Buaya v. Polo, 169 SCRA 471 (1989) People v. Lagon, 185 SCRA 442 (1990) Palana v.

People, 534 SCRA 296 (2007) Trenas v. People, G.R. No. 195002, January 25, 2012 Uy v. C.A., 276 SCRA 367 (1997) Campanano, Jr. Vs. Datuin, 536 SCRA 471 (2007) People v. Taroy, G.R. #192466, Sept. 12, 2011 People v. Gutierrez, 36 SCRA 172 (1970) People v. Pilotin, 65 SCRA 635 (1975) Mondiguing v. Abaci, G.R. No. 4131 3. November 6, 1975, 68 SCRA 14. People v. Sola, G.R. No. L-56158-64 March 17, 1981** Valdepenas v. People, 16 SCRA 871 (1966) Miranda v. Tuliao, 486 SCRA 377 + Figueroa v. People, 558 SCRA 63 (2008) Heirs of Honrales v. Honrales, 629 SCRA 423 (2010) Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. V. People, 427 SCRA 456 (2004) Alonso, et al vs. Cebu Country Club, Inc., et al., G.R. No. Lacson v. Executive Secretary, 301 SCRA 298 (1999) + Magno v. People, 647 SCRA 362 (2011) People v. Mateo, 433 SCRA 640 (2004) People v. Abon, 545 SCRA 606 (2007) People v. Rocha, 531 SCRA 761 (2007) People v. Salome, 500 SCRA 659, Aug. 31, 2006 Tabujara III vs. People, 570 SCRA 229 (2008) Magestrado vs. People, 527 SCRA 125 (2007)+ Constantino v. Sandiganbayan, 533 SCRA 205 (2007) Villegas v. CA, 271 SCRA 148 (1997); People v. Ayochok, 629 SCRA 324 (2010) People v. Barro Sr., 338 SCRA 212 (2000); People v. Asis, 629 SCRA 250 (2010) Merciales v. C.A., 379 SCRA 345 (2002)** Mupas v. People, G.R. No. 189365, Oct. 12, 2011 Bangayan v. Go-Bangayan, G.R. No. 172777/172792, Oct. 19, 2011 Uy v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 105965-70. March 20, Fabian vs. Desierto, 295 SCRA 470, September 16, 1998 Macalalag vs. Ombudsman, 424 SCRA 741 (2004) Office of the Ombudsman vs. Court of Appeals, Golangco vs. Fung, 504 SCRA 321 (2006) Perez vs. Office of the Ombudsman Ombudsman vs. Heirs of Margarita Ventura, 605 SCRA 1(2009) Rodriguez v. Sandiganbayan, 424 SCRA 236 (2004) Bariaga v. Sandiganbayan, 457 SCRA 301 (2005) Organo v. Sandiganbayan, 320 SCRA 684 (1994) Inding v. Sandiganbayan, 434 SCRA 388 (2004) Lacson v. Executive Secretary, supra Magno v. People, supra Ivler v. Mondesto-San Pedro, 635 SCRA 191 (2010) People vs. Asis, 629 SCRA 250 (2010) People v. Velasco, 340 SCRA 207 (2000) ** People v. Molina, G.R Nos. 141129-33, December 14, 2001; Ong vs. Genio, 609 SCRA 188, Dec. 23 2009 Ramirez vs. Court of Appeals 71 SCRA 231 (1976) In Re: Writ of Habeas Corpus for Reynaldo de Villa

Stonehill v. Diokno, 20 SCRA 383 (1967); What is the Moncado doctrine? That even if search and seizure is unconstitutional, it is still admissible in evidence. What is adopted here, abadoning the Moncado doctrine: exclusion of evidence unlawfully obtained. Why is the exclusionary rule adopted? It is the only practical means of enforcing the constitutional injunction against unreasonable search and seizure. (Justice Learned Hand) What is a fishing expedition indicative of? Absence of probable cause. People v. Valdez, 341 SCRA 25 (2000)** Why are the marijuana plants inadmissible in evidence, even though they are located in an unfenced lot? (1) Because no warrant was secured, even if they had an ample time of one day to secure it from a judge; (2) no showing of urgency/necessity for immediate seizure of marijuana plants; (3) that the cannabis plants were in an unfenced lot did not justify warrantless search and seizure. Katz v. U.S., 389 U.S. 347 (1967); Whether the Fourth Amendment of the Constitution protects telephone conversations conducted in a phone booth and secretly recorded from introduction as evidence against a person? Yes. What is the test for constitutional protection of people, not places against unreasonable search and seizure? (Accdg. to J. Harlan) The subjective and objective prongs of the reasonableness inquiry. First, that a person has exhibited an actual expectation of privacy and, second, that the expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable. See: Polo v. David, G.R. No. 181881, October 18, 2011** (Computer in government office search) Why is this a reasonable search? -no actual subjective expectation of privacy -no separate enclosed office / no claim office was not shared with anyone -no claim about use of passwords or means to exclude other employees -normally has visitors in the public assistance office allowed to use the PC -there is office policy, Computer Use Policy (no expectation of privacy; waiver of privacy rights; use of passwords does not produce reasonable expectation; on-the-spot inspections may be done) equivalent to workplace privacy policy -the computer is government property -there is a letter prompting the investigation People v. Marti, 193 SCRA 57 (1991); Does it matter whether evidence is procured by State agents or private individuals, for purposes of the exclusionary rule? Yes. -Bill of Rights does not govern relationships between individuals. -rule on unreasonable search and seizure cannot be extended to private individuals. -violations against it can only be invoked against the State.

Why is there no search in this case? -here, the private individuals search was by virtue of standard operating procedure as precautionary measure; upon opening the box, he took samples to the NBI; entrusted cargo to NBI; the NBI made no search and seizure. -mere presence of NBI agent did not convert reasonable search of private individual into a warrantless search and seizure proscribed by the Constitution -merely to look/observe that which is in plain sight is not search -THERE IS NO TRESPASS by police officers People v. Bongcarawan, 384 SCRA 525 (2002) Why is there no search in this case? -the baggage was searched by the vessel security personnel, who found shabu. -after the search by personnel, he called Philippine Coast Guard. -It was carried out without government intervention. -the fact that vessel security officer is armed and tasked to maintain peace and order doesnt render him a State agent. He does not discharge a government function to enforce the law. Zulueta v. C.A., 253 SCRA 699 (1996) Why are the documents and papers inadmissible between husband and wife? -marital privilege (must have consent before testifying against the other)

Villanueva v. Querubin, 48 SCRA 349 (1972); Guanzon v. De Villa, 181 SCRA 623 (1990); May saturation drives be conducted without search warrants? Yes.

People v. Marti, supra Katz c. U.S., supra Burgos v. Chief of Staff 133 SCRA 800 (1984) Eb; People v. Valde, supra Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S 27 (2001) Thermal Imaging device

Does the use of a thermal-imaging device to detect relative amounts of heat emanating from a private home constitute an unconstitutional search in violation of the Fourth Amendment? Yes. -Scalia: "[w]here, as here, the Government uses a device that is not in general public use, to explore details of the home that would previously have been unknowable without physical intrusion, the surveillance is a 'search' and is presumptively unreasonable without a warrant." In dissent, Justice John Paul Stevens argued that the "observations were made with a fairly primitive thermal imager that gathered data exposed on the outside of [Kyllo's] home but did not invade any constitutionally protected interest in privacy," and were, thus, "information in the public domain." California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S 207 (1986) Aerial naked eye observation Did the warrantless, aerial observation of Ciraolo's back yard from an altitude of 1,000 feet constitute an illegal search and violate the Fourth Amendment? No. -Chief Justice Burger reasoned that the Fourth Amendment protections regarding the home had never been absolute: for example, police officers are not obligated to shield their eyes when passing homes on public streets or sidewalks. Since the observations of the Santa Clara officers was "nonintrusive" and "took place within public navigable airspace," their actions were consistent with the Fourth Amendment. "Any member of the public flying in this airspace who glanced down could have seen everything that these officers observed," concluded Burger. The dissenters, led by Justice Powell, argued that this decision was a significant departure from the Court's holding in Katz v. United States (1967) which established a two-part test to evaluate privacy claims. Dow Chemicals v. U.S., 476 U.S 227 (1986) Aerial search using device Whether EPA's taking, without a warrant, of aerial photographs of petitioner's plant complex from an aircraft lawfully in public navigable airspace was a search prohibited by the Fourth Amendment? No. -The open areas of an industrial plant complex such as petitioner's are not analogous to the "curtilage" of a dwelling, which is entitled to protection as a place where the occupants have a reasonable and legitimate expectation of privacy that society is prepared to accept. The intimate activities associated with family privacy and the home and its curtilage simply do not reach the outdoor areas or spaces between structures and buildings of a manufacturing plant. For purposes of aerial surveillance, the open areas of an industrial complex are more comparable to an "open field" in which an individual may not legitimately demand privacy. Here, EPA was not employing some unique sensory device not available to the public, but rather was employing a conventional, albeit precise, commercial camera commonly used in mapmaking. The photographs were not so revealing of intimate details as to raise constitutional concerns. The mere fact that human vision is enhanced somewhat, at least to the degree here, does not give rise to constitutional problems. United States v. Place, 462 U.S 696 (1983) Sniff Dog Whether a sniff by a police dog specially trained to detect the presence of narcotics is an unreasonable search? No. - Sniff dog is not a search. - Sniff dog is intended only to detect the absence or presence of narcotics. - police actions must use reasonable available, least intrusive means. - Sniff dog is so limited a test.

The Court performed a balancing test and balanced government interest in fighting crime to the minor inconvenience of having your luggage briefly detained. Since the dog can only tell if there are drugs in the bag, it's not a search because it doesn't reveal anything about your possessions, except if there are illegal drugs there.

Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S 293 (1966) Plant Whether evidence obtained by the Government by means of deceptively placing a secret informer in the quarters and councils of a defendant during one criminal trial so violates the defendants Fourth, Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights that suppression of such evidence is required in a subsequent trial of the same defendant on a different charge? No. It is obvious that the petitioner was not relying on the security of his hotel suite when he made the incriminating statements to Partin or in Partins presence. Partin did not enter the suite by force or by stealth. He was not a surreptitious eavesdropper. Partin was in the suite by invitation and every conversation which he heard was either directed to him or knowingly carried on in his presence. The petitioner, in a word, was not relying on the security of the hotel room; he was relying upon his misplaced confidence that Partin would not reveal his wrongdoing. As such, no right protected by the Fourth Amendment was violated. Hoffas Fifth Amendment claim that he was compelled to be a witness against himself was also without merit. There was no type of compulsion or coercion. Hoffa also made two Sixth Amendment arguments found to be without merit. First, Hoffa argued that his lawyers used his suite as a place to confer with him and with each other, to interview witnesses, and to plan the following days trial strategy. Accordingly, he argued that Partins presence in and around the suite violated the petitioners Sixth Amendment right to counsel because an essential ingredient thereof is the right of a defendant and his counsel to prepare for trial without intrusion upon their confidential relationship by an agent of the Government, the defendants trial adversary. In discounting this argument, the majority observed it is far from clear to what extent Partin was present at conversations or conferences of the petitioners counsel. Also, the majority distinguished two cases by observing [Hoffa's] statements related to the commission of a quite separate offense.

California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S 35 (1988) Garbage search Did the warrantless search and seizure of Greenwood's garbage violate the Fourth Amendment's search and seizure guarantee? No. -the Court held that garbage placed at the curbside is unprotected by the Fourth Amendment. The Court argued that there was no reasonable expectation of privacy for trash on public streets "readily accessible to animals, children, scavengers, snoops, and other members of the public." The Court also noted that the police cannot be expected to ignore criminal activity that can be observed by "any member of the public." Washington vs. Boland, 115 Wn.2d (1990); 800P.2d 1112 Do warrantless searches of garbage placed outside of individuals property for collection violate the right to privacy guaranteed by the Washington State Constitution (Article I 7)? Yes. -Justice Dollivers opinion for the Court held that individuals do enjoy a reasonable expectation of privacy with regard to garbage left curbside for collection that

precludes warrantless searches of such garbage. Although individuals reasonably expect licensed trash collectors to remove and dispose of the contents of their garbage cans, no expectation of government intrusion is implied. Despite the fact that the United States Supreme Court had held in California v. Greenwood that the United States Constitution offers no protection against such searches, the Court ruled that the Washington State Constitution confers broader protection upon individuals. People v. Canton, G.R No. 148825, December 277, 2002 Is routine airport security procedure an exception to proscription against warrantless search and seizure? Yes. This constitutes another exception to the proscription against warrantless searches and seizures. As admitted by SUSAN and shown in Annex D of her Brief, the afore-quoted provision is stated in the Notice to All Passengers located at the final security checkpoint at the departure lounge. From the said provision, it is clear that the search, unlike in the Terry search, is not limited to weapons. Passengers are also subject to search for prohibited materials or substances. In this case, after the metal detector alarmed SUSAN consented to be frisked, which resulted in the discovery of packages on her body. It was too late in the day for her to refuse to be further searched because the discovery of the packages whose contents felt like rice granules, coupled by her apprehensiveness and her obviously false statement that the packages contained only money, aroused the suspicion of the frisker that SUSAN was hiding something illegal. It must be repeated that R.A. No. 6235 authorizes search for prohibited materials or substances. To limit the action of the airport security personnel to simply refusing her entry into the aircraft and sending her home (as suggested by appellant), and thereby depriving them of the ability and facility to act accordingly, including to further search without warrant, in light of such circumstances, would be to sanction impotence and ineffectivity in law enforcement, to the detriment of society. Thus, the strip search in the ladies room was justified under the circumstances. Gaanan vs. IAC, G.R. No. L-69809 October 16, 1986 Is telephone extension covered by device or arrangement under AntiWiretapping Law? No.

People v. Aruta, 288 SCRA 626 (1998) Why was the search illegal? -police had reasonable time (24 hrs) to procure warrant -Arutas identity was priorly ascertained by informant -Aruta was not acting suspiciously -Aruta was searched while crossing the street (not moving vehicle) -no valid warrantless arrest This case is similar to People v. Aminnudin where the police received information two days before the arrival of Aminnudin that the latter would be arriving from Iloilo

on board the M/V Wilcon 9. His name was known, the vehicle was identified and the date of arrival was certain. From the information they had received, the police could have persuaded a judge that there was probable cause, indeed, to justify the issuance of a warrant. Instead of securing a warrant first, they proceeded to apprehend Aminnudin. When the case was brought before this Court, the arrest was held to be illegal; hence any item seized from Aminnudin could not be used against him. Another recent case is People v. Encinada where the police likewise received confidential information the day before at 4:00 in the afternoon from their informant that Encinada would be bringing in marijuana from Cebu City on board M/V Sweet Pearl at 7:00 in the morning of the following day. This intelligence information regarding the culprits identity, the particular crime he allegedly committed and his exact whereabouts could have been a basis of probable cause for the lawmen to secure a warrant. This Court held that in accordance with Administrative Circular No. 13 and Circular No. 19, series of 1987, the lawmen could have applied for a warrant even after court hours. The failure or neglect to secure one cannot serve as an excuse for violating Encinadas constitutional right. Manalili v. CA, 280 SRCA 400 (1997); Why was the search valid? It was a stop-and-frisk. -In the case at hand, Patrolman Espiritu and his companions observed during their surveillance that appellant had red eyes and was wobbling like a drunk along the Caloocan City Cemetery, which according to police information was a popular hangout of drug addicts. From his experience as a member of the Anti-Narcotics Unit of the Caloocan City Police, such suspicious behavior was characteristic of drug addicts who were high. The policemen therefore had sufficient reason to stop petitioner to investigate if he was actually high on drugs. During such investigation, they found marijuana in petitioners possession. Did the accused waive the inadmissibility of evidence obtained from illegal search? Yes. -he failed to raise this issue or to object thereto during the trial. A valid waiver of a right, more particularly of the constitutional right against unreasonable search, requires the concurrence of the following requirements: (1) the right to be waived existed; (2) the person waiving it had knowledge, actual or constructive, thereof; and (3) he or she had an actual intention to relinquish the right. Otherwise, the Courts will indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver of fundamental safeguards and will not deduce acquiescence from the failure to exercise this elementary right. In the present case, however, petitioner is deemed to have waived such right for his failure to raise its violation before the trial court. In petitions under Rule 45, as distinguished from an ordinary appeal of criminal cases where the whole case is opened for review, the appeal is generally limited to the errors assigned by petitioner. Issues not raised below cannot be pleaded for the first time on appeal. Malaloan v. CA, 232 SCRA 249 (1994)**; Whether a Court may issue search warrant in connection with an offense allegedly committed outside its territorial jurisdiction? Yes. Whether a Court may issue search warrant to conduct a search in a place outside its territorial jurisdiction? Yes. It is, therefore, incorrect to say that only the court which has jurisdiction over the criminal case can issue the search warrant, as would be the consequence of

petitioners' position that only the branch of the court with jurisdiction over the place to be searched can issue a warrant to search the same. It may be conceded, as a matter of policy, that where a criminal case is pending, the court wherein it was filed, or the assigned branch thereof, has primary jurisdiction to issue the search warrant; and where no such criminal case has yet been filed, that the executive judges or their lawful substitutes in the areas and for the offenses contemplated in Circular No. 19 shall have primary jurisdiction. This should not, however, mean that a court whose territorial jurisdiction does not embrace the place to be searched cannot issue a search warrant therefor, where the obtention of that search warrant is necessitated and justified by compelling considerations of urgency, subject, time and place. Conversely, neither should a search warrant duly issued by a court which has jurisdiction over a pending criminal case, or one issued by an executive judge or his lawful substitute under the situations provided for by Circular No. 19, be denied enforcement or nullified just because it was implemented outside the court's territorial jurisdiction. People v. CA, 291 SCRA 400 (1998); State the rule on differences between issuing court and court where criminal action is pending, insofar as filing motion to quash search warrant is concerned: 2. When the latter court (referring to the court which does not try the main criminal case) issues the search warrant, a motion to quash the same may be filed in and shall be resolved by said court, without prejudice to any proper recourse to the appropriate higher court by the party aggrieved by the resolution of the issuing court. All grounds and objections then available, existent or known shall be raised in the original or subsequent proceedings for the quashal of the warrant, other they shall be deemed waived. The guidelines have been misconstrued. Where a search warrant is issued by one court and the criminal action based on the results of the search is afterwards commenced in another court, it is not the rule that a motion to quash the warrant (or to retrieve things thereunder seized) may be filed only with the issuing Court. Such a motion may be filed for the first time for the first time in either the issuing Court or that in which the criminal action is pending. However, the remedy is alternative, not cumulative. The Court first taking cognizance of the motion does so to the exclusion of the other, and the proceedings thereon are subject to the Omnibus Motion Rule and the rule against forum-shopping. This is clearly stated in the third policy guidelines which indeed is what properly applies to the case at bar, to wit: 3. Where no motion to quash the search warrant was filed in or resolved by the issuing court, the interested party may move in the court where the criminal case is pending for the suppression as evidence of the personal property seized under the warrant if the same is offered therein for said purpose. Since two separate courts with different participations are involved in this situation, a motion to quash a search warrant and a motion to supress evidence are alternative and not cummulative remedies. In order to prevent forum shopping, a motion to quash shall consequently be governed by the omnibus motion rule, provided however, that objections not available, existent or known during the proceedings for the quashal of the warrant may be raised in the hearing of the motion to suppress. The resolution of the court on the motion to suppress shall likewise be subject to any proper remedy in the appopriate higher court.

In this case, the search warrant was applied for in, and issued by, Branch 216 of the Regional Trial Court at Quezon City, and the return was made to said court. On the other hand, the criminal action in connection with the explosives subject of the warrant was filed in Branch 80 of the Regional Trial Court of Bulacan. In this situation, a motion to quash the search warrant, or for the return of the personal property seized (not otherwise contraband) could have properly been presented in the QC RTC. No such motion was ever filed. It was only after the criminal action had been commenced in the Bulacan RTC that the motion to quash and to suppress evidence was submitted to the latter. The case thus falls within guideline No. 3 above quoted in accordance with which the latter court must be deemed to have acted within its competence. PICOP v. Asuncion, 307 SCRA 253 (1999); What are the requisites for issuance of a search warrant? (1) probable cause is present; (2) such presence is determined personally by the judge; (3) the complainant and the witnesses he or she may produce are personally examined by the judge, in writing and under oath or affirmation; (4) the applicant and the witnesses testify on facts personally known to them; (5) the warrant specifically describes the place to be searched and the things to be seized. Why is the search invalid? (1) the trial court failed to examine personally the complainant and the other deponents; (2) SPO3 Cicero Bacolod, who appeared during the hearing for the issuance of the search warrant, had no personal knowledge that petitioners were not licensed to possess the subject firearms; (3) the place to be searched was not described with particularity. People v. Estrada, 296 SCRA 383 (1998); Define probable cause: facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and that the objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place sought to be searched. What is the requirement on facts and circumstances for purpose of probable cause? -The best evidence that could be obtained under the circumstancesi.e. certificate by Department of Health that accused has no license to sell drugs. Such was not procured by officer, though it could easily be procured under the circumstances. (In other cases: presentation of master tapes of copyrighted films, in crime of pirated films). -only evidence submitted: the affidavit of SPO4 Manuel Cabiles where, in paragraph 3 thereof, he declared that he made a "verification in the BFAD registry of licensed persons or premises" and discovered that private respondent Aiden Lanuza had "no license" to sell drugs. -Mere allegation of non-existence of a license is not enough -Presumption of regularity does not apply Microsoft Corporation v. Maxicorp, Inc., 438 SCRA (2004); Define probable cause:

-such reasons, supported by facts and circumstances as will warrant a cautious man in the belief that his action and the means taken in prosecuting it are legally just and proper. -concerned with probability, not with absolute or moral certainty -standards of judgment of a reasonably prudent man -Reliable information is not sufficient. -Mere affidavits are not enough, and the judge must depose in writing the complainant and his witnesses. Why is there probable cause to issue warrant?

People v. Aruta, G.R. No. 120915 April 3, 1998; Define probable cause: Although probable cause eludes exact and concrete definition, it generally signifies a reasonable ground of suspicion supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a cautious man to believe that the person accused is guilty of the offense with which he is charged. It likewise refers to the existence of such facts and circumstances which could lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and that the item(s), article(s) or object(s) sought in connection with said offense or subject to seizure and destruction by law is in the place to be searched. Is information sufficient basis for probable cause to effect a warrantless search? Yes, in some instances. -there must be additional factors and circumstances which, taken together with the information, constitute probable cause. -example of additional factors and circumstances: acting suspiciously, place is known as haven for drug addicts, person to be searched fitted description of informant, identity could be readily ascertained, etc. Burgos v. Chief of Staff, supra What is the requirement for probable cause? Personal knowledge. In mandating that "no warrant shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined by the judge, ... after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce; the Constitution requires no less than personal knowledge by the complainant or his witnesses of the facts upon which the issuance of a search warrant may be justified. In Alvarez v. Court of First Instance, this Court ruled that "the oath required must refer to the truth of the facts within the personal knowledge of the petitioner or his witnesses, because the purpose thereof is to convince the committing magistrate, not the individual making the affidavit and seeking the issuance of the warrant, of the existence of probable cause." As couched, the quoted averment in said joint affidavit filed before respondent judge hardly meets the test of sufficiency established by this Court in Alvarez case.

Why is there no probable cause? when the search warrant applied for is directed against a newspaper publisher or editor in connection with the publication of subversive materials, as in the case at bar, the application and/or its supporting affidavits must contain a specification, stating with particularity the alleged subversive material he has published or is intending to publish. Mere generalization will not suffice. Thus, the broad statement in Col. Abadilla's application that petitioner "is in possession or has in his control printing equipment and other paraphernalia, news publications and other documents which were used and are all continuously being used as a means of committing the offense of subversion punishable under Presidential Decree 885, as amended ..." is a mere conclusion of law and does not satisfy the requirements of probable cause. Bereft of such particulars as would justify a finding of the existence of probable cause, said allegation cannot serve as basis for the issuance of a search warrant and it was a grave error for respondent judge to have done so. Equally insufficient as basis for the determination of probable cause is the statement contained in the joint affidavit of Alejandro M. Gutierrez and Pedro U. Tango, "that the evidence gathered and collated by our unit clearly shows that the premises abovementioned and the articles and things above-described were used and are continuously being used for subversive activities in conspiracy with, and to promote the objective of, illegal organizations such as the Light-a-Fire Movement, Movement for Free Philippines, and April 6 Movement." Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 613 (1983); May a magistrate issue a valid warrant on the basis of an anonymous tip where there is no indicia of the informers basis of knowledge if the information contained in the tip is corroborated with police findings? When a court decides whether or not to issue a search warrant, the elements of the informants credibility/reliability and basis of knowledge are to be used as guides when considering the totality of the circumstances and are not to be exclusive requirements applied in every case. Credibility/reliability and basis of knowledge of an informant are very relevant in determining the value of a tip. These elements alone do not form the entire basis of inquiry in deciding whether probable cause exists. So long as the magistrate had a substantial basis for concluding a search would uncover evidence of wrongdoing, the Fourth Amendment is not violated. What is the Aguilar-Spinelli test? 1. The magistrate must be informed of the reasons to support the conclusion that such an informant is reliable and credible. 2. The magistrate must be informed of some of the underlying circumstances relied on by the person providing the information What is the totality-of-circumstances test? -purpose: reliability test would be too difficult to satisfy -in this case, more information was obtained by detective after getting leads from the anonymous letter.

an informant's "veracity," "reliability" and "basis of knowledge" are all highly relevant in determining the value of his report. We do not agree, however, that these elements should be understood as entirely separate and independent requirements to be rigidly exacted in every case[...] [T]hey should be understood simply as closely intertwined issues that may usefully illuminate the common sense, practical question whether there is "probable cause" to believe that contraband or evidence is located in a particular place. This rejected the AguilarSpinelli test and put in place a totality-of-the-circumstances standard. This was put into place because the court recognized that there was more evidence that the Gateses were involved in drug trafficking than just the letter standing alone. The court agreed that if the letter had just stood alone it would not be probable cause to get a warrant. Stonehill v. Diokno, supra What is required for probable cause? -must be with one specific offense, refer to specific acts -based on competent evidence -fishing expedition indicates absence of probable cause People v. Tuan, G.R. No. 176066. August 11, 2010 Why was the judges personal determination of probable cause valid? -Finding after searching questions: SPO2 Fernandez based his Application for Search Warrant not only on the information relayed to him by Lad-ing and Tudlong. He also arranged for a test buy and conducted surveillance of accused-appellant. (see Q&A sample) Kho v. Makalintal, 306 SCRA 70 Why was the judges personal determination valid? (Even if the accused believe that one question had false assumptions?) Respondent judge had the singular opportunity to assess their testimonies and to find out their personal knowledge of facts and circumstances enough to create a probable cause. The Judge was the one who personally examined the applicants and witnesses and who asked searching questions vis-a-vis the applications for search warrants. He was thus able to observe and determine whether subject applicants and their witnesses gave accurate accounts of the surveillance and investigation they conducted at the premises to be searched. In the absence of any showing that respondent judge was recreant of his duties in connection with the personal examination he so conducted on the affiants before him, there is no basis for doubting the reliability and correctness of his findings and impressions. Petitioners brand as fatally defective and deficient the procedure followed in the issuance of subject search warrants, reasoning out that the same did not comply with constitutional and statutory requirements. They fault respondent Judge for allegedly failing to ask specific questions they deem particularly important during the examination of the applicants and their witnesses. To buttress their submission, petitioners invite attention to the following question, to wit:

How did you know that there are unlicensed firearms being kept by Benjamin Kho at No. 45 Bb. Ramona Tirona St., Phase I, BF Homes, Paranaque, Metro Manila? (TSN, Ali Vargas, May 15, 1990, p. 4) Petitioners argue that by propounding the aforequoted question, the respondent Judge assumed that the firearms at the premises to be searched were unlicensed, instead of asking for a detailed account of how the NBI agents came to know that the firearms being kept thereat were unlicensed. This stance of petitioners is similarly devoid of any sustainable basis. Nothing improper is perceived in the manner the respondent Judge conducted the examination of subject applicants for search warrants and their witnesses. He personally examined them under oath, and asked them searching questions on the facts and circumstances personally known to them, in compliance with prescribed procedure and legal requirements. It can be gleaned that the sworn statements and affidavits submitted by the witnesses were duly attached to the pertinent records of the proceedings. It was within the discretion of the examining Judge to determine what questions to ask the witnesses so long as the questions asked are germane to the pivot of inquiry - the existence or absence of a probable cause. Bache v. Ruiz, 37 SCRA 823 (1971) Why was judges personal determination invalid? There was no personal examination conducted by the Judge of the complainant (De Leon) and his witness (Logronio). The judge did not ask either of the two any question the answer to which could possibly be the basis for determining whether or not there was probable cause against Bache & Co. and Seggerman. The participation of the judge in the proceedings which led to the issuance of the search was thus limited to listening to the stenographers readings of her notes, to a few words of warning against the commission of perjury, and to administering the oath to the complainant and his witness. This cannot be considered a personal examination. Personal examination by the judge of the complainant and his witnesses is necessary to enable him to determine the existence or non-existence of a probable cause. People v. Mamaril, 420 SCRA 662 (2004) Why was judges personal determination invalid? Although it is possible that Judge Ramos examined the complainant and his witnesses in the form of searching questions and answers, the fact remains that there is no evidence that the examination was put into writing as required by law. Otherwise, the depositions in writing of the complainant and his witnesses would have been attached to the record, together with the affidavits that the witnesses submitted, as required by Section 5, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court. Consequently, we find untenable the assertion of the Solicitor General that the subject stenographic notes could not be found at the time Branch Clerk of Court Enrico Castillo testified before the trial court because of the confused state of the records in the latters branch when he assumed office. Tan v. Sy Tiong Gue, 613 SCRA 98 (2010) Who determines probable cause to issue search warrant?

Bache v. Ruiz, supra Kho vs. Makalintal, supra PICOP v. Asuncion, supra People v. Tuan, G.R. No. 176066. August 11, 2010 Roan v. Gonzales, 145 SCRA 687 (1984); Coca- Cola v. Gomez, 571 SCRA 18 (2008) Kho v. Makalintal, supra; Bache vs. Ruiz, supra; People v. Estrada, supra Roan vs. Gonzales, supra PICOP v. Asuncion, supra People v. C.A., supra Burgos vs. Chief of Staff, supra California v. Greenwood, supra Washington vs. Boland, supra People v. Umanito, G.R. #172607 Oct. 26, 2007 People v. Umanito, G.R. #172607, April 16, 2009 Bache v. Ruiz, supra Mustang Lumber v. CA, 257 SCRA 430 (1996); (nevermind) People v. Estrada, supra People v. CA, supra People v. Molina G.R. No. 133917, February 19, 2001** People v. Aruta, G.R. No. 120915 April 3, 1998 People v. Valdez, supra People v. Padilla, 269 SCRA 402 (1997); People v. Chua Ho San, 308 SCRA 432 (1999); People v. Binad Chua, G.R. Nos. 136066-67, February 4, 2003 Office of the Court Administrator v. Barron, 297 SCRA 376 (1998); Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969); Nolasco v. Pano, 147 SCRA 509 (1987); Cf. Nolasco v. Pano, 139 SCRA 152 (1985); Posadas v. CA, 188 SCRA 288 (1990) People vs. Cuizon, 265 SCRA 325 Malacat v. CA, 283 SCRA 159 (1997)**; U.S. vs. Hill, 459 F.3d 966 (2006) U.S. vs. Ziegler, 474 F.3d 1184 (9th Cir., January 30, 2007 Polo v. David, supra Journal Articles: U.S. vs. Finley, 477 F.3d 250 State vs. Smith, 124 Ohio St. 3d 163 (2009) People v. Malasigul, 63 Phil. 221 (1936); Alvarez v. CFI, 64 Phil. 48 (1937); Schneckcloth v Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973) People vs. Cuizon, 265 SCRA 325 Garcia v. Locsin, 65 Phil. 689 (1938);

Roan v. Gonzales, supra People v. Agbot, 106 SCRA 325 (1981); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S 1 (1968); Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366 (1993) Florida v. J. L., 529 U.S. 266 (2000) People v. Binad Chua, supra Malacat v. CA, supra Esquillo v. People, 629 SCRA 370 (2010) People v. Canton, G.R. No. 148825, Dec. 27, 2002, supra Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979); Michigan Dept. Of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444 Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325 Caballes v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 136292, January 15, 2002; People v. Lacerna, 278 SCRA 561 (1997) People v. Solayao, 262 SCRA 255 (1996) People v. Malmstedt, 198 SCRA 401 (1991) People v. Encinada, G.R. No. 116720. October 2, 1997 Valmonte v. De Villa, 178 SCRA (1989); People vs. Vinecario, 420 SCRA 280 (2004); Aniag vs. COMELEC, 237 SCRA 424 (1994); People vs. Escano, 323 SCRA 754 (2000) People vs. Vinecario, 420 SCRA 280 (2004) Caroll v. US, 267 132 (1925); California V. Carney, 471 U.S. 386 (1985) Papa v. Mago, 22 SCRA 857 (1968); Caballes v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 136292, January 15, 2002; Asuncion v. CA, 302 SCRA 490 (1990); Roldan v. Arca, 65 SCRA 336 (1975); People v. Lo Ho Wing, 193 SCRA 122 (1990); + People v. Balingan, 241 SCRA 277 (1995); + Obra v. CA, 317 SCRA 594 (1999); + Harris v. US, 390 U.S. 234 (1966); + Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 472 (1971); Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321 (1987) Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128 (1990) People v. Musa, 217 SCRA 597 (1993); + People v. Doria, 301 SCRA 668 (1999); + People v. Bolasa, 321 SCRA 459 (1999); People v. Evaristo, 216 SCRA 431 (1992); People v. Valdez, 341 SCRA 24 (2000); People v. Salanguit, 356 SCRA 683 (2001) + People v. Marti, supra + + People v. Bongcarawan, G.R. No. 143944, July 11, 2002 State v. Von Bulow, 475 A. 2d 995 + (not yet printed) See: Zulueta v C.A., 253 SCRA 699 (1996) People v. De Gracia, 233 SCRA 716 (1994); Bringham City v. Stuart, 126 S. Ct. 1943 (2006) Nardone v. U.S. 308 U.S. 338 Wong Sun v. U.S. 371 U.S. 471 + + Nix vs. Williams, 467 U.S. 431 People v. Gesmundo, 219 SCRA 743 (1993); People vs. Huang Zhen Hua, 439 SCRA 350 (2004) People v. Gesmundo, supra People v. Lacbanes, 270 SCRA 193 (1997); People v. Gesmundo, supra

Stonehill v. Diokno, supra Bache v. Ruiz, supra Rakes v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978); + PICOP v. Asuncion, supra People vs. Lapitaje, 397 SCRA 674 (2003); Esquillo vs. People, G.R. No. 182010, August 25, 2010 (dissent of Bersamin) Uy Kheytin v. Villareal, 42 Phil. 892 (1920); Magoncia v. Palacio, 80 Phil. 170 (1948); Collector v. Villaluz, 71 SCRA 356 (1976); Mata v. Bayona, 128 SCRA 388 (1984); Rev. Pen. Code, Arts. 128, 129, 130, 206; MHP Garments v. CA, 236 SCRA 227 (1994); Galvante v. Casimiro, G.R. No. 162808, April 22, 2008

Arrest Sanchez v. Demetriou, 227 SCRA 627 (1993); People v. Sequino, 264 SCRA 79 (1996); Defensor- Santiago v. Vasquez, 217 SCRA 663 (1993); Ong vs. Genio, 609 SCRA 188, Dec. 23, 2009 People v. Grey, 625 SCRA 523 (2010) Allado v. Diokno, 232 SCRA 192 (1994); Placer v. Villanueva, 126 SCRA 463 (1983); People v. Inting, 187 SCRA 788 (1990); Cojuangco v. Sandiganbayan, 300 SCRA 367 (1998); Soliven v. Makasiar, + Lim v. Felix, 194 SCRA 292 (1991); Pangandaman v. Casar, 159 SCRA 599 (1988); People v. Court of Appeals, 301 SCRA 475 (1999); Roberts v. C.A. 254 SCRA 307 Webb vs. De Leon, 247 SCRA 652 + Ho vs. People, 280 SCRA 285 (1997) Okabe vs. Gutierrez, 429 SCRA 685 (2004) AAA vs. Carbonell, 524 SCRA 496 (2007) + Tabujara III vs. People, 570 SCRA 229 (2008) + Gutierrez v. Hernandez, A.M. No. MTJ-06-1628, June 8, 2007, + People v. Lumayok, 139 SCRA 1 (1985); People v. Albior, 163 SCRA 332 (1988); People vs. Huang Zhen Hua, G.R. No. 139301, September 29, 2004 People v. Burgos, 144 SCRA 1 (1985); + Umil v. Ramos, 187 SCRA 311 (1990) + Umil v. Ramos, 202 SCRA 251 (1991) + Go vs. Court of Appeals, 206 SCRA 138 (1992) + Larranaga v. C.A., 287 SCRA 581 (1998); + People v. Tudtud, 412 SCRA 142 (2003); People v. Molina, G.R. No. 133917, February 19, 2001** + People v. Chua, 396 SCRA 657 (2003); People v. Mendez, G.R. No. 147671, November 21, 2002; People v. Doria, 301 SCRA 668 (1999) + Cadua v. CA, 312 SCRA 703 (1999); People v. Montilla, 285 SCRA 703 (1998); People v. Burgos, 144 SCRA 1 (1986); People v. Jayson, 282 SCRA 166 (1997); Terry v. Ohio 392 U.S. 1 (1968); + Padilla v. C.A. 269 SCRA 402 (1997) People v. Racho, 626 SCRA 633 (2010) + People v. Mahinay, 302 SCRA 455 (1999) People v. Valdez, 304 SCRA 140 (1999); People v. Burgos, 144 SCRA 1 (1985); People v. Veloso, 48 Phil. 169; Pangandaman v. Casar, 159 SCRA 599 (1988); Wisconsin v. Davis, Wisconsin C.A. District 1,3/8/05 davis. PDF.] Babst, et al. v. NIB, 132 SCRA 316 (1984); People v. Sequi o, 264 SCRA 79 (1996); People v. Del Rosario, 305 SCRA 740 (1999) People v. Pasudag, G.R. No. 128822, May 4, 2001; People v. Zuela, 323 SCRA 589 (2000); People v. Abe Valdez, G.R. No. 129296, September 25, 2000, 341 SCRA 25; People v. Rodriguez, 341 SCRA 645 (2000);

People v. Del Rosario, 305 SCRA 740 (1999); Cf. Babst v. NIB, 132 SCRA 31 (1984) People v. Muleta, 309 SCRA 148 (1999); People v. Tan, 286 SCRA 207 (1998); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); People v. Obrero, 332 SCRA 190 (2000); People v. Duero, 104 SCRA 379 (1981); People v. Obrero, 332 SCRA 190 (2000); People v. Mojello, G.R. No. 145566, March 9, 2004 ** Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971); New York v. Quarles, 104 S. Ct. 2626 (1984); People v. Duero, 104 SCRA 379 (1981); People v. Figueroa, 335 SCRA 299 (2000); Gumabon v. Director of Prisons, 37 SCRA 429 (1971); People v. Galit, 135 SCRA 465 (1985); People v. Continente, 339 SCRA 1 (2000); People v. Caguioa, 141 SCRA 289 (1980); Cf. People v. Bacor, 306 SCRA 522 (1999) People v. Quidato Jr., 297 SCRA 1 (1998); People v. Obrero, 332 SCRA 190 (2000); People v. Labtan, 320 SCRA 140 (1999); People v. Samulde, 336 SCRA 632 (2000); People v. Gallardo, 323 SCRA 218 (2000); People v. Canoy, 328 SCRA 385 (2000); People v. Sapal, 328 SCRA 417 (2000); People v. Jara, 144 SCRA 517 (1986); People v. Nicandro, 141 SCRA 289 (1986) People v. Continente, 339 SCRA 1 (2000); Gamboa v. Cruz, June 27, 1988; United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967); People v. Pavillare, 329 SCRA 684 (2000); People v. Jara, 144 SCRA 516 (1986); People v. Burgos, 144 SCRA 1 (1986); People v. Andan, 269 SCRA 95 (1997); People v. Domantay, 307 SCRA 1 (1999); But cf. People v. Morada, 307 SCRA 362 (1999); People v. Ramos, 186 SCRA 184 (1990); People v. Galit, 135 SCRA 465 (1985); People v. Nicandro, 141 SCRA 289 (1986); People v. Decierdo, 149 SCRA 496 (1987); Miranda vs. Tuliao, 486 SCRA 377 (2006) Why is the quashal of warrant invalid in this case? After Judge Tumaliuan issued warrants for the arrest of petitioners, petitioner Miranda appealed the assistant prosecutors resolution before the Secretary of Justice. Judge Anghad, shortly after assuming office, quashed the warrant of arrest on the basis of said appeal. According to Judge Anghad, x x x prudence dictates (that) and because of comity, a deferment of the proceedings is but proper. Quashal on this basis is grave abuse of discretion. It is inconceivable to charge Judge Tumaliuan as lacking in prudence and oblivious to comity when he issued the warrants of arrest against petitioners just because the petitioners might, in the future, appeal the assistant prosecutors resolution to the Secretary of Justice. But even if the petition for review was filed before the issuance of the warrants of arrest, the fact remains that

the pendency of a petition for the review of the prosecutors resolution is not a ground to quash the warrants of arrest. Cf.- Talag vs. Reyes, 430 SCRA 428 (2004) Why is the motion to defer issuance of warrant or to recall the same if already issued invalid in this case? Where an accused filed an omnibus motion to defer issuance of warrant of arrest and/or to recall the same if already issued and to remand case to the Office of the City Prosecutor at a time when the court has not yet acquired jurisdiction over the person of the accused, the courts issuance of the warrant after the filing of the information was not only procedurally sound but was even required considering that the court had yet to acquire jurisdiction over his person. The Information was filed on May 7, 2002 while the warrant of arrest was issued May 23, 2003. When complainant filed the omnibus motion on May 7, 2002, the court has not yet acquired jurisdiction over his person. With the filing of Information, the trial court could then issue a warrant for the arrest of the accused as provided for by Section 6 of Rule 112 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure. The issuance of the warrant was not only procedurally sound but it was even required considering that respondent had yet to acquire jurisdiction over the person of complainant. Consequently, complainants charge that respondent Judge failed to act on the omnibus motion before issuing the arrest warrant is untenable. Whether respondent correctly disregarded the omnibus motion in view of the alleged fatal defects is a judicial matter, which is not a proper subject in an administrative proceeding. It bears noting that respondent court immediately deferred the execution of the warrant of arrest upon issuance by the Court of Appeals of the TRO. Incidentally, although the Court of Appeals issued a temporary restraining order, it eventually sustained the issuance by respondent of the arrest warrant and dismissed the petition for certiorari. De Joya vs. Marquez, 481 SCRA 376 (2006) Why did the motion to quash warrant fail in this case? Because jurisdiction over the person has not yet been acquired. A person is not entitled to seek relief from the Supreme Court nor from the trial court where he continuously refuses to surrender and submit to the courts jurisdiction.In addition, it may not be amiss to note that petitioner is not entitled to seek relief from this Court nor from the trial court as he continuously refuses to surrender and submit to the courts jurisdiction. Justice Florenz D. Regalado explains the requisites for the exercise of jurisdiction and how the court acquires such jurisdiction, thus: x x x Requisites for the exercise of jurisdiction and how the court acquires such jurisdiction: a. Jurisdiction over the plaintiff or petitioner: This is acquired by the filing of the complaint, petition or initiatory pleading before the court by the plaintiff or petitioner. b. Jurisdiction over the defendant or respondent: This is acquired by the voluntary appearance or submission by the defendant or respondent to the court or by coercive process issued by the court to him, generally by the service of summons. Luna v. Plaza, 26 SCRA 310 (1968); What is the nature preliminary examination prior to warrant of arrest?

Petitioner's last contention that the warrant of arrest issued was a violation of procedural due process because of the alleged defective preliminary examination has no leg to stand on, in view of what we have hereinbefore stated. Moreover, this Court has held that preliminary examination is not an essential part of due process of law.8 Preliminary examination may be conducted by the municipal judge, prior to the issuance of the warrant of arrest, either in the presence, or in the absence, of the accused. The record shows that herein petitioner waived the preliminary investigation before respondent Municipal Judge, and instead, he filed a petition for bail. The petition for bail was at first granted by respondent Judge, but later the order granting bail was revoked. This conduct of petitioner indicates that he had waived his objection to whatever defect, if any, in the preliminary examination conducted by respondent Judge prior to the issuance of the warrant of arrest. Indeed, petitioner has no substantialmuch less legalground to complain that he was denied the due process of law. Alimpoos v. CA, 106 SCRA 159 (1981); May a habeas corpus proceeding order the undertaking of a preliminary examination for purposes of issuing a warrant of arrest? It has been noted that the ORDER contains a provision enjoining the prosecution of the Accused in the Criminal Case. That is error. If the Accused was illegally detained because he was arrested without a preliminary examination, what should have been done was to set aside the warrant of arrest and order the discharge of the Accused, but without enjoining the Municipal Judge from conducting a preliminary examination and afterwards properly issuing a warrant of arrest. Habeas Corpus proceedings are not meant to determine criminal responsibility. What is the proper remedy if there is perceived illegality in the issuance of a warrant of arrest? "At any rate, we believe that, if at all, the remedy available to the petitioner herein, under the circumstances stated in this opinion, is not a petition for a writ of habeas corpus but a petition to quash the warrant of arrest or a petition for a reinvestigation of the case by the respondent Municipal Judge or by the Provincial Fiscal." Is non-existence of other remedies a precondition for habeas corpus? In illegal detention cases, no. Parada v. Veneracion, 269 SCRA 371 (1997); Why is the warrant of arrest without recommendation for bail (offense: estafa) a violation of constitutional right to bail? The warrant of arrest with no recommendation for bail that was issued by respondent Judge on June 3, 1994 is a downright violation of Paradas constitutional right to bail.Likewise, the warrant of arrest with no recommendation for bail that was issued by respondent Judge on June 3, 1994 is a downright violation of Paradas constitutional right to bail. The rule is clear that unless charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua and the evidence of guilt is strong, all persons detained, arrested or otherwise under the custody of the law are entitled to bail as a matter of right. It should be noted that the crime with which Parada was charged is estafa which is undoubtedly a bailable offense. This circumstance could not have escaped the attention of the respondent judge when he issued on June 3, 1994 the order of arrest of Parada with no recommendation for his bail. In so doing, respondent

judge exhibited that degree of ignorance so gross which the Court can not countenance. Judges are required by Canon 3, Rule 3.01 of the Code of Judicial Conduct to be faithful to the law and maintain professional competence. They are called upon to exhibit more than just a cursory acquaintance with statutes and procedural rules; it is imperative that he be conversant with basic legal principles. Sec. of National Defense v. Manalo, G.R. No. 180906, Oct. 7, 2008 Ilagan v. Enrile, 139 SCRA 349 (1985); When is habeas corpus no longer available? Writ of Habeas Corpus no longer available after information is filed and a warrant of arrest issued by the trial court. As contended by respondents, the petition herein has been rendered moot and academic by virtue of the filing of an Information against them for Rebellion, a capital offense, before the Regional Trial Court of Davao City and the issuance of a Warrant of Arrest against them. The function of the special proceeding of habeas corpus is to inquire into the legality of one's detention. Now that the detained attorneys' incarceration is by virtue of a judicial order in relation to criminal cases subsequently filed against them before the Regional Trial Court of Davao City, the remedy of habeas corpus no longer lies. The Writ had served its purpose. What is the remedy after writ of habeas corpus can no longer be availed of? After filing of information and detainee wants to question his detention for lack of warrant of arrest or preliminary investigation, remedy is not habeas corpus but quashal of warrant or information.lf the detained attorneys question their detention because of improper arrest, or that no preliminary investigation has been conducted, the remedy is not a petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus but a Motion before the trial court to quash the Warrant of Arrest, and/or the Information on grounds provided by the Rules, or to ask for an investigation/reinvestigation of the case. Habeas corpus would not lie after the Warrant of commitment was issued by the Court on the basis of the Information filed against the accused. Velasco v. CA, 245 SCRA 677 (1995) What is the writ of habeas corpus? The high prerogative writ of habeas corpus, whose origin is lost in antiquity, was devised and exists as a speedy and effectual remedy to relieve persons from unlawful restraint and as the best and only sufficient defense of personal freedom. More specifically, its vital purposes are to obtain immediate relief from illegal confinement, to liberate those who may be imprisoned without sufficient cause, and to deliver them from unlawful custody. It is then essentially a writ of inquiry and is granted to test the right under which a person is detained. When is writ of habeas corpus not available (general rule)? Ordinarily the writ of habeas corpus will not be granted when there is an adequate remedy by writ of error or appeal or by writ of certiorari.It does not, however, follow that if certiorari is available to Larkins, an application for a writ of habeas corpus will absolutely be barred. While ordinarily, the writ of habeas corpus will not be granted when there is an adequate remedy by writ of error or appeal or by writ of certiorari, it may, nevertheless, be available in exceptional cases, for the writ should not be considered subservient to procedural limitations which glorify form over

substance. It must be kept in mind that although the question most often considered in both habeas corpus and certiorari proceedings is whether an inferior court has exceeded its jurisdiction, the former involves a collateral attack on the judgment and reaches the body but not the record, while the latter assails directly the judgment and reaches the record but not the body. Also: The writ of habeas corpus should not be allowed after the party sought to be released had been charged before any court. May supervening events cure the illegality of detention, and hence bar the application of the writ of habeas corpus? Yes. Even if the arrest of a person is illegal, supervening events may bar his release or discharge from custody. What is to be inquired into is the legality of his detention as of, at the earliest, the filing of the application for a writ of habeas corpus, for even if the detention is at its inception illegal, it may, by reason of some supervening events, such as the instances mentioned in Section 4 of Rule 102, be no longer illegal at the time of the filing of the application. Among such supervening events is the issuance of a judicial process preventing the discharge of the detained person. Moncupa v. Enrile, 141 SCRA 233 (1986); Why does the temporary release of Moncupa constitute illegal restraint which can be addressed by the writ of habeas corpus? This latitudinarian scope of the writ of habeas corpus has, in law, remained undiminished up to the present. The respondents contention that the petition has become moot and academic must necessarily be denied. Efren C. Moncupa may have been released from his detention cell. The restraints attached to his temporary release, however, preclude freedom of action and under the Villavicencio v. Lukban rule warrant this Courts inquiry into the nature of his involuntary restraint and our relieving him of such restraints as may be illegal. The reservation of the military in the form of restrictions attached to the temporary release of the petitioner constitute restraints on the liberty of Mr. Moncupa. Such restrictions limit the freedom of movement of the petitioner. It is not physical restraint alone which is inquired into by the writ of habeas corpus. Ordinarily, a petition for habeas corpus becomes moot and academic when the restraint on the liberty of the petitioners is lifted either temporarily or permanently. We have so held in a number of cases. But the instant case presents a different situation. The question to be resolved is whether the State can reserve the power to re-arrest a person for an offense after a court of competent jurisdiction has absolved him of the offense. An affirmative answer is the one suggested by the respondents because the release of the petitioners being merely tem-porary it follows that they can be re-arrested at anytime despite their acquittal by a court of competent jurisdiction. We hold that such a reservation is repugnant to the government of laws and not of men principle. Under this principle the moment a person is acquitted on a criminal charge he can no longer be detained or re-arrested for the same offense. This concept is so basic and elementary that it needs no elaboration. Navla v. Pardico, G.R. No. 184467, June 19, 2012** Why is it that even if the writ of amparo may lie against private persons, State participation is still indispensable?

We are aware that under Section 1 of A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC a writ of amparo may lie against a private individual or entity. But even if the person sought to be held accountable or responsible in an amparo petition is a private individual or entity, still, government involvement in the disappearance remains an indispensable element. Here, petitioners are mere security guards at Grand Royale Subdivision in Brgy. Lugam, Malolos City and their principal, the Asian Land, is a private entity. They do not work for the government and nothing has been presented that would link or connect them to some covert police, military or governmental operation. As discussed above, to fall within the ambit of A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC in relation to RA No. 9851, the disappearance must be attended by some governmental involvement. This hallmark of State participation differentiates an enforced disappearance case from an ordinary case of a missing person. Is proof of disappearance enough in writ of amparo? No. Proof of disappearance alone is not enough. It is likewise essential to establish that such disappearance was carried out with the direct or indirect authorization, support or acquiescence of the government. This indispensable element of State participation is not present in this case. The petition does not contain any allegation of State complicity, and none of the evidence presented tend to show that the government or any of its agents orchestrated Bens disappearance. In fact, none of its agents, officials, or employees were impleaded or implicated in Virginias amparo petition whether as responsible or accountable persons. Thus, in the absence of an allegation or proof that the government or its agents had a hand in Bens disappearance or that they failed to exercise extraordinary diligence in investigating his case, the Court will definitely not hold the government or its agents either as responsible or accountable persons. Who and how is government participation proved? By petitioner and by substantial evidence. What is the definition of enforced disappearance? the arrest, detention, abduction or any other form of deprivation of liberty by agents of the State or by persons or groups of persons acting with the authorization, support or acquiescence of the State, followed by a refusal to acknowledge the deprivation of liberty or by concealment of the fate or whereabouts of the disappeared person, which place such a person outside the protection of the law. Rubrico vs. Macapagal- Arroyo, 613 SCRA 233 (2010) What is the relationship of the command responsibility doctrine with writ of amparo proceedings? It has never been the intention of the Amparo Rule to determine liability, whether criminal or administrative. The doctrine of command responsibility is a substantive rule that establishes criminal or administrative liability that is different from the purpose and approach of the Amparo Rule. As we have painstakingly explained in Secretary of Defense v. Manalo, 568 SCRA 1 (2008) and Razon v. Tagitis, the Amparo Rule merely provides for a procedural protective remedy against violations or threats of violations of the constitutional rights to life, liberty and security. It does not address criminal, civil or

administrative liability as these are matters determined from the application of substantive law. Yano vs. Sanchez, 612 SCRA 347 (2010) What is the duty of the petitioner in amparo proceeding upon showing that public official did not observe extraordinary diligence? The failure to establish that the public official observed extraordinary diligence in the performance of duty does not result in the automatic grant of the privilege of the amparo writ. It does not relieve the petitioner from establishing his or her claim by substantial evidence. The omission or inaction on the part of the public official provides, however, some basis for the petitioner to move and for the court to grant certain interim reliefs. Razon, Jr. Vs. Tagitis, 612 SCRA 685 (2010) What is the evidentiary standard in amparo proceeding? We see no merit in the petitioners claim that the Kasim evidence does not amount to substantial evidence required by the Rule on the Writ of Amparo. This is not a new issue; we extensively and thoroughly considered and resolved it in our December 3, 2009 Decision. At this point, we need not go into another full discussion of the justifications supporting an evidentiary standard specific to the Writ of Amparo. Suffice it to say that we continue to adhere to the substantial evidence rule that the Rule on the Writ of Amparo requires, with some adjustments for flexibility in considering the evidence presented. When we ruled that hearsay evidence (usually considered inadmissible under the general rules of evidence) may be admitted as the circumstances of the case may require, we did not thereby dispense with the substantial evidence rule; we merely relaxed the evidentiary rule on the admissibility of evidence, maintaining all the time the standards of reason and relevance that underlie every evidentiary situation. This, we did, by considering the totality of the obtaining situation and the consistency of the hearsay evidence with the other available evidence in the case. People v. Alojado, 305 SCRA 236 (1999); Where shall objections to legality of arrest be made and when? Appellant also maintains that he was illegally arrested. This argument, however, comes too late in the day, because appellant failed to allege it prior to his arraignment. In People v. Salvatierra, the Court emphasized that an objection to the legality of an arrest must be submitted to the trial court before the accused enters his plea, viz.: Appellant is estopped from questioning the legality of his arrest considering that he never raised this before entering his plea. Any objection involving a warrant of arrest or the acquisition of jurisdiction over the person of an accused must be made before he enters his plea, otherwise the objection is deemed waived. People v. Rondero, 320 SCRA 383 (1999); When to object to illegality of arrest? It is hornbook knowledge that any irregularity attending the arrest of an accused is deemed waived when, instead of quashing the information for lack of jurisdiction over his person, the accused voluntarily submits himself to the court by entering a

plea of guilty or not guilty during the arraignment and participating in the proceedings.Anent accused-appellants third assignment of error, it might be true that accused-appellants warrantless arrest was not lawful. The police officers who arrested him had no personal knowledge of facts indicating that he was the perpetrator of the crime just committed. His warrantless arrest was not based on a personal knowledge of the police officers indicating facts that he has committed the gruesome crime but solely on Maximos suspicion that he was involved in the slaying of Mylene since he was seen washing his bloodied hands in the early morning of March 26, 1994. Nevertheless, it is hornbook knowledge that any irregularity attending the arrest of an accused is deemed waived when, instead of quashing the information for lack of jurisdiction over his person, the accused voluntarily submits himself to the court by entering a plea of guilty or not guilty during the arraignment and participating in the proceedings. People vs. Racho, 626 SCRA 633 (2010) Umil v. Ramos, 187 SCRA 311 (1990) Umil v. Ramos, 202 SCRA 251 (1991); Bagcal v. Villaraza, 120 SCRA 525 (1983); Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590 (1975); Sayo v. Chief of Police, 80 Phil. 859 (1948);

BAIL Feliciano v. Pasciolan, 2 SCRA 888 (1961) (EB) Who may apply for bail? The constitutional mandate that all persons shall before conviction be bailable except those charged with capital offenses when evidence of guilt is strong, is subject to the limitation that the person applying for bail should be in the custody of the law, or otherwise deprived of his liberty. The purpose of bail is to secure ones release and it would be incongruous to grant bail to one who is free. (Facts: In the instant case, the petitioner upon learning that an amended information charging him and seventeen others with the crime of kidnapping with murder had been filed, and that a warrant for his arrest had been issued, immediately went into hiding and until now is at large. Without surrendering himself, he filed the motion in which he asks that the court fix the amount of the bail bond for his release pending trial. It is, therefore, clear that the petitioner is a free man and is under the jurisprudence not entitled to admission to bail.) Villase or v. Aba o, G.R. No. L-23599, September 29, 1967 (EB) What is the principal factor considered in bail fixing? In bail fixing, the principal factor considered, to the determination of which most other factors are directed, is the probability of the appearance of the accused, or of his flight to avoid punishment. Who has discretion in question on bail and what is the limit? Discretion, indeed, is with the court called upon to rule on the question of bail. However, where conditions imposed upon a defendant seeking bail would amount to a refusal thereof and render nugatory the constitutional right to bail, we will not hesitate to exercise our supervisory powers to provide the required remedy. Defensor-Santiago v. Vasquez, 217 SCRA 663 (1993); What is the effect of posting a bail bond? Posting of bail bond, she holds herself amenable at all times to the orders and processes of the court. It will be recalled that petitioner has posted bail which we have declared legally valid and complete despite the absence of petitioner at the time of filing thereof, by reason of the peculiar circumstances and grounds hereinbefore enunciated and which warrant a relaxation of the afore-cited doctrine in Feliciano. Perforce, since under the obligations assumed by petitioner in her bail bond she holds herself amenable at all times to the orders and processes of the court, she may legally be prohibited from leaving the country during the pendency of the case. It has been held that where after the filing of the complaint or information a warrant for the arrest of the accused is issued by the trial court and the accused either voluntarily submitted himself to the court or was duly arrested, the court thereby acquires jurisdiction over the person of the accused. The voluntary appearance of the accused, whereby the court acquires jurisdiction over his person, is accomplished either by his pleading to the merits (such as by filing a motion to quash or other pleadings requiring the exercise of the courts jurisdiction thereover, appearing for arraignment, entering trial) or by filing bail. On the matter of bail, since the same is intended to obtain the provisional liberty of the accused, as a rule the same cannot be posted before custody of the accused has been acquired by the judicial authorities either by his arrest or voluntary surrender.

Miranda v. Tuliao, 486 SCRA 377 (2006) Differentiate custody of the law from jurisdiction over person of the accused? Our pronouncement in Santiago shows a distinction between custody of the law and jurisdiction over the person. Custody of the law is required before the court can act upon the application for bail, but is not required for the adjudication of other reliefs sought by the defendant where the mere application therefor constitutes a waiver of the defense of lack of jurisdiction over the person of the accused. Custody of the law is accomplished either by arrest or voluntary surrender, while jurisdiction over the person of the accused is acquired upon his arrest or voluntary appearance. One can be under the custody of the law but not yet subject to the jurisdiction of the court over his person, such as when a person arrested by virtue of a warrant files a motion before arraignment to quash the warrant. On the other hand, one can be subject to the jurisdiction of the court over his person, and yet not be in the custody of the law, such as when an accused escapes custody after his trial has commenced. Being in the custody of the law signifies restraint on the person, who is thereby deprived of his own will and liberty, binding him to become obedient to the will of the law. Custody of the law is literally custody over the body of the accused. It includes, but is not limited to, detention. What is the signficance of this distinction? as a general rule, one who seeks an affirmative relief is deemed to have submitted to the jurisdiction of the court. As we held in the aforecited case of Santiago, seeking an affirmative relief in court, whether in civil or criminal proceedings, constitutes voluntary appearance. Custody of the law is required before the court can act upon the application for bail, but is not required for the adjudication of other reliefs sought by the defendant where the mere application therefor constitutes a waiver of the defense of lack of jurisdiction over the person of the accused. A person applying for admission to bail must be in the custody of the law or otherwise deprived of his liberty. A person who has not submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court has no right to invoke the processes of that court. When is jurisdiction over person of the accused deemed waived? To recapitulate what we have discussed so far, in criminal cases, jurisdiction over the person of the accused is deemed waived by the accused when he files any pleading seeking an affirmative relief, except in cases when he invokes the special jurisdiction of the court by impugning such jurisdiction over his person. Therefore, in narrow cases involving special appearances, an accused can invoke the processes of the court even though there is neither jurisdiction over the person nor custody of the law. However, if a person invoking the special jurisdiction of the court applies for bail, he must first submit himself to the custody of the law. In cases not involving the so-called special appearance, the general rule applies, i.e., the accused is deemed to have submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court upon seeking affirmative relief. Notwithstanding this, there is no requirement for him to be in the custody of the law.

Cortes v. Catral, 279 SCRA 1 (1997); What is the rationale of bail? Bail is awarded to the accused to honor the presumption of innocence until his guilt is proven beyond reasonable doubt, and to enable him to prepare his defense without being subject to punishment prior to conviction.Bail is the security required by the court and given by the accused to ensure that the accused appears before the proper court at the scheduled time and place to answer the charges brought against him or her. It is awarded to the accused to honor the presumption of innocence until his guilt is proven beyond reasonable doubt, and to enable him to prepare his defense without being subject to punishment prior to conviction. Who may apply for bail? 1. In all cases, whether bail is a matter of right or of discretion, notify the prosecutor of the hearing of the application for bail or require him to submit his recommendation (Section 18, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court as amended); 2. Where bail is a matter of discretion, conduct a hearing of the application for bail regardless of whether or not the prosecution refuses to present evidence to show that the guilt of the accused is strong for the purpose of enabling the court to exercise its sound discretion (Sections 7 and 8); 3. Decide whether the guilt of the accused is strong based on the summary of evidence of the prosecution; 4. If the guilt of the accused is not strong, discharge the accused upon the approval of the bailbond (Section 19). Otherwise, the petition should be denied. People v. Manallo, 400 SCRA 129 (2003); What additional purpose does a bail serve? A bail application does not only involve the right of the accused to temporary liberty, but likewise the right of the State to protect the people and the peace of the community from dangerous elements two rights which must be balanced by a magistrate in the scale of justice, hence, the necessity for hearing to guide his exercise of jurisdiction.In this case, the appellant filed his motion for bail on May 8, 1992. There was no specific date and time for the hearing of said motion. And yet, on the same day that the motion was filed, the trial court granted the said motion and fixed the bail bond for the provisional liberty of the appellant in the amount of P50,000.00 without any factual basis therefor stated in the order. Even when the public prosecutor prayed the court on June 17, 1992, for the cancellation of the property bond of the appellant on the ground that the trial court granted his motion for bail without even affording the prosecution a chance to be heard thereon and adduce its evidence in opposition thereto, the trial court held in abeyance resolution thereof and even allowed the appellant to remain free on his bond in the amount of only P50,000.00. Patently, the prosecution was deprived of its right to due process. In Go vs. Judge Bongolan, et al., this Court emphasized that: A bail application does not only involve the right of the accused to temporary liberty, but likewise the right of the State to protect the people and the peace of the community from dangerous elements. These two rights must be balanced by a magistrate in the scale of justice, hence, the necessity for hearing to guide his exercise of jurisdiction. The presiding judge of the trial court thus exposed his gross ignorance of the law. As a consequence, the appellant jumped bail and managed to elude arrest for six years, to the prejudice of the administration of justice. People v. Nitcha, 240 SCRA 283 (1995)

What is the effect of posting a bail on questioning legality of warrest on the ground that there was no preliminary investigation? On the assumption that accused-. appellants arrest was illegal for want of preliminary investigation, such hypothesis was nonetheless negated by accusedappellants act of posting a bail bond, apart from the fact that he entered a plea of not guilty which is tantamount to foregoing the right to question the assumed irregularity. People v. Donato, 198 SCRA 130 (1991); What determines which offense is bailable? The penalty. What is a non-bailable offense? Those with capital punishment, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment. Is rebellion a bailable offense? Yes. Penalty is prision mayor (under old law; note that under new law, it is now punishable by reclusion perpetua). When is bail a matter of right, and when is it a matter of discretion? before conviction bail is either a matter of right or of discretion. It is a matter of right when the offense charged is punishable by any penalty lower than reclusion perpetua. To that extent the right is absolute. Upon the other hand, if the offense charged is punishable by reclusion perpetua bail becomes a matter of discretion. It shall be denied if the evidence of guilt is strong. The courts discretion is limited to determining whether or not evidence of guilt is strong. But once it is determined that the evidence of guilt is not strong, bail also becomes a matter of right. May the accused apply for bail even when privilege of writ of habeas corpus is suspended? Yes. Sanctioned by the 1987 Constitution. When does the prosection have right to present evidence for denial of bail? prosecution does not have the right to present evidence for the denial of bail in the instances where bail is a matter of right. However, in the cases where the grant of bail is discretionary, due process requires that the prosecution must be given an opportunity to present, within a reasonable time, all the evidence that it may desire to introduce before the court should resolve the motion for bail. May the right to bail be waived? Yes. It is a right which is personal to the accused and whose waiver would not be contrary to law, public order, public policy, morals, or good customs, or prejudicial to a third person with a right recognized by law. When may the accused waive his right to bail, as in this case? When he agrees to remain in legal custody. Lavides v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 129670, Feburary 1, 2000; When should bail be granted? In cases where it is authorized, bail should be granted before arraignment, otherwise the accused may be precluded from filing a motion to quash.In the first place, as the trial court itself acknowledged, in cases where it is authorized, bail should be granted before arraignment, otherwise the accused may be precluded from filing a

motion to quash. For if the information is quashed and the case is dismissed, there would then be no need for the arraignment of the accused. In the second place, the trial court could ensure the presence of petitioner at the arraignment precisely by granting bail and ordering his presence at any stage of the proceedings, such as arraignment. Under Rule 114, 2(b) of the Rules on Criminal Procedure, one of the conditions of bail is that the accused shall appear before the proper court whenever so required by the court or these Rules, while under Rule 116, 1(b) the presence of the accused at the arraignment is required. Why is it not good to make arraignment a pre-requisite to bail? To condition the grant of bail to an accused on his arraignment would be to place him in a position where he has to choose between (1) filing a motion to quash and thus delay his release on bail because until his motion to quash can be resolved, his arraignment cannot be held, and (2) foregoing the filing of a motion to quash so that he can be arraigned at once and thereafter be released on bail. These scenarios certainly undermine the accuseds constitutional right not to be put on trial except upon valid complaint or information sufficient to charge him with a crime and his right to bail. What should be a condition for bail? That non-appearance in the trial is a waiver of his right to appear, and trial will proceed in absentia. For another condition of bail under Rule 114, 2(c) is that The failure of the accused to appear at the trial without justification despite due notice to him or his bondsman shall be deemed an express waiver of his right to be present on the date specified in the notice. In such case, trial shall proceed in absentia. What is the effect of the invalid condition on the bail, that arraignment is required? Although a condition for the grant of bail to an accused is invalid, it does not follow that his arraignment and the subsequent proceedings against him are invalid. Serapio v. Sandiganbayan, 396 SCRA 443 (2003); When should a person apply for bail? For when bail is a matter of right, an accused may apply for and be granted bail even prior to arraignment. The ruling in Lavides also implies that an application for bail in a case involving an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua to death may also be heard even before an accused is arraigned. Further, if the court finds in such case that the accused is entitled to bail because the evidence against him is not strong, he may be granted provisional liberty even prior to arraignment; for in such a situation, bail would be authorized under the circumstances. The arraignment of an accused is not a prerequisite to the conduct of hearings on his petition for bail. A person is allowed to petition for bail as soon as he is deprived of his liberty by virtue of his arrest or voluntary surrender. An accused need not wait for his arraignment before filing a petition for bail. Teehankee v. Director of Prisons, 76 Phil. 756 (1946); Who is entitled to bail?

Under the Constitution, all persons, without distinction, whether f ormally charged or not yet so charged with any criminal offense, "shall before conviction be bailable," the only exception being when the charge is for a capital offense and the court finds that the evidence of guilt is strong. When is bail discretionary? What is the scope of that discretion? Capital offenses are bailable, in the discretion of the court, before conviction. And such discretion has no other reference than to the determination as to whether or not the evidence of guilt is strong. What are the steps when bail is discretionary? Upon the basis of constitutional, legal and reglementary provisions combined with well-known principles of practice and procedure, the People's Court should follow these steps; (1) In capital cases like the present, when the prosecutor does not oppose the petition for release on bail, the court should, as a general rule, in the proper exercise of its discretion, grant the release after approval of the bail which it should fix for the purpose; (2) but if the court has reasons to believe that the special prosecutor's attitude is not justified, it may ask him questions to ascertain the strength of the state's evidence or to judge the adequacy of the amount of bail; (3) when, however, the special prosecutor refuses to answer anyparticular question on the ground that the answer may involve a disclosure imperiling the success of the prosecution or jeopardizing the public interest, the court may not compel him to do so, if and when he exhibits a statement to that effect of the Solicitor General who, as head of the Office of Special Prosecutors, is vested with the direction and control of the prosecution, and may not, even at the trial, be ordered by the court to present evidence which he does not want to introduceprovided, of course, that such refusal shall not prejudice the rights of the defendant or detainee. What is the general effect when prosecutor declines to oppose application on bail? Release of person in custody. How is judicial discretion limited in granting/denying discretionary bail? (1) Constitution and statute, (2) Rules of procedure, and (3) Right and justice. People v. San Diego, 26 SCRA 522 (1988); How is judicial discretion limited in granting/denying discretionary bail? The court's discretion to grant bail in capital offenses must be exercised in the light of a summary of the evidence presented by the prosecution; otherwise, it would be uncontrolled and might be capricious or whimsical. Hence, the court's order granting or refusing bail must contain a summary of the evidence for the prosecution followed by its conclusion whether or not the evidence of guilt is strong. Ocampo v. Bernabe, 77 Phil. 55 (1946); What is required to control discretion in discretionary bail? The determination of whether or not the evidence of guilt is strong is a matter of judicial discretion. This discretion, by the very nature of things, may rightly be exercised only after- the evidence is submitted to the court at the hearing. Since the discretion is directed to the weight of evidence and since evidence cannot properly be

weighed if not duly exhibited or produced before the court, it is obvious that a proper exercise of judicial discretion requires that the evidence of guilt be submitted to the court, the petitioner having the right of cross-examination and to introduce his own evidence in rebuttal. Mere affidavits or recital of their contents are not sufficient since they are mere hearsay evidence, unless the petitioner fails to object thereto. Siazon v. Judge, 4 SCRA 184 (1971); Differentiate a hearing for purposes of petition for bail vs. trial on the merits: The hearing should be summary or otherwise in the discretion of the court. A summary hearing means such brief and speedy method of receiving and considering the evidence of guilt as is practicable and consistent with the purpose of the hearing which is merely to determine the weight of the evidence for purposes of bail. On such hearing, the court does not sit to try the merits or to enter into any nice inquiry as to the weight that ought to be allowed to the evidence for or against accused, nor will it speculate on the outcome of the trial or on what further evidence may be therein offered and admitted. The course of the inquiry may be left to the discretion of the court which may confine itself to receiving such evidence as has reference to substantial matters, avoiding unnecessary thoroughness in the examination and crossexamination of witnesses and reducing to a reasonable minimum at the amount of corroboration particularly on details that are not essential to the purposes of the hearing. Mamolo v. Narisima, 252 SCRA 613 (1995); What is the basis of the judge in determining whether evidence is weak or strong, for purpose of granting bail? The procedure of conducting a hearing on the application for admission to bail should provide the basis for judges to determine whether the prosecutions evidene is weak or strong. In the case at bench, while respondent conducted a hearing on Balagots petition for bail such proceeding did not elicit evidence from the prosecution to guide respondent in the proper determination of the petition. What is the duty of the judge under such proceeding? In a bail hearing the judge is under legal obligation to receive evidence with the view of determining whether evidence of guilt is so strong as to warrant denial of bail. Cortes v. Catral, 279 SCRA 1 (1997); What are the duties of trial judge in bail applications? 1. In all cases, whether bail is a matter of right or of discretion, notify the prosecutor of the hearing of the application for bail or require him to submit his recommendation (Section 18, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court as amended); 2. Where bail is a matter of discretion, conduct a hearing of the application for bail regardless of whether or not the prosecution refuses to present evidence to show that the guilt of the accused is strong for the purpose of enabling the court to exercise its sound discretion (Sections 7 and 8); 3. Decide whether the guilt of the accused is strong based on the summary of evidence of the prosecution;

4. If the guilt of the accused is not strong, discharge the accused upon the approval of the bailbond (Section 19). Otherwise, the petition should be denied. People v. Tuppal, 395 SCRA 72 (2003); Differentiate a hearing for purposes of petition for bail vs. trial on the merits: Appellant also contends that since the trial court had held during the bail hearing that the prosecution evidence was weak, it is estopped from rendering a contrary ruling after the trial. The Office of the Solicitor General counters that findings of the trial court during the bail hearing were but a preliminary appraisal of the strength of the prosecutions evidence for the limited purpose of determining whether appellant is entitled to be released on bail during the pendency of the trial. Hence, we agree with the OSG that said findings should not be construed as an immutable evaluation of the prosecutions evidence. It is settled that the assessment of the prosecution evidence presented during bail hearings in capital offenses is preliminary and intended only for the purpose of granting or denying applications for the provisional release of the accused. Enrile v. Perez, G.R. No. 147785 (resolution of the Supreme Court En banc dated May 5, 2001) Dela Camara v. Enage, 41 SCRA 1 (1971); What is excessive bail? What is the purpose of its proscription? Where the right to bail exists, it should not be rendered nugatory by requiring a sum that is excessive. So the Constitu- tion commands. It is understandable why. If there were no such prohibition, the right to bail becomes meaningless. It would have been more forthright if no mention of such a guarantee were found in the fundamental law. It is not to be lost sight of that the United States Constitution limits itself to a prohibition against excessive bail. As construed in the latest American decision, the sole permissible function of money bail is to assure the accuseds presence at trial, and declared that bail set at a higher figure than an amount reasonably calculated to fulfill this purpose is excessive under the Eighth Amendment. Example of excessive bail: Nothing can be clearer, therefore, than that the challenged order of August 10, 1970 fixing the amount of P1,195,200.00 as the bail that should be posted by petitioner, the sum of P840,000.00 for the information charging multiple murder, there being fourteen victims, and the sum of P355,200.00 for the other offense of multiple frustrated murder, there being twelve victims, is clearly violative of this constitutional provision. Under the circumstances, there being only two offenses charged, the amount required as bail could not possibly exceed P50,000.00 for the information for murder and P25,000.00 for the other information for frustrated murder. Nor should it be ignored in this case that the Department of Justice did recommend the total sum of P40,-000.00 for the two offenses. Villase or v. Aba o, 21 SCRA 321 (1967); What are guidelines in fixing bail? The guidelines in the fixing of bail was there summarized, in the opinion of Justice Sanchez, as follows: (1) ability of the accused to give bail; (2) nature of the offense;

(3) penalty for the offense charged; (4) character and reputation of the accused; (5) health of the accused; (6) character and strength of the evidence; (7) probability of the accused appearing in trial; (8) forfeiture of other bonds; (9) whether the accused was a fugitive from justice when arrested; and (10) if the accused is under bond for appearance at trial in other cases. Respondent Judge, however, did ignore this decisive consideration appearing at the end of the above opinion: Discretion, indeed, is with the court called upon to rule on the question of bail. We must stress, however, that where conditions imposed upon a defendant seeking bail would amount to a refusal thereof and render nugatory the constitutional right to bail, we will not hesitate to exercise our supervisory powers to provide the required remedy. Re: Anynomous Letter-complaint against Hon. Tamang, 617 SCRA 428 (2010) Where to file the bail bond? The bail bond may be filed either with the court where the case is pending, or with any Regional Trial Court (RTC) of the place of arrest, or if no RTC Judge is available, with any Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) or Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of the place of arrest. Section 17 (a), Rule 114 of the Rules of Court governs the approval of bail bonds for criminal cases pending outside the judges territorial jurisdiction, viz: Section 17. Bail, where filed.(a) Bail in the amount fixed may be filed with the court where the case is pending, or in the absence or unavailability of the judge thereof, with any regional trial judge, metropolitan trial judge, municipal trial judge, or municipal circuit trial judge in the province, city, or municipality. If the accused is arrested in a province, city, or municipality other than where the case is pending, bail may also be filed with any Regional Trial Court of said place, or if no judge thereof is available, with any metropolitan trial judge, municipal trial judge, or municipal circuit trial judge therein. xxx Under the provision, the bail bond may be filed either with the court where thecase is pending, or with any RTC of the place of arrest, or if no RTC Judge is available, with any MeTC or MTC of the place of arrest. Leviste vs C.A., G.R. No. 189122. March 17, 2010 What is the rationale for bail? Bail, the security given by an accused who is in the custody of the law for his release to guarantee his appearance before any court as may be required, is the answer of the criminal justice system to a vexing question: what is to be done with the accused, whose guilt has not yet been proven, in the dubious interval, often years long, between arrest and final adjudication? Bail acts as a reconciling mechanism to accommodate both the accuseds interest in pretrial liberty and societys interest in assuring the accuseds presence at trial. Is bail pending appeal after conviction in lower court allowed? Yes. the denial of the same accuseds application for bail pending appeal on the ground that the evidence of his guilt for the crime charged is strong, would unintentionally be suggestive of the outcome of the appealed decision of the lower court.The Philippine Constitution itself emphasizes the right of an accused to bail with the sole exception of those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong. Cases, like in the present case, when an accused is charged with Murder but was convicted with Homicide, mean only one thing, that the lower court found the evidence for the crime charged not strong, hence, the accuseds conviction of a lesser offense. Therefore, the denial of the same accuseds application

for bail pending appeal on the ground that the evidence of his guilt for the crime charged is strong, would unintentionally be suggestive of the outcome of the appealed decision of the lower court. The discretion whether to grant the application for bail or not is given to the CA in cases such as the present one, on the reason that the same appellate court can review the factual findings of the lower court. However, this will no longer be the case if a Petition for Certiorari is filed with this Court as it is not a trier of facts. Hence, the existence of those queries brought about by the majority opinion casts confusion rather than an enlightenment on the present case. The CA should have applied the provisions of Section 5, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court, wherein the appellate court is given the discretion to grant bail to the petitioner after considering the enumerated circum-stances, the penalty imposed by the trial court having exceeded six years. Although this Court has held that the discretion to extend bail during the course of the appeal should be exercised with grave caution and for strong reasons, considering that the accused has been in fact convicted by the trial court, the set of circumstances succinctly provided in Section 5, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court should be considered. The said set of circumstances has been provided as a guide for the exercise of the appellate courts discretion in granting or denying the application for bail, pending the appeal of an accused who has been convicted of a crime where the penalty imposed by the trial court is imprisonment exceeding six (6) years. Otherwise, if it is intended that the said discretion be absolute, no such set of circumstances would have been necessarily included in the Rules. Thus, if the present ruling of the CA is upheld, anyone who has been charged with a capital offense, or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment but convicted by the trial court of a lesser offense, would no longer be able to apply for bail pending ones appeal. And by that premise, the discretion accorded to the appellate court in granting or denying applications for bail for those who have been convicted by the trial court with imprisonment exceeding six (6) years as penalty would have to be rendered nugatory and the provisions of Section 5, Rule 114 of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure would also be rendered useless.

Secretary of Justice v. Lantion, 322 SCRA 160 (2000) Socrates v. Sandiganbayan, 253 SCRA 773 (1996) People v. Lagon, 185 SCRA 442 (1990) Malaloan v. CA, 232 SCRA 249 (1994) People v. Pardilla, 92 SCRA 591 (1979) ** Malto v. People, 553 SCRA 643, September 21, 2007 Lazarte, Jr. vs. Sandiganbayan, 581 SCRA 431 (2009) ** People v. Valdez, 663 SCRA 272 (Jan. 2012) People v. Berialies, 76 SCRA 42 (1977) Republic v. Sunga, 162 SCRA 191 (1988) People v. Ocapan, 150 SCRA 607 (1987) People v. Ilarde, 125 SCRA 607 (1987) People v. Madali, 349 SCRA 104 (2001) Roberts v CA, 254 SCRA 307 (1996) People v. Guevarra, 179 SCRA 740 (1989) People v. Galigao, G.R. Nos. 140961-63, January 14, 2003 People v. Pardilla, supra ** People v. Purisima, 86 SCRA 542 (1978) People v. Buayaban, 400 SCRA 48 (2003) People v. Delim, G.R. No. 142773, January 28, 2003** People v. Fernandez, 414 SCRA 84 (2003) People v. Masapol, 417 SCRA 371 (2003) Patula v. People, G.R. No. 164457, April 11, 2012 People v. Valdez, 663 SCRA 272 (Jan. 2012) supra People v. Degamo, 402 SCRA 133 (2003); Villaflor v. Viver, 349 SCRA 194 (2001); People v. Fernandez, 183 SCRA 511 (1990); People v. Lopez, 312 SCRA 684 (1999); People v. Chan Toco, 12 Phil. 262 (1908); Balitaan v. CFI- Batangas, 115 SCRA 729 (1982); Matilde v. Jabson, 68 SCRA 456 (1975); People v. Gallo, G.R. No. 124736, resolution dated September 29, Vasquez v. CA, 314 SCRA SCRA 460 (1999); People v. Llanto, G.R. No. 146458, January 20, 2003; Socrates v. Sandiganbayan, supra; People v. Lizada, G.R. Nos. 143468-71, January 24, 2003; People v. Ladrillo, 320 SCRA 61 (1999); People v. Losano, G.R. No. 127122, July 20, 1999; U.S. v. Javier Dichao, 27 Phil. 421 (1914); People v. Molero, 144 SCRA 397 (1986); People v. Lualhati, 171 SCRA 277 (1989); Rocaberte v. People, 193 SCRA 152 (1991); People v. Perez, 417 SCRA 449 (2003); People v. Consing Jr., 395 SCRA 366 (2003); Magestrado v. People, 527 SCRA 125 (2007) Trinidad v. Office of the Ombudsman, 539 SCRA 415 (2007)** People vs. Bayotas, 236 SCRA 239, G.R. No. 102007, September 2, 1994** Manantan v. CA, 350 SCRA 387 (2001) Dreamwork Construction, Inc., Vs. Janiola, 591 SCRA 466 (2009) Teehankee v. Madayag, 140 SCRA 425 (1985)**; Draculan v. Donato, 140 SCRA 425 (1985); Almeda v. Villaluz, 66 SCRA 38 (1975); People v. CA, 121 SCRA 733 (1983); People v. Tubongbanua, 500 SCRA 727 (2006) Matalan v.Sandiganbayan, 455 SCRA 736 (2005)

Cruz v. CA, 194 SCRA 145 (1991);

Sales v. Sandiganbayan, 369 SCRA 293 (2001) Baytan v. COMELEC, 396 SCRA 703 (2003); Paderanga v. Drilon, 196 SCRA 86(1991); Go vs. Court of Appeals, 206 SCRA 138 (1992) Allado v. Diokno, 232 SCRA 192 (1994) Doromal V. Sandiganbayan, 177 SCRA 354 (1989); Go vs. Court of Appeals, supra Webb v. De Leon, 247 SCRA 652 (1995); Velasco v. Casaclang, 294 SCRA 396 (1998); Balgos v. Sandiganbayan, 176 SCRA 287 (1989); Alonzo vs. Concepcion, A.M. No. RTJ-04-1879. January 17, 2005 Rodil v. Garcia, 104 SCRA 362 (1981); Allado v. Diokno, 232 SCRA 192 (1994); See: Ombudsman & DOJ MOA, April 19, 2012 Leviste vs. Alameda, 626 SCRA 575 (2010) Dimatullac v. Villon, 297 SCRA 679 (1998); Ty v. NBI, 638 SCRA 671 (2010) Roberts v. CA, 254 SCRA 307 (1996); Dungog v. CA, 159 SCRA 145 (1988); Velasquez v. Undersecretary of Justice, 182 SCRA 388 (1990); People v. Beriales, 70 SCRA 361 (1976); Doromal v. Sandiganbayan, supra Leviste vs. Almeda, supra Crespo v. Mogul, 151 SCRA 462 (1987); Go vs. Courts of Appeals, 206 SCRA 138 (1992) Socrates v. Sandiganbayan, 253 SCRA 773 (1996); Sales v. Sandiganbayan, supra Primicias v. Pangasinan, 93 SCRA 462 (1979); Guingona Jr. v. City Fiscal, 137 SCRA 597 (1985); Paderanga v. Drilon, supra; People vs. Grey, 625 SCRA 523 (2010) Brocka v. Enrile, 192 SCRA 183 (1990) Ty v. NBI, supra Go v CA, 206 SCRA 138 (1992); Larranaga v. CA, 287 SCRA 581 (1998);