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Andre Beaufre

: The principles of strategy

:

Liddell Hart puts forward six positive and two negative rules, the substance of which can be reduced to the following four 1. Force the enemy to disperse by an indirect

2. Achieve surprise by selecting unforseen 3.

courses of aciion. Action is strength against the enemy's weak points.

approach.

4. Achievement of a decision by action in

secondary theatres if necessary. Liddell Hart has brilliantly developed a theory of "the indi,rect appfoaqh" whipll he holds to be the, best strategy. The essential difference between the indirect approach and indirect stratesy is not merely that the former has geographical connotation. The object of the indirect approg.llh is the attainment of military victory; it is only the prepatory manoeuvring for this victory which is indirect. I therefore place the indirect approach in the category of direct str ateqy. l=he es$ential feature of indirect strategv is that it seeks to obtain a result by methods other than military victory

Sumber: Andr6 Beaufre, An lntroduction to Strategy (1965), hal. 33

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requirements for particular combat capabilities, such as longer endurance surface combatants, platforms able to launch antiship missiles, and longer range aircraft. (Malaysia, for exampte, has included in the performance specifications required of its new fighters the ability to conduct operations with certain payloads and for certain times on station over the area of the South China Sea and the particular Spratly lslands which it claims).
I

4;. The Requirements

for EEZ Surveitlance and Protection. The promqlgation of 200-mile Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs) under the Third United Natlons Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS lll) has generated requirements for surveillance and power projection capabilities over resource-

rich areas which, for many states in the region, are greater than their land areas. ln Malaysia, 'the protection of the economic interest of the country in the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ)'was introduced as 'a new element' in the 1986-1990 five-year defence plan; the defence vote was significantly increased ln the 1991-1995 plan, and the principal reason givpn for the increase was the need to '(improve) the capability and efficiency of the country to control and safeguard the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ)'.

Su.mber

: Dr. Desmond

Ball

"Trends in Milit4ry Acquisitions in The Asia Pacific Region: lmplications for Security and Prospects for
Constraints and Controls". SDSC Canberra 4993

LAPORAN STRATEGI KEAMANAN NASIONAL PRESIDEN BUSH DI GEDUNG PUTIH, 13 AGUSTUS 1991 l. Kutipan bagian terpenting laporan itu meriputi : a. Pengakuan bahwa strategi pencegahan (containment strategy) AS yang sudah dilaksanakan setama 40 tahun kini harus diubah guna mencerminkan kenyataan geostrategis. b. Dorongan evolusi yang membangun dari uni soviet. c. Kesadaran bahwa para sekutu AS secara mendasar akan terkena dampak urusan daram negeri Uni soviet.
d. Pengakuan bahwa

kepemimpinan AS pada umumnya te[ap esensial. e. Suatu penekanan pada kekuatan yang lebih kecil dan iebih tangkas untuk menanggapi kepentingan di kawasan dan keperluan di masa damai, tetapi yang dapat dijadikan dasar untuk menyusun kembali kekuatan yang lebih besar bila diperlukan.

dunia semakin saling bergantung secara politis, ekonomis, teknologis, militer tetapi

f. D.ukungan Amerika yang berkelanjutan pada sistem ekonomi internasional iang seteibuka dan seluas mungkin, dan pada pakta pertahanan Aflantik Utara
(NATO) sebagai landasan yang sangat diperlukan oaiam kerja sama lintas-Atlantik dengbn suitu Eiopa yang baru bersatu dan bebas.
dan

g segiat-giatnya mengusahakan kebijakan AS mengenai

Timur Tengah, dengan mengaliui tantangan

kesempatan baru ya.ng dimungkinkan oleh keilenangan kita dalam Perans Teluk.

h. Pengakuan bahwa

i.

dan bahwa peranan yang dijalankan oleh ikatan keamanan kami di sana juga vital Dukungan yang semakin kuat kepada perserikatan Bangsa-Bangsa yang sudah didayagunakan untuk membangun memelihara perdamaian, memperbaiki keadaan kehidupan manusia, dan mengurangi penderitaan
manusia.

Asia Timur dan pasifik tetap penting

j. Pernyataan melalui

memperkokoh stabilitas internasional. k. Memperbarui perjuangan prinsip-prinsip kebebasan politik dan ekonomi sebagai penjarnin yang paling pasti bagi kemajuan umat manusia dan perdamaian dunil. ' I. Suatu agenda dunia yang baru untuk menanggulangi arus

lersenjata Konvensiol{ di Eropa (cFE) d-an penguiangan senjata strategis (srART) untuk benar-benar dmmiileo pada pengendalian persenjataan sebagai sarana untuk

perjanjian-perjanjian Angkatan

pengungsi, penyalahgunaan obat bius dan Gmerosotan

mutu lingkungan.

Laporan

ini

tujuan kita yang mendasar datam tihun 1ggO-an. a. Ketahanan Amerika Serikat sebagai negara yang bebas
serta kelembagaan dan masyarakatnya yang manta[.
b. Suatu ekonomi

menekankan ketangguhan kepentingan dan

merdeka, dengan nilai-nilai fundamentilnya yang utuh

neqara sahabat.

politis bersemangat dengan para sekutu oan negara-

perorangan dan sumber daya untuk upayi-upaya nasional di dalam dan luar negeri. Hubungan yang sehat dan kooperatif dan yang secara

AS yang sehat dan terus tumbuh untuk memastikan adanya kesempatan bagi kemakmuran .

d. Suatu dunia yang stabil

dan aman, tempat kebebasan politik dan ekonomi serta hak-hak asasi manusia dan

lembaga demokrasi tumbuh dengan subur. 3. Laporan ini menerangkan bahwa perubahan findamental kita adalah mengaitkan sarana politik, ekonomi dan militer yang tersedia dengan tujuan yang teguh di suatu dunia' yang ditandai oleh perubahan yang luar biasa positifnya namun masih penuh dengan tantangan dan ancaman terhadap keamanan dan juga terhadap para sekutu serta sahabat kita. Amerika Serikat akan sepenuhnya tetap terlibat dalam dunia yang lebih luas dan akan terus mengejar tujuannya bersama-sama mereka yang memiliki kesamaan nilai dan perhatian. Pendekatan kita kepada keamanan akan terus dibentuk oleh kenyataan bahwa kita merupakan suatu bangsa yang dipisahkan oleh samudera-samudera luas dari banyak di antara sahabat dan kepentingan kita yang paling penting. Untuk membela mereka masih akan memerlukan kehadiran pasukan Amerika di luar negeri, yang didukung oleh kemampuan memproyeksikan kekuatan dari Amerika Serikat. Laporan strategi ini diakhiri dengan seruan untuk terus bqrdialog, mengadakan kerjasama yang erat dan konsultasi dengan Kongres guna membantu membentuk suatu struktur kemanan yang cocok bagi peluang-peluang masa kini dan tantangan-tantangan esok hari.

kita

SUMBER :USIS , EP 209

091391

d. Suatu dunia yang stabil

dan aman, tempat kebebasan politik dan ekonomi serta hak-hak asasi manusia dan

lembaga demokrasi tumbuh dengan subur. 3. Laporan ini menerangkan bahwa perubahan findamental kita adalah mengaitkan sarana politik, ekonomi dan militer yang tersedia dengan tujuan yang teguh di suatu dunia' yang ditandai oleh perubahan yang luar biasa positifnya namun masih penuh dengan tantangan dan ancaman terhadap keamanan dan juga terhadap para sekutu serta sahabat kita. Amerika Serikat akan sepenuhnya tetap terlibat dalam dunia yang lebih luas dan akan terus mengejar tujuannya bersama-sama mereka yang memiliki kesamaan nilai dan perhatian. Pendekatan kita kepada keamanan akan terus dibentuk oleh kenyataan bahwa kita merupakan suatu bangsa yang dipisahkan oleh samudera-samudera luas dari banyak di antara sahabat dan kepentingan kita yang paling penting. Untuk membela mereka masih akan memerlukan kehadiran pasukan Amerika di luar negeri, yang didukung oleh kemampuan memproyeksikan kekuatan dari Amerika Serikat. Laporan strategi ini diakhiri dengan seruan untuk terus bqrdialog, mengadakan kerjasama yang erat dan konsultasi dengan Kongres guna membantu membentuk suatu struktur kemanan yang cocok bagi peluang-peluang masa kini dan tantangan-tantangan esok hari.

kita

SUMBER :USIS , EP 209

081391

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PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE
PsYchological warfare

time

propaganda, and exploitation of other actions, with the primary purpose of influencing the opinions, emotions, attitudes, and behavior of enemy, neutral or friendly. Foreign groups in ouch a way as to support the aceomplishment of national aims and objectives. Psychological warfare consolidation- psycholog ical warfare directed toward populations in friendly rear areas or in territory occupied by friendly militay forces with the objective of facilitating military operations and promoting maximum cooperation among the civil populace. Psychological warfare objective - military, political, economic, or other objective, the attainment of which is to be achieved or facilitated by the employment of psychological warfare.

of war or declared emer$ency of

- - the planned use in

i..

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Psychological warfare task - - a particular project whose accomplishment will contribute to the achievement of the psychological warfare objective. Psychological warfare theme - - ? subject or topic used as a means of accomplishing a psychological warfare task.

Psychological activities - - those activities conducted in peacetime or in areas outside of active military theaters of war, which are planned and conducted to influenoe the emotions, attitudes, or behavior of foreign groups in ways favorable to the accomprishmenf of u.S policies and objectives. Psychological operations - - this term includes psychological activities and psychological warfare, and encompasses those political, military, economic, and ideological actions planned and conducted to create in enemy, hostile, neutral, or friendly foreign groups the

emotions, attitudes, or behavior favorable to the accomplishment of U.S policies and objectives.
Propagand a

-- any information, ideas,

doctrines, or special appeals disseminated to influence the opinions, emotions, attitudes, or behavior of any specified group in order to benefit the sponsor; either directly or indirectly. Black - - propaganda which purports to emanate from a source other than the true
one.

Grey - - propaganda which does not specially identify any source. -Yhite - - propaganda disseminated and acknowledged by the sponsor or by an accredited agency thereof.
Dictionary of US Military Terms, Washington DC. 1963.

Teori Strategi B.H. LIDDELL HART

7. Pendapat L. Haft tentang Ctausewi?. "The art of the employment of batfles as a means to gain the object of war. strategy forms the plan of the war, maps out the proposed course of the
ditferent campaigns which compose the war, and regulates the battles to be fought in each,, Defects : a. lt intrudes on the sphere of policy, or the higher conduct of the war, which must necessarily be the responsibility of the government and not of the military leaders it emproys as its agents in the executive control of operations.

b. lt narrows the meaning of 'strategy' to the pure utilization of batfle, thus conveying the idea that battle is the only means to the strategical end. (Easy to confuse the means with the end and to reach the conclusion that in war every other consideration should be subordinated to the aim of fighting a decisive batfle).

2. Relation to policy. a. Hubungan panglima perang dan pimpinan

b. Moltke tentang strategy : The practical

nasio na l/pemeri nta h fl !8,

adaptation of the means placed at a generals disposal to the attainment of the objeciin view.

c. L. Hart tentang strategy : The art of distributing

and applying military means to fulfill the ends of policy. (strategy is eoncerned not merely

BUTIR.BUTIR POLITIK DAN STRATEGI AMERIKA SERIKAT

Its first President, George Washington, in his farewell address to the oeople of the United States in 1796, had some good advice for countries in our position. For, in some respects, the United States was then in the same position. \Mastrington argued for an independent and honest course in foreign affairc, and explained: 'nothing is more essential than that permanenL inveterate antipathies against particular nations and passionate attachments for others should be cultivated. The nation which indulges towards another an habitual hatred or an habitupl fondness is in some degree a slave. It is a slave to its animosity or to its affection, either of which is sufficient to lead it astray from its duty and its interest.'

1..

2. Although Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld has advised Congress that the forthcoming Quadrennial Defense Review will differ from that of the Clinton administration in important respects, there has in fact been a remarkable consistency in US strategic poticy-and its formulation-through the Reagan, Bush and Clinton administrations. The 1997 Quadrennial Defense Review, for insnce, begins its chapter on defence strategy with the following
sentiments.
Since the founding of the Republic, the United States has ernbraced seVeral fundamental and enduring goals as a nation : to maintain the sovereignty, political freedorn, and independence of the United States, with its values, institutions, and territory intact ; to protect the lives and personal safety of Americans, both at home and abroad; and to provide for the well-being and prosperity of the nation and its people. Achieving these basic goals in an increasingly interdependent world requires fostering an international environment in which critical regions are stable, at peace, and free from domination by hostile powers; the global economy and free trade are growing; democratic norms and respect for human rights are widely accepted...The United States seeks to pay a leadership role in the international comrnunity, working closely

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Niveaus in het strategieproces Politiek - strategisch Militaire - strategisch Operationeel - strategisch tactisch
De structuur van militaire doctrine krij g sm achtdee ld octri n es kr'rj gsmacht-fi oi nt) doctri ne 'combined' doctrine

NIVEAUS VAN LUCHTMACHTDOCTRINE Basrs : Fundamentele grondslagen en principes Operationeel

. Specifieke doelstellingen,

globale doelstellingen van de huidige missie en operationeele omgevingen. Tactisch '. lnzet van specifieke wapensysteem, uitvoering van functies en taken. Luchtmachtstrategie Counter-Air Belnvloeden van luchtoffensief oppervlaktegevecht

het

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OPERATIONELE HIERARCHIE VAN HET LUCHTWAPEN militaire strategie luchtmachtstrategie

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US INTERESTS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA The Future Military Presence

Excerpts on the maritime aspects, For security purposes, the United States sees Southeast Asia as a maritime region of vast sea spaces. lts friends in the

1,

?r?-the ASEAN (Malaysia, the Philippines, Thailand, lndonesia, Singapore and Brunei)-are all trading states. Washington has identified one of its major security

2.

responbibilities, therefore, to be maintaining open sea lanes for i nternational commerce.

3.

While the region has not been designated as an area of vital American concern since the Second lndochina War (19631975), its importance is inherent in its location astride the sea lanes between the oil-rich Persian Gulf and America's Northeast Asian allies, Japan and the Republic of Korea (ROC). Unlike US deployments in Japan and Korea, however, which provide direct deterrence against potential invaders-the USSR and North Korea-Southeqst Asian mrlitary facilities in the Philippines are not configured primarily to defend their host country. lnstead, they constitutg the storage and repair capacities needed to give the US Navy and Air Force a surge capability, in the event of international crises, to move west to the lndian Ocean/Persian Gulf and north to the Sea of Japan. ln the four decades after the Korean War, the United States developed a multiple carrier battlegroup strategy to protect its friends and deter adversaries the western Pacific. This strategy reached its apex under former Navy Secretary John Lehman who argued for the creation of sufficient naval strength to

attack the Soviet Pacific Fleet at its point of origin around Vladivostok. Whatever the feasibility and desirability of that strategy may have been through the Brezhnev era, the political setting of the 1990s has radically changed and called into

informing China's strategic calculus, otr the one hand, and the
strategic calculus of the US on the other are at cross purposes. China fundamentally pursues a 'zero-sum game' approach, where advance for one side is predicated upon retreat for the other, where victory for one side means defeat for the other, where a 'win' for one side means

a 'loss' for the other. The United States has a quite different

approach. Fundamental to US strategy is the idea that 'victory' does not necessarily require the destnrction of an opponent, but rather the acceptance of an outcome that effectively removes the uncertainties that cause armed conflict in the first place. For the United Stated, the driving concept is 'net value-adding', where both sides are able to claim a 'win', albeit in somewhat different ways. These two different concepts, 'zero-sum game' and 'net valueadding' serye to describe the fundamental forces that drive the tectonic plates of Chinese and US strategy.

Sumber

David W. Lovell (ed) "Asia-Pacific Security : Policy Challenges" ISEAS .2003

own speeches, display a remarkable consistency with the themes elaborated during the previous two decades or so. On I may 200I, for instance, President Bush, speaking on the issue of deterrence
against nuclear proliferation at the National Defense University, Fort McNair, said : broad strategy of active nonproliferation, counterproliferation and defenses. rffe must work together with other like-minded nations to deny weapons of terror from those seeking to acquire them. \I[e must work with allies and friends who wish to join with us to defend against the harm they can inflict...Deterrence can no longer be based solely on the threat of nuclear retaliation. Defenses can strengthen deterrence by reducing the

Today's world requires

a new policy, a

incentive for proliferation.

'humanitarian intervention'and the'defence of democracy' wherever and whenever human beings are under duress or democratic institutions are attacked by external forces ? No. But it
does mean that, when the US finds that its longer-term interests and those of its partners are at stake, it will dedicate its military resources to the delivery of outcomes that not only accrue to its own benefit, but to the benefit of other nations as well. This is the strategy of self-

The issues here, of course, is less the ideas of non-proliferation and counter-proliferation than partnership and the creation of incentives for achieving strategic outcomes. It would, of course, be naive to suggest that the defence posture of the US is based on anything other than fighting and winning. That is an inevitable part of strategy. But US strategy also comprehends the utility of armed force as part of the array of state-controlled forces that deliver strategic outcomes that mean that the US is dedicated to

interested altruism that underpins the 'win-win' philosophy of

modern commerce.
4.

For a host of reasons-political, economic, social, cultural-the

Chinese and US approaches to strategy not only fail to complement each other but they also set the foundations basic misuhderstanding and miscalculation. The underlying philosophies

of

and cooperatively with nations that share our values and goals, and influencing those that can effect US national well-being.

The Quadrennial Defense Review espouses a universalist and valueadding approach to strategy that echoes the modern US business approach to economic development : that economic growth can lead to benefits for all, rather than just for the dominant economic actors. It elaborates on several themes that were set out in President Clinton's February 1996 statement A National Security Strategy of Security and Enlargement, in which Clinton dealt with the political,

economic and military elements that combine to establish an achievable national strategy. After noting the range of threats that continue to characterize the global security environment, President
Clinton went on to say
:

We have unprecedented opportunities to make our nation safer and more

economy linked by an instantaneous communications network...The community of democratic nations is growing, enhancing the prospects for political stability, peaceful conflict resolution and greater dignity and hope for the people
prosperous...We now have
of the world. The international community is beginning to act together to address pressing global environmental needs. Never has American
leadership been more essential.

a truly global

In a clear reflection of the 'net value-adding' concept of

Clinton continued
:

strategy,

Our extraordinary diplomatic leverage to reshape existing security and economic structures and create new ones ultimately relies upon American power...But military force remains an indispensable element of our nation's power...The United Stated recognizes that we have a special responsibility that goes along with being a great power and, at times, our global interests and ideals lead us to oppose those who would endanger the survival or well-being of their peaceful neighbours.

3. To this point, President George W. Bush has not perhaps been the most eloquent of US presidents in articulating the strategic objectives of hls adminisfration. Yet the statements of his key advisor, and his

2.

Definisi slrateoi dan tal a. Strategy : The pro course for a businr

steering that busin about that future c(

Typically, strategy w but this need not ne the organisational r being like a travelle unknown through negotiating hazard presented. ln this e) defined objectives n(

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WHAT IS GI

Geopolitics has simple defi ^ controversial connotations. Geoffrer international relations ftom spati: ^ writers, including Thomas Friedman, of globaltzatton, use the term not for approach to international politics bu striving of state against state for por usage strips the term of its focus o seminal authors ofl geopolitics, such and Halford Mackinder, propound g. Mackinder's oft-quoted dictum expres

. . .

\fi/ho rules East Europe commands t IVho rules the Heartland commands \ffho mles the Wodd Island conunar

Mackinder intended this epigrar for the Allied negotiators at the ! academic political science, geopoliti< During World War II and the Cold

GEOPOLITICS
MC
fui Beq

Intrr
There ate a number of definition of geopolitics. It
geography,

bordering on

international relations. Out o branch, which to some ext( pseudo-scientific rationale fo resulted in a setback for geop mid-1970s. Modern geopoli geopolitics and relates po'o

politician, the military plan: geopolitics as a method to an: be of importance when plann

living organisms. He also intro #ow, to expand or die and c u/ere dynamic and subject to c}

The Swedish Professor

first to use the term geopoliticr

can be regarded as the founder basics were ptesented in 1900 Geograpfut based on lectures at State as a Living Form (191,6)

important book in relation to g Meanwhile geopolitica United Kingdom ^ and the Unir
(1861 -1947),

a British geogral land transport as a k.y to c

Mackinder's land-based power Russia. Eurasia and Afric cor power that could control the I position, what we today would Alfred T. Mahan (1840-1914)
il

and his son Albrecht \il/as execu J"Iy coup against Hitler. At about the same time t Spykman (1893-1943) felt tha emphasis on the Heardand. Ir the "Rimlarrd", alarge buffer z After NTorld \War the Rimlr United States policy of contai communism, a concept descr

II

USSR (and originally the Pe spreading influence to the Riml

After NTodd \War II the During the 1970s, to some extr

the term, geopolitics experienr strengthened during the 1990r
mainly based on Mackinder

an<

some extent geopoU dynamics during the 1990s. S.

wider role.

To

time, both are poter

conflicts.
3. Balkar transportation network richest and most indus

The Eurasian

are also geopoliticall; importance from the

ambitions to at least tt powerful neighbors, ni China also signaling

region. But the Eur important as a poter concentration of natu the region, in additir
gold. 4. Similarly.

It hardly n

marketing China into t cooperation. But supp continues to grow in

ttGreater Chinatt

ma'

and calculations of its that from happening co China. Such a confl relations-for it is far fi

follow America's lea

therefore have potenti Tokyo's definition of resulting in the terminz Far East. However, a exact its own price. T< not a matter of simply have to be substance t put it very directly, ho,
and where, should Amr

7.

The case for

not

geostrategic player is Indonesia is the most region itself its capaci is limited by the rel

Indonesian economy,

uncertainties, its dispel to ethnic conflicts tha exercised in its inten

minority.

At some l

important obstacle to C

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KUTIPAN.KUTIPAN E ..THE GRAND

1. American supremacY has that not only rePlicates t features of the American s

a. a collective
forth);

securitY

and lorces (NATO,

b. regional economic American Free Tra

cooPerative instituti, Trade Organization) c. procedures that emt if dominated by the d. a preference for den

e.

a rudimentary glot
(ranging from the
Flrnsnicn \l/er crimel

hegemonY but alst autonomous and s evolution of this relations among tl tense conflicts bet''

important Point is

deePlY embedder political order ....

Currently, this urlPrc rival. But will it remain
2.

Until recentlY, the lea'

whether land Power wa specific region of Eurt continent. On of the mt the discussion earlY in the Eurasian "Pivot are and much of Central A

Japan-becoming the domination. To fore-str geographer Paul Den

geopol iticians, advocatec

even before World War I

,l

J. The point of departure fr recognition of the three

define the geopolitical history,

st

(2) a non-Eurasian sta (3) the globe's central

Eurasian power.

(l)

asinglestateisat

KUTTPAN BUTIR.

..THE GRAND

GEI DARI i

1.

The world's energy

demand

increase over the nexl

the LI.S. Departmenl

will rise by I and 2015, with tl

",

consumption occurrin Asia's economic devel, pressures for the explo of energy, and the Cen basin are known to con dwarf those of Kuwait, Access to that resourc

MODEL ANALISA STRATEGI

PROSES PEII/IIKIRAN
fi/IODEL DALAM TUJU

1. IDENTIFIKASI

MAS

2.

STELLING) KEPENTINGAN-KE ANGGAPAN.ANG(

3. KEPENTINGANfI

BEF[!.KIF (Thinkinl
1.

Umqm

"Strategy" is a term overworked" lt is used commerce, and ofter

Usually it conveys a se ongoing progress for tl is found in connection instance, production s personnel strategy-al lowly function. Definil emphasis on manag( and resource allocatior

Although in practic, subjective, tactical the near and medi a part of activities.

will be of broader sc perspectives organisational levels as a strategy may b tactical matter. By tt usually called "str however, the two changeable.

But

3.

Despite beinq a fashir

Robert Osgood has sugge "Milita ategy must

less arm

diploFati,c and psvtholoc guP0gtt .foreign policv rTlr L--lL --l ------rt and tacit meanso.

Sumbqr:

R.E. Osgood,
Chicago: Univ.

I\

Michael Howard : "The whole field of interr lattle fiehl in which the C

the use of force by the nu the West hv indircnt r

KUTIPAN.KTiTIPAI
SUMMTTR Y ^IND

l. U.S.Soviet summitry

fundarnental strategicsides in the global str yields sharp outlines expansion that draws fi geopolitical theories of
2.

What is the design of labored through the al found thc harvest. bar
concerned even thoul sophisticated and revea tactics. The reason for

grand strategy is not d

rrlrar. o^.1 o^.ith,

about grand strategynation's security, or in

bent on conquest. Clau battlefield strategy and

political authorities

Whether the great Mac in the Kremlin or the F geographer studied by no evidence of his inf Soviet literature. Nonet such or not, is the high was of Hitler's.
4.

Since there are no Sov subject in another wa) call the theory of "ot evidence of "subjectiv person consciously intr
intAnt-nr rrnrlca infor..

any other practical inst

outf'lank these cbnters Southeast Asia. For ff patiently worked to este the Carihbean, as Germ
7.

The strategic ideas whi

old and familiar. The

them to the scale and te The Soviet leadership r globe, rather than the tir Thucydides wrote, the their successful regiona witnessed the successir II, of France under Lo

during the first half of what all their predecesr power so much greate combination of adversa major war.

of politics by other n

supreme example of itr 'the highest form of wa

Raymond Aron remark reversed Clausewitz' ft of war by other means. idea many centuries a1 developed his insight ar t0. The'Soviet grand stratr geography of power,

Mackinder and his

Mackinder stressed the cent of the earth's sur connected by land an( thirds of the land surfac the Americas and the third. More than 80 per Eurasian-African landn
r- l^-,1

the North African

Baluchistan. I

l. The Soviet Union has L

obtain control of the which already include Empire in 1914, but tl considerable part of Gr Soviet Union is to acl Soviet and the Wester
Mirror-images of each

("Gameplan:ageost

US-Soviet contest"). Tl and self-defense are dif

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ON POLITICS, DIP
The distinction between

1.

relative ofl'e. These two t, single art of politics-tht states so as to further th strategy, the conduct of

diplomatic method.
panoply

guarantees and threats b

regard tr enemies , that is, to the aI The relation of strategy formula : "'W'ar is to hart and policy, to accommc
S7ar."
2.

with

Let us start from the sr political units. proud o

the continuation of policr by its opposite : policy

means. But these

two for both cxpress the contin, altem.ately riolent and n< do not differ in essence. of semi-violent lrlezfiS, fe
a tendency

to broaden, an ought in time of peace to and in time of war as litt practice now than it has
been very close.

The situation known as

original features, some

of

others from the double ideological, of a system exte These original features n three words deterrence, pert three modes of cold-war (

STRATEG] IN UNITED STA]

,
1.

THE MEANII

Attitudes so recenfly reg

undoubtedly has much I practice of using the tern

be taken generally t

engrossing considerations word is by origin a military sfrafegos, signifying a gel and relevant to generalihi
remains exclusivety such.
2.

strict standards of mean

Maybe the usage is ht restrictivgness of the dicti mav he a matfar nf cfrrla

an essential part of the

establishmpnts.

expend energy destructir

5. The numbers of political

purposes put at issue capabilities generated,

expenditure of energy, intensity of the desiruc materiel and of manpow( time entailed-such are il or inversely related acco the measurement and
warfare.

6. Strategy concerns calcul factors. How, in broadest purpdses is its focus. Stl and application of a pat

side appreciable
tacticians.

neec

so, the management of

magnitudes and to afford

9. The closer the two sides greater becomes the requ the interacting factors of words, the role of strategy
Source

C.B. Marshall, ,Th( ' John Hopkins pres

PRltufi!DLES Otr,l PAST I Nt

Excerpts

a. Oxfcrd dictionary

: ggg

emt

psy( nat r max ir, pr

a.

At the end :f World

toward
defir itlon arrd lllre word

,,

;:ra[icurlar a( definition fitr,; more the c called grincl strate.W

Il: ES49EPJ r:{ strateqv t

AD

a.

he primary focus cf

recerntly has been the pr the US ( i,rnd its altier statr:s)".

!,' "Th$ develripment of US

s "9gilie!$ SIgIgSg Te3I! US'.

(1). Bernard Brodie (2). l-lerman Kerhn (3). Flobert C)s;ood (4). A,lbert W'ohlstette"

ilslig! gflsEEst

The(b list of civilians who I since Wc rld War ll are, ar

d. "With resiper:t to nuclear r War il has Eone from fasr a n n rl rci nti,r r't+

+n-lffii

e US will be less willi iru than i: ha will ir decisions concerning g, ptE{.lSgt nerceptions ! few()r conslraints cn acl encourage indirridu historic frienE-ffi

6. Past, present and rxergin

the fralnework in arhich the the yeerrs ahei,rd. Some pa advantage, otJ',..'s not. Sor the test of time. 'l any eve psj ryEiqsllhsm will quid world r.rder SOURCE

: tt.Y

Gmith

(F

rlhrlrond til,ealisnr : R.icha rd Rosflcr

lraJll iarrally t^eferred tr feS0lli'L:3:: l.O t\rtll lIlA.lOf CA.ffipill$lSi A Strolriil:r i rflu(r.r;rr)r:l by the lessons Lidd,ll,l l:[i,rr't br,:irdened this conce6 mighr lrs insuftir:iln:. If it l*fl the n
"Strrr,l*,.dJ SuC*,;;rriii

''

1ld not tillfill all wr*trr: ',ll t,l r;t$s,i; tlii,rl to conduct w, This i;r; rlrrt,t rirrrlerlying Clause polic l:,, citi'rcl' rlr,,ms'-t]rc prolclnE subsr;: :lr. fit;l rtr(,lit{)rl tiltlst al'\,vays [:e after 'rlr,/rrlli.l '\\'ir' getreralizecl prev(:rrriI Cn ,]il'1y1,11".' AcCCrldiug to t1 and irr, rr.ln,lrir ,rlc lr- ilear fi:lrce in lrez engfii1, llr{it't,r11,' "Gr{}r'lL :ri;ri,lur;1', ;towet,sr, rsprss beyorr"l rir,,r'r: Ie]ti)r':llship in wal' or gover lulji,t |,:l:,* nir;" of nriiitary fo econ,)t rr i(:, 1.r,::j ili ".,,r1" 1:sychological.*; thrt ;,rr'i:,,t'li*tlirrt'i r',ri r'l,rr-rrectir' qrrr,-I int,
r,r'i,lr'
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2,

Sanr M*r

{,1.

$nrheuiuri

.'$tIElM on*ioral "Tlr,:r,5 ili u p;n*i: I*lril dcqrrdl*isn in

rjtila:lk,ii.r t'. e n t lr t1

U$(: t,lt*s,*

tur*ri

lilrm$yTnousty. Th

parllculirlr,' 'iyil:j:t Lr*ed in the studl

ob.[ri;lir'*l o{ tht, l$rrig whethsr in for

roflr;"u,

trr tho rne,:llr:rls and means usr

*ullrmrtt':
Tlre tr:rru ''strntgy,"

&rilsd

frE{n tbe

irittr cunnrrl:rr, la
lrli,ul; erl a r,itu#li

rffig tim

*gw

w wtri'tiw d ffi*t

irili[iltsc *irtrr, rmgE- em*r*irry t]w

Irt
l

r;r

lirn,* il* r *trnl*rl ohfixtives.

Thr trllri $tretegy ls used herr: retbr

r$ti,:r'*;tr::,$ri
Se):ir ilr

rUill tr* rriads t0 ra,hat sol

i: [' nr: l:i.al

iltitlll

i' pOWSr Attd itS er

At

r:hr,r lrignc:st

level, grand stl"ategv

ir

TRADITIONAL CONCERNS OF *CORNER STONES OF THE ADMI]

MAJORITY OF THE NATION',S PEO MILITARY CAPABILITY AND EFFI ADVERSARIE,S FROM EFFECTIVELY NATION'S PURSUIT OF ITS NATIONAL

..NATIONAL SECURITY IS THE,

C(

THE, TERM "STRATEGY" DERTVI ORIGINAILY PERTAINED TO THE

COMMAND. IN MODERN TIMES, "GRA TO DESCRIBE, THE, OVERALL DE,FENS OF NATIONS. SINCE THE, MID-T STRATEGY" HAS AfTAINE,D \X'IDE, UI EMPLO\MENT OF THE TOTAL RE,SO

NATIONAL OBJECTIVE,S. CLAUSEU/ITZ : "STRATEGY BORDER OR R,A.THE,R IT BE,COMES BOTH ITSEI SIMPLE, BUT NOT ON THAT ACCOUN]
(sAM

C.

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Geostrateqi. Geopolitik dan Geoekonomi

Geopolitics : a. ls the science of the earth's relationships of political processes. lt is based on the broad foundations of political geography, which is fhe science of the political organism in
space and their strueture. Moreover, geopolitics sets out to furnish the tools for political action and the directives for political life as a whole. iOorpalen 1942. The World of General Hatlshofer. New York).

b. A study of the influence of such physical factors as geography, economics, and demography upon the politics
and esp. the foreign policy of a state. (Webster).

Geostrategy: a. A branch of geopolitics that deals With strategy. b. The combination of geopolitical and strategic factors

c. The use

characterizing a particular geographic region.

by a

government
I

of

strategy based upon

i

geopolitics. (Webster;.

Geostrategic region The geostrategic region must be large enough to possess certain globe influencing characteristics and functions ...tifl... is the expression of the inter-relatiqnships of a large part of the world in terms of location, movement, trade Orientation, and culture or ideological bonds. While it is a single-feature region, in the sense that its purpose is to efnbrace areas over which power can be applied, it is a multi-feature region in its compositlon. Control of strategic passageways on fqnd and
sea is frequently crucial to the unity of geostrategic regions.

4. Geopolitical region. The geopolitical region is a subdivision of the above. lt expresses the uniff of geographic features. Because it is

a framework for common political and economic actions.

derived directly from geographic regions, this unit can provide

Contiguity of location, and complementarity of resources are particularly distinguishing marks of the geopolitical region ..: the geo-strategic region has a strategic role to play and the geopolitical region has a tactical one. (Cohen S.B. 1964. Geography and Politics in a Divided World. New York).
5. Geo-ecopolitics : Consists

and a

to include the neglected economic factors greater awareness the technological significance change. (Mouzon O,T. 1959. lnternational Re$ources and Foreign Policy. New York).

of

geopolitics revised

of rapid

of

6.

Geo-economic: Of, relating to, or characterized by economic conditions or

a.

b.

policies that are influenced by geographic factors and exist or are carried out on the internationai level. (Websteds 3td New lnternational Dictionary 1966). "We are entering the age of geo-economics, with flows of trade, finance, and teqhnology shaping the poyVer realities

and the politics of a new era. Military power remains a significAnt component of national strength. But in today's world, technological and commercial capabilities as much as military strength are the defining element of national

power and influence. (R.H. Solomon: America and Asian Security in an era of geo-economics U.S. Dept. of State Dispatch. , May 25, 1 ee2)

STRATEGIC VIEWS OF THE GLOBE

The classic schools of suategic thoqght, maritime, continental,
and aerospace (see chapter 3), appraise geographic settings in shalply different ways. Three early spokesmap-ffi2har, Mackinder, and de

Seversky- advanced concepts that still illustrate the basic divergences displayed by their philosophical descendents, even
though details outlined by that trio have since been altered to reflect current clrcumstances.

MARITIME
Alfred Thayer Mahan, an unabashed champion of military might, focused his attention on the hydrosphere, the aqueous envelope that covers three-fourths of our earth's epidermis. Before
the turn of the trnrentieth century, h. contended that any country or coalition strong enough to command the hlgh seas could control the wodd's wealth and thereby dominate the earth. As the princrpal prerequisites, he saw a powerful navy with operating bases at home and overseas, complemented by massive merchant marine. For ^ theory depends ofl several maximum effectiveness, Mahan's essentials identified in his tteatise Tbe Influence of Sea Power Upon Historl. A centrally situated strategic position, which combines secure land boundaries with access to one or more bodies of open water, tops his list. Those basic geographic attributes must be coupled with a coastline that features deep-draft harbors and defensible shores. Next, flo nation c n caffy out seafaring strategies ofl a grand scale unless its people have an affinity for salt water and an aptitude for commerce. Finally, governmental policies must actively exploit all environmental advantages to promote power afloat.

CONTINENTAL
Halford J. Mackinder, who folloured Mahan by just a few years, emphasbed the strategic importance of land masses as opposed to the seas. His study, "The Geographical Pivot of History," published in 1904, recognrzed central Eurasia as the hub of the universe (sae
accompan)nng map).

pt\.oT

{RF{ ,1strr

f,

tt.l*rL.rrD ,reit,

The original Pivot Area, whose confines corresponded closely with those of Asiatic Russia, reputedly afforded great mobility for ground forces, but not a base of power in terms of teeming population or intrinsic treasures. Consequendy, Mackinder eventually added ^ good deal of Eastetn Europe to the Pivot Area, which he redesignated the Heardand. His ultimate outline therefore embraced lands that fiford a happier m^rraa,ge of mobrlity and power. The remainder of Europe and Asia constituted an Inner, or Marginal, Crescent, sometimes known as the Rimland. The Americas, Africa south of the Sahara, Australia, and large islands like Britatn; Japan, and Indonesia, comprised an Outer, or fnsular, Crescent. As the concept evolved, Eurasia and Africa in combination came to be called the \il7odd-Island. From that total theorem Mackinder derived
his primary postulation
:

\7"ho rules East Europe cornmands the Heartland. $7ho rules the Heartland cornmands the sTodd-Island. $7ho rules the STodd-Island commands the Sfodd.

AEROSPACE
The advent of au power threw tn a third dimension. Alexander P. de Seversky proposed a competing theory, based on the premise that complete supremacf; not just local or temporary arr ^1r superiority, is possible. His book Air Power : Key to Sunrival, written in 1950, before the existence of ICBMs, discounted overseas bases as "ufltenable," downgraded the importance of naval and land combat, and stated unequivocally that "the manifest destiny of the United States is in the skies." His vieur of the globe, based on polar projection, visuali-ed the East-$7est confrontation across the ^Arctic Ocean, not across the Atlantic and Pacific. He drew a blue circle around the United States, demarking the 5,000-mile strike radius of contemporaty bombers.

A yellow ellipse, demarked by similar bounds, was centered on the

Soviet Union. The Two ovedapped at the Area of Decision;

Where the struggle for mastery

ocean will be ^tr unfolded... Ary investment we make today in the yellow zore with the intention of assuring a flow of strategic supplies in wartime is shear
waste. It is as unrealistic as would be investment for the same purposes by the Soviet Union in our blue zorle. Common sense demands that we channel economic preparedness only into the zofle we can successfully defend.

of the whole

:':

'i

THE NEED FOR INTEGRATED YIEWS

The truth of the matter is, none of the media just addressed offers a panacea, although some influential strategists still persist in pushing one approach to the exclusion of others. Maritime strateges, for example, are ideal for extending national influence over wide areas) as

the Soviets are demonstrating today, but th.y are not likely to cripple resourceful countries like the United States and Red China. Whosoever rules the Heartland (u.y heartland, not necessarily the one described by Mackinder) would be constrained from commanding the rest of the wodd if he lacked the ability to project a
potent punch beyond his particular land mass. Aerospace operations depend heavily on territorial fulcrums. Like Archimedes, airmen need a place to stand before they can even try to move the wodd. Candidates for modern great-

power status need the effectively in all

environments.

three

Source "Grand Strategy : Principles and Practices"

John M. Collins, Naval Inst Press, Annapolis
1,97

F'

The Maritime Strategy

Both ashore and afloat, we . . . . . ... imperatively need first of all a conception of war. Once this is created we will be able to proceed, with our eyes open and our course well market, towatd a coherent comprehensive scheme of naval life. Doctrine, methods and nrles may be made to flow consistendy and logically therefrom. Strategy, tactics, logistics, gunnery, ship design...........every ramification ._of the profession-may be developed ' with confidence and wisdom. . . . . .'

:! t
1.

I
t
:
I

rk

Soutce "Military Doctrine : Blueprint for Force

PIanning" Col. Flarry G. Summers, Jt., USA Strategic Review, 1gg2

B.t)

'K[ox,

op. cit., p.354.