Specpro MTG6

1 DE LA CERNA SPECPRO DIGESTS 2011 AMIN | CHA | JANZ | KRIZEL | VIEN
Quasha v. LCN Construction Corp.

Chico-Nazario, J. Quickie: Triviere passed away proceedings for the settlement of his intestate estate Atty Syquia and Atty. Quasha were appointed administrators of the estate Atty. Quasha passed away Atty. Zapata took over Atty. Syquia and Atty. Zapata filed for Motion for payment claiming for the payment of attorneys fees and litigation expenses. The Court held that when an executor or administrator dies, resigns, or is removed the remaining executor or administrator may administer the trust alone, unless the court grants letters to someone to act with him. If there is no remaining executor or administrator, administration may be granted to any suitable person. The records of the case are wanting in evidence that Quasha Law Office or any of its lawyers substituted Atty. Quasha as co-administrator of the estate. While it rendered legal services for the settlement of the estate of Raymond Triviere since the time of Atty. Quasha's death in 1996, it did not serve as co-administrator thereof, granting that it was never even issued letters of administration. The attorney's fees, therefore, cannot be covered by the prohibition in the third paragraph of Section 7, Rule 85 of the Revised Rules of Court against an attorney, to charge against the estate professional fees for legal services rendered by them. Facts: Raymond Triviere passed away proceedings for the settlement of his intestate estate were instituted by his widow, Amy Consuelo Triviere, Atty. Enrique P. Syquia (Syquia) and Atty.William H. Quasha (Quasha) of the Quasha Law Office, representing the widow and children of the late Raymond Triviere, respectively, were appointed administrators of the estate of the deceased As administrators, Atty. Syquia and Atty. Quasha incurred expenses for the payment of real estate taxes, security services, and the preservation and administration of the estate, as well as litigation expenses. Atty. Syquia and Atty. Quasha filed before the RTC a Motion for Payment of their litigation expenses. Citing their failure to submit an accounting of the assets and liabilities of the estate under administration, the RTC denied in May 1995 the Motion for Payment of Atty. Syquia and Atty.Quasha. In 1996, Atty. Quasha also passed away. Atty. Redentor Zapata (Zapata),also of the Quasha Law Office, took over as the counsel of the Triviere children, and continued to help Atty. Syquia in the settlement of the estate. On 6 September 2002, Atty. Syquia and Atty. Zapata filed another Motion for Payment, for their own behalf and for their respective clients, claiming for the payment of attorneys fees and litigation expenses. LCN, as the only remaining claimant against the Intestate Estate of the Late Raymond Triviere in Special Proceedings Case No. M-1678, filed its Comment on/Opposition to the afore-quoted Motion on 2 October 2002.
563 SCRA 426 (2008)

Argument of LCN: RTC had already resolved the issue of payment of litigation expenses when it denied the first Motion for Payment filed by Atty. Syquia and Atty. Quasha for failure of the administrators to submit an accounting of the assets and expenses of the estate as required by the court. o LCN also averred that the administrators and the heirs of the late Raymond Triviere had earlier agreed to fix the former's fees at only 5% of the gross estate, based on which, per the computation of LCN, the administrators were even overpaid P55,000.00. o contrary to what was stated in the second Motion for Payment, Section 7, Rule 85 of the Revised Rules of Court was inapplicable, since the administrators failed to establish that the estate was large, or that its settlement was attended with great difficulty, or required a high degree of capacity on the part of the administrators. o its claims are still outstanding and chargeable against the estate of the late Raymond Triviere thus, no distribution should be allowed until they have been paid
Issue 1: WHETHER OR NOT THE AWARD IN FAVOR OF THE HEIRS OF THE LATE RAYMOND TRIVIERE IS ALREADY A DISTRIBUTION OF THE RESIDUE OFTHE ESTATE. YES Issue 2: WHETHER OR NOT THE AWARD OF ATTORNEY'S FEES IN FAVOR OF THE COADMINISTRATORS SHOULD HAVE BEEN NULLIFIED YES Ratio 1: While the awards in favor of petitioner children and widow made in the RTC Order dated 12 June 2003 was not yet a distribution of the residue of the estate, given that there was still a pending claim against the estate, still, they did constitute a partial and advance distribution of the estate. Virtually, the petitioner children and widow were already being awarded shares in the estate, although not all of its obligations had been paid or provided for. In sum, although it is within the discretion of the RTC whether or not to permit the advance distribution of the estate, its exercise of such discretion should be qualified by the following: (1) only part of the estate that is not affected by any pending controversy or appeal may be the subject of advance distribution(Section 2, Rule 109); and (2) the distributees must post a bond, fixed by the court, conditioned for the payment of outstanding obligations of the estate(second paragraph of Section 1, Rule 90). There is no showing that the RTC, in awarding to the petitioner children and widow their shares in the estate prior to the settlement of all its obligations, complied with these two requirements or, at the very least, took the same into consideration. Its Order of 12 June 2003 is completely silent on these matters. It justified its grant of the award in a single sentence which stated that petitioner children
2 DE LA CERNA SPECPRO DIGESTS 2011 and widow had not yet received their respective shares from the estate after all these years. Taking into account that the claim of LCN against the estate of the late Raymond Triviere allegedly amounted to P6,016,570.65, already in excess of the P4,738,558.63 reported total value of the estate, the RTC should have been more prudent in approving the advance distribution of the same. Hence, the Court does not find that the Court of Appeals erred in disallowing the advance award of shares by the RTC to petitioner children and widow of the late Raymond Triviere. AMIN | CHA | JANZ | KRIZEL | VIEN anymore as co-administrator),representing and performing legal services for the Triviere children in thesettlement of the estate of their deceased father
Ratio 2: Nothing in the records, however, reveals that any one of the lawyers of Quasha Law Office was indeed a substitute administrator for Atty. Quasha upon his death. The court has jurisdiction to appoint an administrator of an estate by granting letters of administration to a person not otherwise disqualified or incompetent to serve as such, following the procedure laid down in Section 6,Rule 78 of the Rules of Court. Corollary thereto, Section 2, Rule 82 of the Rules of Court provides in clear and unequivocal terms the modes for replacing an administrator of an estate upon the death of an administrator, to wit: Section 2. Court may remove or accept resignation of executor or administrator. Proceedings upon death , resignation, or removal . When an executor or administrator dies, resigns, or is removed the remaining executor or administrator may administer the trust alone, unless the court grants letters to someone to act with him If there is no remaining executor or administrator, administration may be granted to any suitable person. The records of the case are wanting in evidence that Quasha Law Office or any of its lawyers substituted Atty. Quasha as co-administrator of the estate. None of the documents attached pertain to the issuance of letters of administration to petitioner Quasha Law Office or any of its lawyers at any time after the demise of Atty. Quasha in 1996. This Court is thus inclined to give credence to petitioner's contention that while it rendered legal services for the settlement of the estate of Raymond Triviere since the time of Atty. Quasha's death in 1996, it did not serve as coadministrator thereof, granting that it was never even issued letters of administration. The attorney's fees, therefore, cannot be covered by the prohibition in the third paragraph of Section 7, Rule 85 of the Revised Rules of Court against an attorney, to charge against the estate professional fees for legal services rendered by them. However, while petitioner Quasha Law Office, serving as counsel of the Triviere children from the time of death of Atty. Quasha in 1996, is entitled to attorney's fees and litigation expenses of P100,000.00 as prayed for in the Motion for Payment dated 3 September 2002, and as awarded by the RTC in its 12 June2003 Order, the same may be collected from the shares of the Triviere children, upon final distribution of the estate, in consideration of the fact that the Quasha Law Office, indeed, served as counsel (not
Sebial v. Sebial et. al.

Aquino, J.: Nature: Case certified by Court of Appeals to the Supreme Court Quickie: Child of second marriage issued lettersof administration v child of first marriage and creditors. Lower court admitted the inventory (amended) made by administratrix Lower Court approved the second inventory because there was allegedly a "prima facie evidence to show that" the seven parcels of land and two houses listed therein belonged to the decedent's estate. SC: that order is wrong. The probate court should receive evidence on the discordant contentions of the parties as to the assets of decedent's estate, the valuations thereof and the rights of the transferees of some of the assets. The issue of prescription should also be considered . After receiving evidence, the probate court should decide once and for all whether there are still any assets of the estate that can be partitioned and, if so, to effect the requisite partition and distribution. If the estate has no more assets and if a partition had really been made or the action to recover the lands transferred to third person had prescribed, it should dismiss the intestate proceeding. Facts: Gelacio Sebial died intestate in 1943 in Pinamungajan Cebu. According to the appellants, Gelacio Sebial, by his first wife Leoncia Manikis, who allegedly died in 1919, begot three children named Roberta, Balbina and Juliano. By his second wife, Dolores Enad, whom he allegedly married in 1927, he supposedly begot six children named Benjamina, Valentina, Ciriaco, Gregoria, Esperanza and Luciano. Benjamina Sebial filed in the Court of First Instance of Cebu a verified petition for the settlement of Gelacio Sebial's estate. She prayed that she be appointed administratrix thereof (Spec. Proc. No. 2049-R). Roberta Sebial opposed the petition on the ground that the estate of Gelacio Sebial had already been partitioned among his children and that, if an administration proceeding was necessary, she, Roberta Sebial, a resident of Guimbawian, a remote mountain barrio of Pinamungajan, where the decedent's estate was supposedly located, should be the one appointed administratrix and not Benjamina Sebial, a housemaid working at Talisay, Cebu which is about seventy kilometers away from Pinamungajan. In a supplemental opposition the children of the first marriage contended that the remedy of Benjamina Sebial was an action to rescind the partition. Lower court: appointed Benjamina Sebial as administratrix. It found that the decedent left an estate consisting of lands with an area of twenty-one hectares, valued at more than six thousand pesos, and that the alleged partition of the decedent's estate was invalid and ineffective. Letters of administration were issued to Benjamina Sebial and a notice to creditors was issued. The oppositors moved for the reconsideration of the order appointing Benjamina Sebial as administratrix. LC denied the motion
64 SCRA 385 (1975)

The oppositors filed a motion to terminate the administration proceeding on the grounds that the decedent's estate was valued at less than six thousand pesos and that it had already been partitioned and, therefore, there was no necessity for the administration proceeding. Benjamina Sebial filed an inventory and appraisal of the decedent's estate allegedly consisting of seven unregistered parcels of landwith a total value of nine thousand pesos, all located at Barrio Guimbawian, Pinamungajan. The oppositors registered their opposition to the inventory on the ground that the seven parcels of land enumerated in the inventory no longer formed part of the decedent's estate. The administratrix filed a motion to require Lorenzo Rematado, Demetrio Camillo and the spouses Roberta Sebial and Lazaro Recuelo to deliver to her the parcels of land Probate Court: issued an order suspending action on the pending incidents in view of the possibility of an amicable settlement. Oppositors, Roberta Sebial, Juliano Sebial and the heirs of Balbina Sebial, submitted their own inventory of the conjugal assets of Gelacio Sebial and Leoncia Manikis, consisting of two parcels of land acquired in 1912 and 1915. They alleged that the conjugal estate of Gelacio Sebial and Dolores Enad consisted of only one parcel of land, containing an area of seven hectares, allegedly purchased with money coming from the conjugal assets of Gelacio Sebial and Leoncia Manikis. They further alleged that the said seven- hectare land was sold by the children of the second marriage The oppositors claimed that the aforementioned two parcels of land acquired during the first marriage were partitioned in 1945 among (1) Roberta Sebial, (2) Juliano Sebial, (3) Francisco Sebial as the representative of the estate of Balbina Sebial and (4) Valentina Sebial as the representative of the six children of the second marriage, some of whom were minors. They clarified that under that partition the three children of the first marriage received a three-fourths share while the six children of second marriage received a one-fourth share (Tax Declaration No. 06500). They also alleged that Eduardo Cortado, Emilio Sialongo, Lorenzo Rematado and Lazaro Recuelo were the third persons involved in the transfer of the lands pertaining to the estate of Gelacio Sebial (Tax Declarations Nos. 04493, 06571 and 04471). To the inventory submitted by the oppositors, the administratrix filed an opposition dated November 18, 1961. Lower court: inexplicably required the administratrix to submit another inventory. In compliance , she reproduced her inventory and added two other items, namely, two houses allegedly valued at P8,000 and the fruits of the properties amounting to P5,000 allegedly received by the children of the first marriage. The oppositor interposed an opposition to the said inventory. The oppositors filed a "motion for revision of partition" which was based on their own inventory dated November 7, 1961. Lower Court: approved the second inventory because there was allegedly a "prima facie evidence to show that" the seven parcels of land and two houses listed therein belonged to the decedent's estate. In another order the lower court granted the
4 DE LA CERNA SPECPRO DIGESTS 2011 motion of the administratrix dated May 4, 1961 for the delivery to her of certain parcels of land and it directed that the heirs of Gelacio Sebial, who are in possession of the parcels of land should deliver those properties to the administratrix and should not disturb her in her possession and administration of the same. The lower court denied the oppositors' motion dated November 20, 1961 for "revision of partition". Oppositors moved for the reconsideration of the two orders on the grounds (1) that the court had no jurisdiction to approve an inventory filed beyond the three-month period fixed in section 1, Rule 84 of the Rules of Court; (2) that the said inventory is not supported by any documentary evidence because there is no tax declaration at all in Gelacio Sebial's name; (3) that the two houses mentioned in the inventory were nonexistent because they were demolished by the Japanese soldiers in 1943 and the materials thereof were appropriated by the administratrix and her brothers and sisters; (4) that the valuation of P17,000 indicated in the inventory was fake, fictitious and fantastic since the total value of the seven parcels of land amounted only to P3,080; (5) that Gelacio Sebial's estate should be settled summarily because of its small value as provided in section 2, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court and (6) that an ordinary action is necessary to recover the lands in the possession of third persons. The oppositors without awaiting the resolution of their motion for reconsideration filed a notice of appeal from the two orders. The notice of appeal was filed "without prejudice to the motion for reconsideration Lower Court: denied oppositors' motion for reconsideration. It approved Roberta Sebial's amended record on appeal. The case was elevated to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals in its resolution certified the case to this Court Issue/Held: (1) What is the proper construction to be given to section 2, Rule 74 and section 1, Rule 84 (now Rule 83) of the Rules of Court IT IS NOT MANDATORY (2) whether an ordinary civil action for recovery of property and not an administration proceeding is the proper remedy, considering oppositors' allegation that the estate of Gelacio Sebial was partitioned in 1945 and that some of his heirs had already sold their respective shares Ratio: Oppositors' contention in their motion for reconsideration (not in their brief) that the probate court had no jurisdiction to approve the inventory dated November 17, 1961 because the administratrix filed it after three months from the date of her appointment is not well-taken. The three-month period prescribed in section 1, Rule 83 (formerly Rule 84) of the Rules of Court is not mandatory. After the filing of a petition for the issuance of letters of administration and the publication of the notice of hearing, the proper Court of First Instance acquires jurisdiction over a decedent's estate and retains that jurisdiction until the proceeding is closed. The fact that an inventory was filed after the three-month period would not deprive the probate court of jurisdiction to approve it. However, an administrator's unexplained delay in filing the inventory may be a ground for his removal (Sec. 2, Rule 82, Rules of Court). The other contention of the oppositors that inasmuch as the value of the decedent's estate is less than five thousand pesos and he had no debts, the estate could be settled summarily under section 2, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court or that an AMIN | CHA | JANZ | KRIZEL | VIEN administration proceeding was not necessary (the limit of six thousand pesos was increased to ten thousand pesos in section 2, Rule 74 effective on January 1, 1964) rests on a controversial basis. While in the verified petition for the issuance of letters of administration, it was alleged that the gross value of the decedent's estate was "not more than five thousand pesos", in the amended inventory the valuation was P17,000. Indeed, one of the lower court's omissions was its failure to ascertain by preponderance of evidence the actual value of the estate, if there was still an estate to be administered. The approval of the amended inventory was not such a determination. Anyway, in the present posture of the proceeding, no useful purpose would be served by dismissing the petition herein and ordering that a new petition for summary settlement be filed. Inasmuch as a regular administrator had been appointed and a notice to creditors had been issued and no claims were filed, the probate court could still proceed summarily and expeditiously to terminate the proceeding. With the cooperation of the lawyers of the parties, it should strive to effect an amicable settlement of the case (See arts. 222 and 2029, Civil Code). If the efforts to arrive at an amicable settlement prove fruitless, then the probate court should ascertain what assets constituted the estate of Gelacio Sebial, what happened to those assets and whether the children of the second marriage (the petitioner was a child of the second marriage and the principal oppositor was a child of first marriage) could still have a share, howsoever small, in the decedent's estate. The lower court's order of approving the amended inventory of November 11, 1961, is not a conclusive determination of what assets constituted the decedent's estate and of the valuations thereof. Such a determination is only provisional in character and is without prejudice to a judgment in a separate action on the issue of title or ownership (3 Moran's Comments on the Rules of Court, 1970 Ed., 448-449). The other order dated December 11, 1961 requires the delivery to the administratrix of (1) two parcels of land covered by Tax Declarations Nos. 04491 and 04493 in the possession of the spouses Lazaro Recuelo and Roberta Sebial, an oppositor-appellant; (2) the parcel of land covered by Tax Declaration No. 04490 in the possession of Lorenzo Rematado and (3) the parcel of land described under Tax Declaration No. 04478 in the possession of Demetrio Camillo (Canillo), a child of the deceased Balbina Sebial, one of the three children of the first marriage. We hold that the said order is erroneous and should be set aside because the probate court failed to receive evidence as to the ownership of the said parcels of land. The general rule is that questions of title to property cannot be passed upon in a testate or intestate proceeding. However, when the parties are all heirs of the decedent, it is optional upon them to submit to the probate court the question of title to property and, when so submitted, the probate court may definitely pass judgment thereon Lorenzo Rematado and Lazaro Recuelo are not heirs of the decedent. They are third persons. The rule is that matters affecting property under administration may be taken cognizance of by the probate court in the course of the intestate proceedings provided that the interests of third persons are not prejudiced (Cunanan vs. Amparo, 80 Phil. 227) However, third persons to whom the decedent's assets had been fraudulently conveyed may be cited to appear in court and be examined under oath as to how
5 DE LA CERNA SPECPRO DIGESTS 2011 they came into the possession of the decedent's assets (Sec. 6, Rule 87, Rules of Court) but a separate action would be necessary to recover the said assets (Chanco vs. Madrilejos, 12 Phil. 543; Guanco vs. Philippine National Bank, 54 Phil. 244). The probate court should receive evidence on the discordant contentions of the parties as to the assets of decedent's estate, the valuations thereof and the rights of the transferees of some of the assets. The issue of prescription should also be considered . Generally prescription does not run in favor of a coheir as long as he expressly or impliedly recognizes the coownership (Art. 494, Civil Code).1wph1.t But from the moment that a coheir claims absolute and exclusive ownership of the hereditary properties and denies the others any share therein, the question involved is no longer one of partition but that of ownership (Bargayo vs. Camumot, 40 Phil. 857). At the hearing of the petition for letters of administration some evidence was already introduced on the assets constituting the estate of Gelacio Sebial. After receiving evidence, the probate court should decide once and for all whether there are still any assets of the estate that can be partitioned and, if so, to effect the requisite partition and distribution. If the estate has no more assets and if a partition had really been made or the action to recover the lands transferred to third person had prescribed, it should dismiss the intestate proceeding. AMIN | CHA | JANZ | KRIZEL | VIEN
Separate Opinions BARREDO, J., concurring: Concurs considering the small value of the estate herein involved.
Vda. de Paz v. vda. de Madrigal

Bautista Angelo, J. Quickie: This involves reserva troncal, hence the illustration. R died. She was survived by husband A, two sons Ro and S, and two sisters J and M. Upon her death, title to the certain real properties here under litigation (7 parcels of land in CamSur, 1 parcel in Marinduque and 1 house & lot in Manila) passed to her two sons, although administration and usufruct thereof remained with A. Later, S died without issue. By operation of succession laws, A acquired title to Rs real properties through Ss death, A being the sole heir of S. Meanwhile, A re-married, and his 2nd wife is As. Upon As death, the respondents (As and her children) filed a petition for the probate of As will and the settlement of his estate at the CFI Manila. In said proceedings, petitioners (J, M, and Ros heirs MR and PE) registered their opposition to the probate of the will and the approval of the inventory of As estate, claiming that certain properties listed in said inventory belonged to them by reserva troncal because they are the only relatives within the 3rd degree belonging to the line from which the property came from. In the meantime, to protect their rights of ownership to the reservable properties, the petitioners filed a separate case for reconveyance at the same CFI Manila. Respondents moved to dismiss the reconveyance case on the grounds of (1) litis pendentia and (2) that the court has no jurisdiction over the case because the properties involved are situated in CamSur. CFI Manila granted respondents motion and dismissed the reconveyance case~ hence, t his appeal. HELD: Dismissal is improper. There is no reason why the reconveyance case cannot be maintained simply because the plaintiffs appeared as claimants/oppositors in the testate proceedings. A court which takes cognizance of testate or intestate proceedings has the power and jurisdiction to determine whether or not the properties included therein or excluded therefrom belong prima facie to the deceased, but such determination is NOT FINAL OR ULTIMATE in nature, and without prejudice to the right of interested parties, in a proper action, to raise the question bearing on the ownership or existence of the right.
100 Phil 1085 (1956)

Nature: Appeal from the Order of the CFI Manila dismissing the complaint by herein petitioners (Vda. de Paz, et al.) for reconveyance of real property and recovery of ownership thereof on the grounds of litis pendentia and improper venue. Facts: Regina Mondoedo-Madrigal (R) died. She was survived by her husband Antero Madrigal (A), her two sons, Romeo (Ro) and Salvador (S), and her two sisters Maria Mondoedo Vda. de Paz (M) and Josefa Mondoedo Vda. de Roque (J). At the time of Rs death, she left intestate some real properties, titles to which have passed to her two sons Ro and S from the moment of her death, although the usufruct and administration thereof remained with her surviving spouse A. These properties are 7 parcels of land in CamSur, 1 parcel of land in Marinduque and 1 house/lot in Manila Later, S died without issue. By right of succession, A, father of S, acquired title and ownership of Ss share in the estate of R. As acquisition of said estate of S, however, is subject to the provisions of Art. 811 of the Spanish Civil Code (reserva troncal), which obliges him (A) to reserve the properties in favor of relatives within the 3rd degree belonging to the line from which the property came From 1926 (time of Rs death) up to the time of his death in 1949, A has been in possession of the estate in litigation, and upon his death, defendants herein, who are the widow (Asuncion Buag Vda. de Madrigal, As) and their children, took possession thereof by hereditary succession Upon the death of A, his widow As filed a petition for the probate of As will and the settlement of As estate in the CFI Manila In the same proceedings, plaintiffs herein (J, M, MR and PE) filed an opposition to the probate of the will and the approval of the inventory of the estate of A, claiming that certain properties described and included in said inventory are reservable in their favor, they being the only relatives within the 3 rd degree belonging to the line from which the estate came from. They prayed that As executrix be ordered to deliver to them possession of the estate To further their claim, the plaintiffs filed a reconveyance case at the same CFI Manila to recover the possession and ownership of the estate in litigation In the reconveyance case, the defendants (As and children) moved for dismissal on the grounds that (1) there is another action pending between the same parties involving the same cause, i.e. litis pendentia; and (2) that the court has no jurisdiction over the case because the properties involved are situated in CamSur. CFI Manila granted the motion and dismissed the case. Plaintiffs filed MR, but the same was also dismissed~ hence, this appeal Issue/s and Held: WON the dismissal of the reconveyance case was proper NO! Ratio: One of the grounds on which the lower court dismissed the complaint for reconveyance is that the properties which the plaintiffs desire to recover form part of the estate of the deceased (A) which is the subject of testate proceedings pending
7 DE LA CERNA SPECPRO DIGESTS 2011 in the same court wherein the plaintiffs intervened as claimants/oppositors. Therefore, the court ruled that the 2nd case is unnecessary for the questions raised therein can be threshed out in the testate proceedings UNTENABLE While it is true that probate courts have jurisdiction to determine claims involving title to, or right of possession of, properties made by heirs or other interested parties, such determination is merely for the purpose of inclusion in, or exclusion from, the inventory of the properties composing the estate of the deceased. This determination is ONLY PRIMA FACIE, not final or ultimate in nature, and is without prejudice to the rights of the interested parties to raise the question of ownership in a proper action Claims other than for money, debt or interest in the estate of the deceased cannot be presented in the testate or intestate proceedings. Thus, claims for title to, or the right of possession of, personal or real property, made by the heirs themselves, by title adverse to that of the deceased, or that made by third persons, cannot be entertained by the probate court. ONLY for the purpose of inclusion in or exclusion from the inventory of the deceaseds estate may the probate court pass upon a question of title on real or personal property, BUT this is without prejudice to a final, separate action for the determination of the question of title. There is, therefore, no reason why the action for reconveyance of ownership and possession of the real properties in question cannot be maintained simply because the plaintiffs also appeared as claimants/oppositors in the testate proceedings of A. The appearance in the probate court is merely a precautionary measure on the part of plaintiffs. It is but an assertion of their right to some of the properties which have been included in the inventory as As property The jurisdiction of a probate court is limited in character for it cannot definitively pass upon a question of title or ownership even if the property has been included in the inventory. This matter should be threshed out in a separate action. As to the improper venue (2nd ground for dismissal), the fact that the action was brought before the CFI Manila is proper albeit most of the subject property are situated elsewhere (i.e. CamSur and Marinduque). Under Sec. 3, Rule 5 of the Rules of Court, an action affecting title to real property may be commenced in any province where the property or any part thereof lies. Admittedly, a portion of the estate in litigation is located in Manila. THE COMPLAINT, THOUGH, SUFFERS FROM ONE MINOR DEFECT. Since the executrix (Vda. de Madrigal) is now in possession of the estate in litigation, she should have been included as party defendant in that capacity, i.e. as executrix AMIN | CHA | JANZ | KRIZEL | VIEN
DISPOSITIF: The order appealed from is SET ASIDE, with costs against appellees. Appellants, however, are directed to amend the complaint so as to include the executrix of the estate as party defendant. So ordered.
Heirs of Sy Bang v. Sy et. al.

Nachura, J. Quickie: Children from 1st marriage v. 2nd wife and children. Action for partition was instituted. 3 partial decisions were rendered by the lower court. In the 1 st petition, petitioners challenge the 3rd partial decision deferring the resolution as to the inclusion for partition of the properties in the name of the other respondent. 2 nd wife filed a Motion for Payment of Widows Allowance. SC granted the motion. 2nd wife placed under guardianship. Guardianship court issued a writ of execution ordering petitioners to deposit the allowance which is the subject of the 2nd petition. HELD: The court hearing the petition for guardianship had limited jurisdiction. It had no jurisdiction to enforce payment of the widows allowance ordered by this Court. The claim for widows allowance was made before the SC in a case that did not arise from the guardianship proceedings. The widows allowance is chargeable to Sy Bangs estate. It must be stressed that the issue of whether the properties in the names of Rosalino, Bartolome, Rolando, and Enrique form part of Sy Bangs estate remains unsettled since this Petition questioning the trial courts 3rd Partial Decision has been pending. On the other hand, there has been a categorical pronouncement that petitioners are holding properties belonging to Sy Bangs estate. That the full extent of Sy Bangs estate has not yet been determined is no excuse from complying with this Courts order. Properties of the estate have been identified i.e., those in the names of petitioners thus, these properties should be made to answer for the widows allowance of Rosita. Nature: two Petitions for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 Facts: Petitioners - Jose, Julian and Oscar (children of Sy Bang from his 1st marriage to Ba Nga) and Zenaida and Ma. Emma (children of Sps. Jose and Iluminada) Respondents - Rolando, Rosalino, Lucio, Enrique, Rosauro, Bartolome, Julieta, Lourdes, Florecita (children of Sy Bang by his 2nd marriage) and Rosita (2nd wife) Sy Bang died intestate in 1971, leaving behind real and personal properties, including several businesses. May 28, 1980 - Rolando Sy filed a Complaint for Partition against Sps. Jose and Iluminada, Sps. Julian and Rosa, Zenaida, Ma. Emma, Oscar, Rosalino, Lucio, Enrique, Rosauro, Bartolome, Florecita, Lourdes, Julieta, Rosita, and Renato before the CFI of Quezon. During an out-of-court conference between petitioners and respondents, it was agreed upon that Jose would manage, supervise and administer the common properties and/or the entire estate of Sy Bang, as trustee, with authority to delegate some of his functions to any of petitioners or respondents. o The function or duty of bookkeeper was delegated to Julian, and the duty or function of management and operation of the business of cinema of the common ownership was delegated to Rosauro Sy. o The income of the three cinema houses (Long Life, SBS and Sy-Co Theaters) shall exclusively pertain to respondents for their support and sustenance, pending the termination of the Civil Case for Judicial Partition. o
603 SCRA 534 (2009)

The income from the vast parts of the entire estate and other businesses of their father shall to pertain to petitioners. 1981 CFI rendered a 1st Partial Decision based on the Compromise Agreement. Thereafter, the court also rendered a 2nd Partial Decision based on the pretrial order. These two decisions had long become final, without an appeal having been interposed by any of the parties. 1982 CFI rendered a 3rd Partial Decision: o Declaring that all the properties, businesses or assets in the names of Jose and his wife and their children and defendants Julian and his, as belonging to the estate of Sy Bang o Declaring the following as the heirs of Sy Bang, namely: surviving widow, Rosita and her children, and his children by his first wife. o Ordering the partition of the Estate of Sy Bang among his heirs entitled thereto after the extent thereof shall have been determined at the conclusion of the proper accounting which the parties in this case shall render and after segregating and delivering to Rosita her 1/2 share in the conjugal partnership. o Deferring resolution on the question concerning the inclusion for partition of properties in the names of Rosalino, Bartolome, Rolando and Enrique. Petitioners filed a Motion to Suspend Proceedings and for Inhibition that the Judge had patently shown partiality in favor of their co-defendants in the case. DENIED. Then they filed filed a Petition for Prohibition and for Inhibition (Disqualification) and Mandamus with Restraining Order with the SC. The Petition for Prohibition and for Inhibition was DENIED, and the Petition for Mandamus with Restraining Order was NOTED (later withdrawn). CFI issued two Orders: 1. Lucita L. Sarmiento was appointed as Receiver, and petitioners Motion for New Trial and/or Reconsideration were denied 2. ordered the immediate cancellation of the lis pendens annotated at the back of the certificates of title in the names of Bartolome Sy, Rosalino Sy and Rolando Sy. CFI approved the bond posted by Sarmiento, Bartolome, Rolando and Rosalino Petitioners filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition before the SC to enjoin the Judge from taking any action in the Civil Case. 1989 SC referred the petition to the CA for proper determination and disposition. 1993 - The CA rendered the assailed Decision denying due course to and dismissing the petition for lack of merit. o The act of Judge Puno in rendering a partial decision was in accord with then Rule 36, Section 4, of the Rules of Court. It found that the judges decision to defer resolution on the properties in the name of Rosalino, Bartolome, Rolando, and Enrique would not affect the resolution on the properties in the names of Jose, Iluminada, Julian, Rosa, Zenaida, and Ma. Emma, since the properties were separable and distinct from one another such that the claim that the same formed part of the Sy Bang estate could be the subject of separate suits.
9 DE LA CERNA SPECPRO DIGESTS 2011 o the judge appointed a receiver after both parties had presented their evidence and upon verified petition filed by respondents, and in order to preserve the properties under litigation. MR denied. 1994 - Petitioners filed this Petition seeking the reversal of the CA Decision and, consequently, the nullification of the 3rd Partial Decision and orders of the trial court in the Civil Case - CA decided questions of substance not in accord with law when it upheld the trial courts Third Partial Decision which was rendered in violation of their rights to due process. (G.R. No. 114217 1st Petition) 1996 - Rosita filed a Motion for Payment of Widows Allowance. o The properties of the estate were found by the trial court to be their conjugal properties. From 1971 until the filing of the motion, She was not given any widows allowance as provided in Sec. 3, Rule 83 by the parties in possession and control of her husbands estate, or her share in the conjugal partnership. Petitioners Sec. 3, Rule 83 of the Rules of Court specifically provides that the same is granted only "during the settlement of the estate" of the decedent, and this allowance, under Art. 188 CC (now Art. 133 FC, shall be taken from the "common mass of property" during the liquidation of the inventoried properties. Considering that the case is a special civil action for partition under Rule 69, Rosita is not entitled to widows allowance. SC granted the Motion for Payment of Widows Allowance and ordered petitioners jointly and severally to pay Rosita P25k as the widows allowance to be taken from the estate of Sy Bang, effective 1996 and every month thereafter until the estate is finally settled or until further orders. Petitioners informed the SC that Rosita and Enrique had executed a waiver of past, present and future claims against them and, thus, should be dropped as parties to the case. Attached thereto was a Sinumpaang Salaysay wherein Rosita and Enrique stated that they were given P1M and a parcel of land, for which reason they were withdrawing as plaintiffs in the Civil Case. Respondents Counter-Manifestation and Opposition (except Enrique) - it would be ridiculous for Rosita to give up her share in Sy Bangs estate, amounting to hundreds of millions of pesos, which had already been ordered partitioned by the trial court, to the prejudice of her seven full-blooded children. They alleged that Rosita was not in possession of her full faculties when she affixed her thumbmark on the Sinumpaang Salaysay considering her age, her frequent illness, and her lack of ability to read or write. Hence, they filed a petition before the RTC of Lucena City for guardianship over her person and properties. They claim that Rosita has never received a single centavo of the P1 million allegedly given her. Petitioners countered since the document was duly notarized, it was a public document and presumed valid. They, likewise, alleged that the CounterManifestation was filed without Rositas authorization as, in fact, she had written her counsel with instructions to withdraw said pleading. They presented a copy of a sworn certification from Rositas physician that "Rosita is physically fit and mentally competent to attend to her personal or business transactions." Petitioners MR of SC Resolution - Rosita and Enrique executed their Sinumpaang Salaysay. SC was not aware of this development when it issued the resolution. Respondents - Rosita thumbmarked the Sinumpaang Salaysay without understanding the contents of the document or the implications of her acts. Tried to AMIN | CHA | JANZ | KRIZEL | VIEN demonstrate that their mother would thumbmark any document that their children asked her to by exhibiting four documents each denominated as Sinumpaang Salaysay and thumbmarked by Rosita. SC denied the MR. Respondents filed a Joint Petition for the Guardianship of the Incompetent Rosita before the RTC of Lucena City. 1997 - Rosauro, who sought to be named as the special guardian, filed before the Guardianship court a Motion to Order Court Deposit of Widows Allowance Ordered by the SC. Then, he filed a Motion before SC seeking an Order for petitioners to pay Rosita P2,150,000 in widows allowance and P25,000.00 every month thereafter. He also prayed for petitioners imprisonment should they fail to comply therewith. The Guardianship court issued an Order directing the petitioners to deposit to SC, jointly and severally, the amount of P250,000.00 and additional amount of P25,000.00 per month and every month thereafter. Rosauro, the appointed guardian, then asked the Guardianship court to issue a writ of execution. Petitioners filed a Petition for Certiorari with the CA to annul the Orders of the Guardianship court. 2001 CA ruled in respondents favour and denied the petition. Petitioners filed this Petition for Review praying for this Court to reverse the CAs Decision and to declare the Guardianship court to have exceeded its jurisdiction in directing the deposit of the widows allowance. (G.R. No. 150797 2nd Petition) o The Guardianship courts jurisdiction is limited to determining whether Rosita was incompetent and, upon finding in the affirmative, appointing a guardian. o under Rule 83, Sec. 3, a widows allowance can only be paid in an estate proceeding. Even if the complaint for partition were to be considered as estate proceedings, only the trial court hearing the partition case had the exclusive jurisdiction to execute the payment of the widows allowance. 2002 SC resolved to consolidate the two petitions. 2003 - Pending the issuance of this Courts Decision in the two cases, Rosauro filed a Motion to Order Deposit in Court the Widows Allowance and Upon Failure of Petitioners to Comply Therewith to Order Their Imprisonment Until Compliance. o his mother had been ill and had no means to support herself except through his financial assistance, and that respondents had not complied with the Courts promulgated seven years earlier. He argued that respondents defiance constituted indirect contempt of court. That the Guardianship court had found them guilty of indirect contempt did not help his mother because she was still unable to collect her widows allowance. Petitioners - the estate from which the widows allowance is to be taken has not been settled. They also reiterated that Rosita, together with son Enrique, had executed a Sinumpaang Salaysay waiving all claims against petitioners. 2005 SC granted Rosauros Motion - that petitioners s guilty of contempt and collective sentenced to pay a fine (10% of the amount) and ordered their immediate imprisonment until they shall have complied with said Resolution by paying Rosita P2,600,100 plus 6%. Iluminada, Zenaida and Ma. Emma paid the court fine. Respondents (except Rosauro who had died), filed a Motion for Execution before SC.
10 DE LA CERNA SPECPRO DIGESTS 2011 Rosa filed a MR with Prayer for Clarification - in accordance with Chinese culture, she had no participation in the management of the family business or Sy Bangs estate. After her husbands death, she allegedly inherited nothing but debts and liabilities, and, having no income of her own, was now in a quandary on how these can be paid. Other petitioners (Iluminada, Zenaida and Ma. Emma) also filed a MR Motion for Reconsideration with Prayer for Clarification - the P1 million and the piece of land Rosita had already received should form part of the widows allowance. Whatever allowance Rosita may be entitled to should come from the estate of Sy Bang. They further argued the unfairness of being made to pay the allowance when none of them participated in the management of Sy Bangs estate; Zen aida and Ma. Emma being minors, while Iluminada and Rosa had no significant role in the family business. SC issued a Resolution granting respondents motion for execution of the Resolution and denying petitioners MR. SC issued a Warrant of Arrest against petitioners and directed the NBI to detain them until they complied with the Resolutions. 2006 SC issued a Resolution lifting the warrant of arrest on the condition that they issue the corresponding checks to settle the accrued widows allowance. Petitioners (Iluminada, Zenaida and Ma. Emma) filed a Motion to include Rosalino, Bartolome , Rolando, and Heirs of Enrique as Likewise Liable for the Payment of Widows Allowance as Heirs of Sy Bang as they may also hold Assets-Properties of the Estate of Sy Bang. AMIN | CHA | JANZ | KRIZEL | VIEN Catapusan v. CA - In actions for partition, the court cannot properly issue an order to divide the property, unless it first makes a determination as to the existence of coownership. The court must initially settle the issue of ownership, the first stage in an action for partition. Needless to state, an action for partition will not lie if the claimant has no rightful interest over the subject property. In fact, Section 1 of Rule 69 requires the party filing the action to state in his complaint the "nature and extent of his title" to the real estate. Until and unless the issue of ownership is definitely resolved, it would be premature to effect a partition of the properties the 3rd Partial Decision does not have the effect of terminating the proceedings for partition. By its very nature, the Decision is but a determination based on the evidence presented thus far. There remained issues to be resolved by the court. Only after the full extent of the Sy Bang estate has been determined can the trial court finally order the partition of each of the heirs share. WON the Appointment of Receiver proper. YES CA conclusively found that the petitioners were never deprived of their day in court. Moreover, evidence on record shows that respondent Judge appointed the receiver after both parties have presented their evidence and after the Third Partial Decision has been promulgated. Such appointment was made upon verified petition of herein private respondents, alleging that petitioners are mismanaging the properties in litigation by either mortgaging or disposing the same, hence, the said properties are in danger of being lost, wasted, dissipated, misused, or disposed of. The respondent Judge acted correctly in granting the appointment of a receiver in Civil Case No. 8578, in order to preserve the properties in litis pendentia and neither did he abuse his discretion nor acted arbitrarily in doing s. On the contrary, We find that it was the petitioners who violated the status quo sought to be maintained by the SC, by their intrusion and unwarranted seizures of the 3 theaters, subject matter of the litigation, and which are admittedly under the exclusive management and operation of Rosauro Sy. WON the Cancellation of Notice of Lis Pendens was proper. YES The filing of a notice of lis pendens has a two-fold effect: (1) to keep the subject matter of the litigation within the power of the court until the entry of the final judgment in order to prevent the final judgment from being defeated by successive alienations; and (2) to bind a purchaser, bona fide or not, of the land subject of the litigation to the judgment or decree that the court will promulgate subsequently. As provided in Section 14, Rule 13 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, a notice of lis pendens may be cancelled on two grounds: (1) when the annotation was for the purpose of molesting the title of the adverse party, or (2) when the annotation is not necessary to protect the title of the party who caused it to be recorded. This Court has interpreted the notice as: an incident in an action, an extrajudicial one, to be sure. It does not affect the merits thereof. It is intended merely to constructively advise, or warn, all people who deal with the property that they so deal with it at their own risk, and whatever rights they may acquire in the property in any voluntary transaction are subject to the results of the action, and may well be inferior and subordinate to those which may be finally determined and laid down therein. The cancellation of such a precautionary notice is therefore also a mere incident in the action, and may be ordered by the Court having jurisdiction of it at any given time.
Issues/Held: G.R. No. 114217: WON the Third Partial Decision of the RTC is correct. YES The trial courts Third Partial Decision is in the nature of a several judgment as contemplated by Sec. 4, Rule 36. The trial court ruled on the status of the properties in the names of petitioners while deferring the ruling on the properties in the names of respondents pending the presentation of evidence. A several judgment is proper when the liability of each party is clearly separable and distinct from that of his co-parties, such that the claims against each of them could have been the subject of separate suits, and judgment for or against one of them will not necessarily affect the other. Petitioners, although sued collectively, each held a separate and separable interest in the properties of the Sy Bang estate. However, notwithstanding the trial courts pronouncement, the Sy Bang estate cannot be partitioned or distributed until the final determination of the extent of the estate and only until it is shown that the obligations under Rule 90, Section 1 have been settled. In the settlement of estate proceedings, the distribution of the estate properties can only be made: (1) after all the debts, funeral charges, expenses of administration, allowance to the widow, and estate tax have been paid; or (2) before payment of said obligations only if the distributees or any of them gives a bond in a sum fixed by the court conditioned upon the payment of said obligations within such time as the court directs, or when provision is made to meet those obligations.
11 DE LA CERNA SPECPRO DIGESTS 2011 Rosalino, Bartolome and Rolando were able to prove that the notice was intended merely to molest and harass the owners of the property, some of whom were not parties to the case. It was also proven that the interest of Oscar, who caused the notice to be annotated, was only 1/14 of the assessed value of the property. Moreover, Rosalino, Bartolome and Rolando were ordered to post a bond to protect whatever rights or interest Oscar may have in the properties under litis pendentia. AMIN | CHA | JANZ | KRIZEL | VIEN evidence of guilt, neither on evidence establishing guilt beyond reasonable doubt, and definitely not on evidence establishing absolute certainty of guilt. Hence, until the marriage is finally declared void by the court, the same is presumed valid and Rosita is entitled to receive her widows allowance to be taken from the estate of Sy Bang. Motion to Include Rosalino Sy, Bartolome Sy, Rolando Sy, and Heirs of Enrique Sy as Likewise Liable for the Payment of Widows Allowance as Heirs of Sy Bang The widows allowance is chargeable to Sy Bangs estate. It must be stressed that the issue of whether the properties in the names of Rosalino, Bartolome, Rolando, and Enrique form part of Sy Bangs estate remains unsettled since this Petition questioning the trial courts 3rd Partial Decision has been pending. On the other hand, there has been a categorical pronouncement that petitioners are holding properties belonging to Sy Bangs estate. That the full extent of Sy Bangs estate has not yet been determined is no excuse from complying with this Courts order. Properties of the estate have been identified i.e., those in the names of petitioners thus, these properties should be made to answer for the widows allowance of Rosita. In any case, the amount Rosita receives for support, which exceeds the fruits or rents pertaining to her, will be deducted from her share of the estate. Decision: 1st Petition DENIED and 2nd Petition GRANTED.
G.R. No. 150797 WON the Guardianship court to have exceeded its jurisdiction in directing the deposit of the widows allowance in Special Proceedings No. 96-34. YES The court hearing the petition for guardianship had limited jurisdiction. It had no jurisdiction to enforce payment of the widows allowance ordered by this Court. The claim for widows allowance was made before the SC in a case that did not arise from the guardianship proceedings. The case subject of the SC petition is still pending before the RTC of Lucena City. Rule 83, Sec. 3 states: The widow and minor or incapacitated children of a deceased person, during the settlement of the estate, shall receive therefrom, under the direction of the court, such allowance as are provided by law. Art. 188 CC: From the common mass of property support shall be given to the surviving spouse and to the children during the liquidation of the inventoried property and until what belongs to them is delivered; but from this shall be deducted that amount received for support which exceeds the fruits or rents pertaining to them. "The court" referred to in Rule 83, Sec. 3 is the court hearing the settlement of the estate. Also crystal clear is the provision of the law that the widows allowance is to be taken from the common mass of property forming part of the estate of the decedent. Thus it is the court hearing the settlement of the estate that should effect the payment of widows allowance considering that the properties of the estate are within its jurisdiction, to the exclusion of all other courts. This Court has held that the distribution of the residue of the estate of the deceased incompetent is a function pertaining properly, not to the guardianship proceedings, but to another proceeding in which the heirs are at liberty to initiate. Payment of Widows Allowance It has been 13 years since this Court ordered petitioners to pay Rosita her monthly widows allowance. Petitioners Iluminada, Zenaida and Ma. Emma have since fought tooth and nail against paying the said allowance, grudgingly complying only upon threat of incarceration. Then, they again argued against the grant of widows allowance after the DOJ issued its Resolution finding probable cause in the falsification charges against respondents. They contended that the criminal cases for falsification proved that Rosita is a mere common-law wife and not a "widow" and, therefore, not entitled to widows allowance. A finding of probable cause does not conclusively prove the charge of falsification against respondents. It is well-settled that a finding of probable cause needs to rest only on evidence showing that more likely than not a crime has been committed and was committed by the suspects. Probable cause need not be based on clear and convincing
Jocson de Hilado v. Nava

Moran, J.: Quickie: super ikli ng case. As in ito yung full text, bulleted lang. Yung last part Spanish pa. so no need for a quickie. Nature: Facts: February 8, 1935 the administatrix Estefania Fenix of the intestate of the Rafael Jocson, executed in favor of appellant Jesus R. Nava a contract of lease period of five crop years, over certain properties of the estate, at a stipulated rental of P1,000 a year. o The contract was entered into without the intervention of the court acting in the intestate proceedings. July 23, 1936 Conception Jocson de Hillado, filed a motion in said proceedings, praying that the administratrix be required to explain certain details in the matter of said lease; In reply to the answer of the administratrix, Hillado and Fenix agreed to lease the lands compromised in the contract to the highest bidder at public auction. Jesus R. Nava, the lessee, filed a motion asking that the order be set aside, it having been issued without jurisdiction. The motion was denied, and he appealed. Issue/Held: W/N the lower court has the power to annul, in the intestate proceedings, a contract of lease executed by the administratrix without its intervention. YES. Ratio: The contract here in question being a mere act of administration, could validly be entered into by the administratrix within her powers of administration, even without the court's previous authority. And the court had no power to annul or invalidate the contract in the intestate proceedings wherein it had no jurisdiction over the person of the lessee. A separate ordinary action is necessary to that effect. Order is accordingly reversed, with costs against appellee.
69 Phil 1 (1939)
Estate of Ruiz v. CA, et. al.

Puno, J. Quickie: Ruiz executed a holographic will. He died. Edmond, the named executor did not take any action for the probate of his fathers holographic will. 4 years after, there was a petition for the probate and approval of Hilario Ruizs will and for the issuance of letters testamentary to Edmond Ruiz. One of the properties of the estate - a house and lot bequeathed to Maria Cathryn, Candice Albertine and Maria Angeline 4 - was leased out by Edmond Ruiz to third persons. The probate court ordered Edmond to deposit with the Branch Clerk of Court the rental deposit and payments. Edmond turned over the amount of P348,583.56, representing the balance of the rent after deducting P191,416.14 for repair and maintenance expenses on the estate. Petitioner Testate Estate of Hilario Ruiz as executor, filed an Ex-Parte Motion for Release of Funds. Respondent Montes opposed the motion and concurrently filed a Motion for Release of Funds to Certain Heirs and Motion for Issuance of Certificate of Allowance of Probate Will. The probate court ordered the release of the rent payments to the decedents three granddaughters. It further ordered the delivery of the titles to and possession of the properties bequeathed to the three granddaughters and respondent Montes upon the filing of a bond of P50,000.00. The Court held that petitioner cannot correctly claim that the assailed order deprived him of his right to take possession of all the real and personal properties of the estate. The right of an executor or administrator to the possession and management of the real and personal properties of the deceased is not absolute and can only be exercised so long as it is necessary for the payment of the debts and expenses of administration,. As executor, he is a mere trustee of his fathers estate. The funds of the estate in his hands are trust funds and he is held to the duties and responsibilities of a trustee of the highest order.31 He cannot unilaterally assign to himself and possess all his parents properties and the fruits thereof without first submitting an inventory and appraisal of all real and personal properties of the deceased, rendering a true account of his administration, the expenses of administration, the amount of the obligations and estate tax, all of which are subject to a determination by the court as to their veracity, propriety and justness.32 Facts: Hilario M. Ruiz1 executed a holographic will naming as his heirs his only son, Edmond Ruiz, his adopted daughter, private respondent Maria Pilar Ruiz Montes, and his three granddaughters, private respondents Maria Cathryn, Candice Albertine and Maria Angeline, all children of Edmond Ruiz. The testator bequeathed to his heirs substantial cash, personal and real properties and named Edmond Ruiz executor of his estate.2 Hilario Ruiz died. Immediately thereafter, the cash component of his estate was distributed among Edmond Ruiz and private respondents in accordance with the decedents will. For unbeknown reasons, Edmond, the named executor, did not take any action for the probate of his fathers holographic will.
252 SCRA 540 (1996)

four years after the testators death, it was private respondent Maria Pilar Ruiz Montes who filed before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 156, Pasig, a petition for the probate and approval of Hilario Ruizs will and for the issuance of letters testamentary to Edmond Ruiz.3 Surprisingly, Edmond opposed the petition on the ground that the will was executed under undue influence. one of the properties of the estate - the house and lot at No. 2 Oliva Street, Valle Verde IV, Pasig which the testator bequeathed to Maria Cathryn, Candice Albertine and Maria Angeline4 - was leased out by Edmond Ruiz to third persons. the probate court ordered Edmond to deposit with the Branch Clerk of Court the rental deposit and payments totalling P540,000.00 representing the one-year lease of the Valle Verde property. In compliance, on January 25, 1993, Edmond turned over the amount of P348,583.56, representing the balance of the rent after deducting P191,416.14 for repair and maintenance expenses on the estate Edmond moved for the release of P50,000.00 to pay the real estate taxes on the real properties of the estate. The probate court approved the release of P7,722.00 Edmond withdrew his opposition to the probate of the will. Consequently, the probate court, on May 18, 1993, admitted the will to probate and ordered the issuance of letters testamentary to Edmond conditioned upon the filing of a bond in the amount of P50,000.00. The letters testamentary were issued petitioner Testate Estate of Hilario Ruiz as executor, file d an Ex-Parte Motion for Release of Funds. It prayed for the release of the rent payments deposited with the Branch Clerk of Court. Respondent Montes opposed the motion and concurrently filed a Motion for Release of Funds to Certain Heirs and Motion f or Issuance of Certificate of Allowance of Probate Will. o Montes prayed for the release of the said rent payments to Maria Cathryn, Candice Albertine and Maria Angeline and for the distribution of the testators properties, specifically the Valle Verde property and the Blue Ridge apartments, in accordance with the provisions of the holographic will. the probate court denied petitioners motion for release of funds but granted respondent Montes motion in view of petitioners lack of opposition. It thus ordered the release of the rent payments to the decedents three granddaughters. It further ordered the delivery of the titles to and possession of the properties bequeathed to the three granddaughters and respondent Montes upon the filing of a bond of P50,000.00. Petitioner moved for reconsideration. probate court, on December 22, 1993, ordered the release of the funds to Edmond but only such amount as may be necessary to cover the espenses of administration and allowanceas for support of the testators three granddaughters subject to collation and deductible from their share in the inheritance. The court, however, held in abeyance the release of the titles to respondent Montes and the three granddaughters until the lapse of six months from the date of firast publication of the notice to creditors.
14 DE LA CERNA SPECPRO DIGESTS 2011 Issue: whether the probate court, after admitting the will to probate but before payment of the estates debts and obligations, has the authority: (1) to grant an allowance from the funds of the estate for the support of the testators grandchildren NO. (2) to order the release of the titles to certain heirs NO. (3) to grant possession of all properties of the estate to the executor of the will. Ratio: (1) On the matter of allowance, Section 3 of Rule 83 of the Revised Rules of Court provides: Sec. 3. Allowance to widow and family. - The widow and minor or incapacitated children of a deceased person, during the settlement of the estate, shall receive therefrom under the direction of the court, such allowance as are provided by law. Argument of petitioner: this provision only gives the widow and the minor or incapacitated children of the deceased the right to receive allowances for support during the settlement of estate proceedings. o the testators three granddaughters do not qualify for an allowance because they are not incapacitated and are no longer minors but of legal age, married and gainfully employed. o In addition, the provision expressly states children of the deceased which excludes the latters grandchildren. It is settled that allowances for support under Section 3 of Rule 83 should not be limited to the minor or incapacitated children of the deceased. Article 18813 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, the substantive law in force at the time of the testators death, provides that during the liquidation of the conjugal partnership, the deceaseds legitimate spouse and children, regardless of their age, civil status or gainful employment, are entitled to provisional support from the funds of the estate.14 The law is rooted on the fact that the right and duty to support, especially the right to education, subsist even beyond the age of majority.15 Be that as it may, grandchildren are not entitled to provisional support from the funds of the decedents estate. The law clearly limits the allowance to widow and children and does not extend it to the deceaseds grandchildren, regardless of their minority or incapacity. 16 It was error, therefore, for the appellate court to sustain the probate courts order granting an allowance to the grandchildren of the testator pending settlement of his estate. (2) An order releasing titles to properties of the estate amounts to an advance distribution of the estate which is allowed only under the following conditions: Sec. 2. Advance distribution in special proceedings. - Nothwithstanding a pending controversy or appeal in proceedings to settle the estate of a decedent, the court may, in its discretion and upon such terms as it may deem proper and just, permit that such part of the estate as may not be affected by the controversy or appeal be distributed among the heirs or legatees, upon compliance with the conditions set forth in Rule 90 of these Rules.17 And Rule 90 provides that: AMIN | CHA | JANZ | KRIZEL | VIEN Sec. 1. When order for distribution of residue made. - When the debts, funeral charges, and expenses of administration, the allowance to the widow, and inheritance tax, if any, chargeable to the estate in accordance with law, have been paid, the court, on the application of the executor or administrator, or of a person interested in the estate, and after hearing upon notice, shall assign the residue of the estate to the persons entitled to the same, naming them and the proportions, or parts, to which each is entitled, and such persons may demand and recover their respective shares from the executor or administrator, or any other person having the same in his possession. If there is a controversy before the court as to who are the lawful heirs of the deceased person or as to the distributive shares to which each person is entitled under the law, the controversy shall be heard and decided as in ordinary cases. No distribution shall be allowed until the payment of the obligations above-mentioned has been made or provided for, unless the distributees, or any of them, give a bond, in a sum to be fixed by the court, conditioned for the payment of said obligations within such time as the court directs. In settlement of estate proceedings, the distribution of the estate properties can only be made: (1) after all the debts, funeral charges, expenses of administration, allowance to the widow, and estate tax have been paid; or (2) before payment of said obligations only if the distributees or any of them gives a bond in a sum fixed by the court conditioned upon the payment of said obligations within such time as the court directs, or when provision is made to meet those obligations.19 In the case at bar, the probate court ordered the release of the titles to the Valle Verde property and the Blue Ridge apartments to the private respondents after the lapse of six months from the date of first publication of the notice to creditors. The questioned order speaks of notice to creditors, not payment of debts and obligations. Hilario Ruiz allegedly left no debts when he died but the taxes on his estate had not hitherto been paid, much less ascertained. The estate tax is one of those obligations that must be paid before distribution of the estate. If not yet paid, the rule requires that the distributees post a bond or make such provisions as to meet the said tax obligation in proportion to their respective shares in the inheritance.20 Notably, at the time the order was issued the properties of the estate had not yet been inventoried and appraised. It was also too early in the day for the probate court to order the release of the titles six months after admitting the will to probate. The intrinsic validity of Hilarios holographic will was controverted by petitioner before the probate court in his Reply to Montes Opposition to his motion for release of funds24 and his motion for reconsideration of the August 26, 1993 order of the said court.25 Therein, petitioner assailed the distributive shares of the devisees and legatees inasmuch as his fathers will included the estate of his mother and allegedly impaired his legitime as an intestate heir of his mother. The Rules provide that if there is a controversy as to who are the lawful heirs of the decedent and their distributive shares in his estate, the probate court shall proceed to hear and decide the same as in ordinary cases.26
15 DE LA CERNA SPECPRO DIGESTS 2011 (3) petitioner cannot correctly claim that the assailed order deprived him of his right to take possession of all the real and personal properties of the estate. The right of an executor or administrator to the possession and management of the real and personal properties of the deceased is not absolute and can only be exercised so long as it is necessary for the payment of the debts and expenses of administration, Section 3 of Rule 84 of the Revised Rules of Court explicitly provides: Sec. 3. Executor or administrator to retain whole estate to pay debts, and to administer estate not willed. - An executor or administrator shall have the right to the possession and management of the real as well as the personal estate of the deceased so long as it is necessary for the payment of the debts and expenses for administration. When petitioner moved for further release of the funds deposited with the clerk of court, he had been previously granted by the probate court certain amounts for repair and maintenance expenses on the properties of the estate, and payment of the real estate taxes thereon. But petitioner moved again for the release of additional funds for the same reasons he previously cited. It was correct for the probate court to require him to submit an accounting of the necessary expenses for administration before releasing any further money in his favor. It was relevantly noted by the probate court that petitioner had deposited with it only a portion of the one-year rental income from the Valle Verde property. Petitioner did not deposit its succeeding rents after renewal of the lease.29 Neither did he render an accounting of such funds. Petitioner must be reminded that his right of ownership over the properties of his father is merely inchoate as long as the estate has not been fully settled and partitioned.30 As executor, he is a mere trustee of his fathers estate. The funds of the estate in his hands are trust funds and he is held to the duties and responsibilities of a trustee of the highest order.31 He cannot unilaterally assign to himself and possess all his parents properties and the fruits thereof without first submitting an inventory and appraisal of all real and personal properties of the deceased, rendering a true account of his administration, the expenses of administration, the amount of the obligations and estate tax, all of which are subject to a determination by the court as to their veracity, propriety and justness. AMIN | CHA | JANZ | KRIZEL | VIEN
Silverio v. CA
Velsco, Jr. J.: Nature: Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 65 Quickie: Son succeeded in removing dad as administrator. Nelia (dunno who she is, kabit ni dad?) opposed and was ultimately asked by the courts to vacate the forbes park house (concubinage?). Nelia appealed (the omnibus order to vacate and the other order to sell the properties. The denial of due course by the RTC of Nelias appeal was based on two (2) grounds: (1) that Nelia Silverio-Dees appeal was against an order denying a motion for reconsideration which is disallowed under Sec. 1(a), Rule 41 of the Rules of Court; and (2) that Nelia Silverio-Dees Record on Appeal was filed beyond the reglementary period to file an appeal provided under Sec. 3 of Rule 41. SC said that here, the purported authority of Nelia Silverio-Dee, which she allegedly secured from Ricardo Silverio, Sr., was never approved by the probate court. She, therefore, never had any real interest in the specific property located at No. 3 Intsia Road, Forbes Park, Makati City. As such, the May 31, 2005 Order of the RTC must be considered as interlocutory and, therefore, not subject to an appeal. Facts: The instant controversy stemmed from the settlement of estate of the deceased Beatriz Silverio. After her death, her surviving spouse, Ricardo Silverio, Sr., filed an intestate proceeding for the settlement of her estate. During the pendency of the case, Ricardo Silverio, Jr. filed a petition to remove Ricardo C. Silverio, Sr. as the administrator of the subject estate. Edmundo S. Silverio also filed a comment/opposition for the removal of Ricardo C. Silverio, Sr. as administrator of the estate and for the appointment of a new administrator. RTC issued an Order granting the petition and removing Ricardo Silverio, Sr. as administrator of the estate, while appointing Ricardo Silverio, Jr. as the new administrator. Nelia S. Silverio-Dee filed a Motion for Reconsideration Ricardo Silverio Jr. filed an Urgent Motion for an Order Prohibiting Any Person to Occupy/Stay/Use Real Estate Properties Involved in the Intestate Estate of the Late Beatriz Silverio, Without Authority from this Honorable Court. RTC issued an Omnibus Order affirming its Order and denying private respondents motion for reconsideration. In the Omnibus Order, the RTC also authorized Ricardo Silverio, Jr. to, upon receipt of the order, immediately exercise his duties as administrator of the subject estate. The Omnibus Order also directed Nelia S. Silverio-Dee to vacate the property at No. 3, Intsia, Forbes Park, Makati City within fifteen (15) days from receipt of the order. Nelia Silverio-Dee received a copy of the Omnibus Order dated May 31, 2005 on June 8, 2005. private respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Omnibus Order. This was later denied by the RTC
600 SCRA 1 (2009)

Notably, the RTC in its Order dated December 12, 2005 also recalled its previous order granting Ricardo Silverio, Jr. with letters of administration over the intestate estate of Beatriz Silverio and reinstating Ricardo Silverio, Sr. as the administrator. From the Order dated December 12, 2005, Ricardo Silverio, Jr. filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied by the RTC. In the same order, the RTC also allowed the sale of various properties of the intestate estate of the late Beatriz Silverio to partially settle estate taxes, penalties, interests and other charges due thereon. Among the properties authorized to be sold was the one located at No. 3 Intsia Road, Forbes Park, Makati City. Meanwhile Nelia Silverio-Dee filed a Notice of Appeal and Record on Appeal Thereafter, Ricardo Silverio, Jr. filed a Motion to Dismiss Appeal and for Issuance of a Writ of Execution against the appeal of Nelia Silverio-Dee on the ground that the Record on Appeal was filed ten (10) days beyond the reglementary period pursuant to Section 3, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court. RTC issued an Order denying the appeal on the ground that it was not perfected within the reglementary period. The RTC further issued a writ of execution for the enforcement of the Order dated May 31, 2005 against private respondent to vacate the premises of the property located at No. 3, Intsia, Forbes Park, Makati City. The writ of execution was later issued and a Notice to Vacate was issued ordering private respondent to leave the premises of the subject property within ten (10) days. CA issued the assailed Resolution granting the prayer for the issuance of a TRO. In issuing the TRO, the CA ruled that the Notice of Appeal was filed within the reglementary period provided by the Rules of Court applying the "fresh rule period" enunciated by this Court in Neypes v. Court of Appeals as reiterated in Sumaway v. Union Bank Afterwards, the CA issued the assailed decision granting the petition of private respondent.
Issue/Held: WON the Omnibus Order and the Order dated December 12, 2005 are Interlocutory Orders which are not subject to appeal under Sec. 1 of Rule 41;- YES Ratio: The denial of due course by the RTC was based on two (2) grounds: (1) that Nelia Silverio-Dees appeal was against an order denying a motion for reconsideration which is disallowed under Sec. 1(a), Rule 41 of the Rules of Court; and (2) that Nelia Silverio-Dees Record on Appeal was filed beyond the reglementary period to file an appeal provided under Sec. 3 of Rule 41. Sec. 1(a), Rule 41 of the Rules of Court provides: RULE 41: APPEAL FROM THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURTS SECTION 1. Subject of appeal.An appeal may be taken from a judgment or final order that completely disposes of the case, or of a particular matter therein when declared by these Rules to be appealable. No appeal may be taken from: An order denying a motion for new trial or reconsideration;
17 xxxx In all the above instances where the judgment or final order is not appealable, the aggrieved party may file an appropriate special civil action under Rule 65. The rationale behind the rule proscribing the remedy of appeal from an interlocutory order is to prevent undue delay, useless appeals and undue inconvenience to the appealing party by having to assail orders as they are promulgated by the court, when they can be contested in a single appeal. The appropriate remedy is thus for the party to wait for the final judgment or order and assign such interlocutory order as an error of the court on appeal. The denial of the motion for reconsideration of an order of dismissal of a complaint is not an interlocutory order, however, but a final order as it puts an end to the particular matter resolved, or settles definitely the matter therein disposed of, and nothing is left for the trial court to do other than to execute the order. Not being an interlocutory order, an order denying a motion for reconsideration of an order of dismissal of a complaint is effectively an appeal of the order of dismissal itself. The reference by petitioner, in his notice of appeal, to the March 12, 1999 Order denying his Omnibus MotionMotion for Reconsideration should thus be deemed to refer to the January 17, 1999 Order which declared him non-suited and accordingly dismissed his complaint. If the proscription against appealing an order denying a motion for reconsideration is applied to any order, then there would have been no need to specifically mention in both above-quoted sections of the Rules "final orders or judgments" as subject to appeal. In other words, from the entire provisions of Rule 39 and 41, there can be no mistaking that what is proscribed is to appeal from a denial of a motion for reconsideration of an interlocutory order. Thus, the question posed is whether the Omnibus Order dated May 31, 2005 is an interlocutory order. On this aspect, the CA ruled that the Omnibus Order dated May 31, 2005 was a final order, to wit: We note that the Order, dated December 12, 2005, is an offshoot of the Omnibus Order, dated May 31, 2005. In the Omnibus Order, the court a quo ruled that the petitioner, as an heir of the late Beatriz S. Silverio, had no right to use and occupy the property in question despite authority given to her by Ricardo Silverio, Sr. when it said, thus: x x x In the first place, Nelia S. Silverio-Dee cannot occupy the property in Intsia, Forbes Park, admittedly belonging to the conjugal estate and subject to their proceedings without authority of the Court. Based on the pretenses of Nelia SilverioDee in her memorandum, it is clear that she would use and maintain the premises in the concept of a distributee. Under her perception, Section 1 Rule 90 of the Revised Rules of Court is violated. x x x xxxx For the property at Intsia, Forbes Park cannot be occupied or appropriated by, nor distributed to Nelia S. Silverio-Dee, since no distribution shall be allowed until the payment of the obligations mentioned in the aforestated Rule is made. In fact, the said property may still be sold to pay the taxes and/or other obligations owned by the estate, which will be difficult to do if she is allowed to stay in the property. DE LA CERNA SPECPRO DIGESTS 2011 AMIN | CHA | JANZ | KRIZEL | VIEN Moreover, the alleged authority given by SILVERIO, SR. for Nelia S. Silverio-Dee to occupy the property dated May 4, 2004, assuming it is not even antedated as alleged by SILVERIO, JR., is null and void since the possession of estate property can only be given to a purported heir by virtue of an Order from this Court (see Sec. 1 Rule 90, supra; and Sec. 2 Rule 84, Revised Rules of Court). In fact, the Executor or Administrator shall have the right to the possession and management of the real as well as the personal estate of the deceased only when it is necessary for the payment of the debts and expenses of administration (See Sec. 3 Rule 84, Revised Rules of Court). With this in mind, it is without an iota of doubt that the possession by Nelia S. Silverio-Dee of the property in question has absolutely no legal basis considering that her occupancy cannot pay the debts and expenses of administration, not to mention the fact that it will also disturb the right of the new Administrator to possess and manage the property for the purpose of settling the estates legitimate obligations. In the belated Memorandum of Nelia Silverio-Dee, she enclosed a statement of the expenses she incurred pertaining to the house renovation covering the period from May 26, 2004 to February 28, 2005 in the total amount of Php12,434,749.55, which supports this Courts conclusion that she is already the final distributee of the property. Repairs of such magnitude require notice, hearing of the parties and approval of the Court under the Rules. Without following this process, the acts of Nelia Silverio-Dee are absolutely without legal sanction. To our mind, the court a quos ruling clearly constitutes a final deter mination of the rights of the petitioner as the appealing party. As such, the Omnibus Order, dated May 31, 2002 (the predecessor of the Order dated December 12, 2002) is a final order; hence, the same may be appealed, for the said matter is clearly declared by the rules as appealable and the proscription does not apply. An interlocutory order, as opposed to a final order, was defined in Tan v. Republic: A final order is one that disposes of the subject matter in its entirety or terminates a particular proceeding or action, leaving nothing else to be done but to enforce by execution what has been determined by the court, while an interlocutory order is one which does not dispose of the case completely but leaves something to be decided upon. Additionally, it is only after a judgment has been rendered in the case that the ground for the appeal of the interlocutory order may be included in the appeal of the judgment itself. The interlocutory order generally cannot be appealed separately from the judgment. It is only when such interlocutory order was rendered without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion that certiorari under Rule 65 may be resorted to. In the instant case, Nelia Silverio-Dee appealed the May 31, 2005 Order of the RTC on the ground that it ordered her to vacate the premises of the property located at No. 3 Intsia Road, Forbes Park, Makati City. On that aspect the order is not a final determination of the case or of the issue of distribution of the shares of the heirs in the estate or their rights therein. It must be borne in mind that until the estate is partitioned, each heir only has an inchoate right to the properties of the estate, such that no heir may lay claim on a particular property. In Alejandrino v. Court of Appeals: Art. 1078 of the Civil Code provides that where there are two or more heirs, the whole estate of the decedent is, before partition,
18 DE LA CERNA SPECPRO DIGESTS 2011 owned in common by such heirs, subject to the payment of the debts of the deceased. Under a co-ownership, the ownership of an undivided thing or right belongs to different persons. Each co-owner of property which is held pro indiviso exercises his rights over the whole property and may use and enjoy the same with no other limitation than that he shall not injure the interests of his co-owners. The underlying rationale is that until a division is made, the respective share of each cannot be determined and every co-owner exercises, together with his coparticipants, joint ownership over the pro indiviso property, in addition to his use and enjoyment of the same. Although the right of an heir over the property of the decedent is inchoate as long as the estate has not been fully settled and partitioned, the law allows a co-owner to exercise rights of ownership over such inchoate right. CIVIL CODE Art. 493. Each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part and of the fruits and benefits pertaining thereto, and he may therefore alienate, assign or mortgage it, and even substitute another person in its enjoyment, except when personal rights are involved. But the effect of the alienation or the mortgage, with respect to the co-owners, shall be limited to the portion which may be allotted to him in the division upon the termination of the co-ownership. Additionally, the above provision must be viewed in the context that the subject property is part of an estate and subject to intestate proceedings before the courts. It is, thus, relevant to note that in Rule 84, Sec. 2 of the Rules of Court, the administrator may only deliver properties of the estate to the heirs upon order of the Court. Similarly, under Rule 90, Sec. 1 of the Rules of Court, the properties of the estate shall only be distributed after the payment of the debts, funeral charges, and other expenses against the estate, except when authorized by the Court. Verily, once an action for the settlement of an estate is filed with the court, the properties included therein are under the control of the intestate court. And not even the administrator may take possession of any property that is part of the estate without the prior authority of the Court. In the instant case, the purported authority of Nelia Silverio-Dee, which she allegedly secured from Ricardo Silverio, Sr., was never approved by the probate court. She, therefore, never had any real interest in the specific property located at No. 3 Intsia Road, Forbes Park, Makati City. As such, the May 31, 2005 Order of the RTC must be considered as interlocutory and, therefore, not subject to an appeal. Thus, private respondent employed the wrong mode of appeal by filing a Notice of Appeal with the RTC. Hence, for employing the improper mode of appeal, the case should have been dismissed. The implication of such improper appeal is that the notice of appeal did not toll the reglementary period for the filing of a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, the proper remedy in the instant case. This means that private respondent has now lost her remedy of appeal from the May 31, 2005 Order of the RTC. Therefore, there is no longer any need to consider the other issues raised in the petition. AMIN | CHA | JANZ | KRIZEL | VIEN
Moran Sison v. Teodoro

Bautista Angelo, J. Quickie: Margarita David died. CFI Manila appointed Moran Sison as judicial administrator of her estate, without compensation. Sison then took his oath as administrator and filed the requisite bond. Several years later, Sison filed an accounting of his administration which contained as expense items (chargeable against the estate) the renewal premiums on his administrators bond. Teodoro, one of the heirs, opposed the approval of the said disbursement items on the ground that the same is not a necessary expense of administration. CFI agreed with Teodoro and disallowed the assailed disbursement items. Hence, this appeal by Sison the expense incurred by an executor or administrator to produce a bond is NOT a proper charge against the estate. Section 680 of the Code of Civil Procedure (similar to section 7, Rule 86) does not authorize the executor or administrator to charge against the estate the money spent for the presentation, filing, and substitution of a bond. The position of an executor or administrator is one of trust and the ability to give a bond is in the nature of a qualification for the office. The execution and approval of the bond constitute a condition precedent to acceptance of the responsibilities of the trust. Therefore, it would be very far-fetched to construe that the giving of a bond is a necessary expense for the care, management, and settlement of the estate, for these are expenses incurred only AFTER the executor or administrator has met the requirements of the law and has entered upon the performance of his duties. Nature: Appeal from the order of the CFI Manila disallowing as an item chargeable against the estate of the deceased the premiums payable on Moran Sisons bond as judicial administrator Facts: In 1948, Margarita David died. After commencement of the settlement proceedings, the CFI Manila appointed Carlos Moran Sison as judicial administrator, without compensation, of her estate Letters of administration were thus issued to Moran Sison. He took his oath of office as such administrator after filing the requisite administrators bond 1955, Moran Sison filed an accounting of his administration. In said accounting, he included as expenses of the estate the renewal premiums on his administrators bond payable to his surety Narcisa Teodoro, one of the heirs, objected to the approval of the above- quoted expense items on the ground that they are not necessary expenses of administration and should not be charged against the estate CFI Manila agreed with Teodoro and disallowed the said expense items. Moran Sison filed MR, but the same was denied~ hence, this appeal Issue and Held: WON a judicial administrator, serving without compensation, is entitled to charge as an expense of administration the premiums paid on his bond NO
100 Phil 1055 (1957)

Ratio: The expense incurred by an execution or administrator to procure a bond is NOT a proper charge against the estate, and that section 680 of the Code of Civil Procedure DOES NOT authorize the executor or administrator to charge against the estate the money spent for the presentation, filing, and substitution of a bond. The position of an executor or administrator is one of trust. It is proper for the law to safeguard the estate of deceased persons by requiring the executor or administrator to give a suitable bond. The ability to give this bond is in the nature of a qualification for the office. The execution and approval of the bond constitute a condition precedent to acceptance of the responsibilities of the trust. It would be a very far-fetched construction to deduce the giving of a bond in order to qualify for the office of executor or administrator is a necessary expense in the care, management, and settlement of the estate within the meaning of section 680 of the Code of Civil Procedure, for these are expenses incurred after the executor of administrator has met the requirements of the law and has entered upon the performance of his duties. Re: ruling in Sulit v. Santos may be differentiated with this case in that the administrator in Sulit was paid compensation. HOWEVER, such difference in fact is of no moment. Nothing in the Sulit decision may justify the conclusion that the allowance or disallowance of premiums paid on the bond of the administrator is made dependent on the receipt of compensation.
De Borja v. de Borja
Felix, J. Quickie: The administrator filed several reports containing statements as to the income and expenses of the estate. The reports were always opposed by the other heirs. Oppositors grounded their opposition on the following: that the reports were not detailed enough, do not reflect the true income of the properties and no reason for the losses.. They asked to go over the books of the administrator. HELD: The administrator is guilty of acts of maladministration because of his highly irregular practices (pretended ignorance of the necessity of a book or ledger or at least a list of chronological and dated entries of money or produce the Intestate acquired and the amount of disbursements made for the same properties; he did not have even a list of the names of the lessees to the properties under his administration, nor even a list of those who owed back rentals) and specifically in mixing the funds of the estate under his administration with his personal funds instead of keeping a current account for the Intestate in his capacity as administrator. Despite these irregular practices for which he was held already liable and made in some instances to reimburse the Intestate for amounts that were not properly accounted for, his claim for compensation as administrator's fees shall be as they are hereby allowed. Facts: Quintin, Francisco, Crisanta and Juliana are legitimate children of Marcelo de Borja. Marcelo died sometime in 1924 or 1925. He left a considerable amount of property. Intestate proceedings must have followed, and the pre-war records of the case either burned, lost or destroyed during the last war, because the record shows that in 1930 Quintin was already the administrator of the Intestate Estate of Marcelo. 1938 - Quintin died and Crisanto, son of Francisco, was appointed and took over as administrator of the Estate. Franciscoassumed his duties as executor of the will of Quintin but upon petition of the heirs of said deceased on the ground that his interests were conflicting with that of his brother's estate he was later required by the Court to resign as such executor and was succeeded by Rogelio, a son-in-law of Quintin. 1940 - at the hearing set for the approval of the statement of accounts of Quintin as the late administrator of the Intestate Estate of Marcelo, then being opposed by Francisco, the parties submitted an agreement, which was approved by the Court The Intestate remained under the administration of Crisanto until the then outbreak of the war. From then on and until the termination of the war, there was a lull and state of inaction in SP No. 2414 of the CFI Rizal (In the Matter of the Intestate Estate of Marcelo de Borja). 1945 - Miguel Dayco, as administrator of the estate of his deceased mother, Crisanta, filed for a petition for reconstitution of the records of this case. The Court ordered the reconstitution of the same, requiring the administrator to submit his report and a copy of the project of partition. 1946 Crisanto filed his accounts for the period ranging from March 1 to Dec. 22, 1945.
101 Phil 911 (1957)

Heirs of Quintin filed a motion for specification and opposition alleging that the reports were so inadequate and general and that the income reported in said statement was very much less than the true and actual income of the estate and that the expenses appearing therein were exaggerated and/or not actually incurred 1949 - Crisanto filed another report of his administration corresponding to the period lapsed from Dec. 23, 1945, to July 31, 1949, showing a cash balance of P71.96, but with pending obligation amounting to P35,415. Juan and sisters, heirs of the deceased Quintin, filed their opposition to the statement of accounts filed by the administrator on the ground that same was not detailed enough to enable the interested parties to verify the same; that they cannot understand why the Intestate could suffer any loss considering that during the administration of the same by Quintin, the Estate accumulated gains of more than P100,000 in the form of advances to the heirs as well as cash balance; that they desired to examine the accounts of Crisanto to verify the loss Crisanto - Report was already clear and enough, the income as well as the expenditures being specified therein; that he had to spend for the repairs of the properties of the Estate damaged during the Japanese occupation; that instead of gain there was even a shortage in the funds although said administrator had collected all his fees and commissions corresponding to the entire period of his incumbency; that the obligations mentioned in said report will be liquidated before the termination of the proceedings; that he was willing to submit all the receipts of the accounts; that this Intestate could be terminated, the project of partition having been allowed and confirmed by the SC. Crisanto - filed another statement of accounts covering the period of from March 1945, to July 1949, which showed a cash balance of P71.95, with pending obligations in the sum of P35,810. The heirs of Quintin registered their opposition said statement of accounts and prayed the Court to disapprove the same and to appoint an account to go over the books of the administrator and to submit a report thereon as soon as possible. The heir Juliana also formally offered her objection to the approval of the accounts submitted by the administrator and prayed further that said administrator be required to submit a complete accounting of his administration of the Estate from 1937 to 1949. Francisco and Miguel B. Dayco, as the only heir of Crisanta, submitted to the Court an agreement to relieve the administrator from accounting for the period of the Japanese occupation; that as to the accounting from 1937 to 1941 and they have no objection to the approval of the statement of accounts submitted by the administrator covering of the years 1945 to 1949. Crisanto - the corresponding statement of accounts for the years 1937-1941 were presented and approved by the Court before and during the Japanese occupation, but the records of the same were destroyed in the Office of the Clerk during the liberation of the province of Rizal, and his personal records were also lost during the Japanese occupation, when his house was burned; that Judge Pea who was presiding over the Court in 1945 impliedly denied the petition of heirs to require him to render an accounting for the period from 1942 to the early part of 1945, for
21 DE LA CERNA SPECPRO DIGESTS 2011 the reason that whatever money obtained from the Estate during said period could not be made the subject of any adjudication it having been declared fiat money and without value, and ordered that the statement of accounts be presented only for the period starting from March 1945. He was anxious to terminate this administration but some of the heirs had not yet complied with the conditions imposed in the project of partition 1950 - Juan and his sisters, as heirs of Quintin de Borja, filed a motion for the delivery to them of their inheritance in the estate, tendering to the administrator a document ceding and transferring to the latter all the rights, interests and participation of Quintin in Civil Case No. 7190, and expressing their willingness to put up a bond if required to do so by the Court. The Court ordered Crisanto to deliver to the heirs of Quintin all the properties adjudicated to them in the Project of Partition d upon the filing a bond in the sum of P10,000 conditioned upon the payment of such obligation as may be ordered by the Court. SC affirmed this. 1951 Crisanto filed his amended statement of accounts covering the period from March 1945 to July 1949, which showed a cash balance of P36,660. 1961 - An additional statement of accounts was filed for the period of from August 1949, to August 1951, showed a cash balance of P5,851.17 and pending obligations in the amount of P6,165.03. The heirs of Quintin again opposed the approval of the statements of accounts charging the administrator with having failed to include the fruits which the estate should have accrued from 1941 to 1951 amounting to P479,429.70, but as the other heirs seemed satisfied with the accounts presented by said administrator and as their group was only one of the 4 heirs of Intestate Estate, they prayed that the administrator be held liable for only P119,932.42 which was of the amount alleged to have been omitted. Crisanto filed a reply to said opposition containing a counterclaim for moral damages against all the heirs of Quintin in the sum of P30,000 which was admitted by the Court over the objection of the heirs of Quintin that the said pleading was filed out of time. The heirs of Quintin de Borja filed their answer to the counterclaim denying the charges and contending that inasmuch as the acts, manifestations and pleadings upon which the claim for moral damages was based were admittedly committed and prepared by their lawyer, Atty. Amador E. Gomez, same cannot be made the basis of a counterclaim, said lawyer not being a party to the action. 1952 CFI issued an order denying admission to administrator's amended counterclaim directed against the lawyer, Atty. Amador E. Gomez, holding that a lawyer, not being a party to the action, cannot be made answerable for counterclaims. Another order was also issued on the same date dismissing the administrator's counterclaim for moral damages against the heirs of Quintin and their counsel for the alleged defamatory acts, manifestation and utterances, and stating that granting the same to be meritorious, yet it was a strictly private controversy between said heirs and the administrator which would not in any way affect the interest of the Intestate, and, therefore, not proper in an intestate proceedings. CFI rendered judgment ordering Crisanto to distribute the funds in his possession to the heirs as follows: P1,395.90 to the heirs of Quintin; P314.99 to Francisco; AMIN | CHA | JANZ | KRIZEL | VIEN P314.99 to the Estate of Juliana and P314.99 to Miguel, but as the latter still owed the intestate the sum of P900, said heirs was ordered to pay instead the 3 others the sum of P146.05 each. The Court found Crisanto guilty of maladministration and sentenced him to pay the heirs of Quintin of the amount which the state lost. The Court also issued an order requiring Crisanto to deliver to the Clerk PNB Certificate of Deposit No. 211649 for P978.50 which was issued in the name of Quintin. Issue/Held: (1) WON the counsel for a party in a case may be included as a defendant in a counterclaim. NO Sec. 1, Rule 10 defines a counterclaim is any claim, whether for money or otherwise, which a party may have against the opposing party. A counterclaim need not dismiss or defeat the recovery sought by the opposing party, but may claim relief exceeding in amount or different in kind from that sought by the opposing party's claim. It is an elementary rule of procedure that a counterclaim is a relief available to a party-defendant against the adverse party which may or may not be independent from the main issue. The appearance of a lawyer as counsel for a party and his participation in a case as such counsel does not make him a party to the action. The fact that he represents the interests of his client or that he acts in their behalf will not hold him liable for or make him entitled to any award that the Court may adjudicate to the parties, other than his professional fees. Granting that the lawyer really employed intemperate language in the course of the hearings or in the preparation of the pleadings filed in connection with this case, the remedy against said counsel would be to have him cited for contempt of court or take other administrative measures that may be proper in the case, but certainly not a counterclaim for moral damages. (2) WON a claim for moral damages may be entertained in a proceeding for the settlement of an estate. NO SP No. 6414 was instituted for the purpose of settling the Intestate Estate of Marcelo. In taking cognizance of the case, the Court was clothed with a limited jurisdiction which cannot expand to collateral matters not arising out of or in any way related to the settlement and adjudication of the properties of the deceased, for it is a settled rule that the jurisdiction of a probate court is limited and special (Guzman vs. Anog, 37 Phil. 361). Although there is a tendency now to relax this rule and extend the jurisdiction of the probate court in respect to matters incidental and collateral to the exercise of its recognized powers (14 Am. Jur. 251-252), this should be understood to comprehend only cases related to those powers specifically allowed by the statutes. It was in the acknowledgment of its limited jurisdiction that the lower court dismissed the administrator's counterclaim for moral damages against the oppositors, particularly against Marcela who allegedly uttered derogatory remarks intended to cast dishonor to said administrator sometime in 1950 or 1951, his Honor's ground being that the court exercising limited jurisdiction cannot entertain claims of this kind which should properly belong to a court general jurisdiction.
22 DE LA CERNA SPECPRO DIGESTS 2011 (3) WON an administrator, as the one in the case at bar, may be held accountable for any loss or damage that the estate under his administration may incur by reason of his negligence, bad faith or acts of maladministration. YES Acts of Maladministration: o Highly irregular practices of the administrator pretended ignorance of the necessity of a book or ledger or at least a list of chronological and dated entries of money or produce the Intestate acquired and the amount of disbursements made for the same properties he did not have even a list of the names of the lessees to the properties under his administration, nor even a list of those who owed back rentals o specifically in mixing the funds of the estate under his administration with his personal funds instead of keeping a current account for the Intestate in his capacity as administrator o AMIN | CHA | JANZ | KRIZEL | VIEN Judge Penas order required the administrator to render an accounting of his administration only from March 1, 1945, to December of the same year without ordering said administrator to include therein the occupation period. Although the Court below mentioned the condition then prevailing during the war-years, We cannot simply presume, in the absence of proof to that effect, that the administrator received such valuables or properties for the use or in exchange of any asset or produce of the Intestate, and in view of the aforementioned order no practical reason for requiring to account for those occupation years when everything was affected by the abnormal conditions created by the war.
Crisantos Liability to the Estate - includes the income of different properties and unnecessary and unauthorized expenses which were charged to the estate (for more details, please see the list):
No need an accounting of his administration during the Japanese occupation Rentals - 6-door building in Azcarraga Street, Manila, situated in front of the Arranque market he never kept a ledger or book of entry for amounts received for the estate no excuse why Crisanto could not have taken cognizance of these rates and received the same for the benefit of the estate he was administering, considering the fact that he used to make trips to Manila usually once a month. Parcel of land in Mayapyap, Nueva Ecija no reason why the administrator would fail to take possession of this property the estate suffered in the form of unreported income Punta/Junta Section of Hacienda Jalajala the report did not contain the real income of the property devoted to rice cultivation at 1,000 cavanes every year or a total of 8,000 cavanes valued at P73,000. Crisanto sold to Gregorio Santos firewoods Ricefields in Cainta, Rizal actually occupied by several persons accommodating 13 cavanes of seedlings; would have yielded 810 cavanes a year and under the 50-50 sharing system, the estate would have received no less than 405 cavanes every year Surcharges and penalties with a total of P988.75 for failure to pay on time the taxes imposed on the properties under his administration and failure to pay the taxes on the Azcaragga building, it was sold at public auction and Crisanto had to redeem the same at P3,295.48, although the amount that should have been paid was only P2,917.26 = loss of P378.22. Safe containing money belonging to the estate was burned when a big fire razed numerous houses in Pateros, Rizal Crisanto testified that the money and other papers delivered by Juliana to him were saved from said fire. no reason why the administrator should keep in his such amount of money, for ordinary prudence would dictate that as an administration funds that come into his possession in a fiduciary capacity should not be mingled with his personal funds and should have been deposited in the Bank in the name of the intestate. sums paid to Juanita, the administrator's wife, as his private secretary The keeping of receipts and retaining in his custody records connected with the management of the properties under administration is a duty that properly belongs to the administrator, necessary to support the statement of accounts that he is obliged to submit to the court for approval. If ever his wife took charge of the safekeeping of these receipts and for which she should be compensated, the same should be taken from his fee salaries paid to special policemen Reason: most of the workers tilting the Punta property were not natives of Jalajala but of the neighboring towns and
23 DE LA CERNA SPECPRO DIGESTS 2011 AMIN | CHA | JANZ | KRIZEL | VIEN they were likely to run away with the harvest without giving the share of the estate if they were not policed unjustified and unnecessary. This kind of reasoning did not appear to be convincing to the trial judge as the cause for such fear seemed to exist only in the imagination Repairs for the casa solariega which Crisanto and his family occupied when their house was burned considering that during his occupancy of the said "casa solariega" he was not paying any rental at all, it is but reasonable that he should take care of the expenses for the ordinary repair of said house Expenses for alleged repairs on the rice mill in Pateros receipts unsigned although some were dated expenses for planting in the Cainta ricefields The prevailing sharing system in this part of the country was on 50-50 basis. But the report, except for the agricultural year 1950 contained nothing of the payments that the tenants should have made. transportation expenses of the administrator We are being made to believe that the Intestate estate is a losing proposition and assuming arguendo that this is true, that precarious financial condition which he, as administrator, should know, did not deter Crisanto from charging to the depleted funds of the estate comparatively big amounts for his transportation expenses. payment made to Mr. Severo Abellera in the sum of P375 for his transportation expenses as one of the two commissioners who prepared the Project of Partition Court authorized the administrator to withdraw from the funds of the intestate the sum of P300 to defray the transportation expenses of the commissioners. service of summons to the defendants in Civil Case No. 84 of the Court of First Instance of Rizal paid to the Provincial Sheriff of the same province an item for P40 appeared to have been paid to the Chief of Police on Jalajala allegedly for the service of the same summons forgot probably the fact that the local chiefs of police are deputy sheriffs ex-officio. Paid to Atty. Filamor for his professional services rendered for the defense of the administrator in G.R. No. L4179, which was decided against him, with costs SC provided that the costs of that litigation should not be borne by the estate but by the administrator himself, personally. P83,337.31), plus legal interests on this amount from the date of the decision appealed from, which is hereby affirmed in all other respects. On the sum of P13,294 for administrator's fees: o There is no controversy as to the fact that this appropriated amount was taken 1. Rentals - 6-door building in Azcarraga Street, Manila, situated in front of the without the order or previous approval by the probate Court. Neither is there Arranque market any doubt that the administration of the Intestate estate by Crisanto is far from satisfactory. Crisanto - P40,295 = total amount of rentals.; one tenant (Aguila) subleased the o Yet it is a fact that Crisanto exercised the functions of an administrator and is apartments occupied by Enriquez and Sodora and paid the said rentals but to entitled also to a certain amount as compensation for the work and services he Enriquez. has rendered as such. Now, considering the extent and size of the estate, the Oppositors : Lauro Aguila, a lawyer who occupied the basement of Door No. 1541 amount involved and the nature of the properties under administration, the and the whole of Door No. 1543 from 1945 to 1949, and who testified that he paid a amount collected by the administrator for his compensation at P200 a month is total of P28,200. not unreasonable and should therefore be allowed. LC: Based its computation on the rental paid by Atty. Aguila for the 1 doors that o We are of the opinion that despite these irregular practices for which he was he occupied : P112,800 from Feb., 1945, to Nov. 15, 1949, for the 6 doors, held already liable and made in some instances to reimburse the Intestate for accountable not only for the sum of P34,235 reported for the period ranging from amounts that were not properly accounted for, his claim for compensation as March 1945, to Dec., 1949, but also for a deficit of P90,525 or a total of P124,760. administrator's fees shall be as they are hereby allowed. SC: Decision: the decision appealed from is modified by reducing the amount that the Enriquez is the same person who appeared to be the administrator's collector, administrator was sentenced to pay the oppositors to the sum of P46,210.78 (instead of duly authorized to receive the rentals from this Azcarraga property and for
24 DE LA CERNA SPECPRO DIGESTS 2011 which services, said Enriquez received 5% of the amount he might be able to collect as commission. no excuse why Crisanto could not have taken cognizance of these rates and received the same for the benefit of the estate he was administerin g, considering the fact that he used to make trips to Manila usually once a month. the upper floor of Door No. 1549 was vacant in Sept., 1949, and as Atty. Aguila used to pay P390 a month for the use of an entire apartment from Sept. to Nov., 1949, and he also paid P160 for the use of the basement of an apartment (Door No. 1541), the use, therefore, of said upper floor would cost P230 which should be deducted add to the sum reported by Crisanto as received by him as rents for 1945-1949 only, the difference between the sum reported as paid by Atty. Aguila and the sum actually paid by the latter as rents of 1 1/2 of the apartments during the said period, or P25,457.09 1/4 of which is P6,364.27 which shall be paid to the oppositors. AMIN | CHA | JANZ | KRIZEL | VIEN 200 hectares - rice fields and 100 hectares dedicated to the planting of upland rice. It has also timberland and forest Assessed value of P115,000 and for which the estate pay real estate tax of P1,500 annually Crisanto: gross income of P12,089.50 and expenditure in the amount of P28,739.21. Oppositors: Crisanto did not file the true income of the property, they presented several witnesses who testified that there were about 200 tenants working therein; that these tenants paid to Crisanto rentals at the rate of 6 cavanes of palay per hectare; that in the years of 1943 and 1944, the Japanese were the ones who collected their rentals, and that the estate could have received no less than 1,000 cavanes of palay yearly. LC: the report did not contain the real income of the property devoted to rice cultivation at 1,000 cavanes every year or a total of 8,000 cavanes valued at P73,000. SC: as Crisanto accounted for the sum of P11,155 collected from rice harvests and if to this amount we add the sum of P8,739.20 for expenses, this will make a total of P19,894.20, thus leaving a deficit of P53,105.80, of which will be P13,276.45 which the administrator is held liable to pay the heirs of Quintin. Crisanto sold to Gregorio Santos firewoods worth P600 in 1941, P3,500 in 1945 and P4,200 in 1946 or a total of P8,300. As the report included only the amount of P625, there was a balance of P7,675 in favor of the estate. The oppositors were not able to present any proof of sales made after these years, if there were any and the administrator was held accountable to the oppositors for only P1,918.75. Ricefields in Cainta, Rizal Crisanto: income of P12,104 from 1945 to 1951 Oppositors: Basilio Javier worked as a tenant in the land of Juliana de Borja which is near the land belonging to the Intestate, the 2 properties being separated only by a river. As tenant of Juliana de Borja, he knew the tenants working on the property and also knows that both lands are of the same class, and that an area accommodating one cavan of seedlings yields at most 100 cavanes and 60 cavanes at the least. LC: actually occupied by several persons accommodating 13 cavanes of seedlings; would have yielded 810 cavanes a year and under the 50-50 sharing system, the estate would have received no less than 405 cavanes every year SC: For the period of 7 years from 1941 to 1950, excluding the 3 years of war the corresponding earning of the estate should be 2,835 cavanes, out of which the 405 cavanes from the harvest of 1941 is valued at P1,215 and the rest 2,430 cavanes at P10 is valued at P24,300, or all in all P25,515. If from this amount the reported income of P12,104 is deducted, there will be a balance of P13,411.10 1/4 of which or P3,352.75 the administrator is held liable to pay to the oppositors. Surcharges and penalties with a total of P988.75 for failure to pay on time the taxes imposed on the properties under his administration and failure to pay the taxes on the Azcaragga building, it was sold at public auction and Crisanto
2.
Parcel of land in Mayapyap, Nueva Ecija acquired by Quintin in Civil Case NO. 6190 - By virtue of the agreement entered into by the heirs, this property was turned over by the estate of Quintin to the intestate and formed part of the general mass of said estate. Crisanto: failed to disclose any return from this property alleging that he had not taken possession of the same. does not deny that he knew of the existence of this land but claimed that when he demanded the delivery of the Certificate of Title from Rogelio Limaco, then administrator of the estate of Quintin, the latter refused to surrender the same Oppositors: Punzal, who testified that, Quintin offered him the position of overseer of this land but he was not able to assume the same due to the death of said administrator; that, he was instructed by Crisanto to testify in court that he was the overseer of the property Other witnesses testified that they were some of the tenants of the Mayapyap property; that they were paying their shares to the overseers of Francisco and sometimes to his wife LC: no reason why the administrator would fail to take possession of this property considering that this was even the subject of the agreement computed the loss the estate suffered in the form of unreported income from the rice lands for 10 years at 6,700 a year and the amount of P4,000 from the remaining portion of the land not devoted to rice cultivation which was being leased at P20 per hectare. Liable for P17,750 which is of the total amount which should have accrued to the estate for this item. SC: But if We exclude the 3 years of occupation, the income for 7 years would be P46,900 for the ricelands and P2,800 (at P400 a year) for the remaining portion not developed to rice cultivation or a total of P48,700, of which is P12,175 which We hold the administrator liable to the oppositors. Punta/Junta Section of Hacienda Jalajala located in said town of Rizal (pertained to Marcelo).
4.
3.
5.
25 DE LA CERNA SPECPRO DIGESTS 2011 had to redeem the same at P3,295.48, although the amount that should have been paid was only P2,917.26 = loss of P378.22. Crisanto: lack of cash balance for the estate Oppositors: evidence that on Oct. 1939, Crisanto received from Juliana the sum of P20,475.17 together with certain papers pertaining to the intestate LC: Attributing these surcharges and penalties to the negligence of the administrator, the lower Court adjudged him liable to pay the oppositors of P1,366.97, the total loss suffered by the Intestate, or P341.74. 6. Safe containing P15,000 belonging to the estate was burned when a big fire razed numerous houses in Pateros, Rizal Crisanto: this loss was already proved to the satisfaction of the Court who, approved the same by order of January 8, 1943, purportedly issued by Judge Servillano Plato Oppositors: contested the genuineness of this order LC: the administrator testified that the money and other papers delivered by Juliana de Borja to him on October 29, 1939, were saved from said fire. The administrator justified the existence of these valuables by asserting that these properties were locked by Juliana de Borja in her drawer in the "casa solariega" in Pateros and hence was not in his safe when his house, together with the safe, was burned The lower Court also found no reason why the administrator should keep in his such amount of money, for ordinary prudence would dictate that as an administration funds that come into his possession in a fiduciary capacity should not be mingled with his personal funds and should have been deposited in the Bank in the name of the intestate. The administrator was held responsible for this loss and ordered to pay thereof, or the sum of P3,750. Unauthorized Expenditures (a) certain sums amounting to P2,130 paid to and receipted by Juanita V. Jarencio the administrator's wife, as his private secretary Crisanto: he needed her services to keep receipts and records for him, and that he did not secure first the authorization from the court before making these disbursements because it was merely a pure administrative function. LC: The keeping of receipts and retaining in his custody records connected with the management of the properties under administration is a duty that properly belongs to the administrator, necessary to support the statement of accounts that he is obliged to submit to the court for approval. If ever his wife took charge of the safekeeping of these receipts and for which she should be compensated, the same should be taken from his fee. This disbursement was disallowed by the Court for being unauthorized and the administrator required to pay the oppositors , thereof or P532.50. (b) The salaries of Pedro Enriquez, as collector of the Azcarraga property; of Briccio Matienzo and Leoncio Perez, as encargados, and of Vicente Panganiban and Herminigildo Macetas as forest-guards LC: justified, although un authorized, as they appear to be reasonable and necessary for the care and preservation of the Intestate. (c) salaries paid to special policemen amounting to P1,509 AMIN | CHA | JANZ | KRIZEL | VIEN Crisanto: sought for the services of Macario Kamungol and others to act as special policemen during harvest time because most of the workers tilting the Punta property were not natives of Jalajala but of the neighboring towns and they were likely to run away with the harvest without giving the share of the estate if they were not policed LC: unjustified and unnecessary. This kind of reasoning did not appear to be convincing to the trial judge as the cause for such fear seemed to exist only in the imagination SC: Granting that such kind of situation existed, the proper thing for the administrator to do would have been to secure the previous authorization from the Court if he failed to secure the help of the local police. He should be held liable for this unauthorized expenditure and pay the heirs of Quintin de Borja thereof or P377.25. (d) year 1942 when his house was burned, the administrator and his family took shelter at the house belonging to the Intestate known as "casa solariega" which, in the Project of Partition was adjudicated to his father, Francisco de Borja. Crisanto: This property, however, remained under his administration and for its repairs he spent from 1945-1950, P1465,14, duly receipted. had he and his family not occupied the same, they would have to pay someone to watch and take care of said house SC: None of these repairs appear to be extraordinary for the receipts were for nipa, for carpenters and thatchers Rule 85, section 2 provides that: An executor or administrator shall maintain in tenant able repair the houses and other structures and fences belonging to the estate, and deliver the same in such repair to the heirs or devisees when directed so to do by the court. yet considering that during his occupancy of the said "casa solariega" he was not paying any rental at all, it is but reasonable that he should take care of the expenses for the ordinary repair of said house this will not excuse him from this responsibility for the disbursements he made in connection with the aforementioned repairs because even if he stayed in another house, he would have had to pay rentals or else take charge also of expenses for the repairs of his residence. The administrator should be held liable to the oppositors in the amount of P366.28. (e) expenses amounting to P6,304.75 for alleged repairs on the rice mill in Pateros LC: Of the disbursements made therein, the items corresponding, to Exhibits I, I-1, I21, L-26, L-15, L-64 and L-65, in the total sum of P570.70 were rejected by the lower court on the ground that they were all unsigned although some were dated. SC: an oversight in including the sum of P150 covered by Exhibit L-26 which was duly signed by Claudio Reyes because this does not refer to the repair of the ricemill but for the roofing of the house and another building and shall be allowed. Consequently, the sum of P570.70 shall be reduced to P420.70 which added to the sum of P3,059 representing expenditures rejected as unauthorized total of P3,479 1/4 of which is P869.92 that belongs to the oppositors.
7.
26 DE LA CERNA SPECPRO DIGESTS 2011 (f) expenses for planting in the Cainta ricefields Crisanto: a total expense of P5,977 admitted that expenses for planting were advanced by the estate and liquidated after each harvest SC: It was proved that the prevailing sharing system in this part of the country was on 50-50 basis. But the report, except for the agricultural year 1950 contained nothing of the payments that the tenants should have made. If the total expenses for said planting amounted to P5,977, thereof or P2,988.50 should have been paid by the tenants as their share of such expenditures, and as P965 was reported by the administrator as paid back in 1950, there still remains a balance of P2,023.50 unaccounted for. For this shortage, the administrator is responsible and should pay the oppositors thereof or P505.87. (g) transportation expenses of the administrator - P5,170 Crisanto: he used his own car in making those trips to Manila, Pasig and Cainta and a launch in visiting the properties in Jalajala, and they were for the gasoline consumed SC: From the report, We are being made to believe that the Intestate estate is a losing proposition and assuming arguendo that this is true, that precarious financial condition which he, as administrator, should know, did not deter Crisanto from charging to the depleted funds of the estate comparatively big amounts for his transportation expenses. Rather unreasonable spending of the estate's fund prompted the Court to observe that one will have to spend only P0.40 for transportation in making a trip from Pateros to Manila and practically the same amount in going to Pasig. From his report for 1949 alone, appellant made a total of 97 trips to these places or an average of one trip for every 3 1/2 days. Yet We must not forget that it was during this period that the administrator failed or refused to take cognizance of the prevailing rentals of commercial places in Manila that caused certain loss to the estate and for which he was accordingly held responsible. For the reason that the alleged disbursements made for transportation expenses cannot be said to be economical, the lower Court held that the administrator should be held liable to the oppositors for thereof or the sum of P1,292.50, though We think that this sum should still be reduced to P500. 8. Other Expenses (a) ordered 40 booklets of printed contracts of lease in the name of the Hacienda Jalajala which cost P150. LC: As the said hacienda was divided into 3 parts one belonging to this Intestate and the other two parts to Francisco de Boria and Bernardo de Borja, ordinarily the Intestate should only shoulder /3 of the said expense, but as the tenants who testified during the hearing of the matter testified that those printed forms were not being used, the Court adjudged the administrator personally responsible for this amount. SC: this printed form was not utilized because the tenants refused to sign any, and We can presume that when the administrator ordered for the printing of the same, AMIN | CHA | JANZ | KRIZEL | VIEN he did not foresee this situation. As there is no showing that said printed contracts were used by another and that they are still in the possession of the administrator which could be utilized anytime, this disbursement may be allowed. (b) a receipt of payment made to Mr. Severo Abellera in the sum of P375 for his transportation expenses as one of the two commissioners who prepared the Project of Partition Crisanto: payment of certain fees necessary in connection with the approval of the proposed plan of the Azcarraga property which was then being processed in the City Engineer's Office Oppositors: on May 24, 1941, the Court authorized the administrator to withdraw from the funds of the intestate the sum of P300 to defray the transportation expenses of the commissioners. SC: From that testimony, it would seem that appellant could even go to the extent of disobeying the order of the Court specifying for what purpose that amount should be appropriated and took upon himself the task of judging for what it will serve best. Since he was not able to show or prove that the money intended and ordered by the Court to be paid for the transportation expenses of the commissioners was spent for the benefit of the estate as claimed, the administrator should be held responsible therefor and pay to the oppositors of P375 or the sum of P93.75. (c) for the service of summons to the defendants in Civil Case No. 84 of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, P104 was paid to the Provincial Sheriff of the same province Crisanto: the defendants in said civil case lived in remote barrios, the services of the Chief of Police as delegate or agent of the Provincial Sheriff were necessary. LC: an item for P40 appeared to have been paid to the Chief of Police on Jalajala allegedly for the service of the same summons forgot probably the fact that the local chiefs of police are deputy sheriffs exofficio. The administrator was therefore ordered by the lower Court to pay of said amount or P10 to the oppositors. (d) P550 paid to Atty. Filamor for his professional services rendered for the defense of the administrator in G.R. No. L-4179, which was decided against him, with costs. LC: disallowed this disbursement on the ground that this Court provided that the costs of that litigation should not be borne by the estate but by the administrator himself, personally. SC: Costs of a litigation in the Supreme Court taxed by the Clerk of Court, after a verified petition has been filed by the prevailing party, shall be awarded to said party and will only include his fee and that of his attorney for their appearance which shall not be more than P40; expenses for the printing and the copies of the record on appeal; all lawful charges imposed by the Clerk of Court; fees for the taking of depositions and other expenses connected with the appearance of witnesses or for lawful fees of a commissioner. If the costs provided for in that case, which this Court ordered to be chargeable personally against the administrator are not recoverable by the latter, with more reason this item could not be charged
27 DE LA CERNA SPECPRO DIGESTS 2011 against the Intestate. Consequently, the administrator should pay the oppositors of the sum of P550 or P137.50. 9. sum of P1,395 out of the funds still in the possession of the administrator LC: required to pay the oppositors SC: In the statement of accounts submitted by the administrator, there appeared a cash balance of P5,851.17 as of August 31, 1961. From this amount, the sum of P1,002.96 representing the Certificate of Deposit No. 21619 and Check No. 57338, both of the Philippine National Bank and in the name of Quintin de Borja, was deducted leaving a balance of P4,848. As Judge Zulueta ordered the delivery to the oppositors of the amount of P1,890 in his order of October 8, 1951; the delivery of the amount of P810 to the estate of Juliana de Borja in his order of October 23, 1951, and the sum of P932.32 to the same estate of Juliana de Borja by order of the Court of February 29, 1952, or a total of P3,632.32 after deducting the same from the cash in the possession of the administrator, there will only be a remainder of P134.98. AMIN | CHA | JANZ | KRIZEL | VIEN
10. creditor of Miguel, heir and administrator of the estate of Crisanta, in the sum of P900 LC: Add this credit to the actual cash on hand SC: as there is only a residue of P134.98 in the hands of the administrator and dividing it among the 3 groups of heirs who are not indebted to the Intestate, each group will receive P44.99, and Miguel B. Dayco is under obligation to reimburse P213.76 to each of them.
Uy Tioco v. Imperial et. al.

Ostrand, J. Quickie: Judge approved of motion of attorney for attorneys fees to be paid out of the estate of the deceased of which he was counsel. Court said that the fees are for the executor and not the counsel Nature: petition for a writ of prohibition to restrain the respondent judge from compelling the petitioner to pay the sum of P11,250 to the other respondent, Alejandro Panis, out of the funds of the estate of the deceased Basilisa Yangco, of which estate said petitioner is the administrator. Facts: Respondent Panis was counsel for the administration of the estate of Basilisa Yangco. o On October 31, 1927, before the final settlement of accounts, presented a motion in the probate proceedings for the allowance of attorney's fees in the sum of P15,000. o On December 5, 1927, the respondent judge, over the objections in writing presented by the administrator, granted the motion and allowed the fees claimed by Panis. The administrator, herein petitioner, did not appeal from the order of the court But, on February 8, 1928, Jacinto Yangco, in his capacity as guardian ad litem of the minors Pedro and Bruno Uy Tioco, the sons and then the only heirs of the deceased, presented a motion for reconsideration under section 113 of the Code of Civil Procedure on the grounds that he was not notified of the motion for the allowance of fees and had no knowledge thereof or of the order granting the motion until a few days before the filing of there motion for reconsideration; that the fees allowed Panis were excessive and prejudicial to the interest of the estate; and that considering the nature of the work performed, the services rendered with him did not warrant the payment of the sum claimed. o This motion was denied on February 15, 1928, the respondent judge holding that while the heirs of the deceased were not notified by the hearing of the motion for allowance of attorney's fees, such notice was duly served upon the administrator; that was a sufficient compliance with the law; that curador ad litem might have the right to intervene in the case but have no absolute right to be notified of the motion; that the provisions of section 113 of the Code of Civil Procedure were not applicable to the case; and that, in any event, the motion for reconsideration is entirely without merit. February 23, 1928 Yangco excepted to the order of February 15, 1928, and gave notice of his intention to appeal to the Supreme Court.
53 Phil 802 (1928)

On the 28th of the same month, Attorney Felix Wijangco, on behalf of Panis, filed a motion in the probated proceedings in which be set forth that the minor Bruno Uy Tioco is now deceased and that his share of inheritance will go to his father, the herein petitioner; that the property involved in the case is community property in which one-half belongs to the petitioner; that consequently the minor Pedro Uy Tioco is only entitled to a one-fourth of the property pertaining to the estate, and that therefore his appeal from the order allowing the attorney's fees can only relate to one-fourth of the amount allowed, wherefore the movent asked that the administrator be ordered to make payments of three-fourths of the amount within five days from the presentation of the motion. To this motion the guardian ad litem objected, but under the date of March 6, 1928, the respondent judge ordered the administrator to make payment of threefourths of P15,000 within five days. The administrator refused to make such payment, and on March 17th the court, after citing him to show cause, again ordered him to pay as provided for in the order of March 6, under penalty of removal from office. The present action was thereupon brought. Upon filing the petition the respondent were ordered to answer, as ordered, the respondents submitted a demurrer which we, considering that there can be no dispute as to the essential facts, shall regard as a sufficient answer to said petition.
Issue/Held: W/N judge should be prohibited to compel the payment of funds to Panis. YES. Ratio: In our opinion, the petition must be granted. The orders of March 6th and 7th for a partial payment of the fees claimed were issued after an appeal had been taken and perfected by the filing of an appeal bond approved by the court. o The appeal was taken from the order of February 15 denying the motion for reopening and reconsideration of the allowance for attorney's fees and involves the validity of that order and the finality of the order of December 5, 1927. Whether this orders were valid and final need not be here determined, but they are appealable, and we are not aware of any provision of law authorizing the lower court to enforce the immediate execution of such orders and probate proceedings after an appeal has been perfected. The interest of the appellee are supposed to be sufficiently protected by an adequate bond. The arguments submitted indicate a misconception of the character of the liability for the attorney's fees are claimed are supposed to have been rendered to the executor or administrator to assist him in the execution of his trust. The attorney can therefore not hold the estate directly liable for his fees; such fees are allowed to the executor or administrator and not to the attorney. The liability for the payment rests on the executor or administrator, but if the fees paid are beneficial to the estate and reasonable, he is entitled to the reimbursement from the estate. Such payment should be included in his accounts and the reimbursement therefore settled upon the notice prescribed in section 682 of the
29 DE LA CERNA SPECPRO DIGESTS 2011 Code of Civil Procedure. (See Church on Probate Law and Practice, pp. 1570-1588 and authorities there cited; Woerner on the American Law of Administration, 2d ed., sections 515 and 516.) For the reasons stated the respondent judge is hereby prohibited from enforcing the payment of the attorney's fees above-mentioned until the appeal taken by Jacinto Yangco, as guardian ad litem for the minor Pedro Uy Tioco, has been passed upon by this court or dismissed. No costs will be allowed. So ordered. AMIN | CHA | JANZ | KRIZEL | VIEN
Rodriguez v. Ynza
Nature: Appeal from the orders of the CFI Iloilo, authorizing payment to Atty. Benjamin Tirol for professional services. Facts: Appellant objects to said payment on the ground that Hugo Rodriguez, trustee of the estate of Julia Ynza, being a member of the bar, he did not need the assistance of Atty. Tirol and that, at any rate, the later had rendered legal services, not to the estate of Julia Ynza but to said Hugo Rodriguez in his individual capacity. Held: The objection is untenable. Rodriguez was named trustee by reason of his qualifications, not as a lawyer but as administrator. It appears that Rodriguez was involved in 8 cases, not in his private capacity, but as trustee or administrator of the estate of Julia Ynza, deceased and the properties constituting said estate were being claimed by appellant, to the exclusion of the estate of Julia Ynza. It is apparent therefore that as counsel for Rodriguez in said cases, Atty. Tirol had rendered services for the benefit of the estate of Julia Ynza, which obtained a favorable decision in every one of said cases.
97 Phil 1003 (1955)
Tumang v. Laguio
Antonio, J.: Nature: Case forwarded by the Court of Appeals Quickie: Mom v daughter on issue of delivery of properties. Court said its better if the mom/administrator renders an accounting of the estate, even if she had done a prior one, to better resolve the problem, The duty of an executor or administrator to render an account is not a mere incident of an administration proceeding which can be waived or disregarded. It is a duty that has to be performed and duly acted upon by the court before the administration is finally ordered closed and terminated Facts: In Special Proceeding No. 1953 involving the estate of the late Dominador Tumang and pending before the Court of First Instance of Pampanga, the widow of the deceased, namely Magdalena A. Tumang, administratrix and executrix of the will, filed a petition to declare the testate proceedings definitely terminated and closed with respect to herself and two of her children - Melba Tumang Ticzon and Nestor A. Tumang. The petition was premised on the fact that the aforesaid heirs had already acknowledged receipt of the properties adjudicated to them, and in order for such properties to be transferred in their names, there was need for an order of the court declaring the proceedings closed with respect to the aforesaid heirs. The petition was opposed by appellee's daughter, Guia T. Laguio and her children on the ground that appellee, as administratrix and executrix, had not yet delivered all properties adjudicated to them. Moreover, the oppositors contended that there could be no partial termination of the proceedings. Thereafter, the administratrix withdrew the aforementioned petition. During the hearing of the motion to withdraw petition, Magdalena Tumang, as required by the court, filed a pleading captioned "Compliance", alleging that as shown by the attached receipts issued by the BIR, the estate and inheritance taxes had been fully paid; that as certified by the Deputy Clerk of Court, no claim has been presented that has not already delivered all the properties and dividends of the shares of stock adjudicated to her and her minor children since the approval of the original and amendatory projects of partition; and that with such admission, the court no longer has jurisdiction to entertain the motion under consideration. Lower Court: considers the motion to require administratrix to render an accounting untenable, as the final accounting of the administratrix was already approved and therefore denies the motion of oppositor; MR denied Issue/Held: (1) Whether or not the court should have required the executrix to render an accounting of the cash and stock dividends received after the approval of her final accounts. YES (2) Whether or not petitioners have waived their right to demand such accountingNO
96 SCRA 124 (1980)

Ratio: Section 8 of Rule 85 provides that the "executor or administrator shall render an account of his administration within one (1) year from the time of receiving letters testamentary or of administration ..., and he shall render such further accounts as the court may requite until the estate is wholly settled." In the instant case, further accounts by the executrix appear to be in order, in view of the fact that the dividends sought to be accounted for are not included in the final accounts rendered by the executrix. It appears that the interests of all the parties will be better served and the conflict between petitioners and respondent will be resolved if such additional accounting is made. Further, "it has been held that an executor or administrator who receives assets of the estate after he has filed an account should file a supplementary account thereof, and may be compelled to do so, but that it is only with respect to matters occuring after the settlement of final account that representatives will be compelled to file supplementary account." It is only in a case where the petition to compel an executor to account after he has accounted and has been discharged fails to allege that any further sums came into the hands of the executor, and the executor specifically denies the receipt of any further sums that the accounting should be denied. There is no question that in the instant case, the fact that the executrix received funds of the estate after the approval of her final accounts and before the issuance of an order finally closing the proceedings is admitted. She must, therefore, account for the same, in consonance with her duty to account for all the assets of the decedent's estate which have come into her possession by virtue of her office. An executor should account for all his receipts and disbursements since his last accounting. We disagree with the lower court's finding that petitioners, by receiving the dividends without requiring an accounting, had waived their right to do so. The duty of an executor or administrator to render an account is not a mere incident of an administration proceeding which can be waived or disregarded. It is a duty that has to be performed and duly acted upon by the court before the administration is finally ordered closed and terminated, 8 to the end that no part of the decedent's estate be left unaccounted for. The fact that the final accounts had been approved does not divest the court of jurisdiction to require supplemental accounting for, aside from the initial accounting, the Rules provide that "he shall render such further accounts as the court may require until the estate is wholly settled."
Punongbayan v. Punongbayan
Puno, J. Quickie: In 1969, Escolastica Punongbayan-Paguio died. She was survived by her husband, brothers and sisters, and nephews and nieces. One of the nephews, DANILO Punongbayan, was appointed administrator of her estate. In a compromise agreement, the heirs agreed to distribute among themselves Escolasticas estate and authorized DANILO to sell certain properties of the estate. Then, 20 years hiatus in the intestate proceedings. In 1994, SOTERO Punongbayan (brother of Escolastica) finally filed a motion for the immediate distribution of Escolasticas estate according to the compromise agreement and to order DANILO to render accounting of his 20 year administration. SOTEROs motion was granted and obtained finality. Writ of execution was issued but DANILO refused to comply. Later, SOTERO filed another motion to be appointed as co-administrator in view of DANILOs failure to account. Said motion was granted in August 30, 2000. But as soon as September 1, 2000 (the immediately following day), DANILO himself filed a motion for SOTERO to render accounting alleging that SOTERO has committed illegal acts of administration which precludes him (DANILO) from rendering full accounting as administrator in compliance with the earlier writ of execution. Intestate court denied DANILOs motion. Consequently, DANILO assailed the denial via special civil action for certiorari with the CA. The CA granted certiorari and ordered SOTERO to render accounting~ hence, this appeal by SOTERO DANILOs resort to certiorari under Rule 65 to assail the intestate courts order of denial of his motion for SOTERO to render accounting is proper since the same order is merely an interlocutory order. The said order did not fully dispose of the issue involving SOTEROs accountability as an administrator. DANILOs motion, premised on Section 8, Rule 85 and Sec. 7, Rule 87 of the Rules of Court, sought to determine SOTEROs accountability as an administrator. But in so ruling, the intestate court denied the motion on the ground of PREMATURITY, without disposing or precluding future probing into SOTEROs accountability as such administrator. Hence, the order was clearly interlocutory. Under Rule 85, Sec. 8, the administrator is only liable to render accounting 1 year after receipt of letters of administrator. In the case at bar, SOTERO has only been administrator for one (1) day when DANILO sought to make him accountable under Rule 85, Sec. 8. HOWEVER, even if DANILOs resort to certiorari was proper, the CA erred in granting the same. The reasons why certiorari should not be granted are set forth below. They are not SpecPro related so Im not putting them here in the quickie anymore. Nature: Petition to review of the Decision of the Court of Appeals which granted the special civil action for certiorari and mandamus filed by respondent DANILO Punongbayan, as well as the CA Resolution which denied petitioner SOTERO Punongbayans MR Facts: Escolastica Punongbayan-Paguio died intestate leaving behind considerable properties in Misamis Oriental, Iligan City, and Bulacan.
446 SCRA 100 (2004)

She was survived by her husband, Miguel Paguio; brothers and sisters (among whom is petitioner SOTERO Punongbayan); and nephews and nieces (among whom is respondent DANILO Punongbayan) Proceedings for the settlement of her estate were initiated in the RTC Misamis Oriental. Surviving husband Paguio was appointed administrator and later, nephew DANILO, as co-administrator to represent the interests of the Punongbayan family. In 1974, the heirs executed a compromise agreement distributing among themselves the estate of the decedent. They likewise authorized the administrator to sell parcels of land to pay the liabilities of the estate. The intestate court approved the agreement. Thereafter, the intestate proceedings were left dormant from 1976 to 1993. August 1994, SOTERO moved for the immediate distribution of the estate in accordance with the 1974 Compromise Agreement. They asked that DANILO be ordered to deposit the proceeds from the sales of estate properties with the Clerk of Court and to render an accounting of his administration for the past 20 years. Motion granted. DANILO assailed the order with the CA which, however, dismissed the same. The CA decision became final and executory and the corresponding writ of execution was issued. The writ was not served upon DANILO himself as he was always absent from his residence and place of work whenever the sheriff came to serve the writ. Ultimately, DANILO failed to comply with the order of execution. Thus, a warrant for his arrest was issued. In response, he filed an urgent motion to recall the warrant which was denied. Consequently, DANILO assailed the order denying recall of the warrant of arrest before the CA. During the pendency of the latter petition, DANILO was arrested but was later on released by the CA upon his manifestation that he will comply with the writ of execution, which was finally served upon him in open court, and that he will attend the next hearing to submit the certificates of placement of the proceeds from the sales of a substantial portion of the estate under his administration. DANILO did not appear during said hearing. This prompted the CA to recall his release order and directed his arrest. Ultimately, the CA dismissed DANILOs later petition for utter lack of merit, ruling that DANILOs clear and contumacious refusal to obey the writ of execution for several years should no longer be countenanced Meanwhile, SOTERO moved for his appointment as co-administrator of Escloasticas estate on the grounds that DANILO failed to discharge his duties as administrator, to render an accounting of his administration, and to turn over P25M in proceeds from the sales of a substantial portion of the estate, as required in the CA final and executory order of execution. The motion was granted and SOTERO took his oath as co-administrator on August 2000. The next month, DANILO filed a Motion to Order SOTERO to Render an Accounting, alleging that SOTERO appropriated lots belonging to the estate to the exclusion of the other heirs; illegally sold some lots to third persons and illegally transferred other lots in his (SOTEROs) own name, without turning over the proceeds to the estate.
33 DE LA CERNA SPECPRO DIGESTS 2011 DANILO alleged that he encountered difficulties in rendering full accounting of the estates income and properties because of the illegal sales and lease made by SOTERO. Hence, DANILO alleged that SOTERO should be made to account first for the income derived from such illegal transfers and lease before he (DANILO) could render the full accounting required by the intestate court. DANILOs motion was denied as well as a subsequent MR. Consequently, DANILO filed a special civil action for certiorari and mandamus with the CA to assail the intestate courts orders. The CA granted certiorari and mandamus, ordering SOTERO to render an accounting of all the properties and monies belonging to the estate that came into his possession and to deposit with the intestate court the proceeds of the sale of the estate properties~ hence, this petition by SOTERO 2) AMIN | CHA | JANZ | KRIZEL | VIEN which he is obliged to render within one (1) year from receiving letters of administration, or as required by the court until the estate is settled. In the same vein, an examination of SOTEROs accountability under Section 7, Rule 87 cannot definitely settle the issue of his alleged illegal transfers and lease since a proceeding under this section is merely in the nature of factfinding inquiries. It is intended to elicit information or evidence relative to estate properties. The intestate court which has jurisdiction over the administration and settlement of the estate has limited jurisdiction and is without authority to resolve issues of ownership with finality especially when third persons are involved. Separate actions should be instituted by the administrator for the purpose. Thus, an order based on Sec. 7, Rule 87 cannot also be considered a final order but is merely interlocutory. The resort to certiorari was proper.
Issue/s and Held: 1) WON the Orders denying DANILOs motion for SOTERO to render accounting can be properly assailed by certiorari YES! 2) WON the CA erred in granting certiorari and mandamus YES! Ratio: 1) The denial of DANILOs motion for SOTERO to render an accounting is an interlocutory order NOT subject to appeal but may be challenged before a superior court through a petition for certiorari under Rule 65. Recall CivPro: A court order is final in character if it puts an end to the particular matter resolved, or settles definitely the matter therein disposed of, such that no further questions can come before the court except the execution of the order. On the other hand, a court order is merely interlocutory if it is provisional and leaves substantial proceeding to be had in connection with its subject. Clearly, in the instant case, the assailed Order was an interlocutory order. The assailed motion was filed by DANILO under Section 8, Rule 851 and Sec. 7, Rule 872 of the Rules of Court. Applying Sec. 8, Rule 85, the intestate court denied the motion on the ground that it was premature considering that SOTERO has only been co-administrator for only one (1) day at the time it was filed when the Rules require that the administrator must account only after one (1) year from receipt of letter of administration. Such order, HOWEVER, in no way settled SOTEROs accountability as co administrator as it did not preclude or forestall future accountings by him
1Every
executor or administrator shall render an account of his administration within one (1) year from the time of receiving letters testamentary or of administration, unless the court otherwise directs because of extensions of time for presenting claims against, or paying the debts of, the estate, or of disposing of the estate; and he shall render such further accounts as the court may require until the estate is wholly settled. 2 The court, on complaint of an executor or administrator, may cite a person entrusted by an executor or administrator with any part of the estate of the deceased to appear before it, and may require such person to render a full account, on oath, of the money, goods, chattels, bonds, accounts, or other papers belonging to such estate as came to his possession in trust for such executor or administrator, and of his proceedings thereon; and if a person so cited refuses to appear to render such account, the court may punish him for contempt as having disobeyed a lawful order of the court.
Be that as it may, the CA erred nonetheless erred in granting the writ of certiorari. Certiorari under Rule 65 will lie only where a grave abuse of discretion or an act without or in excess of jurisdiction is clearly shown. The abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and hostility. No such grave abuse of discretion was committed by the intestate court in denying DANILOs motion for SOTERO to render accounting It is obvious that DANILOs motion was just another ploy for him to delay his compliance with the courts 1995 Order directing him to render an accounting of his administration of the estate and to turn over the certificates of placement of the proceeds from the sales of estate properties amounting to millions of pesos, which has long become final and executory That SOTERO should be made to account first for the alleged illegal transfers of estate properties made by him before DANILO could render his own accounting is incorrect for two reasons: (1) cases for the annulment of the said sales/leases have already been commenced by DANILO himself, hence, the intestate court will be barred from entertaining and resolving the same controversies by the principle of lis pendens, and (2) questions of title to real property cannot be determined in testate or intestate proceedings. IN OTHER WORDS, it would have been illusory, nay, utterly futile, for the intestate court to order first SOTEROs accounting considering that lis pendens and its limited jurisdiction bar it from determining the grounds cited by DANILO in his motion for SOTERO to account for his administration (which involves issues of title to real property). Thus, there is absolutely no reason for DANILO to further delay the accounting of his own administration of the estate. Clearly, DANILO was not entitled to the writ of certiorari erroneously issued by the CA. Certiorari, being an equitable remedy, will not issue where the petitioner is in bad faith.
Santos v. Manarang
Trent, J. Quickie: The will contained a provision directing the executor and the testators wife to religiously pay the debts he enumerated. Committee, appointed to hear and determine claims, submitted its report. Santos (he was included in the list) asked the court to reconvene the committee and pass upon his claim. This was denied. He then instituted an action against the administratrix to recover the sum. Still denied. HELD: In the present case the time previously limited was 6 months from July 23, 1907. This allowed Santos until January 23, 1908, to present his claims to the committee. An extension of this time under section 690 rested in the discretion of the court. Santos petition was not presented until July 14, 1909. It is commonly termed the statute of nonclaims, and its purpose is to settle the affairs of the estate with dispatch, so that residue may be delivered to the persons entitled thereto without their being afterwards called upon to respond in actions for claims, which, under the ordinary statute of limitations, have not yet prescribed. The claims against the estate in the case at bar were enforceable only when the prescribed legal procedure was followed. DISSENT: the record is entirely lacking in legal evidence to establish the publication which the law requires under that order. The claim was not one that must be submitted to a committee, being recognized as a legal and valid debt by the will and the testator having ordered his executor to pay it. Facts: Don Lucas de Ocampo made a will July 26, 1906. He died November 18, 1906. The 4th clause of this will reads as follows: I also declare that I have contracted the debts detailed below, and it is my desire that they may be religiously paid by my wife and executors in the form and at the time agreed upon with my creditors. Among the debts mentioned in the list are 2 in favor of Isidro Santos; one due on April 14, 1907, for P5,000, and various other described as falling due at different dates (the dates are not given) amounting to the sum of P2,454. The will was duly probated and a committee was regularly appointed to hear and determine such claims against the estate as might be presented. This committee submitted its report. Santos presented a petition to the court asking that the committee be required to reconvene and pass upon his claims against the estate which were recognized in the will of testator. DENIED. Santos instituted the present proceedings against Leandra Manarang, the administratrix of the estate, to recover the sums mentioned in the will. Relief was denied in the court below. Issues/Held: (1) WON the court erred in denying in asking that the committee be reconvened to consider his claim. NO Santos - it does not appear in the committee's report that the publications required by section 687 of the Code of Civil Procedure had been duly made.
27 Phil 209 (1914)

SC - The record affirmatively shows that the committee did make the publications required by law. Santos - at the time he presented his petition the court had not approved the report of the committee. SC - If the approval of the report was necessary we might say that, although the record does not contain a formal approval of the committee's report, such approval must undoubtedly have been made, as will appear from an inspection of the various orders of the court approving the annual accounts of the administratrix, in which claims allowed against the estate by the committee were written off in accordance with its report. This is shown very clearly from the court's order in which the account of the administratrix was approved after reducing final payments of some of the claims against the estate to agree with the amounts allowed by the committee. Santos - at the time this petition was presented the administration proceedings had not been terminated. SC - This is correct. In his petition, Santos stated states that his failure to present the said claims to the committee was due to his belief that it was unnecessary to do so because of the fact that the testator, in his will, expressly recognized them and directed that they should be paid. Provisions of the law regarding the claims that the committee are authorized to pass upon. o Section 686 empowers the committee to try and decide claims which survive against the executors and administrators, even though they be demandable at a future day "except claims for the possession of or title to real estate." o Section 700 provides that all actions commenced against the deceased person for the recovery of money, debt, or damages, pending at the time the committee is appointed, shall be discontinued, and the claims embraced within such actions presented to the committee. o Section 703 provides that actions to recover title or possession of real property, actions to recover damages for injury to person or property, real and personal, and actions to recover the possession of specified articles of personal property, shall survive, and may be commenced and prosecuted against the executor or administrator; "but all other actions commenced against the deceased before his death shall be discontinued and the claims therein involved presented before the committee as herein provided." o Section 708 provides that a claim secured by a mortgage or other collateral security may be abandoned and the claim prosecuted before the committee, or the mortgage may be foreclosed or the security be relied upon, and in the event of a deficiency judgment, the creditor may, after the sale of mortgage or upon the insufficiency of the security, prove such deficiency before the committee on claims. o There are also certain provisions in section 746 et seq., with reference to the presentation of contingent claims to the committee after the expiration of the time allowed for the presentation of claims not contingent. The claims are described in the will as debts. There is nothing in the will to indicate that any or all of them are contingent claims, claims for the possession of or title to
35 DE LA CERNA SPECPRO DIGESTS 2011 real property, damages for injury to person or property, real or personal, or for the possession of specified articles of personal property. Nor is it asserted by the plaintiff that they do. The conclusion is that they were claims proper to be considered by the committee. Section 689 provides: that court shall allow such time as the circumstances of the case require for the creditors to present their claims the committee for examination and allowance; but not, in the first instance, more than twelve months, or less than six months; and the time allowed shall be stated in the commission. The court may extend the time as circumstances require, but not so that the whole time shall exceed eighteen months. It cannot be questioned that thus section supersedes the ordinary limitation of actions provided for in chapter 3 of the Code. It is strictly confined to claims against the estate of deceased persons, and has been almost universally adopted as part of the probate law of the United States. It is commonly termed the statute of nonclaims, and its purpose is to settle the affairs of the estate with dispatch, so that residue may be delivered to the persons entitled thereto without their being afterwards called upon to respond in actions for claims, which, under the ordinary statute of limitations, have not yet prescribed. Due possibly to the comparative shortness of the period of limitation applying to such claims as compared with the ordinary statute of limitations, a saving provision is annexed to the statute of nonclaims in every jurisdiction where is found. In this jurisdiction, the saving clause is found in section 690 which provides: On application of a creditor who has failed to present his claim, if made within six months after the time previously limited, or, if a committee fails to give the notice required by this chapter, and such application is made before the final settlement of the estate, the court may, for cause shown, and on such terms as are equitable, renew the commission and allow further time, not exceeding one month, for the committee to examine such claim, in which case it shall personally notify the parties of the time and place of hearing, and as soon as may be make the return of their doings to the court. If the committee fails to give the notice required, that is a sufficient cause for reconvening it for further consideration of claims which may not have been presented before its final report was submitted to the court. But, this is not the case made by Santos, as the committee did give the notice required by law. Where the proper notice has been given the right to have the committee recalled for the consideration of a belated claim appears to rest first upon the condition that it is presented within six months after the time previously limited for the presentation of claims. In the present case the time previously limited was 6 months from July 23, 1907. This allowed Santos until January 23, 1908, to present his claims to the committee. An extension of this time under section 690 rested in the discretion of the court. Plaintiff's petition was not presented until July 14, 1909. Plea of Santos - he was laboring under a mistake of law a mistake which could easily have been corrected had he sought to inform himself; a lack of information as to the law governing the allowance of claims against estate of the deceased persons which, by proper diligence, could have been remedied in ample to present the claims to the committee. Santos finally discovered his mistake and now seeks to AMIN | CHA | JANZ | KRIZEL | VIEN assert his right when they have been lost through his own negligence . Ignorantia legis neminem excusat. (2) WON the court is correct in dismissing the petition to compel the administratrix to pay him the amounts mentioned in the will. YES We concede all that is implied in the maxim, dicat testor et erit lex (The will of the testator is the law of the case) but the law imposes certain restrictions upon the testator, not only as to the disposition of his estate, but also as to the manner in which he may make such disposition. It is evident from the brief outline of the sections referred to above that the Code of Civil Procedure has established a system for the allowance of claims against the estates of decedents. There are at least 2 restrictions imposed by law upon the power of the testator to dispose of his property, and which pro tanto restrict the maxim that "the will of the testator law: (1) His estate is liable for all legal obligations incurred by him; and (2) he can not dispose of or encumber the legal portion due his heirs by force of law. The former take precedence over the latter. (Sec. 640, Code Civ, Proc.) In case his estate is sufficient they must be paid. (Sec, 734, id.) In case the estate is insolvent they must be paid in the order named in section 735. If it is unnecessary to present such claim to the committee, the source of nonclaims is not applicable. It is not barred until from four to ten years, according to its classification in chapter 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure, establishing questions upon actions. Section 706 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides that an executor may, with the approval of the court, compound with a debtor of deceased for a debt due the estate, but he is not permitted or directed to deal with a creditor of the estate. He is the advocate of the estate before an impartial committee with quasi-judicial power to determine the amount of the claims against the estate, and, in certain cases, to equitably adjust the amounts due. The administrator, representing the debtor estate, and the creditor appear before this body as parties litigant and, if either is dissatisfied with its decision, an appeal to the court is their remedy. To allow the administrator to examine and approve a claim against the estate would put him in the dual role of a claimant and a judge. The most important restriction, in this jurisdiction, on the disposition of property by will are those provisions of the Civil Code providing for the preservation of the legal portions due to heirs by force of law, and expressly recognized and continued in force by sections 614, 684, and 753 of the Code of Civil Procedure. But if a debt is expressly recognized in the will, there is nothing to prevent a partial or total alienation of the legal portion by means of a bequest under a guise of a debt, since all of the latter must be paid before the amount of the legal portion can be determined. The restriction imposed upon the testator's power to dispose of his property when they are heirs by force of law is especially important. The rights of these heirs by force law pass immediately upon the death of the testator. (Art. 657, Civil Code.) The state intervenes and guarantees their rights by many stringent provisions of law to the extent mentioned in article 818 of the Civil Code. The state cannot afford to allow the performance of its obligations to be directed by the will of an individual. There is but one instance in which the settlement of the estate according to the probate procedure provided in the Code of Civil Procedure may be dispense with,
36 DE LA CERNA SPECPRO DIGESTS 2011 and it applies only to intestate estates. (Sec. 596, Code Civ. Proc.) A partial exemption from the lawful procedure is also contained in section 644, when the executor or administrator is the sole residuary legatee. Even in such case, and although the testator directs that no bond be given, the executor is required to give a bond for the payment of the debts of the testator. The facts of the present case do not bring it within either of this sections. We conclude that the claims against the estate in the case at bar were enforceable only when the prescribed legal procedure was followed. It will ordinarily be presumed in construing a will that the testator is acquainted with the rules of law, and that he intended to comply with them accordingly. If two constructions of a will or a part thereof are possible, and one of these constructions is consistent with the law, and the other is inconsistent, the presumption that the testator intended to comply with the law will compel that construction which is consistent with the law to be adopted. (Page on Wills, sec. 465.) The dates of his will and of his death may be separated by a period of time more or less appreciable. In the meantime, as the testator well knows, he may acquire or dispose of property, pay or assume additional debts, etc. In the absence of anything to the contrary, it is only proper to presume that the testator, in his will, is treating of his estate at the time and in the condition it is in at his death. Especially is this true of his debts. Debts may accrue and be paid in whole or in part between the time the will is made and the death of the testator. To allow a debt mentioned in the will in the amount expressed therein on the ground that such was the desire of the testator, when, in fact, the debt had been wholly or partly paid, would be not only unjust to the residuary heirs, but a reflection upon the good sense of the testator himself. A mere comparison of the list of the creditors of the testator and the amounts due them as described in his will, with the same list and amounts allowed by the committee on claims, shows that the testator had creditors at the time of his death not mentioned in the will at all. In fact, of those debts listed in the will, not a single one was allowed by the committee in the amount named in the will. This show that the testator either failed to list in his will all his creditors and that, as to those he did include, he set down an erroneous amount opposite their names; or else, which is the only reasonable view of the matter, he overlooked some debts or contracted new ones after the will was made and that as to others he did include he made a partial payments on some and incurred additional indebtedness as to others. The petition of the plaintiff filed on November 21, 1910, wherein he asks that the administratrix be compelled to pay over to him the amounts mentioned in the will as debts due him appears to be nothing more nor less than a complaint instituting an action against the administratrix for the recovery of the sum of money. Obviously, the plaintiff is not seeking possession of or title to real property or specific articles of personal property. When a committee is appointed as herein provided, no action or suit shall be commenced or prosecute against the executor or administrator upon a claim against the estate to recover a debt due from the state; but actions to recover the seizing and possession of real estate and personal chattels claimed by the estate may be commenced against him. (Sec. 699, Code Civ. Proc.) It is true that a debt may be left as a legacy, either to the debtor (in which case it virtually amounts to a release), or to a third person. But this case can only arise AMIN | CHA | JANZ | KRIZEL | VIEN when the debt is an asset of the estate. It would be absurd to speak of a testator's leaving a bare legacy of his own debt. (Arts. 866, 878, Civil Code.) The creation of a legacy depends upon the will of the testator, is an act of pure beneficence, has no binding force until his death, and may be avoided in whole or in part by the mere with whim of the testator, prior to that time. A debt arises from an obligation recognized by law (art. 1089, Civil Code) and once established, can only be extinguished in a lawful manner. (Art. 1156, id.) Debts are demandable and must be paid in legal tender. Legacies may, and often do, consist of specific articles of personal property and must be satisfied accordingly. In order to collect as legacy the sum mentioned in the will as due him, the plaintiff must show that it is in fact a legacy and not a debt. As he has already attempted to show that this sum represents a debt, it is an anomaly to urge now it is a legacy. But it is said that the plaintiff's claims should be considered as partaking of the nature of a legacy and disposed of accordingly. If this be perfect then the plaintiff would receive nothing until after all debts had been paid and the heirs by force of law had received their shares. From any point of view the inevitable result is that there must be a hearing sometime before some tribunal to determine the correctness of the debts recognized in the wills of deceased persons. This hearing, in the first instance, can not be had before the court because the law does not authorize it. Such debtors must present their claims to the committee, otherwise their claims will be forever barred.
Separate Opinion: Moreland, dissenting: The decision of the court in this case produces a serious miscarriage of justice. It causes the appellant to lose more than P7,000, a debt against the respondent estate, which debt, but a few months before his death, was specifically recognized by the testator in his will as a debt due and owing to petitioner and which he, in said will, ordered and directed his executor to pay "religiously." Even if it be assumed that the notice to creditors should have been published in accordance with the order of July 23, 1907, the record is entirely lacking in legal evidence to establish the publication which the law requires under that order. That being so the claim is not barred. a) An affidavit of the publisher of "El Imparcial" setting out that the notice to creditors attached to the affidavit and signed by Pedro Abad Santos (who before the completion of the publication, resigned) and Marcos Tancuaco, dated July 23, 1907, was published "three weeks from the 25th of July to the 16th of August, 1907." The defectiveness of the affidavit is apparent. It does not show whether the newspaper was daily, weekly, biweekly or monthly, or the day of the week or month on which published. Passing, however, these defects, I note that the notice to creditors requires them to present their claims at the dwelling house of Pedro Abad Santos. It should be noted, as before stated, that this commissioner resigned before the expiration of the six months, thus making it necessary for creditors to present their claims and their proofs thereof to one who was not a member of the committee and to a man who, immediately on his resignation, became the attorney of the estate. b) The remaining item of evidence which it is claimed tends to show that the notice to creditors was duly published is the reference made by the
37 DE LA CERNA SPECPRO DIGESTS 2011 commissioners in their report to the court, above quoted, in which they say, referring to July 25, 19076, "on which date the first publication to creditors was made." This reference cannot be called evidence of publication, although the court accepts it as such. At most it refers and is limited, in terms, to the first publication. It has not the slightest reference to the other publications, if any. I contend, and the record shows, that the notice should not have been published in accordance with the order of July 23, 1907, but in pursuance of an order of January 8, 1908, which was an order for a new publication, and, being later order, necessarily vacated and annulled the order of July 23, 1907, and all proceedings thereunder relative to the matters included in said order of January 8, 1908; that publication was concededly never made under and in pursuance of that order and that, for that reason, the petitioner's claim is not barred. o Let us remember that the first order of the court directing the committee to publish notice to creditors was issued July 23, 1907. It conceded that publication in a newspaper of some sort was started under that order. But, the court, evidently becoming satisfied that, under all the circumstances, the publication under that order would not be sufficient to give creditors fair notice, on January 8, 1908, and before the publication under the first order, if there was ever started in reality a publication under that order, was completed, made a second order of publication. The reason for this order was evidently that, during the six months succeeding the date of the notice which it is claimed was published under the first order, three persons held the office of executor, the complexion of the committee itself was changed, and the member of the committee at whose house the notice required the claims and vouchers to be presented resigned from the committee and became the attorney for the estate. Pedro Abad Santos having ceased to be a member of the committee and having become the attorney for the estate, and the notice to the creditors requiring that claims with their vouchers to be presented at his house, there was no longer a proper place designated where creditors could present their claims. Furthermore, the continual change in the executorship already noted may have resulted in grave prejudice to the estate if the estate were to be held responsible for all claims presented during the time those changes were taking place, it being the duty of the executor, under the law, to be present at the hearing on claims and defend the estate against those which deemed unjust, and the frequent change in the office, thereby bringing the persons unfamiliar with what had gone before, certainly not tending to efficiency. The claim was not one that must be submitted to a committee, being recognized as a legal and valid debt by the will and the testator having ordered his executor to pay it. The motion made to require the executor to pay the claim should have been heard by the court. o There is no provision of the Code of Civil Procedure expressly requiring the presentation of any claim to a committee. Provision is made for the appointment of a committee which is authorized to hear certain classes of claims but nowhere is there an express provision requiring a creditor to present his claim. There is, to be sure, a section which provides (sec. 695) that if the creditor fails to present his claim, if it is a certain kind of claim, within the time provided in the law, it will be barred. It is therefore, gathered by implication that every creditor having a certain kind of claim must present it; AMIN | CHA | JANZ | KRIZEL | VIEN but there is no provision expressly requiring it. Moreover, it must be carefully noted that only certain claims need to be presented to the committee and that only certain claims are barred provided they are not exhibited. Section 686 confers upon the committee whatever jurisdiction it may have with respect to the hearing of claims, apart from those which actions were begun against decedent in his lifetime. It provides that "they may try and decide upon claims, which by law survive against executors or administrators, except claims for the possession of or title to real state;" and under section 695 only those claims are barred which are " proper to be allowed by the committee." o A debt is a claim which has been favorably passed upon by the highest authority to which in can in law be submitted and has been declared to be a debt. A claim, on the other hand, is a debt in embryo. It is a mere evidence of a debt and must pass through the process prescribed by law before it develops into what is properly called a debt. The debt in the case at bar never was a claim. By the act of the testator himself, it was raised to the dignity of a debt and it remains such and must be acted upon as such by the courts as well as by all other o The fact that a debt is mentioned in the will as one not satisfied has, at least, the effect of changing the burden of proof from the creditor to the estate. Instead of the creditor being required to establish the validity of the claim and the fact of nonpayment, it is incumbent upon the estate to show payment affirmatively. At the very least, recognition by the testator in his will should be given that much significance. The provision before us, while not a provision for a legacy, has nevertheless the same force and effect; and as a legatee is not bound to show affirmatively his right to the legacy and as it is the duty of the executor to seek out the legatee and pay him the legacy, so it is not the duty of the creditor in this case to show affirmatively his right to the payment of the debt, but it is the duty of the executor, knowing nothing to the contrary, to seek out the creditor and pay him as the testator has ordered him to do. If he knows anything to the contrary the burden is on him to demonstrate it. It is claimed that the will of the testator is not the law of the case where it is in direct violation of a provision of law; and that the Court of Civil Procedure requiring that all claims shall be presented to the committee, the testator has no right to except a particular debt or any debt from the operation of the Code. In the first place, the Code of Civil Procedure does not require that all claims shall be presented to the committee. It expressly limits the claims which must be exhibited. In the second place, the claim that there is anything contradictory between the will of the testator in this particular case and the provision of the Code of Civil Procedure is, in my judgment, rather fanciful than real. What is the purpose of requiring the exhibition of a claim to a committee? Simply to save the estate from being defrauded. There is absolutely no other reason which is behind the law requiring such a presentation.
Tan Sen Guan v. Go Siu San

Villamor, J. Quickie: Tampoco owed Tan Peng Sue. After the institution of the committee on claims on the estate of Tampoco, administrator of Tan Peng wanted it annulled saying he wasnt able to file the claims of the estate of Tan Peng because of the fraud of Tampocos administrator. SC said the claim has already prescribed and the defense of fraud will not interrupt the running of the prescriptive period. Nature: Appeal Facts: Plaintiff is the administrator of the intestate estate of Tan Peng Sue; defendant is the administrator in the testamentary proceeding for the settlement of the estate of Antonio Tampoco o According to the books kept by the Go Siu San, Antonio Tampoco owed Tan Peng Sue in 1920 some P25,802.60, at the interest of 9.6% per annum. o upon the death of Antonio in February 5, 1920, proceeding was instituted in the Court of First Instance of Manila for the settlement of his estate o on December 14 of that year commissioners were appointed to hear and decide whatever claim might be presented against the estate; that said commissioners qualified as such in due time, and rendered their final report on June 27, 1921, which was approved by the court below on July 14 of said year at about August 30, 1922, after the approval by the court of the report of the committee on claims, the plaintiff, in his capacity as administrator of the estate of Tan Peng Sue, moved the court that the committee on claims be again authorized, or a new committee appointed, to hear and decide a claim that he had and which he was to present against the estate, alleging, among other grounds, that the administrator Go Sui San had been assuring the heirs of Tan Peng Sue that they would not lose their credit, were in no need of presenting their claim, and would be paid by the heirs of Antonio Tampoco as soon as they should ask for it, and that in the meantime the credit might continue in the business of the deceased Antonio Tampoco and thus earn interest. The judge allowed the motion appointed new commissioners, holding that the committee on claims did not comply with the imperative provisions of sections 687 and 693 of the Code of Civil Procedure in rendering its report, and that the motion of the plaintiff Tan Sen Guan was in accordance with the provisions of section 690 of Act No. 190. After due proceeding the new commissioners admitted the claim of the plaintiff, recommending its payment by the defendant administrator, which was by agreement of the parties estimated at P30,272.89 at the end of the year 1922.
47 Phil. 89 (1924)
On December 22, 1923, the court presided over by Judge Anacleto Diaz rendered decision, absolving the defendant administrator of the estate of Antonio Tampoco from the complaint, holding that the commissioners appointed on September 21, 1922, had no authority under the law to hear and decide said claim, because the court that had appointed them had on the said date no jurisdiction to appoint them in view of the fact that more than fourteen months have elapsed since their final report was submitted by the former committee on claims in the aforesaid testamentary proceeding and approved by the court. To this decision the plaintiff excepted on the 29th day of the same month, and moved for the new trial on January 9, 1924, on the ground that said decision was against the law and the facts proven at the trial. March 27, 1924, the lower court presided over by the Honorable Geo. R. Harvey, judge, after considering the motion for new trial, rendered a new decision, setting aside that of December 22, 1923, and ordering the administrator of the estate of Antonio Tampoco to pay the administrator of the estate of Tan Peng Sue the sum of P28,802.60, with interest thereon at the rate of 9 6/10 per cent annum from March 28, 1920.
Issues/Held: (1) W/N the trial court erred in setting aside its former decision and in entering a new decision entirely contrary to the preceding one, instead of granting a new trial NO. (not really discussed much, as in the words of the court: disregarding this feature of the case) (2) W/N the trial court erred in holding that the claim presented was valid and effective at the time it was presented, and in not holding that the same was extinguished at that time under the law: IN SHORT, HAS THE ACTION PRESCRIBED? Sadly, YES. Ratio: (1) In the case of Cordovero v. Villamor it was held that the discretionary power granted the judges by section 145 of the Code of Civil Procedure to revise or amend their judgments, before the same become final, may be exercised upon a motion based on section 145, subsection 3, jointly with, or separately from the power to grant new trial, although the exercise of the power to grant new trial necessarily requires the revocation of the former judgment; that under section 145, a judge may correct errors in his decisions, and in revoking his original decision by amending it upon the motion a reopening of the case. Therefore this assignment must be overruled. (2) Disregarding this feature of the case, what is important to decide is whether or not this action has prescribed, as contended by the defendant. The pertinent part of section 695 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides: A person having a claim against a deceased person proper to be allowed by the committee, who does not, after publication of the required notice, exhibit his claim to the committee as provided in this chapter, shall be barred from
39 DE LA CERNA SPECPRO DIGESTS 2011 recovering such demand or from pleading the same in offset to any action, except as hereinafter provided. It was enacted in order to facilitate the speedy liquidation of estates, and to that end, it bars all proceeding when the claim is one that was not presented after the publication of the notice required. To avoid the effect of section 695, the plaintiff lays stress on two circumstances. In the first place, he says that his failure to present the claim to the committee appointed by the court on September 21, 1922, was due to the machinations and fraudulent and false representations of the defendant. While it is easy to understand that the interests of the plaintiff, in his capacity as administrator of the estate of Tan Peng Sue, were not duly protected, and that his conduct was, to a certain extent, influenced by the unfavorable circumstances that surrounded him, yet we hold that prescription cannot be avoided on the ground of fraud or undue influence. o The failure of Tan Chu Lay, heir of Tan Peng Sue, to present his claim was an omission committed by an heir who had knowledge of the existence of the credit of his deceased father. o The fact that Tan Chu Lay might have been induced by fraudulent machinations and unlawful influence of the defendant administrator cannot affect the legal consequences of said act. And even if it be admitted that the widow of Tan Peng Sue was in China while the committee on claims was acting in the proceeding for the settlement of Antonio Tampoco's estate, still the result would be the same. The law does not make any reservation or exception whatever, and this court cannot make either. Secondly, to avoid the effect of section 695, the plaintiff alleges that the notice to the creditors was not published in the manner prescribed by section 687 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which provides: The committee so appointed shall appoint convenient times and places for the examination and allowance of claims, and, within sixty days from the time of their appointment, shall post a notice in four public places in the province stating the times and places of their meeting, and the time limited for creditors to present their claims, and shall publish the same three weeks successively in a newspaper of general circulation in the province, and give such other notice as the court directs. The court, in the commission issued to the committee, shall designate the paper in which the notice shall be published, and the number of places in the province in which it shall be posted, and any other mode of notice which the court directs. Section 693 requires the committee to state in their report among other things, "the manner in which notice was given to the claimants." The report of the committee was introduced as Exhibit L in the testamentary proceeding, and really it was not written exactly in accordance with the technicality of the law. There is, however, attached to said report, as a part thereof, the affidavit of the editor of the newspaper La Nacion, wherein it appears that the committee on claims in the aforesaid proceeding had published for AMIN | CHA | JANZ | KRIZEL | VIEN three consecutive weeks a notice to claimants, stating that they might present their claims within the period of six months, the committee to hold meetings at the office of Attorney M.G. Goyena, room No. 1, 34, Escolta, on the last Wednesday of each month at 3:30 p. m. for the purpose of hearing and deciding claims. It, thus, appears that the committee complied with the requirements of the law as to publication of notice, so much so that in the stipulation of facts it is stated that the commissioners qualified, and under the date of December 14, 1920 published in the newspaper La Nacion the notice to claimants prescribed by the law for three consecutive weeks. There are also attached to the report of the committee, the appointment issued by the court, in which the places are designated where the notice should be posted, and the newspaper in which it should be published for three weeks, giving the creditors the period of six months to present their claims. We think that the documents attached to the report of said committee, the stipulation of facts and the approval of said report by the trial court constitute a conclusive proof that the commissioners have complied with the statute, requiring the publication of the notice to the creditors. Before a credit may be held barred by our procedural statutes relative to liquidation of inheritance, it must appear, among other things, that the committee have designated convenient hours and places for the holding of their meetings for the examination and admission of claims, and that they have published this fact in the manner provided by the law. Unless this is done, the right of a creditor cannot prescribe, and he who claims the benefit of prescription has the burden of proof. Under section 690, a creditor who has failed to present his claim within the period fixed by the committee on claims may apply to the court, within six months after the period previously fixed, for the renewal of the commission for the purpose of examining his claim. Also a creditor may make such application even after six months from the expiration of the period formerly fixed and before the final settlement of the estate, if the committee shall have failed to give the notice required by section 687. o The record shows that the application of the plaintiff was presented fourteen months after the expiration of the period fixed for the filing of claims. And while it was presented before the final settlement of the estate of Antonio Tampoco, yet, it having been proved that the committee had published in the newspaper La Nacion the notice required by law, there was no possible ground for granting said application. Even considering this application under section 113 of the Code of Civil Procedure, we believe that the lapse of fourteen months is an unsurmountable barrier opposing the granting of said application. It matters not that the defendant did not appeal from the order of the lower court appointing new commissioners, if it is taken into consideration that it was entered beyond the authority given by section 690. And as the defendant objected to said appointment, we believe that he is now entitled to raise the point in this court.
40 DE LA CERNA SPECPRO DIGESTS 2011 For the foregoing the judgment appealed from is reversed, and it is hereby declared that the plaintiff appellee has lost his right to enforce his claim in this proceeding, without pronouncement as to costs. So ordered. Johns, J, dissenting: As stated in appellee's brief, the following appears from the stipulation of facts and exhibits: During all this time, nothing, as has already been said, was done with regards to the estate of Tan Peng Sue. His widow was in China and no legal representative was appointed to look after his affair. When his widow and heirs learned of the death of Tampoco's executor, Go Sui San, assured them that the same will be respected and paid when demanded; that there was no need of presenting the claim before the committee or the probate court as the same appeared already on the books of the estate; and that it was to their advantage not to segregate it from the mass as it was gaining interest. Certain different amounts on this account were in fact received by the widow and heirs of Tan Peng Sue who naturally became more convinced of the advices of Go Sui San. (See affidavits of Go Biec and Tan Chui Lay, folios 79 to 86 of record.) Consequently, the claim of Tan Peng Sue was not presented to the original committee on claims in the estate of Tampoco. Based upon such facts, the judgment of the lower court should be affirmed. AMIN | CHA | JANZ | KRIZEL | VIEN
Heirs of Pizarro Sr. v. Consolacion

Gancayco, J.: Quickie: Luis tan filed a verified petition for the issuance of letters of administration in favor of a certain Alfonso Atilano. Petitioners filed an opposition. Respondent court set the petition for hearing. Said order and the petition were duly published in the Mindanao Times. Parties entered into a compromise. After the judicial administrator had qualified and his inventory of the assets of the late Dominga Garcia was approved, respondent court issued an order requiring the filing of creditors' claim against the said estate within the period of six (6) months from the date of the first publication. The Court held that this order is null and void for violating Section 2, Rule 86 of the RoC. The range of the period specified in the rule is intended to give the probate court the discretion to fix the period for the filing of claims. The probate court is permitted by the rule to set the period provided it is not less than six (6) months nor more than twelve (12) months from the date of the first publication of the notice thereof. Such period once fixed by the court is mandatory. In this case the trial court set the period for the filing of the claims within six (6) months from the date of the first publication of the notice. It was obviously short of the minimum limit of six (6) months provided for by the law. Petitioner correctly observed that the trial court thereby shortened the period set by the law. Facts: Luis Tan filed a verified petition with the CFI of Davao for the issuance of letters of administration in favor of a certain Alfonso Atilano. o The petition alleged, among others that private respondent is the only surviving son of the deceased Dominga Garcia who died intestate sometime in 1930 in Canton, China; o that the deceased left a parcel of land 1 located at C.M. Recto Avenue, Davao City; o and that the said lot is in the possession of the heirs of Ramon Pizarro, 2 petitioners herein. petitioners filed an opposition to the said petition o claiming that they are the heirs of Ramon Pizarro who died intestate on June 16, 1974; o and that the deceased was the vendee of one-half (1/2) of the aforementioned lot by virtue of an extrajudicial settlement of estate and deed of absolute sale executed by Vicente Tan in Hongkong on May 27, 1966. o Petitioners prayed that letters of administration of Dominga Garcia's estate be issued in favor of anyone of them. The respondent court set the petition for hearing. Said order and the petition were duly published in the Mindanao Times. parties herein entered into a compromise whereby petitioners agreed, among others, to withdraw their opposition to the appointment of private respondent's recommendee and for the intestate proceedings to proceed in due course. Said agreement was approved in the order of respondent court
161 SCRA 186 (1988)

after the judicial administrator had qualified and his inventory of the assets of the late Dominga Garcia was approved, respondent court issued an order requiring the filing of creditors' claim against the said estate within the period of six (6) months from the date of the first publication private respondent and the City of Davao filed a joint motion asking respondent court to take notice of their agreement which in substance provides for an agreement to file a joint motion in the CFI of Davao to proceed with the determination of the heirs of the deceased Domingao Garcia which shall be determinative of their respective claims against the estate. On February 19, 1979, petitioners filed their opposition to the said joint motion on the sole ground that it is without procedural basis. private respondent filed a motion to drop and exclude the petitioners on the ground that they do not even claim to be the heirs of the deceased Dominga Garcia and that the extrajudicial deed of partition and deed of absolute sale allegedly executed in Hongkong in favor of the petitioners' deceased father is spurious and simulated. petitioners filed their opposition to said motion. They likewise filed a claim against the estate of the deceased Garcia in the amount of P350,000.00 representing services allegedly rendered by their deceased father in favor of Vicente Tan. On March 8, 1979, private respondent filed a reply to petitioners' opposition and a motion to strike out or dismiss the claim on the ground that it is spurious and barred for having been filed beyond the six (6) month period set in the notice for the filing of creditors' claim. On March 29, 1979, petitioners filed another claim against the estate for P200,000.00 allegedly advanced by their deceased father for the payment of realty and income taxes of the said lot sometime in 1936, to which claim private respondent filed an opposition on the ground that it is barred for having been filed beyond the six (6) month period and that it was merely intended to delay the proceedings. Argument of petitioners: the order of June 1, 1979 of the respondent court, which directed that the filing of claims against the estate of the late Dominga Garcia be filed within six (6) months after the first publication of the notice thereof, is null and void in that it is violative of Section 2, Rule 86 of the Revised Rules of Court. o They contend that said provision mandates that the filing of such claims should be for a period of six (6) months starting from the sixth month after the date of the first publication of the notice down to the twelfth month. 11 o They argue that to require filing of claims within the sixth month from publication of notice will shorten the period in violation of the mandatory provisions of Section 2, Rule 86, which provides: Sec. 2. Time within which claims shall be filed. In the notice provided in the preceding section, the court shall state the time for the filing of claims against the estate, which shall not be more than twelve (12) nor less than six (6) months after the date of the first publication of the notice. However, at anytime before an order of distribution is entered, on application of a creditor who has failed to file his claim within the time previously limited,
42 DE LA CERNA SPECPRO DIGESTS 2011 the court may, for cause shown and on such terms as are equitable, allow such claim to be filed within a time not exceeding one (1) months. Issue/Held: WON the order of June 1, 1979 of the respondent court, which directed that the filing of claims against the estate of the late Dominga Garcia be filed within six (6) months after the first publication of the notice thereof, is null and void YES. Ratio: The range of the period specified in the rule is intended to give the probate court the discretion to fix the period for the filing of claims. The probate court is permitted by the rule to set the period provided it is not less than six (6) months nor more than twelve (12) months from the date of the first publication of the notice thereof. Such period once fixed by the court is mandatory. in this case the trial court set the period for the filing of the claims within six (6) months from the date of the first publication of the notice. It was obviously short of the minimum limit of six (6) months provided for by the law. Petitioner correctly observed that the trial court thereby shortened the period set by the law. Since the notice issued and the period set by the trial court was not in accordance with the requirements of Section 2, Rule 86 of the Rules of Court, what should then apply is the period as provided for by the rules which is not less than six months nor more than twelve (12) months from the date of first publication of notice. The first publication of the notice in the Mindanao Times was on March 30, 1978. Thus the two claims of petitioners against the estate which were filed on March 5, 1979 and March 29, 1979 respectively were filed on time. AMIN | CHA | JANZ | KRIZEL | VIEN
Barredo v. CA
Reyes, JBL, J. Nature: Appeal from CA decision Quickie: McDonough had a secured credit with Barredo. During Japanese war time, the recording of the secured credit in the propertys title was cancelled. McDonough died so at the intestate proceedings, notices to creditors were sent out. Heirs of Barredo filed a belated claim that was not allowed by the Supreme Court. Here, petitioners alleged as excuse for their tardiness the recent recovery of the papers of the late Fausto Barredo from the possession of his lawyer who is now deceased. This ground insufficient, due to the availability, and knowledge by the petitioners, of the annotation at the back of the certificate of title of the mortgage embodying the instant claim, as well as the payment of P20,000.00 made by the Japanese military authorities. Facts: The present appeal by the heirs of the late Fausto Barredo involves a tardy claim to collect the face value of a promissory note for P20,000.00 plus 12% interest per annum from 21 December 1949, the date of its maturity, plus attorney's fees and costs in the sum of P2,000.00, from the intestate estate of the late Charles A. McDonough, represented herein by the administrator, W. I. Douglas. The promissory note was secured by a mortgage executed in favor of Fausto Barredo over the leasehold rights of McDonough on the greater portion of a parcel of registered land located at Dongalo Paraaque, Rizal, owned by Constantino Factor, and over four (4) houses which McDonough had constructed on the leased land. The lease contract between Factor and McDonough provided for a term of 10 years from 1 September 1936; but on December 1940, the parties extended the term up to 31 August 1961. The original lease, the extension of its term, and the mortgage were all inscribed at the back of certificate of title of the land. Upon Fausto Barredo's death, his heirs, in a deed of extrajudicial partition, adjudicated unto themselves the secured credit of the deceased, and had the same recorded on the aforesaid certificate of title. This annotation was, however, cancelled when one day Manuel H. Barredo was ordered to appeal before an officer of the Japanese Imperial Army at the Army and Navy Club and was commanded to bring with him all the documents pertaining to the mortgage executed by the late McDonough whose private properties, because of his enemy citizenship, were, in the words of the Court of Appeals, "appropriated by the triumphant invader". Manuel H. Barredo was paid P20,000.00 in Japanese war notes by the occupation authorities and made to sign, as he did sign, a certification stating "that in consideration of P20,000.00 which I have received today, I am requested the Register of Deeds to cancel the mortgage of these properties"; and, as requested, the cancellation was inscribed at the back of the title.
6 SCRA 620 (1962)

Charles McDonough died; thereupon "In re: Intestate Estate of Charles A. McDonough", was instituted; and pursue a court order the administrator caused to be published in the "Philippine Progress" for three consecutive weeks, a notice to creditors requiring them to their claims with the clerk of court within 6 months reckoned from the date of its first publication Heirs of Fausto Barredo filed their belated claim against the estate of McDonough. This claim was opposed by the administrator. After hearing the lower court allowed the claim, but the Court of Appeals reversed the order of allowance; hence, the Barredo heirs appealed to this Court It is pertinent to state before discussing the argumentation of counsel that in view of the burning and destruction of the buildings which were the subject of the mortgage, the petitioners manifested their wish to abandon their security and prosecute the claim against the estate as for a simple money debt, and that when the Barredo heirs filed their claim, no order of distribution had entered in the proceedings.
Issue/Held: WON the belated claim here can be allowed- NO Ratio: Section 2, Rule 87, of the Rules of Court reads: SEC. 2. Time within which claims shall be filed. In the notice provided in section 1, the court shall state the time for the filing of claims against the estate, which shall not be more than twelve nor less than six months after the date of the first publication of the notice. However, at any time before an order of distribution is entered, on application of a creditor who has failed to file his claim within the time previously limited, the court may, for cause shown and on such terms as are equitable, allow such claim to be filed within a time not exceeding one month. The probate court previously fixed the period for filing claims at six (6) months reckoned from the date of first publication, and the said notice to creditors was first published on 23 August 1945. The present claim was filed on 22 October 1947. There is no doubt, therefore, that the claim was filed outside of the period previously fixed. But a tardy claim may be allowed, at the discretion of the court, upon showing of cause for failure to present said claim on time. The respondent administrator, relying on the case of the Estate of Howard J. Edmands, 87 Phil. 405, argues that the one-month period for filing late claims mentioned in Section 2, Rule 87, of the Rules of Court should be counted from the expiration of the regular six-month period, but this pronouncement was but an obiter dictum that did not resolve the issue involved in said case. The true ruling appears in the case of Paulin vs. Aquino, L-11267, March 20, 1958, wherein the controverted one month period was clarified as follows: The one-month period specified in this section is the time granted claimants, and the same is to begin from the order authorizing the filing of the claims. It does not mean that the extension of one month starts from the expiration of the original period fixed by the court for the presentation of claims.
44 DE LA CERNA SPECPRO DIGESTS 2011 However, the probate court's discretion in allowing a claim after the regular period for filing claims but before entry of an order of distribution presupposes not only claim for apparent merit but also that cause existed to justify the tardiness in filing the claim. Here, petitioners alleged as excuse for their tardiness the recent recovery of the papers of the late Fausto Barredo from the possession of his lawyer who is now deceased. This ground insufficient, due to the availability, and knowledge by the petitioners, of the annotation at the back of the certificate of title of the mortgage embodying the instant claim, as well as the payment of P20,000.00 made by the Japanese military authorities. The order of the trial court allowing the late claim without justification, because under Section 2, Rule 8 of the Rules of Court, said court has no authority to admit a belated claim for no cause or for an insufficient cause. AMIN | CHA | JANZ | KRIZEL | VIEN
Villanueva v. PNB
Paredes, J. Quickie: PNB (Agusan branch) is a creditor of Pascual Villanueva since 1940. Pascual died in 1949. Letters of administration of his estate was issued in 1950 and the Notice to Creditors was duly published in the Morning Times of Cebu City, a newspaper of general circulation, in the same year setting the deadline for claims against Pascuals estate to be filed before November 1951. PNB filed its claim only on July 1953. Thus, the administrator moved that PNB be barred from enforcing its claim not only for failing to file the claim on time but also on the ground of prescription since more than 10 years have passed since the debt became due before PNB enforced the claim. PNB, for its part, filed a Petition for extension of time to file claim alleging that Sec. 2, R ule 87 allows the filing of claims even if the period stated in the notice to creditors elapsed, upon cause shown and on such terms as equitable; that its failure to present the claiming with the period stated in the notice was its lack of knowledge of administration proceedings, the notice having been published in the Morning Times, a newspaper of very limited circulation. PNB also claimed that its action is not barred by prescription because the Moratorium Law suspended the running of the prescriptive period. CFI Agusan disallowed PNBs claim. PNB appealed to the CA and the CA certified the case direct to the SC on the ground that the issues involve purely questions of law While it is quite true that the Courts can extend the period within which to present claims against the estate, even after the period limited in the Notice to Creditors has elapsed, such extension should be granted ONLY under special circumstances. IN THIS CASE, no justifiable reason was given for the extension. AND in any case, there was no period to extend since the same had already elapsed! The records also reveal, contrary to PNBs pretensions, that PNB had knowledge of the administration proceedings long before 1953. Thus, their failure to admit their claim on time is of their own making and shall not be countenanced. Having reached the above conclusions, it is no longer necessary to determine the question as to whether or not the Moratorium Law had suspended the prescriptive period for filing of the claim under consideration. The claim must be barred. Nature: Appeal from the decision of the CFI Agusan denying admission of PNBs claim against the decedents estate Facts: Pascual Villanueva died in 1949. Petitions for letters of administration was filed immediately thereafter by his widow Mauricia at the CFI Agusan. The petition was set for hearing and notices thereof were duly published in the Manila Bulletin on February and March 1950. At the end of said hearing, by agreement of all heirs, Atty. Ricaforte was appointed as administrator of Pascuals estate instead. In due course, letters of administration was issued to him and in November 1950, the Clerk of CFI Agusan issued a NOTICE TO CREDITORS containing the usual order of publication (once a week for 3 consecutive weeks), which was effected thru the Morning Times of Cebu City, a newspaper of general circulation.
9 SCRA 144 (1963)

The said Notice to Creditors required prospective claimants against Pascuals estate to file their claims within 6 to 12 months after the date of the first publication of the same notice. Thus, claims must be filed before November 1951. On July 20, 1953, the Philippine National Bank (PNB) filed in the administration proceedings its Creditor's Claim in the amount of P1, 847.45. In its claim, PNB alleged that the said obligation has been due demandable since Dec. 1940 and that that the same is a true and just claim and that it is still unpaid. The following year, it formally filed its motion for the admission of the said claim. To this motion, the administrator opposed. According to the administrator, the caused action for the recovery of the aforesaid amount of P1,847.45 is barred by the statute of limitations, for more than ten (10) Years have elapsed since the cause of action accrued up to present time. Also, the said claim is barred forever on the ground that notice to creditors having been published in the MORNING TIMES of Cebu City, a newspaper of general circulation in on November 1950, PNB failed to file its claim within the time limited in the notice In response, the PNB flied a pleading captioned Petition for an Extension of time within which to File the Claim of Philippine National Bank", alleging that Sec. 2, Rule 87 of the Rules allows the filing of claims even if the period stated in the notice to creditors elapsed, upon cause shown and on such terms as equitable; that its failure to present the claiming with the period stated in the notice, was its lack of knowledge of administration proceedings, for while said maintains a branch office in Agusan, the employees did not come to know of the proceedings, the notice has been published in the Morning Times, a newspaper very limited circulation. PNB also claimed that its action is not barred by prescription notwithstanding the lapsing of more than 10 years since the debt became due since the Moratorium Law suspended the running of the said prescriptive period. CFI Agusan ruled against PNB and barred its claim against Pascuals estate. CFI ruled that PNB failed to give justifiable reasons for the extension to file its claim and that the failure of PNB to present its claim on time was due its own fault and can hardly be considered excusable negligence. MR denied. Hence, PNB elevated the case to the CA. CA certified the case directly to the SC on the ground that the issues involved pure questions of law
Issue and Held: WON PNBs claim should be admitted NO! Ratio: A careful review of the record shows that PNB, contrary to its pretension, had knowledge of the present administration proceedings long before July 1953. This is evidenced by a payment made in favor of the deceased Pascual Villanueva from the Philippine War Damage Commission which was deposited in PNB Agusan in June 1951 by the administrator Admittedly, the claim was filed outside of the period provided for in the notice to creditors within which to present claims against the estate. The period fixed in the notice lapsed on November 1951 and the claim was filed on July 1953 or about 1 year and 8 months late.
46 DE LA CERNA SPECPRO DIGESTS 2011 This notwithstanding, PNB contends that it did not know of such administration proceedings. HOWEVER, it is to be noted that BOTH the petition for Letters of Administration and the Notice to Creditors were duly published in the Manila Daily Bulletin and in the Morning Times, respectively, which was a full compliance with the requirements of the Rules. Moreover, the supposed lack of knowledge of the proceedings on the p art of PNB had been belied by uncontested and eloquent evidence, consisting of a deposit of an amount of money by the administrator in 1951 It is quite true that the Courts can extend the period within which to present claims against the estate, even after the period limited has elapsed; but such extension should be granted under special circumstances. The lower did not find any justifiable reason to give the extension and for one thing, there was no period to extend, the same had elapsed. Having reached the above conclusions, We deem it necessary to determine the question as to whether or not the Moratorium Law had suspended the prescriptive period for filing of the claim under consideration. AMIN | CHA | JANZ | KRIZEL | VIEN
Aguas et. al. v. Llemos et. al.

Reyes, J. Quickie: Action for damages against Hermogenes. Aguas et al alleged that after receiving a copy of a petition for writ of possession, they went to manila and discovered that no such petition had been filed. Hermogenes died. CFI dismissed the case. HELD: Under Rule 87, section 5, the actions that are abated by death are: (1) claims for funeral expenses and those for the last sickness of the decedent; (2) judgments for money; and (3) "all claims for money against the decedent, arising from contract express or implied". None of these includes that of the plaintiffs; for it is not enough that the claim against the deceased party be for money, but it must arise from "contract express or implied". Upon the other hand, Rule 88, section 1, enumerates actions that survive against a decedent's executors or administrators, and they are: (1) actions to recover real and personal property from the estate; (2) actions to enforce a lien thereon; and (3) actions to recover damages for an injury to person or property. The present suit is one for damages under the last class, it having been held that "injury to property" is not limited to injuries to specific property, but extends to other wrongs by which personal estate is injured or diminished (Baker vs. Crandall). Facts: March 1960 - Francisco Salinas and Sps. Felix Guardino and Maria Aguas jointly filed an action in the CFI of Catbalogan, Samar to recover damages from Hermogenes Llemos, averring that the latter had served them by registered mail with a copy of a petition for a writ of possession, with notice that the same would be submitted to the said court of Samar on February 23, 1960 at 8: 00 a.m.; that plaintiffs proceeded to the court from their residence in Manila accompanied by their lawyers, only to discover that no such petition had been filed; and that Llemos maliciously failed to appear in court, so that plaintiffs' expenditure and trouble turned out to be in vain, causing them mental anguish and undue embarrassment. April 1960 - before he could answer the complaint, the Hermogenes died. Upon leave of court, plaintiffs amended their complaint to include the heirs of the deceased. The heirs filed a motion to dismiss. CFI dismissed the case on the ground that the legal representative, and not the heirs, should have been made the party defendant; and that anyway the action being for recovery of money, testate or intestate proceedings should be initiated and the claim filed therein Issue/Held: WON the action for damages caused by tortious conduct of the defendant survives the death of the latter. YES
5 SCRA 959 (1962)

Ratio: Plaintiffs, contrasting the correlated provisions of the Rules of Court, those concerning claims that are barred if not filed in the estate settlement proceedings (Rule 87, sec. 5) and those defining actions that survive and may be prosecuted against the executor or administrator (Rule 88, sec. 1), argue that it is apparent that actions for damages caused by tortious conduct of a defendant survive the death of the latter. Under Rule 87, section 5, the actions that are abated by death are: (1) claims for funeral expenses and those for the last sickness of the decedent; (2) judgments for money; and (3) "all claims for money against the decedent, arising from contract express or implied". None of these includes that of the plaintiffs; for it is not enough that the claim against the deceased party be for money, but it must arise from "contract express or implied", and these words were construed in Leung Ben vs. O'Brien to include all purely personal obligations other than those which have their source in delict or tort. Upon the other hand, Rule 88, section 1, enumerates actions that survive against a decedent's executors or administrators, and they are: (1) actions to recover real and personal property from the estate; (2) actions to enforce a lien thereon; and (3) actions to recover damages for an injury to person or property. The present suit is one for damages under the last class, it having been held that "injury to property" is not limited to injuries to specific property, but extends to other wrongs by which personal estate is injured or diminished (Baker vs. Crandall). To maliciously cause a party to incur unnecessary expenses, as charged in this case, is certainly injurious to that party's property (Javier vs. Araneta) It now appears from a communication from the CFI of Samar that the parties have arrived at an amicable settlement of their differences, and that they have agreed to dismiss this appeal. The settlement has been approved and embodied in an order of the CFI Decision: The case having thus become moot, it becomes unnecessary to resolve the questions raised therein
Vera et. al. v. Fernandez

De Castro, J.: Quickie: Motion for allowance of claim for the order of payment of taxes filed by the government against the estate of Luis Tongoy was disallowed. SC said that the statute of non-claims in Sec.5 Rule 86 does NOT bar claim of the government for unpaid taxes, if it filed within the prescription period stated in the NIRC. Such stems from the principle that taxes are the lifeblood of the government Nature: Appeal from two orders of the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental, Branch V in Special Proceedings No. 7794, entitled: "Intestate Estate of Luis D. Tongoy," (1) the first dated July 29, 1969 dismissing the Motion for Allowance of Claim and for an Order of Payment of Taxes by the Government of the Republic of the Philippines against the Estate of the late Luis D. Tongoy, for deficiency income taxes for the years 1963 and 1964 of the decedent in the total amount of P3,254.80, inclusive 5% surcharge, 1% monthly interest and compromise penalties, (2) the second, dated October 7, 1969, denying the Motion for reconsideration of the Order of dismissal. Facts: The Motion for allowance of claim and for payment of taxes dated May 28, 1969 was filed on June 3, 1969 in the abovementioned special proceedings, o The claim represents the indebtedness to the Government of the late Luis D. Tongoy for deficiency income taxes in the total sum of P3,254.80, to which motion was attached Proof of Claim. o The Administrator opposed the motion solely on the ground that the claim was barred under Section 5, Rule 86 of the Rules of Court. o Finding the opposition well-founded, the respondent Judge, Jose F. Fernandez, dismissed the motion for allowance of claim filed by herein petitioner, Regional Director of the Bureau of Internal Revenue, in an order dated July 29, 1969 (Annex D, Petition, p. 26, Rollo). On September 18, 1969, a motion for reconsideration was filed, of the order of July 29, 1969, but was denied in an Order dated October 7, 1969. Issue/Held: W/N the statute of non-claims Section 5, Rule 86 of the New Rule of Court, bars claim of the government for unpaid taxes, still within the period of limitation prescribed in Section 331 and 332 of the National Internal Revenue Code. NO. Ratio: Section 5, Rule 86, as invoked by the respondent Administrator in hid Oppositions to the Motion for Allowance of Claim, etc. of the petitioners reads as follows:
89 SCRA 199 (1979)

All claims for money against the decedent, arising from contracts, express or implied, whether the same be due, not due, or contingent, all claims for funeral expenses and expenses for the last sickness of the decedent, and judgment for money against the decedent, must be filed within the time limited in they notice; otherwise they are barred forever, except that they may be set forth as counter claims in any action that the executor or administrator may bring against the claimants. Where the executor or administrator commence an action, or prosecutes an action already commenced by the deceased in his lifetime, the debtor may set forth may answer the claims he has against the decedents, instead of presenting them independently to the court has herein provided, and mutual claims may be set off against each other in such action; and in final judgment is rendered in favored of the decedent, the amount to determined shall be considered the true balance against the estate, as though the claim has been presented directly before the court in the administration proceedings. Claims not yet due, or contingent may be approved at their present value. A perusal of the aforequoted provisions shows that it makes no mention of claims for monetary obligation of the decedent created by law, such as taxes which is entirely of different character from the claims expressly enumerated therein , such as: "all claims for money against the decedent arising from contract, express or implied, whether the same be due, not due or contingent, all claim for funeral expenses and expenses for the last sickness of the decedent and judgment for money against the decedent." Under the familiar rule of statutory construction of expressio unius est exclusio alterius, the mention of one thing implies the exclusion of another thing not mentioned. Thus, if a statute enumerates the things upon which it is to operate, everything else must necessarily, and by implication be excluded from its operation and effect (Crawford, Statutory Construction, pp. 334-335). Commissioner of Internal Revenue vs. Ilagan Electric & Ice Plant, et al.: it was held that the assessment, collection and recovery of taxes, as well as the matter of prescription thereof are governed by the provisions of the National Internal revenue Code, particularly Sections 331 and 332 thereof, and not by other provisions of law. o Even without being specifically mentioned, the provisions of Section 2 of Rule 86 of the Rules of Court may reasonably be presumed to have been also in the mind of the Court as not affecting the aforecited Section of the National Internal Revenue Code. Pineda vs. CFI of Tayabas: "taxes assessed against the estate of a deceased person ... need not be submitted to the committee on claims in the ordinary course of administration. In the exercise of its control over the administrator, the court may direct the payment of such taxes upon motion showing that the taxes have been assessed against the estate." o The abolition of the Committee on Claims does not alter the basic ruling laid down giving exception to the claim for taxes from being filed as the other claims mentioned in the Rule should be filed before the Court. Claims for taxes may be collected even after the distribution of the decedent's estate among his heirs who shall be liable therefor in proportion of their share in the inheritance.
49 DE LA CERNA SPECPRO DIGESTS 2011 The reason for the more liberal treatment of claims for taxes against a decedent's estate in the form of exception from the application of the statute of non-claims, is not hard to find. o Taxes are the lifeblood of the Government and their prompt and certain availability are imperious need. o Upon taxation depends the Government ability to serve the people for whose benefit taxes are collected. To safeguard such interest, neglect or omission of government officials entrusted with the collection of taxes should not be allowed to bring harm or detriment to the people, in the same manner as private persons may be made to suffer individually on account of his own negligence, the presumption being that they take good care of their personal affairs. This should not hold true to government officials with respect to matters not of their own personal concern. This is the philosophy behind the government's exception, as a general rule, from the operation of the principle of estoppel. o As already shown, taxes may be collected even after the distribution of the estate of the decedent among his heirs Furthermore, as held in Commissioner of Internal Revenue vs. Pineda, supra, citing the last paragraph of Section 315 of the Tax Code payment of income tax shall be a lien in favor of the Government of the Philippines from the time the assessment was made by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue until paid with interests, penalties, etc. o By virtue of such lien, this court held that the property of the estate already in the hands of an heir or transferee may be subject to the payment of the tax due the estate. o A fortiori before the inheritance has passed to the heirs, the unpaid taxes due the decedent may be collected, even without its having been presented under Section 2 of Rule 86 of the Rules of Court. It may truly be said that until the property of the estate of the decedent has vested in the heirs, the decedent, represented by his estate, continues as if he were still alive, subject to the payment of such taxes as would be collectible from the estate even after his death. Thus in the case above cited, the income taxes sought to be collected were due from the estate, for the three years 1946, 1947 and 1948 following his death in May, 1945. Even assuming arguendo that claims for taxes have to be filed within the time prescribed in Section 2, Rule 86 of the Rules of Court, the claim in question may be filed even after the expiration of the time originally fixed therein, as may be gleaned from the italicized portion of the Rule herein cited which reads: Section 2. Time within which claims shall be filed. - In the notice provided in the preceding section, the court shall state the time for the filing of claims against the estate, which shall not be more than twelve (12) nor less than six (6) months after the date of the first publication of the notice. However, at any time before an order of distribution is entered, on application of a creditor who has failed to file his claim within the time previously limited the court may, for cause shown and on such terms as are equitable, allow such claim to be flied within a time not exceeding one (1) month. (Emphasis supplied) AMIN | CHA | JANZ | KRIZEL | VIEN In the instant case, petitioners filed an application (Motion for Allowance of Claim and for an Order of Payment of Taxes) which, though filed after the expiration of the time previously limited but before an order of the distribution is entered, should have been granted by the respondent court, in the absence of any valid ground, as none was shown, justifying denial of the motion, specially considering that it was for allowance Of claim for taxes due from the estate, which in effect represents a claim of the people at large, the only reason given for the denial that the claim was filed out of the previously limited period, sustaining thereby private respondents' contention, erroneously as has been demonstrated.
WHEREFORE, the order appealed from is reverse. Since the Tax Commissioner's assessment in the total amount of P3,254.80 with 5 % surcharge and 1 % monthly interest as provided in the Tax Code is a final one and the respondent estate's sole defense of prescription has been herein overruled, the Motion for Allowance of Claim is herein granted and respondent estate is ordered to pay and discharge the same, subject only to the limitation of the interest collectible thereon as provided by the Tax Code. No pronouncement as to costs.
Gotamco v. Chan Seng et.al.

Johns, J. Quickie: Antonio Tanpoco died. He left a will. Go Giu San was appointed executor of his will. The appointed commissioners reported the allowance of the claim here in question. At the time all of the heirs, including Tan Kim Hong, were minors and had lived in China since the death of Antonio Tanpoco, as also had the widow of the deceased. In September, 1922, they arrived in Manila and employed counsel to represent and protect their interest, and it was then that Chan Seng learned for the first time of the allowance of the claim in favor of Tan Kim Hong. Upon her motion, Judge Harvey ordered an investigation of the administration of Go Siu San as executor. Judge Harvey removed Go Siu San as executor, and in his order of removal, among other things, said that commissioners Te Sue and that he had not received any claim; that the claims which appears in the report were taken from the books of the business of the deceased. When the present administrator applied to the court for authority, among other things, to pay the claim in question, the appellee appeared and objected. The lower court denied the motion of the administrator for authority to pay the claim, alleging that the report of the committee allowing the claim was made and filed on June 29, 1921, and contends that it became automatically final on July 14, 1921; that the opponent should have made her opposition within the time specified in the Code, and that her failure to take the statutory appeal is a bar to all defenses. The Court held that in the instant case there was not claim made, filed or presented by anyone. Legally speaking, the allowance of the claim would be like rendering a judgment without the filing of a complaint, or even the making or presentment of a claim. The evidence is conclusive that at the time the alleged claim was allowed, Tan Kim Hong was only twelve years of age, and that all of the other parties were minors. There is no claim or pretense that Tan Kim Hong had a guardian or that anyone had the legal authority to appear for and present his claim or to represent him, or that his claim was ever presented. There is no claim or pretense that any of the parties in interest had any knowledge of the fact that the claim was presented and allowed before they came to Manila from China in September, 1922. As a matter of fact, there is no evidence that the claim in question in any manner, shape or form was ever presented to the commissioners by anyone. Facts: Antonio Tanpoco died in the year 1920 and left a will dividing his estate of over P300,000 among four sons, one-half of which he bequeathed to Tan Kim Hong, the claimant, whom he described in his will as his legitimate son, and the other half he left in equal shares to his three adopted sons, Tan Kimco. Tan Kimbio and Tan Kim Choo, and appointed Go Siu San, a resident of Manila, as executor of his will, which provided that no bond should be required. Two Chinese named Tan Kim Lay and Te Sue, one of Tarlac and the other of Manila, were appointed and qualified as commissioners, and later they published the usual notice to creditors to present their claims within six months at the office of Attorney M. G. Goyena, of Manila. The commissioners presented their report to the court in which, among others, they reported the allowance of the claim here in question.
46 Phil. 542 (1924)

At the time all of the heirs, including Tan Kim Hong, were minors and had lived in China since the death of Antonio Tanpoco, as also had the widow of the deceased. When such report has been filed, the executor filed a motion asking for the appointment of an attorney of his own choice as curador ad litem for the minor heirs which, among other things, that the heirs who are interested in the estate of the above entitled action are all minors, to wit: Tan Kimco, age 20; Tan Kim Hong, age 12; Tan Kimbio, age 11; and Tan Kim Choo, age 4; and that all the above heirs are now in China, and the day of their return to the Islands is unknown to the administrator of the estate which court ignored but appointed Mr. Canillas who considered such appointment as only formality such that he did not make any investigations thereof and hence, the report was approved. In September, 1922, they arrived in Manila and employed counsel to represent and protect their interest, and it was then that Chan Seng learned for the first time of the allowance of the claim in favor of Tan Kim Hong. Upon her motion, on November 27, 1922, Judge Harvey ordered an investigation of the administration of Go Siu San as executor, which was made by Mr. Felipe Canillas, who still held the position of curador ad litem of all the minor heirs, including the claimant, who made a written report to the court. The report concluded with a recommendation for the removal of the executor for gross misconduct and fraud, and the annulment of the claim of Tan Kim Hong. After the report was filed, a hearing was had and testimony was taken, and Judge Harvey removed Go Siu San as executor, and in his order of removal, among other things, said that commissioners Te Sue and that he had not received any claim; that the claims which appears in the report were taken from the books of the business of the deceased, Antonio Tanpoco; nevertheless, the claim of Tan Peng Sue does not appear in the report of these commissioners on claims although it appears in the books and was afterwards accepted by the commissioners last appointed. After such proceedings, nothing was further done until November 14, 1923, when the present administrator applied to the court for authority, among other things, to pay the claim in question, to which the appellee appeared and objected. The court denied the application of the present guardian to the claimant to require the administrator to pay the claim in question upon the ground that it was void and fictitious, from which Tan Kim Hong appeals, contending that the lower court erred in hearing and sustaining the objections to the allowance of the claim, and in denying the motion of the administrator for authority to pay the claim, alleging that the report of the committee allowing the claim was made and filed on June 29, 1921, and contends that it became automatically final on July 14, 1921; that the opponent should have made her opposition within the time specified in the Code, and that her failure to take the statutory appeal is a bar to all defenses, citing and relying upon the case of De los Santos vs. Reyes.
Issue/Held: Whether or not the claim was timely filed and presented and that such filing became final NO.
51 Ratio: The court found as a fact that in the De los Santos vs. Reyes case, supra, there was a substantial compliance with all of the statutory requirements, and the decision in that case was based upon that fact. But there is a marked distinction between the facts there and those in the instant case. Here, all of the parties in interest were minors. The evidence is conclusive that at the time the alleged claim was allowed, Tan Kim Hong was only twelve years of age, and that all of the other parties were minors. There is no claim or pretense that Tan Kim Hong had a guardian or that anyone had the legal authority to appear for and present his claim or to represent him, or that his claim was ever presented. There is no claim or pretense that any of the parties in interest had any knowledge of the fact that the claim was presented and allowed before they came to Manila from China in September, 1922. As a matter of fact, there is no evidence that the claim in question in any manner, shape or form was ever presented to the commissioners by anyone. For aught that appears in the record, the claim was allowed by the commissioners on their own motion and of their own volition. It also appears that the entries which were made in the books of the deceased were made by his bookkeeper, and there is nothing to show that they were made by the authority of the deceased. It is very significant that the will of the deceased was made sometime after the entries were made, and that no reference whatever is made in the will to the claim in question. A judgment is the law's last word in a judicial controversy. It may therefore be defined as the final consideration and determination of a court of competent jurisdiction upon the matters submitted to it in an action or proceeding. A more precise definition is that a judgment is the conclusion of the law upon the matters contained in the record, or the application of the law to the pleadings and to the facts, as found by the court or admitted by the parties, or deemed to exist upon their default in a course of judicial proceedings. It should be noted that only is a judgment which is pronounced between the parties to an action upon the matters submitted to the court for decision. . . . In the instant case there was not claim made, filed or presented by anyone. Legally speaking, the allowance of the claim would be like rendering a judgment without the filing of a complaint, or even the making or presentment of a claim. Upon the facts shown, to legalize the allowance of the claim with all of the formalities and requisites of a final judgment, would be a travesty upon justice. It appears from the record before us that the commissioners did not have any jurisdiction to allow the claim; that as to the claim in question their proceedings were null and void ab initio, and hence they were not res judicata, and in addition to that, it clearly appears that the allowance of the claim was a fraud upon the appellee. DE LA CERNA SPECPRO DIGESTS 2011 AMIN | CHA | JANZ | KRIZEL | VIEN
Paredes et. al. v. Moya et. al.

Fernandez, J. Nature: a petition for certiorari Quickie: Employee v employer(money claim: collection of separation and overtime pays ) then employer died. In case of money claims, death of defendant during the pendency of his appeal from the judgment rendered against him, the appeal should not be dismissed; it should continue, but the deceased defendant should be substituted by his legal representative, namely, the executor or administrator of the estate. If the judgment of the lower court is affirmed, the plaintiff must afterwards go to the probate court for an order directing the executor or administrator to satisfy the judgment. The Court of First Instance that originally rendered the judgment has no power to order its execution and a levy on the properties of the deceased because the same are already in custodia legis in the probate court where administration proceedings for the settlement of the estate of the deceased defendant are already pending. Facts: Petitioner Severino Parades commenced a suit for the collection of separation and overtime pays against his employer, August Kuntze. A decision was rendered against the defendant August Kuntze, from which judgment, he appealed to the Court of Appeals. While the case was pending appeal in the said Court, August Kuntze died Accordingly, plaintiff Parades (now petitioner) was duly notified. Thereafter, Carmencita D. Navarro Kuntze, administratrix of the estate of the deceased, was substituted in his place as party in the appealed case. CA- dismissed the appeal in said Civil Case for appellant's failure to file the printed record on appeal A motion for execution was filed by plaintiff-appellee (petitioner Parades). Provincial Sheriff of Rizal levied on the properties of defendant-appellant consisting of two (2) lots. In the auction sale conducted by the Sheriff of Rizal, plaintiff-appellee (petitioner Paredes) being the highest bidder, acquired said, as per certificate of sale which was duly annotated in the back of TCT No. 45089. 6 However, in spite of a Motion to Quash the Writ of Execution filed by respondentappellant (Administratrix) on September 6, 1973 and still pending resolution, Parades (plaintiff-appellee, below) sold the property he acquired in execution sale in favor of his co-petitioner, Victorio Ignacio Notwithstanding the vigorous opposition to the Motion to Quash the Writ of Execution, respondent Court, issued an order setting aside the Writ of Execution, and the Sheriff's Sale and Public Auction of the property without prejudice to the filing of the judgment as a claim in the proceedings for settlement of the estate of the deceased. Issue/Held: (1) WON the death of the defendant extinguishes the money claim NO (2) WON the court deciding on the money claim can issue writs of execution and levy on the properties in the deceased defendants estate - NO
61 SCRA 526 (1974)

Ratio We hold that in the case of a money claim, where the defendant dies during the pendency of his appeal from the judgment rendered against him, the appeal should not be dismissed; it should continue, but the deceased defendant should be substituted by his legal representative, namely, the executor or administrator of the estate. If the judgment of the lower court is affirmed, the plaintiff must afterwards go to the probate court for an order directing the executor or administrator to satisfy the judgment. The Court of First Instance that originally rendered the judgment has no power to order its execution and a levy on the properties of the deceased because the same are already in custodia legis in the probate court where administration proceedings for the settlement of the estate of the deceased defendant are already pending. Section 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, provides: When the action is for recovery of money, debt or interest thereon, and the defendant dies before final judgment in the Court of First Instance, it shall be dismissed to be prosecuted in the manner especially provided in these rules. Conversely, if the defendant dies after final judgment has been rendered by the CFI, as in the case at bar, the action survives.. This would prevent a useless repetition of presenting (anew) before the probate court the evidence already presented in the Court of First Instance on the validity of the claim. Consequently, contrary to respondents' claim, the judgment against the deceased Kuntze became final and executory; it was not arrested by his death on July 19, 1973. But it was error on the part of the plaintiff Paredes, now one of the petitioners, to have the money judgment in his favor executed against the properties of the deceased Kuntze. The proper remedy of plaintiff Paredes should have been to file his claim in the administration proceedings of the estate of the deceased defendant Kuntze where private respondent is the administratrix, because: o All claims for money against the decedent, arising from contract, express or implied, whether the same be due, not due, or contingent, all claims for funeral expenses and expenses for the last sickness of the decedent, and judgment for money against the decedent, must be filed within the time limited in the notice; (to the creditors) . . . . Judgment for money against the decedent, must be filed at the time limited in the notice (to creditors) before the court where the administration proceeding involving the estate of the deceased Kuntze are pending. Section 5, Rule 86 of the Rules of Court provides: o All claims for money against the decedent, arising from contract, express or implied, whether the same be due, not due, or contingent, all claims for funeral expenses and expenses for the last sickness of the decedent and judgment for money against the decedent, must be filed (before the probate court) within the time limited in the notice (to the creditors); otherwise they are barred forever, except that they may be set forth as counterclaims in any action that the
53 DE LA CERNA SPECPRO DIGESTS 2011 executor or administrator may bring against the claimants. (1st sentence, Section 5, Rule 86 of the Rules of Court) Consequently, the respondent court, correctly nullified its order of execution pursuant to the judgment which became final and executory and the corresponding levy on execution and the public auction sale held. The judgment for money against the deceased stands in the same footing as: All claims for money against the decedent, arising from contract, express or implied, whether the same be due, not due, or contingent, all claims for funeral expenses and expenses for the last sickness of the decedent, (1st sentence, Sec. 5, Rule 86 of the Rules of Court), Rule 86 of the Rules of Court), although the validity of the money claim covered by a judgment against the decedent which has already become final and executory can no longer be litigated in the court where administration proceedings for the settlement of the properties of the deceased are still pending, unlike the other money claims whose validity may yet be challenged by the executor or administrator. In the case of Aldamiz vs. Judge of the Court of First Instance of Mindoro, promulgated on December 29, 1949 (85 Phil. 228), We already held that the writ of execution was not the proper procedure for the payment of debts and expenses of the administration. The proper procedure is for the court to order the administratrix to make the payment; and if there is no sufficient cash on hand, to order the sale of the properties and out of the proceeds to pay the debts and expenses of the administration. We followed the same ruling in the case of Domingo vs. Garlitos, June 29, 1963, 8 SCRA 443, with respect to the payment of estate and inheritance taxes. Execution may issue only where the devisees, legatees or heirs have entered into possession of their respective portions in the estate prior to settlement and payment of the debts and expenses of administration and it is later ascertained that there are such debts and expenses to be paid, in which case "the court having jurisdiction of the estate may, by order for that purpose, after hearing, settle the amount of their several liabilities, and order how much and in what manner each person shall contribute, and may issue execution if circumstances require" (Rule 39, section 6; see also Rule 74, section 4; Emphasis ours). And this is not the instant case. We hold that the same rule must be applied in connection with money judgments against the deceased that have already become final, such as the money judgment in favor of petitioner Paredes. No writ of execution should issue against the properties of the deceased. The claim for satisfaction of the money judgment should be presented in the probate court for payment by the administrator. The legal basis for such a procedure is the fact that in the testate or intestate proceedings to settle the estate of a deceased person, the properties belonging to the estate are under the jurisdiction of the court and such jurisdiction continues until said properties have been distributed among the heirs entitled thereto. During the pendency of the proceedings all the estate is in custodia legis and the proper procedure is not to allow the sheriff, in the case of court judgment, to seize the properties but to ask the court for an order to require the administrator to pay the amount due from the estate and required to be paid." (Domingo vs. Garlitos, et al., June 29, 1963,8 SCRA, 443, 446) In this jurisdiction, a void judgment or order is in legal effect no judgment or order. By it no rights are divested. From it no rights can be obtained. Being worthless, it AMIN | CHA | JANZ | KRIZEL | VIEN neither binds nor bars anyone. All acts performed under it and all claims flowing from it are void. (Chavez vs. Court of Appeals, et al., L-29169, August 19, 1968, 24 SCRA 663). Our decision in this case against the petitioner Paredes binds his co-petitioner Victorio G. Ignacio not only because the order of execution and the public auction sale in question are null and void, but also because petitioner Ignacio cannot be considered as a purchaser in good faith, for Ignacio purchased the "Right of Execution Sale" of Paredes over the property in question on October 10, 1973 when, at that time, the respondent administratrix of the estate of Kuntze had already filed on September 6, 1973 a motion to quash the Writ of Execution and auction sale; as a matter of fact the validity of said writ of execution was still up for respondent court's resolution on October 14, 1973 after the parties shall have submitted memoranda on the question raised in the aforesaid motion as required by the respondent court in its order of September 29, 1973.
De Bautista v. de Guzman
Gutierrez, Jr., J. Quickie: Numeriano Bautista was passenger of a jeepney owned by Rosendo de Guzman. The jeepney turned turtle along Pasay Ave. which caused Numerianos death. The jeepney driver was tried and sentenced with imprisonment as well as to pay indemnity of P3,000 to Numerianos heirs. Driver failed to pay indemnity. Thus, heirs of Numeriano (de Bautista, et al.) sued Rosendos heirs de Guzman, et al. (Rosendo died in the meantime) for subsidiary liability. De Guzman, et al. moved to dismiss on the grounds of lack of cause of action and no jurisdiction. They maintained that de Bautista, et al.s suit was for a money claim against the supposed debtor who was already dead (Rosendo) and as such it should be filed in testate or intestate proceedings or, in the absence of such proceedings, after the lapse of thirty (30) days, the creditors should initiate such proceedings. Not having presented their claims during the settlement proceedings of Rosendos estate which had previously been closed, trial court granted MTD and dismissed the case. Undaunted, de Bautista, et al. filed a 2 nd complaint against de Guzman, et al. containing the same allegations as the first case but with new ones respecting Rosendos settlement proceedings. De Guzman, et al again moved to dismiss the 2nd complaint this time adding res judicata as one of the grounds. Oddly, the trial court did not dismiss. Instead, it gave due course to the 2 nd complaint and ultimately awarded indemnity in favor of de Bautista, et al. but without the damages prayed for pursuant to Sec. 5, Rule 86~ hence, this appeal De Bautista, et al. lost their right to recover because of negligence and a failure to observe mandatory provisions of the law and the Rules, particularly Rule 86, Sec. 5 which requires that creditors of a decedent must proffer their claim against the estate during the testate or intestate proceedings, or if there is none, should commence the same for that purpose. This rule is MANDATORY. The requirement abovementioned is for the purpose of protecting the estate of the deceased. The executor or administrator is informed of the claims against it, thus enabling him to examine each claim and to determine whether it is a proper one which should be allowed. The failure of de Bautista, et al. to present their claims before the intestate proceedings of the estate of Rosendo de Guzman within the prescribed period constituted a bar to a subsequent claim against the estate or a similar action of the same import Nature: Appeal from the decision of the CFI Pasay, ordering the defendants-appellants (de Guzman, et al.) to pay the plaintiffs-appellees (de Bautista, et al.) damages and attorney's fees and dismissing the de Guzman's counterclaim. As no questions of facts were raised, the Court of Appeals certified this case to SC for decision. Facts: Numeriano Bautista, husband and father of the plaintiffs-appellees (de Bautista, et al.) was a passenger of jeepney owned and operated by Rosendo de Guzman, deceased husband and father of defendants-appellants (de Guzman, et al.)
125 SCRA 676 (1983)

Eugenio Medrano was the driver of the jeepney. Said jeepney was plying the route along Taft Ave, Pasay City. Driven in a negligent and reckless manner, the jeepney turned turtle and consequently, Numeriano sustained physical injuries which caused his death. The driver was later tried and convicted of homicide through reckless imprudence. He was sentenced with arresto mayor and ordered to indemnify the heirs of Numeriano in the sum of P3,000. A writ of execution was issued against said driver but the same was returned unsatisfied. In the meantime, Rosendo de Guzman died. Because of their failure to collect the P3,000 from the driver, de Bautista, et al. filed a complaint with the CFI Pasay demanding from Rosendo de Guzman and later from the defendants-appellants (de Guzman, et al.) the payment of P3,000 as subsidiary liability + actual exemplary and moral damages and attorney's fees De Guzman, et al. filed a motion to dismiss predicated on two grounds: (1) that the lower court had no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the litigation; and (2) that the complaint stated no cause of action. They maintained that the suit was for a money claim against the supposed debtor who was already dead and as such it should be filed in testate or intestate proceedings or, in the absence of such proceedings, after the lapse of thirty (30) days, the creditors should initiate such proceedings, that the heirs could not be held liable therefor since there was no allegation that they assumed the alleged obligation. CFI Pasay sustained the motion to dismiss. This order became final. Later, de Bautista, et al. filed with the same trial court against the same defendants another complaint containing analogous allegations as those embodied in the first complaint but in this second complaint they further allege that Rosendo de Guzman died intestate and that intestate proceedings were filed in the same court wherein project of partition was presented and approved by the trial court with the five heirs receiving their shares valued at P2,294.05 each, and that said intestate proceedings were subsequently closed. De Bautista, et al. also alleged that Numeriano during his lifetime was the only one supporting them and his death caused them shock, sufferings and anxiety and therefore de Guzman, et al. should pay to them, aside from the P3,000, moral, exemplary and compensatory damages, plus attorney's fees, besides the costs of suit. De Guzman, et al. again filed a motion to dismiss, alleging the same grounds as those interposed in the first complaint but adding the further ground of res judicata in view of the dismissal of the first case which became final as no appeal or any other action was taken thereon by the appellees. CFI Pasay DENIED the motion to dismiss for lack of merit, gave due course to the 2nd complaint. Ultimately, CFI Pasay gave judgment in favor of de Bautista, et al. for the P3,000 but did not grant the claim for damages pursuant to the provisions of Section 5, Rule 86~hence, this appeal by de Guzman, et al.
Issue and Held: WON CFI Pasay erred in giving due course to de Bautista, et al.s 2 nd complaint YES!
55 Ratio: De Bautista, et al. lost their right to recover because of negligence and a failure to observe mandatory provisions of the law and the Rules. They overlooked the fact that they were no longer suing Rosendo de Guzman who died shortly after the accident but his heirs. Section 5, Rule 86 of the Rules of Court provides: All claims for money against the decedent arising from contract, express or implied, whether the same be due, not due, or contingent, all claims for funeral expenses and expenses for the last sickness of the decedents, and judgment for money against the decedent, must be filed within the time in the notice; otherwise they are barred forever; except that they may be set forth as counterclaims in any action that the executor or administrator may bring against the claimants ... Claims not yet due, or contingent, may be approved at their present value. This rule is mandatory The requirement abovementioned is for the purpose of protecting the estate of the deceased. The executor or administrator is informed of the claims against it, thus enabling him to examine each claim and to determine whether it is a proper one which should be allowed. Therefore, upon the dismissal of the first complaint of de Bautista, et al. they should have presented their claims before the intestate proceedings filed in the same court. Instead of doing so, however, de Bautista, et al. slept on their right. They allowed said proceedings to terminate and the properties to be distributed to the heirs pursuant to a project of partition before instituting this separate action. Such course of action by de Bautista, et al. is not sanctioned by the above rule for it strictly requires the prompt presentation and disposition of claims against the decedent's estate in order to settle the affairs of the estate as soon as possible, pay off its debts and distribute the residue. The failure of de Bautista, et al. to present their claims before the intestate proceedings of the estate of Rosendo de Guzman within the prescribed period constituted a bar to a subsequent claim against the estate or a similar action of the same import Therefore, it was an error on the part of the trial court to hold that de Bautista, et al. had a cause of action against de Guzman, et al. who are the heirs of the deceased against whom the liability is sought to be enforced, much less take cognizance of the complaint. As in the first complaint, said court could not have assumed jurisdiction over the second case for the simple reason that it was no longer acting as a probate court which was the proper forum to file such complaint. The termination of the intestate proceedings and the distribution of the estate to the heirs did not alter the fact that de Bautista, et al.'s claim was a money claim which should have been presented before the probate court. The liability of the late Rosendo de Guzman arose from the breach of his obligations under the contract of carriage between him and the unfortunate passenger. The obligations are spelled out by law but the liability arose from a breach of contractual obligations. The resulting claim is a money claim. The only instance wherein a creditor can file an action against a distributee of the debtor's asset is under Section 5, Rule 88 of the Rules of Court which provides: If such contingent claim becomes absolute and is presented to the court, or to the executor or administrator, within two (2) years from the time limited for other creditors to present their claims, it may be allowed by the court if not disputed by the DE LA CERNA SPECPRO DIGESTS 2011 AMIN | CHA | JANZ | KRIZEL | VIEN executor or administrator, and, if disputed, it may be proved and allowed or disallowed by the court as the facts may warrant. If the contingent claim is allowed, the creditor shall receive payment to the same extent as the other creditors if the estate retained by the executor or administrator is sufficient. But if the claim is not so presented, after having become absolute, within said two (2) years, and allowed, the assets retained in the hands of the executor or administrator, not exhausted in the payment of claims, shall be distributed by the order of the court to the persons entitled to the same; but the assets so distributed may still be applied to the payment of the claim when established, and the creditor may maintain an action against the distributees to recover the debt, and such distributees and their estates shall be liable for the debt in proportion to the estate they have respectively received from the property of the deceased. HOWEVER, even under the above rule, the contingent claims must first have been established and allowed in the probate court before the creditors can file an action directly, against the distributees. Such is not the situation in the case at bar. The complaint herein was filed AFTER the intestate proceedings had terminated and the estate finally distributed to the heirs. If we are to allow the complaint to prosper and the trial court to take cognizance of the same, then the rules providing for the claims against the estate in a testate or intestate proceedings within a specific period would be rendered nugatory as a subsequent action for money against the distributees may be filed independently of such proceedings. This precisely is what the rule seeks to prevent so as to avoid further delays in the settlement of the estate of the deceased and in the distribution of his property to the heirs, legatees or devisees. Furthermore, even assuming that de Bautista, et al. had no knowledge of the intestate proceedings which is not established, the law presumes that they had such knowledge because the settlement of estate is a proceeding in rem and therefore the failure to file their claims before such proceedings barred them from subsequently filing the same claims outside said proceedings.
In the case at bar, after the estate of Rosendo had been judicially settled and closed, heirs of Numeriano had sued defendant heirs of Rosendo in a separate action, before the CFI Pasay (a) for settlement of the subsidiary liability of P3,000, (b) as well as for damages resulting from the death of Numeriano. Trial court gave judgment to de Bautista, et al. for the P3,000 but did not grant the claim for damages pursuant to the provisions of Section 5, Rule 86 The civil liability adjudged in the criminal case, and for which Rosendo de Guzman or his estate became subsidiary liable, is plainly a money claim. On the other hand, any direct liability of Rosendo de Guzman or his estate, for damages for the death of the passenger Numeriano, is not a claim for damages for injury to person, which should be filed under Section 1, Rule 87. Rosendo de Guzman was not personally responsible for the death of Numeriano. The claim of the heirs of Numeriano is one arising from the contract of transportation. A claim for damages arising from breach of contract is within the purview of Section 5, Rule 86. The claim of heirs of Numeriano should have been presented in the judicial proceedings for the settlement of the estate of Rosendo de Guzman and, not having been so presented, has already been barred. It was clear error on the part of the Trial Court not to have summarily dismissed the complaint for lack of cause of action.
Melencio-Herrera, J., concurring:
PNB et. al. v. CA

Quisumbing, J. Quickie: The probate court allowed the special administrator to obtain a loan accommodation secured by the land pertaining to the estate. PNB extrajudicially foreclosed the mortgaged and thereafter filed an action to recover the balance of the loan. HELD: PNB may no longer pursue by civil action the recovery of the balance of indebtedness after having foreclosed the property securing the same. The case at bar, we must stress, involves a foreclosure of mortgage arising out of a settlement of estate, wherein the administrator mortgaged a property belonging to the estate of the decedent, pursuant to an authority given by the probate court. The Rules of Court on Special Proceedings comes into play decisively. The rule grants to the mortgagee three distinct, independent and mutually exclusive remedies that can be alternatively pursued by the mortgage creditor for the satisfaction of his credit in case the mortgagor dies. Clearly PNB has chosen the mortgage-creditors option of extrajudicially foreclosing the mortgaged property of the Chuas. This choice now bars any subsequent deficiency claim against the estate of the deceased, Antonio M. Chua. Nature: petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 Facts: Sps. Antonio and Asuncion Chua were the owners of a parcel of land and registered in their names. Upon Antonios death, the probate court appointed his son, Allan, as special administrator of Antonios intestate estate. The court also authorized Allan to obtain a loan accommodation of P550,000 from PNB to be secured by a real estate mortgage over the parcel of land. Allan obtained a loan of P450,000 from PNB evidenced by a promissory note, payable on June 29, 1990, with interest at 18.8% per annum. To secure the loan, Allan executed a deed of real estate mortgage on the aforesaid parcel of land. Dec. 27, 1990 - for failure to pay the loan in full, PNB extrajudicially foreclosed the real estate mortgage, through the Ex-Officio Sheriff, who conducted a public auction of the mortgaged property pursuant to the authority provided for in the deed of real estate mortgage. During the auction, PNB was the highest bidder with a bid price P306,360. Since PNBs total claim as of the date of the auction sale was P679,185.63, the loan had a balance of P372,825.63. To claim this deficiency, PNB instituted an action with the RTC Batangas against both Asuncion and Allan in his capacity as special administrator of his fathers intestate estate. Respondents did not answer the complaint. The trial court declared them in default and received evidence ex parte. RTC dismissed the complaint. CA affirmed. Issue/Held: WON petitioner may no longer pursue by civil action the recovery of the balance of indebtedness after having foreclosed the property securing the same. YES
360 SCRA 370 (2001)

Ratio: PNB - when the proceeds of the sale are insufficient to pay the debt, the mortgagee has the right to recover the deficiency from the debtor citing Prudential Bank v. Martinez. Furthermore, Act 3135 (An Act to Regulate the Sale of Property under Special Powers Inserted in or Annexed to Real Estate Mortgages) is the law applicable to this case of foreclosure sale and not Section 7 of Rule 86 of the Revised Rules of Court. Allan and Asuncion argue that having chosen the remedy of extrajudicial foreclosure of the mortgaged property of the deceased, PBB is precluded from pursuing its deficiency claim against the estate of Antonio. This is pursuant to Section 7, Rule 86 which states that: A creditor holding a claim against the deceased secured by mortgage or other collateral security, may abandon the security and prosecute his claim in the manner provided in this rule, and share in the general distribution of the assets of the estate; or he may foreclose his mortgage or realize upon his security, by action in court, making the executor or administrator a party defendant, and if there is a judgment for a deficiency, after the sale of the mortgaged premises, or the property pledged, in the foreclosure or other proceeding to realize upon the security, he may claim his deficiency judgment in the manner provided in the preceding section; or he may rely upon his mortgage or other security alone and foreclose the same at any time within the period of the statute of limitations, and in that event he shall not be admitted as a creditor, and shall receive no share in the distribution of the other assets of the estate; but nothing herein contained shall prohibit the executor or administrator from redeeming the property mortgaged or pledged by paying the debt for which it is hold as security, under the direction of the court if the court shall adjudge it to be for the interest of the estate that such redemption shall be made. It must be pointed out that petitioners cited cases involve ordinary debts secured by a mortgage. The case at bar, we must stress, involves a foreclosure of mortgage arising out of a settlement of estate, wherein the administrator mortgaged a property belonging to the estate of the decedent, pursuant to an authority given by the probate court. The Rules of Court on Special Proceedings comes into play decisively. It is clear from the text of Section 7, Rule 89, that once the deed of real estate mortgage is recorded in the proper Registry of Deeds, together with the corresponding court order authorizing the administrator to mortgage the property, said deed shall be valid as if it has been executed by the deceased himself. Section 7 provides in part: Sec. 7. Rule 89. Regulations for granting authority to sell, mortgage, or otherwise encumber estate The court having jurisdiction of the estate of the deceased may authorize the executor or administrator to sell personal estate, or to sell, mortgage, or otherwise encumber real estate, in cases provided by these rules when it appears necessary or beneficial under the following regulations: (f) There shall be recorded in the registry of deeds of the province in which the real estate thus sold, mortgaged, or otherwise encumbered is situated, a certified copy of the order of the court, together with the deed of the executor
57 DE LA CERNA SPECPRO DIGESTS 2011 or administrator for such real estate, which shall be valid as if the deed had been executed by the deceased in his lifetime. In the present case, it is undisputed that the conditions under the rule have been complied with. It follows that we must consider Sec. 7 of Rule 86, appropriately applicable to the controversy at hand. Case law now holds that this rule grants to the mortgagee three distinct, independent and mutually exclusive remedies that can be alternatively pursued by the mortgage creditor for the satisfaction of his credit in case the mortgagor dies, among them: (a) to waive the mortgage and claim the entire debt from the estate of the mortgagor as an ordinary claim; (b) to foreclose the mortgage judicially and prove any deficiency as an ordinary claim; and (c) to rely on the mortgage exclusively, foreclosing the same at any time before it is barred by prescription without right to file a claim for any deficiency. Perez v. Philippine National Bank reversing Pasno vs. Ravina - The dissenting opinion in Pasno vs. Ravina is more in conformity with reason and law. Of the three alternative courses that section 7, Rule 87 (now Rule 86), offers the mortgage creditor, to wit, (1) to waive the mortgage and claim the entire debt from the estate of the mortgagor as an ordinary claim; (2) foreclose the mortgage judicially and prove any deficiency as an ordinary claim; and (3) to rely on the mortgage exclusively, foreclosing the same at any time before it is barred by prescription, without right to file a claim for any deficiency, the majority opinion in Pasno vs. Ravina, in requiring a judicial foreclosure, virtually wipes out the third alternative conceded by the Rules to the mortgage creditor, and which would precisely include extra-judicial foreclosures by contrast with the second alternative. dissent in Pasno: When account is further taken of the fact that a creditor who elects to foreclose by extrajudicial sale waives all right to recover against the estate of the deceased debtor for any deficiency remaining unpaid after the sale it will be readily seen that the decision in this case (referring to the majority opinion ) will impose a burden upon the estates of deceased persons who have mortgaged real property for the security of debts, without any compensatory advantage. The plain result of adopting the last mode of foreclosure is that the creditor waives his right to recover any deficiency from the estate. Following the Perez ruling that the third mode includes extrajudicial foreclosure sales, the result of extrajudicial foreclosure is that the creditor waives any further deficiency claim. Clearly PNB has chosen the mortgage-creditors option of extrajudicially foreclosing the mortgaged property of the Chuas. This choice now bars any subsequent deficiency claim against the estate of the deceased, Antonio M. Chua. Petitioner may no longer avail of the complaint for the recovery of the balance of indebtedness against said estate, after petitioner foreclosed the property securing the mortgage in its favor. It follows that in this case no further liability remains on the part of respondents and the late Antonio M. Chuas estate. AMIN | CHA | JANZ | KRIZEL | VIEN
Ignacio et. al. v. Pampanga Bus Co.

Sanchez, J.: Quickie: Money claim of Pambusco against estate of deceased, based on a final judgment awarded to Pambusco against deceased. SC says Pambuscos claim may properly be admitted by the probate court, because of the circumstance of the case where the administrator of the estate actively participated in collection suit trial, such that the same may be construed as sufficient notice to the estate of the claim. Nature: Facts: CASE # 1: COLLECTION SUIT CASE TIMELINE August 29, 1951 Pampanga Bus Company, Inc. (referred to herein as Pambusco) filed a collection suit in CFI Manila against Valentin Fernando and Encarnacion Elchico Vda. de Fernando. January 23, 1955 Encarnacion Elchico Vda. de Fernando died. By this time, Pambusco in the foregoing civil case had already presented its evidence and submitted its case. March 23, 1955 Intestate proceedings were filed. Notice to the estate's creditors was given for them to file their claims within six (6) months from this date, the first publication of the notice. April 16, 1955 On Pambusco's motion, the court in the civil case ordered Jose Nicolas, then administrator, to substitute for the deceased Encarnacion Elchico Vda. de Fernando as one of the defendants. No objection to this order was registered. July 15, 1955. Pambusco amended its complaint in the civil case naming therein administrator Jose Nicolas and original defendant Valentin Fernando, as defendants. The court, without objection, admitted this amended complaint on August 27, 1955. o Jose Nicolas, as such administrator, filed an amended answer with counterclaim against Pambusco. The date of filing said answer is not of record. In due course, Nicolas presented his evidence. December 11, 1958. After trial on the merits, the Court of First Instance of Manila rendered judgment in the civil case in favor of Pambusco. May 28, 1960. The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment Both defendants appealed by certiorari to this Court. Valentin Fernando's appeal4 was dismissed for having been filed out of time. The appeal of the estate of Encarnacion Elchico Vda. de Fernando, raising issues of fact, likewise dismissed. CASE # 2: INTESTATE PROCEEDINGS OF THE ESTATE OF ENCARNACION February 25, 1959. We go back to Special Proceeding 25256, Intestate Estate of Encarnacion Elchico Vda. Fernando. On this day, while defendants in Civil Case 14576 were perfecting their appeal from the judgment the Court of First Instance, Pambusco registered its contingent claim in these special proceedings for whatever money judgment may be rendered in his favor in the civil suit.
20 SCRA 126 (1967)

January 25, 1961. The judgment in the civil case having reached finality, Pambusco moved in the intestate proceedings that the heirs and/or the present joint administratrices, Natividad E. Ignacio and Leonor E. Almazan, be ordered to pay P46,500.00, the share of the deceased in the judgment debt. The administratrices opposed. Ground: Pambusco's claim is time-barred. March 13, 1961. Resolving Pambusco's motion, the probate court (in Sp. Proc. 25256) issued an order in favor of PambuscoBy order of May 24, 1961, the probate court denied the motion to reconsider the foregoing order. The administratrices came to this Court on appeal.
Issue/Held: W/N Pambusco's claim properly admitted by the probate court YES. Ratio: It will be remembered that at the time Encarnacion Elchico Vda. de Fernando died, the civil case against her and the other defendant Valentin Fernando had not yet been decided by the Court of First Instance of Manila. That case, however, was prosecuted with the assent of the administrator of her estate to final conclusion. o This situation brings to the fore a consideration of Section 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, which reads: SEC. 21. Where claim does not survive. When the action is for recovery of money, debt or interest thereon, and the defendant dies before final judgment in the Court of First Instance, it shall be dismissed to be prosecuted in the manner especially provided in these rules. The Philosophy behind the rule which provides for the dismissal of the civil case is that, upon the death of defendant, all money claims should be filed in the testate or interstate proceedings "to avoid useless duplicity of procedure." Obviously, the legal precept just quoted is procedural in nature. It outlines the method by which an action for recovery of money, debt or interest may continue, upon the terms therein prescribed. Whether the original suit for the recovery of money as here proceeds to its conclusion, or is dismissed and the claim covered thereby filed with the probate court, one thing is certain: no substantial rights of the parties are prejudiced. At the time of the death of defendant Encarnacion Elchico Vda. de Fernando, plaintiff Pambusco had already closed its evidence and submitted its case. Her administrator substituted. By this substitution, the estate had notice of the claim. The estate was thus represented. o The administrator did not complain of the substitution. o At no time did the estate of the deceased impugn the authority of the regular courts to determine the civil case. o Much less did it seek abatement of the civil suit.
59 DE LA CERNA SPECPRO DIGESTS 2011 o On the contrary, its administrator took active steps to protect the interests of the estate. He joined issue with plaintiff. He filed an amended answer. He counterclaimed. He went to trial. Defeated in the Court of First Instance, he appealed to the Court of Appeals. He even elevated that civil case to this Court. Now that the judgment has become final, the estate cannot be heard to say that said judgment reached after a full dress trial on the merits will now go for naught. o The estate has thus waived its right to have Pambusco's claim re-litigated in the estate proceedings. o For, though presentment of probate claims is imperative, it is generally understood that it may be waived by the estate's representative, And, waiver is to be determined from the administrator's "acts and conduct." 9 Certainly, the administrator's failure to plead the statute of nonclaims, his active participation, and resistance to plaintiff's claim, in the civil suit, amount to such waiver. Courts are loathe to overturn a final judgment. Judicial proceedings are entitled to respect. Non quieta movere. Plaintiff's claim has passed the test in three courts of justice: the Court of First Instance, the Court of Appeals and this Court. The judgment in plaintiff's favor should be enforced. Appellants' technical objection after judgment had become final in the civil case that plaintiff's claim should have been litigated in the probate court does not impair the validity of said judgment. For, such objection does not go into the court's jurisdiction over the subject matter. Of course, it is correct to say that upon the demise a defendant in a civil action planted on a claim which does not survive, such claim should be presented to the probate court for allowance, if death occurs before final judgment in the Court of First Instance. o But, procedural niceties aside, the revival of the civil action against the administrator, the decedent's representative, "is generally considered equivalent to presentation" of such claim in probate court, "dispenses with the actual presentation of the claim." o The soundness of this proposition commands assent. Because, the administrator represent the deceased's estate itself, is an alter ego of the heirs. More than this, he is an officer of the probate court.17 In the circumstances, presentment of Pambusco's 1950 claim ad abundantiorem cautelam was at best reduced to a mere formality. It matters not that Pambusco's said claim was filed with the probate court without the six-month period from March 25, 1955, set forth in the notice to creditors. For, Section 2, Rule 86, permits acceptance of such belated claims. Says Section 2: SEC. 2. Time within which claims shall be filed. In the notice provided in the preceding section, the court shall state the time for the filing of claims against the estate, which shall not be more than twelve (12) nor less than six (6) months after the date of the first publication of the notice. However, at any time before an order of distribution is entered, on application of a creditor who has failed to file his claim within the time previously limited, the court may, for cause shown and on such terms as are equitable, allow such claim to be filed within a tune not exceeding one (1) month. AMIN | CHA | JANZ | KRIZEL | VIEN Here, the claim was filed in the probate court on February 25, 1959, while the defendants in the civil case were still perfecting their appeal therein. The record does not show that the administrator objected thereto upon the ground that it was filed out of time. The pendency of that case, we are persuaded to say, is a good excuse for tardiness in the filing of the claim. 19 And, the order of final distribution is still to be given. Besides, the order of the lower court of March 18, 1961 allowing payment of appellee's claim "impliedly granted said appellee an extension of time within which to file said claim." 20 The probate court's discretion has not been abused. It should not be disturbed. 21
For the reasons given, we vote to affirm the order of the lower court of March 13, 1961 and May 24, 1961, under review. Costs against appellants. So ordered.
Bachrach Motor v. Icarangal et. al.

Moran, J. Quickie: Icarangal executed in favor of plaintiff Bachrach Motor Inc. a promissory note and in security, Icarangal executed a real estate mortgage on a parcel of land. Promissors defaulted in payment. Plaintiff instituted an action for the collection of the amount due on the note. Judgment was rendered for the plaintiff. The provincial sheriff levied on the properties of the defendants, including that which has been mortgaged by Icarangal in favor of the plaintiff. The other defendant, Oriental Commercial Co., interposed a third party claim alleging that the property which was the subject of the mortgage had already been acquired by it at the public auction. The judgment rendered in favor of the plaintiff remains unsatisfied. Plaintiff instituted an action to foreclose the mortgage. The Court held that plaintiff appellant is barred from foreclosing the real estate mortgage after it has elected to sue and obtain a personal judgment against the defendant-appellee on the promissory note for the payment of which the mortgage was constituted as a security. In sustaining the rule that prohibits a mortgage-creditor from pursuing both remedies of a personal action for debt or a real action to foreclose the mortgage, the Court held that a rule which would authorize the mortgage-creditor to bring a personal action against the mortgage-debtor and simultaneously or successively another action against the mortgaged property, would result not only in multiplicity of suits so offensive to justice and obnoxious to law and equity, but would also subject the mortgage-debtor to the vexation of being sued in the place of his residence or of the residence of the mortgagecreditor, and then again in the place where the property lies. Facts: defendant herein, Esteban Icaragal, with one Jacinto Figueroa, for value received, executed in favor of the plaintiff, Bachrach Motor Co., Inc., a promissory note for one thousand six hundred fourteen pesos (P1,614), and in security for its payment, said Esteban Icaragal executed a real estate mortgage on a parcel of land in Pagil, Laguna, which was duly registered on August 5, 1931, in the registry of deeds of the Province of Laguna. Thereafter, promissors defaulted in the payment of the agreed monthly installments; wherefore, plaintiff instituted in the Court of First Instance of Manila an action for the collection of the amount due on the note. Judgment was there rendered for the plaintiff. A writ of execution was subsequently issued and, in pursuance thereof, the provincial sheriff of Laguna, at the indication of the plaintiff, levied on the properties of the defendants, including that which has been mortgaged by Esteban Icaragal in favor of the plaintiff. The other defendant herein, Oriental Commercial Co., Inc., interposed a third-party claim, alleging that by virtue of a writ of execution issued in civil case No. 88253 of the municipal court of the City of Manila, the property which was the subject of the mortgage and which has been levied upon by the sheriff, had already been acquired by it at the public auction on May 12, 1933.
68 Phil 287 (1939)

By reason of this third-party claim, the sheriff desisted from the sale of the property and, in consequence thereof, the judgment rendered in favor of the plaintiff remained unsatisfied. Whereupon, plaintiff instituted an action to foreclose the mortgage. The trial court dismissed the complaint and, from the judgment thus rendered plaintiff took the present appeal.
Issue/Held: whether or not plaintiff-appellant is barred from foreclosing the real estate mortgage after it has elected to sue and obtain a personal judgment against the defendant-appellee on the promissory note for the payment of which the mortgage was constituted as a security. YES Ratio: A party who sues and obtains a personal judgment against a defendant upon a note, waives thereby his right to foreclose the mortgage securing it. section 708 of our Code of Civil Procedure which provides that a creditor holding a claim against the deceased, secured by a mortgage or other collateral security, has to elect between enforcing such security or abandoning it by presenting his claim before the committee and share it in the general assets of the estate. Under this provision, It has been uniformly held by this court that, if the plaintiff elects one of the two remedies thus provided, he waives the other, and if he fails, he fails utterly. even if we have no such section 708 of our Code of Civil Procedure, or section 59 of the Insolvency Law, we have still the rule against splitting a single cause of action. For non-payment of a note secured by mortgage, the creditor has a single cause of action against the debtor. This single cause of action consists in the recovery of the credit with execution of the security. In other words, the creditor in his action may make two demands, the payment of the debt and the foreclosure of his mortgage. But both demands arise from the same cause, the non-payment of the debt, and, for that reason, they constitute a single cause of action. Though the debt and the mortgage constitute separate agreements, the latter is subsidiary to the former, and both refer to one and the same obligation. Consequently, there exists only one cause of action for a single breach of that obligation. Plaintiff, then, by applying the rule above stated, cannot split up his single cause of action by filing a complaint for payment of the debt, and thereafter another complaint for foreclosure of the mortgage. If he does so, the filing of the first complaint will bar the subsequent complaint. By allowing the creditor to file two separate complaints simultaneously or successively, one to recover his credit and another to foreclose his mortgage, we will, in effect, be authorizing him plural redress for a single breach of contract at so much cost to the courts and with so much vexation and oppression to the debtor. in the absence of express statutory provisions, a mortgage creditor may institute against the mortgage debtor either a personal action for debt or real action to foreclose the mortgage. In other words, he may pursue either of the two remedies, but not both. Thus, an election to bring personal action will leave open to him all the properties of the debtor for attachment and execution, even including the mortgaged property itself. And, if he waives such personal action and pursues his remedy against the
61 DE LA CERNA SPECPRO DIGESTS 2011 mortgaged property, an unsatisfied judgment thereon would still give him the right to sue for a deficiency judgment, in which case, all the properties of the defendant, other than the mortgaged property, are again open to him for the satisfaction of the deficiency. In either case, his remedy is complete, his cause of action undiminished, and any advantages attendant to the pursuit of one or the other remedy are purely accidental and are all under his right of election. IMPERIAL, J., dissenting: The only existing prohibition against the simultaneous or alternative institution of the two cumulative actions available to a real estate mortgagee is found in section 708 of the Code of Civil Procedure providing that the filing of a claim against the property of a deceased person, secured by a mortgage, implies the waiver of the latter, and the creditor cannot thereafter make use of his right to bring a real action, and vice versa. But this rule is only applicable to actions arising from mortgages upon property of deceased persons. In other cases the mortgagee may not only bring real and personal actions but may avail himself thereof successively as long as the indebtedness, upon the commencement of the second action, has not been fully paid. If a contract of real estate mortgage, by its nature, necessarily includes two distinct and separate contracts, namely, the loan and the mortgage, it is obvious and undoubted that the creditor has also two independent and separate rights, to wit, to recover the debt and to foreclose the mortgage; and if he has two rights it cannot be denied that two actions or causes of action are available to him upon the principle that for every right he has necessarily a corresponding action, and the latter is the correlative of the former. For this reason section 256 of our Code of Civil Procedure provides that the judgment rendered in a foreclosure suit should require, first, that the debtor against whom judgment is rendered should pay his indebtedness to the creditor or deposit it in court, and , secondly, that in default thereof, the mortgaged property should be sold. This procedure marked out for the foreclosure of a mortgage merely corroborates and executes the fundamental idea that a mortgage implies two contracts giving rise to two rights in favor of the creditor who is also entitled to two actions or two causes of action. It is, consequently, incorrect to state and lay down as a doctrine of the Supreme Court that in a contract of real estate mortgage there is, under the law, but one action, that upon the mortgage. To strengthen the doctrine sought to be established, the majority decision applies the rule of splitting of actions. This is another objectionable feature of the majority decision. The rule of the procedure relied upon is no applicable to the present case because it refers solely to those where is only one action or cause of action. In the case under consideration it has already been shown that there are two causes of action, for the enforcement of which there is no need of dividing or separating them as they are already separate and independent. In truth, what is intended to be applied to the case is the rule of merger of actions because with the doctrine desired to be established it is sought to enunciate the rule that from two separate and independent actions arising from the complex contract of mortgage, not more than one of them can be instituted, which, as we have said, is not supported by any law, express or implied, in this jurisdiction. For the foregoing reasons, I dissent from the majority decision and vote to reverse the appealed judgment. AMIN | CHA | JANZ | KRIZEL | VIEN
Soriano v. Parsons
CASTRO, J. Nature: Appeal from order of CFI Quickie: Administrator v Mortgagee, disputing over validity of the foreclosure sale. Administrator says that mortgagee already elected an option under sec. 7 of Rule 86 so he can no longer use foreclosure as remedy. SC says the mortgagee is not barred. Election by the creditor of any of the 3 options is not jurisdictional, and as long as no positive forward step has been taken by him in pursuance of the option already chosen, he is not precluded from dropping the option already chosen and resorting to any of the 2 other options available to him. Facts: Parsons Hardware Co. Inc. was the holder of 2 mortgage deeds over 4 parcels of land executed by the spouses Claro Soriano and Irene Quilao. After Sorianos death, Quirino Soriano was appointed administrator of Claro s estate Company filed a Contingent Claim Against the Estate; basis: various debts owing to it by the spouses 4 years later: Company sent a letter to the provincial sheriff of Cavite, requesting him to foreclose the mortgages extrajudicially; sheriff scheduled the public auction, but was postponed. Thereafter the public sale was held as scheduled and to the Company, which was the only bidder, were sold the mortgaged properties. One year after the public sale, Quirino lodged the present complaint claiming that the foreclosure sale was void because the Company, having priorly elected to pursue its claim in the intestate proceeding s, could not in law be permitted to turn around and pursue the remedy of extrajudicial foreclosure. Lower Court: dismissed the complaint Issue/Held: WON the Company, having priorly elected to pursue its claim in the intestate proceeding s, could not in law be permitted to turn around and pursue the remedy of extrajudicial foreclosure - NO
34 SCRA 519 (1970)

Ratio: Section 7 of rule 87 (now Rule 86) - three distinct, independent and mutually exclusive remedies available to a mortgage creditor for the satisfaction of his credit. SEC. 7. Mortgage debt due from estate.A creditor holding a claim against the deceased secured by mortgage or other collateral security, may abandon the security and prosecute his claim in the manner provided in this rule, and share in the general distribution of the assets of the estate; or he may foreclose his mortgage or realize upon his security, by action in court, making the executor or administrator a party defendant, and if there is a judgment for a deficiency, after the sale of the mortgaged premises, or the property pledged, in the foreclosure or other proceedings to realize upon the security, he may claim his deficiency judgment in the manner provided in the preceding section; or he may rely upon his mortgage or other security alone, and foreclose the same at any time within the period of the statute of limitations, and in that event he shall not be admitted as a creditor, and shall receive no share in the distribution of the other assets of the estate; but nothing herein contained shall prohibit the executor or administrator from redeeming the property mortgaged or pledged, by paying the debt for which it is held as security, under the direction of the court, if the court shall adjudge it to be for the best interest of the estate that such redemption shall be made. It is clear in the Contingent Claim that the company elected the second remedy because it explicitly indicated that it would rely upon the mortgages , reserving its right to ask for a deficiency judgment. But election by the creditor of any of the 3 options is not jurisdictional, and as long as no positive forward step has been taken by him in pursuance of the option already chosen, he is not precluded from dropping the option already chosen and resorting to any of the 2 other options available to him. An entirely distinct and independent act, to be performed in conformity with procedures laid down by the Legislature or by this Court, is still necessary to effectuate and achieve the remedy elected. The mere fact that the Company formally informed the intestate court that it was electing to foreclose judicially its mortgages did not automatically operate as authority for the court motu proprio to put into motion the machinery necessary for the judicial foreclosure of the said securities. It was indispensable for the Company to file an independent complaint for that specific purpose. The Company did no more than signify its election of an option. On the other hand, Quirino did nothing to prevent or impede the forclosure, and even encouraged it when he filed for its postponement (Joint request, along with the Company)
Manalansan et. al. v. Castaneda et. al.

Concepcion, Jr., J. Quickie: Sps. Danan obtained a loan from Sps. Manalansan. As security, they mortgaged their fishpond. Sps. Danan failed to pay after demand. Thus, Sps. Manalansan sued and successfully obtained judgment against Sps. Danan. Sps. Danan appealed all the way to the SC but failed. In due course, a writ of execution was issued. But when the sheriff was about to levy on the foreclosed fishpond, Mrs. Danan opposed levy and moved to set aside the writ of execution on the ground that the property to be foreclosed is presently in custodia legis and that the judgment in favor of Sps. Manalansan should be presented as a money claim in the Intestate Estate of Dominador Danan, pursuant to Sec. 5, Rule 86 since Mr. Danan had died while the case was pending appeal before the CA and intestate proceedings for the settlement of his estate had already been instituted. Judge Castaneda thereafter issued an order for the sheriff to desist from enforcing the writ of execution. Ultimately, Judge Castaneda set aside the writ of execution and in lieu thereof, delegated the execution of the judgment to the probate court. Sps. Manalansan, hence, appealed The action filed by Sps. Manalansan is for the foreclosure of a mortgage, or an action to enforce a lien on property. Under Sec. 1, Rule 87, it is an action which survives. Being so, the judgment rendered therein may be enforced by a writ of execution. An action to enforce a lien on property may be prosecuted by the interested person against the executor or administrator independently of the testate or intestate proceedings "for the reason that such claims cannot in any just sense be considered claims against the estate, but the right to subject specific property to the claim arises from the contract of the debtor whereby he has during life set aside certain property for its payment, and such property does not, except in so far as its value may exceed the debt, belong to the estate. Since the mortgaged property in question does not belong to the estate of the late Salvador Danan, the probate court has no jurisdiction over the property in question, and that the respondent Judge had abused his discretion in delegating the execution of the judgment to the probate court. MOREOVER, Sec. 7, Rule 86 DOES NOT confer jurisdiction upon the probate court, of limited jurisdiction, to enforce a mortgage lien. Nor can it be relied upon as a ground to delegate the execution of the judgment of foreclosure to the probate court. Section 7 of Rule 86 merely reserves a right to the executor or administrator of an estate to redeem a mortgaged or pledged property of a decedent which the mortgage or pledgee has opted to foreclose, instead of filing a money claim with the probate court. Nature: Petition for certiorari and mandamus, to annul and set aside the order of respondent Judge Castaneda vacating the writ of execution he previously issued, and to direct him to order the sale of the property involved therein at public auction. Facts: On June 1962, the spouses Dominador and Adoration Danan mortgaged their fishpond and residential lot, situated at Lubao, Pampanga, in favor of herein petitioners, spouses Benito and Ines Manalansan, to guarantee the payment of the amount of P62,574.80, within one (1) year, with 12% interest thereon, compounded annually.
83 SCRA 777 (1978)

Sps. Danan failed to pay notwithstanding demands. Thus, an action for the foreclosure of the mortgage was filed with the CFI Pampanga. After trial, judgment was rendered in favor of Sps. Manalansan, ordering Sps. Danan to pay their obligation+ attorney's fees, moral damages and the costs of suit. The order further said that in the event that Sps. Danan shall fail to make payment, the properties mortgaged shall be sold at public auction, with the proceeds thereof to be applied to the payment of the above-mentioned mortgage indebtedness and other sums adjudged Sps. Danan appealed to the CA which modified the judgment by eliminating therefrom the portion ordering the said spouses to pay moral damages. Dissatisfied, they filed a petition for review with the SC, but their petition was denied In due time, a writ of execution was issued. 5 But, when the sheriff was about to levy upon the mortgaged properties, Adoracion Danan, opposed the levy on execution and filed a motion to set aside the writ of execution for reasons that the properties are in custodia legis and that the judgment should be presented as a money claim in the Intestate Estate of Dominador Danan, pursuant to Sec. 5, Rule 86 of the Revised Rules of Court since Dominador Danan had died while the case was pending appeal before the CA and intestate proceedings for the settlement of his estate had already been instituted Acting upon the motion, respondent Judge Castaneda issued an order directing the sheriff to desist from enforcing the writ of execution, and set the incident for hearing After the hearing, Judge Castaneda issued an order setting aside the writ of execution. In lieu thereof, a copy of the judgment sought to be executed was served to the Administratrix of the estate of the late Dominador Danan thru the Intestate Court of Guagua, Pampanga for the execution of said judgment Sps. Manalansan filed an MR of said order, but their motion was denied. Unable to obtain, relief, Sps. Manalansan filed the instant petition, seeking the annulment of the above order and to direct the respondent Judge Castaneda to proceed with the execution of the judgment rendered in the foreclosure proceedings
Issue and Held: WON respondent Judge Castaneda abused his discretion, amounting to lack of jurisdiction, in delegating the execution of a judgment to the probate court which has no jurisdiction to enforce a lien on property YES! Ratio: The saving clause in Sec. 7, Rule 86, which Judge Castaneda required to be performed and the observance of which he gave as reason for setting aside the writ of execution, and in delegating the authority to execute the judgment in the foreclosure proceedings to the probate court, DOES NOT confer jurisdiction upon the probate court, of limited jurisdiction, to enforce a mortgage lien. Nor can it be relied upon as a ground to delegate the execution of the judgment of foreclosure to the probate court. Section 7 of Rule 86 merely reserves a right to the executor or administrator of an estate to redeem a mortgaged or pledged property of a decedent which the
64 DE LA CERNA SPECPRO DIGESTS 2011 mortgage or pledgee has opted to foreclose, instead of filing a money claim with the probate court. While the redemption is subject to the approval of the probate court, the exercise of the right is discretionary upon the said executor or administrator and may not be ordered by the probate court upon its own motion. Besides, the action filed herein is for the foreclosure of a mortgage, or an action to enforce a lien on property. Under Sec. 1, Rule 87, it is an action which survives. Being so, the judgment rendered therein may be enforced by a writ of execution. An action to enforce a lien on property may be prosecuted by the interested person against the executor or administrator independently of the testate or intestate proceedings "for the reason that such claims cannot in any just sense be considered claims against the estate, but the right to subject specific property to the claim arises from the contract of the debtor whereby ha has during life set aside certain property for its payment, and such property does not, except in so far as its value may exceed the debt, belong to the estate Since the mortgaged property in question does not belong to the estate of the late Salvador Danan, according to the foregoing rule, the conclusion is reasonable that the probate court has no jurisdiction over the property in question, and that the respondent Judge had abused his discretion in delegating the execution of the judgment to the probate court. The fact that the defendant Salvador Danan died before, and not after the decision of the CA became final and executory will not nullify the writ of execution already issued. The successors of the decedent contended that the writ of execution issued was void because contrary to Section 7, Rule 39, the defendant died before, not after, the entry of judgment. This argument is unacceptable. Section 7 of Rule 39 cannot be so construed as to invalidate the writ of execution already issued in so far as service thereof upon the heirs or successors-in-interest of the defendant is concerned. It merely indicates against whom the writ of execution is to be enforced when the losing party dies after the entry of judgment or order. Nothing therein, nor in the entire Rule 39, intimates that a writ of execution issued after a party dies, which death occurs before entry of the judgment, is a nullity. The writ may yet be enforced against his executor or administrator, if there be any, or his successors-in-interest. AMIN | CHA | JANZ | KRIZEL | VIEN judgment, date of judgment, writ) and, should there be no such payment, judgment, sheriff was commanded to sell judgment, mortgaged properties at public auction. At this juncture, it should be observed, that section 2, Rule 68 provides that trial court after hearing shall order that the mortgage debt should be paid into court "Within a period of not less than ninety (90) days from judgment, date of judgment, service of such order". This provision cannot be literally complied with in case the mortgagor appeals from the lower court's judgment. It would seem that the period for judgment, payment to judgment, court of judgment, mortgage debt should be reckoned from judgment, date of judgment, entry of judgment. In the instant case, it may be repeated that the trial court ordered payment of the mortgage debt within ninety days "from date", without specifying what date is contemplated The clerk of court in the writ of execution interpreted that phrase as ninety days from the date of the writ. The trial court justified that order by citing Sec. 7, Rule 86 that in case judgment mortgagor dies, the executor or administrator of his estate may redeem the mortgaged property under the direction of the probate court. In the trial courts view, in order to implement that provision, the probate court has to be apprised of the mortgage debt so that it can decide whether the mortgaged property should be sold at public auction this interpretation of section 7 of Rule 86 is erroneous! When the mortgagor, Dominador Danan, died during the pendency of his appeal, the action for foreclosure was not extinguished because the claim against him is NOT a pure money claim but an action to enforce a mortgage lien. It is an action which survived his death and which can proceed independently of the intestate proceeding for the settlement of his estate The situation in the instant case is not the one contemplated in Section 7 of Rule 86 which refers to a case where the mortgagor is already dead at the time the mortgagee decides to enforce his mortgage to lien. In this case, one of the mortgagors, Mrs. Danan, survived her husband and is a defendant in the foreclosure proceeding. She is also the administratrix of her husband's estate. She should be substituted for her deceased husband in the foreclosure case. The writ of execution should be served upon her. It is then incumbent upon her to appraise the probate court whether the mortgaged properties should be redeemed and to suggest to the probate court how funds could be raised for that purpose. That is how the provision in section 7, Rule 86 may be implemented. The directive in the writ of execution is a directive to redeem the mortgaged properties within the ninety-day period. Finally, the contention that the mortgaged properties cannot be sold at public auction because they are in custodia legis in the inestate proceeding is wrong. If the said properties are in custodia legis then it is the San Fernando branch. where the foreclosure case is pending, that has custody of the said properties. At any rate, it should be noted that properties in custodia legis may now be attached (Last par. of sec, 7, Rule 57)
Aquino, J., concurring: The trial court acted correctly in issuing the writ of execution. And it erred in subsequently setting aside that writ and in directing that judgment "be served to the administrator" of the intestate estate of Dominador Danan (said administratrix is also a party in the foreclosure proceeding), "thru judgment, intestate court", "for judgment, execution of said judgment." It is to be noted that during the pendency of judgment on appeal before the CA, Dominador Danan died BUT his death was not promptly reported to the court. In fact, in the petition for certiorari filed with the SC contesting the CA decision, Dominador was made a petitioner, as if he was still alive! In 1971, an intestate proceeding was filed for judgment, settlement of Dominador Danan's estate. His wife, Adoracion Vitug-Danan was named administratrix In 1975, Judge Castaneda issued a writ of execution requiring mortgagors Sps. Danan to pay the mortgage debt, plus interest, "within 90 days from date" (meaning
De los Reyes v. CFI

Street, J. Nature: original petition for the writ of certiorari Facts: Chua Pua Hermanos filed an action to foreclose a mortgage upon land against Benito de los Reyes and wife in the CFI of Batangas. CFI Batangas granted the attachment of property belonging to the Sps. De los Reyes upon showing, by affidavit, that yhe mortgage property is insufficient to pay the mortgage debt and that the defendants are attempting to alienate their unmortgaged property to other persons with intent to defraud the plaintiff. Sps. De Los Reyes filed this action to quash the order of the CFI. Issue/Held: WON in a proceeding to foreclose a mortgage upon land, the court can issue an attachment against other property included in the mortgage. YES Ratio: The affidavit accompanying the application for attachment shows, in conformity with the requirement of section 426 of the Code of Civil Procedure, that the value of the mortgaged property is not sufficient to satisfy the debt. It is also alleged in the affidavit that the defendants are attempting to dispose of their other property, meaning property not mortgaged to the plaintiff, with intent to defraud the plaintiff. This is in conformity with the requirement of subsection 5 of section 412 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Under section 424 of the Code of Civil Procedure, an attachment may be obtained at or after the commencement of the plaintiff's "action." The word "action," as used in this provision, includes in our opinion a proceeding for the foreclose of a mortgage. This is of course directed primarily to the property covered by the mortgage, but under section 260 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the mortgage creditor is entitled to judgment for any excess remaining due upon the mortgage debt after the mortgaged property shall have been sold; and this judgment for the balance due is entered upon motion in the foreclosure proceeding itself. This fact, taken in connection with the statement of the affidavit to the effect that the mortgaged property was insufficient in value to cover the indebtedness due to the plaintiff, made a case where it was proper to grant an attachment upon the facts stated.
55 Phil. 408 (1930)

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Heirs of Sy Bang v. Sy et. al.

603 SCRA 534 (2009)

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Jocson de Hilado v. Nava

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Estate of Ruiz v. CA, et. al.

252 SCRA 540 (1996)

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600 SCRA 1 (2009)

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Moran Sison v. Teodoro

100 Phil 1055 (1957)

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101 Phil 911 (1957)

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Uy Tioco v. Imperial et. al.

53 Phil 802 (1928)

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97 Phil 1003 (1955)

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96 SCRA 124 (1980)

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446 SCRA 100 (2004)

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27 Phil 209 (1914)

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Tan Sen Guan v. Go Siu San

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Heirs of Pizarro Sr. v. Consolacion

161 SCRA 186 (1988)

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6 SCRA 620 (1962)

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9 SCRA 144 (1963)

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Aguas et. al. v. Llemos et. al.

5 SCRA 959 (1962)

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Vera et. al. v. Fernandez

89 SCRA 199 (1979)

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Gotamco v. Chan Seng et.al.

46 Phil. 542 (1924)

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Paredes et. al. v. Moya et. al.

61 SCRA 526 (1974)

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125 SCRA 676 (1983)

Melencio-Herrera, J., concurring:

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PNB et. al. v. CA

360 SCRA 370 (2001)

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