X. PATERNITY AND FILIATION A.

Concept of paternity, filiation and legitimacy

FC 163 The filiation of children may be by nature or by adoption. Natural filiation may be legitimate or illegitimate.

B. Legitimate children
FC 164 Children conceived or born during the marriage of the parents are legitimate. Children conceived as a result of artificial insemination of the wife with the sperm of the husband or that of a donor or both are likewise legitimate children of the husband and his wife, provided, that both of them authorized or ratified such insemination in a written instrument executed and signed by them before the birth of the child. The instrument shall be recorded in the civil registry together with the birth certificate of the child. FC 165 Children conceived and born outside a valid marriage are illegitimate, unless otherwise provided in this Code In rel to NCC 256 The child shall be presumed legitimate, although the mother may have declared against its legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an adulteress. NCC 257 Should the wife commit adultery at or about the time of the conception of the child, but there was no physical impossibility of access between her and her husband as set forth in Article 255, the child is prima facie presumed to be illegitimate if it appears highly improbable, for ethnic reasons, that the child is that of the husband. For the purposes of this article, the wife's adultery need not be proved in a criminal case. NCC 166 Unless the wife has been declared a non compos mentis or a spendthrift, or is under civil interdiction or is confined in a leprosarium, the husband cannot alienate or encumber any real property of the conjugal partnership without the wife's consent. If she refuses unreasonably to give her consent, the court may compel her to grant the same. This article shall not apply to property acquired by the conjugal partnership before the effective date of this Code. NCC 167 . In case of abuse of powers of administration of the conjugal partnership property by the husband, the courts, on petition of the wife, may provide for receivership, or administration by the wife, or separation of property. NCC 168 The wife may, by express authority of the husband embodied in a public instrument, administer the conjugal partnership property. NCC 169 The wife may also by express authority of the husband appearing in a public instrument, administer the latter's estate.

TAN v TROCIO
Facts: - April 1971 when as Felicidad said, Galileo Trocio raped her which begot a son, Jewel o Didnt immediately tell the police since Trocio was thereatening to have her alien husband and to tell authrorities that she was violating the Anti-Dummy Law in operation of her vocational school - Nov 1979 Felicidad filed case of disbarment against Atty. Trocio o Trocio denied allegation of rape, only testifying that he dealt her and her familys cases and said she was only doing this because he declined on her request to increase his fee so that she may get the extra. - Feb 13 1986 since Trocio failed to attend the hearings etc, Provincial fiscal of Lanao Del Norte, on prima facie evidence presented, held Trocio administratively liable. ISSUE: WON Trocio should be disbarred for gross immoral conduct HELD: NO, there is lack of evidence - After incident, she still asked him to be the lawyer for her cases such as a robbery case and her claim for indeminity when a fire burned down the school - The fear that her alien husband would be deported has actually been an absent fear since she said she lost contact of her husband on the night the tryst happened. - Keeping her peace for 8 years could be construed as a condonation of his alleged immoral conduct. Testimony of household help that they heard her cries for help is negated by fact that she said it happened in school premises. How could the help have been there then? - INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO SHOW IT WAS HIS SON: (1) unusual closeness as testified by her household help (2) pictures of Jewel and Trocio together = not enough ground to establish paternity Presumption is Jewel is the child of the alien husband since he was born on 1972 when husband and Felicidad were living together.

ANGELES v MAGLAYA
Facts: - Nov 20, 1939 when Aleli Maglaya was born - 1948 when deceased Francisco married Belen Angeles - 1988 when her mother Genoveva died - March 1998 when Aleli Maglaya filed in Rtv Caloocan petition to be made administratix of late Francisco Angeles estate since she is sole legitimate daughter of Francisco. This was contested by his wife Belen Angeles. - RTC: Aleli failed to prove filiation - CA: reversed decision and said that Aleli was indeed a legitimate child of Francisco and Genoveva ISSUE: WON CA erred in declaring Aleli as a legitimate child HELD: YES - Law applied: FC 164 children conceived or born during the marriage of parents are legitimate - Aleli never showed any evidence of a marriage existing between Francisco and Genoveva. In fact, if they did marry, it would have rendered Franciscos marriage to Belen as bigamouse. However, Aleli herself recognized Belen as the surviving spouse in her petition for letters of administration o Without evidence of marriage, one cant presume Aleli to be legitimate child - CA erred in declaring that birth certificate indubitably establishes legitimacy o In order for legitimacy to be established, birth certificate must bear the signatures of BOTH mother and father. Only attending physicians signature was in the certificate. Thus it only showed the fact of birth of a child and not legitimacy - Papers and photogrpahs that show Francisco Angeles as her father is not sufficient enough to prove filiation. RESULT: at best, could only be declared a natural child and NOT a legitimate child. - SSS vs. Aguas ISSUE: WON Janet and Jeylynn are legitimate daughters of Pablo? HELD: Only Jeylynn is - Jeylynn proven by birth certificate where signature of Pablo is present and the fact that she was born on 1991 when marriage between Pablo and Rosana who were married on 1977 was still susbsisting o Pablo never once questioned legitimacy of Jeylynn o Presumption of legitimacy, conditions that husband may contest (398) - Janet birth certificate shown was only photocopy with no confirmation by civil register regarding her date of birth. Thus if one cant show that one is born during the marriage then cant be presumed legitimate Said that she was adopted but no papers to prove it and only legally adopted children are considered dependent children. Thus she cant be a beneficiary.

SAYSON v CA
DOCTRINE: Adopted child/ children has no right of representation FACTS: Eleno and Rafaela Sayson begot five children, namely, Mauricio, Rosario, Basilisa, Remedios and Teodoro. Eleno died on November 10, 1952, and Rafaela on May15,1976. Teodoro, who had married Isabel Bautista, died on March 23, 1972. His wife died nine years later. Their properties were left in the possession of Delia, Edmundo, and Doribel, all surnamed Sayson, who claim to be their children. Mauricio, Rosario, Basilisa, and Remedios, together with Juana C. Bautista, Isabel's mother, filed a complaint for partition and accounting of theintestate estate of Teodoro and Isabel Sayson. Delia, Edmundo and Doribel filed their own complaint, this time for the accounting and partition of the intestate estate of Eleno and Rafaela Sayson, against the couple's four surviving children. Both cases filed on the Lower Court were decided in favor Delia, et al. on the basis of practically the same evidence. The Lower Court declared that Delia and Edmundo were the legally adopted children of Teodoro and Isabel Sayson by virtue of the decree of adoption. Doribel was their legitimate daughter as evidenced by her birth certificate. Consequently, the three children were entitled to inherit from Eleno and Rafaela by right of representation. Both cases were appealed to the Court of Appeals, where they were consolidated. The appellate court affirmed that Delia, et al. are entitled to the intestate estate of spouses Teodoro and Isabel Sayson. However, Delia and Edmundo are disqualified from inheriting from the estate of the deceased spouses Eleno and Rafaela Sayson. ISSUE: W/N CA is correct in holding that Delia and Edmundo are disqualified to inherit from the estate of the deceased spouses Eleno and Rafaela Sayson. HELD: A different conclusion must be reached in the case of Delia and Edmundo, to whom the grandparents were total strangers.

While it is true that the adopted child shall be deemed to be a legitimate child and have the same right as the latter, these rights do not include the right of representation. The relationship created by the adoption is between only the adopting parents and the adopted child and does not extend to the blood relatives of either party. In sum, we agree with the lower courts that Delia and Edmundo as the adopted children and Doribelas the legitimate daughter of Teodoro Sayson and Isabel Bautista, are their

exclusive heirs and are under no obligation to share the estate of their parents with the petitioners. The Court of Appeals was correct, however, in holding that only Doribel has the right of representation in the inheritance of her grandparents' intestate estate, the other private respondents being only the adoptive children of the deceased Teodoro.

SSS v AGUAS
FACTS: Pablo Aguas, SSS member and pensioner, died 12/8/96. Pablos surviving spouse, respondent Rosanna filed a claim with SSS for death benefits. She indicated in her claim that Pablo was likewise survived by his minor child, Jeylynn, born 10/29/91 4/97, SSS received a sworn letter from Pablos sister Letecia contesting Rosannas claim for death benefits, alleged that Rosanna abandoned the family abode more than 6 years before the and lived w/ another man, de la Pena; Pablo had no legal children w/ Rosanna. Letecia enclosed birth cert of Jefren born 11/15/96 to Rosanna and de la Pena and that the 2 were married 11/1/90 Rosanna contends that Jeylynn was a legitimate child of Pablo as evidenced by her birth cert bearing Pablos signature as father Janet, who also claimed to be the child of deceased and Rosanna, joined as claimant. It appears in her birth cert that her father was Pablo and her mother was Rosanna. SSS summoned several persons; some stated that spouses real child was Jeylynn, Janet was only an adopted child but there were no legal papers. SSS ruled that Rosanna was no longer qualified as claimant. As for Jeylynn and Janet, they were not Pablos legitimate children. ISSUE: WON Jeylynn ad Janet are legitimate children of deceased (thus entitled to death benefits) HELD: YES (Jeylynn); NO (Janet) Jeylynns claim is justified by her birth cert w/c bears Pablos signature (showing she was born 10/29/91; Rosanna and Pablo were married 12/4/77 and marriage subsisted until latters death on 12/8/96). Under A164, FC, children conceived or born during the marriage of parents are legitimate. Presumption of legitimacy cant extend to Janet because her date of birth wasnt substantially proven. Under RA1161, only legally adopted children are considered dependent children.

RIVERA v HEIRS OF VILLANUEVA

FACTS: Petitioners are allegedly half-brothers, half-sis-in-law and children of a halfbrother of deceased PACITA. Respondents are allegedly siblings, full and half-blood of ROMUALDO; respondents are denominated as heirs of Romualdo. Respondent Angelina is allegedly the daughter of Pacita and Romualdo. From 1927 until her death in 1980, Pacita cohabited w/ Romualdo w/out the benefit of marriage because the latter was married to Musngi who died on 4/20/63. In the course of their cohabitation, they acquired several properties. Pacita died 7/3/80 without leaving a will. 8/8/80, Romualdo and respondent Angelina executed a deed of extrajudicial partition w/sale (an extrajudicial settlement of Pacitas estate). Petitioners filed a case for partition of Pacitas estate and annulment of titles. RTC made 2 findings 1) Pacita was never married to Romualdo 2) respondent Angelina was her illegitimate child by Romualdo ISSUE: WON respondent Angelina was illegitimate daughter of Pacita HELD: NO, a closer examination of the birth cert reveals that respondent Angelina was listed as adopted by both Pacita and Romualdo. And mere registration of a child in his birth cert as the child of the supposed parents is not a valid adoption, it does not confer upon the child the status of an adopted child and the legal rights of such child. Thus, she cant inherit from Pacita. Pacita was 44 y.o., on the verge of menopause at the time of the alleged birth; Pacita had been living childless w/Romualdo for 20 years

1.

Who are considered legitimate children a. Conceived during marriage i. Valid marriage ii. Terminated marriage under FC 42 in rel to FC 43 (1)

FC 42 The subsequent marriage referred to in the preceding Article shall be automatically terminated by the recording of the affidavit of reappearance of the absent spouse, unless there is a judgment annulling the previous marriage or declaring it void ab initio. A sworn statement of the fact and circumstances of reappearance shall be recorded in the civil registry of the residence of the parties to the subsequent marriage at the instance of any interested person, with due notice to the spouses of the subsequent marriage and without prejudice to the fact of reappearance being judicially determined in case such fact is disputed. FC 43 (1) The termination of the subsequent marriage referred to in the preceding Article shall produce the following effects: (1) The children of the subsequent marriage conceived prior to its termination shall be considered legitimate;

iii. Void marriages under FC 53, 36

FC 53 Either of the former spouses may marry again after compliance with the requirements of the immediately preceding Article; otherwise, the subsequent marriage shall be null and void. FC 36 Psychological incapacity

iv. Voidable marriages FC 45

FC 45 A marriage may be annulled for any of the following causes, existing at the time of the marriage: (1) That the party in whose behalf it is sought to have the marriage annulled was eighteen years of age or over but below twenty-one, and the marriage was solemnized without the consent of the parents, guardian or person having substitute parental authority over the party, in that order, unless after attaining the age of twenty-one, such party freely cohabited with the other and both lived together as husband and wife; (2) That either party was of unsound mind, unless such party after coming to reason, freely cohabited with the other as husband and wife; (3) That the consent of either party was obtained by fraud, unless such party afterwards, with full knowledge of the facts constituting the fraud, freely cohabited with the other as husband and wife; (4) That the consent of either party was obtained by force, intimidation or undue influence, unless the same having disappeared or ceased, such party thereafter freely cohabited with the other as husband and wife; (5) That either party was physically incapable of consummating the marriage with the other, and such incapacity continues and appears to be incurable; or (6) That either party was afflicted with a sexually-transmissible disease found to be serious and appears to be incurable.

b. c.

Born during marriage Conceived by artificial insemination

NCC 40 Birth determines personality; but the conceived child shall be considered born for all purposes that are favorable to it, provided it be born later with the conditions specified in the following article. FC 164 Children conceived or born during the marriage of the parents are legitimate. Children conceived as a result of artificial insemination of the wife with the sperm of the husband or that of a donor or both are likewise legitimate children of the husband and his wife, provided, that both of them authorized or ratified such insemination in a written instrument executed and signed by them before the birth of the child. The instrument shall be recorded in the civil registry together with the birth certificate of the child.

d. e. 2.

Adopted children Legitimated Children

Rights of legitimate children

FC 173 The action to claim legitimacy may be brought by the child during his or her lifetime and shall be transmitted to the heirs should the child die during minority or in a state of insanity. In these cases, the heirs shall have a period of five years within which to institute the action. FC 174 Legitimate children shall have the right: (1) To bear the surnames of the father and the mother, in conformity with the provisions of the Civil Code on Surnames; (2) To receive support from their parents, their ascendants, and in proper cases, their brothers and sisters, in conformity with the provisions of this Code on Support; and (3) To be entitled to the legitimate and other successional rights granted to them by the Civil Code. NCC 364 Legitimate and legitimated children shall principally use the surname of the father. NCC 374 In case of identity of names and surnames, the younger person shall be obliged to use such additional name or surname as will avoid confusion. NCC 376 No person can change his name or surname without judicial authority. NCC 888 The legitime of legitimate children and descendants consists of one-half of the hereditary estate of the father and of the mother. NCC 979 Legitimate children and their descendants succeed the parents and other ascendants, without distinction as to sex or age, and even if they should come from different marriages. An adopted child succeeds to the property of the adopting parents in the same manner as a legitimate child.

MOORE v REPUBLIC
Facts: Petitioner Elaine Moore (American citizen) is married with Joseph Velarde (also American) had a son out of wedlock William Michael Velarde (now 14 yrs old) born also at US. Said marriage however was dissolved through a decree of divorce from SC of California on 5/31/49. Elaine had 2nd marriage with Don Moore on 9/29/56 at LA, CA. William (minor) lived with them. Elaine filed @ CFI Rizal a motion to have her childs surname be changed into Moore instead of Velarde. TC denied such petition therefore this appeal. Issue: Government of the Phil. Opposed such petition with the following issues a) WON law permits minor to adopt surname of the 2nd husband of his mother b) WON justifiable reason exists to allow change of name c) WON mother has the authority to ask such Held: Regarding the 1st issue, RP said that through NCC 364 legitimate child should use the surname of his father. NCC 369 moreover cites that in case of annulment, child conceived before such decree shall use the surname of his/ her father. Likewise, same concept rules over decree of divorce; therefore law does NOT sanction such change of name. SC upheld such position, saying that confusion may arise wrt (with respect to) paternity and that said change may even redound to the prejudice of the child. Moreover, the child is still a minor and therefore aforesaid action is premature. Said child may in his mature age decide for himself to instigate such change of name.

NALDOZA v REPUBLIC
Facts: Zosima Naldoza married Dionesio Divinagracia on 5/30/70. They had 2 children: Jr. and Bombi Roberto. Dionesio abandoned conjugal home after Zosima confronted him about his previous marriage. Also, he allegedly swindled 50k from Rep. Maglana and 10k from a certain Galagar, etc. Classmates of Jr. and Bombi were teasing them because of their swindler father. To obliterate any connection between her children and Dionesio (thereby relieving the kids of the remarks of classmates), Zosima filed @ CFI Bohol on 4/10/78 a petition to change surname of her 2 children from Divinagracia into Naldoza (her maiden name). TC dismissed pet. saying that aforementioned reasons (swindling, abandoning, previous marriage of Dionesio <but their marriage has not yet been annulled nor declared bigamous> ) were not sufficient grounds to invoke such change of surname. Furthermore, change of name would give false impression of family relations. Issue: WON two childrens prayer to drop their fathers surname is justified Held: NO. Following NCC 364, since Jr. and Bombi are LC (legitimate children), therefore they should use their fathers surname. Said minors and their father should be consulted about such, mothers desire should not only be the sole consideration. Change of name is allowed only upon proper and reasonable cause (Rule 103 Sec 5 ROC). Change of name may even redound to the prejudice of the children later on, may cause confusion as to the minors parentage and might also create the impression that said minors are ICs, which is inconsistent with their legal status. In Oshita v. Republic and in Alfon v. Republic, their petition to change names have been granted, but petitioners in said cases have already attained mature age. In this case, when these minors have attained the right age, then they can already file said action for themselves.

ONG v CA
FACTS: -Respondents Alferdo Ong Jr. and Robert Ong are children of Saturnina Caballes allegedly by Manuel Ong. -Manuel (representing himself as Alfredo Go) was introduced to Saturnina by Vicente Sy and Constancia Lim (in 1953 at a night club in cebu). They had a relationship and lived together for 4 months. It was also established that prior to meeting Manuel, Saturnina cohabited with a paralytic. -Alfredo Ong Jr. (registered as Alfredo Go Jr.) was born in 1955 and Robert Ong (registered as Roberto Caballes) 1956. Roberto is surnamed Caballes because the midwife informed Saturnina that it should be the case since she werent married with Manuel. Manuels support dwindled. He stopped seeing her. She discovered his identity and asked for support but he refused. -In 1961 they asked for support but Manuel denied them. In two occasions Dolores Dy, Manuels commonlaw wife, treated private respondents like close relatives of Manuel Ong by giving them on November 2, 1979 and January 6, 1977 tokens of affection, such as family pictures of Dolores Dy and Manuel Ong and by visiting them in their house on A. Lopez Street in 1980. -Manuel Ong also gave money to Alfredo, first, as the latters high school graduation gift and second, for the latters educational support. Manuel Ong even told Alfredo to comeback with a list of what he needs for school but when he came back with some friends in September 1982, Manuel turned down his request and ordered him to leave and threatened to call the police if he did not leave. -September 30, 1982, Alfredo filed a complaint for recognition and support against Manuel Ong. The complaint was amended on November 25, 1982 to include Robert as co-plaintiff. Manuel died in May 1990 while the case is pending. TC-declared Alfredo and Robert illegitimate children of Manuel in accordance with Art. 283, pars. 2 and 4 of the Civil Code. CA-affirm TC, cited Art. 283, par. 3 as an additional ground for ordering the recognition of private respondents as illegitimate children. Issue: WON Alfredo and Roberto are illegitimate children of Manuel Held/Ratio: Yes. Alfredo and Roberto are sons of Manuel. Using Article 283 Paragraph. 4 (The father is obliged to recognize) When the child has in his favor any evidence or proof that the defendant is his father . Art. 283 operates as a blanket provision covering all cases in the preceding ones, so that evidence, even though insufficient to constitute proof under the other paragraphs, may nonetheless be enough to qualify the case under par. 4. In this case, the testimony of Saturnina Caballes that she had illicit sexual relation with Manuel Ong over a long period (1954-1957) which, had it been openly done, would have constituted cohabitation under par. 3 is proof that private respondents were conceived and born during such relationship and constitutes evidence of Ongs paternity. This relationship was further established through the testimony of Constancia Lim. The evidence for private respondents is not negated by the admission of Saturnina Caballes that she had relation with another man before, because the relationship terminated at least a year before the birth of Alfredo Ong, Jr. and two years before the birth of the second child Robert Caballes. SC agree that this DOES NOT fall in Art 283 (2) When the child is in continuous possession of status of a child of the alleged father by the direct acts of the latter or his family--- the times during which Manuel Ong met Alfredo and gave the latter money cannot be considered proof of continuous possession of the status of a child. The fathers conduct toward his son must be spontaneous and uninterrupted for this ground to exist. Does NOT fall in Art 283 (3) When the child was conceived during the time when the mother cohabited with the supposed father----------While Saturnina Caballes testified that she and Manuel Ong lived together for four months as husband and wife in order to justify a finding of cohabitation, the relationship was not open and public so as to constitute cohabitation. Petitioner claims that Manuel is sterile (due to illness during World War). For despite living with 2 other women, Dolores and Victoria Veloria (later established as Victoria Balili) but they didnt have a child. CA dismissed this for there is no medical proof and Manuel acknowledged a Lourdes Balili (born 1939) as his natural child with a Victoria Balili. An adult male is presumed to have normal powers of virility and the burden of evidence to prove the contrary rests upon him who claims otherwise. Petitioner has not overcome this presumption

REPUBLIC v CA
Facts : The petitioner was born at Capitol Medical Center in Quezon City on January 19, 1971 to parents Pablo Castro Vicencio and Fe Esperanza de Vega Leabres. On January 10, 1927, after a marital disagreement, Vicencio left their Meycauayan Bulacan conjugal property and never returned nor gave support to his family. Leabres found an ally in Ernesto Yu who would later end up as her husband. On June 29, 1976, Leabres filed a petition , known as Civil case number E-02009 with the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court for the dissolution of her conjugal partnership with Vicencio. In a decision given by Hon Regina C. Ordoez Benitez dated July11, 1977, the petition was granted. The petitioners mother filed another petition in 1983 to drop the surname of her husband there from and this, known as Special Proclamation 8316346 was again approved in a decision rendered by Hon. Emeterio C. Cui of Branch XXV. Yet again, under Special Proclamation number 84-22605, Leabres filed a petition to declare Pablo Vicencio an absentee. Hon. Corona Ibay- Somera decided in favour of the petitioners mother on April 26,1984. The positive results of these petitions paved the way for the marriage of the petitioners mother and Ernesto Yu on April 15, 1986.Evidence was established that the petitioner had not remembered much her real father, Pablo Vicencio, and that in his absence, it was Ernesto Yu who had taken Vicencios place. Although petitioner uses the surname Vicencio in her school and other related activities, she contends that in such situations, confusion arose as to her parentage leading to inquiries as to why she is using Vicencio as surname; causing much embarrassment on her part. In two occasions when she ran as a beauty contestant for Lions Club Affair and Manila Red Cross, her name was registered as Cynthia L. Yu. His stepfather had given his consent thereto upon prior consultation with him. The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) , having participated in the cross examination of Cynthia Vicencio and her witnesses, manifested opposition over the petition. The court argued that there was no valid cause for the denial of the petition and that taking into account the fact that the court cannot compel the stepfather of the petitioner to consider adoption, failure to observe the process should not be a cause for disallowing petitioner to legally change her name, in addition to the opportunity of the respondent to improve her personality and welfare under a socially recognized surname, that of her stepfather. On August 31, 1987, the Manila Regional Trial Court Branch 52 granted private respondent Cynthia Vicencios petition for change of surname from Vicencio to Yu. The same was affirmed by the decision of the Court of Appeals dated April 28, 1989. Issue : Whether or not the appellate court made a mistake or violated standards in affirming the decision of the trial court to allow the change in private respondents surname to that of her stepfathers surname. Decision : Recognized inter alia in Republic vs. Hernandez, the following are sufficient grounds to warrant a change in name; a) when the name is ridiculous, dishonorable or extremely difficult to write or pronounce, b) when the change is a legal consequence of legitimation or adoption , c. ) when the change will avoid confusion, d) when one has continuously used and been known since childhood by a Filipino name and was unaware of an alien parentage, e) when the change is based on sincere desire to adopt a Filipino name to erase sign of former alienage, in good faith without prejudice to anybody and f) when the surname causes embarrassment and there is no showing that desired change of name was far a fraudulent purpose or would prejudice public interest. Private respondent asserts that she falls under one of the justifiable grounds, specifically under avoidance of confusion since she has been recognized by society as the daughter of Ernesto Yu although she admits to having used Vicencio in beauty pageants and in her debut. In the argument of the Solicitor General , it argues that change in surname might give rise to legal complications since her stepfather has two other children with her mother and such complications may affect even the issue of inheritance should the stepfather die. The OSG further argues that change of name would be easy through adoption which Ernesto Yu did not opt for. The court contends that though confusion may arise with regard to parentage, more confusion with grave legal consequences could arise if private respondent is to use his stepfathers surname even if she is not legally adopted by him. Legal constraints lead the court to reject private respondents desire to use her step-fathers surname and no assurance exists that the end result would not be even more detrimental to her person, as it may trigger deeper inquiries regarding her parentage. It is also noteworthy that as a result of Republic Act 6809, the private respondent although already 18 when the appellate court rendered its decision, was still considered a minor. The court reversed and set aside the appealed decision to allow private respondents change of name from Vicencio to Yu and granted the instant petition to retain surname due to lack of legally justifiable cause for allowing such change.

CONTINENTAL STEEL v MONTANO

Facts: Hortillano, and employee of Continental Steel Manufacturing Corporation and member of the Union, filed a claim for Paternity Leave, Bereavement Leave and Death and Accident Insurance for dependent, pursuant to the Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA). The claim was based on the death of Hortillanos unborn child. Hortillanos wife had a premature delivery while she was in the 38th week of pregnancy. Continental Steel immediately granted Hortillanos claim for paternity leave but denied his claims for bereavement leave and other death benefits. The Union and Continental Steal submitted for voluntary arbitration the sole issue of whether Hortillano was entitled to bereavementleave and other death benefits pursuant to the CBA. The parties proceeded to submit their respective position papers, replies and rejoinders to the arbitrator they chose, Atty. Montano. The Union argued that Hortillano is entitled to bereavement leave and other death benefits because it did not specifically state that a dependent should have first been born alive or must have acquire juridical personality so that his/her death could be covered by the CBA death benefits. On the other hand, Continental Steal claimed that there are two elements for the entitlement to the benefits, namely: death and status as legitimate dependent, none of which existed in Hortillanos case. Atty. Montano found that there was no dispute that the death of an employees legitimate dependent occurred. The fetus had the right to be supported by the parents from the very moment he/she was conceived. Thus, the complaint was dismissed. Continental Steal filed with the Court of Appeals a Petition for Review on Certiorari but it was denied. Issues: Whether or not only one with juridical personality can die. Whether or not an unborn child can be considered as a dependent. Held and Ratio: One need not acquire civil personality first before he/she could die. Even a child inside the womb already has life. Even an unborn child is dependent of its parents. Hortillanos child could not have reached 38-39 weeks of its gestational life without depending upon its mother for sustenance.

C. Illegitimate Children 1. Who are considered illegitimate a. Under NCC b. Under FC 165 SURPOSA UY v NGO CHUA
FACTS: Joanie Surposa Uy filed on 27 October 2003 before the RTC a Petition for the issuance of a decree of illegitimate filiation against Jose Ngo Chua. Uy alleged that Chua who was then married, had an illicit relationship with Irene Surposa.who was then married, had an illicit relationship with Irene Surposa. Joanie denied that he had an illicit relationship with Irene, and that petitioner was his daughter. Hearings then ensued during which petitioner testified that respondent was the only father she knew; that he took care of all her needs until she finished her college education; and that he came to visit heron special family occasions. She also presented documentary evidence to prove her claim of illegitimate filiation. Petitioner JOANIE SURPOSA UY declares, admits and acknowledges that there is no blood relationship or filiation between petitioner and her brother Allan on one hand and [herein respondent] JOSE NGO CHUA on the other. This declaration, admission or acknowledgement is concurred with petitioners brother Allan, who although not a party to the case, hereby affixes his signature to this pleading and also abides by the declaration herein.

FC 165 Children conceived and born outside a valid marriage are illegitimate, unless otherwise provided in this Code.

As a gesture of goodwill and by way of settling petitioner and her brothers (Allan) civil, monetary and similar claims but without admitting any liability, [respondent] JOSE NGO CHUA hereby binds himself to pay the petitioner the sum of TWO MILLION PESOS (P2,000,000.00) and another TWOMILLION PESOS (P2,000,000.00) to her brother, ALLAN SURPOSA. Petitioner and her brother hereby acknowledge to have received in full the said compromise amount. Petitioner and her brother (Allan) hereby declare that they have absolutely no more claims, causes of action or demands against [respondent] JOSE NGO CHUA, his heirs, successors and assigns and/or against the estate of Catalino Chua, his heirs, successors and assigns and/or against all corporations, companies or business enterprises including Cebu Liberty Lumber and Joe Lino Realty Investment and Development Corporation where defendant JOSE NGO CHUA or CATALINO NGO CHUA may have interest or participation. Chua hereby waives all counterclaim or counter-demand with respect to the subject matter of the present petition.

Pursuant to the foregoing, petitioner hereby asks for a judgment for the permanent dismissal with prejudice of the captioned petition. [Respondent] also asks for a judgment permanently dismissing with prejudice his counterclaim. ISSUE: Whether or not filiation can be the subject of judicial settlement? HELD: It is settled, then, in law and jurisprudence, that the status and filiation of a child cannot be compromised. Public policy demands that there be no compromise on the status and filiation of a child. Paternity and filiation or the lack of the same, is a relationship that must be judicially established, and it is for the Court to declare its existence or absence. It cannot be left to the will or agreement of the parties. Being contrary to law and public policy, the Compromise Agreement dated 18 February 2000 between petitioner and respondent is void ab initio and vests no rights and creates no obligations. It produces no legal effect at all. The void agreement cannot be rendered operative even by the parties' alleged performance (partial or full) of their respective presentations.

2.

Rights of Illegitimate children

FC 173 The action to claim legitimacy may be brought by the child during his or her lifetime and shall be transmitted to the heirs should the child die during minority or in a state of insanity. In these cases, the heirs shall have a period of five years within which to institute the action. FC 172 The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following: (1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or (2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned. In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved by: (1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or (2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws. FC 175 Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the same way and on the same evidence as legitimate children. The action must be brought within the same period specified in Article 173, except when the action is based on the second paragraph of Article 172, in which case the action may be brought during the lifetime of the alleged parent. FC 176 Illegitimate children shall use the surname and shall be under the parental authority of their mother, and shall be entitled to support in conformity with this Code. The legitime of each illegitimate child shall consist of one-half of the legitime of a legitimate child. Except for this modification, all other provisions in the Civil Code governing successional rights shall remain in force.

OSMENA de VALENCIA v RODRIGUEZ

Facts: - Plaintiffs say that they are the legitimate children of the defendant Pio Valencia in the latters lawful wedlock with plaintiff Catalina Osmena - Defendants on the otherhand are the illegitimate children of defendant Pio Valencia with Emilia Rodriguez his common-law wife. - Plaintiffs allege that they alone have the right to the surname Valencia Issues: WON the illegitimate children could use the surname Valencia Held: Yes Ratio: This cannot happen since if plaintiffs were correct then they could stop numerous inhabitants from using the surname Valencia as well. Moreover, Pio Valencia has acquiesced to this as well. Finally, there is no law granting the exclusive ownership over a surname.

UYGUANGCO v CA
Facts: Apolinario Uyguangco died intestate in 1975, leaving his wife, four legitimate children and properties which they divided among themselves. Graciano Uyguangco filed a complaint for partition against the petitioners, claiming that as the illegitimate son of the deceased and a Anastacia Bacjao, he must not be left out of the extrajudicial settlement of the estate. He also claims that he received support from his father while in high school and was also assigned by his father as storekeeper at the Uyguangco store. Petitioners moved to dismiss the case on the ground that Graciano could not prove his alleged filiation having none of the documents required in Art. 278 of the NCC (i.e. record of birth, a will, a statement before a court of record or in any authentic writing. Neither may he resort to Art. 285 of the NCC because he was already an adult when his alleged dad died. Graciano insists however, that he is in continuous possession of the status of a child of his alleged father by the direct acts of the latter or of his family as is under Art. 283 of the NCC. Issue: WON Graciano may adequately prove filiation. Held: NO Ratio: The Civil Code provisions they invoke have been superseded or at least modified by the corresponding articles n the FC. Since illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the same way and on the same evidence as legitimate children (Art 175), Graciano may establish his filiation by the means given in Art. 172. Thus while he has no record of birth appearing in the civil registrar or a final judgment or an admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned, he insists that he has nevertheless been in an open and continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate child, which is admissible as evidence of filiation under Art. 172. As proof to this open and continuous possessionhe claims that he lived with his father from 1967 until 1973, received support from him, used the name Uyguangco without objection, a special power of attorney executed in his favor by Apolinarios wife, and another one by Suplcio Uyguangco, shared in the profits of the copra family business of the Uyguangcos and was even given a share in his deceased fathers estate as found in the addendum to the original extrajudicial settlement concluded by the petitioners. However, since his father has already died, his action is now barred as Art. 172 specifically requires that when the action is based on other proofs of filiation such as open and continuous possession, the action must be brought during the lifetime of the alleged parent. Ruling: Petition Granted.

MANGULABNAN v ACERO
Facts: Edna Padilla Mangulabnan filed an action for damages and support for her child Alfie Angelo. The TC ordered Ambrocio Tan Chew Acero to pay monthly support. He then moved for a reconsideration but was denied on December 5, 1984. CA annulled the orders of the TC on the ground that even as to illegitimate children who are not natural children, there is a need for the latter class of children (spurious children) to be recognized either voluntarily or by judicial decree, otherwise they cannot demand support as in the case of an acknowledged child. Issue: WON recognition of an illegitimate child like the minor Alfie whose father is married and had no legal capacity to contract marriage at the time of his conception is required before support may be granted. Held: NO Ratio: The requirement for recognition by father or mother jointly or by only one of them as provided by law refers in particular to a natural child under Article 276 of the NCC. Such child is presumed to be the natural child of the parents recognizing it who had the legal capacity to contract marriage at the time of conception. Thus, an illegitimate child like Alfie is not a natural child but an illegitimate child or spurious child in which case recognition is not required before support may be granted. However, under Article 887 of the NCC, in all cases of illegitimate children, their filiation must be proved. The status of the minor child had been provisionally established as affidavits of petitioner and 2 witnesses, and the birth certificate were presented to prove the paternity of the child.

BRIONES v MIGUEL
Facts: 1) Review of CA decision awarding custody of minor child to mother (custody until child reaches age 10 then he is to choose w/c parent he wants to stay with) w/ visitation rights to the Father, Joey D. Briones. 2) Mar 5, 02 - Petitioner files for Habeas Corpus claiming the child was visited by Respondentss Maricel and Francisca Miguel relatives of the mother of the child, Respondent Loreta Miguel, under the pretext of taking the child to SM, then they did not return. 3) Petitioner claims that he extensively looked for the child but failed so he was compelled to file for habeas corpus. 4) Respondent mother Loreta alleges that the child was not taken as he was fetched by her w/ the petitioners consent. 5) Respondent and Briones met in Japan and had a relationship together w/c bore the child Michael Kevin Pineda (relationship eventually soured according to Respondent Loreta because of Petitioners illicit relationship w/ another woman, now married to Japanese national). 6) Briones petitions for joint custody when the mom Loreta is away. Issues: WON the natural father of an illegitimate child may be denied custody of his own child. Held: Yes, the child being born outside of a legitimate marriage is considered illegitimate since his illegitimacy is not cured by his parents later marriage. As such he is covered by Art 176 of the family code that mentions among other things that a mother shall have parental authority over the illegitimate child, regardless of whether the father acknowledges paternity over the child. Acknowledgment of paternity is only a means of compelling support for the child not entitling custody. Moreover the Family Code does not distinguish b/w the natural and spurious nature of the illegitimate child as they are treated in the same category. Furthermore absent any compelling reason for depriving Loreta custody over the child (such as neglect or abandonment, unemployment, immorality, habitual drunkenness, drug addiction, maltreatment of the child, insanity, and affliction w/ a communicable disease) custody shall remain w/ the mother, with the father granted visitation rights. (action moot since child off to Japan during the pendency of the action)

MONTEFALCON v VASQUEZ
Facts: 1999 Dolores Montefalcon filed with RTC-Naga for acknowledgment and support by Ronnie Vasquez of their son Laurence as his illegitimate child 3 summons were delivered to Vasquez all of which remained unanswered 2001 court, taking Vasquez silence as truth to the allegations, declared Laurence as his illegitimate child and ordered him to support the child. Vasquez resurfaced after this decision and appealed it. Thus the case. ISSUE: WON Laurence is the illegitimate child of Vasquez HELD: YES, and is thus entitled to support. FC Article 172, the filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following: (1) through record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final order This is evidenced by Laurence record of live birth which Vasquez signed and supplied the data. FC Article 195 - parent is obliged to support his illegitimate child. Support comprises everything indispensable for sustenance, dwelling, clothing, medical attendance, education and transportation, in keeping with the financial capacity of the family RESULT: decision of RTC on legitimacy and support is reinstated. Art. 166. Legitimacy of a child may be impugned only on the following grounds: (1) That it was physically impossible for the husband to have sexual intercourse with his wife within the first 120 days of the 300 days which immediately preceded the birth of the child because of: (a) the physical incapacity of the husband to have sexual intercourse with his wife; (b) the fact that the husband and wife were living separately in such a way that sexual intercourse was not possible; or (c) serious illness of the husband, which absolutely prevented sexual intercourse; (2) That it is proved that for biological or other scientific reasons, the child could not have been that of the husband, except in the instance provided in the second paragraph of Article 164; or (3) That in case of children conceived through artificial insemination, the written authorization or ratification of either parent was obtained through mistake, fraud, violence, intimidation, or undue influence.

HEIRS OF MARAMAG v DE GUZMAN

FACTS: Loreto Maramag designated as beneficiary his concubine Eva de Guzman Maramag Vicenta Maramag and Odessa, Karl Brian, and Trisha Angelie (heirs of Loreto Maramag) and his concubine Eva de Guzman Maramag, also suspected in the killing of Loreto and his illegitimate children are claiming for his insurance. Vicenta alleges that Eva is disqualified from claiming RTC: Granted - civil code does NOT apply CA: dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction for filing beyond reglementary period ISSUE: W/N Eva can claim even though prohibited under the civil code against donation HELD: YES. Petition is DENIED. Any person who is forbidden from receiving any donation under Article 739 cannot be named beneficiary of a life insurance policy of the person who cannot make any donation to him o If a concubine is made the beneficiary, it is believed that the insurance contract will still remain valid, but the indemnity must go to the legal heirs and not to the concubine, for evidently, what is prohibited under Art. 2012 is the naming of the improper beneficiary. SECTION 53. The insurance proceeds shall be applied exclusively to the proper interest of the person in whose name or for whose benefit it is made unless otherwise specified in the policy. o GR: only persons entitled to claim the insurance proceeds are either the insured, if still alive; or the beneficiary, if the insured is already deceased, upon the maturation of the policy. o EX: situation where the insurance contract was intended to benefit third persons who are not parties to the same in the form of favorable stipulations or indemnity. In such a case, third parties may directly sue and claim from the insurer It is only in cases where the insured has not designated any beneficiary, or when the designated beneficiary is disqualified by law to receive the proceeds, that the insurance policy proceeds shall redound to the benefit of the estate of the insured

DE LA CRUZ v GARCIA
Facts: For several months in 2005, then 21-year old petitioner Jenie San Juan Dela Cruz (Jenie) and then 19-year old Christian Dominique Sto. Tomas Aquino(Dominique) lived together as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage. They resided in the house of Dominiques parents Domingo B. Aquino and Raquel Sto.Tomas Aquino at Pulang-lupa, Dulumbayan, Teresa, Rizal. On September 4, 2005,Dominique died. After almost two months, or on November 2, 2005, Jenie, who continued to live with Dominiques parents, gave birth to her herein co-petitioner minor child Christian Dela Cruz Aquino at the Antipolo Doctors Hospital, Antipolo City. Jenie applied for registration of the childs birth, using Dominiques surname Aquino, with the Office of the City Civil Registrar, Antipolo City, in support of which she submitted the childs Certificate of Live Birth, Affidavit to Use the Surname of the Father (AUSF) which she had executed and signed, and Affidavit of Acknowledgment executed by Dominiques father Domingo Butch Aquino. Both affidavits attested, inter alia, that during the lifetime of Dominique, he had continuously acknowledged his yet unborn child, and that his paternity had never been questioned. Jenie attached to the AUSF a document entitled AUTOBIOGRAPHY which Dominique, during his lifetime, wrote in his own handwriting, the pertinent portions of which read: AQUINO, CHRISTIAN DOMINIQUE S.T.AUTOBIOGRAPHY IM CHRISTIAN DOMINIQUE STO. TOMAS AQUINO, 19 YEARS OF AGE TURNING20 THIS COMING OCTOBER 31, 2005.[5] I RESIDE AT PULANG-LUPA STREETBRGY. DULUMBAYAN, TERESA, RIZAL. I AM THE YOUNGEST IN OUR FAMILY. IHAVE ONE BROTHER NAMED JOSEPH BUTCH STO. TOMAS AQUINO. MYFATHERS NAME IS DOMINGO BUTCH AQUINO AND MY MOTHERS NAME ISRAQUEL STO. TOMAS AQUINO. x x x AS OF NOW I HAVE MY WIFE NAMED JENIE DELA CRUZ. WE MET EACH OTHERIN OUR HOMETOWN, TEREZA RIZAL. AT FIRST WE BECAME GOOD FRIENDS,THEN WE FELL IN LOVE WITH EACH OTHER, THEN WE BECAME GOODCOUPLES. AND AS OF NOW SHE IS PREGNANT AND FOR THAT WE LIVETOGETHER IN OUR HOUSE NOW. THATS ALL. By letter dated November 11, 2005,[7] the City Civil Registrar of Antipolo City, Ronald Paul S. Gracia (respondent), denied Jenies application for registration of the childs name. In summary, the child cannot use the surname of his father because he was born out of wedlock and the father unfortunately died prior to his birth and has no more capacity to acknowledge his paternity to the child (either through the back of Municipal Form No.102 Affidavit

of Acknowledgment/Admission of Paternity or the Authority to Use the Surname of the Father). (Underscoring supplied) Jenie and the child promptly filed a complaint for injunction/registration of name against respondent before the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo City, docketed as SCA Case No. 06-539, which was raffled to Branch 73 thereof. The complaint alleged that, inter alia, the denial of registration of the childs name is a violation of his right to use the surname of his deceased father under Article 176 of the Family Code, as amended by Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9255,[10] which provides: Article 176. Illegitimate children shall use the surname and shall be under the parental authority of their mother, and shall be entitled to support in conformity with this Code.However, illegitimate children may use the surname of their father if their filiation has been expressly recognized by the father through the record of birth appearing in thecivil register, or when an admission in a public document or private handwritten instrument is made by the father. Provided, the father has the right to institute an action before the regular courts to prove non-filiation during his lifetime. The legitime of each illegitimate child shall consist of one-half of the legitime of a legitimate child. Issue: WHETHER OR NOT THE UNSIGNED HANDWRITTEN STATEMENT OF THEDECEASED FATHER OF MINOR CHRISTIAN DELA CRUZ CAN BE CONSIDEREDAS A RECOGNITION OF PATERNITY IN A PRIVATE HANDWRITTENINSTRUMENT WITHIN THE CONTEMPLATION OF ARTICLE 176 OF THE FAMILYCODE, AS AMENDED BY R.A. 9255, WHICH ENTITLES THE SAID MINOR TO USEHIS FATHERS SURNAME. Held: Petition granted. Article 176 of the Family Code, as amended by R.A. 9255, permits an illegitimate child to use the surname of his/her father if the latter had expressly recognized him/her as his offspring through the record of birth . DOJ OPINION NO. 11 SERIES OF 1990 DOJ OPINION No. 4, Series of 1998

appearing in the civil register, or through an admission made in a public or private handwritten instrument. The recognition made in any of these documents is, in itself, a consummated act of acknowledgment of the childs paternity; hence, no separate action for judicial approval is necessary. Article 176 of the Family Code, as amended, does not, indeed, explicitly state that the private handwritten instrument acknowledging the childs paternity must be signed by the putative father. That a father who acknowledges paternity of a child through a written instrument must affix his signature thereon is clearly implied in Article 176 of the Family Code. Paragraph 2.2, Rule 2 of A.O. No. 1, Series of 2004, merely articulated such requirement; it did not unduly expand the import of Article 176 as claimed by petitioners. First, Dominique died about two months prior to the childs birth. Second, the relevant matters in the Autobiography, unquestionably handwritten by Dominique, correspond to the facts culled from the testimonial evidence Jenie proffered. Third, Jenies testimony is corroborated by the Affidavit of Acknowledgment of Dominiques father Domingo Aquino and testimony of his brother Joseph Butch Aquino whose hereditary rights could be affected by the registration of the questioned recognition of the child. These circumstances indicating Dominiques paternity of the child give life to his statements in his Autobiography that JENIE DELA CRUZ is MY WIFE as WE FELLIN LOVE WITH EACH OTHER and NOW SHE IS PREGNANT AND FOR THAT WELIVE TOGETHER.In the eyes of society, a child with an unknown father bears the stigma of dishonor. It is to petitioner minor childs best interests to allow him to bear the surname of the now deceased Dominique and enter it in his birth certificate

MANUNGAS v LORETO

D. Action to impugn legitimacy REYES v MAURICIO 1. Grounds

FC 166 Legitimacy of a child may be impugned only on the following grounds: (1) That it was physically impossible for the husband to have sexual intercourse with his wife within the first 120 days of the 300 days which immediately preceded the birth of the child because of: (a) the physical incapacity of the husband to have sexual intercourse with his wife; (b) the fact that the husband and wife were living separately in such a way that sexual intercourse was not possible; or (c) serious illness of the husband, which absolutely prevented sexual intercourse; (2) That it is proved that for biological or other scientific reasons, the child could not have been that of the husband, except in the instance provided in the second paragraph of Article 164; or (3) That in case of children conceived through artificial insemination, the written authorization or ratification of either parent was obtained through mistake, fraud, violence, intimidation, or undue influence.

a.

Physical impossibility of access ANDAL v MACARAIG

HELD: YES - Art 108 of NCC - Children born after the one hundred and eighty days next following that of the celebration of marriage or within the three hundred days next following its dissolution or the separation of the spouses shall be presumed to be legitimate. o Emiliano is presumed to be legitimate sine he was born within 300 days following the dissolution of marriage. - Evidence did not show that Emiliano, even when he was sick of tuberculosis, could not sexually perform so even if Maria was having an affair even before eloping with Felix, it is still presumed that Mariano is Emilianos son. RESULT: son is the legit heir and thus inherits the land of his father

Facts: - Jan 1941 Emiliano Andal ,who was married to Maria Duenas, became sick with tuberculosis. His brother Felix went to live with them to help them with the farm. - Sept 10 1942, Maria eloped with Felix and lived together from 1942-1943 - Jan 1, 1943 Emiliano died. Maria didnt attend the funeral - June 17, 1943 Maria gave birth to Mariano Andal - Maria then filed for recovery of land that was originally given to Emiliano by his mother upon his marriage to Maria. Maria said that the land is her sons since he is the legitimate heir of Emiliano. ISSUE: WON Mariano is the legitimate son and can thus inherit the land

MACADANGDANG v CA
FACTS: o Mejias is married to Anahaw o Majias allegedly had intercourse with Macadangdang sometime in March 1967 o Due to the affair, she and her husband separated in 1967 o October 30, 1967: Mejias gave birthday to a boy (Rolando Macadangdang) o April 25, 1972: Mejias filed a complaint for recognition and support against Macadangdang o Macadangdang opposed claim and prayed for its dismissal o Court dismissed the complaint o CA reversed the judgment and declared Rolando to be an illegitimate son of Antonio Macadangdang. ISSUES: o Whether or not the child Rolando is conclusively presumed the legitimate issue of the spouses Elizabeth Mejias and Crispin Anahaw; and o Whether or not the wife may institute an action that would bastardize her child without giving her husband, the legally presumed father, an opportunity to be heard. HELD: o YES The birth of Rolando came more than one hundred eighty 180 days following the celebration of the said marriage and before 300 days following the alleged separation between aforenamed spouses. Art. 255: Rolando is conclusively presumed to be the legitimate son of Mejias and Anahaw Rolando was born on October 30, 1967. Between March, 1967 and October 30, 1967, the time difference is clearly 7 months. The baby Rolando could have been born prematurely. But such is not the case. Respondent underwent a normal nine-month pregnancy. Presumption of legitimacy becomes conclusive in the absence of proof that there was physical impossibility of access between the spouses in the first 120 days of the 300 which preceded the birth of the child the fact remains that there was always the possibility of access to each other same province Physical impossibility: (1) impotence of husband;

 inability of the male organ to copulation, to perform its proper function (2) living separately in such a way that access was impossible; and (3) serious illness of the husband. o NO. Art. 256 provides that the child is presumed legitimate although the mother may have declared against its legitimacy

Art. 257: adultery on the part of the wife, in itself, cannot destroy the presumption of legitimacy of her child, because it is still possible that the child is that of the husband Only the husband can contest the legitimacy of a child born to his wife Art. 220 PETITION GRANTED. JUDGMENT REVERSED AND SET ASIDE.

CONCEPCION v CA
FACTS: Gerardo Concepcion, the petitioner, and Ma. Theresa Almonte, private respondent, were married in December 1989, and begotten a child named Jose Gerardo in December 1990. The husband filed on December 1991, a petition to have his marriage annulled on the ground of bigamy since the wife married a certain Mario Gopiao sometime in December 1980, whom according to the husband was still alive and living in Loyola Heights, QC. Trial court ruled that the son was an illegitimate child and the custody was awarded to the wife while Gerardo was granted visitation rights. Theresa argued that there was nothing in the law granting visitation rights in favor of the putative father of an illegitimate child. She further wanted to have the surname of the son changed from Concepcion to Almonte, her maiden name, since an illegitimate child should use his mothers surname. After the requested oral argument, trial court reversed its ruling and held the son to be not the son of Gerardo but of Mario. Hence, the child was a legitimate child of Theresa and Mario. . HELD: Considering that Theresas marriage with Gerardo was void ab initio, the latter never became the formers husband and never acquired any right to impugn the legitimacy of the child. Theresas contention was to have his son be declared as not the legitimate child of her and Mario but her illegitimate child with Gerardo. In this case, the mother has no right to disavow a child because maternity is never uncertain. Hence, she is not permitted by law to question the sons legitimacy. Under Article 167 of the Family Code, the child shall be considered legitimate although the mother may have declared against its legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an adulteress. Having the best interest of the child in mind, the presumption of his legitimacy was upheld by the Court. As a legitimate child, the son shall have the right to bear the surnames of Mario and Theresa, in conformity with the provisions of Civil Code on surnames. Gerardo cannot then impose his surname to be used by the child, since in the eyes of the law, the child is not related to him in any way

b. Biological or other scientific grounds Rule on DNA Evidence

FC 170 The action to impugn the legitimacy of the child shall be brought within one year from the knowledge of the birth or its recording in the civil register, if the husband or, in a proper case, any of his heirs, should reside in the city or municipality where the birth took place or was recorded. If the husband or, in his default, all of his heirs do not reside at the place of birth as defined in the first paragraph or where it was recorded, the period shall be two years if they should reside in the Philippines; and three years if abroad. If the birth of the child has been concealed from or was unknown to the husband or his heirs, the period shall be counted from the discovery or knowledge of the birth of the child or of the fact of registration of said birth, whichever is earlier. FC 171 The heirs of the husband may impugn the filiation of the child within the period prescribed in the preceding article only in the following cases: (1) If the husband should died before the expiration of the period fixed for bringing his action; (2) If he should die after the filing of the complaint without having desisted therefrom; or (3) If the child was born after the death of the husband.

AGUSTIN v CA
FACTS: Respondents Fe Angela and her son Martin Prollamante sued Martins alleged biological father, petitioner Arnel L. Agustin, for support and support pendente lite Arnel supposedly impregnated Fe on her 34th birthday on November 10, 1999 The babys birth certificate was purportedly signed by Arnel as the father. Arnel shouldered the pre-natal and hospital expenses but later refused Fes repeated requests for Martins support despite his adequate financial capacity and even suggested to have the child committed for adoption. Arnel also denied having fathered the child Arnel is actually married and has a family of his own at the time he impregnated Fe Arnel claimed that the signature and the community tax certificate (CTC) attributed to him in the acknowledgment of Martins birth certificate were falsified. The CTC erroneously reflected his marital status as single when he was actually married and that his birth year was 1965 when it should have been 1964 July 23, 2002, Fe and Martin moved for the issuance of an order directing all the parties to submit themselves to DNA paternity testing pursuant to Rule 28 of the Rules of Court ISSUE: WON DNA testing is self-incriminatory and violates privacy of person HELD: NO Being the first case where DNA testing was the focal issue the court examines the history of DNA testing The court opened the possibility of admitting DNA as evidence of parentage, as enunciated in Tijing v. Court of Appeals In People v. Vallejo[24] where the rape and murder victims DNA samples from the bloodstained clothes of the accused were admitted in evidence. We reasoned that the purpose of DNA testing (was) to ascertain whether an association exist(ed) between the evidence sample and the reference sample. The samples collected (were) subjected to various chemical processes to establish their profile The right against self-incrimination is simply against the legal process of extracting from the lips of the accused an admission of guilt. It does not apply where the evidence sought to be excluded is not an incrimination but as part of object evidence. right to privacy does not bar all incursions into individual privacy. The right is not intended to stifle scientific and technological advancements that enhance public service and the common good... Intrusions into the right must be accompanied by proper safeguards that enhance public service and the common good. where the power is exercised in an arbitrary manner by reason of passion, prejudice, or personal hostility, and it must be so patent or gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law. No evidence to show this If criminal can be subject to it at expense of death, what more in a civil case for paternity?

HERRERA v ALBA ESTATE OF ROGELIO ONG v MINOR JOANNE DIAZ

Facts: - Nov 1993 Rogelio and Jinky got acquainted, and the friendship blossomed into love. - Jinky however, was already married to Hasegawa Katsuo, a Japanese national, in spite of this, the lovers lived together out of which Joanne Diaz was born on Feb 25, 1998 - Rogelio initially recognized Joanne as his, only to abandon the family on Sept 1998, Jinky thereafter files a complaint - Judgment rendered in favor of Jinky , Rogelio files a new motion and is granted - RTC again rules for Jinky given the Rogelios admission that he was the one who shouldered hospital bills during Joannes birth and that on some instances he continued visiting Jinky after the birth of Joanne - Rogelio goes to the Court of Appeals, during the pendency of the trial, however he dies, and is substituted by the Estate of Rogelio Ong. - CA remands the case to the RTC for DNA analysis to finally determine the paternity of Joanne, hence the petition Issue: W/n the court erred in remanding the case for DNA analysis despite the fact that said analysis is no longer feasible given that Rogelio Ong is dead Held: No, decision of the appellate court is affirmed. - Case discusses DNA testing again, see Herrera vs Alba. - The new rules on DNA testing allows for the application of DNA testing for as long as biological samples of Rogelio Ong is present o Biological samples any organic material originating from the persons body, even if found on inanimate objects - Thus, even if Rogelio is dead, biological samples may be available and used for DNA testing

- As held in Tecson vs Comelec: Any physical residue of the long dead parent could be resorted to

Presently, DNA testing has evolved into a dependable and authoritative form of evidence gathering, the Court therefore reiterates its stand that DNA testing is a valid means of determining paternity

LUCAS v LUCAS

c. FC 166 (3)
2.

Legitimacy of a child may be impugned only on the following grounds: That in case of children conceived through artificial insemination, the written authorization or ratification of either parent was obtained through mistake, fraud, violence, intimidation, or undue influence.

Effect of mothers declaration CHUA KENG GIAP v IAC

FC 167 The child shall be considered legitimate although the mother may have declared against its legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an adulteress.

FACTS: 1. Chua Keng Giap filed on May 19, 1983, a petition for the settlement of the estate of the late Sy Kao in the regional trial court of Quezon City. He claims that he is the son of Chua Bing Guan and Sy Kao. 2. The private respondent, moved to dismiss for lack of a cause of action and of the petitioner's capacity to file the petition. No cause of action because he is not the son of the abovementioned couple as testified by the mother herself. CONTENTIONS: Respondent: a. Res judicata: The latter, it was claimed, had been declared as not the son of the spouses Chua Bing Guan and Sy Kao in S.P. No. Q-12592, for the settlement of the estate of the late Chua Bing Guan.

b. Mothers testimonials: SY Kua herself testified that she is not her son. Petitioner: a. paternity and not the maternity of the petitioner is to be decided. Therefore, the testimony of the mother should not be credited. ISSUE: W/N Chua Keng Giap is the son of Chua Bing and Sy Kua. HELD: Yes. Who better than Sy Kao herself would know of Chua Keng Giap was really her son? More than any one else, it was Sy Kao who could say ---- as indeed she has said these many years ---- that Chua Keng Giap was not begotten of her womb. Petition Denied.

3.

In subsequent marriages

FC 168 If the marriage is terminated and the mother contracted another marriage within three hundred days after such termination of the former marriage, these rules shall govern in the absence of proof to the contrary: (1) A child born before one hundred eighty days after the solemnization of the subsequent marriage is considered to have been conceived during the former marriage, provided it be born within three hundred days after the termination of the former marriage; (2) A child born after one hundred eighty days following the celebration of the subsequent marriage is considered to have been conceived during such marriage, even though it be born within the three hundred days after the termination of the former marriage. FC 169 The legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child born after three hundred days following the termination of the marriage shall be proved by whoever alleges such legitimacy or illegitimacy.

PEOPLE v QUITORIANO
FACTS: 1. Quitoriano was charged of the crime of rape. 2. He allegedly raped the victim, Edna Pergis, on December 24, 1992 3. in June 1993, her aunt, Teresa Pergis, discovered that Edna was pregnant. 4. On August 2, 1993, private complainant filed a complaint for rape against accusedappellant 5. She gave birth on October 31, 1993. CONTENTIONS: Accused: private complainant gave birth more than ten months after the alleged rape; therefore, the child could not have been the accuseds ISSUE: Whether or not the child could have been the accuseds. HELD: Yes. The fact that private complainant gave birth more than ten months after the alleged rape does not discredit her testimony. Dr. Honesto Marquez, a physician from the Marinduque Provincial Hospital, explained that the normal gestation period is 40 weeks or 280 days, but it can also extend beyond 40 weeks if the woman is having her first pregnancy. It is undisputed that the child delivered by private complainant on October 31, 1993 was her first. Hence, it is not impossible that the child was conceived in December, 1992, the date of the alleged rape.

4.

Presumptions

FC 170 The action to impugn the legitimacy of the child shall be brought within one year from the knowledge of the birth or its recording in the civil register, if the husband or, in a proper case, any of his heirs, should reside in the city or municipality where the birth took place or was recorded. If the husband or, in his default, all of his heirs do not reside at the place of birth as defined in the first paragraph or where it was recorded, the period shall be two years if they should reside in the Philippines; and three years if abroad. If the birth of the child has been concealed from or was unknown to the husband or his heirs, the period shall be counted from the discovery or knowledge of the birth of the child or of the fact of registration of said birth, whichever is earlier. FC 171 The heirs of the husband may impugn the filiation of the child within the period prescribed in the preceding article only in the following cases: (1) If the husband should died before the expiration of the period fixed for bringing his action; (2) If he should die after the filing of the complaint without having desisted therefrom; or (3) If the child was born after the death of the husband.

5.

Prescription of action to impugn legitimacy GASPAY v CA

Action can be instituted after death of putative father Issue: WON Guadalupe is an IC Held: YES. TC did not discount the testimony of Martin Garin (agent to logging concessionaire of Flaviano for 18 years) who verified handwriting and signature of Flaviano in a letter addressed to Lupe and Toming (Guad and his husband Bartolome Alfaro) regarding the hospitalization expenses of Guads daughter. CA said that TC must have assumed that Flavianos handwriting must have metamorphosed during the years but it could be possible that handwriting of Flaviano never changed at all. Also when Guadalupe filed said action, she still used Gaspay affixed to her legal surname as married to Alfaro, thereby shouting to the world her consent to the acknowledgment of an IC. As to the action being instituted after death of putative father, CA said action based on acknoweldgement may be brought even after death of putative father. She thereby proved entitlement to the admin of estate. Moreover, the

Facts: Flaviano Gaspay died intestate on 10/14/83, then married to Agueda Denoso (childless). On 7/6/88 priv resp Guadalupe Gaspay Alfaro alleged @ TC that shes acknowledged IC of Flaviano with Claudia Pason, prayed for issuance of letters of admin of Flavianos estate. Petitioners are Jr. (adopted son) and Eriberta (next of kin) who filed for an MTD (motion to dismiss) saying that Guadalupe is a stranger. TC denied the MTD saying that such was based on indubitable grounds but TC nonetheless dismissed petition saying that testimonial and documentary evidence failed to prove status of Guadalupe, failed to show Guad consenting to the acknowledgement as IC and that such action should have been filed in the lifetime of Flaviano. CA reversed TC on 9/30/91 saying that: Evid is ample to prove filiation as IC Evid is sufficient to show that Guad consented to the acknowledgement as IC

petitioners neglected to apply for a letter admin 30 days after the death of Flaviano Gaspay.

6.

Who may impugn BENITEZ-BADUA v CA

Issue: WON Marissa is a biological child of Vicente and Isabel and WON TC misapplied FC 166 and 170 Held: NO. Marissa is not a biological child and yes, TC misapplied said FC provisions. SC said that reliance on FC 164, 166, 170 and 171 are misplaced since said provisions show situation where husband denies own child with wife and not a situation where a child is alleged not to be a natural child of a couple. SC only sustained CA findings on ruling that Marissa is not a biological child Vicente and Isabel based on the ff: Isabel Chipongian never became pregnant, as substatntiated by his brother Dr. Nilo Chipongian, saying that shes been married already for 10 years but at age 36 was not yet pregnant and so she was even brought to the attention of Dr. Manahan who was a well known ob-gyne. Many other people (neighbors) corroborated this point that Iabel never became pregnant. Had she been, it would have been noticed by people around her. Marissas birth certificate is highly dubious because it showed that she was born in the Benitez household in Nagcarlan when she would have been born in the hospital and in the skillful hands of Dr. Manahan who was the ob-gyne of her putative mother. Extrajudicial settlement of Nilo and Vicente after Isabels death saying that they are the sole heirs of the deceased Isabel for she has no other ascending or descending heirs Letter of Isabel to Vicente pleading him to give Marissa her share which she would not have need to do had Marissa been their legal heir

Facts: Vicente Benitez married Isabel Chipongian, acquired many props in Laguna. Isabel predeceased Vicente, former died on 4/25/82 while latter died intestate on 11/13/89. On 9/24/90 Vicentes sis and nephew Victoria (priv resps) Benitez Lirio and Feodor Benitez Aguilar filed @ RTC for issuance of letter of admin for Aguilar, saying that Vicente had no legal heirs since Marissa Benitez Badua was never a related by blood and not legally adopted therefore not a legal heir. On 11/2/90 Marissa opposed saying that shes sole heir and shes capable of managing estate. She presented the ff evids: Cert of live brith Baptismal cert ITR and Info Sheet for Members of Gsis of late Vicente naming her as daughter School records Private resps (Victoria) presented testimonial evids: That spouse failed to beget a child Isabel (then 36) was even referred to an ob-gyne for treatment Victoria Benitez Lirio (then 77 years old and about to die) elder sis of Vicente categorically declared that Marissa is not a biological child TC on 12/17/90 dismissed petition of Victoria. Ruled that Marissa is legitimate daughter and sole heir (relying on FC 166 and 170) CA reversed on 5/29/92 saying that Marissa is NOT biological child and therefore not legal heir. CA said that TC failed to apply FC 166 and 170.

LIYAO JR v TANHOTI-LIYAO
Facts: CA reversed RTC w/c declared William Liyao Jr as IC of William Liyao and ordered Juanita et al to recognize jr as compulsory heir of the deceased William (successional rights to be granted thereof). On 11/29/76 Jr (represented by mother Corazon Garcia) filed for said action for compulsory recognition as IC of William Liyao, being in continuous possession of status as child and recognized as such child by decedent. Corazon had been legally married but was de facto separated with husband Ramon Yulo for 10 years and was said to have cohabited with William from 1965 up to his death in 1975. She has 2 other daughters by 1st marriage and it was claimed that Jr (Billy) was born during said cohabitation. This was supposedly with the knowledge of Williams LC by wife Juanita Tanhoti-Liyao, Tita Rose and Chritina who were both employed in Far East Realty Investment where William and Corazon are Pres and VP respectively. Both sides have virtually different stories. TC was convinced of the preponderance of evidence that William sired Jr (billy) because he was conceived during said cohab of William and Corazon and he has been in continuous possession and enjoyment of status of a child of William through his overt acts of: Securing birth certificate through confidential secretary Mrs. Rodriguez Openly and publicly acknowledging billy as son Providing sustenance and introducing him even to his LCs CA reversed saying that: Law favors legitimacy Gave credence to marriage of Corazon with Ramon Yulo (legally married with no legal separation) That Corazon and Ramon were seen in each others arms during the time that Corazon and William were supposed to be cohabiting Birth cert and baptismal cert not enough proof of paternity in the case where William had a hand in preparing such docs Neither family pix would prove filiation Passbook presented did not show that William opened such for Billy and Corazon because it does not bear Williams signature and name Issue: WON Jr (billy) is an IC and WON he can impugn his own legitimacy to claim from estate of his supposed father Held: NO. presumption of legitimacy is strong. Even if Jr. insists that Ramon and Corazon have been separated already for 10 years such that there is physical impossibility for sexual union, de facto separation is of no bearing. Impugning legitimacy under NCC 255 can only be invoked by husband and only in qualified situations, his heirs. Petition cannot prosper because child born within valid marriage is deemed LC even though mother may have declared against said legitimacy or has been sentenced as an adulteress.

REPUBLIC v MAGPAYO E. Proof of Filiation 1. Of legitimate children

FC 172 The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following: (1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or (2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned. In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved by: (1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or (2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws. FC 173 The action to claim legitimacy may be brought by the child during his or her lifetime and shall be transmitted to the heirs should the child die during minority or in a state of insanity. In these cases, the heirs shall have a period of five years within which to institute the action.

DIAZ v COURT OF APPEALS

Facts: 1) In 1911 Isidro Azarraga dies leaving 10 children the first 7 of who are illegitimate born to his mistress Valentina Abarracoso. 2) The legitimacy of the 8th child is in question in this suit namely Leodegario, (the 9th Filomena was the only one established as legitimate being born to the valid marriage of Isidro and his lawful wife Calixta Lozada) 3) Sept 10, 49 Leodegario dies intestate(no will) in an accident in Manila he leaves behind no spouse and no children to inherit his property amounting to P28,000 worth of real estate in Capiz. 4) Oct 15, 49 original Maria Diaz, daughter of the decedents sister Filomena, (she died during the pendency of the case and was replaced by her heirs) files for letters of Administration w/ the CFI. 5) Oct 25, 49 Amador Azarraga (4th illegitimate child of Isidro, half brother of decedent) files an opposition to the petition citing that the deceased is an illegitimate son of Isidro via Valentina Abarracoso and thus is his brother rather than the mothers. 6) Mar 1, 50 CFI rules in favor of 7) Aug 17, 70 20 years after granted admin, Eduardo Azarraga (heir of Amador) files for the removal of admin from citing failure to render a final accounting of the estate and a project of partition. He also requests to be granted admin. 8) s cite that the decedent is not a legitimate child of Isidro and thus is not the full blooded sibling of the mother who was a legitimate child. 9) asserts the opposite, that decedent Leodegario is legitimate 10) CFI again rules for

11) files with CA and is upheld and is granted admin to the prejudice of Issues: WON Leodegario is a legitimate child of Isidro and his legal wife Calixta Lozada Held: YES, the proved the legitimacy of Leodegario through his school records (UST Law) which cited the decedents name as Leodegario Azarraga y Lozada. It was

further strengthened by the preponderance of the will of Pastora Azarraga which stated that the decedent and the mother Filiomena are fullMar 1, 50 (granting admin to the ) also acknowledges this fact of legitimacy. CA set aside CFI affirmed.

TISON v COURT OF APPEALS

Facts: 1) Mar 5, 83Teodora Dezoller Guerero dies w/ no children leaving the prop in question to her husband and the heirs of her brother(who died in 73), the Petitioner. 2) Jan 2, 88 After her death, her husband Martin Guerero adjudicates the house to him and sells it to Respondent Teodora Domingo. 3) Martin dies on Oct 25, 88 and petitioners Tison and Dezoller file for reconveyance Nov. 2, 88 for 1/2share of the prop. 4) During the hearing the Petitioner birth cert.s marriage cert.s w/c prove the filiation to the decedent Teodora through their common link to their father Teodoras brother Hermogenes Dezoller. More importantly they present the testimony of one of the Petitioner Corazon Dezoller Tison attesting that some time in 1946 the decedent had actually acknowledged her as her niece (declaration of filiation). 5) Respondent files a demurrer to the evidence citing that they fall short of the requirements set by Art 172 of the Family Code and that the testimony of Corazon Dezoller Tison was self serving and uncorroborated. 6) Dec 3, 92 TC rules for Respondent granting the demurrer and dismissing the action for reconveyance. 7) CA affirms citing the evidence presented was inadmisible. Issues: WON the satisfy of the quantum of proof mandated by Art 172 of the FC. Held: YES, the court held that legitimacy cannot be attacked collaterally in an action for reconveyance, as such the court held that there being a presumption of legitimacy in relation to the status of the petitioners the Respondents failure to adduce evidence disproving such a fact renders the presumption effective. Thus his choice to file a demurrer rather than adduce evidence to controvert the Petitioner assertions comes as a implied admission of the fact of legitimacy. More importantly the testimony of Corazon Dezoller Tison fell within the definition of a declaration about pedigree that is exempt form the rule on hearsay based on the following conditions: 1) that the declarant is either dead or unable to testify; 2) that the declarant be related to the person whose pedigree is subject of inquiry, 3) that such relationship be shown by evidence other than the declaration 4) that the declaration was made ante litem motum (before the commencement of the suit). Moreover the declaration may stand only if it pertains to the claimants right over the declarants own estate (as in this case). If however the declaration is to claim a right from another family member other than the declarants estate the declaration may not be deemed credible. Judgment reversed and set aside.

TRINIDAD v COURT OF APPEALS

Facts: Arturio Trinidad was born on July 21, 1943 from Felicidad Molato and Inocentes Briones, who allegedly married on May 5, 1942. Upon the death of Inocentes, Arturio lived with his aunt Lourdes in the property of Patricio Briones (father of Inocentes, Lourdes and Felix) until he grew up and got married. When Arturio returned to the property upon Lourdes invitation and sought to claim the share of his father on the land, Lourdes refused to partition the property and claimed that Inocentes never married, died single, and has no child. On the other hand, Arturio claimed that his parents were legally married but failed to provide their marriage certificate and his birth certificate to show his relationship with Inocentes because these were lost during the war. Issue: WON Arturio is the legitimate child of Inocentes Held: Yes 1. The parents of Arturio, Inocentes and Felicidad, were validly married a. Office of the Civil Registrar of Aklan certified that all its records of marriages and birth, among others, were either lost, burned or destroyed during the Japanese occupation b. Isabel Meren and Jovita Gerardo testified that his parents were married and cohabited as husband and wife i. Meren was one of the witnesses to the nuptials ii. Jovita was the barangay captain who had attended the birth and baptismal parties of Arturio 2. Arturio was born during their marriage and cohabitation a. The baptismal certificate of Arturio show his parents to be Inocentes and Felicidad and his birth to be on July 21, 1943, after the legitimate and legal wedding of Inocentes and Felicidad Family photos of Lourdes and Felix with Arturios wife and children substantiate his claim that they had lived together in the property, contrary to Lourdes claim that they had not

LABAGALA v SANTIAGO
Facts: 1. Siblings Nicolasa, Amanda and Jose Santiago owned a parcel of land, which was registered in Joses name alone 2. February 6, 1984: Jose died intestate a. Nicolasa and Amanda, as his legal heirs, sought the recovery of title, ownership, and possession of his 1/3 share in the property b. The case was filed against Ida C. Labagala who claimed i. To be Joses legitimate child with Esperanza Cabrigas 1. His income tax return listed Ida as his daughter ii. To have been the donee of his 1/3 share of the property 1. A Deed of Sale, covering the entire parcel of the property, was executed on March 1979 in Idas favour BUT 2. The sale was actually a donation iii. To had caused the issuance of a title in her name over the entire parcel of land by virtue of the sale in order to prevent the property from being sold by public auction for Nicolasa and Amandas failure to pay its realty taxes iv. To have always been staying on the property 1. Previous ejectment cases by Nicolasa and Amanda were instituted against her in 1985 2. Cases were resolved in Idas favour 3. Contentions of Nicolasa and Amanda a. Ida is a child of Leo Labagala and Cornelia Cabrigas i. Leo Labagala signed and prepared the birth certificate of Isa Santiago as her father ii. Birth certificate of Ida Santiago had the same birth date and place as the claimed day and place of Ida Labagala (1969, Manila) iii. Ida did not present a birth certificate of an Ida Santiago and only alleged that she had been using the surname since her childhood iv. Jose stated in a Civil Case (No. 56226) that he did not have any child. b. The Deed of Sale was forged i. It was not signed by Jose but only thumbmarked, which Jose had never done ii. Ida was unemployed then and could not have afford the price of P150k iii. Ida concealed the sale as she registered the deed only on Jan. 26, 1987 or 8 years after the sale Issue: WON Ida Labagala is Joses child Held: NO 1. NCC 263 does not apply a. Applies only for situations where doubt exists that a child is indeed a mans child by his wife (issue of legitimacy) b. Not for situations where a child is alleged not be the child at all of a particular couple 2. Birth certificate of Ida Labagala is conclusive proof of her filiation with Leo and Cornelia a. BC was signed and prepared by the father, Leo b. Ida did not present any birth certificate in the name of a Ida Santiago c. Baptismal and Income Tax Return are not proofs of filiation but only of the fact that a baptism had been administered and that tax has been paid in a certain amount, respectively 3. Use of a family name does not establish pedigree 4. Ida contradicted herself in relation to her filiation with Cornelia a. In her testimony, she denied knowing Cornelia In her petition, she admitted that Cornelia is her mother, Esperanzas sister

DE JESUS v ESTATE OF JUAN GAMBOA DIZON

Facts: - Aug 23, 1964 Danilo Jesus and Carolina Jesus were married. Their union produced two children, Jacqueline (March 1, 1979) and Jinky Jesus (July 6, 1982).

- June 7 1991, Juan G. Dizon acknowledged Jacqueline and Jinkie de Jesus as his own illegitimate children with Carolina Aves de Jesus - 12 March 1992 Juan Dizon died. Jacqueline and Jinky then filed an action to be part of the heirs of his estate as his illegitimate children in a notarized document. - TC: ulitimately dismissed the complaint for lack of cause of action and for being improper since its not the proper forum to question their paternity and filiation. Thus the present case ISSUE: WON Jinky and Jacquelin are the illegitimate children of Juan Dizon HELD: NO - Presumption of law is that of legitimacy. Those who are born in wedlock without conclusive Facts: - Nov 1993 Rogelio and Jinky got acquainted, and the friendship blossomed into love. - Jinky however, was already married to Hasegawa Katsuo, a Japanese national, in spite of this, the lovers lived together out of which Joanne Diaz was born on Feb 25, 1998 - Rogelio initially recognized Joanne as his, only to abandon the family on Sept 1998, Jinky thereafter files a complaint - Judgment rendered in favor of Jinky , Rogelio files a new motion and is granted - RTC again rules for Jinky given the Rogelios admission that he was the one who shouldered hospital bills during Joannes birth and that on some instances he continued visiting Jinky after the birth of Joanne

proof that there was physical impossibility for the parents to conceive the child are considered legitimate. Upon the expiration of periods found in FC 170 and 171, this presumption of civil status becomes fixed and unassailable. It is only when the legitimacy of the child has been disputed can paternity of the husband be rejected. While the recognition of illegitimacy by Dizon was made in accordance with the rules on recognizing illegitimacy, this does not negate the legitimacy they hold with Danilo Jesus. Petitoners were born during the marriage of their parents. The certificates of live birth also identify Danilo de Jesus as their father. Thus, before they can be recognized as illegitimate children, they must first contest their status as legitimate children of Danilo Jesus.

ONG v DIAZ
- Rogelio goes to the Court of Appeals, during the pendency of the trial, however he dies, and is substituted by the Estate of Rogelio Ong. - CA remands the case to the RTC for DNA analysis to finally determine the paternity of Joanne, hence the petition ISSUE: WON DNA testing is applicable when Rogelio has already died HELD: YES - death of the petitioner does not ipso facto negate the application of DNA testing for as long as there exist appropriate biological samples of his DNA. - Def of biological sampling - any organic material originating from a persons body, even if found in inanimate objects, that is susceptible to DNA testing. This includes blood, saliva, and other body fluids, tissues, hairs and bones. o Any physical residue left by deceased RESULT: case is remanded to RTC for DNA testing

2.

Of illegitimate children

FC 175 Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the same way and on the same evidence as legitimate children. The action must be brought within the same period specified in Article 173, except when the action is based on the second paragraph of Article 172, in which case the action may be brought during the lifetime of the alleged parent.

REYES v CA
Facts: Certiorari of CA decision reversing CFI dismissal of action for reconveyance by the . 1) Respondent file w/ CFI for order compelling the Petitioner Irene Reyes aka Irene Ramero to execute a deed of reconveyance on several props to the Respondent. Respondent allege that petitioner acquired the props in question through fraud, deceit and misrepresentation by registering herself as the sole child of decedent Franciscoo Delgado and thus entitled to inherit. 2) Respondent who are the sisters and brother of the decedent claim otherwise since they allege the petitioner was born during the legal marriage of her mother Genoveva Ramero and the latters husband Justino Reyes. 3) Petitioner claims that she was the fruit of the cohabitation b/w her mother and the decedent during the time subsequent to the separation of her mother w/ Justino Reyes. She also claims continuous possession of the status of illegitimate child since she mentions that decedent supported her financially through her education. 4) CFI rules against dismissing the order for reconveyance. 5) Respondent appeal to CA which rules in their favor reversing the CFI declaring that the TCTs of the Petitioner on the said props are null and void. 6) CA rules that though Petitioner was a spurious child of the decedent she was never recognized and thus cannot inherit. 7) in her motion for reconsideration w/ the CA , petitoner cites how she was in fact acknowledged by the decedent as proven by the latters consent noted on the petitioner marriage certificate. Issues: WON is a recognized child of the decedent and is thus able to inherit. Held: NO, it is a well established doctrine that for an illegitimate child to inherit he/she must first be recognized by the putative parent through voluntary or compulsory means. In this case the was never validly recognized by Francisco Delgado contrary to her assertions. The evidence she presented was not compelling to establish her filiation to the decedent. For instance her birth certificate was not signed by Francisco. Furthermore it cannot be said that her baptismal certificate is credible evidence regarding filiation since the statements contained therein only attest to the administration of the said sacrament on the said date. In addition to this her permanent student records and her written consent to her fathers operation both being unsigned and not written in her fathers handwriting cannot suffice as proof of filiation. Moreover the pictures she present did not give weight to her arguments as they are not constitutive of proof of filiation. Finally the alleged consent stipulated by Francisco in the marriage certificate cannot be given weight since it is not signed and does not appear in the decedents handwriting. Decision affirmed in toto

CASTRO v CA
Facts: - Background love story: Pricola Maregmen after marrying one Felix de Maya on May 23, 1913 realized the mistake she made and went back to her real love, Eustaquio Castro whom she lived with until her death on Sept 11, 1924. Their illicit affair bore them a daughter , Benita Castro on May 27, 1919. - Two earlier civil cases were filed against Benita Castro. The first by her uncle and aunt Juan and Feliciano Castro that they and not Benita should be the forced heirs of Pedro Castro who died on May 27, 1923 and the second by Marcelina Bautista, the wife of her alleged father Eustaquio Castro who died on August 24, 1961. Marcelina also alleges that she and not Benita should be the compulsory heir of the property of Euestaquio. - TC: consolidated the cases and ruled Benita is indeed the acknowledged and recognized child of Eustaquio Castro and is entitled to participate in the partition of the properties left by him. - CA: affirmed the decision of TC and held that Eustaquio Castro voluntarily recognized Benita through the records of birth he registered himself. ISSUE: WON Benita Castro Naval is the acknowledged and recognized illegitimate child of Eustaquio Castro HELD: YES - Since FC is now the law being used and no vested rights will be prejudiced, FC 172 can be used to prove that Benita possessed an open and continuous possession of the status of an legitimate child which action can be brought in her lifetime o Evidence:

lived with Eustaquio for 42 years, even when she was already married Aunt and Uncle Juan Castro and Feliciana Castro admitted that she was the daughter in Civil Case no 3762. Eustaquio himself reported and registered Benitas birth. Plus there was no indication that he should have signed certificate or taken judicial action in order for her to be recognized as his illegitimate child Eustaquio gave away Benita during her wedding to Cipriano Naval certificate of baptism and the picture of the Castro family during the wake for Eustaqui o rule on separating the legitimate from the illegitimate family isnt necessary because Benita and her mother Pricola Maregmen were the only immediate family of Eustaquio. OBITER: Unless she asks about NCC - diff between voluntary and compulsory recognition IN THIS CASE, Eustaquio voluntarily recognized her since he himself took care of and registered her record of birth in the municipality. Thus even if his signature was missing, his actions clearly show his voluntary recognition of her. o voluntary recognition: natural child merely asks for a share in the inheritance in virtue of his having been acknowledged as such, and is not trying to compel the father or his heirs to make the acknowledgment NCC 131 law thspat applies for voluntary recognition: The acknowledgment of a natural child must be made in the record of birth, in a will or in some other public document

 acknowledgment has been formally and legally accomplished because the public character of the document makes judicial pronouncement unnecessary o compulsory recognition - requires judicial pronouncement of illegitimacy since recognition was made in a private document. NCC 135-136 apply. recognition is yet to be ordered by the courts because a private writing, lacking the stronger guaranty and higher authenticity of a public document is not self- executory. based on an express recognition so found and declared by the court after hearing

- diff between natural and spurious IN this case, she was a natural child of Eustaquio but a spurious child of Pricola o natural - those born outside of lawful wedlock of parents who, at the time of conception of the child, were not disqualified by any impediment to marry each other o spurious had legal impediment to marry when child was conceived and born. in case the recognition is made by only one of the parents, it will be presumed that the child is natural if the parents recognizing it had the legal capacity to contract marriage at the time of the conception

BALUYUT v BALUYUT
Facts: Victoria, Ma. Theresa and Ma. Flordeliza were minors when they filed this petition. They were represented by their mother and guardian ad litem, Norma Urbano. The petition is filed against Felicidad Baluyut and the CA. Felicidad is the wife of the deceased, who had an illegal relationship with Norma Urbano because he was already married at the time. The petition states that the minors are his illegitimate children and therefore have a legal interest on the estate of the deceased Enrique Baluyut. They further allege that they were in continuous possession and enjoyment of the status of children of the decease during his lifetime b direct overt acts. (he supported them and maintained them. They added to having been deliberately excluded from the estate of Enrique Baluyut. Felicidad, who is the widow and appointed administratrix of the estate, opposed the petition. Trial Court: declared that the minors were the forced heirs of the deceased (under NCC 887(5)) and ordered Felicidad to provide monthly support for the minors. CA: reversed the decision; the petition was dismissed (although the CA did recognize them as Enriques illegitimate children) Issue: W/N the petitioners are the illegitimate children of the deceased and are therefore entitiled to monthly support. Held: Proof of filiation is not sufficient to confer upon them any hereditary rights in the estate of the deceased. The decision appealed from is affirmed. Ratio The illegitimate child must be acknowledged by the putative parent. (as was decided by SC in a previous case: Reyes, et al. v. Zuzuarregul, et al.) The illegitimate child, to be entitled to support and successional rights from his parents, must prove his filiation through this means - Voluntary or compulsory (NCC 283) recognition through: Record of birth Parents will Statement before a court of record Any authentic writing (NCC 278) In the case at bar, there was no evidence to show voluntary recognition. The records of birth were not signed by the father even if it was in the name of Enrique Baluyut There is no evidence of authentic writing or statement before a court With regard to compulsory recognition, the petitioners relied on testimonies by the mother and another witness: The combined testimony of Norma Urbano and her witness Liberata Vasquez insofar as the issue of recognition is concerned tends to show that Norma was kept by the late Enrique M. Baluyut as his mistress first in the house of Liberata and then in a house supposedly rented from one Lacuna. But this Lacuna was not even presented to testify in support of the claim of Norma and Liberate that Baluyut rented his house for Norma. And, according to Norma and Liberata, Baluyut visited Norma some twice a week in the house where she kept her as his mistress; that Baluyut paid the hospital bills for the delivery of the two younger children of Norma. But, according to Liberata herself, it was not Baluyut who personally paid the hospital bills but he gave the money for the payment of the hospital bills to Liberato and he requested her to pay the money to the hospital. This only shows that Baluyut was hiding his Identity as the father of the children of Norma, an act which is inconsistent with recognizing such children as his own. The SC is very strict in applying the law for compulsory recognition, much more than with voluntary recognition. NCC 283 enumerates the cases where the father is obliged to recognize the child: b.) when the child is in continuous possession of the status of a child of the alleged father by the direct acts of the latter or his family. c.) when the child was conceived during the time when the mother cohabited with the supposed father these enumerations are inconsistent with the testimonies of the witnesses. Baluyut appeared to be hiding the fact that he was the father of the minors.

MENDOZA v CA
Facts: 1981: Private Respondent, Teopista Toring claims to be the illegitimate child of the petitioner, Casimiro Mendoza. She alleges that she was born on Aug. 20, 1930 to a Brigida Toring who was then single while Casimiro was married to Emiliana Barrientos Her mother was the one who told her that she was his child. She added that growing up, she was recognized because she was treated as such. Called him Papa Miroy, she used to visit him at his house, Casimiro helped her and her husband: he bought a truck for him to drive and when he sold it, gave the proceeds to the spouses, PRs son, Lolito, was allowed to build a house on his lot, He opened a joint savings account with her as co-depositor She had two witnesses: Gaudencio Mendoza (cousin of Casimiro) was informed by petitioner himself that he and Brigida Toring were sweethearts. Gaudencio was the one whom Casimiro would send to give money to Toring when Teopista was born. Isaac Mendoza (nephew of Casimiro) was informed by his father (Hipolito, Casimiros brother) and his grandmother, Brigida Mendoza. He also delivered money to Teopista. Petitioner denied her claims up to his dying day. (May, 1986) Vicente Toring, who is the recognized illegitimate child of Petitioner and Brigida Toring, says that petitioner is only his half-sister because she has a different father. He substitutes for Mendoza in this case after petitioner died. RTC: rules for petitioner because private respondent failed to show enough evidence to prove of her filiation. CA: reversed decision. The two witnesses showed truthfulness, there is no reason for them to testify falsely. Vicente Toring would obviously have more to lose if petitioner wins this case so he has a motive. Issue: W/N Teopista is Casimiro Mendozas illegitimate child? Held: YES. Ratio: Although Teopista failed to show that she was in an open and continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate child of Casimiro, she has nevertheless established that status by another method. FC 175 grants the right of illegitimate children to establish their filiation in the same way as legitimate children. FC 172(2) allows them to prove filiation by any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws. In the case at bar, the RTC failed to consider the testimony of Isaac Mendoza as another method of establishing status. Rule 130, Sec. 39, of the Rules of Court discusses the act or declarations about pedigree being allowed as evidence. It has to conform to 4 requisites so it wont be considered hearsay:1.The declarant is dead or unable to testify Brigida and Hipolito Mendoza passed away at the time Isaac testified in court. 2.The pedigree must be in issue Main issue of case! 3.The declaration must be made before the controversy arose Isaac knew about this before PR filed in court 4.The relationship between the declarant (Brigida/Hipolito) and person whose pedigree is in question Casimiro) must be shown in evidence other than declaration. Presentation of extrajudicial partition of the estate of Florencio Mendoza where Casimiro is an heir. This, including the other evidence presented by PR and witnesses shows that she is the illegitimate daughter of Casimiro

JISON v CA
Facts: 1. Francisco Jison was married to Lilia Lopez Jison in 1945 and together, they had Lourdes 2. Francisco impregnated Esperanza F. Amolar, Lourdes nanny, who gave birth to Monina Joson on August 4, 1946 3. March 13, 1985: Monina filed a petition for recognition as Franciscos illegitimate child a. That Esperanza was still employed by Francisco at the time Monina was conceived in 1945 b. That sexual contact between Francisco and Esperanza was not impossible i. Castellanes, Sr., a worker in the Nelly Garden that Lilia managed testified that Lilia spent her evenings in the Nelly Garden, working from 6PM to 3AM c. That the affidavit she signed on September 21, 1971 where she denounced her filiation with Francisco was acquired under duress

i. Bilbao, the procurement officer, hacienda overseer and administrator testified that he was present during the event d. That Francisco fathered Monina and recognized her as his daughter and That Monina has been enjoying the open and continuous possession of the status as Franciscos illegit child where Francisco i. Sent her to school Paid for her school expenses Defrayed her hospitalization expenses 1. Testified to by Monina herself and Ledesma, a banker and former mayor ii. Gave her monthly allowances which he instructed his office personnel to do Paid for her mothers funeral expenses Acknowledged her paternal greetings and Called her his Hija or child 1. Testified to by Tingson, Nelly Gardens paymaster a. who recorded its expenses and issued vouchers and b. who knew the persons receiving money from Franciscos office and c. who kept Moninas accounts in a separate book to hide it from Lilia, as instructed by Francisco iii. Recommended her for employment in Merchant Financing Corporation that is managed by the wife of his first cousin iv. Allowed her to use his house in Bacolod Paid for her long distance telephone calls 1. Testified to by the houseboy, Duatin, that

a. Monina was introduced to him as Franciscos child when she stayed there b. Monina calls Francisco Daddy c. Francisco instructed him to treat Monina just like the rest of his children d. He hid Monina whenever Francisco and Lilia were there, as instructed by Francisco v. Had her vacation in his apartment in Manila vi. Allowed her to use his surname Issue: WON Monina is the illegitimate child of Francisco Held: YES 1. The preponderance of evidence mentioned above sufficiently established her filiation despite a. the Affidavit dated Sept. 21, 1971, attesting that Francisco is not her father, because it would not have been necessary if it were not true; Francisco had gone to such great lengths in order that Monina denounce her filiation b. Moninas birth and baptismal certificates were not signed by Francisco because these are not conclusive evidence of filiation c. Notes of Franciscos relatives attesting to Moninas filiation are without merit since i. they are not shown to be dead or unable to testify ii. they are not family possessions Rule 130, Secs. 39, 40 require that family possessions to be regarded as evidence of pedigree should be articles representing, in effect, the familys joint statement of its belief as to the pedigree of a person

HEIRS OF GABATAN v CA JENIE SAN JUAN DELA CRUZ v RONALD PAUL GARCIA, supra LUCAS v LUCAS, supra 3. Rights of illegitimate children
FC 176 Illegitimate children shall use the surname and shall be under the parental authority of their mother, and shall be entitled to support in conformity with this Code. The legitime of each illegitimate child shall consist of one-half of the legitime of a legitimate child. Except for this modification, all other provisions in the Civil Code governing successional rights shall remain in force.

DAVID v CA
FACTS: 1. Petitioner Daisie T. David worked as secretary of private respondent Ramon R. Villar, a rich businessman. 2. Private respondent is a married man and a father. 3. However, despite this, Daisie and Ramon cohabited 4. Out of this union, Christopher J., was born (on March 9, 1985). 5. Christopher J. was followed by two more children, both girls, namely Christine, born on June 9, 1986, and Cathy Mae on April 24, 1988. 6. The relationship became known to private respondent's wife when Daisie took Christopher J, to Villar's house at Villa Teresa in Angeles City sometime in 1986 and introduced him to Villar's legal wife. 7. the children of Daisie were freely brought by Villar to his house as they were eventually accepted by his legal family. 8. In the summer of 1991, Villar asked Daisie to allow Christopher J., then six years of age, to go with his family to Boracay. 9. Daisie agreed. 10. but after the trip, Villar refused to give back the child. 11. Daisie filed a petition for habeas corpus. Respondents: a. Law and jurisprudence wherein the question of custody of a minor child may be decided in a habeas corpus case contemplate a situation where the parents are married to each other but are separated b. respondent-appellant is financially well-off, he being a very rich businessman; whereas, petitioner-appellee depends upon her sisters and parents for support. In fact, he financially supported petitioner-appellee and her three minor children. It is, therefore, for the best interest of Christopher J that he should temporarily remain under the custody of respondent-appellant ISSUE: Whether or not the child should be given back to Daisie. HELD: Yes. REASON 1: Christopher J. is an illegitimate child since at the time of his conception, his father, private respondent Ramon R. Villar, was married to another woman other than the child's mother. As such, pursuant to Art. 176 of the Family Code, Christopher J. is under the parental authority of his mother, the herein petitioner, who, as a consequence of such authority, is entitled to have custody of him. The fact that private respondent has recognized the minor child may be a ground for ordering him to give support to the latter, but not for giving him custody of the child. REASON 2: Under Art. 213 of the Family Code, "no child under seven years of age shall be separated from the mother unless the court finds compelling reasons to order otherwise." 3 In the case at bar, as has already been pointed out, Christopher J., being less than seven years of age at least at the time the case was decided by the RTC (reckoning time), cannot be taken from the mother's custody. Even now that the child is over seven years of age, the mother's custody over him will have to be upheld because the child categorically expressed preference to live with his mother. Under Art. 213 of the Family Code, courts must respect the "choice of the child over seven years of age, unless the parent chosen is unfit" and here it has not been shown that the mother is in any way `unfit to have custody of her child. Rebuttals of respondnets arguments On A. Rule 1021 1 (the rule on habeas corpus) makes no distinction between the case of a mother who is separated from her husband and is entitled to the custody of her child and that of a mother of an illegitimate child who, by law, is vested with sole parental authority, but is deprived of her rightful custody of her child. Rule 102, 1 of the Rules of Court provides that "the writ of habeas corpus shall extend to all cases of illegal confinement or detention by which any person is deprived of his liberty, or by which the rightful custody of any person is withheld from the person entitled thereto." On B. Nor is the fact that private respondent is well-off a reason for depriving petitioner of the custody of her children, especially considering that she has been able to rear and support them on her own since they were born. Petitioner is a market vendor earning from P2,000 to P3,000 per month in 1993 when the RTC decision was rendered. She augments her income by working as secretary at the Computer System Specialist, Inc. earning a monthly income of P4,500.00. She has an arrangement with her employer so that she can personally attend to her children. She works up to 8:00 o'clock in the evening to make up for time lost during the day. That she receives help from her parents and sister for the support of the three children is not a point against her. Cooperation, compassion, love and concern for every member of the family are characteristics of the close family ties that bind the Filipino family and have made it what it is.

TONOG v CA
FACTS: 1. September 23, 1989, petitioner Dinah B. Tonog gave birth to Gardin Faith Belarde Tonog, her illegitimate daughter with private respondent Edgar V. Daguimol. 2. A year after the birth of Gardin Faith, petitioner left for the United States of America to work as a registered nurse 3. Gardin Faith was left in the care of her father (private respondent herein) and paternal grandparents. 4. On January 10, 1992, private respondent filed a petition for guardianship over Gardin Faith and it was approved

5. Petitioner opposed. on October 4, 1993, a motion to remand custody of Gardin Faith to her. 6. The trial court granted the motion and the case to determine custody of Gardin Faith is now pending. 7. The respondent filed a petition for review on certiorari asserting that temporary custody should be awarded to him because the child has lived with him all her life and It would certainly wreak havoc on the childs psychological make-up to give her to the custody of private respondent, only to return her to petitioner should the latter prevail in the main case. Subjecting the child to emotional seesaw should be avoided ISSUE: W.N. temporary custody should be granted to the father. HELD: Yes. In custody disputes, it is axiomatic that the paramount criterion is the welfare and wellbeing of the child. Insofar as illegitimate children are concerned, Article 176 of the Family Code provides that illegitimate children shall be under the parental authority of their mother. Likewise, Article 213 of the Family Code provides that [n]o child under seven years of age shall be separated from the mother, unless the court finds compelling reasons to order otherwise. The exception allowed by the rule has to be for compelling reasons for the good of the child. If she has erred, as in cases of adultery, the penalty of imprisonment and the divorce decree (relative divorce) will ordinarily be sufficient punishment for her. Moreover, moral dereliction will not have any effect upon the baby who is as yet unable to understand her situation. This is not intended, however, to denigrate the important role fathers play in the upbringing of their children. While the bonds between a mother and her small child are special in nature, either parent, whether father or mother, is bound to suffer agony and pain if deprived of custody. One cannot say that his or her suffering is greater than that of the other parent. It is not so much the suffering, pride, and other feelings of either parent but the welfare of the child which is the paramount consideration. In the case at bar, we are being asked to rule on the temporary custody of the minor, Gardin Faith, since it appears that the proceedings for guardianship before the trial court have not been terminated, and no pronouncement has been made as to who should have final custody of the minor. Bearing in mind that the welfare of the said minor as the controlling factor, we find that the appellate court did not err in allowing her father (private respondent herein) to retain in the meantime parental custody over her. Meanwhile, the child should not be wrenched from her familiar surroundings, and thrust into a strange environment away from the people and places to which she had apparently formed an attachment. COMMENT: The court never expounded on what these compelling reasons are. The best answer I could find is stated in the next paragraph saying that the SC cannot

decide on questions of fact. And the determination of w/n the mother is a good mother is indeed a question of fact. But it still does not answer why custody was granted to the father. Is the compelling reason the fact that her mother is in the states? Is it the fact that the child is already staying at the fathers house and moving the child to and fro would cause the child distress? Are these reasons compelling enough for the court to award temporary custody to the father? I dont know Are cases regarding temporary custody exceptions to Articles 176 and 213? I dont know. For reference, I also posted the full text of the case. Whether a mother is a fit parent for her child is a question of fact to be properly entertained in the special proceedings before the trial court. It should be recalled that in a petition for review on certiorari, we rule only on questions of law. We are not in the best position to assess the parties respective merits vis--vis their opposing claims for custody. Yet another sound reason is that inasmuch as the age of the minor, Gardin Faith, has now exceeded the statutory bar of seven years, a fortiori, her preference and opinion must first be sought in the choice of which parent should have the custody over her person. A word of caution: our pronouncement here should not be interpreted to imply a preference toward the father (herein private respondent) relative to the final custody of the minor, Gardin Faith. Nor should it be taken to mean as a statement against petitioners fitness to have final custody of her said minor daughter. It shall be only understood that, for the present and until finally adjudged, temporary custody of the subject minor should remain with her father WHEREFORE, The trial court is directed to immediately proceed with hearing Sp. Proc. No. Q-92-11053 upon notice of this decision OBITER: Parental Authority and its Renunciation Parental authority or patria potestas in Roman Law is the juridical institution whereby parents rightfully assume control and protection of their unemancipated children to the extent required by the latters needs. It is a mass of rights and obligations which the law grants to parents for the purpose of the childrens physical preservation and development, as well as the cultivation of their intellect and the education of their heart and senses. As regards parental authority, there is no power, but a task; no complex of rights, but a sum of duties; no sovereignty but a sacred trust for the welfare of the minor. GR: Parental authority and responsibility are inalienable and may not be transferred or renounced except in cases authorized by law. The right attached to parental authority, being purely personal, the law allows a waiver of parental authority only in cases of EXC: adoption, guardianship and surrender to a childrens home or an orphan institution. When a parent entrusts the custody of a minor to another, such as a friend or godfather, even in a document, what is given is merely temporary custody and it does not constitute a renunciation of parental authority. Even if a definite renunciation is manifest, the law still disallows the same.

GO v RAMOS
FACTS: These petitions stemmed from the complaint-affidavit for deportation initiated by Luis T. Ramos against Jimmy T. Go alleging that the latter is an illegal and undesirable alien. Luis alleged that while Jimmy represents himself as a Filipino citizen, Jimmys personal circumstances and other records indicate that he is not so. Luis argued that although it appears from Jimmys birth certificate that his parents, Carlos and Rosario Tan, are Filipinos, the document seems to be tampered, because only the citizenship of Carlos appears to be handwritten while all the other entries were typewritten. ISSUE: Did we adopt the jus soli or jus sanguinins principle? Does the principle of res adjudicata apply to decisions on citizenship? HELD: We adopted the jus sanguinis principle. The doctrine of jus soli was never extended to the Philippines. The doctrine of jus soli was for a time the prevailing rule in the acquisition of ones citizenship. However, the Supreme Court abandoned the principle of jus soli in the case of Tan Chong v. Secretary of Labor. Since then, said doctrine only benefited those who were individually declared to be citizens of the Philippines by a final court decision on the mistaken application of jus soli. In citizenship proceedings, res judicata does not obtain as a matter of course. Res judicata may be applied in cases of citizenship only if the following concur: 1. a persons citizenship must be raised as a material issue in a controversy where said person is a party; 2. the Solicitor General or his authorized representative took active part in the resolution thereof; and 3. the finding or citizenship is affirmed by this Court.

4.

Compulsory recognition

RPC 345 Civil liability of persons guilty of crimes against chastity. Person guilty of rape, seduction or abduction, shall also be sentenced: 1. To indemnify the offended woman. 2. To acknowledge the offspring, unless the law should prevent him from so doing. 3. In every case to support the offspring. The adulterer and the concubine in the case provided for in Articles 333 and 334 may also be sentenced, in the same proceeding or in a separate civil proceeding, to indemnify for damages caused to the offended spouse. RPC 46 Penalty to be imposed upon principals in general. The penalty prescribed by law for the commission of a felony shall be imposed upon the principals in the commission of such felony. Whenever the law prescribes a penalty for a felony is general terms, it shall be understood as applicable to the consummated felony. RPC 59 Penalty to be imposed in case of failure to commit the crime because the means employed or the aims sought are impossible. When the person intending to commit an offense has already performed the acts for the execution of the same but nevertheless the crime was not produced by reason of the fact that the act intended was by its nature one of impossible accomplishment or because the means employed by such person are essentially inadequate to produce the result desired by him, the court, having in mind the social danger and the degree of criminality shown by the offender, shall impose upon him the penalty of arresto mayor or a fine from 200 to 500 pesos.

PEOPLE v ABELLA
DOCTRINE: RTC: Rapist Accused is likewise directed to recognize [xxx] as his illegitimate daughter, and provide for her support as soon as his financial means permit. Facts: Sometime in December 1999, the accused Marlon Abella, while armed with a (real name of the victim was withheld by the court in its decision to protect her knife and under the influence of liquor, entered the house of herein complainant [AAA] identity), and then and there have sexual intercourse with [AAA], a 38-year old woman

of feeble mind (moderate mental retardation or intellectual quotient of a 7 to 8-year old child), against her will. During the pendency of the case, [AAA] gave birth to a child. Accused stated that [AAA] was coached to testify against him in furtherance of the hostility between their families. He claims that [AAA]s mental disability made he so subservient to her parents that she would believe everything that they tell her. The RTC convicted the accused of the crime of rape. The case was elevated to the CA which affirmed the decision of the lower court. Hence, the decision is under automatic review by this court. Issues: 1. Whether or not the prosecution failed to prove the guilt of the accused of the crime charged. 2. Whether or not the testimony of the victim is credible to convict the accused. 3. Whether or not the denial of the accused was not given due credit by the court. Held: The high court in affirming the decision of the lower court and the CA stated the following: 1. Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code provides that the crime of rape is committed by a man having carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances: (1) through force, threat or intimidation; (2) when the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; (3) by means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority; and (4) when the offended party is under 12 years of age or is demented, even though none of the circumstances mentioned above be present. In People v. Andaya, [25] it was held that sexual intercourse with a woman who is a mental retardate with the mental age of a child below 12 years old constitutes statutory rape with or without the attendance of force, threat, or intimidation.

2. By well-entrenched jurisprudence, the issue of credibility of witnesses is a question best addressed to the province of the trial court because of its unique position of having observed that elusive and incommunicable evidence of the witnesses' deportment on the stand while testifying which opportunity is denied to the appellate courts and [a]bsent any substantial reason which would justify the reversal of the trial court's assessments and conclusions, the reviewing court is generally bound by the former's findings, particularly when no significant facts and circumstances are shown to have been overlooked or disregarded which when considered would have affected the outcome of the case. 3. It has been stressed, moreover, that the bare denials and uncorroborated alibis of an accused cannot overcome the positive identification of the accused and straightforward recounting of the accuseds commission of a crime. In People v. Nieto, this Court held: It is an established jurisprudential rule that a mere denial, without any strong evidence to support it, can scarcely overcome the positive declaration by the victim of the identity and involvement of appellant in the crimes attributed to him. The defense of alibi is likewise unavailing. Firstly, alibi is the weakest of all defenses, because it is easy to concoct and difficult to disprove. Unless substantiated by clear and convincing proof, such defense is negative, self-serving, and undeserving of any weight in law. Secondly, alibi is unacceptable when there is a positive identification of the accused by a credible witness. Lastly, in order that alibi might prosper, it is not enough to prove that the accused has been somewhere else during the commission of the crime; it must also be shown that it would have been impossible for him to be anywhere within the vicinity of the crime scene.

F. Legitimated Children 1. Who may be legitimated

FC 177 Only children conceived and born outside of wedlock of parents who, at the time of the conception of the former, were not disqualified by any impediment to marry each other may be legitimated. RA 9858

ABADILLA v TABILIRAN
FACTS: Complaint filed by Ma Blyth B. Abadilla, a Clerk of Court assigned at the sala of respondent Judge Jose Tabiliran Respondent charged with gross immorality, deceitful conduct and corruption unbecoming of a judge Complainants allegations: o respondent had scandalously and publicly cohabited with a certain Priscilla Baybayan during the existence of his legitimate marriage with Teresita Banzuela o that respondent shamefacedly contracted marriage with said Priscilla o that respondent falsely represented himself as single in the marriage contract and dispense with the requirements of a marriage contract by invoking cohabitation for 5 years Earlier: wife filed a complaint for abandonment of family home and living with a certain Leonora Pillarion with whom he had a son Charge of Deceitful Conduct: o Complainant claims that respondent caused to be registered as legitimate his three illegitimate children with Priscilla by falsely executing separate affidavits Other charge: Corruption Respondent: o Declared that his cohabitation with Priscilla is not and was neither bigamous nor immoral because he started living with her only after his 1st wife had already left and abandoned the family home in 1966 o Since then, 1st wifes whereabouts is not known and respondent has had no news of her being alive o Further avers that 25 years had already elapsed since the disappearance of his 1st wife when he married Priscilla in 1986

Judge Angeles found respondent guilty only on 2 counts of corruption ISSUES: WON Tabilaran is guilty of deceitful conduct HELD: YES o Children were born in 1970, 1971 and 1975 and prior to the marriage of respondent to Priscilla, which was in 1986 o As a lawyer and a judge, respondent ought to know that, despite his subsequent marriage to Priscilla, these 3 children cannot be legitimated nor in any way be considered legitimate since at the time they were born, there was an existing valid marriage between respondent and his first wife, Teresita o Applicable Provision Art. 269 of NCC: Only natural children can be legitimated. Children born outside of wedlock of parents who, at the time of the conception of the former, were not disqualified by any impediment o marry each other, are natural. o Legitimation is limited to natural children and cannot include those born of adulterous relations o Reasons: 1. The rationale of legitimation would be destroyed 2. It would be unfair to the legitimate children in terms of successional rights; 3. There will be the problem of public scandal, unless social mores change; 4. It is too violent to grant the privilege of legitimation to adulterous children as it will destroy the sanctity of marriage 5. It will be very scandalous, especially if the parents marry many years after the birth of the child. It is clear, therefore, that no legal provision, whether old or new, can give refuge to the deceitful actuations of the respondent.

2.

How legitimation takes place

FC 178 Legitimation shall take place by a subsequent valid marriage between parents. The annulment of a voidable marriage shall not affect the legitimation. FC 180 The effects of legitimation shall retroact to the time of the child's birth.

3.

Retroactivity and effects

FC 180, supra FC 181 The legitimation of children who died before the celebration of the marriage shall benefit their descendants. DOJ OPINION NO. 106 Series of 1991

4. 5.

Action to impugn legitimation Rights of legitimated children

FC 182 Legitimation may be impugned only by those who are prejudiced in their rights, within five years from the time their cause of action accrues.

FC 179 Legitimated children shall enjoy the same rights as legitimate children

RULE ON DNA EVIDENCE

SECTION 1. Scope. This Rule shall apply whenever DNA evidence, as defined in Section 3 hereof, is offered, used, or proposed to be offered or used as evidence in all criminal and civil actions as well as special proceedings. SEC. 2. Application of other Rules on Evidence. In all matters not specifically covered by this Rule, the Rules of Court and other pertinent provisions of law on evidence shall apply. SEC. 3. Definition of Terms. For purposes of this Rule, the following terms shall be defined as follows: (a) Biological sample means any organic material originating from a person body, even if found in inanimate objects, that is susceptible to DNA testing. This includes blood, saliva and other body fluids, tissues, hairs and bones; (b) DNA means deoxyribonucleic acid, which is the chain of molecules found in every nucleated cell of the body. The totality of an individual DNA is unique for the individual, except identical twins; (c) DNA evidence constitutes the totality of the DNA profiles, results and other genetic information directly generated from DNA testing of biological samples; (d) DNA profile means genetic information derived from DNA testing of a biological sample obtained from a person, which biological sample is clearly identifiable as originating from that person; (e) DNA testing means verified and credible scientific methods which include the extraction of DNA from biological samples, the generation of DNA profiles and the comparison of the information obtained from the DNA testing of biological samples for the purpose of determining, with reasonable certainty, whether or not the DNA obtained from two or more distinct biological samples originates from the same person (direct identification) or if the biological samples originate from related persons (kinship analysis); and (f) Probability of Parentage means the numerical estimate for the likelihood of parentage of a putative parent compared with the probability of a random match of two unrelated individuals in a given population. SEC. 4. Application for DNA Testing Order. The appropriate court may, at any time, either motu proprio or on application of any person who has a legal interest in the matter in litigation, order a DNA testing. Such order shall issue after due hearing and notice to the parties upon a showing of the following: (a) A biological sample exists that is relevant to the case; (b) The biological sample: (i) was not previously subjected to the type of DNA testing now requested; or (ii) was previously subjected to DNA testing, but the results may require confirmation for good reasons; (c) The DNA testing uses a scientifically valid technique; (d) The DNA testing has the scientific potential to produce new information that is relevant to the proper resolution of the case; and (e) The existence of other factors, if any, which the court may consider as potentially affecting the accuracy or integrity of the DNA testing. This Rule shall not preclude a DNA testing, without need of a prior court order, at the behest of any party, including law enforcement agencies, before a suit or proceeding is commenced. SEC. 5. DNA Testing Order. If the court finds that the requirements in Section 4 hereof have been complied with, the court shall (a) Order, where appropriate, that biological samples be taken from any person or crime scene evidence; (b) Impose reasonable conditions on DNA testing designed to protect the integrity of the biological sample, the testing process and the reliability of the test results, including the condition that the DNA test results shall be simultaneously disclosed to parties involved in the case; and (c) If the biological sample taken is of such an amount that prevents the conduct of confirmatory testing by the other or the adverse party and where additional biological samples of the same kind can no longer be obtained, issue an order requiring all parties to the case or proceedings to witness the DNA testing to be conducted. An order granting the DNA testing shall be immediately executory and shall not be appealable. Any petition for certiorari initiated therefrom shall not, in any way, stay the implementation thereof, unless a higher court issues an injunctive order. The grant of a DNA testing application shall not be construed as an automatic admission into evidence of any component of the DNA evidence that may be obtained as a result thereof. SEC. 6. Post-conviction DNA Testing. Post-conviction DNA testing may be available, without need of prior court order, to the prosecution or any person convicted by final and executory judgment provided that (a) a biological sample exists, (b) such sample is relevant to the case, and (c) the testing would probably result in the reversal or modification of the judgment of conviction. SEC. 7. Assessment of probative value of DNA evidence. In assessing the probative value of the DNA evidence presented, the court shall consider the following: (a) The chain of custody, including how the biological samples were collected, how they were handled, and the possibility of contamination of the samples; (b) The DNA testing methodology, including the procedure followed in analyzing the samples, the advantages and disadvantages of the procedure, and compliance with the scientifically valid standards in conducting the tests; (c) The forensic DNA laboratory, including accreditation by any reputable standardssetting institution and the qualification of the analyst who conducted the tests. If the laboratory is not accredited, the relevant experience of the laboratory in forensic casework and credibility shall be properly established; and (d) The reliability of the testing result, as hereinafter provided. The provisions of the Rules of Court concerning the appreciation of evidence shall apply suppletorily. SEC. 8. Reliability of DNA Testing Methodology. In evaluating whether the DNA testing methodology is reliable, the court shall consider the following: (a) The falsifiability of the principles or methods used, that is, whether the theory or technique can be and has been tested; (b) The subjection to peer review and publication of the principles or methods; (c) The general acceptance of the principles or methods by the relevant scientific community; (d) The existence and maintenance of standards and controls to ensure the correctness of data generated; (e) The existence of an appropriate reference population database; and (f) The general degree of confidence attributed to mathematical calculations used in comparing DNA profiles and the significance and limitation of statistical calculations used in comparing DNA profiles. SEC. 9. Evaluation of DNA Testing Results. In evaluating the results of DNA testing, the court shall consider the following: (a) The evaluation of the weight of matching DNA evidence or the relevance of mismatching DNA evidence; (b) The results of the DNA testing in the light of the totality of the other evidence presented in the case; and that (c) DNA results that exclude the putative parent from paternity shall be conclusive proof of non-paternity. If the value of the Probability of Paternity is less than 99.9%, the results of the DNA testing shall be considered as corroborative evidence. If the value of the Probability of Paternity is 99.9% or higher, there shall be a disputable presumption of paternity. SEC. 10. Post-conviction DNA Testing. Remedy if the Results Are Favorable to the Convict. The convict or the prosecution may file a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the court of origin if the results of the post-conviction DNA testing are favorable to the convict. In case the court, after due hearing, finds the petition to be meritorious, it shall reverse or modify the judgment of conviction and order the release of the convict, unless continued detention is justified for a lawful cause. A similar petition may be filed either in the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court, or with any member of said courts, which may conduct a hearing thereon or remand the petition to the court of origin and issue the appropriate orders. SEC. 11. Confidentiality. DNA profiles and all results or other information obtained from DNA testing shall be confidential. Except upon order of the court, a DNA profile and all results or other information obtained from DNA testing shall only be released to any of the following, under such terms and conditions as may be set forth by the court: (a) Person from whom the sample was taken; (b) Lawyers representing parties in the case or action where the DNA evidence is offered and presented or sought to be offered and presented;

(c) Lawyers of private complainants in a criminal action; (d) Duly authorized law enforcement agencies; and (e) Other persons as determined by the court. Whoever discloses, utilizes or publishes in any form any information concerning a DNA profile without the proper court order shall be liable for indirect contempt of the court wherein such DNA evidence was offered, presented or sought to be offered and presented. Where the person from whom the biological sample was taken files a written verified request to the court that allowed the DNA testing for the disclosure of the DNA profile of the person and all results or other information obtained from the DNA testing, the same may be disclosed to the persons named in the written verified request. SEC. 12. Preservation of DNA Evidence. The trial court shall preserve the DNA evidence in its totality, including all biological samples, DNA profiles and results or other genetic information obtained from DNA testing. For this purpose, the court may order the appropriate government agency to preserve the DNA evidence as follows: (a) In criminal cases:

i. for not less than the period of time that any person is under trial for an offense; or, ii. in case the accused is serving sentence, until such time as the accused has served his sentence; and (b) In all other cases, until such time as the decision in the case where the DNA evidence was introduced has become final and executory. The court may allow the physical destruction of a biological sample before the expiration of the periods set forth above, provided that: (a) A court order to that effect has been secured; or (b) The person from whom the DNA sample was obtained has consented in writing to the disposal of the DNA evidence. SEC. 13. Applicability to Pending Cases. Except as provided in Sections 6 and 10 hereof, this Rule shall apply to cases pending at the time of its effectivity. SEC. 14. Effectivity. This Rule shall take effect on October 15, 2007, following publication in a newspaper of general circulation.