Anda di halaman 1dari 420

LOGICAL POSITIVISM

EditedbyA.J.AYER TheFree Press,NewYork -iiiCopyright1959byTheFreePress,aCorporation PrintedintheUnitedStatesofAmerica Allrightsreserved.Nopartofthisbookmaybereproducedor utilizedinanyformorbyanymeans,electronicormechanical, photocopying,recording,orbyanyinformationstorageand retrievalsystem,withoutpermissioninwritingfromthePublisher. Collier-MacmillanCanada,Ltd.,Toronto,Ontario LibraryofCongressCatalogCardNumber:58-6467 SecondprintingJuly1966 -iv-

Preface
LogicalPositivismisthesecondinaseriesofbookswhichwillmake availabletothegeneralpublicsomeofthemostinterestingworkof philosophersofverydiverseviewpoints.Eachvolumewilldealwith oneor,insomecases,withtwo,philosophical"schools"or "movements."Itisfortunatethatphilosophersarerarelyunitedby thekindofcommonpurposewhichinspirespoliticalorreligious "movements."Nevertheless,itisfrequentlyhelpfultoconsiderthe workofdifferentwritersaccordingtothesimilaritiesintheiraim andcontentandthisisthepolicywhichhasbeenadoptedin designingtheLibraryofPhilosophicalMovements. Thisvolumepresents,forthefirsttimeinEnglish,manyofthe mostinfluentialpapersbyleadingmembersoftheViennaCircle. Theseandotherarticlescontainauthoritativeexpositionsofthe doctrinesmostcommonlyassociatedwithlogicalpositivism. However,forreasonsexplainedbyProfessorAyerinhis introduction,severalpieceswhichcannotberegardedas expositionsordefensesoflogicalpositivismhavealsobeen included.Thescopeofthebibliography,too,isbroaderthanthe titleofthebookwouldsuggest.Novolumedealingwithotherforms ofanalyticphilosophyiscontemplatedinthisseriesanditwas therefore thoughtdesirabletolistthemostimportantbooksand

articlesdealingwithalltypesofanalyticphilosophyandnotonly withlogicalpositivism. Iwishtoexpressmygratitudetoallthetranslatorswhogenerously contributedtheirlabor,toMarvinZimmerman,JamesBayley,Irving Saltzmann,andanumberofmystudentsforhelpingtocompilethe bibliography,andtoLeonSatinoff,MaxwellGrober,andJos Huerta-Jourdaforpreparingtheindex.Specialthanksaredueto ProfessorsCarnapandHempelforsupplyingnoteswhichindicate theirpresentpositionontheissuesdealtwithintheirpapers. ProfessorCarnapwasalsokindenoughtoassistinthetranslation ofhisownarticles. PAULEDWARDS -v[Thispageintentionallyleftblank.] -vi-

Contents

PREFACE EDITOR'SINTRODUCTION

LogicalAtomism

v 3 31

Philosophy,MetaphysicsandMeaning
MoritzSchlick"THETURNINGPOINTIN PHILOSOPHY" RudolfCarnap"THEELIMINATION OF METAPHYSICSTHROUGHLOGICAL ANALYSISOFLANGUAGE" MoritzSchlick"POSITIVISMANDREALISM" CarlG.Hempel"THEEMPIRICIST CRITERION OFMEANING" RudolfCarnap"THEOLDANDTHENEW LOGIC" HansHahn"LOGIC,MATHEMATICSAND KNOWLEDGEOFNATURE" -vii-

BertrandRussell"LOGICALATOMISM"

53 60 82 108

LogicandMathematics

133 147

KnowledgeandTruth

RudolfCarnap"PSYCHOLOGYINPHYSICAL LANGUAGE" OttoNeurath"PROTOCOLSENTENCES" MoritzSchlick"THEFOUNDATIONOF KNOWLEDGE"

165 199 209

EthicsandSociology

A.J.Ayer"VERIFICATION AND EXPERIENCE" MoritzSchlick"WHATISTHEAIMOF ETHICS?" C.L.Stevenson"THEEMOTIVEMEANINGOF ETHICALTERMS" OttoNeurath"SOCIOLOGYAND PHYSICALISM"

228

247 264 282 321 327 345 381 447

AnalyticalPhilosophy

FrankD.Ramsey"PHILOSOPHY" GilbertRyle "PHILOSOPHICALARGUMENTS" FriedrichWaismann"HOWISEE PHILOSOPHY" BIBLIOGRAPHYOFLOGICALPOSITIVISM INDEX -viii-

LOGICALPOSITIVISM
-1[Thispageintentionallyleftblank.] -2-

Editor'sIntroduction

I.HISTORYOFTHELOGICALPOSITIVIST MOVEMENT
THETERM"LogicalPositivism"wascoinedsomethirtyyearsagoto characterize thestandpointofagroupofphilosophers,scientists andmathematicianswhogavethemselvesthenameoftheVienna Circle.Sincethattimeitsreferencehasbeenextendedtocover otherformsofanalyticalphilosophysothatdisciplesofBertrand Russell,G.E.MooreorLudwigWittgensteinatCambridge,or membersofthecontemporaryOxfordmovementoflinguistic analysismayalsofindthemselvesdescribedaslogicalpositivists. Thiswiderusageisespeciallyfavoredbythosewhoarehostileto thewholemoderndevelopmentofphilosophyasananalytical ratherthanaspeculativeenquiry.Theywishtotaralltheir adversarieswithasinglebrush.Thisisirritatingtotheanalysts themselveswhoarerathermoresensitivetotheirdifferencesthey wouldpreferthattheappellationof"logicalpositivist"bereserved forthosewhosharethespecialoutlookoftheViennaCircle.In compilingthisanthology,Ihavenotbeenquitesostrict.Ihave

drawnmainlyonthewritingsofthemembersoftheViennaCircle, orofthosewhostandclosesttothem,butIhavealsoincluded severalpieceswhichfalloutsidethisrange.Theyareall,insome sense,analyticalbutthescopeofwhatIregardasanalytical philosophyiswide.Itallowsforseriousdisagreement,notonlyover technicalniceties,butonmajorpointsofdoctrine,includingthe methodandpurposeofanalysisitself. TheViennaCirclecameintobeingintheearly1920'swhenMoritz Schlick,aroundwhomitcentered,arrivedfromKieltobecome professorofphilosophyattheUniversityofVienna.Onthe philosophicalsideitsleadingmembers,besidesSchlickhimself, wereRudolfCarnap,OttoNeurath,HerbertFeigl,Friedrich Waismann,EdgarZilselandVictorKraftonthescientificand mathematicalside,PhilippFrank,KarlMenger,KurtGdelandHans Hahn.Atthebeginning,itwasmoreofaclubthananorganized movement.Findingthattheyhadacommoninterestin,anda -3similarapproachto,acertainsetofproblems,itsmembersmet regularlytodiscussthem.Thesemeetingscontinuedthroughoutthe lifeoftheCirclebuttheycametobesupplementedbyother activitieswhichtransformedtheclubintosomethingmorenearly resemblingapoliticalparty.Thisprocessbeganin1929withthe publicationofamanifestoentitled"Wissenschaftliche Weltauffassung,DerWienerKreis"--The ViennaCircleItsScientific Outlook-whichgaveabriefaccountofthephilosophicalpositionof thegroupandareviewoftheproblemsinthephilosophyof mathematicsandofthephysicalandsocialsciencesthattheywere chieflyconcernedtosolve.Thispamphlet,whichwaswrittenby Carnap,NeurathandHahn,isalsoofinterestasshowinghowthe Circle situateditselfinthehistoryofphilosophy.Afterclaimingthat theywere developingaViennesetraditionwhichhadfloweredat theendofthenineteenthcenturyintheworkofsuchmenasthe physicistsErnstMachandLudwigBoltzmann,and,inspiteofhis theologicalinterests,thephilosopherFranzBrentano,theauthors setoutalistofthosewhomtheyregardedastheirmain precursors.AsempiricistsandpositiviststheynamedHume,the philosophersoftheenlightenment,Comte,Mill,Avenariusand Machasphilosophersofscience,Helmholtz,Riemann,Mach, Poincar,Enriques,Duhem,BoltzmannandEinsteinaspureand appliedlogicians,Leibniz,Peano,Frege,Schrder,Russell, WhiteheadandWittgensteinasaxiomatists,Pasch,Peano,Vailati, PieriandHilbertandasmoralistsandsociologistsofapositivistic temper,Epicurus,Hume,Bentham,Mill,Comte,Spencer, Feuerbach,Marx,Mller-Lyer,Popper-LynkeusandtheelderCarl Menger.Thislistissurprisinglycomprehensive,butitmustbe rememberedthatinmostcasesitisonlyaquestionofaspecial aspectoftheauthor'sworks.ThusLeibnizisincludedforhislogic, notforhismetaphysicsKarlMarxisincludedneitherforhislogic norhismetaphysicsbutforhisscientificapproachtohistory.Ifwe excludecontemporariesfromthelist,thosewhostandclosestto

theViennaCircleintheirgeneraloutlookareHumeandMach.Itis indeedremarkable howmuchofthedoctrinethatisnowthoughtto beespeciallycharacteristicoflogicalpositivismwasalreadystated, oratleastforeshadowed,byHume. Amongcontemporaries,Einstein,Russell,andWittgensteinare singledoutbytheauthorsofthepamphletfortheirkinshiptothe ViennaCircleandtheextentoftheirinfluenceuponit.Wittgenstein, indeed,stoodtotheViennaCircleinaspecialrelation.Havingbeen apupilofRussell'satCambridge beforethefirstworldwarhe returnedtoViennaandwastherewhenhisLogischPhilosophischeAbhandlung -4Abhandlungwaspublishedin1921.Thisfamousbook,whichis betterknownasTractatusLogico-Philosophicus,thetitlegiventoits Englishtranslation,hadanenormouseffectuponthepositivist movement,bothinViennaandelsewhere.Itwouldnotbequite correcttosaythattheViennaCircledrewitsinspirationfromit. Schlickhimself,inhisbookonthetheoryofknowledge,Allgemeine Erkenntnislehre ,ofwhichthefirsteditionappearedin1918,had independentlyarrivedatasimilarconceptionofphilosophyand thereisahintofmysticismintheTractatuswhichsomemembers oftheCircle,especiallyNeurath,founddisquietingbutasawhole theyacceptedit,anditstoodoutasthemostpowerfuland exciting,thoughnotindeedthemostlucid,expositionoftheirpoint ofview.WittgensteindidnotofficiallyadheretotheCirclebuthe maintainedclosepersonalrelationsatleastwithSchlickand Waismannwhomhecontinuedtoinfluenceevenafterhisdeparture forCambridgein1929.InCambridge,wherehetaughtuntil1947, fouryearsbeforehisdeath,heexercisedanalmostdespoticsway overhispupils,andthoughhepublishednothingduringtheseyears exceptoneshortarticlehisinfluencewasstrongly,ifinmostcases indirectly,feltbyalmostalltheyoungergenerationofBritish philosophers.Hehimselfmodifiedtherigorsofhisearlypositivism toanextentthatcanbemeasuredbycomparingtheTractatuswith hisposthumouslypublishedPhilosophicalInvestigationsanditisto hisinfluence,combinedwiththatofMoore,thatonemaylargely attributethepreoccupationofcontemporaryBritishphilosophers withtheeverydayusesoflanguage,andtheirtendencytodealwith philosophicalquestionsinanunsystematic,illustrativeway,in contrasttothemorerigorouswould-be scientificmethodwhichwas favoredbytheViennaCircle.Thisisonereasonwhytheyarenot happytobedescribedasLogicalPositivists.ButIshallhavemore tosayaboutthesealternative conceptionsofanalysislateron. Itwasin1929alsothattheViennaCircleorganizeditsfirst internationalcongress.ItwasheldatPragueandwasfollowedat intervalsthroughoutthethirtiesbyfurthercongressesat Knigsberg,Copenhagen,Prague,ParisandCambridge.These meetingsfurtheredtheambitionoftheCircletodevelopLogical Positivismasaninternationalmovement.Ithadformedanearly

alliancewiththeso-calledBerlinschoolofwhichHansReichenbach, RichardvonMises,KurtGrellingandatalaterdateCarlHempel weretheleadingmembers.Thecongresseshelpedittomake contactalsowithScandinavianphilosopherssuchasEinoKaila,Arne Naess,ke Petzll,JoergenJoergensen,andtheUppsalaschoolof empiricists,withtheDutch -5grouparoundthephilosopherMannourywhopursuedwhatthey calledthestudyofSignifics,withtheMnstergroupoflogicians underHeinrichScholtz,withAmericansympathizerssuchasNagel, CharlesMorrisandQuine,andwithBritishanalystsofvarious shadesofopinion,suchasSusanStebbing,GilbertRyle,R.B. Braithwaite,JohnWisdomandmyself.ThebrilliantCambridge philosopherF.P.Ramseywasmarkedasanadherent,buthedied in1930attheearlyageof26.Analliancewasalsoformedwiththe veryimportantPolishgroupsofphilosophersandlogicians,ofwhom Lucasiewicz,Lesnievsky,Chwistek,Kotarbinski,Ajduciewiczand Tarskiwere perhapsthemostprominent.TheinfluenceofTarski's work,particularlyonCarnap,wasnoticeablystrong. ThemissionaryspiritoftheCirclefoundafurtheroutletinits publications.In1930ittookoverajournalcalledAnnalender Philosophie,renameditErkenntnisandmadeit,underthe editorshipofCarnapandReichenbach,theprincipalorganofthe positivistmovement.Inthefollowingyearstherealsoappeareda seriesofmonographswiththecollectivetitleof Einheitswissenschaft--UnifiedScience--andaseriesofbooks,under thegeneraleditorshipofSchlickandPhilippFrank,withthe collectivetitleofSchriftenzurWissenschaftlicheWeltauffassung. Schlickhimselfcontributedtoitabookonethics,ofwhichthefirst chapterisincludedinthisvolume,andFrankabookonthelawof causalityanditslimitations.Amongtheothervolumestoappearin itwere animportantbookbyCarnaponthelogicalsyntaxof language,towhichIshallhaveoccasiontoreferagain,abookon sociologybyNeurathwithsomewhatMarxistleanings,andKarl Popper'sfamousLogikderForschungwhichwasdevotedtothe philosophyofscience.Popperwasnotinfactamemberofthe Circle andwouldatnotimehavewishedtobeclassedasa positivist,buttheaffinitiesbetweenhimandthepositivistswhom hecriticizedappearmorestrikingthanthedivergencies.Inany casethemembersoftheCircledidnotinallpointsagreeamong themselves. Thoughthelogicalpositivistmovementgatheredstrength throughoutthethirties,theViennaCircleitselfwasintheprocessof dissolution.By1933,whenIattendeditsmeetings,Carnapand FrankhadacceptedchairsattheUniversityofPragueandthe discussionswere chieflycarriedonbySchlick,Neurath,Waismann andHahn.ButHahndiedin1934andtwoyearslaterSchlickwas murdered,attheageof54,byadementedstudentwhoshothim ashewasenteringtheUniversity.Thehostiletoneoftheobituaries

whichwere devotedtoSchlickinthegovernmentalpress,implying almostthatlogical -6positivistsdeservedtobemurderedbytheirpupils,foreshadowed thetroubleswhichwere soontofallupontheCircle.Exceptfor Neurath,whohadparticipatedintherevolutionarySpartacist GovernmentinMunichattheendofthefirstworldwar,its membershadnotbeenconspicuouslyactiveinpolitics,buttheir criticalandscientifictempermadethemsuspecttotheright-wing clericalgovernmentsofDolfussandSchuschniggandstillmoreso totheNazis.Themajorityofthemwereforcedintoexile.The adventofNazismwasfatalalsototheBerlinschool,andthePolish groupswere disruptedbythewar.Neurath,whohadtakenrefuge inHolland,madeavaliantattempttokeepthemovementgoing. ThetitleofErkenntniswaschangedtoTheJournalofUnified ScienceanditsplaceofpublicationtotheHague.Arrangements weremadeforthepublicationbytheUniversityofChicago,where Carnapwasestablished,ofaseriesofbrochuresambitiously entitledtheInternationalEncyclopediaofUnifiedScience.Further congresseswere planned.Butwiththeoutbreakofwarand Neurath'sdeathinEnglandsomeyearslater,themovementlostits cohesion.Mostofthevolumeswhichweredesignedtoconstitute theEncyclopediahaveinfactappeared,buttheJournalofUnified Scienceverysoonceasedpublicationandhasnotbeenrevived. BesidesCarnap,Feigl,Gdel,Frank,HempelandTarskiarestillat universitiesintheUnitedStates,andWaismannandPopperat universitiesinEngland.ScholtzhasremainedatMnsterand KotarbinskiandAjduciewiczinPolandandVictorKraftresumedhis chairofphilosophyattheUniversityofVienna.But,howevermuch influencethesephilosophersmayexertindividually,theydonot constituteaschool.Inthissense,thelogicalpositivistmovement hasbeenbrokenup. Neverthelessitstraditionhasbeencontinued,especiallyinEngland, ScandinaviaandtheUnitedStates.InScandinavia,Kailahasbeen joinedatHelsinkibyVonWright,apupilofWittgenstein'swho succeededhimforatimeasprofessorofphilosophyatCambridge, theUppsalaschoolstillflourishes,underthedirectionofHedenius, SegerstedtandMarc-Wogau,withsupportfromthelogician WedberginStockholm,andArne NaessinOslopursueshis sociologicalresearchesintothecurrentusesoflanguage.Petzll continuedtoteachatLunduntilhisdeathin1957andJoergensenis stillteachinginCopenhagen,thoughhispositivismhasbeen modifiedbyaninjectionofMarxism.IntheUnitedStatesanumber ofphilosopherslikeQuine,NagelandNelsonGoodmanconduct logicalanalysisinasystematicscientificspiritthatisprobablycloser totheoriginalidealoftheViennaCirclethananythingthatisnow tobemetwithelse-7-

where.InthisconnectionNelsonGoodman'sbookTheStructure of Appearance (1951)andQuine'scollectionofessaysFromaLogical PointofView(1953)areespeciallynotable.Theiractiveinterestin symboliclogicbringsQuineandGoodmanalsointorelationwith Tarski,Gdel,Churchandothermembersoftheimportant contemporarygroupofAmericanlogicians.Thesameoutlookis maintainedbyCarnapandhispupils,notablyBarHillel,whoisnow teachingattheUniversityofJerusalem,andbyFeiglandHempel. OtherphilosophersintheUnitedStatessuchasNormanMalcolm, MaxBlack,MorrisLazerowitzandC.L.Stevensonowemoretothe influenceofG.E.MooreorthelaterWittgenstein,andconsequently displayanapproachtophilosophicalquestionswhichiscloserto thatofthecontemporaryBritishschools. InspiteoftheexampleofBertrandRussell,thereisnotnow amongBritishphilosophersthesameinterestinformallogic,or beliefintheutilityofsymbolictechniquesforclarifyingphilosophical issues,asistobefoundintheUnitedStates.Neitheristherethe samedesiretoconnectphilosophywithscience.MyownLanguage, TruthandLogic,ofwhichthefirsteditionappearedin1936,did somethingtopopularizewhatmaybecalledtheclassicalpositionof theViennaCirclebutsincethewartheprevailingtendencyin Englandhasbeentoreplacethisuncompromisingpositivismwithits blanketrejectionofmetaphysics,itsrespectforscientificmethod, itsassumptionthatinsofarasphilosophicalproblemsaregenuine atalltheycanbedefinitelysolvedbylogicalanalysis,byan approachtophilosophywhichisempiricalinthepoliticalsense,the senseinwhichBurke wasachampionofempiricism. Generalizationsaredistrusted,particularexamplesaremultiplied andcarefullydissected.Anattemptismadetoilluminateevery facetofaproblemratherthantohammerorcarveoutasolution, commonsensereignsasaconstitutional,ifnotanabsolute, monarch,philosophicaltheoriesareputtothetouchstoneofthe wayinwhichwordsareactuallyused.Themetaphysicianistreated nolongerasacriminalbutasapatient:theremaybegood reasonswhyhesaysthestrangethingsthathedoes.This therapeutictechnique,asithasbeencalled,iswelldisplayedinthe workofJohnWisdom,nowaprofessoratCambridge,whose collectedvolumesofarticles,OtherMindsandPhilosophyand Psycho-Analysis,appearedin1952and1953.Amorerobustform oftherapyispractisedbyGilbertRyle,professorofmetaphysicsat Oxford,whoseConceptofMind(1949),withitsattackonthe Cartesianmythof"theghostinthemachine,"hashadaverygreat -8influence.RyleshareswithWisdomataste,andagift,foranalogy andmetaphor,andafondnessforpilingupexamples,butheisless afraidofageneralization,lesstolerantofdeparturesfromordinary usage,moredirectinhismethodthananypresent-day Wittgensteinian,andmorereadytoassumethataphilosophical problemhasacorrectsolution.Whatisnowsometimescalledthe Oxfordschool,whichtakesitstonefromJ.L.Austinmorethan

fromRyle,carriesitsinterestintheordinaryuseoflanguagetoa pointwhereitmaybethoughtthatphilosophicalanalysishasgiven waytothestudyofphilology.Butthistendencyisnotall-prevailing. TheworkofsuchphilosophersasStuartHampshire,P.F.Strawson andDavidPearsshowsthatevenwithintheframeworkofthe Oxfordmannerthereisstillroomforafairlywidelatitudeof approach.Thechargeofscholasticismwhichisbroughtagainst "Oxfordphilosophy"isnotentirelybaselessbutitisnotatruly warrantedindictment. Atthepresenttime,thephilosophicalworldiscuriouslydivided.If positivismbetakeninitswidestsense,thesenseinwhichit embracesallshadesofanalytical,linguistic,orradicallyempirical philosophy,itisdominantinEnglandandinScandinavia,and commandsconsiderableallegianceinHollandandBelgium,in AustraliaandintheUnitedStates.Elsewhere,itmakeshardlyany showingatall.Theoretically,itisnotinallrespectsatoddswith Marxism:thetwoatleasthavecertainenemiesincommon:butit cannotflourishunderCommunistregimes,sinceLenin'sMaterialism andEmpirioCriticism,anattackonMachandhisfollowerswhich appearedin1905,declaresittobeaformofbourgeoisidealism.In othercountriesagain,onefindsphilosopherssubscribingtoneoThomismortoneo-Kantianismortoneo-Hegelianismorto ExistentialismorwhateverformofGermanmetaphysicsmaybein fashion.TheascendancyofGermanyoverFranceinthisrespectis especiallyremarkable.Conversely,inEnglish-speakingcountries therehasbeenthroughoutthepresentcenturyanalmostcomplete disregardofthecurrentextravaganciesofGermanspeculative thought.Suchnationaldivisionsareindeedregrettable.Theydonot occurtoanythinglikethesameextentinotherbranchesof learning.Itisespeciallycharacteristicofphilosophersthattheytend todisagreenotmerelyaboutthesolutionofcertainproblemsbut abouttheverynatureoftheirsubjectandthemethodsbywhichit istobepursued.Like othersbeforethem,theViennaCircle believedthatthiscouldandshouldberemedied.Theythoughtthat theyhadsucceeded,whereKanthadfailed,infindingaway"toset philosophyuponthesurepathofascience."Thisend -9hasnotbeenattained:itmay,indeed,beunattainable.Allthe same,therecanbeprogressinphilosophyandinonewayand anotherthepositivistmovementisachievingit.

II.THEATTACKONMETAPHYSICS
"Whenwerunoverlibraries,persuadedoftheseprinciples,what havocmustwemake?Ifwetakeinourhandanyvolumeof divinityorschoolmetaphysics,forinstanceletusask,Doesit containanyabstractreasoningconcerningquantityornumber?No. Doesitcontainanyexperimentalreasoningconcerningmatterof factandexistence?No.Commititthentotheflames:foritcan containnothingbutsophistryandillusion."Thisquotationistaken

fromDavidHume'sEnquiryConcerningHumanUnderstanding.Itis anexcellentstatementofthepositivist'sposition.Inthecaseofthe logicalpositivists,theepithet"logical"wasaddedbecausethey wishedtoannexthediscoveriesofmodernlogictheybelieved,in particular,thatthelogicalsymbolismwhichhadbeendevelopedby Frege,PeanoandRussellwouldbeserviceabletothem.Buttheir generaloutlookwasverymuchthesameasHume's.Like him,they dividedsignificantpropositionsintotwoclassesformalpropositions, likethoseoflogicorpuremathematics,whichtheyheldtobe tautological,inasensethatIshallpresentlyexplain,andfactual propositions,ofwhichitwasrequiredthattheyshouldbe empiricallyverifiable.Theseclassesweresupposedtobe exhaustive:sothatifasentencesucceededneitherinexpressing somethingthatwasformallytrueorfalsenorinexpressing somethingthatcouldbeempiricallytested,theviewtakenwasthat itdidnotexpressanypropositionatall.Itmighthaveemotive meaningbutitwasliterallynonsensical.Agreatdealof philosophicaltalkwasheldtofallintothiscategory:talkaboutthe absolute,ortranscendententities,orsubstance,orthedestinyof man.Suchutterancesweresaidtobemetaphysicalandthe conclusiondrawnwasthatifphilosophywastoconstituteagenuine branchofknowledgeitmustemancipateitselffrommetaphysics. TheViennesepositivistsdidnotgosofarastosaythatall metaphysicalworksdeservedtobecommittedtotheflames:they allowed,somewhatperfunctorily,thatsuchwritingmighthave poeticmeritoreventhatitmightexpressanexcitingorinteresting attitudetolife.Theirpointwasthatevensoitdidnotstate anythingthatwaseithertrueorfalseandconsequentlythatitcould contributenothingtotheincreaseofknowledge.Metaphysical utteranceswere condemnednotforbeingemotive,whichcould hardlybeconsideredasobjectionableinitself,butforpretendingto becognitive,formasqueradingassomething -10thattheywere not.Attacksonmetaphysicsoccurfairlyfrequentlyin thehistoryofphilosophy.IhavequotedHumeandImightalso havequotedKantwhomaintainedthatthehumanunderstanding lostitselfincontradictionswhenitventuredbeyondtheboundsof possibleexperience.Theoriginalityofthelogicalpositivistslayin theirmakingtheimpossibilityofmetaphysicsdependnotuponthe natureofwhatcouldbeknownbutuponthenatureofwhatcould besaid.Theirchargeagainstthemetaphysicianwasthathebreaks theruleswhichanyutterancemustsatisfyifitistobeliterally significant. Attheoutset,theirformulationoftheseruleswaslinkedwitha conceptionoflanguagewhichWittgenstein,whoinheriteditfrom Russell,madefullyexplicitinhisTractatus.Theunderlying assumptionisthattherearestatementswhichareelementaryin thesensethat,iftheyaretrue,theycorrespondtoabsolutely simplefacts.Itmaybethatthelanguagewhichweactuallyuse doesnotcontainthemeansofexpressingthesestatements:the

statementswhichitcanserve toexpressmaynoneofthembe entirelyelementarybutthesemorecomplexstatementsmuststill restuponafoundationofelementarystatements,evenifthe foundationbehidden.Theyaresignificantonlyinsofarastheysay whatwouldbesaidbyaffirmingcertainelementarystatementsand denyingcertainothers,thatis,onlyinsofarastheygiveatrueor falsepictureoftheultimate"atomic"facts.Theycan,therefore,be representedasbeingconstructedoutofelementarystatementsby thelogicaloperationsofconjunctionandnegation,insuchaway thattheirtruthorfalsehoodisentirelydependentonthetruthor falsehoodoftheelementarystatementsinquestion.Thus, assumingpandqtobeelementarystatements,the"molecular" statement"porq"istakentobeequivalentto"not(not-pandnotq)"andthismeansthatitisfalseifbothpandqarefalse,but trueinthethreeremainingcases,namelythatinwhichpandqare bothtrue,thatinwhichpistrueandqfalse,andthatinwhichpis falseandqtrue.Ingeneral,givennelementarystatements,where nisanyfinitenumber,thereare2npossibledistributionsoftruth andfalsehoodamongthem:andthemeaningofthemorecomplex statementswhichcanbeconstructedoutofthemisconstitutedby theselectionoftruthdistributionswithwhichtheyagreeor disagree. Asarule,itwillbefoundthatastatementagreeswithsometruth distributionsanddisagreeswithothers:amongthepossiblestates ofaffairswithwhichitisconcerned,somewouldmakeittrue,and otherswouldmakeitfalse.Thereare,however,twoextreme casesthatinwhichastatementagreeswitheverytruthdistribution and -11thatinwhichitagreeswithnone.Intheformercaseitistruein anycircumstanceswhatsoever,andinthelattercasefalse. AccordingtoWittgenstein,thesetwoextremesarethoseof tautologyandcontradiction.Onthisview,allthetruthsoflogicare tautologiesandifRussellandWhiteheadsucceededintheir attempttoshowthatmathematicsisreducibletologic,soarethe truthsofmathematics.Wittgensteinhimselfdidnotallowthat mathematicalstatementswere tautologieshesaidthattheywere identities:butapartfromtechnicalconsiderations,thiscomesto muchthesamething.Thepointisthatneithersayanythingabout theworld.Theonlywayinwhichtheycanaddtoourknowledge is byenablingustoderiveonestatementfromanother:thatis,by bringingouttheimplicationsofwhat,inasense,weknowalready. Tautologiessaynothingbecauseoftheirexcessivemodesty:since theyagreewitheverypossiblestateofaffairs,theymakenoclaim uponthefacts.Thus,Iobtainsomeinformation,whethertrueor false,aboutthehabitsoflionsifIamtoldthattheyare carnivorous,andequallyifIamtoldthattheyarenotbuttotell methattheyareeithercarnivorousornotistotellmenothing aboutthematall.Similarly,contradictionssaynothingbecauseof

theirexcessive cantankerousnesstodisagreewitheverypossible stateofaffairsisagaintobedisqualifiedfromgivingany information.Ilearnnothing,notevenanythingfalse,aboutthe habitsoflionsifIamtoldthattheyareandarenotcarnivorous. Onthisinterpretation,tautologiesandcontradictionsare degeneratecasesoffactualstatements.Metaphysicalassertions,on theotherhand,aremeaninglessbecausetheybearnorelationto fact.Theyarenotconstructedoutofelementarystatementsinany wayatall. SinceWittgensteindidnotsaywhathetookhiselementary statementstobe,hedidnotmakeitquiteclearatwhatpointone isdeemedtoenterintometaphysics.Itwouldseem,however,that anyattempttocharacterize realityasawhole,anysuchassertion asthattheUniverse isspiritual,orthateverythinghappensforthe bestinthebestofallpossibleworlds,mustforhimbe metaphysicalforsuchassertionsdonotdiscriminatebetween possiblestatesofaffairswithintheworld--nomatterwhathappens, itistobecharacterizedasspiritual,orregardedashappeningfor thebest--fromwhichitfollowsthattheyarenotfactual.Neitherdo theyseemtobeconstructedoutoffactualstatementsintheway thattautologiesare.Andeveniftheyweretheywouldstillsay nothing. WhatevermayhavebeenWittgenstein'sownview,hisfollowers tookitforgrantedthattheelementarystatementswhichyielded this -12criterionofmeaningwere reportsofobservations.Asweshallsee lateron,theysooncametodisagreeaboutthecharacterofthese reports.Therewasadisputeoverthequestionwhethertheywere infallible,andwhethertheyreferredtotheprivatesensationsofthe speaker,ortopublicphysicalevents.Butitwasagreedthat,inone formoranother,theyprovidedthetouchstonebyreference to whichallotherstatementswere empiricallyverified.Andsince, accordingtoWittgenstein'stheory,theyalonefurnishedthese statementswiththeirfactualcontent,theywerealsoresponsiblefor theirmeaning.Thisviewwasthensummedupinthefamous sloganthatthemeaningofapropositionisitsmethodof verification. Theassumptionbehindthissloganwasthateverythingthatcould besaidatallcouldbeexpressedintermsofelementary statements.Allstatementsofahigherorder,includingthemost abstractscientifichypotheses,wereintheendnothingmorethan shorthanddescriptionsofobservableevents.Butthisassumption wasverydifficulttosustain.Itwasparticularlyvulnerablewhenthe elementarystatementsweretakentoberecordsofthesubject's immediateexperiences:forwhileithassometimesbeen maintainedthatstatementsaboutphysicalobjectscanbefaithfully translatedintostatementsaboutsense-data,nosuchtranslation haseverbeenachieved:thereare,indeed,goodgroundsfor

supposingthatitisnotfeasible.Moreoverthischoiceofabasis raisedthequestionofsolipsismtheproblemofmakingthe transitionfromthesubject'sprivate experiencestotheexperiences ofothersandtothepublicworld.Carnap,indeed,inhisDer logischeAufbauderWelt(1928)madeavaliantattemptto reconstructourwholeapparatusofempiricalconceptsona solipsisticfoundation,takingashisstarting-pointthesingle undefinednotionofrememberedsimilarity:buthelater acknowledgedthatthisenterprisedidnotsucceed.Thepositionwas easierforthosewhotreatedelementarystatementsasdescriptions ofphysicalevents,thoughtheirrighttodothisremainedin question:theyatleastwerenottroubledbytheproblemof solipsismorbythedifficultyofreducingphysicalobjectstosensedata.Butotherdifficultiesremained.Themostseriousofall, perhaps,waspresentedbythecaseofuniversalstatementsoflaw. Forwhilethetruthofsuchastatementmaybeconfirmedbythe accumulationoffavorable instances,itisnotformallyentailedby themthepossibilitythatafurtherinstancewillrefuteitmust alwaysremainopen:andthismeansthatstatementsofthissort arenotconclusivelyverifiable.Ontheotherhand,theycanbe conclusivelyfalsifiedinthesensethatanegativeinstanceformally contradictsthem.ForthisreasonKarlPoppersuggestedinhis -13LogikderForschungthatwhatshouldberequiredofafactual statementwasjustthatitbecapableintheoryofbeingfalsified. Andhearguedthatapartfromthelogicalsuperiorityofthis criterionitwasmoreinaccordwithscientificpracticeforscientists setuphypotheseswhichtheytestbylookingforcounter-examples: whenacounter-example isdiscoveredthehypothesisisrejectedor modifiedotherwise itisretained.ButPopper'scriterionhas demeritsofitsown.Forinstance,ashehimselfrecognizes,itallows onetodenyanindefiniteexistentialstatementbutnottoaffirmit. Onecansaythattherearenoabominablesnowmen,forthiscould befalsifiedbyfindingthem,butonecannotsaythatthereare abominablesnowmen,forthiscouldnotbefalsifiedthefactthat onehadfailedtofindanywouldnotproveconclusivelythatnone existed.Whatcouldbedisprovedwouldbethatanyofthemexisted ataparticularplaceandtime,anditisonlyifthisfurther specificationisgiventhatthestatementbecomeslegitimate: otherwise itistobecountedasmetaphysical.Butthisistobring thefrontiersofmetaphysicsratherclose. Becauseofthisandotherdifficultiestheviewwhichcametoprevail amongthelogicalpositivistswasthatthedemandsthata statementbeconclusivelyverifiable,orthatitbeconclusively falsifiable,werebothtoostringentascriteriaofmeaning.They choseinsteadtobesatisfiedwithaweakercriterionbywhichitwas requiredonlythatastatementbecapableofbeinginsomedegree confirmedordisconfirmedbyobservationifitwerenotitselfan elementarystatement,ithadtobesuchthatelementary statementscouldsupportit,buttheydidnotneedtoentailitorto

entailitsnegation.Unfortunately,thisnotionof"support"or "confirmation"hasneveryetbeenadequatelyformalized.Various attemptshavebeenmadetogive"theverificationprinciple,"inthis weakerform,athoroughlypreciseexpression,buttheresultshave notbeenaltogethersatisfactory.However,theemploymentofthe principledidnotwaituponitsproperformulationitsgeneral purportwasheldtobesufficientlyclear.Ihavealreadygiven examplesofthekindofphilosophicaltalkthatitservedto eliminate:butitsdestructivenesswasnotconfinedtowhatone mightcallthegrosserformsofmetaphysics.Asemployedbythe Viennesepositivists,itmadeshortworkofmostoftheperennial problemsofphilosophy.Thus,thequestionsatissuebetween monistsandpluralists,orbetweenrealistsandidealists,were accountednolessspuriousthanquestionsaboutthelimitationsof Being,oratranscendentworldofvalues.Forwhatempiricaltest couldpossiblygotodecidewhethertheworldisone -14ormany,orwhetherthethingsthatweperceive doordonotexist outsidesomeone'smind?Itischaracteristicofsuchrival philosophicalthesesasrealismandidealismthateachisconsistent withalltheappearances,whatevertheircontentmayhappentobe. But,forthepositivist,itisjustthisthatcondemnsthem. Anobviousobjectiontotheverificationprinciple,whichthe positivists'opponentswere quicktoseizeon,isthatitisnotitself verifiable.Isupposethatitmightbetakenasanempirical hypothesisaboutthewayinwhichpeopleactuallyusetheword "meaning,"butinthatcaseitwouldappeartobefalseforitisnot contrarytoordinaryusagetosaythatmetaphysicalutterancesare meaningful.Neitherdiditssponsorsputtheprincipleforwardasthe resultofanysuchempiricalinvestigation.Butthenwhatstatusdid theythinkithad?Mightitnotitselfbemetaphysical?Surprisingly, Wittgensteinaccededtothischarge."Mypropositions,"hesaidat theendoftheTractatus,"areelucidatoryinthisway:hewho understandsmefinallyrecognizesthemassenseless,whenhehas climbedoutthroughthem,onthem,overthem.(Hemustsoto speakthrowawaytheladder,afterhehasclimbeduponit.)He mustsurmountthesepropositionsthenheseestheworldrightly." Butthisisavainattempttohaveitbothways.Nodoubtsome piecesofnonsensearemoresuggestivethanothers,butthisdoes notgivethemanylogicalforce.Iftheverificationprinciplereallyis nonsensical,itstatesnothingandifoneholdsthatitstates nothing,thenonecannotalsomaintainthatwhatitstatesistrue. TheViennaCircletendedtoignorethisdifficulty:butitseemsto mefairlyclearthatwhattheywereinfactdoingwastoadoptthe verificationprincipleasaconvention.Theywerepropoundinga definitionofmeaningwhichaccordedwithcommonusageinthe sensethatitsetouttheconditionsthatareinfactsatisfiedby statementswhichareregardedasempiricallyinformative.Their treatmentofaprioristatementswasalsointendedtoprovidean

accountofthewayinwhichsuchstatementsactuallyfunction.To thisextenttheirworkwasdescriptiveitbecameprescriptive with thesuggestionthatonlystatementsofthesetwokindsshouldbe regardedaseithertrueorfalse,andthatonlystatementswhich werecapableofbeingeithertrueorfalseshouldberegardedas literallymeaningful. Butwhyshouldthisprescriptionbeaccepted?Themostthathas beenprovedisthatmetaphysicalstatementsdonotfallintothe samecategoryasthelawsoflogic,orasscientifichypotheses,or ashistoricalnarratives,orjudgmentsofperception,oranyother commonsensedescriptionsofthe"natural"world.Surelyitdoes not -15followthattheyareneithertruenorfalse,stilllessthattheyare nonsensical? No,itdoesnotfollow.Orrather,itdoesnotfollowunlessone makesitfollow.Thequestioniswhetheronethinksthedifference betweenmetaphysicalandcommonsenseorscientificstatements tobesufficientlysharpforittobeusefultounderlineitinthisway. Thedefectofthisprocedure isthatittendstomakeoneblindto theinterestthatmetaphysicalquestionscanhave.Itsmeritisthat itremovesthetemptationtolookuponthemetaphysicianasasort ofscientificoverlord.Neitheristhisatrivialmatter.Ithasfartoo oftenbeenassumedthatthemetaphysicianwasdoingthesame workasthescientist,onlydoingitmoreprofoundlythathewas uncoveringadeeperlayeroffacts.Itisthereforeimportantto emphasizethatheisnotinthissensedescribinganyfactsatall. Butthenwhatishedoing?Whatisthepointofsaying,like McTaggart,thattimeisunrealor,likeBerkeley,thatphysical objectsareideasinthemindofGodor,likeHeidegger,thatthe "nothingnihilatesitself"?Itshouldnotbeassumedthatthereisa generalanswertothisquestion,thatmetaphysiciansarealways doingthesamesortofthing.Onemustbegininanycaseby lookingatthecontextinwhichsuchpronouncementsoccur. Heidegger'sremarkisapieceofverbiage,butitcontributesinits fashiontohisdevelopmentofthethemethatitisamatterfor wonderthattheworldexists.Whyisthereanythingatall,heasks, andnotrathernothing?Thisisindeedthekindofquestionthat peopleexpectphilosopherstoput:ithasanairofprofundityabout it.Thetroubleisthatitdoesnotadmitofanyanswer.Ontheface ofit,McTaggart'scontentionthattimeisunrealseemshardlymore sensible.Iftakenliterally,asimplyingthatnothingeverhappens,it isgrotesquelyfalse.Andifitisnottobetakenliterally,whatdoesit mean?TheansweristobefoundbylookingatMcTaggart's arguments.Heshowshimselftheretobeperplexedbytheideaof thepassageoftimehetriestoprove thatthenotionofanevent's beingsuccessivelyfuture,present,andpastinvolvesavicious infiniteregress.Theproofisinvalid,butwecanlearnsomething fromit.Indefendingouruseoftemporalexpressionsagainst

McTaggart'sargumentswemayreachaclearerunderstandingofall thatitimplies.Berkeley,again,wasconcernedtodiscoverwhat couldbemeantbysayingthatphysicalobjectsexist:heconvinced himselfbyplausibleargumentsthatwhenwespeakofphysical objectswecanbereferringonlytocollectionsof"sensible qualities,"theexistenceofwhichconsistsintheirbeingperceived andhethenbroughtinGodasthepermanentsen-16soriumwhichwasneededtokeepthingsinbeing.Hisarguments canbewithstoodbuttheydoraiseimportantphilosophical problemsaboutthemeaningandjustificationofthestatements thatwemakeaboutthe"externalworld." TheViennesepositivistswerechieflyinterestedintheformaland thenaturalsciences.Theydidnotidentifyphilosophywithscience, buttheybelievedthatitoughttocontributeinitsownwaytothe advanceofscientificknowledge.Theythereforecondemned metaphysicsbecauseitfailedtomeetthiscondition.Thelogical analystsofto-dayaremoreindulgent.Theytooareopposedto metaphysicsinsofarasitismerelyrhapsodical:eveninthesphere ofethicstheywishtodissociatephilosophyfrompreaching.But theyallowthatthemetaphysicianmaysometimesbeseeingthe worldinafreshandinterestingwayhemayhavegoodreasonfor beingdissatisfiedwithourordinaryconcepts,orforproposingto revise them.Inmanycasesnodoubtheisthevictimofalogical errorbutsucherrorsmaybeinstructive.Ifphilosophicalproblems arise,asWittgensteinthought,becauseweareledastraybycertain featuresofourlanguage,themetaphysician,byhisvery extravagancies,mayalsocontributetotheirdissolution.

III.LANGUAGEANDFACT
Withtheireliminationofmetaphysics,theViennesepositivists hopedthattheyhadalsoputthetheoryofknowledge behindthem, butinthistheywere deceived.Thefirstsourceoftroublewasthe notionofelementarystatements.Boththeircharacterandstatus becameamatterofdispute. Attheoutset,asIhavesaid,theprevailingviewwasthatthese statementsreferredtothesubject'sintrospectibleorsensory experiences.Thisviewwasadoptedbecauseitseemedtofollow fromtheequationofthemeaningofastatementwiththemethod ofitsverification.Forinthelastresortitisonlythroughsomeone's havingsomeexperience thatanystatementisactuallyverified.In mostcases,theverificationwouldconsistintheperceptionofsome physicalobjectbutitwasheld,followingRussellandultimately Berkeley,thatperceivingphysicalobjectswastobeanalyzedin termsofhavingsensations,orasRussellputit,ofsensingsensedata.Thoughphysicalobjectsmightbepubliclyaccessible,sensedatawere takentobeprivate.Therecouldbenoquestionofour literallysharingoneanother'ssense-data,anymorethanwecan literallyshareoneanother'sthoughtsorimagesorfeelings.The

resultwasthatthetruth -17ofanelementarystatementcouldbedirectlycheckedonlybythe persontowhoseexperienceitreferred.Andnotonlywashis judgmentsovereigninthemostfavorablecase,itwasheldtobe infallible.Onecanindeedbemistakenabouttheexperiencesthat oneisgoingtohaveinthefuture,orevenaboutthosethatone hashadinthepastitisnotmaintainedthatourmemoriescannot deceiveus:butifonesetsoutmerelytorecordanexperience that oneisactuallyhaving,then,onthisview,thereisnopossibilityof error.Sinceonecanlie,one'sstatementmaybefalsebutone cannotbeindoubtormistakenaboutitstruth.Ifitisfalseone knowsittobeso.Awayinwhichthispointissometimesputisby sayingthatstatementsofthiskindare"incorrigible." Thisconceptionofelementarystatementswasexposedtoattackon variousgrounds.Thereweresometowhomitseemedthatno empiricalstatementcouldbeincorrigible,inthesenserequired. Theywere therefore inclinedtomaintaineitherthatonecouldbe mistakenaboutthecharacterofone'spresentexperience,sothat thestatementswhichpurportedtorecorditwere falliblelikethe rest,orthatthese"directrecordsofexperience"werenotgenuine statements,sincetheypurchasedtheirsecurityattheexpenseof sacrificingalldescriptivecontent.Butthemostseriousdifficultylay intheprivacyoftheobjectstowhichtheelementarystatements weresupposedtorefer.Ifeachoneofusisboundtointerpretany statementasbeingultimatelyadescriptionofhisownprivate experiences,itishardtoseehowwecanevercommunicateatall. Eventospeakof"eachoneofus"istobegaquestionforitwould seemthatonthisviewthesuppositionthatotherpeopleexistcan havenomeaningformeunlessIconstrueitasahypothesisabout myownobservationsofthem,thatis,aboutthecourseofmyown actualorpossibleexperiences.ItwasmaintainedbyCarnapand othersthatthesolipsismwhichseemedtobeinvolvedinthis positionwasonlymethodologicalbutthiswaslittlemorethanan avowalofthepurityoftheirintentions.Itdidnothingtomitigate theobjectionstotheirtheory. Atfirst,itwasthoughtthatthedifficultyaboutcommunicationcould bemetbydrawingadistinctionbetweenthecontentofexperiences andtheirstructure.Content,itwasmaintained,was incommunicable.Sinceotherpeoplecannotsensemysense-data, orsharemythoughtsorfeelings,theycannotverifythestatements thatImakeaboutthemneithercanIverifythecorresponding statementsthattheymakeabouttheirexperiences.AndifIcannot verifythem,Icannotunderstandthemeither.Tothisextentwe inhabitentirelydifferentworlds.Whatcanbeverified,however,is thattheseworlds -18-

haveasimilarstructure.Ihavenomeansoftellingthatthefeeling whichanotherpersonrecordswhenhesaysthatheisinpainisat alllikethefeelingthatIcallpain:Ihavenomeansoftellingthat thecolorswhichheidentifiesbytheuseofcertainwordslookatall thesametohimasthecolorsforwhichIusethesewordslookto me.ButatleastIcanobservethatweapplythewordsonthe sameoccasions,thathisclassificationofobjectsaccordingtotheir colorcoincideswithmineIcanobservethatwhenhesaysheisin painhedisplayswhatIregardastheappropriatesigns.Andthisis allthatisrequiredforcommunication.Itdoesnotmattertome whatmyneighbour'sexperiencesactuallyare:forallthatIcan everknowtheyareutterlydifferentfrommine.Whatmattersis thatthestructure ofourrespectiveworldsissufficientlyalikefor metobeabletorelyontheinformationthathegivesme.Anditis inthissenseonlythatwehaveacommonlanguagewehave,asit were,thesamecanvaswhicheachofuspaintsinhisownprivate fashion.Itfollowsthatiftherearepropositions,likethe propositionsofscience,whichhaveaninter-subjective meaning, theymustbeinterpretedasdescriptionsofstructure. AsIhavealreadyremarked,thefundamentalobjectiontothisview isthatitinconsistentlyputsthe"private worlds"ofotherpeopleon alevelwithone'sownitresultsinacurious,andindeed contradictory,theoryofmultiplesolipsism.But,apartfromthis,the distinctionwhichittriestomakebetweencontentandstructure doesnotseemtobetenable.Forwhatwouldbeanexampleofa statementwhichreferredonlytostructure?Thereisanechohere ofLocke's"primaryqualities."Butstatementswhichrefertothe "geometrical"propertiesofobjects,to"figure,extension,number andmotion"havetobeinterpretedintermsofcontent,justas muchasstatementswhichrefertocolorsandsounds.IfIhaveno meansofknowingthatmyneighbormeansthesameasIdobyhis useofcolor-words,Ihaveequallynomeansofknowingthathe meansthesamebyhisuseofwordswhichrefertospatialrelations ortonumericalquantities.IcannottelleventhatwhatItaketobe thesamewordreallyisthesameforhim.AllthatIamleftwithis theapparentharmonyofourbehavior.Moreoveritseemsthatthe attempttodrawadistinctionwithintheboundariesofdescriptive languagebetweenwhatcanandcannotbecommunicatedmustbe self-defeating.ItleadstotheabsurditytowhichRamseydraws attentioninhisshortpaperon"Philosophy,"whichisincludedinthis volume:"thepositionofthechildinthefollowingdialogue:'Say breakfast.''Can't.''Whatcan'tyousay?''Can'tsaybreakfast.'" -19Becauseofsuchdifficulties,Neurath,andsubsequentlyCarnap, rejectedthiswholeconceptionofelementarystatements.They arguedthatifelementarystatementswere toserveasthebasisfor theintersubjective statementsofscience,theymustthemselvesbe intersubjective.Theymustrefer,nottoprivateincommunicable experiences,buttopublicphysicalevents.Moregenerally, statementswhichostensiblyrefertoexperiences,orto"mental"

statesorprocessesofanykind,whetherone'sownoranybody else's,mustallbeequivalentto"physicalstatements":foritisonly inthiswaythattheycanbepubliclyintelligible.Thisisthethesisof physicalism.Ishallnotdwelluponithere,asIhaveinsertedan articlebyCarnap,"PsychologyinPhysicalLanguage",whichsetsit outatlength. Theviewthattheywere includedin"thephysicallanguage"took awayfromelementary,or,asNeurathandCarnapcalledthem, "protocol,"statementstheirprivilegedposition.Theywereno longerthoughttobeincorrigible.Theirtruth,likethatofanyother physicalstatements,wasalwaysopentoquestion.But,morethan this,theylosteventheirjudicialstatus.Ifaprotocol-statement conflictedwithastatementofahigherorder,suchasascientific hypothesis,oneorotherofthemwouldhavetobeabandoned,but itneednotnecessarilybethescientifichypothesis:incertain circumstancesitmightbemoreconvenienttorejecttheprotocolstatementinstead. Ascanbeseenfromhispaperonthefoundationofknowledge ("berdasFundamentderErkenntnis")Schlickfoundthisconclusion unacceptable.Hearguedthattotreatthereportsofobservation, whichwaswhatprotocol-statementsweresupposedtobe,inthis cavalierfashion,wastoputscientifichypotheses,andindeedall would-beempiricalstatements,outsidethecontroloffact.Neurath andCarnap,however,werenotimpressedbythisargument.They haddecidedbythistimethatitwasmetaphysicaltotalkof comparingstatementswithfacts.Forwhatcouldthis"comparison" beifnotalogicalrelation?Andtheonlythingtowhichastatement couldstandinanylogicalrelationwasanotherstatement. Consequently,theywere ledtoadoptacoherencetheoryoftruth. Theirversionofthecoherencetheorywasinsomewaysless objectionablethanthatwhichtheHegelianidealistshadmade familiar.Evenso,forthereasonswhichIsetoutinmypaperon VerificationandExperience,itseemstomequiteuntenable. CarnaphimselfabandoneditafterhehadbeenconvincedbyTarski oftherespectabilityofsemanticsforsemanticsprovidesuswith themeansofreferringtotherelationshipbetweensentencesand whattheyareusedtosignify.Itprovides,asTarskishowed,an adequatereformu-20lationofthecorrespondencetheoryoftruth.Ontheotherhand Carnaphasnot,sofarasIknow,abandonedthethesisof physicalism.But,ifhedoesstillholdit,Ithinkthatheismistaken. Itnowseemscleartomethatstatementsabouttheexperiencesof otherscannotbelogicallyequivalenttostatementsabouttheir overtbehaviorwhiletomaintainthatthestatementswhichone makesaboutone'sownexperiencesareequivalenttostatements aboutthepubliclyobservable conditionofone'sbodyis,asRamsey putit,tofeignanaesthesia.Nevertheless,thedifficultieswhichthis thesiswasdesignedtomeetremain.Neitherisiteasytoseehow

elsetheycanbeavoided.Isuggest,however,thatmuchofthe troublemayarisefromtheacceptanceoftwofalseassumptions, thefirstbeingthatforalanguagetobepublicitmustreferto publicobjects,andthesecondthatinmakinganempirical statementoneisalwaysreferringtoone'sownexperiences.Istill thinkthatempiricalstatementsmustrefertoexperiences,inthe sensethattheymustbeverifiable butthereferenceneednotbe totheexperiencesofanyoneperson,asopposedtoanyother.But Iacknowledgethatthisattemptto"neutralize"theverification principlemeetswithconsiderabledifficultiesofitsown.

IV.ETHICS
Oneoftheattractions,especiallyforNeurath,ofthethesisof physicalismwasthatitsupportedthedoctrineoftheUnityof Science.Inoneaspect,thiswaslessofadoctrinethanaprogram itwasdesiredthatscientistsofdifferentdisciplinesshould collaboratemorecloselywitheachotherandwithphilosophersthan theyusuallydo:butitwasalsomaintainedthattheywere,or shouldbe,speakingacommonlanguage,thatthevocabularyof thesciencesshouldbeunified.Thus,theViennaCirclerejectedthe view,whichmanystillhold,thatthereisaradicaldistinction betweenthenaturalandthesocialsciences.Thescaleanddiversity ofthephenomenawithwhichthesocialsciencesdealtmadethem lesssuccessfulinestablishingscientificlaws,butthiswasadifficulty ofpractice,notofprinciple:theytoowere concernedintheend withphysicalevents. Eventhosewhodidnotacceptthethesisofphysicalismagreedthat therewasnoessentialdifferenceinaimormethodbetweenthe variousbranchesofscience.Inthesocialsciences,nolessthanin thenatural,anattemptwasmadetoformulatehypotheseswhich couldbetestedbyobservation.ThusSchlick,whoincludedethics amongthesocialsciences,deniedthatitsresultsdependedupon theuseofanyspecialfacultyofmoralintuition.Thequestions which -21ariseinethicsare,inhisopinion,questionsoffactwhypeoplehold theprinciplesthattheydo,whatitisthattheydesire,andhowtheir desirescanbefulfilled.Inshort,hisgeneralpositionisverysimilar tothatoftheUtilitarians.Ithasmuchthesamemeritsandmuch thesamedefects. TheViennaCircleasawholewasnotverygreatlyinterestedin ethicsbutitdidnotdisputeSchlick'sviewthatifethicalstatements weretobebroughtintothescientificfold,theymustbehandledin thewaythatheproposed.Theonlyquestionwaswhetherthey belongedwithinthefold,whethertheywere statementsoffactat all.Carnap,forexample,maintainedthattheywerenothesaid thattheywere disguisedimperatives.Hedidnotdevelopthis suggestion,butithassincebeengivensubstancebyR.M.Harein hisbookonTheLanguageofMorals(1952).Thisimperative theory

ofethicsmayberegardedasaversionoftheso-calledEmotive Theorywhich,mainlythroughtheworkofEnglishandAmerican philosophers,hascometobemostcloselyassociatedwithlogical positivism.Thesalientpointisthatethicalstatementsarenot descriptiveofnaturalfacts,stilllessofanallegednon-naturalworld ofvalues:theyarenotdescriptiveofanythingatall.Theproblemis thentodeterminehowtheydofunction.InC.L.Stevenson'sbook EthicsandLanguage(1944),where theemotivetheorywasfirst workedoutindetail,itwasarguedthatethicalstatementsserved thedualpurposeofexpressingtheirauthor'sapproval,or disapproval,ofwhateverwasinquestionandrecommendingothers tosharehisattitude.Helaidparticularemphasisuponthe persuasive useofethicalterms.Hisviewshavenotpassedwithout criticismevenfromthosewhosharehisgeneralstandpointbutthe alternative accountsofethicswhichthesecriticshaveputforward belong,asitwere,tothesamefamily. Indiscussionsoflogicalpositivism,thistheoryofethicsisaptto receive adisproportionatemeasureofattention,consideringthatit standsontheperipheryofthesystem.Onereasonforthisisthatit hasbeenthought,quitewrongly,thatitwasanonslaughtupon morals.Ithasevenbeenasserted,withoutashadowofempirical evidence,thatitsadvocateswerecorruptersofyouth.Infact,the theoryonlyexplorestheconsequencesofasoundandrespectable pointoflogicwhichwasalreadymadebyHumethatnormative statementsarenotderivablefromdescriptivestatements,or,as Humeputsit,that"ought"doesnotfollowfrom"is."Tosaythat moraljudgmentsarenotfact-statingisnottosaythattheyare unimportant,oreventhattherecannotbeargumentsintheir favor.Buttheseargumentsdonotworkinthewaythatlogicalor scientificargumentsdo.Itisnotasiftheintuitionistshad discoveredgroundsformoral -22judgmentswhichtheemotiviststriedtotakeaway.Onthe contrary,asMr.Strawsonshowsinhispaperon"Ethical Intuitionism,"theintuitioniststhemselvesdonotsupplyany foundationformoraljudgments.Itisthereforeonlyonpersonal groundsthattheycanbeentitledtoputthemselvesforwardasthe guardiansofvirtue.

V.PHILOSOPHICALANALYSIS
Someofthedissatisfactionthatisarousedbytheemotivetheoryof ethics,andindeedbylogicalpositivismingeneral,maybedueto thefactthatpeoplearestillinclinedtolooktophilosophyfor guidanceastothewaytheyoughttolive.Whenthisfunctionis deniedtoit,andwhenitisdeniedeventhepossibilityof penetratingtheveilofappearanceandexploringthehiddendepths ofreality,theyfeelthatitisbeingtrivialized.Ifthistime-honored programisnonsensical,whatremains?AsRamseysays, "philosophymustbeofsomeuse,andwemusttakeitseriously."

Butwhatfunctiondothepositivistsleaveittoperform? FromthepointofviewofWittgenstein'sTractatus,itsfunction wouldappeartobepurelynegative,thoughnotforthatreason unimportant."Therightmethodofphilosophy,"saidWittgenstein, "wouldbethis.Tosaynothingexceptwhatcanbesaid,i.e.the propositionsofnaturalscience,i.e.somethingthathasnothingto dowithphilosophy:andthenalways,whensomeonewishedtosay somethingmetaphysical,todemonstratetohimthathehadgiven nomeaningtocertainsignsinhispropositions.Thismethodwould beunsatisfyingtotheother--he wouldnothavethefeelingthatwe wereteachinghimphilosophy--butitwouldbetheonlystrictly correctmethod."Thisratherdepressingviewofthephilosopher's dutywasnotstrictlymaintainedbyWittgensteinhimself.The PhilosophicalInvestigationscontainsagreatdealmorethana seriesofproofsthatpeoplehavefailedtoattachanymeaningto certainsignsintheirpropositions.Neverthelessitstillgivesthe impressionthattophilosophizeistogetintoamuddle,ortorescue oneselforothersfromone.Philosophyis"abattleagainstthe bewitchmentofourintelligencebymeansoflanguage.""Whatis youraiminphilosophy?Toshowtheflythewayoutofthefly bottle."Allthesame,itismeritoriousoftheflytobethere.Itisthe criticalintelligencesthatgetthemselvesbewitched. TheTractatusleftnoroomforphilosophicalpropositions.Thewhole fieldofsignificantdiscoursewascoveredbyformalstatementson theonehandandempiricalstatementsontheother.There remainednothingforphilosophytobeabout.Itwasforthisreason -23thatWittgenstein,andalsoSchlick,maintainedthatphilosophywas notadoctrinebutanactivity.Theresultofphilosophizing,said Schlick,wouldnotbetoaccumulateastockofphilosophical propositions,buttomakeotherpropositionsclear. Buttomakepropositionsclearitmustbepossibletotalkabout them.AsRussellpointsoutinhisintroductiontotheTractatus, Wittgensteinappearednottoallowforthis,ortoallowforitonlyto alimitedextent.Heimpliedthatanattempttodescribethe structure oflanguage,asopposedtoexhibitingitinuse,must resultinnonsense.Butthoughthisconclusionmayhavebeen formallyacceptedbySchlick,itwasinpracticedisregardedbythe ViennaCircle.Thus,Carnap,inhisDerLogischeAufbauderWelt, explicitlysethimselftodescribethestructureoflanguageby devisingwhathecalleda"Konstitution-System,"inwhichthe varioustypesoflinguisticexpressions,orconcepts,wereassigned theirproperplacesinadeductivehierarchy.Ifhehadbeen questionedaboutthestatusofhisownpropositions,Isupposethat hewouldhavesaidthattheywereanalyticconsisting,astheydid, ofdefinitionsandtheirlogicalconsequences,theywouldbelongto therealmofformaltruths.Howeverthismaybe,hecertainly believedthatthesepropositionsweresignificantandhecarriedthe ViennaCirclewithhiminholdingthattheywerethesortof

propositionsthataphilosophershouldbeexpectedtoputforward. Theattempttobringphilosophywithinthedomainoflogicwas carriedfurtherbyCarnapinhisbookontheLogicalSyntaxof Language."Philosophy,"hesaysintheforewordtothisbook,"isto bereplacedbythelogicofscience--thatistosaybythelogical analysisoftheconceptsandsentencesofthesciences,forthelogic ofscienceisnothingotherthanthelogicalsyntaxofthelanguage ofscience."Thoughhespeakshereofthelanguageofscience,he doesnotholdthatthereneedbeonlyone.Alternative languagesystemsmaybedevised,andthechoicebetweenthemis amatterofconvenience:thisisanimportantdeparturefromthe positionofWittgenstein'sTractatus.AccordingtoCarnap,a languageischaracterizedbyitsformation-rules,whichspecifywhat sequencesofsignsaretocountaspropersentencesofthe language,andbyitstransformation-rules,whichlaydownthe conditionsunderwhichsentencesarevalidlyderivable fromone another.Itmightbethoughtthatifthelanguagewastohaveany empiricalapplicationitmustalsocontainmeaning-rulesruleswhich wouldcorrelate itsexpressionswithobservablestatesofaffairs:but Carnap,inthisformaliststageofhisphilosophy,thoughtthathe coulddispensewiththem.Hebelieved,quitemistakenly,that statementsofverbalequiva-24lencescoulddotheworknotonlyofsemanticstatementsbuteven ofostensivedefinitions. ItisinthisbookthatCarnapmakeshisfamousdistinctionbetween thematerialandtheformalmodesofspeech.Hedistinguishes threekindsofsentences:"object-sentences,"suchas"5isaprime number"or"Babylonwasabigtown,""pseudo-objectsentences," suchas"Five isnotathing,butanumber""Babylonwastreatedof inyesterday'slecture,"and"syntacticalsentences"suchas"'Five'is notathing-word,butanumberword.""Theword'Babylon' occurredinyesterday'slecture."Thepseudo-objectsentencesare saidtobe"quasi-syntactical,"becausetheyaresyntactical sentencesmasqueradingasobject-sentences.Theyare"quasisyntacticalsentencesofthematerialmodeofspeech."Translation fromthematerialintotheformalmodereplacesthembytheir syntacticalequivalents.Toputitlesstechnically,whenonespeaks intheformalmodeoneisovertlyspeakingaboutwordswhenone speaksinthematerialmodeoneisspeakingaboutwordswhile seemingtospeakaboutthings.Thisdistinctiondoesnotofcourse applytoobject-sentences.Carnapwasnotmaintaining,assome criticshavesupposed,thatalldiscourseisaboutwords.Whathedid appeartooverlook,however,wastheexistenceofafurther category,thatofpseudo-syntacticalsentencessentenceswhich wereaboutthingsbutseemedtobeaboutwords.Asaresult,he wasapttofallintotheerroroftreatingthesesentencesasifthey weresyntactical. Itiswiththeoppositeerrorthathereproachedmostother

philosophers.Hemaintainedthatphilosophicalstatementswere syntactical,butthattheyhadbeentreatedasiftheywere objectstatements,becauseofthefashionforexpressingtheminthe materialmodeofspeech.Thus,totakeaselectionofhisexamples, hearguedthat"Theworldisthetotalityoffacts,notofthings,"the firstpropositionofWittgenstein'sTractatus,wasequivalentto "Science isasystemofsentences,notofnames":"This circumstanceislogicallynecessary...logicallyimpossible... logicallypossible"became"Thissentenceisanalytic... contradictory...notcontradictory":Kronecker'sepigram"God createdthenaturalnumberseverythingelseinmathematicsisthe workofman"wasawayofsaying"Thenatural-numbersymbols areprimitivesymbolsothernumericalexpressionsareintroduced bydefinition.""Theonlyprimitive dataarerelationsbetween experiences"wasequivalentto"Onlytwo-ormore-termed predicateswhoseargumentsbelongtothegenusofexperienceexpressionsoccurasdescriptive primitive symbols":"Timeisinfinite inbothdirections"to"Everypositiveornegativerealnumber expressioncanbeusedasatime-co-ordinate."Eventhe -25questionofdeterminismwassaidto"concernasyntactical differenceinthesystemofnaturallaws."Inthiswayrival philosophicaltheses,iftheymadeanysenseatall,were representedasalternative proposalsaboutthewayone'slanguage shouldbeformed.Theywerenottrueorfalse,butonlymoreor lessconvenient. IthinkthatCarnap'sdistinctionbetweenthematerialandformal modeswasfruitful,inthatitcalledattentiontothefactthatmany philosophicalstatementsaredisguisedstatementsaboutlanguage. Wherehewentwrongforthemostpartwasinsupposingthatthey weresyntactical.Forwhattheyareconcernedwithisnottheform ororderofwords,buttheiruse.Thisdoesnotcomeoutin Carnap'sexamplesbecauseheillicitlysmugglessemanticsinto syntax.Thus,"experience-expressions"isnotasyntacticalterm. Whatmakesanexpressionan"experience-expression"isnotits havinganyparticularformbutitsbeingusedtorefertoan experience.Butthenthequestionwhatistocountasanexperience becomesimportant.Neitherisittobesettledbyanarbitrary decision. Inhismorerecentworks,Carnaphasrecognizedthelegitimacyof semantics,andindeeddevotedconsiderableattentionbothtothe developmentofsemantictheoryandtobuildingupsemantic systems.Aninterestingeffectofthishasbeenamarkedrelaxation ofhisphilosophicalausterity.Havingacquiredtherighttospeakof thereference ofwordstothings,hehasallowedalmostanytypeof wordtodenoteitsspecialsortofobject,thusrecreatingthe baroqueuniversewhichRussellhadlaboredtodepopulate.His defenseofthisapparentextravagance istobefoundinhispaper on"Empiricism,SemanticsandOntology,"where hedistinguishes

between"internal"questionswhicharisewithinagivenconceptual frameworkand"external"questionswhichconcernthestatusand legitimacyoftheframeworkitself.Hehimselfhasalwaysbeen chieflyinterestedintheexternalquestions:hehasthoughtithis businessasaphilosophertodeviselinguisticsystemsandelaborate conceptsthatwillbeusefultothescientist.Andnooneshoulddeny thatthisisaseriousandlegitimateactivity.Whereheiswrong,I think,isinassumingthattheexternalquestionspresentnoserious problem:thatnothingmoreisatissuethanachoiceoflinguistic forms. Itisthisdisregardofquestionsaboutthestatusofhislinguistic frameworksthatseparatesCarnapfromtheAmericanphilosophers, likeQuineandGoodman,whoresemblehimintheirsystematic approachtophilosophyandintheirpreferenceforformal techniques.Thesephilosophersareinterestedinwhattheycall ontology,thatis,inthequestionhowfarone'schoiceoflanguage commitsonetosayingthatcertainthingsexist."Tobe,"says Quine,"istobe -26thevalueofavariable":andthismeansthattheextentofwhat Russellcalledthe"furniture"oftheworlddependsupontherange ofpredicatesthatareneededtodescribeit.BothQuineand Goodmanwishthisfurnituretobeashardandspareaspossible. They"renounce abstractentities"notjustbecausetheywishto exercisetheirlogicalingenuityinseeinghowwelltheycando withoutthem,butbecausetheycannotbringthemselvestobelieve thattheyexist.Inthesamespirit,Goodmanforgoesmakingany useofthenotionofpossible,asopposedtoactual,things,orofthe distinctionbetweencausalandaccidentalconnections,orofthat betweenanalyticandsyntheticstatements."Youmay,"hesays, "decrysomeofthesescruplesandprotestthattherearemore thingsinheavenandearththanaredreamtofinmyphilosophy.I amconcerned,rather,thatthereshouldnotbemorethingsdreamt ofinmyphilosophythanthereareinheavenorearth."Itisnot clear,however,eitherinhiscaseorinQuine's,onwhatthis demandforstringenteconomyisbased.Quine,indeed,allowsin theendthatthequestionofwhatthereismustbesettledon pragmaticgrounds.AndsoherejoinsCarnapbuthispragmatism ismuchlessserene. Aninterestincategories,whichisanotherwayofapproachingthe problemofwhatthereis,ischaracteristicalsooftheBritish philosopherswhohavebeeninfluencedbythelaterworkof Wittgenstein.But,forthemostpart,theyareconcernednotso muchwithtryingtoeliminatecertaintypesofentity,orto"reduce" onetoanother,aswithbringingouttheresemblancesand differencesinthefunctioningofthestatementswhichostensibly refertothem.AtechniquewhichWittgensteinhimselfusesforthis purposeisthatofdevisingwhathecallslanguagegames.Theidea isthatbystudyingdistortedorsimplifiedmodelsofouractual

languagewecanobtainaclearerinsightintothewayitreally works.Thisisonewayofprotectingusagainsttheerror,intowhich wesoeasilyfall,ofassumingthatsomethingmustbethecase, insteadoflookingandseeingwhatactuallyisthecase."Where our languagesuggestsabodyandthereisnone,there,weshouldlike tosay,isaspirit."Butthisistoforsakedescriptionforbogus explanation.Veryoftenthementalprocesseswhichweareledto postulatejustdonotoccur.Forinstance,"itisnomoreessentialto theunderstandingofapropositionthatweshouldimagineanything inconnectionwithitthanthatweshouldmakeasketchfromit." SuchremarksforeshadowRyle'sattackuponthemythof"theghost inthemachine."AndmuchasWittgensteindislikedCarnap's methods,thereisanechoofphysicalisminhisdictumthat"an 'innerprocess'standsinneedofoutwardcriteria." -27IsupposethatWittgensteinismainlyresponsiblefortheprevalent interestinthequestionhowwordsareordinarilyused,though accounthasalsotobetakenoftheinfluenceofG.E.Moore.It doesnotseemtome,however,thatMoorehaseverbeenso greatlyconcernedwithordinaryusageassuch.Hehasbeen concernedwithupholdingthe"commonsenseview"oftheworld andwithanalyzingthepropositionswhichexemplifyitbuthehas notinsistedthatwelimitourselvestoordinaryusageincarryingout thisanalysis.Whenhedoesappealtoordinaryusageitismainlyas aweaponfordealingwithotherphilosophers.Heshowsthatiftheir wordsaretakenliterally,theyareusingthemtomakestatements whicharemanifestlyfalse.Itremainspossiblethattheyaresaying somethingquitedifferentfromwhattheywouldappeartobe saying,butthenthediscoveryoftheirmeaningpresentsaproblem. Iftheyarenotusingwordsinanyordinarysense,thesensein whichtheyareusingthemhastobemadeclear. Tomymind,themainachievementofthe"ordinary-language school"hasbeentheirexaminationanddissectionofthe "unscientific"usesoflanguage.AgoodexampleofthisisJ.L. Austin'sdescriptionofwhathecallsperformative statements: statementslike"Iknow..."or"Ipromise..."ofwhichthe purposeisnottoassertafactbuttocommitthespeakerincertain waysortooffersomesortofguarantee.Towhatimaginative lengthsthisgreaterflexibilityintheapproachtolanguagecanlead isindicatedbyDr.Waismann'spaperwhichconcludesthisvolume. Itshowsthatthecurrentconceptionofphilosophicalanalysishas spreadfarbeyondRamsey'sideaofphilosophyassimplyissuingin definitions.ButRamseywasrightinsayingthatitis"allpartofthe vitalworkofclarifyingandorganizingourthought."

VI.
IncompilingthisanthologyIhavetriedtoillustratethehistorical developmentoflogicalpositivism,therangeofitsinterestsandthe mainpointsofcontroversy.Lackofspacehasobligedmetopass

overmanypiecesthatIshouldhavelikedtoinclude.Inparticular,I amsorrytohavehadnoroomforQuine'spaperon"Truthby Convention,"inwhichthepositivists'accountofaprioristatements iseffectivelycriticized,orforCarnap'sinfluentialarticleson "TestabilityandMeaning."Itisespeciallytoberegrettedthatthe volumecontainsnothingofWittgenstein.ButneithertheTractatus LogicoPhilosophicusnorthePhilosophicalInvestigations,foralltheir episodiccharacter,isaworktowhichonecandojusticeby selectingpassages.Theyhavetobereadasawhole. -28-

LogicalAtomism
-29[Thispageintentionallyleftblank.] -30-

1 LogicalAtomism
BYBERTRANDRUSSELL THEPHILOSOPHYwhichIadvocateisgenerallyregardedasa speciesofrealism,andaccusedofinconsistencybecauseofthe elementsinitwhichseemcontrarytothatdoctrine.Formypart,I donotregardtheissuebetweenrealistsandtheiropponentsasa fundamentaloneIcouldaltermyviewonthisissuewithout changingmymindastoanyofthedoctrinesuponwhichIwishto laystress.Iholdthatlogiciswhatisfundamentalinphilosophy, andthatschoolsshouldbecharacterizedratherbytheirlogicthan bytheirmetaphysic.Myownlogicisatomic,anditisthisaspect uponwhichIshouldwishtolaystress.ThereforeIpreferto describemyphilosophyas"logicalatomism,"ratherthanas "realism,"whetherwithorwithoutsomeprefixedadjective. Afewwordsastohistoricaldevelopmentmaybeusefulbywayof preface.Icametophilosophythroughmathematics,orrather throughthewishtofindsomereasontobelieveinthetruthof mathematics.Fromearlyyouth,Ihadanardentdesiretobelieve thattherecanbesuchathingasknowledge,combinedwithagreat difficultyinacceptingmuchthatpassesasknowledge.Itseemed clearthatthebestchanceoffindingindubitabletruthwouldbein puremathematics,yetsomeofEuclid'saxiomswere obviously doubtful,andtheinfinitesimalcalculus,asIwastaughtit,wasa massofsophisms,whichIcouldnotbringmyselftoregardas anythingelse.Isawnoreasontodoubtthetruthofarithmetic,but Ididnotthenknowthatarithmeticcanbemadetoembraceall

traditionalpuremathematics.AttheageofeighteenIreadMill's Logic,butwasprofoundlydissatisfiedwithhisreasonsforaccepting arithmeticandgeometry.IhadnotreadHume,butitseemedto methatpureempiricism(whichIwasdisposedtoaccept)must leadtoscepThisessaywasRussell'scontributiontoContemporary BritishPhilosophy,firstseries(ed.J.H.Muirhead),abook publishedin1924.Itisherereprintedbythekind permissionoftheauthorandGeorgeAllenandUnwin Ltd.,London. -31ticismratherthantoMill'ssupportofreceivedscientificdoctrines.At CambridgeIreadKantandHegel,aswellasMr.Bradley'sLogic, whichinfluencedmeprofoundly.ForsomeyearsIwasadiscipleof Mr.Bradley,butabout1898Ichangedmyviews,largelyasaresult ofargumentswithG.E.Moore.Icouldnolongerbelievethat knowingmakesanydifferencetowhatisknown.AlsoIfound myselfdriventopluralism.Analysisofmathematicalpropositions persuadedmethattheycouldnotbeexplainedasevenpartial truthsunlessoneadmittedpluralismandtherealityofrelations.An accidentledmeatthistimetostudyLeibniz,andIcametothe conclusion(subsequentlyconfirmedbyCouturat'smasterly researches)thatmanyofhismostcharacteristicopinionsweredue tothepurelylogicaldoctrinethateverypropositionhasasubject andapredicate.ThisdoctrineisonewhichLeibnizshareswith Spinoza,Hegel,andMr.Bradleyitseemedtomethat,ifitis rejected,thewholefoundationforthemetaphysicsofallthese philosophersisshattered.Ithereforereturnedtotheproblem whichhadoriginallyledmetophilosophy,namely,thefoundations ofmathematics,applyingtoitanewlogicderivedlargelyfrom PeanoandFrege,whichproved(atleast,soIbelieve)farmore fruitfulthanthatoftraditionalphilosophy. Inthefirstplace,Ifoundthatmanyofthestockphilosophical argumentsaboutmathematics(derivedinthemainfromKant)had beenrenderedinvalidbytheprogressofmathematicsinthe meanwhile.Non-Euclideangeometryhadunderminedtheargument ofthetranscendentalaesthetic.Weierstrasshadshownthatthe differentialandintegralcalculusdonotrequiretheconceptionof theinfinitesimal,andthat,therefore,allthathadbeensaidby philosophersonsuchsubjectsasthecontinuityofspaceandtime andmotionmustberegardedassheererror.Cantorfreedthe conceptionofinfinitenumberfromcontradiction,andthusdisposed ofKant'santinomiesaswellasmanyofHegel's.FinallyFrege showedindetailhowarithmeticcanbededucedfrompurelogic, withouttheneedofanyfreshideasoraxioms,thusdisproving Kant'sassertionthat"7+5=12"issynthetic--atleastinthe obviousinterpretationofthatdictum.Asalltheseresultswere obtained,notbyanyheroicmethod,butbypatientdetailed reasoning,Ibegantothinkitprobablethatphilosophyhaderredin

adoptingheroicremediesforintellectualdifficulties,andthat solutionswere tobefoundmerelybygreatercareandaccuracy. ThisviewIhavecometoholdmoreandmorestronglyastime wenton,andithasledmetodoubtwhetherphilosophy,asastudy distinctfromscienceand -32possessedofamethodofitsown,isanythingmorethanan unfortunatelegacyfromtheology. Frege'sworkwasnotfinal,inthefirstplacebecauseitappliedonly toarithmetic,nottootherbranchesofmathematicsinthesecond placebecausehispremisesdidnotexcludecertaincontradictionsto whichallpastsystemsofformallogicturnedouttobeliable.Dr. WhiteheadandIincollaborationtriedtoremedythesetwodefects, inPrincipiaMathematica,which,however,stillfallsshortoffinality insomefundamentalpoints(notablytheaxiomofreducibility).But inspiteofitsshortcomingsIthinkthatnoonewhoreadsthisbook willdisputeitsmaincontention,namely,thatfromcertainideasand axiomsofformallogic,bythehelpofthelogicofrelations,allpure mathematicscanbededuced,withoutanynewundefinedideaor unprovedpropositions.Thetechnicalmethodsofmathematical logic,asdevelopedinthisbook,seemtomeverypowerful,and capableofprovidinganewinstrumentforthediscussionofmany problemsthathavehithertoremainedsubjecttophilosophic vagueness.Dr.Whitehead'sConceptofNatureandPrinciplesof NaturalKnowledgemayserveasanillustrationofwhatImean. Whenpuremathematicsisorganizedasadeductivesystem-i.e.as thesetofallthosepropositionsthatcanbededucedfroman assignedsetofpremises--itbecomesobviousthat,ifweareto believeinthetruthofpuremathematics,itcannotbesolely becausewebelieveinthetruthofthesetofpremises.Someofthe premisesaremuchlessobviousthansomeoftheirconsequences, andarebelievedchieflybecauseoftheirconsequences.Thiswillbe foundtobealwaysthecasewhenascienceisarrangedasa deductivesystem.Itisnotthelogicallysimplestpropositionsofthe systemthatarethemostobvious,orthatprovidethechiefpartof ourreasonsforbelievinginthesystem.Withtheempiricalsciences thisisevident.Electro-dynamics,forexample,canbeconcentrated intoMaxwell'sequations,buttheseequationsarebelievedbecause oftheobservedtruthofcertainoftheirlogicalconsequences. Exactlythesamethinghappensinthepurerealmoflogicthe logicallyfirstprinciplesoflogic--atleastsomeofthem--are tobe believed,notontheirownaccount,butonaccountoftheir consequences.Theepistemologicalquestion:"WhyshouldIbelieve thissetofpropositions?"isquitedifferentfromthelogicalquestion: "Whatisthesmallestandlogicallysimplestgroupofpropositions fromwhichthissetofpropositionscanbededuced?"Ourreasons forbelievinglogicandpuremathematicsare,inpart,onlyinductive and -33-

probable,inspiteofthefactthat,intheirlogicalorder,the propositionsoflogicandpuremathematicsfollowfromthe premisesoflogicbypurededuction.Ithinkthispointimportant, sinceerrorsareliabletoarisefromassimilatingthelogicaltothe epistemologicalorder,andalso,conversely,fromassimilatingthe epistemologicaltothelogicalorder.Theonlywayinwhichworkon mathematicallogicthrowslightonthetruthorfalsehoodof mathematicsisbydisprovingthesupposedantinomies.Thisshows thatmathematicsmaybetrue.Buttoshowthatmathematicsis truewouldrequireothermethodsandotherconsiderations. OneveryimportantheuristicmaximwhichDr.WhiteheadandI found,byexperience,tobeapplicableinmathematicallogic,and havesinceappliedinvariousotherfields,isaformofOckham's razor.Whensomesetofsupposedentitieshasneatlogical properties,itturnsout,inagreatmanyinstances,thatthe supposedentitiescanbereplacedbypurelylogicalstructures composedofentitieswhichhavenotsuchneatproperties.Inthat case,ininterpretingabodyofpropositionshithertobelievedtobe aboutthesupposedentities,wecansubstitutethelogicalstructures withoutalteringanyofthedetailofthebodyofpropositionsin question.Thisisaneconomy,becauseentitieswithneatlogical propertiesarealwaysinferred,andifthepropositionsinwhichthey occurcanbeinterpretedwithoutmakingthisinference,theground fortheinferencefails,andourbodyofpropositionsissecured againsttheneedofadoubtfulstep.Theprinciplemaybestatedin theform:"Whereverpossible,substituteconstructionsoutofknown entitiesforinferencestounknownentities." Theusesofthisprincipleareveryvarious,butarenotintelligiblein detailtothosewhodonotknowmathematicallogic.Thefirst instanceIcameacrosswaswhatIhavecalled"theprincipleof abstraction,"or"theprinciplewhichdispenseswithabstraction."1 Thisprincipleisapplicableinthecaseofanysymmetricaland transitive relation,suchasequality.Weareapttoinferthatsuch relationsarisefrompossessionofsomecommonquality.Thismay ormaynotbetrueprobablyitistrueinsomecasesandnotin others.Butalltheformalpurposesofacommonqualitycanbe servedbymembershipofthegroupoftermshavingthesaid relationtoagiventerm.Takemagnitude,forexample.Letus supposethatwehaveagroupofrods,allequallylong.Itiseasyto supposethatthereisacertainquality,calledtheirlength,which theyallshare.Butallpropositionsinwhichthissupposedquality occurswill ____________________ 1OurKnowledge ofthe ExternalWorld,p.42. -34retaintheirtruth-value unchangedif,insteadof"lengthoftherod

x"wetake"membershipofthegroupofallthoserodswhichareas longasx."Invariousspecialcases--e.g.thedefinitionofreal numbers--asimplerconstructionispossible. AveryimportantexampleoftheprincipleisFrege'sdefinitionofthe cardinalnumberofagivensetoftermsastheclassofallsetsthat are"similar"tothegivenset--where twosetsare"similar"when thereisaone-onerelationwhosedomainistheonesetandwhose converse domainistheother.Thusacardinalnumberistheclass ofallthoseclasseswhicharesimilartoagivenclass.Thisdefinition leavesunchangedthetruth-valuesofallpropositionsinwhich cardinalnumbersoccur,andavoidstheinferencetoasetofentities called"cardinalnumbers,"whichwereneverneededexceptforthe purposeofmakingarithmeticintelligible,andarenownolonger neededforthatpurpose. Perhapsevenmoreimportantisthefactthatclassesthemselves canbedispensedwithbysimilarmethods.Mathematicsisfullof propositionswhichseemtorequirethataclassoranaggregate shouldbeinsomesenseasingleentity--e.g.theproposition"the numberofcombinationsofnthingsanynumberatatimeis2n." Since2nisalwaysgreaterthann,thispropositionleadsto difficultiesifclassesareadmittedbecausethenumberofclassesof entitiesintheuniverseisgreaterthanthenumberofentitiesinthe universe,whichwouldbeoddifclasseswere someamongentities. Fortunatelyallthepropositionsinwhichclassesappeartobe mentionedcanbeinterpretedwithoutsupposingthatthereare classes.Thisisperhapsthemostimportantofalltheapplicationsof ourprinciple.(See PrincipiaMathematica,*20.) AnotherimportantexampleconcernswhatIcall"definite descriptions,"i.e.suchphrasesas"theevenprime,""thepresent KingofEngland,""thepresentKingofFrance."Therehasalways beenadifficultyininterpretingsuchpropositionsas"thepresent KingofFrance doesnotexist."Thedifficultyarosethrough supposingthat"thepresentKingofFrance"isthesubjectofthis proposition,whichmadeitnecessarytosupposethathesubsists althoughhedoesnotexist.Butitisdifficulttoattributeeven subsistenceto"theroundsquare"or"theevenprimegreaterthan 2."Infact,"theroundsquaredoesnotsubsist"isjustastrueas "thepresentKingofFrancedoesnotexist."Thusthedistinction betweenexistenceandsubsistencedoesnothelpus.Thefactis that,whenthewords"theso-and-so"occurinaproposition,there isnocorrespondingsingleconstituentoftheproposition,andwhen thepropositionis -35fullyanalyzedthewords"theso-and-so"havedisappeared.An importantconsequenceofthetheoryofdescriptionsisthatitis meaninglesstosay"Aexists"unless"A"is(orstandsfor)aphrase oftheform"theso-and-so."Iftheso-and-soexists,andxisthe so-and-so,tosay"xexists"isnonsense.Existence,inthesensein

whichitisascribedtosingleentities,isthusremovedaltogether fromthelistoffundamentals.Theontologicalargumentandmost ofitsrefutationsarefoundtodependuponbadgrammar.(See PrincipiaMathematica,*14.) Therearemanyotherexamplesofthesubstitutionofconstructions forinferencesinpuremathematics,forexample,series,ordinal numbers,andrealnumbers.ButIwillpassontotheexamplesin physics. Pointsandinstantsareobviousexamples:Dr.Whiteheadhas shownhowtoconstructthemoutofsetsofeventsallofwhichhave afiniteextentandafiniteduration.Inrelativitytheory,itisnot pointsorinstantsthatweprimarilyneed,butevent-particles,which correspondtowhat,inolderlanguage,mightbedescribedasa pointataninstant,oraninstantaneouspoint.(Informerdays,a pointofspaceenduredthroughoutalltime,andaninstantoftime pervadedallspace.Nowtheunitthatmathematicalphysicswants hasneitherspatialnortemporalextension.)Event-particlesare constructedbyjustthesamelogicalprocessbywhichpointsand instantswere constructed.Insuchconstructions,however,weare onadifferentplanefromthatofconstructionsinpure mathematics.Thepossibilityofconstructinganevent-particle dependsupontheexistenceofsetsofeventswithcertain propertieswhethertherequiredeventsexistcanonlybeknown empirically,ifatall.Thereisthereforenoapriorireasontoexpect continuity(inthemathematicalsense),ortofeelconfidentthat event-particlescanbeconstructed.Ifthequantumtheoryshould seemtodemandadiscretespace-time,ourlogicisjustasreadyto meetitsrequirementsastomeetthoseoftraditionalphysics,which demandscontinuity.Thequestionispurelyempirical,andourlogic is(asitoughttobe)equallyadaptedtoeitheralternative. Similarconsiderationsapplytoaparticleofmatter,ortoapieceof matteroffinitesize.Matter,traditionally,hastwoofthose"neat" propertieswhicharethemarkofalogicalconstructionfirst,that twopiecesofmattercannotbeatthesameplaceatthesame timesecondly,thatonepieceofmattercannotbeintwoplacesat thesametime.Experienceinthesubstitutionofconstructionsfor inferencesmakesonesuspiciousofanythingsotidyandexact.One -36cannothelpfeelingthatimpenetrabilityisnotanempiricalfact, derivedfromobservationofbilliard-balls,butissomethinglogically necessary.Thisfeelingiswhollyjustified,butitcouldnotbesoif matterwere notalogicalconstruction.Animmensenumberof occurrencescoexistinanylittleregionofspace-timewhenweare speakingofwhatisnotlogicalconstruction,wefindnosuch propertyasimpenetrability,but,onthecontrary,endless overlappingoftheeventsinapartofspace-time,howeversmall. Thereasonthatmatterisimpenetrableisbecauseourdefinitions makeitso.Speakingroughly,andmerelysoastogiveanotionof howthishappens,wemaysaythatapieceofmatterisallthat

happensinacertaintrackinspace-time,andthatweconstructthe trackscalledbitsofmatterinsuchawaythattheydonotintersect. Matterisimpenetrablebecauseitiseasiertostatethelawsof physicsifwemakeourconstructionssoastosecure impenetrability.Impenetrabilityisalogicallynecessaryresultof definition,thoughthefactthatsuchadefinitionisconvenientis empirical.Bitsofmatterarenotamongthebricksoutofwhichthe worldisbuilt.Thebricksareevents,andbitsofmatterareportions ofthestructure towhichwefinditconvenienttogiveseparate attention. Inthephilosophyofmentaloccurrencestherearealso opportunitiesfortheapplicationofourprincipleofconstructions versusinferences.Thesubject,andtherelationofacognitionto whatisknown,bothhavethatschematicqualitythatarousesour suspicions.Itisclearthatthesubject,ifitistobepreservedatall, mustbepreservedasaconstruction,notasaninferredentitythe onlyquestioniswhetherthesubjectissufficientlyusefultobe worthconstructing.Therelationofacognitiontowhatisknown, again,cannotbeastraightforwardsingleultimate,asIatonetime believedittobe.AlthoughIdonotagreewithpragmatism,Ithink WilliamJameswasrightindrawingattentiontothecomplexityof "knowing."Itisimpossibleinageneralsummary,suchasthe present,tosetoutthereasonsforthisview.Butwhoeverhas acquiescedinourprinciplewillagreethathereisprimafacieacase forapplyingit.MostofmyAnalysisofMindconsistsofapplications ofthisprinciple.Butaspsychologyisscientificallymuchless perfectedthanphysics,theopportunitiesforapplyingtheprinciple arenotsogood.Theprincipledepends,foritsuse,uponthe existenceofsomefairlyreliablebodyofpropositions,whichareto beinterpretedbythelogicianinsuchawayastopreserve their truthwhileminimizingtheelementofinferencetounobserved entities.Theprinciplethereforepresupposesamoderately advancedscience,intheabsence -37ofwhichthelogiciandoesnotknowwhatheoughttoconstruct. Untilrecently,itwouldhaveseemednecessarytoconstruct geometricalpointsnowitisevent-particlesthatarewanted.In viewofsuchachangeinanadvancedsubjectlikephysics,itisclear thatconstructionsinpsychologymustbepurelyprovisional. Ihavebeenspeakinghithertoofwhatitisnotnecessarytoassume aspartoftheultimateconstituentsoftheworld.Butlogical constructions,likeallotherconstructions,require materials,anditis timetoturntothepositivequestion,astowhatthesematerialsare tobe.Thisquestion,however,requiresasapreliminarya discussionoflogicandlanguageandtheirrelationtowhattheytry torepresent. Theinfluenceoflanguageonphilosophyhas,Ibelieve,been profoundandalmostunrecognized.Ifwearenottobemisledby thisinfluence,itisnecessarytobecomeconsciousofit,andtoask

ourselvesdeliberatelyhowfaritislegitimate.Thesubjectpredicate logic,withthesubstance-attribute metaphysic,areacaseinpoint. Itisdoubtfulwhethereitherwouldhavebeeninventedbypeople speakinganon-Aryanlanguagecertainlytheydonotseemtohave ariseninChina,exceptinconnectionwithBuddhism,whichbrought Indianphilosophywithit.Again,itisnatural,totakeadifferent kindofinstance,tosupposethatapropernamewhichcanbeused significantlystandsforasingleentitywesupposethatthereisa certainmoreorlesspersistentbeingcalled"Socrates,"becausethe samenameisappliedtoaseriesofoccurrenceswhichweareled toregardasappearancesofthisonebeing.Aslanguagegrows moreabstract,anewsetofentitiescomeintophilosophy,namely, thoserepresentedbyabstractwords--the universals.Idonotwish tomaintainthattherearenouniversals,butcertainlythereare manyabstractwordswhichdonotstandforsingleuniversals--e.g. triangularityandrationality.Intheserespectslanguagemisleadsus bothbyitsvocabularyandbyitssyntax.Wemustbeonourguard inbothrespectsifourlogicisnottoleadtoafalsemetaphysic. Syntaxandvocabularyhavehaddifferentkindsofeffectson philosophy.Vocabularyhasmostinfluenceoncommonsense.It mightbeurged,conversely,thatcommonsenseproducesour vocabulary.Thisisonlypartiallytrue.Awordisappliedatfirstto thingswhicharemoreorlesssimilar,withoutanyreflectionasto whethertheyhaveanypointofidentity.Butwhenonceusagehas fixedtheobjectstowhichthewordistobeapplied,commonsense isinfluencedbytheexistenceoftheword,andtendstosup-38posethatonewordmuststandforoneobject,whichwillbea universalinthecaseofanadjectiveoranabstractword.Thusthe influenceofvocabularyistowardsakindofplatonicpluralismof thingsandideas. Theinfluenceofsyntax,inthecaseoftheIndo-European languages,isquitedifferent.Almostanypropositioncanbeputinto aforminwhichithasasubjectandapredicate,unitedbya copula.Itisnaturaltoinferthateveryfacthasacorresponding form,andconsistsinthepossessionofaqualitybyasubstance. Thisleads,ofcourse,tomonism,sincethefactthattherewere severalsubstances(ifitwere afact)wouldnothavetherequisite form.Philosophers,asarule,believethemselvesfreefromthis sortofinfluenceoflinguisticforms,butmostofthemseemtome tobemistakeninthisbelief.Inthinkingaboutabstractmatters,the factthatthewordsforabstractionsarenomoreabstractthan ordinarywordsalwaysmakesiteasiertothinkaboutthewords thanaboutwhattheystandfor,anditisalmostimpossibletoresist consistentlythetemptationtothinkaboutthewords. Thosewhodonotsuccumbtothesubject-predicatelogicareaptto getonlyonestepfurther,andadmitrelationsoftwoterms,suchas before-and-after,greater-and-less,right-and-left.Languagelends itselftothisextensionofthesubject-predicatelogic,sincewesay

'"AprecedesB,""AexceedsB,"andsoon.Itiseasytoprovethat thefactexpressedbyapropositionofthissortcannotconsistofthe possessionofaqualitybyasubstance,orofthepossessionoftwo ormorequalitiesbytwoormoresubstances.(See Principlesof Mathematics,214.)Theextensionofthesubject-predicatelogicis therefore rightsofarasitgoes,butobviouslyafurtherextension canbeprovednecessarybyexactlysimilararguments.Howfaritis necessarytogouptheseriesofthreeterm,four-term,five-term.. .relationsIdonotknow.Butitiscertainlynecessarytogobeyond two-termrelations.Inprojectivegeometry,forexample,theorder ofpointsonalineorofplanesthroughalinerequiresafour-term relation. Averyunfortunateeffectofthepeculiaritiesoflanguageisin connectionwithadjectivesandrelations.Allwordsareofthesame logicaltypeawordisaclassofseries,ofnoisesorshapes accordingasitisheardorread.Butthemeaningsofwordsareof variousdifferenttypesanattribute(expressedbyanadjective)is ofadifferenttypefromtheobjectstowhichitcanbe(whether trulyorfalsely)attributedarelation(expressedperhapsbya preposition,perhapsbyatransitiveverb,perhapsinsomeother way)is -39ofadifferenttypefromthetermsbetweenwhichitholdsordoes nothold.Thedefinitionofalogicaltypeisasfollows:AandBare ofthesamelogicaltypeif,andonlyif,givenanyfactofwhichAis aconstituent,thereisacorrespondingfactwhichhasBasa constituent,whicheitherresultsbysubstitutingBforA,oristhe negationofwhatsoresults.Totakeanillustration,Socratesand Aristotle areofthesametype,because"Socrateswasa philosopher"and"Aristotle wasaphilosopher"arebothfacts SocratesandCaligulaareofthesametype,because"Socrateswas aphilosopher"and"Caligulawasnotaphilosopher"arebothfacts. Toloveandtokillareofthesametype,because"Platoloved Socrates"and"PlatodidnotkillSocrates"arebothfacts.Itfollows formallyfromthedefinitionthat,whentwowordshavemeanings ofdifferenttypes,therelationsofthewordstowhattheymeanare ofdifferenttypesthatistosay,thereisnotonerelationof meaningbetweenwordsandwhattheystandfor,butasmany relationsofmeaning,eachofadifferentlogicaltype,asthereare logicaltypesamongtheobjectsforwhichtherearewords.Thisfact isaverypotentsourceoferrorandconfusioninphilosophy.In particular,ithasmadeitextraordinarilydifficulttoexpressinwords anytheoryofrelationswhichislogicallycapableofbeingtrue, becauselanguagecannotpreserve thedifferenceoftypebetween arelationanditsterms.Mostoftheargumentsforandagainstthe realityofrelationshavebeenvitiatedthroughthissourceof confusion. Atthispoint,Iproposetodigressforamoment,andtosay,as shortlyasIcan,whatIbelieveaboutrelations.Myownviewson

thesubjectofrelationsinthepastwere lessclearthanIthought them,butwere bynomeanstheviewswhichmycriticssupposed themtobe.Owingtolackofclearnessinmyownthoughts,Iwas unabletoconveymymeaning.Thesubjectofrelationsisdifficult, andIamfarfromclaimingtobenowclearaboutit.ButIthink certainpointsarecleartome.AtthetimewhenIwroteThe PrinciplesofMathematics,Ihadnotyetseenthenecessityoflogical types.Thedoctrineoftypesprofoundlyaffectslogic,andIthink showswhat,exactly,isthevalidelementintheargumentsofthose whooppose"external"relations.Butsofarfromstrengtheningtheir mainposition,thedoctrineoftypesleads,onthecontrary,toa morecompleteandradicalatomismthananythatIconceivedtobe possibletwentyyearsago.Thequestionofrelationsisoneofthe mostimportantthatariseinphilosophy,asmostotherissuesturn onit:monismandpluralismthequestionwhetheranythingis whollytrueexceptthewholeoftruth,orwhollyrealexceptthe -40wholeofrealityidealismandrealism,insomeoftheirforms perhapstheveryexistenceofphilosophyasasubjectdistinctfrom scienceandpossessingamethodofitsown.Itwillservetomake mymeaningclearifItakeapassageinMr.Bradley'sEssayson TruthandReality,notforcontroversialpurposes,butbecauseit raisesexactlytheissuesthatoughttoberaised.ButfirstofallIwill trytostatemyownview,withoutargument.2 Certaincontradictions--ofwhichthesimplestandoldestistheone aboutEpimenidestheCretan,whosaidthatallCretanswereliars, whichmaybereducedtothemanwhosays"Iamlying"-convinced me,afterfiveyearsdevotedmainlytothisonequestion,thatno solutionistechnicallypossiblewithoutthedoctrineoftypes.Inits technicalform,thisdoctrinestatesmerelythatawordorsymbol mayformpartofasignificantproposition,andinthissensehave meaning,withoutbeingalwaysabletobesubstitutedforanother wordorsymbolinthesameorsomeotherpropositionwithout producingnonsense.Statedinthisway,thedoctrinemayseemlike atruism."BrutuskilledCaesar"issignificant,but"Killedkilled Caesar"isnonsense,sothatwecannotreplace"Brutus"by"killed," althoughbothwordshavemeaning.Thisisplaincommonsense, butunfortunatelyalmostallphilosophyconsistsinanattemptto forgetit.Thefollowingwords,forexample,bytheirverynature, sinagainstit:attribute,relation,complex,fact,truth,falsehood, not,liar,omniscience.Togiveameaningtothesewords,wehave tomakeadetourbywayofwordsorsymbolsandthedifferent waysinwhichtheymaymeanandeventhen,weusuallyarrive, notatonemeaning,butataninfiniteseriesofdifferentmeanings. Words,aswesaw,areallofthesamelogicaltypethereforewhen themeaningsoftwowordsareofdifferenttypes,therelationsof thetwowordstowhattheystandforarealsoofdifferenttypes. Attribute-wordsandrelation-wordsareofthesametype,therefore wecansaysignificantly"attribute-wordsandrelationwordshave differentuses."Butwecannotsaysignificantly"attributesarenot

relations."Byourdefinitionoftypes,sincerelationsarerelations, theformofwords"attributesarerelations"mustbenotfalse,but meaningless,andtheformofwords"attributesarenotrelations," similarly,mustbenottrue,butmeaningless.Nevertheless,the statement"attribute-wordsarenotrelation-words"issignificantand true. ____________________ 2Iam muchindebtedtomyfriendWittgensteininthismatter.See hisTractatusLogico-Philosophicus,KeganPaul,1922.Idonot acceptallhisdoctrines,butmydebttohimwillbeobviousto thosewhoreadhisbook. -41Wecannowtacklethequestionofinternalandexternalrelations, rememberingthattheusualformulations,onbothsides,are inconsistentwiththedoctrineoftypes.Iwillbeginwithattemptsto statethedoctrineofexternalrelations.Itisuselesstosay"terms areindependentoftheirrelations,"because"independent"isa wordwhichmeansnothing.Twoeventsmaybesaidtobecausally independentwhennocausalchainleadsfromonetotheotherthis happens,inthespecialtheoryofrelativity,whentheseparation betweentheeventsisspace-like.Obviouslythissenseof "independent"isirrelevant.If,whenwesay"termsare independentoftheirrelations,"wemean"twotermswhichhavea givenrelationwouldbethesameiftheydidnothaveit,"thatis obviouslyfalsefor,beingwhattheyare,theyhavetherelation, andtherefore whateverdoesnothavetherelationisdifferent.If wemean--asopponentsofexternalrelationssupposeustomean-thattherelationisathirdtermwhichcomesbetweentheother twotermsandissomehowhookedontothem,thatisobviously absurd,forinthatcasetherelationhasceasedtobearelation, andallthatistrulyrelationalisthehookingoftherelationtothe terms.Theconceptionoftherelationasathirdtermbetweenthe othertwosinsagainstthedoctrineoftypes,andmustbeavoided withtheutmostcare. What,then,canwemeanbythedoctrineofexternalrelations? Primarilythis,thatarelationalpropositionisnot,ingeneral, logicallyequivalentformallytooneormoresubject-predicate propositions.Statedmoreprecisely:Givenarelationalpropositional function"xRy,"itisnotingeneralthecasethatwecanfind predicates,,,suchthat,forallvaluesofxandy,xRyis equivalenttox,y,(x,y)g(where (x,y)standsforthewhole consistingofxandy),ortoanyoneortwoofthese.This,andthis only,iswhatImeantoaffirmwhenIassertthedoctrineof externalrelationsandthis,clearly,isatleastpartofwhatMr. Bradleydenieswhenheassertsthedoctrineofinternalrelations. Inplaceof"unities"or"complexes,"Iprefertospeakof"facts."It mustbeunderstoodthattheword"fact"cannotoccursignificantly inanypositioninasentencewheretheword"simple"canoccur significantly,norcanafactoccurwhereasimplecanoccur.We

mustnotsay"factsarenotsimples."Wecansay,"Thesymbolfor afactmustnotreplacethesymbolforasimple,orviceversa,if significanceistobepreserved."Butitshouldbeobservedthat,in thissentence,theword"for"hasdifferentmeaningsonthetwo occasionsofitsuse.Ifwearetohavealanguagewhichistosafe-42guardusfromerrorsastotypes,thesymbolforafactmustbea proposition,notasinglewordorletter.Factscanbeassertedor denied,butcannotbenamed.(WhenIsay"factscannotbe named,"thisis,strictlyspeaking,nonsense.Whatcanbesaid withoutfallingintononsenseis:"Thesymbolforafactisnota name.")Thisillustrateshowmeaningisadifferentrelationfor differenttypes.Thewaytomeanafactistoassertitthewayto meanasimpleistonameit.Obviouslynamingisdifferentfrom asserting,andsimilardifferencesexistwheremoreadvancedtypes areconcerned,thoughlanguagehasnomeansofexpressingthe differences. TherearemanyothermattersinMr.Bradley'sexaminationofmy viewswhichcallforreply.Butasmypresentpurposeisexplanatory ratherthancontroversial,Iwillpassthemby,having,Ihope, alreadysaidenoughonthequestionofrelationsandcomplexesto makeitclearwhatisthetheorythatIadvocate.Iwillonlyadd,as regardsthedoctrineoftypes,thatmostphilosophersassumeit nowandthen,andfewwoulddenyit,butthatall(sofarasIknow) avoidformulatingitpreciselyordrawingfromitthosedeductions thatareinconvenientfortheirsystems. IcomenowtosomeofMr.Bradley'scriticisms(loc.cit.,p.280ff.). Hesays: "Mr.Russell'smainpositionhasremainedtomyself incomprehensible.OntheonesideIamledtothinkthat hedefendsastrictpluralism,forwhichnothingis admissiblebeyondsimpletermsandexternalrelations. OntheothersideMr.Russellseemstoassert emphatically,andtousethroughout,ideaswhichsucha pluralismsurelymustrepudiate.Hethroughoutstands uponunitieswhicharecomplexandwhichcannotbe analysedintotermsandrelations.Thesetwopositionsto mymindareirreconcilable,sincethesecond,asI understandit,contradictsthefirstflatly." Withregardtoexternalrelations,myviewistheoneIhavejust stated,nottheonecommonlyimputedbythosewhodisagree.But withregardtounities,thequestionismoredifficult.Thetopicis onewithwhichlanguage,byitsverynature,ispeculiarlyunfittedto deal.Imustbegthereader,therefore,tobeindulgentifwhatI sayisnotexactlywhatImean,andtotrytoseewhatImeanin spiteofunavoidablelinguisticobstaclestoclearexpression. Tobeginwith,Idonotbelievethattherearecomplexesorunities

inthesamesenseinwhichtherearesimples.Ididbelievethis whenIwrote ThePrinciplesofMathematics,but,onaccountofthe doctrineoftypes,Ihavesinceabandonedthisview.To -43speakloosely,Iregardsimplesandcomplexesasalwaysof differenttypes.Thatistosay,thestatements"There aresimples" and"There arecomplexes"usethewords"there are"indifferent senses.ButifIusethewords"there are"inthesensewhichthey haveinthestatement"there aresimples,"thentheformofwords "there arenotcomplexes"isneithertruenorfalse,but meaningless.Thisshowshowdifficultitistosayclearly,inordinary language,whatIwanttosayaboutcomplexes.Inthelanguageof mathematicallogicitismucheasiertosaywhatIwanttosay,but muchhardertoinducepeopletounderstandwhatImeanwhenI sayit. WhenIspeakof"simples"IoughttoexplainthatIamspeakingof somethingnotexperiencedassuch,butknownonlyinferentiallyas thelimitofanalysis.Itisquitepossiblethat,bygreaterlogicalskill, theneedforassumingthemcouldbeavoided.Alogicallanguage willnotleadtoerrorifitssimplesymbols(i.e.thosenothavingany partsthataresymbols,oranysignificantstructure)allstandfor objectsofsomeonetype,eveniftheseobjectsarenotsimple.The onlydrawbacktosuchalanguageisthatitisincapableofdealing withanythingsimplerthantheobjectswhichitrepresentsbysimple symbols.ButIconfessitseemsobvioustome(asitdidtoLeibniz) thatwhatiscomplexmustbecomposedofsimples,thoughthe numberofconstituentsmaybeinfinite.Itisalsoobviousthatthe logicalusesoftheoldnotionofsubstance(i.e.thoseuseswhichdo notimplytemporalduration)canonlybeapplied,ifatall,to simplesobjectsofothertypesdonothavethatkindofbeingwhich oneassociateswithsubstances.Theessenceofasubstance,from thesymbolicpointofview,isthatitcanonlybenamed--inoldfashionedlanguage,itneveroccursinapropositionexceptasthe subjectorasoneofthetermsofarelation.Ifwhatwetaketobe simpleisreallycomplex,wemaygetintotroublebynamingit, whenwhatweoughttodoistoassertit.Forexample,ifPlato lovesSocrates,thereisnotanentity"Plato'sloveforSocrates,"but onlythefactthatPlatolovesSocrates.Andinspeakingofthisas"a fact,"wearealreadymakingitmoresubstantialandmoreofa unitythanwehaveanyrighttodo. Attributesandrelations,thoughtheymaybenotsusceptibleof analysis,differfromsubstancesbythefactthattheysuggesta structure,andthattherecanbenosignificantsymbolwhich symbolizestheminisolation.Allpropositionsinwhichanattribute orarelationseemstobethesubjectareonlysignificantiftheycan bebroughtintoaforminwhichtheattributeisattributedorthe relationrelates.Ifthiswerenotthecase,therewouldbesignificant -44-

propositionsinwhichanattributeorarelationwouldoccupya positionappropriatetoasubstance,whichwouldbecontrarytothe doctrineoftypes,andwouldproducecontradictions.Thusthe propersymbolfor"yellow"(assumingforthesakeofillustration thatthisisanattribute)isnotthesingleword"yellow,"butthe propositionalfunction"xisyellow,"wherethestructureofthe symbolshowsthepositionwhichtheword"yellow"musthaveifitis tobesignificant.Similarlytherelation"precedes"mustnotbe representedbythisoneword,butbythesymbol"xprecedesy," showingthewayinwhichthesymbolcanoccursignificantly.(Itis hereassumedthatvaluesarenotassignedtoxandywhenweare speakingoftheattributeorrelationitself.) Thesymbolforthesimplestpossiblekindoffactwillstillbeofthe form"xisyellow"or"xprecedesy,"onlythat"x"and"y"willbeno longerundeterminedvariables,butnames. Inadditiontothefactthatwedonotexperience simplesassuch, thereisanotherobstacletotheactualcreationofacorrectlogical languagesuchasIhavebeentryingtodescribe.Thisobstacleis vagueness.Allourwordsaremoreorlessinfectedwithvagueness, bywhichImeanthatitisnotalwaysclearwhethertheyapplytoa givenobjectornot.Itisofthenatureofwordstobemoreorless general,andnottoapplyonlytoasingleparticular,butthatwould notmakethemvagueiftheparticularstowhichtheyappliedwere adefiniteset.Butthisisneverthecaseinpractice.Thedefect, however,isonewhichitiseasytoimagineremoved,however difficultitmaybetoremoveitinfact. Thepurposeoftheforegoingdiscussionofanideallogicallanguage (whichwouldofcoursebewhollyuselessfordailylife)istwofold: first,topreventinferencesfromthenatureoflanguagetothe natureoftheworld,whicharefallaciousbecausetheydependupon thelogicaldefectsoflanguagesecondly,tosuggest,byinquiring whatlogicrequiresofalanguagewhichistoavoidcontradiction, whatsortofastructure wemayreasonablysupposetheworldto have.IfIamright,thereisnothinginlogicthatcanhelpusto decidebetweenmonismandpluralism,orbetweentheviewthat thereareultimaterelationalfactsandtheviewthattherearenone. Myowndecisioninfavorofpluralismandrelationsistakenon empiricalgrounds,afterconvincingmyselfthattheapriori argumentstothecontraryareinvalid.ButIdonotthinkthese argumentscanbeadequatelyrefutedwithoutathoroughtreatment oflogicaltypes,ofwhichtheaboveisameresketch. Thisbringsme,however,toaquestionofmethodwhichI -45believetobeveryimportant.Whatarewetotakeasdatain philosophy?Whatshallweregardashavingthegreatestlikelihood ofbeingtrue,andwhataspropertoberejectedifitconflictswith otherevidence?Itseemstomethatsciencehasamuchgreater

likelihoodofbeingtrueinthemainthananyphilosophyhitherto advanced(Idonot,ofcourse,exceptmyown).Insciencethere aremanymattersaboutwhichpeopleareagreedinphilosophy therearenone.Therefore,althougheachpropositioninascience maybefalse,anditispracticallycertainthattherearesomethat arefalse,yetweshallbewisetobuildourphilosophyuponscience, becausetheriskoferrorinphilosophyisprettysuretobegreater thaninscience.Ifwecouldhopeforcertaintyinphilosophythe matterwouldbeotherwise,butsofarasIcanseesuchahope wouldbechimerical. Ofcoursethosephilosopherswhosetheories,primafacie,run countertosciencealwaysprofesstobeabletointerpretscienceso thatitshallremaintrueonitsownlevel,withthatminordegreeof truthwhichoughttocontentthehumblescientist.Thosewho maintainapositionofthissortarebound--soitseemstome--to showindetailhowtheinterpretationistobeeffected.Inmany cases,Ibelievethatthiswouldbequiteimpossible.Idonot believe,forinstance,thatthosewhodisbelieveintherealityof relations(insomesuchsenseasthatexplainedabove)canpossibly interpretthosenumerouspartsofsciencewhichemploy asymmetricalrelations.EvenifIcouldseenowayofansweringthe objectionstorelationsraised(forexample)byMr.Bradley,Ishould stillthinkitmorelikelythannotthatsomeanswerwaspossible, becauseIshouldthinkanerrorinaverysubtleandabstract argumentmoreprobablethansofundamentalafalsehoodin science.Admittingthateverythingwebelieveourselvestoknowis doubtful,itseems,nevertheless,thatwhatwebelieveourselvesto knowinphilosophyismoredoubtfulthanthedetailofscience, thoughperhapsnotmoredoubtfulthanitsmostsweeping generalizations. Thequestionofinterpretationisofimportanceforalmostevery philosophy,andIamnotatallinclinedtodenythatmanyscientific resultsrequireinterpretationbeforetheycanbefittedintoa coherentphilosophy.Themaximof"constructionsversus inferences"isitselfamaximofinterpretation.ButIthinkthatany validkindofinterpretationoughttoleavethedetailunchanged, thoughitmaygiveanewmeaningtofundamentalideas.In practice,thismeansthatstructuremustbepreserved.Andatest ofthisisthatallthepropositionsofascienceshouldremain, thoughnewmean-46ingsmaybefoundfortheirterms.Acaseinpoint,ona nonphilosophicallevel,istherelationofthephysicaltheoryoflight toourperceptionsofcolor.Thisprovidesdifferentphysical occurrencescorrespondingtodifferentseencolors,andthusmakes thestructure ofthephysicalspectrumthesameasthatofwhatwe seewhenwelookatarainbow.Unlessstructureispreserved,we cannotvalidlyspeakofaninterpretation.Andstructureisjustwhat isdestroyedbyamonisticlogic.

Idonotmean,ofcourse,tosuggestthat,inanyregionofscience, thestructure revealedatpresentbyobservationisexactlythat whichactuallyexists.Onthecontrary,itisinthehighestdegree probablethattheactualstructureismorefine-grainedthanthe observedstructure.Thisappliesjustasmuchtopsychologicalasto physicalmaterial.Itrestsuponthefactthat,where weperceive a difference(e.g.betweentwoshadesofcolor),thereisadifference, butwhere wedonotperceive adifferenceitdoesnotfollowthat thereisnotadifference.Wehavethereforearight,inall interpretation,todemandthepreservationofobserveddifferences, andtheprovisionofroomforhithertounobserveddifferences, althoughwecannotsayinadvancewhattheywillbe,exceptwhen theycanbeinferentiallyconnectedwithobserveddifferences. Inscience,structure isthemainstudy.Alargepartofthe importanceofrelativitycomesfromthefactthatithassubstituted asinglefour-dimensionalmanifold(space-time)forthetwo manifolds,three-dimensionalspaceandone-dimensionaltime.This isachangeofstructure,andthereforehasfar-reaching consequences,butanychangewhichdoesnotinvolve achangeof structure doesnotmakemuchdifference.Themathematical definitionandstudyofstructure(underthenameof"relationnumbers")formPartIVofPrincipiaMathematica. Thebusinessofphilosophy,asIconceiveit,isessentiallythatof logicalanalysis,followedbylogicalsynthesis.Philosophyismore concernedthananyspecialsciencewithrelationsofdifferent sciencesandpossibleconflictsbetweentheminparticular,it cannotacquiesceinaconflictbetweenphysicsandpsychology,or betweenpsychologyandlogic.Philosophyshouldbe comprehensive,andshouldbeboldinsuggestinghypothesesasto theuniversewhichscienceisnotyetinapositiontoconfirmor confute.Buttheseshouldalwaysbepresentedashypotheses,not (asistoooftendone)asimmutablecertaintieslikethedogmasof religion.Although,moreover,comprehensiveconstructionispartof thebusinessofphilosophy,Idonotbelieveitisthemostimportant part.Themostimportantpart, -47tomymind,consistsincriticizingandclarifyingnotionswhichare apttoberegardedasfundamentalandaccepteduncritically.As instancesImightmention:mind,matter,consciousness, knowledge,experience,causality,will,time.Ibelieveallthese notionstobeinexactandapproximate,essentiallyinfectedwith vagueness,incapableofformingpartofanyexactscience.Outof theoriginalmanifoldofevents,logicalstructurescanbebuiltwhich willhavepropertiessufficientlylikethoseoftheabovecommon notionstoaccountfortheirprevalence,butsufficientlyunliketo allowagreatdealoferrortocreepinthroughtheiracceptanceas fundamental. Isuggestthefollowingasanoutlineofapossiblestructureofthe worlditisnomorethananoutline,andisnotofferedasmore

thanpossible. Theworldconsistsofanumber,perhapsfinite,perhapsinfinite,of entitieswhichhavevariousrelationstoeachother,andperhaps alsovariousqualities.Eachoftheseentitiesmaybecalledan "event"fromthepointofviewofold-fashionedphysics,anevent occupiesashortfinitetimeandasmallfiniteamountofspace,but aswearenotgoingtohaveanold-fashionedspaceandan oldfashionedtime,thisstatementcannotbetakenatitsfacevalue. Everyeventhastoacertainnumberofothersarelationwhichmay becalled"compresence"fromthepointofviewofphysics,a collectionofcompresenteventsalloccupyonesmallregionin spacetime.Oneexampleofasetofcompresenteventsiswhat wouldbecalledthecontentsofoneman'smindatonetime--i.e.all hissensations,images,memories,thoughts,etc.,whichcancoexist temporally.Hisvisualfieldhas,inonesense,spatialextension,but thismustnotbeconfusedwiththeextensionofphysicalspacetimeeverypartofhisvisualfieldiscompresentwitheveryother part,andwiththerestof"thecontentsofhismind"atthattime, andacollectionofcompresenteventsoccupiesaminimalregionin space-time.Therearesuchcollectionsnotonlywherethereare brains,buteverywhere.Atanypointin"emptyspace,"anumberof starscouldbephotographedifacamerawereintroducedwe believethatlighttravelsovertheregionsintermediatebetweenits sourceandoureyes,andthereforesomethingishappeningin theseregions.Iflightfromanumberofdifferentsourcesreachesa certainminimalregioninspace-time,thenatleastoneevent correspondingtoeachofthesesourcesexistsinthisminimal region,andalltheseeventsarecompresent. Wewilldefineasetofcompresenteventsasa"minimalregion." Wefindthatminimalregionsformafour-dimensionalmanifold, -48andthat,byalittlelogicalmanipulation,wecanconstructfrom themthemanifoldofspace-timethatphysicsrequires.Wefindalso that,fromanumberofdifferentminimalregions,wecanoftenpick outasetofevents,onefromeach,whicharecloselysimilarwhen theycomefromneighboringregions,andvaryfromoneregionto anotheraccordingtodiscoverablelaws.Thesearethelawsofthe propagationoflight,sound,etc.Wefindalsothatcertainregionsin space-timehavequitepeculiarpropertiesthesearetheregions whicharesaidtobeoccupiedby"matter."Suchregionscanbe collected,bymeansofthelawsofphysics,intotracksortubes, verymuchmoreextendedinonedimensionofspace-timethanin theotherthree.Suchatubeconstitutesthe"history"ofapieceof matterfromthepointofviewofthepieceofmatteritself,the dimensioninwhichitismostextendedcanbecalled"time,"butitis onlytheprivate timeofthatpieceofmatter,becauseitdoesnot correspondexactlywiththedimensioninwhichanotherpieceof matterismostextended.Notonlyisspace-timeverypeculiarwithin apieceofmatter,butitisalsoratherpeculiarinitsneighborhood,

growinglesssoasthespatio-temporaldistancegrowsgreaterthe lawofthispeculiarityisthelawofgravitation. Allkindsofmattertosomeextent,butsomekindsofmatter(viz. nervoustissue)moreparticularly,areliabletoform"habits,"i.e.to altertheirstructure inagivenenvironmentinsuchawaythat, whentheyaresubsequentlyinasimilarenvironment,theyreactin anewway,butifsimilarenvironmentsrecuroften,thereactionin theendbecomesnearlyuniform,whileremainingdifferentfrom thereactiononthefirstoccasion.(WhenIspeakofthereactionof apieceofmattertoitsenvironment,Iamthinkingbothofthe constitutionofthesetofcompresenteventsofwhichitconsists, andofthenatureofthetrackinspace-timewhichconstituteswhat weshouldordinarilycallitsmotionthesearecalleda"reactionto theenvironment"insofarastherearelawscorrelatingthemwith characteristicsoftheenvironment.)Outofhabit,thepeculiaritiesof whatwecall"mind"canbeconstructedamindisatrackofsetsof compresenteventsinaregionofspace-timewhere thereismatter whichispeculiarlyliabletoformhabits.Thegreatertheliability,the morecomplexandorganizedthemindbecomes.Thusamindand abrainarenotreallydistinct,butwhenwespeakofamindweare thinkingchieflyofthesetofcompresenteventsintheregion concerned,andoftheirseveralrelationstoothereventsforming partsofotherperiodsinthehistoryofthespatio-temporaltube whichweareconsidering,whereaswhenwespeakofabrainwe -49aretakingthesetofcompresenteventsasawhole,and consideringitsexternalrelationstoothersetsofcompresent events,alsotakenaswholesinaword,weareconsideringthe shapeofthetube,nottheeventsofwhicheachcross-sectionofit iscomposed. Theabovesummaryhypothesiswould,ofcourse,needtobe amplifiedandrefinedinmanywaysinordertofitincompletely withscientificfacts.Itisnotputforwardasafinishedtheory,but merelyasasuggestionofthekindofthingthatmaybetrue.Itis ofcourseeasytoimagineotherhypotheseswhichmaybetrue,for example,thehypothesisthatthereisnothingoutsidetheseriesof setsofeventsconstitutingmyhistory.Idonotbelievethatthereis anymethodofarrivingatonesolepossiblehypothesis,and therefore certaintyinmetaphysicsseemstomeunattainable.In thisrespectImustadmitthatmanyotherphilosophieshavethe advantage,sinceinspiteoftheirdifferencesinterse,eacharrives atcertaintyofitsownexclusive truth. -50-

Philosophy,

MetaphysicsandMeaning
-51[Thispageintentionallyleftblank.] -52-

TheTurningPointinPhilosophy
ByMORITZSCHLICK (TRANSLATEDBYDAVIDRYNIN) FROMTIMEtotimeprizeshavebeenestablishedforessaysonthe questionwhatprogressphilosophyhasmadeinagivenperiod.The periodtendstobelimitedontheonesidebythenameofsome greatthinker,ontheotherby"thepresent."Itwasthusassumed thatthereissomedegreeofclarityregardingthephilosophic progressofmankinduptothetimeofthatthinker,butthatitis dubiouswhatfurthercontributionshavebeenmadeinrecenttimes. Suchquestionsclearlyexpressacertainmistrustconcerningthe philosophyoftheperiodwhichhadrecentlyelapsed.Onehasthe impressionofbeingpresentedonlywithanembarrassed formulationofthequestion:Hasphilosophyinthatperiodmade anyprogresswhatever?Forifonewere surethatcontributionshad beenmadeonewouldalsoknowinwhattheyconsisted. Ifthemoreremotepastisregardedwithlessscepticismandoneis ratherinclinedtoseeinitsphilosophyacontinuousdevelopment, theexplanationmaybethatone'sattitudetowardseverything whoseplaceisestablishedinhistoryistingedwithgreaterrespect. Afurtherpointisthattheolderphilosophershaveatleast demonstratedtheirhistoricalinfluence.Henceinconsideringthem onecantakeasone'sbasetheirhistoricalratherthantheir substantiveimportance,especiallysinceoneoftendoesnotventure todistinguishbetweenthetwo. Butitisjusttheablestthinkerswhomostrarelyhavebelievedthat theresultsofearlierphilosophizing,includingthatoftheclassical models,remainunshakable.Thisisshownbythefactthatbasically everynewsystemstartsagainfromthebeginning,thatevery thinker "DieWendeDerPhilosophie",asthispieceiscalledin German,openedthefirstnumberofVolumeIof Erkenntnis(1930/31).Itisherepublishedwiththekind permissionofMrs.SchlickandProfessorCarnap,thecoeditorofErkenntnis. -53-

seekshisownfoundationanddoesnotwishtostandonthe shouldersofhispredecessors.Descartes(notwithoutreason)felt himselftobemakingawhollynewbeginningSpinozabelievedthat inintroducingthe(tobesurequiteadventitious)mathematicalform hehadfoundtheultimatephilosophicalmethodandKantwas convincedthatonthebasisofthewaytakenbyhimphilosophy wouldatlastadoptthesurepathofascience.Furtherexamples aresuperfluous,forpracticallyallgreatthinkershavesoughtfora radicalreformofphilosophyandconsidereditessential. Thispeculiarfateofphilosophyhasbeensooftendescribedand bemoanedthatitisindeedpointlesstodiscussitatall.Silent scepticismandresignationseemtobetheonlyappropriate attitudes.Twothousandyearsofexperience seemtoteachthat effortstoputanendtothechaosofsystemsandtochangethe fateofphilosophycannolongerbetakenseriously.Topointout thatmanhasfinallysucceededinsolvingthemoststubborn problems,forexamplethatofDaedelus,givesaninformedperson nocomfortforwhathefearsisjustthatphilosophywillnever arrive atagenuine"problem." Irefertothisanarchyofphilosophicalopinionswhichhassooften beendescribed,inordertoleavenodoubtthatIamfullyconscious ofthescopeandweightysignificanceoftheconvictionthatIshould nowliketoexpress.ForIamconvincedthatwenowfindourselves atanaltogetherdecisiveturningpointinphilosophy,andthatwe areobjectivelyjustifiedinconsideringthatanendhascometothe fruitlessconflictofsystems.Wearealreadyatthepresenttime,in myopinion,inpossessionofmethodswhichmakeeverysuch conflictinprincipleunnecessary.Whatisnowrequiredistheir resoluteapplication. Thesemethodshavebeenquietlydeveloped,unnoticedbythe majorityofthosewhoteachorwritephilosophyandthusa situationhasbeencreatedwhichisnotcomparabletoanyearlier one.Thatthesituationisuniqueandthattheturningembarked uponisreallydecisivecanbeunderstoodonlybybecoming acquaintedwiththenewpathsandbylookingback,fromthe standpointtowhichtheylead,uponallthoseeffortsthathaveever passedas"philosophical." Thepathshavetheirorigininlogic.Leibnizdimlysawtheir beginning.BertrandRussellandGottlobFrege haveopenedup importantstretchesinthelastdecades,butLudwigWittgenstein(in hisTractatusLogico-Philosophicus,1922)isthefirsttohavepushed forwardtothedecisiveturningpoint. Itiswellknownthatinrecentdecadesmathematicianshave developednewlogicalmethods,atfirstprimarilyforthesolution -54-

oftheirownproblemswhichcouldnotbeovercomebythe traditionalmethodsoflogic.Butthelogicthusdevelopedhasalso longsinceshownitssuperiorityinotherwaysovertheoldforms, anddoubtlesswillverysoonsupplantthem.WasIreferringtothis logicasthepowerfulmeanswhichisinprinciplecapableofraising usaboveallphilosophicalconflicts?Doesitgiveusgeneralrules withthosehelpallthetraditionalproblemsofphilosophycanat leastinprincipleberesolved? Ifthiswere soIshouldhardlyhavehadtherighttosaythata whollynewsituationhadbeencreated.Forthentherewouldhave beenonlyagradual,asitwere,technicalprogress,asforexample, whentheinventionoftheinternalcombustionenginefinallymade possiblethesolutionoftheproblemofflight.Howeverhighlythe valueofthenewmethodsistobeesteemed,itisplainthatnothing sofundamentalcanbebroughtaboutbythemeredevelopmentof amethod.Thegreatturningpointisthereforenottobeattributed tologicitselfbuttosomethingquitedifferentwhichwasindeed stimulatedandmadepossiblebyit,butwhichproceedsonamuch deeperlevel:theinsightintothenatureoflogicitself. Thatthelogicalisinsomesensethepurelyformalhasbeen expressedearlyandoftenhowever,onewasnotreallyclear concerningthenatureofpureforms.Thecluetotheirnatureisto befoundinthefactthateverycognitionisanexpressionor representation.Thatis,itexpressesafactwhichiscognizedinit. Thiscanhappeninanynumberofways,inanylanguage,by meansofanyarbitrarysystemofsigns.Allthesepossiblemodesof representation--iftheyotherwiseactuallyexpressthesame knowledge-musthavesomethingincommonandwhatiscommon tothemistheirlogicalform. Soallknowledgeissuchonlybyvirtueofitsform.Itisthroughits formthatitrepresentsthefactknown.Buttheformcannotitselfin turnberepresented.Italoneisconcernedincognition.Everything elseintheexpressionisinessentialandaccidentalmaterial,not different,say,fromtheinkbymeansofwhichwewritedowna statement. Thissimpleinsighthasconsequencesoftheverygreatest importance.Aboveall,itenablesustodisposeofthetraditional problemsof"thetheoryofknowledge."Investigationsconcerning thehuman"capacityforknowledge,"insofarastheydonot becomepartofpsychology,arereplacedbyconsiderations regardingthenatureofexpression,ofrepresentation,i.e. concerningeverypossible"language"inthemostgeneralsenseof theterm.Questions -55regardingthe"validityandlimitsofknowledge"disappear. Everythingisknowable whichcanbeexpressed,andthisisthetotal subjectmatterconcerningwhichmeaningfulquestionscanbe raised.Thereareconsequentlynoquestionswhichareinprinciple

unanswerable,noproblemswhichareinprincipleinsoluble.What havebeenconsideredsuchuptonowarenotgenuinequestions, butmeaninglesssequencesofwords.Tobesure,theylooklike questionsfromtheoutside,sincetheyseemtosatisfythe customaryrulesofgrammar,butintruththeyconsistofempty sounds,becausetheytransgresstheprofoundinnerrulesoflogical syntaxdiscoveredbythenewanalysis. Whereverthereisameaningfulproblemonecanintheoryalways givethepaththatleadstoitssolution.Foritbecomesevidentthat givingthispathcoincideswiththeindicationofitsmeaning.The practicalfollowingoutofthispathmayofcoursebehinderedby factualcircumstances--bydeficienthumancapacities,forexample. Theactofverificationinwhichthepathtothesolutionfinallyends isalwaysofthesamesort:itistheoccurrenceofadefinitefact thatisconfirmedbyobservation,bymeansofimmediate experience.Inthismannerthetruth(orfalsity)ofeverystatement, ofdailylifeorscience,isdetermined.Thereisthusnoothertesting andcorroborationoftruthsexceptthroughobservationand empiricalscience.Everyscience,(insofaraswetakethiswordto refertothecontentandnottothehumanarrangementsfor arrivingatit)isasystemofcognitions,thatis,oftrueexperiential statements.Andthetotalityofsciences,includingthestatementsof dailylife,isthesystemofcognitions.Thereis,inadditiontoit,no domainof"philosophical"truths.Philosophyisnotasystemof statementsitisnotascience. Butwhatisitthen?Well,certainlynotascience,butnevertheless somethingsosignificantandimportantthatitmayhenceforth,as before,behonoredastheQueenoftheSciences.Foritisnowhere writtenthattheQueenoftheSciencesmustitselfbeascience.The greatcontemporaryturningpointischaracterizedbythefactthat weseeinphilosophynotasystemofcognitions,butasystemof actsphilosophyisthatactivitythroughwhichthemeaningof statementsisrevealedordetermined.Bymeansofphilosophy statementsareexplained,bymeansofsciencetheyareverified. Thelatterisconcernedwiththetruthofstatements,theformer withwhattheyactuallymean.Thecontent,soulandspiritof scienceislodgednaturallyinwhatinthelastanalysisitsstatements actuallymeanthephilosophicalactivityofgivingmeaningis therefore theAlphaandOmegaofallscientificknowledge.Thiswas indeedcorrectlysurmisedwhen -56itwassaidthatphilosophysuppliedboththefoundationandthe apexoftheedificeofscience.Itwasamistake,however,to supposethatthefoundationwasmadeupof"philosophical" statements(thestatementsoftheoryofknowledge),andcrowned byadomeofphilosophicalstatements(calledmetaphysics). Itiseasytoseethatthetaskofphilosophydoesnotconsistin assertingstatements--thatbestowingmeaninguponstatements cannotbedoneinturnbystatements.Forif,say,Igivethe

meaningofmywordsthroughexplanatorystatementsand definitions,thatisbyhelpofotherwords,onemustaskfurtherfor themeaningofthesewords,andsoon.Thisprocesscannot proceedendlessly.Italwayscomestoanendinactualpointings,in exhibitingwhatismeant,thusinrealactsonlytheseactsareno longercapableof,orinneedof,furtherexplanation.Thefinal givingofmeaningalwaystakesplacetherefore,throughdeeds.It isthesedeedsoractswhichconstitutephilosophicalactivity. Itwasoneofthemostseriouserrorsofformertimestohave believedthattheactualmeaningandultimatecontentwasinturn tobeformulatedinstatements,andsowasrepresentable in cognitions.Thiswastheerrorof"metaphysics."Theeffortsof metaphysicianswere alwaysdirectedupontheabsurdendof expressingthecontentofpurequality(the"essence"ofthings)by meansofcognitions,henceofutteringtheunutterable.1Qualities cannotbe"said."Theycanonlybeshowninexperience.Butwith thisshowing,cognitionhasnothingtodo. Thusmetaphysicscollapsesnotbecausethesolvingofitstasksisan enterprise towhichthehumanreasonisunequal(asforexample Kantthought)butbecausethereisnosuchtask.Withthedisclosure ofthemistakenformulationoftheproblemthehistoryof metaphysicalconflictislikewiseexplained. Ifourconceptionisingeneralcorrectwemustbeabletoestablish ithistorically.Itwouldhavetobecapableofgivingsomeaccountof thechangeinmeaningoftheword"philosophy." Nowthisisactuallythecase.Ifinancienttimes,andactuallyuntil recently,philosophywassimplyidenticalwitheverypurely theoreticalscientificinvestigation,thispointstothefactthatscience founditselfinastateinwhichitsawitsmaintaskstillinthe clarificationofitsfundamentalconcepts.Theemancipationofthe specialsciencesfromtheircommonmother,philosophy,indicates thatthemeaningofcertainfundamentalconceptsbecameclear enoughtomakesuccessfulfurtherworkwiththempossible.If, today,ethics ____________________ 1See myarticle "Erleben,Erkennen,Metaphysik",Kantstudien,Vol. 31(1930). -57andaesthetics,andfrequentlyalsopsychology,areconsidered branchesofphilosophy,thisisasignthatthesestudiesdonotyet possesssufficientlyclearbasicconcepts,thattheireffortsarestill chieflydirecteduponthemeaningoftheirstatements.Finally,if withinawell-establishedsciencethenecessitysuddenlyarisesat somepointofreflectinganewonthetruemeaningofthe fundamentalconcepts,andtherebyamoreprofoundclarificationof theirmeaningisachieved,thiswillbefeltatonceasaneminent philosophicalachievement.Allareagreedthat,forinstance,

Einstein'swork,proceedingfromananalysisofthemeaningof statementsabouttimeandspace,wasactuallyaphilosophical achievement.Hereweshouldaddthatthedecisiveepoch-making forwardstepsofsciencearealwaysofthischaractertheysignifya clarificationofthemeaningofthefundamentalstatementsandonly thosesucceedinthemwhoareendowedforphilosophicalactivity. Thegreatinvestigatorisalsoalwaysaphilosopher. Frequentlyalsothenameofphilosophyisbestowedonmental activitieswhichhaveastheirconcernnotpureknowledge butthe conductoflife.Thisisreadilyunderstandable.Forthewiseman risesabovetheuncomprehendingmassjustbyvirtueofthefact thathecanpointoutmoreclearlythantheythemeaningof statementsandquestionsconcerningliferelationships,factsand desires. Thegreatturningpointofphilosophysignifiesalsoadecisive turningawayfromcertainerroneouspathswhichhavebeen embarkeduponsincethesecondhalfofthe19thcenturyandwhich mustleadtoquiteawrongassessmentandevaluationof philosophy.Imeantheattemptstoclaimforitaninductive characterandaccordinglytobelievethatitconsistssolelyof statementsofhypotheticalvalidity.Theideaofclaimingonly probabilityforitsstatementswasremotefromearlierthinkers. Theywouldhaverejecteditasincompatiblewiththedignityof philosophy.Inthiswasexpressedahealthyinstinctforthefactthat philosophymustsupplytheultimatesupportofknowledge.The reverse sideofthemedalisthedogmathatphilosophysupplies unconditionallytrueaprioriaxioms,whichwemustregardasan extremelyunfortunateexpressionofthisinstinct,particularlysince philosophydoesnotconsistofstatementsatall.Butwetoobelieve inthedignityofphilosophyanddeemincompatiblewithitthe characterofbeinguncertainandonlyprobableandwearehappy thatthedecisiveturningpointmakesitimpossibletoattributeany suchcharactertoit.Fortheconceptofprobabilityoruncertaintyis simplynotapplicabletotheactsofgivingmeaningwhichconstitute philosophy.Itisamatterofpositingthemeaningofstatementsas something -58simplyfinal.Eitherwehavethismeaning,andthenweknowwhat ismeantbythestatement,orwedonotpossessit,inwhichcase mereemptywordsconfrontus,andasyetnostatementatall. Thereisnothinginbetweenandtherecanbenotalkofthe probabilitythatthemeaningistherightone.Thusafterthegreat turningpointphilosophyshowsitsdecisivecharacterevenmore clearlythanbefore. Itisonly,indeed,becauseofthischaracterthattheconflictof systemscanbeended.Irepeat:inconsequenceoftheinsights whichIhavesketchedwemaytodayconsideritasinprinciple alreadyended.Ihopethatthismaybecomeincreasinglyclearin

thepagesofthisjournal*inthenewperiodofitsexistence. Certainlytherewillstillbemanyarear-guardaction.Certainly manywillforcenturiescontinuetowanderfurtheralongthe traditionalpaths.Philosophicalwriterswilllongcontinuetodiscuss theoldpseudo-questions.Butintheendtheywillnolongerbe listenedtotheywillcometoresembleactorswhocontinuetoplay forsometimebeforenoticingthattheaudiencehasslowly departed.Thenitwillnolongerbenecessarytospeakof "philosophicalproblems"foronewillspeakphilosophically concerningallproblems,thatis:clearlyandmeaningfully. ____________________ *Sc.Erkenntnis,Ed. -59-

TheEliminationofMetaphysics ThroughLogicalAnalysis ofLanguage


ByRUDOLFCARNAP (TRANSLATEDBYARTHURPAP)

1.INTRODUCTION
THEREHAVEBEENmanyopponentsofmetaphysicsfromtheGreek skepticstotheempiricistsofthe19thcentury.Criticismsofvery diverse kindshavebeensetforth.Manyhavedeclaredthatthe doctrineofmetaphysicsisfalse,sinceitcontradictsourempirical knowledge.Othershavebelievedittobeuncertain,ontheground thatitsproblemstranscendthelimitsofhumanknowledge.Many antimetaphysicianshavedeclaredthatoccupationwithmetaphysical questionsissterile.Whetherornotthesequestionscanbe answered,itisatanyrateunnecessarytoworryaboutthemletus devoteourselvesentirelytothepracticaltaskswhichconfrontactive meneverydayoftheirlives! Thedevelopmentofmodernlogichasmadeitpossibletogivea newandsharperanswertothequestionofthevalidityand justificationofmetaphysics.Theresearchesofappliedlogicorthe theoryofknowledge,whichaimatclarifyingthecognitivecontent ofscientificstatementsandtherebythemeaningsofthetermsthat occurinthestatements,bymeansoflogicalanalysis,leadtoa positiveandtoanegativeresult.Thepositiveresultisworkedout inthedomainofempiricalsciencethevariousconceptsofthe variousbranchesofscienceareclarifiedtheirformal-logicaland epistemologicalconnectionsaremadeexplicit.Inthedomainof metaphysics, Thisarticle,originallyentitled"berwindungder MetaphysikdurchLogischeAnalyse derSprache",

appearedinErkenntnis,Vol.II(1932).Itispublished herewiththekindpermissionofProfessorCarnap. -60includingallphilosophyofvalueandnormativetheory,logical analysisyieldsthenegativeresultthattheallegedstatementsin thisdomainareentirelymeaningless.Therewitharadical eliminationofmetaphysicsisattained,whichwasnotyetpossible fromtheearlierantimetaphysicalstandpoints.Itistruethatrelated ideasmaybefoundalreadyinseveralearliertrainsofthought,e.g. thoseofanominalistickindbutitisonlynowwhenthe developmentoflogicduringrecentdecadesprovidesuswitha sufficientlysharptoolthatthedecisivestepcanbetaken. Insayingthattheso-calledstatementsofmetaphysicsare meaningless,weintendthiswordinitsstrictestsense.Inaloose senseofthewordastatementoraquestionisattimescalled meaninglessifitisentirelysteriletoassertoraskit.Wemightsay thisforinstanceaboutthequestion"whatistheaverageweightof thoseinhabitantsofViennawhosetelephonenumberendswith '3'?"oraboutastatementwhichisquiteobviouslyfalselike"in 1910Viennahad6inhabitants"oraboutastatementwhichisnot justempirically,butlogicallyfalse,acontradictorystatementsuch as"personsAandBareeachayearolderthantheother."Such sentencesarereallymeaningful,thoughtheyarepointlessorfalse foritisonlymeaningfulsentencesthatareevendivisibleinto (theoretically)fruitfulandsterile,trueandfalse.Inthestrictsense, however,asequenceofwordsismeaninglessifitdoesnot,within aspecifiedlanguage,constituteastatement.Itmayhappenthat suchasequenceofwordslookslikeastatementatfirstglancein thatcasewecallitapseudostatement.Ourthesis,now,isthat logicalanalysisrevealstheallegedstatementsofmetaphysicstobe pseudo-statements. Alanguageconsistsofavocabularyandasyntax,i.e.asetof wordswhichhavemeaningsandrulesofsentenceformation.These rulesindicatehowsentencesmaybeformedoutofthevarious sortsofwords.Accordingly,therearetwokindsofpseudostatements:eithertheycontainawordwhichiserroneously believedtohavemeaning,ortheconstituentwordsaremeaningful, yetareputtogetherinacounter-syntacticalway,sothattheydo notyieldameaningfulstatement.Weshallshowintermsof examplesthatpseudo-statementsofbothkindsoccurin metaphysics.Laterweshallhavetoinquireintothereasonsthat supportourcontentionthatmetaphysicsinitsentiretyconsistsof suchpseudo-statements.

2.THESIGNIFICANCEOFAWORD
Awordwhich(withinadefinitelanguage)hasameaning,isusually alsosaidtodesignateaconceptifitonlyseemstohavea -61-

meaningwhileitreallydoesnot,wespeakofa"pseudo-concept." Howistheoriginofapseudo-concepttobeexplained?Hasnot everywordbeenintroducedintothelanguagefornootherpurpose thantoexpresssomethingorother,sothatithadadefinite meaningfromtheverybeginningofitsuse?How,then,cana traditionallanguagecontainmeaninglesswords?Tobesure, originallyeveryword(exceptingrarecaseswhichweshallillustrate later)hadameaning.Inthecourseofhistoricaldevelopmenta wordfrequentlychangesitsmeaning.Anditalsohappensattimes thatawordlosesitsoldsensewithoutacquiringanewone.Itis thusthatapseudo-conceptarises.What,now,isthemeaningofa word?Whatstipulationsconcerningawordmustbemadeinorder forittobesignificant?(Itdoesnotmatterforourinvestigation whetherthesestipulationsareexplicitlylaiddown,asinthecaseof somewordsandsymbolsofmodernscience,orwhethertheyhave beentacitlyagreedupon,asisthecaseformostwordsof traditionallanguage.)First,thesyntaxofthewordmustbefixed, i.e.themodeofitsoccurrenceinthesimplestsentenceformin whichitiscapableofoccurringwecallthissentenceformits elementarysentence.Theelementarysentenceformfortheword "stone"e.g.is"xisastone"insentencesofthisformsome designationfromthecategoryofthingsoccupiestheplaceof"x," e.g."thisdiamond,""thisapple."Secondly,foranelementary sentenceScontainingthewordananswermustbegiventothe followingquestion,whichcanbeformulatedinvariousways: 1. WhatsentencesisSdeduciblefrom,andwhatsentencesare deduciblefromS? 2. UnderwhatconditionsisSsupposedtobetrue,andunderwhat conditionsfalse? 3. HowisStobeverified? 4. WhatisthemeaningofS? (1)isthecorrectformulationformulation(2)accordswiththe phraseologyoflogic,(3)withthephraseologyofthetheoryof knowledge,(4)withthatofphilosophy(phenomenology). Wittgensteinhasassertedthat(2)expresseswhatphilosophers meanby(4):themeaningofasentenceconsistsinitstruthcondition.((1)isthe"metalogical"formulationitisplannedtogive elsewhere adetailedexpositionofmetalogicasthetheoryofsyntax andmeaning,i.e.relationsofdeducibility.) Inthecaseofmanywords,specificallyinthecaseofthe overwhelmingmajorityofscientificwords,itispossibletospecify theirmeaningbyreductiontootherwords("constitution," definition). -62E.g."'arthropodes'areanimalswithsegmentedbodiesandjointed legs."Therebytheabove-mentionedquestionfortheelementary sentenceformoftheword"arthropode,"thatisforthesentence

form"thethingxisanarthropode,"isanswered:ithasbeen stipulatedthatasentenceofthisformisdeduciblefrompremises oftheform"xisananimal,""xhasasegmentedbody,""xhas jointedlegs,"andthatconverselyeachofthesesentencesis deduciblefromtheformersentence.Bymeansofthesestipulations aboutdeducibility(inotherwords:aboutthetruth-condition,about themethodofverification,aboutthemeaning)oftheelementary sentenceabout"arthropode"themeaningoftheword"arthropode" isfixed.Inthiswayeverywordofthelanguageisreducedtoother wordsandfinallytothewordswhichoccurintheso-called "observationsentences"or"protocolsentences."Itisthroughthis reductionthatthewordacquiresitsmeaning. Forourpurposeswemayignoreentirelythequestionconcerning thecontentandformoftheprimarysentences(protocolsentences) whichhasnotyetbeendefinitelysettled.Inthetheoryof knowledgeitiscustomarytosaythattheprimarysentencesrefer to"thegiven"butthereisnounanimityonthequestionwhatitis thatisgiven.Attimesthepositionistakenthatsentencesaboutthe givenspeakofthesimplestqualitiesofsenseandfeeling(e.g. "warm,""blue,""joy"andsoforth)othersinclinetotheviewthat basicsentencesrefertototalexperiencesandsimilaritiesbetween themastilldifferentviewhasitthateventhebasicsentences speakofthings.Regardlessofthisdiversityofopinionitiscertain thatasequenceofwordshasameaningonlyifitsrelationsof deducibilitytotheprotocolsentencesarefixed,whateverthe characteristicsoftheprotocolsentencesmaybeandsimilarly,that awordissignificantonlyifthesentencesinwhichitmayoccurare reducibletoprotocolsentences. Sincethemeaningofawordisdeterminedbyitscriterionof application(inotherwords:bytherelationsofdeducibilityentered intobyitselementarysentence-form,byitstruth-conditions,bythe methodofitsverification),thestipulationofthecriteriontakes awayone'sfreedomtodecidewhatonewishesto"mean"bythe word.Ifthewordistoreceive anexactmeaning,nothinglessthan thecriterionofapplicationmustbegivenbutonecannot,onthe otherhand,givemorethanthecriterionofapplication,forthe latterisasufficientdeterminationofmeaning.Themeaningis implicitlycontainedinthecriterionallthatremainstobedoneisto makethemeaningexplicit. Letussuppose,bywayofillustration,thatsomeoneinvented -63thenewword"teavy"andmaintainedthattherearethingswhich areteavyandthingswhicharenotteavy.Inordertolearnthe meaningofthisword,weaskhimaboutitscriterionofapplication: howisonetoascertaininaconcretecasewhetheragiventhingis teavyornot?Letussupposetobeginwiththatwegetnoanswer fromhim:therearenoempiricalsignsofteavyness,hesays.In thatcasewewoulddenythelegitimacyofusingthisword.Ifthe personwhousesthewordsaysthatallthesametherearethings

whichareteavyandtherearethingswhicharenotteavy,onlyit remainsfortheweak,finiteintellectofmananeternalsecretwhich thingsareteavyandwhicharenot,weshallregardthisasempty verbiage.Butperhapshewillassureusthathemeans,afterall, somethingbytheword"teavy."Butfromthisweonlylearnthe psychologicalfactthatheassociatessomekindofimagesand feelingswiththeword.Theworddoesnotacquireameaning throughsuchassociations.Ifnocriterionofapplicationfortheword isstipulated,thennothingisassertedbythesentencesinwhichit occurs,theyarebutpseudo-statements.Secondly,takethecase whenwearegivenacriterionofapplicationforanewword,say "toovy"inparticular,letthesentence"thisthingistoovy"betrueif andonlyifthethingisquadrangular(Itisirrelevantinthiscontext whetherthecriterionisexplicitlystatedorwhetherwederive itby observingtheaffirmative andthenegativeusesoftheword).Then wewillsay:theword"toovy"issynonymouswiththeword "quadrangular."Andwewillnotallowitsuserstotellusthat neverthelessthey"intended"somethingelsebyitthan "quadrangular"thatthougheveryquadrangularthingisalsotoovy andconversely,thisisonlybecausequadrangularityisthevisible manifestationoftoovyness,butthatthelatteritselfisahidden,not itselfobservable property.Wewouldreplythatafterthecriterionof applicationhasbeenfixed,thesynonymyof"toovy"and "quadrangular"islikewisefixed,andthatwearenofurtherat libertyto"intend"thisorthatbytheword.Letusbrieflysummarize theresultofouranalysis.Let"a"beanywordand"S(a)"the elementarysentenceinwhichitoccurs.Thenthesufficientand necessaryconditionfor"a"beingmeaningfulmaybegivenbyeach ofthefollowingformulations,whichultimatelysaythesamething: 1. Theempiricalcriteriaforaareknown. 2. Ithasbeenstipulatedfromwhatprotocolsentences"S(a)"is deducible. -643. Thetruth-conditionsfor"S(a)"arefixed. 4. Themethodofverificationof"S(a)"isknown.1

3.METAPHYSICALWORDSWITHOUTMEANING
Manywordsofmetaphysics,now,canbeshownnottofulfillthe aboverequirement,andtherefore tobedevoidofmeaning. Letustakeasanexamplethemetaphysicalterm"principle"(inthe senseofprincipleofbeing,notprincipleofknowledge oraxiom). Variousmetaphysiciansofferananswertothequestionwhichisthe (highest)"principleoftheworld"(orof"things,"of"existence,"of "being"),e.g.water,number,form,motion,life,thespirit,the idea,theunconscious,activity,thegood,andsoforth.Inorderto discoverthemeaningoftheword"principle"inthismetaphysical questionwemustaskthemetaphysicianunderwhatconditionsa statementoftheform"xistheprincipleofy"wouldbetrueand underwhatconditionsitwouldbefalse.Inotherwords:weaskfor thecriteriaofapplicationorforthedefinitionoftheword

"principle."Themetaphysicianrepliesapproximatelyasfollows:"x istheprincipleofy"istomean"yarisesoutofx,""thebeingofy restsonthebeingofx,""yexistsbyvirtueofx"andsoforth.But thesewordsareambiguousandvague.Frequentlytheyhavea clearmeaninge.g.,wesayofathingorprocessythatit"arises outof"xwhenweobservethatthingsorprocessesofkindxare frequentlyorinvariablyfollowedbythingsorprocessesofkindy (causalconnectioninthesenseofalawfulsuccession).Butthe metaphysiciantellsusthathedoesnotmeanthisempirically observablerelationship.Forinthatcasehismetaphysicaltheses wouldbemerelyempiricalpropositionsofthesamekindasthose ofphysics.Theexpression"arisingfrom"isnottomeanherea relationoftemporalandcausalsequence,whichiswhattheword ordinarilymeans.Yet,nocriterionisspecifiedforanyother meaning.Consequently,thealleged"metaphysical"meaning,which thewordissupposedtohavehereincontrasttothementioned empiricalmeaning,doesnotexist.Ifwereflectontheoriginal meaningoftheword"principium"(andofthecorrespondingGreek word"),wenoticethesamedevelopment.Thewordis explicitlydeprivedofitsoriginalmeaning"beginning"itisnot supposedtomeanthetemporallyprioranymore,butthepriorin someother,specificallymetaphysical,respect.Thecriteriaforthis "metaphysicalrespect,"however,arelacking.Inbothcases, ____________________ 1Forthe logicalandepistemologicalconceptionwhichunderliesour exposition,butcanonlybrieflybeintimatedhere,cf. Wittgenstein,TractatusLogico-Philosophicus,1922,andCarnap, DerlogischeAufbauderWelt,1928. -65then,thewordhasbeendeprivedofitsearliermeaningwithout beinggivenanewmeaningthereremainsthewordasanempty shell.Fromanearlierperiodofsignificantuse,itisstillassociatively connectedwithvariousmentalimagestheseinturngetassociated withnewmentalimagesandfeelingsinthenewcontextofusage. Buttheworddoesnottherebybecomemeaningfulanditremains meaninglessaslongasnomethodofverificationcanbedescribed. Anotherexampleistheword"God."Herewemust,apartfromthe variationsofitsusagewithineachdomain,distinguishthelinguistic usageinthreedifferentcontextsorhistoricalepochs,which howeveroverlaptemporally.Initsmythologicalusethewordhasa clearmeaning.It,orparallelwordsinotherlanguages,is sometimesusedtodenotephysicalbeingswhichareenthronedon MountOlympus,inHeavenorinHades,andwhichareendowed withpower,wisdom,goodnessandhappinesstoagreaterorlesser extent.Sometimesthewordalsoreferstospiritualbeingswhich, indeed,donothavemanlikebodies,yetmanifestthemselves neverthelesssomehowinthethingsorprocessesofthevisible worldandaretherefore empiricallyverifiable.Initsmetaphysical use,ontheotherhand,theword"God"referstosomethingbeyond

experience.Thewordisdeliberatelydivestedofitsreference toa physicalbeingortoaspiritualbeingthatisimmanentinthe physical.Andasitisnotgivenanewmeaning,itbecomes meaningless.Tobesure,itoftenlooksasthoughtheword"God" hadameaningeveninmetaphysics.Butthedefinitionswhichare setupproveoncloserinspectiontobepseudo-definitions.They leadeithertologicallyillegitimatecombinationsofwords(ofwhich weshalltreatlater)ortoothermetaphysicalwords(e.g. "primordialbasis,""theabsolute,""theunconditioned,""the autonomous,""theself-dependent"andsoforth),butinnocaseto thetruth-conditionsofitselementarysentences.Inthecaseofthis wordnoteventhefirstrequirementoflogicismet,thatisthe requirementtospecifyitssyntax,i.e.theformofitsoccurrencein elementarysentences.Anelementarysentencewouldherehaveto beoftheform"xisaGod"yet,themetaphysicianeitherrejects thisformentirelywithoutsubstitutinganother,orifheacceptsithe neglectstoindicatethesyntacticalcategoryofthevariablex. (Categoriesare,forexample,materialthings,propertiesofthings, relationsbetweenthings,numbersetc.). Thetheologicalusageoftheword"God"fallsbetweenits mythologicalanditsmetaphysicalusage.Thereisnodistinctive meaninghere,butanoscillationfromoneofthementionedtwo usestotheother.Severaltheologianshaveaclearlyempirical(in ourtermin-66ology,"mythological")conceptofGod.Inthiscasethereareno pseudo-statementsbutthedisadvantageforthetheologianliesin thecircumstancethataccordingtothisinterpretationthe statementsoftheologyareempiricalandhencearesubjecttothe judgmentofempiricalscience.Thelinguisticusageofother theologiansisclearlymetaphysical.Othersagaindonotspeakin anydefiniteway,whetherthisisbecausetheyfollownowthis,now thatlinguisticusage,orbecausetheyexpressthemselvesinterms whoseusageisnotclearlyclassifiablesinceittendstowardsboth sides.Justliketheexaminedexamples"principle"and"God,"most oftheotherspecificallymetaphysicaltermsaredevoidofmeaning, e.g."theIdea,""theAbsolute,""theUnconditioned,""theInfinite," "thebeingofbeing,""non-being,""thinginitself,""absolutespirit," "objective spirit,""essence,""being-in-itself,""being-in-andforitself,""emanation,""manifestation,""articulation,""theEgo," "thenon-Ego,"etc.Theseexpressionsareinthesameboatwith "teavy,"ourpreviouslyfabricatedexample.Themetaphysiciantells usthatempiricaltruth-conditionscannotbespecifiedifheadds thatneverthelesshe"means"something,weknowthatthisis merelyanallusiontoassociatedimagesandfeelingswhich, however,donotbestowameaningontheword.Thealleged statementsofmetaphysicswhichcontainsuchwordshaveno sense,assertnothing,aremerepseudo-statements.Intothe explanationoftheirhistoricaloriginweshallinquirelater.

4.THESIGNIFICANCEOFASENTENCE

Sofarwehaveconsideredonlythosepseudo-statementswhich containameaninglessword.Butthereisasecondkindof pseudostatement.Theyconsistofmeaningfulwords,butthewords areputtogetherinsuchawaythatneverthelessnomeaning results.Thesyntaxofalanguagespecifieswhichcombinationsof wordsareadmissibleandwhichinadmissible.Thegrammatical syntaxofnaturallanguages,however,doesnotfulfillthetaskof eliminationofsenselesscombinationsofwordsinallcases.Letus takeasexamplesthefollowingsequencesofwords: 1. "Caesarisand" 2. "Caesarisaprimenumber" Thewordsequence(1)isformedcountersyntacticallytherulesof syntaxrequirethatthethirdpositionbeoccupied,notbya conjunction,butbyapredicate,hencebyanoun(witharticle)orby anadjective.Thewordsequence"Caesarisageneral,"e.g.,is -67formedinaccordancewiththerulesofsyntax.Itisameaningful wordsequence,agenuinesentence.But,now,wordsequence(2) islikewise syntacticallycorrect,forithasthesamegrammatical formasthesentencejustmentioned.Nevertheless(2)is meaningless."Primenumber"isapredicateofnumbersitcanbe neitheraffirmednordeniedofaperson.Since(2)lookslikea statementyetisnotastatement,doesnotassertanything, expressesneitheratruenorafalseproposition,wecallthisword sequencea"pseudo-statement."Thefactthattherulesof grammaticalsyntaxarenotviolatedeasilyseducesoneatfirst glanceintotheerroneousopinionthatonestillhastodowitha statement,albeitafalseone.But"aisaprimenumber"isfalseif andonlyifaisdivisiblebyanaturalnumberdifferentfromaand from1evidentlyitisillicittoputhere"Caesar"for"a."This examplehasbeensochosenthatthenonsenseiseasilydetectable. Manyso-calledstatementsofmetaphysicsarenotsoeasily recognizedtobepseudo-statements.Thefactthatnatural languagesallowtheformationofmeaninglesssequencesofwords withoutviolatingtherulesofgrammar,indicatesthatgrammatical syntaxis,fromalogicalpointofview,inadequate.Ifgrammatical syntaxcorrespondedexactlytologicalsyntax,pseudo-statements couldnotarise.Ifgrammaticalsyntaxdifferentiatednotonlythe wordcategoriesofnouns,adjectives,verbs,conjunctionsetc.,but withineachofthesecategoriesmadethefurtherdistinctionsthat arelogicallyindispensable,thennopseudo-statementscouldbe formed.If,e.g.,nounsweregrammaticallysubdividedintoseveral kindsofwords,accordingastheydesignatedpropertiesofphysical objects,ofnumbersetc.,thenthewords"general"and"prime number"wouldbelongtogrammaticallydifferentword-categories, and(2)wouldbejustaslinguisticallyincorrectas(1).Inacorrectly constructedlanguage,therefore,allnonsensicalsequencesofwords wouldbeofthekindofexample(1).Considerationsofgrammar wouldalreadyeliminatethemasitwereautomaticallyi.e.inorder toavoidnonsense,itwouldbeunnecessarytopayattentiontothe

meaningsoftheindividualwordsoverandabovetheirsyntactical type(their"syntacticalcategory,"e.g.thing,propertyofthings, relationbetweenthings,number,propertyofnumbers,relation betweennumbers,andsoforth).Itfollowsthatifourthesisthat thestatementsofmetaphysicsarepseudo-statementsisjustifiable, thenmetaphysicscouldnotevenbeexpressedinalogically constructedlanguage.Thisisthegreatphilosophicalimportanceof thetask,whichatpresentoccupiesthelogicians,ofbuildinga logicalsyntax. -68-

5.METAPHYSICALPSEUDO-STATEMENTS
Letusnowtakealookatsomeexamplesofmetaphysical pseudostatementsofakindwheretheviolationoflogicalsyntaxis especiallyobvious,thoughtheyaccordwithhistorical-grammatical syntax.Weselectafewsentencesfromthatmetaphysicalschool whichatpresentexertsthestrongestinfluenceinGermany.2 "Whatistobeinvestigatedisbeingonlyand--nothingelsebeing aloneandfurther--nothingsolelybeing,andbeyondbeing-nothing. WhataboutthisNothing?...DoestheNothingexistonlybecause theNot,i.e.theNegation,exists?Orisittheotherwayaround? DoesNegationandtheNotexistonlybecausetheNothingexists?. ..Weassert:theNothingispriortotheNotandtheNegation.... WheredoweseektheNothing?HowdowefindtheNothing.... WeknowtheNothing....AnxietyrevealstheNothing....That forwhichandbecauseofwhichwewereanxious,was'really'-nothing.Indeed:theNothingitself--assuch--waspresent.... WhataboutthisNothing?--The Nothingitselfnothings." Inordertoshowthatthepossibilityofformingpseudo-statements isbasedonalogicaldefectoflanguage,wesetuptheschema below.ThesentencesunderIaregrammaticallyaswellaslogically impeccable,hencemeaningful.ThesentencesunderII(excepting B3)areingrammaticalrespectsperfectlyanalogoustothoseunder I.SentenceformIIA(asquestionandanswer)doesnot,indeed, satisfytherequirementstobeimposedonalogicallycorrect language.Butitisneverthelessmeaningful,becauseitis translatableintocorrectlanguage.ThisisshownbysentenceIIIA, whichhasthesamemeaningasIIA.SentenceformIIAthen provestobeundesirablebecausewecanbeledfromit,bymeans ofgrammaticallyfaultlessoperations,tothemeaninglesssentence formsIIB,whicharetakenfromtheabovequotation.Theseforms cannotevenbeconstructedinthecorrectlanguageofColumnIII. Nonetheless,theirnonsensicalityisnotobviousatfirstglance, becauseoneiseasilydeceivedbytheanalogywiththemeaningful sentencesIB.Thefaultofourlanguageidentifiedherelies, therefore,inthecircumstancethat,incontrasttoalogicallycorrect language,itadmitsofthesamegrammaticalformformeaningful andmeaninglesswordsequences.Toeachsentenceinwordswe haveaddedacorrespondingformulainthe

____________________ 2The followingquotations(originalitalics)are takenfrom M. Heidegger,Was1stMetaphysik?1929.Wecouldjustaswellhave selectedpassagesfromanyotherofthenumerous metaphysiciansofthepresentorofthepastyettheselected passagesseemtoustoillustrateourthesisespeciallywell. -69notationofsymboliclogictheseformulaefacilitaterecognitionof theundesirableanalogybetweenIAandIIAandtherewithofthe originofthemeaninglessconstructionsIIB. I. II. Transitionfrom Meaningful Senseto Sentencesof Nonsensein Ordinary Ordinary Language Language A.Whatisoutside? A.Whatisoutside? OU(?) Ou(?) Rainisoutside Nothingisoutside Ou(r) Ou(no) III.

B.What aboutthis B."Whataboutthis B.Noneoftheseforms rain? (i.e.what Nothing?"?(no) canevenbe doesthe raindo?or: whatconstructed. elsecanbe said aboutthis rain? ?(r) 1.Weknowthe 1."Weseekthe rain K(r) Nothing" "Wefindthe Nothing" "Weknowthe Nothing" K(no) 2.Therainrains 2."TheNothing R(r) nothings" No(no) 3."TheNothing existsonly because..." Ex(no)

Logically Correct Language A.Thereisnothing (doesnotexistanything)whichis outside. (x).Ou(x)

Oncloserinspectionofthepseudo-statementsunderIIB,wealso findsomedifferences.Theconstructionofsentence(1)issimply basedonthemistakeofemployingtheword"nothing"asanoun, becauseitiscustomaryinordinarylanguagetouseitinthisformin ordertoconstructanegativeexistentialstatement(seeIIA).Ina correctlanguage,ontheotherhand,itisnotaparticularname,but acertainlogicalformofthesentencethatservesthispurpose -70(seeIIIA).SentenceIIB2addssomethingnew,viz.thefabrication ofthemeaninglessword"tonothing."Thissentence,therefore,is senselessforatwofoldreason.Wepointedoutbeforethatthe meaninglesswordsofmetaphysicsusuallyowetheirorigintothe factthatameaningfulwordisdeprivedofitsmeaningthroughits metaphoricaluseinmetaphysics.Buthereweconfrontoneof thoserare caseswhereanewwordisintroducedwhichneverhada meaningtobeginwith.Likewise sentenceIIB3mustberejectedfor tworeasons.Inrespectoftheerrorofusingtheword"nothing"as anoun,itisliketheprevioussentences.Butinadditionitinvolvesa contradiction.Forevenifitwereadmissibletointroduce"nothing" asanameordescriptionofanentity,stilltheexistenceofthis entitywouldbedeniedinitsverydefinition,whereassentence(3) goesontoaffirmitsexistence.Thissentence,therefore,wouldbe contradictory,henceabsurd,evenifitwere notalready meaningless. InviewofthegrosslogicalerrorswhichwefindinsentencesIIB, wemightbeledtoconjecturethatperhapstheword"nothing"has inHeidegger'streatiseameaningentirelydifferentfromthe customaryone.Andthispresumptionisfurtherstrengthenedaswe goontoreadtherethatanxietyrevealstheNothing,thatthe Nothingitselfispresentassuchinanxiety.Forheretheword "nothing"seemstorefertoacertainemotionalconstitution, possiblyofareligioussort,orsomethingorotherthatunderlies suchemotions.Ifsuchwerethecase,thenthementionedlogical errorsinsentencesIIBwouldnotbecommitted.Butthefirst sentenceofthequotationatthebeginningofthissectionproves thatthisinterpretationisnotpossible.Thecombinationof"only" and"nothingelse"showsunmistakablythattheword"nothing"here hastheusualmeaningofalogicalparticlethatservesforthe formulationofanegativeexistentialstatement.Thisintroductionof theword"nothing"isthenimmediatelyfollowedbytheleading questionofthetreatise:"WhataboutthisNothing?". Butourdoubtsastoapossiblemisinterpretationgetcompletely dissolvedaswenotethattheauthorofthetreatiseisclearlyaware oftheconflictbetweenhisquestionsandstatements,andlogic. "QuestionandanswerinregardtotheNothingareequallyabsurd inthemselves....Thefundamentalruleofthinkingcommonly appealedto,thelawofprohibitedcontradiction,general'logic,' destroysthisquestion."Alltheworseforlogic!Wemustabolishits sovereignty:"Ifthusthepoweroftheunderstandinginthefieldof

questionsconcerningNothingandBeingisbroken,thenthefateof thesovereigntyof'logic'withinphilosophyistherebydecidedas -71well.Theveryideaof'logic'dissolvesinthewhirlofamorebasic questioning."Butwillsobersciencecondonethewhirlof counterlogicalquestioning?Tothisquestiontoothereisaready answer:"Theallegedsobrietyandsuperiorityofsciencebecomes ridiculousifitdoesnottaketheNothingseriously."Thuswefind hereagoodconfirmationofourthesisametaphysicianhimself herestatesthathisquestionsandanswersareirreconcilablewith logicandthescientificwayofthinking. Thedifferencebetweenourthesisandthatoftheearlier antimetaphysiciansshouldnowbeclear.Wedonotregard metaphysicsas"mere speculation"or"fairytales."Thestatements ofafairytaledonotconflictwithlogic,butonlywithexperience theyareperfectlymeaningful,althoughfalse.Metaphysicsisnot "superstition"itispossibletobelievetrueandfalsepropositions, butnottobelievemeaninglesssequencesofwords.Metaphysical statementsarenotevenacceptableas"workinghypotheses"for anhypothesismustbecapableofenteringintorelationsof deducibilitywith(true orfalse)empiricalstatements,whichisjust whatpseudo-statementscannotdo. Withreference totheso-calledlimitationofhumanknowledge an attemptissometimesmadetosavemetaphysicsbyraisingthe followingobjection:metaphysicalstatementsarenot,indeed, verifiablebymannorbyanyotherfinitebeingneverthelessthey mightbeconstruedasconjecturesabouttheanswerswhichabeing withhigherorevenperfectpowersofknowledge wouldmaketo ourquestions,andassuchconjecturestheywould,afterall,be meaningful.Tocounterthisobjection,letusconsiderthefollowing. Ifthemeaningofawordcannotbespecified,orifthesequenceof wordsdoesnotaccordwiththerulesofsyntax,thenonehasnot evenaskedaquestion.(Justthinkofthepesudo-questions:"Isthis tableteavy?","isthenumber7holy?","whichnumbersaredarker, theevenortheoddones?").Wherethereisnoquestion,noteven anomniscientbeingcangiveananswer.Nowtheobjectormay say:justasonewhocanseemaycommunicatenewknowledge to theblind,soahigherbeingmightperhapscommunicatetous metaphysicalknowledge,e.g.whetherthevisibleworldisthe manifestationofaspirit.Herewemustreflectonthemeaningof "newknowledge."Itis,indeed,conceivablethatwemight encounteranimalswhotellusaboutanewsense.Ifthesebeings weretoprove tousFermat'stheoremorweretoinventanew physicalinstrumentorweretoestablishahithertounknownlawof nature,thenourknowledge wouldbeincreasedwiththeirhelp.For thissortofthingwe -72-

cantest,justthewayevenablindmancanunderstandandtest thewholeofphysics(andtherewithanystatementmadebythose whocansee).Butifthosehypotheticalbeingstellussomething whichwecannotverify,thenwecannotunderstanditeitherinthat casenoinformationhasbeencommunicatedtous,butmereverbal soundsdevoidofmeaningthoughpossiblyassociatedwithimages. Itfollowsthatourknowledge canonlybequantitativelyenlargedby otherbeings,nomatterwhethertheyknowmoreorlessor everything,butnoknowledge ofanessentiallydifferentkindcanbe added.Whatwedonotknowforcertain,wemaycometoknow withgreatercertaintythroughtheassistanceofotherbeingsbut whatisunintelligible,meaninglessforus,cannotbecome meaningfulthroughsomeoneelse'sassistance,howevervasthis knowledgemightbe.Thereforenogodandnodevilcangiveus metaphysicalknowledge.

6.MEANINGLESSNESSOFALLMETAPHYSICS
Theexamplesofmetaphysicalstatementswhichwehaveanalyzed werealltakenfromjustonetreatise.Butourresultsapplywith equalvalidity,inparteveninverballyidenticalways,toother metaphysicalsystems.Thattreatiseiscompletelyintherightin citingapprovinglyastatementbyHegel("pure Beingandpure Nothing,therefore,areoneandthesame").Themetaphysicsof Hegelhasexactlythesamelogicalcharacterasthismodernsystem ofmetaphysics.Andthesameholdsfortherestofthe metaphysicalsystems,thoughthekindofphraseologyand therewiththekindoflogicalerrorsthatoccurinthemdeviatemore orlessfromthekindthatoccursintheexampleswediscussed. Itshouldnotbenecessaryheretoadducefurtherexamplesof specificmetaphysicalsentencesindiverse systemsandsubmitthem toanalysis.Weconfineourselvestoanindicationofthemost frequentkindsoferrors. Perhapsthemajorityofthelogicalmistakesthatarecommitted whenpseudo-statementsaremade,arebasedonthelogicalfaults infectingtheuseoftheword"tobe"inourlanguage(andofthe correspondingwordsinotherlanguages,atleastinmostEuropean languages).Thefirstfaultistheambiguityoftheword"tobe."Itis sometimesusedascopulaprefixedtoapredicate("Iamhungry"), sometimestodesignateexistence("Iam").Thismistakeis aggravatedbythefactthatmetaphysiciansoftenarenotclear aboutthisambiguity.Thesecondfaultliesintheformoftheverb initssecondmeaning,themeaningofexistence.Theverbalform feigns -73apredicatewhere thereisnone.Tobesure,ithasbeenknownfor alongtimethatexistenceisnotaproperty(cf.Kant'srefutationof theontologicalproofoftheexistenceofGod).Butitwasnotuntil theadventofmodernlogicthatfullconsistencyonthispointwas

reached:thesyntacticalforminwhichmodernlogicintroducesthe signforexistenceissuchthatitcannot,likeapredicate,beapplied tosignsforobjects,butonlytopredicates(cf.e.g.sentenceIIIain theabovetable).Mostmetaphysicianssinceantiquityhaveallowed themselvestobeseducedintopseudo-statementsbytheverbal, andtherewiththepredicativeformoftheword"tobe,"e.g."Iam," "Godis." WemeetanillustrationofthiserrorinDescartes'"cogito,ergo sum."Letusdisregardherethematerialobjectionsthathavebeen raisedagainstthepremise--viz.whetherthesentence"Ithink" adequatelyexpressestheintendedstateofaffairsorcontains perhapsanhypostasis--andconsiderthetwosentencesonlyfrom theformallogicalpointofview.Wenoticeatoncetwoessential logicalmistakes.Thefirstliesintheconclusion"Iam."Theverb"to be"isundoubtedlymeantinthesenseofexistenceherefora copulacannotbeusedwithoutpredicateindeed,Descartes'"Iam" hasalwaysbeeninterpretedinthissense.Butinthatcasethis sentenceviolatestheabove-mentionedlogicalrulethatexistence canbepredicatedonlyinconjunctionwithapredicate,notin conjunctionwithaname(subject,propername).Anexistential statementdoesnothavetheform"aexists"(asin"Iam,"i.e."I exist"),but"thereexistssomethingofsuchandsuchakind."The seconderrorliesinthetransitionfrom"Ithink"to"Iexist."Iffrom thestatement"P(a)"("ahasthepropertyP")anexistential statementistobededuced,thenthelattercanassertexistence onlywithrespecttothepredicateP,notwithrespecttothesubject aofthepremise.Whatfollowsfrom"IamaEuropean"isnot"I exist,"but"aEuropeanexists."Whatfollowsfrom"Ithink"isnot"I am"but"thereexistssomethingthatthinks." Thecircumstancethatourlanguagesexpressexistencebyaverb ('tobe"or"toexist")isnotinitselfalogicalfaultitisonly inappropriate,dangerous.Theverbalformeasilymisleadsusinto themisconceptionthatexistenceisapredicate.Onethenarrivesat suchlogicallyincorrectandhencesenselessmodesofexpressionas werejustexamined.Likewise suchformsas"Being"or"Not-Being," whichfromtimeimmemorialhaveplayedagreatrolein metaphysics,havethesameorigin.Inalogicallycorrectlanguage suchformscannotevenbeconstructed.ItappearsthatintheLatin andtheGerman -74languagestheforms"ens"or"dasSeiende"were,perhapsunder theseductiveinfluenceoftheGreekexample,introduced specificallyforusebymetaphysiciansinthiswaythelanguage deterioratedlogicallywhereastheadditionwasbelievedto representanimprovement. Anotherveryfrequentviolationoflogicalsyntaxistheso-called "typeconfusion"ofconcepts.Whilethepreviouslymentioned mistakeconsistsinthepredicativeuseofasymbolwithnonpredicativemeaning,inthiscaseapredicateis,indeed,usedas

predicateyetaspredicateofadifferenttype.Wehaveherea violationoftherulesoftheso-calledtheoryoftypes.Anartificial exampleisthesentencewediscussedearlier:"Caesarisaprime number."Namesofpersonsandnamesofnumbersbelongto differentlogicaltypes,andsodoaccordinglypredicatesofpersons (e.g."general")andpredicatesofnumbers("prime number").The erroroftypeconfusionis,unlikethepreviouslydiscussedusageof theverb"tobe,"nottheprerogative ofmetaphysicsbutalready occursveryofteninconversationallanguagealso.Buthereitrarely leadstononsense.Thetypicalambiguityofwordsishereofsucha kindthatitcanbeeasilyremoved. Example:1."Thistableislargerthanthat."2."Theheight ofthistableislargerthantheheightofthattable."Here theword"larger"isusedin(1)forarelationbetween objects,in(2)forarelationbetweennumbers,hencefor twodistinctsyntacticalcategories.Themistakeishere unimportantitcould,e.g.,beeliminatedbywriting "larger1"and"larger2""larger1"isthendefinedinterms of"larger2"bydeclaringstatementform(1)tobe synonymouswith(2)(andothersofasimilarkind). Sincetheconfusionoftypescausesnoharminconversational language,itisusuallyignoredentirely.Thisis,indeed,expedient fortheordinaryuseoflanguage,buthashadunfortunate consequencesinmetaphysics.Heretheconditioningbyeveryday languagehasledtoconfusionsoftypeswhich,unlikethosein everydaylanguage,arenolongertranslatableintologicallycorrect form.Pseudo-statementsofthiskindareencounteredinespecially largequantity,e.g.,inthewritingsofHegelandHeidegger.The latterhasadoptedmanypeculiaritiesoftheHegelianidiomalong withtheirlogicalfaults(e.g.predicateswhichshouldbeappliedto objectsofacertainsortareinsteadappliedtopredicatesofthese objectsorto"being"orto"existence"ortoarelationbetween theseobjects). Havingfoundthatmanymetaphysicalstatementsaremeaningless, weconfrontthequestionwhetherthereisnotperhapsacoreof meaningfulstatementsinmetaphysicswhichwouldremainafter eliminationofallthemeaninglessones. -75Indeed,theresultswehaveobtainedsofarmightgiverisetothe viewthattherearemanydangersoffallingintononsensein metaphysics,andthatonemustaccordinglyendeavortoavoid thesetrapswithgreatcareifonewantstodometaphysics.But actuallythesituationisthatmeaningfulmetaphysicalstatements areimpossible.Thisfollowsfromthetaskwhichmetaphysicssets itself:todiscoverandformulateakindofknowledge whichisnot accessibletoempiricalscience. Wehaveseenearlierthatthemeaningofastatementliesinthe methodofitsverification.Astatementassertsonlysomuchasis

verifiablewithrespecttoit.Thereforeasentencecanbeusedonly toassertanempiricalproposition,ifindeeditisusedtoassert anythingatall.Ifsomethingweretolie,inprinciple,beyond possibleexperience,itcouldbeneithersaidnorthoughtnorasked. (Meaningful)statementsaredividedintothefollowingkinds.First therearestatementswhicharetruesolelybyvirtue oftheirform ("tautologies"accordingtoWittgensteintheycorrespond approximatelytoKant's"analyticjudgments").Theysaynothing aboutreality.Theformulaeoflogicandmathematicsareofthis kind.Theyarenotthemselvesfactualstatements,butserveforthe transformationofsuchstatements.Secondlytherearethe negationsofsuchstatements("contradictions").Theyareselfcontradictory,hencefalsebyvirtue oftheirform.Withrespecttoall otherstatementsthedecisionabouttruthorfalsehoodliesinthe protocolsentences.Theyaretherefore(trueorfalse)empirical statementsandbelongtothedomainofempiricalscience.Any statementonedesirestoconstructwhichdoesnotfallwithinthese categoriesbecomesautomaticallymeaningless.Sincemetaphysics doesnotwanttoassertanalyticpropositions,nortofallwithinthe domainofempiricalscience,itiscompelledtoemploywordsfor whichnocriteriaofapplicationarespecifiedandwhichare therefore devoidofsense,orelsetocombinemeaningfulwordsin suchawaythatneitherananalytic(orcontradictory)statementnor anempiricalstatementisproduced.Ineithercasepseudostatementsaretheinevitableproduct. Logicalanalysis,then,pronouncestheverdictofmeaninglessness onanyallegedknowledge thatpretendstoreachaboveorbehind experience.Thisverdicthits,inthefirstplace,anyspeculative metaphysics,anyallegedknowledge bypurethinkingorbypure intuitionthatpretendstobeabletodowithoutexperience.Butthe verdictequallyappliestothekindofmetaphysicswhich,starting fromexperience,wantstoacquireknowledge aboutthatwhich transcendsexperience bymeansofspecialinferences(e.g.the neo-vitalistthesis -76ofthedirective presenceofan"entelechy"inorganicprocesses, whichsupposedlycannotbeunderstoodintermsofphysicsthe questionconcerningthe"essenceofcausality,"transcendingthe ascertainmentofcertainregularitiesofsuccessionthetalkabout the"thinginitself").Further,thesamejudgmentmustbepassed onallphilosophyofnorms,orphilosophyofvalue,onanyethicsor estheticsasanormative discipline.Fortheobjectivevalidityofa valueornormis(evenontheviewofthephilosophersofvalue) notempiricallyverifiable nordeduciblefromempiricalstatements henceitcannotbeasserted(inameaningfulstatement)atall.In otherwords:Eitherempiricalcriteriaareindicatedfortheuseof "good"and"beautiful"andtherestofthepredicatesthatare employedinthenormativesciences,ortheyarenot.Inthefirst case,astatementcontainingsuchapredicateturnsintoafactual

judgment,butnotavaluejudgmentinthesecondcase,it becomesapseudo-statement.Itisaltogetherimpossibletomakea statementthatexpressesavaluejudgment. Finally,theverdictofmeaninglessnessalsohitsthosemetaphysical movementswhichareusuallycalled,improperly,epistemological movements,thatisrealism(insofarasitclaimstosaymorethan theempiricalfactthatthesequenceofeventsexhibitsacertain regularity,whichmakestheapplicationoftheinductivemethod possible)anditsopponents:subjectiveidealism,solipsism, phenomenalism,andpositivism(intheearliersense). Butwhat,then,isleftoverforphilosophy,ifallstatements whateverthatassertsomethingareofanempiricalnatureand belongtofactualscience?Whatremainsisnotstatements,nora theory,norasystem,butonlyamethod:themethodoflogical analysis.Theforegoingdiscussionhasillustratedthenegative applicationofthismethod:inthatcontextitservestoeliminate meaninglesswords,meaninglesspseudo-statements.Initspositive useitservestoclarifymeaningfulconceptsandpropositions,tolay logicalfoundationsforfactualscienceandformathematics.The negativeapplicationofthemethodisnecessaryandimportantin thepresenthistoricalsituation.Buteveninitspresentpractice,the positiveapplicationismorefertile.Wecannotherediscussitin greaterdetail.Itistheindicatedtaskoflogicalanalysis,inquiryinto logicalfoundations,thatismeantby"scientificphilosophy"in contrasttometaphysics. Thequestionregardingthelogicalcharacterofthestatements whichweobtainastheresultofalogicalanalysis,e.g.the statementsoccurringinthisandotherlogicalpapers,canherebe answeredonlytentatively:suchstatementsarepartlyanalytic, partlyempirical.Forthesestatementsaboutstatementsandparts ofstate-77mentsbelonginparttopuremetalogic(e.g."asequenceconsisting oftheexistence-symbolandanoun,isnotasentence"),inpartto descriptivemetalogic(e.g."thewordsequenceatsuchandsucha placeinsuchandsuchabookismeaningless").Metalogicwillbe discussedelsewhere.Itwillalsobeshowntherethatthemetalogic whichspeaksaboutthesentencesofagivenlanguagecanbe formulatedinthatverylanguageitself.

7.METAPHYSICSASEXPRESSIONOFANATTITUDE TOWARDLIFE
Ourclaimthatthestatementsofmetaphysicsareentirely meaningless,thattheydonotassertanything,willleaveeventhose whoagreeintellectuallywithourresultswithapainfulfeelingof strangeness:howcoulditbeexplainedthatsomanymeninall agesandnations,amongthememinentminds,spentsomuch energy,nayveritablefervor,onmetaphysicsifthelatterconsisted

ofnothingbutmerewords,nonsensicallyjuxtaposed?Andhow couldoneaccountforthefactthatmetaphysicalbookshave exertedsuchastronginfluenceonreadersuptothepresentday,if theycontainednotevenerrors,butnothingatall?Thesedoubts arejustifiedsincemetaphysicsdoesindeedhaveacontentonlyit isnottheoreticalcontent.The(pseudo)statementsofmetaphysics donotserve forthedescriptionofstatesofaffairs,neitherexisting ones(inthatcasetheywouldbetruestatements)nornon-existing ones(inthatcasetheywouldbeatleastfalsestatements).They serve fortheexpressionofthegeneralattitudeofapersontowards life("Lebenseinstellung,Lebensgefhl"). Perhapswemayassumethatmetaphysicsoriginatedfrom mythology.Thechildisangryatthe"wickedtable"whichhurthim. Primitivemanendeavorstoconciliatethethreateningdemonof earthquakes,orheworshipsthedeityofthefertilerainsin gratitude.Hereweconfrontpersonificationsofnaturalphenomena, whicharethequasi-poeticexpressionofman'semotional relationshiptohisenvironment.Theheritageofmythologyis bequeathedontheonehandtopoetry,whichproducesand intensifiestheeffectsofmythologyonlifeinadeliberatewayon theotherhand,itishandeddowntotheology,whichdevelops mythologyintoasystem.Which,now,isthehistoricalroleof metaphysics?Perhapswemayregarditasasubstitutefortheology onthelevelofsystematic,conceptualthinking.The(supposedly) transcendentsourcesofknowledge oftheologyareherereplaced bynatural,yetsupposedlytrans-empirical -78sourcesofknowledge.Oncloserinspectionthesamecontentas thatofmythologyisherestillrecognizablebehindtherepeatedly varieddressing:wefindthatmetaphysicsalsoarisesfromtheneed togiveexpressiontoaman'sattitudeinlife,hisemotionaland volitionalreactiontotheenvironment,tosociety,tothetasksto whichhedevoteshimself,tothemisfortunesthatbefallhim.This attitudemanifestsitself,unconsciouslyasarule,ineverythinga mandoesorsays.Italsoimpressesitselfonhisfacialfeatures, perhapsevenonthecharacterofhisgait.Manypeople,now,feela desiretocreateoverandabovethesemanifestationsaspecial expressionoftheirattitude,throughwhichitmightbecomevisible inamoresuccinctandpenetratingway.Iftheyhaveartistictalent theyareabletoexpressthemselvesbyproducingaworkofart. Manywritershavealreadyclarifiedthewayinwhichthebasic attitudeismanifestedthroughthestyleandmannerofaworkof art(e.g.Diltheyandhisstudents).[Inthisconnectiontheterm "worldview"("Weltanschauung")isoftenusedweprefertoavoidit becauseofitsambiguity,whichblursthedifferencebetween attitudeandtheory,adifferencewhichisofdecisiveimportancefor ouranalysis.]Whatishereessentialforourconsiderationsisonly thefactthatartisanadequate,metaphysicsaninadequatemeans fortheexpressionofthebasicattitude.Ofcourse,thereneedbe nointrinsicobjectiontoone'susinganymeansofexpressionone

likes.Butinthecaseofmetaphysicswefindthissituation:through theformofitsworksitpretendstobesomethingthatitisnot.The forminquestionisthatofasystemofstatementswhichare apparentlyrelatedaspremisesandconclusions,thatis,theformof atheory.Inthiswaythefictionoftheoreticalcontentisgenerated, whereas,aswehaveseen,thereisnosuchcontent.Itisnotonly thereader,butthemetaphysicianhimselfwhosuffersfromthe illusionthatthemetaphysicalstatementssaysomething,describe statesofaffairs.Themetaphysicianbelievesthathetravelsin territoryinwhichtruthandfalsehoodareatstake.Inreality, however,hehasnotassertedanything,butonlyexpressed something,likeanartist.Thatthemetaphysicianisthusdeluding himselfcannotbeinferredfromthefactthatheselectslanguageas themediumofexpressionanddeclarativesentencesastheformof expressionforlyricalpoetsdothesamewithoutsuccumbingto self-delusion.Butthemetaphysiciansupportshisstatementsby arguments,heclaimsassenttotheircontent,hepolemicizes againstmetaphysiciansofdivergentpersuasionbyattemptingto refutetheirassertionsinhistreatise.Lyricalpoets,ontheother hand,donottrytorefuteintheirpoemthestatementsinapoem bysome -79otherlyricalpoetfortheyknowtheyareinthedomainofartand notinthedomainoftheory.Perhapsmusicisthepurestmeansof expressionofthebasicattitudebecauseitisentirelyfreefromany reference toobjects.Theharmoniousfeelingorattitude,whichthe metaphysiciantriestoexpressinamonisticsystem,ismoreclearly expressedinthemusicofMozart.Andwhenametaphysiciangives verbalexpressiontohisdualistic-heroicattitudetowardslifeina dualisticsystem,isitnotperhapsbecausehelackstheabilityofa Beethoventoexpressthisattitudeinanadequatemedium? Metaphysiciansaremusicianswithoutmusicalability.Insteadthey haveastronginclinationtoworkwithinthemediumofthe theoretical,toconnectconceptsandthoughts.Now,insteadof activating,ontheonehand,thisinclinationinthedomainof science,andsatisfying,ontheotherhand,theneedforexpression inart,themetaphysicianconfusesthetwoandproducesastructure whichachievesnothingforknowledge andsomethinginadequate fortheexpressionofattitude.Ourconjecturethatmetaphysicsisa substitute,albeitaninadequateone,forart,seemstobefurther confirmedbythefactthatthemetaphysicianwhoperhapshad artistictalenttothehighestdegree,viz.Nietzsche,almostentirely avoidedtheerrorofthatconfusion.Alargepartofhisworkhas predominantlyempiricalcontent.Wefindthere,forinstance, historicalanalysesofspecificartisticphenomena,oranhistoricalpsychologicalanalysisofmorals.Inthework,however,inwhichhe expressesmoststronglythatwhichothersexpressthrough metaphysicsorethics,inThusSpakeZarathustra,hedoesnot choosethemisleadingtheoreticalform,butopenlytheformofart, ofpoetry.

REMARKSBYTHEAUTHOR(1957)

Tosection1,"metaphysics."Thistermisusedinthispaper,as usuallyinEurope,forthefieldofallegedknowledge ofthe essenceofthingswhichtranscendstherealmofempirically founded,inductivescience.Metaphysicsinthissenseincludes systemslikethoseofFichte,Schelling,Hegel,Bergson, Heidegger.Butitdoesnotincludeendeavorstowardsa synthesisandgeneralizationoftheresultsofthevarious sciences. Tosection1,"meaning."Todaywedistinguishvariouskindsof meaning,inparticularcognitive(designative,referential) meaningontheonehand,andnon-cognitive(expressive) meaningcomponents,e.g.emotiveandmotivative,onthe other.Inthepresentpaper,theword -80"meaning"isalwaysunderstoodinthesenseof"cognitive meaning."Thethesisthatthesentencesofmetaphysicsare meaningless,isthustobeunderstoodinthesensethatthey havenocognitivemeaning,noassertivecontent.Theobvious psychologicalfactthattheyhaveexpressive meaningisthereby notdeniedthisisexplicitlystatedinSection7. Tosection6,"metalogic."Thistermreferstothetheoryof expressionsofalanguageand,inparticular,oftheirlogical relations.Todaywewoulddistinguishbetweenlogicalsyntaxas thetheoryofpurelyformalrelationsandsemanticsasthe theoryofmeaningandtruthconditions. Tosection6,realismandidealism.Thatboththeaffirmative andthenegativethesesconcerningtherealityoftheexternal worldarepseudostatements,Ihavetriedtoshowinthe monographScheinprobleme inderPhilosophie:Das Fremdpsychische undderRealismusstreit,Berlin,1928.The similarnatureoftheontologicalthesesabouttherealityor unrealityofabstractentities,e.g.,properties,relations, propositions,isdiscussedin"Empiricism,Semantics,and Ontology",Revue Intern.dePhilos.4,1950,20-40,reprintedin: MeaningandNecessity,secondedition,Chicago,1956. -81-

4
PositivismandRealism
BYMORITZSCHLICK (TRANSLATEDBYDAVIDRYNIN)

1.PRELIMINARYQUESTIONS
EVERYPHILOSOPHICALPOINTOFVIEWisdefinedbytheprinciples whichitconsidersfundamentalandtowhichitconstantlyrecursin argument.Butinthecourseofthehistoricaldevelopmentofsucha

viewtheseprinciplestendtochange--whethertheybe reformulated,extended,orrestricted,orevengraduallyalteredin meaning.Atsometimethenthequestionariseswhetherweshould stillspeakofthedevelopmentoftheonepointofviewatall,and retainitsoldnameorwhetheranewviewpointhasarisen. If,alongwiththedevelopedviewtherealsoexistsan"orthodox" viewpointwhichretainsthefirstprinciplesintheiroriginalformand meaning,soonerorlatersometerminologicaldistinctionbetween theoldandthenewwillariseautomatically.Butwhere thisisnot clearlythecase,whereratherthedifferentexponentsofa "viewpoint"employextremelydifferent,evencontradictory, formulationsandmeaningsoftheprinciples,confusionarisesthe adherentsandopponentsoftheviewtalkatcrosspurposeseach selectsthosestatementswhichcanbeusedindefenseofhisown opinions,andallendsinfatalmisunderstandingandobscurity. Theseconfusionsdisappearonlywhenthedifferentprinciplesare distinguished,andeachistestedseparatelyforitsmeaningand truth.Insuchanexaminationofprinciplesonequiteignores,for thetime,thequestionofthehistoricalcontextsoftheirorigins,and oftheirnames. IshouldliketoapplytheseconsiderationstothemodesofthinkThisarticlefirstappearedinErkenntnis,VolumeIII( 1932/33)andishererepublishedwiththekindpermission ofMrs.SchlickandProfessorCarnap.Itwaswrittenin responsetocriticismsofpositivisminalecturebyMax Planckentitled"PositivismusundRealeAussenwelt," publishedin1931bytheAkademische Verlagsgesellschaft,Leipzig. -82inggroupedtogetherunderthename"positivism."Theyhave,from thetimeAugustComteinventedthetermuntilthepresent, undergoneadevelopmentwhichfurnishesagoodexampleofwhat hasjustbeensaid.ButIdonotdothiswiththehistoricalaim,say, ofdeterminingastrictconceptofpositivismasithasappearedin history,butratherinordertocontributesomethingtoapositive settlementofthedisputecarriedonnowadaysconcerningcertain principleswhichpassasfundamentaltopositivism.Sucha settlementconcernsmethemorebecauseImyselfadvocatesome oftheseprinciples.Iamconcernedhereonlytomaketheir meaningasclearaspossiblewhetherornotonewill,afterthis clarification,attributethemto"positivism"isaquestionofverylittle importance. Ifonewishestocharacterizeeveryviewwhichdeniesthepossibility ofmetaphysicsaspositivisticthisisquiteunobjectionable,asa meredefinitionandIshouldinthissensecallmyselfastrict positivist.Butthisholds,ofcourse,onlyunderthepresuppositionof aspecialdefinitionof"metaphysics."Whatthedefinitionof metaphysicsiswhichmustbeadoptedhereneednotinterestusat

themomentbutithardlyagreeswiththeformulationsusualin philosophicliterature,andfurtherdeterminationsofpositivism whichrefertosuchformulationsleadatonceintoconfusionsand difficulties. Ifwesay,asfrequentlyhasbeensaid,thatmetaphysicsisthe theoryof"truebeing,"of"realityinitself,"of"transcendentbeing" thisobviouslyimpliesa(contradictory)spurious,lesser,apparent beingashasindeedbeenassumedbyallmetaphysicianssincethe timeofPlatoandtheEleatics.Thisapparentbeingistherealmof "appearances,"andwhilethetruetranscendentrealityistobe reachedonlywithdifficulty,bytheeffortsofthemetaphysician,the specialscienceshavetodoexclusivelywithappearanceswhichare perfectlyaccessibletothem.Thedifferencebetweenthewaysin whichthesetwo"modesofbeing"aretobeknown,isthen explainedbythefactthattheappearancesareimmediately present,"given,"tous,whilemetaphysicalrealitymustbeinferred fromtheminsomeroundaboutmanner.Andthusweseemto arrive atafundamentalconceptofthepositivists,fortheyalways speakofthe"given,"andusuallyformulatetheirfundamental principleinthepropositionthatthephilosopheraswellasthe scientistmustalwaysremainwithinthegiven,thattogobeyondit, asthemetaphysicianattempts,isimpossibleorsenseless. Thusitamountstoidentifyingthe"given"ofthepositivistwiththe "appearances"ofmetaphysics,andtobelievingthatpositivismisat bottomametaphysics,fromwhichonehasleft,orstricken, -83outthetranscendentandsuchanopinionmayindeedoften enoughhaveinspiredtheargumentsofthepositivists,aswellas thoseoftheiropponents.Butthisbelieffindsuswellonourwayto dangerouserrors. Theterm"thegiven"itselfisacauseofgrave misunderstandings. "Togive"usuallyconnotesathreetermrelation:itpresupposes first,someonewhogives,secondly,onetowhomisgiven,and thirdly,somethinggiven.Themetaphysicianfindsthisquitein order,forwhatgivesisthetranscendentreality,whatreceivesis theknowingmind,whichmakeswhatisgiventoitintoits "content."Butevidentlythepositivistwillfromtheveryoutsethave nothingtodowithsuchnotionsthegivenisforhimbutawordfor whatismostsimpleandnolongerquestionable.Nomatterwhat wordwechoose,everyonewillbecapableofmisinterpretationsif wespeakof"experiences"weseemtopresupposethedistinction betweenwhatexperiencesandwhatisexperiencedwiththeuseof thephrase"contentofconsciousness"weseemburdenedwitha similardistinction,andinadditionwiththecomplicatedconceptof "consciousness,"whichinanycasedidnotexistuntilinventedby philosophy. Butevenapartfromsuchdifficultiesitisperhapsstillnotclearwhat isactuallymeantbythegiven.Doonlysuch"qualities"as"blue,"

"warm,""pain,"comeunderthisheading,ore.g.alsorelations betweenthem,ortheirorder?Isthesimilarityoftwoqualities "given"inthesamesenseasthequalitiesthemselves?Andifthe givenissomehowworkeduporinterpretedorjudgedisthis working-uporjudgingnotalsoinsomesensesomethinggiven? Butitisnotobscuritiesofthissortthatgiverisetothecurrent matterofdispute:theboneofcontentionappearsamongthe variouspartiesonlywiththequestionof"reality." Iftherejectionofmetaphysicsbypositivismsignifiesthedenialof transcendentrealitythenitseemsthemostnaturalconclusionin theworldthatthepositivistattributesrealityonlytonontranscendentbeing.Thefundamentalprincipleofthepositivistthen seemstorun:"Onlythegivenisreal."Ifoneenjoysword-playone canlendtothispropositionthesemblanceoftautologicalselfevidencebymakinguseofapeculiarityoftheGermanlanguagein thusformulatingit:"EsgibtnurdasGegebene."(Thereisonlythe given.) Whatshallwemakeofthisproposition?Manypositivistsmayhave expressedandadvocatedit(especially,perhaps,thosewho representedphysicalobjectsas"mere logicalconstructions,"or "mere auxiliaryconcepts"),whilethisviewhasbeenattributedto othersbytheiropponents.Wemustinsist,however,thatwhoever -84statesthispropositionseekstoestablishanassertionwhichis metaphysicalinexactlythesamesenseanddegreeasitsapparent contradictory:"There isatranscendentreality." Theproblemaboutwhichthematterrevolveshereisevidentlythe so-calledproblemoftherealityoftheexternalworld,andthere seemtobetwoparties:thatof"realism"whichbelievesinthe realityoftheexternalworld,andthatof"positivism"whichdoes not.Intruth,Iamconvincedthatitisquitesenselesstosettwo viewsinoppositioninthismanner,forneitherpartyreallyknows whatitwantstosay(whichisthecasewitheverymetaphysical proposition.)ButbeforeIexplainthisIshouldliketoshowhowthe moreobviousinterpretationsoftheproposition"onlythegivenis real"actuallyleadatoncetowell-knownmetaphysicalviews. Thisproblemcantaketheformofthequestionabouttheexistence ofthe"external"worldonlyifsomehowwecandistinguishbetween innerandouterandthisdistinctionismadebyconsideringthe givenasa"content"ofconsciousness,asbelongingtooneor severalsubjectstowhomitisgiven.Thustheimmediatedatum wouldhaveattributedtoitsomesortofmentalcharacter,the characterofarepresentationoranideaandthepropositionwould thenstatethatthischaracterpertainedtoallreality:nobeing outsideofconsciousness.Butthisisnothingbutthefundamental principleofmetaphysicalidealism.Ifthephilosopherthinkshimself abletospeakonlyofwhatisgiventohimselfwehavebeforeusa

solipsisticmetaphysics,butifhethinkshemayassumethatthe givenisdistributedamongmanysubjectswehaveametaphysicsof theBerkeleyanvariety. Onthisinterpretationpositivismwouldbesimplyidenticalwiththe olderidealisticmetaphysics.Butsinceitsfounderscertainlydesired somethingquitedifferentfromarenewalofthatidealism,this interpretationistoberejectedascontrarytotheanti-metaphysical attitudeofpositivism.Idealismandpositivismareincompatible.The positivistErnstLaashaswrittenaworkofseveralvolumesto demonstratetheirreconcilable oppositionwhichexistsonallpoints betweenthemandifhisstudentHansVaihingergavetohis "PhilosophyofAsIf"thesubtitlean"idealisticpositivism"itisbut oneofthecontradictionsfromwhichthisworksuffers.ErnstMach especiallyemphasizedthathisownpositivismdevelopedinan oppositedirectiontothatofBerkeleyanmetaphysicsandheand Avenariuslaidgreatstressuponnottakingthegivenasacontent ofconsciousness.Theytriedtoexcludethisconceptfromtheir philosophyaltogether. Inviewoftheuncertaintyinthecampofthepositiviststhem-85selvesitisnowonderthatthe"realist"failstoobserve the distinctionswehavediscussed,anddirectshisargumentsagainst thethesis:"Thereisnothingbutthecontentsofconsciousness,"or "Thereisonlyaninternalworld."Butthispropositionbelongsto idealisticmetaphysics,andhasnoplaceinananti-metaphysical positivism,whichisnotaffectedbytheserealisticarguments. Ofcoursetherealistcanthinkthatitissimplyinevitabletoconceive thegivenascontentsofconsciousness,assubjective,asmental--or whateverexpressionisusedandhewillthenconsiderasafailure theattemptofMachandAvenariustotakethegivenasneutraland toresolvethedistinctionbetweeninnerandouter,andwillbelieve thataviewfreeofanymetaphysicalbasisisimpossible.Butthis lineofthoughtisrarelymetwith.Andhoweveritmayfare,inany case,thewholebusinessismuchadoaboutnothing,forthe "problemoftherealityoftheexternalworld"isameaningless pseudo-problem.Thismustnowbemadeevident.

2.ONTHEMEANINGOFPROPOSITIONS
Itisthepeculiarbusinessofphilosophytoascertainandmakeclear themeaningofstatementsandquestions.Thechaoticstatein whichphilosophyhasfounditselfduringthegreaterpartofits historyisduetotheunfortunatefactthat,inthefirstplace,ittook certainformulationstoberealquestionsbeforecarefully ascertainingwhethertheyreallymadeanysense,and,inthe secondplace,itbelievedthattheanswerstothequestionscouldbe foundbytheaidofspecialphilosophicalmethods,differentfrom thoseofthespecialsciences.Butwecannotbyphilosophical analysisdecidewhetheranythingisreal,butonlywhatitmeansto

saythatitisrealandwhetherthisisthenthecaseornotcanbe decidedonlybytheusualmethodsofdailylifeandofscience,that is,throughexperience.Hencewehaveherethetaskofmaking cleartoourselveswhetheranymeaningcanbeattachedtothe problemoftherealityofthe"externalworld." When,ingeneral,arewesurethatthemeaningofaquestionis cleartous?Evidentlywhenandonlywhenweareabletostate exactlytheconditionsunderwhichitistobeansweredinthe affirmative,or,asthecasemaybe,theconditionsunderwhichitis tobeansweredinthenegative.Bystatingtheseconditions,andby thisalone,isthemeaningofaquestiondefined. Itisthefirststepofanyphilosophizing,andthefoundationofall reflection,toseethatitissimplyimpossibletogivethemeaningof anystatementexceptbydescribingthefactwhichmustexistif -86thestatementistobetrue.Ifitdoesnotexistthenthestatement isfalse.Themeaningofapropositionconsists,obviously,inthis alone,thatitexpressesadefinitestateofaffairs.Andthisstateof affairsmustbepointedoutinordertogivethemeaningofthe proposition.Onecan,ofcourse,saythatthepropositionitself alreadygivesthisstateofaffairs.Thisistrue,buttheproposition indicatesthestateofaffairsonlytothepersonwhounderstandsit. ButwhendoIunderstandaproposition?WhenIunderstandthe meaningsofthewordswhichoccurinit?Thesecanbeexplainedby definitions.Butinthedefinitionsnewwordsappearwhose meaningscannotagainbedescribedinpropositions,theymustbe indicateddirectly:themeaningofawordmustintheendbe shown,itmustbegiven.Thisisdonebyanactofindication,of pointingandwhatispointedatmustbegiven,otherwiseIcannot bereferredtoit. Accordingly,inordertofindthemeaningofaproposition,wemust transformitbysuccessivedefinitionsuntilfinallyonlysuchwords occurinitascannolongerbedefined,butwhosemeaningscan onlybedirectlypointedout.Thecriterionofthetruthorfalsityof thepropositionthenliesinthefactthatunderdefiniteconditions (giveninthedefinition)certaindataarepresent,ornotpresent.If thisisdeterminedtheneverythingassertedbythepropositionis determined,andIknowitsmeaning.IfIamunable,inprinciple,to verifyaproposition,thatis,ifIamabsolutelyignorantofhowto proceed,ofwhatImustdoinordertoascertainitstruthorfalsity, thenobviouslyIdonotknowwhatthepropositionactuallystates, andIshouldthenbeunabletointerpretthepropositionbypassing fromthewords,withtheaidofthedefinitions,topossible experiences.ForinsofarasIamabletodothisIamalsoablein thesamewaytostateatleastinprinciplethemethodof verification(eventhough,often,becauseofpracticaldifficultiesI amunabletocarryitout).Thestatementoftheconditionsunder whichapropositionistrueisthesameasthestatementofits meaning,andnotsomethingdifferent.

Andthese"conditions,"wehavealreadyseen,mustfinallybe discoverable inthegiven.Differentconditionsmeandifferencesin thegiven.Themeaningofeverypropositionisfinallytobe determinedbythegiven,andbynothingelse. Idonotknowifthisinsightoughttobecalledpositivisticbutof courseIshouldliketobelievethatitunderlayallthoseefforts whichappearbythisnameinthehistoryofphilosophy,whetheror notitwaseverclearlyformulated.Wemayindeedassumethatit constitutestherealnucleusandmotiveforceofmanyquite pervertedformulationswhichwefindamongpositivists. -87Ifwebutonceattaintheinsightthatthemeaningofevery propositioncanbedeterminedonlybymeansofthegivenwecan nolongerconceivethepossibilityofanotheropinion,forwesee thatwehavediscoveredsimplytheconditionsunderwhichopinions ingeneralcanbeformulated.Henceitwouldbequitemistakento see,somehow,inwhatwehavesaida"theoryofmeaning"(in AngloSaxoncountriesthisinsight,thatthemeaningofaproposition isdeterminedwhollyandalonebyitsverificationinthegiven,is oftencalledthe"experimentaltheoryofmeaning").Whatprecedes everyformulationofatheorycannotitselfbeatheory. Thecontentofourinsightisindeedquitesimple(andthisisthe reasonwhyitissosensible).Itsays:apropositionhasastatable meaningonlyifitmakesaverifiabledifferencewhetheritistrueor false.Apropositionwhichissuchthattheworldremainsthesame whetheritbetrueorfalsesimplysaysnothingabouttheworlditis emptyandcommunicatesnothingIcangiveitnomeaning.We haveaverifiabledifference,however,onlywhenitisadifferencein thegiven,forverifiablecertainlymeansnothingbut"capableof beingexhibitedinthegiven." Itisobviousthatverifiabilityisusedhereinthesenseof"verifiable inprinciple,"forthemeaningofapropositionis,ofcourse, independentofwhethertheconditionsunderwhichwefind ourselvesataspecifiedtimealloworpreventtheactual verification.Thereisnottheleastdoubtthattheproposition"there isamountainofaheightof3000metersontheothersideofthe moon"makesgoodsense,eventhoughwelackthetechnical meansofverifyingit.Anditwouldremainjustasmeaningfulifone knewwithcertainty,onscientificgrounds,thatnomanwouldever reachtheothersideofthemoon.Theverificationremains conceivablewearealwaysabletostatewhatdataweshouldhave toexperience inordertodecidethetruthorfalsityofthe propositiontheverificationislogicallypossible,whateverbethe caseregardingitspracticalfeasibility,andthisaloneconcernsus. Butifsomeoneshouldsay:withineveryelectronthereisanucleus, which,thoughalwayspresent,neverhasinanywayanyexternal effects,sothatitsexistencenevermanifestsitselfinnature-this

wouldbeameaninglessassertion.Forweshouldhavetoaskthe makerofthehypothesis:whatdoyoureallymeanbythepresence ofthat"nucleus"?andhecouldansweronly:Imeanthat somethingexiststhereintheelectron.Weshouldinquirefurther: whatdoesthatmean?Whatwouldbethecaseifitdidn'texist?And hewouldhavetoanswer:everythingwouldremainexactlythe sameasbefore. -88Foraccordingtohisassertion,the"somewhat"intheelectronhas noeffects,andtherewouldsimplybenoobservablechange:the realmofthegivenwouldnotbeaffectedinanyway.Weshould judgethathehadnotsucceededincommunicatingthemeaningof hishypothesis,andthattherefore itmadenosense.Inthiscase theimpossibilityofverificationisnotfactual,butlogical,forby reasonoftheutterineffectivenessofthatnucleusadecision regardingitbasedondifferencesinthegivenisinprinciple excluded. Onecannotheresupposethatthedistinctionbetweenthe impossibilityofverifyingsomethinginprincipleandthemere factual,empiricalimpossibilityisnotclear,andistherefore sometimesdifficulttodrawfortheimpossibilityinprincipleis logicalimpossibilitywhichdoesnotdifferindegreefromempirical impossibility,butinveryessence.Whatisempiricallyimpossiblestill remainsconceivable,butwhatislogicallyimpossibleis contradictory,andcannotthereforebethoughtatall.Asamatter offactwefindthatinscientificthinkingthisdistinctionisalways clearlyandinstinctivelyfelt.Thephysicistswerethefirsttoreject thestatementgiveninourexampleregardingtheforeverhidden nucleusoftheelectron,withthecriticismthatitwasnohypothesis atall,butmereemptywordplay.Andinalltimesthemost successfulscientificinvestigatorshaveadoptedthisstandpointwith respecttothemeaningoftheirstatements,sincetheyhaveacted inaccordancewithit,evenifforthemostpartunconsciously. Forscience,then,ourstandpointdoesnotrepresentsomething foreignandoutoftheordinary,butithasinacertainsensealways beenmoreorlesstakenforgranted.Itcouldnotbeotherwise, becauseonlyfromthisstandpointisapropositionverifiableatall andsincealltheactivitiesofscienceconsistinexaminingthetruth ofpropositions,itcontinuouslyacknowledgesthecorrectnessofour insightbyitspractice. Ifexpressconfirmationwerestillnecessary,itwouldbefoundmost conspicuouslyatcriticalpointsinthedevelopmentofsciencewhere investigationisforcedtobringtheself-evidentpresuppositionsto light.Thisisthecasewhere difficultiesofprincipleleadoneto supposethatsomethingmaybewrongwiththesepresuppositions. Themostfamousexampleofthissort,whichwillremainforever memorable,isEinstein'sanalysisoftheconceptoftime,which consistsinnothingbuttheanalysisofthemeaningofour statementsaboutthesimultaneityofspatiallyseparateevents.

Einsteinsaidtothephysicists(andtothephilosophers):youmust firststatewhatyoumeanbysimultaneity,andyoucandothisonly -89byshowinghowtheproposition"twoeventsaresimultaneous"is verified.Butwiththisyouhavecompletelydetermineditsmeaning. Whatistrueoftheconceptofsimultaneityholdsofeveryother concept:everypropositionhasmeaningonlyinsofarasitcanbe verified,anditsaysonlywhatisverified,andsimplynothingmore. Ifoneshouldsaythatitdidcontainsomethingmorehemustbe abletosaywhatmorethisis,andtodothishewouldhavetotell ushowtheworldwoulddifferifhewere mistaken.Butthiscannot bedone,sincebyassumptionalltheobservabledifferencesare alreadyincludedintheverification. Intheexampleofsimultaneitytheanalysisofthemeaning,asis appropriateforthephysicist,iscarriedonlytothepointwherethe decisionregardingthetruthorfalsityofapropositionabouttimeis basedontheoccurrence ornon-occurrence ofadefinitephysical event(e.g.thecoincidenceofapointerwithapointonascale). Butitisclearthatonecanaskfurther:whatdoesitmeantosay thatthepointerindicatesadefinitepointonthescale?Andthe answercanonlybemadebyreferencetotheoccurrenceofcertain data,orasonegenerallysays,certain"sense-impressions."This willbegenerallyadmitted,especiallybyphysicists."Forpositivism willalwaysberightinthis,thatthereisnoothersourceof knowledgethansense-impressions"saysPlanck1andthisevidently meansthatthetruthorfalsityofaphysicalstatementdepends entirelyupontheoccurrenceofcertainsense-impressions(which constituteaspecialclassofdata). Buttherewillalwaysbemanywhoareinclinedtosay:grantedthat thetruthofaphysicalstatementcanbetestedonlybythe occurrence ofcertainsense-impressions,thisisnotthesameas assertingthatthemeaningofthestatementisalsothereby exhaustivelygiven.Thislattermustbedenied:apropositioncan containmorethancanbeverifiedthatthepointerstandsata definitepointonthescalemeansmorethantheexistenceof certainsensations(namely"theexistenceofadefinitefactinthe externalworld"). Inanswertothisdenialoftheidentityofmeaningandverification wemustpointoutthefollowing:1)Thisdenialisfoundamong physicistsonlywhentheyleavetheactualsphereofphysical statementsandbegintophilosophize.(Inphysics,obviously,there occuronlystatementsaboutthepropertiesorbehaviorofthingsor events,anexpressstatementconcerningtheir"reality"isnota scientificstatementbutaphilosophicalone).Inhisownspherethe physicistadmitsentirelythecorrectnessofourstandpoint.We mentionedthisearlier,andillustrateditintheexampleof simultaneity.Thereare ____________________

1PositivismusundReale Aussenwelt,p.14.

-90indeedmanyphilosopherswhosay:ofcoursewecandetermine onlyrelative simultaneity,butitdoesnotfollowfromthisthat thereisnosuchthingasabsolutesimultaneity,andwecontinue tobelieveinit!Thefalsityofthisstatementcannotinanysense bedemonstrated,buttheoverwhelmingmajorityofphysicistsis rightlyoftheopinionthatitismeaningless.Howeveritmustbe sharplyemphasizedthatinbothcaseswehavetodowiththe samesituation.ThereisinprinciplenodifferencewhetherIask: doestheproposition"twoeventsaresimultaneous"meanmore thancanbeverified?OrwhetherIask:doestheproposition "thepointerpointstowardthefifthlineonthescale"mean morethancanbeverified?Thephysicistwhohandlesthesetwo casesdifferentlyisguiltyofaninconsistency.Hewillofcourse justifyhimself,believingthatinthesecondcasewherethe questionconcernsthe"realityoftheexternalworld"muchmore isatstake,philosophically.Thisargumentistoovagueforusto attachmuchweighttoit,butweshallseepresentlywhether anythingliesbehindit. 2. Itisperfectlytruethateverystatementaboutaphysicalobject oraneventmeansmorethanisverified,say,bytheoccurrence ofasingleexperience.Itisratherpresupposedthatthe experience occurredunderverydefiniteconditions,whose realizationofcoursecanonlybeverifiedbysomethinggiven, anditispresupposedfurtherthatevermoreverificationsare possible(confirmationsetc.),whichintheirturn,naturally, reducetocertaingivenevents.Inthismanneronecanand mustgiveanaccountofillusionsofsense,andoferror,anditis easytoseehowthosecasesaretobeincludedinwhichwe shouldsaytheobserverwasmerelydreaming,thatthepointer indicatedadefiniteline,orthathedidnotcarefullyobserve, etc.TheassertionsofBlondlotaboutN-Rayswhichhebelieved himselftohavediscoveredwere certainlymorethanstatements thatundercertainconditionshehadexperiencedcertainvisual sensationsandbecauseofthis,ofcourse,theycouldbe refuted.2Strictlyspeaking,themeaningofapropositionabout physicalobjectswouldbeexhaustedonlybyanindefinitelylarge numberofpossibleverifications,andwegatherfromthisthat suchapropositioncaninthelastanalysisneverbeshowntobe absolutelytrue.Itisindeedgenerallyrecognizedthateventhe mostcertainpropositionsofsciencearealwaystobetakenas hypotheses,whichremainopentofurtherrefinementand improvement.Thishascertainconsequencesforthelogical natureofsuchpropositions,butthesedonotinterestushere. Onceagain:themeaningofaphysicalstatementisneverde____________________ 2Cf.Planck,op.cit.,p.11. -91-

terminedbyasingleisolatedverification,butitmustbethought ofintheform:Ifconditionsxaregiven,thedatayoccur, wherewecansubstituteanindefinitelylargenumberof conditionsforx,thepropositionremainingtrueforeachcase. (Thisholdsevenwhenthestatementreferstoasingle happening--ahistoricalevent,forsuchaneventhas innumerableconsequenceswhoseoccurrencesareverifiable). Thusthemeaningofeveryphysicalstatementislodgedfinallyin anendlessconcatenationofdatatheisolateddatumtherefore ishereuninteresting.Henceifanypositivisteversaidthatthe onlyobjectsofsciencearethegivenexperiencesthemselveshe wascertainlyquitemistakenwhatalonethescientistsseekare theruleswhichgoverntheconnectionsamongexperiences,and bymeansofwhichtheycanbepredicted.Noonewilldenythat thesoleverificationofnaturallawsliesinthefactthattheyyield suchtruepredictions.Thecommonobjectionthatthe immediatelygiven,whichatmostcanbebuttheobjectof psychology,isthusfalselymadeintotheobjectofphysicsisin thiswayrefuted. 3. Mostimportanthowever:ifanyoneisoftheopinionthatthe meaningofapropositionisneverthelessnotexhaustedbywhat canbeverifiedinthegiven,butextendsfarbeyondit,hemust atleastadmitthatthisadditionalmeaningcannotinanywaybe described,stated,orexpressedinlanguage.Forlethimtryto communicatethisadditionalmeaning!Totheextenttowhichhe succeedsincommunicatingsomethingaboutthisadditional meaninghewillfindthatthecommunicationconsistsinthefact thathehasindicatedcertainconditionswhichcanserve for verificationinthegiven,andthushefindsourposition confirmed.Orelsehebelieveshimselftohavegivenameaning, butcloserexaminationshowsthathiswordsexpressonlythat somethingmoreisthere,concerningwhosenaturesimply nothingissaid.Andtheninfacthehascommunicatednothing, andhisassertionismeaningless.Foronecannotassertthe existenceofsomethingwithoutsayingwhatoneassertstoexist. Thisisobviousinthecaseofourexampleofthe"nucleusofthe electron"whichinprincipleliesbeyondexperience yetfor clarity'ssakeweshallconsideranotherexamplewhichbrings outanimportantpointofprinciple. Iobserve twopiecesofgreenpaperanddeterminethattheyhave thesamecolor.Thepropositionwhichassertsthesamenessof colorisverified,amongotherways,bythefactthatatthesame timeIhavetwoexperiencesofthesamecolor.Theproposition: "there aretwospotsofthesamecolorbeforemenow"cannotbe reducedtoanyothersitisverifiedbythefactthatitdescribesthe -92given.Ithasaclearmeaning:byvirtue ofthemeaningsofthe wordsinvolvedintheproposition,itsignifiesjusttheexistenceof colorsamenessandbyvirtueoflinguisticusagetheproposition

expressesjustthatexperience.NowIshowoneofthesetwopieces ofpapertoasecondobserver,andaskthequestion:doeshesee thegreenasIdo?Ishiscolorexperience likemycolorexperience? Thiscasediffersinprinciplefromthatjustconsidered.Whilethere thestatementwasverifiablebytheexperienceofcolorsameness, here,briefreflectionshows,suchaverificationissimplyimpossible. Ofcoursethesecondobserver,ifheisnotcolorblind,callsthe papergreen,andifIdescribethisgreentohimmorecloselyby saying:itisyellowerthanthiscarpet,butbluerthanthebilliard cloth,darkerthanthisplant,etc.,hewillfindthesametoholdin hisexperience,i.e.hewillagreewithmystatements.Butevenifall hisjudgmentsaboutcoloragreeentirelywithmineIcannotinfer fromthisthatheexperiencesthissamequality.Itcouldbethecase thatonlookingatthegreenpaperhewouldhaveacolor experience whichIwouldcall"red,"thatontheotherhand,whenI seeredhewouldseegreen,callingit"red"ofcourse,andsoon. Indeeditmightevenbethatmycolorsensationscorrespondtohis toneexperiences,ortoanyotherdata.Itwouldnevertheless foreverbeimpossibletodiscoverthesedifferences,betweenhis andmyexperience.Weshouldalwaysunderstandoneanother perfectly,andcouldneverbeofdifferentopinionsregardingour environmentif(andthisistheonlyassumptionthatneedbemade) theinnerorderofhisexperiencesagreedwiththatofmine.There isnoquestionhereoftheir"quality,"allthatisrequiredisthatthey canbearrangedintosystemsinthesamemanner. Allthisisindeedadmitted,andphilosophershaveoftenpointedit out.But,forthemostpart,whiletheyhaveallowedthatsuch subjectivedifferencesaretheoreticallypossible,andthatthis possibilityraisesaveryinterestingquestionofprinciple,theyhave heldittobe"highlyprobable"thattheotherobserverandIdoin facthavethesameexperience.But,wemustpointout,the statementthatdifferentindividualshavethesameexperience has itssoleverifiablemeaninginthefactthatalltheirassertions(and ofcoursealltherestoftheirbehavior)exhibitcertainagreements. Henceitfollowsthatthestatementmeansnothingbutthis.Itis onlytoexpressthesamethinginadifferentmannerifwesaythat wehereareconcernedwiththesimilarityoftwosystem-orders. Thepropositionthattwoexperiencesofdifferentsubjectsnotonly occupythesameplaceintheorderofasystembutare,inaddition, qualitativelysimilarhasnomeaningforus.Notewell,itisnotfalse, butmeaningless:wehavenoideawhatitmeans. -93Experience shows,however,thatmostpeoplefinditverydifficultto agreetothis.Wemustmakeitclearthatherewehavetodowith alogicalimpossibilityofverification.Itmakesgoodsensetospeak ofthesimilarityofdatainthesameconsciousness,foritcanbe verifiedthroughanimmediateexperience.Butifwewanttospeak ofthesimilarityofdataindifferentconsciousnesseswearedealing withanewconcept,whichhastobenewlydefined.Forthe statementsinwhichitoccursarenolongerverifiableintheold

manner.Thenewdefinitionissimplythesimilarityofallrelevant reactionsofthetwoindividualswecanfindnoother.Mostpeople, ofcourse,believethatnodefinitionisrequiredhereoneknowsthe meaningof"similar"withoutit,andthemeaninginbothcasesis thesame.But,torecognizethisasamistakeweneedonly remembertheconceptofsimultaneity,inwhichthesituationis exactlythesame.Totheconceptof"simultaneityataplace"there correspondstheconceptof"similarityoftheexperiencesofthe sameindividual,"andto"simultaneityatdifferentplaces"there correspondsthenotionof"similarityoftheexperiencesofdifferent persons."Thesecondnotionis,withrespecttothefirst,anew conceptineachcase,andmustbespeciallydefined.Wecanno moreindicateadirectlyexperiencable qualitywhichwouldverifythe similarityoftwogreensindifferentconsciousnessesthanwecanfor simultaneityatdifferentpoints:bothmustbedeterminedbya systemofrelations. Manyphilosophershavesoughttoovercomethedifficultywhich seemedtoconfrontthemherebyallsortsofspeculationsandideal experiments,speaking,say,ofauniversalconsciousness comprehendingallindividuals(God)orthinkingperhapsthatby meansofsomeartificialconnectionofthenervoussystemsoftwo individualsthesensationsofonewouldbemadeaccessibletothe other,andthusberenderedcomparable.Butofcourseallthisisin vain.Foreveninthisfantasticwayintheendonlythecontentsof oneandthesameconsciousnesswouldbedirectlycompared.The question,however,concernsthepossibilityofthecomparisonof qualitiesinsofarastheybelongtodifferent,andnotthesame, consciousnesses. Henceitmustbegrantedthatastatementconcerningthesimilarity oftheexperiencesoftwopersonshasnoothercommunicable meaningthanacertainagreementoftheirreactions.Ofcourse everyone isfreetobelievethatsuchapropositionalsopossesses anothermoredirectmeaningbutsomuchissure:nosuch meaningisverifiable,andonecannotinanywaystateorshow whatthismeaningis.Henceitfollowsthatsuchameaningsimply cannotinanywaybecometheobjectofdiscussion.Wecansay absolutely -94nothingaboutit,anditcaninnowayenterintoanylanguageby meansofwhichwecommunicatewithoneanother.Andwhathas,I hope,becomeclearhereholdsgenerally.Wecanunderstandina propositiononlywhatitcommunicates,andameaningis communicableonlyifitisverifiable.Sincepropositionsarenothing butvehiclesforcommunicationwecanincludeintheirmeanings onlywhattheycancommunicate.ForthisreasonIshouldmaintain that"meaning".canmeanonly"verifiable meaning." Butevenifsomeoneshouldinsistthatthereisanon-verifiable meaningthiswouldnothelpintheleast.Forsuchameaningcanin nowayenterintoanythinghesaysorasks,orintowhatweask

himoranswerhim.Inotherwords:iftherewereanysuchthing, allourutterances,arguments,andmodesofbehaviorwould remainquiteunaffectedbyit,whetherweweredealingwithdaily life,ethicaloraestheticattitudes,withscienceorphilosophy. Everythingwouldremainasiftherewere nounverifiable meaning. Foriftherewereadifferencethisverydifferencewouldmakeit verifiable. Thisisaserioussituation,andwemustinsistthatitbetaken seriously.Above allonemustguardagainstconfusingthislogical impossibilitywithanempiricalincapacity,asifsometechnical difficultyandhumanimperfectionwereresponsibleforthefactthat onlywhatisverifiable canbeexpressed,andasiftherewerestill somerearentrancethroughwhichanunverifiable meaningmight slipinandmakeitselfevidentinourdiscourseandbehavior.No! Theincommunicabilityisabsolutehewhobelieves(orrather imaginesthathebelieves)inanon-verifiable meaningmust neverthelessadmitthatwithrespecttoitonlyonecourseisopento him:uttersilence.Neitherhenorwegainanything,nomatterhow oftenheasserts:"yetthereisanon-verifiable meaning!"Forthis statementitselfisdevoidofmeaning,ittellsusnothing.

3.WHATISTHEMEANINGOF"REALITY," OF"EXTERNALWORLD"?
Wearenowpreparedtoapplywhathasbeensaidtotheso-called problemoftherealityoftheexternalworld. Weask:Whatisthemeaningoftherealist'sassertion,"thereisan externalworld?"orwhatisthemeaningofthestatement (attributedtothepositivistbytherealist)"there isnoexternal world"? Inordertoanswerthequestionitisofcoursenecessarytomake clearthemeaningsofthewords,"there is,"and"externalworld." Webeginwiththefirst."Thereisanx"meansthesameas"xis -95real"or"xisactual."Hencewhatdowemeanwhenweattribute realitytoanobject?Itisanold,veryimportantlogicalor philosophicalinsight,thattheproposition"xisreal"isofquitea differentsortfromapropositionwhichascribessomepropertytox (e.g."xishard.")Inotherwords:realityorexistenceisnota predicate.Thestatement"thedollarinmypocketisround"hasa completelydifferentlogicalformfromthatofthestatement"the dollarinmypocketisreal."Inmodernlogicthisdistinctionis expressedbymeansoftwoverydifferentsymbolisms,butitwas alreadyclearlydrawnbyKant,who,asweknow,inhiscritiqueof theso-calledontologicalproofofGod'sexistence,correctlyfound thesourceoferrorofthisproofinthefactthatexistenceistreated asapredicate. Indailylifeweconstantlyspeakofrealityorexistence,andforthis

reasonitcannotbeverydifficulttodiscoveritsmeaning.Inalawsuititisoftennecessarytodeterminewhetheracertaindocument actuallyexists,orwhetheritismerelywronglyassertedtoexist anditisnotaltogetherunimportanttomewhetherthedollarinmy pocketisonlyimaginedorisreal.Noweveryone knowshowsuch anassertionoftherealityofsomethingisverified,andthere cannotbetheslightestdoubtthattherealityofthedollarisverified andverifiedonlybythefactthat,asaresultofcertainsuitable manipulations,Iobtaincertainsensationsoftouchandsightupon whosepresenceIamaccustomedtosay"thisisadollar."The sameholdsofthedocument,exceptthatinthiscasewewould contentourselveswithcertainstatementsofotherswhoclaimto haveseenthedocument,i.e.tohavehadperceptionsofavery definitesort.Andthe"statementsofothers"consistagainofcertain acoustic,or,iftheywere writtenstatements,ofcertainvisual perceptions.Nospecialanalysisisrequiredofthefactthatthe occurrence ofcertainsense-perceptionsamongthedataalways constitutesthesolecriterionofstatementsconcerningtherealityof a"physical"objectoreventineverydaylife,aswellasinthemost subtlepropositionsofscience.ThatthereareokapisinAfricacan bedeterminedonlybythefactthatsuchanimalsareobserved there.Howeveritisnotnecessarythattheobjectorevent"itself" beperceived.Wecan,forexample,imaginetheexistenceofa transneptunianplanettobeinferredwithasmuchcertaintyfrom theobservationofperturbationsasfromthedirectperceptionofa spotoflightinthetelescope.Therealityofatomsfurnishesuswith anotherexample.Andthesameistrueoftheothersideofthe moon. Itisofgreatimportancetorealizethattheoccurrenceofadefinite singleexperience intheverificationofapropositionabout -96natureisoftennotacceptedasverifyingtheproposition,butthat throughoutweareconcernedwithuniformities,withconnections obeyingnaturallaws:inthismannergenuineverificationsare distinguishedfromillusionsandhallucinations.Whenwesayofany objectorevent--whichmustbedesignatedbyadescription--thatit isrealthismeansthatthereexistsaverydefiniteconnection betweenperceptionsorotherexperiences,thatundercertain conditionscertaindataappear.Suchastatementisverifiedinthis manneralone,andtherefore ithasonlythiscommunicable meaning. ThiswasinprinciplealreadyformulatedbyKanta,whomnoone wouldchargewith"positivism."Realityforhimisacategory,andif weapplyitinanyway,andsayofanobjectthatitisrealthis means,accordingtoKant,thatitbelongstoacollectionof perceptionsconnectedaccordingtosomenaturallaw. Weseethatforus(asforKantandthesameappliestoevery philosopherwhounderstandshisbusiness)itissimplyamatterof sayingwhatitmeansineverydaylifeorinsciencetoascribereal

existencetoathing.Ourtaskisinnosensethatofcorrectingthe statementsofeverydaylifeorofscience.ImustconfessthatI shouldrepudiateandconsiderabsurdanyphilosophicalsystemthat involvedtheassertionthatcloudsandstars,mountainsandsea wereunreal,thatthechairbythewallceasedtoexistwheneverI turnedmyback.NordoIcreditanyseriousthinkerwithanysuch statement.Itwouldforexamplesurelybequiteaperverse interpretationofBerkeley'sphilosophytoseeinitsuchasystem. Hetoodidn'tdenytherealityoftheworldofbodies,butmerely triedtoexplainwhatwemeanwhenweascriberealitytoit.He whosaysthatunperceivedideasexistinGod'sminddoesnot therebydenytheirexistencebutseekstounderstandit.JohnStuart Millhimselfdidnotwishtodenytherealityofphysicalbodies,but toclarifyit,whenhedeclaredthemtobe"permanentpossibilities ofsensation,"thoughinmyopinionhismannerofexpressionwas veryillchosen. Therefore ifoneunderstandsby"positivism"aviewwhichdenies therealityofbodiesImustdeclarepositivismtobesimplyabsurd. ButIdonotbelievethatsuchaninterpretationofpositivisticviews wouldbehistoricallyjust,atleastsofarastheirablest representativesareconcerned.Bethisasitmay,wearenot concernedwithit,butwiththeviewitself.Andinthisconnectionwe haveseenthatourprinciple,thatthemeaningofapropositionis identicalwithitsverification,leadstotheinsightthattheassertion oftherealityofathingisastatementregardingaregular connectionofexperiences.Itdoesnotleadtotheconclusionthat theassertionisfalse.(There-97forerealityisnotdeniedtophysicalthingsinfavorofsensations.) Butopponentsoftheviewjustexpoundedarenotatallsatisfied withthis.Theywouldprobablyofferthefollowinganswer:"Youdo, indeed,admittherealityofthephysicalworld,but,asitseemsto us,onlyverbally.Yousimplycallthatrealwhichwewoulddescribe asamereconceptualconstruction.Whenweusethewordreality wemeanbyitsomethingquitedifferentfromwhatyoumean.Your definitionofrealityrefersbacktoexperiencesbutwemean somethingaltogetherindependentofexperience.Wemean somethingwhichpossessesthatsameindependenceevidently attributedbyyoutothedataalone,inthesensethatyoureduce everythingtothemastosomethingnotfurtherreducible." Eventhoughitwouldsufficeasarebuttaltoinviteouropponentsto reconsiderhowexistentialpropositionsareverified,andhow verificationandmeaningareconnected,Ithinkitnecessaryto considerthepsychologicalattitudefromwhichthisargumentarises, andtorequestattentionforthefollowingremarks,whichmay resultinamodificationofthatattitude. Weaskfirstwhetheronourviewarealityisattributedtoa"content ofconsciousness"whichisdeniedtoaphysicalobject.Thuswe

inquirewhethertheassertionoftherealityofafeelingora sensationhasadifferentmeaningfromthatoftherealityofa physicalbody?Thiscanmeanforusonly:dowehavedifferent modesofverificationineachcase?Theansweris:No!Inorderto makethisclearitisnecessarytoundertake someslightanalysisof thelogicalformofexistentialpropositions.Thegenerallogical insightthatanexistentialpropositionaboutadatumispossibleonly ifitisreferredtobyadescription,andnotifitisgivenbydirect indicationholdsofcoursefor"dataofconsciousness."(Inthe languageofsymboliclogicthisisexpressedbythefactthatan existentialpropositionmustcontainan"operator.")InB.Russell's symbolism,forexample,anexistentialpropositionhastheform (x)fx,orinwords:"thereisanxhavingthepropertyf."The combinationofwords"there isana,"where "a"isthepropername ofanobjectdirectlypresent,andthereforemeansthesameas "this,"ismeaningless,andcannotbewritteninRussell'ssymbolism. WemustattaintheinsightthatDescartes'statement"Iam"--or,to usealessmisleadingformulation,"mycontentsofconsciousness exist"--issimplymeaninglessitexpressesnothingandcontainsno knowledge.Thisisbecause"contentsofconsciousness"occursin thiscontextsimplyasanameforthegiven:nocharacteristicis expressedwhosepresencecouldbetested.Apropositiononlyhas meaning,isverifiable only,ifIcan -98statetheconditionsunderwhichitwouldbetrueandunderwhichit wouldbefalse.ButhowshallIdescribetheconditionsunderwhich theproposition"mycontentsofconsciousnessexist"wouldbefalse? Everyattemptwouldleadtoabsurdity,forexampletosuch statementsas"itisthecasethatnothingisthecase,"orsomething ofthesort.Thereforeitisself-evidentthatIcannotdescribethe conditionswhichmakethepropositiontrue(trytodoso!).Thereis indeedalsonodoubtthatDescartesfailedtogainanyknowledge throughhisstatement,andwasnowiserattheendthanhewasat thebeginningofhisinquiry. No,aquestionconcerningtherealityofanexperience makessense onlyifitsrealitycansignificantlybedoubted.Icanforexample ask:IsitreallytruethatIfelthappyuponhearingthatnews?This canbeverifiedorfalsifiedinexactlythesamewayas,say,the question:isittruethatSiriushasasatellite(thatthissatelliteis real)?ThatonagivenoccasionIexperiencedpleasurecanfor examplebeverifiedbyexaminingthestatementsofothers concerningmybehavioratthetime,byfindingaletterwrittenby meatthetime,orevensimplybyaveridicalmemoryofthe emotionexperienced.Hencethereishereabsolutelynodifference inprinciple:toberealalwaysmeanstostandinadefinite relationshiptothegiven.Andthisalsoholds,say,foranexperience atthisverymoment.Forexample,Icansignificantlyask(sayinthe courseofaphysiologicalexperiment):doI,ordoInot,experience apainatthismoment?Observe thathere"pain"doesnotfunction asapropernameforathis-here,butrepresentsaconceptwhich

standsforadescribableclassofexperiences.Here,too,the questionisansweredbydeterminingthatanexperience having certaindescribablepropertiesoccursinconjunctionwithcertain conditions(experimentalconditions,concentrationofattentionetc.). Suchdescribablepropertieswouldbe,forinstance,similaritytoan experience occurringundercertainotherconditionsthetendency toproducecertainreactions,etc. Nomatterhowwetwistandturn:itisimpossibletointerpretan existentialpropositionexceptasastatementregardingaconnection ofperceptions.Itisrealityofthesamesortthatonemustattribute todataofconsciousnessand,say,tophysicalevents.Hardly anythinginthehistoryofphilosophyhasproducedgreater confusionthantheattempttodistinguishoneofthetwoastrue "being."Wherevertheword"real"issignificantlyuseditmeansone andthesamething. Theopponentofthisviewwillperhapsnotfeelthatwhathas -99beensaidupsetshisownviewinanyway,butwillbeofthe impressionthattheprecedingargumentspresupposeapointof departureheisfromtheoutsetunwillingtoadopt.Hemustindeed grantthatadecisionregardingtherealityorunrealityofafactin experience isalwaysmadeinthewaydescribed,butheclaimsthat inthiswayonearrivesonlyatwhatKantcalledempiricalreality. Thismethoddefinestherealmoftheobservationsofeverydaylife andofscience,butbeyondthislimitliessomethingmore,the transcendentreality,whichcannotbededucedbystrictlogic,and therefore isnotapostulateoftheunderstanding,butisperhapsa postulateofreason.Thisistheonlyrealexternalworld,andit aloneisrelevanttothephilosophicalproblemoftheexistenceof theexternalworld.Thusourdiscussionleavesthequestionofthe meaningoftheword"reality,"andturnstothatofthephrase "externalworld." Thephrase"externalworld"isevidentlyusedintwodifferentways: firstinthelanguageofeverydaylife,andsecondlyasatechnical terminphilosophy. Whereveritoccursindailylifeithas,asdomostoftheexpressions usedinpracticalaffairs,asensiblemeaningwhichcanbestated.In oppositiontothe"innerworld,"whichincludesmemories,thoughts, dreams,desires,feelings,theexternalworldissimplytheworldof mountainsandtrees,ofanimalsandmen.Everychildknowswhat ismeantwhenweasserttheexistenceofdefiniteobjectsofthis worldandwemustinsistthatitreallymeansabsolutelynothing morethanwhatthechildknows.Weallknowhowtoverifythe statement,say,that"there isacastleintheparkoutsidethecity." Weactincertainwaysandthenifcertainclearlydescribablefacts areexperiencedwesay:"Yes,therereallyisacastlethere," otherwise wesaythestatementwaswrong,oralie.Andif someoneasksus:"Wasthecastlealsothereatnight,whennoone

sawit?"Weanswer:"Undoubtedly!Foritwouldhavebeen impossibletobuilditsincethismorningfurthermore thecondition ofthebuildingshowsthatnotonlywasitthereyesterday,butfor hundredsofyears,hencebeforewewereborn."Thuswepossess quitedefiniteempiricalcriteriawithwhichtodeterminewhether housesandtreesexistedwhenwedidnotseethem,andwhether theyalreadyexistedbeforeourbirth,andwhethertheywillexist afterourdeath.Thismeansthatthestatementthatthosethings "existindependentlyofus"hasaclearverifiable meaning,andis obviouslytobeaffirmed.Wecanverywelldistinguishempirically thingsofthissortfromthosethatareonly"subjective"and -100"dependentuponus."If,forinstance,becauseofsomevisual defectIseeadarkspotwhenIlookattheadjacentwallIsaythat thespotisthereonlywhenIlookatit,butIsaythatthewallis thereevenwhenIdonotlookatit.Theverificationofthis distinctionisindeedquiteeasy,andboththesestatementssayjust whatiscontainedintheverifications,andnothingelse. Henceifthephraseexternalworldistakenwiththesignificationit hasineverydaylifethenthequestionregardingitsexistenceis simplythequestion:arethereinadditiontomemories,desiresand ideasalsostars,clouds,plants,animals,andmyownbody?We havejustseenthatitwouldbesimplyabsurdtoanswerthis questioninthenegative.Thereare,quiteevidently,houses,clouds, andanimalsexistingindependentlyofus,andIsaidabovethatany thinkerwhodeniedtheexistenceoftheexternalworldinthissense wouldhavenoclaimonourrespect.Insteadoftellinguswhatwe meanwhenwespeakofmountainsandplantshewouldconvince usthattherearen'tanysuchthingsatall! Butscience!Doesit,inoppositiontocommonsense,mean somethingotherthanthingslikehousesandtreeswhenitspeaksof theexternalworld?Itseemstomethatnothingofthesortisthe case.Foratomsandelectricfields,orwhateverthephysicistmay speakof,arejustwhatconstitutehousesandtreesaccordingto theirtheoryandtherefore theonemustberealinthesamesense astheother.Theobjectivityofmountainsandcloudsisexactlythe sameasthatofprotonsandenergies--these latterstandinno greateroppositionto"subjectivity,"saytofeelingsand hallucinations,thandotheformer.Infactweareatlastconvinced thattheexistenceofeventhemostsubtle"invisible things," assumedbythescientist,is,inprinciple,verifiedexactlyasisthe realityofatreeorastar. Inordertosettlethedisputeconcerningrealismitisofverygreat importancetodrawthephysicist'sattentiontothefactthathis externalworldissimplynature,whichalsosurroundsusindailylife, andnotthe"transcendentworld"ofthemetaphysician.The distinctionbetweenthetwoisagainespeciallyclearinKant's philosophy.Nature,andeverythingofwhichthephysicistcanand mustspeakbelongs,accordingtoKant,toempiricalreality,and

whatthatmeansis(aswehavealreadysaid)explainedbyhimin justthewaythatitmustbebyus.AtomsinKant'ssystemhaveno transcendentreality,theyarenot"thingsinthemselves."Hencethe physicistcannotappealtotheKantianphilosophyitsarguments leadonlytotheempiricalexternalworldwhichweallacknowledge, -101nottoatranscendentworldhiselectronsarenotmetaphysical entities. Neverthelessmanyscientistsspeakofthenecessityofassumingthe existenceofanexternalworldasametaphysicalhypothesis.Tobe sure,theydonotdothiswithintheirownscience(eventhoughall thenecessaryhypothesesofascienceoughttobefoundwithinit), butonlywheretheyleavethisrealmandbegintophilosophize.In factthetranscendentexternalworldissomethingdealtwithonlyin philosophy,neverinascience,norindailylife.Itissimplya technicaltermintowhosemeaningwemustnowinquire. Howisthetranscendentormetaphysicalexternalworld distinguishedfromtheempiricalworld?Inphilosophicalsystemsitis thoughtofassomehowstandingbehindtheempiricalworld,where theword"behind"indicatesthatitcannotbeknowninthesame senseascantheempiricalworld,thatitliesbeyondaboundary whichseparatestheaccessiblefromtheinaccessible. Thisdistinctionhasitsoriginalsourceintheview,formerlyheldby mostphilosophers,thatinordertoknowanobjectitisnecessaryto perceive itdirectlyknowledge isasortofintuition,andisperfect onlywhentheobjectisdirectlypresenttotheknowerasa sensationorfeeling.Henceaccordingtothisviewwhatcannotbe immediatelyexperiencedorperceivedremainsunknowable, incomprehensible,transcendentitbelongstotherealmofthingsin themselves.Herethereissimplyaconfusion,whichIhaverevealed elsewhere manytimes,betweenknowledge andmereacquaintance orexperience.Butmodernscientistswillcertainlybeguiltyofno suchconfusion.Idonotbelievethatanyphysicistisoftheopinion thatknowledgeoftheelectronconsistsinthefactthatitenters bodilyintotheconsciousnessoftheinvestigatorthroughanactof intuition.Hewill,rather,holdtheviewthatforcompleteknowledge itisonlynecessarytostatethelawsgoverningthebehaviorofthe electronsoexhaustivelythatallformulaeintowhichitsproperties enterinanywayarecompletelyconfirmedbyexperience.Inother words:theelectron,andequallyallphysicalrealitiesarenot unknowablethingsinthemselves,theydonotbelongto transcendentreality,ifthisischaracterizedbythefactthatit containstheunknowable. Therefore weagaincometotheconclusionthatallphysical hypothesescanreferonlytoempiricalreality,ifbythiswemean theknowable.Infactitwouldbeaself-contradictiontoassume hypotheticallysomethingunknowable.Fortheremustalwaysbe definitereasonsforsettingupanhypothesis,thehypothesishasa

certainfunctiontofulfill.Thereforewhatisassumedinthe hypothesismust -102havethepropertyoffulfillingthisfunction,andmustbeso constitutedthatitisjustifiedbythosereasons.Butinjustthisway certainstatementsaremaderegardingtheassumedentityand theseexpressourknowledge ofit.Andofcoursetheycontain completeknowledgeofit.Foronlythatcanbeassumed hypotheticallyforwhichtherearegroundsinexperience. Ordoesthe"realistic"scientistwanttodesignatethetheoryof objectswhicharenotdirectlyexperiencedasametaphysical hypothesisforsomeotherreasonthanthatoftheir unknowableness,whichisnotunderconsiderationatall?Tothishe willperhapsansweraffirmatively.Infactwelearnfromnumerous statementsintheliterature thatthephysicistdoesnotaddany statementofitsunknowable charactertohisaffirmationofa transcendentworldquitethecontrary,heisrightlyoftheopinion thatthenatureoftheextra-mentalthingsiscorrectlyrepresented byhisequations.Thustheexternalworldofthephysicalrealistis notthatoftraditionalmetaphysics.Heusesthetechnicaltermof thephilosopher,butwhathemeansbyithasappearedtoustobe nothingbuttheexternalworldofeverydaylife,whoseexistenceno one,noteventhe"positivist,"doubts. What,then,isthatotherreasonwhichleadsthe"realist"to conceivehisexternalworldasametaphysicalhypothesis?Whydoes hewanttodistinguishitfromtheempiricalexternalworldwhichwe havedescribed?Theanswertothisquestionleadsusbackagainto anearlierpointinourdiscussion.Thephysical"realist"isquite satisfiedwithourdescriptionoftheexternalworldexceptinone point:hedoesnotbelievethatwehavegranteditenoughreality. Itisnotbecauseitisunknowable,orforanysuchreasonthathe thinkshis"externalworld"differsfromtheempirical,butonly becauseadifferent,higherrealitypertainstoit.Thisoftenshows itselfinhislanguagetheword"real"isfrequentlyreservedforthat externalworldincontrastwiththemerely"ideal,""subjective" contentsofconsciousness,andinoppositiontomere"logical" constructions,"positivism"beingreproachedwiththeattemptto reducerealitytosuchlogicalconstructs. Butthephysicalrealist,too,feelsobscurelythat,asweknow, realityisnota"predicate,"hencehecannotwellpassfromour empiricaltohistranscendentexternalworldbyascribingtoit,in additiontothecharacteristicswhichwealsoattributetophysical objects,thecharacteristicof"reality."Neverthelessheexpresses himselfinthiswayandthisillegitimateleap,whichcarrieshim beyondtherealmofsignificance,wouldindeedbe"metaphysical," andwillbefeltbyhimtobesuch. -103-

Nowweseethesituationclearly,andcanbaseourfinaljudgment ontheforegoingconsiderations. Ourprinciplethatthetruthandfalsityofallstatements,including thoseconcerningtherealityofaphysicalobject,canbetestedonly inthe"given,"andthattherefore themeaningofallpropositions canbeformulatedandunderstoodonlywiththehelpofthegiven-thisprincipleismistakenlyconceivedasifitassertedor presupposedthatonlythegivenisreal.Therefore the"realist"feels impelledtocontradictthisprincipleandtoestablishthecontrary: thatthemeaningofanexistentialpropositionisinnosense exhaustedbymerepropositionsoftheform"underthesedefinite conditionsthatdefiniteexperience willoccur"(thosepropositions constitutinganinfinitesetaccordingtoourview),butthattheir meaningliesbeyondallthisinsomethingelse,whichistobe designated,say,as"independentexistence,"as"transcendent being,"orsimilarly,andtowhichourprinciplefailstodojustice. Andhereweinquire:Well,howdoyoudojusticetoit?Whatdo thesephrases"independentexistence"and"transcendentbeing" mean?Inotherwords:whatverifiable differencedoesitmakein theworldwhethertranscendentbeingpertainstoanobjectornot? Twoanswersaregiventothisquestion.Thefirstisthatitmakesa verygreatdifference.Forascientistwhobelievesina"real" externalworldwillfeelandworkverydifferentlyfromonewho believeshimselftobe"describingsensations."Theformerwill observe thestarryheavens,whoseviewmakeshimconsciousofhis ownpunynature,andtheincomprehensiblesublimityandgrandeur oftheworldwithverydifferentfeelingsoffervorandawefromthe latter,forwhomthemostdistantgalacticsystemsaremerely "complexesofhisownsense-impressions."Theformerwilldevote himselftohistaskwithaninspirationandwillfeelasatisfactionin theknowledgeoftheexternalworldwhichisdeniedtothelatter, becausehebelieveshimselftobedealingonlywithhisown constructions. Inanswertothisweofferthefollowingcomment.Letusassume thatsomewhere inthebehavioroftwoscientiststheredoesexista differencesuchashasbeendescribedhere.Suchadifference wouldofcoursebeanobservabledifference.Supposenow somebodyinsistsonexpressingthisdifferencebysayingthatoneof thescientistsbelievesinarealexternalworldandtheotherdoes not.Inthateventthemeaningofthisstatementwouldconsist solelyinwhatweobserve inthebehaviorofthetwomen.Thatis, thewords"absolatereality"or"transcendentbeing,"orwhatever expressionswe -104mightchoosetoemploy,meanheresimplycertainstatesof feeling,whichoccurinthemenwhentheyobserve theworld,or makestatementsaboutit,orphilosophize.Itis,indeed,thecase

thattheuseofthewords"independentexistence,""transcendent reality,"etc.,issimplyandonlytheexpressionofafeeling,ofa psychologicalattitudeofthespeaker(this,moreover,may,inthe finalanalysis,betrueofallmetaphysicalpropositions).Ifsomeone assuresusthatthereisarealexternalworldinthetrans-empirical senseoftheword,heofcoursebelieveshimselftohave communicatedsometruthabouttheworld.Butinactualfact,his wordsexpresssomethingverydifferenttheymerelyexpress certainfeelingswhichgiverisetovariouslinguisticandother reactionsonhispart. Ifthisself-evidentpointrequiresanyfurtheremphasisIshouldlike tocallattentiontothefact--andwiththegreateststressonthe seriousnessofwhatissaid--thatthenon-metaphysicianisnot distinguishedfromthemetaphysicianby,say,theabsenceinhimof thosefeelingswhichtheotherexpressesintermsofthestatements ofarealisticphilosophy,butonlybythefactthatherecognizesthat thesestatementssimplydonothavethemeaningtheyseemto have,andaretherefore tobeavoided.Thenon-metaphysicianwill expressthesesamefeelingsinadifferentway.Inotherwords:the contrastdrawninthefirstanswerofthe"realist"betweenthetwo typesofthinkerswasmisleadingandunjust.Ifoneisunfortunate enoughnottofeelthesublimityofthestarryheavenssomething otherthanalogicalanalysisoftheconceptsofrealityandexternal worldistobeblamed.Toassumethattheopponentsof metaphysicsareunablejustlytocomprehend,say,thegreatnessof Copernicus,becauseinacertainsensethePtolemaicview representstheempiricalfactsaswellastheCopernican,seemsto metobeasstrangeastobelievethatthe"positivist"cannotbea goodparentbecauseaccordingtohistheoryhischildrenaremerely complexesofhisownsenseimpressions,anditistherefore senselesstotakemeasuresfortheirwelfareafterhisdeath.No: theworldofthenon-metaphysicianisthesameworldasthatofall othermenitlacksnothingwhichisneededtobestowmeaningon allthepropositionsofscienceandthewholeconductoflife.He merelyavoidsaddingmeaninglessstatementstohisdescriptionof theworld. Wecomenowtothesecondanswerwhichcanbegiventothe questionconcerningthemeaningoftheassertionofatranscendent reality.Itconsistsingrantingthatitmakesnodifferenceatallfor experience whetherornotoneassumessomethingfurthertoexist behindtheempiricalworld,thatmetaphysicalrealismtherefore -105cannotbetestedandisactuallyunverifiable.Henceonecannot indicateanyfurtherwhatismeantbythisassertionbut neverthelessitdoesmeansomething,andthismeaningcanbe understoodevenwithoutverification. Thisisnothingbuttheview,criticizedintheprevioussection,that themeaningofapropositionhasnothingtodowithitsverification, andweneedonlyapplyourearliergeneralcriticismtothisspecial

case.Thereforewemustsay:youdesignateherebyexistenceor realitysomethingwhichsimplycannotinanywaybegivenor explained.Yetdespitethisyoubelievethatthosewordsmake sense.Weshallnotquarrelwithyouoverthispoint.Butthismuch iscertain:accordingtotheadmissionjustmadethissensecanin nowaybecomeevident,itcannotbeexpressedinanywrittenor spokencommunication,norbyanygestureorconduct.Forifthis werepossibleweshouldhavebeforeusaverifiable empiricalfact, andtheworldwouldbedifferentiftheproposition"thereisan externalworld"were true,fromwhatitwouldbeifitwerefalse. Thisdifferencewouldthenconstitutethemeaningofthephrase "realexternalworld,"henceitwouldbeanempiricalmeaningthat is,thisrealexternalworldwouldagainbeonlytheempiricalworld, which,likeallhumanbeings,wealsoacknowledge.Eventospeak ofanyotherworldislogicallyimpossible.Therecanbeno discussionconcerningit,foranon-verifiable existencecannotenter meaningfullyintoanypossibleproposition.Whoeverstillbelieves-orbelieveshimselftobelieve--initmustdosoonlysilently. Argumentscanrelateonlytowhatcanbesaid. Theresultsofourdiscussionmaybesummarizedasfollows: 1)Thejustifiedunassailablenucleusofthe"positivistic"tendency seemstometobetheprinciplethatthemeaningofevery propositioniscompletelycontainedwithinitsverificationinthe given. Butthisprinciplehasseldombeenclearlyapparentwithinthat generaltendency,andhassofrequentlybeenmixedwithsomany untenablepropositionsthatalogicalpurificationisnecessary.Ifone wishestocalltheresultofthepurificationpositivism,whichwould perhapsbehistoricallyjustifiable,atleastadifferentiatingadjective mustbeadded.Sometimestheterm"logical"orelse"logistic positivism"isused.3Otherwise thedesignation"consistent empiricism"seemstometobeappropriate. ____________________ 3See the article byBlumbergandFeiglinthe Journalof Philosophy,Vol.XXVIII(1931),thearticlebyE.Kailainthe "AnnalesUniversitatisAboensis",Vol.XIII,Ser.B.(Turku,1930), andtheonebyA.PetzllintheSchriftenderUniversitt Gteborg. -1062)Thisprincipledoesnotmeananddoesnotimplythatonlythe givenisreal.Suchanassertiondoesnotmakesense. 3)Hencealso,consistentempiricismdoesnotdenytheexistenceof anexternalworlditmerelypointsouttheempiricalmeaningof thisexistentialproposition. 4)Itisnota"TheoryofAsIf."Itdoesnotassertthateverything behavesasiftherewere physicalindependentbodiesbutforit,

too,everythingisrealwhichthenon-philosophizingscientistcalls real.Thesubject-matterofphysicsisnotsensations,butlaws.The formulation,usedbysomepositivists,thatbodiesareonly "complexesofsensations"isthereforetoberejected.Whatis correctisonlythatpropositionsconcerningbodiesare transformable intoequivalentpropositionsconcerningthe occurrence ofsensationsinaccordancewithlaws. 5)Hencelogicalpositivismandrealismarenotinopposition whoeveracknowledgesourfundamentalprinciplemustbean empiricalrealist.4 6)Anoppositionexistsonlybetweentheconsistentempiricistand themetaphysician,andindeednomoreagainsttherealistthan againsttheidealistmetaphysician(theformerhasbeenreferredto inourdiscussionas"realist"inquotationmarks). 7)Thedenialoftheexistenceofatranscendentexternalworld wouldbejustasmuchametaphysicalstatementasitsaffirmation. Hencetheconsistentempiricistdoesnotdenythetranscendent world,butshowsthatbothitsdenialandaffirmationare meaningless. Thislastdistinctionisofthegreatestimportance.Iamconvinced thatthechiefoppositiontoourviewderivesfromthefactthatthe distinctionbetweenthefalsityandthemeaninglessnessofa propositionisnotobserved.Theproposition"Discourseconcerninga metaphysicalexternalworldismeaningless"doesnotsay:"There is noexternalworld,"butsomethingaltogetherdifferent.The empiricistdoesnotsaytothemetaphysician"whatyousayis false,"but,"whatyousayassertsnothingatall!"Hedoesnot contradicthim,butsays"Idon'tunderstandyou." ____________________ 4Onthispointandonthe entire subjectofthe presentessaythe readerisalsoreferredtoHansCornelius'"ZurKritikder WissenschaftlichenGrundbegriffe",Erkenntnis,Vol.II.The formulationsthereare,however,opentoobjections.Seealsothe splendidremarksinChapterXofPhillipFrank'sfinework,Das KausalgesetzundseineGrenzen,andRudolfCarnap's ScheinproblemederPhilosophie. -107-

5
TheEmpiricistCriterion ofMeaning
BYCARLG.HEMPEL

1.INTRODUCTION

THEFUNDAMENTALTENETofmodernempiricismistheviewthatall non-analyticknowledgeisbasedonexperience.Letuscallthis thesistheprincipleofempiricism.1Contemporarylogical empiricismhasadded2toitthemaximthatasentencemakesa cognitivelymeaningfulassertion,andthuscanbesaidtobeeither trueorfalse,onlyifitiseither(1)analyticorself-contradictoryor (2)capable,atleastinprinciple,ofexperientialtest.Accordingto thisso-calledempiricistcriterionofcognitivemeaning,orof cognitivesignificance,manyoftheformulationsoftraditional metaphysicsandlargepartsofepistemologyaredevoidofcognitive significance--howeverrichsomeofthemmaybeinnon-cognitive importbyvirtueoftheiremotiveappealorthemoralinspiration theyoffer.Similarlycertaindoctrineswhichhavebeen,atonetime oranother,formulatedwithinempiricalscienceoritsborder disciplinesaresocontrivedastobeincapableoftestbyany conceivableevidencetheyarethereforequalifiedaspseudohypotheses,whichassertnothing,andwhich ThisarticlefirstappearedinVol.4ofRevue InternationaledePhilosophie(1950).Itisrepublished herewiththekindpermissionofProfessorHempeland theeditorofthatjournal. ____________________ 1Thisterm isusedbyBenjamin(2)inanexaminationofthe foundationsofempiricism.Forarecentdiscussionofthebasic ideasofempiricismseeRussell(27),PartSix. 2Inhisstimulatingarticle,"Positivism,"W.T.Stace argues,in effect,thatthetestabilitycriterionofmeaningisnotlogically entailedbytheprincipleofempiricism.(See(29),especially section11.)Thisiscorrect:accordingtothelatter,asentence expressesknowledgeonlyifitiseitheranalyticorcorroborated byempiricalevidencetheformergoesfurtherandidentifiesthe domainofcognitivelysignificantdiscoursewiththatofpotential knowledge i.e.,itgrantscognitiveimportonlytosentencesfor which--unlesstheyareeitheranalyticorcontradictory--atestby empiricalevidenceisconceivable. -108therefore havenoexplanatoryorpredictiveforcewhatever.This verdictapplies,forexample,totheneo-vitalistspeculationsabout entelechiesorvitalforces,andtothe"telefinalisthypothesis" propoundedbyLecomteduNoy.3 Theprecedingformulationsoftheprincipleofempiricismandofthe empiricistmeaningcriterionprovidenomore,however,thana generalandrathervaguecharacterizationofabasicpointofview, andtheyneedtherefore tobeelucidatedandamplified.Andwhile intheearlierphasesofitsdevelopment,logicalempiricismwastoa largeextentpreoccupiedwithacritiqueofphilosophicandscientific formulationsbymeansofthosefundamentalprinciples,therehas beeninrecentyearsanincreasingconcernwiththepositivetasks

ofanalyzingindetailthelogicandmethodologyofempiricalscience andofclarifyingandrestatingthebasicideasofempiricisminthe lightoftheinsightsthusobtained.Inthepresentarticle,Ipropose todiscusssomeoftheproblemsthissearchhasraisedandsomeof theresultsitseemstohaveestablished.

2.CHANGESINTHETESTABILITYCRITERION OFEMPIRICALMEANING
Asourformulationshows,theempiricistmeaningcriterionlays downtherequirementofexperientialtestabilityforthoseamong thecognitivelymeaningfulsentenceswhichareneitheranalyticnor contradictoryletuscallthemsentenceswithempiricalmeaning,or empiricalsignificance.Theconceptoftestability,whichistorender precisethevaguenotionofbeingbased--orratherbaseable--on experience,hasundergoneseveralmodificationswhichreflectan increasinglyrefinedanalysisofthestructureofempirical knowledge.Inthepresentsection,letusexaminethemajorstages ofthisdevelopment. Forconvenienceofexposition,wefirstintroducethreeauxiliary concepts,namelythoseofobservablecharacteristic,ofobservation predicate,andofobservationsentence.Apropertyorarelationof physicalobjectswillbecalledanobservablecharacteristicif,under suitablecircumstances,itspresenceorabsenceinagiveninstance canbeascertainedthroughdirectobservation.Thus,theterms "green,""soft,""liquid,""longerthan,"designateobservable characteristics,while"bivalent,""radioactive,""betterelectric conductor,"and"introvert"donot.Termswhichdesignate observablecharacteristicswillbecalledobservationpredicates. Finally,byan ____________________ 3Cf.(19),Ch.XVI. -109observationsentenceweshallunderstandanysentencewhich-correctlyorincorrectly--assertsofoneormorespecificallynamed objectsthattheyhave,orthattheylack,somespecifiedobservable characteristic.Thefollowingsentences,forexample,meetthis condition:"TheEiffelToweristallerthanthebuildingsinits vicinity,""Thepointerofthisinstrumentdoesnotcoverthepoint marked'3'onthescale,"andeven,"Thelargestdinosauronexhibit inNewYork'sMuseumofNaturalHistoryhadabluetongue"for thislastsentenceassignstoaspecifiedobjectacharacteristic-havingabluetongue--whichisofsuchakindthatundersuitable circumstances(e.g.,inthecaseofmyChowdog)itspresenceor absencecanbeascertainedbydirectobservation.Ourconceptof observationsentenceisintendedtoprovide apreciseinterpretation ofthevagueideaofasentenceassertingsomethingthatis"in principle"ascertainablebydirectobservation,eventhoughitmay happentobeactuallyincapableofbeingobservedbymyself,

perhapsalsobymycontemporaries,andpossiblyevenbyany humanbeingwhoeverlivedorwilllive.Anyevidencethatmightbe adducedinthetestofanempiricalhypothesismaynowbethought ofasbeingexpressedinobservationsentencesofthiskind.4 Wenowturntothechangesintheconceptionoftestability,and thusofempiricalmeaning.IntheearlydaysoftheViennaCircle,a sentencewassaidtohaveempiricalmeaningifitwascapable,at leastinprinciple,ofcompleteverificationbyobservational evidencei.e.,ifobservationalevidencecouldbedescribedwhich,if actuallyobtained,wouldconclusivelyestablishthetruthofthe sentence.5Withthehelpoftheconceptofobservationsen____________________ 4ObservationsentencesofthiskindbelongtowhatCarnaphas calledthething-language(cf.,e.g.,(7),pp.52-53).Thatthey areadequatetoformulatethedatawhichserveasthebasisfor empiricaltestsisclearinparticularfortheintersubjective testing proceduresusedinscienceaswellasinlargeareasofempirical inquiryonthecommon-senselevel.Inepistemological discussions,itisfrequentlyassumedthattheultimateevidence forbeliefsaboutempiricalmattersconsistsinperceptionsand sensationswhosedescriptioncallsforaphenomenalistictypeof language.Thespecificproblemsconnectedwiththe phenomenalisticapproachcannotbediscussedherebutitshould bementionedthatatanyrateallthecriticalconsiderations presentedinthisarticleinregardtothetestabilitycriterionare applicable,mutatismutandis,tothecaseofaphenomenalistic basisaswell. 5Originally,the permissible evidence wasmeanttobe restrictedto whatisobservable bythespeakerandperhapshisfellow-beings duringtheirlifetimes.Thusconstrued,thecriterionrulesout,as cognitivelymeaningless,allstatementsaboutthedistantfutureor theremotepast,ashasbeenpointedout,amongothers,byAyer in(1),ChapterIbyPapin(21),Chapter13,esp.pp.333ff. andbyRussellin(27),pp.445-47.Thisdifficultyisavoided, however,ifwepermittheevidencetoconsistofanyfinitesetof "logicallypossibleobservationdata,"eachofthemformulatedin anobservationsentence.Thus,e.g.,thesentenceS1,"The tongueofthelargestdinosaurinNewYork'sMuseumofNatural Historywasblue -110tence,wecanrestatethisrequirementasfollows:AsentenceShas empiricalmeaningifandonlyifitispossibletoindicateafiniteset ofobservationsentences,O1,O2,...,On,suchthatifthese aretrue,thenSisnecessarilytrue,too.Asstated,however,this conditionissatisfiedalsoifSisananalyticsentenceorifthegiven observationsentencesarelogicallyincompatiblewitheachother.By thefollowingformulation,werulethesecasesoutandatthesame timeexpresstheintendedcriterionmoreprecisely:

(2.1)Requirementofcompleteverifiabilityinprinciple:Asentence hasempiricalmeaningifandonlyifitisnotanalyticandfollows logicallyfromsomefiniteandlogicallyconsistentclassof observationsentences.6 ____________________ 5orblack"iscompletelyverifiable inoursense foritisalogical consequenceoftheSentenceS2,"Thetongueofthelargest dinosaurinNewYork'sMuseumofNaturalHistorywasblue"and thisisanobservationsentence,ashasbeenshownabove. Andiftheconceptofverifiabilityinprincipleandthemoregeneral conceptofconfirmabilityinprinciple,whichwillbeconsidered later,areconstruedasreferringtologicallypossibleevidenceas expressedbyobservationsentences,thenitfollowssimilarlythat theclassofstatementswhichareverifiable,oratleast confirmable,inprincipleincludessuchassertionsasthatthe planetNeptuneandtheAntarcticContinentexistedbeforethey were discovered,andthatatomicwarfare,ifnotchecked,may leadtotheexterminationofthisplanet.Theobjectionswhich Russell(cf.(27),pp.445and447)raisesagainsttheverifiability criterionbyreference tothoseexamplesdonotapplytherefore if thecriterionisunderstoodinthemannerheresuggested. Incidentally,statementsofthekindmentionedbyRussell,which arenotactuallyverifiable byanyhumanbeing,wereexplicitly recognizedascognitivelysignificantalreadybySchlick(in(28), PartV),whoarguedthattheimpossibilityofverifyingthemwas "merelyempirical."Thecharacterizationofverifiabilitywiththe helpoftheconceptofobservationsentenceassuggestedhere mightserve asamoreexplicitandrigorousstatementofthat conception. 6Ashasfrequentlybeenemphasizedinempiricistliterature,the term"verifiability"istoindicate,ofcourse,theconceivability,or better,thelogicalpossibilityofevidenceofanobservationalkind which,ifactuallyencountered,wouldconstituteconclusive evidenceforthegivensentenceitisnotintendedtomeanthe technicalpossibilityofperformingthetestsneededtoobtainsuch evidence,andevenlessdoesitmeanthepossibilityofactually findingdirectlyobservable phenomenawhichconstituteconclusive evidenceforthatsentence--whichwouldbetantamounttothe actualexistenceofsuchevidenceandwouldthusimplythetruth ofthegivensentence.Analogousremarksapplytotheterms "falsifiability"and"confirmability."Thispointhasbeendisregarded insomerecentcriticaldiscussionsoftheverifiabilitycriterion. Thus,e.g.,Russell(cf.(27),p.448)construesverifiabilityasthe actualexistenceofasetofconclusivelyverifyingoccurrences. Thisconception,whichhasneverbeenadvocatedbyanylogical empiricist,mustnaturallyturnouttobeinadequatesince acordingtoittheempiricalmeaningfulnessofasentencecould notbeestablishedwithoutgatheringempiricalevidence,and moreoverenoughofittopermitaconclusiveproofofthe sentencesinquestion!Itisnotsurprising,therefore,thathis extraordinaryinterpretationofverifiabilityleadsRusselltothe conclusion:"Infact,thatapropositionisverifiable isitselfnot

verifiable"(l.c.)Actually,undertheempiricistinterpretationof completeverifiability,anystatementassertingtheverifiabilityof somesentenceSwhosetextisquoted,iseitheranalyticor contradictoryforthedecisionwhetherthereexistsaclassof observationsentenceswhichentailS,i.e.,whethersuch observationsentencescanbeformulated,nomatterwhether theyaretrueorfalse--thatdecision -111Thiscriterion,however,hasseveralseriousdefects.Thefirstof thoseheretobementionedhasbeenpointedoutbyvarious writers: a. Theverifiabilityrequirementrulesoutallsentencesofuniversal formandthusallstatementspurportingtoexpressgeneral lawsforthesecannotbeconclusivelyverifiedbyanyfiniteset ofobservationaldata.Andsincesentencesofthistype constituteanintegralpartofscientifictheories,theverifiability requirementmustberegardedasoverlyrestrictive inthis respect.Similarly,thecriteriondisqualifiesallsentencessuchas "Foranysubstancethereexistssomesolvent,"whichcontain bothuniversalandexistentialquantifiers(i.e.,occurrencesof theterms"all"and"some"ortheirequivalents)forno sentencesofthiskindcanbelogicallydeducedfromanyfinite setofobservationsentences. Twofurtherdefectsoftheverifiabilityrequirementdonotseem tohavebeenwidelynoticed: b. SupposethatSisasentencewhichsatisfiestheproposed criterion,whereasNisasentencesuchas"Theabsoluteis perfect,"towhichthecriterionattributesnoempiricalmeaning. ThenthealternationSvN(i.e.,theexpressionobtainedby connectingthetwosentencesbytheword"or"),likewise satisfiesthecriterionforifSisaconsequenceofsomefinite classofobservationsentences,thentriviallySvNisa consequenceofthesameclass.Butclearly,theempiricist criterionofmeaningisnotintendedtocountenancesentences ofthissort.Inthisrespect,therefore,therequirementof completeverifiabilityistooinclusive. c. Let"P"beanobservationpredicate.Thenthepurelyexistential sentence"(Ex)P(x)"("There existsatleastonethingthathas thepropertyP")iscompletelyverifiable,foritfollowsfromany observationsentenceassertingofsomeparticularobjectthatit hasthepropertyP.Butitsdenial,beingequivalenttothe universal ____________________ 6isamatterofpure logicandrequiresnofactualinformation whatever. Asimilarmisunderstandingisinevidenceinthefollowingpassage inwhichW.H.Werkmeisterclaimstocharacterizeaviewheldby logicalpositivists:"Apropositionissaidtobe'true'whenitis 'verifiableinprinciple'i.e.,whenweknowtheconditionswhich,

whenrealized,willmake'verification'possible(cf.Ayer)."(cf. (31),p.145).Thequotedthesis,which,again,wasneverheld byanylogicalpositivist,includingAyer,isinfactlogicallyabsurd. Forwecanreadilydescribeconditionswhich,ifrealized,would verifythesentence"TheoutsideoftheChryslerBuildingis paintedabrightyellow"butsimilarly,wecandescribeverifying conditionsforitsdenialhence,accordingtothequotedprinciple, boththesentenceanditsdenialwouldhavetobeconsidered true.Incidentally,thepassageunderdiscussiondoesnotaccord withWerkmeister'sperfectlycorrectobservation,l.c.,p.40,that verifiabilityisintendedtocharacterizethemeaningofa sentencewhichshowsthatverifiabilityismeanttobeacriterionof cognitivesignificanceratherthanoftruth. -112sentence"(x)P(x)"("NothinghasthepropertyP")isclearly notcompletelyverifiable,asfollowsfromcomment(a)above. Hence,underthecriterion(2.1),thedenialsofcertain empirically--andthuscognitively--significantsentencesare empiricallymeaninglessandastheyareneitheranalyticnor contradictory,theyarecognitivelymeaningless.Buthoweverwe maydelimitthedomainofsignificantdiscourse,weshallhaveto insistthatifasentencefallswithinthatdomain,thensomustits denial.Toputthemattermoreexplicitly:Thesentencestobe qualifiedascognitivelymeaningfularepreciselythosewhichcan besignificantlysaidtobeeithertrueorfalse.Butthen, adherenceto(2.1)wouldengenderaseriousdilemma,asis shownbytheconsequencejustmentioned.Wewouldeither havetogiveupthefundamentallogicalprinciplethatifa sentenceistrueorfalse,thenitsdenialisfalseortrue, respectively(andthuscognitivelysignificant)orelse,wemust deny,inamannerreminiscentoftheintuitionisticconceptionof logicandmathematics,that"(x)P(x)"islogicallyequivalentto thenegationof"(Ex)P(x)."Clearly,thecriterion(2.1),which hasdisqualifieditselfonseveralothercounts,doesnotwarrant suchdrasticmeasuresforitspreservationhence,ithastobe abandoned.7 Strictlyanalogousconsiderationsapplytoanalternativecriterion, whichmakescompletefalsifiabilityinprinciplethedefining characteristicofempiricalsignificance.Letusformulatethis criterionasfollows:Asentencehasempiricalmeaningifandonlyif itiscapable,inprinciple,ofcompleterefutationbyafinitenumber ofobservationaldataor,moreprecisely: (2.2)Requirementofcompletefalsifiabilityinprinciple:Asentence hasempiricalmeaningifandonlyifitsdenialisnotanalyticand followslogicallyfromsomefinitelogicallyconsistentclassof observationsentences.8 ____________________ 7The argumentshere adducedagainstthe verifiabilitycriterionalso

provetheinadequacyofaviewcloselyrelatedtoit,namelythat twosentenceshavethesamecognitivesignificanceifanysetof observationsentenceswhichwouldverifyoneofthemwouldalso verifytheother,andconversely.Thus,e.g.,underthiscriterion, anytwogenerallawswouldhavetobeassignedthesame cognitivesignificance,fornogenerallawisverifiedbyanysetof observationsentences.Theviewjustreferredtomustbeclearly distinguishedfromapositionwhichRussellexaminesinhiscritical discussionofthepositivisticmeaningcriterion.Itis"thetheory thattwopropositionswhoseverifiedconsequencesareidentical havethesamesignificance"(27),p.448).Thisviewisuntenable indeed,forwhatconsequencesofastatementhaveactuallybeen verifiedatagiventimeisobviouslyamatterofhistoricalaccident whichcannotpossiblyserve toestablishidentityofcognitive significance.ButIamnotawarethatanylogicalpositivistever subscribedtothat"theory." 8The ideaofusingtheoreticalfalsifiabilitybyobservational evidenceasthe"criterionofdemarcation"separatingempirical sciencefrommathematicsandlogicontheonehandandfrom metaphysicsontheotherisduetoK.Popper(cf.(22), -113Thiscriterionqualifiesasentenceasempiricallymeaningfulifits denialsatisfiestherequirementofcompleteverifiabilityasistobe expected,itistherefore inadequateonsimilargroundsasthe latter: a. Itrulesoutpurelyexistentialhypotheses,suchas"There exists atleastoneunicorn,"andallsentenceswhoseformulationcalls formixed--i.e.,universalandexistential--quantificationfor noneofthesecanpossiblybeconclusivelyfalsifiedbyafinite numberofobservationsentences. b. IfasentenceSiscompletelyfalsifiablewhereasNisasentence whichisnot,thentheirconjunction,S.N.(i.e.,theexpression obtainedbyconnectingthetwosentencesbytheword"and")is completelyfalsifiableforifthedenialofSisentailedbysome classofobservationsentences,thenthedenialofS.N.is,a fortiori,entailedbythesameclass.Thus,thecriterionallows empiricalsignificancetomanysentenceswhichanadequate empiricistcriterionshouldruleout,suchas,say"Allswansare whiteandtheabsoluteisperfect." c. If"P"isanobservationpredicate,thentheassertionthatall thingshavethepropertyPisqualifiedassignificant,butits denial,beingequivalenttoapurelyexistentialhypothesis,is disqualified(cf.(a)).Hence,criterion(2.2)givesrisetothe samedilemmaas(2.1). Insum,then,interpretationsofthetestabilitycriterionintermsof completeverifiabilityorofcompletefalsiflabilityareinadequate becausetheyareoverlyrestrictive inonedirectionandoverly inclusiveinanother,andbecausebothofthemrequire incisive changesinthefundamentalprinciplesoflogic.

Severalattemptshavebeenmadetoavoidthesedifficultiesby construingthetestabilitycriterionasdemandingmerelyapartial andpossiblyindirectconfirmabilityofempiricalhypothesesby observationalevidence. (2.3)AformulationsuggestedbyAyer9ischaracteristicofthese attemptstosetupaclearandsufficientlycomprehensivecriterion ofconfirmability.Itstates,ineffect,thatasentenceShasempirical importiffromSinconjunctionwithsuitablesubsidiary ____________________ section1-7and19-24alsosee(23),vol.II,pp.282-285). WhetherPopperwouldsubscribetotheproposedrestatementof thefalsifiabilitycriterion,Idonotknow. 9(1),Ch.I.--The case againstthe requirementsofverifiabilityand offalsifiability,andfavorofarequirementofpartialconfirmability anddisconfirmabilityisveryclearlypresentedalsobyPapin(21), Chapter13. -114hypothesesitispossibletoderive observationsentenceswhichare notderivablefromthesubsidiaryhypothesesalone. Thisconditionissuggestedbyacloserconsiderationofthelogical structure ofscientifictestingbutitismuchtooliberalasitstands. Indeed,asAyerhimselfhaspointedoutinthesecondeditionofhis book,Language,Truth,andLogic,10hiscriterionallowsempirical importtoanysentencewhatever.Thus,e.g.,ifSisthesentence "Theabsoluteisperfect,"itsufficestochooseasasubsidiary hypothesisthesentence"Iftheabsoluteisperfectthenthisappleis red"inordertomakepossiblethedeductionoftheobservation sentence"Thisappleisred,"whichclearlydoesnotfollowfromthe subsidiaryhypothesisalone.11 (2.4)Tomeetthisobjection,Ayerhasrecentlyproposedamodified versionofhistestabilitycriterion.Themodificationrestricts,in effect,thesubsidiaryhypothesesmentionedin(2.3)tosentences whichareeitheranalyticorcanindependentlybeshowntobe testableinthesenseofthemodifiedcriterion.12 Butitcanreadilybeshownthatthisnewcriterion,likethe requirementofcompletefalsifiability,allowsempiricalsignificance toanyconjunctionS.N,whereSsatisfiesAyer'scriterionwhileNis asentencesuchas"Theabsoluteisperfect,"whichistobe disqualifiedbythatcriterion.Indeed:whateverconsequencescan be ____________________ 10(1),2ded.,pp.11-12. 11AccordingtoStace (cf.(29),p.218),the criterionofpartialand indirecttestability,whichhecallsthepositivistprinciple, presupposes(andthuslogicallyentails)anotherprinciple,which

hetermsthePrincipleofObservable Kinds:"Asentence,inorder tobesignificant,mustassertordenyfactswhichareofakindor classsuchthatitislogicallypossibledirectlytoobservesome factswhichareinstancesofthatclassorkind.Andifasentence purportstoassertordenyfactswhichareofaclassorkindsuch thatitwouldbelogicallyimpossibledirectlytoobserve any instanceofthatclassorkind,thenthesentenceisnonsignificant."IthinktheargumentStaceofferstoprove thatthis principleisentailedbytherequirementoftestabilityis inconclusive(mainlybecauseoftheincorrecttacitassumptionthat "onthetransformationviewofdeduction,"thepremisesofavalid deductiveargumentmustbenecessaryconditionsforthe conclusion(l.c.,p.225).Withoutpressingthispointanyfurther,I shouldliketoaddherearemarkontheprincipleofobservable kindsitself.ProfessorStacedoesnotsayhowweareto determinewhat"facts"agivensentenceassertsordenies,or indeedwhetheritassertsordeniesany"facts"atall.Hence,the exactimportoftheprincipleremainsunclear.Nomatter, however,howonemightchoosethecriteriaforthefactual reference ofsentences,thismuchseemscertain:Ifasentence expressesanyfactatall,sayf,thenitsatisfiestherequirement laiddowninthefirstsentenceoftheprincipleforwecanalways formaclasscontainingftogetherwiththefactexpressedby someobservationsentenceofourchoice,whichmakesfa memberofaclassoffactsatleastoneofwhichiscapable,in principle,ofdirectobservation.Thefirstpartoftheprincipleof observable kindsisthereforeall-inclusive,somewhatlikeAyer's originalformulationoftheempiricistmeaningcriterion. 12Thisrestrictionisexpressedinrecursive form andinvolvesno viciouscircle.ForthefullstatementofAyer'scriterion,see(1), secondedition,p.13. -115deducedfromSwiththehelpofpermissiblesubsidiaryhypotheses canalsobededucedfromS.N.bymeansofthesamesubsidiary hypotheses,andasAyer'snewcriterionisformulatedessentiallyin termsofthededucibilityofacertaintypeofconsequencefromthe givensentence,itcountenancesS.NtogetherwithS.Another difficultyhasbeenpointedoutbyProfessorA.Church,whohas shown13thatifthereareanythreeobservationsentencesnoneof whichaloneentailsanyoftheothers,thenitfollowsforany sentenceSwhatsoeverthateitheritoritsdenialhasempirical importaccordingtoAyer'srevisedcriterion.

3.TRANSLATABILITYINTOANEMPIRICISTLANGUAGE ASANEWCRITERIONOFCOGNITIVEMEANING
Ithinkitisuselesstocontinuethesearchforanadequatecriterion oftestabilityintermsofdeductiverelationshipstoobservation sentences.Thepastdevelopmentofthissearch--ofwhichwehave consideredthemajorstages--seemstowarranttheexpectation thataslongaswetrytosetupacriterionoftestabilityfor

individualsentencesinanaturallanguage,intermsoflogical relationshiptoobservationsentences,theresultwillbeeithertoo restrictive ortooinclusive,orboth.Inparticularitappearslikely thatsuchcriteriawouldallowempiricalimport,inthemannerof (2.1)(b)orof(2.2)(b),eithertoanyalternationortoany conjunctionoftwosentencesofwhichatleastoneisqualifiedas empiricallymeaningfulandthispeculiarityhasundesirable consequencesbecausetheliberalgrammaticalrulesofEnglishasof anyothernaturallanguagecountenanceassentencescertain expressions("Theabsoluteisperfect"wasourillustration)which evenbythemostliberalempiriciststandardsmakenoassertion whateverandthesewouldthenhavetobepermittedas componentsofempiricallysignificantstatements. Thepredicamentwouldnotarise,ofcourse,inanartificiallanguage whosevocabularyandgrammarweresochosenastopreclude altogetherthepossibilityofformingsentencesofanykindwhichthe empiricistmeaningcriterionisintendedtoruleout.Letuscallany suchlanguageanempiricistlanguage.Thisreflectionsuggestsan entirelydifferentapproachtoourproblem:Giveageneral characterizationofthekindoflanguagethatwouldqualifyas empiricist,andthenlaydownthefollowing (3.1)Translatabilitycriterionofcognitivemeaning:Asentence ____________________ 13Church(11). -116hascognitivemeaningifandonlyifitistranslatableintoan empiricistlanguage.Thisconceptionofcognitiveimport,while perhapsnotexplicitlystated,seemstounderliemuchofthemore recentworkdonebyempiricistwritersasfarasIcanseeithasits origininCarnap'sessay,TestabilityandMeaning(especiallypart IV).Asanylanguage,soalsoanyempiricistlanguagecanbe characterizedbyindicatingitsvocabularyandtherulesdetermining itslogicthelatterincludethesyntacticalrulesaccordingtowhich sentencesmaybeformedbymeansofthegivenvocabulary.In effect,therefore,thetranslatabilitycriterionproposesto characterize thecognitivelymeaningfulsentencesbythevocabulary outofwhichtheymaybeconstructed,andbythesyntactical principlesgoverningtheirconstruction.Whatsentencesaresingled outascognitivelysignificantwilldepend,accordingly,onthechoice ofthevocabularyandoftheconstructionrules.Letusconsidera specificpossibility:(3.2)WemightqualifyalanguageLasempiricist ifitsatisfiesthefollowingconditions: a. ThevocabularyofLcontains: 1. Thecustomarylocutionsoflogicwhichareusedinthe formulationofsentencesincludinginparticularthe expressions"not,""and,""or,""if...then...,""all," "some,""theclassofallthingssuchthat...,""...isan elementofclass..." 2. Certainobservationpredicates.Thesewillbesaidto

constitutethebasicempiricalvocabularyofL 3. Anyexpressiondefinablebymeansofthosereferredto under(1)and(2). b. TherulesofsentenceformationforLarethoselaiddownin somecontemporarylogicalsystemsuchasPrincipia Mathematica. Sincealldefinedtermscanbeeliminatedinfavorofprimitives, theserulesstipulateineffectthatalanguageLisempiricistifallits sentencesareexpressible,withthehelpoftheusuallogical locutions,intermsofobservablecharacteristicsofphysicalobjects. Letuscallanylanguageofthissortathing-languageinthe narrowersense.Alternatively,thebasicempiricalvocabularyofan empiricistlanguagemightbeconstruedasconsistingof phenomenalisticterms,eachofthemreferringtosomeaspectof thephenomenaofperceptionorsensation.Theconstructionof adequatephenomenalisticlanguages,however,presents considerabledifficulties,14andinrecentempiricism,attentionhas beenfocussedprimarilyonthepotential____________________ 14Importantcontributionstothe problem have beenmade by Carnap(5)andbyGoodman(15). -117itiesoflanguageswhosebasicempiricalvocabularyconsistsof observationpredicatesforthelatterlendthemselvesmoredirectly tothedescriptionofthattypeofintersubjective evidencewhichis invokedinthetestofscientifichypotheses.Ifweconstrueempiricist languagesinthesenseof(3.2),thenthetranslatabilitycriterion (3.1)avoidsalloftheshortcomingspointedoutinourdiscussionof earlierformsofthetestabilitycriterion: a. Ourcharacterizationofempiricistlanguagesmakesexplicit provisionforuniversalandexistentialquantification,i.e.,forthe useoftheterms"all"and"some"hence,notypeofquantified statementisgenerallyexcludedfromtherealmofcognitively significantdiscourse b. Sentencessuchas"Theabsoluteisperfect"cannotbe formulatedinanempiricistlanguage(cf.(d)below)hence thereisnodangerthataconjunctionoralternationcontaininga sentenceofthatkindasacomponentmightbequalifiedas cognitivelysignificant c. InalanguageLwithsyntacticalrulesconformingtoPrincipia Mathematica,thedenialofasentenceisalwaysagaina sentenceofL.Hence,thetranslatabilitycriteriondoesnotlead totheconsequence,whichisentailedbyboth(2.1)and(2.2), thatthedenialsofcertainsignificantsentencesarenonsignificant d. Despiteitscomprehensiveness,thenewcriteriondoesnot attributecognitivemeaningtoallsentencesthus,e.g.,the sentences"Theabsoluteisperfect"and"Nothingnessnothings" cannotbetranslatedintoanempiricistlanguagebecausetheir

4.THEPROBLEMOFDISPOSITIONTERMSANDOF THEORETICALCONSTRUCTS
Yet,thenewcriterionisstilltoorestrictive--asare,incidentally,also itspredecessors--inanimportantrespectwhichnowcallsfor consideration.Ifempiricistlanguagesaredefinedinaccordance with(3.2),then,aswasnotedabove,thetranslatabilitycriterion (3.1)allowscognitiveimporttoasentenceonlyifitsconstitutive empiricaltermsareexplicitlydefinablebymeansofobservation predicates.Butasweshallarguepresently,manytermsevenof thephysicalsciencesarenotsodefinablehencethecriterionwould obligeustoreject, -118asdevoidofcognitiveimport,allscientifichypothesescontaining suchterms--analtogetherintolerableconsequence. Theconceptoftemperature isacaseinpoint.Atfirstglance,it seemsasthoughthephrase"Objectxhasatemperature ofc degreescentigrade,"orbriefly"T(x)=c"couldbedefinedbythe followingsentence,(D):T(x)=cifandonlyifthefollowing conditionissatisfied:Ifathermometerisincontactwithx,thenit registerscdegreesonitsscale. Disregardingniceties,itmaybegrantedthatthedefiniensgiven hereisformulatedentirelyinreference toobservables.However,it hasonehighlyquestionableaspect.InPrincipiaMathematicaand similarsystems,thephrase"ifpthenq"isconstruedasbeing synonymouswith"notporq"andunderthisso-calledmaterial interpretationoftheconditional,astatementoftheform"ifpthen q"isobviouslytrueif(thoughnotonlyif)thesentencestandingin theplaceof"p"isfalse.If,therefore,themeaningof"if...then. .."inthedefiniensof(D)isunderstoodinthematerialsense,then thatdefiniensistrueif(thoughnotonlyif)xisanobjectnotin contactwithathermometer--nomatterwhatnumericalvaluewe maygivetoc.Andsincethedefiniendumwouldbetrueunderthe samecircumstances,thedefinition(D)wouldqualifyastruethe assignmentofanytemperaturevaluewhatsoevertoanyobjectnot incontactwithathermometer!Analogousconsiderationsapplyto suchtermsas"electricallycharged,""magnetic,""intelligent," "electricresistance,"etc.,inshorttoalldispositionterms,i.e., termswhichexpressthedispositionofoneormoreobjectstoreact inadeterminatewayunderspecifiedcircumstances.Adefinitionof suchtermsbymeansofobservationpredicatescannotbeeffected inthemannerof(D),howevernaturalandobviousamodeof definitionthismayatfirstseemtobe.15 Therearetwomaindirectionsinwhicharesolutionofthedifficulty mightbesought.Ontheonehand,itcouldbearguedthatthe definitionofdispositiontermsinthemannerof(D)isperfectly

keytermsarenotdefinablebymeansofpurelylogical expressionsandobservationterms.

adequateprovidedthatthephrase"if...then..."inthe definiensisconstruedinthesenseitisobviouslyintendedtohave, namelyasimplying,inthecaseof(D),thatevenifxisnotactually incontactwithathermometer,stillifitwereinsuchcontact,then thethermometerwouldregistercdegrees.Insentencessuchas this,thephrase"ifthenissaidtobeusedcounterfactually ____________________ 15Thisdifficultyinthe definitionofdispositiontermswasfirst pointedoutandanalyzedbyCarnap(in(6)seeesp.section7). -119anditisinthis"strong"sense,whichimpliesacounterfactual conditional,thatthedefiniensof(D)wouldhavetobeconstrued. Thissuggestionwouldprovideananswertotheproblemofdefining dispositiontermsifitwere notforthefactthatnoentirely satisfactoryaccountoftheexactmeaningofcounterfactual conditionalsseemstobeavailableatpresent.Thus,thefirstway outofthedifficultyhasthestatusofaprogramratherthanthatof asolution.Thelackofanadequatetheoryofcounterfactual conditionalsisallthemoredeplorableassuchatheoryisneeded alsofortheanalysisoftheconceptofgenerallawinempirical scienceandofcertainrelatedideas.Aclarificationofthisclusterof problemsconstitutesatpresentoneoftheurgentdesideratainthe logicandmethodologyofscience.16 Analternativewayofdealingwiththedefinitionalproblemsraised bydispositiontermswassuggested,anddevelopedindetail,by Carnap.Itconsistsinpermittingtheintroductionofnewterms, withinanempiricistlanguage,bymeansofso-calledreduction sentences,whichhavethecharacterofpartialorconditional definitions.17Thus,e.g.,theconceptoftemperatureinourlast illustrationmightbeintroducedbymeansofthefollowingreduction sentence,(R):Ifathermometerisincontactwithanobjectx,then T(x)=cifandonlyifthethermometerregisterscdegrees. Thisrule,inwhichtheconditionalmaybeconstruedinthematerial sense,specifiesthemeaningof"temperature,"i.e.,ofstatements oftheform"T(x)=c,"onlypartially,namelyinregardtothose objectswhichareincontactwithathermometerforallother objects,itsimplyleavesthemeaningof"T(x)=c"undetermined. Thespecificationofthemeaningof"temperature"maythenbe graduallyextendedtocasesnotcoveredin(R)bylayingdown furtherreductionsentences,whichreflectthemeasurementof temperature bydevicesotherthanthermometers. Reductionsentencesthusprovideameansfortheprecise formulationofwhatiscommonlyreferredtoasoperational definitions.18 ____________________ 16The conceptofstrictimplicationasintroducedbyC.I.Lewis

wouldbeofnoavailfortheinterpretationofthestrong"if... then..."ashereunderstood,foritreferstoapurelylogical relationshipofentailment,whereastheconceptunder considerationwill,ingeneral,representanomological relationship,i.e.,onebasedonempiricallaws.Forrecent discussionsoftheproblemsofcounterfactualsandlaws,see Langford(18)Lewis(20),pp.210-230Chisholm(10) Goodman(14)Reichenbach(26),ChapterVIIIHempeland Oppenheim.(16),PartIIIPopper(24). 17Cf.Carnap(6)abriefelementaryexpositionofthe centralidea maybefoundinCarnap(7),PartIII.Thepartialdefinition(R) formulatedabovefortheexpression"T(x)=c"illustratesonlythe simplesttypeofreductionsentence,theso-calledbilateral reductionsentence. 18Onthe conceptofoperationaldefinition,whichwasdevelopedby Bridgman,see,forexample,Bridgman(3,4)andFeigl(12). -120Atthesametime,theyshowthatthelatterarenotdefinitionsin thestrictsenseoftheword,butratherpartialspecificationsof meaning. Theprecedingconsiderationssuggestthatinourcharacterization (3.2)ofempiricistlanguageswebroadentheprovisiona(3)by permittinginthevocabularyofLallthosetermswhosemeaning canbespecifiedintermsofthebasicempiricalvocabularyby meansofdefinitionsorreductionsentences.Languagessatisfying thismoreinclusivecriterionwillbereferredtoasthing-languagesin thewidersense. Iftheconceptofempiricistlanguageisbroadenedinthismanner, thenthetranslatabilitycriterion(3.1)covers--asitshould-alsoall thosestatementswhoseconstituentempiricaltermsinclude "empiricalconstructs,"i.e.,termswhichdonotdesignate observables,butwhichcanbeintroducedbyreductionsentenceson thebasisofobservationpredicates. Eveninthisgeneralizedversion,however,ourcriterionofcognitive meaningmaynotdojusticetoadvancedscientifictheories,which areformulatedintermsof"theoreticalconstructs,"suchasthe terms"absolutetemperature,""gravitationalpotential,""electric field,""function,"etc.Therearereasonstothinkthatneither definitionsnorreductionsentencesareadequatetointroducethese termsonthebasisofobservationpredicates.Thus,e.g.,ifa systemofreductionsentencesfortheconceptofelectricfieldwere available,then--tooversimplifythepointalittle--itwouldbe possibletodescribe,intermsofobservablecharacteristics,some necessaryandsomesufficientconditionsforthepresence,ina givenregion,ofanelectricfieldofanymathematicaldescription, howevercomplex.Actually,however,suchcriteriacanatbestbe givenonlyforsomesufficientlysimplekindsoffields. Nowtheoriesoftheadvancedtypeherereferredtomaybe

consideredashypothetico-deductive systemsinwhichall statementsarelogicalconsequencesofasetoffundamental assumptions.Fundamentalaswellasderivedstatementsinsucha systemareformulatedeitherintermsofcertaintheoretical constructswhicharenotdefinedwithinthesystemandthusplay theroleofprimitives,orintermsofexpressionsdefinedbymeans ofthelatter.Thus,intheirlogicalstructuresuchsystemsequalthe axiomatizeduninterpretedsystemsstudiedinmathematicsand logic.Theyacquireapplicabilitytoempiricalsubjectmatter,and thusthestatusoftheoriesofempiricalscience,byvirtue ofan empiricalinterpretation.Thelatteriseffectedbyatranslationof someofthesentencesof -121thetheory--oftenderivedratherthanfundamentalones--intoan empiricistlanguage,whichmaycontainbothobservationpredicates andempiricalconstructs.Andsincethesentenceswhicharethus givenempiricalmeaningarelogicalconsequencesofthe fundamentalhypothesesofthetheory,thattranslationeffects, indirectly,apartialinterpretationofthelatterandoftheconstructs intermsofwhichtheyareformulated.19 Inordertomaketranslatabilityintoanempiricistlanguagean adequatecriterionofcognitiveimport,webroadenthereforethe conceptofempiricistlanguagesoastoincludething-languagesin thenarrowerandinthewidersenseaswellasallinterpreted theoreticalsystemsofthekindjustreferredto.20Withthis understanding,(3.1)mayfinallyserveasageneralcriterionof cognitivemeaning.

5.ON"THEMEANING"OFANEMPIRICALSTATEMENT
Ineffect,thecriterionthusarrivedatqualifiesasentenceas cognitivelymeaningfulifitsnon-logicalconstituentsrefer,directlyor incertainspecifiedindirectways,toobservables.Butitdoesnot makeanypronouncementonwhat"themeaning"ofacognitively significantsentenceis,andinparticularitneithersaysnorimplies thatthatmeaningcanbeexhaustivelycharacterizedbywhatthe totalityofpossibletestswouldrevealintermsofobservable phenomena.Indeed,thecontentofastatementwithempirical importcannot,ingeneral,beexhaustivelyexpressedbymeansof anyclassofobservationsentences. Forconsiderfirst,amongthestatementspermittedbyourcriterion, anypurelyexistentialhypothesisoranystatementinvolving ____________________ 19The distinctionbetweenaformaldeductive system andthe empiricaltheoryresultingfromitbyaninterpretationhasbeen elaboratedindetailbyReichenbachinhispenetratingstudiesof therelationsbetweenpureandphysicalgeometrycf.,e.g., Reichenbach(25).Themethodbymeansofwhichaformal

systemisgivenempiricalcontentischaracterizedbyReichenbach as"coordinatingdefinition"oftheprimitivesinthetheoryby meansofspecificempiricalconcepts.Asissuggestedbyour discussionofreductionandtheinterpretationoftheoretical constructs,however,theprocessinquestionmayhavetobe construedasapartialinterpretationofthenon-logicaltermsof thesystemratherthanasacompletedefinitionofthelatterin termsoftheconceptsofathing-language. 20These systemshave notbeencharacterizedhere asfullyandas preciselyaswouldbedesirable.Indeed,theexactcharacterof theempiricalinterpretationoftheoreticalconstructsandofthe theoriesinwhichtheyfunctionisinneedoffurtherinvestigation. Someproblemswhichariseinthisconnection--suchaswhether, orinwhatsense,theoreticalconstructsmaybesaidtodenote-areobviouslyalsoofconsiderableepistemologicalinterest.Some suggestionsastotheinterpretationoftheoreticalconstructsmay befoundinCarnap(8),section24,andinKaplan(17)foran excellentdiscussionoftheepistemologicalaspectsofthe problem,seeFeigl(13). -122mixedquantification.Aswaspointedoutearlier,under(2.2)(a), statementsofthesekindsentailnoobservationsentences whateverhencetheircontentcannotbeexpressedbymeansofa classofobservationsentences. Andsecondly,evenmoststatementsofpurelyuniversalform(such as"Allflamingoesarepink")entailobservationsentences(suchas "Thatthingispink")onlywhencombinedwithsuitableother observationsentences(suchas"Thatthingisaflamingo").Thislast remarkcanbegeneralized.Theuseofempiricalhypothesesforthe predictionofobservable phenomenarequires,inpracticallyall cases,theuseofsubsidiaryempiricalhypotheses.21Thus,e.g.,the hypothesisthattheagentoftuberculosisisrod-shapeddoesnotby itselfentailtheconsequencethatuponlookingatatubercular sputumspecimenthroughamicroscope,rod-like shapeswillbe observed:alargenumberofsubsidiaryhypotheses,includingthe theoryofthemicroscope,havetobeusedasadditionalpremisesin deducingthatprediction. Hence,whatissweepinglyreferredtoas"the(cognitive)meaning" ofagivenscientifichypothesiscannotbeadequatelycharacterized intermsofpotentialobservationalevidencealone,norcanitbe specifiedforthehypothesistakeninisolation.Inorderto understand"themeaning"ofahypothesiswithinanempiricist language,wehavetoknownotmerelywhatobservationsentences itentailsaloneorinconjunctionwithsubsidiaryhypotheses,but alsowhatother,non-observational,empiricalsentencesare entailedbyit,whatsentencesinthegivenlanguagewouldconfirm ordisconfirmit,andforwhatotherhypothesesthegivenonewould beconfirmatoryordisconfirmatory.Inotherwords,thecognitive meaningofastatementinanempiricistlanguageisreflectedinthe

totalityofitslogicalrelationshipstoallotherstatementsinthat languageandnottotheobservationsentencesalone.Inthissense, thestatementsofempiricalsciencehaveasurplusmeaningover andabovewhatcanbeexpressedintermsofrelevantobservation sentences.22

6.THELOGICALSTATUSOFTHE EMPIRICISTCRITERIONOFMEANING
Whatkindofasentence,ithasoftenbeenasked,istheempiricist meaningcriterionitself?Plainlyitisnotanempiricalhypothesis ____________________ 21ThispointisclearlytakenintoconsiderationinAyer'scriteria of cognitivesignificance,whichwerediscussedinsection2. 22Forafullerdiscussionofthe issueshere involvedcf.Feigl(13) andthecommentsonFeigl'spositionwhichwillbepublished togetherwiththatarticle. -123butitisnotanalyticorself-contradictoryeitherhence,when judgedbyitsownstandard,isitnotdevoidofcognitivemeaning? Inthatcase,whatclaimofsoundnessorvaliditycouldpossiblybe madeforit? Onemightthinkofconstruingthecriterionasadefinitionwhich indicateswhatempiricistsproposetounderstandbyacognitively significantsentencethusunderstood,itwouldnothavethe characterofanassertionandwouldbeneithertruenorfalse.But thisconceptionwouldattributetothecriterionameasureof arbitrarinesswhichcannotbereconciledwiththeheated controversiesithasengenderedandevenlesswiththefact, repeatedlyillustratedinthepresentarticle,thatthechangesinits specificcontenthavealwaysbeendeterminedbytheobjectiveof makingthecriterionamoreadequateindexofcognitiveimport. Andthisveryobjectiveilluminatesthecharacteroftheempiricist criterionofmeaning:Itisintendedtoprovideaclarificationand explicationoftheideaofasentencewhichmakesanintelligible assertion.23Thisideaisadmittedlyvague,anditisthetaskof philosophicexplicationtoreplaceitbyamorepreciseconcept.In viewofthisdifferenceofprecisionwecannotdemand,ofcourse, thatthe"new"concept,theexplicatum,bestrictlysynonymouswith theoldone,theexplicandum.24How,then,arewetojudgethe adequacyofaproposedexplication,asexpressedinsomespecific criterionofcognitivemeaning? Firstofall,thereexistsalargeclassofsentenceswhicharerather' generallyrecognizedasmakingintelligibleassertions,andanother largeclassofwhichthisismoreorlessgenerallydenied.Weshall havetodemandofanadequateexplicationthatittakeintoaccount thesespheresofcommonusagehenceanexplicationwhich,letus say,deniescognitiveimporttodescriptionsofpasteventsorto

generalizationsexpressedintermsofobservableshastobe rejectedasinadequate.Aswehaveseen,thisfirstrequirementof adequacyhasplayedanimportantrleinthedevelopmentofthe empiricistmeaningcriterion. ____________________ 23Inthe preface tothe secondeditionofhisbook,Ayertakesa verysimilarposition:heholdsthatthetestabilitycriterionisa definitionwhich,however,isnotentirelyarbitrary,becausea sentencewhichdidnotsatisfythecriterion"wouldnotbecapable ofbeingunderstoodinthesenseinwhicheitherscientific hypothesesorcommonsensestatementsarehabitually understood"((1),p.16). 24Cf.Carnap'scharacterizationofexplicationinhisarticle (9),which examinesinoutlinetheexplicationoftheconceptofprobability. TheFrege-Russelldefinitionofintegersasclassesofequivalent classes,andthesemanticaldefinitionoftruth--cf.Tarski(30)--are outstandingexamplesofexplication.Foraluciddiscussionof variousaspectsoflogicalanalysisseePap(21),Chapter17. -124Butanadequateexplicationoftheconceptofcognitivelysignificant statementmustsatisfyyetanother,evenmoreimportant, requirement:togetherwiththeexplicationofcertainother concepts,suchasthoseofconfirmationandofprobability,ithasto providetheframeworkforageneraltheoreticalaccountofthe structure andthefoundationsofscientificknowledge.Explication,as hereunderstood,isnotameredescriptionoftheacceptedusages ofthetermsunderconsideration:ithastogobeyondthe limitations,ambiguities,andinconsistenciesofcommonusageand hastoshowhowwehadbetterconstruethemeaningsofthose termsifwewishtoarrive ataconsistentandcomprehensive theory ofknowledge.Thistypeofconsideration,whichhasbeenlargely influencedbyastudyofthestructureofscientifictheories,has promptedthemorerecentextensionsoftheempiricistmeaning criterion.Theseextensionsaredesignedtoincludeintherealmof cognitivesignificancevarioustypesofsentenceswhichmightoccur inadvancedscientifictheories,orwhichhavetobeadmittedsimply forthesakeofsystematicsimplicityanduniformity,25buton whosecognitivesignificanceornon-significanceastudyofwhatthe term"intelligibleassertion"meansineverydaydiscoursecould hardlyshedanylightatall. Asaconsequence,theempiricistcriterionofmeaning,likethe resultofanyotherexplication,representsalinguisticproposal whichitselfisneithertruenorfalse,butforwhichadequacyis claimedintworespects:firstinthesensethattheexplication providesareasonablycloseanalysisofthecommonlyaccepted meaningoftheexplicandum--andthisclaimimpliesanempirical assertionandsecondlyinthesensethattheexplicationachievesa "rationalreconstruction"oftheexplicandum,i.e.,thatitprovides, togetherperhapswithotherexplications,ageneralconceptual

frameworkwhichpermitsaconsistentandpreciserestatementand theoreticalsystematizationofthecontextsinwhichtheexplicandum isused--andthisclaimimpliesatleastanassertionofalogical character. Thoughaproposalinform,theempiricistcriterionofmeaningis therefore farfrombeinganarbitrarydefinitionitissubjectto revisionifaviolationoftherequirementsofadequacy,orevena wayofsatisfyingthoserequirementsmorefully,shouldbediscov____________________ 25Thus,e.g.,ourcriterionqualifiesassignificantcertainstatements containing,say,thousandsofexistentialoruniversalquantifiers-eventhoughsuchsentencesmayneveroccurineverydaynor perhapseveninscientificdiscourse.Forindeed,froma systematicpointofviewitwouldbearbitraryandunjustifiableto limittheclassofsignificantstatementstothosecontainingno morethansomefixednumberofquantifiers.Forfurther discussionofthispoint,cf.Carnap(6),sections17,24,25. -125ered.Indeed,itistobehopedthatbeforelongsomeoftheopen problemsencounteredintheanalysisofcognitivesignificancewill beclarifiedandthatthenourlastversionoftheempiricistmeaning criterionwillbereplacedbyanother,moreadequateone.

BIBLIOGRAPHICREFERENCES

1. (1)AyerA.J.,Language,TruthandLogic,Gollancz,London, 19362nded.,1946. 2. (2)BenjaminA.C.,"IsEmpiricismSelf-refuting?"(Journalof Philos.,Vol.38,1941). 3. (3)BridgmanP.W.,TheLogicofModernPhysics,TheMacmillan Co.,NewYork,1927. 4. (4)BridgmanP.W.,"OperationalAnalysis"(Philos.ofScience, Vol.5,1938). 5. (5)CarnapR.,DerlogischeAufbauderWelt,Berlin,1928. 6. (6)CarnapR.,"TestabilityandMeaning"(Philos.ofScience, Vol.3,1936,andVol.4,1937). 7. (7)CarnapR.,"LogicalFoundationsoftheUnityofScience",In: Internat.EncyclopediaofUnifiedScience,I,1Univ.ofChicago Press,1938. 8. (8)CarnapR.,FoundationsofLogicandMathematics.Internat. EncyclopediaofUnifiedScience,I,3Univ.ofChicagoPress, 1939. 9. (9)CarnapR.,TheTwoConceptsofProbability(Philos.and Phenom.Research,Vol.5,1945). 10. (10)ChisholmR.M.,"TheContrary-to-FactConditional"(Mind, Vol.55,1946). 11. (11)ChurchA.,"Reviewof(1)",2nded.(TheJournalofSymb. Logic,Vol.14,1949,pp.52-53). 12. (12)FeiglH.,"OperationismandScientificMethod"(Psychol. Review,Vol.52,1945).(AlsoreprintedinFeiglandSellars, ReadingsinPhilosophicalAnalysis,NewYork,1949.)

13. (13)FeiglH.,"ExistentialHypothesesRealisticvs. PhenomenalisticInterpretations",(Philos.ofScience,Vol.17, 1950). 14. (14)GoodmanN.,"TheProblemofCounterfactualConditionals" (JournalofPhilos.,Vol.44,1947). 15. (15)GoodmanN.,TheStructure ofAppearance.Harvard UniversityPress,1951. 16. (16)HempelC.G.,andOppenheimP.,"StudiesintheLogicof Explanation"(Philos.ofScience,Vol.15,1948). 17. (17)KaplanA.,"DefinitionandSpecificationofMeaning"( JournalofPhilos.,Vol.43,1946). 18. (18)LangfordC.H.,ReviewinTheJournalofSymb.Logic,Vol. 6(1941),pp.67-68. -12619. (19)LecomteduNoy,HumanDestiny,NewYork,London, Toronto,1947. 20. (20)LewisC.I.,AnAnalysisofKnowledge andValuation,Open CourtPubl.,LaSalle,Ill.,1946. 21. (21)PapA.,ElementsofAnalyticPhilosophy,TheMacmillan Co.,NewYork,1949. 22. (22)PopperK.,LogikderForschung,Springer,Vienna,1935. 23. (23)PopperK.,TheOpenSocietyandItsEnemies,2vols., Routledge,London,1945. 24. (24)PopperK.,"ANoteonNaturalLawsandSo-called 'Contrary-toFactConditionals"(Mind,Vol.58,1949). 25. (25)ReichenbachH.,PhilosophiederRaum-Zeit-Lehre ,Berlin, 1928. 26. (26)ReichenbachH.,ElementsofSymbolicLogic,TheMacmillan Co.,NewYork,1947. 27. (27)RussellB.,HumanKnowledge ,SimonandSchuster,New York,1948. 28. (28)SchlickM.,"MeaningandVerification"(Philos.Review,Vol. 45,1936).(AlsoreprintedinFeiglandSellars,Readingsin PhilosophicalAnalysis,NewYork,1949). 29. (29)StaceW.T."Positivism"(Mind,Vol.53,1944). 30. (30)TarskiA.,"TheSemanticConceptionofTruthandthe FoundationsofSemantics"(Philos.andPhenom.Research,Vol. 4,1944).(AlsoreprintedinFeiglandSellars,ReadingsinPhilo. sophicalAnalysis,NewYork,1949.) 31. (31)WerkmeisterW.H.,TheBasisandStructure ofKnowledge, Harper,NewYorkandLondon,1948. 32. (32)WhiteheadA.N.,andRussellB.,PrincipiaMathematica,3 vols.,2nded.,Cambridge,1925-1927.

REMARKSBYTHEAUTHOR(1958)

IfIwere towrite arevisedversionofthisarticle,Iwouldqualify theobjections(2.1)(b)and(2.2)(b)againstcompleteverifiability orfalsifiabilityascriteriaofempiricalmeaningfulness,orempirical significance.Thefirstoftheseobjectionsarguesthatifasentence Sisempiricallysignificantundertheverifiabilitycriterion,thensois SvN,evenwhenNiscognitivelymeaninglessinthesenseofbeing

(i)neitheranalyticnorself-contradictoryand(ii)devoidofempirical meaninginthesenseoftheverifiabilitycriterionforwhateverclass ofobservationsentencescompletelyverifiesSalsocompletely verifiesSvN,sinceSvNisalogicalconsequenceofS.--Butthe ruleunderlyingthislatterassertion,i.e.,therulethatanalternation islogicallyimpliedbyeitherofitscomponents,appliesonlyifN,no lessthanS,isastatement,i.e.asentencewhichiseithertrueor falseandiftheverifiabilitycriterionistakentocharacterizeall sentences,otherthantheanalyticandtheself-contradictoryones, -127whichcansignificantlybesaidtobeeithertrueorfalse,thenclearly Ncannotbesignificantlysaidtobeeithertrueorfalseandthusis nostatementatallhencetheinferencefromStoSvNfails.--The caseagainstobjection(2.2)(b)isanalogous.1However,thelatter objectionstillappliesagainsttheviewofthosewhopropound falsiflabilityasacriterionwhichwillseparateoffthestatementsof empiricalsciencefromthoseoflogicandmathematicsandfrom thoseofmetaphysics,withoutdenyingtruthorfalsitytothelatter. ForthenS.NqualifiesasasignificantscientificstatementifSdoes, eventhoughNbeapurelymetaphysicalutterance.Theremaining argumentsmentionedinsection2ofmyarticleseemstomefully sufficient,however,todisqualifybothcompleteverifiabilityand completefalsiflabilityascriteriaofcognitivesignificance. Ihavemoreseriousdoubtsconcerningtheideaofatranslatability criterionofthekindproposedinsections3and4ofthearticle.For thenotionoftranslatabilityneededinthiscontextisbynomeans fullyclear,andanattempttoexplicateitfacesconsiderable difficulties.2Itseemsdesirable,therefore,todowithoutthatidea. Inasequel3tothearticlehereunderconsideration,Ididjustthat andconsideredinsteadthepossibilityofcharacterizingcognitively significantsentencesasbeingbuiltup,accordingtospecified syntacticalrules,fromagivenlogicalvocabularyandfrom cognitively(better:empirically)significanttermseachofthelatter wouldhavetobeeitheranobservationalpredicateoranexpression connectedwithasetofobservationaltermsbysentencesof specifiedtypes,suchasdefinitionsorreductionsentences,which couldthenbesaidtointroducethenon-observationaltermin question.4Thereremainstheproblemofspecifyingthetypesof sentenceswhicharetobepermissibleforthispurpose.Thisissue, whichisbrieflyexaminedinsection4ofthepresentarticle,has beendealtwithinmuchgreaterdetailintwomorerecentessaysof mine.5 ____________________ 1Acriticism tothiseffectwasputforthsome yearsagobystudents inagraduateseminarofminerecently,thesamepointwas madeexplicitlyandforcefullybyD.Rynininhispresidential address,"VindicationofL*G*C*LP*S*T*V*SM*",Proceedings andAddressesofTheAmericanPhilosophicalAssociation,Vol.30 (1957),p.45-67cf.especiallypp.57-58.

2ThishasrecentlybeenpointedoutverylucidlybyI.Schefflerin

"ProspectsofaModestEmpiricism",TheReviewofMetaphysics, Vol.10,pp.383-400,602625(1957)cf.especiallysections711. 3C.G.Hempel,"The ConceptofCognitive Significance:A Reconsideration",Proc.Amer.Acad.ofArtsandSciences,Vol. 80,No.1,pp.61-77(1951). 4Thisprocedure seemscloselyrelatedinspirittoone recently suggestedbyScheffier(loc.cit.,section9),namelyreplacement ofthetranslatabilityconditionbythefollowingcriterion:Sis cognitivelysignificantifandonlyifitisasentenceofsome empiricistlanguage. 5"ALogicalAppraisalofOperationism",The ScientificMonthly,Vol. 79,pp.215-220(1954),reprintedinPhilippFrank,ed.,The ValidationofScientificTheories,theBeaconPress,Boston,1957.-"TheTheoretician'sDilemma",inH.Feigl,M.ScrivenandG. Maxwell,eds.,MinnesotaStudiesinthePhilosophyofScience, Vol.II.UniversityofMinnesotaPress,1958.Foracritical discussionoftheissuesraisedinthesearticles,seeespeciallyR. Carnap,"TheMethodologicalCharacterofTheoreticalConcepts", inH.FeiglandM.Scriven,eds.,MinnesotaStudiesinthe PhilosophyofScience -128Butnomatterhowonemightreasonablydelimittheclassof sentencesqualifiedtointroduceempiricallysignificantterms,this newapproachseemstometoleadtotherealizationthatcognitive significancecannotwellbeconstruedasacharacteristicofindividual sentences,butonlyofmoreorlesscomprehensive systemsof sentences(correspondingroughlytoscientifictheories).Acloser studyofthispointsuggestsstronglythat,muchliketheanalyticsyntheticdistinction,theideaofcognitivesignificance,withits suggestionofasharpdistinctionbetweensignificantandnonsignificantsentencesorsystemsofsuch,haslostitspromiseand fertilityasanexplicandum,andthatithadbetterbereplacedby certainconceptswhichadmitofdifferencesindegree,suchasthe formalsimplicityofasystemitsexplanatoryandpredictivepower anditsdegreeofconfirmationrelativetoavailableevidence.6The analysisandtheoreticalreconstructionoftheseconceptsseemsto offerthemostpromisingwayofadvancingfurthertheclarification oftheissuesimplicitintheideaofcognitivesignificance. ____________________ StudiesinthePhilosophyofScience,Vol.I.Universityof MinnesotaPress,1956andsections12-19ofScheffler'sarticle citedinnote28. Thispointisdevelopedindetailinmyarticlecitedinnote3. -129[Thispageintentionallyleftblank.]

-130-

LogicandMathematics
-131[Thispageintentionallyleftblank.] -132-

TheOldandtheNewLogic
BYRUDOLFCARNAP (TRANSLATEDBYISAACLEVI)

1.LOGICASAMETHODOFPHILOSOPHIZING
THENEWSERIESofthisjournal,whichbeginswiththisvolume,will bedevotedtothedevelopmentofanew,scientificmethodof philosophizing.Perhapsthismethodcanbebrieflycharacterizedas consistinginthelogicalanalysisofthestatementsandconceptsof empiricalscience.Thisdescriptionindicatesthetwomostimportant featuresthatdistinguishthismethodfromthemethodsof traditionalphilosophy.First,thistypeofphilosophizinggoesstrictly handinhandwithempiricalscience.Thus,philosophyisnolonger viewedasadomainofknowledgeinitsownright,onaparwith,or superiorto,theempiricalsciences.Secondly,thisdescription indicatesthepartthatphilosophyplaysinempiricalscience:it consistsintheclarificationofthestatementsofempiricalscience morespecifically,inthedecompositionofstatementsintotheir parts(concepts),thestepbystepreductionofconceptstomore fundamentalconceptsandofstatementstomorefundamental statements.Thiswayofsettingtheproblembringsoutthevalueof logicforphilosophicalenquiries.Logicisnolongermerelyone philosophicaldisciplineamongothers,butweareabletosay outright:Logicisthemethodofphilosophizing.Logicisunderstood hereinthebroadestsense.Itcomprehendspure,formallogicand appliedlogicorthetheoryofknowledge. Thedesiretoreplacemetaphysicalconcept-poetrybyarigorous, scientificmethodofphilosophizingwouldhaveremainedapious hopeifthesystemoftraditionallogichadbeentheonlylogicalinThisarticle,originallyentitled"Diealteunddieneue Logik",appearedinthefirstissueofErkenntnis.Vol.Iof Erkenntnis(1930-31)wasatthesametimeVol.IXof AnnalenderPhilosophie(seeEditor'sIntroduction,p.6 above).Itispublishedherewiththekindpermissionof

ProfessorCarnap. -133strumentavailable.Traditionallogicwastotallyincapableof satisfyingtherequirementofrichnessofcontent,formalrigorand technicalutilitywhichitsnewroledemandedofit.Formallogic restedonthearistotelian-scholasticsystemwhichinthecourseof itsfurtherdevelopmenthadbeenonlyslightlyimprovedand extended.Inthefieldofappliedlogic(methodology),therewere indeedagreatmanyindividualstudiesandseveralcomprehensive works,someofthemcontaininginterestingmaterial.Butwith regardtotheirprecisioninformingconceptsandprofundityof analysis,theyremainedataratherprimitive stage.Thisisno reproachagainsttheseworks,atleastnotagainstthosebelonging tothepreviouscentury.Forthestateofappliedlogicwas determinedbytheinadequacyofitsformalfoundations. Thecreationofanewandefficientinstrumentintheplaceofthe oldanduselessonetookalongtime.Itisperhapstobedoubted whetherthelogicianscouldhavebroughtthisaboutundertheirown power.Fortunatelyaninstrumenthasbeenfound,anewlogic whichhasbeendevelopedalmostentirelybymathematiciansinthe lastfiftyyears.Difficultiesinmathematicsgaverisetothis development.Generalapplicationsofaphilosophicallysignificant naturewere notatfirstenvisaged.Themajorityofphilosophers haveevennowtakenlittlecognizanceofthenewlogicandhave extractedevenlessadvantagefromitfortheirownwork.Indeed, thecautionanduneasytimiditywithwhichtheyapproachor,more generally,circumventthenewlogicisstriking.Tobesure,the formalgarbdemandedbymathematicsfrightensmanyaway. However,aninstinctivefeelingofoppositionliesattherootofthe philosophers'fear.Andforoncetheyhavecaughtthescent correctly:inthenewlogic--thisisnotyetrealizedbymanyofits advocates--liesthepointatwhichtheoldphilosophyistobe removedfromitshinges.Beforetheinexorablejudgmentofthe newlogic,allphilosophyintheoldsense,whetheritisconnected withPlato,ThomasAquinas,Kant,SchellingorHegel,orwhetherit constructsanew"metaphysicofBeing"ora"philosophyofspirit," provesitselftobenotmerelymateriallyfalse,asearliercritics maintained,butlogicallyuntenableandthereforemeaningless.

2.THENEWLOGIC
Thenewlogiccameintoexistenceinthefinaldecadesofthelast century.FollowingonLeibniz'sideasandmakinguseoftheearlier contributions(DeMorgan1847Boole1854),Frege,Peano -134andSchrdermadethefirstattemptsatanewandcomprehensive reconstructionoflogic.Onthebasisofthispreviouswork,

WhiteheadandRussellcreatedthegreatbasicworkofthenew logic,PrincipiaMathematica(1910-1913).Allfurthercontributions tothenewlogicdependuponthiswork.Theyattempteitherto supplementorreviseit.(Afewnamesmaybementionedherethe GttingenSchool:Hilbert,Ackermann,Bernays,Behmann,etal. theWarsawSchool:Lukasiewicz,Lesniewski,Chwistek,Tarski,et al.WittgensteinandhisassociateRamsey.) Themostimportantstimulusforthedevelopmentofthenewlogic layintheneedforacriticalre-examinationofthefoundationsof mathematics.Mathematics,especiallysincethetimeofLeibnizand Newton,hadmadeenormousadvancesandacquiredanabundance ofnewknowledge.Butthesecuringofthefoundationshadnotkept instepwiththerapidgrowthoftheedifice.Therefore,abouta centuryago,amorevigorouseffortbegantobemadetoclarify thefundamentalconcepts.Thiseffortwassuccessfulinmany instances.Mathematicianssucceededindefininginarigorousform suchimportantconceptsas,forexample,limit,derivative and complexnumber.Foralongtime,theseconceptshadbeen fruitfullyappliedinpracticewithouthavingadequatedefinitions.We haveonlythesureinstinctsofgreatmathematiciansandnotthe clarityofconceptstothankforthefactthattheinadequacyofthe conceptformationcausednomischiefinmathematics. Effortsataclarificationoffundamentalconceptswentforwardstep bystep.Peoplewerenotsatisfiedwithreducingthevarious conceptsofmathematicalanalysistothefundamentalconceptof numbertheyrequiredthattheconceptofnumbershoulditselfbe logicallyclarified.Thisinquiryintothelogicalfoundationsof arithmeticwithalogicalanalysisofnumberasitsgoal,called peremptorilyforalogicalsystemwhichhadthecomprehensiveness andprecisiontodotheworkdemandedofit.Thus,theseinquiries gaveanespeciallystrongimpetustothedevelopmentofthenew logic.Peano,Frege,Whitehead,RussellandHilbertwereledtodo theirworkonlogicprimarilyforthisreason. Thenecessityforanewreconstructionoflogicbecameevenmore pressingwhencertaincontradictions("antinomies")werenoticedin therealmofmathematicswhichsoonprovedthemselvestobeofa general,logicalnature.Thesecontradictionscouldbeovercome onlybyafundamentalreconstructionoflogic. Inthefollowingpages,someoftheimportantcharacteristicsofthe newlogicwillbestated.Aboveall,mentionwillbemadeof -135thosetraitswhichdistinguishthenewlogicfromtheoldandby meansofwhichthenewlogichasgainedaspecialsignificancefor thewholeofscience.Firstweshalltakealookatthesymbolicgarb inwhichthenewlogiccustomarilyappears.Thenafewremarkswill bemadeabouttheenrichmentincontentwhichconsistsprimarilyin takingaccountofrelationsinsteadofrestrictingoneselfto predicates.Inaddition,itwillbebrieflyshownhowthe

contradictionstowhichwehavejustreferredareovercomebythe so-calledtheoryoftypes.Afterdealingwiththesepoints,whichare significantchieflyforlogicitself,weshallexaminetheseveralpoints ofgeneralscientificimportance:thepossibilityofderiving mathematicsfromlogictheexplanationoftheessentially tautologicalcharacteroflogicalsentences,apointwhichisvery importantforphilosophytheanalysisofconceptsbymeansof whichscienceisrenderedaunifiedwholeandfinallythe eliminationofmetaphysicsbylogicalanalysis.

3.THESYMBOLICMETHOD
Whenareaderlooksatatreatiseinmodernlogic,thefirstoutward featurethatstrikeshimistheuseofsymbolicformswhichappear similartothoseofmathematics.Thissymbolismwasoriginally constructedinimitationofmathematics.However,formsmore suitableforthespecialpurposesoflogicweresubsequently developed. Inmathematics,theadvantageofthesymbolicmethodof representationoververballanguageisobvious.Considerthe sentence:"ifonenumberismultipliedbyanother,theresultisthe sameasthatobtainedbymultiplyingthesecondbythefirst."Itis evidentlymuchclearerandmoreconvenienttosay,"Forany numbersxandy,itisthecasethatx.y=y.x"ormorebriefly, usingthelogicalsignforuniversality,"(x,y).x.y=y.x." Byemployingsymbolisminlogic,inferencesacquirearigorwhichis otherwise unobtainable.Inferencesaremadebymeansof arithmeticaloperationsonformulaeanalogoustocalculations (hencethedesignation"calculus,""propositionalcalculus," "functionalcalculus").Tobesure,materialconsiderationsguidethe courseofdeduction,buttheydonotenterintothedeductionitself. Thismethodguaranteesthatnounnoticedassumptionswillslipinto thededuction,athingwhichitisverydifficulttoavoidina wordlanguage.Suchdeductiverigorisespeciallyimportantinthe axiomatizationofanydomain,e.g.geometry.Thehistoryof geometryfurnishesnumerousexamplesofimpuredeductions,such asthevariousattemptstoderive theaxiomofparallelsfromthe otheraxioms -136ofEuclideangeometry.Asentenceequivalenttotheaxiomof parallelswasalwaystacitlyassumedandemployedinthese derivations.Rigorandneatnessisrequiredintheconstitutionof conceptsjustasmuchasinthederivationofsentences.Withthe methodsofthenewlogic,analysishasshownthatmany philosophicalconceptsdonotsatisfythehigherstandardsofrigor somehavetobeinterpreteddifferentlyandothershavetobe eliminatedasmeaningless.(See Section9below.) Aswillbecomeclearerpresently,thetheoryofknowledge,whichis afterallnothingbutappliedlogic,cannomoredispensewith

symboliclogicthanphysicscandispensewithmathematics.

4.THELOGICOFRELATIONS
Thenewlogicisdistinguishedfromtheoldnotonlybytheformin whichitispresentedbutchieflyalsobytheincreaseofitsrange. Themostimportantnewdomainsarethetheoryofrelational sentencesandthetheoryofsententialfunctions.Onlythetheoryof relationswillbe(briefly)consideredhere. Theonlyformofstatements(sentences)intheoldlogicwasthe predicativeform:"Socratesisaman,""All(orsome)Greeksare men."Apredicate-conceptorpropertyisattributedtoa subjectconcept.Leibnizhadalreadyputforwardthedemandthat logicshouldconsidersentencesofrelationalform.Inarelational sentencesuchas,forexample,"aisgreaterthanb,"arelationis attributedtotwoormoreobjects,(or,asitmightbeput,to severalsubjectconcepts).Liebniz'sideaofatheoryofrelationshas beenworkedoutbythenewlogic.Theoldlogicconceivedrelational sentencesassentencesofpredicative form.However,many inferencesinvolvingrelationalsentencestherebybecome impossible.Tobesure,onecaninterpretthesentence"aisgreater thanb"insuchawaythatthepredicate"greaterthanb"is attributedtothesubjecta.Butthepredicatethenbecomesaunity onecannotextractbbyanyruleofinference.Consequently,the sentence"bissmallerthana"cannotbeinferredfromthis sentence.Inthenewlogic,thisinferencetakesplaceinthe followingway:Therelation"smallerthan"isdefinedasthe "converse"oftherelation"greaterthan."Theinferenceinquestion thenrestsontheuniversalproposition:Ifarelationholdsbetween xandy,itsconverse holdsbetweenyandx.Afurtherexampleofa statementthatcannotbeprovedintheoldlogic:"Whereverthere isavictorsomeoneisvanquished."Inthe -137newlogic,thisfollowsfromthelogicalproposition:Ifarelationhas areferent,italsohasarelatum. Relationalstatementsareespeciallyindispensableforthe mathematicalsciences.Letusconsiderasanexamplethe geometricalconceptofthethree-placerelation"between"(onan openstraightline).Thegeometricalaxioms"Ifaliesbetweenband c,bdoesnotliebetweencanda"canbeexpressedonlyinthe newlogic.Accordingtothepredicative view,inthefirstcasewe wouldhavethepredicates"lyingbetweenbandc"and"lying betweencanda."Iftheseareleftunanalyzed,thereisnowayof showinghowthefirstistransformedintothesecond.Ifonetakes theobjectsbandcoutofthepredicate,thestatement"alies betweenbandc"nolongerservestocharacterizeonlyoneobject, butthree.Itistherefore athree-placerelationalstatement. Therelations"greaterthan"and"between"areofsuchakindthat theorderoftheirtermscannotbealteredatwill.The

determinationofanyorderinanydomainrestsessentiallyon relationsofthiskind.Ifamongaclassofpersonsitisknownwhich ofanypairisthetaller,thisclassofpersonsistherebyserially ordered.Itmightbeheldthatthiscouldalsobedonebymeansof predicativeascriptions--namely,byattributingadefinitemeasureas apropertytoeachperson.Butinthatcaseitwouldagainhaveto beassumedthatwithrespecttoanytwoofthesequantities,itwas knownwhichwasthegreater.Thuswithoutanorderingrelationno seriescanbeconstructed.Thisshowstheindispensabilityofthe theoryofrelationsforallthosescienceswhichdealwithseriesand orderings:arithmetic(numberseries),geometry(pointseries), physics(allscalesofmeasurement:thoseofspaceandtimeand thevariousstatemagnitudes). Restrictiontopredicate-sentenceshashaddisastrouseffectson subjectsoutsidelogic.PerhapsRussellisrightwhenhemadethis logicalfailingresponsibleforcertainmetaphysicalerrors.Ifevery sentenceattributesapredicatetoasubject,therecan,afterall,be onlyonesubject,theAbsolute,andeverystateofaffairsmust consistinthepossessionofacertainattributebytheAbsolute.In thesamewayperhapsallmetaphysicaltheoriesaboutmysterious "substances"couldbetracedtothismistake. Howeverthismaybe,itiscertainthatthisrestrictionhasforalong timebeenaseriousdraguponphysics--e.g.,theideathatphysical matterissubstanceinthephilosophicalsense.Aboveall,wemay wellassumethatthislogicalerrorisresponsiblefortheconceptof absolutespace.Becausethefundamentalformofaprop-138ositionhadtobepredicative,itcouldonlyconsistinthespecification ofthepositionofabody.SinceLeibnizhadrecognizedthe possibilityofrelationalsentences,hewasabletoarrive atacorrect conceptionofspace:theelementaryfactisnotthepositionofa bodybutitspositionalrelationstootherbodies.Heupheldtheview onepistemologicalgrounds:thereisnowayofdeterminingthe absolutepositionofabody,butonlyitspositionalrelations.His campaigninfavoroftherelativisticviewofspace,asagainstthe absolutisticviewsofthefollowersofNewton,hadaslittlesuccessas hisprogramforlogic. Onlyaftertwohundredyearswerehisideasonbothsubjectstaken upandcarriedthrough:inlogicwiththetheoryofrelations(De Morgan1858Peirce1870),inphysicswiththetheoryofrelativity (anticipatoryideasinMach1883Einstein1905).

5.THELOGICALANTINOMIES
Aroundtheturnofthecentury,certainstrangecontradictions ("paradoxes")appearedinthenewmathematicaldisciplineofset theory.Closerinvestigationsoonshowedthatthesecontradictions werenotspecificallymathematicalbutwereofagenerallogical character,theso-called"logicalantinomies."Thenewlogichadnot

yetdevelopedtothepointwhere itwasabletoovercomethese contradictions.Thiswasadefectwhichitsharedwiththeoldlogic, anditprovidedafurthermotiveforrebuildingthesystemoflogic fromitsfoundations.Russellsucceededineliminatingthe contradictionsbymeansofthe"theoryoftypes."Thegulfbetween thenewandtheoldlogictherebybecamestillwider.Theoldlogic isnotonlysignificantlypoorerincontentthanthenew,but, becausethecontradictionsarenotremovedfromit,itnolonger countsatall.(Mostlogicaltextbooksarestillunawareofthis.) Letusconsiderthesimplestexampleofanantinomy(following Russell).Aconceptistobecalled"predicable"ifitisapplicableto itself.Forexample:Theconcept"abstract"isabstract.Aconceptis tobecalled"impredicable"ifitdoesnotapplytoitself.For example:Theconcept"virtuous"isnotvirtuous.Accordingtothe lawofexcludedmiddle,theconcept"impredicable"iseither predicableorimpredicable.Assumethatitispredicablethen, accordingtothedefinitionof"predicable,"itcanbeascribedto itselfandis,therefore,impredicable.Assumethattheconcept "impredicable"isimpredicablethentheconceptisascribedto itselfconsequently,accordingtothedefinitionof"predicable,"itis predicable.There-139fore,bothassumptionsareself-contradictory.Therearemany similarantinomies. Thetheoryoftypesconsistsinthefactthatallconcepts,both propertiesandrelations,areclassifiedaccordingto"types."For simplicity'ssake,letusrestrictourselvestoproperties.Adistinction ismadebetween"individuals,"i.e.objectswhicharenotproperties (zerolevel)propertiesofindividuals(firstlevel)propertiesof propertiesofindividuals(secondlevel)andsoon.Letustakefor examplebodiestobeindividualsthen"square"and"red"are propertiesofthefirstlevel"spatialproperty"and"color"are propertiesofthesecondlevel.Thetheoryoftypessays:aproperty ofthefirstlevelcanbeattributedordeniedonlytoindividualsbut cannotapplytopropertiesofthefirstorhigherlevelsatalla propertyofthesecondlevelcanbeattributedordeniedonlyto propertiesofthefirstlevelbutcannotapplytoindividualsorto propertiesofthesecondorhigherlevels,andsoon.Forexample: Ifaandbarebodies,thesentences"aissquare"and"bisred"are eithertrueorfalsebutineithercasemeaningful.Further,the sentences"Squarenessisaspatialproperty"and"Redisacolor" aretrue.Ontheotherhand,theseriesofwords"aisaspatial property,""Squarenessisred"and"Colorisaspatialproperty"are neithertruenorfalsebutmeaningless.Theyaremerepseudosentences.Suchpseudosentencesareavoidedifapropertyofthe nthlevelisappliedonlytoconceptsoftheleveln-1.Aparticularly importantspecialcasefollowsfromthis:Theassumptionthata certainpropertybelongsordoesnotbelongtoitselfcanbeneither truenorfalse,butismeaningless.

Asonecaneasilysee,iftherulesofthetheoryoftypesare obeyed,theabove-mentionedantinomyof"impredicable"doesnot arise.Forthestateddefinitionsof"predicable"andimpredicable" cannotbeformulated.Theyarethereforemeaningless.The remainingantinomieswhichhavenotbeenreferredtoherecanbe eliminatedinasimilarmanner.

6.MATHEMATICSASABRANCHOFLOGIC
Ashasbeenmentioned,thelogicalanalysisofarithmeticisoneof thegoalsofthenewlogic.Fregehadalreadycometothe conclusionthatmathematicsistobeconsideredabranchoflogic. ThisviewwasconfirmedbyWhiteheadandRussellwhocarried throughtheconstructionofthesystemofmathematicsonthebasis oflogic.Itwasshownthateverymathematicalconceptcanbe derivedfromthefundamentalconceptsoflogicandthatevery mathematicalsentence -140(insofarasitisvalidineveryconceivabledomainofanysize)can bederivedfromthefundamentalstatementsoflogic. Themostimportantconceptsofthenewlogic(theyareinpart reducibletooneanother)arethefollowing:1.Negation:"not"2. thelogicalconnectivesfortwosentences:"and,""or,""if--then"3. "every"(or"all"),"there is"4."identical."Thepossibilityofderiving arithmeticalconceptsmaybeillustratedbyasimpleexample:the numbertwoasacardinal,i.e.,asthenumberofaconcept. Definition:"Thecardinalnumberofaconceptfistwo"istomean "Thereisanxandthereisaysuchthatxisnotidenticalwithy,x fallsunderf,yfallsunderf,andforeveryzitisthecasethatifz fallsunderf,zisidenticalwithxorwithy."Weseethatonlythe logicalconceptswhichhavejustbeenlistedareemployedinthis definitionof"two"thiscanbeshownrigorouslyonlyinasymbolic representation.Allthenaturalnumberscanbedefinedinasimilar manner.Furthermore,thepositiveandnegativenumbers, fractions,realnumbers,complexnumbers,andfinallyeventhe conceptsofanalysis--limit,convergence,derivative,integral, continuity,etc.-canalsobedefinedinthisway. Sinceeverymathematicalconceptisderivedfromthefundamental conceptsoflogic,everymathematicalsentencecanbetranslated intoasentenceaboutpurelylogicalconceptsandthistranslationis thendeducible(undercertainconditions,ashasbeenindicated) fromthefundamentallogicalsentences.Letustakeasanexample thearithmeticalsentence"1+1=2."Itstranslationintoasentence ofpurelogicreads:"Ifapropertyfhasthecardinalnumber1and apropertyghasthecardinalnumber1,andfandgaremutually exclusive,andiftheconcepthistheunionoffandg,thenhhas thecardinalnumber2."Thistranslationrepresentsasentencefrom thelogicofproperties(theoryofsententialfunctions)whichis derivablefromthefundamentalsentencesoflogic.Inasimilar way,alltheremainingsentencesofarithmeticandanalysis(tothe

extentthattheyareuniversallyvalidinthewidestsense)are provableassentencesoflogic.

7.THETAUTOLOGICALCHARACTEROFLOGIC
Onthebasisofthenewlogic,theessentialcharacteroflogical sentencescanbeclearlyrecognized.Thishasbecomeofthe greatestimportanceforthetheoryofmathematicalknowledge as wellasfortheclarificationofcontroversialphilosophicalquestions. Theusualdistinctioninlogicbetweenfundamentalandderived -141sentencesisarbitrary.Itisimmaterialwhetheralogicalsentenceis derivedfromothersentences.Itsvaliditycanberecognizedfrom itsform.Thismaybeillustratedbyasimpleexample. Withtheaidofthelogicalconnectives,onecanconstructother sentencesfromtwosentences"A"and"B",e.g.,"not-A,""AorB," "AandB."Thetruthofthesecompoundsentencesobviouslydoes notdependuponthemeaningsofthesentences"A"and"B"but onlyupontheirtruth-values,i.e.,uponwhethertheyaretrueor false.Nowtherearefourcombinationsoftruth-valuesfor"A"and "B,"namely,1."A"istrueand"B"istrue:TT,2.TF,3.FT,4.FF. Themeaningofalogicalconnectiveisdeterminedbythefactthat thesentencesconstructedwiththehelpofthisconnectivearetrue incertainofthefourpossiblecasesandfalseintheothers.For example,themeaningof"or"(inthenon-exclusive sense)is determinedbythestipulationthatthesentence"AorB"istruein thefirstthreecasesandfalseinthefourth.Compoundsentences canbecombinedfurthertomakenewcompoundsentences.Letus takeasanexample:"(not-Aandnot-B)or(AorB)."Wecannow establishthetruth-valuesinthefourcasesfirstfortheconstituent sentencesandthenforthesentenceasawhole.Wetherebyinthis examplearrive ataremarkable result."Not-A"istrueonlyinthe thirdandfourthcases."Not-Bistrueonlyinthesecondandfourth cases.Consequently,"not-Aandnot-B"istrueonlyinthefourth case. not-A and 1 2 3 4 T T F F A T F T F B F F T T not-A F T F T not-B F F F T not-B T T T F AorB (not-A and not-B) or (AorB) T T T T

"AorB"istrueinthefirstthreecases.Therefore,theentire sentence"(not-Aandnot-B)or(AorB)"istrueineverycase.Such aformula,whichdependsneitheronthemeaningsnorthe

truthvaluesofthesentencesoccurringinitbutisnecessarilytrue, whetheritsconstituentsentencesaretrueorfalse,iscalleda tautology.Atautologyistrueinvirtue ofitsmereform.Itcanbe shownthatallthesentencesoflogicand,hence,accordingtothe viewadvocatedhere,allthesentencesofmathematicsare tautologies. Ifacompoundsentenceiscommunicatedtous,e.g.,"Itisrain-142inghereandnoworitissnowing,"welearnsomethingabout reality.Thisissobecausethesentenceexcludescertainofthe relevantstates-of-affairsandleavestheremainingonesopen.In ourexample,therearefourpossibilities:1.Itisrainingand snowing,2.Itisrainingandnotsnowing,3.Itisnotrainingbutitis snowing,4.Itisnotrainingandnotsnowing.Thesentence excludesthefourthpossibilityandleavesthefirstthreeopen.If,on theotherhand,wearetoldatautology,nopossibilityisexcluded buttheyallremainopen.Consequently,welearnnothingabout realityfromthetautology,e.g.,"Itisraining(here andnow)oritis notraining."Tautologies,therefore,areempty.Theysaynothing theyhave,so-to-speak,zero-content.However,theyneednotbe trivialonthisaccount.Theabove-mentionedtautologyistrivial.On theotherhand,thereareothersentenceswhosetautological charactercannotberecognizedatfirstglance. Sinceallthesentencesoflogicaretautologicalanddevoidof content,wecannotdrawinferencesfromthemaboutwhatwas necessaryorimpossibleinreality.Thustheattempttobase metaphysicsonpurelogicwhichischieflycharacteristicofsucha systemasHegel's,isshowntobeunwarranted. Mathematics,asabranchoflogic,isalsotautological.Inthe Kantianterminology:Thesentencesofmathematicsareanalytic. Theyarenotsyntheticapriori.Apriorismistherebydeprivedofits strongestargument.Empiricism,theviewthatthereisnosynthetic aprioriknowledge,hasalwaysfoundthegreatestdifficultyin interpretingmathematics,adifficultywhichMilldidnotsucceedin overcoming.Thisdifficultyisremovedbythefactthatmathematical sentencesareneitherempiricalnorsyntheticaprioributanalytic.

8.UNIFIEDSCIENCE
Wedistinguishappliedlogic,thelogicalanalysisoftheconceptsand sentencesofthedifferentbranchesofscience,frompurelogicwith itsformalproblems.Thoughuptonowmostoftheworkinthenew logichasdealtwithformalsubjects,ithasalsoattainedsuccessful resultsinthisdomain. Theanalysisoftheconceptsofsciencehasshownthatallthese concepts,nomatterwhethertheybelong,accordingtotheusual classification,tothenaturalsciences,ortopsychologyorthesocial sciences,gobacktoacommonbasis.Theycanbereducedtoroot

conceptswhichapplytothe"given,"tothecontentofimmediate -143experience.Tobeginwith,allconceptsrelatingtoone'sown experience,i.e.thosewhichapplytothepsychologicaleventsofthe knowingsubject,canbetracedbacktothegiven.Allphysical conceptscanbereducedtoconceptsrelatingtoone'sown experience,foreveryphysicaleventisinprincipleconfirmableby meansofperceptions.Allconceptsrelatingtootherminds,thatis, thosethatapplytothepsychologicalprocessesofsubjectsother thanoneself,areconstitutedoutofphysicalconcepts.Finallythe conceptsofthesocialsciencesgobacktoconceptsofthekindsjust mentioned.Thus,agenealogicaltreeofconceptsresultsinwhich everyconceptmustinprinciplefinditsplaceaccordingtothewayit isderivedfromotherconceptsandultimatelyfromthegiven.The constitutiontheory,i.e.thetheoryoftheconstructionofasystem ofallscientificconceptsonacommonbasis,showsfurtherthatina correspondingmannereverystatementofsciencecanbe retranslatedintoastatementaboutthegiven("methodological positivism"). Asecondconstitutionsystem,whichlikewise includesallconcepts, hasphysicalconceptsforitsbasis,i.e.,conceptswhichapplyto eventsinspaceandtime.Theconceptsofpsychologyandthesocial sciencesarereducedtophysicalconceptsaccordingtotheprinciple ofbehaviorism("methodologicalmaterialism"). Wespeakof"methodological"positivismormaterialismbecausewe areconcernedhereonlywithmethodsofderivingconcepts,while completelyeliminatingboththemetaphysicalthesisofpositivism abouttherealityofthegivenandthemetaphysicalthesisof materialismabouttherealityofthephysicalworld.Consequently, thepositivistandmaterialistconstitutionsystemsdonotcontradict oneanother.Botharecorrectandindispensable.Thepositivist systemcorrespondstotheepistemologicalviewpointbecauseit provesthevalidityofknowledge byreductiontothegiven.The materialistsystemcorrespondstotheviewpointoftheempirical sciences,forinthissystemallconceptsarereducedtothephysical, totheonlydomainwhichexhibitsthecompleteruleoflawand makesintersubjective knowledgepossible. Thus,withtheaidofthenewlogic,logicalanalysisleadstoa unifiedscience.Therearenotdifferentscienceswithfundamentally differentmethodsordifferentsourcesofknowledge,butonlyone science.Allknowledge findsitsplaceinthisscienceand,indeed,is knowledgeofbasicallythesamekindtheappearanceof fundamentaldifferencesbetweenthesciencesarethedeceptive resultofourusingdifferentsub-languagestoexpressthem. -144-

9.THEELIMINATIONOFMETAPHYSICS
Thetautologicalcharacteroflogicshowsthatallinferenceis tautological.Theconclusionalwayssaysthesameasthepremises (orless),butinadifferentlinguisticform.Onefactcanneverbe inferredfromanother.(Accordingtotheusualviewthisdoesoccur ininductiveinference,butthissubjectcannotbediscussedhere.) Fromthisfollowstheimpossibilityofanymetaphysicswhichtriesto drawinferencesfromexperiencetosomethingtranscendentwhich liesbeyondexperience andisnotitselfexperiencablee.g.the "thinginitself"lyingbehindthethingsofexperience,the"Absolute" behindthetotalityoftherelative,the"essence"and"meaning"of eventsbehindtheeventsthemselves.Sincerigorousinferencecan neverleadfromexperience tothetranscendent,metaphysical inferencesmustleaveoutessentialsteps.Theappearanceof transcendencestemsfromthis.Conceptsareintroducedwhichare irreducibleeithertothegivenortothephysical.Theyaretherefore mereillusoryconceptswhicharetoberejectedfromthe epistemologicalviewpointaswellasfromthescientificviewpoint. Nomatterhowmuchtheyaresanctifiedbytraditionandcharged withfeeling,theyaremeaninglesswords. Withtheaidoftherigorousmethodsofthenewlogic,wecantreat sciencetoathoroughgoingprocessofdecontamination.Every sentenceofsciencemustbeprovedtobemeaningfulbylogical analysis.Ifitisdiscoveredthatthesentenceinquestioniseithera tautologyoracontradiction(negationofatautology),the statementbelongstothedomainoflogicincludingmathematics. Alternativelythesentencehasfactualcontent,i.e.,itisneither tautologicalnorcontradictoryitisthenanempiricalsentence.Itis reducibletothegivenandcan,therefore,bediscovered,in principle,tobeeithertrueorfalse.The(trueorfalse)sentencesof theempiricalsciencesareofthischaracter.Therearenoquestions whichareinprincipleunanswerable.Thereisnosuchthingas speculativephilosophy,asystemofsentenceswithaspecialsubject matteronaparwiththoseofthesciences.Topursuephilosophy canonlybetoclarifytheconceptsandsentencesofscienceby logicalanalysis.Theinstrumentforthisisthenewlogic. -145-

REMARKSBYTHEAUTHOR(1957)
Thepositionexplainedinsections8and9oftheforegoingpaper wasmodifiedintheyearsfollowingitspublicationinthefollowing respect.Thereductionofscientificconceptstotheconceptsof eitherofthetwobasesindicated(viz.,tothegiven,i.e.,sensedata,ortoobservable propertiesofphysicalthings)cannot generallybecarriedoutintheformofexplicitdefinitions.Therefore scientificsentencesareingeneralnottranslatableintosentencesof eitherofthetwobasestherelationbetweenthemismore complicated.Consequentlyascientificsentenceisnotsimply decidableastrueorasfalseitcanonlybemoreorlessconfirmed

onthebasisofgivenobservations.Thustheearlierprincipleof verifiability,firstpronouncedbyWittgenstein,wasreplacedbythe weakerrequirementofconfirmability.Thethesisoftheunityof scienceremained,however,intactinvirtue ofthecommonbasisof confirmationforallbranchesofempiricalscience.Themodification hereindicatedwasexplainedinthearticle"TestabilityandMeaning" (1936-37).Forthelaterdevelopmentoftheconceptionofthe natureofscientificconcepts,seethearticle"TheMethodological CharacterofTheoreticalConcepts"(1956),inH.FeiglandM. Scriveneds.,MinnesotaStudiesinthePhilosophyofScience,Vol.I. -146-

7
Logic,Mathematicsand KnowledgeofNature
BYHANSHAHN (TRANSLATEDBYARTHURPAP)

I
EVENACURSORYglanceatthestatementsofphysicsshowsthat theyareobviouslyofaverydiversecharacter.Thereare statementslike"ifastretchedstringisplucked,atoneisheard"or "ifarayofsunlightispassedthroughaglassprism,thenacolored band,interspersedwithdarklines,isvisibleonascreenplaced behindtheprism,"whichcanbetestedatanytimebyobservation. Wealsofindstatementslike"thesuncontainshydrogen,""the satelliteofSiriushasadensityofabout60,000,""ahydrogenatom consistsofapositivelychargednucleusaroundwhichanegatively chargedelectronrevolves,"whichcannotbyanymeansbetested byimmediateobservationbutwhicharemadeonlyonthebasisof theoreticalconsiderationsandlikewise aretestableonlywiththe helpoftheoreticalconsiderations.Andthusweareconfrontedby theurgentquestion:whatistherelationshipbetweenobservation andtheoryinphysics--andnotjustinphysics,butinscience generally.Forthereisbutonescience,andwhereverthereis scientificinvestigationitproceedsultimatelyaccordingtothesame methodsonlyweseeeverythingwiththegreatestclarityinthe caseofphysics,becauseitisthemostadvanced,neatest,most scientificofallthesciences.Andinphysics,indeed,theinteraction ofobservationandtheoryis Thiscontributioncomprisesthefirstfoursectionsofthe pamphletLogik,MathematikundNaturerkennen, publishedinViennain1933asthesecondvolumeofthe seriesentitledEinheitswissenschaft.Itisreproducedhere withthekindpermissionofMrs.LillyHahn,Gerold&Co., Vienna,andProfessorRudolfCarnap,thecoeditorof Einheitswissenschaft.ThelasttwosectionsofHahn's

pamphletwhichareomitteddonotdealwiththenature oflogicalormathematicalpropositions. -147especiallypronounced,evenofficiallyrecognizedbytheinstitution ofspecialprofessorshipsforexperimentalphysicsandfor theoreticalphysics. Now,presumablytheusualconceptionisroughlyspeakingthe following:wehavetwosourcesofknowledge,bymeansofwhich wecomprehend"theworld,""thereality"inwhichweare"placed": experience ,orobservationontheonehand,andthinkingonthe other.Forexample,oneisengagedinexperimentalphysicsorin theoreticalphysicsaccordingtoone'susingtheoneortheotherof thesesourcesofknowledge inphysics. Now,inphilosophywefindatime-honoredcontroversyaboutthese twosourcesofknowledge:whichpartsofourknowledge derive fromobservation,are"aposteriori,"andwhichderive from thinking,are"apriori"?Isoneofthesesourcesofknowledge superiortotheothers,andifso,which? Fromtheverybeginningphilosophyhasraiseddoubtsaboutthe reliabilityofobservation(indeed,thesedoubtsareperhapsthe sourceofallphilosophy).Itisquiteunderstandablethatsuch doubtsarose:theyspringfromthebeliefthatsense-perceptionis frequentlydeceptive.Atsunriseoratsunsetthesnowondistant mountainsappearsred,but"inreality"itissurelywhite!Astick whichisimmersedinwaterappearscrooked,but"inreality"itis surelystraight!Ifamanrecedesfromme,heappearssmallerand smallertome,butsurelyhedoesnotchangesize"inreality"! Now,althoughallthephenomenatowhichwehavebeenreferring havelongsincebeenaccountedforbyphysicaltheories,sothat nobodyanylongerregardsthemasdeceptionscausedby senseperception,theconsequenceswhichflowfromthisprimitive, longdiscardedconceptionstillexertapowerfulinfluence.Onesays: ifobservationissometimesdeceptive,perhapsitisalwaysso! Perhapseverythingdisclosedbythesensesismereillusion! Everybodyknowsthephenomenonofdreams,andeverybody knowshowdifficultitisattimestodecidewhetheragiven experience was"reallife"or"ameredream."Perhaps,then, whateverweobserve ismerelyadreamobject!Everybodyknows thathallucinationsoccur,andthattheycanbesovividthatthe subjectcannotbedissuadedfromtakinghishallucinationforreality. Perhapsthen,whateverweobserveisonlyahallucination!Ifwe lookthroughappropriatelypolishedlenses,everythingappears distortedwhoknowswhetherperhapswedonotalways, unknowingly,lookattheworldasitwerethroughdistortingglasses, andtherefore seeeverythingdistorted,differentfromwhatitreally is!ThisisoneofthebasicthemesofthephilosophyofKant. -148-

Butletusreturntoantiquity.Aswesaid,theancientsbelievedthat theywere frequentlydeceivedbyobservation.Butnothingofthis kindeverhappenedinthecaseofthought:therewereplentyof delusionsofsense,butnodelusionsofthought!Andthus,as confidenceinobservationgotshaken,thebeliefmayhavearisen thatthinkingisamethodofknowledgewhichisabsolutelysuperior toobservation,indeedtheonlyreliablemethodofknowledge: observationdisclosesmereappearance,thoughtalonegraspstrue being. This,"rationalistic,"doctrinethatthinkingisasourceofknowledge whichsurpassesobservation,thatitisindeedtheonlyreliable sourceofknowledge,hasremaineddominantfromtheclimaxof Greekphilosophyuntilmoderntimes.Icannotevenintimatewhat peculiarfruitsmaturedonthetreeofsuchknowledge.Atanyrate, theyprovedtohaveextraordinarilylittlenourishingvalueandthus the"empiricist"reaction,originatinginEngland,slowlygainedthe upperhand,supportedbythetremendoussuccessofmodern naturalscience--the philosophywhichteachesthatobservationis superiortothought,indeedistheonlysourceofknowledge:nihil estinintellectu,quodnonpriusfueritinsensuinEnglish:"nothing isintheintellectwhichwasnotpreviouslyinthesenses." Butatoncethisempiricismfacesanapparentlyinsuperable difficulty:howisittoaccountfortherealvalidityoflogicaland mathematicalstatements?Observationdisclosestomeonlythe transient,itdoesnotreachbeyondtheobservedthereisnobond thatwouldleadfromoneobservedfacttoanother,thatwould compelfutureobservationstohavethesameresultasthose alreadymade.Thelawsoflogicandmathematics,however,claim absolutelyuniversalvalidity:thatthedoorofmyroomisnow closed,IknowbyobservationnexttimeIobserveititmaybe open.Thatheatedbodiesexpand,Iknowbyobservationyetthe verynextobservationmayshowthatsomeheatedbodydoesnot expandbutthattwoandtwomakefour,holdsnotonlyforthe caseinwhichIverifyitbycountingIknowwithcertaintythatit holdsalwaysandeverywhere.WhateverIknowbyobservation couldbeotherwise:thedoorofmyroommighthavebeenopen now,IcaneasilyimagineitandIcaneasilyimaginethatabody doesnotexpandonbeingheatedbuttwoandtwocouldnot occasionallymakefive,Icannotimagineinanywaywhatitwould belikefortwicetwotoequalfive. Theconclusionseemsinevitable:sincethepropositionsoflogicand mathematicshaveabsolutelyuniversalvalidity,areapodeictically certain,sinceitmustbeastheysayandcannotbeotherwise,these propositionscannotbederivedfromexperience.Inviewofthetre-149mendousimportanceoflogicandmathematicsinthesystemofour knowledge,empiricism,therefore,seemstobeirrevocablyrefuted.

Tobesure,inspiteofallthistheolderempiricistshaveattempted tofoundlogicandmathematicsuponexperience.Accordingto themwenowbelievethatsomethingmustbethiswayandcannot beotherwisesimplybecausetherelevantexperience issooldand therelevantobservationshavebeenrepeatedinnumerabletimes. Onthisview,therefore,itisentirelyconceivablethat,justasan observationmightshowthataheatedbodydoesnotexpand,two andtwomightsometimesmakefive.Thisisallegedtohave escapedournoticesofarbecauseithappenswithsuch extraordinaryrarity,likefindingapieceoffour-leavedcloverwhich forsuperstitiouspeopleisasignofgoodluck,anoccurrencewhich isnotsoveryrare--howmuchmorepromiseoffortunewouldthere beinthediscoveryofacasewheretwoandtwomakefive!One cansafelysaythatonclosersighttheseattemptstoderive logic andmathematicsfromexperience arefundamentally unsatisfactory,anditisdoubtfulwhetheranybodyseriouslyholds thisviewtoday. Rationalismandempiricismhavingthus,asitwere,suffered shipwreck--rationalism,becauseitsfruitslackednourishingvalue, empiricism,becauseitcouldnotdojusticetologicandmathematics --dualisticconceptionsgainedtheupperhand,withtheviewthat thinkingandobservationareequallylegitimatesourcesof knowledgewhicharebothindispensabletoourcomprehensionof theworldandplayadistinctiveroleinthesystemofour knowledge.Thoughtgraspsthemostgenerallawsofallbeing,as formulatedperhapsinlogicandmathematicsobservationprovides thedetailedfillingofthisframework.Asregardsthelimitssetto thetwosourcesofknowledge,opinionsdiverge. Thusitis,forinstance,disputedwhethergeometryisaprioriora posteriori,whetheritisbasedonpurethinkingoronexperience. Andthesamedisputeisencounteredinconnectionwiththemost fundamentalphysicallaws,e.g.thelawofinertia,thelawsofthe conservationofmassandenergy,thelawofattractionofmasses: allofthemhavealreadybeenacclaimedasapriori,asnecessities ofthought,byvariousphilosophers--butalwaysaftertheyhadbeen establishedandwellconfirmedasempiricallawsinphysics.This wasboundtoleadtoaskepticalattitude,andasamatteroffact thereisprobablyaprevalenttendencyamongphysiciststoregard theframeworkwhichcanbegraspedbypurethinkingasbeingas wideandgeneralaspossible,andtoacknowledge -150experience asthesourceofourknowledge ofeverythingthatis somehowconcrete. Theusualconception,then,maybedescribedroughlyasfollows: fromexperience welearncertainfacts,whichweformulateas "lawsofnature"butsincewegraspbymeansofthoughtthemost generallawfulconnections(ofalogicalandmathematical character)thatpervade reality,wecancontrolnatureonthebasis offactsdisclosedbyobservationtoamuchlargerextentthanithas

actuallybeenobserved.Forweknowinadditionthatanything whichcanbededucedfromobservedfactsbyapplicationoflogic andmathematicsmustbefoundtoexist.Accordingtothisview,the experimentalphysicistprovidesknowledge oflawsofnatureby directobservation.Thetheoreticalphysicistthereafterenlargesthis knowledgetremendouslybythinking,insuchawaythatweareina positionalsotoassertpropositionsaboutprocessesthatoccurfar fromusinspaceandtimeandaboutprocesseswhich,onaccount oftheirmagnitudeorminuteness,arenotdirectlyobservablebut whichareconnectedwithwhatisdirectlyobservedbythemost generallawsofbeing,graspedbythought,thelawsoflogicand mathematics.Thisviewseemstobestronglysupportedby numerousdiscoveriesthathavebeenmadewiththehelpoftheory, like--tomentionjustsomeofthebestknown--the calculationofthe positionoftheplanetNeptunebyLeverrier,thecalculationof electricwavesbyMaxwell,thecalculationofthebendingoflight raysinthegravitationalfieldofthesunbyEinsteinandthe calculationoftheredshiftinthesolarspectrum,alsobyEinstein. Neverthelessweareoftheopinionthatthisviewisentirely untenable.Foroncloseranalysisitappearsthatthefunctionof thoughtisimmeasurablymoremodestthantheoneascribedtoit bythistheory.Theideathatthinkingisaninstrumentforlearning moreabouttheworldthanhasbeenobserved,foracquiring knowledgeofsomethingthathasabsolutevalidityalwaysand everywhere intheworld,aninstrumentforgraspinggenerallaws ofallbeing,seemstouswhollymystical.Justhowshoulditcometo passthatwecouldpredictthenecessaryoutcomeofanobservation beforehavingmadeit?Whenceshouldourthinkingderive an executivepower,bywhichitcouldcompelanobservationtohave thisratherthanthatresult?Whyshouldthatwhichcompelsour thoughtsalsocompelthecourseofnature?Onewouldhaveto believeinsomemiraculouspre-establishedharmonybetweenthe courseofourthinkingandthecourseofnature,anideawhichis highlymysticalandultimatelytheological. Thereisnowayoutofthissituationexceptareturntoapurely -151empiriciststandpoint,totheviewthatobservationistheonlysource ofknowledgeoffacts:thereisnoaprioriknowledge aboutmatters offact,thereisno"material"apriori.However,weshallhaveto avoidtheerrorcommittedbyearlierempiricists,thatofinterpreting thepropositionsoflogicandmathematicsasmerefactsof experience.Wemustlookoutforadifferentinterpretationoflogic andmathematics.

II
Letusbeginwithlogic.Theoldconceptionoflogicisapproximately asfollows:logicistheaccountofthemostuniversalpropertiesof things,theaccountofthosepropertieswhicharecommontoall thingsjustasornithologyisthescienceofbirds,zoologythe

scienceofallanimals,biologythescienceofalllivingbeings,so logicisthescienceofallthings,thescienceofbeingassuch.Ifthis werethecase,itwouldremainwhollyunintelligiblewhencelogic derivesitscertainty.Forwesurelydonotknowallthings.Wehave notobservedeverythingandhencewecannotknowhoweverything behaves. Ourthesis,onthecontrary,asserts:logicdoesnotbyanymeans treatofthetotalityofthings,itdoesnottreatofobjectsatallbut onlyofourwayofspeakingaboutobjectslogicisfirstgenerated bylanguage.Thecertaintyanduniversalvalidity,orbetter,the irrefutabilityofapropositionoflogicderivesjustfromthefactthat itsaysnothingaboutobjectsofanykind. Letusclarifythepointbyanexample.Italkaboutawell-known plant:Idescribeit,asisdoneinbotanicalreferencebooks,in termsofthenumber,colorandformofitsblossomleaves,itscalyx leaves,itsstamina,theshapeofitsleaves,itsstem,itsroot,etc., andImakethestipulation:letuscallanyplantofthiskind"snow rose,"butletusalsocallit"heffeborusniger."ThereuponIcan pronouncewithabsolutecertaintytheuniversallyvalidproposition: "everysnowroseisahelleborusniger."Itiscertainlyvalid,always andeverywhere itisnotrefutablebyanysortofobservationbut itsaysnothingatallaboutfacts.Ilearnnothingfromitaboutthe plantinquestion,whenitisinbloom,whereitmaybefound, whetheritiscommonorrare.Ittellsmenothingabouttheplantit cannotbedisconfirmedbyanyobservation.Thisisthebasisofits certaintyanduniversalvalidity.Thestatementmerelyexpressesa conventionconcerningthewaywewishtotalkabouttheplantin question. -152Similarconsiderationsapplytotheprinciplesoflogic.Letusmake thepointwithreference tothetwomostfamouslawsoflogic:the lawofcontradictionandthelawoftheexcludedmiddle.Take,for example,coloredobjects.Welearn,bytrainingasIamtemptedto say,toapplythedesignation"red"tosomeoftheseobjects,and westipulatethatthedesignation"notred"beappliedtoallother objects.Onthebasisofthisstipulationwenowcanassertwith absolutecertaintythepropositionthatthereisnoobjecttowhich boththedesignation"red"andthedesignation"notred"isapplied. Itiscustomarytoformulatethisbrieflybysayingthatnothingis bothredandnotred.Thisisthelawofcontradiction.Andsincewe havestipulatedthatthedesignation"red"istobeappliedtosome objectsandthedesignation"notred"toallotherobjects,wecan likewisepronouncewithabsolutecertaintytheproposition: everythingiseitherdesignatedas"red"oras"notred,"whichitis customarytoformulatebrieflybysayingthateverythingiseither redornotred.Thisisthelawoftheexcludedmiddle.Thesetwo propositions,thelawofcontradictionandthelawoftheexcluded middle,saynothingatallaboutobjectsofanykind.Theydonot tellmeofanyofthemwhethertheyareredornotred,whichcolor

theyhave,oranythingelse.Theymerelystipulateamethodfor applyingthedesignations"red"and"notred"toobjects,i.e.they prescribe amethodofspeakingaboutthings.Andtheiruniversal validityandcertainty,theirirrefutability,justderivesfromthefact thattheysaynothingatallaboutobjects. Thesameistobesaidofalltheotherprinciplesoflogic.Weshall presentlyreturntothispoint.Butfirstletusinsertanother consideration.Wehavepreviouslymaintainedthattherecanbeno materialapriori,i.e.noaprioriknowledge aboutmattersoffact. Forwecannotknowtheoutcomeofanobservationbeforethe lattertakesplace.Wehavemadecleartoourselvesthatno materialaprioriiscontainedinthelawsofcontradictionandof excludedmiddle,sincetheysaynothingaboutfacts.Thereare those,however,whowouldperhapsadmitthatthenatureofthe lawsoflogicisasdescribed,yetwouldinsistthatthereisamaterial apriorielsewhere,e.g.inthestatement"nothingisbothredand blue"(ofcoursewhatismeantis:atthesametimeandplace) whichisallegedtoexpressrealaprioriknowledge aboutthenature ofthings.Evenbeforehavingmadeanyobservation,theysay,one canpredictwithabsolutecertaintythatitwillnotdiscloseathing whichisbothblueandredanditismaintainedthatsuchapriori knowledgeisobtainedby"eideticinsight"oranintuitivegraspof -153theessenceofcolors.Ifonedesirestoadheretoourthesisthat thereisnokindofmaterialapriori,onemustsomehowface statementslike"nothingisbothblueandred."Iwanttoattempt thisinafewsuggestivewords,thoughtheycannotbyanymeans dofulljusticetothisproblemwhichisnoteasy.Itsurelyiscorrect thatwecansaywithcompletecertaintybeforehavingmadeany observations:thelatterwillnotshowthatathingisbothblueand red--justaswecansaywithcompletecertaintythatnoobservation willyieldtheresultthatathingisbothredandnotred,orthata snowroseisnotahelleborusniger.Thefirststatement,however, isnotacaseofamaterialapriorianymorethanthesecondand third.Likethestatements"everysnowroseisahelleborusniger": and"nothingisbothredandnotred,"thestatement"nothingis bothblueandred"saysnothingatallaboutthenatureofthingsit likewiserefersonlytoourproposedmannerofspeakingabout objects,ofapplyingdesignationstothem.Earlierwesaid:thereare someobjectsthatwecall"red,"everyotherobjectwecall"not red,"andfromthiswederive thelawsofcontradictionand excludedmiddle.Nowwesay:someobjectswecall"red,"some otherobjectswecall"blue,"andotherobjectsagainwecall "green,"etc.Butifitisinthiswaythatweascribecolor designationstoobjects,thenwecansaywithcertaintyinadvance: inthisprocedurenoobjectisdesignatedbothas"red"andas "blue,"ormorebriefly:noobjectisbothredandblue.Thereason whywecansaythiswithcertaintyisthatwehaveregulatedthe ascriptionofcolordesignationstoobjectsinjustthisway.

Wesee,then,thattherearetwototallydifferentkindsof statements:thosewhichreallysaysomethingaboutobjects,and thosewhichdonotsayanythingaboutobjectsbutonlystipulate rulesforspeakingaboutobjects.IfIask"whatisthecolorofMiss Erna'snewdress?"andgettheanswer"MissErna'snewdressis notbothredandblue(allover),"thennoinformationaboutthis dresshasbeengiventomeatall.Ihavebeenmadenowiserbyit. ButifIgettheanswer"MissErna'snewdressisred,"thenIhave receivedsomegenuineinformationaboutthedress. Letusclarifythisdistinctionintermsofonemoreexample.A statementwhichreallysayssomethingabouttheobjectswhichit mentions,isthefollowing:"Ifyouheatthispieceofironupto 800,itwillturnred,ifyouheatitupto1300,itwillturnwhite." Whatmakesthedifferencebetweenthisstatementandthe statementscitedabove,whichsaynothingaboutfacts?The applicationoftemperature designationstoobjectsisindependentof theappli-154cationofcolordesignations,whereasthecolordesignations"red" and"notred,"or"red"and"blue"areappliedtoobjectsinmutual dependence.Thestatements"MissErna'snewdressiseitherredor notred"and"MissErna'snewdressisnotbothredandblue" merelyexpressthisdependence,hencemakenoassertionabout thatdress,andareforthatreasonabsolutelycertainand irrefutable.Theabovestatementaboutthepieceofiron,onthe otherhand,relatesindependentlygivendesignations,andtherefore reallysayssomethingaboutthatpieceofironandisforjustthat reasonnotcertainnorirrefutablebyobservation. Thefollowingexamplemaymakethedifferencebetweenthesetwo kindsofstatementsparticularlyclear.Ifsomeoneweretotenme: "Iraisedthetemperature ofthispieceofironto800butitdidnot turnred,"thenIwouldtesthisassertiontheresultofthetestmay bethathewaslying,orthathewasthevictimofanillusion,but perhapsitwouldturnoutthat--contrarytomypreviousbeliefs-therearecaseswhere apieceofironheatedto800doesnot becomered-hot,andinthatcaseIwouldjustchangemyopinion aboutthereactionofirontoheating.Butifsomeonetellsme"I raisedthetemperature ofthispieceofironto800,andthismade itturnbothredandnotred"or"itbecamebothredandwhite," thenIwillcertainlymakenotestwhatever.NorwillIsay"hehas toldmealie,"or"hehasbecomethevictimofanillusion"anditis quitecertainthatIwouldnotchangemybeliefsaboutthereaction ofirontoheating.Thepointis--itisbesttoexpressitinlanguage whichanycardplayerisfamiliarwith--thatthemanhasrevoked: hehasviolatedtherulesinaccordancewithwhichwewantto speak,andIshallrefusetospeakwithhimanylonger.Itisas thoughoneattemptedinagameofchesstomovethebishop orthogonally.Inthiscasetoo,Iwouldnotmakeanytests,Iwould notchangemybeliefsaboutthebehaviorofthings,butIwould

refusetoplaychesswithhimanylonger. Tosumup:wemustdistinguishtwokindsofstatements:those whichsaysomethingaboutfactsandthosewhichmerelyexpress thewayinwhichtheruleswhichgoverntheapplicationofwordsto factsdependuponeachother.Letuscallstatementsofthelatter kindtautologies:theysaynothingaboutobjectsandareforthis veryreasoncertain,universallyvalid,irrefutable byobservation whereasthestatementsoftheformerkindarenotcertainandare refutablebyobservation.Thelogicallawsofcontradictionandof theexcludedmiddlearetautologies,likewise,e.g.,thestatement "nothingisbothredandblue." -155Andnowwemaintainthatinthesamewayalltheotherlawsof logicaretautologies.Letus,therefore,returntologiconcemorein ordertoclarifythematterbyanexample.Aswesaid,the designation"red"isappliedtocertainobjectsandtheconventionis adoptedofapplyingthedesignation"notred"toanyotherobject. Itisthisconventionabouttheuseofnegationwhichisexpressed bythelawsofcontradictionandoftheexcludedmiddle.Nowwe addtheconvention--stilltakingourexamplesfromthedomainof colors--thatanyobjectwhichiscalled"red"isalsotobecalled"red orblue,""blueorred,""redoryellow,""yelloworred,"etc.,that everyobjectwhichiscalled"blue,"isalsocalled"blueorred,""red orblue,""blueoryellow,""yelloworblue,"etc.,andsoon.Onthe basisofthisconvention,wecanagainassertwithcomplete certaintytheproposition:"everyredobjectiseitherredorblue." Thisisagainatautology.Wedonotspeakabouttheobjects,but onlyaboutourmanneroftalkingaboutthem. Ifoncemoreweremindourselvesofthewayinwhichthe designations"red,""notred,""blue,""redorblue,"etc.areapplied toobjects,wecanmoreoverassertwithcompletecertaintyand irrefutability:everythingtowhichbothdesignations"redorblue" and"notred"areapplied,isalsodesignatedas"blue"--whichis usuallyputmorebriefly:ifathingisredorblueandnotred,then itisblue.Whichisagainatautology.Noinformationaboutthe natureofthingsiscontainedinit,itonlyexpressesthesensein whichthelogicalwords"not"and"or"areused. Thuswehavearrivedatsomethingfundamental:ourconventions regardingtheuseofthewords"not"and"or"issuchthatin assertingthetwopropositions"objectAiseitherredorblue"and "objectAisnotred,"Ihaveimplicitlyalreadyasserted"objectAis blue."Thisistheessenceofso-calledlogicaldeduction.Itisnot, then,inanywaybasedonrealconnectionsbetweenstatesof affairs,whichweapprehendinthought.Onthecontrary,ithas nothingatalltodowiththenatureofthings,butderivesfromour mannerofspeakingaboutthings.Apersonwhorefusedto recognizelogicaldeductionwouldnottherebymanifestadifferent belieffrommineaboutthebehaviorofthings,buthewouldrefuse tospeakaboutthingsaccordingtothesamerulesasIdo.Icould

notconvincehim,butIwouldhavetorefusetospeakwithhimany longer,justasIshouldrefusetoplaychesswithapartnerwho insistedonmovingthebishoporthogonally. Whatlogicaldeductionaccomplishes,then,isthis:itmakesus -156aware ofallthatwehaveimplicitlyasserted--onthebasisof conventionsregardingtheuseoflanguage--inassertingasystemof propositions,justas,intheaboveexample,"objectAisblue"is implicitlyassertedbytheassertionofthetwopropositions"objectA isredorblue"and"objectAisnotred." Insayingthiswehavealreadysuggestedtheanswertothe question,whichnaturallymusthaveforceditselfonthemindof everyreaderwhohasfollowedourargument:ifitisreallythecase thatthepropositionsoflogicaretautologies,thattheysaynothing aboutobjects,whatpurposedoeslogicserve? Thelogicalpropositionswhichwere usedasillustrationsderived fromconventionsabouttheuseofthewords"not"and"or"(andit canbeshownthatthesameholdsforallthepropositionsof socalledpropositionallogic).Letus,then,firstaskforwhatpurpose thewords"not"and"or"areintroducedintolanguage.Presumably thereasonisthatwearenotomniscient.IfIamaskedaboutthe colorofthedresswornbyMissErnayesterday,Imaynotbeable torememberitscolor.Icannotsaywhetheritwasredorblueor greenbutperhapsIwillbeabletosayatleast"itwasnotyellow." WereIomniscient,Ishouldknowitscolor.Therewouldbenoneed tosay"itwasnotyellow":Icouldsay"itwasred."Oragain:my daughterhaswrittentomethatshereceivedacocker-spanielasa present.AsIhavenotseenityet,IdonotknowitscolorIcannot say"itisblack"nor"itisbrown"butIamabletosay"itisblackor brown."WereIomniscient,Icoulddowithoutthis"or"andcould sayimmediately"itisbrown." Thuslogicalpropositions,thoughbeingpurelytautologous,and logicaldeductions,thoughbeingnothingbuttautological transformations,havesignificanceforusbecausewearenot omniscient.Ourlanguageissoconstitutedthatinassertingsuch andsuchpropositionsweimplicitlyassertsuchandsuchother propositions--butwedonotseeimmediatelyallthatwehave implicitlyassertedinthismanner.Itisonlylogicaldeductionthat makesusconsciousofit.Iassert,e.g.,thepropositions"theflower whichMr.Smithwearsinhisbuttonhole,iseitheraroseora carnation,""ifMr.Smithwearsacarnationinhisbuttonhole,thenit iswhite,""theflowerwhichMr.Smithwearsinhisbuttonholeisnot white."PerhapsIamnotconsciouslyawarethatIhaveimplicitly assertedalso"theflowerwhichMr.Smithwearsinhisbuttonholeis arose"butlogicaldeductionbringsittomyconsciousness.Tobe sure,thisdoesnotmeanthatIknowwhethertheflowerwhichMr. Smithwears

-157inhisbuttonholereallyisaroseifInoticethatitisnotarose, thenImustnotmaintainmypreviousassertions--otherwise Isin againsttherulesofspeaking,Irevoke.

III
IfIhavesucceededinclarifyingsomewhattheroleoflogic,Imay nowbequitebriefabouttheroleofmathematics.Thepropositions ofmathematicsareofexactlythesamekindasthepropositionsof logic:theyaretautologous,theysaynothingatallaboutthe objectswewanttotalkabout,butconcernonlythemannerin whichwewanttospeakofthem.Thereasonwhywecanassert apodeicticallywithuniversalvaliditytheproposition:2+3=5,why wecansayevenbeforeanyobservationshavebeenmade,and cansayitwithcompletecertainty,thatitwillnotturnoutthat2+3 =7,isthatby"2+3"wemeanthesameasby"5"--justaswe meanthesameby"helleborusniger"asby"snowrose."Forthis reasonnobotanicalinvestigation,howeversubtle,coulddisclose thataninstanceofthespecies"snowrose"isnotahelleborus niger.Webecomeaware ofmeaningthesameby"2+3"andby "5,"bygoingbacktothemeaningsof"2,""3,""5,""+,"and makingtautologicaltransformationsuntilwejustseethat"2+3" meansthesameas"5."Itissuchsuccessivetautological transformationthatismeantby"calculating"theoperationsof additionandmultiplicationwhicharelearntinschoolaredirectives forsuchtautologicaltransformationeverymathematicalproofisa successionofsuchtautologicaltransformations.Theirutility,again, isduetothefactthat,forexample,wedonotbyanymeanssee immediatelythatwemeanby"24X31"thesameasby"744"but ifwecalculatetheproduct"24X31,"thenwetransformitstepby step,insuchawaythatineachindividualtransformationwe recognizethatonthebasisoftheconventionsregardingtheuseof thesignsinvolved(inthiscasenumeralsandthesigns"+"and"X") whatwemeanafterthetransformationisstillthesameaswhatwe meantbeforeit,untilfinallywebecomeconsciouslyawareof meaningthesameby"744"asby"24X31." Tobesure,theproofofthetautologicalcharacterofmathematics isnotyetcompleteinalldetails.Thisisadifficultandarduoustask yetwehavenodoubtthatthebeliefinthetautologicalcharacterof mathematicsisessentiallycorrect. Therehasbeenprolongedoppositiontotheinterpretationof mathematicalstatementsastautologiesKantcontestedthetauto-158logicalcharacterofmathematicsemphatically,andthegreat mathematicianHenriPoincar,towhomwearegreatlyindebted alsoforphilosophicalcriticism,wentsofarastoarguethatsince

mathematicscannotpossiblybeahugetautology,itmust somewhere containanaprioriprinciple.Indeed,atfirstglanceitis difficulttobelievethatthewholeofmathematics,withitstheorems thatitcostsuchlabortoestablish,withitsresultsthatsooften surprise us,shouldadmitofbeingresolvedintotautologies.But thereisjustonelittlepointwhichthisargumentoverlooks:it overlooksthefactthatwearenotomniscient.Anomniscientbeing, indeed,wouldatonceknoweverythingthatisimplicitlycontainedin theassertionofafewpropositions.Itwouldknowimmediatelythat onthebasisoftheconventionsconcerningtheuseofthenumerals andthemultiplicationsign,"24X31"issynonymouswith"744."An omniscientbeinghasnoneedforlogicandmathematics.We ourselves,however,firsthavetomakeourselvesconsciousofthis bysuccessivetautologicaltransformations,andhenceitmayprove quitesurprisingtousthatinassertingafewpropositionswehave implicitlyalsoassertedapropositionwhichseeminglyisentirely differentfromthem,orthatwedomeanthesamebytwo complexesofsymbolswhichareexternallyaltogetherdifferent.

IV
Andnowletusbeclearwhataworld-wide differencethereis betweenourconceptionandthetraditional--perhapsonemaysay: platonizing--conception,accordingtowhichtheworldismadein accordancewiththelawsoflogicandmathematics("Godis perenniallydoingmathematics"),andourthinking,afeeble reflectionofGod'somniscience,isaninstrumentgiventousfor comprehendingtheeternallawsoftheworld.No!Ourthinking cannotgiveinsightintoanysortofreality.Itcannotbringus informationofanyfactintheworld.Itonlyreferstothemannerin whichwespeakabouttheworld.Allitcandoistotransform tautologicallywhathasbeensaid.Thereisnopossibilityofpiercing throughthesensibleworlddisclosedbyobservationtoa"worldof truebeing":anymetaphysicsisimpossible!Impossible,notbecause thetaskistoodifficultforourhumanthinking,butbecauseitis meaningless,becauseeveryattempttodometaphysicsisan attempttospeakinawaythatcontravenestheagreementasto howwewishtospeak,comparabletotheattempttocapturethe queen(inagameofchess)bymeansofanorthogonalmoveofthe bishop. -159Letusreturnnowtotheproblemwhichwasourpointofdeparture: whatistherelationshipbetweenobservationandtheoryinphysics? Wesaidthattheusualviewwasroughlythis:experience teachesus thevalidityofcertainlawsofnature,andsinceourthinkinggivesus insightintothemostgenerallawsofallbeing,weknowthat likewiseanythingwhichisdeduciblefromtheselawsofnatureby meansoflogicalandmathematicalreasoningmustbefoundto exist.Weseenowthatthisviewisuntenableforthinkingdoesnot graspanysortoflawsofbeing.Neverandnowhere,then,can thoughtsupplyuswithknowledge aboutfactsthatgoesbeyondthe

observed.Butwhat,then,shouldwesayaboutthediscoveries madebymeansoftheoryonwhich,aswepointedout,theusual viewsostronglyreliesforitssupport?Letusaskourselves,e.g., whatwasinvolvedinthecomputationofthepositionoftheplanet NeptunebyLeverrier!Newtonnoticedthatthefamiliarmotions, celestialaswellasterrestrial,canbewelldescribedinaunifiedway bytheassumptionthatbetweenanytwomasspointsaforceof attractionisexertedwhichisproportionaltotheirmassesand inverselyproportionaltothesquareoftheirdistance.Anditis becausethisassumptionenablesustogiveasatisfactory descriptionofthefamiliarmotions,thathemadeit,i.e.heasserted tentatively,asanhypothesis,thelawofgravitation:betweenany twomasspointsthereisaforceofattractionwhichisproportional totheirmassesandinverselyproportionaltothesquareoftheir distance.Hecouldnotpronouncethislawasacertainty,butonlyas anhypothesis.Fornobodycanknowthatsuchisreallythebehavior ofeverypairofmasspoints-nobodycanobserve allmasspoints. Buthavingassertedthelawofgravitation,onehasimplicitly assertedmanyotherpropositions,thatis,allpropositionswhichare deduciblefromthelawofgravitation(togetherwithdata immediatelyderivablefromobservation)bycalculationandlogical inference.Itisthetaskoftheoreticalphysicistsandastronomersto makeusconsciousofeverythingweimplicitlyassertalongwiththe lawofgravitation.AndLeverrier'scalculationsmadepeopleaware thattheassertionofthelawofgravitationimpliesthatatadefinite timeanddefiniteplaceintheheavensahithertounknownplanet mustbevisible.Peoplelookedandactuallysawthatnewplanet-thehypothesisofthelawofgravitationwasconfirmed.Butitwas notLeverrier'scalculationthatprovedthatthisplanetexisted,but thelooking,theobservation.Thisobservationcouldjustaswell havehadadifferentresult.Itcouldjustaswellhavehappened thatnothingwasvisibleatthecomputedplaceintheheavens--in whichcasethelawofgravitationwould -160nothavebeenconfirmedandonewouldhavebeguntodoubt whetheritisreallyasuitablehypothesisforthedescriptionofthe observablemotions.Indeed,thisiswhatactuallyhappenedlater:in assertingthelawofgravitation,oneimplicitlyassertsthatata certaintimetheplanetMercurymustbevisibleatacertainplacein theheavens.Whetheritwouldactuallybevisibleatthattimeat thatplace,onlyobservationcoulddisclosebutobservationsshowed thatitwasnotvisibleatexactlytherequiredpositioninthe heavens.Andwhathappened?Theysaid:sinceinassertingthelaw ofgravitationweimplicitlyassertpropositionswhicharenottrue, wecannotmaintainthehypothesisofthelawofgravitation. Newton'stheoryofgravitationwasreplacedbyEinstein's. Itisnotthecase,then,thatweknowthroughexperience that certainlawsofnaturearevalid,and--sincebyourthinkingwe graspthemostgenerallawsofallbeing--therefore alsoknowthat whateverisdeduciblefromtheselawsbyreasoningmustexist.On

thecontrary,thesituationisthis:thereisnotasinglelawofnature whichweknowtobevalidthelawsofnaturearehypotheseswhich weasserttentatively.Butinassertingsuchlawsofnaturewe implicitlyassertalsomanyotherpropositions,anditisthetaskof thinkingtomakeusconsciousoftheimplicitlyassertedpropositions. Solong,now,astheseimplicitlyassertedpropositions,tothe extentthattheyareaboutthedirectlyobservable,areconfirmed byobservation,theselawsofnatureareconfirmedandweadhere tothembutiftheseimplicitlyassertedpropositionsarenot confirmedbyobservation,thenthelawsofnaturehavenotbeen confirmedandarereplacedbyothers. -161[Thispageintentionallyleftblank.] -162-

KnowledgeandTruth
-163[Thispageintentionallyleftblank.] -164-

PsychologyinPhysicalLanguage
BYRUDOLFCARNAP (TRANSLATEDBYGEORGESCHICK)

1.INTRODUCTION.PHYSICALLANGUAGE ANDPROTOCOLLANGUAGE
INWHATFOLLOWS,weintendtoexplainandtoestablishthethesis thateverysentenceofpsychologymaybeformulatedinphysical language.Toexpressthisinthematerialmodeofspeech:all sentencesofpsychologydescribephysicaloccurrences,namely,the physicalbehaviorofhumansandotheranimals.Thisisasub-thesis ofthegeneralthesisofphysicalismtotheeffectthatphysical languageisauniversallanguage,thatis,alanguageintowhich everysentencemaybetranslated.Thegeneralthesishasbeen discussedinanearlierarticle,1whosepositionshallhereserveas ourpointofdeparture.Letusfirstbrieflyreviewsomeofthe conclusionsoftheearlierstudy. Inmeta-linguisticdiscussionwedistinguishthecustomarymaterial

modeofspeech(e.g."Thesentencesofthislanguagespeakofthis andthatobject.")fromthemorecorrectformalmodeofspeech (e.g."Thesentencesofthislanguagecontainthisandthatword andareconstructedinthisandthatmanner.")Inusingthematerial `modeofspeechweruntheriskofintroducingconfusionsand pseudoproblems.If,becauseofitsbeingmoreeasilyunderstood, weoccasionallydouseitinwhatfollows,wedosoonlyasa paraphrase oftheformalmodeofspeech. Offirstimportanceforepistemologicalanalysesarethe protocollanguage ThisarticlewasoriginallypublishedinVolumeIIIof Erkenntnis(1932/33).Itisreproducedherewiththekind permissionofProfessorCarnap. ____________________ 1Carnap,"Die Physikalische Sprache alsUniversalsprache der Wissenschaft",ErkenntnisII,1931,pp.432-465.[TheEnglish translationofthisarticlebyMaxBlackwaspublishedasa monographunderthetitle"TheUnityofScience"(London: KeganPaul,1934).] -165language,inwhichtheprimitive protocolsentences(inthematerial modeofspeech:thesentencesabouttheimmediatelygiven)ofa particularpersonareformulated,andthesystemlanguage,in whichthesentencesofthesystemofscienceareformulated.A personStests(verifies)asystem-sentencebydeducingfromit sentencesofhisownprotocollanguage,andcomparingthese sentenceswiththoseofhisactualprotocol.Thepossibilityofsucha deductionofprotocolsentencesconstitutesthecontentofa sentence.Ifasentencepermitsnosuchdeductions,ithasno content,andismeaningless.Ifthesamesentencesmaybe deducedfromtwosentences,thelattertwosentenceshavethe samecontent.Theysaythesamething,andmaybetranslatedinto oneanother. Toeverysentenceofthesystemlanguagetherecorrespondssome sentenceofthephysicallanguagesuchthatthetwosentencesare inter-translatable.Itisthepurposeofthisarticletoshowthatthisis thecaseforthesentencesofpsychology.Moreover,everysentence oftheprotocollanguageofsomespecificpersonisintertranslatablewithsomesentenceofphysicallanguage,namely,with asentenceaboutthephysicalstateofthepersoninquestion.The variousprotocollanguagesthusbecomesub-languagesofthe physicallanguage.Thephysicallanguageisuniversalandintersubjective.Thisisthethesisofphysicalism. Ifthephysicallanguage,onthegroundsofitsuniversality,were adoptedasthesystemlanguageofscience,allsciencewould becomephysics.Metaphysicswouldbediscardedasmeaningless. Thevariousdomainsofsciencewouldbecomepartsofunified

science.Inthematerialmodeofspeech:therewould,basically,be onlyonekindofobject--physicaloccurrences,inwhoserealmlaw wouldbeall-encompassing. Physicalismoughtnottobeunderstoodasrequiringpsychologyto concernitselfonlywithphysicallydescribablesituations.Thethesis, rather,isthatpsychologymaydealwithwhateveritpleases,itmay formulateitssentencesasitpleases--thesesentenceswill,inevery case,betranslatableintophysicallanguage. WesayofasentencePthatitistranslatable(moreprecisely,that itisreciprocallytranslatable)intoasentenceQiftherearerules, independentofspaceandtime,inaccordancewithwhichQmaybe deducedfromPandPfromQtousethematerialmodeofspeech, PandQdescribethesamestateofaffairsepistemologically speaking,everyprotocolsentencewhichconfirmsPalsoconfirmsQ andviceversa.Thedefinitionofanexpression"a"bymeansof expressions"b,""c"...,representsatranslation-rule with -166thehelpofwhichanysentenceinwhich"a"occursmaybe translatedintoasentenceinwhich"a"doesnotoccur,but"b,""c," ...do,andviceversa.Thetranslatabilityofallthesentencesof languageL1intoa(completelyorpartially)differentlanguageL2is assuredif,foreveryexpressionofL1,adefinitionispresented whichdirectlyorindirectly(i.e.,withthehelpofotherdefinitions) derivesthatexpressionfromexpressionsofL2.Ourthesisthus statesthatadefinitionmaybeconstructedforeverypsychological concept(i.e.expression)whichdirectlyorindirectlyderivesthat conceptfromphysicalconcepts.Wearenotdemandingthat psychologyformulateeachofitssentencesinphysicalterminology. Foritsownpurposespsychologymay,asheretofore,utilizeitsown terminology.Allthatwearedemandingistheproductionofthe definitionsthroughwhichpsychologicallanguageislinkedwith physicallanguage.Wemaintainthatthesedefinitionscanbe produced,since,implicitly,theyalreadyunderliepsychological practice. Ifourthesisiscorrect,thegeneralizedsentencesofpsychology,the lawsofpsychology,arealsotranslatableintothephysicallanguage. Theyarethusphysicallaws.Whetherornotthesephysicallawsare deduciblefromthoseholdingininorganicphysics,remains, however,anopenquestion.Thisquestionofthededucibilityofthe lawsiscompletelyindependentofthequestionofthedefinabilityof concepts.Wehavealreadyconsideredthismatterinourdiscussion ofbiology.2Assoonasonerealizesthatthesentencesof psychologybelongtothephysicallanguage,andalsoovercomes theemotionalobstaclestotheacceptanceofthisprovablethesis, onewill,indeed,inclinetotheconjecture,whichcannotasyetbe proved,thatthelawsofpsychologyarespecialcasesofphysical lawsholdingininorganicphysicsaswell.Butwearenotconcerned withthisconjecturehere.

Letuspermitourselvesabriefremark--apartfromourprincipal point--concerningtheemotionalresistancetothethesisof physicalism.Suchresistanceisalwaysexertedagainstanythesis whenanIdolisbeingdethronedbyit,whenweareaskedto discardanideawithwhichdignityandgrandeurareassociated.As aresultofCopernicus'work,manlostthedistinctionofacentral positionintheuniverseasaresultofDarwin's,hewasdeprivedof thedignityofaspecialsupra-animalexistenceasaresultof Marx's,thefactorsbymeansofwhichhistorycanbecausally explainedwere degradedfromtherealmofideastothatof materialeventsasaresultof ____________________ 2"Die Physikalische Sprache",op.cit.,p.449ff.,(The Unityof Science,p.68ff.). -167Nietzsche's,theoriginsofmoralswere strippedoftheirhaloasa resultofFreud's,thefactorsbymeansofwhichtheideasand actionsofmencanbecausallyexplainedwerelocatedinthe darkestdepths,inman'snetherregions.Theextenttowhichthe sober,objectiveexaminationofthesetheorieswasobstructedby emotionaloppositioniswellknown.Nowitisproposedthat psychology,whichhashithertobeenrobedinmajestyasthetheory ofspiritualevents,bedegradedtothestatusofapartofphysics. Doubtless,manywillconsiderthisanoffensivepresumption. Perhapswemaytherefore expresstherequestthatthereader makeaspecialeffortinthiscasetoretaintheobjectivityand opennessofmindalwaysrequisitetothetestingofascientific thesis.

2.THEFORMSOFPSYCHOLOGICALSENTENCES
Thedistinctionbetweensingularandgeneralsentencesisas importantinpsychologyasinothersciences.Asingular psychologicalsentence,e.g."Mr.Awasangryatnoonyesterday" (ananalogueofthephysicalsentence,"Yesterdayatnoonthe temperature oftheairinViennawas28degreescentigrade"),is concernedwithaparticularpersonataparticulartime.General psychologicalsentenceshavevariousforms,ofwhichthefollowing twoareperhapsthemostimportant.Asentencemaydescribea specificqualityofaspecifickindofevent,e.g."Anexperience of surprise always(or:alwaysforMr.A,or:alwaysforpeopleofsuch andsuchasociety)hassuchandsuchastructure."Aphysical analogywouldbe:"Chalk(or:chalkofsuchandsuchasort)always iswhite."Thesecondimportantformisthatofuniversal-conditional statementsconcerningsequencesofevents,thatis,ofcausallaws. Forinstance,"When,undersuchandsuchcircumstances,imagesof suchandsuchasortoccurtoaperson(or:toMr.A,or:toanyone ofsuchandsuchasociety),anemotionofsuchandsuchasort always(or:frequently,or:sometimes)isaroused."Aphysical analogywouldbe:"Whenasolidbodyisheated,itusually

expands." Researchisprimarilydirectedtothediscoveryofgeneral sentences.Thesecannot,however,beestablishedexceptbymeans oftheso-calledmethodofinductionfromtheavailablesingular sentences,i.e.bymeansoftheconstructionofhypotheses. Phenomenologyclaimstobeabletoestablishuniversalsynthetic sentenceswhichhavenotbeenobtainedthroughinduction.These sentencesaboutpsychologicalqualitiesare,allegedly,knowneither apriorioronthebasisofsomesingleillustrativecase.Inour -168view,knowledgecannotbegainedbysuchmeans.Weneednot, however,enteruponadiscussionofthisissuehere,sinceevenon theviewofphenomenologyitself,thesesentencesdonotbelongto thedomainofpsychology. Inphysicsitsometimesseemstobethecasethatagenerallawis establishedonthebasisofsomesingleevent.Forinstance,ifa physicistcandetermineacertainphysicalconstant,say,the heatconductivityofasampleofsomepuremetal,inasingle experiment,hewillbeconvincedthat,onotheroccasions,notonly thesampleexaminedbutanysimilarsampleofthesamesubstance will,veryprobably,becharacterizablebythesameconstant.But heretooinductionisapplied.Asaresultofmanyprevious observationsthephysicistisinpossessionofauniversalsentenceof ahigherorderwhichenableshiminthiscasetofollowan abbreviatedmethod.Thishigher-ordersentencereadsroughly:"All (or:thefollowing)physicalconstantsofmetalsvaryonlyslightlyin timeandfromsampletosample." Thesituationisanalogousforcertainconclusionsdrawnin psychology.Ifapsychologisthas,asaresultofsomesingle experiment,determinedthatthesimultaneoussoundingoftwo specificnotesisexperiencedasadissonancebysomespecific personA,heinfers(underfavorablecircumstances)thetruthofthe generalsentencewhichstatesthatthesameexperimentwithAwill, atothertimes,havethesameresult.Indeed,hewillevenventure-andrightly--toextendthisresult,withsomeprobability,topairsof toneswiththesameacousticintervalifthepitchisnottoodifferent fromthatofthefirstexperiment.Heretootheinferencefroma singularsentencetoageneraloneisonlyapparent.Actually,a sentenceinductivelyobtainedfrommanyobservationsisbrought intoservice here,asentencewhich,roughly,reads:"Thereaction ofanyspecificpersonastotheconsonanceordissonanceofa chordvariesonlyveryslightlywithtime,andonlyslightlyonanot toolargetranspositionofthechord."Itthusremainsthecasethat everygeneralsentenceisinductivelyestablishedonthebasisofa numberofsingularones. Finally,wemustconsidersentencesaboutpsycho-physical interrelations,suchasforinstance,theconnectionbetweenphysical

stimulusandperception.Thesearelikewise arrivedatthrough induction,inthiscasethroughinductioninpartfromphysicalandin partfrompsychologicalsingularsentences.Themostimportant sentencesofgestaltpsychologybelongalsotothiskind. Generalsentenceshavethecharacterofhypothesesinrelation -169toconcretesentences,thatis,thetestingofageneralsentence consistsintestingtheconcretesentenceswhicharededuciblefrom it.Ageneralsentencehascontentinsofarandonlyinsofarasthe concretesentencesdeduciblefromithavecontent.Logicalanalysis musttherefore primarilybedirectedtowardstheexaminationof thelattersortofsentences. IfAuttersasingularpsychologicalsentencesuchas"Yesterday morningBwashappy,"theepistemologicalsituationdiffers accordingasAandBareorarenotthesameperson. Consequently,wedistinguishbetweensentencesaboutotherminds andsentencesaboutone'sownmind.Asweshallpresentlysee, thisdistinctioncannotbemadeamongthesentencesofintersubjectivescience.Fortheepistemologicalanalysisofsubjective, singularsentencesitis,however,indispensable.

3.SENTENCESABOUTOTHERMINDS
Theepistemologicalcharacterofasingularsentenceaboutother mindswillnowbeclarifiedbymeansofananalogywithasentence aboutaphysicalproperty,definedasadispositiontobehave(or respond)inaspecificmannerunderspecificcircumstances(or stimuli).Totakeanexample:asubstanceiscalled"plastic"if, undertheinfluenceofdeformingstressesofaspecificsortanda specificmagnitude,itundergoesapermanentchangeofshape,but remainsintact. Weshalltrytocarryoutthisanalogybyjuxtaposingtwoexamples. Weshallbeconcernedwiththeepistemologicalsituationofthe exampletakenfrompsychologytheparallelexampleaboutthe physicalpropertyisintendedonlytofacilitateourunderstandingof thepsychologicalsentence,andnottoserveasaspecimenofan argumentfromanalogy.(Forthesakeofconvenience,wherethe textwouldhavebeenthesameinbothcolumns,itiswrittenonly once.) ASentenceaboutapropertyofa ASentenceaboutaconditionof physicalsubstance. someothermind. Example:IassertthesentenceP1: Example:IassertthesentenceP1: "Thiswoodensupportisveryfirm." "Mr.Aisnowexcited."

TherearetwodifferentwaysinwhichsentenceP1maybederived. Weshalldesignatethemasthe"rational"andthe"intuitive" methods.TherationalmethodconsistsofinferringP1fromsome protocol -170sentencep1(orfromseverallikeit),morespecifically,froma perception-sentence abouttheshapeandcolorofthe woodensupport. aboutthebehaviorofA,e.g. about hisfacialexpressions,his gestures, etc.,oraboutphysicaleffectsof A's behavior,e.g.about characteristics ofhishandwriting.

Inordertojustifytheconclusion,amajorpremiseOisstill required,namelythegeneralsentencewhichassertsthat whenIperceive awoodensupport whenIperceiveapersontohave tobeofthiscolorandform,it thisfacialexpressionandhand(usually)turnsouttobefirm.(A writinghe(usually)turnsoutto sentenceabouttheperceptualsigns beexcited.(Asentenceaboutthe offirmness.) expressionalorgraphologicalsigns ofexcitement.) ThecontentofP1doesnotcoincidewiththatofp1,butgoes beyondit.ThisisevidentfromthefactthattoinferP1fromp1O isrequired.ThecitedrelationshipbetweenP1andp1mayalsobe seeninthefactthatundercertaincircumstances,theinference fromp1toP1maygoastray.Itmayhappenthat,thoughp1 occursinaprotocol,Iamobliged,onthegroundsoffurther protocols,toretracttheestablishedsystemsentenceP1.Iwould thensaysomethinglike,"Imadeamistake.Thetesthasshown thatthesupportwasnotfirm,even thatAwasnotexcited,eventhough thoughithadsuchandsuchaform hisfacehadsuchandsuchanexandcolor."

pression." Inpracticalmatterstheintuitivemethodisappliedmorefrequently thanthisrationalone,whichpresupposestheoreticalknowledge andrequiresreflection.Inaccordancewiththeintuitivemethod,P1 isobtainedwithoutthemediationofanyothersentencefromthe identicallysoundingprotocolsentencep2. "Thesupportisfirm." "Aisexcited."

Consequently,onespeaksinthiscaseofimmediateperceptions ofpropertiesofsubstances,e.g., ofthefirmnessofsupports. ofotherminds,e.g.,oftheexcitementofA.

Butinthiscasetootheprotocolsentencep2andthesystem sentenceP1havedifferentcontents.Thedifferenceisgenerallynot notedbecause,ontheordinaryformulation,bothsentencessound alike. -171Heretoowecanbestclarifythedifferencebyconsideringthe possibilityoferror.Itmayhappenthat,thoughp2occursinmy protocol,Iamobliged,onthebasisoffurtherprotocols,toretract theestablishedsystemsentenceP1.Iwouldthensay"Imadea mistake.Furthertestshaveshown thatthesupportwasnotfirm,althoughIhadtheintuitiveimpressionthatitwas." thatAwasnotexcited,althoughI hadtheintuitiveimpressionthat hewas."

onthistable,"ofanearlierexample.3Theargumentofthatarticle showsthattheinferenceofP1fromp2,ifitistoberigorous,also requiresamajorpremiseofgeneralform,andthatitisnotinthe leastsimple.Insofarasordinaryusage,forconvenience'ssake, assignstobothsentencesthesamesequenceofwords,the inferenceis,inpractice,simplifiedtothepointoftriviality.] Ourproblemnowis:whatdoessentenceP1mean?Sucha questioncanonlybeansweredbythepresentationofasentence (orofseveralsentences)whichhas(orwhichconjointlyhave)the samecontentasP1.Theviewpointwhichwillherebedefendedis

[Thedifferencebetweenp2andP1isthesameasthatbetween theidenticallysoundingsentencespandP1:"Aredmarbleislying

thatP1hasthesamecontentasasentenceP2whichassertsthe existenceofaphysicalstructurecharacterizedbythedispositionto reactinaspecificmannertospecificphysicalstimuli.Inour example,P2assertstheexistenceofthatphysicalstructure (microstructure) ofthewoodensupportthatis ofMr.A'sbody(especiallyofhis characterizedbythefactthat,under centralnervoussystem)thatis a slightload,thesupport characterizedbyahighpulseand undergoes nonoticeabledistortion,and,un- rateofbreathing,which,onthe derheavierloads,isbentinsuch applicationofcertainstimuli,may andsuchamanner,butdoesnot evenbemadehigher,by vehement break. andfactuallyunsatisfactory answers toquestions,bytheoccurrence of agitatedmovementsonthe applicationofcertainstimuli,etc. Onmyview,thereishereagainathoroughgoinganalogybetween theexamplesfromphysicsandfrompsychology.If,however,we weretoquestiontheexpertsconcerningtheexamplesfromtheir ____________________ 3See Erkenntnis,Vol.II,p.460(The UnityofScience ,p.92). -172respective fields,themajorityofthemnowadayswouldgiveus thoroughlynon-analogousanswers.TheidentityofthecontentofP
2

andofthecontentofthephysical andofthecontentofthepsychosentenceP1wouldbeagreedto logicalsentenceP1wouldbe as denied amatterofcoursebyall byalmostallpsychologists(the physicists. exceptionsbeingtheradicalbehaviorists). Thecontraryviewwhichismostfrequentlyadvocatedby psychologistsisthat,"AsentenceoftheformofP1assertsthe existenceofastateofaffairsnotidenticalwiththecorresponding physicalstructure,butrather,onlyaccompaniedbyit,orexpressed byit.Inourexample: P1statesthatthesupportnot

only P1statesthatMr.Anotonlyhas hasthephysicalstructure abodywhosephysicalstructure described byP2,butthat,besides,there (atthetimeinquestion)isdeexistsinitacertainforce,namely scribedbyP2,butthat--sincehe its firmness. isapsychophysicalbeing--he has, besides,aconsciousness,a certain powerorentity,inwhichthatexcitementistobefound. Thisfirmnessisnotidenticalwith Thisexcitementcannot,consethephysicalstructure,butstands quently,beidenticalwiththe cited insomeparallelrelationtoitin structureofthebody,butstands suchamannerthatthefirmness insomeparallelrelation(orin existswhenandonlywhena somerelationofinteraction)toit physicalstructure ofthecharacterized insuchamannerthattheexcitesortexists. mentexistswhenandonlywhen (oratleast,frequentlywhen)a physical,bodilystructureofthe characterizedsortexists. Becauseofthisparallelismone Becauseofthisparallelismone may may considerthedescribedreactionto considerthedescribedreactionto certainstimuli--whichiscausally certainstimulitobean expression dependentuponthatstructure-ofexcitement. to beanexpressionoffirmness. FirmnessisthusanoccultpropExcitement,ortheconsciousness erty,anobscurepowerwhich ofwhichitisanattribute,isthus stands behindphysicalstructure, anoccultproperty,anobscure appears init,butitselfremainsunknow- powerwhichstandsbehindphysiable." calstructure,appearsinit,but itselfremainsunknowable."

Thisviewfallsintotheerrorofahypostatizationasaresultof -173whicharemarkable duplicationoccurs:besidesorbehindastateof affairswhoseexistenceisempiricallydeterminable,another,

parallelentityisassumed,whoseexistenceisnotdeterminable. (Notethatwearehereconcernedwithasentenceaboutother minds.)But--one maynowobject--istherenotreallyatleastone possibilityoftestingthisclaim,namely,bymeansoftheprotocol sentencep2abouttheintuitiveimpressionof thefirmnessofthesupport? theexcitementofA?

Theobjectorwillpointoutthatthissentence,afterall,occursinthe protocolalongwiththeperceptionsentencep1.Maynotthena systemsentencewhosecontentgoesbeyondthatofP2befounded onp2?Thismaybeansweredasfollows.Asentencesaysnomore thanwhatistestableaboutit.If,now,thetestingofP1consisted inthedeductionoftheprotocolsentencep2,thesetwosentences wouldhavethesamecontent.Butwehavealreadyseenthatthisis impossible. ThereisnootherpossibilityoftestingP1exceptbymeansof protocolsentenceslikep1orlikep2.If,now,thecontentofP1 goesbeyondthatofP2,thecomponentnotsharedbythetwo sentencesisnottestable,andisthereforemeaningless.Ifone rejectstheinterpretationofP1intermsofP2,P1becomesa metaphysicalpseudo-sentence. Thevarioussciencestodayhavereachedverydifferentstagesin theprocessoftheirdecontaminationfrommetaphysics.Chiefly becauseoftheeffortsofMach,Poincar,andEinstein,physicsis, byandlarge,practicallyfreeofmetaphysics.Inpsychology,onthe otherhand,theworkofarrivingatasciencewhichistobefreeof metaphysicshashardlybegun.Thedifferencebetweenthetwo sciencesismostclearlyseeninthedifferentattitudestakenby expertsinthetwofieldstowardsthepositionwhichwerejectedas metaphysicalandmeaningless.Inthecaseoftheexamplefrom physics,mostphysicistswouldrejectthepositionas anthropomorphic,ormythological,ormetaphysical.Theythereby revealtheiranti-metaphysicalorientation,whichcorrespondstoour own.Ontheotherhand,inthecaseoftheexamplefrom psychology(though,perhaps,notwhenitissocrudelyformulated), mostpsychologistswouldtodayconsidertheviewwehavebeen criticizingtobeself-evidentonintuitivegrounds.Inthisonecansee themetaphysicalorientationofpsychologists,towhichoursis opposed. -174-

4.REJOINDERTOFOURTYPICALCRITICISMS
Generalizingtheconclusionoftheargumentwhich,withreference toaspecialcase,wehavebeenpursuingabove,wearrive atthe thesisthatasingularsentenceaboutothermindsalwayshasthe

samecontentassomespecificphysicalsentence.Phrasingthe samethesisinthematerialmodeofspeech--asentenceabout othermindsstatesthatthebodyofthepersoninquestionisina physicalstateofacertainsort.Letusnowdiscussseveral objectionsagainstthisthesisofphysicalism. A.Objectiononthegroundoftheundevelopedstateofphysiology: "Ourcurrentknowledgeofphysiology--especiallyourknowledge of thephysiologyofthecentralnervoussystem--isnotyetsufficiently advancedtoenableustoknowtowhatclassofphysicalconditions somethinglikeexcitementcorresponds.Consequently,whentoday weusethesentence'Aisexcited,'wecannotmeanbyitthe correspondingphysicalstateofaffairs." Rebuttal.SentenceP1,"Aisexcited"cannot,indeed,todaybe translatedintoaphysicalsentenceP3oftheform"suchandsucha physico-chemicalprocessisnowtakingplaceinA'sbody" (expressedbyaspecificationofphysicalstate-coordinatesandby chemicalformulae).Ourcurrentknowledge ofphysiologyisnot adequateforthispurpose.Eventoday,however,P1maybe translatedintoanothersentenceaboutthephysicalconditionofA's body,namelyintothesentenceP2,towhichwehavealready referred.Thistakestheform"A'sbodyisnowinastatewhichis characterizedbythefactthatwhenIperceive A'sbodytheprotocol sentencep1(statingmyperceptionofA'sbehavior)and(or)the protocolsentencep2(statingmyintuitiveimpressionofA's excitement)orother,analogous,protocolsentencesofsuchand suchasortareproduced."Justas,inourexamplefromphysics, sentenceP1,"Thewoodensupportisfirm,"referstothephysical structure ofthewoodensupport--andthiseventhoughtheperson usingthesentencemaysometimesnotbecapableofcharacterizing thisphysicalstructure byspecifyingthedistributionofthevaluesof thephysicalstate-coordinates,soalsodoesthepsychological sentenceP1,"Aisexcited,"refertothephysicalstructureofA's body--thoughthisstructure canonlybecharacterizedbypotential perceptions,impressions,dispositionstoreactinaspecificmanner, etc.,andnotbyanyspecificationofstatecoordinates.Our ignoranceofphysiologycanthereforeaffectonlythemodeofour characterizationofthephysicalstateofaffairsin -175question.Itinnowaytouchesupontheprincipalpoint:that sentenceP1referstoaphysicalstateofaffairs. B.Objectiononthegroundofanalogy:"WhenImyselfamangry,I notonlyactoutthebehavior-patternofanangryman,I experience aspecialfeelingofanger.If,consequently,Iobserve someoneelseactingoutthesamebehavior-patternImay,on groundsofanalogy,conclude(ifnotwithcertainty,atleastwith probability)thathetoo,besidesactingashedoes,nowhasa feelingofanger(whichisnotmeantasaphysicalstateofaffairs)."

Rebuttal.Thoughargumentsfromanalogyarenotcertain,as probabilityargumentstheyareundoubtedlyadmissible.Bywayof anexampleletusconsideraneverydayargumentfromanalogy.I seeaboxofacertainshape,size,andcolor.Idiscoverthatit containsmatches.Ifindanotherboxofasimilarappearance,and now,byanalogy,drawtheprobabilityinferencethatittoocontains matches.Ourcriticbelievesthattheargumentfromanalogyhe presentsisofthesamelogicalformastheargumentjust presented.Ifthiswerethecase,hisconclusionwouldcertainlybe sound.Butthisisnotthecase.Inourcritic'sargument,the conclusionismeaningless--amerepseudo-sentence.For,beinga sentenceaboutotherminds,nottobephysicallyinterpreted,itisin principlenottestable.Thiswastheresultofourprevious considerationsobjectionDwillofferusanopportunityfor discussingitagain.Inthenon-testabilityofourcritic'sconclusion restsalsothedifferencebetweenhisargumentsandtheexample justcited.Thatthesecondboxalsocontainsmatchesmayin principlebetestedandconfirmedbyobservationsentencesofone's protocol.Thetwoanalogoussentences,"Thefirstboxcontains matches"and"Thesecondboxcontainsmatches"arebothlogically andepistemologicallyofthesamesort.Thisiswhytheanalogy holdshere.Thecaseisdifferentwith"Iamangry"and"That personisangry."Weconsidertheformerofthesetwosentencesto bemeaningfulandthelatter(ifitsphysicalinterpretationis rejected)tobemeaningless.Ourcritic,whoconsidersthelatteras wellastheformersentencetobemeaningful,willbelievethatthe personwhoassertsthesentencefindsittestable,onlyinamanner altogetherdifferentfromthatinwhichtheformeristestable.Thus bothofusagreethatthelattersentenceisepistemologically differentfromtheformer.Theuseofthesamegrammatical structure inthesetwosentencesislogicallyillegitimate.Itmisleads usintobelievingthatthetwosentencesareofthesamelogical form,andthatonemaybeusedasananalogueoftheother. Iftheconclusionisacknowledgedtobemeaningless,itremains -176tobeexplainedhowthispseudo-sentencewasintroducedintothe argument.Thelogicalanalysisofconceptformationandof sentencesinscienceand(especially)inphilosophyveryfrequently disclosespseudo-sentences.However,apseudo-sentencerarely turnsupastheconclusionofanargumentfromanalogywith meaningfulpremises.Thismayreadilybeaccountedfor.An argumentfromanalogyhas(inasimplecase)thefollowingform. Premises:IfAhasthepropertyE,italwaysalsohastheproperty FresemblesAinmanyrespectshasthepropertyE.We conclude(withprobability):alsohasthepropertyF.Now, accordingtosemantics,if"A"and"B"areobject-names,"E"and "F"property-names,and"E(A)"meansthatAhasthepropertyE, thena)if"E(A)"and"E(B)"aremeaningful(i.e.eithertrueor false),"A"and"B"belongtothesamesemantictypeb)iftwo names,"A"and"B,"belongtothesamesemantictype,and"F(A)"

ismeaningful,then"F(B)"isalsomeaningful.Inthecaseunder discussionhere"E(A)"and"E()"aremeaningful,and consequently--inaccordancewithb)--"F(),"theconclusionofthe argumentfromanalogy,isalsomeaningful.Thusifthepremisesof anargumentfromanalogyaremeaningfulandyettheconclusionis meaningless,theformulationofthepremisesmustbeinsomeway logicallyobjectionable.Andthisisindeedthecasewiththe argumentfromanalogypresentedbyourcritic.Thepredicative expression"Iamangry"doesnotadequatelyrepresentthestateof affairswhichismeant.Itassertsthatacertainpropertybelongsto acertainentity.Allthatexists,however,isanexperiencedfeeling ofanger.Thisshouldhavebeenformulatedas,roughly,"now anger."Onthiscorrectformulationthepossibilityofanargument fromanalogydisappears.Fornowthepremisesread:whenI(i.e. mybody)displayangrybehavior,angeroccursthebodyof anotherpersonresemblesmineinmanyrespectsthebodyofthe otherpersonisnowdisplayingangrybehavior.Theoriginal conclusioncannownolongerbedrawn,sincethesentence"Anger occurs"containsno"I"whichmaybereplacedby"theother person."Ifonewantedtodrawtheappropriateconclusion,inwhich nosubstitutionismadebuttheformofthepremisessimply retained,onewouldarrive atthemeaningfulbutplainlyfalse conclusion,"Angeroccurs"--whichstateswhatwouldbeexpressed inordinarylanguageby"Iamnowangry." C.Objectiononthegroundofmentaltelepathy."Thetelepathic transmissionofthecontentsofconsciousness(ideas,emotions, thoughts)occurswithoutanydeterminablephysicalmediation.Here wehaveaninstanceoftheknowledge ofothermindswhich involves -177noperceptionofotherpeople'sbodies.Letusconsideranexample. Iwakeupsuddenlyonenight,haveadistinctsensationoffear,and knowthatmyfriendisnowexperiencingfearlater,Idiscoverthat atthatverymomentmyfriendwasindangerofdeath.Inthis case,myknowledgeofmyfriend'sfearcannotrefertoanystateof hisbody,forIknownothingofthatmyknowledge concernsitself immediatelywithmyfriend'ssensationoffear." Rebuttal.Psychologistsarenotyetunanimouslydecidedonthe degreetowhichtheyoughtproperlytocredittheoccurrenceof casesoftelepathy.Thisisanempiricalproblemwhichitisnotour businesstosolvehere.Letusconcedethepointtoourcritic,and assumethattheoccurrence ofcasesoftelepathictransmissionhas beenconfirmed.Weshallshowthat,evenso,ourearlier contentionsarenotaffectedintheleast.Thequestionbeforeusis: whatdoessentenceP1,"Myfriendnowexperiencesfear"mean,if ItakeP1tobeastatementoftelepathicallyderivedcognition?We maintainthatthemeaningofP1ispreciselythesameasitwould beifweuseditonthegroundsofsomenormally(rationallyor intuitively)derivedcognition.Theoccurrenceoftelepathyinnoway

altersthemeaningofP1. Letusconsiderapreciselyanalogoussituationinvolvingthe cognitionofsomephysicalevent.Isuddenlyhavetheimpression thatapicturehasfallenfromthewallatmyhouse,andthiswhen neitherInoranyoneelsecaninanynormalwayperceive thatthis hashappened.Later,Idiscoverthatthepicturehas,indeed,fallen fromthewall.InowexpressthiscognitionwhichIhaveobtained byclairvoyance insentenceQ,"Thepicturehasnowfallenfromthe wall."Whatisthemeaningofthissentence?ThemeaningofQ hereisclearlythesameasitwouldbeifIuseditonthegroundof somenormallyderivedcognition,thatis,onthegroundofsome cognitionbydirectperceptionoftheeventinquestion.Forinboth casesQassertsthataphysicaleventofacertainsort,aspecific displacementofaspecificbody,hastakenplace. Thecaseisthesamewithtelepathiccognition.Wehavealready consideredthecaseinwhichthestateofsomeothermindis intuitivelygrasped,thoughbymeansofaperceptionoftheother person'sbody.Ifatelepathiccognitionofthestateofsomeother mindoccurs,ittooisbasedonanintuitiveimpression,thistime withoutasimultaneousperception.Thatwhichiscognized, however,isthesameinbothcases.Earlier,weremarkedthatP1 doesnothavethesamecontentastheprotocolsentencep2about the(normally)intuitiveimpression,andthatp2cannotsupporta sentenceaboutsome-178thingbesideorbehindthephysicalconditionoftheotherperson's body.Ourremarksholdequallyfortelepathicallyintuitive impressions. D.Objectiononthegroundofstatementsbyothers."Weare,to beginwith,agreedthatAisinacertainphysicalstatewhichis manifestedbybehaviorofacertainsortandproducesinme,apart fromsense-perceptions,anintuitiveimpressionofA'sanger. Beyondthis,however,IcanfindoutthatAreallydoesexperience angerbyquestioninghim.Hehimselfwilltestifythathe experiencedanger.Knowinghimtobeatruthfulpersonandagood observer,whyshouldInotconsiderhisstatementtobetrue--orat leastprobablytrue?" Rebuttal.Before IcandecidewhetherIshouldacceptA's statementastrue,orfalse,orprobablytrue--before,indeed,Ican considerthisquestionatall--Imustfirstofallunderstandthe statement.Itmusthavemeaningforme.Andthisisthecaseonly ifIcantestit,if,thatis,sentencesofmyprotocolarededucible fromit.Iftheexpressionisinterpretedphysicallyitistestableby meansofprotocolsentencessuchasmyp1andp2,thatis,by sentencesaboutspecificperceptionsandintuitiveexpressions. Since,however,ourcriticrejectsthephysicalinterpretationofthe expression,itisinprincipleimpossibleformetotestit.Thusitis

meaninglessforme,andthequestionwhetherIshouldconsiderit tobetrue,orfalse,orprobable,cannotevenbeposed. Shouldunusual,brilliantpatternssuddenlyappearinthesky-evenif theytooktheformofletterswhichseemedtocomposeasentence-sciencecouldnotcomprehendthemexceptbyfirstconceiving them,describingthem,andexplainingthem(i.e.subsumingthem undergeneralcausal-sentences)asphysicalfacts.Thequestion whethersuchanarrangementofsymbolsconstitutesameaningful sentencemustbedecidedwithouttakingintoconsiderationwhether ornotitappearsinthesky.Ifthissymbol-arrangementisnota meaningfulsentenceatothertimes,itcannotbecomeoneno matterhoweffulgentanappearanceitmakesinthesky.Whethera sentenceistrueorfalseisdeterminedbyempiricalcontingencies butwhetherasentenceisorisnotmeaningfulisdeterminedsolely bythesyntaxoflanguage. Itisnodifferentinthecaseofthoseacousticphenomenathatissue fromthemouthsofcertainvertebrates.Theyarefirstofallfacts, physicaloccurrences,andspecifically,soundwavesofacertain sort.Wecan,further,alsointerpretthemassymbols.Butwhether ornotsuchanarrangementofsymbolsismeaningfulcan-179notdependonitsoccurrence asanacousticphenomenon.Ifthe sentence"Awasangryyesterdayatnoon"hasnomeaningforme-aswouldbethecaseif(insofarasourcriticrejectsitsphysical meaning)Icouldnottestit--itwillnotberenderedmeaningfulby thefactthatasoundhavingthestructureofthissentencecame fromA'sownmouth. But--itwillbeasked--dowenotneedthestatementsofourfellowmenfortheelaborationofinter-subjective science?Wouldnot physics,geography,andhistorybecomeverymeagerstudiesifI hadtorestrictmyselfinthemtooccurrenceswhichImyselfhad directlyobserved?Thereisnodenyingthattheywould.Butthereis abasicdifferencebetweenastatementbyAaboutthegeography ofChinaoraboutsomehistoricaleventinthepastontheone hand,and,ontheother,astatementbyAabouttheangerhefelt yesterday.Ican,inprinciple,testthestatementsofthefirstsortby meansofperceptionsentencesofmyownprotocol,sentences aboutmyownperceptionsofChina,orofsomemap,orof historicaldocuments.Itis,however,inprincipleimpossibleforme totestthestatementaboutangerifourcriticasksmetorejectthe physicalmeaningofthesentence.IfIhaveoftenhadoccasionto notethatthegeographicalorhistoricalreportsthatAmakescanbe confirmedbyme,then,onthebasisofaninductiveprobability inference,Iconsidermyselfjustifiedinusinghisotherstatements-insofarastheyaremeaningfultome--intheelaborationofmy scientificknowledge.Itisinthiswaythatinter-subjective scienceis developed.Asentence,however,whichisnottestableandhence notmeaningfulpriortoitsstatementbyAisnotanythemore meaningfulaftersuchastatement.If,inaccordancewithour

position,IconstrueA'sstatementaboutyesterday'sangerasa statementaboutthephysicalconditionofA'sbodyyesterday,this statementmaybeusedforthedevelopmentofinter-subjective science.ForweuseA'ssentenceasevidence(justtotheextentto whichwehavefoundAtobetrustworthy)insupportofthe attributionofacorrespondingphysicalstructuretothe correspondingspatio-temporalregionofourphysicalworld.Neither dotheconsequenceswhichwedrawfromthisattribution genericallydifferfromthosethatareobtainedfromanyother physicalstatement.Webuildourexpectationsoffutureperceptions onit--inthiscasewithrespecttoA'sbehavior,asinothercases withrespecttothebehaviorofotherphysicalsystems. Theassertionsofourfellowmencontributeagreatdealto extendingtherangeofourknowledge.Buttheycannotbringus anythingbasicallynew,thatis,anythingwhichcannotalsobe learned -180insomeotherway.Fortheassertionsofourfellowmenare,at bottom,nodifferentfromotherphysicalevents.Physicaleventsare differentfromoneanotherasregardstheextenttowhichtheymay beusedassignsofotherphysicalevents.Thosephysicalevents whichwecall"assertionsofourfellowman"rankparticularlyhigh onthisscale.Itisforthisreasonthatscience,quiterightly,treats theseeventswithspecialconsideration.However,betweenthe contributionoftheseassertionstoourscientificknowledge andthe contributionsofabarometerthereis,basically,atmosta differenceofdegree.

5.BEHAVIORISMAND"INTUITIVE"PSYCHOLOGY
Thepositionweareadvocatingherecoincidesinitsbroadoutlines withthepsychologicalmovementknownas"behaviorism"-when, thatis,itsepistemologicalprinciplesratherthanitsspecialmethods areconsidered.Wehavenotlinkedourexpositionwithastatement ofbehaviorismsinceouronlyconcerniswithepistemological foundationswhilebehaviorismisaboveallelseinterestedina specificmethodofresearchandinspecificconceptformations. Theadvocatesofbehaviorismwereledtotheirpositionthrough theirconcernwithanimalpsychology.Inthisdomain,whenthe materialgiventoobservationdoesnotincludestatementsbutonly inarticulatebehavior,itismosteasytoarrive atthecorrectmethod ofapproach.Thisapproachleadsonetothecorrectinterpretation ofthestatementsofhumanexperimentalsubjects,foritsuggests thatthesestatementsaretobeconceivedasactsofverbalizing behavior,basicallynodifferentfromotherbehavior. Behaviorismisconfrontedwithviews,moreinfluentialinGermany thanintheUnitedStates,whichupholdthethesisthatpsychology's concernisnotwithbehaviorinitsphysicalaspect,butrather,with meaningfulbehavior.Forthecomprehensionofmeaningful

behaviorthespecialmethodknownas"intuitive understanding" ("Verstehen")issaidtoberequired.Physicsallegedlyknows nothingofthismethod.Neithermeaningfulbehaviorconsidered collectivelynortheindividualinstancesofsuchbehaviorwhich psychologyinvestigatescanpossibly--soitismaintained--be characterizedintermsofphysicalconcepts. Inintuitivepsychologythisviewisgenerallylinkedwiththeview thatbesidephysicalbehaviorthereisyetanother,psychicalevent, whichconstitutesthetruesubject-matterofpsychology,andto whichintuitiveunderstandingleads.Wedonotwanttoconsiderthis ideaanyfurtherhere,sincewehavealreadythoroughlyexamined it. -181Butevenafteroneputsthisideaaside,intuitivepsychologyposes thefollowingobjectiontophysicalism. Objectionbasedontheoccurrenceof"meaningfulbehavior." "Whenpsychologyconsidersthebehavioroflivingcreatures(we disregardherethequestionwhetheritdealsonlywithsuch behavior),itisinterestedinitasmeaningfulbehavior.Thisaspect ofbehaviorcannot,however,begraspedintermsofphysical concepts,butonlybymeansofthemethodofintuitive understanding.Andthisiswhypsychologicalsentencescannotbe translatedintophysicalsentences." Rebuttal.Letusrecallapreviousexampleofthephysicalizationof anintuitiveimpression,i.e.ofaqualitativedesignationinthe protocollanguage.4Wethereshowedthatitispossibleby investigatingopticalstate-coordinates,todeterminetheentiretyof thosephysicalconditionswhichcorrespondto"greenofthisspecific sort"andtosubsumethemunderlaws.Thesameisthecasehere. Itsimplydependsonthephysicalnatureofanact--say,ofanarmmovement--whetherIcanintuitivelyunderstandit--as,say,a beckoningmotion--ornot.Consequently,physicalizationispossible heretoo.Theclassofarm-movementstowhichtheprotocoldesignation"beckoningmotion"correspondscanbedetermined, andthendescribedintermsofphysicalconcepts.Butperhaps doubtsmayberaisedastowhethertheclassificationofarmmovementsasintelligibleorunintelligible,and,further,the classificationofintelligiblearmmovementsasbeckoningmotionsor othersreallydepends,asourthesisclaims,solelyonthephysical constitutionofthearms,therestofthebody,andtheenvironment. Suchdoubtsarereadilyremovedif,forinstance,onethinksof films.Weunderstandthemeaningoftheactiononthemovie screen.Andourunderstandingwoulddoubtlessbethesameif, insteadofthefilmpresented,anotherwhichresembleditinevery physicalparticularwere shown.Thusonecanseethatbothour understandingofmeaningandtheparticularformsittakesare,in effect,completelydeterminedbythephysicalprocessesimpinging onoursense-organs(inthefilmexample,thoseimpingingonour

opticandauditorysense-organs). Theproblemofphysicalizationinthisarea,thatis,theproblemof thecharacterizationofunderstandablebehaviorassuchandofthe variouskindsofsuchbehaviorbymeansofconceptsof systematizedphysics,isnotasyetsolved.Butdoesnotthenour basicthesisrestonair?Itstatesthatallpsychologicalsentences canbetranslatedintophysicalsentences.Onemaywellasktowhat extent ____________________ 4Erkenntnis,Vol.II,op.cit.,pp.444ff.(The UnityofScience ,p. 58ff.). -182suchatranslationispossible,giventhepresentstateofour knowledge.Eventodayeverysentenceofpsychologycanbe translatedintoasentencewhichreferstothephysicalbehaviorof livingcreatures.Insuchaphysicalcharacterizationtermsdoindeed occurwhichhavenotyetbeenphysicalized,i.e.reducedtothe conceptsofphysicalscience.Nevertheless,theconceptsusedare physicalconcepts,thoughofaprimitive sort--justas"warm"and "green"(appliedtobodies)werephysicalconceptsbeforeonecould expressthemintermsofphysicalstate-coordinates(temperature andelectromagneticfield,respectively). Weshouldlike,again,tomakethematterclearbyusingaphysical example.Letussupposethatwehavefoundasubstancewhose electricalconductivityisnoticeablyraisedwhenitisirradiatedby varioustypesofelectro-magneticradiation.Wedonotyet, however,knowtheinternalstructureofthissubstanceandso cannotyetexplainitsbehavior.Wewanttocallsuchasubstancea "detector"forradiationofthesortinvolved.Letussuppose, further,thatwehavenotyetsystematicallydeterminedtowhat sortsofradiationthedetectorreacts.Wenowdiscoverthatthe sortsofradiationtowhichitrespondssharestillanother characteristic,say,thattheyacceleratespecificchemicalreactions. Nowsupposethatweareinterestedinthephoto-chemicaleffects ofvarioussortsofradiation,butthatthedeterminationofthese effects,inthecaseofaspecificsortofradiation,isdifficultand time-consuming,whilethedeterminationofthedetector'sreaction toitiseasyandquicklyaccomplishedthenweshallfinditusefulto adoptthedetectorasatest-instrument.Withitsaidwecan determineforanyparticularsortofradiationwhetherornotitis likelytohavethedesiredphotochemicaleffect.Thispractical applicationwillnotbeimpededbyourignoranceofthedetector's micro-structure andourinabilitytoexplainitsreactioninphysical terms.Inspiteofourignorance,wecancertainlysaythatthe detectorisolatesacertainphysicallyspecifiedclassofrays.The objectionthatthisisnotaphysicalclasssincewecannot characterize itbyaspecificationofopticalstatecoordinatesbutonly bythebehaviorofthedetectorwillnotstand.Fortobeginwith,we knowthatifwecarriedoutacarefulempiricalinvestigationofthe

electro-magneticspectrum,wecouldidentifytheclassofraysto whichthedetectorresponds.Onthebasisofthisidentificationwe couldthenphysicalizethecharacterizationoftheraysintermsof detector-reactions,bysubstitutingforitacharacterizationinterms ofsystematicphysicalconcepts.Butevenourpresentwayof characterizingtheradiationintermsofthedetector-183testisaphysicalcharacterization,thoughanindirectone.Itis distinguishedfromthedirectcharacterizationwhichisourgoalonly throughbeingmorecircumstantial.Thereisnodifferenceofkind betweenthetwocharacterizations,onlyoneofdegree,thoughthe differenceofdegreeisindeedsufficientlygreattogiveusamotive forpursuingtheempiricalinvestigationswhichmightbringthe directphysicalcharacterizationwithinourgrasp. Whetherthedetectorisorganicorinorganicisirrelevanttothe epistemologicalissueinvolved.Thefunctionofthedetectoris basicallythesamewhetherwearedealingwithaphysicaldetector ofspecificsortsofradiationorwithatree-frogasadetectorof certainmeteorologicalstatesofaffairsor(ifonemaybelievethe newspapers)withasniffingdogasadetectorofcertainhuman diseases.Peopletakeapracticalinterestinmeteorological forecasts.Wherebarometersarenotavailabletheymay, consequently,useatreefrogforthesamepurpose.Butletusbe clearaboutthefactthatthismethoddoesnotdeterminethestate ofthetree-frog'ssoul,butaphysicallyspecifiedweathercondition, evenifonecannotdescribethisconditionintermsoftheconcepts ofsystematizedphysics.People,likewise,haveapracticalinterest inmedicaldiagnoses.Whenthedirectlydeterminablesymptomsdo notsuffice,theymay,consequently,enlistadog'sdelicatesenseof smellforthepurpose.Itiscleartothedoctorthat,indoingso,he isnotdeterminingthestateofthedog'ssoul,butaphysically specifiedconditionofhispatient'sbody.Thedoctormaynotbe able,giventhepresentstateofphysiologicalknowledge,to characterize thediseasedconditioninquestionintermsofthe conceptsofsystematicphysics.Nonetheless,heknowsthathis diagnosis--whetheritisbasedonthesymptomshehimselfhas directlyobservedoronthereactionsofthediagnosticdog-determinesnothingandcandeterminenothingbutthephysical conditionofhispatient.Evenapartfromthis,thephysiologist acknowledgestheneedforphysicalization.Thiswouldhereconsist indescribingthebodilyconditioninquestion,i.e.definingthe diseaseinvolvedinpurelyphysiologicalterms(thuseliminatingany mentionofthedog'sreaction).Afurthertaskwouldbetotrace thesebacktochemicalterms,andthese,inturn,tophysicalones. Thecasewithintuitivepsychologyispreciselyanalogous.The situationherehappenstobecomplicatedforepistemological analysis(thoughforpsychologicalpracticeitissimplified)bythe factthatintheexaminationofanexperimentalsubjecttheintuitive psychologistisboththeobserveranddetector.Thedoctorhereis

hisown -184diagnosticdogwhich,indeed,isalsooftenthecaseinmedical diagnoses--intheirintuitivephases.Thepsychologistcallsthe behavioroftheexperimentalsubject"understandable"or,ina specialcase,forinstance,"anodofaffirmation,"whenhisdetector respondstoit,or--inourspecialcase--whenitresultsinhis protocolsregistering"Anodsaffirmatively."Scienceisnotasystem ofexperiences,butofsentencesitdoesnotincludethe psychologist'sexperience ofunderstanding,butrather,hisprotocol sentence.Theutteranceofthepsychologist'sprotocolsentenceisa reactionwhoseepistemologicalfunctionisanalogoustothetreefrog'sclimbingandtothebarkingofthediagnosticdog.Tobesure, thepsychologistfarsurpassestheseanimalsinthevarietyofhis reactions.Asaresult,heiscertainlyveryvaluabletothepursuitof science.Butthisconstitutesonlyadifferenceofdegree,nota differenceofkind. Inthelightoftheseconsiderations,twodemandsaretobemade ofthepsychologist.First,weshallexpecthim(asweexpectthe doctor)tobeclearaboutthefactthat,inspiteofhiscomplicated diagnosticreaction,heestablishesnothingbuttheexistenceof somespecificphysicalconditionoftheexperimentalsubject,though aconditionwhichcanbecharacterizedonlyindirectly--byhisown diagnosticreaction.Secondly,hemustacknowledge (asthe physiologistdoes)thatitisataskofscientificresearchtofindaway ofphysicalizingtheindirectcharacterization.Psychologymust determinewhatarethephysicalconditionstowhichpeople's detector-reactionscorrespond.Whenthisiscarriedoutforevery reactionofthissort,i.e.foreveryresultofintuitiveunderstanding, psychologicalconceptformationcanbephysicalized.Theindirect definitionsbasedondetectorreactionswillbereplacedbydirect definitionsintermsoftheconceptsofsystematizedphysics. Psychology,liketheothersciences,mustandwillreachthelevelof developmentatwhichitcanreplacethetreefrogbythebarometer. Buteveninthetree-frogstagepsychologyalreadyusesphysical language,thoughofaprimitive sort.

6.PHYSICALIZATIONINGRAPHOLOGY
Thepurposeofthissectionisnottojustifyphysicalism,butonlyto showhowpsychologicalconceptscaninfactbephysicalized.Tothis endweshallexamineabranchofpsychologyinwhich physicalizationhasalreadybeenundertakenwithsomesuccess.In doingsowemayperhapsalsomeetthecriticismwhichis occasionallyvoiced,thattheachievementofphysicalization, assumingitwere possible,wouldinanycasebefruitlessand uninteresting.Itisheld -185-

that,givensufficientinformationconcerningthesocialgroupand thecircumstancesofthepeopleinvolved,onemightperhapsbe abletospecifyarm-movementswhichareinterpretedas beckoningmotionsinsuchawaythattheywouldbecharacterizable intermsofkinematic(i.e.spatio-temporal)concepts.Butitis allegedthatthisprocedurewouldnotprovide uswithanyfurther insightintoanythingofinterest,leastofallintotheconnectionsof thesewithotherevents. Remarkablyenough,physicalizationcanshowsignificantsuccessin abranchofpsychologywhichuntilcomparativelyrecenttimeswas pursuedinapurelyintuitive(oratmostapseudo-rational)manner andwithwhollyinadequateempiricaldata,sothatitthenhadno claimtoscientificstatus.Thisisgraphology.Theoreticalgraphology-we shallconcernourselvesherewithnoothersort-investigatesthe law-like relationshipswhichholdbetweentheformalpropertiesofa person'shandwritingandthoseofhispsychologicalpropertiesthat arecommonlycalledhis"character." Wemustfirstofallexplainwhatismeantbycharacterinphysical psychology.Everypsychologicalpropertyismarkedoutasa dispositiontobehaveinacertainway.By"actualproperty"weshall understandapropertywhichisdefinedbycharacteristicsthatcan bedirectlyobserved:by"disposition"(or"dispositionalconcept")we shallunderstandapropertywhichisdefinedbymeansofan implication(aconditionalrelationship,anif-thensentence). Examplesoffamiliardispositionalconceptsofphysicsmayserveto illustratethisdistinction,andwill,atthesametime,illustratethe distinctionbetweenoccurrentandcontinuantproperties,a distinctionwhichisimportantinpsychology.Anexampleofa physicaloccurrentpropertyisaspecificdegreeoftemperature.We define"BodyKhastemperatureT"tomean"Whenasufficiently smallquantityofmercuryisbroughtintocontactwithK,then..." Whendefinedinthisway,theconceptoftemperatureisa dispositionalconcept.Nowthatphysicshasdisclosedthemicrostructure ofmatteranddeterminedthelawsofmolecularmotion,a differentdefinitionoftemperature isused:temperatureisthe meankineticenergyofmolecules.Here,then,temperatureisno longeradispositionalconcept,butanactualproperty.The occurrentpropertiesofpsychologyarelogicallyanalogoustothe familiardispositionalconceptsofphysics.Indeed,onourview,they arethemselvesnothingelsethanphysicalconcepts.Example: "PersonXisexcited"means"If,now,stimuliofsuchandsucha sortwere applied,Xwouldreactinsuchandsuchamanner"(both stimuliandreactionsbeingphysicalevents).Heretoothe -186aimofscienceistochangetheformofthedefinitionmore accurateinsightintothemicro-structure ofthehumanbodyshould enableustoreplacedispositionalconceptsbyactualproperties. Thatthisisnotautopianaimisshownbythefactthatevenatthe presenttime,amoreaccurateknowledge ofphysiologicalmacro-

eventshasyieldedusasetofactualcharacteristicsofoccurrent states(e.g.forfeelingsofvarioussorts:frequencyandintensityof pulseandrespiration,glandularsecretion,innervationofvisceral muscles,etc.).Suchachangeofdefinitionsismarkedlymore difficultwhenthestateswhichhavetobedelimitedarenot emotional,foritthenpresupposesaknowledge ofthemicrostructure ofthecentralnervoussystemwhichfarsurpassesthe knowledgecurrentlyavailable. Physicalconstants,e.g.heat-conductivity,coefficientofrefraction, etc.mightbetakenasexamplesofphysicalcontinuantproperties. Thesetoowere originallydefinedasdispositionalconcepts,e.g."A substancehasacoefficientofrefractionn"means"Ifarayoflight entersthesubstance,then..."Hereagaintheaimof transformingthedefinitionhasalreadybeenachievedforsome concepts,andisbeingpursuedinthecaseoftheremainder.The reference todispositionsgiveswaytoanactualdesignationofthe composition(intermsofatomsandelectrons)ofthesubstancein question.Thepsychologicalcontinuantpropertiesor"character properties"(theword"character"isherebeingusedinabroad, neutralsense--tomeanmorethanvolitionalorattitudinal properties)can,atpresent,bedefinedonlyintheformof dispositionalconcepts.Example:"XismoreimpressionablethanY" means"IfbothXandYhavethesameexperience underthesame circumstances,moreintensefeelingsareexperiencedbyXthanby Y."Inthesedefinitions,bothinthecharacterizationofthestimuli (thestatementofthecircumstances)andinthatofthereaction, therearenameswhichstilldesignatepsychologicaloccurrent properties,forwhichtheproblemofphysicalizationhasnotyet beensolved.Tophysicalizethedesignationsofcontinuant propertieswillbepossibleonlywhenthedesignationsofoccurrent propertieshavebeendealtwith.Solongasthesearenot completelyphysicalized,thephysicalizationofcontinuantproperties and,asaresult,thatofcharacterologyasawhole,mustremainin ascientificallyincompletestate,andthisnomatterhowrichour stockofintuitiveknowledgemaybe. Thereisnosharpdivisionbetweenoccurrentandcontinuant designations.Nonetheless,thedifferenceofdegreeislargeenough tojustifytheirbeingdifferentlylabelledanddifferentlytreated, and,consequently,largeenoughtojustifytheseparationof characterology -187frompsychologyasawhole(consideredasthetheoryofbehavior). Graphologysetsitselfthetaskoffindinginthefeaturesofa person'shandwritingindicationsofhischaracterand,tosome extent,ofhisoccurrentproperties.Thepractisinggraphologistdoes notintendtherationalmethodtoreplaceintuition,butonlyto supportortocorrectit.Ithas,however,becomeclearthatthe pursuitofthetaskofphysicalizationwillserveeventhispurpose. Alongtheselinesgraphologyhasalready,oflate,madesome

significantdiscoveries. Sincetheproblemofgraphologyistodiscoverthecorrespondences holdingbetweenthepropertiesofaperson'shandwritingandthose ofhischaracter,wemayheredividetheproblemofphysicalization intothreeparts.Thephysicalizationofthepropertiesofhandwriting constitutesthefirstpartoftheproblem.Acertainscriptgivesme, forinstance,anintuitiveimpressionofsomethingfullandjuicy.In sayingso,Idonotprimarilyrefertocharacteristicsofthewriter, buttocharacteristicsofhisscript.Theproblemnowistoreplace intuitivelyidentifiedscript-propertiesofthissortbypropertiesofthe script'sshape,i.e.bypropertieswhichmaybedefinedwiththeaid ofgeometricalconcepts.Thatthisproblemcanbesolvedisclear. Weneedonlythoroughlyinvestigatethesystemofformswhich letters,words,andlinesofscriptmightpossiblytakeinorderto determinewhichoftheseformsmaketheintuitiveimpressionin questiononus.So,forinstance,wemightfindthatascriptappears fullortwo-dimensional(asopposedtothinorlinear)ifrounded connectionsaremorefrequentthanangles,theloopsbroaderthan normal,thestrokesthicker,etc.Thistaskofthephysicalizationof thepropertiesofhandwritinghasinmanycasesbeenaccomplished toalargeextent.5Wearenotobjectingtotheretentionofthe intuitivelyderiveddescriptions(interms,forinstance,of"full," "delicate,""dynamic,"etc.).Ourrequirementwillbeadequately metassoonasadefinitioninexclusivelygeometrictermsis providedforeachsuchdescription.Thisproblemisprecisely analogoustotheproblem,towhichwehavefrequentlyreferred,of identifyinginquantitativetermsthosephysicalconditionswhich correspondtoaqualitativedesignation--suchas"greenofsuchand suchasort"--intheprotocollanguage. Thesecondpartoftheproblemconsistsofthephysicalizationofthe characterpropertiesreferredtoingraphologicalanalyses.The traditionalconceptsofcharacterology--whose meaningisasa ____________________ 5Cf.KlagesL.,HandschriftundCharacter,Leipzig,1920.Several ofourexamplesaretakenfromthisbookorsuggestedbyit. -188rulenotclearlydefined,butlefttobeexpressedinoureveryday vocabularyorbymeansofmetaphoricallanguage--have tobe systematizedandgivenphysicalistic(behavioristic)definitions.We havealreadyseenthatsuchadefinitionreferstoadispositionto behaveinacertainway,andfurther,thatthetaskofthe constructionofsuchdefinitionsisdifficultandpresupposesthe physicalizationofpsychologicaloccurrentproperties. Wecanseethatinbothpartsoftheproblemthetaskisoneof replacingprimitive,intuitiveconceptformationsbysystematicones, ofreplacingtheobserverwithatree-frogbytheobserverwitha barometer(ingraphology,asinintuitivemedicaldiagnoses,the observerandthetree-frogcoincide).

Inadditiontothesequestionsthereisathirdaspectoftheproblem tobeconsidered:thebasicempiricaltaskofgraphology.This consistsofthesearchforthecorrelationswhichholdbetweenthe propertiesofhandwritingandthoseofcharacter.Heretoo,a systematization,thoughofadifferentsort,takesplace.The correspondenceofaspecificpropertyofhandwritingtoaspecific propertyofcharactermay,atfirst,berecognizedintuitively--for instance,asaresultofanempatheticreflectiononthearmmovementswhichproducedthescriptinquestion.Theproblemof systematizationhereistodeterminethedegreeofcorrelationof thetwopropertiesbyastatisticalinvestigationofmanyinstancesof scriptofthetypeinquestionandthecharactersofthe correspondingwriters. Ourpositionnowisthatthefurtherdevelopmentandclarificationof theconceptsofpsychologyasawholemusttakethedirectionwe haveillustratedinourexaminationofgraphology,thedirection, thatis,ofphysicalization.But,aswehavealreadyemphasized severaltimes,psychologyisaphysicalscienceevenpriortosucha clarificationofitsconcepts--aphysicalsciencewhoseassignmentit istodescribesystematicallythe(physical)behaviorofliving creatures,especiallythatofhumanbeings,andtodeveloplaws underwhichthisbehaviormaybesubsumed.Theselawsareof quitediversesorts.Ahandmovement,forinstance,maybe examinedfromvariousaspects:first,semiotically,asamoreor lessconventionalsignforsomedesignatedstateofaffairs secondly,mimically,asanexpressionofthecontemporaneous psychologicalstate--the occurrentpropertiesofthepersonin questionthirdly,physiognomically,asanexpressionofthe continuantproperties--the characterofthepersoninquestion.In ordertoinvestigate,say,thehandmovementsofpeople(ofcertain groups)intheirmimicalandphysiognomic -189aspectsonemightperhapstakemotionpicturesofthem,and,from these,derivekinematicdiagramsofthesortwhichengineers constructformachineparts.Inthismannerthesharedkinematic (i.e.,spatio-temporal)characteristicsofthehandmovementswith whoseperceptioncertainintuitiveprotocoldesignationstendtobe associated(e.g."Thishandmovementlooksrushed,""... grandiose,"etc.)wouldhavetobedetermined.Itwillnowbeclear whypreciselygraphology--the characterologicalinvestigationof writingmovements,averyspecialsortofhandmovements, identifiableintermsoftheirspecificpurpose--shouldbetheonly studyofthissortwhichcanasyetshowanyresults.Thereasonis thatwritingmovementsthemselvesproducesomethingresembling kinematicdiagrams,namely,thelettersonthepaper.Tobesure, onlythetrackofthemovementsisdrawn.Thepassageoftimeis notrecorded--the graphologistcansubsequentlyonlyinferthis, imperfectly,fromindirectsigns.Moreaccurateresultswouldbe demonstrableifthecompletethree-dimensionalspatio-temporal

diagram,notonlyitsprojectiononthewritingplane,were available.Buteventheconclusionstowhichgraphologycurrently subscribesallaywhatevermisgivingstheremighthavebeenthat investigationsdirectedatthephysicalizationofpsychological conceptswouldprovetobeuninteresting.Itmaynotevenbetoo rashaconjecturethatinterestingparallelsmaybefoundtohold betweentheconclusionsofcharacterologicalinvestigationsofboth theinvoluntaryandthevoluntarymotionsofthevariouspartsof thehumanbodyontheonehand,andontheotherhandthe conclusionsofgraphologywhicharealreadyavailabletous.If specificpropertiesofaperson'scharacterexpressthemselvesboth inaspecificformofhandwritingandinaspecificformofarm motion,aspecificformoflegmotion,specificfacialfeatures,etc., mightnotthesevariousformsresembleoneanother?Perhaps, afterhavingfirstgivenfruitfulsuggestionsfortheinvestigationof othersortsofbodilymovements,graphologymay,inturn,be stimulatedbytheresultstoexaminescriptpropertiesithad previouslyoverlooked.These,ofcourse,aremereconjectures whetherornottheyarejustifiablecannotaffectthetenabilityof ourthesis,whichmaintainsthepossibilityoftranslatingall psychologicalsentencesintophysicallanguage.Thistranslatability holdsregardlessofwhetherornottheconceptsofpsychologyare physicalized.Physicalizationissimplyahigher-level,morerigorously systematizedscientificformofconceptformation.Its accomplishmentisapracticalproblemwhichconcernsthe psychologistratherthantheepistemologist. -190-

7.SENTENCESABOUTONE'SOWNMIND "INTROSPECTIVEPSYCHOLOGY"
Ourargumenthasshownthatasentenceaboutothermindsrefers tophysicalprocessesinthebodyofthepersoninquestion.Onany otherinterpretationthesentencebecomesuntestableinprinciple, andthusmeaningless.Thesituationisthesamewithsentences aboutone'sownmind,thoughheretheemotionalobstaclestoa physicalinterpretationareconsiderablygreater.Therelationshipof asentenceaboutone'sownmindtooneaboutsomeoneelse'smay mostreadilybeseenwithrespecttoasentenceaboutsomepast stateofone'sownmind,e.g.P1:"Iwasexcitedyesterday."The testingofthissentenceinvolveseitherarationalinferencefrom protocolsentencesoftheformofp1--whichrefertopresently perceivedscript,photographs,films,etc.originatingwithme yesterdayoritinvolvesanintuitivemethod,e.g.utilizingthe protocolsentencep2,"Irecallhavingbeenexcitedyesterday."The contentofp1exceedsboththatoftheprotocolsentencep1and thatoftheprotocolsentencep2,asismostclearlyindicatedby thepossibilityoferroranddisavowalwhere P1isconcerned.P1 canonlybeprogressivelybetterconfirmedbysetsofprotocol sentencesoftheformofp1andp2.Theverysameprotocol

sentences,however,alsoconfirmthephysicalsentenceP2:"My bodywasyesterdayinthatphysicalconditionwhichonetendsto call'excitement.'"P1has,consequently,thesamecontentasthe physicalsentenceP2. Inthecaseofasentenceaboutthepresentstateofone'sown mind,e.g.P1:"Inowamexcited"onemustclearlydistinguish betweenthesystemsentenceP1andtheprotocolsentencep2, which,likewise,mayread"Inowamexcited."Thedifferencerests inthefactthatthesystemsentenceP1may,undercertain circumstances,bedisavowed,whereasaprotocolsentence,being anepistemologicalpointofdeparture,cannotberejected.The protocolsentencesp1whichrationallysupportP1haveheresome suchformas"Ifeelmyhandstrembling,""Iseemyhands trembling,""Ihearmyvoicequavering,"etc.Heretoo,thecontent ofP1exceedsthatofbothp1andp2,inthatitsubsumesallthe possiblesentencesofthissort.P1hasthesamecontentasthe physicalsentenceP2,"Mybodyisnowinthatconditionwhich,both undermyownobservationandthatofothers,exhibitssuchand suchcharacteristicsofexcitement,"thecharacteristicsinquestion beingthosewhicharementionedbothinmyownprotocol sentencesofthesortofp1 -191andp2andinotherpeople'sprotocolsentencesofcorresponding sorts(discussedaboveinourexampleofsentencesaboutother minds). Thetableoppositeshowstheanalogousapplicationofthe physicalistthesistothethreecaseswehavediscussedbyexhibiting theparallelismofsentencesaboutotherminds,sentencesabout somepastconditionofone'sownmind,andsentencesaboutthe presentconditionofone'sownmind,withthephysicalsentence aboutthewoodensupport. Objectionfromintrospectivepsychology:"Whenthepsychologist isnotinvestigatingotherexperimentalsubjects,butpursues selfobservation,or"introspection,"instead,hegrasps,inadirect manner,somethingnon-physical--andthisisthepropersubjectmatterofpsychology." Rebuttal.Wemustdistinguishbetweenaquestionofthe justificationoftheuseofsomeprevalentpracticalmethodof inquiryandaquestionofthejustificationofsomeprevalent interpretationoftheresultsofthatmethod.Everymethodof inquiryisjustifieddisputescanariseonlyoverthequestionofthe purposeandfruitfulnessofagivenmethod,whichisaquestionour problemdoesnotinvolve.Wemayapplyanymethodwechoose wecannot,however,interprettheobtainedsentencesaswe choose.Themeaningofasentence,nomatterhowobtained,can

protocol.Anearlierinvestigation6hasshownthattheviewwhich holdsthatprotocolsentencescannotbephysicallyinterpreted,that, onthecontrary,theyrefertosomethingnon-physical(something "psychical,"some"experiencecontent,"some"datumof consciousness,"etc.)leadsdirectlytotheconsequencethatevery protocolsentenceismeaningfulonlytoitsauthor.IfA'sprotocol sentencep2were notsubjecttoa ____________________ 6Erkenntnis,Vol.II,p.454,(The UnityofScience ,pp.78-79). -192-

unequivocallybedeterminedbyalogicalanalysisofthewayin whichitisderivedandtested.Apsychologistwhoadoptsthe methodofwhatiscalled"introspection"doesnottherebyexpose himselftocriticism.Suchapsychologistadmitssentencesofthe form"Ihaveexperiencedsuchandsucheventsofconsciousness" intohisexperiment-protocolandthenarrivesatgeneralconclusions ofhisownbymeansofinductivegeneralization,theconstructionof hypotheses,and,finally,acomparisonofhishypotheseswiththe conclusionsofotherpersons.Butagainwemustconclude,bothon logicalandepistemologicalgrounds,thatthesingularaswellasthe generalsentencesmustbeinterpretedphysically.Letussaythat psychologistAwritessentencep2:"(Iam)nowexcited"intohis

THEPHYSICALISTICINTERPRETATION OFPSYCHOLOGICAL SENTENCES 1. 2. 3. 4. Sentence Sentence Sentenceabout Sentenceabout about about the theStateof thePresent Wooden theStateof One's State Support (Asan Someone ofOne'sOwn OwnMindat Analogy) Else's Mind Mind SomeTimein ThePast System "The "Iamnow sentenceP supportis "Aisexcited" "Iwasexcited yesterexcited" firm" 1 : a)rationally day" derived from protocol

sentencep "The support 1 : hassuch andsuch acolor and

"Ahassuch and suchan expres-

"Theseletters (written

"Myhandsare now

bymeyesterday) have trembling"

shape" orb) intuitively derived from protocol

soin"

suchandsucha shape"

sentencep "The support 2 : looks firm" P1hasthe same content asthe physical sentence "The p2: supportis physicallyfirm"

"Aisexcited "Nowa (A recollectionof looksexcted" excitement"

"Nowexcited"

"As'sbodyis "Mybodywas phyphysisically excited callyexcited yesterday."

"Mybodyisnow physicallyexcited"

The "physically physical firm" term: ishereby definedas a disposition toreact under certain circumstancesin aspecified way: "physically excited"

"Under "Undersuchandsuchcircumstances,suchand suchand suchgestures,exsuch aload, pressions,actions,andwords suchand occur." sucha distortion occurs under suchand sucha load,

breakage occurs" -193physicalinterpretation,itcouldnotbetestedbyB,andwould,thus, bemeaninglesstoB.Onthepreviousoccasioninquestionwe showed,further,thatthenon-physicalinterpretationleadsoneinto insolublecontradictions.Finally,wefoundthateveryprotocol sentencehasthesamecontentassomephysicalsentence,7and thatthisphysicaltranslationdoesnotpresupposeanaccurate knowledgeofthephysiologyofthecentralnervoussystem,butis feasibleevenatpresent.Sentencesaboutone'sownmind-whetheronetakesthesetobeinter-subjective systemsentencesor so-calledintrospectiveprotocolsentences--are thusineverycase translatableintosentencesofthephysicallanguage. Onemayperhapsobjectthatthereis,afterall,adifference betweenanexperience andanutteranceaboutit,andthatnot everyexperience hastobeexpressedinaprotocolsentence.The differencereferredtocertainlyexists,thoughwewouldformulateit differently.SentencesP1:"Anowseesred"andP2:"Anowsays 'Iseered'"donothaveexactlythesamecontent.NordoesP1 justifytheinferenceofP2onlytheconditionalsentence"Ifthis andthatoccurs,thenP2"maybeinferred.ForP1ascribesa physicalstatetoAofsuchakindthat,undercertaincircumstances, itleadstotheeventofspeakingthesentencereferredtoinP2. Ifweconsiderthemethodinaccordancewithwhichtheconclusions ofso-calledintrospectionaregenerallyintegratedwiththebodyof scientificknowledge,weshallnotethattheseconclusionsare, indeed,physicallyevaluated.Itsohappensthatthephysicalism adoptedinpracticeisgenerallynotacknowledgedintheory. PsychologistAannounceshisexperimentalresultsreaderBreads inthem,amongothers,thesentence"Awasexcited"(forthesake ofclaritywewrite"A"insteadoftheword"I"whichBinreading mustreplaceby"A").ForB,thisisasentenceaboutsomeone else'smindnothingofitsclaimcanbeverifiedexceptthatA'sbody wasinsuchandsuchaphysicalconditionatthetimereferredto. (WearguedthispointinouranalysisofsentenceP1about someoneelse'smind.)Bhimselfcouldnot,indeed,haveobserved thiscondition,buthecannowindirectlyinferitshavingexisted.For, tobeginwith,heseesthesentenceinquestioninabookonwhose title-pageAisidentifiedastheauthor.Now,onthebasisofa generalsentenceforwhichhehasalreadyobtainedindirect evidence,Binfers(withsomedegreeofprobability)thatAwrote thesentencesprintedinthisbookfromthis,initsturn,onthe basisof ____________________ 7Ibid.,pp.457ff.,(The UnityofScience ,pp.84ff.).

-194ageneralsentence,withregardtoA'sreliability,forwhichheagain hasgoodinductiveevidence,Binfersthat,hadheobservedA's bodyattherelevanttimehewould(probably)havebeenableto confirmtheexistenceofthestateof(physical)excitement.Since thisconfirmationcanreferonlytosomephysicalstateofA'sbody, thesentenceinquestioncanhaveonlyaphysicalmeaningforB. Generallyspeaking,apsychologist'sspoken,written,orprinted protocolsentences,whentheyarebasedonso-calledintrospection, aretobeinterpretedbythereader,andsofigureinintersubjectivescience,notchieflyasscientificsentences,butas scientificfacts.Theepistemologicalconfusionofcontemporary psychologystems,toalargeextent,fromthisconfusionoffactsin theformofsentenceswiththesentencesthemselvesconsideredas partsofscience.(Ourexampleofthepatternsintheskyisrelevant here.)Theintrospective statementsofapsychologistarenot,in principle,tobeinterpretedanydifferentlyfromthestatementsof hisexperimentalsubjects,whichhehappenstobereporting.The onlydistinctionthepsychologistenjoysisthat,whenthe circumstancesjustifyit,onemayaccepthisstatementsasthoseof anexceptionallyreliableandwell-trainedexperimentalsubject. Further,thestatementsofanexperimentalsubjectarenot,in principle,tobeinterpreteddifferentlyfromhisothervoluntaryor involuntarymovements--thoughhisspeechmovementsmay,under favorablecircumstances,beregardedasespeciallyinformative. Again,themovementsofthespeechorgansandoftheotherparts ofthebodyofanexperimentalsubjectarenot,inprinciple,tobe interpreteddifferentlyfromthemovementsofanyotheranimal-thoughtheformermay,underfavorablecircumstances,bemore valuableintheconstructionofgeneralsentences.Themovements ofananimalarenot,again,inprinciple,tobeinterpretedany differentlyfromthoseofavoltmeter--thoughunderfavorable circumstances,animalmovementsmayservescientificpurposesin morewaysthandothemovementsofavolt-meter.Finally,the movementsofavolt-meterarenot,inprinciple,tobeinterpreted differentlyfromthemovementsofaraindrop--thoughtheformer offermoreopportunitiesfordrawinginferencestoother occurrencesthandothelatter.Inallthesecases,theissueis basicallythesame:fromaspecificphysicalsentence,other sentencesareinferredbyacausalargument,i.e.withthehelpof generalphysicalformulae--the so-callednaturallaws.Theexamples citeddifferonlyinthedegreeoffruitfulnessoftheirpremises.Voltmeterreadingswill,perhaps,justifytheinferenceofagreater numberofscientificallyimportantsentencesthanthe -195behaviorofsomespecificraindropwillspeechmovementswill,ina certainrespect,justifymoresuchinferencesthanotherhuman bodilymovementswill.Now,inthecasewithwhichweare

concernedhere,theinferencefromthesigntothestateofaffairs signifiedhasaquiteremarkable form.Inusingsomeone's introspective statementaboutthestateofhisownmind(e.g.A's statement:"Aisexcited"),thestatement,takenasanacoustic event,isthesignunderfavorableconditions,whicharefrequently satisfiedinscientificcontexts,thestateofaffairsreferredtoissuch thatitcanbedescribedbyasentence("Aisexcited")ofthevery sameformastheacousticeventwhichfunctionsasasignofit. [Therequisiteconditionsarethatthepersoninquestionbe consideredreliableandqualifiedtomakepsychologicalreports,and furtherthatthelanguageofthesereportsbethesameasthatof thescientificsystem.]Thisidentityoftheformoftheacousticfact andthescientificsentencewhichistobeinferredfromitexplains whythetwoaresoeasilyandsoobstinatelyconfused.The disastrousmuddleintowhichthisconfusionleadsusisclearedupas soonaswerealizethathere,asintheothercasescited,itisonlya questionofdrawinganinferencefromasigntothatwhichit indicates. Itbecomesallthemoreclearthatso-calledintrospective statementscannotbegivenanon-physicalinterpretationwhenwe considerhowtheiruseislearned.Atiredchildsays"NowIam happytobeinbed."Ifweinvestigatedhowthechildlearnedtotalk aboutthestatesofhisownmindwewoulddiscoverthat,under similarcircumstances,hismotherhadsaidtohim,"Nowyouare happytobeinbed."ThusweseethatAlearnstousetheprotocol sentencep2fromB--who,however,interpretsthisseriesofwords asconstitutingthesystemsentenceP2,asentence,forB,about someoneelse'smind.LearningtotalkconsistsofB'sinducinga certainhabitinA,ahabitof"verbalizing"(asthebehavioristsputit) inaspecificmannerinspecificcircumstances.And,indeedone tendssotodirectthishabitthattheseriesofwordsproducedby thespeechmovementsofthechildAcoincideswiththesentenceof theintersubjective physicallanguagewhichnotonlydescribesthe appropriatestateofA,but--andthisistheessentialpoint-describesA'sstateasBperceivesit,thatis,thephysicalstateofA's body.Theexampleofthechildshowsthisespeciallyclearly.The sentence,"Youarehappy,"spokenbythemother,isasentence aboutsomeoneelse'smind,andthus,accordingtoourearlier analysis,candesignatenothingbutsomephysicalstateofaffairs. Thechildisthusinducedtodevelopthehabitofrespondingto specificcir-196cumstancesbyutteringasentencewhichexpressesaphysicalstate observedbysomeotherperson(orinferredbysomeotherperson fromobservedsigns).Ifthechilduttersthesamesoundsagainon someotheroccasion,nomorecanbeinferredthanthatthechild's bodyisagaininthatphysicalstate.

8.SUMMARY

So-calledpsychologicalsentences--whethertheyareconcrete sentencesaboutotherminds,oraboutsomepastconditionofone's ownmind,oraboutthepresentconditionofone'sownmind,or, finally,generalsentences--are alwaystranslatableintophysical language.Specifically,everypsychologicalsentencerefersto physicaloccurrencesinthebodyoftheperson(orpersons)in question.Onthesegrounds,psychologyisapartofthedomainof unifiedsciencebasedonphysics.By"physics"wewishtomean,not thesystemofcurrentlyknownphysicallaws,butratherthescience characterizedbyamodeofconceptformationwhichtracesevery conceptbacktostate-coordinates,thatis,tosystematic assignmentsofnumberstospace-timepoints.Understanding "physics"inthisway,wecanrephraseourthesis--aparticularthesis ofphysicalism--asfollows:psychologyisabranchofphysics.

REMARKSBYTHEAUTHOR(1957)
WhileIwouldstillmaintaintheessentialcontentofthemainthesis ofthisarticle,Iwouldtodaymodifysomespecialpoints.Perhaps themostimportantofthemisthefollowing.InthearticleI regardedapsychologicalterm,say"excited,"asdesignatingastate characterizedbythedispositiontoreacttocertainstimuliwithovert behaviorofcertainkinds.Thismaybeadmissibleforthe psychologicalconceptsofeverydaylanguage.Butatleastforthose ofscientificpsychology,asalsoofotherfieldsofscience,itseems tomemoreinlinewiththeactualprocedureofscientists,to introducethemnotasdispositionconcepts,butratherastheoretical concepts(sometimescalled"hypotheticalconstructs").Thismeans thattheyareintroducedasprimitivesbythepostulatesofatheory, andareconnectedwiththetermsoftheobservationlanguage, whichdesignateobservable properties,bysocalledrulesof correspondence.Thismethodisexplainedanddiscussedindetailin myarticle"TheMethodologicalCharacterofTheoreticalConcepts", inH.FeiglandM.Scriven,(eds.,MinnesotaStudiesinthe PhilosophyofScience,Vol.I. -197Themainthesisofphysicalismremainsthesameasbefore.Itsays thatpsychologicalstatements,boththoseofeverydaylifeandof scientificpsychology,saysomethingaboutthephysicalstateofthe personinquestion.Itisdifferentfromthecorresponding statementsintermsofmicro-physiologyormicro-physics(whichat thepresentstageofscientificdevelopmentarenotyetknown, comp.4Aabove)byusingtheconceptualframeworkof psychologyinsteadofthoseofthetwootherfields.Tofindthe specificfeaturesofthecorrespondencewillbeanempiricaltask (comp.6,thethirdpartoftheprocedureofphysicalization).Once known,thecorrespondencecanbeexpressedbyempiricallawsor, accordingtoourpresentview,bytheoreticalpostulates.Our presentconceptionofphysicalism,theargumentsforit,andthe developmentwhichledtoit,arerepresentedinthefollowingtwo articlesbyHerbertFeigl:(1)"Physicalism,UnityofScienceandthe

FoundationsofPsychology",in:P.A.Schilpp,editor,ThePhilosophy ofRudolfCarnap(LibraryofLivingPhilosophers)seealsomyreply toFeiglinthesamevolume(2)"The'Mental'andthe'Physical,'"in Vol.IIofMinnesotaStudiesinPhilosophyofScience. -198-

9
ProtocolSentences
BYOTTONEURATH (TRANSLATEDBYGEORGESCHICK) WITHTHEPROGRESSofknowledge,thenumberofexpressions whichareformulatedwithahighdegreeofprecisioninthe languageofUnifiedScienceiscontinuallyontheincrease.Evenso, nosuchscientifictermiswhollyprecisefortheyareallbasedupon termswhichareessentialforprotocolsentencesanditis immediatelyobvioustoeveryone thatthesetermsmustbevague. Thefictionofanideallanguageconstructedoutofpureatomic sentencesisnolessmetaphysicalthanthefictionofLaplace's demon.Thelanguageofscience,withitseverincreasing developmentofsymbolicsystems,cannotberegardedasan approximationtosuchanideallanguage.Thesentence"Ottois observinganangryperson"islessprecisethanthesentence"Otto isobservingathermometerreading24degrees,"insofarasthe expression"angryperson"cannotbesoexactlydefinedas "thermometerreading24degrees."But"Otto"itselfisinmany waysavagueterm.Thephrase"Ottoisobserving"couldbe replacedbythephrase"Theman,whosecarefullytaken photographislistedno.16inthefile,isobserving":buttheterm "photographlistedno.16inthefile"stillhastobereplacedbya systemofmathematicalformulae,whichisunambiguously correlatedwithanothersystemofmathematicalformulae, ThisarticlefirstappearedinVolumeIIIofErkenntnis( 1932/33).Itispublishedherewiththekindpermissionof Mrs.MarieNeurathandProfessorRudolfCarnap.Atthe beginningofhisarticleNeurathhadthefollowingnote: "ReferenceswillbetoRudolfCarnap'sarticle,"Die Physikalische Sprache alsUniversalsprache der Wissenschaft,"Erkenntnis,1932,Vol.II,pp.432ff.* SincethereiswidespreadagreementwithCarnap,we shalladopthisterminology.SothatIneednotrepeat whatIhavealreadywrittenelsewhere,Ireferthereader tomyarticles"Physikalismus,"Scientia,1931,pp.297ff. and"SoziologieimPhysikalismus,"Erkenntnis,Vol.II, 1932,pp.393ff." ____________________

*There isanEnglishtranslationofthisarticle byMaxBlackunder

thetitleTheUnityofScience.Itwaspublishedasamonograph byKeganPaul,London.] -199-

thetermsofwhichtaketheplaceof"Otto,""angryOtto,""friendly Otto,"etc. Whatisoriginallygiventousisourordinarynaturallanguagewitha stockofimprecise,unanalyzedterms.Westartbypurifyingthis languageofmetaphysicalelementsandsoreachthephysicalistic ordinarylanguage.Inaccomplishingthiswemayfinditveryuseful todrawupalistofproscribedwords. Thereisalsothephysicalisticlanguageofadvancedsciencewhich wecansoconstructthatitisfreefrommetaphysicalelementsfrom thestart.Wecanusethislanguageonlyforspecialsciences,indeed onlyforpartsofthem. Ifonewishedtoexpressalloftheunifiedscienceofourtimeinone language,onewouldhavetocombinetermsofordinarylanguage withtermsofthelanguageofadvancedscience,since,inpractice, thetwooverlap.Therearesometermswhichareusedonlyin ordinarylanguage,otherswhichoccuronlyinthelanguageof advancedscience,andstillotherswhichappearinbothlanguages. Consequently,inascientifictreatiseconcernedwiththeentirefield ofunifiedscienceonlya"slang"comprisingwordsofboth languageswillserve. Webelievethateverywordofthephysicalisticordinarylanguage willprovetobereplaceablebytermstakenfromthelanguageof advancedscience,justasonemayalsoformulatethetermsofthe languageofadvancedsciencewiththehelpofthetermsof ordinarylanguage.Onlythelatterisaveryunfamiliarproceeding, andsometimesnoteasy.Einstein'stheoriesareexpressible (somehow)inthelanguageoftheBantus--butnotthoseof Heidegger,unlesslinguisticabusestowhichtheGermanlanguage lendsitselfareintroducedintoBantu.Aphysicistmust,inprinciple, beabletosatisfythedemandofthetalentedwriterwhoinsisted that:"Oneoughttobeabletomaketheoutlinesofanyrigorously scientificthesiscomprehensibleinhisowntermstoahackneycoach-driver." Thelanguageofadvancedscienceandordinarylanguagecoincide todayprimarilyinthedomainofarithmetic.But,inthesystemof radicalphysicalism,eventheexpression"2times2is4,"a tautology,islinkedtoprotocolsentences.Tautologiesaredefinedin termsofsentenceswhichstatehowtautologiesfunctionascodicils appendedtocertaincommandsundercertaincircumstances.For instance:"OttosaystoKarl'Gooutsidewhentheflagwavesand when2times2isfour.'"Theadditionofthetautologyheredoes notaltertheeffectofthecommand.

Evenconsiderationsofrigorousscientificmethodrestrictusto -200theuseofa"universalslang."Sincethereisasyetnogeneral agreementastoitscomposition,eachscholarwhoconcernshimself withthesemattersmustutilizeauniversalslangtowhichhehimself hascontributednewterms. Thereisnowayoftakingconclusivelyestablishedpureprotocol sentencesasthestartingpointofthesciences.Notabularasa exists.Wearelikesailorswhomustrebuildtheirshipontheopen sea,neverabletodismantleitindry-dockandtoreconstructit thereoutofthebestmaterials.Onlythemetaphysicalelementscan beallowedtovanishwithouttrace.Vaguelinguisticconglomerations alwaysremaininonewayoranotherascomponentsoftheship.If vaguenessisdiminishedatonepoint,itmaywellbeincreasedat another. Weshall,fromtheveryfirst,teachchildrentheuniversal-slang-purgedofallmetaphysics--asthelanguageofthehistorically transmittedunifiedscience.Eachchildwillbesotrainedthatit startswithasimplifieduniversal-slang,andadvancesgraduallyto theuseoftheuniversal-slangofadults.Inthisconnection,itis meaninglesstosegregatethischildren'slanguagefromthatofthe adults.Onewould,inthatcase,havetodistinguishseveral universalslangs.Thechilddoesnotlearnaprimitiveuniversal-slang fromwhichtheuniversal-slangoftheadultsderives.Helearnsa "poorer"universal-slang,whichisgraduallyfilledin.Theexpression "ballofiron"isusedinthelanguageofadultsaswellasinthatof children.Intheformeritisdefinedbyasentenceinwhichterms suchas"radius"and""occur,whileinthechildren'sdefinition wordssuchas"nine-pins,""presentfromUncleRudi,"etc.areused. But"UncleRudi"alsocropsupinthelanguageofrigorousscience,if thephysicalballisdefinedbymeansofprotocolsentencesinwhich "UncleRudi"appearsas"theobserverwhoperceivesaball." Carnap,ontheotherhand,speaksofaprimitive protocollanguage. 1Hiscommentsonthe primitive protocollanguage--onthe protocol sentenceswhich"require noverification"--are onlymarginaltohis significantanti-metaphysicalviews,themainspringofwhichisnot affectedbytheobjectionsherebroughtforward.Carnapspeaksof aprimarylanguage,alsoreferredtoasanexperientialorasa phenomenalisticlanguage.Hemaintainsthat"atthepresentstage ofinquiry,thequestionoftheprecisecharacterizationofthis languagecannotbeanswered."Thesecommentsmightinduce ____________________ 1Op.cit.,Erkenntnis,Vol.II,pp.437ff.and453ff.(Unityof Science,pp.42ff.and76ff.). -201-

youngermentosearchforaprotocollanguageofthesort described:andthismighteasilyleadtometaphysicaldeviations. Althoughmetaphysicalspeculationcannotaltogetherberestrained byargument,itisimportant,asameansofkeepingwaverersin line,tomaintainphysicalisminitsmostradicalversion.Apartfrom tautologies,unifiedscienceconsistsoffactualsentences.Thesemay besub-dividedinto A. (a)protocolsentences B. (b)non-protocolsentences. Protocolsentencesarefactualsentencesofthesameformasthe others,exceptthat,inthem,apersonalnounalwaysoccursseveral timesinaspecificassociationwithotherterms.Acompleteprotocol sentencemight,forinstance,read:"Otto'sprotocolat3:17o'clock: [At3:16o'clockOttosaidtohimself:(at3:15o'clocktherewasa tableintheroomperceivedbyOtto)]."Thisfactualsentenceisso constructedthat,withineachsetofbrackets,furtherfactual sentencesmaybefound,viz.:"At3:16o'clockOttosaidtohimself: (At3:15o'clocktherewasatableintheroomperceivedbyOtto)" and"At3:15o'clocktherewasatableintheroomperceivedby Otto."Thesesentencesare,however,notprotocolsentences. Eachtermoccurringinthesesentencesmay,tosomeextent,be replacedattheveryoutsetbyagroupoftermsofthelanguageof advancedscience.Onemayintroduceasystemofphysicalistic designationsinplaceof"Otto,"andthissystemofdesignations may,inturn,furtherbedefinedbyreferringtothe"position"ofthe name"Otto"inagroupofsignscomposedofthenames"Karl," "Heinrich,"etc.Allthewordsusedintheexpressionoftheabove protocolsentenceareeitherwordsoftheuniversal-slangormay withoutdifficultybereplacedatanymomentbywordsofthe universal-slang. Foraprotocolsentencetobecompleteitisessentialthatthename ofsomepersonoccurinit."Nowjoy,"or"Nowredcircle,"or"Ared dieislyingonthetable"arenotcompleteprotocolsentences.2 Theyarenotevencandidatesforapositionwithintheinnermost setofbrackets.Forthistheywould,onouranalysis,atleasthave toread"Ottonowjoy,"or"Ottonowseesaredcircle,"or"Otto nowseesareddielyingonthetable"--whichwouldroughly correspondtothechildren'slanguage.Thatis,inafullprotocolsen____________________ 2Cf.Carnap,op.cit.,Erkenntnis,Vol.II,pp.438ff.(Unityof Science,pp.43ff.). -202tencetheexpressionwithintheinnermostsetofbracketsisa sentencewhichagainfeaturesapersonalnounandatermfrom thedomainofperception-terms.Therelativeextenttowhichterms ofordinarylanguageandofthelanguageofadvancedscienceare usedisofnosignificance,sincetheuniversal-slangmaybeused withconsiderableflexibility.

Theexpression"saidtohimself,"afterthefirstbracket, recommendsitselfwhen,asabove,onewantstoconstructvarious groupsofsentences,as,forinstance,sentencesincorporating reality-terms,orhallucination-terms,ordream-terms,and especiallywhenonewantstoidentifyunrealityassuch.For instance,onecouldsay:"Ottoactuallysaidtohimself,'Therewas nothingintheroombutabirdperceivedbyOtto'but,inorderto amusehimself,hewrote,'Therewasnothingintheroombuta tableperceivedbyOtto.'"Thisisespeciallypertinenttothe discussioninthenextsection,inwhichwerejectCarnap'sthesisto theeffectthatprotocolsentencesarethose"whichrequire no verification." Thetransformationofthesciencesiseffectedbythediscardingof sentencesutilizedinaprevioushistoricalperiod,and,frequently, theirreplacementbyothers.Sometimesthesameformofwordsis retained,buttheirdefinitionsarechanged.Everylawandevery physicalisticsentenceofunified-scienceorofoneofitssub-sciences issubjecttosuchchange.Andthesameholdsforprotocol sentences. Inunifiedsciencewetrytoconstructanon-contradictorysystemof protocolsentencesandnon-protocolsentences(includinglaws).3 Whenanewsentenceispresentedtouswecompareitwiththe systematourdisposal,anddeterminewhetherornotitconflicts withthatsystem.Ifthesentencedoesconflictwiththesystem,we maydiscarditasuseless(orfalse),as,forinstance,wouldbedone with"InAfricalionssingonlyinmajorscales."Onemay,onthe otherhand,acceptthesentenceandsochangethesystemthatit remainsconsistentevenaftertheadjunctionofthenewsentence. Thesentencewouldthenbecalled"true." Thefateofbeingdiscardedmaybefallevenaprotocolsentence. NosentenceenjoysthenolimetangerewhichCarnapordainsfor protocolsentences.Letusconsideraparticularlydrasticexample. Weassumethatweareacquaintedwithascholarcalled"Kalon," whocanwritewithbothhandssimultaneously.Hewriteswithhis lefthand,"Kalon'sprotocolat3:17o'clock:[At16minutes30 ____________________ 3Cf.Carnap,op.cit.,Erkenntnis,Vol.II,pp.439ff.(Unityof Science,pp.47ff.). -203secondspast3o'clockKalonsaidtohimself:(Therewasnothingin theroomat3:16o'clockexceptatableperceivedbyKalon)]."At thesametime,withhisrighthand,hewrites,"Kalon'sprotocolat 3:17o'clock:[At16minutes30secondspast3o'clockKalonsaidto himself:(There wasnothingintheroomat3:16o'clockexcepta birdperceivedbyKalon)]."Whatishe--andwhatarewe--tomake oftheconjunctionofthesetwosentences?Wemay,ofcourse, makestatementssuchas"Marksmaybefoundonthissheetof

paper,sometimesshapedthiswayandsometimesthat."With respecttothesemarksonpaper,however,Carnap'sword "verification"findsnoapplication."Verification"canonlybeused withreference tosentences,thatis,withreferencetosequencesof markswhichareusedinacontextofareaction-testandwhichmay systematicallybereplacedbyothermarks.4Synonymous sentencesmaybecharacterizedasstimuliwhichunderspecific reaction-testsevoke thesameresponses.Chainsofink-markson paperandchainsofair-vibrationswhichmayunderspecific conditionsbeco-ordinatedwithoneanotherarecalled"sentences." Twoconflictingprotocolsentencescannotbothbeusedinthe systemofunifiedscience.Thoughwemaynotbeabletotellwhich ofthetwoistobeexcluded,orwhetherbotharenottobe excluded,itisclearthatnotbothareverifiable,thatis,thatbothdo notfitintothesystem. Ifaprotocolsentencemustinsuchcasesbediscarded,maynot thesameoccasionallybecalledforwhenthecontradictionbetween protocolsentencesontheonehandandasystemcomprising protocolsentencesandnon-protocolsentences(laws,etc.)onthe otherissuchthatanextendedargumentisrequiredtodiscloseit? OnCarnap'sview,onecouldbeobligedtoalteronlynon-protocol sentencesandlaws.Wealsoallowforthepossibilityofdiscarding protocolsentences.Adefiningconditionofasentenceisthatitbe subjecttoverification,thatistosay,thatitmaybediscarded. Carnap'scontentionthatprotocolsentencesdonotrequire verification,howeveritmaybeunderstood,maywithoutdifficulty berelatedtothebeliefinimmediateexperienceswhichiscurrentin traditionalacademicphilosophy.Accordingtothisphilosophythere are,indeed,certainbasicelementsoutofwhichtheworld-picture is tobeconstructed.Onthisacademicview,theseatomicexperiences are,ofcourse,aboveanykindofcriticalscrutinytheydonot requireverification. Carnapistryingtointroduceakindofatomicprotocol,with ____________________ 4Cf.myarticle inScientia ,p.302. -204hisdemandthat"aclear-cutdistinctionbemadeinscientific procedurebetweentheadoptionofaprotocolandthe interpretationoftheprotocolsentences,"asaresultofwhich"no indirectlyacquiredsentenceswouldbeacceptedintotheprotocol." 5The above formulationofacomplete protocolsentence shows that,insofaraspersonalnounsoccurinaprotocol,interpretation mustalwaysalreadyhavetakenplace.Whenpreparingscientific protocols,itmaybeusefultophrasetheexpressionwithinthe innermostsetofbracketsassimplyaspossible,as,forinstance,"At 3o'clockOttowasseeingred,"or--anotherprotocol--"At3o'clock OttowashearingCsharp,"etc.Butaprotocolofsuchasortisnot

primitiveinCarnap'ssense,sinceonecannot,afterall,getaround Otto'sactofperception.Therearenosentencesintheuniversalslangwhichonemaycharacterizeas"more primitive"thanany others.Allareofequalprimitiveness.Personalnouns,words denotingperceptions,andotherwordsoflittleprimitivenessoccur inallfactualsentences,or,atleast,inthehypothesesfromwhich theyderive.Allofwhichmeansthatthereareneitherprimitive protocolsentencesnorsentenceswhicharenotsubjectto verification. Theuniversal-slang,inthesenseexplainedabove,isthesamefor thechildasfortheadult.ItisthesameforaRobinsonCrusoeas forahumansociety.IfCrusoewantstorelatewhatheregistered ("protokolliert")yesterdaywithwhatheregisterstoday,thatis, whenhewantstohaveanysortofrecoursetoalanguage,he cannotbuthaverecourse totheinter-subjective language.The Crusoe ofyesterdayandtheCrusoeoftodaystandtooneanother inpreciselytherelationinwhichCrusoestandstoFriday.Considera manwhohasbothlosthismemoryandbeenblinded,whoisnow learningafreshtoreadandtowrite.Thenoteswhichhehimself tookinthepastandwhichnow,withtheaidofaspecialapparatus, hereadsagainareforhimasmuchthenotesofsomeotherman asnotesactuallywrittenbysomeoneelse.Andthesamewouldstill bethecaseafterhehadrealizedthetragicnatureofhis circumstances,andhadpiecedtogetherthestoryofhislife. Inotherwords,everylanguageassuchisinter-subjective.The protocolsofonemomentmustbesubjecttoincorporationinthe protocolsofthenext,justastheprotocolsofAmustbesubjectto incorporationintheprotocolsofB.Itistherefore meaninglessto talk,asCarnapdoes,ofaprivatelanguage,orofasetofdisparate protocollanguageswhichmayultimatelybedrawntogether. ____________________ 5Op.cit.,p.437(UnityofScience ,p.42). -205TheprotocollanguagesoftheCrusoeofyesterdayandofthe Crusoe oftodayareascloseandasfarapartfromoneanotheras aretheprotocollanguagesofCrusoeandofFriday.If,under certaincircumstances,theprotocollanguagesofyesterday'sCrusoe andoftoday'sarecalledthesamelanguage,thenonemayalso, underthesamecircumstances,calltheprotocollanguageofCrusoe andthatofFridaythesamelanguage. InCarnap'swritingswealsoencounteranemphasisonthe"I" familiartousfromidealisticphilosophy.Intheuniversal-slangitis asmeaninglesstotalkofapersonalprotocolastotalkofahereor anow.Inthephysicalisticlanguagepersonalnounsaresimply replacedbyco-ordinatesandcoefficientsofphysicalstates.One candistinguishanOtto-protocolfromaKarl-protocol,butnota protocolofone'sownfromaprotocolofothers.Thewholepuzzle ofothermindsisthusresolved.

Methodologicalsolipsismandmethodologicalpositivism6donot becomeanythemoreserviceablebecauseoftheadditionofthe word"methodological."7 Forinstance,hadIsaidabove,"Today,the27thofJuly,Iexamine protocolsbothofmyownandofothers,"itwouldhavebeenmore correcttohavesaid"OttoNeurath'sprotocolat10:00a.m.,July 27,1932[At9:35o'clockOttoNeurathsaidtohimself:(Otto Neurathoccupiedhimselfbetween9:40and9:57withaprotocolby NeurathandonebyKalon,tobothofwhichthefollowingtwo sentencesbelong:...)]."EventhoughOttoNeurathhimself formulatestheprotocolconcerningtheutilizationoftheseprotocols, hedoesnotlinkhisownprotocolwiththesystemofunifiedscience inanydifferentwayfromthatinwhichhelinksKalon's.Itmaywell happenthatNeurathdiscardsoneofNeurath'sprotocols,and adoptsinitssteadoneofKalon's.Thefactthatmengenerally retaintheirownprotocolsentencesmoreobstinatelythantheydo thoseofotherpeopleisahistoricalaccidentwhichisofnoreal significanceforourpurposes.Carnap'scontentionthat"every individualcanadoptonlyhisownprotocolasanepistemological basis"cannotbeaccepted,fortheargumentpresentedinitsfavor isnotsound:"S1can,indeed,alsoutilizetheprotocolofS2--and theincorporationofbothprotocollanguagesinphysicalistic languagemakesthisutilizationparticularlyeasy.Theutilizationis, however,indirect:S1mustfirststateinhisownprotocolthathe seesapieceofwriting ____________________ 6Cf.Carnap,op.cit.,Erkenntnis,Vol.II,p.461(UnityofScience , p.93). 7Cf.myarticle inErkenntnis,Vol.II,p.401.[Translatedinthe presentvolume,seep.282below.] -206ofsuchandsuchaform."8ButNeurathmustdescribeNeurath's protocolinamanneranalogoustothatinwhichhedescribes Kalon's!HedescribeshowNeurath'sprotocollookstohimaswellas howKalon'sdoes. Inthiswaywecangoontodealwitheveryone'sprotocol sentences.Basically,itmakesnodifferenceatallwhetherKalon workswithKalon'sorwithNeurath'sprotocols,orwhetherNeurath occupieshimselfwithNeurath'sorwithKalon'sprotocols.Inorder tomakethisquiteclear,wecouldconceiveofasorting-machine intowhichprotocolsentencesarethrown.Thelawsandother factualsentences(includingprotocolsentences)servingtomeshthe machine'sgearssorttheprotocolsentenceswhicharethrowninto themachineandcauseabelltoringifacontradictionensues.At thispointonemusteitherreplacetheprotocolsentencewhose introductionintothemachinehasledtothecontradictionbysome otherprotocolsentence,orrebuildtheentiremachine.Who rebuildsthemachine,orwhoseprotocolsentencesarethrowninto

themachineisofnoconsequencewhatsoever.Anyone maytesthis ownprotocolsentencesaswellasthoseofothers.

SUMMINGUP:
Unifiedscienceutilizesauniversal-slang,inwhichtermsofthe physicalisticordinarylanguagenecessarilyalsooccur. Childrencanbetrainedtousetheuniversal-slang.Apartfromitwe donotemployanyspeciallydistinguishable"basic"protocol sentences,nordodifferentpeoplemakeuseofdifferentprotocol languages. Wefindnouseinunifiedsciencefortheexpressions "methodologicalsolipsism"and"methodologicalpositivism." Onecannotstartwithconclusivelyestablished,pureprotocol sentences.Protocolsentencesarefactualsentencesliketheothers, containingnamesofpersonsornamesofgroupsofpeoplelinkedin specificwayswithotherterms,whicharethemselvesalsotaken fromtheuniversal-slang. TheViennaCircledevotesitselfmoreandmoretothetaskof expressingunifiedscience(whichincludessociologyaswellas chemistry,biologyaswellasmechanics,psychology--more properly termed"behavioristics"--aswellasoptics)inaunifiedlanguage, andwiththedisplayingoftheinter-connectionsofthevarious scienceswhicharesooftenneglectedsothatonemaywithout ____________________ 8Cf.Carnap,op.cit.,Erkenntnis,Vol.II,p.461(The Unityof Science,p.93). -207difficultyrelatethetermsofanysciencetothoseofanyother.The word"man"whichisprefixedto"makesassertions"istobedefined injustthesamewayastheword"man"occurringinsentences whichcontainthewords"economicsystem"and"production." TheViennaCirclehasreceivedpowerfulencouragementfrom varioussources.TheachievementsofMach,Poincar,andDuhem. havebeenturnedtoasgoodaccountasthecontributionsofFrege, Schrder,andRussell.Wittgenstein'swritingshavebeen extraordinarilystimulating,boththroughwhathasbeentakenfrom themandthroughwhathasbeenrejected.Hisoriginalplan--touse philosophyasaladderwhichitisnecessarytoclimbinordertosee thingsclearly--may,however,beconsideredtohavecometogrief. Themainissueinthis,asinallotherintellectualactivities,will alwaysbetobringthesentencesofunifiedscience--bothprotocol sentencesandnon-protocolsentences--intoconsonancewithone another.Forthis,alogicalsyntaxofthesorttowardwhichCarnap isworkingisrequired--Carnap'slogicalreconstructionoftheworld beingthefirststepinthisdirection.

ThediscussionIhaveinitiatedhere--forCarnapwillcertainlyfind muchinthecorrectionstocorrectagainandtodevelop--serves,as dosomanyofourotherefforts,tosecureevermorefirmlythe common,broadfoundationsonwhichalltheadherentsof physicalismbasetheirstudies.Discussionsofperipheralissues,such asthisone,are,however,goingtoplayacontinuouslydiminishing role.TherapidprogressoftheworkoftheViennaCircleshowsthat theplannedco-operative projectdedicatedtotheconstructionof unifiedscienceisinconstantdevelopment.Thelesstimewefindit necessarytodevotetotheeliminationofancientconfusionsandthe morewecanoccupyourselveswiththeformulationoftheinterconnectionsofthesciences,thequickerandmoresuccessfulwill thisconstructionbe.Tothisenditisofthefirstimportancethatwe learnhowtousethephysicalisticlanguage,onbehalfofwhich Carnap,inhisarticle,enteredthelists. -208-

10
TheFoundationofKnowledge
BYMORITZSCHLICK (TRANSLATEDBYDAVIDRYNIN) ALLIMPORTANTATTEMPTSatestablishingatheoryofknowledge growoutoftheproblemconcerningthecertaintyofhuman knowledge.Andthisprobleminturnoriginatesinthewishfor absolutecertainty. Theinsightthatthestatementsofdailylifeandsciencecanatbest beonlyprobable,thateventhemostgeneralresultsofscience, whichallexperiencesconfirm,canhaveonlythecharacterof hypotheses,hasagainandagainstimulatedphilosopherssince Descartes,andindeed,thoughlessobviously,sinceancienttimes, tosearchforanunshakeable,indubitable,foundation,afirmbasis onwhichtheuncertainstructureofourknowledge couldrest.The uncertaintyofthestructure wasgenerallyattributedtothefactthat itwasimpossible,perhapsinprinciple,toconstructafirmeroneby thepowerofhumanthought.Butthisdidnotinhibitthesearchfor thebedrock,whichexistspriortoallconstructionanddoesnotitself vacillate. Thissearchisapraiseworthy,healthyeffort,anditisprevalent evenamong"relativists"and"sceptics,whowouldrathernot acknowledgeit."Itappearsindifferentformsandleadstoodd differencesofopinion.Theproblemof"protocolstatements,"their structure andfunction,isthelatestforminwhichthephilosophyor ratherthedecisiveempiricismofourdayclothestheproblemofthe ultimategroundofknowledge. Whatwasoriginallymeantby"protocolstatements,"asthename

indicates,arethosestatementswhichexpressthefactswith absolutesimplicity,withoutanymoulding,alterationoraddition,in whoseelaborationeveryscienceconsists,andwhichprecedeall knowThisarticle,originallyentitled"berdasFundamentder Erkenntnis",firstappearedinErkenntnis,Vol.IV(1934). ItispublishedherewiththekindpermissionofMrs. SchlickandProfessorCarnap. -209ing,everyjudgmentregardingtheworld.Itmakesnosenseto speakofuncertainfacts.Onlyassertions,onlyourknowledge can beuncertain.Ifwesucceedthereforeinexpressingtherawfactsin "protocolstatements,"withoutanycontamination,theseappearto betheabsolutelyindubitablestartingpointsofallknowledge.They are,tobesure,againabandonedthemomentonegoesoverto statementswhichareactuallyofuseinlifeorscience(sucha transitionappearstobethatfrom"singular"to"universal" statements),buttheyconstituteneverthelessthefirmbasisto whichallourcognitionsowewhatevervaliditytheymaypossess. Moreover,itmakesnodifferencewhetherornottheseso-called protocolstatementshaveeveractuallybeenmade,thatis,actually uttered,writtendownorevenonlyexplicitly"thought"itisrequired onlythatoneknowwhatstatementsformthebasisforthe notationswhichareactuallymade,andthatthesestatementsbeat alltimesreconstructible.Ifforexampleaninvestigatormakesa note,"Undersuchandsuchconditionsthepointerstandsat10.5," heknowsthatthismeans"twoblacklinescoincide,"andthatthe words"undersuchandsuchconditions"(whichwehereimagineto bespecified)arelikewisetoberesolvedintodefiniteprotocol statementswhich,ifhewished,hecouldinprincipleformulate exactly,althoughperhapswithdifficulty. Itisclear,andissofarasIknowdisputedbynoone,that knowledgeinlifeandscienceinsomesensebeginswith confirmationoffacts,andthatthe"protocolstatements"inwhich thisoccursstandinthesamesenseatthebeginningofscience. Whatisthissense?Is"beginning"tobeunderstoodinthetemporal orlogicalsense? Herewealreadyfindmuchconfusionandoscillation.IfIsaidabove thatitisnotimportantwhetherthedecisivestatementshavebeen actuallymadeoruttered,thismeansevidentlythattheyneednot standatthebeginningtemporally,butcanbearrivedatlaterjust aswellifneedbe.Thenecessityforformulatingthemwouldarise whenonewishedtomakecleartooneselfthemeaningofthe statementthatonehadactuallywrittendown.Isthereference to protocolstatementsthentobeunderstoodinthelogicalsense?In thateventtheywouldbedistinguishedbydefinitelogicalproperties, bytheirstructure,theirpositioninthesystemofscience,andone wouldbeconfrontedwiththetaskofactuallyspecifyingthese

properties.Infact,thisistheforminwhich,forexample,Carnap usedexplicitlytoputthequestionofprotocolstatements,while later1declaringittobeaquestionwhichistobesettledbyan arbitrarydecision. ____________________ 1See Carnap,"berProtokollstze",Erkenntnis,Vol.III,pp.216 ff. -210Ontheotherhand,wefindmanyexpositionswhichseemto presupposethatby"protocolstatements"onlythoseassertionsare tobeunderstoodthatalsotemporallyprecedetheotherassertions ofscience.Andisthisnotcorrect?Onemustbearinmindthatitis amatteroftheultimatebasisofknowledge ofreality,andthatitis notsufficientforthistotreatstatementsas,sotospeak,"ideal constructions"(asoneusedtosayinPlatonicfashion),butrather thatonemustconcernoneselfwithrealoccurrences,withevents thattakeplaceintime,inwhichthemakingofjudgmentsconsists, hencewithpsychicactsof"thought,"orphysicalactsof"speaking" or"writing."Sincepsychicactsofjudgmentseemsuitablefor establishinginter-subjectivelyvalidknowledge onlywhentranslated intoverbalorwrittenexpressions(thatis,intoaphysicalsystemof symbols)"protocolstatements"cometoberegardedascertain spoken,writtenorprintedsentences,i.e.,certainsymbolcomplexes ofsoundsorprinter'sink,whichwhentranslatedfromthecommon abbreviationsintofull-fledgedspeech,wouldmeansomethinglike: "Mr.N.N.atsuchandsuchatimeobservedsoandsoatsuchand suchaplace."(ThisviewwasadoptedparticularlybyO.Neurath).2 Asamatteroffact,whenweretracethepathbywhichweactually arrive atallourknowledge,wedoubtlessalwayscomeupagainst thissamesource:printedsentencesinbooks,wordsoutofthe mouthofateacher,ourownobservations(inthelattercaseweare ourselvesN.N.). Onthisviewprotocolstatementswouldberealhappeningsinthe worldandwouldtemporallyprecedetheotherrealprocessesin whichthe"constructionofscience,"orindeedtheproductionofan individual'sknowledgeconsists. Idonotknowtowhatextentthedistinctionmadeherebetween thelogicalandtemporalpriorityofprotocolstatementscorresponds todifferencesintheviewsactuallyheldbycertainauthors--butthat isnotimportant.Forwearenotconcernedtodeterminewho expressedthecorrectview,butwhatthecorrectviewis.Andfor thisourdistinctionbetweenthetwopointsofviewwillservewell enough. Asamatteroffact,thesetwoviewsarecompatible.Forthe statementsthatregistersimpledataofobservationandstand temporallyatthebeginningcouldatthesametimebethosethat byvirtueoftheirstructure wouldhavetoconstitutethelogical

startingpointofscience. ____________________ 2Neurath,"Protokollstze",Erkenntnis,Vol.III,pp.104ff.(This articleistranslatedinthepresentvolume,seepp.199-208 above.) -211-

II
Thequestionwhichwillfirstinterestusisthis:Whatprogressis achievedbyformulatingtheproblemoftheultimatebasisof knowledgeintermsofprotocolstatements?Theanswertothis questionwillitselfpavethewaytoasolutionoftheproblem. Ithinkitagreatimprovementinmethodtotrytoaimatthebasis ofknowledgebylookingnotfortheprimaryfactsbutforthe primarysentences.ButIalsothinkthatthisadvantagewasnot madethemostof,perhapsbecauseofafailuretorealizethatwhat wasatissue,fundamentally,wasjusttheoldproblemofthebasis. Ibelieve,infact,thatthepositiontowhichtheconsiderationof protocolstatementshasledisnottenable.Itresultsinapeculiar relativism,whichappearstobeanecessaryconsequenceofthe viewthatprotocolstatementsareempiricalfactsuponwhichthe edificeofscienceissubsequentlybuilt. Thatistosay:whenprotocolstatementsareconceivedinthis manner,thendirectlyoneraisesthequestionofthecertaintywith whichonemayasserttheirtruth,onemustgrantthattheyare exposedtoallpossibledoubts. Thereappearsinabookasentencewhichsays,forexample,that N.N.usedsuchandsuchaninstrumenttomakesuchandsuchan observation.Onemayundercertaincircumstanceshavethe greatestconfidenceinthissentence.Nevertheless,itandthe observationitrecords,canneverbeconsideredabsolutelycertain. Forthepossibilitiesoferrorareinnumerable.N.N.can inadvertentlyorintentionallyhavedescribedsomethingthatdoes notaccuratelyrepresenttheobservedfactinwritingitdownor printingit,anerrormayhavecreptin.Indeedtheassumptionthat thesymbolsofabookretaintheirformevenforaninstantanddo not"ofthemselves"changeintonewsentencesisanempirical hypothesis,whichassuchcanneverbestrictlyverified.Forevery verificationwouldrestonassumptionsofthesamesortandonthe presuppositionthatourmemorydoesnotdeceiveusatleastduring abriefinterval,andsoon. Thismeans,ofcourse--andsomeofourauthorshavepointedthis outalmostwithanoteoftriumph--thatprotocolstatements,so conceived,haveinprincipleexactlythesamecharacterasallthe otherstatementsofscience:theyarehypotheses,nothingbut hypotheses.Theyareanythingbutincontrovertible,andonecan usethemintheconstructionofthesystemofscienceonlysolong

astheyaresup-212portedby,oratleastnotcontradictedby,otherhypotheses.We therefore alwaysreserve therighttomakeprotocolstatements subjecttocorrection,andsuchcorrections,quiteoftenindeed,do occurwhenweeliminatecertainprotocolstatementsanddeclare thattheymusthavebeentheresultofsomeerror. Eveninthecaseofstatementswhichweourselveshaveput forwardwedonotinprincipleexcludethepossibilityoferror.We grantthatourmindatthemomentthejudgmentwasmademay havebeenwhollyconfused,andthatanexperience whichwenow saywehadtwominutesagomayuponlaterexaminationbefound tohavebeenanhallucination,orevenonethatnevertookplaceat all. Thusitisclearthatonthisviewofprotocolstatementstheydonot provideonewhoisinsearchofafirmbasisofknowledge with anythingofthesort.Onthecontrary,theactualresultisthatone endsbyabandoningtheoriginaldistinctionbetweenprotocoland otherstatementsasmeaningless.Thuswecometounderstand howpeoplecometothink3thatanystatementsofsciencecanbe selectedatwillandcalled"protocolstatements,"andthatitis simplyaquestionofconveniencewhicharechosen. Butcanweadmitthis?Aretherereallyonlyreasonsof convenience?Itisnotratheramatterofwheretheparticular statementscomefrom,whatistheirorigin,theirhistory?In general,whatismeantherebyconvenience?Whatistheendthat onepursuesinmakingandselectingstatements? Theendcanbenootherthanthatofscienceitself,namely,thatof affordingatruedescriptionofthefacts.Forusitisself-evidentthat theproblemofthebasisofknowledge isnothingotherthanthe questionofthecriterionoftruth.Surelythereasonforbringingin theterm"protocolstatement"inthefirstplacewasthatitshould servetomarkoutcertainstatementsbythetruthofwhichthetruth ofallotherstatementscomestobemeasured,asbyameasuring rod.Butaccordingtotheviewpointjustdescribedthismeasuring rodwouldhaveshownitselftobeasrelative as,say,allthe measuringrodsofphysics.Anditisthisviewwithitsconsequences thathasbeencommendedasthebanishingofthelastremnantof "absolutism"fromphilosophy.4 Butwhatthenremainsatallasacriterionoftruth?Sincethe proposalisnotthatallscientificassertionsmustaccordwithcertain definiteprotocolstatements,butratherthatallstatementsshall accordwithoneanother,withtheresultthateverysingleoneis consid____________________ 3K.PopperasquotedbyCarnap,op.cit.,Erkenntnis,Vol.III,p.

4Carnap,op.cit.,p.228.

223.

-213eredas,inprinciple,corrigible,truthcanconsistonlyinamutual agreementofstatements.

III
Thisview,whichhasbeenexpresslyformulatedandrepresentedin thiscontext,forexample,byNeurath,iswellknownfromthe historyofrecentphilosophy.InEnglanditisusuallycalledthe "coherence theoryoftruth,"andcontrastedwiththeolder "correspondence theory."Itistobeobservedthattheexpression "theory"isquiteinappropriate.Forobservationsonthenatureof truthhaveaquitedifferentcharacterfromscientifictheories,which alwaysconsistofasystemofhypotheses. Thecontrastbetweenthetwoviewsisgenerallyexpressedas follows:accordingtothetraditionalone,thetruthofastatement consistsinitsagreementwiththefacts,whileaccordingtothe other,thecoherencetheory,itconsistsinitsagreementwiththe systemofotherstatements. Ishallnotingeneralpursuethequestionherewhetherthelatter viewcannotalsobeinterpretedinawaythatdrawsattentionto somethingquitecorrect(namely,tothefactthatinaquitedefinite sensewecannot"gobeyondlanguage"asWittgensteinputsit).I havehererathertoshowthat,ontheinterpretationrequiredinthe presentcontext,itisquiteuntenable. Ifthetruthofastatementistoconsistinitscoherenceor agreementwiththeotherstatements,onemustbeclearastowhat oneunderstandsby"agreement,"andwhichstatementsaremeant by"other." Thefirstpointcanbesettledeasily.Sinceitcannotbemeantthat thestatementtobetestedassertsthesamethingastheothers,it remainsonlythattheymustbecompatiblewithit,thatis,thatno contradictionsexistbetweenthem.Truthwouldconsistsimplyin absenceofcontradiction.Butonthequestionwhethertruthcanbe identifiedsimplywiththeabsenceofcontradiction,thereoughtto benofurtherdiscussion.Itshouldlongsincehavebeengenerally acknowledgedthatonlyinthecaseofstatementsofatautological naturearetruth(ifonewillapplythistermatall)andabsenceof contradictiontobeequated,asforinstancewiththestatementsof puregeometry.Butwithsuchstatementseveryconnectionwith realityispurposelydissolvedtheyareonlyformulaswithina determinatecalculusitmakesnosenseinthecaseofthe statementsofpuregeometrytoaskwhethertheyagreewiththe factsoftheworld:theyneedonlybecompatiblewiththeaxioms -214-

arbitrarilylaiddownatthebeginning(inaddition,itisusuallyalso requiredthattheyfollowfromthem)inordertobecalledtrueor correct.Wehavebeforeuspreciselywhatwasearliercalledformal truthanddistinguishedfrommaterialtruth. Thelatteristhetruthofsyntheticstatements,assertionsofmatters offact,andifonewishestodescribethembyhelpoftheconcept ofabsenceofcontradiction,ofagreementwithotherstatements, onecandosoonlyifonesaysthattheymaynotcontradictvery specialstatements,namelyjustthosethatexpress"factsof immediateobservation."Thecriterionoftruthcannotbe compatibilitywithanystatementswhatever,butagreementis requiredwithcertainexceptionalstatementswhicharenotchosen arbitrarilyatall.Inotherwords,thecriterionofabsenceof contradictiondoesnotbyitselfsufficeformaterialtruth.Itis, rather,entirelyamatterofcompatibilitywithveryspecialpeculiar statements.Andforthiscompatibilitythereisnoreasonnottouse-indeedIconsiderthereiseveryjustificationforusing--thegood oldexpression"agreementwithreality." Theastoundingerrorofthe"coherence theory"canbeexplained onlybythefactthatitsdefendersandexpositorswerethinkingonly ofsuchstatementsasactuallyoccurinscience,andtookthemas theironlyexamples.Undertheseconditionstherelationof noncontradictionwasinfactsufficient,butonlybecausethese statementsareofaveryspecialcharacter.Theyhave,thatis,ina certainsense(tobeexplainedpresently)their"origin"in observationstatements,theyderive,asonemayconfidentlysayin thetraditionalwayofspeaking,"fromexperience." Ifoneistotakecoherenceseriouslyasageneralcriterionoftruth, thenonemustconsiderarbitraryfairystoriestobeastrueasa historicalreport,orasstatementsinatextbookofchemistry, providedthestoryisconstructedinsuchawaythatnocontradiction everarises.Icandepictbyhelpoffantasyagrotesqueworldfullof bizarre adventures:thecoherencephilosophermustbelieveinthe truthofmyaccountprovidedonlyItakecareofthemutual compatibilityofmystatements,andalsotaketheprecautionof avoidinganycollisionwiththeusualdescriptionoftheworld,by placingthesceneofmystoryonadistantstar,whereno observationispossible.Indeed,strictlyspeaking,Idon'teven requirethisprecautionIcanjustaswelldemandthattheothers havetoadaptthemselvestomydescriptionandnottheotherway round.Theycannotthenobjectthat,say,thishappeningruns countertotheobservations,foraccording -215tothecoherencetheorythereisnoquestionofobservations,but onlyofthecompatibilityofstatements. Sincenoonedreamsofholdingthestatementsofastorybooktrue

andthoseofatextofphysicsfalse,thecoherenceviewfailsutterly. Somethingmore,thatis,mustbeaddedtocoherence,namely,a principleintermsofwhichthecompatibilityistobeestablished, andthiswouldalonethenbetheactualcriterion. IfIamgivenasetofstatements,amongwhicharefoundsome thatcontradicteachother,Icanestablishconsistencyinanumber ofways,by,forexample,ononeoccasionselectingcertain statementsandabandoningoralteringthemandonanother occasiondoingthesamewiththeotherstatementsthatcontradict thefirst. Thusthecoherencetheoryisshowntobelogicallyimpossibleit failsaltogethertogiveanunambiguouscriterionoftruth,forby meansofitIcanarrive atanynumberofconsistentsystemsof statementswhichareincompatiblewithoneanother. Theonlywaytoavoidthisabsurdityisnottoallowanystatements whatevertobeabandonedoraltered,butrathertospecifythose thataretobemaintained,towhichtheremainderhavetobe accommodated.

IV
Thecoherencetheoryisthusdisposedof,andwehaveinthe meantimearrivedatthesecondpointofourcriticalconsiderations, namely,atthequestionwhetherallstatementsarecorrigible,or whethertherearealsothosethatcannotbeshaken.Theselatter wouldofcourseconstitutethe"basis"ofallknowledge whichwe havebeenseeking,withoutsofarbeingabletotakeanystep towardsit. Bywhatmark,then,arewetodistinguishthesestatementswhich themselvesremainunaltered,whileallothersmustbebroughtinto agreementwiththem?Weshallinwhatfollowscallthemnot "protocolstatements,"but"basicstatements"foritisquitedubious whethertheyoccuratallamongtheprotocolsofscience. Themostobviousrecoursewoulddoubtlessbetofindtherulefor whichwearesearchinginsomekindofeconomyprinciple,namely, tosay:wearetochoosethoseasbasicstatementswhoseretention requiresaminimumofalterationinthewholesystemofstatements inordertoriditofallcontradictions. Itisworthnoticingthatsuchaneconomyprinciplewouldnotenable ustopickoutcertainstatementsasbeingbasiconceandforall,for itmighthappenthatwiththeprogressofsciencethe -216basicstatementsthatservedassuchuptoagivenmomentwould beagaindegraded,ifitappearedmoreeconomicaltoabandon theminfavorofnewlyfoundstatementswhichfromthattimeonuntilfurthernotice--wouldplaythebasicrole.Thiswould,ofcourse,

nolongerbethepurecoherenceviewpoint,butonebasedon economy"relativity,"however,wouldcharacterizeitalso. Thereseemstomenoquestionbutthattherepresentativesofthe viewwehavebeencriticizingdidinfacttaketheeconomyprinciple astheirguidinglight,whetherexplicitlyorimplicitlyIhave therefore alreadyassumedabovethatontherelativityviewthere arepurposivegroundswhichdeterminetheselectionofprotocol statements,andIasked:Canweadmitthis? Inowanswerthisquestioninthenegative.Itisinfactnot economicpurposivenessbutquiteothercharacteristicswhich distinguishthegenuinebasicstatements. Theprocedure forchoosingthesestatementswouldbecalled economicifitconsistedsayinconformingtotheopinions(or "protocolstatements")ofthemajorityofinvestigators.Nowitisof coursethecasethatwedonotdoubttheexistenceofafact,for exampleafactofgeographyorhistory,orevenofanaturallaw, whenwefindthatintherelevantcontextsitsexistenceisvery frequentlyreported.Itdoesnotoccurtousinthosecasestowish toinvestigatethematterourselves.Weacquiesceinwhatis universallyacknowledged.Butthisisexplainedbythefactthatwe havepreciseknowledge ofthemannerinwhichsuchfactual statementstendtobemade,andthatthismannerwinsour confidenceitisnotthatitagreeswiththeviewofthemajority. Quitethecontrary,itcouldonlyarrive atuniversalacceptance becauseeveryone feelsthesameconfidence.Whetherandtowhat extentweholdastatementtobecorrigibleorannulabledepends solelyonitsorigin,and(apartfromveryspecialcases)notatall uponwhethermaintainingitrequiresthecorrectionofverymany otherstatementsandperhapsareorganizationofthewholesystem ofknowledge. Beforeonecanapplytheprincipleofeconomyonemustknowto whichstatementsitistobeapplied.Andiftheprinciplewerethe onlydecisiveruletheanswercouldonlybe:toallthatareasserted withanyclaimtovalidityorhaveeverbeensoasserted.Indeed, thephrase"withanyclaimtovalidity"shouldbeomitted,forhow shouldwedistinguishsuchstatementsfromthosewhichwere assertedquitearbitrarily,asjokesorwithintenttodeceive?This distinctioncannotevenbeformulatedwithouttakingintoconsidera-217tionthederivationofthestatements.Sowefindourselvesonce morereferredtothequestionoftheirorigin.Withouthaving classifiedstatementsaccordingtotheirorigin,anyapplicationofthe economyprincipleofagreementwouldbequiteabsurd.Butonce onehasexaminedthestatementswithrespecttotheiroriginit becomesimmediatelyobviousthatonehastherebyalready orderedthemintermsoftheirvalidity,andthatthereisnoplace leftfortheapplicationoftheprincipleofeconomy(apartfrom certainveryspecialcasesinstillunfinishedareasofscience).We

canseealsothattheestablishmentofthisorderpointsthewayto thebasisofwhichweareinsearch.

V
Hereofcoursethegreatestcareisnecessary.Forwearetreading onthepathwhichhasbeenfollowedfromancienttimesbyall thosewhohaveeverembarkeduponthejourneytowardsthe ultimategroundsoftruth.Andalwaystheyhavefailedtoreachthe goal.IntheorderingofstatementsaccordingtotheiroriginwhichI undertake forthepurposeofjudgingtheircertainty,Istartby assigningaspecialplacetothosethatImakemyself.Andherea secondarypositionisoccupiedbythosethatlieinthepast,forwe believethattheircertaintycanbeimpairedby"errorsofmemory"-andindeedingeneralthemoresothefartherbackintimetheylie. Ontheotherhand,thestatementswhichstandatthetop,free fromalldoubt,arethosethatexpressfactsofone'sown "perception,"orwhateveryouliketocallit.Butinspiteofthefact thatstatementsofthissortseemsosimpleandclear,philosophers havefoundthemselvesinahopelesslabyrinththemomentthey actuallyattemptedtousethemasthefoundationofallknowledge. Somepuzzlingsectionsofthislabyrinthareforexamplethose formulationsanddeductionsthathaveoccupiedthecenterofso manyphilosophicaldisputesundertheheading"evidence ofinner perception,""solipsism,""solipsismofthepresentmoment,""selfconsciouscertainty,"etc.TheCartesiancogitoergosumisthebestknownofthedestinationstowhichthispathhasled--aterminating pointtowhichindeedAugustinehadalreadypushedthrough.And concerningcogitoergosumoureyeshavetodaybeensufficiently opened:weknowthatitisamerepseudo-statement,whichdoes notbecomegenuinebybeingexpressedintheform"cogitatioest"-"thecontentsofconsciousnessexist."5Suchastatement,which doesnotexpressanythingitself,cannotinanysenseserveasthe basisofanything. ____________________ 5Cf."PositivismusundRealismus",Erkenntnis,Vol.III,p.20(see thepresentvolume,p.82above). -218Itisnotitselfacognition,andnonerestsuponit.Itcannotlend certaintytoanycognition. Thereexiststherefore thegreatestdangerthatinfollowingthe pathrecommendedonewillarrive atemptyverbiage insteadofthe basisoneseeks.Thecriticaltheoryofprotocolstatements originatedindeedinthewishtoavoidthisdanger.Butthewayout proposedbyitisunsatisfactory.Itsessentialdeficiencyliesin ignoringthedifferentrankofstatements,whichexpressesitself mostclearlyinthefactthatforthesystemofsciencewhichone takestobethe"right"one,one'sownstatementsintheendplay theonlydecisiverole.

Itwouldbetheoreticallyconceivablethatmyownobservationsin nowaysubstantiatetheassertionsmadeabouttheworldbyother men.ItmightbethatallthebooksthatIread,alltheteachersthat Ihearareinperfectagreementamongthemselves,thatthey nevercontradictoneanother,butthattheyaresimplyincompatible withalargepartofmyownobservationstatements.(Certain difficultieswouldinthiscaseaccompanytheproblemoflearning thelanguageanditsuseincommunication,buttheycanbe removedbymeansofcertainassumptionsconcerningtheplacein whichthecontradictionsaretoappear.)Accordingtotheviewwe havebeencriticizingIwouldinsuchacasesimplyhavetosacrifice myown"protocolstatements,"fortheywouldbeopposedbythe overwhelmingmassofotherstatementswhichwouldbeinmutual agreementthemselves,anditwouldbeimpossibletoexpectthat theseshouldbecorrectedinaccordancewithmyownlimited fragmentaryexperience. Butwhatwouldactuallyhappeninsuchacase?Well,underno circumstanceswouldIabandonmyownobservationstatements. Onthecontrary,IfindthatIcanacceptonlyasystemof knowledgeintowhichtheyfitunmutilated.AndIcanalways constructsuchasystem.Ineedonlyviewtheothersasdreaming fools,inwhosemadnessliesaremarkable method,or--toexpress itmoreobjectively--Iwouldsaythattheothersliveinadifferent worldfrommine,whichhasjustsomuchincommonwithmineas tomakeitpossibletoachieveunderstandingbymeansofthesame language.InanycasenomatterwhatworldpictureIconstruct,I wouldtestitstruthalwaysintermsofmyownexperience.Iwould neverpermitanyonetotakethissupportfromme:myown observationstatementswouldalwaysbetheultimatecriterion.I should,sotospeak,exclaim"WhatIsee,Isee!" -219-

VI
Inthelightofthesepreliminarycriticalremarks,itisclearwhere wehavetolookforthesolutionoftheseconfusingdifficulties:we mustusetheCartesianroadinsofarasitisgoodandpassable, butthenbecarefultoavoidfallingintothecogitoergosumand relatednonsense.Weeffectthisbymakingcleartoourselvesthe rolewhichreallybelongstothestatementsexpressing"the immediatelyobserved." Whatactuallyliesbehindone'ssayingthattheyare"absolutely certain"?Andinwhatsensemayonedescribethemastheultimate groundofallknowledge? Letusconsiderthesecondquestionfirst.IfweimaginethatIat oncerecordedeveryobservation--anditisinprincipleindifferent whetherthisisdoneonpaperorinmemory--andthenbeganfrom thatpointtheconstructionofscience,Ishouldhavebeforeme genuine"protocolstatements"whichstoodtemporallyatthe beginningofknowledge.Fromthemwouldgraduallyarisetherest

ofthestatementsofscience,bymeansoftheprocesscalled "induction,"whichconsistsinnothingelsethanthatIamstimulated orinducedbytheprotocolstatementstoestablishtentative generalizations(hypotheses),fromwhichthosefirststatements,but alsoanendlessnumberofothers,followlogically.Ifnowthese othersexpressthesameasisexpressedbylaterobservation statementsthatareobtainedunderquitedefiniteconditionswhich areexactlyspecifiablebeforehand,thenthehypothesesare consideredtobeconfirmedsolongasnoobservationstatements appearthatstandincontradictiontothestatementsderivedfrom thehypothesesandthustothehypothesesthemselves.Solongas thisdoesnotoccurwebelieveourselvestohavehitcorrectlyupon alawofnature.Inductionisthusnothingbutmethodically conductedguessing,apsychological,biologicalprocesswhose conducthascertainlynothingtodowith"logic." Inthiswaytheactualprocedureofscienceisdescribed schematically.Itisevidentwhatroleisplayedinitbythe statementsconcerningwhatis"immediatelyperceived."Theyare notidenticalwiththosewrittendownormemorized,withwhatcan correctlybecalled"protocolstatements,"buttheyaretheoccasions oftheirformation.Theprotocolstatementsobservedinabookor memoryare,asweacknowledgedlongago,sofarastheirvalidity goes,doubtlesstobecomparedtohypotheses.For,whenwehave suchastatementbeforeus,itisamereassumptionthatitistrue, thatit -220agreeswiththeobservationstatementsthatgiverisetoit.(Indeed itmayhavebeenoccasionedbynoobservationstatements,but derivedfromsomegameorother.)WhatIcallanobservation statementcannotbeidenticalwithagenuineprotocolstatement,if onlybecauseinacertainsenseitcannotbewrittendownatall-a pointwhichweshallpresentlydiscuss. Thusintheschemaofthebuildingupofknowledge thatIhave described,thepartplayedbyobservationstatementsisfirstthatof standingtemporallyatthebeginningofthewholeprocess, stimulatingitandsettingitgoing.Howmuchoftheircontententers intoknowledgeremainsinprincipleatfirstundetermined.Onecan thuswithsomejusticeseeintheobservationstatementsthe ultimateoriginofallknowledge.Butshouldtheybedescribedas thebasis,astheultimatecertainground?Thiscanhardlybe maintained,forthis"origin"standsinatooquestionablerelationto theedificeofknowledge.Butinadditionwehaveconceivedofthe trueprocessasschematicallysimplified.Inrealitywhatisactually expressedinprotocolsstandsinalesscloseconnectionwiththe observed,andingeneraloneoughtnottoassumethatanypure observationstatementseverslipinbetweentheobservationand the"protocol." Butnowasecondfunctionappearstobelongtothesestatements

abouttheimmediatelyperceived,these"confirmations"*aswe mayalsocallthem,namely,thecorroborationofhypotheses,their verification. Sciencemakespropheciesthataretestedby"experience."Its essentialfunctionconsistsinmakingpredictions.Itsays,for example:"Ifatsuchandsuchatimeyoulookthroughatelescope adjustedinsuchandsuchamanneryouwillseeapointoflight(a star)incoincidencewithablackmark(crosswires)."Letusassume thatinfollowingouttheseinstructionsthepredictedexperience actuallyoccurs.Thismeansthatwemakeananticipated ____________________ *The term usedbythe authoris"Konstatierung"whichhe sometimesequateswith"observationstatement"i.e., "Beobachtungssatz,"andgenerallytendstoquote,inamanner indicatinghisawarenessthatitisasomewhatunusualusageand perhapsanotaltogetheradequatetechnicalterm.WilfredSellars inarecentlypublishedessay("EmpiricismandthePhilosophyof Mind,"MinnesotaStudiesinthePhilosophyofScience,VolumeI, UniversityofMinnesotaPress,1956)usestheterm"report"in referringtowhatseemstobethekindofstatementSchlickis discussing.Idonotadoptthisterm,despitesomeundoubted advantagesithasover"confirmation,"becauseoftheclose connectionthat"Konstatierung"haswithconfirmationor verification,aconnectionsoclosethatSchlickusesthesameterm unquotedtorefertoconfirmation.Furthermore,asthetext shows,confirmationsareneverfalse,asSchlickunderstands thembutthisiscertainlynotacharacteristicofreports,asthe term"report"isusedineverydayorevenscientificlanguage. (Translator'snote.) -221confirmation,wepronounceanexpectedjudgmentofobservation, weobtaintherebyafeelingoffulfilment,aquitecharacteristic satisfaction:wearesatisfied.Oneisfullyjustifiedinsayingthatthe confirmationorobservationstatementshavefulfilledtheirtrue missionassoonasweobtainthispeculiarsatisfaction. Anditisobtainedintheverymomentinwhichtheconfirmation takesplace,inwhichtheobservationstatementismade.Thisisof theutmostimportance.Forthusthefunctionofthestatements abouttheimmediatelyexperienceditselfliesintheimmediate present.Indeedwesawthattheyhavesotospeaknoduration, thatthemomenttheyaregoneonehasatone'sdisposalintheir placeinscriptions,ormemorytraces,thatcanplayonlytheroleof hypothesesandtherebylackultimatecertainty.Onecannotbuild anylogicallytenablestructureupontheconfirmations,fortheyare gonethemomentonebeginstoconstruct.Iftheystandatthe beginningoftheprocessofcognitiontheyarelogicallyofnouse. Quiteotherwise howeveriftheystandattheendtheybring verification(oralsofalsification)tocompletion,andinthemoment

oftheiroccurrence theyhavealreadyfulfilledtheirduty.Logically nothingmoredependsonthem,noconclusionsaredrawnfrom them.Theyconstituteanabsoluteend. Ofcourse,psychologicallyandbiologicallyanewprocessof cognitionbeginswiththesatisfactiontheycreate:thehypotheses whoseverificationendsinthemareconsideredtobeupheld,and theformulationofmoregeneralhypothesesissought,theguessing andsearchforuniversallawsgoeson.Theobservationstatements constitutetheoriginandstimulifortheseeventsthatfollowintime, inthesensedescribedearlier. Itseemstomethatbymeansoftheseconsiderationsanewand clearlightiscastupontheproblemoftheultimatebasisof knowledge,andweseeclearlyhowtheconstructionofthesystem ofknowledgetakesplaceandwhatrolethe"confirmations"playin it. Cognitionisoriginallyameansintheserviceoflife.Inordertofind hiswayaboutinhisenvironmentandtoadjusthisactionsto events,manmustbeabletoforeseetheseeventstoacertain extent.Forthishemakesuseofuniversalstatements,cognitions, andhecanmakeuseofthemonlyinsofaraswhathasbeen predictedactuallyoccurs.Nowinsciencethischaracterofcognition remainswhollyunalteredtheonlydifferenceisthatitnolonger servesthepurposesoflife,isnotsoughtbecauseofitsutility.With theconfirmationofpredictionthescientificgoalisachieved:thejoy incognitionisthejoyofverification,thetriumphantfeelingof -222havingguessedcorrectly.Anditisthisthattheobservation statementsbringabout.Inthemscienceasitwereachievesits goal:itisfortheirsakethatitexists.Thequestionhiddenbehind theproblemoftheabsolutelycertainbasisofknowledge is,asit were,thatofthelegitimacyofthissatisfactionwithwhich verificationfillsus.Haveourpredictionsactuallycometrue?In everysinglecaseofverificationorfalsificationa"confirmation" answersunambiguouslywithayesorano,withjoyoffulfilmentor disappointment.Theconfirmationsarefinal. Finalityisaveryfittingwordtocharacterizethefunctionof observationstatements.Theyareanabsoluteend.Inthemthe taskofcognitionatthispointisfulfilled.Thatanewtaskbegins withthepleasureinwhichtheyculminate,andwiththehypotheses thattheyleavebehinddoesnotconcernthem.Sciencedoesnot restuponthembutleadstothem,andtheyindicatethatithasled correctly.Theyarereallytheabsolutefixedpointsitgivesusjoyto reachthem,evenifwecannotstanduponthem.

VII
Inwhatdoesthisfixityconsist?Thisbringsustothequestionwe postponedearlier:inwhatsensecanonespeakofobservation

statementsasbeing"absolutelycertain"? Ishouldliketothrowlightonthisbyfirstsayingsomethingabouta quitedifferentkindofstatement,namelyaboutanalytic statements.Iwillthencomparethesetothe"confirmations."Inthe caseofanalyticstatementsitiswellknownthatthequestionof theirvalidityconstitutesnoproblem.Theyholdapriorionecannot andshouldnottrytolooktoexperience forproofoftheir correctnessfortheysaynothingwhateveraboutobjectsof experience.Forthisreasononly"formaltruth"pertainstothem, i.e.,theyarenot"true"becausetheycorrectlyexpresssomefact. Whatmakesthemtrueisjusttheirbeingcorrectlyconstructed,i.e. theirstandinginagreementwithourarbitrarilyestablished definitions. However,certainphilosophicalwritershavethoughtthemselves obligedtoask:Yes,buthowdoIknowinanindividualcase whetherastatementreallystandsinagreementwiththedefinition, whetheritisreallyanalyticandtherefore holdswithoutquestion? MustInotcarryinmyheadthesedefinitions,themeaningofall thewordsthatareusedwhenIspeakorhearorreadthe statementevenifitenduresonlyforasecond?ButcanIbesure thatmypsychologicalcapacitiessufficeforthis?Isitnotpossible, forexample,thatattheend -223ofthestatementIshouldhaveforgottenorincorrectly rememberedthebeginning?MustInotthusagreethatfor psychologicalreasonsIcanneverbesureofthevalidityofan analyticjudgmentalso? Tothisthereisthefollowinganswer:thepossibilityofafailureof thepsychicmechanismmustofcoursealwaysbegranted,butthe consequencesthatfollowfromitarenotcorrectlydescribedinthe scepticalquestionsjustraised. Itcanbethatowingtoaweaknessofmemory,andathousand othercauses,wedonotunderstandastatement,orunderstandit erroneously(i.e.differentlyfromthewayitwasintended)--but whatdoesthissignify?Well,solongasIhavenotunderstooda sentenceitisnotastatementatallforme,butamereseriesof words,ofsoundsorwrittensigns.Inthiscasethereisnoproblem, foronlyofastatement,notofanuncomprehendedseriesof words,canoneaskwhetheritisanalyticorsynthetic.ButifIhave misinterpretedaseriesofwords,butneverthelessinterpreteditas astatement,thenIknowofjustthisstatementwhetheritis analyticorsyntheticandtherefore validaprioriornot.Onemay notsupposethatIcouldcomprehendastatementassuchandstill beindoubtconcerningitsanalyticcharacter.ForifitisanalyticI haveunderstooditonlywhenIhaveunderstooditasanalytic.To understandmeansnothingelse,thatis,thantobeclearaboutthe rulesgoverningtheuseofthewordsinquestionbutitisprecisely theserulesofusagethatmakestatementsanalytic.IfIdonot

knowwhetheracomplexofwordsconstitutesananalyticstatement ornot,thissimplymeansthatatthatmomentIlacktherulesof usage:thattherefore Ihavesimplynotunderstoodthestatement. ThusthecaseisthateitherIhaveunderstoodnothingatall,and thennothingmoreistobesaid,orIknowwhetherthestatement whichIunderstandissyntheticoranalytic(whichofcoursedoesnot presupposethatthesewordshoverbeforeme,thatIameven acquaintedwiththem).InthecaseofananalyticstatementIknow atoneandthesametimethatitisvalid,thatformaltruthbelongs toit. Theabovedoubtconcerningthevalidityofanalyticstatementswas therefore outoforder.ImayindeeddoubtwhetherIhave correctlygraspedthemeaningofsomecomplexofsigns,infact whetherIshalleverunderstandthemeaningofanysequenceof words.ButIcannotraisethequestionwhetherIcanascertainthe correctnessofananalyticstatement.Fortounderstanditsmeaning andtonoteitsapriorivalidityareinananalyticstatementoneand thesameprocess.Incontrast,asyntheticassertionischaracterized bythefactthatIdonotintheleastknowwhetheritis -224trueorfalseifIhaveonlyascertaineditsmeaning.Itstruthis determinedonlybycomparisonwithexperience.Theprocessof graspingthemeaningisherequitedistinctfromtheprocessof verification. Thereisbutoneexceptiontothis.Andwethusreturntoour "confirmations."These,thatis,arealwaysoftheform"Herenow soandso,"forexample"Heretwoblackpointscoincide,"or"Here yellowbordersonblue,"oralso"Here nowpain,"etc.Whatis commontoalltheseassertionsisthatdemonstrativetermsoccurin themwhichhavethesenseofapresentgesture,i.e.theirrulesof usageprovidethatinmakingthestatementsinwhichtheyoccur someexperience ishad,theattentionisdirecteduponsomething observed.Whatisreferredtobysuchwordsas"here,""now,""this here,"cannotbecommunicatedbymeansofgeneraldefinitionsin words,butonlybymeansofthemtogetherwithpointingsor gestures."Thishere"hasmeaningonlyinconnectionwitha gesture.Inordertherefore tounderstandthemeaningofsuchan observationstatementonemustsimultaneouslyexecutethe gesture,onemustsomehowpointtoreality. Inotherwords:Icanunderstandthemeaningofa"confirmation" onlyby,andwhen,comparingitwiththefacts,thuscarryingout thatprocesswhichisnecessaryfortheverificationofallsynthetic statements.Whileinthecaseofallothersyntheticstatements determiningthemeaningisseparatefrom,distinguishablefrom, determiningthetruth,inthecaseofobservationstatementsthey coincide,justasinthecaseofanalyticstatements.However differenttherefore "confirmations"arefromanalyticstatements, theyhaveincommonthattheoccasionofunderstandingthemisat thesametimethatofverifyingthem:Igrasptheirmeaningatthe

sametimeasIgrasptheirtruth.Inthecaseofaconfirmationit makesaslittlesensetoaskwhetherImightbedeceivedregarding itstruthasinthecaseofatautology.Bothareabsolutelyvalid. However,whiletheanalytic,tautological,statementisemptyof content,theobservationstatementsuppliesuswiththesatisfaction ofgenuineknowledgeofreality. Ithasbecomeclear,wemayhope,thathereeverythingdepends onthecharacteristicofimmediacywhichispeculiartoobservation statementsandtowhichtheyowetheirvalueanddisvaluethe valueofabsolutevalidity,andthedisvalueofuselessnessasan abidingfoundation. Amisunderstandingofthisnatureisresponsibleformostofthe unhappyproblemsofprotocolstatementswithwhichouren-225quirybegan.IfImaketheconfirmation"Herenowblue,"thisisnot thesameastheprotocolstatement"M.S.perceivedblueonthe nthofApril1934atsuchandsuchatimeandsuchandsucha place."Thelatterstatementisahypothesisandassuchalways characterizedbyuncertainty.Thelatterstatementisequivalentto "M.S.made...(here timeandplacearetobegiven)the confirmation'herenowblue.'"Andthatthisassertionisnotidentical withtheconfirmationoccurringinitisclear.Inprotocolstatements thereisalwaysmentionofperceptions(ortheyaretobeaddedin thought--theidentityoftheperceivingobserverisimportantfora scientificprotocol),whiletheyarenevermentionedin confirmations.Agenuineconfirmationcannotbewrittendown,for assoonasIinscribethedemonstratives"here,""now,"theylose theirmeaning.Neithercantheybereplacedbyanindicationof timeandplace,forassoonasoneattemptstodothis,theresult, aswesaw,isthatoneunavoidablysubstitutesfortheobservation statementaprotocolstatementwhichassuchhasawhollydifferent nature.

VIII
Ibelievethattheproblemofthebasisofknowledge isnow clarified. Ifscienceistakentobeasystemofstatementsinwhichone's interestasalogicianisconfinedtotheirlogicalconnections,the questionofitsbasis,whichwouldthenbea'logical"question,can beansweredquitearbitrarily.Foroneisfreetodefinethebasisas onewishes.Inanabstractsystemofstatementsthereisnopriority andnoposteriority.Forinstance,themostgeneralstatementsof science,thusthosethatarenormallyselectedasaxioms,couldbe regardedasitsultimatefoundationbutthisnamecouldjustas wellbereservedforthemostparticularstatements,whichwould thenmoreorlessactuallycorrespondtotheprotocolswritten down.Oranyotherchoicewouldbepossible.Butallthestatements ofsciencearecollectivelyandindividuallyhypothesesthemoment

oneconsidersthemfromthepointofviewoftheirtruthvalue,their validity. Ifattentionisdirectedupontherelationofsciencetorealitythe systemofitsstatementsisseentobethatwhichitreallyis, namely,ameansoffindingone'swayamongthefactsofarriving atthejoyofconfirmation,thefeelingoffinality.Theproblemof the"basis"changesthenautomaticallyintothatoftheunshakeable pointofcontactbetweenknowledge andreality.Wehavecometo knowtheseabsolutelyfixedpointsofcontact,theconfirmations,in -226theirindividuality:theyaretheonlysyntheticstatementsthatare nothypotheses.Theydonotinanywaylieatthebaseofscience butlikeaflame,cognition,asitwere,licksouttothem,reaching eachbutforamomentandthenatonceconsumingit.Andnewly fedandstrengthened,itflamesonwardtothenext. Thesemomentsoffulfilmentandcombustionarewhatisessential. Allthelightofknowledgecomesfromthem.Anditisforthesource ofthislightthephilosopherisreallyinquiringwhenheseeksthe ultimatebasisofallknowledge. -227-

11
VerificationandExperience
BYA.J.AYER WHATISITthatdeterminesthetruthorfalsehoodofempirical propositions?Thecustomaryansweris,ineffect,thatitistheir agreementordisagreementwithreality.Isay"ineffect"becauseI wishtoallowforalternative formulations.Therearesomewho wouldspeakofcorrespondence oraccordanceratherthan agreementsomewhofortheword"reality"wouldsubstitute "facts"or"experience."ButIdonotthinkthatthechoiceof differentwordsherereflectsanyimportantdifferenceofmeaning. Thisanswer,thoughIbelieveittobecorrect,requiressome elucidation.ToquoteWilliamJames"Pragmatistsand Intellectualistsbothaccept(it)asamatterofcourse.Theybeginto quarrelonlyafterthequestionisraisedastowhatpreciselymaybe meantbytheterm'agreement'andwhatbytheterm'reality'when realityistakenassomethingforourideastoagreewith."1Ihope atleasttothrowsomelightuponthisquestioninthecourseofthis paper. Itwillsimplifyourundertakingifwecandrawadistinctionbetween thoseempiricalpropositionswhosetruthorfalsehoodcanbe determinedonlybyascertainingthetruthorfalsehoodofother

propositionsandthosewhosetruthorfalsehoodcanbedetermined directlybyobservation.Totheformerclassbelongalluniversal propositions.Wecannot,forexample,directlyestablishthetruthor falsehoodofthepropositionthatgoldisdissolubleinaquaregia, unlessofcourseweregardthisasadefiningattributeofgoldand somakethepropositionintoatautology.Wetestitbyestablishing thetruthorfalsehoodofsingularpropositionsrelating,among otherthings,toparticularpiecesofgold.Wemayindeeddeduce oneuniThispaperwasoriginallypublishedintheProceedingsof theAristotelianSociety,Volume37(1936-37).Itis reprintedherewiththepermissionofthesecretaryofthe AristotelianSociety. ____________________ 1Pragmatism ,p.198. -228versalpropositionfromanother,oreveninferitbyanalogy,butin allsuchcaseswemustfinallyarrive atapropositionforwhichthe evidenceconsistssolelyinthetruthorfalsehoodofcertainsingular propositions.Itisheretoberemarkedthatnomatterhowmany suchsingularpropositionswesucceedinestablishingwearenever entitledtoregardtheuniversalpropositionasconclusivelyverified. Howeveroftenwemayhaveobservedthedissolutionofpiecesof goldinaquaregia,wemuststillallowittobepossiblethatthenext piecewithwhichweexperimentwillnotsodissolve.Ontheother handthefalsityofanyoneoftherelevantsingularpropositions doesentailthefalsityoftheuniversalproposition.Itisthislogical assymetryintherelationshipofuniversalandsingularpropositions thathasledsomephilosophers2toadoptthepossibilityof falsificationratherthanthatofverificationastheircriterionof empiricalsignificance. Wesaidthatthewaytotestthevalidityofauniversalproposition aboutthedissolubilityofgoldwastoascertainthetruthor falsehoodofsingularpropositionsreferringtoparticularpiecesof gold.Butthesepropositionsintheirturndependfortheir verificationupontheverificationofotherpropositions.Forapiece ofgoldisamaterialthingandtotestthevalidityofpropositions referringtomaterialthingswemustascertainthetruthor falsehoodofpropositionsreferringtosense-data.Herewehave anotherinstanceoflogicalassymetry.Apropositionreferringtoa materialthingmayentailpropositionsreferringtosense-databut cannotitselfbeentailedbyanyfinitenumberofthem. Nowatlastweseemtohavereachedpropositionswhichneednot waituponotherpropositionsforthedeterminationoftheirtruthor falsehood,butaresuchthattheycanbedirectlyconfrontedwith thegivenfacts.ThesepropositionsIproposetocallbasic propositions.Ifthedistinctionwhichwehavedrawnbetweenthem andotherpropositionsislegitimate,wemayconfineourselves,for

ourpresentpurpose,toquestionsconcerningthenatureofbasic propositionsandthemannerinwhichourdeterminationoftheir validitydependsuponourexperience. Itisnoteworthythatthelegitimacyofthedistinctionwhichwehave drawnisimplicitlyacknowledgedevenbyphilosopherswhoreject thenotionofagreementwithrealityasacriterionoftruth.Neurath andHempel,forexample,haverecentlybeenmaintainingthatitis nonsensicaltospeakofcomparingpropositionswithfacts ____________________ 2NotablyKarlPopper.See hisLogikderForschung. -229orrealityorexperience-3Aproposition,theysay,canbe comparedonlywithanotherproposition.Atthesametimethey assignastatuscorrespondingtothatofourbasicpropositionstoa classofpropositionswhichtheycallprotocolpropositions.According toNeurath,forasentencetoexpressaprotocolpropositionitis necessarythatitshouldcontainthenameordescriptionofan observerandsomewordsreferringtoanactofobservation.He givesthefollowingasanexample."Otto'sprotocolat3.17/Otto's speech-thoughtat3.16was(therewasintheroomat3.15atable observedbyOtto)/."ThisisnotregardedbyNeurathastheonly legitimatewayofformulatingaprotocolproposition.Ifotherscare toadoptadifferentconvention,theyare,asfarasheisconcerned, atlibertytodoso.Butheclaimsforthepeculiarformthathehas chosenthatithastheadvantageofgivingprotocolpropositions greaterstabilitythantheymightotherwisehave. Itiseasyenoughtoseewhyhesaysthis.Heisthinkingofthecase inwhichitturnsoutthatOttohasbeenhavingahallucinationor thatinwhichheisfoundtobelying.Intheformercasethe propositionintheinteriorbracketmustbeheldtobefalseinthe latter,thepropositioninthemainbracket.Butthewhole propositionisnotatruth-functionofthepropositionswithinthe brackets,anymorethantheyaretruth-functionsofoneanother. Wemaytherefore continuetoacceptitevenwhenwehave rejectedthem.Initself,thisisavalidpoint.Butitissurely inconsistentwithNeurath'smainposition.Forhow,ifweare debarredfromappealingtothefacts,canweeverdiscoverthat Ottohasliedorhadahallucination?Neurathmakesthetruthand falsehoodofanypropositionwhatsoeverdependuponits compatibilityorincompatibilitywithotherpropositions.He recognizesnoothercriterion.Inthisrespect,hisprotocol propositionsarenotallowedanyadvantage.Ifwearepresented withaprotocolpropositionandalsowithanon-protocolproposition whichisincompatiblewithitwearenotobligedtoacceptthe protocolpropositionandrejecttheother.Wehaveanequalrightto rejecteither.Butifthisissoweneednotbothertodeviseaspecial formforprotocolpropositionsinordertoensuretheirstability.All wehavetodoifwewishapropositiontobestableistodecideto

acceptitandtorejectanypropositionthatisincompatiblewithit. Thequestionwhethersuchadecisionisem____________________ 3OttoNeurath,Protokollstze ."Erkenntnis",Volume III,p.223, [seeabove,p.1991,and"RadikalerPhysikalismusund'Wirkliche Welt,'"Erkenntnis,Vol.IVCarlHempel,"OntheLogical Positivists'TheoryofTruth,"Analysis,Vol.II,"Some Remarkson Empiricism,"Analysis,Vol.III,and"Some Remarkson'Facts'and Propositions,"Analysis,Vol.II. -230piricallyjustifiedornotisonetowhich,accordingtotheimplications ofNeurath'sdoctrine,nomeaningcanbeattached. OnewondersindeedwhyheandHempelpaysomuchattentionto protocolpropositions,inasmuchastheonlydistinctionwhichthey areabletodrawbetweenthemandotherpropositionsisa distinctionofform.Theydonotmeanbyaprotocolpropositionone whichcanbedirectlyverifiedbyobservation,fortheydenythatthis ispossible.Theyusetheterm"protocol"purelyasasyntactical designationforacertainassemblageofwords.Butwhyshouldone attachspecialsignificancetotheword"observation"?Itmaybethat thereisnoerrorinvolvedinconstructingsentencesofapeculiar typeanddignifyingthemwiththetitleofProtokollstze,butitis arbitraryandmisleading.Thereisnomorejustificationforitthan therewouldbeformakingacollectionofallthepropositionsthat couldbecorrectlyexpressedinEnglishbysentencesbeginningwith theletterB,andchoosingtocallthemBasicpropositions.If NeurathandHempeldonotrecognizethisitisprobablybecause,in writingaboutProtokollstze,theyunconsciouslyemploythe forbiddencriterionofagreementwithexperience.Thoughtheysay thattheterm"protocol"isnothingmorethanasyntactical designation,theydonotuseitmerelyassuch.Weshallseelater onthatCarnapequivocateswiththisterminasimilarway. Itisnot,however,asufficientreasonforrejectingatheorythat someofitsadvocateshavefailedconsistentlytoadheretoit.Andit isnecessaryforustoinvestigatemorecloselytheviewthatin ordertodeterminethevalidityofasystemofempiricalpropositions onecannotandneednotgobeyondthesystemitself.Forifthis viewwere satisfactoryweshouldbeabsolvedfromtroublingany furtherabouttheuseofthephrase"agreementwithexperience." Thetheorywhichwenowhavetoexamineisthatwhichis commonlyknownasthecoherencetheoryoftruth.Itshouldbe notedthatthetheoryisnot,asweinterpretit,concernedwiththe definitionoftruthandfalsehoodbutonlywiththemeansbywhich theyaredetermined.Accordingtoitapropositionistobeaccepted ifitisfoundtobecompatiblewithotheracceptedpropositions, rejectedifitisnot.If,however,weareanxioustoaccepta propositionwhichconflictswithourcurrentsystemwemayabandon oneormoreofthepropositionswhichwehadpreviouslyaccepted.

Insuchacaseweshould,itissometimessaid,beguidedbya principleofeconomy.Weshouldmakethesmallesttransformation ofthesystemwhichensuredself-consistency.Ithinkitisusually assumedalsothatwehave,oroughttohave,apreferencefor largeandhighlyintegrated -231systemssystemscontainingagreatnumberofpropositionswhich supportoneanothertoahighdegree. OnestrongobjectiontothistheoryiswellputbyProfessorPricein hislectureonTruthandCorrigibility."Suppose,"hesays,"wehave agroupofmutuallysupportingjudgments.Theextraordinarything isthathoweverlargethegroupmaybe,andhowevergreatthe supportwhichthemembersgivetoeachother,theentiregroup hangs,sotospeak,intheair.Ifweacceptonemember,nodoubt itwillbereasonabletoaccepttherest.Butwhymustweaccept anyofthem?Whyshouldwenotrejectthewholelot?Mightthey notallbefalse,althoughtheyallsupporteachother?"4Hegoeson toarguethatwecannotconsidersuchasystemofjudgmentsto haveevenanyprobabilityunlesswecanattributetoatleastoneof itsconstituentsaprobabilitywhichisderivedfromsomeother groundthanitsmembershipofthesystem.Hesuggeststherefore thattheonlywaytosavethetheorywouldbetomaintainthat somepropositionswere intrinsicallyprobable.Butthis,thoughhe doesnotsayso,istoreduceittoabsurdity.Thereisnocaseatall tobemadeoutfortheviewthatapropositioncanbeprobable independentlyofallevidence.Themostthatcouldbesaidinfavor ofanyonewhoacceptedPrice'ssuggestionwouldbethathehad chosentogivetheword"probability"anunfamiliarsense. ApointwhichPriceappearstohaveoverlookedisthataccordingto onewell-knownversionofthecoherencetheorytherecanbeonly onecompletelycoherentsystemofpropositions.Ifthisweresothe theorywouldgiveusatleastanunequivocalcriterionfor determiningthetruthofanypropositionnamely,thepossibilityof incorporatingitinthissinglesystem.Itwouldnot,however,afford usanygroundforsupposingthattheenlargementofanapparently coherentsystemofpropositionsincreaseditsprobability.Onthe contrary,weoughtrathertoholdthatitdecreasedit.Forex hypothesianysetofpropositionswhichisinternallycoherentisthe onlyonethatissoif,therefore,wehaveasetofpropositionswhich appearstobeself-consistent,eitheritistheuniquecoherent systemoritcontainsacontradictionwhichwehavefailedto discoverandthelargerthesetthegreatertheprobabilitythatit containsacontradictionwhichwehavefailedtodiscover.Butin sayingthisweareassumingthetruthofapropositionaboutthe limitedpowersofthehumanunderstanding,whichmayormaynot findaplaceintheonecoherentsystem.Perhaps,therefore,it wouldbe ____________________

4TruthandCorrigibility(Inaugurallecture,OxfordUniversityPress,

1936),p19.

-232bettertosaythattheadvocatesofthisformofthecoherence theorydispensewiththenotionofprobabilityaltogether. Butnowwemustask,Whyshoulditbeassumedthatonlyone completelycoherentsystemofpropositionsisconceivable?However manyempiricalpropositionswesucceedincombiningintoan apparentlyself-consistentsystemweseemalwaysabletoconstruct arivalsystemwhichisequallyextensive,appearsequallyfreefrom contradiction,andyetisincompatiblewiththefirst.Whyshouldit beheldthatatleastoneofthesesystemsmustcontaina contradiction,eventhoughweareunabletodetectit?Icanseeno reasonatallforthisassumption.Wemaynotbeableto demonstratethatagivensystemisfreefromcontradictionbutthis doesnotmeanthatitisprobablethatitcontainsone.Thisindeedis recognizedbythemorerecentadvocatesofwhatwearecallinga coherencetheory.Theyadmitthepossibilityofinventingfictitious sciencesandhistorieswhichwouldbejustascomprehensive, elegantandfreefromcontradictionasthoseinwhichweactually believe.Buthowthendotheyproposetodistinguishthetrue systemsfromthefalse? Theanswergiven5isthattheselectionofthetruesystemdoesnot dependuponanyinternalfeaturesofthesystemitself.Itcannotbe effectedbypurelylogicalmeans.Butitcanbecarriedoutinside therealmofdescriptive syntax.Wearetosaythatthetruesystem isthatwhichisbasedupontrueprotocolpropositionsandthattrue protocolpropositionsarethosewhichareproducedbyaccredited observers,includingnotablythescientistsofourera.Logically,it mightbethecasethattheprotocolpropositionswhicheachofus expressedweresodivergentthatnocommonsystemofscienceor onlyaverymeagresystemcouldbebaseduponthem.But fortunatelythisisnotso.Peopledooccasionallyproduce inconvenientprotocolpropositions.Butbeinginasmallminority theyareover-ridden.Theyaresaidtobebadobserversorliarsor, inextreme cases,mad.Itisacontingent,historicalfactthatthe restofusagreeinacceptingan"increasinglycomprehensive, common,scientificsystem."Anditistothis,sothetheoryruns, thatwereferwhenoutofthemanycoherentsystemsofscience thatareconceivablewespeakofonlyoneasbeingtrue. Thisisaningeniousanswerbutitwillnotdo.Onereasonwhywe trust"thescientistsofourera"isthatwebelievethattheygivean accurateaccountoftheirobservations.Butthismeansthatweshall beinvolvedinacircleifwesaythatthereasonwhyweaccept ____________________ 5E.g.,byRudolfCarnap,"Erwiderungaufdie Aufstze vonE.Zilsel undK.Duncker",Erkenntnis,Vol.III,pp.179-180.

-233certainevidenceismerelythatitcomesfromthescientistsofour era.Andfurthermore,Howarewetodeterminethataparticular systemisacceptedbycontemporaryscientistsexceptbyappealing tothefactsofexperience?Butonceitisconcededthatsuchan appealispossiblethereisnolongeranyneedtobringinthe contemporaryscientists.Howevergreatouradmirationforthe achievementsofthescientistsofourerawecanhardlymaintain thatitisonlywithreference totheirbehaviorthatthenotionof agreementwithrealityhasanymeaning.Hempel6hasindeed attemptedtomeetthisobjectionbytellingusthatinsteadofsaying that"thesystemofprotocol-statementswhichwecalltruemayonly becharacterizedbythehistoricalfactthatitisactuallyadoptedby thescientistsofourculturecircle"weoughttoexpressourselves "formally"andsay:"Thefollowingstatementissufficiently confirmedbytheprotocol-statementsadoptedinourscience 'Amongstthenumerousimaginableconsistentsetsofprotocolstatements,thereisinpracticeexactlyonewhichisadoptedbythe vastmajorityofinstructedscientificobserversatthesametime,it isjustthissetwhichwegenerallycalltrue.'"Butthisdoesnot removethedifficulty.Fornowwemustask,Howisitdetermined thattheprotocol-statementswhichsupportthestatementquoted reallyareadoptedinourscience?IfHempelisreallyspeaking formally,ashesaysheis,thenthephrase"adoptedinourscience" mustberegardedmerelyasanarbitrarysyntacticaldesignationof acertainsetofsentences.Butitisclearthathedoesnotintendit tobenothingmorethanthis.Heintendsittoconveythe informationthatthepropositionsexpressedbythesesentences actuallyareadopted.Butthisistore-introduce thereferenceto historicalfactwhichheistryingtoeliminate.Wehavehereafallacy whichisakintothefallacyoftheontologicalargument.Itisnot legitimatetousethephrase"adoptedinourscience"simplyasa meansofnamingcertainstatementsandthenproceedtoinfer fromthisthatthesestatementsreallyareadoptedinit.ButHempel cannotdispensewiththisfallaciousinference.Foreachofmany incompatiblesystemsmightcontainthestatementthatitalonewas acceptedbycontemporaryscientists,togetherwiththeprotocol propositionsthatwere neededtosupportit. Wemayconcludethenthattheattempttolaydownacriterionfor determiningthetruthofempiricalpropositionswhichdoesnot containanyreference to"facts"or"reality"or"experience,"hasnot provedsuccessful.Itseemsplausibleonlywhenitinvolvesatacit introductionofthatveryprincipleofagreementwithreality ____________________ 6Analysis,Vol.III,pp.39-40. -234whichitisdesignedtoobviate.Accordingly,wemayreturntoour

originalquestionconcerningthenatureofbasicpropositionsand themannerinwhichtheirvaliditydependsuponfact.Andfirstofall Iwishtoconsiderhowfarthisquestionadmitsofapurely conventionalanswer. AccordingtoProfessorCarnapitiswhollyamatterofconvention whatpropositionswetakeasbasic."Everyconcreteproposition,"he tellsus,7"belongingtothephysicalisticsystem-languagecanin suitablecircumstancesserveasaprotocolproposition.LetGbea law(thatisageneralpropositionbelongingtothesystem language).Forthepurposeofverificationonemustinthefirst instancederive fromGconcretepropositionsreferringtoparticular spacetimepoints(throughsubstitutionofconcretevaluesforthe spacetimeco-ordinatesx,y,z,twhichoccurinGasfreevariables). Fromtheseconcretepropositionsonemaywiththehelpof additionallawsandlogico-mathematicalrulesofinferencederive furtherconcretepropositions,untilonecomestopropositionswhich intheparticularcaseinquestiononeiswillingtoaccept.Itisherea matterofchoicewhichpropositionsareemployedatanygiventime astheterminatingpointsofthisreduction,thatisasprotocol propositions.Ineverycasetheprocessofreduction,whichserves thepurposeofverification,mustbebroughttoanendsomewhere. Butoneisneverobligedtocallahaltatanyonepointratherthan another." Inreasoningthus,Carnapsaysthatheisfollowingtheexampleof KarlPopper.ActuallyPopperadoptsarathernarrowerconvention. Heproposes,andtakestheviewthattherecaninthismatterbeno warrantforanythingmorethanaproposal,thatbasicpropositions shouldhavetheformofsingularexistentials.Theymust,according tohisconvention,refertoparticularspatio-temporalpointsandthe eventswhicharesaidtobeoccurringatthesepointsmustbe observableevents.Butincaseanyoneshouldthinkthattheuseof theword"observable"bringsinanelementofpsychologyhe hastenstoaddthatinsteadofan"observable"eventhemight equallywellhavespokenofaneventofmotionlocatedin (macroscopic)physicalbodies.8Hisviewsconcerningthe verificationofthesepropositionsaresummedupasfollows:"The basicpropositionsareacceptedbyanactofwill,byconvention.Sie sindFestsetzungen."9 ____________________ 7"berProtokollstze."Erkenntnis,Vol.III,p.224. 8LogikderForschung,p.59. 9Op.cit.,p.62. -235Theverificationofallotherempiricalpropositionsisheldtodepend uponthatofthebasicpropositions.SothatifwetaketheremarkI havequotedliterally,wearepresentedwiththeviewthatour acceptanceorrejectionofanyempiricalpropositionmustbewholly arbitrary.Andthisissurelywrong.Actually,Idonotthinkthat

Popperhimselfwishestomaintainthis.Hisstipulationthatbasic propositionsshouldrefertoobservableeventssuggeststhathe recognizesthatouracceptanceofthemsomehowdependsupon ourobservations.Buthedoesnottellushow. ThereisindeedthismuchtruthinwhatPoppersays.The propositionswhichhecallsbasicrefertomaterialthings.Assuch, theycanbetestedbyobservation,butneverconclusively established.For,aswehavealreadyremarked,althoughtheymay entailpropositionsreferringtosense-datatheycannotbeentailed bythem.Itfollowsthatthereisinouracceptanceoftheman elementofconvention.Icannotcarryoutallthetestswhichwould bearuponthetruthofevensosimpleapropositionasthatmypen islyingonmytable.Inpractice,therefore,Iacceptsucha propositionaftermakingonlyalimitednumberoftests,perhaps onlyasingletest,whichleavesitstillpossiblethatitisfalse.But thisisnottosaythatmyacceptanceofitistheresultofan arbitrarydecision.Ihavecollectedsomeevidenceinfavorofthe proposition,eventhoughitmaynotbeconclusiveevidence.Imight haveaccepteditwithouthavinganyevidenceatallandthenmy decisionwould,infact,havebeenarbitrary.Thereisnoharmin Popper'sinsistingthatouracceptanceofsuchpropositionsashe callsbasicisnotwhollydictatedbylogicbutheoughtstillto distinguishthecasesinwhichouracceptanceofa"basic" propositionisreasonablefromthoseinwhichitisnot.Wemaysay thatitisreasonablewhenthepropositionissupportedbyour observations.Butwhatismeantbysayingthatapropositionis supportedbyourobservations?Thisisaquestionwhichinhis discussionofthe"Basis-problem"Popperdoesnotanswer. Wefind,therefore,thatthis"discovery"ofPopper'swhichhasbeen fastenedontobyCarnapamountstonomorethanthisthatthe processoftestingpropositionsreferringtophysicalobjectscanbe extendedasfaraswechoose.Whatisconventionalisourdecision tocarryitinanygivencasejustsofarandnofarther.Toexpress this,asCarnapdoes,bysayingthatitisamatterofconvention whatpropositionswetakeasprotocolsissimplytogivetheterm "protocolproposition"anunfamiliarmeaning.Weunderstandthat henowproposestouseittodesignateanysingularproposition,be-236longingto"thephysicalisticsystem-language,"whichweare preparedtoacceptwithoutfurthertests.Thisisaperfectly legitimateusage.Whatisnotlegitimateistoignorethediscrepancy betweenitandhisformerusageaccordingtowhichprotocol propositionswere saidto"describedirectlygivenexperience."And inabandoningtheoriginalusagehehasincidentallyshelvedthe problemwhichitwasdesignedtomeet. Elsewhere,10Carnaphassuggestedthatproblemsconcerningthe natureofbasicpropositions,inoursenseoftheterm,dependfor theirsolutiononlyonconventionsaboutformsofwords.Ithinkthat

this,too,canbeshowntobeamistake.Mostpeoplearebynow familiarwithhisdivisionofpropositionsintofactualpropositions suchas"therosesinmygardenarered,"pseudo-factual propositionssuchas"aroseisathing,"whicharealsosaidtobe syntacticalpropositions,expressedinthematerialmodeofspeech, andpropositionssuchas"'rose'isathing-word,"whichare syntacticalandexpressedintheformalmodeofspeech.Nowwhen heraisesthequestion"Whatobjectsaretheelementsofgiven, directexperience?"hetreatsitasifitwereasyntacticalquestion, expressedinthematerialmodeofspeech.Thatis,heconsidersit tobealoosewayofraisingthequestion"Whatkindsofwordoccur inprotocolstatements?"11Andhesetsoutvariouspossibleanswers bothinwhathecallsthematerialandinwhathecallstheformal mode.Thus,hesaysthatitmaybethecasethat"theelements thataredirectlygivenarethesimplestsensationsandfeelings"or "morecomplexobjectssuchaspartialgestaltsofsinglesensory fields"orthat"materialthingsareelementsofthegiven"andhe takesthesetobemisleadingwaysofsayingthat"protocolstatementsareofthesamekindas:'joynow,''here,now,blue'"or that"protocolstatementsareofformssimilarto'redcircle,now'"or thattheyhave"approximatelythesamekindofformas'aredcube isonthetable.'"12Inthiswayheassumesthatquestionsabout thenatureofimmediateexperience arelinguisticincharacter.And thisleadshimtodismissallthe"problemsoftheso-calledgivenor primitivedata"asdependingonlyuponourchoiceofaformof language.13ButthisistorepeattheerrorofNeurathandHempel, whichwehavealreadyexposed.Iftheterm"protocol-statement" wasbeingusedmerelyasasyntacticaldesignationforcertain combinationsof ____________________ 10LogicalSyntaxofLanguage ,pp.305-6. 11The UnityofScience ,p.45. 12The UnityofScience ,pp.46-7. 13The LogicalSyntaxofLanguage ,pp.305-6. -237symbolsthenourchoiceofthesentencestowhichweappliedit wouldindeedbeamatterofconvention.Itwouldinvolve nomore reference totruththanadecisiontoapplythedesignation"basic" toallEnglishsentencesbeginningwithB.Butthisisnotthesensein whichCarnapissupposedtobeusingtheterm.Heisusingitnotto markouttheformofcertainstatements,butrathertoexpressthe factthattheyrefertowhatisimmediatelygiven.Accordingly,our answertohisquestion"Whatkindsofwordoccurin protocolstatements?"cannotdependsimplyuponaconventional choiceoflinguisticforms.Itmustdependuponthewayinwhichwe answerthequestion"Whatobjectsaretheelementsofgiven, directexperience?"Andthisisnotamatteroflanguage,buta matteroffact.Itisaplainquestionoffactwhethertheatomisticor thegestalttheoryofsensationiscorrect.

Thusweseethatthepropositionthat"theelementsthatare directlygivenarethesimplestsensationsandfeelings"which Carnaptakestobeasyntacticalpropositionexpressedinthe materialmodeofspeech,isnotsyntacticalatall.Andthe propositionwhichhegivesasitsformalequivalent,namely,that "protocol-statementsareofthesamekindas:'joynow,''here, now,bluethere,red'"isnotsyntacticaleither.Ifwewanttogiveit alabelwemaycallitapseudo-syntacticalproposition.Andbythis weshallmeanthatitseemstobeaboutwordsbutisreallyabout objects.Itisimportantthattheexistenceofsuchpropositions shouldnotbeoverlookedfortheyarequiteasdangerousintheir wayasthepseudo-factualpropositionsofwhichCarnaphasmade somuch.Inthisinstancethesourceofconfusionistheuseofthe term"protocol."Itcannotwithoutcontradictionbeinterpretedboth asapurelyformaldesignationandasinvolvingacovertreference toamatteroffact.ButthisispreciselyhowCarnapdoesinterpret itanditisthusthatheisledtomakethemistakeofsupposing thatquestionsaboutthenatureofbasicpropositionscanbe decidedmerelybyconvention.Itisindeedamatterofconvention thatweshoulduseawordconsistingoftheletters"j oy"todenote joy.Butthepropositionthatjoyisimmediatelyexperienced,which isimpliedinsayingthat"joy"isaprotocolword,isonewhosetruth orfalsehoodisnottobedecidedbyconventionbutonlyby referringtothefacts.Thepsychologyofsensationisnotanapriori branchofscience. Weconcludetherefore thattheformsofbasicpropositionsdepend partlyindeeduponlinguisticconventionsbutpartlyalsouponthe natureofthegivenandthisissomethingthatwecannot determineapriori.Wemayholdindeedthataperson'ssensations are -238alwaysprivate tohimselfbutthisisonlybecausewehappensoto usewordsthatitdoesnotmakesensetosay"Iamacquaintedwith yoursense-data"or"YouandIareexperiencingthesame sensedatum."14Thisisapointaboutwhichweareapttobe confused.Onesaysmournfully"Icannotexperience your toothache"asthoughitrevealedalackofmentalpower.Thatis, weareinclinedtothinkofthecontentsofanotherperson'smind, ortheimmediateobjectsofhisexperience,asbeingconcealed fromusbysomesortofnaturalobstacle,andwesaytoourselves: "Ifonlywehadaraywhichwouldpenetratethisobstacle!" (Intuition!)or"Perhapswecanconstructareflectorwhichwillshow uswhatisgoingonbehind."Butinfactthereisnoobstaclebutour usageofwords.Tosaythatwhateverisdirectly"given"tomeis mineandmineonlyistoexpressatautology.AmistakewhichI, forone,havemadeinthepastistoconfusethiswiththe proposition"Whateverisdirectly'given'ismine."Thisisnota tautology.Itisanempiricalproposition,anditisfalse. Afurtherpointwhichitisadvisabletomakeclearisthatwearenot

settinganyarbitraryboundariestothefieldofpossibleexperience. Asanillustrationofthisletusconsiderthecaseofthemanwho claimstohaveanimmediate,non-sensoryexperience ofGod.So longasheusestheword"God"simplyasanameforthecontentof hisexperience,Ihavenorighttodisbelievehim.Nothavingsuch experiencesmyselfIcannotunderstandhimfully.Idonotmyself knowwhatitisliketobeacquaintedwithGod.ButIcanatleast understandthatheishavingsomeexperience ofakindthatIdo nothave.AndthisImayreadilybelieve.Ishouldcertainlynotbe justifiedinassumingthatthesortofexperiencesthatImyselfhad weretheonlysortthatcouldbehadatall.Atthesametimeit mustberemarkedthat"God,"inthisusage,cannotbethenameof atranscendentbeing.Fortosaythatonewasimmediately acquaintedwithatranscendentbeingwouldbeself-contradictory. Andthoughitmightbethenameofapersonwhoinfactendured foreveronecouldnotsaythatonewasimmediatelyacquainted withHimasenduringforever.Forthis,too,wouldbeselfcontradictory.Neitherwouldthefactthatpeoplewereacquainted withGod,inthissense,affordavalidgroundforinferringthatthe worldhadafirstcause,orthathumanbeingssurviveddeath,orin shortthatanythingexistedwhichhadtheattributesthatare popularlyascribed ____________________ 14Thispointhasbeenforciblymade byG.A.Paul,vide "Isthere a ProblemAboutSense-Data?"Supp.Proc.Arist.Soc.,1936,also reprintedinA.Flew(ed.),EssaysinLogicandLanguage,First Series. -239samethingappliestothecaseofmoralexperience.Weshould certainlynotbejustifiedindenyingapriorithepossibilityofmoral experience.Butthisdoesnotmeanthatwerecognizethatthereis anygroundforinferringtheexistenceofanideal,objectiveworld ofvalues.Itisnecessarytosaythisbecausetheuseof"God"or "value"asadesignationofthecontentofacertainkindof experience oftenmisleadspeopleintothinkingthattheyareentitled todrawsuchinferencesandwemustmakeitclearthatin admittingthepossibilityofsuchexperienceswearenotalso upholdingtheconclusionswhichareillegitimatelydrawnfromthem. Wehavetriedtoshowthatneithertheformnorthevalidityof basicpropositionsisdependentmerelyonconvention.Sinceitis theirfunctiontodescribewhatcanbeimmediatelyexperienced, theirformwilldependuponthegeneralnatureofthe"given,"their validityupontheiragreementwithitintherelevantparticularcase. Butwhatisthisrelationofagreement?Whatkindof correspondencedowesupposetoexistbetweenbasicpropositions andtheexperiencesthatverifythem? Itissometimessuggestedthatthisrelationofagreementisofthe samekindasthatwhichholdsbetweenapictureandthatofwhich itisapicture.Idonotthinkthatthisistrue.Itispossibleindeedto

constructpicture-languagesnodoubttheyhavetheiradvantages butitsurelycannotbemaintainedthattheyalonearelegitimate orthatalanguagesuchasEnglishisreallyapicturelanguage althoughwedonotknowit.ButifEnglishisnotapicturelanguage andpropositionsexpressedinEnglisharesometimesverified,as theysurelyare,thenitcannotbethecasethatthisrelationof agreementwithwhichweareconcernedisoneofpicturing. Besides,thereisthisfurtherdifficulty.Ifanypropositionsare pictures,presumablyfalsepropositionsaresoaswellastrueones. Inotherwords,wecannottellfromtheformoftheproposition, thatis,merelybylookingatthepicture,whetheritdepictsareal situationornot.Buthowthenarewetodistinguishthetruepicture fromthefalse?Mustwenotsaythatthetruepictureagreeswith realitywhereasthefalseonedoesnot?Butinthatcasethe introductionofthenotionofpicturingdoesnotserveourpurpose. Itdoesnotenableustodispensewiththenotionofagreement. Thesameobjectionsholdagainstthosewhosaythatthisrelationof agreementisoneofidentityofstructure.Thisistotreat propositionsasiftheyweremaps.Butthenitistobesupposed thatafalsepropositionisalsoamap.Themereformofthe propositionwillnottelluswhetherthecountrywhichitpurportsto mapis -240imaginaryorreal.Canwethenavoidsayingthatwetestthetruth ofsuchamapbyseeingwhetheritagreeswithreality?Butthen thenotionofagreementisstillleftunclarified.And,inanycase, whyshoulditbeassumedthatifapropositionistodescribewhatis directlygivenitmusthavethesamestructureasthegiven?One might,perhaps,allowthepossibilityofcreatingalanguageinwhich allbasicpropositionswere expressedbysentencesfunctioningas maps,thoughIambynomeanssurethatitwouldbepossibleto drawamapofourinternalsensationsbutIcanseenogroundat allforassumingthatonlyalanguageofthiskindislegitimate,or thatanyoftheEuropeanlanguageswithwhichIamacquaintedisa languageofthiskind.Yetpropositions,expressedinthese languages,arefrequentlyverified.Thereis,perhaps,ahistorical connectionbetweentheviewthatbasicpropositionsmustbe identicalinstructure withthefactsthatverifythemandtheview thatonlystructure canbeknownorexpressed.15Butthistoois arbitrary,andindeedself-defeating.Tomaintainthatcontentis inexpressibleistobehavelikeRamsey'schild."'Saybreakfast.' 'Can't.''Whatcan'tyousay?''Can'tsaybreakfast.'"16 Whatisbeingassumedinthetheorieswhichwehavejustbeen discussingisnotsomuchthatapropositioncannotbeverifiedas thatit,or,tospeakmoreaccurately,thesentenceexpressingit, cannothaveasenseatallunlessitisapictureoramap.The difficultywithregardtosentencesthatexpressfalsepropositionsis gotroundbysayingthattheydepictormappossiblefacts.But surelythisassumptionisquitegratuitous.IfIamspeakingEnglishI

mayusethewords"Iamangry"tosaythatIamangry.Youmay say,ifyoulike,thatindoingsoIamobeyingameaning-rule 17of theEnglishlanguage.Forthistobepossibleitisnotintheleast necessarythatmywordsshouldinanywayresemblethestateof angerwhichtheydescribe.That"thisisred"isusedtosaythatthis isreddoesnotimplythatitbearsanyrelationofresemblance, whetherofstructure orcontent,toanactualorhypotheticalred patch. Butifthewords"Iamangry"areusedtosaythatIamangry,then itdoesnotseeminanywaymysteriousthatmybeingangryshould verifythepropositionthattheyexpress.ButhowdoIknowthatI amangry?Ifeelit.HowdoIknowthatthereisnowaloudsound? Ihearit.HowdoIknowthatthisisaredpatch?Iseeit. ____________________ 15Cf.E.Zilsel,"BemerkungenzurWissenschaftslogik,"Erkenntnis, Vol.III,p.143. 16FoundationsofMathematics,p.268.[Vide pp.321-6ofthis volume.] 17Cf.K.Ajdukiewicz,"Sprache undSinn,"Erkenntnis,Vol.IV,pp. 114-116. -241Ifthisanswerisnotregardedassatisfactory,Idonotknowwhat othercanbegiven. Itmaybesuggestedthatweoughtinthisconnectiontointroduce thenotionofcausation.Therelation,itmaybesaid,betweenthe proposition"Iaminpain"andthefactthatverifiesitisthatthefact causesmetoasserttheproposition,oratanyratetobelieveit. Thatsucharelationoftenexistsisnottobedenied.Butwecannot analyzeverificationintermsofit.ForifIamahabitualliarmy beinginpainmaycausemetodenythatIaminpainandifIam asufficientlyhideboundChristianScientistitmaynotcausemeto believeit.Butineithercasemybeinginpainwillverifythe propositionthatIaminpain.Why?BecausewhenIsay"Iamin pain"ImeanthatIaminpain,andifpthenp.ButhowdoI establishp?HowdoIknowthatIreallyaminpain?Againthe answercanonlybe"Ifeelit." Doesthismeanthatbasicpropositionsmustberegardedas incorrigible?IfindthisquestiondifficulttoanswerbecauseIdonot knowwhatprecisemeaningthosewhohavediscussedithavebeen givingtotheterm"incorrigible."Probably,differentphilosophers havegivenitdifferentmeanings.ProfessorPrice,forexample, whenhearguesthatbasicpropositionsareincorrigibleappearsto meannomorethanthatourreasonsforacceptingthemarefound inourexperience thatifoneisjustifiedinsayingofavisualsensedatum"thisisred,"itisbecauseoneseesitso.Fortheonly argumentswhichhegivesinfavoroftheviewthatsomefirst-order propositionsareincorrigibleareargumentsagainstthecoherence

theoryoftruth.18Ishouldofcourseagreethatbasicpropositions wereincorrigible,inthisratherunnaturalsense.Dr.vonJuhos makesthesamestatement.19Butwhatheappearstomeanbyit isthattherecanneverbeanygroundforabandoningabasic propositionthatonceitisaccepteditcannotsubsequentlybe doubtedordenied.Inasense,wemayagreethatthisisso.For wemaysaythatwhatissubsequentlydoubtedordeniedisalways adifferentproposition.WhatIacceptnowistheproposition"thisis red"whatImaydoubtordenyinthirtyseconds'timeisthe proposition"Iwasseeingsomethingredthirtysecondsago."Butin thissenseeverypropositionwhichcontainsademonstrativeis incorrigible,andnotonlybasicpropositions.AndifvonJuhoswishes tomaintainthatsomespecialsacrosanctityattachestopropositions whichpurporttoberecordsofourimmediateexperiences,Ithink thatheiswrong.IfIfindthe ____________________ 18Vide TruthandCorrigibility. 19See hisarticlesinAnalysis,Vol.II,andErkenntnis,Vol.IV. -242sentence"Ifeelhappy"writteninmydiaryundertheheading February3rdIamnotobligedtobelievethatIreallydidfeelhappy onFebruary3rd,merelybecausethesentencehasthesameform asthatwhichIshouldutterifIfelthappynow.Imayindeed believeitonthegroundthatIamnotinthehabitofwritingdown falsestatementsinmydiary.Butthatisadifferentmatter. ProfessorMoorehassuggestedtomethatwhatsomeofthosewho saythatbasicpropositionsareincorrigiblemayhaveinmindisthat wecannotbemistakenabouttheminthewaythatwecanbe mistakenaboutotherempiricalpropositions.IfIsay"Iaminpain" or"thisisred"Imaybelying,orImaybeusingwordswrongly thatis,Imaybeclassifyingas"pain"oras"red"somethingthat wouldnotnormallybesoclassified.ButIcannotbemistakeninany otherway.IcannotbemistakeninthewaythatIcanbemistaken ifItakethisredpatchtobethecoverofabook.Ifthisisafact,it isnotafactabouthumanpsychology.Itisnotjustamerciful dispensationofProvidence thatwearesecuredfromerrorsofa certainkind.Itis,ifanything,afactaboutlanguage.20IfMooreis right,itdoesnotmakesensetosay"Idoubtwhetherthisisred"or "IthinkthatIaminpainbutImaybemistaken,"unlessitis merelymeantthatIamdoubtingwhether"pain"or"red"isthe correctwordtouse.IbelievenowthatMooreisrightonthispoint. Butwhetheritisafactfromwhichanyimportantconclusionsfollow Idonotprofesstoknow. ____________________ 20CLJohnWisdom,"PhilosophicalPerplexity,"Proc.Arist.Soc., 1936-7,p.81. -243-

[Thispageintentionallyleftblank.] -244-

EthicsandSociology
-245[Thispageintentionallyleftblank.] -246-

12
WhatIstheAimofEthics?
BYMORITZSCHLICK (TRANSLATEDBYDAVIDRYNIN)

1.ETHICSSEEKSNOTHINGBUTKNOWLEDGE
IFTHEREAREethicalquestionswhichhavemeaning,andare therefore capableofbeinganswered,thenethicsisascience.For thecorrectanswerstoitsquestionswillconstituteasystemoftrue propositions,andasystemoftruepropositionsconcerningan objectisthe"science"ofthatobject.Thusethicsisasystemof knowledge,andnothingelseitsonlygoalisthetruth.Every scienceis,assuch,purelytheoreticalitseekstounderstandhence thequestionsofethics,too,arepurelytheoreticalproblems.As philosopherswetrytofindtheircorrectsolutions,buttheirpractical application,ifsuchispossible,doesnotfallwithinthesphereof ethics.Ifanyonestudiesthesequestionsinordertoapplythe resultstolifeandaction,hisdealingwithethicshas,itistrue,a practicalendbutethicsitselfneverhasanyothergoalthanthe truth. Solongasthephilosopherisconcernedwithhispurelytheoretical questions,hemustforgetthathehasahumaninterestaswellasa cognitiveinterestintheobjectofhisinvestigation.Forhimthereis nogreaterdangerthantochangefromaphilosopherintoa moralist,fromaninvestigatorintoapreacher.Desireforthetruth istheonlyappropriateinspirationforthethinkerwhenhe philosophizesotherwise histhoughtsrunthedangerofbeingled astraybyhisfeelings.Hiswishes,hopes,andfearsthreatento encroachuponthatobjectivitywhichisthenecessarypresupposition ofallhonestinquiry.Ofcourse,theprophetandtheinvestigator canbeoneandthesamepersonbutonecannotatthesame momentserve

ThisisChapterIofSchlick'sProblemsofEthics,copyright 1939byPrentice-HallInc.,NewYork.Itisreprintedhere withthekindpermissionofthetranslatorandthe publishers.Schlick'sbookwasfirstpublishedinViennain 1930. -247bothinterests,forwhoevermixesthetwoproblemswillsolve neither. Aglanceatthegreatethicalsystemswillshowhownecessarythese remarksare.Thereishardlyoneinwhichwedonotoccasionally findanappealtothefeelingorthemoralityofthereaderwhere a scientificanalysiswouldhavebeenappropriate. Nevertheless,Idonotpointoutthepurelytheoreticalcharacterof ethicsmerelytowarnmyreader,andmyself.Idoitalsobecauseit willhelpustodefinetheproblemswithwhichethicsisconcerned andwhichweshalltrytosolve.

2.THESUBJECT-MATTEROFETHICS
Towhatobject,orrealmofobjects,dothequestionsofethics relate?Thisobjecthasmanynames,andweusethemsooftenin dailylifethatonemightthinkweshouldknowexactlywhatwe meanbythem.Theethicalquestionsconcern"morality,"orwhatis morally"valuable,"whatservesasa"standard"or"norm"of humanconduct,whatis"demanded"ofusor,finally,tonameitby theoldest,simplestword,ethicalquestionsconcernthe"good." Andwhatdoesethicsdowiththisobject?Wehavealready answeredthisquestion:ethicsseekstounderstandit,togain knowledgeofit,andwouldandcanundernocircumstancesdo anythingelsewithit.Sinceethicsis,inessence,theoryor knowledge,itstaskcannotbetoproducemorality,ortoestablishit, orcallittolife.Itdoesnothavethetaskofproducingthegood-neitherinthesensethatitsbusinessistoinvestthegoodwith realityinhumanaffairs,norinthesensethatithastostipulateor decreewhattheword"good"oughttosignify.Itcreatesneitherthe conceptnortheobjectswhichfallundertheconcept,nordoesit providetheopportunityofapplyingtheconcepttotheobjects.All thisitfinds,aseverysciencefindsthematerialsitworkswith,in experience.Itisobviousthatnosciencecanhaveanyother beginning.Themisleadingview(introducedbythe"Neo-Kantians") accordingtowhichobjectsofasciencearenotsimply"given"toit butarethemselvesalways"givenasproblems"willnotleadanyone todenythatwhoeverwishestounderstandanythingmustfirst knowwhatitishewishestounderstand. Whereandhow,then,is"thegood"ofethicsgiven? Wemustfromtheoutsetbeclearonthepointthatherethereis onlyonepossibility,thesamethatliesbeforeallothersciences.

Whereveraninstanceoftheobjecttobeknownoccurs,theremust beexhibitedacertainmark(orgroupofmarks)whichcharacterizes thethingoreventasoneofacertaindefinitekind,thusdis-248tinguishingitfromallothersinaspecialway.Ifthiswerenotsowe wouldhavenoopportunityandnomotivetocallitbyaspecial name.Everynamewhichisusedindiscourseforcommunication musthaveameaningcapableofbeingindicated.Thisisindeed selfevident,anditwouldnotbedoubtedoftheobjectofanyother science--onlyinethicshasitsometimesbeenforgotten. Letusconsidersomeexamplesoutsidethefieldofethics.Biology, thescienceoflife,findsitsspherelimitedbyagroupof characteristics(aspecialkindofmotion,regeneration,growth,and soforth)whichbelongtoalllivingthings,andstandoutsoclearly foreverydayobservationthat--apartfromcertaincriticalinstances-thedifferencebetweentheanimateandinanimateisverysharply distinguished,withouttheuseofanyscientificanalysis.Itisonly becauseofthisthattheconceptoflifecouldhavefirstbeen formed,andobtaineditsspecialname.Ifthebiologistsucceeds, withprogressive knowledge,inestablishingnewandsharper definitionsoflife,inorderbettertobringtheeventsoflifeunder generallaws,thismeansonlymoreprecisionin,andperhaps extensionof,theconcept,withouthoweveralteringitsoriginal meaning. Similarlytheword"light"hadadefinitemeaningbeforetherewas ascienceoflight,thatis,optics,andthismeaningdeterminedthe subject-matterofoptics.Thedistinguishingmarkwasinthiscase thatimmediateexperiencewhichwecall"light-sensation,"thatis,a not-further-definable datumofconsciousness,knownonlytothe perceiver,theoccurrence ofwhich--againapartfromcritical instances--indicatesthepresenceofthoseeventswhichconstitute thesubject-matterofoptics.Thefactthatopticsinitsmodern developedformisthescienceofRoentgenraysandradiotelegraphicwavesaswell(becausetheirlawsareidenticalwiththe lawsoflight)enlargesthemeaningoftheword"optics"without changingitsbasis. Ascertainly,then,astheexpression"moralgood"makesgood sense,justascertainlymustwebeabletodiscoveritinaway analogoustothatbywhichonediscoversthemeaningoftheword "life"or"light."Butmanyphilosophersseeinthisaseriousdifficulty ofethics,indeedthedifficulty,andtheyareoftheopinionthatthe soletaskofethicsisthediscoveryofthedefinitionof"good."

3.ONTHEDEFINITIONOFGOOD
Thisviewcanbeinterpretedintwoways.Inthefirstplace,itcould meanthatthetaskofthephilosopherisexhaustedindescribing exactlythesenseinwhichtheword"good"--orbonorgut

-249orbuonoor--initsmoralsignificationisactuallyused.It wouldconcernitselfmerelywithmakingclearthealready wellknownmeaning,byastrictformulationofitinotherwords (were itnotalreadywellknownonewouldnotknowthat,for example,"good"isthetranslationofbonum).Isthisreallythegoal ofethics?Thestatementofthemeaningofwordsbydefinitionsis (asG.E.MooreinhisPrincipiaEthicahaspointedoutinasimilar connection)thebusinessofthescienceoflanguage.Oughtwe reallytobelievethatethicsisabranchoflinguistics?Perhapsa branchthathassplitofffromitbecausethedefinitionof"good" harborsspecialdifficultieswemeetinnootherword?Avery peculiarcase,thatawholescienceshouldbenecessarytofind merelythedefinitionofaconcept!Andinanycase,whois interestedinmeredefinitions?Theyare,afterall,onlymeanstoan endtheystandatthebeginningoftherealcognitivetask.Ifethics endedwithadefinitionitwouldbeatmosttheintroductiontoa science,andthephilosopherwouldinteresthimselfonlyinwhat comesafterit.No,therealproblemsofethicsarecertainlyofa verydifferentsort.Eventhoughthetaskofethicscouldbe formulatedasthatofstatingwhatthegood"reallyis,"thiscould notbeunderstoodasconsistinginthemeredeterminationofthe meaningofaconcept(asalso,inourexample,opticsdoesnot strive forameredefinitionof"light").Ratheritwouldhavetobe understoodasthetaskofexplanation,ofcompletecognitionofthe good--whichpresupposesthatthemeaningoftheconceptis alreadyknownandthenrelatesittosomethingelse,ordersitin moregeneralconnections(justasopticsdoeswithlight,whichtells uswhatlight"reallyis"bypointingouttheplaceinthesphereof naturaleventstowhichthewell-knownphenomenonbelongs,by describingtothelastdetailitslaws,andbyrecognizingtheir identitywiththelawsofcertainelectricalevents). Secondly,theviewaccordingtowhichthegoalofethicsconsistsof acorrectdeterminationoftheconcept"good"couldbeinterpreted asnotbeingconcernedwiththeformulationofthecontentofthe concept,butratherwithgivingitacontent.Thiswould,however, beexactlythatviewwhichwehavefromthestartrecognizedtobe quitesenseless.Itwouldmeanthatthephilosophermade,or created,theconceptofthegood,whilewithouthimthereexisted merelytheword"good."Hewouldofcoursehavetoinventitquite arbitrarily.(Butinasmuchasinformulatinghisdefinitionhecould notactcompletelyarbitrarily,sincehewouldbeboundbysome norm,someguidingprinciple,theconceptofthegoodwould alreadybedeterminedbythesenorms.Thephilosopherwould havemerely -250tofindaformulationofit,andweshouldhavebeforeusthe previouslyconsideredcase.)However,itwouldbequiteabsurdto

demandofethicsnothingbutthearbitraryestablishmentofthe meaningofaword.Thatwouldbenoachievementatall.Eventhe prophet,thecreatorofanewmorality,neverformsanewconcept ofmorality,butpresupposesone,andassertsonlythatother modesofbehavioraresubsumedunderitthanthosewhichpeople havebelieveduptothattime.Inlogicalterms,theprophetholds thattheacknowledgedcontentoftheconcepthasadifferentrange fromthatsupposed.Thisalonecanbethemeaningwhenhe declares:"Notthatis'good'whichyouhaveheldassuch,but somethingelse!" Thusweseetheviewconfirmedthatinnowayistheformulationof theconceptofthemoralgoodtobeconsideredasthefinaltaskof ethicsitcannotberegardedasanythingbutamerepreparation. Tobesure,thispreparationisnottobeneglectedethicsoughtnot tospareitselfthetaskofdeterminingthemeaningofitsconcept, eventhough,aswehavesaid,themeaningoftheword"good" mayinonesensebeassumedasknown.

4.ISTHEGOODINDEFINABLE?
Itisverydangeroustowithdrawfromthistaskunderthepretext thattheword"good"isoneofthosewhosemeaningissimpleand unanalyzable,ofwhichthereforeadefinition,astatementofthe connotation,isimpossible.Whatisdemandedhereneednotbea definitioninthestrictestsenseoftheword.Itissufficientto indicatehowwecangetthecontentoftheconcepttostatewhat mustbedoneinordertobecomeacquaintedwithitscontent.Itis, strictlyspeaking,alsoimpossibletodefinewhattheword"green" means--butwecanneverthelessfixitsmeaningunambiguously,for example,bysayingitisthecolorofasummermeadow,orby pointingtothefoliageofatree.Wementionedabovethata "lightsensation"whichfurnishesuswiththefundamentalconceptof opticsisnotdefinablehowever,weknowexactlywhatismeantby it,becausewecangivetheexactconditionsunderwhichwehavea lightsensation.Inthesameway,inethicswemustbeabletogive theexactconditionsunderwhichtheword"good"isapplied,even thoughitsfundamentalconceptbeindefinable.Inthismannerit mustbepossibletogivethemeaningofanyword,forotherwiseit wouldhavenomeaningatall.Itmustevenbecapableofbeing giveneasilyprofoundphilosophicalanalysiscannotbenecessary forthis,forthematterconcernsmerelyaquestionoffact,namely, a -251descriptionofthoseconditionsunderwhichtheword"good"(orits equivalentinotherlanguages,oritscontrary,"evil")isactually used. Itisdifficultformanyphilosopherstosticktotherealmoffacts eventemporarily,withoutimmediatelyinventingatheoryto describethefacts.Andthusthetheoryhasbeenfrequently

propoundedthatthefundamentalconceptofethicsisgivenasis thefundamentalconceptofoptics.Justaswepossessaspecial sense,namelythesenseofsight,fortheperceptionoflight,soitis supposedthataspecial"moralsense"indicatesthepresenceof goodorevil.Accordingly,goodandevilwouldbeobjective characters,tobedeterminedandinvestigatedasarethephysical eventswhichopticsinvestigates,andwhichitconsiderstobethe causesoflight-sensations. Thistheoryisofcoursewhollyhypothetical.Themoralsenseis merelyassumeditsorganscannotbepointedoutascanthe humaneye.Butthehypothesisisalsofalse,itfailstoaccountfor thevariationsinmoraljudgmentamongmen,sincethefurther assumptionthatthemoralsenseispoorlydevelopedinmany persons,orcompletelyabsent,doesnotsufficetoexplainthese variations. No,itisnotthedistinguishingcharacteristicofthesubjectmatterof ethicsthatitistheobjectofaspecialkindofperception.Its characteristicsmustbecapableofexhibitionbysimplypointingto certainknownfacts,withoutanyartifice.Thiscanhappenin differentways.Twowaysareheredistinguished:first,onecanseek foranexternal,formalcharacteristicofgoodandeviland,second, onecansearchforamaterialcharacteristic,oneofcontent.

5.THEFORMALCHARACTERISTICOFTHEGOOD
Theformalcharacteristic,onwhichKantplacedthewholeweightof hismoralphilosophy,andwhichhemadeprominentbyhisgreatest eloquence,isthis:thegoodalwaysappearsassomethingthatis demanded,orcommandedtheevil,assomethingforbidden.Good conductissuchasisdemandedordesiredofus.Or,asithas generallybeenexpressedsinceKant:thoseactionsaregoodwhich weoughttodo.Now,toademand,aclaim,oradesirethere belongssomeonewhodemands,claims,ordesires.Thisauthorof themorallawmustalsobegiveninorderthatthecharacterization bymeansoftheformalpropertyofthecommandbeunambiguous. Hereopinionsdiffer.IntheologicalethicsthisauthorisGod,and accordingtooneinterpretationthegoodisgoodbecauseGod desiresitinthiscasetheformalcharacteristic(tobeacommand -252ofGod)wouldexpresstheveryessenceofthegood.Accordingto another,perhapsprofounder,interpretation,Goddesiresthegood becauseitisgood.Inthiscaseitsessencemustbegivenbycertain materialcharacterspreviouslytoandindependentlyofthoseformal determinations.Intraditionalphilosophicalethicstheopinion prevailsthattheauthoris,forexample,humansociety (utilitarianism)ortheactiveself(eudaimonism)orevennoone (thecategoricalimperative).FromthislastproceedsKant'sdoctrine ofthe"absoluteought,"thatis,ademandwithoutademander. Oneoftheworsterrorsofethicalthoughtliesinhisbeliefthatthe

conceptofthemoralgoodiscompletelyexhaustedbythe statementofitspurelyformalproperty,thatithasnocontent excepttobewhatisdemanded,"whatshouldbe."

6.MATERIALCHARACTERISTICS
Inoppositiontothis,itisclearthatthediscoveryoftheformal charactersofthegoodconstitutesonlyapreliminarystepinthe determinationofthecontentofthegood,inthestatementof materialcharacteristics.Ifweknowthatthegoodiswhatis demanded,wemuststillask:Whatisitthenthatisactually demanded?Inanswertothisquestionwemustturntotheauthor ofthecommandandinvestigatehiswillanddesire,forthecontent ofhisdesireisthatwhichhewishestohappen.WhenIrecommend anactiontosomeoneasbeing"good,"IexpressthefactthatI desireit. Solongasthelawgiverisnotknownwithcertainty,wemuststick tothelawsastheyaregenerallyobserved,totheformulationsof moralrulesaswefindthemamongmen.Wemustdiscoverwhich waysofacting(ordispositions,orwhateverbethetermused)are called"good"bydifferentpeople,atdifferenttimes,bydifferent wisemenorreligiouswriters.Onlyinthiswaydowecometoknow thecontentofthisconcept.Fromthecontentitmaythenbe possibletoinferthelawgivingauthority,ifitcannotbeascertained otherwise. Ingroupingtogethertheindividualcasesinwhichsomethingis designatedasmorallygood,wemustsearchforthecommon elements,thecharactersinwhichtheseexamplesagreeorshow similarities.Thesesimilarelementsarethecharactersofthe concept"good"theyconstituteitscontent,andwithinthemmust liethereasonwhyoneandthesameword,"good,"isusedforthe severalcases. Tobesure,onewillatoncecomeuponcasesinwhichnothing -253commoncanbefound,inwhichthereseemstobeacomplete incompatibilityoneandthesamething--forexample,polygamy-willbeconsideredmoralinonecommunity,andinanotheracrime. Insuchasituationtherearetwopossibilities.First,therecouldbe severalirreduciblydifferentconceptsof"good"(whichagreeinthe purelyformalpropertyofbeingsomehow"demanded")ifthiswere sotherewouldnotbeasinglemorality,butmany.Or,second,it couldbethatthedivergenceinmoraljudgmentswasonlyapparent andnotfinalthat,namely,intheendoneandthesamegoalwas approved,butthatadifferenceofopinionprevailedastowhich wayleadstoit,whichactionsshouldthereforebedemanded.(For instance,polygamyandmonogamyarenotinthemselvesjudged morally.Therealobjectofvaluationisperhapsthepeaceoffamily life,ortheleasttroublesomeorderofsexualrelationships.One personbelievesthatthisendcanbeattainedonlythrough

monogamousmarriage,andconsidersit,therefore,tobemorally goodanotherbelievesthesameofpolygamy.Onemayberight, theotherwrongtheydiffer,notbytheirfinalvaluations,butonly byvirtueoftheirinsight,capacityofjudgment,orexperience.) Whetherthereisactuallyamongmenamultiplicityofmoralities incompatiblewithoneanother,orwhetherthedifferencesinthe moralworldareonlyspecious,sothatthephilosopherwouldfind everywhere,underthemanydisguisesandmasksofmorality,one andthesamefaceoftheoneGood,wecannotnowdecide.Inany case,therearewideregionsinwhichtheunanimityandsecurityof moraljudgmentsissubstantiated.Themodesofbehaviorwhichwe grouptogetherunderthenamesreliability,helpfulness,sociability areeverywhere judgedtobe"good,"while,forexample,thievery, murder,quarrelsomenesspassfor"evil"sounanimouslythathere thequestionofthecommonpropertycanbeansweredwith practicallyuniversalvalidity.Ifsuchcharactersarefoundforalarge groupofactions,thenonecanapplyhimselftothe"exceptions" andirregularities,thatis,tothosecasesinwhichthesame behaviorevokesdivergentmoraljudgmentsindifferenttimes, amongdifferentpeoples.Hereonefindseitherthatthereisno differentgroundforthejudgmentfromthatinallordinarycases, butthatitismerelymoreremote,hidden,orappliedunderaltered circumstancesoronemustsimplynotethefactasindicatinganew orambiguousmeaningoftheword"good."Andfinally,ithappens, ofcourse,thatcertainindividualsholddifferentopinionsregarding goodandevilfromthoseheldbypeopleoftheirtimeand community.Inthesecasesitisquiteasimportanttomakeoutthe contentandcausesoftheir -254opinionsasinanyothermoreregularcases,ifthepersonsin questionareimportantasprophets,moralwriters,ormorally creative menoriftheirteachingsdisclosehiddencurrentsor impresstheirmoraljudgmentsonhumanityandthefuture.

7.MORALNORMSANDMORALPRINCIPLES
Thecommoncharacteristicswhichagroupof"good"actsor dispositionsexhibitscanbecombinedinaruleoftheform:Amode ofactionmusthavesuchandsuchpropertiesinordertobecalled "good"(or"evil").Sucharulecanalsobecalleda"norm."Letitbe understoodatonce,however,thatsucha"norm"isnothingbuta mereexpressionoffactitgivesusonlytheconditionsunderwhich anactordispositionorcharacterisactuallycalled"good,"thatis,is givenamoralvalue.Thesettingupofnormsisnothingbutthe determinationoftheconceptofthegood,whichethicsundertakes tounderstand. Thisdeterminationwouldproceedbyseekingevernewgroupsof actsthatarerecognizedtobegood,andshowingforeachofthem theruleornormwhichalloftheirmemberssatisfy.Thedifferent norms,soobtained,wouldthenbecompared,andonewouldorder

themintonewclassessuchthattheindividualnormsofeachclass hadsomethingincommon,andthuswouldallbesubsumedunder ahigher,thatis,amoregeneral,norm.Withthishighernormthe sameprocedure wouldberepeated,andsoon,until,inaperfect case,onewouldatlastreachahighest,mostgeneralrulethat includedallothersasspecialcases,andwouldbeapplicableto everyinstanceofhumanconduct.Thishighestnormwouldbethe definitionof"thegood"andwouldexpressitsuniversalessenceit wouldbewhatthephilosophercallsa"moralprinciple." Ofcourse,onecannotknowbeforehandwhetheronewillactually arrive atasinglemoralprinciple.Itmightwellbethatthehighest seriesofrulestowhichthedescribedwayleadssimplyshowsno commoncharacter,thatonehas,therefore,tostopwithseveral normsashighestrules,becausedespiteallattemptsnonehigher canbefoundtowhichthesecouldbereduced.Therewouldthenbe severalmutuallyindependentmeaningsoftheexpression"moral good,"severalmutuallyindependentmoralprincipleswhichonlyin theirtotalitywoulddeterminetheconceptofmorality,orperhaps severaldifferentconceptsofthemoral,dependinguponthetime andthepeople.Itissignificanthowlittlethesepossibilitieshave,in general,beenconsideredbyphilosophersalmostallhaveatonce -255soughtasinglemoralprinciple.Quitethecontraryistrueofthe practicalmoralsystems,whichordinarilydonotattempttoestablish anall-inclusiveprincipleasinthecaseofthecatechism,which stopsatthetencommandments. Forthosewhobelievethatthesoletaskofethicsconsistsinthe determinationoftheconceptofthegood,thatis,inthe establishmentofoneorseveralmoralprinciples,thecompletionof thedescribedprocedure wouldexhaustthethemeofethics.It wouldbeapure"normative science"foritsendwouldlieinthe discoveryofahierarchyofnormsorruleswhichculminatedinone orseveralpoints,themoralprinciples,andinwhichthelowerlevels wouldbeexplainedor"justified"bythehigher.Tothequestion, "Whyisthisactmoral?"theexplanationcanbegiven,"Because it fallsunderthesedefiniterules"andifoneasksfurther,"Whyare alltheactsfallingunderthisrulemoral?"thiswouldbeexplained bysaying,"Because theyallfallunderthatnexthigherrule."And onlywiththehighestnorm--withthemoralprincipleormoral principles--istheknowledgeofthevalidatinggrounds,a justification,nolongerpossibleinthisway.Thereethicsisatan endforhimwhoseesitasamerenormative science.

8.ETHICSASA"NORMATIVESCIENCE"
Wenowseeclearlywhatmeaningthephrase"normative science" canhave,andinwhatsensealoneethicscan"justify"anactorits valuation.InmodernphilosophysinceKant,theidearepeatedly appearsthatethicsasanormativescienceissomethingcompletely differentfromthe"factualsciences."Itdoesnotask,"Whenisa

personjudgedtobegood?"or,"Whyishejudgedtobegood?" Thesequestionsconcernmerefactsandtheirexplanation.Butit doesask,"Withwhatrightisthatpersonjudgedtobegood?"It doesnottroubleitselfwithwhatisactuallyvalued,butasks:"What isvaluable?Whatshouldbevalued?"Andhereobviouslythe questionisquitedifferent. Butthismannerofopposingnormativeandfactualsciencesis fundamentallyfalse.Forifethicsfurnishesajustificationitdoesso onlyinthesensejustexplained,namely,inarelative-hypothetical way,notabsolutely.It"justifies"acertainjudgmentonlytothe extentthatitshowsthatthejudgmentcorrespondstoacertain normthatthisnormitselfis"right,"orjustified,itcanneithershow nor,byitself,determine.Ethicsmustsimplyrecognizethisasafact ofhumannature.Evenasanormativescience,asciencecandono -256morethanexplainitcanneversetuporestablishanorm(which alonewouldbeequivalenttoanabsolutejustification).Itisnever abletodomorethantodiscovertherulesofthejudgment,toread themfromthefactsbeforeittheoriginofnormsalwayslies outsideandbeforescienceandknowledge.Thismeansthattheir origincanonlybeapprehendedbythescience,anddoesnotlie withinit.Inotherwords:if,orinsofaras,thephilosopheranswers thequestion"Whatisgood?"byanexhibitionofnorms,thismeans onlythathetellsuswhat"good"actuallymeanshecannevertell uswhatgoodmustorshouldmean.Thequestionregardingthe validityofavaluationamountstoaskingforahigheracknowledged normunderwhichthevaluefalls,andthisisaquestionoffact.The questionofthejustificationofthehighestnormsortheultimate valuesissenseless,becausethereisnothinghighertowhichthese couldbereferred.Sincemodernethics,asweremarked,often speaksofthisabsolutejustificationasthefundamentalproblemof ethics,itmustbesaid,unfortunately,thattheformulationofthe questionfromwhichitproceedsissimplymeaningless. Theperversityofsuchaformulationofthequestionwillbe exhibitedbyafamousexample.JohnStuartMillhasoftenbeen justlycriticizedbecausehethoughthimselfabletodeducefromthe factthatathingwasdesiredthatitwasinitselfdesirable.The doublemeaningoftheworddesirable("capableofbeingdesired" and"worthdesiring")misledhim.Buthiscriticswerealsowrong, fortheyrestedtheircriticismuponthesamefalsepresupposition (expresslyformulatedbyneither),namely,thatthephrase"initself desirable"hadadefinitemeaning(by"initself"Imean"foritsown sake,"notmerelyasameanstoanend)butinfacttheycould giveitnomeaning.IfIsayofathingthatitisdesirable,andmean thatonemustdesireitasameansifonedesiresacertainend, theneverythingisperfectlyclear.If,however,Iassertthatathing isdesirablesimplyinitself,IcannotsaywhatImeanbythis statementitisnotverifiableandistherefore meaningless.Athing canbedesirableonlywithrespecttosomethingelse,notinitself.

Millbelievedhimselfabletodeducewhatisinitselfdesirablefrom whatactuallyisdesiredhisopponentsheldthatthesehadnothing todowithoneanother.Butultimatelyneithersideknewwhatit said,forbothfailedtogiveanabsolutemeaningtotheword "desirable."Thequestionwhethersomethingisdesirableforitsown sakeisnoquestionatall,butmereemptywords.Ontheother hand,thequestionofwhatactuallyisdesiredforitsownsakeisof coursequitesensible,andethicsisactuallyconcernedonlywith answeringthisquestion. -257Millsucceededinarrivingatthisrealquestion,inthepassage criticized,andthusfreedhimselfofthesenselessformofthe question,tobesure,lessbyhisfalseargumentthanbyhishealthy instinct,whilehisopponentsremainedtiedtoitandcontinuedto searchforanabsolutejustificationofdesire.

9.ETHICSASFACTUALSCIENCE
Suchnormsasarerecognizedastheultimatenorms,orhighest values,mustbederivedfromhumannatureandlifeasfacts. Therefore,noresultofethicscanstandincontradictiontolife ethicscannotdeclareasevilorfalsethosevalueswhichlieatthe foundationoflifeitsnormscannotdemandorcommandanything thatisinarealoppositiontothosefinalnormsrecognizedbylife. Wheresuchoppositionoccursitisasuresignthatthephilosopher hasmisunderstoodhisproblem,andhasfailedtosolveitthathe hasunwittinglybecomeamoralist,thathefeelsuncomfortablein theroleofaknowerandwouldprefertobeacreatorofmoral values.Thedemandsandclaimsofamorallycreativepersonare merelysubjectsforinvestigationforthephilosopher,mereobjects forcognitiveconsiderationandthisholdsalsoifheshouldby chance,atothertimes,bethiscreativemanhimself. Wejustsaidthattherecouldbenorealoppositionbetweenthe meaningoftheword"good"thatisactuallyacceptedinlife,andthe meaningfoundbythephilosopher.Anapparentdifferencecanof courseoccur,forlanguageandthoughtareveryimperfectindaily life.Oftenthespeakerandvaluerishimselfnotclearastowhathe expresses,andoftenhisvaluationsrestonafalseinterpretationof thefacts,andwouldatoncechangewithacorrectionofthe mistake.Thephilosopherwouldhavethetaskofdiscoveringsuch errorsandfaultyexpressions,andwouldhavetorecognizethetrue normsthatlieattherootofmoraljudgments,andplacethemin oppositiontotheapparentoneswhichtheagent,orvaluer, believeshimselftofollow.Andinsodoinghewould,perhaps,findit necessarytodelvedeepintothehumansoul.Always,however,it wouldbeanactual,alreadyfundamentalnormthathewouldfind there. Theultimatevaluationsarefactsexistinginhumanconsciousness, andevenifethicswere anormativescienceitwouldnotcease becauseofthistobeascienceoffacts.Ethicshastodoentirely

withtheactualthisseemstometobethemostimportantofthe propositionswhichdetermineitstask.Foreigntousistheprideof those -258philosopherswhoholdthequestionsofethicstobethemostnoble andelevatedofquestionsjustbecausetheydonotrefertothe commonisbutconcernthepureought. Ofcourse,afteroneisinthepossessionofsuchasystemofnorms, ofasystemofapplicationsoftheconceptsgoodandevil,onecan considertheconnectionsofthemembersofthehierarchy,the orderoftheindividualrules,quiteindependentlyofanyrelationto actualityonecaninvestigatemerelytheinnerstructureofthe system.Andthisholdsevenifthenormsarenotthereallyvalid ones,butarefalselyconsideredsuch,orarefreelyimaginedand arbitrarilyestablished.Thelastcasewouldindeedpossessonlythe interestofagameandwouldmakenoclaimtothenameof "ethics."Ethicsasanormative sciencewould,however,furnisha hierarchicalorderofrules,inwhichallactsandattitudesand characterswouldpossessadefiniteplacewithrespecttotheir moralvalue.Andofcoursethiswouldbetruenotonlyofexisting actsandattitudes,butalsoofallpossibleonesforifthesystemis tobeofanyvalueitmustbeforehandsupplyaplaceforevery possibilityofhumanbehavior.Afterbecomingacquaintedwiththe highestnorms,onecanconsiderthewholesystemwithoutany reference toactualbehavior,bymerelyconsideringthepossible. ThusKantemphasizedthatforhismoralphilosophyitwas indifferentwhetherornotanymoralwillactuallyexisted.Hence ethicsconceivedasatheoryofnormswouldexhibitthe characteristicsofan"idealscience"itwouldhavetodowitha systemofidealrules,whichcould,ofcourse,beappliedto actuality,andwouldonlytherebypossessanyinterest,buttherules wouldhavemeaningquiteindependentlyofthisapplication,and couldbeinvestigatedintheirrelationstooneanother.Thus someonemighthaveinventedtherulesofchess,andmighthave consideredtheirapplicationtotheindividualmatchesevenifthe gamehadneverbeenplayed,exceptinhismind,between imaginaryopponents.

10.ETHICSSEEKSCAUSALEXPLANATION
Torecapitulate:Webeganwiththepositionthatthetaskofethics isto"explainthemoralgood,"andweasked,first,whatsortof thingthis"good"iswhichwewanttoexplain.Wefoundthatthis subject-matterofethicsisnotgiventousassimplyas,say,the subject-matterofoptics,light,thatis,byameresensationbut thatforitsdeterminationthediscoveryofa"moralprinciple"ora wholesystemofprinciplesorrulesisnecessary.Ifwecalla disciplinethat -259-

concernsitselfwithsuchasystema"normative science,"wesee thatthistheoryofnormsaffordsnothingmorethanthediscovery ofthemeaningoftheconcept"good."Inthisitexhaustsitself. Thereisnoquestioninitofarealexplanationofthegood.Itoffers ethicsonlytheobjectwhichistobeexplained.Thereforewehave fromtheoutsetrejectedtheviewofthosephilosopherswho considerethicstobemerelyanormativescience.No,onlywhere thetheoryofnormsendsdoesethicalexplanationbegin.The formerfailscompletelytoseetheimportant,excitingquestionsof ethics,or,worse,turnsthemasideasforeigninessencetoethics intruthitfails,exceptthroughmistakes,togetbeyondthemere linguisticresultofdeterminingthemeaningsofthewords"good" and"evil." Itdoesofcoursealsogiveusakindofpseudo-explanation, namely,thatwhichwecalljustification.Explanationalwaysconsists ofthereductionofwhatistobeexplainedtosomethingelse,to somethingmoregeneralandactuallythenormsarethusreferred backtooneanother,untilthehighestarereached.These,the moralprinciples(orthemoralprinciple),accordingtodefinition, cannotbereferredtootherethicalnorms,andcannotthereforebe morallyjustified. Butthisdoesnotmeanthatallfurtherreductionmustbe impossible.Itmightbethatthemoralgoodcouldbeshowntobea specialcaseofamoregeneralkindofgood.Actuallytheword "good"isusedinanextra-moralsense(onespeaksnotonlyof goodmen,butalsoofgoodriders,goodmathematicians,ofagood catch,agoodmachine,andsoforth)itisthereforeprobablethat theethicalandtheextra-ethicalmeaningsofthewordare somehowconnected.Ifthemoralgoodcaninthismannerbe subsumedunderawiderconceptofthegood,thenthequestion, "Whyismoralbehaviorgood?"couldbeansweredby,"Becauseitis goodinamoregeneralsenseoftheword."Thehighestmoral normwouldbejustifiedbymeansofanextra-moralnormthe moralprinciplewouldbereferredbacktoahigherprincipleoflife. Possiblythereductioncouldgoonafewmoresteps,butthefinal norm,thehighestprinciple,caninnowaybejustified,forthevery reasonthatitisthelast.Itwouldbesenselesstoaskforafurther justification,afurtherexplanation.Itisnotthenorms,principles,or valuesthemselvesthatstandinneedofandarecapableof explanation,butrathertheactualfactsfromwhichtheyare abstracted.Thesefactsaretheactsofgivingrules,ofvaluation,of approbationinhumanconsciousnesstheyarethusrealeventsin thelifeofthesoul."Value,""thegood,"aremereabstractions,but -260valuation,approbation,areactualpsychicoccurrences,and separateactsofthissortarequitecapableofexplanation,thatis, canbereducedtooneanother.

Andhereliesthepropertaskofethics.Herearetheremarkable factswhichexcitephilosophicwonder,andwhoseexplanationhas alwaysbeenthefinalgoalofethicalinquiry.Thatmanactually approvesofcertainactions,declarescertaindispositionstobe "good,"appearsnotatallself-explanatorytothephilosopher,but oftenveryastonishing,andhethereforeaskshis"Why?"Now,inall ofthenaturalscienceseveryexplanationcanbeconceivedasa causalexplanation,atruthwhichweneednotprovehere therefore the"why"hasthesenseofaquestionconcerningthe causeofthatpsychicalprocessinwhichmanmakesavaluation, establishesamoralclaim.(Wemustmakeclearthatwhenwe speakofthediscoveryofthe"cause,"wemeanbytheterm "cause"onlyapopularabbreviationforthestatementofthe completelawsgoverningtheeventtobeknown.) Inotherwords,thedeterminationofthecontentsoftheconcepts ofgoodandevilismadebytheuseofmoralprinciplesanda systemofnorms,andaffordsarelativejustificationofthelower moralrulesbythehigherscientificknowledge ofthegood,onthe otherhand,doesnotconcernnorms,butreferstothecause, concernsnotthejustificationbuttheexplanationofmoral judgments.Thetheoryofnormsasks,"Whatdoesactuallyserve as thestandardofconduct?"Explanatoryethics,however,asks"Why doesitserve asthestandardofconduct?"

11.FORMULATIONOFTHEFUNDAMENTALQUESTION
Itisclearthatinessencethefirstquestionisadry,formalmatter thatcouldwinlittleinterestfrommandiditnothavesuch importanceforpractice,andifthepathtoitsanswerdidnotoffer somanyopportunitiesforprofoundinsightintohumannature.The secondquestion,however,leadsdirectlytotheseprofundities.It concernstherealgrounds,theactualcausesandmotivesthatdrive onetodistinguishbetweengoodandevil,andcallforththeactsof moraljudgment.Notonlyjudgments,butalsoconduct,forthis followsuponjudgment.Theexplanationofmoraljudgmentcannot beseparatedfromtheexplanationofconduct.Tobesure,one shouldnotbelieve,withoutfurtherreason,thateveryone arranges hisconductaccordingtohismoraljudgments.Obviously,thatwould beafalseassumption.Theconnection,althoughindissoluble,is morecompli-261cated.Whatamanvalues,approves,anddesiresisfinallyinferred fromhisactions--betterfromthesethanfromhisassertions, thoughthese,too,arekindsofaction.Whatkindofdemandsone makesofhimselfandotherscanonlybeknownfromone's conduct.Aman'svaluationsmustsomehowappearamongthe motivesofhisactstheycannot,inanycase,bediscovered anywhere else.Hewhotracesthecausesofconductfarenough mustcomeuponthecausesofallapprobation.Thequestionofthe causesofconductis,therefore,moregeneralthanthatofthe

groundsofmoraljudgmentsitsanswerwouldgivemore comprehensive knowledge,anditwouldbemethodologically profitabletostartwithitevenifitwerenotnecessarytobeginwith thestudyofconductastheonlythingobservable. Therefore,wemayandshouldreplacethequestionraisedabove, "Whatmotivescauseustoestablishmoralnorms?"bytheother question,"Whatarethemotivesofconductingeneral?"(We formulatethequestioninthisgeneralwayanddonotatonce restrictittomoralactionsbecause,accordingtowhathasbeen said,itmightbepossibletodeducevaluationsandtheirmotives justaswell,ifnotbetter,fromimmoralorneutralacts.)Weare themorewarrantedinrelatingourquestionatoncetoconduct, sincemaninterestshimselfinvaluationsonlybecauseconduct dependsuponthem.Ifmoralapprobationweresomethingthat remainedenclosedinthedepthsoftheheart,ifitcouldnever appearinanywayandcouldnotexerttheleastinfluenceonthe life,happinessandunhappinessofman,noonewouldbother himselfwithit,andthephilosopherwouldbecomeacquaintedwith thisunimportantphenomenononlybyanactofintrospection.That wonderconcerningthemoraljudgmentsofman,whichwehave describedastheearliestimpulseleadingtotheformulationof ethicalquestions,isaboveallwonderathisownactualmoral behavior. Therefore,weinquireintothecauses,thatis,theregularityand order,ofallhumanactions,withtheaimofdiscoveringthemotives ofmoralactions.Andweprofitinsodoingbecausewecan postponethequestionregardingtheessenceofmorality,themoral principle,untilwesolvetheproblemofthenaturallawgoverning behavioringeneral.When,however,wecometoknowabout actioningeneral,itwillcertainlybemucheasiertolearnwhatis peculiartomoralactionsandtodefinethecontentoftheconcept "good"withoutdifficulty.Perhapsitwillturnoutthatwenolonger feelthenecessityofdeterminingasharpboundaryforit(justas, afterthephysicalexplanationoflight,thequestionofhowand whethertheconceptof"light"istobedistinguishedfromthatof heatradiationorultra-violetradiationlosesallinterest). -262-

12.THEMETHODOFETHICSISPSYCHOLOGICAL
Thusthecentralproblemofethicsconcernsthecausalexplanation ofmoralbehaviorallothersinrelationtoitsinktothelevelof preliminaryorsubordinatequestions.Themoralproblemwasmost clearlyformulatedinthiswaybySchopenhauer,whosesoundsense ofrealityledhimtothecorrectpathhere(ifnotinthesolution) andguardedhimfromtheKantianformulationoftheproblemand fromthepost-Kantianphilosophyofvalue. Theproblemwhichwemustputatthecenterofethicsisapurely psychologicalone.For,withoutdoubt,thediscoveryofthemotives orlawsofanykindofbehavior,andthereforeofmoralbehavior,is

apurelypsychologicalaffair.Onlytheempiricalscienceofthelaws whichdescribethelifeofthesoulcansolvethisproblem.One mightwishtoderive fromthisasupposedlyprofoundand destructive objectiontoourformulationoftheproblem.For,one mightsay,"Insuchcasetherewouldbenoethicsatallwhatis calledethicswouldbenothingbutapartofpsychology!"Ianswer, "Whyshouldn'tethicsbeapartofpsychology?"Perhapsinorder thatthephilosopherhavehisscienceforhimselfandgovern autonomouslyinthissphere?Hewould,indeed,therebybefreedof manyburdensomeprotestsofpsychology.Ifhelaiddowna command,"Thusshallmanact,"hewouldnothavetopayattention tothepsychologistwhosaidtohim,"Butmancannotactso, becauseitcontradictspsychologicallaws!"Ifeargreatlythathere andtherethismotive,thoughhidden,isatwork.However,ifone sayscandidlythat"there isnoethics,"becauseitisnotnecessaryto labelapartofpsychologybyaspecialname,thenthequestionis merelyterminological. Itisapoorrecommendationofthephilosophicalspiritofourage thatwesooftenattempttodrawstrictlinesofdivisionbetweenthe sciences,toseparateevernewdisciplines,andtoprove their autonomy.Thetruephilosophergoesintheoppositedirectionhe doesnotwishtomakethesinglesciencesself-sufficientand independent,but,onthecontrary,tounifyandbringthem togetherhewishestoshowthatwhatiscommontothemiswhat ismostessential,andthatwhatisdifferentisaccidentalandtobe viewedasbelongingtopracticalmethodology.Subspecie aeternitatisthereisforhimonlyonerealityandonescience. Therefore,ifwedecidethatthefundamentalquestionofethics, "Whydoesmanactmorally?"canbeansweredonlybypsychology, weseeinthisnodegradationof,norinjuryto,science,butahappy simplificationoftheworld-picture.Inethicswedonotseek independence,butonlythetruth. -263-

13
TheEmotiveMeaning ofEthicalTerms
BYC.L.STEVENSON

I
ETHICALQUESTIONSfirstariseintheform"Issoandsogood?"or "Isthisalternative betterthanthat?"Thesequestionsaredifficult partlybecausewedon'tquiteknowwhatweareseeking.Weare asking,"Isthereaneedleinthathaystack?"withoutevenknowing justwhataneedleis.Sothefirstthingtodoistoexaminethe questionsthemselves.Wemusttrytomakethemclearer,eitherby definingthetermsinwhichtheyareexpressed,orbyanyother

methodthatisavailable. Thepresentpaperisconcernedwhollywiththispreliminarystepof makingethicalquestionsclear.Inordertohelpanswerthequestion "IsXgood?"wemustsubstituteforitaquestionwhichisfreefrom ambiguityandconfusion. Itisobviousthatinsubstitutingaclearerquestionwemustnot introducesomeutterlydifferentkindofquestion.Itwon'tdo(to takeanextreme instanceofaprevalentfallacy)tosubstitutefor"Is Xgood?"thequestion"IsXpinkwithyellowtrimmings?"andthen pointouthoweasythequestionreallyis.Thiswouldbegthe originalquestion,nothelpanswerit.Ontheotherhand,wemust notexpectthesubstitutedquestiontobestrictly"identical"withthe originalone.Theoriginalquestionmayembodyhypostatization, anthropomorphism,vagueness,andalltheotherillstowhichour ordinarydiscourseissubject.Ifoursubstitutedquestionistobe clearer,itmustremove theseills.Thequestionswinbeidentical onlyinthesensethatachildisidenticalwiththemanhelater becomes.Hencewemustnotdemandthatthesubstitutionstrike us,onimmediateintrospection,asmakingnochangeinmeaning. ThisarticlefirstappearedinMind,1937.itisreprinted withthekindpermissionofProfessorStevensonandthe editorofMind. -264Justhow,then,mustthesubstitutedquestionberelatedtothe original?Letusassume(inaccurately)thatitmustresultfrom replacing"good"bysomesetoftermswhichdefineit.Thequestion thenresolvesitselftothis:Howmustthedefinedmeaningof "good"berelatedtoitsoriginalmeaning? Ianswerthatitmustberelevant.Adefinedmeaningwillbecalled "relevant"totheoriginalmeaningunderthesecircumstances: Thosewhohaveunderstoodthedefinitionmustbeabletosayall thattheythenwanttosaybyusingtheterminthedefinedway. Theymustneverhaveoccasiontousethetermintheold,unclear sense.(Ifapersondidhavetogoonusingthewordintheold sense,thentothisextenthismeaningwouldnotbeclarified,and thephilosophicaltaskwouldnotbecompleted.)Itfrequently happensthatawordisusedsoconfusedlyandambiguouslythatwe mustgiveitseveraldefinedmeanings,ratherthanone.Inthiscase onlythewholesetofdefinedmeaningswillbecalled"relevant," andanyoneofthemwillbecalled"partiallyrelevant."Thisisnota rigoroustreatmentofrelevance,byanymeansbutitwillservefor thepresentpurposes. Letusnowturntoourparticulartask--thatofgivingarelevant definitionof"good."Letusfirstexaminesomeofthewaysinwhich othershaveattemptedtodothis. Theword"good"hasoftenbeendefinedintermsofapproval,or

similarpsychologicalattitudes.Wemaytakeastypicalexamples: "good"meansdesiredbyme(Hobbes)and"good"means approvedbymostpeople(Hume,ineffect).*Itwillbeconvenient torefertodefinitionsofthissortas"interesttheories,"following Mr.R.B.Perry,althoughneither"interest"nor"theory"isusedin themostusualway. Aredefinitionsofthissortrelevant? Itisidletodenytheirpartialrelevance.Themostsuperficialinquiry willrevealthat"good"isexceedinglyambiguous.Tomaintainthat "good"isneverusedinHobbes'ssense,andneverinHume's,is onlytomanifestaninsensitivitytothecomplexitiesoflanguage.We mustrecognize,perhaps,notonlythesesenses,butavarietyof similarones,differingbothwithregardtothekindofinterestin question,andwithregardtothepeoplewhoaresaidtohavethe interest. ____________________ *[The authorhasrequestedthatthe followingnote be addedhere: ForamoreadequatetreatmentofHume'sviewsseemyEthics andLanguage(YaleUniversityPress,1944),Chap.XII,Sect.5. InthepresentpaperthereferencestoHumearetobetakenas referencestothegeneralfamilyofdefinitionsofwhichHume'sis typicalbutHume'sowndefinitionissomewhatdifferentfromany thatisherespecificallystated.Perhapsthesameshouldbesaid ofHobbes.] -265Butthisisaminormatter.Theessentialquestionisnotwhether interesttheoriesarepartiallyrelevant,butwhethertheyarewholly relevant.Thisistheonlypointforintelligentdispute.Briefly: Grantedthatsomesensesof"good"mayrelevantlybedefinedin termsofinterest,istheresomeothersensewhichisnotrelevantly sodefined?Wemustgivethisquestioncarefulattention.Foritis quitepossiblethatwhenphilosophers(andmanyothers)have foundthequestion"IsXgood?"sodifficult,theyhavebeen graspingforthisothersenseof"good,"andnotanysense relevantlydefinedintermsofinterest.Ifweinsistondefining "good"intermsofinterest,andanswerthequestionwhenthus interpreted,wemaybebeggingtheirquestionentirely.Ofcourse thisothersenseof"good"maynotexist,oritmaybeacomplete confusionbutthatiswhatwemustdiscover. Nowmanyhavemaintainedthatinteresttheoriesarefarfrom beingcompletelyrelevant.Theyhavearguedthatsuchtheories neglecttheverysenseof"good"whichismostvital.Andcertainly, theirargumentsarenotwithoutplausibility. Only...whatisthis"vital"senseof"good"?Theanswershave beensovague,andsobesetwithdifficulties,thatonecanscarcely determine.

Therearecertainrequirements,however,withwhichthis"vital" sensehasbeenexpectedtocomply--requirementswhichappeal stronglytoourcommonsense.Itwillbehelpfultosummarize these,showinghowtheyexcludetheinteresttheories. Inthefirstplace,wemustbeablesensiblytodisagreeabout whethersomethingis"good."ThisconditionrulesoutHobbes's definition.Forconsiderthefollowingargument:"Thisisgood." "Thatisn'tsoit'snotgood."AstranslatedbyHobbes,this becomes:"Idesirethis.""Thatisn'tso,forIdon't."Thespeakers arenotcontradictingoneanother,andthinktheyare,onlybecause ofanelementaryconfusionintheuseofpronouns.Thedefinition, "good"meansdesiredbymycommunity,isalsoexcluded,forhow couldpeoplefromdifferentcommunitiesdisagree?1 Inthesecondplace,"goodness"musthave,sotospeak,a magnetism.ApersonwhorecognizesXtobe"good"mustipso, factoacquireastrongertendencytoactinitsfavorthanhe otherwise wouldhavehad.ThisrulesouttheHumiantypeof definition.ForaccordingtoHume,torecognizethatsomethingis "good"issimplytorecognizethatthemajorityapproveofit. Clearly,amanmayseethatthemajorityapproveofXwithout having,himself,a ____________________ 1See G.E.Moore'sPhilosophicalStudies,pp.332-334. -266strongertendencytofavorit.Thisrequirementexcludesany attempttodefine"good"intermsoftheinterestofpeopleother thanthespeaker.2 Inthethirdplace,the"goodness"ofanythingmustnotbeverifiable solelybyuseofthescientificmethod."Ethicsmustnotbe psychology."Thisrestrictionrulesoutallofthetraditionalinterest theories,withoutexception.Itissosweepingarestrictionthatwe mustexamineitsplausibility.Whatarethemethodological implicationsofinteresttheorieswhicharehererejected? AccordingtoHobbes'sdefinition,apersoncanprovehisethical judgments,withfinality,byshowingthatheisnotmakingan introspective errorabouthisdesires.AccordingtoHume's definition,onemayprove ethicaljudgments(roughlyspeaking)by takingavote.Thisuseoftheempiricalmethod,atanyrate,seems highlyremotefromwhatweusuallyacceptasproof,andreflects onthecompleterelevance ofthedefinitionswhichimplyit. Butaren'ttheremorecomplicatedinteresttheorieswhichare immunefromsuchmethodologicalimplications?No,forthesame factorsappeartheyareonlyputoffforawhile.Consider,for example,thedefinition:"Xisgood"meansmostpeoplewould approveofXiftheyknewitsnatureandconsequences.How, accordingtothisdefinition,couldweprove thatacertainXwas

good?Weshouldfirsthavetofindout,empirically,justwhatXwas like,andwhatitsconsequenceswouldbe.Tothisextentthe empiricalmethod,asrequiredbythedefinition,seemsbeyond intelligentobjection.Butwhatremains?Weshouldnexthaveto discoverwhethermostpeoplewouldapproveofthesortofthing wehaddiscoveredXtobe.Thiscouldn'tbedeterminedbypopular vote--butonlybecauseitwouldbetoodifficulttoexplaintothe voters,beforehand,whatthenatureandconsequencesofXreally were.Apartfromthis,votingwouldbeapertinentmethod.Weare againreducedtocountingnoses,asaperfectlyfinalappeal. Nowweneednotscornvotingentirely.Amanwhorejected interesttheoriesasirrelevantmightreadilymakethefollowing statement:"IfIbelievedthatXwouldbeapprovedbythemajority, whentheyknewallaboutit,IshouldbestronglyledtosaythatX wasgood."Buthewouldcontinue:"NeedIsaythatXwasgood, underthecircumstances?Wouldn'tmyacceptanceofthealleged 'finalproof'resultsimplyfrommybeingdemocratic?Whatabout themorearistocraticpeople?Theywouldsimplysaythatthe approvalofmostpeople,evenwhentheyknewallabouttheobject ____________________ 2See G.C.Field'sMoralTheory,pp.52,56-57. -267oftheirapproval,simplyhadnothingtodowiththegoodnessof anything,andtheywouldprobablyaddafewremarksaboutthe lowstateofpeople'sinterests."Itwouldindeedseem,fromthese considerations,thatthedefinitionwehavebeenconsideringhas presupposeddemocraticidealsfromthestartithasdressedup democraticpropagandaintheguiseofadefinition. Theomnipotenceoftheempiricalmethod,asimpliedbyinterest theoriesandothers,maybeshownunacceptableinasomewhat differentway.Mr.G.E.Moore'sfamiliarobjectionabouttheopen questionischieflypertinentinthisregard.Nomatterwhatsetof scientificallyknowablepropertiesathingmayhave(saysMoore,in effect),youwillfind,oncarefulintrospection,thatitisanopen questiontoaskwhetheranythinghavingthesepropertiesisgood. Itisdifficulttobelievethatthisrecurrentquestionisatotally confusedone,orthatitseemsopenonlybecauseoftheambiguity of"good."Rather,wemustbeusingsomesenseof"good"whichis notdefinable,relevantly,intermsofanythingscientifically knowable.Thatis,thescientificmethodisnotsufficientforethics.3 These,then,aretherequirementswithwhichthe"vital"senseof "good"isexpectedtocomply:(1)goodnessmustbeatopicfor intelligentdisagreement(2)itmustbe"magnetic"and(3)itmust notbediscoverablesolelythroughthescientificmethod.

II
Letusnowturntomyownanalysisofethicaljudgments.Firstlet

mepresentmypositiondogmatically,showingtowhatextentIvary fromtradition. Ibelievethatthethreerequirements,givenabove,areperfectly sensiblethatthereissomeonesenseof"good"whichsatisfiesall threerequirementsandthatnotraditionalinteresttheorysatisfies themall.Butthisdoesnotimplythat"good"mustbeexplainedin termsofaPlatonicIdea,orofaCategoricalImperative,orofan unique,unanalyzableproperty.Onthecontrary,thethree requirementscanbemetbyakindofinteresttheory.Butwemust giveupapresuppositionwhichallthetraditionalinteresttheories havemade. Traditionalinteresttheoriesholdthatethicalstatementsare descriptiveoftheexistingstateofinterests--thattheysimplygive informationaboutinterests.(More accurately,ethicaljudgments aresaidtodescribewhatthestateofinterestsis,was,orwillbe, ____________________ 3See G.E.Moore'sPrincipia Ethica,chap.i.Iam simplytryingto preserve thespiritofMoore'sobjection,andnottheexactform ofit. -268ortoindicatewhatthestateofinterestswouldbeunderspecified circumstances.)Itisthisemphasisondescription,oninformation, whichleadstotheirincompleterelevance.Doubtlessthereisalways someelementofdescriptioninethicaljudgments,butthisisbyno meansall.Theirmajoruseisnottoindicatefacts,buttocreatean influence.Insteadofmerelydescribingpeople'sinterests,they changeorintensifythem.Theyrecommendaninterestinan object,ratherthanstatethattheinterestalreadyexists. Forinstance:Whenyoutellamanthatheoughtn'ttosteal,your objectisn'tmerelytolethimknowthatpeopledisapproveof stealing.Youareattempting,rather,togethimtodisapproveofit. Yourethicaljudgmenthasaquasi-imperative forcewhich, operatingthroughsuggestion,andintensifiedbyyourtoneofvoice, readilypermitsyoutobegintoinfluence,tomodify,hisinterests.If intheendyoudonotsucceedingettinghimtodisapproveof stealing,youwillfeelthatyou've failedtoconvincehimthatstealing iswrong.Youwillcontinuetofeelthis,eventhoughhefully acknowledgesthatyoudisapproveofit,andthatalmosteveryone elsedoes.Whenyoupointouttohimtheconsequencesofhis actions--consequenceswhichyoususpecthealreadydisapproves of--these reasonswhichsupportyourethicaljudgmentaresimplya meansoffacilitatingyourinfluence.Ifyouthinkyoucanchangehis interestsbymakingvividtohimhowotherswilldisapproveofhim, youwilldosootherwise not.Sotheconsiderationaboutother people'sinterestisjustanadditionalmeansyoumayemploy,in ordertomovehim,andisnotapartoftheethicaljudgmentitself. Yourethicaljudgmentdoesn'tmerelydescribeintereststohim,it directshisveryinterests.Thedifferencebetweenthetraditional

interesttheoriesandmyviewislikethedifferencebetween describingadesertandirrigatingit. Anotherexample:Amunitionmakerdeclaresthatwarisagood thing.Ifhemerelymeantthatheapprovedofit,hewouldnot havetoinsistsostrongly,norgrowsoexcitedinhisargument. Peoplewouldbequiteeasilyconvincedthatheapprovedofit.Ifhe merelymeantthatmostpeopleapprovedofwar,orthatmost peoplewouldapprove ofitiftheyknewtheconsequences,he wouldhavetoyieldhispointifitwereprovedthatthiswasn'tso. Buthewouldn'tdothis,nordoesconsistencyrequireit.Heisnot describingthestateofpeople'sapprovalheistryingtochangeit byhisinfluence.Ifhefoundthatfewpeopleapprovedofwar,he mightinsistallthemorestronglythatitwasgood,fortherewould bemorechangingtobedone. -269Thisexampleillustrateshow"good"maybeusedforwhatmostof uswouldcallbadpurposes.Suchcasesareaspertinentasany others.Iamnotindicatingthegoodwayofusing"good."Iamnot influencingpeople,butamdescribingthewaythisinfluence sometimesgoeson.Ifthereaderwishestosaythatthemunition maker'sinfluenceisbad--thatis,ifthereaderwishestoawaken people'sdisapprovaloftheman,andtomakehimdisapproveofhis ownactions--Ishouldatanothertimebewillingtojoininthis undertaking.Butthisisnotthepresentconcern.Iamnotusing ethicalterms,butamindicatinghowtheyareused.Themunition maker,inhisuseof"good,"illustratesthepersuasivecharacterof thewordjustaswellasdoestheunselfishmanwho,eagerto encourageineachofusadesireforthehappinessofall,contends thatthesupremegoodispeace. Thusethicaltermsareinstrumentsusedinthecomplicated interplayandreadjustmentofhumaninterests.Thiscanbeseen plainlyfrommoregeneralobservations.Peoplefromwidely separatedcommunitieshavedifferentmoralattitudes.Why?Toa greatextentbecausetheyhavebeensubjecttodifferentsocial influences.Nowclearlythisinfluencedoesn'toperatethroughsticks andstonesalonewordsplayagreatpart.Peoplepraiseone another,toencouragecertaininclinations,andblameoneanother, todiscourageothers.Thoseofforcefulpersonalitiesissue commandswhichweakerpeople,forcomplicatedinstinctive reasons,finditdifficulttodisobey,quiteapartfromfearsof consequences.Furtherinfluenceisbroughttobearbywritersand orators.Thussocialinfluenceisexerted,toanenormousextent,by meansthathavenothingtodowithphysicalforceormaterial reward.Theethicaltermsfacilitatesuchinfluence.Beingsuitedfor useinsuggestion,theyareameansbywhichmen'sattitudesmay beledthiswayorthat.Thereason,then,thatwefindagreater similarityinthemoralattitudesofonecommunitythaninthoseof differentcommunitiesislargelythis:ethicaljudgmentspropagate themselves.Onemansays"Thisis,good"thismayinfluencethe

approvalofanotherperson,whothenmakesthesameethical judgment,whichinturninfluencesanotherperson,andsoon.In theend,byaprocessofmutualinfluence,peopletakeupmoreor lessthesameattitudes.Betweenpeopleofwidelyseparated communities,ofcourse,theinfluenceislessstronghencedifferent communitieshavedifferentattitudes. Theseremarkswillserve togiveageneralideaofmypointofview. Wemustnowgointomoredetail.Thereareseveralquestions whichmustbeanswered:Howdoesanethicalsentenceacquireits -270powerofinfluencingpeople--whyisitsuitedtosuggestion?Again, whathasthisinfluencetodowiththemeaningofethicalterms? Andfinally,dotheseconsiderationsreallyleadustoasenseof "good"whichmeetstherequirementsmentionedinthepreceding section? Letusdealfirstwiththequestionaboutmeaning.Thisisfarfrom aneasyquestion,sowemustenterintoapreliminaryinquiryabout meaningingeneral.Althoughaseemingdigression,thiswillprove indispensable.

III
Broadlyspeaking,therearetwodifferentpurposeswhichleadusto uselanguage.Ontheonehandweusewords(asinscience)to record,clarify,andcommunicatebeliefs.Ontheotherhandweuse wordstogiveventtoourfeelings(interjections),ortocreate moods(poetry),ortoincitepeopletoactionsorattitudes(oratory). ThefirstuseofwordsIshallcall"descriptive"thesecond, "dynamic."Notethatthedistinctiondependssolelyuponthe purposeofthespeaker. Whenapersonsays"Hydrogenisthelightestknowngas,"his purposemaybesimplytoleadthehearertobelievethis,orto believethatthespeakerbelievesit.Inthatcasethewordsare useddescriptively.Whenapersoncutshimselfandsays"Damn," hispurposeisnotordinarilytorecord,clarify,orcommunicateany belief.Thewordisuseddynamically.Thetwowaysofusingwords, however,arebynomeansmutuallyexclusive.Thisisobviousfrom thefactthatourpurposesareoftencomplex.Thuswhenonesays "Iwantyoutoclosethedoor,"partofhispurpose,ordinarily,isto leadthehearertobelievethathehasthiswant.Tothatextentthe wordsareuseddescriptively.Butthemajorpartofone'spurposeis toleadthehearertosatisfythewant.Tothatextentthewordsare useddynamically. Itveryfrequentlyhappensthatthesamesentencemayhavea dynamicuseononeoccasion,andmaynothaveadynamicuseon anotherandthatitmayhavedifferentdynamicusesondifferent occasions.Forinstance:Amansaystoavisitingneighbor,"Iam

loadeddownwithwork."Hispurposemaybetolettheneighbor knowhowlifeisgoingwithhim.Thiswouldnotbeadynamicuseof words.Hemaymaketheremark,however,inordertodropahint. Thiswouldbedynamicusage(aswellasdescriptive).Again,he maymaketheremarktoarousetheneighbor'ssympathy.This wouldbeadifferentdynamicusagefromthatofhinting. -271Oragain,whenwesaytoaman,"Ofcourseyouwon'tmakethose mistakesanymore,"wemaysimplybemakingaprediction.Butwe aremorelikelytobeusing"suggestion,"inordertoencouragehim andhencekeephimfrommakingmistakes.Thefirstusewouldbe descriptivethesecond,mainlydynamic. Fromtheseexamplesitwillbeclearthatwecan'tdetermine whetherwordsareuseddynamicallyornot,merelybyreadingthe dictionary-evenassumingthateveryone isfaithfultodictionary meanings.Indeed,toknowwhetherapersonisusingaword dynamically,wemustnotehistoneofvoice,hisgestures,the generalcircumstancesunderwhichheisspeaking,andsoon. Wemustnowproceedtoanimportantquestion:Whathasthe dynamicuseofwordstodowiththeirmeaning?Onethingisclearwemustnotdefine"meaning"inawaythatwouldmakemeaning varywithdynamicusage.Ifwedid,weshouldhavenouseforthe term.Allthatwecouldsayaboutsuch"meaning"wouldbethatitis verycomplicated,andsubjecttoconstantchange.Sowemust certainlydistinguishbetweenthedynamicuseofwordsandtheir meaning. Itdoesn'tfollow,however,thatwemustdefine"meaning"insome non-psychologicalfashion.Wemustsimplyrestrictthepsychological field.Insteadofidentifyingmeaningwithallthepsychological causesandeffectsthatattendaword'sutterance,wemustidentify itwiththosethatithasatendency(causalproperty,dispositional property)tobeconnectedwith.Thetendencymustbeofa particularkind,moreover.Itmustexistforallwhospeakthe languageitmustbepersistentandmustberealizablemoreor lessindependentlyofdeterminatecircumstancesattendingthe word'sutterance.Therewillbefurtherrestrictionsdealingwiththe interrelationofwordsindifferentcontexts.Moreover,wemust include,underthepsychologicalresponseswhichthewordstendto produce,notonlyimmediatelyintrospectableexperiences,but dispositionstoreactinagivenwaywithappropriatestimuli.Ihope togointothesemattersinasubsequentpaper.Sufficeitnowto saythatIthink"meaning"maybethusdefinedinawaytoinclude "propositional"meaningasanimportantkind.Nowawordmay tendtohavecausalrelationswhichinfactitsometimesdoesn't anditmaysometimeshavecausalrelationswhichitdoesn'ttendto have.Andsincethetendencyofwordswhichconstitutestheir meaningmustbeofaparticularkind,andmayinclude,as responses,dispositionstoreactions,ofwhichanyofseveral immediateexperiencesmaybeasign,thenthereisnothing

surprisinginthefactthatwordshaveaper-272manentmeaning,inspiteofthefactthattheimmediately introspectableexperienceswhichattendtheirusagearesohighly varied. When"meaning"isdefinedinthisway,meaningwillnotinclude dynamicuse.Foralthoughwordsaresometimesaccompaniedby dynamicpurposes,theydonottendtobeaccompaniedbythemin thewayabovementioned.E.g.,thereisnotendencyrealizable independentlyofthedeterminatecircumstancesunderwhichthe wordsareuttered. Therewillbeakindofmeaning,however,inthesenseabove defined,whichhasanintimaterelationtodynamicusage.Ireferto "emotive"meaning(inasenseroughlylikethatemployedby OgdenandRichards).4Theemotivemeaningofawordisa tendencyofaword,arisingthroughthehistoryofitsusage,to produce(resultfrom)affectiveresponsesinpeople.Itisthe immediateauraoffeelingwhichhoversaboutaword.Such tendenciestoproduceaffectiveresponsesclingtowordsvery tenaciously.Itfwouldbedifficult,forinstance,toexpress merrimentbyusingtheinterjection"alas."Becauseofthe persistenceofsuchaffectivetendencies(amongotherreasons)it becomesfeasibletoclassifythemas"meanings." Justwhatistherelationbetweenemotivemeaningandthe dynamicuseofwords?Letustakeanexample.Supposethata manistalkingwithagroupofpeoplewhichincludesMissJones, aged59.Hereferstoher,withoutthinking,asan"oldmaid."Now evenifhispurposesareperfectlyinnocent--evenifheisusingthe wordspurelydescriptively--MissJoneswon'tthinkso.Shewillthink heisencouragingtheotherstohavecontemptforher,andwill drawinherskirts,defensively.Themanmighthavedonebetterif insteadofsaying"oldmaid"hehadsaid"elderlyspinster."The latterwordscouldhavebeenputtothesamedescriptiveuse,and wouldnotsoreadilyhavecausedsuspicionsaboutthedynamicuse. "Oldmaid"and"elderlyspinster"differ,tobesure,onlyinemotive meaning.Fromtheexampleitwillbeclearthatcertainwords, becauseoftheiremotivemeaning,aresuitedtoacertainkindof dynamicuse-sowellsuited,infact,thatthehearerislikelytobe misledwhenweusetheminanyotherway.Themorepronounced aword'semotivemeaningis,thelesslikelypeoplearetouseit purelydescriptively.Somewordsaresuitedtoencouragepeople, sometodiscouragethem,sometoquietthem,andsoon. ____________________ 4See The MeaningofMeaning,byC.K.OgdenandI.A.Richards. Onp.125,secondedition,thereisapassageonethicswhich wasthesourceoftheideasembodiedinthispaper.

-273Eveninthesecases,ofcourse,thedynamicpurposesarenottobe identifiedwithanysortofmeaningfortheemotivemeaning accompaniesawordmuchmorepersistentlythandothedynamic purposes.Butthereisanimportantcontingentrelationbetween emotivemeaninganddynamicpurpose:theformerassiststhe latter.Henceifwedefineemotivelyladentermsinawaythat neglectstheiremotivemeaning,wearelikelytobeconfusing.We leadpeopletothinkthatthetermsdefinedareuseddynamically lessoftenthantheyare.

IV
Letusnowapplytheseremarksindefining"good."Thiswordmay beusedmorallyornon-morally.Ishalldealwiththenon-moral usagealmostentirely,butonlybecauseitissimpler.Themain pointsoftheanalysiswillapplyequallywelltoeitherusage. Asapreliminarydefinition,letustakeaninaccurateapproximation. Itmaybemoremisleadingthanhelpful,butWilldotobeginwith. Roughly,then,thesentence"Xisgood"meansWelikeX.("We" includesthehearerorhearers.) Atfirstglancethisdefinitionsoundsabsurd.Ifused,weshould expecttofindthefollowingsortofconversation:A."Thisisgood." B."ButIdon'tlikeit.WhatledyoutobelievethatIdid?"The unnaturalnessofB'sreply,judgedbyordinaryword-usage,would seemtocastdoubtontherelevance ofmydefinition. B'sunnaturalness,however,liessimplyinthis:heisassumingthat "Welikeit"(aswouldoccurimplicitlyintheuseof"good")isbeing useddescriptively.Thiswon'tdo.When"Welikeit"istotakethe placeof"Thisisgood,"theformersentencemustbeusednot purelydescriptively,butdynamically.Morespecifically,itmustbe usedtopromoteaverysubtle(andforthenon-moralsensein question,averyeasilyresisted)kindofsuggestion.Totheextent that"we"referstothehearer,itmusthavethedynamicuse, essentialtosuggestion,ofleadingthehearertomaketruewhatis said,ratherthanmerelytobelieveit.Andtotheextentthat"we" referstothespeaker,thesentencemusthavenotonlythe descriptiveuseofindicatingbeliefaboutthespeaker'sinterest,but thequasiinterjectory,dynamicfunctionofgivingdirectexpression totheinterest.(Thisimmediateexpressionoffeelingsassistsinthe processofsuggestion.Itisdifficulttodisapproveinthefaceof another'senthusiasm.) Foranexampleofacasewhere "Welikethis"isusedinthe -274dynamicwaythat"Thisisgood"isused,considerthecaseofa motherwhosaystoherseveralchildren,"One thingiscertain,we

allliketobeneat."Ifshereallybelievedthis,shewouldn'tbother tosayso.Butsheisnotusingthewordsdescriptively.Sheis encouragingthechildrentolikeneatness.Bytellingthemthatthey likeneatness,shewillleadthemtomakeherstatementtrue,soto speak.If,insteadofsaying"Weallliketobeneat"inthisway,she hadsaid"It'sagoodthingtobeneat,"theeffectwouldhavebeen approximatelythesame. Buttheseremarksarestiffmisleading.Evenwhen"Welikeit"is usedforsuggestion,itisn'tquitelike"Thisisgood."Thelatteris moresubtle.Withsuchasentenceas"Thisisagoodbook,"for example,itwouldbepracticallyimpossibletouseinstead"Welike thisbook."Whenthelatterisused,itmustbeaccompaniedbyso exaggeratedanintonation,topreventitsbecomingconfusedwitha descriptivestatement,thattheforceofsuggestionbecomes stronger,andludicrouslymoreovert,thanwhen"good"isused. Thedefinitionisinadequate,further,inthatthedefinienshasbeen restrictedtodynamicusage.Havingsaidthatdynamicusagewas differentfrommeaning,Ishouldnothavetomentionitingiving themeaningof"good." Itisinconnectionwiththislastpointthatwemustreturnto emotivemeaning.Theword"good"hasapleasingemotive meaningwhichfitsitespeciallyforthedynamicuseofsuggesting favorableinterest.Butthesentence"Welikeit"hasnosuch emotivemeaning.Hencemydefinitionhasneglectedemotive meaningentirely.Nowtoneglectemotivemeaningislikelytolead toendlessconfusions,asweshallpresentlyseesoIhavesought tomakeupfortheinadequacyofthedefinitionbylettingthe restrictionaboutdynamicusagetaketheplaceofemotivemeaning. WhatIshoulddo,ofcourse.,istofindadefinienswhoseemotive meaning,likethatof"good,"simplydoesleadtodynamicusage. Whydidn'tIdothis?Ianswerthatitisn'tpossible,ifthedefinition istoaffordusincreasedclarity.Notwowords,inthefirstplace, havequitethesameemotivemeaning.Themostwecanhopefor isaroughapproximation.Butifweseekforsuchanapproximation for"good,"weshallfindnothingmorethansynonyms,suchas "desirable"or"valuable"andtheseareprofitlessbecausetheydo notclearuptheconnectionbetween"good"andfavorableinterest. Ifwerejectsuchsynonyms,infavorofnon-ethicalterms,weshall behighlymisleading.Forinstance:"Thisisgood"hassomethinglike themeaningof"Idolikethisdosoaswell."But -275thisiscertainlynotaccurate.Fortheimperative makesanappeal totheconsciouseffortsofthehearer.Ofcoursehecan'tlike somethingjustbytrying.Hemustbeledtolikeitthrough suggestion.Henceanethicalsentencediffersfromanimperative in thatitenablesonetomakechangesinamuchmoresubtle,less fullyconsciousway.Notethattheethicalsentencecentersthe hearer'sattentionnotonhisinterests,butontheobjectofinterest,

andtherebyfacilitatessuggestion.Becauseofitssubtlety, moreover,anethicalsentencereadilypermitscounter-suggestion, andleadstothegiveandtakesituationwhichissocharacteristicof argumentsaboutvalues. Strictlyspeaking,then,itisimpossibletodefine"good"intermsof favorableinterestifemotivemeaningisnottobedistorted.Yetitis possibletosaythat"Thisisgood"isaboutthefavorableinterestof thespeakerandthehearerorhearers,andthatithasapleasing emotivemeaningwhichfitsthewordsforuseinsuggestion.Thisis aroughdescriptionofmeaning,notadefinition.Butitservesthe sameclarifyingfunctionthatadefinitionordinarilydoesandthat, afterall,isenough. Awordmustbeaddedaboutthemoraluseof"good."Thisdiffers fromtheaboveinthatitisaboutadifferentkindofinterest. Insteadofbeingaboutwhatthehearerandspeakerlike,itisabout astrongersortofapproval.Whenapersonlikessomething,heis pleasedwhenitprospers,anddisappointedwhenitdoesn't.When apersonmorallyapprovesofsomething,heexperiencesarich feelingofsecuritywhenitprospers,andisindignant,or"shocked" whenitdoesn't.Theseareroughandinaccurateexamplesofthe manyfactorswhichonewouldhavetomentionindistinguishingthe twokindsofinterest.Inthemoralusage,aswellasinthe nonmoral,"good"hasanemotivemeaningwhichadaptsitto suggestion. Andnow,aretheseconsiderationsofanyimportance?WhydoI stressemotivemeaningsinthisfashion?Doestheomissionofthem reallyleadpeopleintoerrors?Ithink,indeed,thattheerrors resultingfromsuchomissionsareenormous.Inordertoseethis, however,wemustreturntotherestrictions,mentionedinsectionI, withwhichthe"vital"senseof"good"hasbeenexpectedtocomply.

V
Thefirstrestriction,itwillberemembered,hadtodowith disagreement.Nowthereisclearlysomesenseinwhichpeople disagreeonethicalpointsbutwemustnotrashlyassumethatall disagree-276mentismodelledafterthesortthatoccursinthenaturalsciences. Wemustdistinguishbetween"disagreementinbelief"(typicalof thesciences)and"disagreementininterest."Disagreementinbelief occurswhenAbelievespandBdisbelievesit.Disagreementin interestoccurswhenAhasafavorableinterestinX,whenBhasan unfavorableoneinit,andwhenneitheriscontenttolettheother's interestremainunchanged. Letmegiveanexampleofdisagreementininterest.A."Let'sgoto acinemato-night."B."Idon'twanttodothat.Let'sgotothe symphony."Acontinuestoinsistonthecinema,Bonthe

symphony.Thisisdisagreementinaperfectlyconventionalsense. Theycan'tagreeonwheretheywanttogo,andeachistryingto redirecttheother'sinterest.(Notethatimperativesareusedinthe example.) Itisdisagreementininterestwhichtakesplacesinethics.WhenC says"Thisisgood,"andDsays"No,it'sbad,"wehaveacaseof suggestionandcounter-suggestion.Eachmanistryingtoredirect theother'sinterest.Thereobviouslyneedbenodomineering,since eachmaybewillingtogiveeartotheother'sinfluencebuteachis tryingtomovetheothernonetheless.Itisinthissensethatthey disagree.Thosewhoarguethatcertaininteresttheoriesmakeno provisionfordisagreementhavebeenmisled,Ibelieve,simply becausethetraditionaltheories,inleavingoutemotivemeaning, givetheimpressionthatethicaljudgmentsareuseddescriptively onlyandofcoursewhenjudgmentsareusedpurelydescriptively, theonlydisagreementthatcanariseisdisagreementinbelief.Such disagreementmaybedisagreementinbeliefaboutinterestsbut thisisnotthesameasdisagreementininterest.Mydefinition doesn'tprovidefordisagreementinbeliefaboutinterests,any morethandoesHobbes'sbutthatisnomatter,forthereisno reasontobelieve,atleastoncommon-sensegrounds,thatthiskind ofdisagreementexists.Thereisonlydisagreementininterest.(We shallseeinamomentthatdisagreementininterestdoesnot removeethicsfromsoberargument--thatthiskindofdisagreement mayoftenberesolvedthroughempiricalmeans.) Thesecondrestriction,about"magnetism,"ortheconnection betweengoodnessandactions,requiresonlyaword.Thisrulesout onlythoseinteresttheorieswhichdonotincludetheinterestofthe speaker,indefining"good."Myaccountdoesincludethespeaker's interesthenceisimmune. Thethirdrestriction,abouttheempiricalmethod,maybemetina waythatspringsnaturallyfromtheaboveaccountofdisagreement. Letusputthequestioninthisway:Whentwopeopledis-277agreeoveranethicalmatter,cantheycompletelyresolvethe disagreementthroughempiricalconsiderations,assumingthateach appliestheempiricalmethodexhaustively,consistently,andwithout error? Ianswerthatsometimestheycan,andsometimestheycannot andthatatanyrate,evenwhentheycan,therelationbetween empiricalknowledgeandethicaljudgmentsisquitedifferentfrom theonewhichtraditionalinteresttheoriesseemtoimply. Thiscanbestbeseenfromananalogy.Let'sreturntotheexample where AandBcouldn'tagreeonacinemaorasymphony.The exampledifferedfromanethicalargumentinthatimperatives wereused,ratherthanethicaljudgmentsbutwasanalogousto theextentthateachpersonwasendeavoringtomodifytheother's

interest.Nowhowwouldthesepeoplearguethecase,assuming thattheywere toointelligentjusttoshoutatoneanother? Clearly,theywouldgive"reasons"tosupporttheirimperatives.A mightsay,"Butyouknow,GarboisattheBijou."Hishopeisthat B,whoadmiresGarbo,willacquireadesiretogotothecinema whenheknowswhatplaywillbethere.Bmaycounter,"But Toscaniniisguestconductortonight,inanall-Beethovenprogram." Andsoon.Eachsupportshisimperative ("Let'sdosoandso")by reasonswhichmaybeempiricallyestablished. Togeneralizefromthis:disagreementininterestmayberootedin disagreementinbelief.Thatistosay,peoplewhodisagreein interestwouldoftenceasetodosoiftheyknewtheprecisenature andconsequencesoftheobjectoftheirinterest.Tothisextent disagreementininterestmayberesolvedbysecuringagreementin belief,whichinturnmaybesecuredempirically. Thisgeneralizationholdsforethics.IfAandB,insteadofusing imperatives,hadsaid,respectively,"Itwouldbebettertogotothe cinema,"and"Itwouldbebettertogotothesymphony,"the reasonswhichtheywouldadvancewouldberoughlythesame. Theywouldeachgiveamorethoroughaccountoftheobjectof interest,withthepurposeofcompletingtheredirectionofinterest whichwasbegunbythesuggestiveforceoftheethicalsentence. Onthewhole,ofcourse,thesuggestiveforceoftheethical statementmerelyexertsenoughpressuretostartsuchtrainsof reasons,sincethereasonsaremuchmoreessentialinresolving disagreementininterestthanthepersuasiveeffectoftheethical judgmentitself. Thustheempiricalmethodisrelevanttoethicssimplybecauseour knowledgeoftheworldisadeterminingfactortoourinterests.But notethatempiricalfactsarenotinductivegroundsfromwhich -278theethicaljudgmentproblematicallyfollows.(Thisiswhat traditionalinteresttheoriesimply.)Ifsomeonesaid"Closethe door,"andaddedthereason"We'llcatchcold,"thelatterwould scarcelybecalledaninductivegroundoftheformer.Now imperativesarerelatedtothereasonswhichsupporttheminthe samewaythatethicaljudgmentsarerelatedtoreasons. Istheempiricalmethodsufficientforattainingethicalagreement? Clearlynot.Forempiricalknowledge resolvesdisagreementin interestonlytotheextentthatsuchdisagreementisrootedin disagreementinbelief.Notalldisagreementininterestisofthis sort.Forinstance:Aisofasympatheticnature,andBisn't.They arearguingaboutwhetherapublicdolewouldbegood.Suppose thattheydiscoveredalltheconsequencesofthedole.Isn'tit possible,evenso,thatAwillsaythatit'sgood,andBthatit'sbad? Thedisagreementininterestmayarisenotfromlimitedfactual knowledge,butsimplyfromA'ssympathyandB'scoldness.Or

again,suppose,intheaboveargument,thatAwaspoorand unemployed,andthatBwasrich.Hereagainthedisagreement mightnotbeduetodifferentfactualknowledge.Itwouldbedueto thedifferentsocialpositionsofthemen,togetherwiththeir predominantself-interest. Whenethicaldisagreementisnotrootedindisagreementinbelief, isthereanymethodbywhichitmaybesettled?Ifonemeansby "method"arationalmethod,thenthereisnomethod.Butinany casethereisa"way."Let'sconsidertheaboveexample,again, where disagreementwasduetoA'ssympathyandB'scoldness. Musttheyendbysaying,"Well,it'sjustamatterofourhaving differenttemperaments"?Notnecessarily.A,forinstance,maytry tochangethetemperamentofhisopponent.Hemaypourouthis enthusiasmsinsuchamovingway--presentthesufferingsofthe poorwithsuchappeal--thathewillleadhisopponenttoseelife throughdifferenteyes.Hemaybuildup,bythecontagionofhis feelings,aninfluencewhichwillmodifyB'stemperament,and createinhimasympathyforthepoorwhichdidn'tpreviouslyexist. Thisisoftentheonlywaytoobtainethicalagreement,ifthereis anywayatall.Itispersuasive,notempiricalorrationalbutthatis noreasonforneglectingit.Thereisnoreasontoscornit,either, foritisonlybysuchmeansthatourpersonalitiesareabletogrow, throughourcontactwithothers. ThepointIwishtostress,however,issimplythattheempirical methodisinstrumentaltoethicalagreementonlytotheextentthat disagreementininterestisrootedindisagreementinbelief.There islittlereasontobelievethatalldisagreementisofthissort.Hence -279theempiricalmethodisnotsufficientforethics.Inanycase,ethics isnotpsychology,sincepsychologydoesn'tendeavortodirectour interestsitdiscoversfactsaboutthewaysinwhichinterestsareor canbedirected,butthat'squiteanothermatter. Tosummarizethissection:myanalysisofethicaljudgmentsmeets thethreerequirementsforthe"vital"senseof"good"thatwere mentionedinsectionI.Thetraditionalinteresttheoriesfailtomeet theserequirementssimplybecausetheyneglectemotivemeaning. Thisneglectleadsthemtoneglectdynamicusage,andthesortof disagreementthatresultsfromsuchusage,togetherwiththe methodofresolvingthedisagreement.Imayaddthatmyanalysis answersMoore'sobjectionabouttheopenquestion.Whatever scientificallyknowablepropertiesathingmayhave,itisalways opentoquestionwhetherathinghavingthese(enumerated) qualitiesisgood.Fortoaskwhetheritisgoodistoaskfor influence.AndwhateverImayknowaboutanobject,Icanstill ask,quitepertinently,tobeinfluencedwithregardtomyinterestin it.

VI

Andnow,haveIreallypointedoutthe"vital"senseof"good"? Isupposethatmanywillstillsay"No,"claimingthatIhavesimply failedtosetdownenoughrequirementswhichthissensemust meet,andthatmyanalysis,likeallothersgivenintermsof interest,isawayofbeggingtheissue.Theywillsay:"Whenweask 'IsXgood?'wedon'twantmereinfluence,mereadvice.We decidedlydon'twanttobeinfluencedthroughpersuasion,norare wefullycontentwhentheinfluenceissupportedbyawidescientific knowledgeofX.Theanswertoourquestionwill,ofcourse,modify ourinterests.Butthisisonlybecauseanuniquesortoftruthwillbe revealedtous--atruthwhichmustbeapprehendedapriori.We wantourintereststobeguidedbythistruth,andbynothingelse. Tosubstituteforsuchatruthmereemotivemeaningand suggestionistoconcealfromustheveryobjectofoursearch." IcanonlyanswerthatIdonotunderstand.Whatisthistruthtobe about?ForIrecollectnoPlatonicIdea,nordoIknowwhattotryto recollect.Ifindnoindefinableproperty,nordoIknowwhattolook for.Andthe"self-evident"deliverancesofreason,whichsomany philosophershaveclaimed,seem,onexamination,tobe deliverancesoftheirrespectivereasonsonly(ifofanyone's)and notofmine. Istronglysuspect,indeed,thatanysenseof"good"whichis -280expectedbothtouniteitselfinsyntheticapriorifashionwithother concepts,andtoinfluenceinterestsaswell,isreallyagreat confusion.Iextractfromthismeaningthepowerofinfluence alone,whichIfindtheonlyintelligiblepart.Iftherestisconfusion, however,thenitcertainlydeservesmorethantheshrugofone's shoulders.WhatIshouldliketodoistoaccountfortheconfusion-toexaminethepsychologicalneedswhichhavegivenrisetoit,and toshowhowtheseneedsmaybesatisfiedinanotherway.Thisis theproblem,ifconfusionistobestoppedatitssource.Butitisan enormousproblem,andmyreflectionsonit,whichareatpresent workedoutonlyroughly,mustbereserveduntilsomelatertime. Imayaddthatif"Xisgood"isessentiallyavehicleforsuggestion, itisscarcelyastatementwhichphilosophers,anymorethanmany othermen,arecalledupontomake.Totheextentthatethics predicatestheethicaltermsofanything,ratherthanexplainstheir meaning,itceasestobeareflectivestudy.Ethicalstatementsare socialinstruments.Theyareusedinaco-operative enterprise in whichwearemutuallyadjustingourselvestotheinterestsof others.Philosophershaveapartinthis,asdoallmen,butnotthe majorpart. -281-

14
SociologyandPhysicalism
BYOTTONEURATH (TRANSLATEDBYMORTONMAGNUSANDRALPHRAICO)

I.PHYSICALISM:ANON-METAPHYSICALSTANDPOINT
CONTINUINGtheworkofMach,Poincar,Frege,Wittgensteinand others,the"ViennaCircle fortheDisseminationoftheScientific World-Outlook(Weltauffassung)seekstocreateaclimatewhichwill befreefrommetaphysicsinordertopromotescientificstudiesin allfieldsbymeansoflogicalanalysis.Itwouldbelessmisleadingto speakofa"ViennaCircleforPhysicalism,"since"world"isaterm whichdoesnotoccurinthelanguageofscience,andsinceworldoutlook(Weltauffassung)isoftenconfusedwithworld-view (Weltanschauung).AlltherepresentativesoftheCirclearein agreementthat"philosophy"doesnotexistasadiscipline, alongsideofscience,withpropositionsofitsown:thebodyof scientificpropositionsexhauststhesumofallmeaningful statements. Whenreducedtounifiedscience,thevarioussciencesarepursued inpreciselythesamemannerasintheirdisassociation.Uptonow theiruniformlogicalcharacterhasnotalwaysbeensufficiently emphasized.Unifiedscienceistheoutgrowthofcomprehensive collectivelabor--inthesamewayasthestructureofchemistry, geology,biologyorevenmathematicsandlogic. Unifiedsciencewillbepursuedinthesamefashionastheindividual scienceshavebeenpursuedhitherto.Thus,the"thinkerwithouta school"willhavenomoresignificancethanhehadwhenthe scienceswere disunited.Theindividualcanhereachievejustas muchorjustaslittlewithisolatednotionsashecouldbefore.Every proposedinnovationmustbesoformulatedthatitmaybeexpected Thisarticle,originallyentitled"SoziologieimPhysikalismus",first appearedinVolumeIIof"Erkenntnis"(1931/2).itisincludedin thepresentworkwiththekindpermissionofMrs.MarieNeurath andProfessorRudolfCarnap. -282togainuniversalacceptance.Onlythroughthecooperativeeffortof manythinkersdoallitsimplicationsbecomeclear.Ifitisfalseor meaningless,i.e.,metaphysical,then,ofcourse,itfallsoutsidethe rangeofunifiedscience.Unifiedscience,alongsideofwhichthere existsno"philosophy"or"metaphysics,"isnottheachievementof isolatedindividuals,butofageneration. Somerepresentativesofthe"ViennaCircle"who,likeatheir

colleaguesinthisgroup,explicitlydeclarethatthereareno peculiarly"philosophictruths,"neverthelessstilloccasionallyemploy theword"philosophy."Bythistheymeantodesignate "philosophizing,"the"operationwherebyconceptsareclarified." Thisconcessiontotraditionallinguisticusage,though understandableforanumberofreasons,easilygivesriseto misconceptions.Inthepresentexpositionthetermisnotemployed. Wearenothereseekingtoopposeanew"Weltanschauung"toan oldone,ortoimprove onanoldonebytheclarificationof concepts.Theopposition,rather,isbetweenallworld-viewsand sciencewhichis"free ofanyworld-view."Intheopinionofthe "ViennaCircle,"thetraditionaledificeofmetaphysicsandother constructionsofasimilarnature,consist,insofarastheydonot "accidentally"containscientificstatements,ofmeaningless sentences.Buttheobjectiontotheexpression,"philosophizing,"is notmerelyaterminologicalonethe"clarificationofthemeaningof concepts"cannotbeseparatedfromthe"scientificmethod,"to whichitbelongs.Thetwoareinextricablyintertwined. Thecontributionstounifiedsciencearecloselyinterrelated,whether itbeaquestionofthinkingouttheimplicationsofnewastronomical observation-statements,orofinquiringintothechemicallawswhich areapplicabletocertaindigestiveprocesses,orofreexaminingthe conceptsofvariousbranchesofscienceinordertofindoutthe degreetowhichtheyarealreadycapableofbeingconnectedwith oneanother,inthewaythatunifiedsciencedemands.Thatisto say,everylawinunifiedsciencemustbecapableofbeing connected,undergivenconditions,witheveryotherlaw,inorderto reachnewformulations. Itis,ofcourse,possibletodelimitdifferentkindsoflawsfromone another,asforinstance,chemical,biologicalorsociological.But onemaynotassertthatthepredictionofaconcreteindividual eventdependssolelyonlawsofoneofthesekinds.Whether,for example,theburningdownofaforestatacertainspotonthe earthwillproceedinacertainwaydependsjustasmuchonthe weatherasonwhetherornothumanbeingswillundertakecertain measures.Thesemeasures,however,canonlybepredictedifthe lawsofhuman -283behaviorareknown.Thatistosay,alltypesoflawsmust,under givenconditions,becapableofbeingconnectedwithoneanother. Alllaws,whetherchemical,climatologicalorsociological,must, therefore,beconceivedofasconstituentsofasystem,viz.,of unifiedscience. Fortheconstructionofunifiedscienceaunifiedlanguage ("Einheitsprache")1,withitsunifiedsyntax,isrequired.Tothe imperfectionsofsyntaxintheperiodpreparatorytounifiedscience onemaytracetherespectivepositionsofparticularschoolsand ages.

Wittgensteinandotherproponentsofthescientificworld-outlook, whodeserve greatcreditfortheirrejectionofmetaphysics,i.e.,for theeliminationofmeaninglessstatements,areoftheopinionthat everyindividual,inordertoarrive atscientificknowledge,has temporaryneedofmeaninglessword-sequencesfor"elucidation"( Wittgenstein,Tractatus6.54):"Mypropositionsareelucidatoryin thisway:hewhounderstandsmefinallyrecognizesthemas senseless,whenhehasclimbedoutthroughthem,onthem,over them.(Hemust,sotospeak,throwawaytheladderafterhehas climbeduponit.)"Thissentenceseemstosuggestthatonemust asitwere undergorepeatedpurgationsofmeaningless,i.e., metaphysical,statements,thatonemustrepeatedlymakeuseof andthendiscardthisladder.Onlywiththehelpofelucidations, consistingofwhatarelaterrecognizedtobemeremeaningless sequencesofwords,isoneabletoarrive attheunifiedlanguageof science.Theseelucidations,whichmay,indeed,bepronounced metaphysical,donot,however,appearinisolationinWittgenstein's writings:wefindtherefurtherexpressionswhichresemblelessthe rungsofaladderthanpartsofanunobtrusivelyformulated subsidiarymetaphysicaldoctrine.Theconclusionofthe"Tractatus", "Whereofonecannotspeak,thereofonemustbesilent,"is,atleast grammatically,misleading.Itsoundsasiftherewerea"something" ofwhichonecouldnotspeak.Weshouldrathersay:ifonereally wishestoavoidthemetaphysicalattitudeentirely,thenonewill"be silent,"butnot"aboutsomething." Wehavenoneedofanymetaphysicalladderofelucidation.We cannotfollowWittgensteininthismatter,althoughhisgreat significanceforlogicisnot,forthatreason,tobelesshighlyvalued. Weowehim,amongotherthings,thedistinctionbetween "tautologies"and"statementsaboutempiricalevents."Logicand mathematicsshowuswhatlinguistictransformationsarepossible withoutany ____________________ 1KurtLewinhaspointedoutthatthe term hasbeenemployed, althoughinasomewhatdifferentsense,byFranzOppenheimer. -284extensionofmeaning,independentlyofthewayinwhichwechoose toformulatethefacts. Logicandmathematicsdonotrequire anyobservationstatements tocompletetheirstructures.Logicalandmathematicalerrorscan beeliminatedwithoutrecoursetoanyoutsidefield.Thisisnot contradictedbythefactthatempiricalstatementsmaybethe occasionforsuchcorrections.Letussupposethatacaptainsailshis shipontoareef.Alltherulesofcalculationhavebeencorrectly applied,andthereefistobefoundonthemaps.Inthiswayan errorinthelogarithmtables,whichwasresponsibleforthe misfortune,couldbediscovered,butitalsocouldbediscovered independentlyofsuchanexperience.

Inhis"elucidations,"whichmayalsobecharacterizedas "mythologicalintroductoryremarks,"Wittgensteinseemstobe attemptingtoinvestigate,asitwere,apre-linguisticstatefromthe pointofviewofapre-linguisticstageofdevelopment.These attemptsmustnotonlyberejectedasmeaninglesstheyarealso notrequiredasapreliminarysteptowardsunifiedscience.Onepart oflanguagecan,tobesure,beusedtodiscussotherpartsbut onecannotmakepronouncementsconcerninglanguageasawhole froma"notyetlinguistic"standpoint,asWittgensteinandcertain representativesofthe"ViennaCircle"seektodo.Apartofthese endeavors,althoughinamodifiedform,maybesuitably incorporatedintoscientificwork.Therestwouldhavetobe discarded. Normaylanguageasawholebesetagainst"experience asa whole,""theworld,"or"thegiven."Thus,everystatementofthe kind,"Theverypossibilityofsciencedependsonthefactoforderin theuniverse,"ismeaningless.Suchstatementscannotbesalvaged bycountingthemas"elucidations,"towhichasomewhatless rigorouscriterionapplies.Thereislittledifferencebetweensuchan attemptandmetaphysicsintheconventionalsense.Thepossibility ofscienceisdemonstratedbytheexistenceofscience.Weextend itsdomainbyaugmentingthebodyofscientificpropositions,by comparingnewpropositionswiththelegacyofpastscientists,and thuscreatingaself-consistentsystemofunifiedsciencecapableof beingutilizedforsuccessfulprediction.Wecannotasdeponents standaside,asitwere,fromourdepositionsandserve simultaneouslyasplaintiff,defendantandjudge. Thatsciencekeepswithinthedomainofpropositions,that propositionsareitsstartingpointandterminus,isoftenconceded evenbymetaphysicians,ofcoursewiththeriderthatbesides sciencethereexistsyetanotherdomain,containingstatements whichare -285tosomedegreefigurative.Incontrasttothedovetailingofscience andmetaphysicswhichissofrequentlyproposed,thisseparationof scienceandmetaphysics(without,however,eliminatingthelatter) iscarriedoutbyReininger,2whoalso,whenitcomestoscientific questions,adoptsapositiontowardsbehaviorismwhichissimilarto thatoftheViennaCircle. Unifiedscienceformulatesstatements,correctsthem,andmakes predictions.Butitcannotanticipateitsownfuturestate.Thereisno "true"systemofstatementsasdistinctfromthatwhichisaccepted atthepresenttime.Itwouldbemeaninglesstospeakofsucha thingevenasalimitingconcept.Wecanonlyascertainthatweare operatingtodaywiththespace-timesystemtowhichthatofphysics corresponds,andthusachievesuccessfulpredictions.Thissystemof statementsisthatofunifiedscience.Thisisthepointofviewwhich maybedesignatedphysicalism.3Ifthistermshouldbecome

established,thenitwouldbeadvisabletospeakof"physicalistic" whenonehasinmindanyspatio-temporaldescriptionframedin thespiritofcontemporaryphysics,e.g.,abehavioristicdescription. Theterm"physical"wouldthenbereservedfor"physicalstatement inthenarrowersense,"e.g.,forthoseofmechanics, electrodynamics,etc.Ignoringallmeaninglessstatements,the unifiedsciencepropertoagivenhistoricalperiodproceedsfrom propositiontoproposition,blendingthemintoaself-consistent systemwhichisaninstrumentforsuccessfulprediction,and, consequently,forlife.

II.THEUNIFIEDLANGUAGEOFPHYSICALISM
Unifiedsciencecomprisesallscientificlaws.Thesearecapable, withoutexception,ofbeingcombinedwithoneanother.Lawsare notstatements,butmerelydirectionsforproceedingfrom observationstatementstopredictions.(Schlick) Unifiedscienceexpresseseverythinginitsunifiedlanguage, commontotheblindandtheseeing,thedeafandthehearing.Itis "intersensual"and"intersubjective."Itconnectswhatthe soliloquizerassertstodaywithwhatheassertedyesterday,the statementshemakeswhenhisearsareclosedwiththosehe makeswhenheopensthem.Theonlythingessentialinlanguageis ordering,somethingpresenteveninaMorseCodemessage. "Intersubjective"or"intersensual"languagedependsaboveallon ordering("nextto,""between,"etc.),thatis,onthatwhichis expressedinthesymbol ____________________ 2MetaphysikderWirklichkeit,1931. 3Cf.OttoNeurath,Empirische Soziologie ,p.2. -286sequencesoflogicandmathematics.Itisinthislanguagethatall predictionsareformulated. Theunifiedlanguageofunifiedscience,whichisderivable byand largefrommodificationsofthelanguageofeverydaylife,isthe languageofphysics.Inthisconnection,itisamatterofindifference fortheuniformityofthelanguageofphysicalismwhatparticular languagethephysicsofagivenperiodmayuse.Itisofno significancewhetheritexplicitlyemploysafour-dimensional continuuminitsmorehighlyrefinedformulations,whetherit recognizesaspatiotemporalorderofsuchatypethatthelocusof everyeventispreciselydetermined,orwhethercouplingsofplacer andvelocitydispersions,whoseprecisionislimitedinprinciple,figure asbasicelements.Itisessentialonlythattheconceptsofunified science,bothwheretheyarethoughtoutinthemostsubtledetail andwhere thedescriptionremainsimprecise,bemadetosharethe currentfateoffundamentalphysicalconcepts.Itispreciselyinthis thatthepointofviewofphysicalismisexpressed.Butall predictions,inwhoseconfirmationorrejectionweseethemeasure

ofscience,arereducibletoobservation-statements,tostatements involvingpercipientindividualsandobjectsemittingstimuli. Thebeliefthatwiththeabandonment,asinmodernphysics,ofthe idealofcompleteprecision,themoreorlesscomplexrelations whichthisyieldsprovidealessintelligiblepicturethanweshould obtainbytheintroductionofhypotheticalelectronpathsisprobably duetoourpersistenceincertainhabitualwaysofthinking.4 Theunifiedlanguageofphysicalismconfrontsuswhereverwe makeascientificpredictiononthebasisoflaws.Whensomeone saysthatifheseesacertaincolorhewillhearacertainsound,or viceversa,orwhenhespeaksofthe"redpatch"nexttothe"blue patch,"whichwillappearundercertainconditions,heisalready operatingwithintheframeworkofphysicalism.Asapercipientheis aphysicalstructure:hemustlocalizeperception,e.g.,inthecentral nervoussystemorinsomeotherplace.Onlyinthiswaycanhe makepredictionsandreachagreementwithothersandwithhimself atdifferenttimes.Everytemporaldesignationisalreadyaphysical formulation. Scienceendeavorstotransformthestatementsofeverydaylife. Theyarepresentedtousas"agglomerations,"consistingof physicalisticandpre-physicalisticcomponents.Wereplacethemby the"unification"ofphysicalisticlanguage.Ifonesays,forinstance, "the ____________________ 4Cf.Concerningthis,PhilippFrank"DerCharakterderheutigen physikalischenTheorien",Scientia,March1931. -287screechingsawcutsthroughthebluewoodencube,""cube"is obviouslyan"intersensual"and"intersubjective"concept,equally availablefortheblindandthedeaf.Ifamansoliloquizesand makespredictions,whichhecanhimselfcontrol,heisableto comparewhathesaidofthecubewhenhesawitwithwhathe communicatesinthedarkwhenhetouchesit. Withtheword"blue,"ontheotherhand,thereis,atfirst,adoubt astohowitistobeincorporatedintotheunifiedlanguage.Itcan beusedinthesenseoftherateofvibrationofelectromagnetic waves.Butitcanalsobeusedinthesenseofa"fieldstatement," meaning:whenaseeingman(definedinacertainway)enters,as atestbody,therangeofthiscube,hebehavesinacertain manner,describablephysicalisticallye.g.,hesays,"Isee'blue.'" Whiletheremaybedoubtastowhatpeoplemeanwhentheyuse "blue"incolloquialspeech,"screeching"wouldbechieflyintended asa"fieldstatement,"i.e.,asanexpressioninwhichtheauditoris alwaysincluded.Closerconsideration,however,revealsthat"cube," "blue"and"screeching"areallwordsofthesametype. Letusattempttofollowupouranalysisbygivingamoreexact

renderingoftheabovesentence,inaccordancewithphysicalism, andreformulatingitinawaythatwillmakeitmoresuitablefor prediction. "Hereisabluecube."(Thisformulation,likethosewhichfollow, mayberestatedasaphysicalformula,inwhichthelocusis determinedbymeansofcoordinates.) "Hereisascreechingsaw."(Thescreechingentersintothe formulation,atfirst,onlyasvibrationsofthesawandtheair,which couldbeexpressedinphysicalformulae.) "Hereisapercipientman."(Possiblya"fieldstatement"couldbe addedindicatingthatundercertainconditionsthepercipiententers intoarelationshipwiththephysicalblueandthephysical screeching.) Thisperceivingmayperhapsbedividedinto: "Neuralchangesareoccurringhere." "Cerebralchangesareoccurringhereintheperceptionareaand, perhaps,inthespeechareaalso."(Itisimmaterialforour purposeswhethertheseareascanbedefinedlocationallyor whethertheyhavetobedefinedstructurally.Neitherisitnecessary todiscusswhetherchangesinthespeecharea--the "speechthought"ofthebehaviorists--are connectedwiththelarynxor laryngealinnervation.) Perhaps,inordertoexhaustthephysicalisticmeaningofthis -288simplesentence,somethingmorehasstilltobeadded,e.g., particularsconcerningtime,orpositionalcoordinatesbutthe essentialthingisthat,ineverycase,theadditionsshouldbe statementsinvolving,physicalconcepts. Itwouldbeamistaketosuppose,becausephysicalformulaeofa verycomplexnature,whicharestillnotfullyatourdisposal,are requiredforthecomputationofcertaincorrelations,that, therefore,thephysicalisticexpressionsofeverydaylifemustalsobe complex.Physicalisticeverydaylanguagewillarisefromexisting commonspeech,onlypartsofwhichwillhavetobediscarded otherswillbeintegrated,whilesupplementswillmakeupfor certaindeficiencies.Theoccurrenceofaperceptionwillbe,from theoutset,morecloselyconnectedthanhithertowiththe observationstatementandwiththeidentificationoftheobject.The analysisofcertaingroupsofstatements,e.g.,observation statements,willproceedinadifferentmannerfrombefore. Childrenarecapableoflearningphysicalisticevery-daylanguage. Theyareabletoadvancetotherigoroussymboliclanguageof scienceandlearnhowtomakesuccessfulpredictionsofallkinds,

withouthavingtoresortto"elucidations"supposedlyfunctioningas ameaninglessintroduction.Itisaquestionofamorelucidmodeof speech,soformulatedastoomitsuchexpressions,forinstanceas "illusionofthesenses,"whichcreatesomuchconfusion.Buteven thoughthephysicalisticlanguagehasthecapacitysomedayto becometheuniversallanguageofsocialintercourse,wemust continuetodevoteourselves,forthepresent,tocuttingawaythe metaphysicalappendagesfromthe"agglomerations"ofour languageandtodefiningphysicalisticallyeverythingthatremains. Whenthemetaphysicalcordisnolongerpresent,muchofwhatis leftmaypresentitselfasdisconnectedheaps.Thefurtheruseof suchremnantswouldnotbeprofitable,andareconstructionwould beindispensable. Wecanoftencontinuetomakeuseofavailable"agglomerations" byreinterpretingthem.Butcautionisrequiredhere:menwhoare readyenoughtoadjusttheirviews,butatthesametime comfortloving,frequentlyconsolethemselveswiththebeliefthata greatdealcanbe"systematically"reinterpreted.Itismorethan questionablewhetheritwouldbeconvenienttocontinuetoemploy termslike"instinct,""motive,""memory,""world,"etc.,attachingto themawhollyunusualsense,whichonemayeasilyforgetwhen onegoesonusingthesetermsforthesakeofpeace.Certainly therearemanycasesinwhichareconstructionoflanguageis superfluous,or -289evendangerous.Solongasoneexpressesoneself"approximately," onemustguardagainstthedesiretobe,atthesametime, excessivelysubtle. Sincetheviewspresentedherearemostnearlysimilartotheideas ofCarnap,letitbeemphasizedthattheyexcludethespecial "phenomenal"languagefromwhichCarnapseekstoderivethe physicallanguage.Theeliminationofthe"phenomenal"language, whichdoesnotevenseemtobeusablefor"prediction"--the essenceofscience--intheformithasassumeduptonow,will probablynecessitatemanymodificationsinhissystemofconcept construction.*Inthesameway,wemustexclude"methodological solipsism"(Carnap,Driesch),whichseemstobeanattenuated residueofidealisticmetaphysics,apositionfromwhichCarnap himselfconstantlyattemptstogetaway.Thethesisof "methodologicalsolipsism,"asevenCarnapwouldprobably concede,cannotbescientificallyformulated.Norcanitbeusedto indicateaparticularstandpoint,whichwouldbeanalternativeto someotherstandpoint,becausethereexistsonlyonephysicalism, andeverythingsusceptibleofscientificformulationiscontainedinit. Therecanbenocontrastingofthe"ego"orthe"thinking personality,"oranythingelsewith"experience,""whatis experienced,"or"thought."Thestatementsofphysicalismare basedonstatementsconnectedwithseeing,hearing,feelingand

other"senseperceptions"(asphysicalevents),butalsowith "organicperceptions,"which,forthemostpart,areonlyroughly noted.Wecan,ofcourse,closeoureyes,butwecannotstopthe processofdigestion,thecirculationoftheblood,ortheoccurrence ofmuscularinnervations.Whatpeopleareatpainstoseparateoff as"theego"are,inthelanguageofphysicalism,eventsofthissort also,ofwhichwearenotinformedthroughourordinary"external" senses.All"personalityco-efficients"whichseparateoneindividual fromanotherareofaphysicalistickind! Althoughthe"ego"cannotbesetoffagainsteitherthe"worldor "thinking,"oneisable,withoutabandoningphysicalism,to distinguishstatementsaboutthe"physicalisticallydescribedperson," besidesthoseconcerningthe"physicalisticallydescribedcube,"and can,undercertainconditions,make"observationstatements," therebycreatingasubstituteforthe"phenomenallanguage."But carefulinvestigationwillshowthatthemassofobservation statementsiscontainedinthemassofphysicalstatements. ____________________ *[Thisisareference tothe "Konstitutionssystem"elaboratedby CarnapinhisbookDerLogischeAufbauderWelt.Videthe Introductionp.24.Ed.] -290Theprotocolstatementsofanastronomerorachronicler (appearingasphysicalformulations)will,ofcourse,bedistinguished fromstatementshavingapreciselydeterminedpositioninthe contextofaphysicalsystem,despitethefactthatbetweenthetwo therearefluidtransitionalstages.Butthereisnospecial "phenomenal"asopposedtophysicalisticlanguage.Everyoneof ourstatementscan,fromtheveryoutset,beaphysicalisticone-anditisthisthatdistinguisheswhatissaidherefromallthe pronouncementsofthe"ViennaCircle,"whichotherwiseconstantly stressestheimportanceofpredictionsandtheirverification.Unified languageisthelanguageofpredictions,whicharetheveryheartof physicalism. Inacertainsense,thedoctrinehereproposedproceedsfroma givenconditionofeverydaylanguage,whichinthebeginningis essentiallyphysicalistic,and,intheusualcourseofevents,is graduallydevelopedinametaphysicaldirection.Thisformsapoint ofcontactwiththe"naturalconceptoftheworld"("Natrlicher Weltbegriff")inAvenarius.Thelanguageofphysicalismis,soto speak,innowaynewitisthelanguagefamiliartocertain"naive" childrenandpeoples. Itisalwaysscienceasasystemofstatementswhichisatissue. Statementsarecomparedwithstatements,notwith"experiences," "theworld,"oranythingelse.Allthesemeaninglessduplications belongtoamoreorlessrefinedmetaphysicsandare,forthat reason,toberejected.Eachnewstatementiscomparedwiththe totalityofexistingstatementspreviouslycoordinated.Tosaythata

statementiscorrect,therefore,meansthatitcanbeincorporated inthistotality.Whatcannotbeincorporatedisrejectedasincorrect. Thealternative torejectionofthenewstatementis,ingeneral,one acceptedonlywithgreatreluctance:thewholeprevioussystemof statementscanbemodifieduptothepointwhereitbecomes possibletoincorporatethenewstatement.Withinunifiedscience thereisimportantworktobedoneinmakingtransformations.The definitionof"correct"and"incorrect"proposedheredepartsfrom thatcustomaryamongthe"ViennaCircle,"whichappealsto "meaning"and"verification."Inourpresentationweconfine ourselvesalwaystothesphereoflinguisticthought.Systemsof statementsaresubjectedtotransformation.Generalizing statements,however,aswellasstatementselaboratedbymeans ofdeterminaterelations,canbecomparedwiththetotalityof protocolstatements. Unifiedsciencethuscomprehendsavarietyoftypesofstatements. So,forexample,whetheroneisdealingwith"statementsabout reality,""hallucinationstatements,"or"untruths"dependsonthe -291degreetowhichonecanemploythestatementsindrawing inferencesaboutphysicaleventsotherthanoralmovements.Oneis confrontedbyan"untruth"whenonecaninferacertainexcitation ofthespeechcenterofthebrain,butnotcorrespondingeventsin theperceptioncentersthelattereventsare,ontheotherhand, essentialforahallucination.If,besidesexcitationintheperception centers,onecanalsoinfer,inamannertobespecified,events outsidethebody,thenoneisdealingwith"statementsabout reality."Inthiscase,wecancontinuetoemploythestatement--for example,"acatissittinginthisroom"--asaphysicalisticstatement. Astatementisalwayscomparedwithanotherstatementorwiththe systemofstatements,neverwitha"reality."Suchaprocedure wouldbemetaphysicalitwouldbemeaningless."The"realityis not,however,replacedby"the"physicalisticsystem,butbygroups ofsuchsystems,oneofwhichisemployedinpractice. Fromallthisitbecomesclearthatwithinaconsistentphysicalism therecanbeno"theoryofknowledge,"atleastnotinthe traditionalform.Itcouldconsistonlyofdefensiveoperations againstmetaphysics,thatistosay,oftheunmaskingof meaninglessphrases.Manyoftheproblemsofthetheoryof knowledgewill,perhaps,betransformedintoempiricalquestionsin suchawaythattheycanbeaccommodatedinunifiedscience. Thisproblemcannomorebediscussedherethanthequestionof howall"statements"canbeincorporatedinphysicalismas physicalisticconstructions."Twostatementsareequivalent"could, perhaps,beexpressedinthisway.Letamanbeactedonbya systemofcommandsconnectedwithallsortsofstatements,e.g., "IfAbehavesinsuchandsuchaway,dothisandthat."Nowone canfixcertainconditions,andobservethattheadditionofacertain statementproducesthesamechangeinhisreactionsasthe

additionofanother.Thenonewillsaythatthefirststatementis equivalenttothesecond.Whentautologiesareadded,thestimulus offeredbythesystemofcommandsremainsunchanged. Allthiscouldbedevelopedexperimentallywiththeaidofa "thinkingmachine"suchasJevonsproposed.Bymeansofthis machine,syntaxcouldbeformulatedandlogicalerrors automaticallyavoided.Themachinewouldnotevenbeableto write thesentence,"twotimesredishard." Theviewssuggestedherearebestcombinedwithabehavioristic orientation.Onewillnotthenspeakof"thought,"butof "speechthought,"i.e.,ofstatementsasphysicalevents.Whethera perceptionstatementaboutthepast(e.g.,"Irecentlyhearda melody")canbe -292tracedbacktoapastspeech-thought,orwhetherpreviousstimuli areonlynowevokingareactioninspeech-thought,is,inthis regard,ofnoessentialimportance.Alltoooftenthediscussionis conductedasiftherefutationofsomeminorassertionsofthe behavioristshadsomehowshakenthefundamentalprinciplethat onlyphysicalisticstatementshaveameaning,i.e.,canbecomepart ofunifiedscience. Webeginwithstatements,andweconcludewithstatements.There areno"elucidations"whicharenotphysicalisticstatements.If someonewishedtoconceiveof"elucidations"asexclamations, then,likewhistlesandcaresses,theywouldbesubjecttonological analysis.Thephysicalisticlanguage,unifiedlanguage,istheAlpha andOmegaofallscience.Thereisno"phenomenallanguage" besidethe"physicallanguage,"no"methodologicalsolipsism" besidesomeotherpossibleposition,no"philosophy,"no"theoryof knowledge,"nonew"Weltanschauung"besidetheothers:thereis onlyUnifiedScience,withitslawsandpredictions.

III.SOCIOLOGYNo"MORALSCIENCE"
Unifiedsciencemakespredictionsaboutthebehaviorofmachines justasitdoesaboutthatofanimals,aboutthebehaviorofstones asaboutthatofplants.Someofitscomplexstatementswecould analyzeeventoday,whiletheanalysisofotherstemporarilyeludes us.Thereare"laws"ofthebehaviorofanimalsandofmachines. The"laws"ofmachinescanbereducedtophysicallaws.Buteven inthissphere,alawintermsofmassandmetricalmeasurement oftensuffices,withoutrecoursetoatomsorotherelements.Inthe sameway,thelawsoftheanimalbodyareoftensoformulated thatthereisnoneedtofallbackonmicro-structurallaws. Admittedly,where muchhasbeenhopedforfromtheinvestigation ofmacrostructurallaws,theyhaveoftenturnedouttobe inadequate:certainirregularitiesremainincalculable. Thereisaconstantsearchforcorrelationsbetweenmagnitudes

appearinginthephysicalisticdescriptionofevents.Itmakesno fundamentaldifferencewhetherstatisticalornonstatistical descriptionsareinvolved.Nomatterwhetheroneisinvestigating thestatisticalbehaviorofatoms,plantsoranimals,themethods employedinestablishingcorrelationsarealwaysthesame.Aswe sawabove,allthelawsofunifiedsciencemustbecapableofbeing connectedwithoneanotheriftheyaretobeequaltothetaskof serving,asoftenaspossible,topredictindividualeventsorcertain groupsofevents. -293Thisdoesaway,attheoutset,withanyfundamentaldivisionof unifiedscience,forinstance,intothe"naturalsciences"andthe "moralsciences,"thelatterbeingoftenreferredtoalsoinother ways,e.g.,"Kulturwissenschaften"("sciencesofculture").The thesesbywhichitisintendedtoestablishthisdivisionvary,butare alwaysofametaphysicalcharacter,thatis,meaningless.Itis senselesstospeakofdifferent"essences"reposing"behind"events. Whatcannotbeexpressedintermsofrelationsamongelements cannotbeexpressedatall.Itisconsequentlymeaninglesstogo beyondcorrelationsandspeakofthe"essenceofthings."Onceitis understoodwhattheunifiedlanguageofsciencereallymeans, therewillbenomoretalkof"differentkindsofcausality."Onecan onlycomparetheorganizationofonefieldanditslawswiththe organizationofanother,andascertain,perhaps,thatthelawsin onefieldaremorecomplexthanthoseinanother,orthatcertain modesoforganizationlackinginonearefoundinanotherthat,for example,certainmathematicalformulaearerequiredinonecase butnotintheother. Ifthe"naturalsciences"cannotbedelimitedfromthe"moral sciences,"itisevenlesspossibletomakethedistinctionbetween the"philosophyofnature"andthe"philosophyofthemoral sciences."Evenleavingasidethefactthattheformertermis unsuitablebecause,asmentionedabove,itstillcontainstheword "philosophy,"by"philosophyofnature"onecanonlyunderstanda sortofintroductiontothewholeworkofunifiedscience.Forhow should"nature"bedistinguishedfrom"non-nature"? Onecannotevenadducethepracticalexigenciesofeverydaylifeor oftheconductofscientificinvestigationsasjustificationforthis dichotomy.Isthetheoryofhumanbehaviorseriouslytobe opposedtothatofthebehaviorofallotherobjects?Isitseriously intendedthatthetheoryofhumansocietiesshouldbefittedinto onedisciplineandthetheoryofanimalsocietiesintoanother?Are thenaturalsciencestodealwith"cattle-breeding,""slavery"and "warfare"amongants,andthemoralscienceswiththesesame institutionsamongmen?Ifthisisnotmeant,thenthedistinctionis nosharperthanthatbetweendifferent"scientificfields"intheolder sense. Oristheresomethingtobesaid,perhaps,forthelinguisticusage accordingtowhichonesimplyspeaksof"moralsciences"whenever

"socialsciences"aremeant?But,tobeconsistent,onewouldhave tocountthetheoryofanimalsocietiestogetherwiththetheoryof humansocietiesassocialsciences,andthereforeas"moral sciences,"animplicationfromwhichmostpeoplewouldrecoil.And quite -294understandablyso,forthenwherewouldbethegreatcleavage concealedbehindallthis,thecleavagedependingonthe maintenanceofthecenturies-oldtheologicalhabitofthoughtwhich dividesupallexistenceintoatleasttwodepartments,e.g.,a "noble'"andan"ignoble"?Thedualismof"naturalsciences"and "moralsciences,"andthedualismof"philosophyofnature"and "philosophyofculture"are,inthelastanalysis,residuesof theology. Theancientlanguagesare,onthewhole,morephysicalisticthan themodern.Theyarefullofmagicalelements,tobesure,but abovealltheytreat"body"and"soul"assimplytwoformsof matter:thesoulisadiminutive,shadowybodywhichissuesfrom themouthoftheindividualatdeath.Itistheologywhichfirst replacesthecontrastof"matter-soul"and"matter-body"withthat of"non-matter-soul"and"matter-body,"aswellas"non-matterGod"and"matter-world,"addingawholehierarchyofsubordinate andsuperiorentities,naturalandsupernatural.Theoppositionof "natural"and"supernatural"canbeformulatedonlybymeansof meaninglessphrases.Thesephrases,becausetheyare meaningless,donotcontradictthestatementsofunifiedscience neitheraretheyinaccordwiththem.Buttheyarecertainlythe causeofgreatconfusion.Itiswhenitisassertedthatthese expressionsarejustasmeaningfulasthoseofsciencethatthe troublestarts.5 Whatpartthementalhabitoftheologicaldualismplaysinthe creationofsuchdichotomiescanperhapsbegatheredfromthefact thatassoonasonesuchdivisionisdiscardedanothereasily establishesitself.Theoppositionofthe"Is"andthe"Ought,"which isencounteredespeciallyamongphilosophersoflaw,maybe mentionedhere.Inpart,ofcourse,thismaybetracedtothe theologicaloppositionof"Ideal"to"Reality."Butthecapacityof languageforformingnounsfacilitatesallthesemeaningless schemes.Onecan,withoutviolatingsyntacticalrules,asserenely say"theOught"as"thesword."Andthenpeoplegoontomake statementsaboutthis"Ought"justastheywouldabouta"sword," oratleastastheywouldaboutthe"Is." The"moralsciences,"the"psychicalworld,"theworldofthe "categoricalimperative,"therealmofEinfhlung(empathy),the realmofVerstehen("the'understanding'characteristicofthe historian")--these aremoreorlessinterpenetrating,oftenmutually substitutable,expressions.Someauthorspreferonegroupof meaninglessphrases,someanother,somecombineand

accumulatethem. ____________________ 5Cf.HansHahn,berflssige Wesenheiten(Publicationsofthe VereinErnstMach,Vol.II). -295Whilesuchphrasesprovideonlythemarginaldecorationsofscience inthecaseofmanywriters,withotherstheyinfluencetheentire bodyoftheirpronouncements.Evenifthepracticaleffectofthe doctrinesonwhichtheschoolof"moralsciences"isbasedarenot over-rated,eveniftheconfusioninempiricalinvestigationwrought byitisnotexaggerated,still,inthesystematicestablishmentof physicalismandsociology,clarityrequiresthatacleansweepbe madehere.Itisthedutyofthepractitionersofunifiedscienceto takeadeterminedpositionagainstsuchdistinctionsthisisnota matterfortheirarbitrarychoice. Ifthereisuncertaintyoverthesequestionsevenamong antimetaphysicallymindedthinkers,itispartlyconnectedwiththe factthattheredoesnotexistsufficientclarityaboutthesubject matterandmethodof"psychology."Thedetachmentofthe"moral "sciences"fromotherdisciplinesisconcurrentwiththeseparationof "psychical"objectsfromothersinotherfields.Thisdetachmenthas onlybeensystematicallyeliminatedbybehaviorism,which,inthis essay,wealwaysunderstandinthewidestsense.Onlyphysicalistic statementsabouthumanbehaviorareincorporatedintoitssystem. Whenthesociologistmakespredictionsabouthumangroupsinthe samewayasthebehavioristdoesaboutindividualmenoranimals, sociologymayappropriatelybecalledsocialbehaviorism. Ourconclusionisasfollows:sociologyisnota"moralscience"or "thestudyofman'sspirituallife"(Sombart's"Geisteswissenschaft") standinginfundamentaloppositiontosomeothersciences,called "naturalsciences"no,associalbehaviorism,sociologyisapartof unifiedscience.

IV.SOCIOLOGYASSOCIALBEHAVIORISM
Itispossibletospeakinthesametermsofmen'spainting, housebuilding,religion,agriculture,poetry.Andyet,itismaintained againandagainthat"understanding"humanbeingsis fundamentallydifferentfrom"merely"observingthemand determiningregularitiesexpressible aslaws.Theareaof "understanding,"of"empathy"withotherpersonalitiesisclosely connectedwiththattraditionallyclaimedbythe"moralsciences." Wefindherearesurrectionofthedivisionongroundsofprinciple-alreadyeliminatedonapreviouslevel--between"internal"and "external"perceptions(experience,mind,etc.),whichpossessthe sameempiricalcharacter. Philosophicalliterature,especiallytheliteratureofthephilosophyof history,frequentlyinsiststhatwithout"empathy"and"under-

-296standing"itwouldbeimpossibletopursuehistoricalstudiesor comprehensivelytoarrange anddescribehumanactionsatall. Howcanweattempttodisposeingeneraloftheseobstaclesfrom thepointofviewofphysicalism?Itmustbeassumedfromthe outsetthatthepersistentasseverationsofmanysociologistsand philosophersofhistoryconcerningtheunavoidabilityofrecourseto "understanding"arealsoaimedatpreservingtheresultsofsome veryworthyscientificresearches.Here,assooftenelsewhere,it maybeacaseofanoteasilydisentangledcombinationofthe dualistichabitsofmind,originatingintheology,andtheactual procedureofscience.Itwillbeapparenttoanyonefamiliarwiththe monismofunifiedsciencethatevenstatementswhicharefully capableofformulationinphysicalistictermshavebeenpresentedin anunphysicalisticform. Sentencessuchas"Iseeabluetableinthisroom,"and"Ifeel angry"donotliefarapart.The"I"isappropriatelyreplacedby somepersonalname,sinceallsuchstatementsmaybeappliedto anyone,andan"I-statement,"therefore,mustbecapableofbeing assertedbysomeoneelse.Nowwehave:"Thereisabluetablein thisroom,"and"Thereisangerinthisman."Thediscussions concerning"primary"and"secondary"qualitiesareatanendwhen itisrealizedthat,inthelastanalysis,allstatementsaboutqualities areofonetype,onlytautologiesbeingexcludedfromtheclassof suchstatements.Thenallstatementsaboutqualitiesbecome physicalisticstatements.Besidesthese,therearetautologies,rules forthecombinationandconnectionofstatements.Thepropositions ofgeometrycanbeinterpretedasphysicalisticstatementsoras tautologies,therebyremovingmanydifficulties. What,amongotherthings,ischaracteristicofthesentence,"There isangerinthisman"?Itspeculiarityisthatitisopenonlyto inadequateanalysis.Itisasifsomeonewereabletotellus,"Here isasevere storm"withoutbeinginapositiontostateinwhat manneritwascomposedoflightning,thunder,rain,etc.,noryet whetherhearrivedathisdiscoveriesbymeansofhiseyes,earsor nose. Whenonespeaksofanger,organicperceptionsaremadeuseof. Changesintheintestinaltract,internalsecretions,bloodpressure andmusclecontractionareessentiallyequivalenttochangesinthe eye,earornose.Inthesystematicconstructionofbehaviorism,a man'sstatement,"Iamangry"isincorporatedintophysicalismnot onlyasthereactionofthespeaker,butalsoastheformulationof his"organicperceptions."Justas,fromtheenunciationof"color perceptions,"onecaninferphysicalisticstatementsaboutretinal -297changesandotherevents,sofromassertionsaboutanger,i.e.,

about"organicperceptions,"onecanderive physicalisticstatements about"intestinalchanges,""changesinbloodpressure,"etc., phenomenawhichbecomeknowntoothersoftenonlybymeansof suchstatements.Thismaybeappendedasasupplementto Carnap'sdiscussionsonthissubject,wherethefullvalueof statementsabout"organicperceptions"(intheoldersense)hasnot beentakenintoconsideration. Ifsomeonesaysthatherequiresthisexperience of"organic perceptions"inordertohaveempathywithanotherperson,his statementisunobjectionable.Thatistosay,theemploymentof physicalisticstatementsconcerningone'sownbodyinmaking physicalisticstatementsaboutanother'siscompletelyinlinewith ourscientificwork,whichthroughoutmakesthissortof "extrapolation."Ourcommitmenttoinductionleadsusconstantlyto suchextensions.Thesameprincipleisinvolvedinmaking statementsabouttheothersideofthemoononthebasisofour experience concerningthesidewhichfacesus.Thatistosay,one mayspeakof"empathy"inthephysicalisticlanguageifonemeans nomorebyitthanthatonedrawsinferencesaboutphysicalevents inotherpersonsonthebasisofformulationsconcerningorganic changesinone'sownbody.Whatisinvolvedhere,asinsomany othercases,isaphysicalisticinduction,theusualattemptat establishingcertaincorrelations.Thelinguisticclarityachievedsofar inregardtomanyoftheseeventsleaves,tobesure,muchtobe desired.Onewouldcomeveryclosetotheactualstateofaffairsif onewere tosaythatthemoralsciencesare,aboveall,thesciences inwhichcorrelationsareassertedbetweeneventswhicharevery inadequatelydescribedandforwhichonlycomplexnamesare available. Whenweanalyzetheconceptsof"understanding"and"empathy" moreclosely,everythinginthemthatisusableinaphysicalisticway provestobeastatementaboutorder,exactlyasinallsciences. Theallegeddistinctionbetween"naturalsciences"and"moral sciences,"totheeffectthattheformerconcernthemselves"only" witharrangement,thelatterwithunderstandingaswell,isnonexistent. If,wherevernon-metaphysicalformulationsareencountered,they aresubjectedtosystematicformulation,physicalisticstatementswill beachievedthroughout.Therewillnolongerbeaspecialsphereof the"psychical."Itisamatterofindifferenceforthepositionhere maintainedwhethercertainindividualthesesofWatson's,Pavlov's orothersareupheldorrejected.Whatisessentialisthatonly -298physicalisticallyformulatedcorrelationsbeemployedinthe descriptionoflivingthings,whatevermaybeobservedinthese things. Itwouldbemisleadingtoexpressthisbysayingthatthedistinction of"psychical"and"corporeal"nolongerexisted,buthadbeen

replacedby"somethingneutral."Itisnotatallaquestionofa "something,"butsimplyofcorrelationsofaphysicalisticcharacter. Onlyinsufficientanalysiscanleadanyonetosaysomethinglike:"It cannotyetbeascertainedwhetherthewholesphereofthe 'psychical'reallyadmitsofphysicalisticexpression.Itis,afterall, possiblethathereandthereanothertypeofformulationis required,i.e.,conceptsnotphysicalisticallydefinable."Thisisthe lastremnantofbeliefina"soul"asaseparateformofbeing.When peoplehaveobservedarunningclockandthenseeitstop,they caneasilymakeuseofthecapacityoflanguageforcreatingnouns, andposetheproblem,"Where hasthe'movement'goneto?"And afteritisexplainedtothemthatallthatcanbeknownaboutthe clockistobediscoveredthroughanalysisoftherelationsbetween itspartsandthesurroundings,ascepticmaystillobjectthat, althoughheunderstandsthatspeculationaboutthe"movement"is puremetaphysics,heisstilldoubtfulwhether,forthesolutionof certaincomplicatedproblemsrelatingtotheoperationsofclocks, physicalismentirelysuffices. Withoutmeaningtosaythateverysociologistmustbetrainedin behaviorism,wecanstilldemandofhimthat,ifhewishestoavoid errors,hemustbecarefultoformulateallhisdescriptionsof humanbehaviorinawhollystraightforwardphysicalisticfashion.Let himnotspeakofthe"spiritoftheage"ifitisnotcompletelyclear thathemeansbyitcertainverbalcombinations,formsofworship, modesofarchitecture,fashions,stylesofpainting,etc.Thathe undertakestopredictthebehaviorofmenofotheragesonthe basisofhisknowledgeofhisownbehavioriswhollylegitimate, evenifsometimesmisleading.But"empathy"maynotbecredited withanypeculiarmagicalpowertranscendingordinaryinduction. Withinductionsinthisorthatfield,itisalwaysaquestionofa decision.Thisdecisionmaybecharacteristicofcertainhuman groupsorofwholeages,butisnotitselflogicallydeducible.Yet inductionalwaysleads,withinthephysicalisticsphere,tomeaningful statements.Itmustnot,forthisreason,beconfusedwiththe interpolationofmetaphysicalconstructions.Therearemanywho concedethattheyformulatemetaphysicalconstructions,i.e.,that theyinsertmeaninglessverbalcombinations,butneverthelesswill notfullyappreciatethedamagecausedbysuchaprocedure.The elimination -299ofsuchconstructionsinsociologyandpsychology,aswellasin otherfields,mustbeundertakennotonlyforthesakeoffreeing themofsuperfluitiesandofavoidingmeaninglessverbal combinations,whichperhapsaffordsatisfactiontosome.The eliminationofmetaphysicswillbecomescientificallyfruitfulthrough obviatingtheoccasionforcertainfalsecorrelationsintheempirical sphere.Itwillbeseenthatoneismostlikelytooverestimatethe significanceofcertainelementsinthehistoricalprocess,whichare capableofaphysicalisticformulation,whentheyarebelievedtobe

linkedwithcertainmetaphysicalessences.Peopleoftenexpectfrom thepriestofthetranscendentGodcertainempiricallycontrollable superachievementswhichwouldnotbededuciblefromempirical experience. Therearemanywhoallegeinfavorofmetaphysicalconstructions that,withtheirhelp,betterpredictionscanbemade.Accordingto thisview,oneproceedsfromphysicalisticallyformulated observationstatementstotherealmofmetaphysicalwordsequences.Bytheemploymentofcertainruleswhich,inthe metaphysicalsphere,areappliedtomeaninglessword-sequences, thisprocessissupposedtoresultinpredictionsconsonantwitha systemofprotocolstatements.Evenifresultsareactuallyachieved inthisway,metaphysicsisnotessentialforpredictioninthiscase, althoughitmayperhapsactasastimulus,likesomenarcotic.Forif predictionscanbemadeinthisroundaboutway,"thentheycan alsobedirectlydeducedfromthegivendata.Thisisclearfroma purelylogicalconsideration:ifYfollowsfromX,andZfollowsfrom Y,thenZfollowsimmediatelyfromX."6EvenifKeplermadeuse oftheworldoftheologicalconceptionsinarrivingattheplanetary orbits,thisworldofconceptionsneverthelessdoesnotenterintohis scientificstatements.Muchthesameistrueofthehighlyproductive fieldsofpsychoanalysisandindividualpsychology,whose behavioristictransformationwillcertainlybenoeasytask. Whenthemetaphysicaldeviationsfromthemainlineof behaviorismhavebeendistinguishedinthisway,thepathwillbe clearedforasociologyfreeofmetaphysics.Justasthebehaviorof animalscanbestudiednolessthanthatofmachines,starsand stones,socanthebehaviorofanimalgroupsbeinvestigated.Itis possibletotakeintoaccountbothchangesinindividualsproduced by"external"stimuliandthosecausedby"autonomous"changes "within"livingthings(e.g.,therhythmicalcourseofaprocess),just asonecaninvestigatethedisintegrationofradium,whichisnot ____________________ 6OttoNeurath,Empirische Soziologie ,p.57. -300influencedbyanythingexternal,aswellasthedecompositionofa chemicalcompoundthroughtheadditionofoxygen.Whether analogiestothedisintegrationofradiumplayarolewithinthe humanbodyneednotbediscussedhere. Sociologydoesnotinvestigatepurelystatisticalvariationsinanimal or,aboveall,humangroupsitisconcernedwiththeconnections amongstimulioccurringbetweenparticularindividuals.Sometimes, withoutanalyzingtheseconnectionsindetail,itcandetermine undercertainconditionsthetotalbehaviorofgroupsunitedby commonstimuli,andmakepredictionsbymeansofthelaws obtained.Howis"socialbehaviorism,"unimpededbymetaphysics, tobepursued?Justaseveryotheractualscienceispursued. Naturally,ininvestigatinghumanbeingscertaincorrelationsresult

whicharenotencounteredinthestudyofstarsormachines.Social behaviorismattainstolawsofadefinitetypepeculiartoitself. Topursuephysicalisticsociologyisnottotransferthelawsof physicstolivingthingsandthegroupstheyform,assomehave consideredfeasible.Itispossibletodiscovercomprehensive sociologicallaws,aswellaslawsfornarrowersocialareas,without havingrecourse tomicro-structure,andthusbeingabletobase thesesociologicallawsonphysicalones.Whateversociologicallaws arediscoveredwithouttheaidofphysicallawsinthenarrower sensearenotnecessarilyalteredbytheadditionofasubsequently discoveredphysicalsubstructure.Thesociologistiscompletely unimpededinhissearchforlaws.Theonlystipulationisthathe mustalwaysspeak,inhispredictions,ofstructureswhicharegiven inspaceandtime.

V.SOCIOLOGICALCORRELATIONS
Itisaslittlepossibleinsociologyasinothersciencestostateatthe outsetonthebasisofpurelytheoreticalconsiderationswhat correlationscanbeemployedwithaprospectofsuccess.Butitis demonstrablethatcertaintraditionalendeavorsmeetwith consistentfailure,whileothermethods,adaptedtodiscovering correlations,arenotatpresentsufficientlycultivated. Ofwhattype,then,aresociologicalcorrelations?Howdoesone arrive,withacertaindegreeofreliability,atsociological predictions?Inordertobeabletopredictthebehaviorofagroup inacertainrespect,itisoftennecessarytobeacquaintedwiththe totallifeofthegroup.Variationsintheparticularmodesof behaviordistinguishableinthetotalityofevents,theconstructionof machines,the -301erectionoftemples,theformsofmarriage,arenot"autonomously" calculable.Theymustberegardedaspartsofthewholethatis investigatedatanygiventime.Inordertoknowhowthe constructionoftempleswillchangeinthefuture,onemustbe familiarwiththemethodsofproduction,theformofsocial organization,andthemodesofreligiousbehaviorintheperiod whichistakenasthestartingpointonemustknowthe transformationtowhichallofthesetogetheraresubject. Notalleventsproveequallyresistanttobeingemployedinsuch predictions.Givencertainconditions,fromthemodeofproduction ofahistoricalperiodonecanoftenroughlyinferthenextphasesin thedevelopmentofthemodeofproductionandtheformofsocial organization.Thenoneisinapositiontoattemptwithsome successtomakefurtherpredictionsaboutreligiousbehaviorand similarmatterswiththeaidofsuchpreviouspredictions.Experience showsthatthereverse procedure,ontheotherhand,meetswith failure,i.e.,itdoesnotseempossibletoderive predictionsabout themodeofproductionfrompredictionsaboutreligiousbehavior

alone. But,whetherwedirectourattentiontothemethodsofproduction, toreligiousbehavior,totheconstructionofbuildings,ortomusic, wearealwaysconfrontedwitheventswhichcanbephysicalistically described. Manyofthesocialinstitutionsofanagecanbeproperlyaccounted foronlyiftheirdistantpastisknown,whileothersmight,soto speak,bedevisedatanytimegiventheappropriatestimuli.There isacertainsenseinwhichthepresenceofcannonsactsasa stimulus,producingarmedturretsbywayofreaction.Thedress coatsofourday,ontheotherhand,donotrepresentareactionto dancing,anditisonlywithdifficultythattheywouldbenewly devised.Butitiscomprehensibletousthatatsometimeinthe past,amandressedinalong-skirtedcoatbecametheinventorof thedresscoatwhentheskirtsofhiscoatflappedupwhilehewas riding.Thecoherencebetweenestablishedcustomsisdifferentin thetwocases. Justasonemustbeinformedaboutthetypeofcoherenceinorder tobeabletomakepredictions,soonemustknowwhetherthe detachmentofacertaininstitutionorsegmentfromasocial complexiseasyordifficult,andwhether,inthecaseofloss,itcan bereplaced.Thestate,forexample,isahighlystablecomplex whoseoperationsare,toaconsiderableextent,independentofthe changeoverofpersonnel:evenifmanyjudgesandsoldierswereto die,therewouldbenewonestotaketheirplace.Amachine,on the -302contrary,doesnotgenerallyreplacewheelswhichhavebeen removedfromit. Itisawhollyphysicalisticquestiontowhatextenttheexistenceof speciallyconditionedindividuals,deviatingfromthenorm,assures thestabilityofthestatestructure.Therelatedquestionofthe degreetowhichsuchsignificantindividualsarereplaceablemustbe treatedseparately.Thequeenbeeassumesaspecialpositioninthe hive,butwhenaqueenbeegetslost,thereisthepossibilitythata newonewillemerge.Therearealways,sotospeak,latentqueens. Howisthisinthecaseofhumansociety? Theextenttowhichpredictionsaboutsocialcomplexescanbe madewithouttakingintoconsiderationthefateofcertain particularlyprominentindividualsisentirelyaconcretesociological question.Itispossibletomaintain,withgoodreason,thatthe creationofbourgeoisEurope,oncethemachinesystemhad impartedtothemoderncapitalistictransformationitscharacteristic hue,waspredictableattheendoftheeighteenthcentury.Onthe otherhand,onecouldhardlyhavepredictedNapoleon'sRussian campaignandtheburningofMoscow.Butitwould,perhaps,be validtosaythatifNapoleonhaddefeatedRussia,the

transformationofthesocialorderwouldhaveproceededinthe samewayasitdidinfactproceed.EvenavictoriousNapoleon wouldhavehadtocountenancetheoldfeudalismofCentralEurope toacertaindegreeandforacertaintime,justas,onanother occasion,here-establishedtheCatholicChurch. Theextenttowhichpredictionispossible,orrelatestoparticular individuals,innowayaffectstheessenceofsocialbehaviorism.The movementsofaleafofpaperinthewindareequally unpredictable,andyetkinematics,climatologyandmeteorologyare allhighlydevelopedsciences.Itisnopartoftheessenceofa developedsciencetobecapableofpredictingeveryindividual event.Thatthefateofasingleleafofpaper,say,abreeze-blown thousanddollarbill,mayespeciallyinterestus,isoflittleconcernto scientificinvestigation.Weneednotdiscussherewhethera chronicleofthe"accidental"pathsofleavesinthewindcould eventuallyleadtoatheoryofthepathsofleaves.Manyofthe viewsassociatedwithRickertandalliedthinkersyieldnoscientific lawsevenwheretheycanbephysicalisticallyinterpreted. Sociology,likeeveryscience,tracksdowncorrelationswhichcanbe utilizedforpredictions.Itseekstolaydownitsbasicconceptionsas unambiguouslyandclearlyaspossible.Onemayattempt, -303forinstance,todefinegroupsthrough"commercium"and "connubium."Oneascertainswhotradeswithwhom,orwho marrieswhom.Theremayemergeclearlydistinguishableareasof concentration,togetherwithpoorlyoccupiedborderareas.And thenonecouldinvestigatetheconditionsunderwhichsuch concentrationsvaryorevendisappear.Todiscoverthecorrelation ofsuchareasofconcentrationwiththeprocessesofproduction obtainingattheirrespective periodsisobviouslyalegitimate sociologicaltask,whichmightbeofimportanceforthetheoryof "classes." Onecaninvestigate,forinstance,underwhatconditions matriarchy,ancestorworship,agricultureandsimilarinstitutions arise,atwhatpointthefoundingofcitiesbegins,orwhat correlationsexistbetweensystematictheologyandotherhuman activities.Onecanalsoaskhowtheadministrationofjusticeis determinedbysocialconditions,althoughitisquestionablewhether suchlimiteddivisionswillexhibitsufficientlaw-like regularities.It maywellbe,forinstance,thatcertaineventsoccurringoutsidethe fieldoflawmustbeaddedtothoseinvolvedintheadministration ofjustice,ifrelationsstatableaslawsaretobefound. Whatonegrouprecognizesaslaw,anothermayregardasoutside thelegalorder.Thus,onlycorrelationsamongmen'sstatements concerningthe"law,"orbetweentheirbehaviorandtheir statementscanbeestablished.Butitisnotpossible,withoutspecial preliminarywork,tocontrast"legalevents"assuchwithother events.

Itisdoubtfulwhethersimplesociologicalcorrelationscanbe determinedbetweentheallowedinterestrate,ontheonehand, andthestandardoflivingofaperiod,ontheotherwhether simplerrelationsdonotappearwhenthe"allowedinterestrate" and"prohibitedusury"aretakentogether.Thus,themodesof behavioronwhichunfavorable"legal"and"ethical"judgmentsare passedcouldbeincorporatedintosociology,andthejudgments themselvescouldbeincluded.Thesedisciplinesareineverysense branchesofsociology,buttheyarequitedifferentfromthe"ethics" and"jurisprudence"whicharecommonlycultivated.Thelatteryield fewornosociologicalcorrelations.Theyarepredominantly metaphysical,or,where freeofmetaphysics,theirmethodology andarrangementofstatementscanonlybeexplainedasresidues oftheology.Inpart,theyyieldpurelylogicaldeductions,the extractionofcertaininjunctionsfromothers,orofcertain conclusionsfromgivenlegalassumptions.Butallthisliesoutside thesphereoforderedcorrelations. -304-

VI.ETHICSANDJURISPRUDENCEAS REMNANTSOFMETAPHYSICS
Initsorigin,ethicsisthedisciplinewhichseekstodeterminethe totalityofdivineinjunctions.Itattemptstofindout,bymeansofa logicalcombinationofcommandmentsandprohibitionsofa universalkind,whetheragivenindividualactiscommanded, permittedorforbidden.The"casuistry"ofCatholicmoral theologianshasextensivelyelaboratedthistypeofdeduction.Itis quiteobviousthattheindeterminatenessofdivineinjunctionsand theambiguityoftheirmeaningprecludeanygenuinescientific method.Thegreatexpenditure onlogicaldeductionswas,soto speak,squanderedonaworthlessobject,eventhough,historically, itpreparedthewayforthecominglogicizingperiodofscience.If theGodwhoissuesthecommands,aswellaseventsinheavenand hell(whichwaslocatedbymanytheologiansatthecenterofthe earth)arephysicalisticallydefined,thenoneisdealingwithanonmetaphysicaldiscipline,tobesure,butahighlyuncriticalone. Buthowisadisciplineof"ethics"tobedefinedonceGodis eliminated?Isitpossibletopassmeaningfullytoa"commandinitself,"tothe"categoricalimperative"?Onemightjustaswelltalk ofa"neighbor-in-himselfwithoutanyneighbors,"orofa"son-inhimself,whoneverhadafatherormother." Howisonetodistinguishcertaininjunctionsormodesofbehaviorin ordertomakepossible"anewethicswithinthecontextof physicalism"?Itseemstobeimpossible.Mencanformjoint resolutionsandconductthemselvesincertainways,anditis possibletostudytheconsequencesofsuchactions.Butwhatmodes ofbehavior,whatdirectivesisonetodistinguishas"ethical,"sothat correlationsmaythenbesetup?

Theretentionofanoldnameisbasedontheviewthatthereis somethingabidingtobediscovered,whichiscommontotheold theologicalormetaphysicalandthenewempiricistdisciplines.When allmetaphysicalelements,aswellaswhateverphysicalistic theologicalelementsitmaycontain,havebeeneliminatedfrom ethics,thereremainonlystatementsaboutcertainmodesof humanbehaviorortheinjunctionsdirectedbysomementoothers. Onecould,however,alsoconceiveofadisciplinepursuingits investigationsinawhollybehavioristicfashionaspartofunified science.Suchadisciplinewouldseektodeterminethereactions producedbythestimulusofacertainwayofliving,andwhether such -305waysoflivingmakemenmoreorlesshappy.Itiseasytoimagine athoroughlyempirical"felicitology"(Felicitologie),onabehavioristic foundation,whichcouldtaketheplaceoftraditionalethics. Butanon-metaphysicalethicsusuallyseekstoanalyze,inoneway oranother,men's"motivations,"asifthisprovidedasuitable groundworkforrelationsstatableaslaws.Whatmenassertabout the"reasons"fortheirconduct,however,isessentiallymore dependentoncontingenciesthanthegeneralrunoftheirbehavior. Whenthegeneralsocialconditionsofagivenperiodareknown,the behaviorofwholegroupscanbefarmorereadilypredictedthan therationalewhichindividualswilladducefortheirconduct.The modesofconductwillbedefendedinverydifferentfashions,and veryfew,moreover,willnotethecorrelationbetweenthesocial situationandaverage conduct. These"conflictsofmotivations,"forthemostpartmetaphysically formulated,areavoidedbyanempiricalsociology,whichisintent uponfruitfulwork.ThisisthecasewithMarxism,themost productive sociologyofthepresentday.Itendeavorstoestablish correlationsbetweenthesocialsituationandthebehaviorofentire classes,sothatitcanthenaccountforthefrequentlychanging verbalsequenceswhicharesupposedto"explainthemotivation"of thescientificallylaw-abidingactionswhichareconditionedinthis way.SinceMarxism,initsdescriptionsofrelationsexpressible as laws,makesaslittleuseaspossibleofwhatmenassertabout themselves,the"eventsintheirconsciousness,"their"ideology,"it isrelatedtothoseschoolsof"psychology"whichaccordtothe "unconscious"inoneformoranotheraprominentrole.Thusitis thatpsychoanalysisandindividualpsychology,byvirtue ofthefact thattheyconfuteandeliminatethemotivationalpsychologyof consciousness(todayquiteobsolete),preparethewayformodern empiricalsociology,whichseeks,inthespiritofunifiedscience,to discovercorrelationsbetweenactionsandthefactorsthatcondition them. Andevenifpsychoanalysisandindividualpsychologyintheir presentformcontainverymanymetaphysicalexpressions,

nevertheless,throughtheiremphasisontherelationbetween behavioranditsunconsciouspreconditions,theyareprecursorsof thebehavioristicwayofthinkingandofsociologicalmethodology. Thusitispermissibletoaskwhetheracertainmannerofliving yieldsmoreorlesshappiness,since"happiness"canbedescribed whollybehavioristicallyitisvalidtoaskonwhatdependthe demandswhichmassesofmenmakeofoneanother,whatnew demandsareset,whatmodesofbehaviorwillemergeinsucha situation. -306(Claimsandmodesofbehaviorinthisregardareoften fundamentallydivergent.)Allthesearelegitimatesociological formulationsofproblems.Whetheritisadvisabletocharacterize themas"ethical"neednotbedecidedhere. Thecaseof"jurisprudence"isasimilarone,whenitisunderstood assomethingotherthanthesociologyofcertainsocialphenomena. Butwhenittakesupthetaskofestablishingwhetherasystemof claimsislogicallyconsistent,whethercertainconclusionsofthe statutebookscanbeharmonizedwithcertain observationstatementsaboutlegalpractice,weareconcernedwith purelylogicalinvestigations.Whenwedeterminethattherulesofa chemistarelogicallycompatible,wehavenotyetenteredthe sphereofthescienceofchemistry.Inordertopursuechemistry, wemustestablishcorrelationsbetweencertainchemicaleventsand certaintemperatures,andothersuchthings.Thefactthat,despite theiressentiallymetaphysicalpreliminaryformulations,the representativesofcertainschoolsofjurisprudencecanproduce somethinglogicallyandscientificallysignificantdoesnotpreventour rejectingtheseformulations,as,forexample,thefollowing: Thethinkingofmathematicalorlogicallawsisapsychical act,buttheobjectofmathematics--thatwhichisthought of--isnotsomethingpsychical,neitheramathematicalnor alogical"soul,"butaspecificintellectualreality.For mathematicsandlogicabstractfromthepsychological factofthethinkingofsuchanobject.Inthesameway thestate,astheobjectofaspecialmodeofthoughtto bedistinguishedfrompsychology,isadistinctivereality, butisnotthefactofthethinkingandwillingofsuchan object.Itisanidealorder,aspecificsystemofnorms.It residesnotintherealmofnature--the realmof physicalpsychicalrelations--butintherealmofspirit.The stateasobligatingauthorityisavalueor--sofarasthe propositionalexpressionofvalueisestablished--anorm, orsystemofnorms.Assuch,itisessentiallydifferent fromthespecificallyrealfactoftheconceivingorwilling ofthenorm,whichischaracterizedbyindifferenceto value.7 Formulationsofthistypeareconnectedwithsimilaroneson

"ethics"andrelateddisciplines,withoutanyattempthavingbeen madetodiscoverhowtheterm"objectivegoals"istobefittedinto unifiedscience,andwithoutindicatinganyobservation-statements throughwhich"objective goals"assuchmightbedetermined. Again: Ifthe"generaltheoryofthestate"askswhatthestateis andhowitis,i.e.,whatitspossiblebasicformsandchief componentsare,politics ____________________ 7Kelsen,Allgemeine Staatslehre ,pp.14ff. -307askswhetherthestateistobeatall,and,ifitis,whichof itspossibleformsmightbethebest.Throughthis formulationofquestions,politicsexhibitsitselfaspartof ethics,asthejudgmentofmoralitywhichsetsobjective goalsforhumanconduct,i.e.,whichpositsasobligatory thecontentofsomeactions.Butpolitics,sofarasitseeks meansappropriate totherealizationoftheseobjective goalswhicharesomehowestablishedandassumedby virtueoftheirestablishmentsofar,thatis,asitfixes thosecontentsofconductwhichareshownbyexperience tocausetheeffectscorrespondingsubstantiallytothe presupposedgoalstothisextent,politicsisnotethics,it isnotaddressedtothenormative,prescriptive law. Rather,itisatechnology,ifthetermmaybeused,social technology,andassuchdirectedtowardscausal-typelaws oftheconnectionofmeansandend.8 Evenafterextensive alteration,mostoftheseviewscannotbe employedwithinthebodyofanempiricalsociology,i.e.,ofasocial behaviorism.Forwhatcorrelationissupposedtobeasserted?One mayobject,however,thatitisagainaquestionofshowingthat combinationsofcertainrulesandlegaldefinitionsarelogically equivalenttootherdefinitions(althoughthisissomethingnot necessarilynoticedatfirstsight).Butthen,whilesuch demonstrationsarecertainlyimportantforpracticallife,nospecial metaphysicaldiscussionsarerequired. Itisclearthatthesetautologiesofthelegalsystemwillbeless prominentwhenthebasicspiritofunifiedscienceprevails.People willthenbemoreinterestedinwhateffectscertainmeasures produce,andlessinwhethertheordinancesformulatedinstatute booksarelogicallyconsistent.Nospecialdiscipline,certainly,is requiredtotestthelogicalcompatibilityoftherulesforthe administrationofahospital.Whatonewishestoknowishowthe jointoperationofcertainmeasuresaffectsthestandardofhealth, sothatonemayactaccordingly.

VII.THEEMPIRICALSOCIOLOGYOFMARXISM

Theunifiedlanguageofphysicalismsafeguardsthescientific method.Statementislinkedtostatement,lawtolaw.Ithasbeen shownhowsociologycanbeincorporatedinunifiedsciencenoless thanbiology,chemistry,technologyorastronomy.Thefundamental separationofspecial"moralsciences"fromthe"naturalsciences" hasproveditselftheoreticallymeaningless.Butevenapurely practicaldivision,sharperthananyofthemanyothersthatexist hasbeenshowntobeinappropriateandwhollyuncalledfor. ____________________ 8Kelsen,op.cit.,p.27. -308Inthisconnectionwehavegivenasketchoftheconceptof sociologicalcorrelationsasapplicablewithinadevelopedsocial behaviorism.Wehaveseenthatbyvirtue ofthisconception, disciplinessuchas"ethics"andjurisprudence"losetheirtraditional foundations.Withoutmetaphysics,withoutdistinctionsexplicable onlythroughreference tometaphysicalhabits,thesedisciplines cannotmaintaintheirindependence.Whateverelementsofgenuine sciencearecontainedinthembecomeincorporatedintothe structure ofsociology. Inthissciencetheregraduallyconvergewhateverusefulprotocol statementsandlawseconomics,ethnology,historyandother disciplineshavetooffer.Sometimesthefactthatmenaltertheir modesofreactionplaysanimportantroleinsociologicalthought, andsometimesthestartingpointisthefactthatmendonot changeintheirreactionbehavior,butenterintomodifiedrelations withoneanother.Economics,forinstance,reckonswithaconstant humantype,andtheninvestigatestheconsequencesofthe operationofthegiveneconomicorder,e.g.themarket mechanism.Itseekstodeterminehowcrisesandunemployment arise,hownetprofitsaccrue,etc. Butwhenitisobservedthatthegiveneconomicorderisalteredby men,theneedarisesforsociologicallawswhichdescribethis change.Investigationoftheeconomicorderanditsoperationis thennotsufficient.Itisnecessarytoinvestigate,inaddition,the lawswhichdeterminethechangeintheeconomicorderitself.How certainchangesinthemodeofproductionalterstimuliinsucha waythatmentransformtheirtraditionalwaysofliving,oftenby meansofrevolutions,isaquestioninvestigatedbysociologistsof themostdivergentschools.Marxismis,toahigherdegreethan anyotherpresent-daysociologicaltheory,asystemofempirical sociology.ThemostimportantMarxistthesesemployedfor predictionareeitheralreadyformulatedinafairlyphysicalistic fashion(sofarastraditionallanguagemadethispossible),orthey canbesoformulated,withoutthelossofanythingessential. WecanseeinthecaseofMarxismhowsociologicallawsaresought forandhowrelationsconformabletolawareestablished.When oneattemptstoestablishthecorrelationbetweenthemodesof

productionofsuccessiveperiodsandthecontemporaneousformsof religiousworship,thebooks,discourses,etc.,thenoneis investigatingthecorrelationbetweenphysicalisticstructures. Marxismlaysdown,overandabovethedoctrineofphysicalism (materialism)certainspecialdoctrines.Whenitopposesonegroup offormsas -309"substructure"toanothergroupas"superstructure"("historical materialism"asaspecialphysicalistictheory),itproceeds throughoutitsoperationswithintheconfinesofsocialbehaviorism. Whatisinvolvedhereisnooppositionofthe"material"tothe "spiritual,"i.e.,of"essences"with"differenttypesofcausality." Thecomingdecadesmaybeconcernedingrowingmeasurewith thediscoveryofsuchcorrelations.MaxWeber'sprodigiousattempt todemonstratetheemergenceofcapitalismfromCalvinismclearly showstohowgreatanextentconcreteinvestigationisobstructed bymetaphysicalformulations.Toaproponentofsocialbehaviorism itseemsatoncequitenaturalthatcertainverbalsequences--the formulationofcertaindivinecommands--shouldberecognizedas dependentoncertainmodesofproductionandpowersituations. Butitdoesnotseemveryplausiblethatthewayoflifeofvast numbersofhumanbeingsoccupiedwithtrade,industryandother matters,shouldbedeterminedbyverbalsequencesofindividual theologians,orbythedeity'sinjunctions,alwaysveryvaguely worded,whichthetheologianstransmit.AndyetMaxWeberwas committedtothispointofview.Hesoughttoshowthatfromthe "spiritofCalvinism"wasbornthe"spiritofcapitalism"andwithit thecapitalistorder. ACatholictheologian,Kraus,haspointedoutthatsuchan overestimationoftheinfluenceoftheologicalformulationscanonly beexplainedbythefactthatheascribedtospiritasortof "magical"effect.IntheworkofWeberandotherthinkers,"spirit"is regardedasverycloselyboundupwithwordsandformulae.Thus weunderstandWeber'sassiduousquestforcrucialtheological formulationsofindividualCalvinists,inwhichtheoriginsofcrucial capitalistformulationsmightbesought.The"rationalism"ofone sphereistospringfromthatoftheother.Thattheological discoursesandwritingspossesssuchenormouspowersisa suppositionwhichwouldbeformallypossiblewithinaphysicalistic system.Butexperience provesotherwise.Incompanywiththe Marxists,theCatholictheologianmentionedabovepointsoutthe factthattheologicalsubtletiesexercise littleinfluenceonhuman behavior,indeed,thattheyarescarcelyknowntotheaverage merchantorprofessionalman.Itwouldbemuchmoreplausibleto supposethatinEngland,forexample,merchantsopposedtothe royalmonopoly,andusurersdesiringtotakeinterestatahigher ratethantheChurchofEnglandpermitted,readilygavetheir supporttoadoctrineandapartywhichturnedagainsttheChurch andthecrownalliedwiththeChurch.Firstthebehaviorofthese

menwas,toaconsiderableex-310tent,capitalisticallyoriented--thentheybecameCalvinists.We shouldexpecttofind,inaccordancewithallourexperience of theologicaldoctrinesatothertimes,thatthesedoctrineswere subsequentlyrevisedandadaptedtothesystemofproductionand commerce.And,Krausfurthershows,inoppositiontoWeber,that thosetheologicalformulationswhichare"compatible"with capitalismdidnotappearuntillater,whileCalvinisminitsoriginal formwasrelatedrathertothedogmasoftheanti-capitalistMiddle Ages.Weber'smetaphysicalstarting-pointimpededhisscientific work,anddeterminedunfavorablyhisselectionofobservationstatements.Butwithoutasuitableselectionofobservationstatementstherecanbenofruitfulscientificwork. Letusanalyzeaconcretecaseinsomewhatgreaterdetail.With whatisthedeclineofslaveryintheancientworldconnected? ManyhavebeeninclinedtotheviewthatChristiandoctrineandthe Christianwayoflifeeffectedthedisappearanceofslavery,afterthe Stoicphilosophershadimpairedtheconceptionofslaveryasan eternalinstitution. Ifsuchanassertionismeanttoexpressacorrelation,itisnatural toconsider,inthefirstplace,whetherornotChristianityand slaveryarefoundtogether.Itisthenseenthatthemostoppressive formsofslaveryappearatthebeginningofthemodernera,ata timewhenChristianstatesareeverywhere expandingtheirpower, whentheChristianChurchesarevigorousaboveallinthecolonies. BecauseoftheinterventionofCatholictheologiansmotivatedby humanitarianconsiderations,thepreservationoftheperishing IndianslavesofAmericawasundertakenthroughtheimportation ofsturdierNegroslavesbroughttothatcontinentinshiploads. Itwouldreallybenecessarytodefineinadvancewithagreater degreeofprecisionwhatismeant,ontheonehand,by"Christian," and,ontheother,by"slavery."Iftheattemptismadetoformulate thecorrelationbetweenthemwithgreaterclarity,itmustbesaid thatstatementsofacertaintype,religiousbehavior,etc.,never appearinconjunctionwiththelarge-scaleownershipofslaves.But inthisconnection,itwouldbenecessarytolaydownadefinite modeofapplication.Foramancanbea"slave"fromthe"juristic" standpoint,and,simultaneously,a"master"fromthe"sociological" pointofview.Sociologicalconcepts,however,maybelinkedonly withothersociologicalconcepts. "Christiandogma"isanextraordinarilyindeterminateconcept.Many theologianshavebelieveditpossibletodemonstrate,fromthe Bible,thatGodhascondemnedtheNegroestoslavery:when -311-

HamtreatedhisdrunkenfatherNoahirreverently,Noahcursedhim anddeclaredthatheandhisdescendantswere tobesubjecttohis brothersShemandJaphethandtheirdescendants.Stillother theologianshavesoughttodiscoverinChristiandoctrinearguments againstslavery. Itisevidentthatthesociologistadvancesmuchfurtherwhenhe delimitsacertainsystemofmen,religiousacts,dogmas,etc.,and thennoteswhetheritcomesintobeinginconjunctionwithcertain modesofsocialbehavior.Thisis,ofcourse,averyrough procedure.Theattemptmustbemadetodiscovernotonlysuch simplecorrelations,butalsocorrelationsofgreatercomplexity. Lawsmustbecombinedwithoneanother,inorderforittobe possibletoproducecertainpredictions. Somesociological"laws"arevalidonlyforlimitedperiods,justas, inbiology,therearelawsaboutantsandaboutlionsinadditionto moregenerallaws.Thatistosay,wearenotyetinapositionto statepreciselyonwhatcertaincorrelationsdepend:thephrase "historicalperiod"referstoacomplicatedsetofconditionswhich hasnotbeenanalyzed.Muchconfusionisduetotheopinionof someanalyticalsociologiststhatthelawswhichtheyhaddiscovered hadtopossessthesamecharacteraschemicallaws,i.e.,thatthey hadtoholdtrueunderallconceivableearthlyconditions.But sociologyisconcernedforthemostpartwithcorrelationsvalidfor limitedperiodsoftime.Marxwasjustifiedinassertingthatitis senselesstospeakofauniversallawofpopulation,asMalthusdid. Butitispossibletostatewhichlawofpopulationholdsforany givensociologicalperiod. When,forthepurposeofclarifyingthequestion,"Howdoesthe declineofslaverycomeabout?"oneanalyzestheconflictbetween theNorthernandSouthernStatesoverthefreeingoftheslaves, oneisconfrontedbyaconflictbetweenindustrialandplantation states.Theemancipationinflictsseriousinjuryontheplantation states.Shouldn'tweexpectaconnectionbetweenthefreeingofthe slavesandtheprocessesofproduction?Howissuchanotiontobe madeplausible? Oneattemptstodeterminetheconditionsunderwhichslavery offerstheslave-owneradvantages,andtheconditionsunderwhich thecontraryisthecase.Ifthosemasterswhofreetheirslavesare askedwhytheydoso,onlyafewwillsaythattheyopposeslavery becauseitdoesnotyieldsufficientadvantages.Manywillinformus, withouthypocrisy,thattheyhavebeendeeplyimpressedby readingaphilosopherwhochampionedtheslaves.Otherswillde-312scribeindetailtheirconflictingmotives,willperhapsexplainthat slaverywouldreallybemoreadvantageoustothem,butthatthe desiretosacrifice,torenounceproperty,hasledthem,afteralong innerconflict,tothedifficultstepoffreeingtheirslaves.Anyone

accustomedtooperateinthespiritofsocialbehaviorismwill,above all,keepinmindtheverycomplicated"stimulus"ofthewayoflife basedonslave-owning,andthenproceedtoinvestigatethe "reaction"--retentionorfreeingoftheslaves.Hewillemploythe resultsofthisinquirytodeterminehowfartheologicaldoctrines concerningtheemancipationofslavesaretoberecognizedas "stimulus,"howfaras"reaction." Ifitisshownthatrelativelysimplecorrelationscanbeestablished betweentheeffectsofslaveryonthemasters'tenoroflifeandthe behaviorofthemastertowardtheliberationofslaves,andthat,as againstthis,nosimplecorrelationscanbelaiddownbetweenthe doctrinesofthetimeandthebehavioroftheslave-owners,then preference willbegiventotheformermodeofinvestigation. Thustherewillbeexaminedundervariousconditionsthe relationshipbetweenhuntingandslavery,agricultureandslavery, manufactureandslavery.Itwillbefound,forexample,thatthe possessionofslavesgenerallyoffersnoadvantagewhere thereare sufficientlynumerousfreeworkerswhoeagerlyseekemployment inordertoavoidstarvation.Columella,aRomanagrarianwriterof thelaterperiod,bluntlysays,forexample,thattheemploymentof slavesisdisadvantageoustoanyonewhodrainsfeverswampsin theCampagna:thesicknessofaslavemeanslossofinterest,while hisdeathresultsinlossofcapital.Hegoesontosaythatitis possible,ontheotherhand,toobtainfreeworkersonthemarket atanytime,andthattheemployerisinnowayburdenedbytheir sicknessordeath. Whenseriousfluctuationsinthebusinesssituationoccur, entrepreneursfinditdesirabletobeinapositiontodropfree workersslaves,likehorses,mustcontinuetobefed.Whenone readsinStrabo,therefore,thatinantiquitypapyrusshrubsinEgypt werealreadybeingcutdowninordertomaintainthemonopoly price,oneunderstandsthattheuniversalemploymentoffreelabor couldnotbefaraway. Theconditionswhichledtothefluctuatingtendenciesofearly capitalisteconomicinstitutionscanlikewisebeinvestigated. Correlationisaddedtocorrelation.Itisseenthat"free labor"and "thedestructionofcommodities"seemtobecorrelatedunder certainconditions.Thisisequallytrueof"plantationslavery"and"a con-313stantmarket."OnecanviewtheCivilWarasaconflictbetweenthe industrialNorth,whichwasnotinterestedinslavery,andthe cottonproducingagrarianSouth,andtherebybeabletomake extensive predictions. Thisdoesnotmeanthatthereligiousandethicalopponentsof slaverywere lyingwhentheysaidthattheydirectlyrejoicedinthe emancipationoftheslaves,butnotintheincreaseofindustrial

profitswhichensuedintheNorth.Thatsuchadesireforthefreeing oftheslavescoulddevelopatthistimeandfindsoricha satisfactionissomethingwhichtheempiricalsociologistcould deduce,inbroadoutline,fromthetotaleconomicsituation. Themethodsusedintheelaborationofatheoryofagricultural economicshavealsobeenappliedbyseveralwriters(theologians amongthem)intheconstructionofawhollyempiricaltheoryofthe "employmentofnatives,"yieldingalltypesofcorrelations.9In combinationwithotherrelationsexpressible aslawsonecanmake allsortsofpredictionsconcerningthefateofslaveryinparticular countriesandterritories. Thedistributionofgraintofreemenbutnottoslaves,duringthe laterhistoryofRome,offeredslave-ownersanadditionalmotivefor freeingtheirslaves.Theformermastercouldthenre-employthe freedmanatalowercost,andalsousehissupportatelections.Itis likewiseeasytounderstandhow,duringthedeclineofRome,the systemofthe"coloni"andserfdomemergethroughtheregression ofearlycapitalisticinstitutions.Inordertoundertake anenterprise withslavelabor,onehadtohaveatone'sdisposalextensive financialresources,sincebothworkersandimplementsof productionhadtobepurchased.Underaregimeoffreelabor,the purchaseoftoolswassufficient.Thesystemofthe"coloni"required noinvestmentatallfromtheowner,whowasassuredofduesof allkinds.The"free"workerswere forcedbythewholesocialorder tolabor--thedeathpenaltywasimposedforidleness--while each slavehadtobedisciplinedbyhisownmaster.Themasterhadto protectthehealthandlifeofhisslave,tocareforhimjustashe hadtocareforahorseorabullock,evenwhenitwasunruly. Weseehow,bymeansofsuchanalyses,correlationsare establishedbetweengeneralsocialconditionsandcertainmodesof behavioroflimitedhumangroups.The"statements"whichthese groupsmakeabouttheirownbehaviorarenotessentialtothese correlationstheycanoftenbeaddedwiththehelpofadditional ____________________ 9Cf.OttoNeurath,"Probleme derKriegswirtschaftslehre", ZeitschriftfrdiegesamtenStawswissenschaften,1914,p.474. -314correlations.ItisaboveallinMarxismthatempiricalsociologyis pursuedinthisway.10 Asystemofempiricalsociologyinthespiritofsocialbehaviorism, asithasbeendevelopedaboveallintheUnitedStatesandthe U.S.S.R.,wouldhavetodirectitsinquiriesprimarilytothetypical "reactions"ofwholegroups.Butsignificanthistoricalmovements arealsooftenmeasuredorevaluatedwithoutsuchanalysis.Andit mayfurtherbeshownthatthroughthedevelopmentofcertain institutions,throughtheincreaseinacertainmagnitude,areversal isproducedwhichcausesfurtherchangestotakeawhollydifferent

direction.Theprimitive"ideaofprogress,"thateverymagnitude increasesindefinitely,isuntenable.Onemustconsiderthewhole systemofsociologicalmagnitudesinallitscomplexity,andthen notewhatchangesarepredictable.Onecannotinferfromthe growthoflargecitiesuptothepresenttimethattheprocesswill continueapproximatelythesame.Rapidgrowthisespeciallyaptto releasestimulileadingtoasuddencessationofgrowthandperhaps tothereconstitutionofmanysmallcenters.Theexpansionof capitalistlarge-scale industryandtheemergenceoftheproletarian massesdependentonthoseindustriescanleadtoasituationwhere thewholecapitalistmechanismmovesthroughaseriesofeconomic crisestowardsitsultimatedissolution.

VIII.POSSIBILITIESOFPREDICTION
Itispossibletostatetheextenttowhichpredictionscanbe successfullymadewithinthesphereofsocialbehaviorism.Itis evidentthatitsvarious"predictions,"i.e.,itsscientifictheories,are sociologicaleventsessentiallydependentonthesocialand economicorder.Itisonlyafterthisisunderstoodthatitbecomes clear,forexample,thatundercertainconditionscertainpredictions eitherdonotemergeatall,orcannotbeelaborated.Evenwhenan individualbelievesthathedivinesthedirectionoffurthersuccessful investigation,hecanbepreventedfromfindingthecollaboration requiredforsociologicalresearchbytheindifference,oreventhe opposition,ofothermen. Theapproachofsocialchangesisdifficulttonotice.Inordertobe abletomakepredictionsabouteventsofanewtype,onemust usuallypossessacertainamountofnewexperiences.Itisoftenthe changesinthehistoricalprocessthatfirstgivethescientistthe ____________________ 10Cf.forexample,Ettore Ciccotti,DerUntergangderSklavereiin Altertum(GermantranslationbyOdaOlberg),Berlin,1910. -315necessarydataforfurtherinvestigations.Butsincesociological investigationsalsoplayacertainroleasstimuliandinstrumentsin theorganizationofliving,thedevelopmentofsociologyisvery closelyboundupwithsocialconflicts.Onlyestablishedschoolsof sociology,requiringsocialsupport,canmaster,bymeansof collectivelabor,themassesofmaterialwhichmustbeadaptedtoa stricterformulationofcorrelations.Thispresupposesthatthe powerswhichfinancesuchworkarefavorablyinclinedtowards socialbehaviorism. Thisisingeneralnotthecasetoday.Indeed,thereexistsinthe rulingclassesanaversiontosocial,aswellastoindividual, behaviorismwhichismuchmorethanamatterofascientificdoubt, whichwouldbecomprehensibleinviewoftheimperfectionsofthis doctrine.Theoppositionoftherulingcircles,whichusuallyfind supportintheuniversitiesofthecapitalistcountries,isexplained

sociologically,aboveall,bythefactthatempiricalsociology, throughitsnon-metaphysicalattitude,revealsthemeaninglessness ofsuchexpressionsas"categoricalimperative,""divine injunction," "moralidea,""superpersonalstate,"etc.Indoingthisitundermines importantdoctrineswhichareusefulinthemaintenanceofthe prevailingorder.Theproponentsof"unifiedscience"donotdefend oneworldviewamongotherworld-views.Hencethequestionof tolerancecannotberaised.Theydeclaretranscendentaltheologyto benotfalse,butmeaningless.Withoutdisputingthefactthat powerfulinspiration,andcheeringanddepressingeffects,canbe associatedwithmeaninglessdoctrines,theycaninpractice"let sevenbeaholynumber,"sincetheydonotharassthesupporters ofthesedoctrines.Buttheycannotallowthattheseclaimshave anymeaningatall,however"hidden,"i.e.,thattheycanconfirmor confutescientificstatements.Evenifsuchreasoningbythepure scientistleavesmetaphysicsandtheologyundisturbed,itdoubtlessly shakesthereverence forthemwhichisfrequentlydemanded. Allthemetaphysicalentitieswhoseinjunctionsmenendeavoredto obey,andwhose"holy"powerstheyvenerated,disappear.Intheir placetherestandsasanempiricalsubstitute,confinedwithinthe boundsofpurelyscientificformulations,theactualbehaviorof groups,whosecommandsoperateasempiricalforcesonindividual men.Thatgroupsofmenlendstrengthtoindividualmenpursuing certainmodesofactionandobstructotherspursuingdifferent modes,isastatementwhichiswhollymeaningfulinthecontextof socialbehaviorism. Thesocialbehaviorist,too,makescommands,requestsand reproachesbuthedoesnotsupposethattheseutterances,when -316connectedwithpropositions,canyieldasystem.Wordscanbe employedlikewhistles,caressesandwhiplashesbutwhenusedin thisway,theycanneitheragreewithnorcontradictpropositions. Aninjunctioncanneverbededucedfromasystemofpropositions! Thisisno"limitation"ofthescientificmethod:itissimplytheresult oflogicalanalysis.Thatinjunctionsandpredictionsaresofrequently linkedfollowsfromthefactthatbotharedirectedtothefuture.An injunctionisaneventwhichitisassumedwillevokecertainchanges inthefuture.Apredictionisastatementwhichitisassumedwill agreewithafuturestatement. Theproponentsof"unifiedscience"seek,withthehelpoflaws,to formulatepredictionsinthe"unifiedlanguageofphysicalism."This takesplaceinthesphereofempiricalsociologythroughthe developmentof"socialbehaviorism."Inordertoattaintomore usefulpredictions,onecanimmediatelyeliminatemeaningless verbalsequencesbytheuseoflogic.Butthisisnotsufficient.There mustfollowtheeliminationofallfalseformulations.The representativesofmodernscience,evenaftertheyhaveeffected theeliminationofmetaphysicalformulations,muststilldisposeof falsedoctrines,forexample,astrology,magic,etc.Inorderto

liberatesomeonefromsuchideas,theuniversalacknowledgment accordedtotherulesoflogicdoesnot,aswiththeeliminationof meaninglessstatements,suffice.Onemust,ifonewishestosee one'sowntheoryprevail,createthegroundworkwhichwilllead peopletorecognizetheinadequacyofthesetheories,which,while "alsophysicalistic,"areuncritical. Thefruitfulnessofsocialbehaviorismisdemonstratedbythe establishmentofnewcorrelationsandbythesuccessfulpredictions madeonthebasisofthem.Youngpeopleeducatedinthespiritof physicalismanditsunifiedlanguagewillbesparedmanyofthe hindrancestoscientificworktowhichwearestillatpresent subjected.Asingleindividualcannotcreateandemploythis successfullanguage,foritistheproductofthelaborofa generation.Thus,evenintheformofsocialbehaviorism,sociology willbeabletoformulatevalidpredictionsonalargescaleonly whenagenerationtrainedinphysicalismsetstoworkinall departmentsofscience.Despitethefactthatwecanobserve metaphysicsontheincrease,thereismuchtoshowthatnonmetaphysicaldoctrinesarealsospreadingandconstantlygaining groundasthenew"superstructure"erectedonthechanging economic"substructure"ofourage.11 ____________________ 11Cf.OttoNeurath,"Physicalism,the Philosophyofthe Vienna Circle",TheMonist,October1931. -317[Thispageintentionallyleftblank.] -318-

AnalyticalPhilosophy
-319[Thispageintentionallyleftblank.] -320-

15
Philosophy
BYFRANKP.RAMSEY PHILOSOPHYMUSTBEofsomeuseandwemusttakeitseriously itmustclearourthoughtsandsoouractions.Orelseitisa dispositionwehavetocheck,andaninquirytoseethatthisisso

i.e.thechiefpropositionofphilosophyisthatphilosophyis nonsense.Andagainwemustthentakeseriouslythatitis nonsense,andnotpretend,asWittgensteindoes,thatitis importantnonsense! Inphilosophywetakethepropositionswemakeinscienceand everydaylife,andtrytoexhibittheminalogicalsystemwith primitivetermsanddefinitions,etc.Essentiallyaphilosophyisa systemofdefinitionsor,onlytoooften,asystemofdescriptionsof howdefinitionsmightbegiven. IdonotthinkitisnecessarytosaywithMoorethatthedefinitions explainwhatwehavehithertomeantbyourpropositions,but ratherthattheyshowhowweintendtousetheminfuture.Moore wouldsaytheywere thesame,thatphilosophydoesnotchange whatanyonemeantby"Thisisatable."Itseemstomethatit mightformeaningismainlypotential,andachangemight therefore onlybemanifestedonrareandcriticaloccasions.Also sometimesphilosophyshouldclarifyanddistinguishnotions previouslyvagueandconfused,andclearlythisismeanttofixour futuremeaningonly.1Butthisisclear,thatthedefinitionsareto giveatleastourfuturemeaning,andnotmerelytogiveanypretty wayofobtainingacertainstructure. Iusedtoworrymyselfaboutthenatureofphilosophythrough excessive scholasticism.Icouldnotseehowwecouldunderstand ThisextractistakenfromRamsey'sTheFoundationsof Mathematics,copyright1931byRoutledgeandKegan Paul,London,withwhosepermissionitisherereprinted. ____________________ 1Butinsofarasourpastmeaningwasnotutterlyconfused, philosophywillnaturallygivethat,too.E.g.thatparadigmof philosophy,Russell'stheoryofdescriptions. -321awordandnotbeabletorecognizewhetheraproposeddefinition ofitwasorwasnotcorrect.Ididnotrealizethevaguenessofthe wholeideaofunderstanding,thereferenceitinvolvestoa multitudeofperformancesanyofwhichmayfailandrequire tobe restored.Logicissuesintautologies,mathematicsinidentities, philosophyindefinitionsalltrivialbutallpartofthevitalworkof clarifyingandorganizingourthought.Ifweregardphilosophyasa systemofdefinitions(andelucidationsoftheuseofwordswhich cannotbenominallydefined),thethingsthatseemtomeproblems aboutitarethese: 1. Whatdefinitionsdowefeelituptophilosophytoprovide,and whatdoweleavetothesciencesorfeelitunnecessarytogive atall? 2. Whenandhowcanwebecontentwithoutadefinitionbut merelywithadescriptionofhowadefinitionmightbegiven? [Thispointismentionedabove.]

3. Howcanphilosophicalinquirybeconductedwithoutaperpetual petitioprincipii? (1)Philosophyisnotconcernedwithspecialproblemsofdefinition butonlywithgeneralones:itdoesnotproposetodefineparticular termsofartorscience,buttosettlee.g.problemswhicharisein thedefinitionofanysuchtermorintherelationofanyterminthe physicalworldtothetermsofexperience. Termsofartandscience,however,mustbedefined,butnot necessarilynominallye.g.wedefinemassbyexplaininghowto measureit,butthisisnotanominaldefinitionitmerelygivesthe term"mass"inatheoreticalstructureaclearrelationtocertain experimentalfacts.Thetermswedonotneedtodefinearethose whichweknowwecoulddefineifneedarose,like"chair,"orthose whichlike"clubs"(thesuitofcards)wecantranslateeasilyinto visualorsomeotherlanguage,butcannotconvenientlyexpandin words. (2)Thesolutiontowhatwecalledin(1)a"generalproblemof definition"isnaturallyadescriptionofdefinitions,fromwhichwe learnhowtoformtheactualdefinitioninanyparticularcase.That wesooftenseemtogetnoactualdefinitions,isbecausethe solutionoftheproblemisoftenthatnominaldefinitionis inappropriate,andthatwhatiswantedisanexplanationoftheuse ofthesymbol. Butthisdoesnottouchwhatmaybesupposedtobethereal -322difficultyunderthishead(2)forwhatwehavesaidappliesonlyto thecaseinwhichthewordtobedefinedbeingmerelydescribed (becausetreatedasoneofaclass),itsdefinitionorexplanationis also,ofcourse,merelydescribed,butdescribedinsuchawaythat whentheactualwordisgivenitsactualdefinitioncanbederived. Butthereareothercasesinwhichthewordtobedefinedbeing given,wearegiveninreturnnodefinitionofitbutastatementthat itsmeaninginvolvesentitiesofsuch-and-suchsortsinsuch-andsuch ways,i.e.astatementwhichwouldgiveusadefinitionifwehad namesfortheseentities. Astotheuseofthis,itisplainlytofittheterminconnectionwith variables,toputitasavalueoftherightcomplexvariableandit presupposesthatwecanhavevariableswithoutnamesforalltheir values.Difficultquestionsariseastowhetherwemustalwaysbe abletonameallthevalues,andifsowhatkindofabilitythis means,butclearlythephenomenonisinsomewaypossiblein connectionwithsensationsforwhichourlanguageisso fragmentary.Forinstance,"Jane'svoice"isadescriptionofa characteristicofsensationsforwhichwehavenoname.Wecould perhapsnameit,butcanweidentifyandnamethedifferent inflectionsofwhichitconsists?

Anobjectionoftenmadetothesedescriptionsofdefinitionsof sensorycharacteristicsisthattheyexpresswhatweshouldfindon analysis,butthatthiskindofanalysischangesthesensation analyzedbydevelopingthecomplexitywhichitpretendsmerelyto discover.Thatattentioncanchangeourexperienceisindubitable, butitseemstomepossiblethatsometimesitrevealsapre-existing complexity(i.e.enablesustosymbolizethisadequately),forthisis compatiblewithanychangeinincidentalfacts,anythingeven exceptacreationofthecomplexity. Anotherdifficultywithregardtodescriptionsofdefinitionsisthatif wecontentourselveswiththemwemaygetsimplynonsenseby introducingnonsensicalvariables,e.g.describedvariablessuchas "particular"ortheoreticalideassuchas"point."Wemightfor instancesaythatby"patch"wemeananinfiniteclassofpointsif soweshouldbegivingupphilosophyfortheoreticalpsychology.For inphilosophyweanalyzeourthought,inwhichpatchcouldnotbe replacedbyinfiniteclassofpoints:wecouldnotdeterminea particularinfiniteclassextensionally"Thispatchisred"isnotshort for"aisredandbisredetc...."where a,b,etc.,arepoints. (Howwoulditbeifjustawerenotred?)Infiniteclassesofpoints -323couldonlycomeinwhenwelookatthemindfromoutsideand constructatheoryofit,inwhichitssensoryfieldconsistsofclasses ofcoloredpointsaboutwhichitthinks. Nowifwemadethistheoryaboutourownmindweshouldhaveto regarditasaccountingforcertainfacts,e.g.thatthispatchisred butwhenwearethinkingofotherpeople'smindswehavenofacts, butarealtogetherintherealmoftheory,andcanpersuade ourselvesthatthesetheoreticalconstructionsexhaustthefield.We thenturnbackonourownminds,andsaythatwhatarereally happeningtherearesimplythesetheoreticalprocesses.The clearestinstanceofthisis,ofcourse,materialism.Butmanyother philosophies,e.g.Carnap's,makejustthesamemistake. (3)Ourthirdquestionwashowwecouldavoidpetitioprincipii,the dangerofwhicharisessomewhatasfollows: Inordertoclarifymythoughtthepropermethodseemstobe simplytothinkoutwithmyself"WhatdoImeanbythat?""What aretheseparatenotionsinvolvedinthisterm?""Doesthisreally followfromthat?"etc.,andtotestidentityofmeaningofa proposeddefiniensandthedefiniendumbyrealandhypothetical examples.Thiswecanoftendowithoutthinkingaboutthenature ofmeaningitselfwecantellwhetherwemeanthesameor differentthingsby"horse"and"pig"withoutthinkingatallabout meaningingeneral.Butinordertosettlemorecomplicated questionsofthesortweobviouslyneedalogicalstructure,a systemoflogic,intowhichtobringthem.Thesewemayhopeto obtainbyarelativelyeasypreviousapplicationofthesame methodsforinstance,itshouldnotbedifficulttoseethatfor

eithernot-pornot-qtobetrueisjustthesamethingasfornot bothpandqtobetrue.Inthiscaseweconstructalogic,anddoall ourphilosophicalanalysisentirelyunselfconsciously,thinkingallthe timeofthefactsandnotaboutourthinkingaboutthem,deciding whatwemeanwithoutanyreferencetothenatureofmeanings. [Ofcoursewecouldalsothinkaboutthenatureofmeaninginan unselfconsciouswayi.e.thinkofacaseofmeaningbeforeus withoutreference toourmeaningit.]Thisisonemethodandit maybetherightonebutIthinkitiswrongandleadstoan impasse,andIpartcompanyfromitinthefollowingway. Itseemstomethatintheprocessofclarifyingourthoughtwe cometotermsandsentenceswhichwecannotelucidateinthe obviousmannerbydefiningtheirmeaning.Forinstance,variable hypotheticalsandtheoreticaltermswecannotdefine,butwecan explainthewayinwhichtheyareused,andinthisexplanationwe areforced -324tolooknotonlyattheobjectswhichwearetalkingabout,butat ourownmentalstates.AsJohnsonwouldsay,inthispartoflogic wecannotneglecttheepistemicorsubjectiveside. Nowthismeansthatwecannotgetclearaboutthesetermsand sentenceswithoutgettingclearaboutmeaning,andweseemtoget intothesituationthatwecannotunderstande.g.whatwesay abouttimeandtheexternalworldwithoutfirstunderstanding meaningandyetwecannotunderstandmeaningwithoutfirst understandingcertainlytimeandprobablytheexternalworldwhich areinvolvedinit.Sowecannotmakeourphilosophyintoan orderedprogresstoagoal,buthavetotakeourproblemsasa wholeandjumptoasimultaneoussolutionwhichwillhave somethingofthenatureofahypothesis,forweshallacceptitnot astheconsequenceofdirectargument,butastheonlyonewecan thinkofwhichsatisfiesourseveralrequirements. Ofcourse,weshouldnotstrictlyspeakofargument,butthereisin philosophyaprocessanalogousto"linearinference"inwhichthings becomesuccessivelyclearandsince,fortheabovereason,we cannotcarrythisthroughtotheend,weareintheordinaryposition ofscientistsofhavingtobecontentwithpiecemealimprovements: wecanmakeseveralthingsclearer,butwecannotmakeanything clear. Ifindthisself-consciousnessinevitableinphilosophyexceptina verylimitedfield.Wearedriventophilosophizebecausewedonot knowclearlywhatwemeanthequestionisalways"WhatdoI meanbyx?"Andonlyveryoccasionallycanwesettlethiswithout reflectingonmeaning.Butitisnotonlyanobstacle,thisnecessity ofdealingwithmeaningitisdoubtlessanessentialcluetothe truth.IfweneglectitIfeelwemaygetintotheabsurdpositionof thechildinthefollowingdialogue:"Saybreakfast.""Can't.""What can'tyousay?""Can'tsaybreakfast."

Butthenecessityofself-consciousnessmustnotbeusedasa justificationfornonsensicalhypotheseswearedoingphilosophy nottheoreticalpsychology,andouranalysesofourstatements, whetheraboutmeaningoranythingelse,mustbesuchaswecan understand. Thechiefdangertoourphilosophy,apartfromlazinessand woolliness,isscholasticism,theessenceofwhichistreatingwhatis vagueasifitwere preciseandtryingtofititintoanexactlogical category.AtypicalpieceofscholasticismisWittgenstein'sviewthat alloureverydaypropositionsarecompletelyinorderandthatitis impossibletothinkillogically.(Thislastislikesayingthatitis impossibletobreaktherulesofbridgebecauseifyoubreakthem -325youarenotplayingbridgebut,asMrs.C.says,not-bridge.) Anotheristheargumentationaboutacquaintancewithbefore leadingtotheconclusionthatweperceivethepast.Asimple considerationoftheautomatictelephoneshowsthatwecouldreact differentlytoABandBAwithoutperceivingthepast,sothatthe argumentissubstantiallyunsound.Itturnsonaplaywith "acquaintance"whichmeans,first,capacitytosymbolizeand, secondly,sensoryperception.Wittgensteinseemstoequivocatein justthesamewaywithhisnotionof"given." -326-

16
PhilosophicalArguments
BYGILBERTRYLE ROBINGEORGECOLLINGWOODheldthisWaynfleteChairfora lamentablybrieftime.Yethisliteraryproductivityduringthisshort periodwasimmense.Thetimeisnotyetripeformetoattemptto offeracriticalevaluationofthesecontributionstophilosophy,nor, evenwere Icompetent,shouldIonthisoccasionofferan appreciationofhisoriginalityasanhistorian.Hewouldhimself,I think,havedesiredrecognitionchieflyforhisthoughtsonthe philosophyofhistory.Aboutthesethoughts,therefore,Isubmit, withhumilityanddiffidence,afewreflections. Therearemanybranchesofmethodicalinquiryintothedifferent departmentsoftheworld.Therearethemathematicalsciences, theseveralnaturalsciences,andtherearethehumaneorhuman studiesofanthropology,jurisprudence,philosophy,thelinguistic andliterarystudies,andhistory,whichlastembracesinonewayor anothermostoftheothers.Therearealsomanydisciplineswhich teachnottruthsbutartsandskills,suchasagriculture,tactics, music,architecture,painting,games,navigation,inference,and

scientificmethod.Alltheoriesapplytheirownseveralprinciplesand canonsofinquiryandalldisciplinesapplytheirownseveral principlesandcanonsofpractice.Theseprincipleswerecalledby ProfessorCollingwoodtheir"presuppositions."Inotherwords,all employtheirownstandardsorcriteriabywhichtheirparticular exercisesarejudgedsuccessfulorunsuccessful. Nowitisonethingintelligentlytoapplyprinciplesitisquite anotherthingtostepbacktoconsiderthem.Ascientistwhoceases foramomenttotrytosolvehisquestionsinordertoinquire insteadwhyheposesthemorwhethertheyaretherightquestions toposeceasesforthetimetobeascientistandbecomesa philosopher.This ThisisProfessorRyle'sInaugurallectureatOxford, copyright1946bytheClarendonPress,Oxford.Itis reprintedherewiththekindpermissionoftheauthorand publisher. -327dualityofinterestsmay,ashistoryshows,makehimbothagood philosopherandabetterscientist.Thebestphilosophicaltheoriesof mathematicshavecomefrommathematicianswhohavebeen forcedtotrytoresolveinternalpuzzlesabouttheprinciplesoftheir study,aphilosophicalexercisewhichhassometimesledtothe originationofnewmathematicalmethodsandhasoftenledtothe originationofilluminatingphilosophicalviews.Everygeniusisthe inventorofnewmethodsandhemustthereforebesomesortofa criticofprinciplesofmethod. ProfessorCollingwoodwasanhistorianwhowaspuzzledaboutthe canonsofhistoricalresearch.Hewantednotonlytoexplaincertain historicalprocessesandeventsbutalsotoelucidatewhatsortofa thingagoodhistoricalexplanationwouldbe.Norwasthisapurely domesticortechnologicalinterest.Fortoseewhatisanhistorical explanation,is,amongotherthings,toseehowitdiffersfroma chemical,mechanical,biological,anthropological,orpsychological theory.Thephilosophermay,perhaps,beginbywonderingabout thecategoriesconstitutingtheframeworkofasingletheoryor discipline,buthecannotstopthere.Hemusttrytoco-ordinatethe categoriesofalltheoriesanddisciplines.Theproblemof"Man's placeinNature"is,roughly,theproblemofco-ordinatingthe questionswhichgovernlaboratoryresearcheswiththequestions governingtheresearchesprosecutedinlibraries.Andthiscoordinationisdoneneitherinlibrariesnorinlaboratoriesbutinthe philosopher'shead. ProfessorCollingwoodsawmoreclearly,Ithink,thandidhismost eminentpredecessorsinthephilosophyofhistorythatthe appearanceofafeudorantithesisbetweenNatureandSpirit,that istosay,betweentheobjectivesofthenaturalsciencesandthose ofthehumanstudies,isanillusion.Thesebranchesofinquiryare notgivingrivalanswerstothesamequestionsaboutthesame

worldnoraretheygivingseparateanswerstothesamequestions aboutrivalworldstheyaregivingtheirownanswerstodifferent questionsaboutthesameworld.Justasphysicsisneitherthefoe northehandmaidofgeometry,sohistory,jurisprudence and literarystudiesareneitherhostilenorancillarytothelaboratory sciences.Theircategories,thatis,theirquestions,methodsand canonsaredifferent.Inmypredecessor'sword,theyworkwith differentpresuppositions.Toestablishthispointitisnecessaryto chartthesedifferences.ThistaskProfessorCollingwooddiedtoo soontocompletebutnottoosoontobegin.Hehadalreadymade thatgreatphilosophicadvanceofreducingapuzzletoaproblem. -328ProfessorCollingwoodkepthimselfalooffromthesparringandthe shadow-boxingbywhichacademicphilosophersordinarily strengthentheirmusclesanddischargetheirhumors.Whatwelost bythisabstentionwascompensatedbytheworld'sgain.Forhe wrotelessfortheeyesofhisprofessionalassociatesthanforthose oftheintelligentcitizensoftheentirerepublicofletters.In consequenceheachievedastyleofphilosophicalwritingand,I believe,diction,whichatitsfrequentbestisonalevelwiththe higherrangesofEnglishphilosophicprose.

THEPROBLEM
Philosophershaveinrecentyearsgivenmuchconsiderationtothe nature,objectivesandmethodsoftheirowninquiry.Thisinterest hasbeenduepartlytoacertainprofessionalhypochondria,since theconspicuousprogressmadebyotherstudieshasinducedin philosopherssomenervousnessaboutthescaleoftheirown successes.Partly,also,ithasbeenduetotheapplicationofmodern logicaltheorytotheprocessesofthemathematicalandthe inductivesciences,whichhasautomaticallyledtoitsapplicationto philosophy.Theexpositionofthelogicalcredentialsofdifferent sortsofscientificconclusionshasposedinabrightifpainfullight thecorrespondingquestionaboutthefoundationsofphilosophical doctrines. Myobjectistoexhibitthelogicalstructureofatypeofarguments whicharepropertophilosophicalthinking.Itmakesnodifference whethertheseargumentsareusedpolemicallyincontroversies betweenphilosophersorpeaceablyinprivatephilosophical reflection.Forargumentsareeffectiveasweaponsonlyiftheyare logicallycogent,andiftheyaresotheyrevealconnections,the disclosureofwhichisnotthelessnecessarytothediscoveryof truthforbeingalsohandyinthediscomfitureofopponents.The loveoftruthisnotincongruouswithapassionforcorrectingthe erring. Philosophicalargumentsarenotinductions.Boththepremisesand theconclusionsofinductionscanbedoubtedordeniedwithout absurdity.Observedfactsandplausiblehypotheseshavenomore

illustrative forceinphilosophythanispossessedbyfictionsor guesses.Norhaveeitherfactsorfanciesanyevidentialforceinthe resolutionofphilosophicalproblems.Theevidentialforceofmatters offactisonlytoincreaseordecreasetheprobabilityofgeneralor particularhypothesesanditisabsurdtodescribephilosophical propositionsasrelativelyprobableorimprobable. Ontheotherhandphilosophicalargumentsarenotdemonstra-329tionsoftheEuclideantype,namelydeductionsoftheoremsfrom axiomsorpostulates.Forphilosophyhasnoaxiomsanditis debarredfromtakingitsstartfrompostulates.Otherwise there couldbealternative philosophicaldoctrinesastherearealternative geometries. Apatternofargumentwhichisproperandevenproprietaryto philosophyisthereductioadabsurdum.Thisargumentmovesby extractingcontradictionsorlogicalparadoxesfromitsmaterial.Itis theobjectofthisdiscussiontoshowhowthisispossibleandwhyit isnecessary. Firstitisexpedienttodistinguishthestrongreductioadabsurdum fromtheweakreductio.ThelatterformisusedinsomeofEuclid's demonstrations.Hedemonstratesthetruthofatheoremby deducingfromitscontradictoryconsequenceswhichconflictwiththe axiomsofhissystemorwithconsequencesdrawnfromthem.It shouldbenoticedthatthisargumentprovesonlyeitherthatthe requiredtheoremistrueiftheaxiomsaretrueorthatbothare false,thatis,thatthecontradictoryoftherequiredtheoremisnot compatiblewiththeaxioms.Thestrongreductionconsistsin deducingfromapropositionoracomplexofpropositions consequenceswhichareinconsistentwitheachotherorwiththe originalproposition.Itshows(toexpressitinafashionwhichwill havetobeamendedlater)thatapropositionisillegitimatebecause ithaslogicallyabsurdcorollaries.Thepropositionunder investigationisshowntobenotmerelyfalsebutnonsensical. Toprovethatargumentsofthistypebelongtophilosophyitis enoughtomentionthatitwouldbeproperforadissentient philosophertotrytodemolishthisoranyotherphilosophical assertionbyexhibitingcontradictionslatentinit.Iamnottryingto provethatnoothertypesofargumentarepropertophilosophy. Onfirstconsiderationitwillseemthatargumentsofthetype reductioadabsurdumcanhaveonlyadestructiveeffect.Theymay beeffectiveindemolishingsillytheoriesandthuspossess,besides thepleasingpropertyofdefeatingopponents,theusefuloneof clearingthesiteforsubsequentconstructivetheory.Butitwillbe feltthatnodemolitionscanresultintheerectionofanewdwelling. Ihopetodisarmanysuchobjectionbyshowingthat(touse anothermetaphor)reductioadabsurdumargumentsareneither morenorlessnihilistthanarethreshingoperations.Or,tochange

thepictureagain,thepositionwillbemaintainedthatphilosophical argumentsofthetypedescribedhavesomethingincommonwith thedestructiontestsbywhichengineersdiscoverthestrengthof materials.Certainly -330engineersstretch,twist,compress,andbatterbitsofmetaluntil theycollapse,butitisjustbysuchteststhattheydeterminethe strainswhichthemetalwillwithstand.Insomewhatthesameway, philosophicalargumentsbringoutthelogicalpowersoftheideas underinvestigation,byfixingthepreciseformsoflogical mishandlingunderwhichtheyrefusetowork.

THELOGICALPOWERSOF PROPOSITIONS
Everypropositionhaswhatwillherebecalledcertain"logical powers"thatistosay,itisrelatedtootherpropositionsinvarious discoverable logicalrelationships.Itfollowsfromsomeasa consequenceanditimpliesothers.Itisincompatiblewithsomeand merelycompatiblewithothers.Itisevidencestrengtheningor weakeningtheprobabilityofulteriorhypotheses.Further,forany logicalpowerspossessedbyagivenpropositionitisalwayspossible tofindorinventanindefiniterangeofotherpropositionswhichcan beclassedwithitashavinganalogouslogicalpowersor,asitis commonlyput,asbeingofthesamelogicalform. Fortherulesoflogicaregeneral.Validargumentsexhibitpatterns whichcanbemanifestedequallywellbycollocationsofanyother propositionsofthesamelogicalfamily.Formallogicianslearnto extractthelogicalskeletonsofpropositionsinvirtueofwhichthese andanyotherpropositionsembodyingthesameskeletonscan functionaspremisesorconclusionsofparallelvalidarguments. Nowwhenpeopleareusingorconsideringagivenpropositionthey cannotthenandtherebeattendingtoallitslogicalpowers.They cannotinonemomentbeconsideringitandallthevalidarguments intowhichitmightenterandallthefallaciousargumentsintowhich itmightbeimproperlycoerced.Atbesttheirgraspisadequatefor themtobeabletothinkoutsomeoftheselogicalpowersifthey haveoccasiontodoso.Manyofthelogicalpowersofaproposition arenotnoticedatallintheroutinesofworkadaythinkingandof theseaproportionbafflesdiscoveryevenwhenthethinkeris concentratinghiswholeintellectualstrengthuponthesearchfor them.Thuspeoplecancorrectlybesaidtohaveonlyapartialgrasp ofmostofthepropositionsthattheyconsider.Theycouldusually betakenbysurprise bycertainoftheremoterlogicalconnections oftheirmostordinarypropositions. Nonetheless,thoughpeople'sunderstandingofthepropositions thattheyuseisinthissenseimperfect,thereisanothersensein whichtheirunderstandingofsomeofthemmaybenearlyorquite

complete. -331Fortheymayhavelearnedfrompracticeorinstructionalltheir logicalpowerswhichgovernthelimitedusestowhichthose propositionsareordinarilyput.Aboylearnsquicklyhowtousesuch propositionsas3X3=9orLondonisduenorthofBrighton withoutevermakingthearithmeticalorgeographicalmistakes whichwouldbeevidenceofanimperfectgraspofsuch propositions.Hedoesnotknowtherulesgoverningthelogical behaviorofthesepropositionsbutheknowsbywonttheirlogical coursedownalimitedsetoffamiliartracks. Thefactthatpeople,howeverintelligent,neverachieveacomplete appreciationofallthelogicalpowersofthepropositionsthatthey useisonewhichwillbeseentohaveimportantconsequences.It shouldbenoticedthatevenmasteryofthetechniquesandthe theoryofformallogicdoesnotinprinciplemodifythissituation.The extractionofthelogicalskeletonsofpropositionsdoesnotreveal thelogicalpowersofthosepropositionsbysometrickwhich absolvesthelogicianfromthinkingthemout.Atbestitismerelya summaryformulationofwhathisthinkinghasdiscovered. Whenseveraldifferentpropositionsarenoticedhavingsomethingin common(andwhenthiscommonfeatureorfactorisnotitselfa constituentproposition)itisconvenientandidiomatic,though hazardous,toabstractthiscommonfactorandcallit(with exceptions)an"idea"or"concept."Thusmenlearntofastenonthe ideaofmortalityortheconceptofpriceasthatwhichiscommonto arangeofpropositionsinwhichpersonsareaffirmedordeniedto bemortalorinwhichcommoditiesaresaidtocostsomuchorto beexchangeableatsuchandsuchrates.Latertheylearntoisolate inthesamemannermoreabstractideaslikethoseofexistence, implication,duty,species,mind,andscience. Intheearlydaysoflogicalspeculationtheseideasorconceptswere construedasbeingproperpartsorsubstantialbits,anassemblage oftwoormoreofwhichwassupposedtoconstituteaproposition. Theywere oftentechnicallystyled"terms."Thiserroneoustheory hasbeenthesourceofamultitudeofdamagingconfusions.The truthisthatwhatwelabel"ideas"or"concepts"areabstractions fromthefamiliesofpropositionsofwhichtheyarecommonfactors orfeatures.Tospeakofagivenideaistospeaksummarilyofthe familyofpropositionsresemblingeachotherinrespectofthis commonfactor.Statementsaboutideasaregeneralstatements aboutfamiliesofpropositions. Anaturalbutdisastrouscorollarydrawnfromtheerroneous doctrineoftermswastheassumptionthattherulesoflogicgovern the -332-

relationsbetweenpropositionsbuthavelittleornobearingupon theirfactors.Itwas,indeed,earlydiscernedthattherearelogically importantdifferencesoftypeorcategorybetweendifferentclasses of"terms,""ideas,"or"concepts,"buttheoriginalandtraditional classificationofafewofthesetypeslentnothingtoandborrowed nothingfromthestudyoftherulesofinference.(True,certain rulesofinferencewereseentobeinterlockedwiththeconcepts all,some,andnot.Butnonichewasfoundevenfortheseideasin thetableofcategoriesofconcepts.) Infactthedistinctionbetweenthelogicaltypesofideasisidentical withthediscriminationbetweenthelogicalformsofthepropositions fromwhichtheideasareabstractions.Ifonepropositionhas factorsofdifferenttypesfromthoseofanotherproposition,those propositionsareofdifferentlogicalformsandhavedifferentsorts oflogicalpowers.Therulesgoverningtheconjunctionsof propositionsinvalidargumentsreflectthelogicalconstitutionsof theirvariousabstractiblefactorsandfeatures.Thereareasmany typesoftermsasthereareformsofpropositions,justasthereare asmanyuphillasdownhillslopes. Itistherefore bothproperandnecessarytospeaknotonly(atone levelofabstraction)ofthelogicalpowersofpropositions,butalso (atahigherlevelofabstraction)ofthelogicalpowersofideasor concepts.Ofcourse,adescriptionofthelogicalpowersofagiven ideaisneithermorenorlessthanadescriptionofcertainofthe logicalpowersofallpropositionssimilartooneanotherinhaving thatideaasanabstractiblecommonfactor. Aspeople'sunderstandingofthepropositionsthattheyuseis alwaysimperfect,inthesensethattheyneverhaverealizedand nevercouldrealizeallthelogicalpowersofthosepropositions,so theirgraspofideasorconceptsisnecessarilyincomplete.Therisk alwaysexiststhatconfusionorparadoxwillariseinthecourseof anyhithertountriedoperationswiththoseideas.

THESOURCESOFLOGICALPARADOXES
Conceptsandpropositionscarrywiththemnosignaltoindicatethe logicaltypestowhichtheybelong.Expressionsofthesame grammaticalpatternsareusedtoexpressthoughtsofmultifarious logicalsorts.Mennaturally,therefore,tendtobeblindtothefact thatdifferentideashavedifferentlogicalpowersoratleastthey tendtotreatthevarietiesoflogicaltypesasbeingfewinnumber. Evenphilosophershaveassumedforovertwothousandyearsthat Aris-333totle'sinventoryoftensuchtypeswasexhaustive ifnot overelaborate.

Whathappenswhenapersonassumesanideatobeofonelogical typewhenitreallybelongstoanother?--when,forexample,he assumesthattheideaslargeorthreehavelogicalpowerssimilarto thoseofgreenormerry?Theinevitableconsequenceisthatnave intellectualoperationswiththoseideasleaddirectlytologically intolerableresults.Conceptsofdifferenttypescannotbecoerced intosimilarlogicalconduct.Somesortofcontradictionarisesfrom theattemptandthis,infortunatecases,compelsthethinkerto turnbackinhistracksandtrytochangehistreatmentofthe outragedconcept.

THEDIAGNOSISANDCUREOF PARADOXES
Heretherebeginsanewsortofinquiry,thedeliberateattemptto discoverthereal(asdistinctfromthenavelyanticipated)logical powersofideas.Thelogicalabsurditieswhichbetraytheoriginal type-confusionsgiveanintellectualshockandsetatheoretical problem,theproblemofdeterminingwithmethodandwith definitivecheckstherulesgoverningthecorrectmanipulationof concepts. Thistaskcanbemetaphoricallydescribedasthechartingofthe logicalpowersofideas.Themetaphorishelpfulinanumberof ways.Peopleoftenknowtheirwayaboutalocalitywhilequite unabletodescribethedistancesordirectionsbetweendifferent partsofitorbetweenitandotherfamiliarlocalities.Theymay knowadistrictandstillbeperplexedwhenapproachingitbyan unaccustomedrouteorinastrangelight.Againtheymayknowthe districtandstillgivedescriptionsofitwhichentailthattwodifferent buildingsareinoneplaceorthatonebuildingliesintwodifferent directionsfromagivenobject. Ourworkadayknowledgeofthegeographyofourideasisinsimilar case--evenofthoseideaswithwhichwecanoperateefficientlyin thedailytasksinwhichwehavebeendrilled.Thisworkaday knowledgeisknowledgebutitisknowledge withoutsystemand withoutchecks.Itisknowledge bywontandnotknowledge by rules. Thereisanotherrespectinwhichthemetaphorofmapsisuseful. Surveyorsdonotmapsingleobjectslikethevillagechurch.They puttogetherinonemapallthesalientfeaturesofthearea:the church,thebridge,therailway,theparishboundary,andperhaps thecontours.Further,theyindicatehowthismapjoinsthemapsof theneighboringareas,andhowallareco-ordinatedwith -334thepointsofthecompass,thelinesoflatitudeandlongitudeand standardsofmeasurement.Anyerrorinsurveyingresultsina cartographicalcontradiction.

Theresolutionoftype-puzzlesaboutthelogicalpowersofideas demandsananalogousprocedure.Heretootheproblemisnotto pinpointseparatelythelocusofthisorthatsingleideabutto determinethecross-bearingsofallofagalaxyofideasbelonging tothesameorcontiguousfields.Theproblem,thatis,isnotto anatomizethesolitaryconcept,say,oflibertybuttoextractits logicalpowersasthesebearonthoseoflaw,obedience, responsibility,loyalty,governmentandtherest.Like ageographical surveyaphilosophicalsurveyisnecessarilysynoptic.Philosophical problemscannotbeposedorsolvedpiecemeal. Thisdescriptionoftheinquiryintothelogicalpowersofideasas beinganalogousinsomerespectstoageographicalsurveyis,of course,ofillustrativeutilityonlywithinnarrowlimits.Inone importantrespectamongmanyotherstheanalogybreaksdown. Thecorrectnessofageographicalsurveyisestablishedbytwo majorsortsofchecksthepresenceofacartographical contradictionprovesthatthesurveyiserroneousbutvisual observationsarepositiveevidenceofitsveracity.Intheextraction ofthelogicalpowersofideasthereisnoprocessdirectly correspondingtovisualobservation.Hencetheprimacyin philosophicalreasoningofthereductioadabsurdumargument.The objecttowhichthisphilosophicaldestruction-testisappliedisthe practiceofoperatingwithanideaasifitbelongedtoacertain category,thatisasifithadpowerscorrespondingtothoseofan acceptedmodel.Initiallythispracticeisnaveandunpremeditated. Sometimesitisdeliberatelyrecommendedandadopted.Inthis casethedestruction-testisbeingappliedtoaphilosopher'stheory. Theearliestphilosophicalproblemsaresetbycontradictions inadvertentlyencounteredinthecourseofnon-philosophical thinking.Aseverynewtheorybeginscertainnewconceptscome intocurrency,conceptswhicharecardinalnotmerelytoits conclusionsbuteventoitsquestions.Beingnewtheirlogicalpowers arestillunexplored,andbeingnewtheyareunthinkinglycredited withlogicalpowerssimilartothoseofideasthedisciplineofwhichis familiar.Paradoxicalconsequencesflowingfromconventional operationsuponthemrevealthattheyhavecharactersoftheir own.Somusthorseshavestartledtheirfirstmastersbytheirnonbovineshapeandbehavior. Whenthedeliberateattemptismadetofindtheharnesswhich -335willfitrefractoryconcepts,themethodisadoptedofconsciously lookingforfurtherlogicalparadoxesandcontradictions.Therules governingthelogicalconductofanideaareimperfectlygraspedso longasthereremainunexaminedchancesthatitisstillbeing mishandled.Absurditiesaretheoriginalgoadtophilosophical thinkingtheycontinuetobeitsscalpel. Thisprocesscanwithoutinjusticetothegenealogyofthewordbe called"dialectical,"thoughthereseemsnoreasontoconstrictthe

processwithinthesymmetricalconfinesofthehalloweddoubleentry methodoftenassociatedwithitsemployment.Itisalsothe procedure followed,thoughnotexplicitlyprescribed,bythosewho prefertodescribephilosophyasbeingtheclarificationofideas,the analysisofconcepts,thestudyofuniversalsandeventhesearch fordefinitions.

ANOBJECTION
Atthispointitisnecessarytofaceandresolveadifficulty--indeeda contradiction--whichthreatenstomakenonsenseofeverythingthat Ihavesaid.Itsemergenceanditsresolutionmayserveasan illustrationofmygeneralposition. Ithasbeensaidthatphilosophicalproblemsarisefromatendency ofpropositions(asweinadvertentlyhandlethem)togenerate absurdconsequences.Butiftheconsequencesofapropositionare absurdthatpropositionisabsurdandthentherecanbenosuch proposition.Itisabsurdtosaythatthereareabsurdpropositions. Itislogicallyimpossiblefortheretobeapropositionofsuchatype thattherecouldbenopropositionsofthattype.Itseemstofollow thatthereductioadabsurdumcanneverbeapplied,thoughthe argumentestablishingthispointitselfexemplifiesthatpattern. Thesolutionisthatexpressionsandonlyexpressionscanbe absurd.Onlyofagivenexpressionsuchasasentence,therefore, canitbesaidthatitcannotbeconstruedasexpressinga propositionofacertainlogicalconstitutionor,perhaps,a propositionofanylogicalconstitution.Thisiswhatthereductioad absurdumdoes.Itdisclosesthatagivenexpressioncannotbe expressingapropositionofsuchandsuchacontentwithsuchand suchalogicalskeleton,sinceapropositionwithcertainofthese propertieswouldconflictwithonewithcertainoftheothers.The operationbywhichthisisestablishedisinacertainfashion experimentalorhypothetical.Iftheexpressionisexpressinga propositionatall,itcannotbeexpressingoneanalogousinthese respectstocertainfamiliarpropositions -336andinthoserespectstoothers,sincethecorollariesofpartofthe hypothesisareatvariance withthoseofanotherpart.Itisan hypotheticalargumentofthepatternknownasponendotollens.In extreme casesitmayestablishthattheexpressioncannotbe expressingapropositionofanypatterninmildercasesitproves onlythatitcannotbeexpressingapropositionofcertainspecified patterns. Forexamples,takethetwostatements"Numbersareeternal"and "Timebeganamillionyearsago."Botharelinguisticallyregular statementsbutthelattersentenceexpressesnoproposition.Ittries tosaywhatcannotbesignificantlysaid,viz.thattherewasa momentbeforewhichtherewasnopossibilityofanythingbeing

beforeanythingelse,whichcontainsapatentcontradiction.The formersentenceisnonsensicalifconstruedasexpressinga propositionofonetypebutnotifconstruedinanotherway.Ifitis construedasatersewayofsayingthatnumbersarenottemporal thingsoreventsor,better,thatnumericalexpressionscannotenter intosignificantexpressionsassubjectstoverbswithtenses,then whatitsaysistrueandimportant.Butifitisconstrued,aschildlike peoplehaveconstruedit,assayingthatnumbers,liketortoises,live averylongtime--andinfacthoweveroldtheyget,theycannotdie-thenitcouldbeshowntobeabsurd.Itisnonsensewhen construedasanitemofbiologybuttruewheninterpretedasan applicationofthetheoryoflogicaltypestoarithmeticalideas. Reductioadabsurdumarguments,therefore,applytothe employmentandmisemploymentofexpressions.Soitisnecessary torecastwhatwassaidearlier.Statementsaboutthemisreadingof thelogicalpowersofpropositionsandideasshouldbereformulated somewhatasfollows. Certainclassesofexpressionswhenfunctioningincertainclassesof contextseitherhaveorareunthinkinglysupposedtohaveacertain logicalforce.AndwhenIspeakofanexpressionashavingorbeing creditedwithacertainlogicalforceImeannomorethanthatit expressesorisassumedtoexpressanideaorpropositionwith certainlogicalpowers,inthesenseadumbratedabove.Itis therefore alwayspossibletoinquirewhatconsequentialpropositions wouldbetrueiftheexpressionunderinvestigationexpressedor helpedtoexpressapropositionthelogicalpowersofwhichwere analogoustothoseofaknownmodel.Itisalwaysinitiallypossible thatthislogicalexperimentwillrevealthatsomeofthe consequencesoftheassumptionconflictwithsomeofitsother consequencesandthusrevealthattheattributionofthislogical forcetothisexpressioninthisusewasafalseone.Thegenuine logicalforceoftheexpression -337(ifithasaforceatall),mustthereforebesuchthatthe propositionswhichithelpstoexpresshaveconstitutionswhichare insuredagainsttheseandothercontradictions.

THEFUNCTIONOFTHE"REDUCTIOAD ABSURDUM"
Thediscoveryofthelogicaltypetowhichapuzzle-generatingidea belongsisthediscoveryoftherulesgoverningthevalidarguments inwhichpropositionsembodyingthatidea(oranyotherideaofthe sametype)canenteraspremisesorconclusions.Itisalsothe discoveryofthegeneralreasonswhyspecificfallaciesresultfrom misattributionsofittospecifictypes.Ingeneraltheformer discoveryisonlyapproachedthroughtheseveralstagesofthe latter.Theideais(deliberatelyorblindly)hypotheticallytreatedas homogeneouswithonefamiliarmodelafteranotheranditsown

logicalstructureemergesfromtheconsecutiveeliminationof supposedlogicalpropertiesbytheabsurditiesresultingfromthe supposals. Thisprogramappearsvexatiouslycircuitousandoneistemptedto dreamofsomedirectwayoffixingthelogicalpowersof puzzlegeneratingideas,whichshallsharewiththemethodof progressive reductiothemeritofbeingrigorouswhileimprovingon itbydispensingwithtrialanderror.But,whateverothermethods ofsearchmaybeused,thereremainsthisimportantfactaboutits object,thattofindorunderstandaruleitisnecessaryto appreciatenotonlywhatitenforcesbutalsowhatitpermitsand whatitforbids.Peoplearenotfullyseizedofalogicalruleifthey havenotconsideredtheabsurditiesagainstwhichitprescribes.The boundariesofarightofwayarealsoboundariesofforbidden ground.Sonomethodofdiscoveringthelegitimateemployments ofaconceptcandispensewiththemethodofforecastingthelogical disastersconsequentuponillegitimateoperationswithit.Beforethe argumentcomestoitsclose,itisnecessarytoclearupthree subsidiarypoints.

SYSTEMATICAMBIGUITY
Itiscommonlysupposedthataparticularconceptisprecisely indicatedbyreference toaparticularexpression,asifforexample theideaofequalitywereunmistakablyidentifiedbybeingdescribed asthatforwhichtheword"equality"stands. Thereare,ofcourse,inalllanguagessomewordswhichhappento havetwoormoredifferentmeanings.Thatishowpunsare possible.Buttheseambiguitiesareofnotheoreticalinterest.They are -338randomintheiroccurrence,theycanbecircumventedbysimple translationorparaphrasesandthedifferentideasexpressedbya pun-wordhavegenerallysolittleconnectionwithoneanotherthat thecontextinwhichthewordisusednormallysufficestospecify whichideaisintendedtobeconveyed.Butthereisanothersortof elasticityofsignificationwhichcharacterizestheusenotofafew butofmostorofallexpressionsandwhichissuchthatthe paraphrasesandtranslationsofanexpressionwithacertain elasticityofsignificancewillnormallyhaveapreciselysimilar elasticity.Thissortofambiguityissystematicinfurtherrespects. Thevariousideasexpressedbyanexpressioninitsdifferentuses areintimatelyconnectedwitheachother.Theyareinonewayor anotherdifferentinflectionsofthesameroot. Agivenwordwill,indifferentsortsofcontext,expressideasofan indefiniterangeofdifferinglogicaltypesand,therefore,with differentlogicalpowers.Andwhatistrueofsinglewordsisalso trueofcomplexexpressionsandofgrammaticalconstructions.

Considertheadjective"punctual."Itcanbeusedtocharacterizea person'sarrivalataplace,thepersonwhoarrivesthere,his character,andeventheaveragecharacterofaclassofpersons.It wouldbeabsurdtocomparethepunctualityofamanona particularoccasionwiththatofhisarrivalonthatoccasionitwould beabsurdtocomparethepunctualityofhischaracterwiththatof hisarrivalonaparticularoccasionanditwouldbeabsurdto comparethepunctualityofNavalofficersasaclasswiththatofa particularNavalofficer.Theseandsimilarabsurditiesshowthatthe word"punctual"undergoesinflectionsofsignificancewhenapplied todifferenttypesofsubjects.Therewouldbethesameinflections ofsignificanceinFrenchorGermanandparallelinflectionswith otherwordsofthesamesort,like"tidy"and"industrious."So, where precisioniswanted,itiswrongtospeakof"theidea"of punctuality,althoughtheword"punctual"doesnotbecomeapunwordbyhavingadifferentlogicalforceforeachdifferenttypeof contextinwhichitisused. Aphilosophicallymoreinterestingexampleisaffordedbytheverb to"exist."ItmaybetruethatthereexistsacathedralinOxford,a three-enginedbomber,andasquarenumberbetween9and25. Butthenavepassagetotheconclusionthattherearethree existents,abuilding,abrandofaircraftandanumbersoonleads totrouble.Thesensesof"exists"inwhichthethreesubjectsare saidtoexistaredifferentandtheirlogicalbehaviorsaredifferent. Thediscoveryofdifferentlogicalinflectionsintheforcesof expressions -339ismadebytheimpactuponusoftheabsurditiesresultingfrom ignoringthemthedeterminationofthosedifferencesisdoneby pressingthesearchforfurthersuchabsurdities.Unnoticed systematicambiguitiesareacommonsourceoftype-confusions andphilosophicproblems.Philosophersaresometimesfound lamentingthisreadinessoflanguagestogivetooneexpressionthe powerofexpressinganindefinitevarietyofideassomeofthem evenrecommendreformsofusagewhichwillpinsinglemeanings tosingleexpressions.But,infact,thecapacityoffamiliardictionsto acquirenewinflectionsoflogicalforcesisoneofthechieffactors makingoriginalthoughtpossible.Anewthoughtcannotfindanew vehiclereadymadeforit,norcanthediscriminationofthelogical powersofnewideasprecedethebirthoftheknowledge (bywont) ofhowtothinkwiththem.Assomespannersaredesignedtobe adjustable,soastofitboltsofthesameshapebutdifferentsizes, so,thoughundesigned,thoselinguisticinstrumentsofthoughtare foundtobemosthandywhicharethemostreadilyadjustable.The suggestionthatmenshouldcoinadifferentdictiontocorrespond witheverydifferenceinthelogicalpowersofideasassumes, absurdly,thattheycouldbeawareofthesedifferencesbefore beingtakenabackbytheparadoxesarisingfromtheirnavely attributedsimilarities.Itislikesuggestingthatdrillshouldprecede theformationofhabitsorthatchildrenshouldbetaughttherules

ofgrammarbeforelearningtotalk.

ABSTRACTIONS
Ihavebeenspeakingsofarasifallideasalikegenerate philosophicalpuzzles.Butthisneedscorrection.Toputitroughly, concreteideasdonotgeneratesuchpuzzles,abstractideasdo.But thisdistinctionbetweenconcreteandabstractaswellasthat betweenlowerandhigherabstractionsrequiresaclarification,of whichnomorethanasketchcanbegivenhere.Bya"concrete idea"ismeantonetheoriginaluseofwhichistoserveasan elementinpropositionsaboutwhatexistsoroccursinthereal world.Itcouldbeintroducedorexplainedtoaninquirerby confrontinghimwithoneorseveralspecimensfromtherealworld, orelsebypresentinghimwithphysicalmodels,picturesormental imagesofspecimens.Propositionscontainingsuchideascanbe calledfirst-orderpropositions.Questionsabouttheirtruthand falsehoodcaninfavorable casesbesettledbyobservationorsets ofobservations. Ideaslikespaniel,dog,ache,thunderintheiroriginaluseare instancesofconcreteconcepts.Inthisusetheygeneratenophilo-340sophicalpuzzles,sinceonelearnsfromtheroutinesofdaily experience thescopeandthelimitsoftheirapplication.Their "logicalgeography"istaughtbyone'sdailywalks.Suchconcepts areformedfromnoticingsimilaritiesintherealworld. Quitedifferentfromthesearewhatareoftencalled"abstract ideas."Itisanegativemarkofthesethatapersoncannotbe introducedtosuchconceptsbybeingpresentedwithcorresponding realities.Nothingintheworldexemplifiestheeconomicman,the Spaniel(asthisideaoccurse.g.intheSpanielisadescendantof theWolf),or2(asthisoccurse.g.in2isaprimenumber).Itisa positivemarkofsomeabstractideasthattheycanbeexpressedby abstractnouns,like"justice,""circularity"and"wickedness"butthis istheexceptionratherthantherule.Thepropositiontheeconomic manbuysinthecheapestandsellsinthedearestmarketisan abstractproposition,thoughnothinginthevocabularyofthe sentenceindicatesthatthepropositionisofadifferentlogicaltype fromtheoldmanbuyshistobaccointheneighboringtobacconist's shop. Abstractpropositionsdonotdirectlydescribetherealworldbutnor dotheydirectlydescribeanyotherworld.Theyapplyindirectlyto therealworld,thoughtherearevarioustypesofsuchindirect application.Arithmeticisnotaboutinventories,butinventories satisfyarithmeticalpropositionsgeometrydoesnotdescribeAsia, butthegeographyofAsiaisanapplicationofgeometry,andsoon. Toformabstractideasitisnecessarytonoticenotsimilarities betweenthingsinnaturebutsimilaritiesbetweenpropositionsabout

thingsinnatureor,lateron,betweenpropositionsabout propositionsaboutthingsinnature....Butthisconclusionhasan airofmystery,derivingfromthefactthatpropositionsare themselvesabstractions.Theworlddoesnotcontainpropositions.It containspeoplebelieving,supposingandarguingpropositions.This amounts(nearlyenough)tosayingthattheworldcontainslinguistic andotherexpressions,usedorusablebyno-matter-whom,which expressions,whenused,expresstruthsorfalsehoods.Totalkabout agivenpropositionisthereforetotalkaboutwhatisexpressedby anyexpression(ofnomatterwhatlinguisticstructure)havingthe samelogicalforceassomegivenexpression,assuchexpressions areormightbeintelligentlyusedbypersons(nomatterwhom). Thisdoctrinethattospeakofaspecifiedpropositionistospeakof persons(nomatterwho)usingexpressions(nomatterofwhat sorts)havingthesamelogicalforceasthatofagivenexpression canbeproved.Inanyparticularinstance,itisalwayssignificantto suggestthatthereisnosuchproposition,sincethegivensentence is -341absurd,having,perhaps,partswhichhavecorrectusesinother contextsbutcannotbecombinedinthiswaytoformasentence withanintegrallogicalforce. Withthesesafeguardsitiscorrecttosaythatsomepropositions areaboutotherpropositionsandarethereforesecond-or higherorderpropositions.Somehigher-orderpropositions,which form,perhaps,themostnumerousclass,areonlyaboutother propositionsinthespecialsensethattheyareaboutpartial similaritiesbetweenotherwisedifferentpropositions.Foranygiven propositiontheremaybefoundarangeofdifferentpropositions sharingwithitandwitheachothersomeonecommonfactor. "Socratesiswise"expressesapropositionhavingsomethingin commonwithwhatisexpressedby"Platosapiensest."This commonfactorcanbeexpressedbyaskeletonsentenceofthe pattern"soandsoiswise"(where "soandso"announcesthegap intheskeletonsentence).Similarlytheskeletonsentence"ifpthen q"expresseswhatiscommontoarangeofhypothetical propositions. Propositionsaboutsuchfactorsofpropositions,withcertain exceptions,areordinarilysaidtobepropositionsaboutabstractions orabstractideas.Theyarehigher-orderpropositionsaboutisolable featuresofrangesoflower-orderpropositionsanddescribethe logicalforceofskeletonsentencesequipollentwithagivenskeleton sentence.Thus,apropositionaboutwisdomdoesnotmention SocratesorPlatofactsaboutSocratesandPlatoareirrelevantto itstruth.Yetthegeneralfactthatthereareormightbesubjectsof whomitcouldbetruethattheywerewiseisnotirrelevanttothe logicalforceoftheword"wisdom"anditisconsequentlyrelevantto thetruthofpropositionsaboutwisdom.Thisillustratesthesensein whichithasbeensaidthatabstractpropositionsdonotdescribethe

world,oranyotherworld,butdoindirectlyapplytotheworld.Itis alwayspossibletoaccuseasubmittedabstractideaofabsurdityor rathertoaccuseanexpressionpurportingtoexpressanabstract ideaofbeinganabsurdexpression.Naturallyenoughlanguage doesnotprovidemanynonsensicalsinglewordsbutthere frequentlyoccurabsurdcomplexexpressions,purportingtoexpress complexconcepts,whensuchacomplexisillegitimate.Thefact thatsuchaccusationsarealwayssignificantprovesthatabstract propositionsalwaysembodyovertorcovertinvertedcommas. (Indeedanyabstractpropositionifexpressedwithmaximumlogical candorwouldbeseentobedescribingatenuousmorselofthereal world,namelyanexpressionininvertedcommas.Butofcourseit onlymentionssuchanexpressionasameansofspecifying -342theideaorpropositionwhichisthelogicalforceofthatandany equipollentexpression.) Thereis,ofcourse,anunlimitedvarietyoftypesandordersof abstractideas,butallalikecangeneratephilosophicalpuzzles,just becauseexperience oftherealworldgivesusnodrillintheir correctuse.Mistakenviewsaboutabstractionsarenotrebuttedby abruisedshinoraparchedthroat.Nordoesthelanguageusedto expressabstractideasvarywiththeirdifferentvarieties.The chartingoftheirlogicalpowersconsiststhereforeinthecheckingof theirlogicalbehavioragainstlogicalrules,whichistheoperation describedinthislecture,i.e.theeliminationbyreductioad absurdumoflogicalpowersincorrectlyascribedorascribableto them. Anothergeneralpointcannowbeestablished.Foranyabstract propositiontheremustbearangeofpropositionsofalowerlevel, sincetheabstractpropositiondescribesfactorscommontothem. Thisimpliesthatcorrespondingtoanyabstractionthereisata lowerproposition-levelanideabeingactuallyused(andnot described).Theremustbeatthislowerlevelknowledge bywontof somepowersofthisideabeforetherecanbeginthehigher-level researchintotherulesgoverningthosepowers.Wemustknowin practicehowtodecidewhetherSocratesiswiseorcleverbeforewe candebatetheabstractquestionoftherelationsbetweenwisdom andcleverness.(Hencephilosophyissometimessaidtotellusonly whatweknewbefore.Thisisastrueasthecorresponding statementaboutMr.Jourdain'sknowledge ofprosebeforehis introductiontogrammar.) Thisindicateswhatwasmissinginmyprefatoryaccountofthe methodandeffectsofphilosophicalreasoning.Thiswaslikenedto threshing,whichseparatesthegrainfromthechaff,discardsthe chaffandcollectsthegrain.Philosophicalreasoningseparatesthe genuinefromtheerroneouslyassumedlogicalpowersofabstract ideasbyusingthereductioadabsurdumargumentasitsflailand winnowingfan,butknowledgebywontoftheuseofconcreter ideasisalsonecessaryasitsfloor.

CRUCIALANDCARDINALIDEAS Thoughallabstractideasalikeareliabletogeneratephilosophical puzzles,somedemandpriorityinphilosophicalexamination.Of theseoneclassconsistslargelyofthenewtheory-shapingideas whicharestruckoutfromtimetotimeinthefieldsofscience, criticism,statesmanship,andphilosophybymenofgenius.Genius showsitself -343notsomuchinthediscoveryofnewanswersasinthediscoveryof newquestions.Itinfluencesitsagenotbysolvingitsproblemsbut byopeningitseyestopreviouslyunconsideredproblems.Sothe newideasreleasedbygeniusarethosewhichgiveanewdirection toinquiry,oftenamountingtoanewmethodofthinking. Suchcrucialideas,beingnew,areatthestartunco-ordinatedwith theold.Theirpotencyisquicklyrecognizedbuttheirlogicalpowers havestilltobedetermined,as,correspondinglyhavethoselogical powersoftheoldideaswhichhaveyettobecorrelatedwiththe new.Thetaskofassimilatingthenewcrucialideasintothe unfeveredblood-streamofworkadaythoughtisrenderedboth moreurgentandmoredifficultbythefactthattheseideas necessarilybeginbybeingexciting.Theyshockthesettledwho execratethemassuperstition,andtheyspell-bindtheyoungwho consecratethemintomyth.Thatcloudandthisrainbowarenot dispelleduntilphilosopherssettlethetruelogicalperspectivesofthe ideas. Quitedistinctfromthese,thoughoftenintegraltothem,arewhat maybedescribedasphilosophicallycardinalideas,those,namely, thelogicalunravellingofwhichleadsdirectlytotheunravellingof somecomplextangleofinterconnectedideas.Oncethesekey-ideas arecharted,thegeographyofawholeregionis,atleastinoutline, fixed.Nogeneralcluecanbegivenforpredictingwhichideaswill turnouttohavethiscatalyticpower.Todiscernthisistheprivilege ofphilosophicgenius. -344-

17
HowISeePhilosophy BYFRIEDRICHWAISMANN I
WHATPHILOSOPHYIS?1Idon'tknow,norhaveIasetformulato offer.ImmediatelyIsitdowntocontemplatethequestionIam floodedwithsomanyideas,tumblingoveroneanother,thatI cannotdojusticetoallofthem.Icanmerelymakeanattempt,a

veryinadequateone,tosketchwithafewstrokeswhatthelieof thelandseemstometobe,tracingsomelinesofthoughtwithout enteringuponaclose-knitargument. Itis,perhaps,easiertosaywhatphilosophyisnotthanwhatitis. Thefirstthing,then,Ishouldliketosayisthatphilosophy,asitis practisedtoday,isveryunlikescienceandthisinthreerespects:in philosophytherearenoproofstherearenotheoremsandthere arenoquestionswhichcanbedecided,YesorNo.Insayingthat therearenoproofsIdonotmeantosaythatthereareno arguments.Argumentscertainlythereare,andfirst-rate philosophersarerecognizedbytheoriginalityoftheirarguments onlythesedonotworkinthesortofwaytheydoinmathematicsor inthesciences. Therearemanythingsbeyondproof:theexistenceofmaterial objects,ofotherminds,indeedoftheexternalworld,thevalidityof induction,andsoon.Gonearethedayswhenphilosopherswere tryingtoproveallsortsofthings:thatthesoulisimmortalthatthis isthebestofallpossibleworldsandtherest,ortorefute,by "irrefutable"argumentandwithrelish,materialism,positivismand whatnot.Proof,refutation--these aredyingwordsinphilosophy (thoughG.E.Moorestill"proved"toapuzzledworldthatitexists. What ThisessayisDr.Waismann'scontributionto ContemporaryBritishPhilosophy,thirdseries(ed.H.D. Lewis),copyright1956byGeorgeAllenandUnwinLtd,, London,withwhosekindpermissionitisherereprinted. ____________________ 1Thisarticle isinreplytoaquestionputtome bythe Editor(of ContemporaryBritishPhilosophy). -345canonesaytothis--save,perhaps,thatheisagreatproverbefore theLord?). Butcanitbeprovedthattherearenoproofsinphilosophy?Nofor onething,suchaproof,ifitwerepossible,wouldbyitsvery existenceestablishwhatitwasmeanttoconfute.Butwhysuppose thephilosophertohaveanI.Q.solowastobeunabletolearn fromthepast?Justastheconstantfailureofattemptsat constructingaperpetualmotionhasintheendledtosomething positiveinphysics,sotheeffortstoconstructaphilosophical "system,"goingonforcenturiesandgoingoutoffashionfairly recently,telltheirtale.This,Ithink,ispartofthereasonwhy philosopherstodayaregetingweanedfromcastingtheirideasinto deductivemoulds,inthegrandstyleofSpinoza. WhatIwanttoshowinthisarticleisthatitisquitewrongtolookat philosophyasthoughithadforitsaimtoprovidetheoremsbuthad lamentablyfailedtodoso.Thewholeconceptionchangeswhenone

comestorealizethatwhatphilosophersareconcernedwithis somethingdifferent--neitherdiscoveringnewpropositionsnor refutingfalseonesnorcheckingandre-checkingthemasscientists do.Foronething,proofsrequirepremisses.Wheneversuch premisseshavebeensetupinthepast,evententatively,the discussionatoncechallengedthemandshiftedtoadeeperlevel. Wheretherearenoproofstherearenotheoremseither.(Towrite downlistsofpropositions"proved"byPlatoorKant:apastime stronglytoberecommended.)Yetthefailuretoestablishasortof Euclideansystemofphilosophybasedonsomesuitable"axioms"is, Isubmit,neitheramereaccidentnorascandalbutdeeplyfounded inthenatureofphilosophy. Yettherearequestions(andarguments).Indeed,aphilosopheris amanwhosensesasitwere hiddencrevicesinthebuildofour conceptswhere othersonlyseethesmoothpathof commonplacenessbeforethem. Questionsbutnoanswers?Decidedlyodd.Theoddnessmaylessen whenwetakealookatthematcloserrange.Considertwofamous examples:Achillesandthetortoise,andtheastonishmentofSt. Augustinewhenconfrontedwiththefactofmemory.Heisamazed, notatsomestrikingfeatofmemory,butattherebeingsucha thingasmemoryatall.Asense-impression,sayasmellorataste, floatsbeforeusanddisappears.Onemomentitishereandthe nextitisgone.Butinthegalleriesofthememorypalecopiesofit arestoredupafteritsdeath.FromthereIcandragthemoutwhen andasoftenasIwish,like,andyetstrangelyunlike,the -346original--unlike inthattheyarenotperishablelikethemomentary impression:whatwastransitoryhasbeenarrestedandhas achievedduration.Butwhocansayhowthischangecomesabout? Heretheveryfactofmemoryfeelsmystifyinginawayinwhich ordinaryquestionsaskingforinformationdonotandofcourseitis notafactualquestion.Whatisit? FromPlatotoSchopenhauerphilosophersareagreedthatthe sourceoftheirphilosophizingiswonder.Whatgivesrisetoitis nothingreconditeandrarebutpreciselythosethingswhichstareus intheface:memory,motion,generalideas.(Plato:Whatdoes "horse"mean?Asingleparticularhorse?No,foritmayrefertoany horseallthehorses,thetotalclass?No,forwemayspeakofthis orthathorse.Butifitmeansneitherasinglehorsenorallhorses, whatdoesitmean?)Theidealistisshakeninjustthesameway whenhecomestoreflectthathehas,inSchopenhauer'swords, "noknowledgeofthesunbutonlyofaneyethatseesasun,and noknowledgeoftheearthbutonlyofahandthatfeelsanearth." Canitbe,then,thatnothingwhateverisknowntousexceptour ownconsciousness? Inlookingatsuchquestions,itseemsasifthemind'seyewere

growingdimandasifeverything,eventhatwhichoughttobe absolutelyclear,wasbecomingoddlypuzzlingandunlikeitsusual self.Tobringoutwhatseemstobepeculiartothesequestionsone mightsaythattheyarenotsomuchquestionsastokensofa profounduneasinessofmind.Tryforamomenttoputyourselfinto theframeofmindofwhichAugustinewaspossessedwhenhe asked:Howisitpossibletomeasuretime?Timeconsistsofpast, presentandfuture.Thepastcan'tbemeasured,itisgonethe futurecan'tbemeasured,itisnotyethereandthepresentcan't bemeasured,ithasnoextension.Augustineknewofcoursehow timeismeasuredandthiswasnothisconcern.Whatpuzzledhim washowitispossibletomeasuretime,seeingthatthepasthour cannotbeliftedoutandplacedalongsidethepresenthourfor comparison.Orlookatitthisway:whatismeasuredisinthepast, themeasuringinthepresent:howcanthatbe? Thephilosopherashepondersoversomesuchproblemhasthe appearanceofamanwhoisdeeplydisquieted.Heseemstobe strainingtograspsomethingwhichisbeyondhispowers.Thewords inwhichsuchaquestionpresentsitselfdonotquitebringoutinto theopentherealpoint--whichmay,perhapsmoreaptly,be describedastherecoilfromtheincomprehensible.If,onastraight railwayjourney,yousuddenlycomeinsightoftheverystationyou have -347justleftbehind,therewillbeterror,accompaniedperhapsbyslight giddiness.Thatisexactlyhowthephilosopherfeelswhenhesaysto himself,"Ofcoursetimecanbemeasuredbuthowcanit?"Itisas though,uptonow,hehadbeenpassingheedlesslyoverthe difficulties,andnow,allofasudden,henoticesthemandasks himselfinalarm,"Buthowcanthatbe?"Thatisasortofquestion whichweonlyaskwhenitistheveryfactsthemselveswhich confoundus,whensomethingaboutthemstrikesusas preposterous. Kant,Ifancy,musthavefeltsomethingofthesortwhenhe suddenlyfoundtheexistenceofgeometryapuzzle.Herewehave propositionsasclearandtransparentasonewouldwish,prior,it seems,toallexperience atthesametimetheyapplymiraculously totherealworld.Howisthatpossible?Canthemind,unaidedby experience,insomedarkmanneractuallyfathomthepropertiesof realthings?Lookeduponinthisway,geometrytakesona disturbingair. Weallhaveourmomentswhensomethingquiteordinarysuddenly strikesusasqueer--forinstance,whentimeappearstousasa curiousthing.Notthatweareofteninthisframeofmindbuton someoccasions,whenwelookatthingsinacertainway, unexpectedlytheyseemtochangeasthoughbymagic:theystare atuswithapuzzlingexpression,andwebegintowonderwhether theycanpossiblybethethingswehaveknownallourlives.

"Timeflows"wesay--anaturalandinnocentexpression,andyet onepregnantwithdanger.Itflows"equably,"inNewton'sphrase, atanevenrate.Whatcanthismean?Whensomethingmoves,it moveswithadefinitespeed(andspeedmeans:rateofchangein time).Toaskwithwhatspeedtimemoves,i.e.toaskhowquickly timechangesintime,istoasktheunaskable.Italsoflows,againin Newton'sphrase,"withoutrelationtoanythingexternal."Howare wetofigurethat?Doestimeflowonirrespective ofwhathappens intheworld?Woulditflowonevenifeverythinginheavenandon earthcametoasuddenstandstillasSchopenhauerbelieved?Forif thiswere notso,hesaid,timewouldhavetostopwiththestopping oftheclockandmovewiththeclock'smovement.Howodd:time flowsatthesamerateandyetwithoutspeedandperhapseven withoutanythingtooccurinit?Theexpressionispuzzlinginanother way."Icannevercatchmyselfbeinginthepastorinthefuture," someonemightsay"wheneverIthinkorperceive orbreathethe word'now,'IaminthepresentthereforeIamalwaysinthe present."Insayingthis,hemaythinkofthepresentmomentasa bridgeasitwerefromwhichheislookingdownatthe"riverof time."Timeisglidingalongunderneaththebridge,butthe"now" -348doesnottakepartinthemotion.Whatwasfuturepassesintothe present(isjustbelowthebridge)andthenintothepast,whilethe onlooker,the"self"orthe"I,"isalwaysinthepresent."Timeflows throughthe'now,'"hemayfeeltobeaquiteexpressive metaphor. Yes,itsoundsallright--untilhesuddenlycomestohissensesand, withastart,realizes,"Butsurelythemomentflies?"(Query:How tosucceedinwastingtime?Answer:Inthisway,forinstance--by trying,witheyesclosedorstaringvacantlyinfrontofoneself,to catchthepresentmomentasitisflittingby.)Hemaycomenowto lookatmattersinadifferentway.Heseeshimselfadvancing throughtimetowardsthefuture,andwiththisgoesasuggestionof beingactive,justasatothertimeshemayseehimselffloating downthestreamwhetherhelikesitornot."Whatexactlyisitthat ismoving--the eventsintimeorthepresentmoment?"hemay wonder.Inthefirstcase,itlookstohimasiftimeweremoving whilehestandsstillinthesecondcaseasifheweremoving throughtime."Howexactlyisit,"hemaysayinadubiousvoice, "amIalwaysinthepresent?Isthepresentalwayseludingme?" Bothringtrueinawaybuttheycontradicteachother.Again,does itmakesensetoask,"Atwhattimeisthepresentmoment?"Yes, nodoubtbuthowcanit,ifthe"now"isbutthefixedpointfrom whichthedatingofanyeventultimatelyreceivesitssense? Soheispulledtoandfro:"Iamalwaysinthepresent,yetitslips throughmyfingersIamgoingforwardintime--no,Iamcarried downthestream."Heisusingdifferentpictures,eachinitsway quiteappropriate totheoccasionyetwhenhetriestoapplythem jointlytheyclash."Whataqueerthingtimemustbe,"hemaysay tohimselfwithapuzzledlookonhisface,"whatafterallistime?"-expecting,half-expectingperhaps,thattheanswerwillrevealto

himtime'shiddenessence.Rangedbeyondtheintellectualare deeperlevelsofuneasiness--terroroftheinevitabilityoftime's passage,withallthereflectionsuponlifethatthisforcesuponus. Nowalltheseanxiousdoubtsreleasethemselvesinthequestion, "Whatistime?"(Enpassantthisisahintthatoneanswerwillnever do--willneverremove allthesedoubtsthatbreakoutafreshon differentlevelsandyetareexpressedinthesameformofwords.) Asweallknowwhattimeisandyetcannotsaywhatitisitfeels mystifyingandpreciselybecauseofitselusivenessitcatchesour imagination.Themorewelookatitthemorewearepuzzled:it seemschargedwithparadoxes."Whatistime?Whatisthisbeing madeupofmovementonlywithoutanythingthatismoving?"( Schopenhauer).Howfunnytohaveitbottledup!"I've gothere -349inmyhandthemostpotent,themostenigmatic,themostfleeting ofallessences--Time."(LoganPearsallSmithofanhour-glass.) ForShelleyitisan"unfathomablesea!whosewavesareyears,"a "shorelessflood,"forProust--well,whynotleavesomethingtothe reader? Butisn'ttheanswertothisthatwhatmystifiesusliesinthenoun form"thetime"?Havinganotionembodiedintheformofanoun almostirresistiblymakesusturnroundtolookforwhatitis"the nameof."Wearetryingtocatchtheshadowscastbytheopacities ofspeech.Awronganalogyabsorbedintotheformsofour languageproducesmentaldiscomfort(andthefeelingof discomfort,whenitreferstolanguage,isaprofoundone)."All sounds,allcolors...evoke indefiniteandyetpreciseemotions,or, asIprefertothink,calldownamonguscertaindisembodied powerswhosefootstepsoverourheartswecallemotions"(W.B. Yeats). Yettheanswerisaprosaicone:don'taskwhattimeisbuthowthe word"time"isbeingused.Easiersaidthandoneforifthe philosopherrectifiestheuseoflanguage,ordinarylanguagehas "theadvantageofbeinginpossessionofdeclensions,"tospeakwith Lichtenberg,andthusrenewsitsspelloverhim,luringhimoninto theshadowchase.Itisperhapsonlywhenweturntolanguagesof awidelydifferentgrammaticalstructurethatthewaytowardssuch possibilitiesofinterpretationisentirelybarred."Itishighlyprobable thatphilosopherswithinthedomainoftheUral-Altaiclanguages (where thesubject-conceptisleastdeveloped)willlookdifferently 'intotheworld'andbefoundonpathsofthoughtdifferentfrom thoseoftheIndo-EuropeansorMussulmans"(Nietzsche).

II
Itmaybewellatthispointtoremindourselvesthatthewords "question"and"answer,""problem"and"solution"arenotalways usedintheirmosttritesense.Itisquiteobviousthatweoftenhave todosomethingverydifferenttofindthewayoutofadifficulty.A

problemofpoliticsissolvedbyadoptingacertainlineofaction,the problemsofnovelistsperhapsbytheinventionofdevicesfor presentingtheinmostthoughtsandfeelingsoftheircharacters thereisthepainter'sproblemofhowtosuggestdepthor movementonthecanvas,thestylisticproblemofexpressingthings notyetcurrent,notyetturnedintoclichthereareathousand questionsoftechnologywhichareanswered,notbythediscovery ofsometruth,butbyapracticalachievementandthereisof coursethe"social -350question."Inphilosophy,therealproblemisnottofindtheanswer toagivenquestionbuttofindasenseforit. Toseeinwhatthe"solution"ofsucha"problem"consistsletus startwithAchilleswho,accordingtoZeno,istothisdaychasingthe tortoise.SupposethatAchillesrunstwiceasfastasthetortoise.If thetortoise'sstartis1,Achilleswillhavetocoversuccessively1,, ,,...thisseriesisendless:sohecannevercatchthe tortoise."Nonsense!"(amathematician'svoice),"thesumofthe infiniteseriesisfinite,namely2,andthatsettlesit."Though perfectlytrue,hisremarkisnottothepoint.Itdoesnotremove thestingfromthepuzzle,thedisconcertingidea,namely,that howeverfarwegointheseriesthereisalwaysanextterm,that theleadthetortoisehasintherace,thoughnaturallygetting smallerandsmaller,yetneverceasestobe:therecanbeno momentwhenitisstrictlyzero.Itisthisfeatureofthecase,I suggest,thatwedonotunderstandandwhichthrowsusintoa stateofconfusion. Butlookatitthisway.Supposethatweapplythesamesortof argumenttoaminute,thenweshallhavetoargueinsomesuch wayasthis.Before theminutecanbeoverthefirsthalfofitmust elapse,thenone-quarterofit,thenone-eighthofit,andsoonad infinitum.Thisbeinganendlessprocess,theminutecannever cometoanend.Immediatelywehavetheargumentinthisform, theblunderleapstotheeye:wehavebeenconfusingtwosenses of"never,"atemporalandanon-temporalone.Whileitisquite correcttosaythatthesequence1,,,,...neverends,this senseoftheword"never"hasnothingwhatevertodowithtime.All itmeansisthatthereisnolasttermintheseries,or(whatcomes tothesame)thattoanyterm,nomatterhowfaroutinthe sequence,asuccessorcanbeconstructedaccordingtothesimple rule"halveit":thatismeanthereby"never"whereasinsaying, forinstance,thatmanwillneverfindoutanythingtoavertdeath, "never"ismeantinthesense"atnotime."Itisclearthatthe mathematicalassertionconcerningthepossibilityofgoingoninthe sequencebyformingnewtermsaccordingtotheruledoesnot stateanythingaboutactualoccurrencesintime.Themistakeshould reallybeobvious:insayingthat,sincethestartisgetting progressivelysmallerandyetcanneverceasetobe,Achillescan nevercatchthetortoise,wejumpfromthemathematical,non-

temporaltothetemporalsense.Hadtherebeentwodifferent wordsinourlanguagetomarkthesesensestheconfusioncould neverhavearisen,andtheworldwouldbepoorerforoneofits mostattractive paradoxes.Butthesamewordisasamatterof courseusedwithdifferentmeanings.Result:somethinglikea conjuring -351trick.Whileourattentionisdiverted,while,"inourmind'seye,"we starefixedlyatAchillesasheisspeedingalong,witheachbig bounddiminishinghisdistancefromthetortoise,theonesenseis soinnocuouslypalmedofffortheotherastoescapenotice. Thiswayofbringingoutthefallacyalsoholdswhentheotherkey termisusedforpresentingthepuzzle.Astherewill"always"bea nextterminthesequence,i.e.anextstepintheschemeof subdividingtherace-course (theword"always"lookingjustas spotlessandinnocent)wereadilyfallintothetrapofconcluding thatthetortoisewill"always"beaheadofAchilles,eternallytobe chasedbyhispursuer. Manyarethetypesofbewilderment:thereistheobsessional doubt--canIeverknowthatotherpeoplehaveexperiences,that theysee,hearandfeelasIdo?CanIbesurethatmemorydoes notalwaysdeceiveme?Aretherereallymaterialobjectsandnot onlysense-impressions"of"them?Thereisthedoubtlike uneasiness-whatsortofbeingispossessedbynumbers?Thereis theanxietydoubt--are wereallyfree?Thisdoubthastakenmany differentformsoneofwhichIshallsingleoutfordiscussion--the question,namely,whetherthelawofexcludedmiddle,whenit referstostatementsinthefuturetense,forcesusintoasortof logicalPredestination.Atypicalargumentisthis.Ifitistruenow thatIshalldoacertainthingtomorrow,say,jumpintothe Thames,thennomatterhowfiercelyIresist,strike outwithhands andfeetlikeamadman,whenthedaycomesIcannothelp jumpingintothewaterwhereas,ifthispredictionisfalsenow, thenwhatevereffortsImaymake,howevermanytimesImay nerveandbracemyself,lookdownatthewaterandsaytomyself, "One,two,three--,"itisimpossibleformetospring.Yetthatthe predictioniseithertrueorfalseisitselfanecessarytruth,asserted bythelawofexcludedmiddle.Fromthisthestartlingconsequence seemstofollowthatitisalreadynowdecidedwhatIshalldo tomorrow,thatindeedtheentirefutureissomehowfixed,logically preordained.WhateverIdoandwhicheverwayIdecide,Iam merelymovingalonglinesclearlymarkedinadvancewhichleadme towardsmyappointedlot.Weareall,infact,marionettes.Ifwe arenotpreparedtoswallowthat,then--andthereisaglimmerof hopeinthe"then"--there isanalternativeopentous.Weneed onlyrenouncethelawofexcludedmiddleforstatementsofthis kind,andwithitthevalidityofordinarylogic,andallwillbewell. Descriptionsofwhatwillhappenare,atpresent,neithertruenor false.(Thissortofargumentwasactuallypropoundedby

-352Lukasiewiczinfavorofathree-valuedlogicwith"possible"asa thirdtruth-value alongside"true"and"false.") Thewayoutisclearenough.Theaskerofthequestionhasfallen intotheerrorofsomanyphilosophers:ofgivingananswerbefore stoppingtoconsiderthequestion.Forisheclearwhatheisasking? Heseemstosupposethatastatementreferringtoaneventinthe futureisatpresentundecided,neithertruenorfalse,butthatwhen theeventhappensthepropositionentersintoasortofnewstate, thatofbeingtrue.Buthowarewetofigurethechangefrom "undecided"to"true"?Isitsuddenorgradual?Atwhatmoment doesthestatement"itwillraintomorrow"begintobetrue?When thefirstdropfallstotheground?Andsupposingthatitwillnotrain, whenwillthestatementbegintobefalse?Justattheendofthe day,at12p.m.sharp?Supposingthattheeventhashappened, thatthestatementistrue,willitremainsoforever?Ifso,inwhat way?Doesitremainuninterruptedlytrue,ateverymomentofday andnight?Eveniftherewerenooneabouttogiveitanythought? Orisittrueonlyatthemomentswhenitisbeingthoughtof?In thatcase,howlongdoesitremaintrue?Forthedurationofthe thought?Wewouldn'tknowhowtoanswerthesequestionsthisis duenottoanyparticularignoranceorstupidityonourpartbutto thefactthatsomethinghasgonewrongwiththewaythewords "true"and"false"areappliedhere. IfIsay,"ItistruethatIwasinAmerica,"IamsayingthatIwasin Americaandnomore.Thatinutteringthewords"Itistruethat--"I takeresponsibilityuponmyselfisadifferentmatterthatdoesnot concernthepresentargument.Thepointisthatinmakinga statementprefacedbythewords"Itistruethat"Idonotadd anythingtothefactualinformationIgiveyou.Sayingthat somethingistrueisnotmakingittrue:cp.thecriminallyingin court,yeteverytimeheistellingalieprotesting,hishandonhis heart,thatheistellingthetruth. Whatischaracteristicoftheuseofthewords"true"and"false"and whatthepleaderoflogicaldeterminismhasfailedtonoticeisthis. "Itistrue"and"itisfalse,"whiletheycertainlyhavetheforceof assertinganddenying,arenotdescriptive.Supposethatsomeone says,"Itistruethatthesunwillrisetomorrow"allitmeansisthat thesunwillrisetomorrow:heisnotregalinguswithan extradescriptionofthetruenessofwhathesays.Butsupposingthat hewere tosayinstead,"Itistruenowthatthesunwillrise tomorrow,"thiswouldboildowntosomethinglike"Thesunwillrise tomorrow -353now"whichisnonsense.Toask,asthepuzzle-poserdoes,"Isit trueorfalsenowthatsuch-and-suchwillhappeninthefuture?"is

notthesortofquestiontowhichananswercanbegiven:whichis theanswer. Thisshedslightonwhathas,rathersolemnly,beentermedthe "timelessnessoftruth."Itliesinthisthattheclause"itistruethat-"doesnotallowofinsertingadate.Tosayofapropositionlike "Diamondispurecarbon"thatitistrueonChristmasEvewouldbe justaspoorajokeastosaythatitistrueinParisandnotin Timbuctoo.(Thisdoesnotmeanthatwecannotsayincertain circumstances,"Yes,itwastrueinthosedays"asthiscanclearlybe paraphrasedwithoutusingtheword"true.") Nowitbeginstolookabitlessparadoxicaltosaythatwhena philosopherwantstodisposeofaquestiontheonethinghemust notdois:togiveananswer.Aphilosophicquestionisnotsolved:it dissolves.Andinwhatdoesthe"dissolving"consist?Inmakingthe meaningofthewordsusedinputtingthequestionsoclearto ourselvesthatwearereleasedfromthespellitcastsonus. Confusionwasremovedbycallingtomindtheuseoflanguageor, sofarastheusecanbedistilledintorules,therules:ittherefore wasaconfusionabouttheuseoflanguage,oraconfusionabout rules.Itisherethatphilosophyandgrammarmeet. Thereisonefurtherpointthatneedselucidation.Whenwesayofa givenassertion,e.g."Itisraining,"thatitistruewecanhardly escapetheimpressionthatwesaysomething"about"theassertion, namely,thatithasthepropertyoftrueness.Tomakesucha statementseems,then,tosaymorethanwhatwasasserted originally,namely,thatitisrainingandthatthisassertionistrue. That,however,leadstoqueerconsequences.Forinwhichsense doesitsaymore?Considerfirstunderwhichcircumstancesitwould beappropriatetosayoftwogivenpropositionsthattheonesays "more"thantheother."Thisisred"saysmorethan"thisiscolored" fortheobviousreasonthatanyonecanconcludefromthefirst statementtothesecondbutnoonereverselysimilarly"todayis Tuesday"saysmorethan"todayisaweekday."Thecriterion,then, suggestsitselfthat,giventwopropositionspandq,psaysmore thanq,ifp.qismeaningfulandp.qcontradictory.Theholderof theviewthat"pistrue"saysmorethanp(pstandinge.g.for"Itis raining"),maynowbechallengedtoexplainwhathemeansby that.Isheusingtheword"more"inthesensejustexplained?Ifso, thecuriousconsequenceensuesthatitmustmakesensetoassert -354theconjunctionp.q,thatisinourcase,"Itisnottruethatitis raininganditisraining."Sincethisobviouslyisnotwhathehadin mind,whatdoeshemean?Wearenotcontradictinghimwe merelyremindhimofhowthesewordshavealwaysbeenusedby him,innon-philosophicalcontextsthatis,andthenpointoutthat,if hestillwantstousetheminthissense,tosaywhathewantedto saylandshiminanabsurdity.Allwedoistomakehimawareof hisownpractice.Weabstainfromanyassertion.Itisforhimto

explainwhathemeans.Notthathecannotdoit.Inascribingtruth toagivenstatement,hemightsay,hewantstoexpressperhaps either(i)thatitis"inaccordancewithfact"orsomethingofthe sortor(ii)thatheknowsthatitistrue.Inthefirstcaseheisfaced withthesamedilemma,namely,thatitmustmakesensetosay, "Itisnotinaccordancewiththefactsthatitisraininganditis raining"inthesecondfreshdifficultiesarebreakingout.Forone thing,thewords"itistruethat--,"whenutteredbydifferent people,wouldthenmeandifferentthingsforanother,andthisis morefataltotheadvocateoffatalism,inconstruingthewordsin thissense,hecutsthegroundfromunderhisownfeet.Noone wouldthenbeworriedbythequestionwhether,supposingthatitis falsenowthathewillwriteacertainlettertomorrow,itfollowsthat itwillreallybeimpossibleforhimtowritethatletter,thatthisline ofconductisbarredtohim,logicallybarred.Forsince"itisfalse now"meansinthenewsense"hedoesn'tknowyet"nothingfollows andthewholequestionevaporates. Myreasonforgoingintothistangleatsomelengthisthatthe methodappliedinunravellingitpresentssomeinterestingfeatures. First,wedon'tforceourinterlocutor.Weleavehimfreetochoose, acceptorrejectanywayofusinghiswords.Hemaydepartfrom ordinaryusage--language isnotuntouchable--ifitisonlyinthisway thathecanexplainhimself.Hemayevenuseanexpressionone timeinthis,anothertimeinthat,way.Theonlythingweinsist uponisthatheshouldbeawareofwhatheisdoing.Ifwestrictly adheretothismethod--goingovertheargument,askinghimat eachstepwhetherheiswillingtouseanexpressioninacertain way,ifnot,offeringhimalternatives,butleavingthedecisionsto himandonlypointingoutwhattheirconsequencesare--nodispute canarise.Disputesariseonlyifcertainstepsinthisprocedureare omittedsothatitlooksasifwehadmadeanassertion,addingto theworld'swoesanewappleofdiscord.Thiswouldbethetrue wayofdoingphilosophyundogmatically.Thedifficultyofthis methodliesin -355presentingthesubjectinamannerwhichcaneasilybetakenin-in arrangingthecasesandthewaysinwhichtheyareconnected throughintermediatelinkssothatwecangainaclearsynopticview ofthewhole. Second,wedonotuseargumentsinordertoproveordisproveany "philosophicview."Aswehavenoviewswecanaffordtolookat thingsastheyare. Next,weonlydescribewedonot"explain."Anexplanation,inthe senseofadeductiveproof,cannotsatisfyusbecauseitpushesthe question"Whyjusttheserulesandnootherones?"onlyonestage back.Infollowingthatmethod,wedonotwanttogivereasons.All wedoistodescribeauseortabulaterules.Indoingthis,weare notmakinganydiscoveries:thereisnothingtobediscoveredin grammar.Grammarisautonomousandnotdictatedbyreality.

Givingreasons,boundasitistocometoanendandleadingto somethingwhichcannotfurtherbeexplained,oughtnottosatisfy us.Ingrammarweneveraskthequestion"why?" Butisn'ttheresultofthisthatphilosophyitself"dissolves"? Philosophyeliminatesthosequestionswhichcanbeeliminatedby suchatreatment.Notallofthem,though:themetaphysician's cravingthatarayoflightmayfallonthemysteryoftheexistence ofthisworld,orontheincomprehensiblefactthatitis comprehensible,oronthe"meaningoflife"--evenifsuchquestions couldbeshowntolackaclearmeaningortobedevoidofmeaning altogether,theyarenotsilenced.Itdoesnothingtolessenthe dismaytheyrouseinus.Thereissomethingcheapin"debunking" them.Theheart'sunrestisnottobestilledbylogic.Yetphilosophy isnotdissolved.Itderivesitsweight,itsgrandeur,fromthe significanceofthequestionsitdestroys.Itoverthrowsidols,andit istheimportanceoftheseidolswhichgivesphilosophyits importance. Nowitcanperhapsbeseenwhythesearchforanswersfittingthe mouldsofthequestionsfails,isboundtofail.Theyarenotreal questionsaskingforinformationbut"muddlesfeltasproblems"( Wittgenstein)whichwitherawaywhenthegroundiscleared.If philosophyadvances,itisnotbyaddingnewpropositionstoitslist, butratherbytransformingthewholeintellectualsceneand,asa consequenceofthis,byreducingthenumberofquestionswhich befogandbedevilus.Philosophysoconstruedisoneofthegreat liberatingforces.Itstaskis,inthewordsofFrege,"tofreethe spiritfromthetyrannyofwordsbyexposingthedelusionswhich arise,almostinevitably,throughtheuseofawordlanguage." -356-

III
What,onlycriticismandnomeat?Thephilosopherafogdispeller? Ifthatwere allhewascapableofIwouldbesorryforhimand leavehimtohisdevices.Fortunately,thisisnotso.Foronething,a philosophicquestion,ifpursuedfarenough,mayleadtosomething positive--forinstance,toamoreprofoundunderstandingof language.Takethescepticaldoubtsastomaterialobjects,other minds,etc.Thefirstreactionisperhapstosay:thesedoubtsare idle.Ordinarily,whenIdoubtwhetherIshallfinishthisarticle,after atimemydoubtcomestoanend.Icannotgoondoubtingfor ever.It'sthedestinyofdoubttodie.Butthedoubtsraisedbythe scepticneverdie.Are theydoubts?Are theypseudo-questions? Theyappearsoonlywhenjudgedbythetwinstandardsofcommon senseandcommonspeech.Therealtroubleliesdeeper:itarises fromthescepticcastingdoubtontheveryfactswhichunderliethe useoflanguage,thosepermanentfeaturesofexperience which makeconceptformationpossible,whichinfactareprecipitatedin theuseofourmostcommonwords.Supposethatyouseean objectinfrontofyouquiteclearly,say,apipe,andwhenyouare

goingtopickitupitmeltsintothinair,thenyoumayfeel,"Lord, I'mgoingmad"orsomethingofthesort(unlessthewholesituation issuchthatyouhavereasontosuspectthatitwassomeclever trick).Butwhat,thescepticmaypressnow,ifsuchexperiences werequitefrequent?Wouldyoubepreparedtodissolvethe connectionbetweendifferentsenseexperienceswhichformthe hardcoreofourideaofasolidobject,toundowhatlanguagehas done--topartwiththecategoryofthing-hood?Andwouldyouthen belivinginaphenomenalist'sparadisewithcolorpatchesandthe otherparaphernaliaofthesensedatumtheory,inadisobjected, desubstantializedworld?Tosayinsuchcircumstances,"Look,it's justtablingnow"wouldbeajoke(forevenintheweakenedverb forms"tabling,""chairing"anelementofthething-categorylingers on).Thatiswhythescepticstrugglestoexpresshimselfina languagewhichisnotfitforthispurpose.Heexpresseshimself misleadinglywhenhesaysthathedoubtssuch-and-suchfacts:his doubtscutsodeepthattheyaffectthefabricoflanguageitself.For whathedoubtsisalreadyembodiedintheveryformsofspeech, e.g.inwhatiscondensedintheuseofthingwords.Themomenthe triestopenetratethosedeep-sunkenlayers,heunderminesthe languageinwhichheventilateshisqualms--withthe -357resultthatheseemstobetalkingnonsense.Heisnot.Butinorder tomakehisdoubtsfullyexpressible,languagewouldfirsthaveto gointothemelting-pot.(Wecangetaglimmeringofwhatis neededfrommodernsciencewhere allthelong-established categories-thinghood,causality,position--hadtoberevolutionized. Thisrequirednothinglessthantheconstructionofsomenew language,nottheexpressionofnewfactswiththeoldone.) Ifwelookatthematterinthiswaytheattitudeofthescepticis seeninanewlight.Heconsiderspossibilitieswhichliefaroutside thedomainofourcurrentexperience.Ifhisdoubtsaretaken seriously,theyturnintoobservationswhichcastanewand searchinglightonthesubsoiloflanguage,showingwhatpossibilities areopentoourthought(thoughnottoordinarylanguage),and whatpathsmighthavebeenpursuedifthetextureofour experience were differentfromwhatitis.Theseproblemsarenot spurious:theymakeusawareofthevastbackgroundinwhichany currentexperiencesareembedded,andtowhichlanguagehas adapteditselfthustheybringouttheunmeasuredsumof experience storedupintheuseofourwordsandsyntacticalforms. Foranotherthing,aquestionmaydecidetogoinforanother careerthandissolving:itmaypassintoscience.Frege,forinstance, waspromptedtohisinquiriesbyphilosophicalmotives,namely,to findadefiniteanswertothequestionaboutthenatureof arithmeticaltruths--whethertheyareanalyticorsynthetic,apriori oraposteriori.Startingfromthisquestionandpursuingitwithall possiblerigor,hewasledtounearthawholemineofproblemsofa scientificnatureandproceedingalongtheselines,hecameto

fashionanewinstrument,alogic,whichindelicacyandrangeand powerfarsurpassedanythingthatwentbythisnamebefore,a subjectrevealingtothisdaynewandunexpecteddepths.True,the questionfromwhichFrege setoutwasnottooclearlydefined owingtotheimprecisenatureoftheKantiantermsinwhichitwas expressed. Awholechaptermightbewrittenonthefateofquestions,their curiousadventuresandtransformations--howtheychangeinto othersandintheprocessremain,andyetdonotremain,the same.Theoriginalquestionmaysplitandmultiplyalmostlikea characterinadreamplay.Tomentionjustafewexamples:can logicbecharacterizedcompletelyinaformalway,i.e.without bringinginanyextraneousideassuchastheuseoflanguageand allthatgoeswithit?Canarithmeticbecharacterizedinanysuch way,entirely"fromwithin"?Orwillanyinterpretationincludesome Erdenrestoftheempiric?Thesequestionshavegivenriseto extensive research -358onmathematicalinterpretationofformalsystems.Thequeryhow farlogicalintuitioniscorrecthasgotramifiedintoabunchof questionspertainingtothetheoryoflogicaltypes,theaxiomof choice,etc.,indeedtoafarmorefundamentalissue,namely, whetherordinarylogicitselfis"right"ascontrastedwiththesystem ofinferencesevolvedbytheintuitionists.Oragain,arethere undecidablequestionsinmathematics,notintherestrictedsenseof Gdel,butundecidableinanabsolutesense?Are therenatural limitstogeneralization?Itisinterestingtowatchhowfroma questionofthissort,nottooprecise,somewhatblurred,newand betterdefinedquestionsdetachthemselves,theparentquestion--in Frege'scasephilosophicparexcellence--givingrisetoascientist's progeny. Nowsomethingelsemustbenoted--howthesequestionsbecome, notonlyprecise,butclear(whichisnotthesamething).To illustrate,cantheinfinityrepresentedbyallnaturalnumbersbe comparedwiththeinfinityrepresentedbyallpointsinspace?That is,cantheonebesaidtobelessthan,orequalto,theother? Whenitwasfirstasked,thequestionhadnoclearsense--perhaps nosenseatall.YetitguidedG.Cantorinhisingenioussearch. Beforesettheorywasdiscovered--orshouldIrathersay "invented"?--the questionactedasasortofsignpostpointing vaguelytosomesofarunchartedregionofthought.Itisperhaps bestcharacterizedbysayingthatitguidesourimaginationina givendirection,stimulatesresearchalongnewlines.Suchquestions donot"dissolve":theyaresolved,onlynotintheexistingsystemof thoughtbutratherbyconstructinganewconceptualsystem--such assettheory--where theintendedandfaintlyanticipatedsense findsitsfullrealization.Theyarethereforeofthenatureof incitementstothebuildingofsuchsystems,theypointfromthe not-yet-meaningfultothemeaningful.

Thequestionisthefirstgropingstepofthemindinitsjourneyings thatleadtowardsnewhorizons.Thegeniusofthephilosopher showsitselfnowheremorestrikinglythaninthenewkindof questionhebringsintotheworld.Whatdistinguisheshimandgives himhisplaceisthepassionofquestioning.Thathisquestionsareat timesnotsoclearisperhapsofnotsomuchmomentasonemakes ofit.Thereisnothinglikeclearthinkingtoprotectonefrommaking discoveries.Itisallverywelltotalkofclarity,butwhenitbecomes anobsessionitisliabletonipthelivingthoughtinthebud.This,I amafraid,isoneofthedeplorableresultsofLogicalPositivism,not foreseenbyitsfounders,butonlytoostrikinginsomeofits followers.Lookatthesepeople,grippedbyaclarityneurosis, hauntedbyfear,tongue-tied,askingthemselvescontinually,"Oh dear,nowdoesthis -359makeperfectlygoodsense?"Imaginethepioneersofscience, Kepler,Newton,thediscoverersofnon-Euclideangeometry,offield physics,theunconscious,matterwavesorheavenknowswhat, imaginethemaskingthemselvesthisquestionateverystep--this wouldhavebeenthesurestmeansofsappinganycreativepower. Nogreatdiscovererhasactedinaccordancewiththemotto, "Everythingthatcanbesaidcanbesaidclearly."Andsomeofthe greatestdiscoverieshaveevenemergedfromasortofprimordial fog.(Somethingtobesaidforthefog.Formypart,I'vealways suspectedthatclarityisthelastrefugeofthosewhohavenothing tosay.) Thegreatmindisthegreatquestioner.Anexampleinpointis Kant'sproblem"Howisgeometrypossible?"Thewaytoitssolution wasonlyopenedupthroughtheriseofthe"axiomaticmethod." Seeingthattheaxiomsofgeometryarecapableofanindefinite numberofdifferentinterpretationsandthattheparticularwaythey maybeinterpretedisirrelevanttodeductivepurposes,Hilbert separatedwhatbelongstothelogicalformoftheaxiomsfrom whatbelongstotheirintuitional(orother)contentandturnedthe wholequestionbysaying:apoint,astraightline,etc.,maybe anythingthatsatisfiestheaxioms.Asthebusinessofdeduction hingesonlyontherelationsinwhichthebasictermsstandtoeach otherandnotonthe"content"weassociatewiththem,andas theserelationsarefullysetoutintheaxioms,theaxiomsintheir totalitydeterminewhata"point,"a"line,"etc.,issofarasitis sufficientfordeductiveneeds.Throughtheriseofthistechniqueit becameapparentthattheword"geometry,"asunderstoodby Kant,covers,infact,twototallydifferentsciences,mathematical andphysicalgeometry.Itwasthefailuretodistinguishbetween themthatproducedKant'sperplexity."Sofarasthelawsof mathematicsrefertoreality,theyarenotcertainandsofaras theyarecertain,theydonotrefertoreality"(Einstein).Kant's creditliesinhavingseenthatthereisaproblem,notinhaving solvedit.

Buthereanewproblempresentsitself:Howdoweknowwhatwill satisfyagivenquestion?Moregenerally:Howdoestheanswerfit thequestion?Questionsofthecurrentsort("Whatistheright time?")showalreadybytheirformwhatsortofanswertoexpect. Theyare,sotospeak,chequeswithablanktobefilledyetnot alwaysso:Augustine'squestion,"Howisitpossibletomeasure time?"orKant'squestion,"Howisgeometrypossible?"donottrace outtheformoftheanswer.Thereisnoobviouslinkbetween questionandanswer,anymorethanthereisinthecaseofasking "Whatisapoint?"WhenHilbert'sidea--thattheaxiomsofgeometry -360jointlyprovidethe"implicitdefinition"ofthebasicterms--wasfirst propoundeditcametotallyunexpectednoonehadeverthoughtof thatbeforeonthecontrary,manypeoplehadanuneasyfeelingas ifthiswere awayofevadingtheissueratherthanananswer, amongstthemnolessamanthanFrege.Hethoughttheproblem stillunsolved. NowisthereanythingonecandotomakeamanlikeFrege see thattheaxiomaticmethodprovidesthecorrectanswer?Canit,for example,beprovedtohim?Thepointtowhichattentionmustnow bedrawn,thoughitshouldreallybeobvious,isthatsuchaproof cannotbegiven,anditcannotbecausehe,theasker,hasfirstto beturnedroundtoseethematterdifferently.Whatisrequiredisa changeoftheentirewayofthinking.Indeed,anyonewhois puzzledbythisproblemandyetrefusestoacceptHilbert'ssolution onlybetraysthathehasgotstuckinthegroove hollowedoutby theforminwhichthequestionisput."Apointis--"hebeginsand thenstops.Whatistobedonetohelphimtogetoutofthegroove or,betterstill,tomakehimshiftforhimselfwhenhefeels "cramped"init,isadiscussion,notaproof. Fregebehavesnotsoveryunlikeamanmystifiedbythequestion, "Whatistime?"Wemaysuggestconvertingthelatterintothe questionhowtheword"time"isbeingused(whichwouldbringhim downtoearth).Butaren'twecheatinghim?Weseemtobeholding outtheanswertoonequestion,butnottothatonewhichhewas asking.Hemaysuspectthatwearetryingtofobhimoffwiththe secondbestwehaveinstore,hisoriginalquestionstillremainingan enigma.SimilarlyFrege:heconsidereditascandalthatthe questions"Whatisapoint?""Whatisanumber?"werestill unanswered. Ineitherofthesecases,theaimofadiscussion,intheabsenceof aproof,canonlybetochangetheasker'sattitude.Wemay,for instance,scrutinizesimilar,orpartiallysimilar,cases,pointoutthat theformoftheanswerisnotalwaysthatofthequestionbygoing patientlyoversuchcases,thevastbackgroundofanalogiesagainst whichthequestionisseenwillslowlychange.Theturningupofa widefieldoflanguageloosensthepositionofcertainstandards whicharesoingrainedthatwedonotseethemforwhattheyare andifwedothisinaneffectivemanner,amindlikeFrege'swillbe

releasedfromtheobsessionofseekingstraininglyforananswerto fitthemould.Argumentsareusedinsuchadiscussion,notas proofsthoughbutratherasmeanstomakehimseethingshehad notnoticedbefore:e.g.todispelwronganalogies,tostress similarities -361withothercasesandinthiswaytobringaboutsomethinglikea shiftofperspective.However,thereisnowayofprovinghimwrong orbullyinghimintomentalacceptanceoftheproposal:whenallis saidanddonethedecisionishis. Butheremoreisatstakethanlooseningacrampedposition-itisa questionofescapingthedominationoflinguisticforms.Howoften arewemerelyfollowingthechannelscarvedoutbynumberless repetitionofthesamemodesofexpression--aswhenwesay, unsuspectingly,"Timeflows"andare,whenconfronted(say)with Augustine'sparadox,suddenlyshockedoutofcomplacency.Existing language,byofferingusonlycertainsterotypedmouldsof expression,createshabitsofthoughtwhichitisalmostimpossible tobreak.Suchamouldis,e.g.theactor-actionschemeofthe IndoEuropeanlanguages.Howdeeptheirinfluenceiscanperhaps besurmisedfromDescartes'conclusionfromthinkingtothe presenceofanagent,anego,differentfromthethinking,that doesthethinking--aconclusionsonaturalandconvincingtous becauseitissupportedbythewholeweightoflanguage.Frege's obsessionwiththequestion"Whatisanumber?"isanothercase. Aswecanspeakof"thenumberfive,"five,Fregeargued,mustbe thepropernameofanentity,asortofPlatoniccrystal,indicatedby meansofthedefinitearticle.(AChinesepupilofmineonce informedmethatFrege'squestionisunaskableinChinese,"five" beingusedthereonlyasanumeralincontextslike"five friends," fiveboats,"etc.).Again,whenwesayofagivenstatementthatit istrue,weseemtobesayingsomething"about"it--evidence ofthe powerofthesubject-predicate clich.Indeed,sostrongisthe temptationtoconstrueitinthisway,namely,asastatementabout astatement,thattheideaofadifferentinterpretationscarcely occurstous.Itisimportanttonoticethatindoingsoweassimilate theexpressiontoanalogicalformsbutitisnolessimportantto noticethatnoneoftheseanalogiesneedstobepresenttoour minds:itisenoughiftheymakethemselvesfeltinadim, inarticulatedway.Suchpatternshaveaneffectonuslikethousands ofexplicitanalogies:theyactuponus,onemightsay,likeafieldof force,alanguagefield,thatdrawsourmentalgazeinacertain direction.And,Iventure toadd,itispreciselybecauseofofthe fleeting,half-formed,shadow-like natureoftheseanalogiesthatit isalmostimpossibletoescapetheirinfluence.Ifwearetakeninby them,itisourfault.Aphilosopher,insteadofpreachingthe righteousnessofordinaryspeech,shouldlearntobeonhisguard againstthepitfallseverpresentinitsforms.Touseapicture:just -362-

asagoodswimmermustbeabletoswimup-stream,sothe philosophershouldmastertheunspeakablydifficultartofthinking up-speech,againstthecurrentofclichs. Nowforanotherpoint.WhenwedissuadeamanlikeFrege from hissearch,weseemtobehinderinghimfromreachingtheaimhe setouttoreach.Doesourdiscussionclash,then,withhissearch? And,ifso,inwhichway?Firstofall,innoclearlydefinablewayfor heisnotyetclearlyaware whatheisaimingat,andthediscussion bringshimgraduallytoseethingsinadifferentlight.Howisthis changebroughtabout?Well,hefirstsawthequestioninanalogy withotherones,andtheseanalogiesare,onebyone,destroyed orrather,inthecourseofthediscussiontheyareseentobe misleading.Inproportionasthewholeconceptualbackground changes,hecomestoseethatsomethingiswrongwiththewayhe putshisquestion,thattheattainmentofhisobjectisnolonger satisfying.Itisnotthathegivesupbecausehehastriedveryhard, butinvain,andhasnowgottired:no,hegivesupbecausehe "sees"thequestiondifferently.Andinwhatdoesthisconsist?Well, inthefactthatheisnowwellawareoftheanalogieswhichwere misleadinghim,thatheseesthequestionagainstadifferent linguisticbackground(a"figure"sometimeschangeswhenitisseen againstadifferent"ground"),thatacertainstraindisappearsand thathesays,withasighofrelief,"Yes,that'sit." Thephilosophercontemplatesthingsthroughtheprismoflanguage and,misled(say)bysomeanalogy,suddenlyseesthingsinanew strangelight.Wecancopewiththeseproblemsonlybydigging downtothesoilfromwhichtheyspring.Whatwedoistolightup thementalbackgroundfromwhichthequestionhasdetacheditself inaclearerperceptionofsomeofthecrucialconceptsthequestion transformsitselfintoanotherone.Notthatithasbeenansweredin thecurrentsense.Ratherwehaveremovedthefactorsthat promptedthequestionbyamoreprofoundandpenetrating analysis.Theessenceofthisprocessisthatitleadsthequestioner ontosomenewaspect--andleadshimwithhisspontaneous consent.Heagreestobethusledandthereforeendsby abandoninghissearch.Wecannotconstrainanyonewhoisunwilling tofollowthenewdirectionofaquestionwecanonlyextendthe fieldofvisionoftheasker,loosenhisprejudices,guidehisgazein anewdirection:butallthiscanbeachievedonlywithhisconsent. Byourcriticalanalysiswetrytocounteracttheinfluenceofthe languagefield,or(whatcomestothesame)wemayhelpthe -363questionertogainadeeperinsightintothenatureofwhatheis seekingfirstofall--make himseethebuildoftheconceptsandthe mouldsinwhichheexpressesthequestion.Whatmattersismore likechanginghisoutlookthanprovingtohimsometheoremor morelikeincreasinghisinsight.Insightcannotbelodgedina

theorem,andthisisthedeeperreasonwhythedeductivemethod isdoomedtofail:insightcannotbedemonstratedbyproof.Whatit comestointheendisthattheaskerofthequestion,inthecourse ofthediscussion,hastomakeanumberofdecisions.Andthis makesthephilosophicalproceduresounlikealogicalone.He compares,forinstance,thecasebeforehimwithanalogousones andhastojudgehowfartheseanalogieshold.Thatis,itisforhim todecidehowfarheiswillingtoaccepttheseanalogies:hehas not,likeaslave,tofollowblindlyintheirtrack.Science isrichin questionsofthistype.Theyarenotscientificquestionsproperlyand yettheyexercise scientists,theyarephilosophicquestionsandyet theydonotexercise philosophers.WhatIhavewantedtosayinthis sectionandhavenotsaid,oronlyhalf-said: 1. Philosophyisnotonlycriticismoflanguage:soconstrued,its aimistoonarrow.Itiscriticizing,dissolvingandsteppingover allprejudices,looseningallrigidandconstrictingmouldsof thought,nomatterwhethertheyhavetheirorigininlanguage orsomewhere else. 2. Whatisessentialinphilosophyisthebreakingthroughtoa deeperinsight--whichissomethingpositive--notmerelythe dissipationoffogandtheexposure ofspuriousproblems. 3. Insightcannotbelodgedinatheorem,anditcanthereforenot bedemonstrated. 4. Philosophicargumentsare,noneofthem,logicallycompelling: theyreallyscreenwhatactuallyhappens--thequietandpatient underminingofcategoriesoverthewholefieldofthought. 5. Theirpurposeistoopenoureyes,tobringustoseethingsina newway--fromawiderstandpointunobstructedby misunderstandings. 6. Theessentialdifferencebetweenphilosophyandlogicisthat logicconstrainsuswhilephilosophyleavesusfree:ina philosophicdiscussionweareled,stepbystep,tochangeour angleofvision,e.g.topassfromonewayofputtingaquestion toanother,andthiswithourspontaneousagreement--athing profoundlydifferentfromdeducingtheoremsfromagivenset ofpremises.MisquotingCantoronemightsay:theessenceof philosophyliesinitsfreedom. -364-

IV
Thereisanotionthatphilosophyisanexerciseoftheintellectand thatphilosophicquestionscanbesettledbyargument,and conclusivelyifoneonlyknewhowtosetaboutit.Whatseemsto mequeer,however,isthatIcannotfindanyreallygoodhard argumentandmorethanthat,theexamplejustdiscussedmust makeitdoubtfulwhetheranycompellingargumentcanbefound. OutofthisplightIinclinetocometoanewandsomewhatshocking conclusion:thatthethingcannotbedone.Nophilosopherhasever provedanything.Thewholeclaimisspurious.WhatIhavetosayis simplythis.Philosophicargumentsarenotdeductivetherefore theyarenotrigorousandthereforetheydon'tproveanything.Yet

theyhaveforce. Beforegoingintothematter,Iwanttoshow,quitesummarilyfirst, howunplausibletheviewisthatrigorousargumentsareappliedin philosophy.Afirstalarmingsigncanperhapsalreadybeseeninthe notoriousfactthattheablestmindsdisagree,thatwhatis indisputabletotheoneseemstohavenoforceintheeyesofthe other.Inaclearsystemofthoughtsuchdifferencesareimpossible. Thattheyexistinphilosophyisweightyevidencethatthe argumentshavenoneofthelogicalrigortheyhaveinmathematics andtheexactsciences. Next,arguments,inthewaytheyarethoughtof,mustcontain inferences,andinferencesmuststartsomewhere.Nowwhereis thephilosophertolookforhispremises?Toscience?Thenhewill "do"science,notphilosophy.Tostatementsofeverydaylife?To particularones?Thenhewillneverbeabletoadvanceasinglestep beyondthem.Togeneralstatements?Ifso,anumberofquestions raisetheiruglyheads.Bywhatrightdoeshepassfrom"some"to "all"?("ToGeneralizeistobeanIdiot,"W.Blake.)Canhebesure thathispremisesarestatedwithsuchclarityandprecisionthatnot aghostofadoubtcancreepin?Canhebesurethattheycontain meat,arenotanalytic,vacuous,definitionsindisguiseandthelike? Canhebesurethattheyaretrue?(Howcanhe?)Andeven supposing,whatisnotthecase,thatalltheserequirementscould bemet,thereisstillanothertaskloomingbeforehimwhenit comestodevelopingtheconsequences:canhebesurehowto operatewiththeterms?(Howcanhe?)Iamnotlettingouta secretwhenIsaythattheordinaryrulesoflogicoftenbreakdown innaturalspeech-afactusuallyhushedupbylogicbooks.Indeed, thewordsofcom-365monlanguagearesoelasticthatanyonecanstretchtheirsenseto fithisownwhimsandwiththistheir"logic"isqueered.(Plentyof scopefora"naturallogic"weknowthatweareunhappysowe areunhappy.Weknowthatweareunhappysowearegreat. Pascal."Ifshehadperished,shehadperished:"doesthisentail thatshehasnotperished?Ifso,bywhatrule?"IfIbelievedthatI shouldbeverysillyindeed:"doesthis,ordoesthisnot,entailthatI don'tbelieveit?Naturallanguageholdslogicalproblemsofitsown, lotsofthem.) Thisbringsmetoanotherpoint.Ordinarylanguagesimplyhasnot gotthe"hardness,"thelogicalhardness,tocutaxiomsinit.It needssomethinglikeametallicsubstancetocarveadeductive systemoutofitsuchasEuclid's.Butcommonspeech?Ifyoubegin todrawinferencesitsoonbeginstogo"soft"andfluffsup somewhere.Youmayjustaswellcarvecameosonacheese souffl.(Mypointis:languageisplastic,yieldingtothewillto express,evenatthepriceofsomeobscurity.Indeed,howcouldit everexpressanythingthatdoesnotconformtotheclich?If logicianshadtheirway,languagewouldbecomeasclearand

transparentasglass,butalsoasbrittleasglass:andwhatwouldbe thegoodofmakinganaxeofglassthatbreaksthemomentyou useit?)Butlanguageisnothard.Andthatiswhyitisdangerousin philosophytohuntforpremisesinsteadofjustgoingoverthe ground,standingbackandsaying:look. Mostphilosophicarguments,toignoreconstructionslaSpinoza, hingeonsuchpointsaswhat"can"andwhat"cannot"besaidor whatsortofquestionitis"proper"andwhatsortofquestionit wouldbe"inappropriate"toask.Muchskillandingenuityhasbeen spentinelucidatingsuchquestionsastowhetheracertain metaphoris"natural,"acertaindiction"fitting."Itwouldnotbe righttoburkethepointthatconsiderationssuchasthese,while apparentlypertainingtomattersofstyle,contributeinfactlargely totheforcefulnessofanargument,indeedplayaveryrealand decisivepartinthewaytheymakeuslookatthesubject.Ingoing over,examiningandcomparingthevariousmodesofexpression thatcenteraroundcertainkeynotions,forinstance,"imagination," "memory,""pleasure,"wecatchthefirstglimpseofwhatis sometimescalledthe"logic"ofthesenotions.Nowcananyofthese thingsbeproved?Canitbeproved,forexample,thatacertain dictionis"fitting"?(Remember,nosuchthingasadefinitionofa "well-formedformula.")Nophilosopherhasevermadesomuchas anattempt.Everyone useswordsinthiswayandheleavesitat thatandrightlyso.Forwhatsortofreasonscouldhegiveanyway? Herealready,attheverythreshold,theideaofaphilosophicproof beginstoringhollow. -366"Ah,buttheordinaryuseoflanguage."Allrightbutevenso,itis notthatone"cannot"uselanguagedifferently.Toillustrate:"frozen music"--doesthis"tell"youanything?Perhapsnotyetasayinglike "Architecture isfrozenmusic"(Goethe)drivesthepointhome.To say"Thearmsarefullofbluntedmemories"soundsodd,untilyou comeuponitinProust'scontext.The"willtounderstand"doesnot evenflinchbeforethosebogiesofthelogician,contradictions:it transformsthem,wrestinganewsensefromtheapparent nonsense.("Darkwithexcessoflight,""theluminousgloomof Plato"--justtoremindthereaderoftwoexamplesofColeridge.) Thereareabout303reasonswhywesometimesexpressourselves inacontradiction,andunderstandablyso. Result:itcannotevenbeprovedthatagivenexpressionisnatural, ametaphorfitting,aquestionproper(orunaskable),acollocation ofwordsexpressive (ordevoidofmeaning).Nothingofthesortcan bedemonstrated. Twootherpointsreinforce whathasbeensaid.Whatwesometimes doinaphilosophicaldiscussionisnotargueatallbutsimplyraise lotsofquestions--amethodbrilliantlyemployedbyRyle.Indeed,a volleyofperplexingquestionscancertainlynotbedescribedasan argumentandafortiorinotasalogicalone,yetitisnoless effectiveinmakingoneturnbackinrecoiltoconsiderone'sviews.

Lastly,thoughonthesurfacethephilosopherseemstobeengaged inmuchthesamethingasalogicianis,forinstance,intestingan argumentforanylooselinksinitorinbuildingupanargument, thisshouldnotmisleadus.Forifhewere toconstructrigorous proofs,wherearethetheoremsestablishedbythem?Whathashe toshowasthefruitofhislabors? Ihavenotraisedanyofthesequestionswantonlytheyforce themselvesoneveryone whotriestoarrive ataclearandunbiased viewofthematter.Shouldthesedifficultiesnothavetheiroriginin thenatureofphilosophyitself?

V
Iproceednowtoconsiderphilosophicarguments,especiallythose whichareregardedasconstitutingadecisiveadvance,tosee whethertheygiveusanyreasonformodifyingtheviewadvocated here.Thereareonlyafewclassicalcases.OneofthemisHume's celebratedargumenttoshowthattherelationofcauseandeffect isintrinsicallydifferentfromthatofgroundandconsequence.Now inwhatdoesthis"proof"consist?Heremindsusofwhatwehave -367alwaysknown:that,whileitisself-contradictorytoassertthe groundanddenytheconsequence,nosuchcontradictionarisesin assumingthatacertainevent,the"cause,"maybefollowednotby itsusualeffectbutbysomeotherevent.Ifitisasked"Isthisa proof?"whatisonetosay?Itcertainlyisnotthesortofprooftobe foundinadeductivesystem.MuchthesameappliestoBerkeley's argumentwhenhetellsusthat,tryashemight,hecannotcallup inhismindanabstractideaofatriangle,ofjustatrianglewithno particularshape,anymorethanhecanconceivetheideaofaman withoutqualities.Isthisaproof?Hepointsouttheobvious.(Onlyit wantsageniustoseeit.) Totakemyownargumentagainstlogicalfatalism,itisnotstrict. Thedecisivestepconsistsinfollowingacertainanalogywithother cases.Itisanalogical,notlogical.Similarlytheargumentused againstZenoisnotconclusive.(Ihavenospacetoenlargeupon that.) Nowfortwomoreexamples,oneofthecurrentsortofargument appliedtodaybyphilosophers,theothertakenfromAristotle. Whenwesayofsomeonethathe"sees"or"hears"anaeroplane, or"descries,""detects"alarkinthesky,oragainthathe"tastes" or"smells"roastpork,wedonotascribetohimanactivity.That "seeing"isnotasortofdoingcanbeillustrated,e.g.bycalling attentiontothefactthatwedon'tusethecontinuouspresent tense.Wesay"Iseetheclock,"not"Iamseeingtheclock"(save G.E.Moore,who,oddlyenough,regularlysaysthathe"isseeing hisrighthand"),whereasitisperfectlycorrecttosay"Iamlooking

attheclock,listeningtoitsticking,"andsointheothercases. Again,whileitispropertosay"Ihaveforgottentoposttheletter," noonewouldsay"Ihaveforgottentoseetheletter-box."Thereis nosenseinaskingyou,whenyoulookatme,whetheryourseeing iseasyordifficult,quickorslowish,carefulorheedless,whether youseemedeliberatelyandwhetheryouhavenowfinishedseeing me.So,itisargued,perceivingisnotadoing(anargumentused bymyselfinlectures). Thepointtobelaboredisthatthisargumentisnotconclusive.Odd asitsounds,"Ihavefinishedseeingyou"maybesaid,thoughonly inveryspecialcircumstances.Amanwithimpairedeyesightwho, unabletotakeintheshapeasawhole,hasperhapstoscanthe facebitbybitinsearchofsomecharacteristicmarksmightsay, andunderstandably,"NowIhavefinishedseeingyou."Wetooare occasionallyinanotmuchbetterposition,aswhen,inmagnesium light,welookatsomescene,andafterwardscomplain,"Tooquick, Icouldn'ttakeitin."Itwouldseemthenthatthereisnomore -368thanadifferenceindegreebetweenthiscaseandthenormalones. Oddcases,certainlybutwhatwouldyouthinkofamathematician whosetheoremscollapsewhenappliedtoslightlyout-of-the-way curves? FormynextexampleIchoosepleasure.Aristotle,incriticizing Plato,pointedoutthatifpleasurewereaprocessgoingonintimeI couldenjoysomethingswiftlyorslowly--anargumentwhichis almostabombshellinitsdestructivepower.Certainly,tospeakin suchtermsisveryoddandsoundsabsurd.Yet,ifIstrainmy imagination,Icanperhapsbringmyselftoconceiveofasetof circumstancesunderwhichitwouldnotbeentirelyunnaturaltosay suchathing.Inlisteningtomusic,forexample,whenIam followingaslowandgentlemovement,myenjoyingitappearsin somerespectstobedifferentfromwhatIgetwhenlisteningtoan excitingpieceofmusic.Theveryqualityofmyenjoymentseemsto changeasifsomethingoftheslowandgentleorofthewild, intoxicatingflowofthemusichadenteredintoit.IfIsay,inthe onecase,thatIwasenjoyingitleisurelylikebaskinginthesunor sippingwine,intheotherthatIwassuddenlycarriedaway, breathlesslyfollowingitsonrushandenjoyingitlikeastormatsea-doesthissoundlikesheernonsense?Sotheredoesseemtobea timefactorinpleasure. Amongstthemostpowerfulweaponsinthephilosopher'sarmory arereductioadabsurdumandinfiniteregressarguments.Before proceedingtoanappraisaloftheseformsofreasoning,itwillbe welltoconsiderhowtheyworkintheirhomeland,mathematics. Letmechooseasatypicalcasetheproofthat2isirrational.Ifit werearationalnumber,wecouldfindtwointegersmandnsuch that

m2=2n2

(1)

Wemaythenargueasfollows.Asm2iseven,mmustbeeven hencem=2m1.Substitutionyields 2m12=n2 (2)

Asn2iseven,nmustbeevenhencen=2n1.Substitutionyields m12=2n12. (3)

If,then,twointegersmandnexistwhichstandintherelation(1), theymusthavehalveswhichstandinexactlythesamerelation(3), andthesemusthavehalveswhichstandinthesamerelation,and soonadinfinitumwhichisplainlyimpossible,mandnbeingfinite. Therefore thetentativeassumption(1)cannothold,and2can-369notberational.Q.E.D.Thisistheprototypeofarefutationby infiniteregress. Argumentsofthistypehavebeenappliedoutsidemathematics. However,whenIcometolookatthemabitmorecloselyIbeginto hesitate.Anexamplewillillustratemydoubts.Anargument propoundedagainsttheuseofmechanicalmodelsisthis.Ifthe elasticpropertiesofmattercanbeexplainedasbeingdueto electricforceswithwhichthemoleculesactoneachother,itsurely ispointlesstoexplaintheactionoftheelectricforcesasbeingdue totheelasticpropertiesofamechanicalmedium,the"ether."To dothisistogoroundinacircle:elasticityisexplainedintermsof electricforce,andelectricforceintermsofelasticitywhilethe attempttobreakoutofthecirclebysupposingthattheelasticityof theetherisdueto"electricforces"actingbetweentheether particlesandthesetotheelasticpropertiesofasecond-orderether istobepushedintoaninfiniteseriesofreductionsteps.Thusthe mechanisticprogramisfacedwithadilemmabothhornsofwhich areequallyfatal. Aformidableargument--orisit?Icanwellimagineanundaunted championofthelostcauseretort:"Notabitofaregress.Yes,the etheriselastic,not,however,inthesenseinwhichaspringis: whileelasticityofmattercanbereducedtoelectricforce,elasticity oftheether,beinganultimatepostulateofthetheory,cannotbe reducedanyfurther."Andwiththistheargumentfallstothe ground. Butthisisunconvincing,itwillbesaid.IagreeIamnotsuchan imbecileastopleadforretainingmechanicalmodelsandtherest. Mypointisonlytoseewhetherthis"refutation"iscompelling.It isn't.Theadvocateofmodelsisnotforciblydislodgedfromhis position.Thereis,itwouldseem,alwaysawayofgettingoutofthe

dilemma--ofwrigglingoutifyoulike--whichfoilstheargument. Whatisshowninitismerelythattoclingtomodelsofthissort becomes,inthecircumstances,veryunnatural.Buttosaythat somethingisunnaturalisnottosaythatitislogicallyimpossible: yetthisiswhattheargumentshouldestablish.Inthemathematical proofcitedabovenoloopholewasleftforwrigglingout.Thewhole deductionwasa"chainofadamant"--preciselythesortofthingthe argumentunderreviewisnot. Considernowasimilarargument.Therecannotbeanysuchthing asvolitions,ithasbeensaid.Volitionswerecalledinbytheoriststo providecausesnotonlyforwhatwe(intentionally)dobutalsofor mentalprocessesoroperationssuchascontrollinganimpulse, payingheedtosomething,andthelike.Asaconsequenceofthis, actsofwillwere supposedtobethesortofthingthepresenceof -370whichmakesanaction"voluntary,"orwhich--somehow,insome unfathomableway--"getsitselftranslated"intoabodilyormental act.Infine,volitionswere thoughtofascausesaswellaseffectsof other,mentalorphysical,occurrences.Nowthedilemma:ifmy pullingofthetriggerwere theresultofamentalactof"willingto pullthetrigger,"whatofthismentalactitself?Wasitwilledor unwilled?Ifunwilled,itcannotbecalledvoluntaryandthereforenot avolitionifwilled,thenwemustsuppose,accordingtothetheory, thatitresultsfromaprioract,namely,"willingtowilltopullthe trigger,"andthatfromanotheradinfinitum,leavingnopossibility formeevertostart. Brilliantastheargumentis,thepointtobebroughtuphereisonly whetheritislogicallyfatal.Doesitreallyprovethattheassumption ofactsofwillinginvolvesaninfiniteregress?Abelieverinsuchacts neednotbecowedintosubmission.Toaskofvolitionswhether theyarethemselvesvoluntaryorinvoluntaryacts,hemaysay,is plainnonsense.Onlyanactioncanbevoluntaryorinvoluntary,not anactofwill.Itisjustthepointthatanactofwillisanactofwill anddoesnotissuefromanyanterioractofwill,anymorethan,in ordertorecallathingImustfirstrecallwhatIwanttorecall,and beforeIcanevendothatImustrecallthatIwanttorecallwhatI wanttorecall,andsoonadinfinitum.JustasIcanrecallathing withoutneedtocallinanactofrecallingwhatIwanttorecall,so mypullingthetriggermaybethedirectresultofanactofwill withoutthelatterissuingfromaparentactofwill.Thusthewhole argumentapparentlycrumblesaway. Thisismeantnottobelittletheargumentordetractfromitsforce, butonlytogetclearastowhatsortofforceithas.Ifitwere conclusive,itwould,withitsdestructivepower,doawaywitha goodmanymoreactsandstatesofmind,notonlywithvolitions-withintendinganddesiring,forinstance.Indeed,preciselysimilar argumentscanbeconstructed"todealwiththem."Intention: thoughclearlynotthesortofthingtobeclassedasasimple"act," ityetseemssomehowto"connect"withwhatgoesoninusbefore

wecarryitintoaction--suchasconsidering,planning,hesitating, choosing.Imay,letussay,intendtofindaflawinagiven argument,andwhenIsubsequentlyturnitoverinmymind,this willbetheresultofmyintention.Somementaloperations,then, canarisefromanintention,theyare"intended."Sowhatofthe intentionitself?Isitintendedorunintended?Iftheintentionisnot intended,itisnottheintention,andifitisintendeditmustbedue toanotherintention,andthistoyetanotheradinfinitum.Similarly inthecase -371ofdesire.SupposethatIfeeladesireforacertainthing,isthis desireitselfdesiredorundesired?Eitheranswerlandsusin absurdities. Ifthestrengthoftheargumentweretolieinitsstructureitwould, withitsdevastatingeffect,applyaftertheexchangeofsomeofits termsforotherones,e.g."volition"for"intention"--provided,of course,thatcertainothercircumstancesessentialtothereasoning arethesame.Yet,whilethefirstargumentsounds,tosaythe least,veryplausible,noonewillbedupedbyitscaricatures.Soifit hasanyforceitcannotoweittoitsstructureandconsequently cannotbeofalogicalsort.Itismeanttorefutetheexistenceofa kindofmentalthrustbutthenweshouldrememberthattoprove thenonexistenceofsomethingisalwaysaprecariousbusiness."No onehaseverprovedthenon-existenceofApolloorAphrodite"it hasbeenobservedtoomuchweight,then,needperhapsnotbe laidonthisparticularcase.Whatisdisturbing,however,istheease withwhichargumentscanbecastintopseudo-deductive moulds. AnditisthisfacttowhichIwishtocallattentionbyexaminingthe argument.Ashasbeenshownintheprecedingdiscussion,itisnot anisolatedcase.NophilosophicargumentendswithaQ.E.D. Howeverforceful,itneverforces.Thereisnobullyinginphilosophy, neitherwiththestickoflogicnorwiththestickoflanguage.

VI
Inthrowingsuchstrongdoubtsonthepowerofargumentsasused byphilosophersImayseemtodenythemanyvaluewhatever.But suchisnotmyintention.Eveniftheyarelackinginlogicalrigorthis certainlyhasnotpreventedanoriginalthinkerfromusingthem successfully,orfrombringingoutsomethingnotseenbeforeornot seensoclearly.SointhecaseIhavediscussed:somethingisseen inthatargument,somethingismadeclear,thoughperhapsnot quiteinthesenseintendedbythearguer.Ifso,somethingvery importanthasbeenleftoutfromthepicture. Perhapsourobjectionshavebeendoinginjusticetophilosophic arguments.Theywere,quitemistakenlyasIhopetohaveshown, supposedtobeproofsandrefutationsinastrictsense.Butwhat thephilosopherdoesissomethingelse.Hebuildsupacase.First, hemakesyouseealltheweaknesses,disadvantages,shortcomings

ofapositionhebringstolightinconsistenciesinitorpointsout howunnaturalsomeoftheideasunderlyingthewholetheoryare bypushingthemtotheirfarthestconsequencesandthishedoes -372withthestrongestweaponsinhisarsenal,reductiontoabsurdity andinfiniteregress.Ontheotherhand,heoffersyouanewwayof lookingatthingsnotexposedtothoseobjections.Inotherwords, hesubmitstoyou,likeabarrister,allthefactsofhiscase,andyou areinthepositionofthejudge.Youlookatthemcarefully,gointo thedetails,weightheprosandconsandarrive ataverdict.Butin arrivingataverdictyouarenotfollowingadeductivehighway,any morethanajudgeintheHighCourtdoes.Comingtoadecision, thougharationalprocess,isveryunlikedrawingconclusionsfrom givenpremises,justasitisveryunlikedoingsums.Ajudgehasto judge,wesay,implyingthathehastousediscernmentincontrast toapplying,machine-like,asetofmechanicalrules.Thereareno computingmachinesfordoingthejudge'sworknorcouldtherebe any--atrivialyetsignificantfact.Whenthejudgereachesadecision thismaybe,andinfactoftenis,arationalresult,yetnotone obtainedbydeductionitdoesnotsimplyfollowfromsuch-andsuch:whatisrequiredisinsight,judgment.Nowinarrivingata verdict,youarelikeajudgeinthisthatyouarenotcarryingouta numberofformallogicalsteps:youhavetousediscernment,e.g. todescrythepivotalpoint.Considerationssuchasthesemakeus seewhatisalreadyapparentintheuseof"rational,"thatthisterm hasawiderrangeofapplicationthanwhatcanbeestablished deductively.Tosaythatanargumentcanberationalandyetnot deductiveisnotasortofcontradictionasitwouldinevitablybein theoppositecase,namely,ofsayingthatadeductiveargument neednotberational. Thisaltersthewholepicture.Thepointtobeemphasizedisthata philosophermayseeanimportanttruthandyetbeunableto demonstrateitbyformalproof.Butthefactthathisargumentsare notlogicaldoesnothingtodetractfromtheirrationality.Toreturn toourpreviousexample,theargumentusedagainstvolition, thoughitisnotwhatitprofessestobe,logicallydestructive, neverthelesshasaforcedifficulttoresist.Nowtowhatisthisdue? Itdoesnotneedmuchacumentofindtheanswer.Itisthewhole arrangementofsomanyfelicitousexamples,precedingthe argument,andtheirmasterlyanalysis,whichbreatheslifeintoits barebonesaidedgreatlybythefactthattheconnectionbetween amentalthrustandabodilymovementisallowedtoremaina mystery.Theunsatisfactorinessofthisposition,togetherwiththe amassingofhostsofunanswerablequestionsandverystriking examples--thismakestheargumentsoconvincing. WhatdoyoufindinreadingRyleorWittgenstein?Lotsofex-373-

ampleswithlittleornologicalboneinbetween.Whysomany examples?Theyspeakforthemselvestheyusuallyaremore transparentthanthetroublemakereachoneactsasananalogy togethertheylightupthewholelinguisticbackgroundwiththe effectthatthecasebeforeusisseeninthelighttheyproduce. Indeed,examplesaptlyarrangedareoftenmoreconvincingand, aboveall,ofamorelastingeffectthananargumentwhichis anyhowspidery.Notthatthe"proofs"profferedarevalueless:a reductioadabsurdumalwayspointstoaknotinthought,andso doesaninfiniteregress.Buttheypointonly.Therealstrengthlies intheexamples.Alltheproofs,inagoodbookonphilosophy,could bedispensedwith,withoutitslosingawhitofitsconvincingness.To seek,inphilosophy,forrigorousproofsistoseekfortheshadowof one'svoice. Inordertoforestallmisinterpretationswhichwillotherwisecertainly ariseIhavetoconcedeonepoint:argumentsonasmallscale, containingafewlogicalstepsonly,mayberigorous.Thesubstance ofmyremarksisthattheconceptionofawholephilosophicalview-fromHeraclitustoNietzscheorBradley--isneveramatterof logicalsteps.Aweltanschauunglikeanyoftheseorevenanew approachlikethatofWittgensteinisnever"arrivedat,"inparticular itisnotdeduced,andoncefounditcanneitherbeprovednor refutedbystrictlylogicalreasoningthoughargumentsmayplaya partinmakingthemacceptable.Butsomeauthorshavedisdained eventhat. Theoneremainingquestiontobeaskedisthis:ifthephilosopher's viewscannotbederivedfromanypremiseshowhasheever arrivedatthem?Howcanhegettoaplacetowhichnoroadis leading?Thisleadstoanewanddeeperproblem.

VII
Toask,"Whatisyouraiminphilosophy?"andtoreply,"Toshowthe flythewayoutofthefly-bottle"is...well,honorwhereitisdue,I suppresswhatIwasgoingtosayexceptperhapsthis.Thereis somethingdeeplyexcitingaboutphilosophy,afactnotintelligibleon suchanegativeaccount.Itisnotamatterof"clarifyingthoughts" norof"thecorrectuseoflanguage"norofanyotherofthese damnedthings.Whatisit?Philosophyismanythingsandthereis noformulatocoverthemall.ButifIwereaskedtoexpressinone singlewordwhatisitsmostessentialfeatureIwouldunhesitatingly say:vision.Attheheartofanyphilosophyworththenameisvision anditisfromthereitspringsandtakesitsvisibleshape.WhenI say"vision"Imeanit:Idonotwanttoromanticize. -374Whatischaracteristicofphilosophyisthepiercingofthatdeadcrust oftraditionandconvention,thebreakingofthosefetterswhichbind ustoinheritedpreconceptions,soastoattainanewandbroader wayoflookingatthings.Ithasalwaysbeenfeltthatphilosophy

shouldrevealtouswhatishidden.(Iamnotquiteinsensitiveto thedangersofsuchaview.)YetfromPlatotoMooreand Wittgensteineverygreatphilosopherwasledbyasenseofvision: withoutitnoonecouldhavegivenanewdirectiontohuman thoughtoropenedwindowsintothenot-yet-seen.Thoughhemay beagoodtechnician,hewillnotleavehismarksonthehistoryof ideas.Whatisdecisiveisanewwayofseeingand,whatgoeswith it,thewilltotransformthewholeintellectualscene.Thisisthereal thingandeverythingelseissubservienttoit. Supposethatamanrevoltsagainstacceptedopinion,thathefeels "cramped"initscategoriesatimemaycomewhenhebelieves, rightlyorwrongly,thathehasfreedhimselfofthesenotionswhen hehasthatsenseofsuddengrowthinlookingbackatthe prejudiceswhichheldhimcaptiveoratimewhenhebelieves, rightlyorwrongly,thathehasreachedavantagepointfromwhich thingscanbeseentobearrangedinclearandorderlypatterns whiledifficultiesoflongstandingdissolveasthoughbymagic.Ifhe isofaphilosophiccastofmindhewillarguethisoutwithhimself andthen,perhaps,trytoimpartwhathasdawnedonhimto others.Theargumentshewilloffer,theattackshewillmake,the suggestionshewilladvancearealldevisedforoneend:towin otherpeopleovertohisownwayoflookingatthings,tochange thewholeclimateofopinion.Thoughtoanoutsiderheappearsto advanceallsortsofarguments,thisisnotthedecisivepoint.What isdecisiveisthathehasseenthingsfromanewangleofvision. Comparedtothateverythingelseissecondary.Argumentscome onlyafterwardstolendsupporttowhathehasseen."Bigwords, noteveryphilosopher,etc.:"butwhere shouldonegetone's bearingsifnotfromthemasters?Andbesides,oncetraditionhas givenwaythereisalwaysamplescopeforspecialiststoreduce some"pocketsofresistance."Unpalatablethoughitmaybe,behind theargumentssowell-planned,soneatandlogical,somethingelse isatwork,awilltotransformtheentirewayofthinking.Inarguing forhisview,thephilosopherwill,almostagainsthiswill,haveto underminecurrentcategoriesandclichsofthinkingbyexposing thefallacieswhichunderlytheestablishedviewsheisattacking andnotonlythis,hemaygosofarastoquestionthecanonsof satisfactorinessthemselves.Inthissense,philosophyistheretestingofthestandards.Ineveryphilosopher -375livessomethingofthereformer.Thatisthereasonwhyany advanceinsciencewhenittouchesthestandardsisfelttobeof philosophicsignificance,fromGalileotoEinsteinandHeisenberg. Ifthereisanytruthinthis,therelationoflogicandphilosophy appearsinanewlight.Whatisatissueisnotaconflictbetweena formalandalessformalorinformallogic,norbetweenthe behavioroftechnicalandeverydayconcepts,butsomething radicallydifferent.Itisthedifferencebetweendrawingaconclusion andseeing,ormakingonesee,anewaspect.

Toputthematterinanutshell,aphilosophicargumentdoesmore anddoeslessthanalogicalone:lessinthatitneverestablishes anythingconclusivelymoreinthat,ifsuccessful,itisnotcontentto establishjustoneisolatedpointoftruth,buteffectsachangeinour wholementaloutlooksothat,asaresultofthat,myriadsofsuch littlepointsarebroughtintovieworturnedoutofsight,asthecase maybe.Are illustrationsnecessary?OnceHumehadexposedthe fallaciesofhispredecessorswhendealingwiththenotionof causalityhehadmadeitimpossibleforanyonetothinkalongthe linesofSpinozawhoseworldlookstousstrangeasthemoon. Supposethatyoulookatapicture-puzzle:atfirstyoucanseeinit onlyamazeoflinesthen,suddenly,yourecognizeahumanface. Canyounow,havingdiscoveredtheface,seethelinesasbefore? Clearlynot.Aswiththemazeoflines,sowiththemuddlecleared upbyHume:torecapture themoodofthepast,totravelbackinto thefoghasbecomeimpossible--oneofthebigdifficultiesof understandinghistoryofphilosophy.Itisforthesamereasonthat theriseofthelinguistictechniqueinourdayhasputanendtothe greatspeculativesystemsofthepast. Aphilosophyisanattempttounfreezehabitsofthinking,toreplace thembylessstiffandrestrictingones.Ofcourse,thesemayintime themselvesharden,withtheresultthattheyclogprogress:Kant, theAlleszermalmertohiscontemporaries,yetproudlyupholdinghis tableofcategories--whichappeartousundulynarrow.The liberatorofyesterdaymayturnintothetyrantoftomorrow. Itcannowbeseenthatthephilosopherisnotdoingwhatthe logiciandoesonlylesscompetentlybutdoingsomethingaltogether different.Aphilosophicargumentisnotanapproximationofa logicalonenoristhelattertheidealthephilosopherisstrivingfor. Suchanaccounttotallymisdescribeswhatreallytakesplace. Philosophyisnotanexerciseinformallogic,philosophicarguments arenotchainsoflogicalinference,onlybungledones,norcanthey byanyeffortberecastintodeductivemoulds.Whatisbeing confusedhere -376isthescientist'saimtofindnewtruthsandthephilosopher'saimto gaininsight.Asthetwothingsaresoentirelyoutofscaleitissmall wonderthatthephilosophercannotmoveinthelogician'sarmor. Notevenifthelogicianhimselfisfightingthebattle.Theclashover thelawofexcludedmiddleinmathematicsisaclashbetweentwo parties,eachinpossessionofclearandpreciselydefinedconcepts. Yetthereseemstobenowayofsettlingthedisputebycogent argument.Ifitwere truethatphilosophicaltroublesarisefromthe loosenatureofoureverydayconcepts,whyshouldsuchconflicts breakoutintheexactestofthesciences? Therehaveneverbeenanyabsolutelycogentreasonsforparting withthelawofexcludedmiddle,acceptingDarwinism,givingupthe Ptolemaicsystemorrenouncingtheprincipleofcausality.Ifanyof thesethingscouldbedemonstratedhowdoesitcomethatthere

arealwayspartisansofthe"lostcauses"?Are theyliketheunlucky circle-squarers,wastingtheirtimeintryingtodowhathasbeen showntobelogicallyimpossible?Thetruthisthatconflictsofthis typecannotberesolved,notentirely,eitherbyadducingfactual evidenceorbylogicaldemonstration.Bothsides,ofcourse,bring upargumentsinthecombatbuttheyarenotdecisive.Theseare battlesneverlostandneverwonirrevocably.Itisatypical situation,arecurrentthemeinthehistoryofhumanthought. Wheneversciencearrivesatacrucialstagewherethefundamental notionsbecomeuncertainandareheldasitwereinsolution, disputesofanoddkindarebreakingout.Themerefactthat leadingscientists,inspiteofdifferencesintemperament,outlook, etc.,takepartinthem,feelboundtodoso,shouldmakeus reflect.Nowwhattheprotagonistsavowedlyorunavowedlyare tryingtodoistowintheirfellowscientistsovertotheirownwayof thinkingandtothedegreetowhichtheirargumentsareattempts atchangingthewholeintellectualattitudetheytakeona philosophicalcharacter.Isthiscoincidence?

VIII
Ihavesofarspokenof"seeinganewaspect"withoutmakingan attempttoexplaintheterm.Ihopenowtodoso,thoughonly perfunctorily,bygivingoneortwoillustrations.Thereisasortof paradoxconnectedwiththeideaofcertaindiscoveries.Descartes, forinstance,wasthediscovererofanalyticgeometry.Butcouldhe seekforit?Tosaythathespentyearslookingforitsounds downrightabsurd.Whatweareinclinedtosayinsuchacaseis:to seek -377foranalyticgeometryisnotpossible--firstbecauseitwasnotseen andthenbecauseitwasseen.Butifhecouldnotseek,howcould hefind?Thisleadsusstraighttotheheartofthematter. Considerfirstanentirelyimaginarycase.Inthepropositional calculus,asitwasbuiltupbyFrege,twoprimitive ideasoccur,"not" and"or."ItwaslaterdiscoveredbyShefferthatthewholecalculus canbebasedononesingleidea(his"stroke"function).Ofwhat kindwasthisdiscovery?SupposethatFrege,byacuriouschance, hadwrittenallhislogicalaxiomsintheform (....)v(....) i.e.asasumoftwonegations,buthadnonethelessmistakenly believedthattwosymbolswererequiredforexpressingtheselaws, namely""and"v."Imaginenowthatsomeoneelselookingat theseformulaeisstruckbywhat,onourassumption,hasescaped Frege,namelythattheyallhaveoneandthesamestructureand requiretherefore onlyonesymbol.Inwhatexactlydoeshis discoveryconsist?Inhisseeingtheformulaeinanewway,inhis

readinganewstructure intothem.Whatmattersishis apprehension:solongashedoesnotseethestructureofanew systemintheoldonehehasnotgotit.Anyone maylookatthe formulaeandyetnotperceivewhatShefferhasperceived,the occurrence ofanidenticalstructure.Thisisthediscovery,notthe introducingofaspecialsymbolforacombinationoftheoldones.It wouldhavebeenquiteenough,forinstance,hadSheffermerely pointedouttheconstantrecurrence ofthisstructureinallthelaws withoutprovidinghis"stroke"thatisinessential. Thisexamplemayillustratewhatismeantbythe"seeingofanew aspect."Seeingsuchanaspectisoftenthecoreofanewdiscovery. Ifyoulookattheformulae,themomentyounoticethenew structure inthemtheysuddenlyseemtochange--aphenomenon akintoseeingafigure,say,adrawncubedifferently,nowassolid andprotruding,nowashollowandreceding.Theonepattern suddenly"jumps"intotheother.Similarlyinourcase,thoughthere arealsodifferencesthusthenewaspect,onceithasdawned,can steadilybeheldinmindandhasnotthatperceptualinstability.The apprehensionofanewpatternintheformulaeseemstoholdinit actuallymoreofavisualexperience,anyhowtobemoreclosely akintoitthanitmightatfirstappear.Seeingandinterpreting, lookingandthinkingseemasitweretofusehere. Ifitisnowaskedwhetheritispossibleforanyonetoseekfor -378thenewaspect,whatisonetoreply?Well,thatsomethingcanbe seeninanewwayisseenonlywhenitisseeninthisway.Thatan aspectispossibleisseenonlywhentheaspecthasalreadyflashed andnotbefore:that'swhythefindingcannotbeanticipated,not evenbythegreatestgenius.Italwayscomesunbiddenand,asit wouldseem,inasuddenflash. Totakeanothercase,isthecalculation (5+3)2=52+2.5.3+32 atthesametimeaproofthat (2+3)2=22+2.2.3+32? Yesandno--dependingonhowyoulookatit.(Doesitstrikeyou thatthe2inthemiddletermisa"structural"2,derivingnotfrom thespecialnumbersbutfromthegeneralformoftheoperation?)A man,whilereckoningwithspecialnumbersonly,mayyet conceivablydoalgebraifheseesthespecialsumsinanewway,as theexpressionsofagenerallaw.(Discoveryofalgebraasthe discoveryofanaspectofnumericalcalculation.) WhatgoesforthesemoreorlesstrivialcasesgoesforDescartes andalsoforEinsteinandHilbert.Theywereunabletoseek, Einsteinforaconceptualgapintheideaofsimultaneity,Hilbertfor

theaxiomaticmethod.Thoughthesediscoveriesareofadifferent orderaltogether,theprincipleunderlyingthemisthesame.None ofthemhasever"arrived"athisviewbecausehewasnever travelling.Theydidnotseek,theyfound(like Picasso).Andthatis sowrongwiththewholewayinwhichsuchdiscoveriesaresooften presented--asiftheywere theresultofa"method"or"procedure," asifthegreatmenarrivedattheirsolutionsbydrawinglogical inferences.Thisleavesoutthemostessentialthing--theflashingof anewaspectwhichisnon-inferential.Themomentsofseeing cannotbeforeseen,anymorethantheycanbeplanned,forced, controlled,orsummonedbywill-power. IsthereanytruthinwhatIamsaying?Ishallnotargue.Instead, letmeremindyouofsomeobservationswhichwillbefamiliarto you.Itisnotoriousthataphilosophyisnotmade,itgrows.You don'tchooseapuzzle,youareshockedintoit.Whoeverhas ponderedsometimeoversomedarkprobleminphilosophywill havenoticedthatthesolution,whenitcomes,comeswitha suddenness.Itisnotthroughworkingveryhardtowardsitthatitis found.Whathappensisratherthathesuddenlyseesthingsina newlight--asifaveilhadbeenliftedthatscreenedhisview,orasif thescaleshad -379fallenfromhiseyes,leavinghimsurprisedathisownstupiditynot tohaveseenwhatwastherequiteplainbeforehimallthetime.It islesslikefindingoutsomethingandmorelikematuring, outgrowingpreconceivednotions. Togivejustoneexampleofvisioninphilosophy:Wittgensteinsaw throughabigmistakeofhistime.Itwasthenheldbymost philosophersthatthenatureofsuchthingsashopingandfearing, orintending,meaningandunderstandingcouldbediscovered throughintrospection,whileothers,inparticularpsychologists, soughttoarrive atananswerbyexperiment,havingonlyobscure notionsastowhattheirresultsmeant.Wittgensteinchangedthe wholeapproachbysaying:whatthesewordsmeanshowsitselfin thewaytheyareused--the natureofunderstandingrevealsitselfin grammar,notinexperiment.Thiswasatthetimequitea revelationandcametohim,sofarasIremember,suddenly. Theviewadvocatedhereisthatatthelivingcenterofevery philosophyisavisionandthatitshouldbejudgedaccordingly.The reallyimportantquestionstobediscussedinthehistoryof philosophyarenotwhetherLeibnizorKantwereconsistentin arguingastheydidbutratherwhatliesbehindthesystemsthey havebuilt.AndhereIwanttoendwithafewwordson metaphysics. Tosaythatmetaphysicsisnonsenseisnonsense.Itfailsto acknowledgetheenormouspartplayedatleastinthepastbythose systems.Whythisisso,whytheyshouldhavesuchaholdoverthe humanmindIshallnotundertakeheretodiscuss.Metaphysicians,

likeartists,aretheantennaeoftheirtime:theyhaveaflairfor feelingwhichwaythespiritismoving.(There isaRilke poemabout it.)Thereissomethingvisionaryaboutgreatmetaphysiciansasif theyhadthepowertoseebeyondthehorizonsoftheirtime.Take, forinstance,Descartes'work.Thatithasgivenrisetoendless metaphysicalquibblesiscertainlyathingtoholdagainstit.Yetif weattendtothespiritratherthantothewordsIamgreatly inclinedtosaythatthereisacertaingrandeurinit,aprophetic aspectofthecomprehensibilityofnature,aboldanticipationof whathasbeenachievedinscienceatamuchlaterdate.Thetrue successorsofDescarteswerethosewhotranslatedthespiritofthis philosophyintodeeds,notSpinozaorMalebranchebutNewtonand themathematicaldescriptionofnature.Togoonwithsome hairsplittingastowhatsubstanceisandhowitshouldbedefined wastomissthemessage.Itwasacolossalmistake.Aphilosophyis theretobelivedout.Whatgoesintotheworddies,whatgoesinto theworklives. -380-

BibliographyofLogical Positivism

Therangeofthisbibliographyisratherwiderthanthatofthebook. Itincludesworkswhichareeitherexpositoryorcriticalnotonlyof logicalpositivism,inthestrictsense,butofeveryformofmodern analyticalphilosophy.Itdoesnotclaimtobeexhaustiveevenon thetopicoflogicalpositivism:butanefforthasbeenmadetolistat anyratethemostimportantbooksandarticlesthatcanreasonably beregardedasfallingwithinthisfield.Thebibliographyisdivided intothreesections:anthologiesandcompilationsbooksand monographsandarticles,includingcontributionstosymposiaand criticalnoticesofspecialinterest.Contributionsbyanyonewriter arelistedinchronologicalorder.Thereferencestoarticlesdonot givethenumbersoftheperiodicalsorproceedingsinwhichthey appear,butthedatesofthevolumesinwhichthesenumbersfall. Thisisinconformitywiththepracticefollowedbytheotherbooksin tiffsseries.

ANTHOLOGIES ANDCOMPILATIONS

AyerA.J.etal.,TheRevolutioninPhilosophy,London: Macmillan,1956 BlackM.(ed.),PhilosophicalAnalysis,Ithaca:CornellUniv. Press,1950 EdwardsP.andPapA.(eds.),AModernIntroductionto Philosophy,Glencoe:TheFreePressLondon:AllenandUnwin, 1957 EltonW.(ed.),AestheticsandLanguage,Oxford:Basil Blackwell,1954 FeiglH.andBrodbeckM.(eds.),ReadingsinthePhilosophyof Science,NewYork:Appleton-Century-Crofts,1953

FeiglH.andScrivenM.(eds.),MinnesotaStudiesinthe PhilosophyofScienceVol.I,TheFoundationsofScienceand theConceptsofPsychologyandPsychoanalysis,Minneapolis: Univ.ofMinnesotaPress,1956 -381FeidlH.,ScrivenM.andMaxwellG.(eds.),MinnestaStudiesin thePhilosophyofScienceVol.II,Concepts,THeories,andthe Mind-BodyProblem,Minneapolis:Univ.ofMinnestaPress,1958 FeiglH.andSellarsW.(eds.),ReadingsinPhilosophical Analysis,New-Crofts,1949 FlewA.G.N.(ed.),LogicandLanguage(firstseries),Oxford: Blackwell,1951LogicandLanguage(secondseries),Oxford: Blackwell,1953EsmysinConceptualAnalysis,London: Macmillan,1956 FlewA.andMacintyre A.(eds.),NewEssaysinPhilosophical Theology,London:SCMPressNewYork:Macmillan,1955 GardinerP.(ed.),TheoriesofHistory,Glencoe:TheFreePress, 1959 HenleP.,KaIlenH.M.andLangerS.K.(eds.),Structure, MethodandMeaning:EssaysinhonorofHenryM.Sheffer,New York:LiberalArtsPress,1951 HookS.(ed.),AmericanPhilosophersatWork,NewYork: CriterionBooks,1956DeterminismandFreedom,NewYork: NewYorkUniv.Press,1958 InternationalEncyclopediaofUnitedScience,ed.O.Neurath andothers:(combineded.),vol.1in2parts,Chicago:Univ.of Chic.Press,1955 LaslettP.(ed.),ThePhysicalBasisofMind,Oxford:Blackwell, 1950Politics,PhilosophyandSociety,Oxford:Blackwell,1956 LewisH.D.(ed.),ContemporaryBritishPhilosophy(third series),London:AllenandUnwin,1956 LinskyL.(ed.),SemanticsandthePhilosophyofLanguage, Urbana:Univ.ofIllinoisPress,1952 MacdonaldM.(ed.),PhilosophyandAnalysis,Oxford:Blackwell, 1954 MaceC.A.(ed.)BritishPhilosophyintheMid-Century,London: AllenandUnwinNewYork:Macmillan,1957 MitchellB.(ed.),FaithandLogic,London:AlienandUnwin, 1957 MuirheadJ.H.(ed.),ContemporaryBritishPhilosophy(firstand secondseries),London:AllenandUnwin,1924and1925 MunitzM.K.(ed.),AModernIntroductiontoEthics,Glencoe: TheFree Press,1958 NeurathO.,etal.,EncyclopediaandUnifiedScience,Chicago: Univ.ofChic,Press(Int.Encycl.ofUnifiedScience),1938 PearsD.F.(ed.),TheNatureofMetaphysics,London: Macmillan,1957RunesD.(ed.),TwentiethCenturyPhilosophy, NewYork:PhilosophicalLibrary,1943 SchilppP.A.(ed.),ThePhilosophyofG.E.Moore,Evanston: NorthwesternUniv.,19421952ThePhilosophyBertrand Russell,Evanston:NorthwesternUniv.,1944AlbertEinstein:

Philosopher-Scientist,NewYork:TudorPress,1949 SellarsW.andHospersJ.(eds.),ReadingsinEthicalTheory, NewYork:Appleton-Century-Crofts,1952 PhilosophicalStudies.EssaysinMemoryofL.SusanStebbing, London:AllenandUnwin,1948 WienerP.P.(ed.),ReadingsinPhilosophyofScience,New York:Scribner's,19531936 -382-

BOOKS

AjdukiewiczK.,BeitrigezurMethodologiederdeduktiven Wissenschaften,Lwow:VerlagderPolnischenPhilosophischen GesellschaftinLemberg,1921 AnscombeG.E.M.,Intention,Oxford:BasilBlackwell,1957 AustinJ.L.,IfsandCans,BritishAcademyAnnualPhilosophical Lecture,London:OxfordUniv.Press,1956 Ayer,A.J.,Language,TruthandLogic,London:Gollancz,1936, 2nded.1946 TheFoundationsofEmpiricalKnowledge,London:Macmillan, 1940 ThinkingandMeaning,London:H.K.Lewis,1947 PhilosophicalEssays,London:Macmillan,1954 TheProblemofKnowledge ,London:MacmillanandPenguin Books,1956 BaierK.,TheMoralPointofView,Ithaca:CornellUniv.Press, 1958 BarnesW.H.F.,ThePhilosophicalPredicament,London:A.and C.Black,1950 BergmannG.,TheMetaphysicsofLogicalPositivism,London: Longmans,Green,1954 PhilosophyofScience,Madison:Univ.ofWisconsinPress,1957 BlackM.,TheNatureofMathematics,London:KeganPaulNew York:HarcourtBrace,1933 LanguageandPhilosophy,Ithaca:CornellUniv.Press,1949 CriticalThinking,NewYork:PrenticeHall,1952 ProblemsofAnalysis,London:RoutledgeandKeganPaul,1954 BloomfieldL.,LinguisticAspectsofScience,Chicago:Univ.of Chic.Press,(Int.Encycl.ofUnifiedScience),1939 BochenskiI.M.,EuroptischePhilosophiederGegenwart,Bern: Francke,1947.Eng.transl.byD.NichollandK.Aschenbrenner, ContemporaryEuropeanPhilosophy,Berkeley:Univ.of CaliforniaPress,1956 PrcisdeLogiqueMathmatique,Bussum:F.G.Kroonder,1949 Braithwaite R.B.,ScientificExplanation,Cambridge:Cambridge Univ.Press,1953 BridgmanP.W.,TheLogicofModernPhysics,NewYork: Macmillan,1927 TheNatureofPhysicalTheory,Princeton:PrincetonUniv.Press, 1936 ReflectionsofaPhysicist,NewYork:PhilosophicalLibrary,1950 BrittonK.,Communication:APhilosophicalStudyofLanguage,

London:RoutledgeandKeganPaul,1939 BroadC.D.,ScientificThought,London:KeganPaul,1923 TheMindandItsPlaceinNature,London:KeganPaul,1925 CarnapR.,DerRaum,Berlin:Erg.Heft56derKantstudien, 1922 DerlogischeAufbauderWelt,Berlin:Weltkreis-Verlag,1928 ScheinproblemeinderPhilosophie,dasFremdpsychische und derRealismusstreit,Berlin,1928 AbrissderLogistik,Vienna:Springer,1929 LogischeSyntaxderSprache,Vienna:Springer,1934.Eng. transl.,LogicalSyntaxofLanguage,London:KeganPaulNew York:HarcourtBrace,1937 -383DieAufgabederWissenschaftslogik,Einheitswissenschaft,No.3, Vienna:Gerold,1934.Frenchtransl.(togetherwiththatof "FormalwissenschaftundRealwissenschaft",seearticlesbelow), Leproblmedelalogiquedelascience,scienceformelleet sciencedurel,Paris:ActualitsScientifiques291,Herman, 1935 PhilosophyandLogicalSyntax,London:KeganPaul,1935 FoundationsofLogicandMathematics,Chicago:Univ.ofChic. Press(Int.Encycl.ofUnifiedScience),1939 IntroductiontoSemantics(StudiesinSemantics,vol.I), Cambridge:HarvardUniv.Press,1942 FormalizationofLogic(StudiesinSemantics,vol.II), Cambridge:HarvardUniv.Press,1943 MeaningandNecessity:AStudyinSemanticsandModalLogic, Chicago:Univ.ofChic.Press,1947 LogicalFoundationsofProbability(ProbabilityandInduction,vol. I),Chicago:Univ.ofChic.Press,1950 TheNatureandApplicationofInductiveLogic(sixsectionsfrom LogicalFoundationsofProbability),Chicago:Univ.ofChic. Press,1951 TheContinuumofInductiveMethods,Chicago:Univ.ofChic. Press,1952 EinfhrungindiesymbolischeLogik,mitbesonderer BercksichtigungihrerAnwendungen,Vienna:Springer,1954. Engl.transl.,IntroductiontoSymbolicLogic,NewYork:Dover, 1958 CarnapR.andBar-HillelY.,AnOutlineoftheTheoryof SemanticInformation,Cambridge:Res.Lab.ofElectronics, M.I.T.ReportNo.247,1952 CarnapR.,HahnH.andNeurathO.,Wissenschaftliche Weltauffassung:DetWienerKreis,Vienna:Wolf,1929 ChisholmR.M.,Perceiving:APhilosophicalStudy,Ithaca: CornellUniv.Press,1957 ClaubergK.W.andDubislavW.,SystematischesWrterbuch derPhilosophie,Leipzig:Meiner,1923 CoplestonF.,ContemporaryPhilosophy,London:Burnsand Oates,1956 CornforthM.,ScienceversusIdealism,London:Lawrence and

Wishart,1946 InDefenceofPhilosophyagainstPositivismandPragmatism, London:Lawrence andWishart,1950 DrayW.,LawsandExplanationinHistory,Oxford:OxfordUniv. Press,1957 DubislavW.,berdiesog.analytischenundsynthetischen Urteile,Berlin,1926 berdieDefinition,Berlin,1927 DiePhilosophiederMathematikinderGegenwart,Berlin: Dunker&Dunnhaupt,1932 DubislavW.andClaubergK.W.,SystematischesWrterbuch derPhilosophie,Leipzig:Meiner,1923 EdwardsP.,TheLogicofMoralDiscourse,Glencoe:TheFree Press,1955 EinsteinA.,GeometrieundErfahrung,Berlin:Springer,1921 EwingA.C.,TheDefinitionofGood,NewYork:Macmillan,1947 FeiglH.,TheorieundErfahrunginderPhysik,Karlsruhe:Braun, 1929 Finlay-FreundlichE.,Cosmology,Chicago:Univ.ofChic.Press (Int.Encycl.ofUnifiedScience),1951 FrankP.,DasKausalgesetzundseineGrenzen,Vienna: Springer,1932 DosEndedermechanistischenPhysik,EinheitswissenschaftNo. 5,Vienna:Gerold,1935 -384InterpretationsandMisinterpretationsofModernPhysics,Paris: Hermann,1938 BetweenPhysicsandPhilosophy,Cambridge:HarvardUniv. Press,1941 FoundationsofPhysics,Chicago:Univ.ofChic.Press(Int. Encycl.ofUnifiedScience),1946 Einstein.HisLifeandTimes,NewYork:Knopf,1947London: JonathanCape,1948 ModernScienceandItsPhilosophy,Cambridge:HarvardUniv. Press,1949 Relativity:ARicherTruth,Boston:BeaconPress,1950London: Cape,1951 PhilosophyofScience,EnglewoodCliffs:Prentice-Hall,1957 GardinerP.,TheNatureo!HistoricalExplanation,Oxford: OxfordUniv.Press,1952 GoodmanN.,TheStructure ofAppearance,Cambridge:Harvard Univ.Press,1951 Fact,FictionandForecast,London:AthlonePress,1954 Cambridge:HarvardUniv.Press,1955 HahnH.,berflssigeWesenheiten,Vienna:Wolf,1929 Logik,MathematikundNaturerkennen,EinheitswissenschaftNo. 2,Vienna:Gerold,1933.Eng.transl.inthepresentvolume HahnH.,CarnapR.andNeurathO.,Wissenschaftliche Weltauffassung:DerWienerKreis,Vienna:Wolf1929 HalldnS.I.,TheLogicofNonsense,Uppsala:BokhandelnA-B. Lundequistska,1949

EmotivePropositions,Stockholm:Almqvist&Wiksell,1954 HareR.M.,TheLanguageofMorals,Oxford:ClarendonPress, 1952 HartH.L.A.,DefinitionandTheoryinJurisprudence ,Oxford: ClarendonPress,1953 HelmholtzH.von,SchriftenzurErkenntnistheorie ,ed.SchlickM. andHertzP.,Berlin:Springer,1921 HempelC.G.,FundamentalsofConceptFormationinEmpirical Science,Chicago:Univ.ofChic.Press(Int.Encycl.ofUnified Science),1952 HempelC.G.andOppenheimP.,DerTypusbegriffimLichteder neuenLogik,LeidenSijthoff,1936 HillT.E.,ContemporaryEthicalTheories,NewYork:Macmillan, 1950 HollowayJ.,LanguageandIntelligence,London:Macmillan, 1951 HospersJ.,MeaningandTruthintheArts,ChapelHill:Univ.of NorthCarolinaPress,1946 AnIntroductiontoPhilosophicalAnalysis,NewYork:PrenticeHall,1953 HuttenE.H.,TheLanguageofModernPhysics,London:Allen andUnwin,1956 JoadC.E.M.,ACritiqueofLogicalPositivism,London:Gollancz Chicago:Univ.ofChic.Press,1950 JordanZ.,OntheDevelopmentofMathematicalLogicandof LogicalPositivisminPoland,London:OxfordUniv.Press,1946 JorgensenJ.,ATreatiseofFormalLogic,Copenhagen:Levin& MunksgaardLondon:HumphreyMilford(OxfordUniv.Press), 1931 PeykologiPaaBiologiskGrundlag(PsychologyBasedonBiology), Copenhagen,1941-45 TheDevelopmentofLogicalEmpiricism,Chicago:Univ.ofChic. Press(Int.Encycl.ofUnifiedScience),1951 -385KailaE.,DerLogistischeNeupositivismus:EinekritischeStudie, Turku:TurunYliopistonjulkaisuja,1930 berdasSystemderWirklichkeitsbegriffe ,Helsinki:Acta PhilosophicaFennica,Fast.2,1936 berdenphysikalischenRealittsbegriff,Helsinki:Acta PhilosophicaFennica,Fasc.4,1941 Terminal-KausalittalsdieGrundlageeinesunitarischen Naturbegriffs:einenaturphilosophischeUntersuchung,Helsinki: ActaPhilosophicaFennica,1956 KaufmannF.,DasUnendlicheinderMathematikundseine Ausschaltung,Vienna:Deuticke,1930 MethodologyoftheSocialSciences,London:OxfordUniv.Press, 1944 KelsenH.,VergeltungundKausalitt,TheHague:vanStockum, 1941.Eng.transl.SocietyandNature,Chicago:Univ.ofChic. Press,1943London:KeganPaul,1946 KnealeW.,ProbabilityandInduction,Oxford:ClarendonPress,

1949 KotarbinskiT.,Elementyteoripoznania,logikiformalnej i metodologinauk(Elementsofthetheoryofknowledge,formal logicandmethodologyofscience),Lwow,1929 KraftV.,DieGrundlageneinerwissenschaftlichenWertlehre, Vienna:Springer,1937 Mathematik,LogikundErfahrung,Vienna:Springer,1947 EinfhrungindiePhilosophie--Philosophie,Weltanschauung, Wissenschalt,Vienna:Springer,1950 DerWienerKreis,DerUrsprungdesNeupositivismus,Vienna: Springer,1950.Eng.transl.,TheViennaCircle,NewYork: PhilosophicalLibrary,1953 LazerowitzM.,TheStructure ofMetaphysics,London:Routledge andKeganPaul,1955 LeanM.,Sense-PerceptionandMatter,London:Routledgeand KeganPaul,1953 LewisC.I.,MindandtheWorldOrder,NewYork:Scribner, 1929 AnAnalysisofKnowledge andValuation,LaSalle:OpenCourt, 1946 LukasiewiczJ.,DielogischenGrundlagender Wahrscheinlichkeitsrechnung,Cracow:KrakauerAkad.d.Wiss., 1913 Onauce(OnScience),Lwow,1934 MainxF.,FoundationsofBiology,Chicago:Univ.ofChic.Press (Int.Encycl.ofUnifiedScience),1955 MalcolmN.,LudwigWittgenstein:AMemoir,OxfordandNew York:OxfordUniv.Press,1958 Marc-WogauK.,DieTheoriederSinnesdaten,Uppsala: UniversitetsArsskrift,1945 vonR.Mises,Wahrscheinlichkeit,StatistikundWahreit,Vienna: Springer,1936.Eng.transl.,Probability,StatisticsandTruth, NewYork:MacmillanLondon:WilliamHodge,1939 ErnstMachunddieempiristischeWissenschaftsauffassung, EinheitswissenschaftNo.7,'sGravenhage:W.P.vanStockum, 1938 KleinesLehrbuchdesPositivismus,TheHague:VanStockum& Son,1939.Eng.transl.,Positivism:AStudyinHuman Understanding,Cambridge:HarvardUniv.Press,1951 MooreG.E.,PrincipiaEthica,Cambridge:Univ.Press,1903 Ethics,London:HomeUniversityLibrary,1912 -386MooreG.E.(continued) PhilosophicalStudies,London:KeganPaul,1922 ProofofanExternalWorld,BritishAcademy:Annual PhilosophicalLecture ,1939 SomeMainProblemsofPhilosophy,London:AllenandUnwin, 1953 MorrisC.W.,LogicalPositivism,Pragmatism,andScientific Empiricism,Paris:Hermann,1937 FoundationsoftheTheoryofSigns,Chicago:Univ.ofChic.

Press(Int.Encycl.ofUnifiedScience),1938 Signs,Language,andBehavior,NewYork:Prentice-Hall,1946 NaessA.,ErkenntnisundWissenschaftlichesVerhalten,Oslo: 1936 "Truth"asConceivedbyThoseWhoAreNotProfessional Philosophers,Oslo:1938 InterpretationandPreciseness,Oslo:1953 Innforing,LogikkogMetodelaere,Oslo:Universitets Studentkontor,1949 NaessA.,ChristophersenJ.A.andKvaloK.,Democracy, IdeologyandObjectivity:StudiesintheSemanticsandCognitive AnalysisofIdeologicalControversy,Oslo:Univ.PressOxford, Blackwell,1956 NagelE.,OntheLogicofMeasurement,NewYork:Columbia Univ.Ph.D.Thesis,1930 PrinciplesoftheTheoryofProbability,Chicago:Univ.ofChic. Press(Int.Encycl.ofUnifiedScience),1939 SovereignReason,Glencoe:TheFree Press,1954 LogicWithoutMetaphysics,Glencoe:TheFreePress,1956 NagelE.andNewmanJ.R.,Gdel'sProof,NewYork:NewYork Univ.Press,1958 NeurathO.,Antispengler,Munich:Callwey,1921 EmpirischeSoziologie,Vienna:Springer,1931 "EinheitswissenschaftundPsychologie,EinheitswissenschaftNo. 1",Vienna:Springer,1933 LedveloppementduCercledeVienneetl'avenirde l'empirismelogique,Paris:Hermann,1935 WasBedeutetRationaleWirtschaftsbetrachtung?, EinheitswissenschaftNo.4,Vienna:Gerold,1935 FoundationsoftheSocialSciences,Chicago:Univ.ofChic.Press (Int.Encycl.ofUnifiedScience),1944 NeurathO.,BrunswikE.,HullC.L.,MannouryG.andWoodger J.H.,ZurEncyklopdiederEinheitswissenschaft,Vortrge, EinheitswissenschaftNo.6,'sGravenshage:W.J.vonStockum, 1938 NeurathO.,CarnapR.andHahnH.,Wissenschaftliche Weltauffassung:DerWienerKreis,Vienna:Wolf,1929 NewmanJ.R.andNagelE.,Gdel'sProof,NewYork:NewYork Univ.Press,1958 NicodJ.,FoundationsofGeometryandInduction,London: KeganPaul,1930 Nowell-SmithP.H.,Ethics,London:Penguin,1954Oxford: Blackwell,1958 OgdenC.K.andRichardsI.A.,TheMeaningofMeaning, London:KeganPaul,1923 OppenheimP.,DieNatrlicheOrdnungderWissenschaften. GrundgesetzedervergleichendenWissenschaftslehre,Jena: GustavFischer,1926 OppenheimP.andHempelC.G.,DerTypusbegriffimLichteder neuenLogik,Leiden:Sijthoff,1936 -387-

PapA.,TheAPrioriinPhysicalTheory,NewYork:King'sCrown Press,1946 ElementsofAnalyticPhilosophy,NewYork:Macmillan,1949 Analytische Erkenntnistheorie ,Vienna:Springer-Verlag,1955 SemanticsandNecessaryTruth,NewHaven:YaleUniv.Press, 1958 PassmoreJ.,AHundredYearsofPhilosophy,London: Duckworth,1957 PerelmanC.andOlbrechts-TytecaL.,Traitdel'Argumentation (Lanouvellerhtorique),Paris:PressesUniversitairesde France,1958 PetzllA.,DerLogistischeNeupositivismus,AnnalesUniversitatis Aboensis,Ser.B.,Tom.XIII,1930 LogistischerPositivismus,GteborgsHgskolasArsskriftXXXVII, Gteborg:Wettergren&Kerbers,1931 PoleD.,TheLaterPhilosophyofWittgenstein,London:Athlone Press,1958 PopperK.R.,LogikderForschung,Vienna:Springer,1935.Eng. transl.,TheLogicofScientificDiscovery,London:Hutchinson, 1958 TheOpenSocietyandItsEnemies,London:KeganPaul,1945 ThePovertyofHistoricism,London:RoutledgeandKeganPaul, 1957 PriceH.H.,Perception,London:Methuen,1932 TruthandCorrigibility,InauguralLecture ,London:OxfordUniv. Press,1936 Hume'sTheoryoftheExternalWorld,Oxford:ClarendonPress, 1940 ThinkingandRepresentation,BritishAcademyLecture,1946 ThinkingandExperience,London:Hutchinson,1953 QuineW.V.O.,"FromaLogicalPointofView",Cambridge: HarvardUniv.Press,1953 RamseyF.P.,TheFoundationsofMathematicsandOther LogicalEssays,London:KeganPaul,1931 ReichenbachH.,Relativittstheorie undErkenntnisApriori, Berlin:Springer,1920 AxiomatikderrelativistischenRaum-Zeit-Lehre (Die WissenschaftNo.72),Braunschweig:Vieweg,1924 PhilosophiederRaum-Zeit-Lehre ,BerlinandLeipzig:Walterde Gruyter,1928.Engl.transl.,ThePhilosophyofSpaceandTime, NewYork:Dover,1957 AtomundKosmos.DasphysikalischeWeltbildderGegenwart, Berlin:DeutscheBuch-Gemeinschaft,1930.Eng.transl.,Atom andCosmos.TheWormofModernPhysics,London:Allenand Unwin,1932NewYork:Macmillan,1933 ZieleundWegederheutigenNaturphilosophie,Leipzig:Meiner, 1931.Eng.transl.inSelectedEssays,London:Routledgeand KeganPaul,1959 Wahrscheinlichkeitslehre.EineUntersuchungberdielogischen undmathematischenGrundlagender Wahrscheinlichkeitsrechnung,Leiden:Sijthoff,1935.Eng. transl.,TheTheoryofProbability.InquiryintotheLogicaland MathematicalFoundationsoftheCalculusofProbability,2nded., BerkeleyandLosAngeles:Univ.ofCaliforniaPress,1949

"Experience andPrediction.AnAnalysisoftheFoundationsand theStructure ofKnowledge",Chicago:Univ.ofChic.Press,1938 PhilosophicFoundationsofQuantumMechanics,Berkeleyand LosAngeles:Univ.ofCaliforniaPress,1944.Ger.transl.,Basel: Birkhauser,1949 -388ElementsofSymbolicLogic,NewYork:Macmillan,1947 TheRiseofScientificPhilosophy,BerkeleyandLosAngeles: Univ.ofCaliforniaPress,1951.Ger.transl.,Berlin-Grunewald: Herbig,1953 NomologicalStatementsandAdmissibleOperations, Amsterdam:N.HollandPub.Co.,1954 TheDirectionofTime(ed.M.Reichenbach),BerkeleyandLos Angeles:Univ.ofCaliforniaPress,1956 RichardsI.A.,andOgdenC.K.,TheMeaningofMeaning, London:KeganPaul,1923 RobinsonR.,Definition,Oxford:ClarendonPress,1950 RougierL.,Lesparalogismesdurationalisme,Paris:Alcan,1920 Lastructure desthoriesdductives,Paris:Alcan,1921 Traitdelaconnaissance,Paris:Gauthier-Villars,1955 RussellB.,ACriticalExpositionofthePhilosophyofLeibniz, Cambridge:Univ.Press,1900,seconded.,London:Allenand Unwin,1937 ThePrinciplesofMathematics,Cambridge:Univ.Press,1903 2nded.,London:AllenandUnwin,1937NewYork:Norton, 1938 PhilosophicalEssays,LondonandNewYork:Longmans,1910 TheProblemsofPhilosophy,HomeUniversityLibrary,1912 OurKnowledgeoftheExternalWorld,ChicagoandLondon: OpenCourtPublishingCompany,1914.2nded.London:Allen andUnwin,1926. MysticismandLogic,London:Longmans,1918nowAllenand Unwin IntroductiontoMathematicalPhilosophy,London:Allenand Unwin,1919 TheAnalysisofMind,London:AllenandUnwinNewYork: Macmillan,1921 TheAnalysisofMatter,London:KeganPaul,1927 AnOutlineofPhilosophy,London:AllenandUnwinNewYork: Norton,1927 AnInquiryintoMeaningandTruth,London:AllenandUnwin NewYork:Norton,1940 AHistoryofWesternPhilosophy,London:AllenandUnwinNew York:SimonandSchuster,1946 HumanKnowledge:ItsScopeandLimits,London:Allenand UnwinNewYork:SimonandSchuster,1948 LogicandKnowledge ,Essays1901-1950(ed.R.C.Marsh), London:AllenandUnwin,1956 RussellB.andWhiteheadA.N.,PrincipiaMathematica, Cambridge:Univ.Press,Vol.I,1910Vol.II,1912Vol.III, 1913,seconded.,1925-1927

RyleG.,PhilosophicalArguments.InauguralLecture.London: OxfordUniv.Press,1945.Reprintedinthepresentvolume TheConceptofMind,London:Hutchinson,1949 Dilemmas,Cambridge:Univ.Press,1954 SantillanaG.deandZilselE.,TheDevelopmentofRationalism andEmpiricism,Chicago:Univ.ofChic.Press(Int.Encycl.of UnifiedScience),1941 SchchterJ.,ProlegomenazueinerkritischenGrammatik, Vienna:Springer,1935 SchlickM.,RaumundZeitindergegenwrtigenPhysik,Berlin: Springer,19172nded.1919.Eng.transl.,SpaceandTimein ContemporaryPhysics,Oxford:ClarendonPress,1920 -389AllgemeineErkenntnislehre ,Berlin:Springer,1918 VomSinndesLebens,Berlin:WeltkreisVerlag,1927 FragenderEthik,Vienna:Springer,1930.Eng.transl.,Problems ofEthics,NewYork:Prentice-Hall,1939 GesammelteAufstze1926-36,Vienna:Gerold,1938 Gesetz,KausalittundWahrscheinlichkeit,Vienna:Gerold,1948 GrundzgederNaturphilosophie,posthumouspapersed.W. HolitscherandJ.Rauscher,Vienna:Gerold,1948.Eng.transl., PhilosophyofNature,NewYork:PhilosophicalLibrary,1949 NaturundKultur,posthumouspapersed.J.Rauscher,Vienna: bHumboldtVerlag,1952 SchlickM.andHertzP.(eds.),HelmholtzH.,Schriftenzur Erkenntnistheorie ,Berlin:Springer,1921 SchultzerB.,ObservationandProtocolStatement,London: WilliamsandNorgate,1938 StebbingL.S.,LogicalPositivismandAnalysis,BritishAcademy AnnualPhilosophicalLecture,1933 PhilosophyandthePhysicists,London:Methuen,1937 StevensonC.L.,EthicsandLanguage,NewHaven:YaleUniv. Press,1945 StrawsonP.F.,IntroductiontoLogicalTheory,London: Methuen,1952 StrollA.,TheEmotiveTheoryofEthics,Berkeley:Univ.of CaliforniaPress,1954 TarskiA.,EinfhrungindieMathematischeLogikunddie MethodologiederMathematik,Vienna:Springer,1937.Eng. transl.,IntroductiontoLogicandtotheMethodologyofthe DeductiveSciences,London:OxfordUniv.Press,1941 Logic,Semantics,Meta-Mathematics,Oxford:ClarendonPress, 1956 ToulminS.E.,ThePlaceofReasoninEthics,Cambridge:Univ. Press,1950PhilosophyofScience,London:Hutchinson,1953 TheUsesofArgument,Cambridge:Univ.Press,1958 UllmanS.,ThePrinciplesofSemantics,Glasgow:Jackson,1951 Oxford:Blackwell,1958 UrmsonJ.O.,PhilosophicalAnalysis,Oxford:ClarendonPress, 1956 WaismannF.,EinfhrungindasmathematischeDenken,

Vienna:Springer,1936.Eng.transl.,Introductionto MathematicalThinking,London:Hafner,1951 WarnockG.J.,EnglishPhilosophySince1900,London:Oxford Univ.Press,1958 WeinbergJ.K.,AnExaminationofLogicalPositivism,London: KeganPaulNewYork:HarcourtBrace,1936 WeldonT.D.,TheVocabularyofPolitics,London:Penguin,1953 WeylH.,PhilosophiederMathematikundNaturwissenschaft, MunichandBerlin,1927.Eng.transl.(revised),Philosophyof MathematicsandNaturalScience,Princeton:PrincetonUniv. Press,1949 WhiteA.R.,G.E.Moore.ACriticalExposition,Oxford: Blackwell,1958 WhiteM.,TowardReunioninPhilosophy,Cambridge:Harvard Univ.Press,1956 Whitehead,A.N.,AnEnquiryConcerningthePrinciplesof NaturalKnowledge,Cambridge:Univ.Press,1919 TheConceptofNature,Cambridge:Univ.Press,1920 -390WhiteheadA.N.andRussellB.,PrincipiaMathematica, Cambridge:Univ.Press,Vol.I,1910Vol.II,1912Vol.III, 1913,seconded.,1925-1927 WilliamsD.,TheGroundofInduction,Cambridge:HarvardUniv. Press,1947 WisdomJohn,InterpretationandAnalysis.PsycheMiniature, London:KeganPaul,1931 ProblemsofMindandMatter,Cambridge:Univ.Press,1934 OtherMinds,Oxford:Blackwell,1952 PhilosophyandPsycho-Analysis,Oxford:Blackwell,1953 WisdomJ.O.,CausationandtheFoundationsofScience,Paris: Hermann,1946 TheMetamorphosisofPhilosophy,Cairo:Al-MaarefPress,1947 FoundationsofInferenceinNaturalScience,London:Methuen, 1952 WittgensteinL.,TractatusLogico-Philosophicus(LogischPhilosophischeAbhandlung),GermanversioninAnnalender Naturphilosophie,1921GermanandEnglish,London:Kegan Paul,1922 PhilosophicalInvestigations,Oxford:BlackwellNewYork: Macmillan,1953 RemarksontheFoundationsofMathematics,Oxford:Blackwell, 1956 TheBlueandBrownBooks,Oxford:Blackwell,1958 WoodgerI.H.,BiologicalPrinciples,London:KeganPaul,1929 TheAxiomaticMethodinBiology,London:Cambridge Univ. Press,1937 TheTechniqueofTheoryConstruction,Chicago:Univ.ofChic. Press(Int.Encycl.ofUnifiedScience),1939 BiologyandLanguage,Cambridge:Cambridge Univ.Press, 1952 vonG.H.Wright,TheLogicalProblemofInduction,Helsinki:

ActaPhilosophicaFennica,Fasc.3,19412ndrev.ed.,Oxford: Blackwell,1957 DenlogiskaEmpirismen,Helsinki,1943 ATreatiseonInductionandProbability,London:Routledgeand KeganPaul,1951 ZilselE.,DasAnwendungsproblem.EinphilosophischerVersuch berdasGesetztiergrossenZahlenunddieInduktion,Leipzig: Barth,1916 ZilselE.andSantillanaG.de,TheDevelopmentofRationalism andEmpiricism,Chicago:Univ.ofChic.Press(Int.Encycl.of UnifiedScience),1941 ZuurdeegW.F.,AResearchontheConsequencesoftheVienna CirclePhilosophyforEthics,Utrecht:KeminkenZoon,N.U., 1946 -391-

ARTICLES

Thefollowingabbreviationsareusedinthislist: AforAnalysis JSLforJournalofSymbolicLogic AJforAustralasianJournalof JUSforJournalofUnifiedScience PsychologyandPhilosophy MforMind Arch.F.Sy.Phil.forArchlyfr PforPhilosophy SystematischePhilosophie PPRforPhilosophyand PhenomenologiAr.Soc.forProceedingsofthe calResearch AristotelianSociety PQforPhilosophicalQuarterly Ar.Soc.Sup.forProceedingsof PRforPhilosophicalReview theAristotelianSociety,Supplementary PSforPhilosophyofScience Volumes PStforPhilosophicalStudies BJPSforTheBritishJournalfor Psych.Rev.forPsychological the Review PhilosophyofScience Rev.Int.Phil.forRevue Internationalede EforErkenntnis Philosophie HJforHibbertJournal RMforReviewofMetaphysics JPforJournalofPhilosophy TforTheoria ActonH.B.,"TheExpletive TheoryofMorals",A,1936-37 "IsEthicalRelativityNecessary?"Ar.Soc.Sup.,1938 "MoralSubjectivism",A,1948-49 AdamsE.M.,"ACritique oftheEmotiveTheoryofEthical Terms",JP,1949 "Word-MagicandLogicalAnalysisintheFieldofEthics",JP,1950 AikenH.D.,"Emotive'Meanings'andEthicalTerms",JP,1944 "Stevenson'sEthicsandLanguage",JP,1945 "EvaluationandObligation:TwoFunctionsofJudgmentsinthe LanguageofConduct",JP,1950.ReprintedinSellarsH.and

HospersJ.,ReadingsinEthicalTheory "TheAuthorityofMoralJudgments",PPR,1951-52 "Definitions,FactualPremisesandEthicalConclusions",PR,1952 "T