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KAPISANAN NG MGA MANGGAGAWA SA MANILA RAILROAD COMPANY CREDIT UNION, INC., petitionerappellant, vs.MANILA RAILROAD COMPANY, respondent appellee.

FACTS: -mandamus petition dismissed by the lower court, petitionerappellant would seek a reversal of such decision relying on what it considered to be a right granted by Section 62 of the Republic Act No. 2023, more specifically the first two paragraphs thereof: (1) A member of a cooperative may, notwithstanding the provisions of existing laws, execute an agreement in favor of the co-operative authorizing his employer to deduct from the salary or wages payable to him by the employer such amount as may be specified in the agreement and to pay the amount so deducted to the co-operative in satisfaction of any debt or other demand owing from the member to the co-operative. ( 2) Upon the exemption of such agreement the employer shall if so required by the co-operative by a request in writing and so long as such debt or other demand or any part of it remains unpaid, make the claimant and remit forth with the amount so deducted to the cooperative."
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The only effect of Rep. Act 2023 is to compel the employer to deduct from the salaries or wages payable to members of the employees' cooperative credit unions the employees' debts to the union and to pay the same to the credit union. if Rep. Act 2023 had been enacted, the employer could not be compelled to act as the collecting agent of the employees' credit union for the employees' debt to his credit union but to contend that the debt of a member of the employees cooperative credit union as having first priority in the matter of deduction, is to write something into the law which does not appear. the mandatory character of Rep. Act 2023 is only to compel the employer to make the deduction of the employees' debt from the latter's salary and turn this over to the employees' credit union but this mandatory character does not convert the credit union's credit into a first priority credit. If the legislative intent in enacting pars. 1 and 2 of Sec. 62 of Rep. Act 2023 were to give first priority in the matter of payments to the obligations of employees in favor of their credit unions, then, the law would have so expressly declared. Thus, the express provisions of the New Civil Code, Arts. 2241, 2242 and 2244 show the legislative intent on preference of credits. ISSUE: WON the petitioners interpretation of RA 2023 is correct?

petitioner contends that under the above provisions of Rep. Act 2023, the loans granted by credit union to its members enjoy first priority in the payroll collection from the respondent's employees' wages and salaries. -Court ruled in favor of respondent and held that: there is nothing in the provision of Rep. Act 2023 hereinabove quoted which provides that obligation of laborers and employees payable to credit unions shall enjoy first priority in the deduction from the employees' wages and salaries.

HELD: NO -that there is nothing in said provision from which it could be implied that it gives top priority to obligations of the nature of that payable to petitioner, and that, therefore, respondent company did not violate the above-quoted Section 62 of Republic Act 2023. - The applicable provision of Republic Act No. 2023 quoted earlier, speaks for itself. There is no ambiguity.

-Petitioner-appellant cannot therefore raise any valid objection. For the lower court to view it otherwise would have been to alter the law. That cannot be done by the judiciary. That is a function that properly appertains to the legislative branch. -As was pointed out in Gonzaga v. Court of Appeals: "It has been repeated time and time again that where the statutory norm speaks unequivocally, there is nothing for the courts to do except to apply it. The law, leaving no doubt as to the scope of its operation, must be obeyed. Our decisions have consistently born to that effect. Lidasan v Comelec Facts: 1. Lidasan, a resident and taxpayer of the detached portion of Parang, Cotabato, and a qualified voter for the 1967 elections assails the constitutionality of RA 4790 and petitioned that Comelec's resolutions implementing the same for electoral purposes be nullified. Under RA 4790, 12 barrios in two municipalities in the province of Cotabato are transferred to the province of Lanao del Sur. This brought about a change in the boundaries of the two provinces. 2. Barrios Togaig and Madalum are within the municipality of Buldon in the Province of Cotabato, and that Bayanga, Langkong, Sarakan, Kat-bo, Digakapan, Magabo, Tabangao, Tiongko, Colodan and Kabamakawan are parts and parcel of another municipality, the municipality of Parang, also in the Province of Cotabato and not of Lanao del Sur. 3. Apprised of this development, the Office of the President, recommended to Comelec that the operation of the statute be suspended until "clarified by correcting legislation." 4. Comelec, by resolution declared that the statute should be implemented unless declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court. ISSUE: Whether or not RA 4790, which is entitled "An Act Creating the Municipality of Dianaton in the Province of Lanao del Sur", but

which includes barrios located in another province Cotabato is unconstitutional for embracing more than one subject in the title YES. RA 4790 is null and void 1. The constitutional provision contains dual limitations upon legislative power. First. Congress is to refrain from conglomeration, under one statute, of heterogeneous subjects. Second. The title of the bill is to be couched in a language sufficient to notify the legislators and the public and those concerned of the import of the single subject thereof. Of relevance here is the second directive. The subject of the statute must be "expressed in the title" of the bill. This constitutional requirement "breathes the spirit of command." Compliance is imperative, given the fact that the Constitution does not exact of Congress the obligation to read during its deliberations the entire text of the bill. In fact, in the case of House Bill 1247, which became RA 4790, only its title was read from its introduction to its final approval in the House where the bill, being of local application, originated. 2. . The title "An Act Creating the Municipality of Dianaton, in the Province of Lanao del Sur" projects the impression that only the province of Lanao del Sur is affected by the creation of Dianaton. Not the slightest intimation is there that communities in the adjacent province of Cotabato are incorporated in this new Lanao del Sur town. The phrase "in the Province of Lanao del Sur," read without subtlety or contortion, makes the title misleading, deceptive. For, the known fact is that the legislation has a twopronged purpose combined in one statute: (1) it creates the municipality of Dianaton purportedly from twenty-one barrios in the towns of Butig and Balabagan, both in the province of Lanao del Sur; and (2) it also dismembers two municipalities in Cotabato, a province different from Lanao del Sur. 3. . Finally, the title did not inform the members of Congress the full impact of the law . One, it did not apprise the people in the towns of Buldon and Parang in Cotabato and in the province of Cotabato itself that part of their territory is being taken away from their towns and province and added to the adjacent Province of Lanao del Sur. Two, it kept the public in the dark as to what towns and provinces were actually affected by the bill.

Insular Lumber Co. vs. Court of Tax Appeals FACTS: Insular Lumber (ILC) is an American company engaged as a licensed forest concessionaire. The ILC purchased manufactured oil and motor fuel which it used in the operation of its forest concession. In 1956, RA 1435 was passed. Sec 5 thereof provides that there should be a partial tax refund to those using oil in the operation of forest and mining concessions. In 1964 ILC filed with the Commissioner of Internal Revenue to have a tax refund of P19,921.37 pursuant to the said RA. The Court of Industrial Relations (CIR) ruled that ILC is not covered by such provision because Sec 5, RA 1435 is only effective 5 years from its enactment. Hence, in 1961 the provision ceased to be effective. ICL appealed the issue to the CTA and the CTA ruled the operation of a sawmill is distinct from the operation of a forest concession, hence, the refund provision of Sec 5, RA1435 allowing partial refund to forest and mining concessionaires cannot be extended to the operators of a sawmill. And out of the P19,921.37 claimed, only the amount of P14,598.08 was paid on oil utilized in logging operations. The CTA did not allow the refund of the full amount of P14,598.08 because the ILCs right to claim the refund of a portion thereof, particularly those paid during the period from January 1, 1963 to April 29, 1963 had already prescribed. Hence, ICL was credited the refund of P10,560.20 only. Both parties appealed from the decision of the CTA. The CIR averred that CTA should not have ruled this way. The title of RA 1435 is An Act to Provide Means for Increasing The Highway Special Fund. The CIR contends that the subject of RA 1435 was to increase Highway Special Fund. However, Section 5 of the Act deals with another subject which is the partial exemption of miners and loggers. And this partial exemption on which the Company based its claim for refund is clearly not expressed in the title of the aforesaid Act . More importantly, Section 5 provides for a decrease rather than an increase of the Highway Special Fund. ISSUE: Whether or not to grant the partial tax refund to ICL. HELD: The SC ruled that there is no merit in the contention of the CIR. RA 1435 deals with only one subject and proclaims just one policy, namely, the necessity for increasing the Highway

Special Fund through the imposition of an increased specific tax on manufactured oils. The proviso in Sec 5 of the law is in effect a partial exemption from the imposed increased tax. Said proviso, which has reference to specific tax on oil and fuel, is not a deviation from the general subject of the law . The primary purpose of the aforequoted constitutional provision is to prohibit duplicity in legislation the title of which might completely fail to apprise the legislators or the public of the nature, scope and consequences of the law or its operation. But that is not so for in the passage of RA 1435 since, as the records of its proceedings bear out, a full debate on precisely the issue of whether its title reflects its complete subject was held by Congress which passed it. Joint Ministry of Health-Ministry of Labor and Employment Accreditation Committee vs. Court of Appeals FACTS: -Challenged in this petition for review is the decision of the Court of Appeals, declaring null and void the decision of the Joint Ministry of Health Ministry of Labor and Employment Accreditation Committee revoking the accreditation of the Ermita Medical Center, Inc. as a medical clinic for overseas 1 employment and the conduct of medical examinations. -Committee was formed to establish, regulate and upgrade the standards of medical service and/or examination of workers for overseas employment and to ensure that only occupationally qualified and physically and medically fit workers participate in the 2 overseas employment program. -revocation was made pursuant to the Rules and Regulations promulgated by the Committee on June 1, 1983, covering all duly licensed and registered hospitals, medical clinics and laboratories desirous of offering their services to private employment agencies, recruitment entities and manning agencies in the medical 3 examination of workers being hired for overseas employment. -Accredited medical clinics were classified into:

(a) regularly accredited medical clinics, which were allowed to conduct medical examinations of applicants for overseas employment for all private recruitment firms or agencies, and (b) in-house clinics, which were allowed to conduct medical examinations of applicants for overseas employment for such 4 companies only to which they are in-house medical clinics. -Ermita Medical Center was issued a certificate of accreditation as an in-house medical clinic to service only Builders and Heavy Equipment Services Corporation (BHESCO), but this was revoked by the Committee on the ground that the Center was conducting medical examinations of other companies. -The Center filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals questioning the authority of the Committee to issue the Rules and Regulations and, assuming their validity, to revoke its accreditation as an in- house medical clinic. -In its decision, the respondent court sustained the Rules and Regulations as a valid exercise of the police power intended -It also affirmed that the Committee was validly authorized to issue the Rules and Regulations under Section 79(B) of the Revised Administrative Code providing that: Sec. 79(B) Power to regulate. The Department Head shall have power to promulgate, whenever he may see fit to do so, all rule regulations, orders, circulars, memorandums and other instructions, not contrary to law, . . . for the strict enforcement and proper execution of the laws relative to matters under the jurisdiction of said Department. . . . -However, it held that the Committee had no competence to revoke the accreditation given to the Center because all it was empowered to do under the Rules and Regulations was to "recommend to appropriate authorities the proper sanctions to be taken" in case of violation of the said Rules and Regulations.

-respondent court set aside the revocation by the Committee of the accreditation previously issued to the Center. - the Solicitor General disagrees with the ruling that the Committee could not impose the sanction of revocation but could only recommend the same. -The Solicitor General insists that as an administrative body, the Committee was empowered to impose remedial or civil sanctions as distinguished from penal sanctions, which require specific legislative authority. -He also denies that the Committee unjustly revoked the accreditation of the Center while favoring others apparently similary situated. - evidence before us shows that the Rules and Regulations issued by the Committee have never been published . In the absence of any refutation of this evidence, the Court must conclude that the said Rules and Regulations have indeed not come into force and so cannot be used as a basis for the resolution of the herein petition. -In the controversy before us, the Rules and Regulations now under examination by the Court, and earlier by the respondent court, had not yet been published and so were not yet operating when the accreditation of the Center was revoked. Indeed , they have not been published to date and so continue to be without any force and effect whatsoever. We therefore cannot interpret and apply them as part of our laws. -the petition is DENIED for lack of statutory basis. The challenged decision is SET ASIDE for the same reason LOZADA VS COMELEC FACTS: Lozada together with Igot filed a petition for mandamus compelling the COMELEC to hold an election to fill the

vacancies in the Interim Batasang Pambansa (IBP ). They anchor their contention on Sec 5 (2), Art 8 of the 1973 Constitution which provides: In case a vacancy arises in the Batasang Pambansa eighteen months or more before a regular election, the Commission on Election shall call a special election to be held within sixty (60) days after the vacancy occurs to elect the Member to serve the unexpired term. COMELEC opposes the petition alleging, substantially, that 1) petitioners lack standing to file the instant petition for they are not the proper parties to institute the action; 2) this Court has no jurisdiction to entertain this petition; and 3) Section 5(2), Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution does not apply to the Interim Batasan Pambansa. -the representation in the Interim Batasan Pambansa is regional and sectoral, the need to fill up vacancies in the Body is neither imperative nor urgent. No district or province would ever be left without representation at all, as to necessitate the filling up of vacancies in the Interim Batasan Pambansa. There would always be adequate representation for every province which only forms part of a certain region, specially considering that the Body is only transitory in character. -provision of Section 5(2) of Article VIII of the New Constitution is in the main body of the said Constitution, not in the transitory provisions in which all matters relating to the Interim Batasan Pambansa are found. No provision outside of Article VIII on the "Transitory Provisions" has reference or relevance to the Interim Batasan Pambansa. - the Interim National Assembly had only one single occasion on which to call for an election, and that is for the election of members of the regular National Assembly. - The Constitution could not have at that time contemplated to fill up vacancies in the Interim National Assembly the composition of which, as already demonstrated, would not raise any imperious necessity of having to call special elections for that purpose, because the duration of its existence was neither known or pre-determined.

-the aforementioned provision for calling special elections to fill up vacancies apply only to the regular Batasan Pambansa. This is evident from the language thereof which speaks of a vacancy in the Batasan Pambansa, " which means the regular Batasan Pambansa as the same words "Batasan Pambansa" found in all the many other sections of Article VIII, undoubtedly refer to the regular Batasan, not the interim one. A word or phrase used in one part of a Constitution is to receive the same interpretation when used in every other part, unless it clearly appears, from the context or otherwise, that a different meaning should be 7 applied. - the petition is hereby dismissed In re : Cunanan FACTS: case at bar deals with an RA that, when effected, result in the passage and admittance to the practice of law of people ewho have previously flunked the bar exams. The enactment of the RA will result in the admittance of additional 1,094candidates. RA 972 An Act to Fix the Passing Marks for Bar Examinations from 1946 up to and including 1955. Those who deemed to have passed by virtue of the RA shall be allowed to take and subscribe the corresponding oath of office as member of the Philippine Bar. OBJECTIVE: to admit to the bar those candidates who suffered from insufficiency of reading materials and inadequate preparation. Issue (WON) RA 972 is constitutional. Requirement of legal profession The public interest demands of legal profession adequate preparation and efficiency, precisely more so as legal problem evolved by the times become more difficult. An adequate legal preparations one of the vital requisites for the practice of law that should be developed constantly and maintained firmly. To the legal profession is entrusted the protection of property, life, honor, and civil liberties. Admission to the practice of law The

admission, suspension, disbarment, and reinstatement of attorneys at law in the practice of the profession their supervision have been indisputably a judicial function and responsibility. Role of Congress May repeal, alter, and supplement the rules promulgated by the Court, but the authority and responsibility over th eadmission, suspension, disbarment, and reinstatement of attorneys at law and their supervision remain vested in the SC. Discussion of the issue The law is contrary to public interest because it qualifies 1,094 law graduates who confessedly had inadequate preparation nfor the practice of the profession. To approve officially of those inadequately prepared individual to dedicate themselves to such a delicate mission is to create a serious social danger . In decreeing that bar candidates who obtained in the bar exams of 1946 to 1952, a general average of 70%...be admitted in mass to the practice of law, the disputed law is not a legislation ;it is a judgment revoking those promulgated by the Court during the aforecited year affecting the bar candidates concerned. Although the Court can certainly revoke these judgments, it is no less certain that only the Court, and not the legislative (by virtue of RA) or executive (EO) department may do so. Otherwise, it will be a usurpation of functions. Resolution The RA is partly unconstitutional and constitutional, the latter being caused by lack of unanimity among the presiding justices RA No. 972 has for its object, according to its author, to admit to the Bar, those candidates who suffered from insufficiency of reading materials and inadequate preparation. In the judicial system from which ours has been evolved, the admission, suspension, disbarment and reinstatement of attorneys at law in the practice of the profession and their supervision have been indisputably a judicial function and responsibility. We have said that in the judicial system from which ours has been derived, the admission, suspension, disbarment or reinstatement of attorneys at law in the practice of the profession is concededly judicial. On this matter, there is certainly a clear distinction between the functions of the judicial and legislative departments of the government.

It is obvious, therefore, that the ultimate power to grant license for the practice of law belongs exclusively to this Court, and the law passed by Congress on the matter is of permissive character, or as other authorities may say, merely to fix the minimum conditions for the license. Republic Act Number 972 is held to be unconstitutional. That the Constitution has conferred on Congress the power to repeal, alter or supplement the rule promulgated by this Tribunal, concerning the admission to the practice of law, is no valid argument. Section 13, article VIII of the Constitution provides: Section 13. The Supreme Court shall have the power to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, and the admission to the practice of law. Said rules shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade and shall not diminish, increase or modify substantive rights. The existing laws on pleading, practice and procedure are hereby repealed as statutes, and are declared Rules of Court, subject to the power of the Supreme Court to alter and modify the same. The Congress shall have the power to repeal, alter, or supplement the rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure, and the admission to the practice of law in the Philippines. Constitution of the Philippines, Art. VIII, sec. 13. It will be noted that the Constitution has not conferred on Congress and this Tribunal equal responsibilities concerning the admission to the practice of law. the primary power and responsibility which the Constitution recognizes continue to reside in this Court. Had Congress found that this Court has not promulgated any rule on the matter, it would have nothing over which to exercise the power granted to it. Congress may repeal, alter and supplement the rules promulgated by this Court, but the authority and responsibility over the admission, suspension, disbarment and reinstatement of attorneys at law and their supervision remain vested in the Supreme Court. The power to repeal, alter and supplement the rules does not signify nor permit that Congress substitute or take the place of this

Tribunal in the exercise of its primary power on the matter. The Constitution does not say nor mean that Congress may admit, suspend, disbar or reinstate directly attorneys at law, or a determinate group of individuals to the practice of law. Its power is limited to repeal, modify or supplement the existing rules on the matter, if according to its judgment the need for a better service of the legal profession requires it. But this power does not relieve this Court of its responsibility to admit, suspend, disbar and reinstate attorneys at law and supervise the practice of the legal profession. Being coordinate and independent branches, the power to promulgate and enforce rules for the admission to the practice of law and the concurrent power to repeal, alter and supplement them may and should be exercised with the respect that each owes to the other, giving careful consideration to the responsibility which the nature of each department requires. These powers have existed together for centuries without diminution on each part; the harmonious delimitation being found in that the legislature may and should examine if the existing rules on the admission to the Bar respond to the demands which public interest requires of a Bar endowed with high virtues, culture, training and responsibility. The legislature may, by means of appeal, amendment or supplemental rules, fill up any deficiency that it may find, and the judicial power, which has the inherent responsibility for a good and efficient administration of justice and the supervision of the practice of the legal profession, should consider these reforms as the minimum standards for the elevation of the profession, and see to it that with these reforms the lofty objective that is desired in the exercise of its traditional duty of admitting, suspending, disbarring and reinstating attorneys at law is realized. They are powers which, exercise within their proper constitutional limits, are not repugnant, but rather complementary to each other in attaining the establishment of a Bar that would respond to the increasing and exacting necessities of the administration of justice. Laws are unconstitutional on the following grounds: first, because they are not within the legislative powers of Congress to enact, or Congress has exceeded its powers; second, because they create or establish arbitrary methods or forms that infringe constitutional principles; and third, because their purposes or effects violate the

Constitution or its basic principles. As has already been seen, the contested law suffers from these fatal defects. Summarizing, we are of the opinion and hereby declare that Republic Act No. 972 is unconstitutional and therefore, void, and without any force nor effect for the following reasons , to wit: 1. Because its declared purpose is to admit 810 candidates who failed in the bar examinations of 1946-1952, and who, it admits, are certainly inadequately prepared to practice law, as was exactly found by this Court in the aforesaid years. It decrees the admission to the Bar of these candidates, depriving this Tribunal of the opportunity to determine if they are at present already prepared to become members of the Bar. It obliges the Tribunal to perform something contrary to reason and in an arbitrary manner. This is a manifest encroachment on the constitutional responsibility of the Supreme Court. 2. Because it is, in effect, a judgment revoking the resolution of this Court on the petitions of these 810 candidates, without having examined their respective examination papers, and although it is admitted that this Tribunal may reconsider said resolution at any time for justifiable reasons , only this Court and no other may revise and alter them. In attempting to do it directly Republic Act No. 972 violated the Constitution. 3. By the disputed law, Congress has exceeded its legislative power to repeal, alter and supplement the rules on admission to the Bar. Such additional or amendatory rules are, as they ought to be, intended to regulate acts subsequent to its promulgation and should tend to improve and elevate the practice of law, and this Tribunal shall consider these rules as minimum norms towards that end in the admission, suspension, disbarment and reinstatement of lawyers to the Bar, inasmuch as a good bar assists immensely in the daily performance of judicial functions and is essential to a worthy administration of justice. It is therefore the primary and inherent prerogative of the Supreme Court to render the ultimate decision on who may be admitted and may continue in the practice of law according to existing rules.

4. The reason advanced for the pretended classification of candidates, which the law makes, is contrary to facts which are of general knowledge and does not justify the admission to the Bar of law students inadequately prepared. The pretended classification is arbitrary. It is undoubtedly a class legislation. 5. Article 2 of Republic Act No. 972 is not embraced in the title of the law, contrary to what the Constitution enjoins, and being inseparable from the provisions of article 1, the entire law is void. 6. Lacking in eight votes to declare the nullity of that part of article 1 referring to the examinations of 1953 to 1955, said part of article 1, insofar as it concerns the examinations in those years, shall continue in force. RESOLUTION Upon mature deliberation by this Court, after hearing and availing of the magnificent and impassioned discussion of the contested law by our Chief Justice at the opening and close of the debate among the members of the Court, and after hearing the judicious observations of two of our beloved colleagues who since the beginning have announced their decision not to take part in voting, we, the eight members of the Court who subscribed to this decision have voted and resolved, and have decided for the Court, and under the authority of the same: 1. That (a) the portion of article 1 of Republic Act No. 972 referring to the examinations of 1946 to 1952, and (b) all of article 2 of said law are unconstitutional and, therefore, void and without force and effect. 2. That, for lack of unanimity in the eight Justices, that part of article 1 which refers to the examinations subsequent to the approval of the law, that is from 1953 to 1955 inclusive, is valid and shall continue to be in force, in conformity with section 10, article VII of the Constitution.

Consequently, (1) all the above-mentioned petitions of the candidates who failed in the examinations of 1946 to 1952 inclusive are denied, and (2) all candidates who in the examinations of 1953 obtained a general average of 71.5 per cent or more, without having a grade below 50 per cent in any subject, are considered as having passed, whether they have filed petitions for admission or not. After this decision has become final, they shall be permitted to take and subscribe the corresponding oath of office as members of the Bar on the date or dates that the chief Justice may set. So ordered. IBP VS ZAMORA Facts: Invoking his powers as Commander-in-Chief under Sec. 18, Art. VII of the Constitution, the President directed the AFP Chief of Staff and PNP Chief to coordinate with each other for the proper deployment and utilization of the Marines to assist the PNP in preventing or suppressing criminal or lawless violence. The President declared that the services of the Marines in the anti-crime campaign are merely temporary in nature and for a reasonable period only, until such time when the situation shall have improved. The IBP filed a petition seeking to declare the deployment of the Philippine Marines null and void and unconstitutional. Issues: (1) Whether or not the Presidents factual determination of the necessity of calling the armed forces is subject to judicial review (2) Whether or not the calling of the armed forces to assist the PNP in joint visibility patrols violates the constitutional provisions on civilian supremacy over the military and the civilian character of the PNP

Held: When the President calls the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion, he necessarily exercises a discretionary power solely vested in his wisdom . Under Sec. 18, Art. VII of the Constitution, Congress may revoke such proclamation of martial law or suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and the Court may review the sufficiency of the factual basis thereof. However, there is no such equivalent

provision dealing with the revocation or review of the Presidents action to call out the armed forces. The distinction places the calling out power in a different category from the power to declare martial law and power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, otherwise, the framers of the Constitution would have simply lumped together the 3 powers and provided for their revocation and review without any qualification. The reason for the difference in the treatment of the said powers highlights the intent to grant the President the widest leeway and broadest discretion in using the power to call out because it is considered as the lesser and more benign power compared to the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and the power to impose martial law, both of which involve the curtailment and suppression of certain basic civil rights and individual freedoms, and thus necessitating safeguards by Congress and review by the Court. In view of the constitutional intent to give the President full discretionary power to determine the necessity of calling out thearmed forces, it is incumbent upon the petitioner to show that the Presidents decision is totally bereft of factual basis. The present petition fails to discharge such heavy burden, as there is no evidence to support the assertion that there exists no justification for calling out the armed forces. The Court disagrees to the contention that by the deployment of the Marines, the civilian task of law enforcement is militarized in violation of Sec. 3, Art. II of the Constitution. The deployment of the Marines does not constitute a breach of the civilian supremacy clause. The calling of the Marines constitutes permissible use of military assets for civilian law enforcemen t. The local police forces are the ones in charge of the visibility patrols at all times, the real authority belonging to the PNP Moreover, the deployment of the Marines to assist the PNP does not unmake the civilian character of the police force . The real authority in the operations is lodged with the head of a civilian institution, the PNP, and not with the military. Since none of the Marines was incorporated or enlisted as members of the PNP, there

can be no appointment to civilian position to speak of. Hence, the deployment o fthe Marines in the joint visibility patrols does not destroy the civilian character of the PNP. In view of abuse of discretion The President did not commit grave abuse of discretion in calling out the Marines. President as stated in Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution, specifically, the power to call out the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. Calling the armed forces is not proper for judicial scrutiny since it involves a political question and the resolution of factual issues which are beyond the review powers of this Court. By grave abuse of discretion is meant simply capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment that is patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or hostility. When the President calls the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion, he necessarily exercises a discretionary power solely vested in his wisdom.

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