of most
llf his community and emigrate first. Predicting this eventuality, as early as
1964. Archbishop Jacob of America warned:
29
The Patriarchate is not a collection of buildings, walls and grounds. It
is a living spiritual force embodied in an institution that has for cen-
turies been the very core and heart of the Greek Orthodox Christian
tradition. Therefore, Turkish assurances that the Patriarchate will not
be endangered are meaningless. Just as the Greek Orthodox Christians
can not exist in Turkey without the Patriarchate, so too the Ecumenical
Patriarchate cannot fulfil its true and inherent function without the
communicants who entrust their spiritual life to the Patriarchal See ...
The Ecumenical Patriarchate cannot live in a void.
26. Le Monde, 27 April 1965.
See for instance the refutation by the Dominican theologian Father Dumont. in Le Monde,
28 April 1965.
28 .. Bitsios to Secretary-General. 27 September 1965. UNSC/S/6723.
29. Quoted in The Hellenic Rel'iell', October 1964.
305
The patriarch, too, was noted to be in despair about the future of the
Patriarchate. During the last years of his patriarchate, he was compelled to
watch helplessly while the size of his flock in istanbul dwindled to a catas-
trophic degree. As the suggestion of removal of the Patriarchate to Patmos,
Mt Athos, Crete, Rhodes and Geneva gained ground in some Orthodox
circles, Athenagoras firmly refused to abandon his remaining flock at this
critical conjuncture. On the other hand, faced with a renewed Turkish cam-
paign for the expulsion of the Patriarchate from Turkey coupled with veil
threats from Ankara, the patriarch took some steps for guaranteeing the
uninterrupted continuity of the institution. Thus, in 1966, with the generous
donations of Greek shipping magnate, George Laimos, a centre of Or-
thodoxy, attached to the Ecumenical Patriarchate. was founded in the out-
skirts of Geneva, Switzerland.
30
Similarly, in 1968, two educational estab-
lishments. affiliated to the Patriarchate. an institute of theology (l1arpwp-
IIKOl' ",[c5PVj.lC1 ilarEplKCUl' lviEi.GTCU1') in Thessaloniki and an Orthodox
academy in Crete. were erected.}! At the same time. thanks to the patriarch's
energetic leadership and diplomatic skills. the Ecumenical Patriarchate was
able to maintain its international prestige.
When the aged patriarch Athenagoras died on 7 July 1972. the issue of his
succession raised considerable difficulties. The dispute was brought about by
the new Turkish regulations concerning the election of a patriarch. communi-
cated to the Patriarchate at the beginning of February 1972. The clergy was
particularly apprehensive about the clause stipulating the witnessing of the
future patriarchal elections by a public notary. This, the prelates argued. was
contrary to the canonical law of the church. Further, the close associate of the
patriarch. the dynamic Archbishop Meliton of Chalcedon together with
another two prominent members of the Holy Synod were declared objection-
able by the Turkish government and were thus disqualified from succeeding
Athenagoras. Finally. on 16 July 1972, the holy synod elected Dimitrios. the
archbishop of Imbros and Tenedos. patriarch with the title Dimitrios 1.
32
Ever since his election the new patriarch has kept a low profile concentrating
30. JEi.rfol' Kil'TPOU KWl'aral'rII'OU7roi.lTwl', p .. 56.
31. Stavridis. '0 ObiOUPEVIKO:; [JaTp/(ipX1J:;, p .. 458,
32. Born in 1914 in the Bosphorus suburd of Tarabya. Dimitrios Papadopoulos graduated from
the Theological seminary of Chalki and followed post-graduate studies in Canada and Athens.
He entered the Phanar in 1937 and became the bishop at the parish ofSt. Apostles at Ferik6y. In
1966 he was promoted to archbishop of Imbros and Tenedos Immediately after his enthrone-
ment the new patriarch declared his loyalty to Turkey and expressed his wish for the improve-
306
on appealing to the government against the vaklf surcharge, which threatens
most of the Greek pious foundation in Istanbul with bankruptcy.33 But, the
highlight of Dimitrios' patriarchate so far has been the visit of Pope John Paul
II to the Phanar on 29 November 1979. In an effort to strengthen further links
with the Orthodox church, Pope John Paul went even further than his pre-
decessor Paul VI and attended an Orthodox mass at the Phanar cathedral of
St. George.
H
Apart from its significance to the movement for Christian
Unity. the papal visit helped enhance the prestige of the beleaguered Patri-
ar'chate of Constantinople.
3. The Muslim minority a/Greece.
On their part the Turks too appeared to have nursed grievances about the
treatment accorded to their minority in Greece. Not unlike the Constan-
tinopolitan Greeks, the Thracian Muslims benefited from the Greek- Turkish
detente of the 1930s. While enjoying an increasing amount of religious,
linguistic and cultural freedom, they were preoccupied with the cultivation of
their tobacco-fields. In particular, those tobacco merchants, who acted as
middlemen between the growers and the British-American Tobacco
company were quite prosperous. In a detailed memorandum on the minorities
in Greece, British Ambassador R.A. Leeper. an experienced diplomat on
Greek affairs, remarked that the treatment by the Greeks of the Turkish
minority in Western Thrace has been uniformly good.1 The reasons for this,
according to Leeper. were not hard to see. During the 1930s, Greece was
genuinely attached to its new friendship with Turkey. Both the government
and public opinion felt the need for Turkish support, in view of the threats
posed by Fascist Italy in the west and Bulgaria in the north. Further, the
existence and well-being of the Thracian Muslims may be used as a factor in
urging the Turkish government to show goodwill towards the Greeks in
Turkey. After stressing that the Muslims of Greek Thrace were happy and
content, Leeper concluded his account by intimating that the Greeks culti-
vated that community as a model minority with a certain hostage value.2
These favourable conditions were abruptly interrupted by World War II.
After Greek capitulation to the Axis Powers in May 1941, Greek Thrace was
ment of relations between Greece and Turkey. He concluded his speech by stating our road is
that prescribed by Atatiirk, the text of this speech is given in $ahin, op.cit., p. 210.
33. See above chapter XI: I.
34. The Guardian (London), 28 & 30 November & I December 1979.
I. Minorities in Greece, memorandum prepared by Leeper, Cairo, 29 May 1944, FO
371/43775/RI2193
2. Ibid.
307
occupied by Bulgaria. During the three-year Bulgarian occupation both
Christians and Muslims were subjected to severe maltreatment. To escape
Bulgarian persecution many local Muslims found refuge in Turkey. Their
position. moreover. continued to be precarious even after the termination of
World War II. as Thrace became one of the main theatres of the Greek civil
war. Because of their allegiance to the royalist government of Athens. the
Muslims were subjected to continuous pressure by communist bands.
3
Per-
secution at the hands of the Bulgarians and Greek communists coupled with
severe economic difficulties. forced some 3000 Muslims to emigrate to
Turkey . .! By the end of 1946. however. the government forces in Thrace had
taken strict measures against communist raids and the flow of Muslims to
Turkey stopped.
s
The end of the civil war coupled with the entrance of both Greece and
Turkey in NATO. contributed significantly to the amelioration of conditions
in Greek Thrace. In accordance with the spirit of coexistence with Turkey.
the Greek government sought ways of responding to the grievances of the
Muslim community. Thus. on 24 March 1954. in a statement concerning the
Muslim minority. the Greek premier. Marshal Papagos. declared:
<<1 follow the question myself as I attach a particular importance to it
and I am personally examining the demands and complaints of the
Muslim communities. I have given orders that not only the pending
problems should be solved immediately in a satisfactory manner and in
conformity with the spirit to which I have referred, but all questions
must be dealt with effectively to attain a general improvement in the
social and spiritual conditions of this minority. 6
Earlier. Athens officially recognized the ethnic rather than religious
character of the minority. when. on 28 January 1954. the governor-general of
Thrace. G. Phessopoulos instructed the local authorities to substitute the
word Muslim at the expense of non-Turkish Pomak and Gypsie Muslims.?
3. Ankara Chancery to Foreign Office. 13 September 1946. FO 371/58868/R 13871. An article
which appeared in the Ei.i.l)I'lhOV Mii.i.Ol' (Thessalonikil of 22 September 1946 stated that the
Greek Communist party caused a panic among the Turcophone residents in Thrace. quoted in
FO 37]i58868//RI4657. Peck (Thessaloniki) to Reilly (Athens). 23 September 1946.
4 .. Interview with Turkish consul in Komotini. Muzaffer Gordiisu in Peck (Thessaloniki) to
Reilly (Athens). 290ctober 1946. FO 371/58868/R 16150. See also The Times. 30 November 1946.
5. Peck (Thessaloniki) to Reilly (Athens). 29 October 1946. FO 371/58868/R 16150 ..
6. See Ch. Christidis. Kvnplal(o hoi Ti.i.1)I'orovphIKa 19531967, Athens 1967. Lawyer and
expert on the minority issue, Christos Christidis was employed by the Greek government to draw
up a memorandum on the problems of the Thracian minority.
7. Andreadis. op.cit .. , p. 9.
308
The term Muslim of Hellenic nationality appears in the Lausanne treaty
which exempted the Thracian Muslims from the exchange of populations of
1923 on the basis of their religion rather than nationality. This distinction.
however. was eroded when at the Greek-Turkish negotiations of 1930-31.
Venizelos conceded to Turkish demands for a greater secularization of the
Muslim minority in Greece.
s
As a result. the deportation of leading local
conservatives and the introduction of Turkish teachers from Turkey led to
the gradual transformation of a basically religious to an ethnic minority in
Greek Thrace.
9
Like their counterparts in Turkey. the Muslim minority in Greece bene-
fited from the provisions of a number of educational and cultural agreements
concluded by the two countries during the early 1950s. Further. with the
initiative of King Paul, the Greek government built a Turkish gymnasium in
Komotini for the use of the local Muslim community. The opening of the
high-school coincided with the state visit of President CeliU Bayar who
attended the inaugural celebrations in Komotini on 1 December 1952. In
honour of the Turkish president the new high"school was named after him
(eelal Bayar Lisesi). 10
According to the results of the Greek census of 1951. 111.665 (or 14.76 per
cent of the popUlation) inhabitants were followers of the Muslim religion. I I
Beside the Thracian Muslims this figure included the tiny Turkish popu-
lation. estimated at 3.500 persons. in the newly incorporated Dodecanese.
Being Greek citizens. the Muslims of Greece were represented in parliament
by three deputies (sworn in on the Koran). They still have their own schools
and four daily newspapers. while the Greek national radio network broad-
casts a daily news bulletin in Turkish. Almost 300 mosques are scattered
throughout Greek Thrace and are administered by the mufti (head of the
Islamic order) and the community leaders.
With the emergence of the Cyprus dispute, however, conditions for the
Turks in Greece deteriorated. From January 1956, wide coverage to the
8. See above chapter VI:3.
9. See an excellent article by Anastassiadou. op .. cit .. , pp. 371-n.
10. The Times, 28 November and 3 December 1952.
1 L The Greek census of 1940 estimated that there were 141.090 Hellenic Muslims. But this
figure included about 22.000 Albanian Muslims in Tsamouria. During the World War II and civil
war. these Albanian Muslims moved across the border to Albania. In the census of 1961. there
were 105.000 Muslims in Greek Thrace alone. During the census of 1971 the language and
religion question was not asked. For details see A. Angelopoulos. Population Distribution of
Greece Today according to Language. National Consciousness and Religion. BS 20 (1979) 123
ff. Today it is generally acknowledged that the Muslim population of Greece is about 125.000
strong.
309
unbearably oppressed Muslim minority in Thrace was given in the Turkish
press. Indignant deputies in the Ankara assembly referred to the
maltreatment of their brethren in Greece, comparing them unfavourably
with the confortable living enjoyed by the Greeks in Istanbul.
12
Indeed, not
unlike the Constantinopolitan Greeks, the Muslim minority in Thrace has
experienced a deterioration in its relations with the majority group since the
mid-1950s. Communal and racial suspicions were revived; though the Istan-
bul riots of 5/6 September 1955 had not been followed by retaliatory measures
of the same nature in Greek Thrace.
The Turkish press that the Greek government endeavoured to
dichotomize the minority into Turks and Pomaks. The Greek claim that the
Pomaks were originally of Hellenic stock was strongly resented by the Turks.
According to official statistics there were 11,739 Pomaks in Greek Thrace in
March 1920. By 1940 their numbers had increased to 18,086, in 1951 to 18,671
and ten years later to 19,000. Tracing their origins to the ancient race of
Thrace, the Achrians, the Pomaks have been both culturally and linguisti-
cally influenced by the Slavs, Turks and Greeks. What bound them to the
Turks was not language (they speak aconupt Bulgarian with Turkish idioms
and a sprinkling of Greek) but principally a common religion with its prescrip-
tions and customs. They are on the whole conservative Muslims and are
opposed to the secularization oflife in modem Turkey. There is also evidence
that they have a certain feeling of aversion for the Turks which was well
illustrated during the Bulgarian occupation of Greek Thrace in 1941-44.
Unlike the Turkish-speaking Muslims of the area, who remained loyal to the
Greek rule, many Pomaks, headed by the former deputy of Xanthi, Hamdi
Fehmi, openly collaborated with the Bulgarian occupation authorities. As a
result, during World War II, the Pomaks, unlike the Thracian turcophones,
were spared from persecution.
13
Although some of the differences histori-
cally dividing the two Muslim communities remain, today there is greater
integration and cooperation between the two different racial Muslim groups
in Greece.
Again Athens was accused of treating favourably the conservative Muslim
element which is strongly opposed to secularization. Facilities and govern-
ment subsidies, the Turks asserted, were given to the religious publications
12. For speeches of DP deputies B. Bilgin, F. Belen and O. Turan, who claimed that
psychological pressures were exerted on the Thracian Turks, see Armaogiu, op.cit .. p. 196;
Cumhuriyet. 28 January 1958.
13. The Pomak leader, Hamdi Fehmi, for instance, was even seen in Bulgarian uniform. More
details on the Bulgarian-Pomak relationship during World War II in Knight (Thessaloniki) to
Lascalles (Athens), 18 September 1946, FO 371/58868/RI4234.
310
Peygamber Binasl (The Construction of the Prophet) and MulzaJazakar (The
Conservative). both printed in the old Arabic-Ottoman print.
14
There is
evidence to support this in that Hiisnii Yusuf and Hafiz leading
members of the traditionalist faction in Thrace, as well as the Union of
Muslims in Greece (El'(J)011 Movaovl.wivWI' nie,; 'EVdJoc,;), enjoyed the
goodwill of the Greek government even though, the authorities did little to
discourage the development of a secularist conscience among the Thracian
Muslims. Today, the minority maintains two youth clubs and two teachers'
associations with strong secular and nationalist tendencies.
ls
Further, a number of outspoken newspapers, such as the Trakya, Ak'tn
(Attack) and the more recent A z'tn l'tk Pastas't (The Minority Post), adopted a
strong line against the Greek authorities,. Thus, the fonner Thracian deputy,
Osman Nuri, in his daily Trakya, published in Xanthi, openly argued that the
Turks of Thrace were living under a police state. Referring to the governors
of Thrace, Osman Nuri went on to describe them as dictators and labelled
the local Greek administration as defective (sakat).16
Thus, most of the nationalist and secularist turcophone press of Komotini
and Xanthi was able to champion the rights of the minority with considerable
freedom. Reacting to the hardships encountered by the Constantinopolitan
Greek journalists in Turkey, particularly since the imprisonment and expul-
sion of Andreas Lambikis whose printing-house was ransacked by Turkish
youths, the Greek authorities recently adopted a tougher line against publi-
cations in Thrace with anti-Greek tendencies. Further, the mere presence of a
large Turkish consulate - staffed with high-ranking diplomats- in Komotini
disturbed the peace of mind of the Greek authorities. The latter accused a
Komotini newspaper, Akin (Attack) of being support.ed by the Turkish
consulate. In January 1981, the authorities fined the editor of Akin,
Hasan Hatiboglu, 15,000 Drachmas and closed his newspaper fur three
months, after a court found him gUilty of inciting communal tensions
between the Orthodox and Muslim population P The Greek authorities
14. Cumhuriyet. 10 January and I3 May 1958. There was another traditionalist newspaper, the
Sebat (Stability) first issued in Komotini in 1957. On the Turkish press see C. Orhonlu Batl
Trakya'da Tiirk Baslnlna Yapllan Bask!, Turk Kulturu. 4 (July 1966) 595-97.
15. The Turkish associations of Thrace are: The Turkish Union (Xanthi), Turkish Youth Club
(Komotini), Turkish Teachers' Union, Muslim Union of Greece, Muslim Teachers' Association
of Thrace, The Islamic Awakening Club and numerous Turkish agricultural cooperative
societies.
16. Article quoted in Cumhuriyet. 21 January 1958.
17. In 1979, Salih Halil of ileri (Forward) demanded the demolition of the Greek hospital of
Ballkll in lstanbul as a reprisal to the pressure applied by the Greek authorities in Western
3 I I
strongly suspect that, through some sympathetic local journalists, the
kish consulate of Komotini is actively attempting to politicize the Hellenic
Muslims of Thrace.
Recently, the attacks of the turcophone Thracian press intensified causing
a strong reaction of the local Greeks. As communal tensions increased, the
Greeks formed an association, the Panthracian Anti-Turkish Defense
(JI avOpaKlIoj 'A "AJiuva) , determined to combat a Turkish attack
and infiltration. I
8
The Greek press, headed by Xp6vo;' (Times) of Komotini,
charged that several pro-Turkish and anti-Greek groups have been formed
within the Muslim community, chiefly among the better-educated young and
the growing ranks of white-collar workers. These groups, it is alleged, have
close ties with the association of Western Thrace (Bat't Trakya) , whose
headquarters are in istanbul. With strong chauvinistic tendencies, this as-
sociation seeks the incorporation of both Bulgarian and Greek Thrace to
Turkey.19 Alarmed by these.developments Muslim community leaders em-
phatically deny the existence in Thrace of groups working at the expense of
the Greek state. Thus, declaring pride in his Islamic heritage, ,sevket Hilmi,
the moderate publisher of MilIiyet in Xanthi, urged his colleagues to refrain
from publishing abusive articles.
One of the most controversial issues concerning the Muslim minority of
Greece is education. Literacy is far below average among the Thracian
Muslims, and the Turks claim that the Greek authorities refuse to allow
qualified Turkish teachers into their schools.
20
The Greeks deny the charges
maintaining that there is no discrimination whatsoever practised against the
Muslim community. They instead point out that the Turkish lyceum of
Komotini, as well as three other primary schools, were not only built and
supported out of Greek public funds, but also that the annual sum contributed
out ofthe Greek Treasury to Muslim education in Thrace amounts to 800,000
drachmas.
21
Contrasted with the condition of the Greek educational estab-
Thrace. He concluded his articre by requesting the protection of the mother country (Turkey).
The Greek courts found Salih Halil guilty of subversion and sentenced him to twenty-three
months' imprisonment,
18, The mlljii of Xanthi. Mustafa Hilmi. too. joined forces with the nationalist section of the
turcophone press and on 15 February 1979 published a long article in Gerr;ek (The Truth)
protecting against the attitude of the Greek authorities towards the minority.
19, This society is also known as the General Association of Mutual Aid for the Turks of
Western Thrace. whose present president is Hikmet Yur:lakul (1982)
20. See U .H. BayiHken, Turkish Minorities in Greece in The Turkish Yearbook of Interna-
tional Relations. 4 (1%3) 145-64.
21. The Greek Minority in Turkey and the Turkish Minority in Greece. p. 22. The quoted figure
was allocated in 1964 and amounted to $ 27,000, By comparison, during the same year, the
312
lishments in istanbul, the Greeks argued, the Turkish school in Thrace enjoy
a favourable position, According to official Greek statistics there were 289
Turkish schools with 14,489 students in Thrace in the academic year 1963-64,
as against only 86 schools in 1923.
22
The Turks continued however to com-
plain of harassment in the schools and a Greek tendency to encourage
outmoded fashions and reactionary religious leaders.
An extremely conservative community, the Hellenic Muslims tend to
adhere faithfully to the traditions of their forefathers, Never subjected to
Atatiirk's revolution, they have often been described as the last bastion of the
Ottoman empire. Even today, women continue to wear the long black kaftans
of the days of the sultans, and rarely leave their houses unescorted. Men still
dress in the bloused trousers and high leather boots of the past, and their
status in the community is clearly proclaimed by the colour and shape of their
traditional the fez, Apart from their dress, the use of the Arabic
script and the strict observance of religious practices and social customs of a
bygone era constitute part of their daily life. Family law is based upon the
Koran, and children are given Muslim names.
A closed and somewhat suspicious community - 68 per cent of Turkish
origin, 22 per cent Pomak-speaking and 10 per cent gypsies- the Muslims of
Thrace have neither assimilated nor adopted twentieth-century life. Success-
fully resisting the introads of modern life, the Hellenic Muslims maintained a
distinctly Ottoman-Turkish character and culture. As a result, both local
officials and the Greek authorities have repeatedly expressed concern over
the question of where the loyalties of the Muslim community members lie.
Greek apprehension intensified with the emergence of the Cyprus question
and the subsequent invasion of that island. The existence of tensions between
Greece and Turkey creates unpleasant difficulties for the Muslim minority.
Muslims claim that they are restricted from buying property and that they can
only sell their land to Greeks. They also complain that it is very difficult to get
agricultural loans and subsidies. In addition they resent the fact that they
have not been allowed to elect their own community councils. Pointing to the
fact that there was not a mass exodus from Thrace to Turkey, the Greek
government persistently refused to take seriously the claims that this min-
ority was ill-treated.
Economically, moreover, the Muslim community of Thrace is riding high
on the wave of prosperity enjoyed by northern Greece over the past few
municipality ofistanbul made a token payment of 50- I 50 TL to each Greek minority school in the
city.
22. Ibid.
313
years. Almost 90 per cent of the Muslims are farmers, owning much of the
richest land in Thrace. Their 1978 revenue from tobacco cultivation alone
surpassed $ 25,000,000 and their per capita income - according to Greek
figures- is a staggering 22 per cent higher than that of their Greek neigh-
bours. Anticipating even greater benefits from the entrance of Greece to the
European Community, the Muslim farmers of Thrace appear determined to
remain in their native land. Thus, unlike the Greek minority in Turkey, the
Hellenic Muslim population is on the increase reaching 125,000. Yet, mutual
suspicious reflect the growing sensitivity and political awareness of the
Muslim community, which views its delicate position as a potential issue in
the diplomatic between Greece and Turkey with some trepi-
dation.
23
In this diplomatic antagonism, the Turks, with their systematic campaign
on behalf of the Muslim minority in Greece, appear to have won some
support. Thus, in a report by United States President Carter to the Congress
on the issue of human rights, in February 1978, he referred to the periodic
complaints of harassment and maltreatment of the Muslim minority in
Greece on such matters as buying and selling land, and bureaucratic delays
in processing official papers. The report reflected the official Greek view
that the Muslims in Greek Thrace enjoy absolute equality of opportunity,
but described it as a claim. Sensitive to suggestions of official discrimination
against its minority at a time of strain in relations with Turkey, the Greek
government strongly resented these remarks contained in the chapter on
Greece. On 13 February 1978, Greek Foreign Minister Panayiotis Papa-
ligouras declared to the press that:
President Carter's report to Congress on the human rights contains, as
regards to our area, erroneous evaluations.
The Greeks were particularly upset by the fact that the report did not even
mention the Greek minority in Turkey and the prevailing conditions in
istanbul which resulted in the disappearence of that community. Once again,
the Greeks characterized this statement as another example of the implicit
United States support of Turkish claims at the expense of Greece.
At the present moment both Greece and Turkey keep the potentially
volatile issue of the minorities at abeyance. But given the Cyprus experience,
23. In October/November 1978, the PASOK deputies Peponis, Atmatzidis and Amalia Flem-
ing charged the Turcophone press in Thrace with publishing abusive and provocative articles.
They also warned that Thracian societies were in close contact with the ultra-nationalist
General Association of Mutual Aid for the Turks of Western Thrace. For details see P.
Hidiroglou, TOVPKI"7T 'E)).I/voi'parpia, Thessaloniki 1980, pp. 35-38.
314
that the Turks. taking advantage of the existence of a large
.Turklsh mmonty at Greece's northeastern panhandle. might be tempted to
mvolve themselves in another adventure on an even wider scale.24 These
are reinforced by Ankara's refusal, since 1960. to issue
resldencesh,ips .and working permits to Muslims with Hellenic nationality.
The determmatlOn of the Turkish government to maintain a large minority in
Greece coupled with the activities of the government-sponsored Association
of Mutual Aid for the Turks of Western Thrace, which advocates the
liberation of Western Thrace. added credibility to the Greek fears.
Further. recently the Turks installed a high-powered radio transmitter in
on the Turkish side of the border broadcasting into Greek Thrace
programs with strong nationalist content. On the other hand, no hard
eVidence to substantiate Turkish official designs on Greek territory has as yet
surfaced. and the Turkish government has on several occasions reassured
Greece that it would continue to respect the Maritza frontier established in
1923,
Arguing that the Thracian minority factor may pose a serious problem ifnot
a danger, for the national security of Greece. Greek public opinion urged the
government to provide a new formula which takes into account the steady
growth of the Hellenic Muslim popUlation and the virtual disappearance of
the Greek minority in Turkey. Accordingly, the numerical balance of the
minorities. was wiped out by the Turkish refusal to honour its commitments
at Lausanne. As a result, the argument goes, Greece, under
article 4) of the Lausanne minority clauses. has the right to take measures to
restore the numerical balance of the respective minorities. which has been
under:mined ever since 1955. Faced with the urgent problems of the Aegean
and Cyprus: the Greek government, favouring a policy of appeasement and
towards Turkey. has been reluctant to reopen the minority
Issue.
24. In a strategic study, Faruk Sukan, a Turkish general, argued that, in case of a
Greek-TurkIsh war, the Turkish minority of Western Thrace represented a weak point in the
rear of the Greek defences,
315
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
The story of the Constantinopolitan Greek minority is perhaps the best
example of the abortive attempts to assimilate the non-Muslim elements in
republican Turkey.1 The Turkish constitution and the law accorded com-
plete equality to all citizens. Yet the republic' s principles of secularism and
formal legal protection of all its citizens has only nominally superseded past
attitudes and prejudices. Notwithstanding the political status of the Constan-
tinopolitan Greeks as Turkish citizens. both government and public opinion
in Turkey looked upon this community as an alien element. As a result,
Ankara felt no compunction in using the Greek minority as a lever against
Greece whenever relations between the two countries became tense. One
important conclusion of the Constantinopolitan Greek experience is that
minorities can only exist within neighbouring nationalist states if general
relations are friendly. Thus, during such intervals (1930-40,1947-54,1959-64
and 1968 -71) the Greek minority was able to enjoy a certain sense of security
and belonging. As soon as relations between the two neighbours began to
deteriorate there was an immediate backlash against them. Under these
circumstances. and as the Turks applied official and psychological pressure,
the fortunes of the Greek minority were adversely It is not coinci-
dental that the four principal waves of Greek exodus from Istanbul ( 1922-29.
1955-59. 1964-67 and 1972-75) took place during such periods of strained
Greek-Turkish relations.
The Constantinopolitan Greeks all along manifested a strong determina-
tion to remain in their native city. However, in return for their survival in
Turkey, the Turks demanded the renunciation of their distinct ethnic Greek
identity and its replacement with modern Turkey's secular and nationalist
values. While a few, headed by Papa Eftim and his associates, were all too
willing to make this transformation. the great majority of the Constantinopoli-
tan Greeks remained faithful to their religious. ethnic and linguistic tradi-
tions. Despite their to fulfil loyally their duties as Turkish citizens,
the Greek minority strongly opposed assimilation and clung to their tradi-
tional urban culture. As a result. although they were for all intents and pur-
poses fully bilingual, the Greeks successfully resisted the inroads of Kemalist
I. By far the best integrated non-Muslim minority in Turkey is that of the
(Sliryaniler). detailed account of the history of this community see A GiineL T/irk Slirvalllier
TaT'ihi. Diyarbaklr 1970. passim.
316
nationalism and secularism, maintaining a distinctly Greek/cosmopolitan
character.
In their part, both government and public opinion in Turkey expressed
repeatedly their concern over the question of where the loyalties of the
members of the Greek community lay. Particularly at times of strained
Greek-Turkish relations, Turkish suspicions of their Greek fellow co-citizens
reached the levels of mass hysteria. This was best illustrated during the
Cyprus conflict when the Turkish press launched an inflammatory campaign
against the Greeks resulting in the ugly episode of 5/6 September 1955. Envy
of the business acumen and European status of the Greeks, further accentua-
ted this mistrust. This led to the common assumption in Turkey that the
Greeks, as well as the other non-Muslim groups, were solely interested in
money-making and, given their cosmopolitan affiliations, lacked any patri-
otic sentiments. The imposition of the punitive and discriminatory varl'lk
taxation during the Second World War was perhaps the best illustration of
this notion. Again, behind thelaique fa<;:ade of the republic the older Muslim
Turkish concept of full and second-class citizenship, inherited from the
Ottoman empire, was still vigorously alive. Throughout the history of the
republic, non-Muslims in general remained second class citizens, excluded
from participation in public life. Even today, this fundamental division is
reflected in the moral stigma attached to the word gavur (infidel, unbeliever,
non-Muslim) in modern Turkey. These religious-cum-racial factors, coupled
with the persistence of Greco- Turkish rivalries doomed to failure the experi-
ment of Muslim-Orthodox symbiosis in istanbul.
Reluctant to leave their city, the Constantinopolitan Greeks only did so
after being SUbjected to prolonged pressure, both on personal and communal
levels. Such pressures often went counter to the obligations assumed by the
Turkish government at Lausanne. It was during the Lausanne negotiations
that the inherent right of at least a remnant of the large Constantinopolitan
Greek community to remain in the city, separate from strictly political con-
siderations, was internationally acknowledged. To safeguard this right, the
minority clauses were embodied in the treaty of Lausanne. It is because of the
systematic violation of these clauses by Turkey, rather than the desire to
expand their financial concerns, as was intimated on several occasions by
Turkish leaders, that the Constantinopolitan Greeks were ultimately forced
to close their lucrative businesses, sell their immovable property and emig-
rate.
Almost all the Lausanne minority provisions have either systematically or
periodically been violated by successive Turkish governments. Thus, by
weakening the prestige of the Greek Patriarchate and by applying restrictions
317
on the functions of the patriarch, who in his capacity as the archbishop of
Constantinople was also the religious head of the community, the authorities
were in fact interfering with the free exercise of religion stipulated by
article 38. The occupation of the Greek Orthodox churches of Galata, with
the connivance of the local officials, by a renegade priest, Papa Eftim, who
incidently was not even a member of the Constantinopolitan Greek minority,
was also contrary to this article. Notwithstanding the government's attempt
to give a legal character to the seizures by issuing title-deeds to Papa Eftim,
these churches were built as early as the seventeenth century by the Constan-
tinopolitan Greek community and were administered by them until their
forceful occupation in 1924, 1926 and 1965. The third paragraph of the same
article was also violated when between 1922-30, the Greek minority was
confined within the limits of the istanbul prefecture and was not allowed to
visit any other province of Turkey without special permission. Likewise.
the third paragraph of article 39 stating that differences of religion, creed or
confession shall not prejudice any Turkish national in matters relating to the
enjoyment of civil or political rights, as, for instance, admission to public life,
functions and honours, was systematically ignored. Nor were adequate
facilities ever given to Turkish nationals of non-Turkish speech for the oral
use of their own language before the court.
The legal restrictions and interference by the authorities in the administra-
tion of the Greek minority schools and communal property are also contrary
to articles 40 and 41 of the Lausanne treaty. The successful attempt of the
Turkish government to coerce the minority notables into renouncing article
42 in 1925 have been described in some detail. In general, moreover, most of
the secular reforms, such as the abolition of the clerical garb in 1934, the
refusal to establish new religious and charitable institutions and the closure of
existing establishments like the Prinkipo orphanage in 1964, were contrary to
the Lausanne provisions. Because of its discriminatory character, the varllk
taxation of 1942 was also a most serious breach ofthese clauses. So were the
anti-Greek riots in istanbul on 5/6 September 1955 which resulted in exten-
sive damage of Constantinopolitan Greek property. In a memorandum pre-
pared by the Southern Department of the British Foreign Office, as early as
February 1943, just before a meeting between the British secretary of state
and the Greek prime minister, it was pointed out:
2
Despite the declarations made regarding the perfect equality of treat-
ment that would be accorded to the minorities, since 1930 the minority
2. Brief for the Secretary of State in cOIlversation with the Greek Prime Minister E.
Tsouderos, prepared by the Southern Dept., 27 February 1943, FO 371/37401/RI552.
318
clauses of the Lausanne treaty have been, for all intents and purposes, a
dead letter. The Turkish legislation has definitely been discriminatory
on more than one occasion. Petty persecution of Greeks has been
endemic.
Such endemic petty persecution which intensified after the emergence of
the Cyprus question led to the almost complete disappearance of the once
numerous and prosperous Constantinopolitan Greek community. Yet the
Turkish attitude towards the Greek minority was formulated as early as the
first two decades of the twentieth century. As ethnic polarization in the
Ottoman capital reached a peak in 1918-20, Turkish nationalists vowed to rid
themselves of all non-Turkish elements. This view was ably articulated by
the chief Turkish delegates at Lausanne, ismet inonii and Dr RIza Nur.
Although the Turks fought hard at Lausanne for the complete deportation of
the Ottoman Greek element, they finally had to yield to concerted inter-
national pressure and consent to the exemption of a small number of Greeks
in istanbul (with an approximately equal number of Muslims left in Greek
Thrace) from the compulsory Greek-Turkish population exchange. Notwith-
standing the humanitarian, economic and political factors which dictated the
retention of some 100,000 Constantinopolitan Greeks in Turkey, the Turks
never ceased to regard this element as an unwelcome residlle of the Ottoman
empire. The subsequent rapprochement of the 1930s and the entrance of
Greece and Turkey into NATO simply acted as a postponement in the
inevitable process of the dehellenization of Istanbul which was in fact sealed
with the defeat of the Greeks in Anatolia and with the emergence of
homogeneous national states on the shores of the Aegean.
While the Greek minority is still undergoing an irreversible eclipse, the
Patriarchate of Constantinople is slowly but steadily dying from inanition.
Having to rely for recruits solely on the Greek community of Turkey whose
numbers are far too small to produce the required twelve metropolitans of the
holy synod, the Ecumenical Patriarchate will sooner or later be faced with an
impasse. The closure of the Chalki seminary in 1971, which had hitherto
trained the Phanar clergy has been an additional blow to the Patriarchate of
Constantinople. Hitherto, while tolerating the physical presence of the Pat-
riarchate in Turkey (as agreed at Lausanne), the Turks managed to isolate the
Phanar from the rest of Orthodoxy. With the disappearance of the Greek
element in Turkey, however, the Turks will be increasingly unable to honour
their Lausanne pledge, for lacking the appropriate personnel, the Phanar will
not be in a position to respond to its ecclesiastical responsibilities. Under
these circumstances, Greece and Turkey will have to find a workable solution
to both the Patriarchate and the minority questions.
319
21
APPENDIX A
THE MINORITY CLAUSES OF THE TREA 1Y OF LAUSANNE
Article 37.
Turkey undertakes that the stipulations contained in Articles 38 to 44 shall
be recognised as fundamental laws, and that no law, no regulation, nor official
action shall conflict or interfere with these stipulations, nor shall any law,
regulation, nor official action prevail over them.
Article 38.
The Turkish Government undertakes to assure full and complete protec-
tion oflife and liberty to all inhabitants of Turkey without distinction ofbirt.h,
nationality, language, race or religion.
All inhabitants of Turkey shall be entitled to free exercise, whether in
public or private, of any creed, religion or belief, the observance of which
shall not be incompatible with public order and good morals.
Non-Moslem minorities will enjoy full freedom of movement and of emig-
ration, subject to the measures applied, on the whole or on the part. of the
territory, to all Turkish nationals, and which may be taken by the Turkish
Government for national defence, or for the maintenance of public order.
Article 39.
Turkish subjects belonging to non-Moslem minorities will enjoy the same
civil and political rights as Moslems.
All the inhabitants of Turkey, without distinction of religion, shall be equal
before the law.
Differences of religion, creed or confession shall not prejudice any Turkish
national in matters relating to the enjoyment of civil and political rights, as,
for instance, admission to public employments, functions and honours, or the
exercise of professions and industries.
No restrictions shall be imposed on the free use by any Turkish national of
320
.;
any language in private intercourse, in commerce, religion, in the press, or in
publications of any kind or at public meetings.
Notwithstanding the existence of the official language, adequate facilities
shall be given to Turkish nationals of non-Turkish speech for the oral use of
their own language before the Courts.
Article 40.
Turkish nationals belonging to non-Moslem minorities shall enjoy the same
treatment and security in law and in fact as other Turkish nationals. In
particular, they shall have an equal right to establish, manage and control at
their own expense, any charitable, religious and social institutions, any
schools and other establishments for instruction and education, with the right
to use their own language and to exercise their own religion freely therein.
Article 41.
As regards public instruction, the Turkish Government will grant in those
towns and districts, where a considerable proportion of non-Moslem nation-
als are resident, adequate facilities for ensuring that in the primary schools
the instruction shall be given to the children of such Turkish nationals
through the medium of their own language. This provision shall not prevent
the Turkish Govenmlent from making the teaching of the Turkish language
obligatory in the said schools.
In towns and districts where there is a considerable proportion of Turkish
nationals belonging to non-Moslem minorities, these minorities shall be as-
sured an equitable share in the enjoyment and application of these sums
which may be provided out of public funds under the State, municipal or other
budgets for educational, religious, or charitable purposes.
The sums in question shall be paid to the qualified representatives of the
establishments and institutions concerned.
Article 42.
The Turkish Government undertakes, as regards non-Moslem minorities,
in so far as concerns their family law or personal status, measures permitting
the settlement of these questions in accordance with the customs of those
minorities.
These measures will be elaborated by special Commissions composed of
representatives of the Turkish Government and of representatives of each of
the minorities concerned in equal number. In case of divergence, the Turkish
321
Government and the Council of the League of Nations will appoint in agree-
ment an umpire chosen from amongst European lawyers.
The Turkish Government undertakes to grant full protection to the
churches, synagogues, cemeteries, and other religious establishments of the
above-mentioned minorities. All facilities and authorisation will be granted to
the pious foundations, and to the religious and charitable institutions of the
said minorities at present existing in Turkey, and the Turkish Government
will not refuse, for the formation of new religious and charitable institutions,
any of the necessary facilities which are guaranteed to other private institu-
tions of that nature.
Article 43.
Turkish nationals belonging to non-Moslem minorities shall not be compel-
led to perform any act which constitutes a violation of their faith or religious
observances, and shall not be placed under any disability by reason of their
refusal to attend Courts of Law or to perform any legal business on their
weekly day of rest.
This provision, however, shall not exempt such Turkish nationals from
such obligations as shall be imposed upon all other Turkish nationals for the
preservation of public order.
Article 44.
Turkey agrees that, in so far as the preceding Articles of this Section affect
non-Moslem nationals of Turkey, these provisions constitute obligations of
international concern and shall be placed under the guarantee of the League
of Nations. They shall not be modified without the assent of the majority of
the Council of the League of Nations. The British Empire, France, Italy and
Japan hereby agree not to withhold their assent to any modification in these
Articles which is in due form assented to by a majority of the Council of the
League of Nations.
Turkey agrees that any Member of the Council of the League of Nations
shall have the right to bring to the attention of the Council any infraction or
danger of infraction of any of these obligations, and that the Council may
thereupon take such action and give such directions as it may deem proper
and effective in the circumstances.
Turkey further agrees that any difference of opinion as to questions of law
or of fact arising out ofthese Articles between the Turkish Government and
anyone of the other Signatory Powers or any other Power, a member of the
322
Council of the League of Nations, shall be held to be a dispute of an interna-
tional character under Article 14 of the Covenant of the League of Nations.
The Turkish Government hereby consents that any such dispute shall, if the
other party thereto demands, be referred to the Pennanent Court of Interna-
tional Justice. The decision of the Permanent Court shall be final and shall
have the same force and effect as an award under Article 13 of the Covenant.
Article 45.
The rights conferred by the provisions of the present Section on the
non-Moslem minorities of Turkey will similarly conferred by Greece on the
Moslem minority in her territory.
323
APPENDIX B
Greek Parishes and associations in istanbul
t. Archbishopric of Constantinople.
1) CibaIi
2) Langa BMYKa
3) Kumkapi KOV'WcrKUAlOv
4) Samatya "AywC; rEropylOC;
5) Samatya "AywC; K(J)vo"'ravtivoe;
6) Kazll
7) BEAtypu8wv
8) AItl Mermer Mupflapa
9) Egrikapi Kapcria I1UAT]
10) Ayvansaray 3uponopta
11) Balat BaAata.e;
12) Salmatombruk
13) Tekfursaray TEK<POUp LapU!
14) LapflacriKw
15) Topkapi I1UAT] p(J)flavou
16) Haskoy I1tKpi8wv
17) Fener I1avayia MouXAiOU
18) Fener "AywC; rEropylOC; I10tT]paC;
19) Beyoglu I1avayia Ltaupo8pofliou
20) Beyoglu "AywC; K(J)vcrtavtivoC;
I1epa
2. Archbishopric of Chalcedon.
1) Kadikoy XaAKT]86va
2) Yeldegirmeni
3) KaAaflicrta
4) Dskiidar XpucrounOAtC;/LKOUtapt
5) Kuzguncuk KoucrJcoUVtsOuKWV
21) Taksim < Ayul T ptu8a I1epa
22) NEKpOta<pEiov
23) Ferikoy Llro8EKa ' AnocrtOA(J)V
24) TataUAa
25) EuaYYEAicrTpta
26) Galata "AywC; NtKoAaoc; raAaTa.
27) Galata I1avayia Ka<panavfjc; raAaTa.
28) Galata L(J)TfjpOC; XptcrTOU raAaTa
29) Galata "AYlOe; 'I(J)UVV11C; tCOV Xi(J)v
30) I1avayia LltnAOKt(J)viou
31) Ortakoy MEcraxropou Bocrnopou
32) 3T]POKPilvT]
33) Amavutkoy Meya PEufla Bocrnopou
34) Bebek Bocrnopou
35) istinye L(J)crgevlO Bocrnopou
36) Yenikoy I1avayia NWX(J)piou
37) "AywC; NtKOAaoc; Bocrnopou
38) Boyadkoy Ba<pwxroplO Bocrnopou
39) BaAivo
6) Kandilli Kav8uAAl
7)
8) Beykoz
9) c;.'engelkoy
324
3. Archbishopric of Dercos.
Tarabya 0Epanwl
Biiyiikdere
Yenimahalle
4. Archbishopric of Prinkiponnisa.
Burgazada 'AvttyovT]
Kinallada I1protT]
5. Greek associations and establishments.
Bakirkoy MmcpoxroplO
Y "Aywe; I>te<pavoc;
Biiyiikada I1piYKT]nOC;
HeybeJiada XUAKT]
Archbishopric of Constantinople: 37 philanthropic associations.
Archbishopric of Chalcedon: 6 philanthropic associations.
3 cultural (flOP<P(J)ttKOi) societies.
Archbishopric of Dercos: 5 philanthropic associations.
5 cultural societies.
Archbishopric of Prinkiponnisa: 2 philanthropic associations.
3 cultural societies.
I hospital: Ballkll (BaAouKAfj)
I orphanage: I1piYKT]nOC;
7 monasteries: 'Ayia Tptu8a XUAKT]C;
"Aywe; rEropywC; I1ptYKilnou
'A ywe; r EropyWC; , A vn yovT]
BaAouKAfj
"'AywC; 0EpunOvtaC;
BAaXEpvcov
BE<pa.
325
APPENDIX C
NUMBERS OF GREEK STUDENTS IN
CONSTANTINOPOLITAN GREEK SCHOOLS
I) ARCHBISHOPRIC OF CONSTANTINOPLE 1920/21 1923/24 1927/28 1933/34 1948/49 1978/79
HIGHER EDUCATION
1. Theological College of Chalki 9 30 (offering higher 37 75 70 25
theological as
well as secon-
dary education)
SECONDARY EDUCATION
2. Patriarchal Lycee for boys at Phanar 243 163 217 300 170 83
3. Zographeion Lycee for boys at Pera 274 195 264 364 302 156
4. Greek-French Lycee at Pera (G. Apostolidis) 389 232 177
5. National College of Language and Commerce 454 390
6. Commercial College of Galata (with primary school 927 575 (operating as 250 183
for boys) primary school)
7. National teacher's training school for women
(T. Bareidou) 7 198 245 152
8. Zappeion Lycee for girls at Pera 617 345 192 393 354 229
9. Ioakeimeion Lycee for girls at Phanar 457 361 281 305 107 44
10. Kendrikon Lycee for girls at Pera 576 492 442 366 287 68
PRIMARY EDUCATION
11. Patriarchal Primary school Marasleios at Phanar
272 188 260 237 61 18
12. National Orphanage
13. S. Siniosoglou Orphanage
45
. 14. Primary School for boys at Ciban
230 214
C
40
{ 90
C
9
15. Primary School for girls at Ciban
170 192
16. Mixed Primary school at Vefa
63
17. Mixed Primary school 0epu7tcoV
208 103 130
18. Primary School of Mouchlion at Phanar
214 206
{ 115
130 16
19. Primary School of Mouchlion at Phanar
244 170
20. Primary School for boys at Balata
106 166
{ 102
fll8
C2
21. Primary School for Girls at Balata
253 141 t
22. Mixed Primary School at Xyloporta
193 150 130 66
23. Mixed Primary School at Egrikapt
78 60 30 63
24. Mixed Primary School at Edirnekapi
130 73
25. Mixed Primary School at Tekfursaray
26. Chatzopouleios Mixed Primary School
(Salmatombruk) 183
27. Mixed Primary School at 33
28. Mixed Primary School at Topkapi 56
29. Mixed Primary School at Belgrade Forest 54 36
30. Mixed Primary School at Eptapyrgion
(Yedikule)
74 54
31. Mixed Primary School at St. George Kyparissas
60
32. Mixed Primary School at Exi Marmara
(Altlmermer)
78 25
1920121 1923124 1927128 1933/34 1948/49 1978/79
33. St. Constantine School for boys at Ypsomatheion
(Samatya) 233
{ 312 { 203 {182
4
34. St. Constantine School for girls at Ypsomatheion 230
35. Primary School for boys at Vlanga (Langa) 296 193 109
{128 { 81 {16
36. Primary School for girls at Vlanga 268 156 101
37. Primary School for boys at Kondoskali (Kumkap1) 508 495 270
{ 78
38. Primary School for girls at Kondoskali 483 432 250
39. Mixed Primary School at Pikridion (Haskoy) 157 125 72 13
40. Primary School for boys at Tatavla 527 378 198 290
{205
53
41. Primary School for girls at Tatavla 413 347 185 200
42. Primary School for boys at Evangelistria
(Y 197 f 136
{ 150
f65
r
04
{ 3
43. Primary School for girls at Evangelistria 173 l
44. Primary School for boys at Ferikoy 295 301 200
e
04
e
09
{41
45. Primary School for girls at Ferikoy 217 235 150
46. First Primary School for boys at Stavrodromi
(Galatasaray) 295
{l.O73
{ 737
t
3
f
47. Second Primary School for boys at Stavrodromi 292 t219
r
48. Third Primary School for boys at Stavrodromi 337 214 52
49. Fourth Primary School for boys at Stavrodromi 264
50. Fifth Primary School for boys at Stavrodromi 170 98
51. Sixth Primary School for boys at Stavrodromi 130
{ 668 { 418 {S30
75
52. First Primary School for girls at Stavrodromi 312 65
53. Second Primary School for girls at Stavrodromi 303
54. Third Primary School for girls at Stavrodromi 482
55. Primary School for girls at Galata
658 506 250 174 166 41
56. Primary School for boys at Diplokionion
207 167
{ 127 (130 fl7

57. Primary School for Girls at Diplokionion 165 121 then amalgamated
1
with boyschool
58. Primary School for boys at Mesochorion (Ortakoy) 134
{ 223 { 103
{95
f 20
59. Primary School for girls at Mesochorion 124 l-
60. Primary School for boys at Mega Revma
(Arnavutkoy) 235
{ 325 { 228 {205 {78 { 18
61. Primary School for girls at Mega Revma 236
62. Mixed Primary School at Bebek 158 95 85
63. Mixed Primary School at Stenia 50
64. Mixed Primary School at Vapheochorion
(Boyadkoy) 163 137 78 50 38
65. Mixed Primary School at Neochorion
(Yenikoy) 220 226 126 120 55
PRIVATE SCHOOLS
66. Greek-French School for Girls
statistics
Efterpi Santorinaiou at Pera
delayed
67. Greek-French School N. Melas at Per a
81
68. Primary School P. Moumtzi at Pera
94
15.806 11.527 7.125 5.844 3.490 865
2) ARCHBISHOPRIC OF CHALCEDON
1. Chalcedon School for boys 318 208 250 89 49
2. Chalcedon School for girls 283 220 276 68
3. 62 5
4. Yeldegirmeni
5. Mixed Primary School at Scoutari (Uskiidar)
6. <;engelkoy
7. Parish School of Kouskountzoukion
8. Parish School of Kandylli
9. Parish School of Bei'cos (Beykoz)
IO. Parish School of
3) ARCHBISHOPRIC OF DERCOS
1. Parish School of Therapeia
2. Parish School of Biiyiikdere
3. Parish School of Yenimahalle
4. Parish School of Makrochori (Baklrkoy)
5. Parish School of St. Stephano
4) ARCHBISHOPRIC OF PRINKIPONNISA
1. Primary School of Prinkipos (Biiyiikada)
2. Primary School of Chalki (Heybeliada)
3. Parish School of Antigoni (Burgazada)
4. Parish School of Proti (Klnallada)
Total
1. * Numbers of Greek Schools in lstanbul: 1920/21 :88
1923/24:73
1927/28:57
1933/34:48
1948/49:50
1958/59:56
1978/79:26
1923/24 1927/28
102
195 155
172 53
256 122
45 35
31 24
30 22
1.494 839
181 130
92 109
141 32
460 270
194 112
1.068 653
401 212
275 126
69 51
28
773 389
14.862 9.006
1933/34 1948/49 1978j79
141 62
32 20
103 44
35 10
837 298 49
106 29 2
67 35
32 25
255 88 19
68 20 3
528 197 24
214 202 12
144 46 7
68 23
426 271 19
7.635 4.256 957
2 * The analytical statistics for 1920/21 are limited to the Archbishopric of Constantinople. The aggregate student numbers for
Chalcedon and Dercos are 7233 and 5136 respectively. The great majority of these Greeks was subsequently exchanged in 1922-24 for
they were considered to be established outside the municipal boundaries of lstanbul.
Sources: E.A. 43 (1923) 40/supplement
Statistics forwarded to the Greek Foreign Ministry by the Greek Consul-General in lstanbul, in YE/B/33 0924-1929).
Statistics by Zervopoulos, op. cit., I (1934) 233.
Official statistics of the Turkish Ministry of Education for the period 1948 to 1960, publications: no. 304; no. 431 and no. 437.
Greek parish statistics for 1978/79 given to the author by the Constantinopolitan Greek educationalist and former deputy
Alexander Chatzopoulos.
APPENDIXD
PATRIARCHS AND MEMBERS OF THE HOLY SYNOD
Dorotheos (Mammelis)
Germanos (Karavangelis)
Nicholas (Sakkopoulos)
Constantine (Araboglou)
Gervasios (Sarisitis)
Gerasimos
Joachim (Georgiadis)
Anthimos
Evgenios (Papathomas)
Agathangelos (Konstantinidis)
Chrysostomos (Chatzichristou)
Eirinaios
Nicholas (Sakkopoulos)
Germanos (Karavangelis)
Constantine (Araboglou)
Gervasios (Sarisitis)
Gerasimos
Joachim (Georgiadis)
Anthimos
Evgenios (Papathomas)
Agathangelos (Konstantinidis)
Chrysostomos (Chatzichristou)
Eirinaios
Meletios (Metaxakis) Patriarch
Nicholas (Sakkopoulos)
Gregory (Zervoudakis)
1918-1921
Brussa and locum tenens
Amaseia
Caesarea
Cyzicus
Angyra
Pissidia
Ainos
Vizya
Silyvria
Saranta Ekklisies
Tyroloi
Dardanelles
1921-1922
Caesarea and locum tenens
Amaseia
Cyzicus
Angyra
Pissidia
Ainos
Vizya
Silyvria
Saranta Ekklisies
Tyroloi
Dardanelles
1922-1923
332
Caesarea
Chalcedon
Basil (Georgiadis)
; Kallinikos (Delikanis)
Agathangelos (Konstantinidis)
Apostolos (Triphonos)
Benjamin (Christodoulou)
Joachim (Stroubis)
Nikodimos (Komninos)
Jacob (Nikolaou)
Joachim (Martinianos)
Cyril (Chatzidimitriou)
Nicaea
Cyzicus
N eocaesarea
Rhodes
Philippopolis
Korytza
Varna
Dyrrachion
Belgrade
Rodopolis
1923-1924
Gregory (Zervoudakis) Patriarch
Nicholas (Sakkopoulos)
Basil (Georgiadis)
Joachim (Georgiadis)
Kallinikos
Constantine (Araboglou)
Agathangelos (Konstantinidis)
Evgenios (papathomas)
Cyril (Chatzidimitriou)
Thomas (Savvopoulos)
Gennanos (Athanasiadis)
Photios (Maniatis)
Kallinikos (Delikanis)
Changes:
Caesarea
Nicaea
Chalcedon
Dercos
Brussa
N eocaesarea
Silyvria
Rodopolis
Anea
Sardis
Philadelphia
Cyzicus
Jan. 1924: Agathangelos from Neocaesarea to Prinkiponisa
March 1924: Ambrosios Neocaesarea
May 1924: Constantine from Brussa to Dercos
May 1924: Nikodimos from Varna to Brussa
1924-1925
Constantine (Araboglou) Patriarch
Kallinikos (Delikanis)
Basil (Georgiadis)
Joachim (Georgiadis)
Photios (Maniatis)
Nikodimos (Komninos)
333
Cyzicus
Nicaea
Chalcedon
Dercos
Brussa
Ambrosios (Stavrianos)
Evgenios (Papathomas)
Cyril (Chatzidimitriou)
Thomas (Savvopoulos)
Germanos (Athanasiadis)
Agathangelos (Konstantinidis)
Nicholas (Sakkopoulos)
Basil (Georgiadis) Patriarch
Kallinikos (Delikanis)
Benjamin (Christodoulou)
Joachim (Georgiadis)
Agathangelos (Konstantinidis)
Photios (Maniatis)
Ambrosios (Stavrianos)
Nikodimos (Komninos)
Evgenios (Papathomas)
Cyril (Chatzidimitriou)
Germanos (Athanasiadis)
Nicholas (Sakkopoulos)
Thomas (Savvopoulos)
Changes:
N eocaesarea
Silyvria
Rodopolis
Anea
Sardis
Prinkiponisa
Caesarea
1925-1929
Cyzicus
Nicaea
ChaIcedon
Prinkiponisa
Dercos
N eocaesarea
Brussa
Silyvria
RodopoIis
Sardis
Caesarea
Anea
1927: Death of Joachim; replaced by Nicholas
1927: Death of Nicholas; replaced by Agathangelos
1927: Thomas from Anea to Prinkiponisa
1927: Gennadios (Arabatzoglou) Ilioupolis appointed member of the Holy
Synod
Photios (Maniatis) Patriarch
Kallinikos (Delikanis)
Ambrosios (Stavrianos)
Maximos (Vaportzis)
Agathangelos (Konstantinidis)
Benjamin (Christodoulos)
Nikodimos (Komninos)
Cyril (Chatzidimitriou)
1929-1936
Caesarea
Dercos
Philadelphia
ChaIcedon
Nicaea
Brussa
Rodopolis
334
Germanos (Athanasiadis)
Thomas (Savvopoulos)
Evgenios (Papathomas)
Gennadios (Arabatzoglou)
Jacob (papapaisiou)
Changes:
Sardis
Prinkiponisa
Silyvria
IIioupoIis
Imbros
1932: Agathangelos resigned because of poor health and was replaced by
Maximos
1931: Ambrosios died: replaced by Joachim
1934: Deaths of Kallinikos and Evgenios
1935: Deaths of Nikodimos and Agathangelos
1936: Death of Cyril
1936-1946
Benjamin (Christodoulou) Patriarch
Joachim (pelekanos)
Thomas (Savvopoulos)
Maximos (Vaportzis)
Gerrnanos (Athanasiadis)
Gennadios (Arabatzoglou)
Jacob (Papapaisiou)
Polykarpos (Dimitriadis)
Leondios (Liverios)
Meletios (Loukakis)
Germanos (Athanasiadis)
Constantine (Alatopoulos)
Dorotheos (Georgiadis)
Maximos (Vaportzis) Patriarch
Thomas (Savvopoulos)
Joachim (pelekanos)
Dorotheos (Georgiadis)
Polykarpos (Dimitriadis)
Maximos (Christopoulos)
Gennadios (Arabatzoglou)
Jacob (Papapaisiou)
Leondios (Liverios)
22
Dercos
Prinkiponisa
ChaIcedon
Sardis
IlioupoIis
Imbros
Brussa
TheodoroupoIis
Christopolis
Ainos
Eirinopolis
Laodicaea
1946-1948
Chalcedon
Dercos
Prinkiponisa
Brussa
Laodicaea
IIioupoIis
Imbros
Theodoroupolis
335
Maximos (Repanellis)
Germanos (Athanasiadis)
Constantine (Alatopoulos)
Philotheos
Athenagoras (Spyrou) Patriarch
Thomas (Savvopoulos)
Joachim (Pelekanos)
Polykarpos (Dimitriadis)
Dorotheos (Georgiadis)
Gennadios (ArabatzogIou)
Constantine (Alatopoulos)
Germanos (Athanasiadis)
Philotheos
Agathangelos (papatheodorou)
Chrysostomos (Papachristou)
Maximos (Christopoulos)
Maximos (Repanellis)
Sardis
Ainos
Eirinopolis
Proikonisos
1949-1972
Chalcedon
Dercos
Brussa
Prinkiponisa
IIioupoIis
Eirinoupolis
Ainos (after his death Adamantios
Pergamos)
Proikonisos
Kydoniai
Neocaesarea
Laodicaea
Sardis
1973-
Dimitrios (Papadopoulos) Patriarch
Meliton (Chatzis)
Maximos (Christopoulos)
Maximos (RepaneIIis)
Ieronymos (Konstantinidis)
Chrysostomos (Konstantinidis)
Simeon (AmariIios)
Gabriel (Premetidis)
Agapios (Kesisoglou)
Evangelos (Galanis)
Kallinikos (Alexandridis)
Constantinos (Charisiadis)
Joachim (NerantzouIis)
Chalcedon
Laodicaea
Sardis
Rodopolis
Myra
Eirinopolis
Kolonia
Prinkiponisa
Perga
Lystra
Dercos
Melitini
336
BIBLIOGRAPHY
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37403 37404 3406 37469 37470 37473
43775 48349 58860 58868 59330 67106 67293 67305b
b. Files 406/40-41 (Confidential Prints, Eastern Affairs).
c. Files 608 (British Delegation, 87 Constantinople).
d. 800 (Private Collections, Balfour, Lord Curzon, Ryan).
e. Cabmet Papers (CAB 29 International Conferences).
3. LAMBETH PALACE LIBRARY, London.
a. Private correspondence of Ranall Davison (archbisho of Canterbury), 1918-1948.
32 (3 files), 65, 98 and 148 (7 files), deal with the Patriarchate of Constantinople and
Anglican-Orthodox relations.
b. Private Correspondence of Canon J. A. Douglas, 1911-1955.
Boxes 17, 18, 19,22,31,32,33,76,78 and 88, deals with the Patriarchate of Constantino-
pIe. There are also valuable press cuttings from the press in istanbuL
4. VENIZELOS PAPERS, Benaki Museum, Athens, 1919-1,,3L
5. POLITIS PAPERS, Benaki Museum, Athens, 1925-1931.
6. JOHN STAVRIDI PAPERS, St. Antony's College, Oxford.
Ten files.
7. PALAIOLOGOS PAPERS, Athens.
Private Correspondence of Patriarch Athenagoras i with Paul Palaiologos, 1949-1971.
B. Published
1. OFFICIAL PUBLICATIONS.
Great Britain
a. Command Papers: 964, vol. L, 1920 - Treaty of Sevres.
1814, XXVI, 1923 - Lausanne negotiations.
1929, XXV, Treaty Series 16 - Treaty of Lausanne, 24.7.1923.
b. British and Foreign State Papers: V. I 13, 652-776 - Treaty of Sevres. II. 133, 609 _
Greco-Turkish Pact of 1930.
c. Documents on British Foreign Policy, 1919-1939, first series, vols. 4, 7, 15, 17 and lK
d. Foreign Office, Tilrkey in Europe, 1918.
The Rise of the Turks, 1919.
The Ethnological Map of Central and South Eastern Europe, 1919.
Greece
Greek Information Service: The Greek Minority in Turkey and the Turkish Minority in
Greece. How Two Governments Treat their Minorities, Athens, 1965.
338
Turkey
a. Atatiirk'iin Tamin, Telegrafve Beyannameleri (Circulars, Telegrams and Proclamations
of Atatiirk), 4 vols. Ankara, 1964.
b. La Legislation Turque. Code Civil Turc, istanbul, 1926.
c. Constitution of the Turkish Republic, eds, Sadlk Balkan, Ahmet E. Uysal and Kemal H.
Karpat, Anara, 1961.
d. istatistik Umum Miidiirliigii. istatistik nlllfjJ, Ankara.
e. Biiyiik Millet Meclisi Zablt Ceridesi (Records of the Grand National Assembly).
League of Nations
a. Official Journal, especially issues of November, 1924. February, 1925. April, 1925. May,
1925. July, 1925.
b. Documents: C.614.1924 (VII)
C.694.1924 (I)
C.775.M.73 (I)
C.130.1925 (VII)
C. 134. 1925 (VII)
C.160.1925 (VII)
C .306.1925 (VII)
C.402.1926 (I)
C.588.1926 (I)
Permanent Court of International Justice:
C.645.1924 (VII)
C. 774.1924 (I)
C.129.1925 (VII)
C. 131.1925 (VII)
C.135.1925 (VII)
C.211.M.70.1925 (VII)
C.57.M.30.1925 (VII)
C.566.1926 (I)
C.185.1927 (I)
Series B, 21.2.1925. Collection of Advisory Opinions no. to Exchange of Greek and
Turkish populations; and no.16 Interpretation of the Greco-Turkish Agreement of 1
December 1926.
United Nations/Security Council:
Documents:
2. PAMPHLETS
S/5665
S/5951
S/6351
S/6758
S/5677
S/5957
S/6718
S/6783
S/5702
S/5968
S/6723
S/6820
S/5844
S/6162
S/6728
Memorial Address to th Powers by the Inedeemed Greeks, London 1918.
S/5946
S/6288
S/6734
Persecution of the Greeks in Turkey, 1914-1918. (Ma6pl1 BiP),or;) , Phanar, Constantinople
1919.
The Unredeemed Greeks Before the Peace Conference: Memoranda of the CEcumenical
Patriarchate and the National Council of the Unredeemed Greeks, Paris, 1919.
Memoire Soumis a la Conference par Ie Patriarcat CEcumenique: Les Grecs de I'Empire
Ottoman, Paris, 1919.
E.K. Venizelos, La Grece devant Ie Congres de la Paix, Paris 1919.
lIivaKsr; L'm"Cll1rIKOi rcOv BV KWVl1raVrIVOV1to).e1 Kai rd 1tPOt1.I1r:eza I1XO),eiwv ,cOV 'Op8oJoc;,wv,
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L1shiov Kivrpov Kwvl1rav"ClvOV1to).lrcOv. (Bulletin of the Centre of Constantinopolitans), 2
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Minority Rights Group: Report n. 32 The Armenians (ed.) David M. Lang and Christopher
J. Walker, London, 1976.
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Newspapers/Journals
Turkish
Akam (Evening)
Ayln Tarihi (The Month's History)
Cumhuriyet (Republic)
Hiirriyet (Freedom)
Milliyet (Nationality)
Resmi Gazete (Official Gazette)
Tanin (Echo)
Terciiman (Interpreter)
Tiirk Kiiltiirii (Turkish Culture)
Ulus (Nation)
Vakit (Time)
Greek
'A9i;vm
, A1toyeuj.lanvij (Afternoon/istanbul)
Other
Annual Register (London)
Church Times (London)
Contemporary History (London)
Current History (New York)
Manchester Guardian
Messagerd'Athenes
New York Times
Orient News (istanbul)
Oriente Moderno (Rome)
Journal d'Orient (lstanbul)
Survey of International Affairs
(London)
Temps (Paris)
Times (London)
'EKlCAT]01acrnKij , AAijgew (Ecclesiastical Truth/istanbul)
366
'E!.eugepov BiillU (Free Step/Athens)
(Free Press/Athens)
'HeugepT] <I>wvij (Free Voice/istanbul) .'
'E'). LunO'fO;, ITeptOOtKOV (Greek LIterary SocIety
Journal/istanbul)
(Advance/istanbul)
'Epyucriu (Work/Athens)
Kupepvijcrew; (Official Gazette/Athens)
'Hilepit crw Ntu (Daily News/istanbul)
'HXciJ (Echo/istanbul)
(Constantinople/Athens)
Merappti8lltcrt; (Reform/istanbul)
Neat-0Yo; (New Word/istanbul)
(Orthodoxy /Phanar)
(Motherland/istanbul)
IT0 l-l (Constantinopolitan/ Athens)
ITof.neiu (State/istanbul)
(Progress/istanbul)
TuxuOpollO; (Postman/istanbul)
<I>ro; (Light/istanbul)
XPOVlKIl (Chronicle/istanbul)
Illterl'iell's
. h" d w publisher of floi.irl/:: in
Themistoklis Chatzidimitriou (former patrIarchal arc IVlst an no .
Athens).
Meliton Chatzis (Archbishop of Chalcedon).
Alexander Chatzopoulos (former Greek deputy in .
Nicholas Damtsas (former senior official of the Greek ?lplomatIc corps In Ankara).
Dimitri Kalloumenos (former photographer of the Patnarchate). . f b t the
John Karayiannis (former gYlIlllasia/"chis /headmaster of the patriarchal lycee or oys a
(publisher of the 'Ei.evBep1/ cPom) in istanbul and now owner of the Kwvarav
T/l'ovnoi.z:; in Athens). . .
Christos Mavrophrydis (Constantinopolitan Greek educatIonalIst). . I' t
Paul Palaiologos (Constantinopolitan Greekjoyrnalist and one of the most pronllnent co umIlls
in Greece).
Nicholas Palaiopoulos (Councillor in Imbros). " .
Michael Vasileiadis (former journalist in 'Ei.evBepl/ cPWI'l) and Ejmpo:;).
367
INDEX
A
AbaHoglu, Yunus Nadi, Turkish journa-
list. 195
Abdiilhamid II. Sultan, 30. 31. 40
Abdiilaziz. Sultan, 26, 28
Abdiilmecid, Sultan, 25, 26, 28. 29. 30
Adana. 210. 222
Adlvar, Adnan, Turkish Politician, 102
Adrianople, see Edirne
Aegean. islands, 52. 177, 235. 268n"6, 294,
315, 319
Agnidis, A., Greek ambassador in Lon-
don, 230
Ahmet Rlza. president of the Ottoman se-
nate, 63
AimiIianos. Zacharopoulos, archbishop of
Selevkia. 248. 270, 299
Akaygen, Mehmet Enis, Turkish ambas-
sador in Athens. 176
Akdagmadeni. 151
Ak/n, Turkish daily of Komotini, 311
Aks;am. Turkish daily of istanbul, 158
n.24
Albanian Muslims, 41, 124n.18, 309n. II.
Orthodox. 142n.12, 172.205
Aleksei. Russian patriarch, 238, 244, 277
Alexander. king of Greece, 53
Alexander. king of Yugoslavia. 197
Alexandria, Patriarchate of, 171, 184. 201.
244,278
Alexandris, Apostolos, Greek foreign mi-
nister, 89
Alexandropoulos. John, Greek representa-
tive in istanbul. 57
Alexandroupolis. conference of, 291, 292
Alibrantis. brothers. Tatavliot wrestlers.
49
Ali Haydar. governor of istanbul. 150
Ali KemaL anti-Kemalist leader. 82
Allen. George. US ambassador in Greece,
273
Allies, Allied Powers (World War I). 52.
57, 60, 61. 63, 64. 66. 67, 68, 75-86.
92. 94. 96. 97, 99-103, 106. 107. 118.
368
133. 139, 144, 146, 147, 153, 155
Altlmermer. 133
Alp, Tekin, Turkish writer. 220
Ambrosios. Stavrianos. archbishop of
Neocaesarea. 169
AmYl/a. 69-73. 81
Anatolia. see Asia Minor
Anchialus. episcopy. 168
Andoniadis, Basil. Greek theologian. 198
Anglican Church. 61. 62, 91. 93, 197, 198,
278. 301
Anglo-Hellenic Society. 162
Ankara, accord of (1925), 125-130, 166
Ankara. accord of (Aras-Polychroniadis,
1930), 177-180, 186
Ankara, government of, 77, 78, 88, 100,
101. 104, 107. 108. 109. 115. 118,
122. 125, 127. 131. 132, 134-138, 140.
141, 147-151. 167, 177, 181, 182, 187,
190, 194. 201, 203, 204, 207, 214,
215. 220, 225, 228-230, 235, 239,
241-243, 247, 248, 254, 255, 260, 267.
269, 270. 273. 275. 282, 291. 293-296,
298,301,305,315.316
Ankara. treaty of (1930), 179. 273, 281
Anthimos. archbishop of Vizya. 73n.21
Anthomelidis, Theologos, linguist and
turcologue, 192. 193
Anthopoulos, Constantine, Ottoman am-
bassador to London, 27n"9. 29
Antioch. Patriarchate of. 171. 244, 277
Apostolidis, school of, 134
Arabatzoglou. see Gennadios
Araboglou, see Constantine VI
Arabs, 21. 43. Arabic. 313
Aras. Tevfik R. Turkish foreign minister,
114, 131. 166, 168, 175. 177. 179,
188, 195, 196. 199
Argyropoulos, Pericles. Greek representa-
tive in Ankara, 52, 127. 128, 131
Arlkan. DiIaver. 154
Arlkan. Saffet, 152. 154
Aristarchi, Sophia. prominent Phanariot.
28
Aristarchis. Gregory. Ottoman Greek di-
plomat. 28
Aristarchis. John. Ottoman Greek ambas-
sador to Berlin. 28
Aristarchis, Miltiadis. Ottoman Greek
administrator, 28
Aristarchis, Nicholas. prominent Phanari-
ot. 28
Aristarchis, Stavros. Ottoman Greek sena-
tor. 27. 28
Aristoklis, John. Ottoman Greek civil ser-
vant. 48
Armaoglu. Fahir. 274
Armenians. Armenian millet, 21, 26. 27,
30-34. 41. 43. 48. 52. 57. 77. 81, 96,
101. 104. 111. 136. 137, 182. 214.
217. 219. 250. 258. 271
Asia Minor. 44. 45, 53. 54. 69-71, 76. 77,
84, 85, 105, 107. 123. 144. 15 H59,
161. 162. 169, 174, 213. 223, 319
Asimakopoulos, Nicholas. Constantinopo-
litan labour leader, 112
222-224
Assani. Amlenian broker. 31
Atatiirk, Kemal, 80. 156- 158. 174,
176. 180, HB. 187. 193. 195, 200,
207.231. 234. 252. 256-258. 263, 313
Athanasiadis. Bodosakis, 70, 7 i
Athanasiadis. see Germanos
Athenagoras. Spyrou, patriarch of Con-
stantinople, 245-250, 252-255, 265,
268-271, 273-275. 277-279. 297, 299,
302, 303. 306
Athens. agreement of (1926), 128-130
Averoff. Evangelos Tossitzas. 250. 268
n.6. 269, 273. 275. 277
Axis. 207, 208, 216. 224, 225, 228. 230,
307. see also Nazi Germany
Aydemir, S.S .. 206
Az/n/lk Pastas/, Turkish daily in Komoti-
ni.311
'A7lOi'WIWTll'lj. Greek daily of istanbul, 288
'Arr6uroi.o;; 'A \'(5psa;;, religious journal of
the Phanar. 248, 299
B
Baban. Cihan. Turkish journalist, 253
Balat, 4
369
Ba/lk/l. hospital of. 48, 115, 146, 184, 186,
202, 207, 227, 242, 243. 257. 290,
295, 296, 3 I In. 17
Balkans. nations of the. 92. 127. 170, 234,
238. 267. 275, 276
Basil III, Georgiadis, patriarch of Con-
stantinople. 168. 172, 194
Bawapaz (archpriest) 171. 195
Bayar, Celal. Turkish president, 236, 249,
260. 263, 264, 309
Bayiilken, U.H. 312n.20
Bedel. 99
Bekir Sami, Turkish foreign minister. 67
Bele. Refet. Kemalist leader, 77-83. 144
Bennett. Sterndale, British envoy in An-
kara. 213, 221. 225. 226
Benjamin I, Christodoulou, patriarch of
Constantinople. 203-205. 241. 243
Berat, 23. 161
Berlin. congress of. 26. treaty of. 27
Beyoglu.47. 104, 118, II9, 169. 191. 192.
22 I. 262, 27 I. 290. see also Pera
Bil. Hikmet. Turkish journalist, 254, 26 I
n.23. 263
Bilgehan, Clhat, Turkish minister of edu-
cation. 288
Binns. British colonel. 223
Bitsios. Dimitri, Greek representative in
the United Nations. 276, 283, 289,
300, 305
Bled. treaty of. 236
Bousios. George, Ottoman Greek deputy.
42n.15
Bozcaada. see Tenedos
Bozkurt. Mahmut Esat. 130. 164n.25. 23 I
Brussa. 55. see also Bursa
Bulak, Adnan, 292, 295
Bulgaria, Exarchate of, Bulgaria, 22. 37.
40. 176. 189, 197.205,231,238,243,
304, 307, 308
Bursa, 74. 160. 230
Biiyiikada. 48, 58, 252, see also Prinkipo
C
Caesarea, 33, 72. 151, 167nAI
<;aglayangil. ihsan S., Turkish politician.
293
Caliphate, 87. 88, 135. 158. 230
Calthorpe. Arthur. 56
(anakkale. 77
Canterbury. archbishop of. 61. 67. 75. 91.
93. 197. 198. 140. 179
(atalca. 89
Catholics. Catholic Church. 21. 91. 93.
see also Vatican
Cehi.1 Bayar Lisesi. Turkish lyceum in
Komotini. 309
Cenani. Ali. 109
Chalcedon. 33. 155. 167. 172. 204. 230.
1411018
Chalki. theological academy of. 24. 48.
134. 198. 240. 242. 243. 248. 287
1031. 293. 299. 305. 3061032. 319
Charnoudopoulos. Minas. prominent Ot-
toman Greek. 48
Chanak crisis. 77. 80
Charalambidis. Ch... patriarchal counsel-
lor. 64
Chatzidimitriou. see Cyril
Chatzis. see Meliton
Chatzopoulos. Alexander. member of the
national assembly. 250. 251. 155.
261. 262. 265
Cheetham. Milne. 163
Child. R. Washburne. 85
Chonaios. Ottoman Greek deputy. 421015
Christ Church of Galata. see Sotiros Chri-
stou
Christian Church Association. 184
Christodoulou. see Benjamin I
Chrysanthos. Philippidis. archbishop of
Trebizond. 59. 197. 245
Chrysostomos. Konstantinidis. archbishop
of Myra. 177
Chrysostomos. archbishop of Tyroloi.
731021
Churchill. Wo, 232
Clement. Olivier. 255
Clerk George. British ambassador to
Turkey. 114. 129. 183
Commercial College of Galata. patriar-
chaL 47
Committee of Union and Progress. 39. 40
Constantine VI. Araboglou. patriarch of
Constantinople. 73121. 160-167. 172
Constantine. King of Greece. 70. 71. 73.
76
370
Cosmo Long. archbishop of Canterbury.
196
Council of the Judicial Ordinances. 27
Council of State. Ottoman. 27
Crete. Cretan issue. 29. 179. 180. possible
haven for the Patriarchate. 306
ClIllllzllriyet. Turkish daily. 131. 164. 195.
196. 199.219.231. 253. 255. 286
Curzon. EarL 85. 89. 91. 92. 94. 98. 99.
102. 144
Cyprus. 85. 172. 247. 250. 252-256. 263.
264. 266. 267. 268. 270. 271. 274-276.
280. 282. 285. 288. 292. 294. 296.
298.299.302.309.315.317
"Cyprus is Turkish Society. 2531.3. 254.
2601023. 263
Cyril 1. Loukaris. patriarch of Constanti-
nople. 24. 299
Cyril VII. patriarch of Constantinople. 34
Cyril. Chatzidimitriou. archbishop of Ro-
dopolis. 153. 155. 156. 169. 173
Cyzicus. 33. 155. 160
D
Dai. Erica. 295. 296
Daliatos. k. Greek vice-consul in istan-
buL 180
Damad Ferid Pasha. 64107. 65
Damaskinos. archbishop-regent. 240. 245
Damianidis. Damianos. eftimite leader.
145-147. 151. 152. 168. 169
Damtsas. Nicholas. 2721.30. 2731034.
276n.5
Davison. R.T o. see archbishop of Canter-
bury
Defence of Turkish Rights in Cyprus
Society. 253
Delikanis. see Kallinikos
DemireL SUleyman. Turkish premier. 278.
289. 290
Dendramis. Greek ambassador in Berne.
96
Dercos. 33. 160. 204. 246. 298
Devetzis. see Joachim III
Diamandopoulos. Kimon. Greek consu!-
general in istanbul. 133. 159
Diamandy. Rumanian negotiator. 92
Didymoteichon. 123
Dimitrios I. Papadopoulos. patriarch of
Constantinople. 279. 295. 306. 307
Dionysios III. Vardalis. patriarch of Con-
stantinople. 221.3
Dodecanese. 228. 234. 235. 267. 309
Donllle, \06. 216. 220
Dorotheos. Mammelis. archbishop of
Brussa. 55. 59-63. 68. 711 .. 13. 72. 74
Douglas. JoAn Anglican religious leader.
91. 93. 198
Dragoumis. Ion. 38. 421 .. 15
Dulles. Allen. 265
Dulles. John Foster. 267
Durrazzo. 172109
E
Ecevit. Bulent. Turkish premier. 295. 296
Econollliste d'Orient, 107
Eden. Antony. 228
Edirne. 183. 315
Eftim. see Papa Eftim
Egypt. 84
Eirinaios. archbishop of Dardanelles. 73
1.11
EllIente Liberale, 40. 41. 81
EOKA. 254. 257. 282
Ephesos. 33
Eralp. Orhan. Turkish representative at
the United Nations. 283. 302. 305
Erdek. see Cyzicus
EreneroL Turgut. son of Papa Eftim.
302-304
Eriigil. Eo, minister of the interior. 147
Erkin. Feridun CemaL Turkish foreign
minister. 2441.33. 277. 302
Erzurum. congress of. 65. 222
Esperey. general Franchet d'. 58. 64
etablis. 112-117. 125. 129. 130. 140. 164.
166. 177. 178. 281. 337
etlzelodollieia. 35
Eugenopoulos. Greek journalist in istan-
buL 140
Every. Edward. Anglican priest. 198
Evgenidis. Constantinopolitan Greek ban-
ker. 3113.34.47.69
Evgenios. Papathomas. archbishop of Si-
Iyvria. 731021
elkq!. see l'aUf 202. directory of the.
242n020. 299
371
exchange of populations. 84-88. 92. 95.
103. 105. 112. 177
Exindaris. George. 125. 163. 166-168
Eyuboglu. Orhan. minister to the prime
minister. 295. 296
'EOl'll':!) I/JWl'l/, 163
EKXi.IJUIMrIKI) 'A i.ljOela. 95. 150
Ei.evOepll l/JoJl'lj. Athenian daily, 162
'Ei.evOep'l I/JWl'l/. Constantinopolitan news-
paper. 254-256. 261. 288
'EhvOepo BliJIa. 166, 190, 191
Ei.i.'ll'll{o\' Mii.i.o\'. 199, 308n03
'EJlTipo;, 254
F
Fahrettin. assistant governor of istanbuL
155
Fakatchellis. Nicholas. Greek deputy.
250.270
Fehmi. Hamdi. Pomak deputy. 3\0
Fehmi. Hilmi. see Hilmi Fehmi
Fevzi Bey. minister of public works. 1 \0
Franks. 21
Free Republican Party. 182. 183n.4
Frederika. Queen. 236. 249
I/Jcv;, 160
G
Galata. 145. 146. 151n .. 12. 159. 169. 187.
205. 242. 243. 171. 290. 303. 318
Galata bankers. 31
Galatasaray. imperial Iycee of. 27. 48
Gennadios II. Scholarios. patriarch of
Constantinople. 22
Gennadios. Arabatzoglou. archbishop of
Ilioupolis. 150
Gensberg. Ronald. 112
Georgantzoglou. Aristeidis Pasha. 42. 43
1.18. 63. 68
Georgiadis. see Basil III
Georgiadis. Dimitrios. Ottoman Greek se-
nator. 43no 18
Gerassimos. archbishop of Pisidia, 73n.21
Germanos V. Kavakopoulos. patriarch of
Constantinople. 23. 35. 36, 44, 55.
155
Germanos, Athanasiadis. archbishop of
Sardis. 67. 150. 196. 197
Germanos. Strinopoulos. archbishop of
Thyateira. 94. 197. 240. 245
Gerondes. Gerondis/Ilos. 33. 35. 55. 68.
155
Gervasios. Sarisitis. archbishop of Angy-
ra. 151
Gkikis. Basil Mousouros. Ottoman Greek
senator. 40. 41. 43n .. 18. 75n.30
Gok<;:eada. see Imbros
Goulakis. Lambros. secretary of the Con-
stantinopolitan Hellenic Union. 272.
273n . .31
Gounaris. Dimitrios. Greek premier. 70
Gouras. Oikonomou. 281
Grand archivist. 23
Grand logothete. 23
Grand treasurer. 23
Greek Cypriots. 252. 253. 255. 256. 267.
280
Greek Literary Society of Constantinople.
29n.13. 45. 61. 127. 132
Gregorian Armenians. 21
Gregory VII. Zervoudakis. patriarch of
Constantinople. 68. 155-160. 172
Giinaltay. .. Turkish premier. 247
Giirsel. Cemal. Turkish president. 276.
277. 288. 289. 299
H
HadlmH. governor of izmir. 263. 266
Hamdi. Turkish delegate at the mixed
commission on the exchange of
Greek and Turkish popUlations. 125
Hamit. Hasancan. Turkish representative
in istanbul. 84
Halil. Salih. Muslim journalist in Thrace.
311n,17
Halkel'ieri (People's Houses) 184. 193
Harington. Sir Charles. commanding offi-
cer of the Allied forces in istanbul.
79. 81-83. 144
Hatlboglu. Hasan. Muslim journalist in
Thrace. 311
Hatt-i Hiimayun. 26. 33
Hatt-i 26
Hayrettin Pasha. Tunuslu. 29
"Hellenes Expelled from Turkey. Soci-
ety of the. 284
372
Hellenes. Hellenic Greeks. 71. 83. 118.
124. 128. 129. 133. 142. 178, 185.
189. 191. 201. 225, 226. 227. 240.
248. :270. 272. 273, 281-286. 297. 299
Hellenic Union of the Constantinopolitan
Greeks. 272. 284
Helm. kK .. British diplomat. 214
Henderson. Nevile. acting British High
Commissioner in istanbul, 79. 82.
102. 146
Heraclea. 33, 204
Heybeli. 134, 242. see also Chalki
Hilmi Fehmi. associate of Papa Eftim. 152
Hilmi. Mustafa. mufti of Xanthi, 312n,18
Hilmi. Muslim journalist in Thra-
ceo 312
Hoare, Samuel. British representative in
Turkey. 134
Hugessen. Sir H. Knatchbull. 205. 209,
224. 230
Hiirriyet. 253. 256. 259n.8
Hiisnii. Cemal. Turkish member at the
mixed commission on the exchange
of Greek and Turkish popUlations,
122
i<;:el. 210
ileri. Turcopl1one paper in Thrace, 31 I
n.17
Iliaskou. L, 119
Imbros. 142. 180. 181, 230. 242. 264. 279.
281. 291-294. 306
inonii. Ismet, 85, 86, 90. 92. 95, 97, 100-
102, 113. 118. 125. 145. 147, 150,
157, 164, 166. 175. 176, 179, 188.
191. 196, 200. 207. 211. 216, 230,
232, 246. 247, 262. 277. 285, 298, 319
Institute of Pat ric Studies, Thessaloniki.
306
Ioakeimeion college. 293
Ioannidis. Angelos. prominent Constanti-
nopolitan Greek. 67, 96n.5
Ioannidis. Christos. Greek deputy, 251
Ioannidis, Michael, associate of Papa Ef-
tim. 170
Ioannou. D .. 70
Ionian state. 71
Ishi. Viscount. secretary-general of the
League of Nations. 165
iskenderun. 125
Islamic Awakening Club of Thrace. 311
n,15
istamat Zihni. see Ozdamar
istanbul Ekspres. 156
izmir. 52, 56. 65. 213. 256. 258. 259. 263.
266, 267
izmit. 82, 146. 169
iznik. see Nicaea
"HpepljGla !Yea. Grecophone daily in istan-
bul. 160. 164
'H1W. Grecophone daily in istanbul. 288.
294
J
Jacob. Nikolaou. archbishop of Durazzo.
172n.9
Jacob, Koukouzis. archbishop of North
and South America, 295, 305
Jacob. Papapai'siou. archbishop of Imbros
and Tenedos, 204
Jacob. Tsanavaris, archbishop of Ikonio.
248. 299
Jerusalem. Patriarchate of. 171. 244. 277
Jewish, millet. 27. 43. Ill, 136. 180. 183.
213.215-217.224.231. 250. 258
Joachim III. Devetzis. patriarch of Con-
stantinople. 23. 34, 35. 42
Joachim, archbishop of Chalcedon. 167.
172
Joachim. Pelekanos. archbishop of Der-
cos, 246
John Paul II, Pope. 279. 307
K
Kadlk6y. 290. see also Chalcedon
Kaklamanos. Dimitri. Greek politician. 82.
94, 96, 165
Kalliadis. Constantine. prominent Otto-
man Greek. 45
Kallimachis. Phanariot Greek. 28n.1O
Kallinikos. Delikanis. archbishop of Cyzi-
eus. 153
Kalokairinos. Gerassimos. bishop of Pam-
phylos. 243n.27. 257
Kaloumenos. Dimitrios. 258n.5. 272n .. 27
373
KanatlL chief of army staff. 236
Kanellopoulos. Efthymios. Greek High
Commissioner in istanbul. 64. 81.
133
Kanellopoulos. Panayiotis. Greek politici-
an. 266
Kapetanakis. Greek consul-general in
istanbul. 227
Kaphandaris. George. Greek politician.
121
Kaphatiani. see Panagia Kaphatiani
Karahissaridis. see Papa Eftim
Ka/"{//Il{/Illides or Katal1lallll. 142n.12.
151-153. 192. 291n.43
Karamanlis. Constantine. Greek premier.
250. 269. 275
Karandreas. Greek consul-general in
istanbul. 300
Karatheodoris. Alexander. prominent
Constantinopolitan Greek. 27n,8. 28.
29
Karatheodoris. Constantine. Ottoman
Greek Senator. 27n.7
Karatheodoris. Paul. patriarchal counsel-
lor. 67. 119
Karatheodoris. Stephen. prominent Greek
physician. 29
Karatzas. Phanariot Greek. 28n.1O
Karayannis. John. headmaster of the Pa-
triarchal lycee. 286n.28
Kadowitz. treaty of, 24
Karolidis. Paul. Ottoman Greek deputy.
39. 41. 42
Katechakis. George. Greek officer. 70
Kavakopoulos. see Germanos V
Kavalall. ibrahim Hiiseyin.
donme Turk businessman. 106
Kaya. 96. 109. 162n,13. 164. 198
Kayioglou. Michael. istanbul Greek de-
puty. 251
Kayseri. 151. 157
Kedros brothers. Constantinopolitan
Greek businessmen. 107
Kehayioglou. John. 71. 152
Kemalism. 125. 135. 136, 151. 154. 181.
182. 184. 187. 192. 200. 203. 208.
215.220.296.316
Kepetzis. Michael. 101
Keresteciyan. Armenian community
leader. 181n.29
Kerr. Philip. 70
conference of. 291. 292
Keskin. 151
Kinall (Proti). Greek cemetery of. 259
Kiosseoglou. Alexander. Constantinopoli-
tan Greek businessman. 108. 119
Kocarian. Vahan. Armenian religious
leader. 201n.27
Kollias. Constantine. 291
Kombodekras. Constantine. Greek journa-
list. 272n.27
Komninos. Pandeleimon. theologian. 198
Komotini. 123. 135. 308n.4. 309. 3 I I. 312
Kondy1is. George. Greek leader. 70. 162
Konos. Basil. Greek deputy. 25 I
Konstantinidis. Basil. 224
Koprulu. Fuad. Turkish foreign minister.
236. 265. 27 I
Korea. war in. 236
Kosmidis. Pandelis. Ottoman Greek de-
puty.42n.15
Kostopoulos. SL. Greek foreign minister.
285. 300
Koukouzis. see Jacob
Kaynarca (Kutchuk-I\ainardji). 25
Kumkapl. 152
Kuneralp. Zeki. 276
Kurds. 22. 52. 125
49. 133. 142. 287n.31. see also
Tatavla
24. 47
Kymiatzi. headmistress of Zappeion. 286
L
Laimos. Goo Greek shipowner. 306
Lambert. A.E .. Foreign Office official.
190
Lambeth Palace. 62. 93. 94. 240
Lambikis Andreas. istanbul Greek journa-
list. 254-256. 261. 288. 31 I
Lambikis Pasha. prominent Constantino-
politan Greek. 68
Lara. General Manrique de. president of
the mixed commission on the ex-
change of Greek and Turkish popula-
tions. 114-116. 129. 130
374
Laskaridis. Kaloudis. Greek Senator. 276
Lausanne. conference of. 78. 84. 90-92.
94.95. 101-103. 106. 111. 113. 116.
145. 147. 149. 150. 154. 161. 162.
164. 165. 187
Lausanne. treaty of. 93. 94. 103. 1 I 1. 113.
116. 119. 128. 132. 135-138. 142. 150.
156. 158. 170. 174. 175. 177. 190.
195. 196. 200. 203. 232. 234. 248.
253. 269. 271. 275. 281. 286. 287.
288. 290. 294. 296. 300. 309. 315.
317-319
League of Nations. 84. 85, 97. 98. 112.
113, 115. 120. 124. 138. 163-167. 169.
181. 241
Leeper. KA.. British ambassador to
Greece. 307
Liatis. Soo Greek acting High Commissi-
oner in istanbul. 81. 82
Limnos.85
Lloyd George. British premier. 54. 61. 67,
74,75
Locarno, 179
London. tripartite conference of (1955).
256. 266
Loukaris. see Cyril
Loraine, P., British ambassador in
Athens. 131. 183
M
Macedonia. 39. 55n.4. 121. 189
see Rodopolis
Mahmud II. Sultan. 28n.10
Makarios III, archbishop of Cyprus. 253.
255. 269. 280. 282. 283. 285
Th,. director of the Byzantine
Museum of istanbul. 192
Mammelis. see Dorotheos
Mango. A.A" 217
Mantas. Chrysanthos. 257
Mara. General Charles. 246
Maritza. river of (Evros). 120
Markouizos. TL Greek journalist, 272
n.27
Markos Pasha. prominent Greek. 27
Marmarali. Abravaya. Jewish deputy.
181n.29.211
Marx. Karl. 211
Mavridis, K., 81
Mavrokordatos, D., 43n.18, 68
Mavrokordatos, Th., 31n.3
Mavrophrydis Ch., 287n.31
Mavropoulos, Dimitri, 274
Mavroudis, Constantine, Constantinopoli-
tan Greek journalist, 244n.33
Mavroyenis, Alexander, Ottoman Greek
diplomat, 30
Mavroyenis, Spyridon, Greek physician,
27,30
Maximos, Dimitrios, Greek foreign mini-
ster, 199
Maximos, Seraphim, Greek socialist, 112
Maximos, Vaportzis, patriarch of Con-
stantinople, 204, 241, 243, 244, 246
Mazarakis, Alexander, 70
Mazbut, 201
Megali idea, 38, 44, 53, 68, 70, 104, 239,
253
Mecelle, 136
Mehmet II, Sultan, 22, 37, 58, 144
Mehmet VI, Vahdettin, Sultan, 63, 78
Meletios, Metaxakis, patriarch of Con-
stantinople, 69, 72-76, 81, 85, 88, 94,
101, 118, 133, 144149, 151153, 155,
160, 172, 201
Meletopoulos, D., commander of Greek
navy stationed in istanbul, 81
Meliton, Chatzis, archbishop of ChaIce-
don, 278n.14, 279, 295n.56, 296, 306
Menderes, Adnan, Turkish premier, 235,
236, 249, 254, 256, 260, 262266, 268,
270, 273, 276
Menemencioglu, Numan, Turkish foreign
minister, 213, 225, 229
Menemencioglu, TUI'gut, 302
Metaxakis, see Meletios
Metaxas, John, Greek leader, 180, 196
Michalakopoulos, Andreas, 125-127, 131,
163, 179
Middle East, 238, 244, 276
Mighirdich, Vaton, 201n.27
Mikrasiatic state, 73, 74, see also Ionian
state
Milletbas,l, 22, 98
Milliyet (istanbul), 199, 260, 293
Milliyet (Xanthi), 312
24
Misak-i Mill!, 77, 96, 137
Misiroglou, Anastasios, 163
Mithat Pasha, 28
Mitylene, 172n.9
Mixed commiSSIOn on the exchange of
Greek and Turkish populations,
113-117, 122, 126, 129, 130, 132, 143,
159-163, 165, 166, 177
Montagna, G.M., Italian negotiator at
Lausanne, 86, 90-92, 94, 101
Morgan, J., Senior member of the British
embassy in Ankara, 195,196
Moschos, AchiIleas, Greek deputy, 250,
251
Moscow, 200, 238, 239, 244
Mosul, 94, 96, 125, 127
Mt. Athos, 88, 148, 149, 171, 197, 200,
278, 306
Mousouros, Constantine, Ottoman Greek
diplomat, 27-29
Mousouros, Stephen, Ottoman Greek di-
plomat,30
Mudanya, conference of, 78-80, 103
Mudros, armistice of, 52, 55, 64, 68, 114,
155, 168
Mufti, 123, 309, 312n.21
Muhafazakiir, Thracian newspaper, 311
Mukataa, tax of, 242n.20, 243, 248, 290,
375
294-296
Miilhak, 202
Murad V, sultan, 31
Muslims of Western Thrace, 85, 86, 95,
96, 114, 116, 117, 120-126, 128, 131,
135, 164, 187, 188, 190, 199, 257n.2,
273, 307-315
Muslim Teachers' Association of Thrace,
311n.15
Miitevelli heyetleri (ephories), 202
Myrivilis, Stratis, 272n.30
Merappv()J1/(nr;. eftimite paper, 170, 184
N
Nadi, Nadir, Turkish journalist, 219
Nansen, Dr Fridtj, 84, 85
Naroyian, Mesrup, Armenian community
leader, 201n.27
National Turkish Commercial Union, 106,
107
NATO, 235, 254, 258, 264, 267, 275, 277,
280, 285, 308, 319
Nazi Germany, 207, 208, 220, 231, 232,
see also Axis
Negrepontis, 21
Neocaesarea, 169
Neologos (Neal.oyor:;) , Constantinopolitan
Greek paper, 34n.8, 45, 58, 119
New York Herald, 158
New York Times, 217, 228, 260
Nicaea, 33, 155, 168, 172
Nicholas, Sakkopoulos, archbishop of
Caesarea, 72, 148, 150, 153, 167n.41
Nicolson, Sir Harold, British diplomat, 53
Nicomedia, 33
Nicolaidis-Souliotis, A., 38
Niksar, see Neocaesarea
Northern Epirus, 44, 52
Nur, Rlza, 86-88, 90, 92, 93, 96-100, 102,
149, 150, 154, 319
Nuri, Osman, Thracian deputy, 3ll
o
Oakley, Austin, chaplain at the Crimean
Memorial Church, 191, 202
Oikonomou-Gouras, Greek foreign mini-
ster, 291
Okte, Faik, 215-217, 220, 221
Okyar, Fethi, Turkish Liberal Leader,
ll5, 120, 125, 162n.13, 164, 182
Orbay, Rauf, Turkish ambassador in Lon-
don, 230
Organization of Constantinople, 38, 42n.15
Orient News, 125
Orphanidis, Basil, Ottoman Greek deputy,
68, 138n.7, 149
Ottomanism (OsmanlUlk), 26, 31, 32, 42
Ozdamar; istamat Zihni, eftimite leader,
152n.15, 18In.29, 184, 186, 188, 202,
206, 242, 250
'OpBol5oc,ia, official journal of the Patriar-
chate, 248, 299
P
Palaiologos, A., Greek diplomat, 45
Palaiologos, Paul, Greek journalist, 247
n.15
Palamas, Christos Xanthopoulos, Greek
376
ambassador in the United Nations,
269, 293
Pallis, Alexander, 148, 16In.10, 239
Pammakaristos, church of, 24
Panagia Kaphatiani, church of, 145, 151,
157, 169, 243n.28
Panagia Paramythias, church of, 24
Panagia of Pera, church of, 170
Pandelaras, Dimitris, headmaster of Ioa-
keimeion, 293
Pangalos, Theodore, 126-129, 163
Panthracian anti-Turkish Defence, 312
Papa Eftim, 151-159, 168-\70, 173, 187,
188, 20In.27, 202, 205, 206, 242, 243,
250, 27\, 302-304, 316, 318
Papadopoulos, see Dimitrios I
Papadopoulos, George, Greek dictator,
291-293
Papadopoulos, Kotsos, eftimite journalist,
170, 184
Papadopoulos, Stephen, Greek journalist,
272n.27
Papagos, Alexander, Greek premier, 267,
275, 308
Papaligouras, Panagiotis, Greek foreign
minister, 314
Papandreou, George, Greek premier, 285
Papapa'isiou, see Jacob
Paparrigopoulos, Constantine, 35
Pappas, Alexander, patriarchal counsellor,
59, 178
Paraskevopoulos, Leonidas, 57n.15
Paris, peace conference of, 52, 55, 59, 60,
64, 65, 66
Paris, peace treaty of (1947), 234
Patriarchal Iycee, 46, 286, 295
Patriarcheas, George, Greek journalist,
272n.27
Paul, King of Greece, 236, 249, 309
Paul, Pope,-.?78, 307
Peker, Recep, minister of the interior,
159n.3, 243
Pelekanos, see Joachim
Pendik, 91
Pera, 87, 104, 1/8, 119, 152, 169, 190-192,
257, 262
Pera Palas, Constantinopolitan hotel, 70,
ll9
r '
Permanent Court of International Justice,
115-117, 165-167
Pesmazoglou, George, Greek ambassador
in Ankara, 272
Peterson, Maurice, British ambassador in
Ankara, 237, 239, 241
Peygamber Binasl. religious paper in
Thrace,311
Phessopoulos, G., governor of Thrace,
308
Philaretos, bishop of Myra, 145
Philippidis, see Chrysanthos
Photios II, Maniatis, patriarch of Constan-
tinople, 194-198, 200, 203-205
Photiadis, John, Ottoman Greek diplomat,
29
Phrantzis, George, 22n.3
Phytos, Dr D., patriarchal counsellor on
political affairs, 150
Pipinelis, Panayiotis, 245n.7, 292, 293
Plastiras, Nicholas, 89n.7, 236
Poland, 196
Politis, John, Greek charge d'affaires in
Ankara, 125, 156
Politis, Nicholas, 84, 115
Polychroniadis, Spyridon, Greek represen-
tative in Ankara, 176, 177, 186, 188,
195, 196
Polykarpos, Stergios, anti-Meletios figure,
147
Pomaks, 310, 313
Portokaloglou, 119
Pouloglou, Stamatis, see Ordamar
Princes Islands, see Biiyiikada
PIinkipo, 141, orphanage of, 287n.31, 318
Progressive RepUblican Party, 125
[la\'ePi'awai "EvwaI/ KwvaravTlvovno).ewr:;.
112
[lo).Ireia (Politeia), 164
[lpwia (Proia), 197
R
Rakitch, Serbian delegate at Lausanne, 92
Rallis, George, 108
Raphail, Raphail, 221, 226, 231
Refornls, Ottoman, 24
Religious privileges, 22
377
Reat, Hafiz, Muslim leader in Thrace,
311
Rhodes, 277, 278, 306
Rlfat Bey, 201n.27
Robeck, J.M. de, British high commissi-
oner in istanbul, 66
Roberts, N.S., \06
Rodopolis, 155, 169, 173
Rombopoulos, Charalambos, istanbul
Greek journalist, 288, 294
Roosevelt, Franklin, 232, 245
Roussos, George, Greek foreign minister,
121
Rumania, 92, 196, 207
Rumbold, Sir Harold, British high com-
missioner in istanbul, 82, 101, 102,
147
Russia, 25, 197
Russian Patriarchate, 197, 244, 245, 249
Ryan, Andrew, 64, 76n.30, 93, 99, \00
S
Sabahattin, Ottoman prince, 40, 41
Sabri, Mustafa, 135, 187, 206
Saka, Hasan, Turkish foreign minister,
237
Sakellaropoulos, Constantine, consul-
general in istanbUl, 186, 187
Sakkopoulos, see Nicholas
Samatya, 152
Sara<;:oglu, Turkish premier, 128,
139, 2/1, 215, 229, 230, 232, 237,
241, 242
Sarandis, Frankiskos, 178
Sardis, 197
Sarisitis, see Gervasios
Sarper, Selim, Turkish foreign minister,
276
Sarris, Neoklis, 294n.54
Savas, John, 27n.8, 48
Saydam, Dr. Refik, Turkish premier,
208n.4
Sbarounis, Ath., 237
Scoutari, see Dskiidar
Sebat. Thracian turcophone paper, 3ll
n.14
Sergius, Russian patriarch, 238
Sepheroglou, Nicholas, Greek tobacco
merchant, 107
Seriat, islamic law, 88
Sevres, treaty of, 66, 67
Seyyid, minister of justice, 156
Shaki, Ishaq, Jewish religious head in
Turkey, 201n.27
Slgl (Sigrni), 160
Siniosoglou, Alexander, Constantinopoli-
tan Greek entrepreneur, 108, 118,
152
Siotis, Antony, Greek member at the mi-
xed commission on the exchange of
Greek and Turkish populations, 160
cemetery of, 259
Sismanoglou, Alexander, Greek business-
man, 119, 152
Sivas, congress of, 65
Skalieris, George, eminent Constantinopo-
litan Greek, 40, 338
Skalieris, Kleanthis, influential politician,
40n.21
Skepheris, Sophocles, Greek ambassador
in Ankara, 241, 242
Skouros, Aristeidis Pasha, prominent
Constantinopolitan Greek, 68, 138
n.7
Skouros, Phaidon, local councillor, 256
Smith, Adam, 211
Smyrna, Greek rule of, 65, 74, massacre
of, 77, 80, 81
Sotiros Christou, Greek Orthodox church
of Galata, 243n.28, 272
Soviet Living Church, 171
Soviet Union, the, 176, 200, 207, 234,
237-241, 244, 245
Soysal, Miimtaz, 274, 282
Spanoudis, Constantine, Constantinopoli-
tan Greek journalist, 190, 191
Spatharis, Avrilios, Constantinopolitan
Greek lawyer, 137, 169
Spyrou, see Athenagoras
Stalin, Joseph, 237, 254
Stavrianos, see Ambrosios
Stavridi, Sir John, Anglo-Greek banker,
56
St. Dimitrios Kanavi, church of, 24
Steinhardt, U.S. ambassador in Turkey,
224
378
Stephanopoulos, St., Greek foreign mini-
ster, 267
Stephanovik, Paul Skylitzis, Constantino-
politan Greek philanthropist, 3In.3,
34
Stergiadis, Aristeidis, Greek governor of
Smyrna, 73n.23
St. George, patriarchal cathedral of, 24,
161, 249n.7, 272, 299, 307
St. George, Therapeia church of, 298
St. John of Galata, church of, 303
St. Nicholas of Galata, church of, 169,
205, 303
Strinopoulos, see Germanos
St. Sophia, Church of, 62n.39, 200
Sublime Porte, 23, 24, 29, 33, 45, 68, 75
Siileyman Sami, governor of istanbul,
160n.6, 167
Sulzberger, c'L., American journalist, 228
Sunay, Cevdet, Turkish president, 278,
304
Syllogoi, 45
T
Taksim, square of, 118, 246
Talii, Nairn, Turkish premier, 293
Tanin, 95, 149, 154, 158
Tanrliiver, H.S., prominent Turk, 244n.l,
247
Tanzimat, 25, 29, 48
Taptas, Dr Nicholas, Greek deputy, 181,
190, 21I, 250
Tatavla, 49, 58, 133, 141, see also Kur-

Temps, Le, 163
Tenedos, 89, 143, 180, 181, 192, 204, 242,
279, 281, 291-293, 306
Terciiman, 253
Terkoz, see Dercos
Tevfik Ottoman premier, 63, 78
Tevhid-i Ejkar, 94, 158n.24
Theotokas, Michael, Constantinopolitan
Greek lawyer, 96, 138n.9, 161n.1O
Thessaloniki, 131, 148, 162, 167, 256, 257,
263
Thrace (eastern and western), 39, 44, 45.
53, 70, 71, 77, 78, 80, 85, 86, 89, we-
stern, 96, 99, 103, 105, 120-128, 135.
174, 177, 186, 189, 249, 257, 294,
307-315,319
Thyateira, 94, 197, 240, 245
Tokatliyan, hotel of, 152
Toynbee, Arnold, 53, 159, 164
Trakya, Western Thracian paper, 311
Trebizond, 59, 197, 245
Triantaphyllos, eftimite Greek, 184
Truman doctrine, 234, 245-247
Tsakonas, Dimitri, 245n.7
Tsaldaris, Constantine, 235
Tsaldaris, Panayis, Greek premier, 180,
196, 201
Tsanavaris, see Jacob
Tsatsos, Dimitri, 272n.30
Tsirigotis, John, anti-Meletios figure, 147
Tsirimokos, Elias, Greek political leader,
288
Tsitouris, N., Constantinopolitan Greek
businessman, 132
Tsouderos, Emmanuel, Greek premier,
228, 229
Tulga, Refik, 271
Tiiliiy, Turhan, Turkish ambassador in
Athens, 282
Tunisia, 84
Turkish Cypriots, 271, 273, 275, 278, 289
Turkish National Export and Import
Company, 107
Turkish Orthodox Church, 149, 151, 157,
159, 183, 184, 188, 206, 302-304
Turkish Teachers' Union of Thrace, 31I
n.15
Turkish Union of Xanthi, 311n.15
Turkish Youth Hearth of Thrace, 123
Tzambazoglou, Miltiadis, istanbul Greek
community representative, 295n.56,
296
Tzounis, John, Greek diplomat, 292, 295
V
Vakfj; 201, 243, 248, 290, 306
Vak'lflar Bank, 202
Vakit, 205
Valoukli, see Bal/kll
Vaportzis, see Maximos
Vardopoulos, Basil, 178
Varllk vergisi, 211, 213-232, 237, 284, 318
379
Varougas, Dionysos, 201n.27
Vasiadis, Iroklis, Greek educationalist, 45
Vatan, 149, 15In.24, 215
Vatican, 91, 238, 278, 279, 304
Vatopedion, 197
Vayianis, Constantine, 43n.18, 63
Vehbi, police commandant in istanbul,
146
Venizelos, Eleftherios, Greek leader, 43,
44, 52-55. 59, 65, 69-73, 75, 84, 85,
89, 90. 95-97, 99, 100, 101, 129, 145,
147. 148, 167, 174-176, 178-180, 186-
189, 194, 196, 201, 234, 252, 254,
309, 338
Venizelos, Sophocles, 234, 235, 236
Vlastos, A., 31
Vogoridis, Stephen, 27n.6, 28, 30
Votsis, Nicholas, Greek high commissi-"
oner in istanbul, 72
Voutyras, Alexander, 178
Voutyras, Stavros, prominent Constanti-
nopolitan Greek journalist, 34, 45,
58, 1I9
X
Xanthi, 123, 310, 31In.18
Xenos, Anastasios, Constantinopolitan
priest, 299
Xylopolta, 24
Xyrokrini, see
XPOVIKa., 140
XPOI'OC;, Komotini daily, 312
W
Wallach Saray, 24
Watson, Douglas, manager of the Con-
stantinople telephone company, 1I0
Watt, manager of the Ionian Bank in
istanbul, 110
Webb, Richard, acting British high com-
missioner in istanbul, 58, 59, 64
Whitehouse, Canon, Chaplain of the Bri-
tish Embassy in istanbul, 194
Woods, H., 107
U
VIliS, 213, 258
Union of Muslims in Thrace, 311
Unionists, see Young Turks
Unite Armenians, 202
United Nations, 228, 269, 283, 285, 289,
291, 296, 300, 302, 303, 305
United States, 245-247, 269, 270, 297, 301,
314
Urgiiplii, Suat H., Turkish premier, 285,
288, 289, 299, 304
Uskiidar, 87, 168, 219
USSR, 237-239
Y
Yal<;:!n, Hiiseyin, Turkish journalist, 243,
244n.l,258
Yalman, Ahmet Emin, Turkish journalist,
215, 216, 220, 223
Yass!ada, 263, 266, 269, 273, 276
Yedikule, 48
Yeni Gazete. 291
Yeni Gun. 199
Yeni istanbul. 268, 270, 274
Yenimahale, 133
Young Turks, 36, 39-44, 58, 63, 106, 132,
220
Yozgat, 151
Ypsilantis, Alexander, 37
Yugoslavia, 171, 196, 235, 236, 267
380
Yusuf, Hiisnii, Muslim leader, 311
z
Zacharias, !lias, 112
Zacharopoulos, see Aimilianos
Zaimis, Andreas, Greek deputy foreign
minister, 294
Zakynthinos, D., 272n.30
Zapheiropoulos, Constantinopolitan ban-
ker, 47
Zappas, Constantine, Greek benefactor,
47
Zappeion, Greek Iycee for girls, 47, 134,
203, 205, 250n.ll, 262, 286
Zariphis, Leonidas, Greek banker, 31, 34,
47, 69, 118, 130
Zaven, Armenian patriarch, 80
Zeki, Ali, correspondant of Tanin, 149
Zeki, Salih, 133
Zervoudakis, see Gregory VII
Zincirdere, 151
Zimbrakakis, E., 70
Zographeion, Greek lycee for boys, 47,
147, 286
Zographos, Chnstaki, Greek financier, 22,
24,47
Zorlu, Fatin, Turkish foreign minister,
263-266
Marko Pasha. a prominent member of
the Constantinopolitan Greek com-
munity.
Solon Kazanovas, member of the pa-
triarchal mixed council.
Alexander Zoiros Pasha, prominent
Greek doctor employed at the Otto-
man palace.
C. Karatheodoris, Constantinopolitan
Greek politician.
Alexander Siniosoglou, prominent
Greek businessman of karamanll
origins.
John Chatzopoulos, prominent Con-
stantinopolitan Greek and member of
the patriarchal mixed council.
E. Evgenidis, successful Constant i-
nopolitan Greek businessman and
philanthropist.
George Exindaris, Greek negotiator at
the Mixed Commission (with the kind
permission of his nephew, Ambassador
Exindaris).
From the historic meeting of the Pope
and the Patriarch in 1967.
Patriarch Dimitrios I.
Fraternity. A Turkish mollah (in the centre) is shown sitting at the voting-table
with a Greek priest on his right and an Armenian priest on his left. The wail at
the back is the fac;:ade of a Greek church.
Premier C Karamanlis with his Turkish counterpart Adnan Menderes. This pho-
tograph has been taken during the Greek premier's visit to istanbul in May 1959.
On the right hand it is the Greek deputy of istanbul, Alexander Chatzopoulos.
Atatiirk with a group of istanbul Greeks. The picture was taken at the early 1930
at Florya beach.
The church of St. George and the patriarchal gardens.
The offices of the patriarchal mixed council and the library, part of the patriar-
chal complex.
The historical Patriarchal Throne of Chrysostomos at St. George Church of the
Phanar Monastery (offer of Dimitri Kalloumenos).
The icon of Panagia Pammakaristos - one of the oldest icons preserved at the
Phanar cathedral.
A.
The Theological Academy of Chalki.
The auditorium of the patriarchal Iycee of Phanar.
The patriarchal lycee and the FenerjPhanari quarter of istanbul. The picture was taken at the turn of thf'
century. (I would like to thank Dimitri Kalloumenos for offering me this picture).
. . ~