Table of Contents............................................................................................. 1 Title 2: Crimes Against the Fundamental Law of the State...............................7 Art. 124: Arbitrary Detention.........................................................................7 Milo v. Salanga (G.R. No. L-37007).............................................................7 Cayao v. Del Mundo (A.M. No. MTJ-93-813)................................................9 Astorga v. People (G.R. No. 154130)........................................................11 Art. 125: Delay in the Delivery of Detained Persons to the Proper Judicial Authorities................................................................................................... 13 People vs. Garcia (G.R. No. 126252)........................................................13 Jasper Agbay vs. Deputy Ombudsman for Military (G.R. No. 134503)......15 Title 3: Crimes Against Public Order...............................................................17 Art.134: Rebellion or Insurrection...............................................................17 People vs. Silongan (G.R. No. 137182).....................................................17 Enrile vs. Amin (G.R. No. 93335)..............................................................18 People vs. Manglallan (G.R. No. L-38538)................................................19 Title 4: Crimes Against Public Interest............................................................21 Art. 168: Illegal Possession and Use of False Treasury or Bank Notes and Other Instruments of Credit........................................................................21 Tecson v. CA (370 SCRA 181)..................................................................21 Art. 171: Falsification by Public Officer, Employee; or Notary or Ecclesiastical Minister................................................................................. 23 Art. 172: Falsification by Private Individuals and Use of Falsified Documents .................................................................................................................... 23 Amora v. CA (155 SCRA 388).................................................................23 Pajelga V. Scareal (167 SCRA 350)..........................................................25 Recebido v. People (346 SCRA 88)...........................................................27 Art. 183: Perjury ......................................................................................... 29 Villanueva vs. Secretary of Justice (475 SCRA 495).................................29 Acuna vs. Deputy Ombudsman (450 SCRA 237)......................................31 Choa vs. People (299 SCRA 145)..............................................................33 Art. 185: Machinations in Public Auctions...................................................35 Ouano v. CA............................................................................................. 35 Art. 201: Immoral Doctrines, Obscene Publications and Exhibitions, and Indecent Shows........................................................................................... 37 Iglesia ni Kristo v. CA (G.R. No. 119673)..................................................37 Pita v. CA (G.R. No. 80806)......................................................................39 Fernando v. CA (G.R. No. 159751)...........................................................41 Title 7: Crimes Committed by Public Officers.................................................43 Art. 204: Knowingly Rendering Unjust Judgment.........................................43 1 |Page
Diego v. Castillo (A.M. No. RTJ-02-1673)..................................................43 Vuitton v. Villanueva (A.M. No. MTJ-92-643).............................................45 Buenavista v. Garcia (A.M. No. RTJ-88-246).............................................47 Art. 206: Unjust Interlocutory Order............................................................50 Layola v. Judge Gabo, Jr. (323 SCRA 348)................................................50 Art. 211: Indirect Bribery............................................................................. 53 Formilleza v. Sandiganbayan (G.R. No. 149152)......................................53 Art. 212: Corruption of Public Officials........................................................55 Chua vs. Nuestro (A.M. No. P-88-256)......................................................55 Art. 217: Malversation of Public Funds or Property.....................................56 Davalos v. People (G.R. No. 145229).......................................................56 People v. Uy (G.R. No. 157399)................................................................60 Chan v. Sandiganbayan (G. R. No. 149613).............................................63 Art. 220: Illegal Use of Public Funds or Property.........................................65 Tetangco v. Ombudsman (G.R. No. 156427)............................................65 Abdulla v. People (G.R. No. 150129)........................................................67 Parungao v. Sandiganbayan (G.R. No. 96025).........................................69 Title 8: Crimes Againt Persons........................................................................71 Art. 247: Death or Physical Injuries Inflicted under Exceptional Circumstances............................................................................................. 71 People v. Gelaver..................................................................................... 71 People v. Amamongpong.........................................................................72 People v. Oyanib...................................................................................... 74 Art. 248: Murder.......................................................................................... 76 People vs Mallari (G.R. No. 145993).........................................................76 People vs Gonzales (G.R. No. 139542) ....................................................78 People vs Avecilla (G.R. No. 117033).......................................................81 Art. 249: Homicide...................................................................................... 83 Navarro vs Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 121087) .....................................83 People vs Ullep (G.R. No. 132547)...........................................................85 People vs Antonio (G.R. No. 128900).......................................................87 Art. 251: Death Caused in a Tumultous Affray............................................89 People v. Anecito Unlagada y Suanque (G.R. No. 141080)......................89 Sison vs. People (G.R. No. 108280-83).....................................................91 People v. Cresenciano Maramara (G.R. No. 110994)...............................94 Art. 254: Discharge of Firearms..................................................................96 Dado v. People (G.R. No. 131421)............................................................96 Art. 257: Unintentional Abortion..................................................................99 People v. Salufrania (G.R. No. L-50884)...................................................99 People v. Genoves (G.R. No. L-42819)...................................................101 2 |Page
Art 266: Slight Physical Injuries and Maltreatment....................................102 Kingston(e) Li v. People and CA (G.R. No. 127962).............................102 Art. 266-A: Rape........................................................................................ 104 People v. Hermocilla (G.R. No. 175830).................................................104 People v. Basquez (G.R No. 144035)......................................................106 People v. Oga (G.R. No. 152302)...........................................................107 Title 9: Crimes Against Personal Liberty and Security..................................109 Art. 267: Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention...................................109 People v. Ejandra (G.R. No. 134203) ............................................................................................................... 109 People v. Silongan y Linandang (G.R. No. 137182)................................113 People v. Castro (G.R. No. 132726)........................................................116 Art. 268: Slight Illegal Detention...............................................................118 People v. Dadles (G.R. Nos. 118620-21)................................................118 People v. Llaguno (G.R. No. 91262).......................................................120 People v. Roluna (G.R. No. 101797).......................................................122 Art. 270: Kidnapping and Failure to Return a Minor..................................124 People v. Rubi-Rosa Pastrana (G.R. No. 143644)...................................124 People v. Teresa Bernardo (G.R. No. 144316)........................................126 People v. Vicente Ty and Carmen Ty (G.R. No. 121519)........................128 Art. 287: Light Coercions...........................................................................130 Baleros v. People (G.R. No. 138099)......................................................130 Ong Chiu Kwan vs. CA (G.R. No. 113006)..............................................132 Title 10: Crimes Aganst Property..................................................................133 Art. 293: Robbery...................................................................................... 133 People v. Romeo Apolinario and Antonio Rivera (G.R. No. 97426).........133 People v. Calixto Zinampan, Artemio Apostol, Roger Allan (at large), and Elvis Doca (G.R. No. 126781).................................................................135 People v. Donato Del Rosario (G.R. No. 13106).....................................137 Art. 308: Theft........................................................................................... 139 Laurel v. Abrogar (G.R. No. 155076)......................................................139 Alfonso D. Gaviola v. People G.R. No. 163297.......................................144 Santos v. People (G.R. No. 77429).........................................................146 Art. 310: Qualified Theft............................................................................149 People v. Salonga (G.R. No. 131131).....................................................149 Roque v. People (G.R. No. 138954)........................................................152 People v. Bustinera (G. R. No. 148233)..................................................157 Art. 312: Occupation of Real Property or Usurpation of Real Rights in Property.................................................................................................... 162 Quinao v. People (335 SCRA 741)..........................................................162 Art. 315: Estafa......................................................................................... 164 3 |Page
Ong v. People (G.R. No. 165275)...........................................................164 .............................................................................................................. 166 Chua v. People (G.R. Nos. 150926 and 30)............................................167 Gonzaludo v. People (G.R. No. 150910).................................................169 Art. 318: Other Deceits............................................................................. 172 Jaime Guinhawa vs. People (G.R. No. 162822).......................................172 Title 11: Crimes against Chastity..................................................................175 Art. 333, 334: Adultery and Concubinage.................................................175 Beltran v. People (G.R. No. 137567)......................................................175 Vera Neri v. People (G.R. No. 96602).....................................................177 Art. 338: Simple Seduction........................................................................179 People v. Pascua (GR No. 128159-62)....................................................179 People v. Teodosio (GR. No. 97496).......................................................181 Art. 344: Prosecution of the Crimes of Adultery, Concubinage, Seduction, Abduction, Rape and Acts of Lasciviousness ...........................................186 Beltran v. People (334 SCRA 106)..........................................................186 People v. Tipay (329 SCRA 52)...............................................................188 Alonte v. Savellano (287 SCRA 245)......................................................190 Art.336: Acts of Lasciviousness.................................................................192 Amployo vs. People (457 SCRA 340)......................................................192 People vs. Collado (353 SCRA 381)........................................................194 Dulla vs. Court of Appeals (326 SCRA 32)..............................................196 Art. 337: Qualified Seduction....................................................................197 People v. Javier (G.R. No. 126096).........................................................197 People v. Manansala (G.R. Nos. 110974-81)..........................................198 People v. Alvarez (G.R. No. L-34644).....................................................201 Art. 342: Forcible Abduction......................................................................205 People vs. Egan (GR No. 139338)..........................................................205 People vs. Ablaneda (G.R. No. 131914).................................................208 People vs. Sabrado (G.R. No. 126114)...................................................210 Art. 349: Bigamy....................................................................................... 215 Diego v. Castillo..................................................................................... 215 Abunado v. People.................................................................................216 Cacho v. People..................................................................................... 217 Title 13: Crimes against Honor.....................................................................219 Art. 353: Libel............................................................................................ 219 Fermin v. People (G.R. No. 157643).......................................................219 Magno v. People (G.R. No. 133896).......................................................224 Buatis v. People (G.R. No. 142509)........................................................231 Art. 358: Slander....................................................................................... 236 4 |Page
Villanueva v. People (G.R. No. 160351).................................................236 Caal v. People (G.R. No. 163181).........................................................238 Pader v. People (G.R. No. 139157).........................................................239 Title 14: Quasi-Offenses...............................................................................240 Art. 365: Imprudence and Negligence.......................................................240 Loney vs. People (G.R. No. 152644).......................................................240 Abueva vs. People (G.R. No. 134387)....................................................242 People v. De los Santos (G.R. No. 131588)............................................244 Anti-Wiretapping Act (R.A. No. 4200)...........................................................247 Socorro D. Ramirez vs. CA and Ester S. Garcia (G.R. No. 93833)...........247 Felipe Navarro vs. CA and People (G.R. No. 121087).............................249 Edgardo A. Gaanan vs. IAC and People (G.R. No. L- 69809)...................251 Anti-Carnapping Law (R.A. 6539).................................................................254 People v. Bustinera (G.R. No. 148233)...................................................254 People v. Garcia (G.R. No. 138470)........................................................256 People v. Lobitania (G.R. No. 142380)...................................................258 Probation Law............................................................................................... 260 Domingo Lagrosa and Osias Baguin v. People (G.R. No. 152044)..........260 Lilia Vicoy v. People (G.R. No. 138203)..................................................262 Alejandra Pablo v. Hon. Silverio Castillo and People (G.R. No. 125108). 264 Anti-Fencing Law.......................................................................................... 266 Fransisco v. People (GR No. 146584).....................................................266 Tan v. People (GR No. 134298)............................................................270 Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (R.A. 3019)..........................................276 People v. Arturo F. Pacificador (G.R. No. 139405)..................................276 Rosalia M. Dugayon vs. People (G.R. No. 147333).................................278 Arturo A. Mejorada vs. Sandiganbayan (G.R. Nos. L-51065-72).............280 Anti-Highway Robbery (P.D. 532).................................................................282 People v. Pascual (G.R. No. 132870)......................................................282 People v. Reanzares (G.R. No. 130656).................................................283 People v. Cerbito (G.R. No. 126397)......................................................284 Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act..........................................................285 People v. Bongcarawan (384 SCRA 525)................................................285 Suson v. People (494 SCRA 691)............................................................287 People v. Lagata (404 SCRA 671)...........................................................289 Illegal Possession of Firearms/Explosives Law (R.A. 8294)...........................291 Sayco v. People (G.R. No. 159703)........................................................291 People v. Comadre (G.R. No. 153559)....................................................293 People v. Tadeo (G.R. Nos. 127660 & 144011-12).................................296 Anti Fencing Law (P.D. 1612)......................................................................298 5 |Page
Francisco v. People (G.R. No. 146584)...................................................298 Anti-Bouning Checks Law (B.P. 22)...............................................................301 Marigomen v. People (G.R. No. 153451)................................................301 Sycip v. CA (328 SCRA 447)...................................................................304 Recuerdo v. People (G.R. No. 133036)...................................................307 Art. 294(B): Robbery with Rape.................................................................309 People v. Moreno .................................................................................. 309 People v. Domingo (383 SCRA 43).........................................................310 People v. Verceles (388 SCRA 515)........................................................312 Art. 148: Direct Assault.............................................................................313 People vs. Dural (223 SCRA 201)...........................................................313 People vs. Abalos (258 SCRA 523).........................................................314 People vs. Tac-an (182 SCRA 201).........................................................315
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law as a person in authority. As such, he may make arrest and detain persons within legal limits.
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personal liberty (Black's Law Dictionary, 270 [1979]) . Under the circumstances, respondent judge was in fact guilty of arbitrary detention when he, as a public officer, ordered the arrest and detention of complainant without legal. In overtaking another vehicle, complainant-driver was not committing or had not actually committed a crime in the presence of respondent judge. Such being the case, the warrantless arrest and subsequent detention of complainant were illegal. In the case at bar, it was duly proved that petitioner was indeed deprived of his liberty for three days on the ground of mere personal vengeance and the abusive attitude of respondent contrary to the law.
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Astorga v. People (G.R. No. 154130) Facts: On September 1, 1997, the private offended parties who are members of the Regional Special Operations Group (RSOG) of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources station at Tacloban City, accompanied by SPO3 Cinco and SPO1 Capoquian, went to the Island of Daram, Western Samar to conduct intelligence operations on possible illegal logging activities. At that afternoon, they found two boats measuring 18 meters in length and 5 meters in breadth being constructed at Barangay Locob-Locob. There they met petitioner Benito Astorga, the Mayor of Daram, who turned out to be the owner of the boats. A heated altercation ensued between them. Petitioner accompanied by ten armed men brought the DENR team to petitioners house where they had dinner and drinks. The team left at 2 in the morning. This matter was brought to before the Sandiganbayan which ruled and holds petitioner for arbitrarily detaining the private offended parties. Issue: Whether or not petitioner is criminally liable for arbitrary detention? Decision: No. the Supreme Court ruled that the determinative factor in Arbitrary Detention, in the absence of actual physical restraint, is fear. The elements of the crime of Arbitrary Detention are: 1.) That the offender is a public officer or employee, 2.) That he detains a person and 3.) That the detention is without legal grounds.There is no proof that petitioner instilled fear in the minds of the private offended parties. There was no actual restraint imposed on the private offended parties. SPO1 Capoquian in fact testified that they were free to leave the house and roam around the barangay. Furthermore, he admitted that it was raining at that time. Hence, it is possible that petitioner prevented the team from leaving the island because it was unsafe for them to travel by boat. Petitioner, being then a municipal mayor, merely extended his hospitality and entertained the DENR Team in his house. The testimony made by the private offended parties negate
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the element of detention. Fear is a state of mind and is necessarily subjective. Addressed to the mind of the victim, its presence cannot be tested by any hardand-fast rule but must instead be viewed in the light of the perception and judgment of the victim at the time of the crime.
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Art. 125: Delay in the Delivery of Detained Persons to the Proper Judicial Authorities
People vs. Garcia (G.R. No. 126252)
Facts: On Nov. 18, 1994 herein accused Jesus Garcia boarded a jeep carrying a plastic bag, and occupied the seat next to the driver. Also in that jeepney two policeman who were in civilian clothes. After herein accused boarder smelled marijuana of which seemed to emanate from the plastic bag carried by Garcia. To confirm their suspicion, they decided to follow the accused when he gets of the jeepney. When the two policeman were certain that it was indeed marijuana that the accused was in possession they quickly identified themselves and arrested Garcia. The accused after the arrest was turned over to the CIS office at the Baguio Water district compound for further investigation. Issue: Whether or not there was delay in the delivery of the person as provided for in Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code? Decision: NO. The Sc held that there was no irregularity with the turn over of the appellants to the CIS office. It was clarified that this has been the practice of the arresting officers as their office had previously arranged with the CIS for assistance with respect to investigations of suspected criminals, the CIS office being more specialized in the area of investigation. Neither can the police officers be held liable for arbitrarily detaining appellant at the CIS office. Art. 125 of the RPC, penalizes a public officer who shall detain another for some legal ground and fail to deliver him to the proper authorities for 36 hours for crimes punishable by the afflictive or capital penalties. In the present case, the record bears that appellant was arrested for possession of 5 kls. Of marijuana in Nov. 28, 1994 at 2 p.m. a crime punishable with reclusion perpetua to death. He was detained for further investigation and delivered by the arresting officers to the court in the
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afternoon of the next day. Clearly, the detention of appellant for purposes of investigation did not exceed the duration allowed by law. i.e., 36 hours from the time of his arrest.
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Jasper Agbay vs. Deputy Ombudsman for Military (G.R. No. 134503)
Facts: On September 7, 1997 Jasper Agbay together with a Sherwin Jugalbot were arrested and detained at the Liloan Police Station by herein private respondent policemen. They were arrested for an alleged violation of R.A. 7160. The following day a complaint for violation of said law was filed against the two accused before the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Liloan, Metro Cebu by one Gicarya for and behalf of her daughter Gayle. On September 10, 1997 the petitioner argued to the Chief of Police that they be released, considering that the latter had failed to deliver the detained petitioner to the proper judicial authority within 36 hours from Sept. 7, 1997. The Main argument of herein petitioners that they were not delivered to the proper judicial authority, hence herein private respondent policemen were in violation of Art. 125 of the Revised Penal Code. Petitioner contends that the act of Gicarya in filing the complaint before the MCTC was for the purposes of P.I. as the MCTC has no jurisdiction to try the case, thus not falling within the requirements of Art. 25. Isuue: Wheter or not there was a violation of Art. 125 of the RPC? Decision: NO. The SC Held that upon filing of the Complaint to the MCTC, the intent behind Art. 125 of the RPC is satisfied considering that by such act, the detained person is informed of the crime imputed against him and, upon his application with the court, he may be released on bail. Petitioner himself acknowledged this power of the MCTC to order release when he applied for and was granted his release upon posting bail. Thus, the very purpose underlying Art. 125 of the RPC
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has been duly served with the MCTC. That the filing of the complaint with the MCTC interrupted the period prescribed in said Article.
Ranvylle Albano
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2008-0052
2008-0052
Ranvylle Albano
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2008-0052
Huks in that region, we find Federico Agarin alias Commander "Smith" guilty of the crime of simple rebellion only (People vs. Hernandez, et al ., 99 Phil. 515; 52 Off. Gaz. [12] 5506; Secs. 4 and 5, Rule 116; People vs. Melecio Aquino, et al., 108 Phil 814; 57 Off. Gaz [51] 91 80)'" [ People vs. Agarin, 109 Phil. 430, 436]" The Court, therefore, sustains the contention of the appellant that the crime he committed is not murder but the crime of rebellion punishable under Articles 134 and 135 of the Revised Penal Code.
2007-0388
entrapment, petitioners natural reaction from the seeming interest of the of the poseur-buyer to buy fake US dollar notes constitutes an overt act which clearly shows his intent to use or sell the counterfeit US dollar notes. It is worthy to note that prior to the buy-bust operation, the civilian informer had an agreement with the petitioner to arrange a meeting with the prospective buyers. It was actually the petitioner who planned and arranged said meeting and what the informer did was only to convince the petitioner that there are prospective buyers. Clearly therefore, prior to the buy-bust operation, the petitioner had already the intention to sell fake US dollar notes and from that fact alone he cannot claim that he was only instigated to commit the crime. The petitioner also failed to overcome the legal presumption that public officers regularly perform their official duties.
Melencio S. Faustino
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2008-0094
Art. 171: Falsification by Public Officer, Employee; or Notary or Ecclesiastical Minister Art. 172: Falsification by Private Individuals and Use of Falsified Documents
Amora v. CA (155 SCRA 388)
Facts: Petitioners Inocentes Amora, Jr. and Claudio Murillo were accused of four (4) counts of Estafa thru Falsification of Public Documents. Petitioners allegedly falsify the Time Book and Payroll Voucher of the municipality of Guindulman, Bohol, covering the period from September 1 to 30, 1972 by making it appear that Vicente Begamano and Alfredo Bagtasos rendered 21 days services each in "gathering boulders for shore protection" for the period from September 1 to 30, 1972 when they did not in fact render said services. After trial, the Court of First Instance of Bohol finds the accused Guilty as charged. The Court of Appeals held that the accused were not guilty of estafa because evidently the Municipality of Guindulman did not suffer any loss or damage arising from the payrolls. On the contrary, the government gained from the said project. However, the Court of Appeals found that Inocentes Amora, Jr. was a municipal employee and convicted him of falsification by public officer. Although Claudio Murillo was not in the government service he was also convicted of falsification by public officer on the ground that there was a conspiracy between him and Amora. The Court of Appeals also held that the appellants were motivated by a single intention and so found them guilty of only one (1) instead of four (4) crimes. Issue: Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in disregarding their defense of good faith. Decision: The Supreme Court held that although the accused altered a public document or made a misstatement or erroneous assertion therein, he would
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not be guilty of falsification as long as he acted in good faith and no one was prejudiced by the alteration or error." In the instant case, It is quite obvious that the proper method for claiming payment under the pakyaw contract was for Murillo to simply bill the town for so many cubic meters of boulders which had been delivered and piled at the municipal wharf. Instead he and Inocentes Amora, Jr. resorted to the payroll system which is not only cumbersome but also involved falsification. The reason could only be that they were ignorant and ill-advised as claimed. From the foregoing coupled with the fact that the town of Guindulman suffered no damage and even gained on the project (the cost of the boulders actually delivered was P18,285.00 but Murillo was paid only P13,455.00) plus the additional fact that the alleged complaining witness mentioned in the informations suffered no damage whatsoever and were in fact awarded no indemnity, it is obvious that the falsifications made by the petitioners were done in good faith. The petition is hereby granted. The decision of the Court of Appeals which adjudged the petitioners guilty of falsification is hereby reversed and the petitioners are acquitted.
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Decision: Petitioner is entitled to an acquittal. As Justice Albert says: "in the falsification of public or official document under Art. 171 of the Revised Penal Code, it is not enough that the falsification be committed by a public officer; it is also necessary that it should be committed by a public officer with abuse of his office, that is, in deeds, instrument, indentures, certificates, etc., in the execution of which he participates by reason of his office." In the instant case, the deed of absolute sale executed by Ablat was adjudged to be a falsified document because it conveyed the impression that Ablat was the owner of the motorcycle, subject matter of the transaction, when such was not the case, as the petitioner Fajelga is the true and registered owner of the said motorcycle, thereby making an untruthful narration of facts. It should be noted, however, that the statement that Ablat was the owner of the motorcycle in question is not altogether untruthful since the petitioner Fajelga had previously sold the motorcycle to him. While the deed of sale may not have been registered with the Bureau of Land Transportation, Ablat nevertheless became the owner thereof before its aborted sale to the provincial government of Batanes. Besides, malicious intent to injure a third person is absent. In fact, neither the government nor any third person incurred any loss by reason of the "untruthful" narration.
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This argument is without merit. Under the circumstance, there was no need of any direct proof that the petitioner was the author of the forgery. As keenly observed by the Solicitor General, "the questioned document was submitted by petitioner himself when the same was requested by the NBI for examination. Clearly in possession of the falsified deed of sale was petitioner and not Caridad Dorol who merely verified the questioned sale with the Provincial Assessor's Office of Sorsogon. In other words, the petitioner was in possession of the forged deed of sale which purports to sell the subject land from the private complainant to him. Given this factual backdrop, the petitioner is presumed to be the author of the forged deed of sale, despite the absence of any direct evidence of his authorship of the forgery. Since the petitioner is the only person who stood to benefit by the falsification of the document found in his possession, it is presumed that he is the material author of the falsification. As it stands, therefore, we are unable to discern any grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Court of Appeals.
Jaypee Garcia
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2007-0280
preceding articles, shall testify under oath or make an affidavit upon any material matter before a competent person authorized to administer an oath in cases in which the law so requires. Any person who, in case of a solemn affirmation made in lieu of an oath, shall commit any of the falsehoods mentioned in this and the three preceding articles of this section shall suffer the respective penalties provided therein. Perjury is an obstruction of justice; its perpetration may affect the earnest concerns of the parties before a tribunal. The felony is consummated when the false statement is made. A mere assertion of a false objective fact, a falsehood, is not enough. The assertion must be deliberate and willful. Perjury being a felony by dolo, there must be malice on the part of the accused. Willfully means intentionally; with evil intent and legal malice, with the consciousness that the alleged perjurious statement is false with the intent that it should be received as a statement of what was true in fact. It is equivalent to knowingly. Deliberately implies meditated as distinguished from inadvertent acts. It must appear that the accused knows his statement to be false or as consciously ignorant of its truth. Perjury cannot be willful where the oath is according to belief or conviction as to its truth. A false statement of a belief is not perjury. Bona fide belief in the truth of a statement is an adequate defense. A false statement which is obviously the result of an honest mistake is not perjury. There are two essential elements of proof for perjury: (1) the statement made by the defendants must be proven false; and (2) it must be proven that the defendant did not believe those statements to be true.
Jaypee Garcia
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2007-0280
Probable cause, as used in preliminary investigations, is defined as the existence of such facts and circumstances as would excite the belief, in a reasonable mind, acting on the facts within the knowledge of the prosecutor, that the person charged was guilty of the crime for which he was prosecuted. The elements of perjury under Article 183 of the Revised Penal Code are: (a) that the accused made a statement under oath or executed an affidavit upon a material matter; (b) that the statement or affidavit was made before a competent officer, authorized to receive and administer oath; (c) that in that statement or affidavit, the accused made a willful and deliberate assertion of a falsehood; and, (d) that the sworn statement or
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affidavit containing the falsity is required by law or made for a legal purpose. Public respondent correctly ruled that the first and third elements are absent here in that private respondents statements were not material to that case nor do they constitute willful and deliberate assertion of falsehood.
Whether petitioner may be convicted of perjury based on the alleged false statements he stated in his petition for naturalization withdrawn almost two years prior to the filing of the Information for perjury? Decision: We cannot go along with the submission of the petitioner and the Solicitor General that petitioner could no longer be prosecuted for perjury in view of the withdrawal of the petition for naturalization containing his false material statements. In this jurisdiction, it is not necessary that the proceeding in which the perjury is alleged to have been committed be first terminated before a prosecution for the said crime is commenced. At the time he filed his petition for naturalization, he had committed perjury. As discussed earlier, all the elements of the crime were already present then. He knew all along that he wilfully stated material falsities in his verified petition. Surprisingly, he withdrew his petition without even stating any reason therefore. But such withdrawal only terminated the proceedings for naturalization. It did not extinguish his culpability for perjury he already committed. Indeed, the fact of withdrawal alone cannot bar the State from prosecuting petitioner, an alien, who made a mockery not only of the
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Philippine naturalization law but the judicial proceedings as well. And the petition for naturalization tainted with material falsities can be used as evidence of his unlawful act.
Issue:
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Whether or not the requirements of Act. No. 3135, the governing law for extra-judicial foreclosures were complied with? Decision: No, the republication and reposting of notice were not complied with. The waiver by the parties only authorized the adjournment of the execution sale. There is nothing in the statute that states that republication and reposting may be waived.
Art. 201: Immoral Doctrines, Obscene Publications and Exhibitions, and Indecent Shows
Iglesia ni Kristo v. CA (G.R. No. 119673)
Facts: Respondent appellate court affirmed the ruling of the respondent Board xrating IGLESIA NI CRISTOs TV Program Series Nos. 115, 119, 121 and 128. The records show that the respondent Board disallowed the program series for "attacking" other religions. Thus, Exhibits "A," "A-1," (respondent Board's Voting Slip for Television) reveal that its reviewing members x-rated Series 115 for criticizing different religions, based on their own interpretation of the Bible. They suggested that the program should only explain petitioner's own faith and beliefs and avoid attacks on other faiths. Exhibit "B" shows that Series No. 119 was xrated because "the Iglesia ni Cristo insists on the literal translation of the bible and says that our Catholic veneration of the Virgin Mary is not to be condoned because nowhere it is found in the bible that we should do so. Exhibit "C" shows that Series No. 121 was x-rated for reasons of the attacks, they do on, specifically, the Catholic religion. Exhibit "D" also shows that Series No. 128 was not favorably recommended because it outrages Catholic and Protestant's beliefs. On second review, it was x-rated because of its unbalanced interpretations of some parts of the bible. In sum, the respondent Board x-rated petitioner's TV program series Nos. 115, 119, 121 and 128 because of petitioner's controversial biblical interpretations and its "attacks" against contrary religious beliefs. The respondent appellate court agreed and even held that the said "attacks" are indecent, contrary to law and good customs. Issue: Whether respondent board gravely abused its discretion when it prohibited the airing of petitioner's religious program for the reason that they constitute an attack against other religions and that they are indecent, contrary to law and good customs?
Decision:
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It is opined that the respondent board can still utilize "attack against any religion" as a ground allegedly because section 3 (c) of PD No. 1986 prohibits the showing of motion pictures, television programs and publicity materials which are contrary to law and Article 201 (2) (b) (3) of the Revised Penal Code punishes anyone who exhibits "shows which offend any race or religion." We respectfully disagree for it is plain that the word "attack" is not synonymous with the word "offend." Moreover, Article 201 (2) (b) (3) of the Revised Penal Code should be invoked to justify the subsequent punishment of a show which offends any religion. It cannot be utilized to justify prior censorship of speech. It must be emphasized that E.O. 876, the law prior to PD 1986, included "attack against any religion" as a ground for censorship. The ground was not, however, carried over by PD 1986. Its deletion is a decree to disuse it. There can be no other intent.
this decree results in an acquittal, the obscene/immoral literature, films, prints, engravings, sculptures, paintings or other materials and articles involved in the violation referred to in Section 1 (referring to Art. 201) hereof shall nevertheless be forfeited in favor of the government to be destroyed, after forfeiture proceedings conducted by the Chief of Constabulary. (c) The person aggrieved by the forfeiture action of the Chief of Constabulary may, within fifteen (15) days after his receipt of a copy of the decision, appeal the matter to the Secretary of National Defense for review. The decision of the Secretary of National Defense shall be final and unappealable. The Court is not ruling out warrantless searches, as the Rules of Court (1964 rev.) (the Rules then prevailing), provide: SEC. 12. Search without warrant of person arrested. A person charged with an offense may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may be used as proof of the commission of the offense. But as the provision itself suggests, the search must have been an incident to a lawful arrest, and the arrest must be on account of a crime committed. Here, no party has been charged, nor are such charges being readied against any party, under Article 201, as amended, of the Revised Penal Code. To say that the respondent Mayor could have validly ordered the raid (as a result of an anti-smut campaign) without a lawful search warrant because, in his opinion, "violation of penal laws" has been committed, is to make the respondent Mayor judge, jury, and executioner rolled into one. And precisely, this is the very complaint of the petitioner.
Issue:
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Whether petitioners participate in the distribution and exhibition of obscene materials? Decision: The Supreme Court emphasizes that mere possession of obscene materials, without intention to sell, exhibit, or give them away, is not punishable under Article 201, considering the purpose of the law is to prohibit the dissemination of obscene materials to the public. The offense in any of the forms under Article 201 is committed only when there is publicity. The law does not require that a person be caught in the act of selling, giving away or exhibiting obscene materials to be liable, for as long as the said materials are offered for sale, displayed or exhibited to the public. In the present case, we find that petitioners are engaged in selling and exhibiting obscene materials.
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is contrary to law or is not supported by the evidence, and that the same was made with conscious and deliberate intent to do an injustice. The law requires that (a) the offender is a judge; (b) he renders a judgment in a case submitted to him for decision; (c) the judgment is unjust; (d) he knew that said judgment is unjust. This Court reiterates that in order to hold a judge liable, it must be shown that the judgment is unjust and that it was made with conscious and deliberate intent to do an injustice. That good faith is a defense to the charge of knowingly rendering an unjust judgment remains the law. As held in Alforte v. Santos, even assuming that a judge erred in acquitting an accused, she still cannot be administratively charged lacking the element of bad faith, malice or corrupt purpose. Malice or bad faith on the part of the judge in rendering an unjust decision must still be proved and failure on the part of the complainant to prove the same warrants the dismissal of the administrative complaint. There is, therefore, no basis for the charge of knowingly rendering an unjust judgment.
beyond reasonable doubt that the judgment is unjust and that it was made with conscious and deliberate intent to do an injustice. In this case, We are constrained to hold that complainant failed to substantiate its claims that respondent judge rendered an unjust judgment knowingly. It merely relied on the failure of respondent judge to mentioned the motion in the decision, on his alleged reliance on the testimony of defense witness and on the delay in the promulgation of the case. But they are not enough to show that the judgment was unjust and was maliciously rendered. A judgment is said to be unjust when it is contrary to the standards of conduct prescribed by law. 9 The test to determine whether an order or judgment is unjust may be inferred from the circumstances that it is contrary to law or is not supported by evidence. The decision herein rests on two legal grounds: first, that there was no unfair competition because the elements of the crime were not sufficiently proven; second, that Jose V. Rosarion who was accused as owner/proprietor of COD was not properly charged as his personality is distinct from that of the COD's.
determine whether the judgment or order is unjust, may be inferred from the circumstance that it is contrary to law or is not supported by evidence. (In re: Rafael C. Climaco, Adm. Case No. 134-J, Jan. 21, 1974; 55 SCRA 107). Judgment may be said to be unjust when it is manifestly against the law and contrary to the weight of evidence. (Sec. 1, par. [c], Rule 37, Rules of Court). An unjust judgment is one contrary to the standards of right and justice or standards of conduct prescribed by the law. (US vs. Oglesby Grocery Co., 264 F. 691; Komen vs. City of St. Louis, 316 Mo. 9; 289 S.W. 838).' (p. 4, Report and Recommendation.) In view of Judge Garcia's legal backs round as a former Assistant Provincial Fiscal of Palawan in 1985, the Court cannot imagine that he would be ignorant of the law which penalizes statutory rape (Art. 335, Par. 3, Revised Penal Code) or that he did not know that as the victim's consent in statutory rape is invalid, it is not a defense (People vs. Gonzales, 58 SCRA 265; People vs. Celic, 137 SCRA 166). Being incompetent to give valid consent to the rape committed against her, her consent to the dismissal of the original charge against her rapist is likewise invalid. Judge Garcia's allegation that "ample amount" had been paid by the accused to the complainant to settle the case "during a sort of a conference between the parties in the chambers of the presiding judge " (Emphasis supplied; p. 13, Rollo) while evidently intended to impugn the motives of the complainant in prosecuting the rapist and kidnapper of his daughter has only succeeded in revealing Judge Garcia's improper and immoral intervention in brokering a compromise of the criminal cases against Ledesma. It is an admission that he is either ignorant of the rule that criminal cases are not allowed by law to be compromised, and that an offer of compromise by the accused is an implied admission of guilt (Sec. 24, Rule 130, Rules of Court), or that he does not know that his participation in such a transaction is unbecoming of a judge. Respondent Judge also admitted that the offended party, Gail Buenavista, has never appeared before him "even for once" (p. 13, Rollo), That circumstance would have aroused suspicion in a more alert Judge that she was being sequestered by the accused to prevent her from disowning the letter she supposedly signed in defense of the accused (Annex B, p. 24, Rollo) and her affidavit of desistance (Annex B-2, p. 17, Rollo).
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For all the foregoing, we find respondent Judge Marcelo G. Garcia guilty of serious misconduct, gross ignorance of the law, and knowingly rendering an unjust order or judgment. The last is punishable under Article 204 of the Revised Penal Code as follows: Art. 204. Any judge who shall knowingly render an unjust judgment in a case submitted to him for decision shall be punished by prision mayor and perpetual disqualification.
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With respect to the alleged rendering of an unjust interlocutory order, in connection with the denial by respondent judge of the motion for reconsideration of the order granting the petition of the Chief of Police, Sta. Maria Station to take custody of accused SPO2 German, the OCA found such a charge to be unfounded. Knowingly rendering an unjust interlocutory order must have the elements: 1) that the offender is a judge; 2) that he performs any of the following acts: a) he knowingly renders unjust interlocutory order or decree; or b) he renders a manifestly unjust interlocutory order or decree through inexcusable negligence or ignorance. The OCA perceived no evidence that the respondent judge issued the questioned order knowing it to be unjust, and neither is there any proof of conscious and deliberate intent to do an injustice. Thus, the OCA recommended: 1. x x x 2. That the charges of violation of Section 3 (e) of R.A. 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act) and issuance of an unjust interlocutory order be DISMISSED for lack of merit. Issue: Whether or not Respondent Judge Basilio R. Gabo, Jr. is liable for issuance of unjust interlocutory order under Article 206 of the Revised Penal Code notwithstanding the recommendation of the Office of the Court Administrator that the same be dismissed for lack of merit? Decision: The Supreme Court sustained the recommendation of the Office of the Court Administrator, thus: It is a settled doctrine that for a judge to be held liable for knowingly rendering an unjust judgment, it must be established beyond cavil that the judgment adverted to is unjust, contrary to law or unsupported by the evidence, and that the same was rendered with conscious and deliberate intent to do an
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injustice. In other words, the quantum of proof required to hold respondent judge guilty for alleged violations of Section 3 (e) of R.A. 3019 and Article 206 of the Revised Penal Code, is proof beyond reasonable doubt. Proof beyond reasonable doubt requires moral certainty. If the inculpatory facts and circumstances are capable of two or more explanations or interpretations, one of which is consistent with the innocence of the accused and the other consistent with his guilt, the evidence does not fulfill or hurdle the test of moral certainty and does not suffice to convict. Here, the allegations of the complaint-affidavit are unsubstantiated. Respondent judge cannot, of course, be pronounced guilty on the basis of bare allegations. There has to be evidence on which conviction can be anchored. The evidence must truly be beyond reasonable doubt. However, the Supreme Court found Judge Basilio R. Gabo, Jr. guilty of gross ignorance of the law.
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Decision: No. The essential ingredient of indirect bribery as defined in Article 211 of the Revised Penal Code is that the public officer concerned must have accepted the gift or material consideration. There must be a clear intention on the part of the public officer to take the gift so offered and consider the same as his own property from then on, such as putting away the gift for safekeeping or pocketing the same. Mere physical receipt unaccompanied by any other sign, circumstance or act to show such acceptance is not sufficient to lead the court to conclude that the crime of indirect bribery has been committed. An examination of the seven photographs that were allegedly taken immediately after the passing of the money shows that the petitioner was standing up when the PC agents apprehended her. There was no picture showing petitioner to be seated which should be her position immediately after the money was handed to her under the table. None of the photographs show the petitioner in the process of appropriating or keeping the money after it was handed to her.
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Despite his belief that he was then no longer obligated to liquidate his P18,000.00 cash advance, petitioner nonetheless settled his account. Petitioner brushed aside the charge of malversation and declared that he had already been relieved of his accountabilities by the Commission on Audit. He, however, admitted receiving from the provincial treasurer the two demand letters earlier adverted to dated May 5, 1988 and May 26, 1988 requiring him to submit his liquidation of the P18,000.00 cash advance on the dates respectively indicated therein. On June 30, 2000, the Sandiganbayan rendered its decision, finding petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of malversation of public funds and sentencing him accordingly. Issue: Whether or not the alleged acts of the petitioner constitute the crime charge? Decision: The elements essential for the conviction of an accused under the above penal provision are; that the offender is a public officer; that he has the custody or control of funds or property by reason of the duties of his office; that the funds or property are public funds or property for which he is accountable; and that he appropriated, took, misappropriated or consented or through abandonment or negligence, permitted another person to take them. The Supreme court ruled that there can hardly be no dispute about the presence of the first three elements. Petitioner is a public officer occupying the position of a supply officer at the Office of the Provincial Engineer of Marinduque. In that capacity, he receives money or property belonging to the provincial government for which he is bound to account. In the crime of malversation, all that is necessary for conviction is sufficient proof that the accountable officer had received public funds, that he did not have them in his possession when demand therefore was made, and that he could not satisfactorily explain his failure to do so. Direct evidence of personal
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misappropriation by the accused is hardly necessary as long as the accused cannot explain satisfactorily the shortage in his accounts. The failure of a public officer to have duly forthcoming any public funds or property with which he is chargeable, upon demand by any duly authorized officer, is prima facie evidence that he has put such missing fund or property to personal uses. When the absence of funds is not due to the personal use thereof by the accused, the presumption is completely destroyed; in fact, the presumption is never deemed to have existed at all. The petitioner failed to overcome this prima facie evidence of guilt. Petitioner does not at all dispute the fact that he did receive a cash advance. He also admitted receiving the demand letters of the provincial treasurer for him to submit a liquidation of the cash advance on two occasions, which he failed to do. He harps on Memorandum No. 88-63 issued by then Marinduque Governor Reyes that he can offset his unliquidated cash advance of from the commutation of his unused vacation and sick leave credits to justify his failure to liquidate his cash advance. He also invites attention to the fact that, even before the approval of his application for the commutation of his leave credits, he already paid his cash advance on January 27, 1995. Petitioners attempt at rationalization for his failure to liquidate is unacceptable. Memorandum No. 88-63 merely informed petitioner that his application for commutation may be granted provided that the commutated amount is first applied to his unliquidated cash advance. Nowhere in the said memorandum did it state that he is exempted from submitting his liquidation of the same cash advance. As it is, petitioner failed to liquidate and return his cash advance despite repeated demands. He was able to return the said amount only on January 27, 1995, that is, after almost seven (7) years from the last demand. The return of the said amount cannot be considered a mitigating circumstance analogous to voluntary surrender considering that it took petitioner almost seven (7) years to return the amount. In malversation of public funds, payment, indemnification, or reimbursement of funds misappropriated, after the commission of the crime, does not extinguish the criminal liability of the offender which, at most, can merely affect the accused's civil liability thereunder and be considered a mitigating circumstance being analogous to voluntary surrender.
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funds it had remitted to the Bank of Japan, Tokyo. Both the State and the accused have offered explanations for the failure of UCPB, T.M. Kalaw Branch to remit the dollar equivalent of P183,805,291.25 to Credit Lyonnais. Both explanations, naturally, were diametrically opposed. The accused allegedly diverted the funds covered by the two PNB Managers checks by falsifying a commercial document called an Application for Cashiers Check (ACC) by inserting an account number (A/C #111-1212-04) of a private individual after the name of the payee, UCPB, T.M. Kalaw Branch. It claims that NPC did not authorize the insertion considering that the Payment Instruction (PI) issued by NPC instructing PNB to prepare a Managers check to be charged to NPCs savings account did not contain any account number. Through the insertion, the accused allegedly succeeded in diverting the funds from the UCPB, T.M. Kalaw Branch in favor of Raul Gutierrez, Raul Nicolas, George Aonuevo and Mara Aonuevo. On May 28, 2002, the Sandiganbayan rendered its Decision, finding the accused Jaime B. Ochoa guilty of the crime of malversation of public funds thru falsification of commercial documents. On the ground of reasonable doubt accused Jose Ting Lan Uy, was acquitted. An alias warrant of arrest was issued against Raul Gutierrez. Issue: Whether or not the herein accused is guilty of Malversation of Public Funds thru Falsification of Commercial Documents? Decision: The Supreme Court ruled that to be found guilty of malversation, the prosecution must prove the the offender is a public officer; that he has the custody or control of funds or property by reason of the duties of his office; that the funds or property involved are public funds or property for which he is accountable; and that he has appropriated, taken or misappropriated, or has consented to, or through abandonment or negligence, permitted the taking by another person of, such funds or property. The Supreme Court further ruled that Malversation may be committed either through a positive act of misappropriation of public funds or property or
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passively
through
negligence
by
allowing
another
to
commit
such
misappropriation. To sustain a charge of malversation, there must either be criminal intent or criminal negligence and while the prevailing facts of a case may not show that deceit attended the commission of the offense, it will not preclude the reception of evidence to prove the existence of negligence because both are equally punishable in Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code. More pointedly, the felony involves breach of public trust, and whether it is committed through deceit or negligence, the law makes it punishable and prescribes a uniform penalty therefor. Even when the information charges willful malversation, conviction for malversation through negligence may still be adjudged if the evidence ultimately proves that mode of commission of the offense. The Supreme Court explicitly stated that even on the putative assumption that the evidence against petitioner yielded a case of malversation by negligence but the information was for intentional malversation, under the circumstances of this case his conviction under the first mode of misappropriation would still be in order. Malversation is committed either intentionally or by negligence. The dolo or the culpa present in the offense is only a modality in the perpetration of the felony. Even if the mode charged differs from mode proved, the same offense of malversation is involved and conviction thereof is proper. The question of whether or not an information charging the commission of the crime by means of deceit will preclude a conviction on the basis of negligence is neither novel nor of first impression. An accused charged with willful or intentional falsification can validly be convicted of falsification through negligence.
Issue:
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Whether or not the petitioner herein is guilty of the crime of Malversation of Public Funds? Decision: The Supreme Court ruled that the petition lacks merit and guilty of te crime charge. In affirming the courts below the Supreme Court pointed out the following reasons, that the fact that Bas was given official designation during all the times that she acted as collection officer, petitioner's liability is not, by that fact alone, mitigated. Petitioner could still be held liable for the amount unremitted by Bas if it can be shown that the latter was under her supervision. The questioned amount on time because it is incumbent upon him to exercise the strictest supervision on the person he designated, otherwise, he would suffer the consequences of the acts of his designated employee through negligence. In short, by failing to exercise strict supervision he could be liable for malversation through negligence. The auditor thus committed no error when she charged to petitioner's account the shortage in the collections actually done by Bas. The failure of a public officer to have duly forthcoming any public funds or property with which he is chargeable, upon demand by any duly authorized officer, shall be prima facie evidence that he has put such missing funds or property to personal use. The petitioner not only did omit to report the shortages of Bas to the proper authority upon her discovery thereof; she even practically admitted to having assisted Bas in covering up such shortages. Petitioner did not only lend Bas those amounts given on November 7, 9, and 15, 1995. She admittedly extended 'vales to her and to others, also out of public funds. The grant of loans through the "vale" system is a clear case of an accountable officer consenting to the improper or unauthorized use of public funds by other persons, which is punishable by the law. To tolerate such practice is to give a license to every disbursing officer to conduct a lending operation with the use of public funds. The Supreme Court further ruled that the alleged acquiescence of petitioner's superior, even if true, is not a valid defense. The fact that petitioner did not personally use the missing funds is not a valid defense and will not exculpate him from his criminal liability.
gave
Php 3,000 cash financial assistance to the chairman and Php 1,000 to each tanod in a certain barangay. When it was not justified as a lawful expense, the latter refunded the amount from the City of Manila. Respondent asserted that the Ombudsman has no jurisdiction over the case, but it is lodged in the COMELEC instead. He alse maintained his position on the validity of the expenses made. Issue: Whether or not Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the case against respondent? Decision: It is well-settled that the Court will not ordinarily interfere with the Ombudsmans determination of whether or not probable cause exists except when it commits grave abuse of discretion. Grave abuse of discretion exists where a power is exercised in an arbitrary, capricious, whimsical or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility so patent and gross as to amount to evasion of positive duty or virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by, or in contemplation of law.
The Ombudsman found no evidence to prove probable cause. Probable cause signifies a reasonable ground of suspicion supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a cautious mans belief that the person accused is guilty of the offense with which he is charged. Here, the Complaint merely alleged that the disbursement for financial assistance was neither authorized by law nor justified as a lawful expense. Complainant did not cite any law or ordinance that provided for an original appropriation of the amount
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used for the financial assistance cited and that it was diverted from the appropriation it was intended for. The elements of the offense, also known as technical malversation, are: (1) the offender is an accountable public officer; (2) he applies public funds or property under his administration to some public use; and (3) the public use for which the public funds or property were applied is different from the purpose for which they were originally appropriated by law or ordinance. It is clear that for technical malversation to exist, it is necessary that public funds or properties had been diverted to any public use other than that provided for by law or ordinance. To constitute the crime, there must be a diversion of the funds from the purpose for which they had been originally appropriated by law or ordinance. Patently, the third element is not present in this case.
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to its employees in the form of terminal leave benefits such employees were entitled to under existing civil service laws. There is no dispute that the money was spent for a public purpose payment of the wages of laborers working on various projects in the municipality. It is pertinent to note the high priority which laborers wages enjoy as claims against the employers funds and resources. Settled is the rule that conviction should rest on the strength of evidence of the prosecution and not on the weakness of the defense. Absent this required quantum of evidence would mean exoneration for accused-appellant. The Sandiganbayans improper reliance on Sec. 5(b) of Rule 131 does not save the day for the prosecutions deficiency in proving the existence of criminal intent nor could it ever tilt the scale from the constitutional presumption of innocence to that of guilt. The Court notes that there is no particular appropriation for salary differentials of secondary school teachers of the Sulu State College in RA 6688. The third element of the crime of technical malversation which requires that the public fund used should have been appropriated by law is therefore absent. The authorization given by the Department of Budget and Management for the use of the Php 40,000.00 allotment for payment of salary differentials of 34 secondary school teachers is not an ordinance or law contemplated in Article 220 of the Revised Penal Code. Appellant herein, who used the remainder of the Php 40,000 released by the DBM for salary differentials, for the payment of the terminal leave benefits of other school teachers of the Sulu State College, cannot be held guilty of technical malversation in the absence, as here, of any provision in RA 6688 specifically appropriating said amount for payment of salary differentials only. In fine, the third and fourth elements of the crime defined in Article 220 of the Revised Penal Code are lacking in this case.
Petitioner was charged with malversation of public funds allegedly committed by him as a municipal treasurer. After hearing, the Sandiganbayan acquitted him of malversation of public funds but convicted him instead of illegal use of public funds.
Issue: Whether or not petitioner can be convicted of illegal use of public funds?
Decision:
The 1987 Constitution mandates that the accused, in all criminal prosecutions, shall enjoy the right to be informed of the nature and cause of accusation against him. From this fundamental precept proceeds the rule that the accused may be convicted only of the crime with which he is charged. An exception to this rule, albeit constitutionally permissible, is the rule on variance in Section 4, Rule 120 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure. The essential elements of the crime of malversation are: (a) the offender is a public officer; (b) by reason of his duties he is accountable for public funds and property; and (c) he appropriates, takes, or misappropriates, or permits other persons to take such public funds or property, or otherwise is guilty of misappropriation or malversation of such funds or property. The essential elements of this crime, more commonly known as technical malversation, are: (a) the offender is an accountable public officer; (b) he applies public funds or property under his administration to some public use; and (c) the public use for which the public funds or property were applied is different from the purpose for which they were originally appropriated by law ordinance. A comparison of the two articles reveals that their elements are entirely distinct and different from the other. In malversation of public funds, the offender misappropriates public funds for his own personal use or allows any other person
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to take such public funds for the latter's personal use. In technical malversation, the public officer applies public funds under his administration not for his or another's personal use, but to a public use other than that for which the fund was appropriated by law or ordinance. Technical malversation is, therefore, not included in nor does it necessarily include the crime of malversation of public funds charged in the information. Since the acts constituting the crime of technical malversation were not alleged in the information, and since technical malversation does not include, or is not included in the crime of malversation of public funds, he cannot resultantly be convicted of technical malversation. Considering however that all the evidence given during the trial in the malversation case is the same evidence that will be presented and evaluated to determine his guilt or innocence in the technical malversation case in the event that one is filed and in order to spare the petitioner from the rigors and harshness compounded by another trial, not to mention the unnecessary burden on our overloaded judicial system, the Court deems it best to pass upon the issue of whether or not the petitioner indeed is guilty of illegal use of public funds. Lacsamana's testimony shows that the CRBI fund is a general fund, and the utilization of this fund specifically for the concreting of the Barangay Jalung Road was merely an internal arrangement between the Department of Public Works and Highways and the barangay captain and was not particularly provided for by law or ordinance. There is no dispute that the money was spent for a public purposepayment of the wages of laborers working on various projects in the municipality. It is pertinent to note the high priority which laborers' wages enjoy as claims against the employers' funds and resources. In the absence of a law or ordinance appropriating the CRBI fund for the concreting of the Barangay Jalung Road, the petitioner cannot be declared guilty of the crime of illegal use of public funds.
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the spouse and/or the lover; and 3) the accused never consented to the carnal acts done by the spouse.
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Unfortunately for Eduardo, he wasnt able to establish the existence of the aforesaid circumstances. His version of how things went down were too full of inconsistencies. First off, he stabbed his wife several times which is not consistent with an accidental killing (because he claimed he was aiming for the lover). Another was that he claimed that the paramour was able to GET DRESSED while under attack. And another was that even his daughter testified that she did not tell her father anything about her mothers residence or whereabouts as even she did not know where her mother was staying. So the guilty verdict is sustained.
People v. Amamongpong
Facts:
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Amamompong was charged with homicide for the killing of SPO1 Flores in their house. The accused contends that not only was the killing done under exceptional circumstances (Art. 247 of the RPC), but that he was also justified in killing Flores under Art 11 of the RPC because his act was done in defense of the honor of his wife. Although a prosecution witness testified that he saw the accused actually hold a scythe to hack Flores in the first floor of the house, the accused counters that the incident took place in the bedroom located at the 2 nd floor of their residence. And it was there that he saw Flores naked from the waist down attempting to have sex with his wife. It was then that he pursued Flores with the scythe and thereby wounding him. And when the victim tried to run, Flores also drew his gun but the accused was quick to wrestle the gun away and use it against Flores. The accused whereby emptied the bullets on the victim. Another prosecution witness testified that although the accused claims this all happened in the second floor, large quantities of blood was found in the first floor and even on the stairs and that on the second floor, no apparent signs of struggle can be seen as all the furniture and appliances were in order. And except for the victims bloody carcass, nothing else seemed out of the ordinary. But Amamompong was steadfast in his defense. Issue: Should the accused be afforded the benefit under Art. 11 as well as Art. 247 of the RPC?
Decision: No. Not only is the accused version of the events not credible, but the fact that the accused claims BOTH Art 11 and 247 of the RPC is contradictory in itself. One cannot claim that rage was brought upon when an accused sees his
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wife engaged in sexual intercourse willingly with a lover, and at same time claim that his acts were to defend the honor of his wife. Add to this the testimony of the prosecution witness that he saw the accused strike the victim with a scythe on the first floor, as well as the forensic evidence pointing to the fact that the body of the victim could have been just carried on the second floor to make it seem like the victim was attempting to have intercourse, then the Court has no reason to reverse the finding of the trial court that Art 11 and 247 of the RPC can not be appreciated in the case at bar.
People v. Oyanib
Facts:
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Michael Oyanib was charged with parricide and homicide for the killing of his wife and her lover at Michaels wifes residence. The following facts have been established: That Michael and his wife Tita started living separately a year earlier. Michael tried to win back Tita but the latter was openly flaunting his new lover Jesus Esquirdo. In one occasion, Micheal and Jesus almost came to blows when Michael saw his wife and Jesus in a loving embrace at the plaza. After this incident, Jesus and Tita were heard threatening Michael that they would kill him the next time they see each other. A day before the killings, One of Michael and Titas children was asked by the school to call her parents for a meeting. But because Michael was indisposed, he went to his wifes residence the next day to ask her if she could come. But because of the threats of Jesus and his wife in the previous incident, he brought with him a hunting knife. Unfortunately, when the accused arrived at Titas house, he saw Tita and Jesus having sex. Jesus launched at Michael but he (Mike) was able to draw his knife and stab Jesus. Tita, meanwhile got a hold of a liquor bottle whereby she attacked Michael. And so, Michael also stabbed Tita. But the RTC still found Mike guilty. Issue Should the exempting circumstance under Art. 247 be applied under the circumstances? Decision: In order for Art. 247 to apply, the accused or the defense must be able to show the following elements: 1) he/she/ catches the other spouse by surprise having sex with a lover;
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physical injuries to the spouse and/or the lover; and consented to the carnal acts done by the spouse.
The evidence show that all three elements are present in this case. Michael was still married to Tita (albeit living separately), he caught his wife and Jesus by surprise having sex, and Michael certainly did not approve of their relationship, much less their carnal act. The fact that Mike brought with him a hunting knife is consistent with his excuse that he was fearful of an attack by either Jesus or Tita because of past events. So the decision of the RTC is modified. Mike is found guilty only under Art. 247 of the RPC.
Facts: While Joseph and Liza (wife) were watching a basketball game at the barangay basketball court, Rufino and his brothers, who were then carrying bladed weapons, arrived and attempted to stab Joseph; but Joseph was able to run away. When they were not able to catch up with him, Rufino boarded and drove the truck parked near the basketball court and continued chasing Joseph until the truck ran over the latter, which caused his instantaneous death. Appreciating the qualifying circumstance of use of motor vehicle, it convicted Rufino of murder. Issue: Whether or not the use of a motor vehicle is a qualifying circumstance for the crime of murder? Decision: The evidence shows that Rufino deliberately used his truck in pursuing Joseph. Upon catching up with him, Rufino hit him with the truck, as a result of which Joseph died instantly. It is therefore clear that the truck was the means used by Rufino to perpetrate the killing of Joseph. The case of People v. Muoz cited by Rufino finds no application to the present case. In the said case, the police patrol jeep was merely used by the accused therein in looking for the victim and in carrying the body of the victim to the place where it was dumped. The accused therein shot the victim, which caused the latters death. In the present case, the truck itself was used to kill the victim by running over him. Under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, a person who kills another by means of a motor vehicle is guilty of murder. Thus, the use of motor vehicle qualifies the killing to murder. The penalty for murder is reclusion perpetua to death. In view of the absence of an aggravating circumstance and the presence of one mitigating circumstance, reclusion perpetua, not death, should be the penalty to be imposed on Rufino.
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Noel Andres overtook the car driven of the accused and cut cross his path. Noel Andres alighted from his vehicle and confronted Inocencio. Noel later on also had an argument with Dino Gonzalez, the son of the accused. Inocencio seeing his son having confrontation with Noel, got his gun to protect Dino. Accused fired on Noel Andres but instead hit and caused the fatal injuries to the victims John Kenneth Andres, Kevin Valdez and Feliber Andres resulting to the ultimate death of the latter. The Trial court rendered judgement finding that the shooting was attended by the qualifying circumstance of treachery and held the appellant guilty of the complex crime of murder for the death of Feliber Andres and for two counts of frustrated murder for the injuries sustained by Kenneth Andres and Kevin Valdez.
Issue:
Whether or not the qualifying circumstance of treachery is present for the crime of murder?
Decision:
The fact that the appellant fired his gun from behind the victim does not by itself amount to treachery. There is no evidence on record that the appellant deliberately positioned himself behind the victim to gain advantage over him when he fired the shot. On the contrary, the evidence before us reveals that the position of the appellants car was not of his own doing but it became so when Noel Andres overtook his car and cut off his path.
Appellant did not act belligerently towards Noel Andres even after the latter cut off the appellants path. Andres stated in court that the appellant did not alight from his car nor opened his window until he, Andres, tapped on it. For his part Gonzalez categorically stated in court that he did not point his gun nor threatened Andres during their short spat. Gonzalez, although he had his gun in his car, did not react to Andres cursing until the latter was having an altercation with the appellants son, Dino. Gonzalez claimed that he perceived that his son was in imminent danger.
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There is no indication that Gonzalez had any opportunity to see the passengers when he fired the shot. The totality of the evidence on record fails to support a conclusion that Gonzalez deliberately employed the mode of attack to gain undue advantage over the intended nor the actual victim. Without any decisive evidence to the contrary, treachery cannot be considered; thus the crime committed is homicide.
As regards the injuries sustained by the two children we find that the crime committed are two counts of slight physical injuries. The intent to kill determines whether the crime committed is physical injuries or homicide and such intent is made manifest by the acts of the accused which are undoubtedly intended to kill the victim. In a case wherein the accused did not know that a person was hiding behind a table who was hit by a stray bullet causing superficial injuries requiring treatment for three days, the crime committed is slight physical injuries. In case of doubt as to the homicidal intent of the accused, he should be convicted of the lesser offense of physical injuries.
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correccional in its maximum period and a fine of not less than Fifteen thousand pesos (P15,000.00) shall be imposed upon any person who shall unlawfully manufacture, deal in, acquire, dispose, or possess any low powered firearm, such as rimfire handgun, .380 or .32 and other firearm of similar firepower, part of firearm, ammunition, or machinery, tool or instrument used or intended to be used in the manufacture of any firearm or ammunition: Provided, that no other crime was committed. If homicide or murder is committed with the use of an unlicensed firearm, such use of an unlicensed firearm such use of an unlicensed firearm shall be considered as an aggravating circumstance. It is clear from the foregoing that where murder or homicide results from the use of an unlicensed firearm, the crime is no longer qualified illegal possession, but murder or homicide, as the case may be. The crime of illegal possession of firearm, in its simple form, is committed only where the unlicensed firearm is not used to commit any of the crimes of murder, homicide, rebellion, insurrection, sedition or attempted coup d'etat. Otherwise, the use of unlicensed firearm would be treated either: (1) as an essential ingredient in the crimes of rebellion, insurrection, sedition or attempted coup d'etat; or (2) as an aggravating circumstance in murder or homicide.
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The allowance of this mitigating circumstance is consistent with the rule that criminal liability shall be incurred by any person committing a felony although the wrongful act done be different from that which he intended. In People v. Castro, the mitigating circumstance of lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong as that committed was appreciated in favor of the accused while finding him guilty of homicide.
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Indeed, to hold him criminally liable for murder and sentence him to death under the circumstances would certainly have the effect of demoralizing other police officers who may be called upon to discharge official functions under similar or identical conditions. We would then have a dispirited police force who may be half-hearted, if not totally unwilling, to perform their assigned duties for fear that they would suffer the same fate as that of accused-appellant.
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There would be no treachery when the victim was placed on guard, such as when a heated argument preceded the attack, or when the victim was standing face to face with his assailants and the initial assault could not have been unforseen. Antonio can only be convicted of the lesser crime of homicide under Article 249 of the Revised Penal code.
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Decision: Basic is the rule that the defense of alibi should be rejected when the identity of the accused has been sufficiently and positively established by an eyewitness because alibi cannot prevail over the positive identification . A tumultuous affray takes place when a quarrel occurs between several persons who engage in a confused and tumultuous manner, in the course of which a person is killed or wounded and the author thereof cannot be ascertained. The quarrel in the instant case is between a distinct group of individuals , one of whom was sufficiently identified as the principal author of the killing, as against a common, particular victim. It is not, as the defense suggests, a tumultuous affray within the meaning of Art. 251 of The Revised Penal Code, that is, a melee or free- for- all, where several persons not comprising definite or identifiable groups attack one another in a confused and disorganized manner, resulting in the death or injury of one or some of them. Verily, the attack was qualified by treachery. The deceased was relieving himself, fully unaware of any danger to his person when suddenly the accused walked past witness Edwin Selda, approached the victim and stabbed him at the side. There was hardly any risk at all to accused- appellant; the attack was completely without warning, the victim was caught by surprise, and given no chance to put up any defense. Wherefore, the decision of conviction appealed from is affirmed.
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The trial court rendered decision finding Romeo Sison, Nilo Pacadar, Joel Tan, Richard De Los Santos and Joselito Tamayo guilty as principals in the crime of murder qualified by treachery. Ferrer was convicted as an accomplice. The Court of Appeals modified the decision of the trial court by acquitting Ferrer but increasing the penalty of the rest of the accused except for Tamayo. The court convicts Tamayo of homicide. Issue: Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in finding that the crime committed is murder and not death caused in a tumultuous affray? Decision: For Article 251 of the Revised Penal Code to apply; it must be established that: (1) there be several persons; (2) that they did not compose groups organized for the common purpose of assaulting and attacking each other reciprocally; (3) these several persons quarreled and assaulted one another in a confused and tumultuous manner;(4) someone was killed in the course of the affray; (5) it cannot be ascertained who actually killed the deceased; and (6) that the person or persons who inflicted serious physical injuries or who used violence be can be identified. A tumultuous affray takes place when a quarrel occurs between several persons and they engage in a confused and tumultuous affray, in the course of which some person is killed or wounded and the author thereof cannot be ascertained. The quarrel in the instant case, if it can be called a quarrel, was between one distinct group and one individual. Confusion may have occurred because of the police dispersal of the rallyists, but this confusion subsided eventually after the loyalists fled to Maria Orosa Street. It was only a while later after said dispersal that one distinct group identified as loyalists picked on one defenseless individual and attacked him repeatedly, taking turns in inflicting punches, kicks and blows on him. There was no confusion and tumultuous quarrel or affray, nor was there a reciprocal aggression at this stage of the incident.
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As the lower courts found, the victims assailants were numerous by as much as fifty in number and were armed with stones with which they hit the victim. They took advantage of their superior strength and excessive force and frustrated any attempt by Salcedo to escape and free himself. Salcedo pleaded for mercy but they ignored his pleas until he finally lost unconsciousness. The deliberate and prolonged use of superior strength on a defenseless victim qualifies the killing of murder. Wherefore, the decision appealed from is affirmed and modified.
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Held: There is no merit in the accused- appellants position that he should be held liable only for death caused in a tumultuous affray under Article 251 of the Revised Penal Code. It was in such situation that accused came at the scene and joined the fray purportedly to pacify the protagonists when Miguelito attacked him causing four (4) stab wounds in different parts of his body- two on the stomach, one on the left nipple, and one on the left arm. Then accused- appellant with his hand- gun shot Miguelito. Assuming that a rumble or a free- for- all fight occurred at the benefit dance, Article 251 of the Revised Penal Code cannot apply because prosecution witness Ricardo and Regarder Donato positively identified accused- appellant as Miguelitos killer. While accused- appellant himself suffered multiple stab wounds which, at first blush, may lend verity to his claim that a rumble ensued and that victim Miguelito inflicted upon him these wounds, the evidence is adequate to consider them as a mitigating circumstance because the defenses version stands discredited in light of the more credible version of the prosecution as to the circumstances surrounding Miguelitos death. Wherefore, the Court modifies the judgment appealed from. The Court finds Cresenciano Maramara guilty beyond reasonable doubt of homicide.
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fragments of a 5.56 mm jacketed bullet. However, on cross-examination, he declared that he is not sure whether the 2 other metallic fragments recovered from the fatal wound of the victim are indeed parts of a copper jacket of a caliber 5.56 mm. jacketed bullet. The trial court convicted petitioner and accused Eraso of the crime of homicide which was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. Accused Eraso filed a Petition for Review but was denied by CA; on the other hand petitioner, filed this petition. Issue: Whether or not the trial court and the Court of Appeals erred in finding the petitioner guilty of homicide? Decision: The Court sustains the finding of the trial court that petitioner fired his .45 caliber pistol towards the victim. However, it appears that there is no evidence to prove that petitioner had intent to kill the victim. The prosecution witnesses did not see whether petitioner aimed to kill the victim. life. Intent to kill cannot be automatically drawn from the mere fact that the use of firearms is dangerous to Intent to kill must be established with the same degree of certainty as is required of the other elements of the crime. The inference of intent to kill should not be drawn in the absence of circumstances sufficient to prove such intent beyond reasonable doubt. Absent an intent to kill in firing the gun towards the victim, petitioner should be held liable for the crime of illegal discharge of firearm under Article 254 of the Revised Penal Code. The elements of this crime are: (1) that the offender discharges a firearm against or at another person; and (2) that the offender has no intention to kill that person . The Decision of the Court of Appeals in affirming the conviction of petitioner for the crime of homicide is set aside and petitioner is acquitted of the crime charged on the ground of reasonable doubt.
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However, petitioner Geronimo Dado is guilty of the crime of illegal discharge of firearm.
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It has been clearly established (a) that Marciana Abuyo was seven (7) to eight (8) months pregnant when she was killed; (b) that violence was voluntarily exerted upon her by her husband Filomeno; and (c) that, as a result of said violence, Marciana Abuyo died together with the fetus in her womb. The abortion was caused by the same violence that caused the death of the wife, Marciana Abuyo, such violence being voluntarily exerted by Filomeno upon her. However, the intent to cause the abortion has not been sufficiently established. Mere boxing on the stomach, taken together with the immediate strangling of the victim in a fight, is not sufficient proof to show intent to cause an abortion. In fact, Filomeno must have merely intended to kill his wife but not necessarily to cause an abortion.
Issue:
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Whether or not petitioner should be convicted for the crime of slight physical injury instead of homicide? Decision: The Supreme Court ruled in the affirmative. It ruled that the only injury attributable to Li is the contusion on the victims right arm that resulted from Li striking Arugay with a baseball bat. In view of the victims supervening death from injuries which cannot be attributed to Li beyond reasonable doubt, the effects of the contusion caused by Li are not mortal or at least lie entirely in the realm of speculation. When there is no evidence of actual incapacity of the offended party for labor or of the required medical attendance, the offense is only slight physical injuries. What transpired during the dawn hours of was an artless, spontaneous street fight devoid of any methodical plan for consummation. It arose not because of any long-standing grudge or an appreciable vindication of honor, but because the actors were too quick to offense and impervious to reason. Yet, however senseless this lethal imbroglio is, a judicious examination of the circumstances must be made to avoid leaps into hyperbole. Careful scrutiny of the evidence reveals that the criminal culpability of Li in the death of Arugay was not established beyond reasonable doubt. Unfortunately, the person who is responsible for the death apparently remains at large.
Decision:
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The second incident committed in 2002 whereby appellant inserted his fingers into Ms vagina likewise constitute rape through sexual assault. In People v. Palma, we held that the insertion of the appellants finger into the victims vagina constituted the crime of rape through sexual assault under Republic Act No. 8252 or the Anti-Rape Law of 1997. Rape by sexual assault is punishable by reclusion temporal if committed with any aggravating or qualifying circumstances. year old minor. The Information in Family Case No. A-436 mentioned the victim as appellants stepdaughter and an 11A stepdaughter is a daughter of ones spouse by previous marriage, while a stepfather is the husband of ones mother by virtue of a marriage subsequent to that of which the person spoken of is the offspring. In the instant case, appellant and Ms mother were never married. Appellant is the common law spouse of Ms mother. considered in the imposition of the proper penalty. Hence, appellant is not Ms stepfather; vice-versa, M is not appellants stepdaughter. However, since the relationship was not specifically pleaded in the information, it cannot be
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At 12:30 a.m., Eddie received a call through his home phone, informing him that his son had been kidnapped. The caller demanded P10,000,000.00 for the safe release of his son which was reduce to P5,000,000.00. Thereafter, Eddie received several calls threatening him that if he refused to pay the ransom they demanded, the kidnappers would cut Ed Hendersons ear and finger, and thereafter kill the boy and dump his body in an isolated place. Eddie pleaded for mercy but the caller would simply hang up the telephone. At 10:00 a.m. the next day, July 4, 1997, another call from the kidnappers came through, and Eddie reiterated that he could no longer raise any additional amount. The caller hung up, but called again and informed Eddie that the kidnappers had agreed to accept a ransom of P548,000.00. At about noon, the caller contacted Eddie and instructed him to place the money in a newspaper and to bring the money to the parking lot in front of the Sto. Domingo Church in Quezon City within ten minutes. The caller further instructed Eddie to open the doors and windows of his car upon arriving at the designated spot. Eddie was also told that a man would approach him and call him "Eddie." Eddie did as he was told. Suddenly, a man approached him and called him Eddie, so he immdiately he handed over the plastic bag which contained the money. He asked her how his son was, she told him not to worry because she would bring the boy home. Shortly after his arrival at their house, Eddie received two telephone calls from a male and a female, respectively, who informed him of his sons impending release. Between 3:20 to 3:30 p.m. of July 4, 1997, Ed Henderson was told that he would be brought back home. The boy then called up his mother and told her that he would be back soon. Tampos and Calunod boarded Ed Henderson in a taxi. Calunod ordered the boy to pretend that she was his aunt. The taxi stopped near the Imperial Drugstore at E. Rodriguez Avenue, where Calunod instructed Ed Henderson to get down. She gave the boy P50.00 for his fare back home. The boy took a taxi and was soon reunited with his waiting family.
Issue:
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Whether or not the accused could be held liable for the crime of kidnapping? Decision: Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code as amended by Republic Act No. 7659 reads: Any private individual who shall kidnap or detain another, or in any other manner deprive him of his liberty, shall suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death; (1) If the kidnapping or detention shall have lasted more than three days; (2) If it shall have committed simulating public authority; (3) If any serious physical injuries shall have been inflicted upon the person kidnapped or detained, or if threats to kill him shall have been made; or (4) If the person kidnapped or detained shall be a minor, except when the accused is any of the parents, female or a public officer. The penalty shall be death where the kidnapping or detention was committed for the purpose of extorting ransom from the victim or any other person, even if none of the circumstances abovementioned were present in the commission of the offense. When the victim is killed or dies as a consequence of the detention or is raped, or is subjected to torture dehumanizing acts, the maximum penalty shall be imposed. For the accused to be convicted of kidnapping or serious illegal detention, the prosecution is burdened to prove beyond reasonable doubt all the elements of the crime, namely, (1) the offender is a private individual; (2) he kidnaps or detains another, or in any manner deprives the latter of h is liberty; (3) the act of detention or kidnapping must be illegal; and (4) in the commission of the offense any of the following circumstances is present: (a) the kidnapping or detention lasts for more than three days; (b) it is committed by simulating public authority; (c) any serious physical injuries are inflicted upon the person kidnapped or detained or threats to kill him are made; or (d) the person kidnapped and serious illegal detention is a minor, the duration of his detention is immaterial. Likewise, if the victim is kidnapped and illegally detained for the purpose of extorting ransom, the duration of his detention is immaterial. To warrant an imposition of the death penalty for the crime of kidnapping and serious illegal detention for ransom, the prosecution must prove the following beyond reasonable doubt: (a) intent on the part of the accused to deprive the victim of his liberty; (b) actual deprivation of the victim of his liberty; and, (c) motive of the accused, which is ransom for the victim or other person for the
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qualifying circumstance which may be proven by his words and overt acts before, during and after the kidnapping and detention of the victim. demand for nor actual payment of ransom is necessary for the crime to be committed. Ransom as employed in the law is so used in its common or ordinary sense; meaning, a sum of money or other thing of value, price, or consideration paid or demanded for redemption of a kidnapped or detained person, a payment that releases from captivity. It may include benefits not necessarily pecuniary which may accrue to the kidnapper as a condition for the victims release. In this case, the appellants not only demanded but also received ransom for the release of the victim.
Issue: Whether or not the accused the guilt of the appellants has been proven by credible evidence beyond reasonable doubt? Decision: The essence of the crime of kidnapping and serious illegal detention as defined and penalized in Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code is the actual deprivation of the victim's liberty coupled with proof beyond reasonable doubt of an intent of the accused to effect the same. It is thus essential that the following be established by the prosecution: (1) the offender is a private individual; (2) he kidnaps or detains another, or in any other manner deprives the latter of his liberty; (3) the act of detention or kidnapping must be illegal; and (4) in the commission of the offense, any of the four circumstances enumerated in Article 267 be present. But if the kidnapping was done for the purpose of extorting ransom, the fourth element is no longer necessary. There is no mistaking the clear, overwhelming evidence that the appellants abducted Alexander Saldaa and his companions at gunpoint and deprived them of their freedom. That the appellants took shifts guarding the victims until only Alexander was left to be guarded and in transferring Alexander from one hideout to another to prevent him from being rescued by the military establish that they acted in concert in executing their common criminal design. Macapagal's participation is clearly evident from the records. Aside from being one of Alexander's armed guards in Kabuntalan, and having been part of a party which brought Alexander from the river hideout of Commander Kugta to Mayangkang Saguile's lair in Talayan, indirect evidence also support Macapagal's participation in the criminal design. First, Macapagal made several postponements of their trip on March 16, 1996 until it was already 7:30 in the evening. His reason that someone in his family died is not corroborated at all. Teddy, his cousin, never mentioned it, and his other relative, co-accused Abdila Silongan, was reticent about it. In fact, nobody told the trial court the name of the deceased relative. Secondly, Americo testified that when they stopped over at Macapagal's house, he heard the wife of Macapagal utter the words "kawawa naman sila" as they were leaving. Thirdly, it was established that Macapagal
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ordered the driver to proceed slowly towards the highway. During this time, he was busy talking on his handheld radio with someone and the victims heard him say "ok." When they were near the highway, he ordered the driver to stop whereupon 15 armed men appeared and blocked their vehicle. Finally, while the 15 men took away Alexander Saldaa and his three companions, nothing was done to Macapagal or to Teddy Silongan. By their own admission, they were just left behind after being hogtied. How they managed to escape was not explained. All these taken together give rise to the reasonable inference that Macapagal had concocted the funeral for a supposed recently deceased relative purposely to afford his co-conspirators time to stage the kidnapping. Then, also, it was through Macapagal's indispensable contribution that the armed men were able to stop the vehicle at a precise location near the highway. Likewise, the prosecution has established beyond reasonable doubt that the kidnapping was committed "for the purpose of extorting ransom" from Alexander, as to warrant the mandatory imposition of the death penalty. For the crime to be committed, at least one overt act of demanding ransom must be made. It is not necessary that there be actual payment of ransom because what the law requires is merely the existence of the purpose of demanding ransom. In this case, the records are replete with instances when the kidnappers demanded ransom from the victim. At the mountain hideout in Maganoy where Alexander was first taken, he was made to write a letter to his wife asking her to pay the ransom of twelve million pesos. Among those who demanded ransom were the appellants Ramon Pasawilan, Sacaria Alon, and Jumbrah Manap. Then, when Alexander was in the custody of Mayangkang Saguile, not only was he made to write more letters to his family, Mayangkang himself wrote ransom notes. In those letters, Mayangkang even threatened to kill Alexander if the ransom was not paid.
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Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code provides: Any private individual who shall kidnap or detain another, or in any other manner deprive him of his liberty, shall suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death; (1) If the kidnapping or detention shall have lasted more than three days; (2) If it shall have been committed simulating public authority; (3) If any serious physical injuries shall have been inflicted upon the person kidnapped or detained; or if threats to kill him shall have been made; or (4) If the person kidnapped or detained shall be a minor, except when the accused is any of the parents, female or a public officer. The penalty shall be death where the kidnapping or detention was committed for the purpose of extorting ransom from the victim or any other person, even if none of the circumstances abovementioned were present in the commission of the offense. When the victim is killed or dies as a consequence of the detention or is raped, or is subjected to torture or dehumanizing acts, the maximum penalty shall be imposed." The corpus delicti in the crime of kidnapping for ransom is the fact that an individual has been in any manner deprived of his liberty for the purpose of extorting ransom from the victim or any other person. Whether or not the ransom is actually paid to or received by the perpetrators is of no moment. In People vs. Salimbago, the Court stressed: "x x x No specific form of ransom is required to consummate the felony of kidnapping for ransom so long as it was intended as a bargaining chip in exchange for the victim's freedom. In municipal criminal law, ransom refers to the money, price or consideration paid or demanded for redemption of a captured person or persons, a payment that releases from captivity. Neither actual demand for nor actual payment of ransom is necessary for the crime to be committed."
the accused. The Court found that both incidents of kidnapping were related in that proof of one kidnapping tends to prove the other, thereby establishing the accuseds intent to deprive the victims of their liberty.
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deliberate failure of the custodian of the minor to restore the latter to his parents or guardians. The word deliberate as used in Article 270 must imply something more than mere negligence - it must be premeditated, headstrong, foolishly daring or intentionally and maliciously wrong. In the final analysis, the issue posed here is the credibility of witnesses. As consistently ruled by the Court, we will not interfere with the judgment of the trial court in determining the credibility of witnesses unless there appears on record some fact or circumstance of weight and influence which has been overlooked or the significance of which has been misinterpreted. Factual findings of the trial court, especially on the credibility of witnesses, are accorded great weight and respect. This is so because the trial court has the advantage of observing the witnesses through the different indicators of truthfulness or falsehood. In the instant case, there is no reason for us to disregard the trial courts finding that the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses are entitled to full faith and credit.
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Decision:
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No, the Court ruled that a person whose only intention is to look for the childs mother would generally return the child to the person who entrusted the child to her. This did not happen in the present case. The only logical conclusion we can derive from appellants actions is that her intention was really to kidnap the child not to look for the childs mother. The essential element of the crime of kidnapping and failure to return a minor is that the offender is entrusted with the custody of the minor, but what is actually being punished is not the kidnapping of the minor but rather the deliberate failure of the custodian of the minor to restore the latter to his parents or guardians. It has two essential elements, namely: (1) the offender is entrusted with the custody of a minor person; and (2) the offender deliberately fails to restore the said minor to his parents or guardians ( People vs. Bondoc, 232 SCRA 478 [1997]). In People vs. Ty (263 SCRA 745 [1996]), we stated that the essential element of the crime of kidnapping and failure to return a minor is that the offender is entrusted with the custody of the minor, but what is actually being punished is not the kidnapping of the minor but rather the deliberate failure of the custodian of the minor to restore the latter to his parents or guardians. Indeed, the word deliberate as used in Article 270 of the Revised Penal Code must imply something more than mere negligence it must be premeditated, headstrong, foolishly daring or intentionally and maliciously wrong.
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Decision:
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No, the Court ruled that before a conviction for kidnapping and failure to return a minor under Article 270 of the Revised Penal Code can be had, two elements must concur, namely: (a) the offender has been entrusted with the custody of the minor, and (b) the offender deliberately fails to restore said minor to his parents or guardians. The essential element herein is that the offender is entrusted with the custody of the minor but what is actually punishable is not the kidnapping of the minor, as the title of the article seems to indicate, but rather the deliberate failure or refusal of the custodian of the minor to restore the latter to his parents or guardians. Said failure or refusal, however, must not only be deliberate but must also be persistent as to oblige the parents or the guardians of the child to seek the aid of the courts in order to obtain custody. Essentially, the word deliberate as used in the article must imply something more than mere negligence; it must be premeditated, obstinate, headstrong, foolishly daring or intentionally and maliciously wrong. In the case at bar, it is evident that there was no deliberate refusal or failure on the part of the accused-appellants to restore the custody of the complainant's child to her.
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Issue: Whether or not the act of pressing chemical-soaked cloth while on top of the victim constitutes the crime of attempted rape?
Decision: The Supreme Court held the acquittal of Chito from the crime of attempted rape. There was no overt act of rape in this case. Overt act is some physical activity or deed indicating the intention to commit a particular crime. It is more than a mere planning or preparation. Considering the facts of the case, it cannot be construed that the act of pressing chemical-soaked cloth on the face of Malou constitutes an overt act of rape when there was no commencement of any act indicating the intent to rape the victim. The acts committed by Chito are not indicative of rape but rather of unjust vexation under Article 287, second paragraph. Unjust vexation exists when an act causes annoyance, irritation, torment, distress or disturbance to the mind of the offended. Unjust vexation includes any conduct which would unjustly annoy or irritate a person.
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admitted that he ordered the cutting of electric, water and telephone lines without the permit to relocate such, he caused the annoyance and vexation of Mildred Ong. To add, the electric, water and telephone interruption happened during the operation of the business.
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Issue: Whether or not the essential elements of the crime of robbery with homicide were proven by the prosecution? Decision: Yes, the essential elements of the crime of robbery with homicide was proven by the prosecution. Add to that that the homicide was committed by reason or on the occasion of the robbery, appellants are guilty of the special complex crime of robbery with homicide under Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code. The element of taking or asportation was completed when the apellants took the personal property of spouses Hibaler. The wife Restituta testified that after the incident, she made an inventory and found out that some of their personal belongings were missing. It is of no moment that the property taken was not disposed of in so far as the characterization of the crime as robbery is concerned.
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People v. Calixto Zinampan, Artemio Apostol, Roger Allan (at large), and Elvis Doca (G.R. No. 126781)
Facts: Elvis Doca, Artemio Apostol, Calixto Zinampan and Roger Allan entered the sari-sari store of Henry and Gaspara Narag of Linao, Tuguegarao, Cagayan and forced their way into the house adjacent to the store. The housekeeper, Marlyn Calaycay was pulled back to the store by Elvis Doca as Henry was taken to the sala. Henry was repeatedly ordered to produce his gun and money and when he refused Artemio hit him in the head with his gun. Henry gave them money but insisted that he did not have a gun for which Calixto hit him with the butt of a gun at the back of his head while Gaspara pleaded for their lives. The intruders then carried away property and money that they had obtained from the couple. Henry died five days later due to the injuries suffered from the robbery. Gaspara Narag passed away while the criminal case was pending with the trial court leaving Marlyn as the lone witness left. The trial court found Elvis Doca guilty of robbery with homicide and sentenced him to reclusion perpetua. Issue: Whether or not the guilt of the accused for the crime of robbery with homicide was proven by the testimony of the single witness? Decision: Yes, the guilt of the accused was sufficiently proven by the sole prosecution witness for the crime of robbery. The accused was positively identified by the prosecution witness who has no motive whatsoever against him that would cause her to fabricate evidence. It is clear from the facts of the case that there exist a conspiracy between the appellant and his co-accused as can be inferred from their acts.
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The court found the testimony of the sole prosecution eyewitness as honest and credible and further holds that a credible and positive testimony of a single eyewitness is sufficient. A conviction for the truth is determined by the quality of the testimony and not by the number of witnesses.
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satisfactorily explain his possession. The accused knew exactly where he can recover the stolen jewelries and was positively identified by witnesses. Intent to gain is assumed in an information where it is alleged that there was unlawful taking and appropriation by the offender of the properties stolen. The jewelries recovered were pawned and sold by the accused and was positively identified by the owner of the establishments. Homicide may occur before or after robbery, what is important is there is an intimate connection between the killing and the robbery.
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the "right to carry on a business." This right is what is considered as property. Since the services of PLDT cannot be considered as "property," the same may not be subject of theft. Issue: Whether or not the international calls as well as the business of providing telecommunication or telephone service are personal properties capable of appropriation and can be objects of theft. Held: The court granted PLDTs petition but remanded the case to the trial court with direction to the Public Prosecutor of Makati City to amend the Amended Information to show that the property subject of the theft were services and business of the private offended party because the international calls, although considered as personal properties, are not owned by PLDT hence petitioner cannot be liable for theft on that matter; but the business of providing telecommunication is a personal property which is capable of being appropriated hence subject to theft. This Court adhering the decisions in United States v. Genato, United States v. Carlos, and United States v. Tambunting, consistently ruled that any personal property, tangible or intangible, corporeal or incorporeal, capable of appropriation can be the object of theft. Moreover, since the passage of the Revised Penal Code on December 8, 1930, the term "personal property" has had a generally accepted definition in civil law. In Article 335 of the Civil Code of Spain, "personal property" is defined as "anything susceptible of appropriation and not included in the foregoing chapter (not real property)." Thus, the term "personal property" in the Revised Penal Code should be interpreted in the context of the Civil Code provisions in accordance with the rule on statutory construction that where words have been long used in a technical sense and have been judicially construed to have a certain meaning, and have been adopted by the legislature as having a certain meaning prior to a particular statute, in which they are used, the words used in such statute should be construed according to the sense in which they have been previously used. In fact, this Court used the Civil Code definition of
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"personal property" in interpreting the theft provision of the penal code in United States v. Carlos. The only requirement for a personal property to be the object of theft under the penal code is that it be capable of appropriation. It need not be capable of "asportation," which is defined as "carrying away." Jurisprudence is settled that to "take" under the theft provision of the penal code does not require asportation or carrying away. To appropriate means to deprive the lawful owner of the thing. The word "take" in the Revised Penal Code includes any act intended to transfer possession which, as held in the assailed Decision, may be committed through the use of the offenders own hands, as well as any mechanical device, such as an access device or card as in the instant case. This includes controlling the destination of the property stolen to deprive the owner of the property, such as the use of a meter tampering, as held in Natividad v. Court of Appeals,10 use of a device to fraudulently obtain gas, as held in United States v. Tambunting, and the use of a jumper to divert electricity, as held in the cases of United States v. Genato, United States v. Carlos, and United States v. Menagas. As illustrated in the above cases, appropriation of forces of nature which are brought under control by science such as electrical energy can be achieved by tampering with any apparatus used for generating or measuring such forces of nature, wrongfully redirecting such forces of nature from such apparatus, or using any device to fraudulently obtain such forces of nature. In the instant case, petitioner was charged with engaging in International Simple Resale (ISR) or the unauthorized routing and completing of international long distance calls using lines, cables, antennae, and/or air wave frequency and connecting these calls directly to the local or domestic exchange facilities of the country where destined. The right of the ownership of electric current is secured by Articles 517 and 518 of the Penal Code; the application of these articles in cases of subtraction of gas, a fluid used for lighting, and in some respects resembling electricity, is confirmed by the rule laid down in the decisions of the supreme court of Spain of January 20, 1887, and April 1, 1897, construing and enforcing the provisions of articles 530 and 531 of the Penal Code of that country, articles 517 and 518 of the code in force in these islands.
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The acts of "subtraction" include: (a) tampering with any wire, meter, or other apparatus installed or used for generating, containing, conducting, or measuring electricity, telegraph or telephone service; (b) tapping or otherwise wrongfully deflecting or taking any electric current from such wire, meter, or other apparatus; and (c) using or enjoying the benefits of any device by means of which one may fraudulently obtain any current of electricity or any telegraph or telephone service. In the instant case, the act of conducting ISR operations by illegally connecting various equipment or apparatus to private respondent PLDTs telephone system, through which petitioner is able to resell or re-route international long distance calls using respondent PLDTs facilities constitutes all three acts of subtraction mentioned above. The business of providing telecommunication or telephone service is likewise personal property which can be the object of theft under Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code. Business may be appropriated under Section 2 of Act No. 3952 (Bulk Sales Law), hence, could be object of theft. Interest in business was not specifically enumerated as personal property in the Civil Code in force at the time the above decision was rendered. Yet, interest in business was declared to be personal property since it is capable of appropriation and not included in the enumeration of real properties. Article 414 of the Civil Code provides that all things which are or may be the object of appropriation are considered either real property or personal property. Business is likewise not enumerated as personal property under the Civil Code. Just like interest in business, however, it may be appropriated. It was conceded that in making the international phone calls, the human voice is converted into electrical impulses or electric current which are transmitted to the party called. A telephone call, therefore, is electrical energy. It was also held in the assailed Decision that intangible property such as electrical energy is capable of appropriation because it may be taken and carried away. Electricity is personal property under Article 416 (3) of the Civil Code, which enumerates "forces of nature which are brought under control by science." Indeed, while it may be conceded that "international long distance calls," the matter alleged to be stolen in the instant case, take the form of electrical energy, it cannot be said that such international long distance calls were personal
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properties belonging to PLDT since the latter could not have acquired ownership over such calls. PLDT merely encodes, augments, enhances, decodes and transmits said calls using its complex communications infrastructure and facilities. PLDT not being the owner of said telephone calls, then it could not validly claim that such telephone calls were taken without its consent. It is the use of these communications facilities without the consent of PLDT that constitutes the crime of theft, which is the unlawful taking of the telephone services and business.
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respectively specified in the next preceding article, if committed by a domestic servant, or with grave abuse of confidence, or if the property stolen is motor vehicle, mail matter or large cattle or consists of coconuts taken from the premises of a plantation, fish taken from a fishpond or fishery or if property is taken on the occasion of fire, earthquake, typhoon, volcanic eruption, or any other calamity, vehicular accident or civil disturbance. For one to be guilty of theft, the accused must have intent to steal (animu furandi) personal property, meaning the intent to deprive another of his ownership/lawful possession of personal property which intent is apart from but concurrent with the general criminal intent which is an essential element of a felony of dolo. Thus, petitioners claim of good faith in taking the coconuts from private complainants land is a mere pretense to escape criminal liability.
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Decision: Although the information charged the petitioner with estafa, the crime committed was theft. It is settled that what controls is not the designation of the offense but the description thereof as alleged in the information. And as described therein, the offense imputed to Santos contains all the essential elements of theft, to wit: (1) that there be a taking of personal property; (2) that said property belongs to another; (3) that the taking be done with intent to gain; (4) that the taking be done without the consent of the owner; and (5) that the taking be accomplished without the use of violence or intimidation against persons or force upon things. Theft should not be confused with estafa. According to Chief Justice Ramon C. Aquino in his book on the Revised Penal Code, "The principal distinction between the two crimes is that in theft the thing is taken while in estafa the accused receives the property and converts it to his own use or benefit. However, there may be theft even if the accused has possession of the property. If he was entrusted only with the material or physical (natural) or de facto possession of the thing, his misappropriation of the same constitutes theft, but if he has the juridical possession of the thing, his conversion of the same constitutes embezzlement or estafa." The petitioner argues that there was no intent to gain at the time of the taking of the vehicle and so no crime was committed. In U.S. v. De Vera, we held that the subsequent appropriation by the accused of the thing earlier delivered to him supplied the third element that made the crime theft instead of estafa. Illustrating, the Court declared: ... let us suppose that A, a farmer in the Province of Bulacan, agrees to sell B a certain quantity of rice at a certain price per picul. A ships several sacks of the grain which B receives in his warehouse. If, prior to the measuring required before the payment of the agreed price, B takes a certain quantity of rice from the different sacks, there can be no doubt that he is guilty of the crime of theft. Now, it may be asked: Did not B receive the sacks of rice shipped to him by A?-Yes. And did A voluntarily deliver the sacks of rice which he owned by shipping them to B?-Yes Was the taking of the rice by B from the different sacks done with A's consent?- No.
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This shows, to our mind, that the theory of the defense is untenable, according to which, when the thing is received and then appropriated or converted to one's own use without the consent of the owner, the crime committed is not that of theft. It was erroneous for the respondent court to hold the petitioner guilty of qualified theft because the fact that the object of the crime was a car was not alleged in the information as a qualifying circumstance. Santos would have had reason to argue that he had not been properly informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, as qualified theft carries a higher penalty. But although not pleaded and so not considered qualifying, the same circumstance may be considered aggravating, having been proved at the trial. Hence the imposable penalty for the theft, there being no other modifying circumstances, should be in the maximum degree.
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Issues: Whether or not the accused is guilty of qualified theft? Whether or not the penalty imposed is proper? Decsion: The prosecution established beyond reasonable doubt the participation of accused-appellant in the crime charged. It was established that accused-appellant was the custodian of the blank Metrobank cashiers check which was processed and encashed. Arthur Christy Mariano of the spot audit group testified that the amount of accounts payable for October 23, 1986 as reflected in the proof sheet did not tally with the debit tickets of the same date, showing that the check was issued without any transaction. Mariano also testified that after finding basic differences in the signature of bank manager Antonia Manuel appearing on the subject check with other specimens he conferred with the latter who told him that the signature appearing therein was not hers. Manager Antonia Manuel likewise testified that the signature appearing in the cashiers check varies with the way she signs. Significantly, in a letter dated September 15, 1987 to Atty. Severino S. Tabios of Metrobank, accused-appellant confirmed the statements in his extra-judicial confession and offered to return the amount of P8,500.00. The crime charged is Qualified Theft through Falsification of Commercial Document. Since the value of the check is P38,480.30, the imposable penalty for the felony of theft is prision mayor in its minimum and medium periods and 1 year of each additional PHP 10,000.00 in accordance with Article 309, paragraph 1 of the RPC. However, under Article 310 of the Revised Penal Code, the crime of qualified theft is punished by the penalties next higher by two degrees than that specified in Article 309 of the Revised Penal Code. Two degrees higher than prision mayor in its minimum and medium periods is reclusion temporal in its medium and maximum periods. In addition, forging the signatures of the bank
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officers authorized to sign the subject cashiers check was resorted to in order to obtain the sum of P36,480.30 for the benefit of the accused. Falsification of the subject cashiers check was a necessary means to commit the crime of qualified theft resulting in a complex crime. Hence, we apply Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code, which provides that, where an offense is a necessary means for committing the other, the penalty for the more serious crime in its maximum period shall be imposed. Considering that qualified Theft is more serious than falsification of bank notes or certificates which is punished under Article 166 (2) of the Revised Penal Code with prision mayor in its minimum period, the correct penalty is fourteen (14) years and eight (8) months of reclusion temporal as minimum to twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal as maximum.
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Decision: When the defendant, with a grave abuse of confidence, removed the money and appropriated it to his own use without the consent of the bank, there was the taking or apoderamiento contemplated in the definition of the crime of theft. In the case of the United States vs. De Vera (43 Phil., 1000, 1003), Justice Villamor enumerated the essential elements of the crime of theft, which are as follows: The taking of personal property; The property belongs to another; The taking away be done with intent of gain; The taking away be done without the consent of the owner; and The taking away be accomplished without violence or intimidation against persons or force upon things. In the present case, what is involved is the possession of money in the capacity of a bank teller. In People v. Locson, this Court considered deposits received by a teller in behalf of a bank as being only in the material possession of the teller. This interpretation applies with equal force to money received by a bank teller at the beginning of a business day for the purpose of servicing withdrawals. Such is only material possession. Juridical possession remains with the bank. If the teller appropriates the money for personal gain then the felony committed is theft and not estafa. Further, since the teller occupies a position of confidence, and the bank places money in the tellers possession due to the confidence reposed on the teller, the felony of qualified theft would be committed. The elements of qualified theft include the elements of theft and any of the circumstances enumerated in Article 310 of the RPC. The elements of theft, which is defined in Article 308 of the RPC, are the following: 1. Taking of personal property; 2. That said property belongs to another;
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3. That said taking be done with intent to gain; 4. That it be done without the owners consent; and 5. That it be accomplished without the use of violence or intimidation against persons, nor of force upon things. The specific qualifying circumstance in Article 310 of the RPC which the information indicated was that the felony was committed with grave abuse of confidence. Hence, to warrant a conviction, the prosecution should have also proven the fact that it be done with grave abuse of confidence. In the case at bar, regarding the first element, the taking of personal property, the prosecution was not able to present direct evidence that petitioner took the PHP 10,000 on November 16, 1989. The prosecution attempted to prove the taking through circumstantial evidence. One of the pieces of evidence that the prosecution adduced was the withdrawal slip for PHP 10,000 dated November 16, 1989. Antonio Salazar disowned the signature on the withdrawal slip. However, he also indicated that he did not know who made the withdrawal. Rosalina de Lazo testified that the initial on the withdrawal slip, written after the figure 11-17-89, was the customary signature of petitioner. She, however, did not intimate the significance of petitioners initial on the withdrawal slip. A careful inspection of all the withdrawal slips including the withdrawal slip stated above shows that the date and the initial of petitioner were written across the stamped word paid. This indicates that petitioners initial was placed in her capacity as a teller which, therefore, only proves that this transaction passed through her hands in such capacity. It does not in any manner show that petitioner prepared the withdrawal slip or that the proceeds of the withdrawal increased her patrimony. The presumption that being in possession of said withdrawal slip before its delivery to Reynaldo Manlulu, the accused is the one who prepared the said withdrawal slip is without basis in law. The presumption under paragraph (j), Section 3 of Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, which reads: That a person found in possession of a thing taken in the doing of a recent wrongful act is the taker and the doer of the whole act; otherwise, that things
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which a person possesses, or exercises acts of ownership over, are owned by him; Thas always applied to a situation where property has been stolen and the stolen property is found in the possession of the accused. In these cases the possession of the accused gives rise to the presumption that the accused is the taker of the stolen property. In the case at bar, the withdrawal slip, is not stolen property. The presumption used by the lower court and the one found in paragraph (j), Section 3 of Rule 131 are different. The lower court presumed that the petitioner was the maker of the withdrawal slip and not that the petitioner stole anything. It is plain that there is no basis for the finding that the withdrawal slip was prepared by the petitioner. Another piece of evidence offered to prove petitioners taking is her extrajudicial confession that she allegedly admitted taking money from the accounts of several members of the BABSLA and the list of people from whose accounts she took money. However, it cannot be deduced from the alleged verbal confession of petitioner that she was confessing a specific taking of P10,000 from the account of Sgt. Salazar on November 16, 1989. And a perusal of the handwritten list allegedly prepared by petitioner does not disclose any relation to the specific taking alleged in the information. All that was written on the list, among other names and figures, was the name Salazar, Antonio and the number fifteen (15) to the right of the name. The list does not mention the date on which the money was taken. Neither does it disclose the precise amount that was taken. The other pieces of evidence such as the Tellers Daily Report and Abstract of Payment merely reveal that on 16 November 1989, a withdrawal was made on the account of Sgt. Antonio Salazar and that this withdrawal passed through the hands of petitioner in her capacity as a teller of the BABSLA. Again, they prove neither that petitioner prepared the subject withdrawal slip nor that she took the P10,000 on that date.
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It is plain that the prosecution failed to prove by direct or sufficient circumstantial evidence that there was a taking of personal property by petitioner.
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However, Article 310 has been modified, with respect to certain vehicles, by Republic Act No. 6539, as amended, otherwise known as "AN ACT PREVENTING AND PENALIZING CARNAPPING. The elements of the crime of theft as provided for in Article 308 of the RPC are: 1.that there be taking of personal property; 2.that said property belongs to another; 3.that the taking be done with intent to gain; 4.that the taking be done without the consent of the owner; and, 5.that the taking be accomplished without the use of violence against or intimidation of persons or force upon things. Theft is qualified when any of the following circumstances is present: the theft is committed by a domestic servant; the theft is committed with grave abuse of confidence; the property stolen is either a motor vehicle, mail matter or large cattle; the property stolen consists of coconuts taken from the premises of a plantation; the property stolen is fish taken from a fishpond or fishery; and the property was taken on the occasion of fire, earthquake, typhoon, volcanic eruption, or any other calamity, vehicular accident or civil disturbance. Section 2 of Republic Act No. 6539, as amended defines carnapping as the taking, with intent to gain, of a motor vehicle belonging to another without the latter's consent, or by means of violence against or intimidation of persons, or by using force upon things. The elements of carnapping are thus: (1) the taking of a motor vehicle which belongs to another; (2) the taking is without the consent of the owner or by means of violence against or intimidation of persons or by using force upon things; and (3) the taking is done with intent to gain.
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Carnapping is essentially the robbery or theft of a motorized vehicle, the concept of unlawful taking in theft, robbery and carnapping being the same. The unlawful taking of motor vehicles is now covered by the anti-carnapping law and not by the provisions on qualified theft or robbery. The anti-carnapping law is a special law, different from the crime of robbery and theft included in the RPC. It particularly addresses the taking, with intent to gain, of a motor vehicle belonging to another without the latter's consent, or by means of violence against or intimidation of persons, or by using force upon things. But a careful comparison of this special law with the crimes of robbery and theft readily reveals their common features and characteristics, to wit: unlawful taking, intent to gain, and that personal property belonging to another is taken without the latter's consent. However, the anti-carnapping law particularly deals with the theft and robbery of motor vehicles. Hence a motor vehicle is said to have been carnapped when it has been taken, with intent to gain, without the owner's consent, whether the taking was done with or without the use of force upon things. Without the anti-carnapping law, such unlawful taking of a motor vehicle would fall within the purview of either theft or robbery which was certainly the case before the enactment of said statute. While the anti-carnapping law penalizes the unlawful taking of motor vehicles, it excepts from its coverage certain vehicles such as roadrollers, trolleys, streetsweepers, sprinklers, lawn mowers, amphibian trucks and cranes if not used on public highways, vehicles which run only on rails and tracks, and tractors, trailers and tractor engines of all kinds and used exclusively for agricultural purposes. By implication, the theft or robbery of the foregoing vehicles would be covered by Article 310 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended and the provisions on robbery, respectively. Since appellant is being accused of the unlawful taking of a Daewoo sedan, it is the anti-carnapping law and not the provisions of qualified theft which would apply as the said motor vehicle does not fall within the exceptions mentioned in the anti-carnapping law.
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The designation in the information of the offense committed by appellant as one for qualified theft notwithstanding, appellant may still be convicted of the crime of carnapping.For while it is necessary that the statutory designation be stated in the information, a mistake in the caption of an indictment in designating the correct name of the offense is not a fatal defect as it is not the designation that is controlling but the facts alleged in the information which determines the real nature of the crime. In the case at bar, the information alleges that appellant, with intent to gain, took the taxi owned by Cipriano without the latters consent. Thus, the indictment alleges every element of the crime of carnapping, and the prosecution proved the same. Appellants appeal is thus bereft of merit. That appellant brought out the taxi on December 25, 1996 and did not return it on the same day as he was supposed to is admitted. Unlawful taking, or apoderamiento, is the taking of the motor vehicle without the consent of the owner, or by means of violence against or intimidation of persons, or by using force upon things; it is deemed complete from the moment the offender gains possession of the thing, even if he has no opportunity to dispose of the same. While the nature of appellants possession of the taxi was initially lawful as he was hired as a taxi driver and was entrusted possession thereof, his act of not returning it to its owner, which is contrary to company practice and against the owners consent transformed the character of the possession into an unlawful one. Appellant himself admits that he was aware that his possession of the taxi was no longer with Ciprianos consent as the latter was already demanding its return. Appellant assails the trial courts conclusion that there was intent to gain with the mere taking of the taxi without the owners consent. Appellants position does not persuade.
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Intent to gain or animus lucrandi is an internal act, presumed from the unlawful taking of the motor vehicle. Actual gain is irrelevant as the important consideration is the intent to gain. The term gain is not merely limited to pecuniary benefit but also includes the benefit which in any other sense may be derived or expected from the act which is performed. Thus, the mere use of the thing which was taken without the owners consent constitutes gain.
Christine Perez
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2006-0104
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In Castrodes vs. Cubelo, the Court stated that the elements of the offense are (1) occupation of another's real property or usurpation of a real right belonging to another person; (2) violence or intimidation should be employed in possessing the real property or in usurping the real right, and (3) the accused should be animated by the intent to gain. Petitioner failed to give any cogent reason for this Court to deviate from this salutary principle.
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From the allegations in an information, the real nature of the crime charged is determined. In the case at bar, the Information alleged that petitioner issued the questioned checks knowing that she had no funds in the bank and failing to fund them despite notice that they were dishonored. These allegations clearly constitute a charge, not under paragraph 2(a) as the lower courts found but, under paragraph 2(d) of Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code. Although the earlier quoted paragraph 2(a) and the immediately quoted paragraph 2(d) of Article 315 have a common element false pretenses or fraudulent acts the law treats Estafa under paragraph 2(d) by postdating a check or issuing a bouncing check differently. Thus, under paragraph 2(d), failure to fund the check despite notice of dishonor creates a prima facie presumption of deceit constituting false pretense or fraudulent act, which is not an element of a violation of paragraph 2(a). Under paragraph 2(d), if there is no proof of notice of dishonor, knowledge of insufficiency of funds cannot be presumed, and unless there is a priori intent, which is hard to determine and may not be inferred from mere failure to comply with a promise, no Estafa can be deemed to exist.Notice of dishonor being then an element of a charge under Article 2(d) under which petitioner was clearly charged, failure to prove it is a ground for acquittal thereunder. In the case at bar, as priorly stated, petitioner was charged under paragraph 2(d), but there is no evidence that petitioner received notice of dishonor of all, except one (Allied Bank Check No. 7600042 for P76,654), of the questioned checks. Hence, with respect to all but one of the checks, the prima facie presumption of knowledge of insufficiency of funds did not arise. This leaves it unnecessary to pass on the evidence for the defense. Suffice it to state that petitioners defenses of good faith and lack of criminal intent, defenses to a malum in se like Estafa, are not difficult to credit. For, on notice of the lack of sufficient funds in her bank account, to cover the Allied Bank check, petitioner offered to pay in installment, to which the private complainant agreed, the amount covered by the said check, as well as the others. As reflected above, the prosecution stipulated that petitioner had made a total payment of P338,250, which amount is almost one-third of the total amount of the ten checks or more than the amount covered by the P76,654 Allied Bank check.
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In fine, the prosecution having failed to establish all the elements of Estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(d) under which petitioner was clearly charged, her acquittal is in order. The judgment bearing on her civil liability stands, however.
Bernadette Remalla
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2007-0392
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The elements of estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(d) of the RPC, as amended by RA 4885, are: (1) that the offender postdated or issued a check in payment of an obligation contracted at the time of the postdating or issuance; (2) that the at the time of the issuance of the check, the offender had no funds in the bank or the funds deposited were insufficient to cover the amount of the check; and, (3) that the payee has been defrauded. All the elements of the crime of estafa under par. 2(d) of Art. 315, RPC are present in this case. The evidence showed and petitioner Chua admitted issuing the questioned checks in favor of private respondent in exchange for the imported goods she obtained from the latter. It is likewise not disputed that the checks she issued bounced or were dishonored due to insufficiency of funds and/or because her bank account had already been closed by the bank due to lack of funds. As a result, private respondent suffered damage. She had to close down her business because she could not recoup her losses due to the huge amount petitioner owed her. Petitioners defense that she issued the unfunded checks as collateral or security for the goods she got from private respondent was not worthy of credence. the amounts of the checks issued by petitioner clearly showed that they were intended as payments for the items she obtained from private respondent. Private respondent would not have parted with her goods in exchange for bum checks. It was likewise contrary to ordinary human experience and to sound business practice for petitioner to issue so many unfunded checks as "collateral" or "by way of accommodation." As an experienced businesswoman, petitioner could not have been so nave as not to know that she could be held criminally liable for issuing unfunded checks. Ergo, the petition is denied for lack of merit.
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Issue: Whether or not Rosemarie Villaflor is guilty of the crime of Estafa thru Falsification of Public Document as defined and punished under Paragraph 2(a), Article 315, Revised Penal Code considering that the third element of the crime of Estafa is not present? Decision: The petition is partly impressed with merit. For an accused to be convicted of the complex crime of estafa through falsification of public document, all the elements of the two crimes of estafa and falsification of public document must exist. There is no question that the first, second and fourth elements are present: there was false or fraudulent misrepresentation by Rosemarie Gelogo when she used the fictitious surname "Villaflor"; the misrepresentation or false pretense was made prior to or simultaneous with the commission of the fraud; and private complainant Anita Manlangits right to the subject 2-storey house was lost or at the very least prejudiced when Rosemarie sold it to the Canlases. It is petitioners thesis, however, that there is here an absence of the third element contending that private complainant Anita Manlangit, who was the offended party in this case, was never induced to part with any money or property by means of fraud, committed simultaneously with the false pretense or fraudulent representation by Rosemarie. The Court find merit in petitioners submission. The Court finds no cogent reason to depart from the settled principle that the deceit, which must be prior to or simultaneously committed with the act of defraudation, must be the efficient cause or primary consideration which induced the offended party to part with his money or property and rule differently in the present case. While it may be said that there was fraud or deceit committed by Rosemarie in this case, when she used the surname "Villaflor" to give her semblance of authority to sell the subject 2-storey house, such fraud or deceit
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was employed upon the Canlas spouses who were the ones who parted with their money when they bought the house. However, the Information charging Rosemarie of estafa in the present case, alleged damage or injury not upon the Canlas spouses, but upon private complainant, Anita Manlangit. Since the deceit or fraud was not the efficient cause and did not induce Anita Manlangit to part with her property in this case, Rosemarie cannot be held liable for estafa. With all the more reason must this be for herein petitioner. The lack of criminal liability for estafa, however, will not necessarily absolve petitioner from criminal liability arising from the charge of falsification of public document under the same Information charging the complex crime of estafa through falsification of public document. It is settled doctrine that the conviction of an accused on one of the offenses included in a complex crime charged, when properly established, despite the failure of evidence to hold the accused of the other charge is legally feasible. As correctly found by the trial court, petitioner conspired with Rosemarie to falsify, that is, by making untruthful statement in the narration of facts in the deed of sale, by declaring Rosemarie to be the owner of the house subject of such sale and signing as "Rosemarie Villaflor" instead of her real name, Rosemarie Gelogo, in order to sell the same to the Canlas spouses. It is established by evidence beyond reasonable doubt that Rosemarie committed the crime of falsification of public document. Likewise, proof beyond reasonable doubt has been duly adduced to establish conspiracy between Rosemarie and petitioner who is the brother-in-law of Melba Canlas, one of the buyers of the house in this case. Petitioner is acquitted of the complex crime of Estafa through Falsification of Public Document, but found guilty of the crime of Falsification of Public Document.
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the vehicular accident. Subsequently, the spouses Silo withdrew their complaint from the DTI. On February 14, 1996, Josephine Silo filed a criminal complaint for violation of paragraph 1, Article 318 of the Revised Penal Code against Guinhawa. Issue: Whether or not Jaime Guinhawa violated Article 318 of the RPC covering other deceits? Decision: Yes, Jaime Guinhawa violated Article 318. Petitioner insists that the private complainant merely assumed that the van was brand new, and that he did not make any misrepresentation to that effect. He avers that deceit cannot be committed by concealment, the absence of any notice to the public that the van was not brand new does not amount to deceit. The Supreme Court held that the petitioner cannot barefacedly claim that he made no personal representation that the herein subject van was brand new for the simple reason that nowhere in the records did he ever refute the allegation in the complaint, which held him out as a dealer of brand new cars. It has thus become admitted that the petitioner was dealing with brand new vehicles a fact which, up to now, petitioner has not categorically denied. Therefore, when private complainant went to petitioners showroom, the former had every right to assume that she was being sold brand new vehicles there being nothing to indicate otherwise. But as it turned out, not only did private complainant get a defective and used van, the vehicle had also earlier figured in a road accident when driven by no less than petitioners own driver. It is true that mere silence is not in itself concealment. Concealment which the law denounces as fraudulent implies a purpose or design to hide facts which the other party sought to know. Failure to reveal a fact which the seller is, in good faith, bound to disclose may generally be classified as a deceptive act due to its inherent capacity to deceive. Suppression of a material fact which a party is
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bound in good faith to disclose is equivalent to a false representation. Moreover, a representation is not confined to words or positive assertions; it may consist as well of deeds, acts or artifacts of a nature calculated to mislead another and thus allow the fraud-feasor to obtain an undue advantage. The petitioner knew that the van had figured in an accident, was damaged and had to be repaired. Nevertheless, the van was placed in the showroom, thus making it appear to the public that it was a brand new unit. The petitioner was mandated to reveal the foregoing facts to the private complainant. But the petitioner even obdurately declared when they testified in the court a quo that the vehicle did not figure in an accident, nor had it been repaired; they maintained that the van was brand new. Thus, the private complainant bought the van, believing it was brand new. Hence, petitioner Guinhawa is guilty of the crime of Other Deceits punishable under Article 318 of the Revised Penal Code.
Sheryll Tablico
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2008-0341
latter pending the final determination of the civil case, it must appear not only that the said civil case involves the same facts upon which the criminal prosecution would be based, but also that in the resolution of the issue or issues raised in the aforesaid civil action, the guilt or innocence of the accused would necessarily be determined. So that in a case for concubinage, the accused, like the herein petitioner need not present a final judgment declaring his marriage void for he can adduce evidence in the criminal case of the nullity of his marriage other than proof of a final judgment declaring his marriage void. With regard to petitioner's argument that he could be acquitted of the charge of concubinage should his marriage be declared null and void, suffice it to state that even a subsequent pronouncement that his marriage is void from the beginning is not a defense. Therefore, in the case at bar it must also be held that parties to the marriage should not be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, for the same must be submitted to the judgment of the competent courts and only when the nullity of the marriage is so declared can it be held as void, and so long as there is no such declaration the presumption is that the marriage exists for all intents and purposes. Therefore, he who cohabits with a woman not his wife before the judicial declaration of nullity of the marriage assumes the risk of being prosecuted for concubinage. The lower court therefore, has not erred in affirming the Orders of the judge of the Metropolitan Trial Court ruling that pendency of a civil action for nullity of marriage does not pose a prejudicial question in a criminal case for concubinage.
Sheryll Tablico
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2008-0341
Decision:
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The concept of pari delicto is not found in the Revised Penal Code, but only in Article 1411 of the Civil Code. The Court notes that Article 1411 of the Civil Code relates only to contracts with illegal consideration. The case at bar does not involve any illegal contract which either of the contracting parties is now seeking to enforce. In the Guinucud case, the Court found that the complaining husband, by entering into an agreement with his wife that each of them were to live separately and could marry other persons and by filing complaint only about a year after discovering his wife's infidelity, had "consented to, and acquiesced in, the adulterous relations existing between the accused, and he is therefore, not authorized by law to institute the criminal proceedings." In fine, the Guinucud case refers not to the notion of pari delicto but to consent as a bar to the institution of the criminal proceedings. In the present case, no such acquiescence can be implied: the accused did not enter into any agreement with Dr. Neri allowing each other to marry or cohabit with other persons and Dr. Neri promptly filed his complaint after discovering the illicit affair. It should also be noted that while Article 344 of the Revise Penal Code provides that the crime of adultery cannot be prosecuted without the offended spouse's complaint, once the complaint has been filed, the control of the case passes to the public prosecutor. Enforcement of our law on adultery is not exclusively, nor even principally, a matter of vindication of the private honor of the offended spouse; much less is it a matter merely of personal or social hypocrisy. Such enforcement relates, more importantly, to protection of the basic social institutions of marriage and the family in the preservation of which the State has the strongest interest; the public policy here involved is of the most fundamental kind.
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Issue: Whether or not accused-appellant may be held liable for the crime of rape even if allegedly he did not employ force in order to have sexual intercourse with the twins? Whether or not he is liable for simple seduction? Decision: Yes. It is clear from the foregoing testimony that private complainants tried to scream but the appellant prevented them by threatening to kill them. Also, after each rape incident, private complainants were warned by the appellant not to tell their mother what happened to them. It is settled that a rape victim is not required to resist her attacker unto death. Force, as an element of rape, need not be irresistible; it need only be present and so long as it brings about the desired result, all considerations of whether it was more or less irresistible is beside the point. Indeed, physical resistance need not be established in rape when, as in this case, intimidation was used on the victim and she submitted to the rapists lust for fear of her life or her personal safety. Jurisprudence holds that even though a man lays no hand on a woman, yet, if by an array of physical forces, he so overpowers her mind that she does not resist or she ceases resistance through fear of greater harm, the consummation of unlawful intercourse by the man is rape. Without question, the prosecution was able to prove that force or intimidation was actually employed by the appellant on the two victims to satisfy his lust. No. Equally untenable is the argument of the appellant that, if he is at all liable for anything, it should only be for simple seduction. Under Article 338 of the Revised Penal Code, to constitute seduction, there must in all cases be some deceitful promise or inducement. The woman should have yielded because of this promise or inducement. In this case, the appellant claims that the acts of sexual intercourse with the private complainants were in exchange for money. He declared that, prior to every sexual intercourse with Liza and Anna, he would promise them P20. However, aside from his bare testimony, the appellant presented no proof that private complainants consent was secured by means of such promise. As aptly opined by the trial court, the money given by the appellant to private complainants was not intended to lure them to have sex with him.
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Rather, it was for the purpose of buying their silence to ensure that nobody discovered his dastardly acts. The evidence for the prosecution was more than enough to show that the element of voluntariness on the part of private complainants was totally absent. Liza and Annas respective testimonies established that the appellant had sexual intercourse with them without their consent and against their will. Considering that the victims accounts of what the appellant did to them were absolutely credible and believable, the trial court correctly convicted the appellant of several crimes of rape against the 12-yearold twins, Liza and Anna Paragas.
Facts: In a complaint filed against defendant-appellant Fernando Carreon, who was a 4th year college student, Elaine Cesar, who was then only 12 years and 6 months old, alleged therein that on December 19, 1985 Fernando raped her against her will. According to her, she did not gave her consent to said incident as Fernando gave her softdrinks which made her unconscious and thus enable him to succeed in having carnal knowledge with her at the Champion Lodge Inn at Sta. Cruz Manila where she was dragged forcefully by Fernando. Fernando for his part denied in his answer that she forced her in having sexual intercourse with him because according to him she agreed to go and stay with him at Champion Lodge Inn. Based on the record, it was undisputed that prior to the said incident, Fernando and Elaine were together. Earlier that day he accompanied her to her Christmas party at her school in Manila Central University in the morning; went to Luneta Park and took a stroll; thereafter went to Cubao and ate at a fastfood restaurant; then she accompanied him to his school at Lyceum where he took his examination; and then finally they went to Champion Lodge Inn where said incident took place. After said incident, Elaine told it to her mother who, without wasting time, brought her to PC Crime Laboratory for a physical examination, the result of which revealed that she had a fresh laceration on her hymen. Based on said findings, a complaint was filed against Fernando. After arraignment, Fernando pleaded not guilty. In the meantime during her testimony before the court, Elaine admitted that she knew Fernando because they were neighbors. She even admitted that they were sweethearts and that she had given him her photo, at the back of which, she had her personal message for him. The trial court rendered a decision convicting accused of the offense charged. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the assailed decision and imposed upon defendant the penalty of reclusion perpetua. The case was brought to the Supreme court through an automatic review.
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Issues: Whether or not the trial court had proven the guilt of defendant for the crime of rape beyond reasonable doubt? Whether or not defendant may be held liable for the crime of simple seduction? Decision: NO. The contradictions in the testimony of Elaine where she attempted to prove that their coition was involuntary rather than fortify the case of the prosecution, served to demolish the same. Firstly, while Elaine claimed she was dragged to the hotel, her medical examination did not reveal any contusions on her body showing use of any force on her. Indeed, if she was under any compulsion, she could easily have escaped during the many hours they were together going from one place to another, but she did not. She was enjoying their tryst. Secondly, if she was really drugged she should have been given at least a blood and urine test to determine if there were any remaining chemicals in her system. This was not done. Thirdly, after the incident, Elaine was composed and was not disturbed at all. She did not show any sign of having had a traumatic experience. It was only when her mother scolded her that she contrived her story. Fourthly, in one part of her Sagot Salaysay submitted to the fiscal's office, she said she did not accept the invitation of appellant for them to go to the Luneta. In another part thereof, she said she accepted the same. 6 In court, she said she agreed to go to the Luneta and thereafter she said she was forced. She also stated in her Sagot Salaysay that she was only persuaded to give appellant her photograph and appellant dictated what she wrote thereon. In court she admitted she gave the photograph to appellant and that appellant did not ask her to write the dedication thereon.
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Verily, the foregoing circumstances effectively disprove the theory of force and involuntariness in the sexual interlude of the two. What is obvious and clear is that these two young lovers, carried by their mutual desire for each other, in a moment of recklessness, slept together and thus consummated the fruition of their brief love affair. Appellant cannot be held liable for rape as there was none committed. It was a consensual affair. NO. Article 338 of the Revised Penal Code provides: Art. 338. Simple seduction. The seduction of a woman who is
single or a widow of good reputation, over twelve but under eighteen years of age, committed by means of deceit, shall be punished by arresto mayor. All the elements of the offense are present. Frankly 1. 2. 3. 4. Elaine was over 12 and under 18 years of age. She is single and of good reputation. The offender had sexual intercourse with her. It was committed by deceit.
Appellant said he planned to marry Elaine and for this reason he successfully persuaded her to give up her virginity. This is the deceit contemplated by law that attended the commission of the offense. Section 4, Rule 120 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure provides: Sec. 4. Judgment in case of variance between allegation and proof. When there is variance between the offense charged in the complaint or information, and that proved or established by the evidence, and the offense as charged is included in or necessarily includes the offense proved, the accused shall be convicted of the offense proved included in that which is charged, or of the offense charged included in that which is proved. Unfortunately, the essential ingredients of simple seduction are not alleged nor necessarily included in the offense charged in the information. The only elements of the offense alleged in the sworn complaint of the offended party are that she is over 12 years of age when appellant had carnal knowledge of her. Thus, appellant cannot be convicted even for simple seduction either.
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Art. 344: Prosecution of the Crimes of Adultery, Concubinage, Seduction, Abduction, Rape and Acts of Lasciviousness
Beltran v. People (334 SCRA 106)
Facts: Petitioner Meynardo Beltran and wife Charmaine Felix were legally married. After 24 years of marriage and having four children, petitioner filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity under Art. 36 of the Family Code. In her answer to said petition, Charmaine Felix alleged that it was petitioner who abandoned the conjugal home and cohabited with a woman named Milagros. Felix then filed a criminal complaint for concubinage under Art. 344 of the RPC against petitioner and his paramour. The City prosecutor of Makati found probable cause and ordered the filing of an information against petitioner. On the other hand, petitioner, in order to forestall the issuance of warrant of arrest, filed a motion to defer proceedings. He argued that the pendency of the civil case for declaration of nullity of marriage posed a prejudicial question to the determination of the criminal case of concubinage against him. Issue: Whether or not the criminal case of concubinage should be suspended on the ground of a prejudicial question in the civil case for declaration of nullity of marriage? Decision: The pendency of the civil case for declaration of nullity of marriage is not a prejudicial question to the concubinage case. Article 40 of the Civil Code provides that the absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for the purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void. In view of this provision, it follows that for purposes other than remarriage, other evidence is acceptable. Therefore in a case for concubinage, the accused, like the herein petitioner, need not present a final judgment declaring his marriage void for he can adduce evidence in the criminal
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case of the nullity of his marriage other than proof of a final judgment declaring his marriage void. A subsequent pronouncement that marriage is void from the beginning is not a defense in a concubinage case. He who cohabits with a woman not his wife before the judicial declaration of nullity of the marriage assumes the risk of being prosecuted for concubinage.
However, with the advent of RA 8353, which reclassified rape as a crime against person and no longer a private crime, for which reason, the complaint can now be instituted by any person. It is also worthy to note that in the case of People vs. Estrebella, it was held that any technical defect in a complaint for rape would be remedied by testimony showing the consent and willingness of the family of the complainant who cannot give her consent (due to minority or mental retardation, for instance) to have the private offense publicly tried. In the case at bar, Marilyn Deguino (complainants mother) herself requested Susans grandmother to take care of the case. The Supreme Court, however, held that the trial court erred in imposing death penalty on accused-appellant. In view of RA 7659 (the Death Penalty Law) applicability in the crime of rape, which imposes death penalty when the victim is under 18 years of age and the offender is her parent, ascendant, step-parent.. it is required that the prosecution proved with certainty the fact that the victim was under 18 years of age when the rape was committed in order to justify the imposition of death penalty. In the case at bar, the allegation in the complaint that complainant is under 16 years of age when the crime was committed and that the accused-appellant lack of denial in that regard is not sufficient to excuse the prosecution of its burden to prove said qualifying circumstance by competent evidence.
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Whether or not the affidavit of desistance filed by the offended party extinguished the criminal liability of the accused? Decision: An affidavit of desistance by itself, even when construed as a pardon in the so-called "private crimes," is not a ground for the dismissal of the criminal case once the action has been instituted. The affidavit, nevertheless, may, as so earlier intimated, possibly constitute evidence whose weight or probative value, like any other piece of evidence, would be up to the court for proper evaluation. Paragraph 3 of Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code prohibits a prosecution for seduction, abduction, rape, or acts of lasciviousness, except upon a complaint made by the offended party or her parents, grandparents, or guardian, nor, in any case, if the offender has been expressly pardoned by the above-named persons, as the case may be. It does not prohibit the continuance of a prosecution if the offended party pardons the offender after the case has been instituted, nor does it order the dismissal of said case.
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Pursuant to Sec. 5 of RA 7610, before an accused can be convicted of child abuse through lascivious conduct on a minor below 12 years of age, the requisites for acts of lasciviousness under Article 336 of the RPC must be met in addition to the requisites for sexual abuse under Section 5 of Rep. Act No. 7610. Thus, Alvin Ampayo is guilty for the crime of Child Abuse because the prosecution sufficiently proved the elements of acts of lasciviousness.
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Isue:
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Whether or not Jessie should be held liable for acts of lasciviousness and statutory rape? Decision: The trial court was correct in finding accused-appellant guilty of three (3) counts of acts of lasciviousness. However, RTC erred in sentencing him guilty for statutory rape because he should only be convicted for acts of lasciviousness. While Jessie succeeded in touching her genitalia with his private parts there was no indication that it successfully penetrated at least the labia of the victim. We recall that during the first incident of 27 April 1993, accused-appellant tried forcing his penis into her vagina, but when he failed in his first attempt, he inserted it into her anus instead. This could have been attempted rape, or even consummated rape but the Complaint filed was only for acts of lasciviousness. By then he must have realized that it was difficult to penetrate his victims sex organ. Touching of the female organ will result in consummated rape if the penis slid into or touched either labia of the pudendum. Anything short of that will only result in either attempted rape or acts of lasciviousness.
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Court believes otherwise and is fully convinced that accused-appellant is guilty as well of these two other counts of rape.
Jennifer Manansala, a 14-year old girl, was raped eight times by her father, a 44-year old taho vendor, Rodante Manansala, on November of 1991. On direct examination, Jennifer testified that she was raped eight times in the taho factory in Tondo, the workplace of her father. On cross examination, however, Jennifer changed her statement that the first rape incident was committed in the taho factory in Tondo but the rest of the seven rape incidents were committed in Tarlac. She also mentioned that her father gave her money every time they had sexual intercourse. The trial court found Rodante Manansala guilty of having raped his daughter in Manila but dismissed those committed in Tarlac on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. Issue: Whether or not the accused is guilty of the crime of rape or quite possibly, the crime of qualified seduction, taking into account the inconsistencies of the victims statement? Decision: No. SC acquitted the accused, both on the crime of rape and qualified seduction. The inconsistencies on victims testimony for evidence cannot be dismissed as trivial. Trial courts must keep in mind that the prosecution must be able to overcome the constitutional presumption of innocence beyond a reasonable doubt to justify the conviction of the accused. The prosecution must stand or fall on its own evidence; it cannot draw strength from the weakness of the evidence for the defense. As SC has said: Rape is a very emotional word, and the natural human reactions to it are categorical: admiration and sympathy for the courageous female publicly seeking retribution for her outrageous violation, and condemnation of the rapist. However, being interpreters of the law and dispensers of justice, judges must look at a rape charge without those
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proclivities, and deal with it with extreme caution and circumspection. Judges must free themselves of the natural tendency to be overprotective of every woman decrying her having been sexually abused, and demanding punishment for the abuser. While they ought to be cognizant of the anguish and humiliation the rape victim goes through as she demands justice, judges should equally bear in mind that their responsibility is to render justice based on the law. The prosecutions evidence is not only shot through with inconsistencies and contradictions, it is also improbable. If complainant had been raped on November 1, 1991, the Court cannot understand why she went with her father to Tarlac on November 2 and stayed there with him until November 14, 1991. She was supposed to have gone through a harrowing experience at the hands of her father but the following day and for thirteen more days after that she stayed with him. It is true the medico-legal examination conducted on November 17, 1991 showed that she was no longer a virgin and that she had had recent sexual intercourse. But the fact that she had voluntarily gone with her father to Tarlac suggests that the crime was not rape but, quite possibly qualified seduction, considering the age of complainant (14 at the time of the crime). This is especially true because she said she had been given money by her father everytime they had an intercourse. The fact that she could describe the lurid details of the sexual act shows that it was not an ordeal that she went through but a consensual act. One subjected to sexual torture can hardly be expected to see what was being done to her. What is clear from complainants testimony is that although accusedappellant had had sexual intercourse with her, it was not done by force or intimidation. Nor was the rape made possible because of accused-appellants moral ascendancy over her, for the fact is that accused-appellant was not living with them, having separated from complainants mother in 1986. Considering the allegations in the complaint that the rape in this case was committed by means of force, violence and intimidation, accused-appellant cannot possibly be convicted of qualified seduction without offense to the constitutional rights of the accused to due process and to be informed of the accusation against him. That charge does not include qualified seduction. Neither can qualified seduction include rape.
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Facts: On June 6, 1969, Loreta T. dela Concepcion, a 13-year old girl, was raped by her brother-in-law, Nicanor Alvarez. Loreta narrated that the accused raped her in the presence of her sister (wife of the accused) while they were sleeping in the sala. Loreta resisted but she was not able to shout because she was allegedly weak and tired. She told the incident to her sister the following morning but the latter did not pay heed. She eventually got pregnant and a child was born. An Information was filed. The trial court found the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape. Issue: Whether or not the accused is guilty of rape or quite possibly, of the crime of qualified seduction? Decision: SC acquitted the accused for the crime of rape but charged him of the crime of qualified seduction, the elements of which were included in the facts alleged in the Information. Viewed from human observation and experience not even a confirmed sex maniac would dare do his thing before the eyes of strangers, how much more for a healthy husband before the eyes of his very wife? Then, again, testimony that her sister before whose very eyes the alleged raping incident took place did not lift a finger to her, mocks at human sensibility. In the natural course of things, this piece of evidence is repugnant to common experience and observation in that the natural reaction wife would be that of righteous indignation rather than passive [acquiescence] and the natural response of a sister would be to protect the virtue of a younger sister from abuse of her husband. Our criminal law is not susceptible to such a reproach, it being clear from the information that the elements of the crime of qualified seduction were included in the facts alleged. He cannot be heard to complain thereafter that he is entitled to complete acquittal. As a matter of fact, in his defense, rightfully given
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credence by us, he did admit his having taken advantage of an inexperienced adolescent, the younger sister of his wife, to whom he ought to have been bound by the closest ties of affinity, considering also, as testified to by him, how close she felt towards him. In the case of People v. Fontanilla, it is said that when the offender is a public officer, a priest or minister, a servant, domestic, tutor, teacher, or under any title is in charge of the education or keeping of the offended woman, as in the present case, the act is punishable although fraud or deceit may not have been used or, if employed, has not been proved. The seduction of a virgin over twelve and under eighteen years of age, committed by any of the persons enumerated in art. 337 is constitutive of the crime of qualified seduction, even though no deceit intervenes or even when such carnal knowledge were voluntary on the part of the virgin, because in such a case, the law takes for granted the existence of the deceit as an integral element of the said crime and punishes it with greater severity than it does the simple seduction, taking into account the abuse of confidence on the part of the agent (culprit), an abuse of confidence which implies deceit or fraud. As early as 1908, in the leading case of United States v. Arlante , the penalty for qualified seduction was rightfully visited on an accused whose conduct was similar to the appellant. The facts, as set forth in the very able opinion of no less than Chief Justice Arellano, reads as follows: "That the accused had carnally abused two orphan girls, relatives of his wife, who were sheltered in his house; that they respectively gave birth to a boy and a girl, one of them on the 5th of November, 1905, this being the one who files the complaint for seduction, and the other on the 15th of October of the same year, the latter appearing in the case as a witness for the prosecution x x x x And even though the accused were not, as a matter of fact, in charge of the keeping of the offended girl, it is beyond doubt that, as she was a domestic, the crime is included within paragraph 1 of said article. 'Upon the word domestic being employed in said legal provision segregating it from that of a servant, the term is applied to persons usually living under the same roof, pertaining to the same house, and constituting, in this sense, a part thereof, distinguishing it from the term servant whereby a person serving another on a salary is designated; in this manner, it has been properly used."
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Nothing remains to be added except that in a situation like the present, where, in keeping with Filipino mores, a younger sister is called upon to be of help to those ahead of her and to stay, even if intermittently, in the latter's house, especially so after marital ties are formed and children born, may give rise to situations of this character considering that among the poorer elements of our society, all the members of a family are huddled together within briefest confines, and insistence on personal modesty and privacy is practically out of the question. If the ascendancy of a brother-in-law, instead, were used for moral purposes, then, certainly, there is more than a justification for adherence to the view first announce in the landmark Arlante decision that thereby the offense qualified seduction was in fact committed.
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The trial court rejected the defenses of the accused and convicted him of forcible abduction with rape. The accused appealed the decision of the trial court. Issue: Between the accused and the victim, whose version is more credible, more plausible and more trustworthy considering the circumstances surrounding the commission of the crime charged? Decision: All the elements of forcible abduction were proved in this case. The victim who is a young girl was taken against her will as shown by the fact that at knifepoint, she was dragged and taken by accused-appellant to a place far from her abode. At her tender age, she could not be expected to physically resist considering the fact that even her companion, Jessica, had to run home to escape accusedappellants wrath as he brandished a haunting knife. The evidence likewise shows that the taking of the young victim against her will was done con miras deshonestas or in furtherance of lewd and unchaste designs. The word lewd is defined as obscene, lustful, indecent, lascivious, lecherous. It signifies that form of immorality which has relation to moral impurity; or that which is carried on in a wanton manner. Such lewd designs were established by the prurient and lustful acts which accused-appellant displayed towards the victim after she was abducted. This element may also be inferred from the fact that while Lenie was then a naive twelve (12)-year old, accused-appellant was thirty-six (36) years old and although unmarried was much wiser in the ways of the world than she Given the straightforward and candid testimony of Lenie and her father Palmones as well as the absence of any motive to testify falsely against accusedappellant, the logical conclusion is that there was no improper motive on their part, and their respective testimonies as to facts proving forcible abduction are worthy of full faith and credit Accused-appellant would however insist that he and Lenie had been engaged under Manobo rituals to marry each other and that her companionship was willful and voluntary. Proof of this, he said, was the alleged dowry of one (1) horse, two (2) pigs, ten (10) sacks of palay, and P2,000.00, with two (2) wild
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horses forthcoming, he had given her father in exchange for her hand in marriage. In moving from one place to another to look for the horses which the old man Palmones had demanded, it was allegedly only his intention to realize his matrimonial aspiration with Lenie. The testimony of the victim negated this contrived posture of accusedappellant which in reality is simply a variation of the sweetheart defense. If they were, surely, Lenie would not have jeopardized their relationship by accusing him of having held her against her will and molesting her and, on top of it all, by filing a criminal charge against him. If it had been so, Lenie could have easily told her father after the latter had successfully traced their whereabouts that nothing untoward had happened between her and the accused. Her normal reaction would have been to cover-up for the man she supposedly loved and with whom she had a passionate affair. But, on the contrary, Lenie lost no time in denouncing accused-appellant and exposing to her family and the authorities the disgrace that had befallen her. If they had indeed been lovers, Lenie's father would not have shown so much concern for her welfare and safety by searching for the couple for four (4) months, desperately wanting to rescue her from captivity and seeking the intervention of the datus in resolving the matter. Under the circumstances, the criminal liability of accused-appellant is only for forcible abduction under Art. 342 of The Revised Penal Code. The sexual abuse which accused-appellant forced upon Lenie constitutes the lewd design inherent in forcible abduction and is thus absorbed therein. The indecent molestation cannot form the other half of a complex crime since the record does not show that the principal purpose of the accused was to commit any of the crimes against chastity and that her abduction would only be a necessary means to commit the same. Surely it would not have been the case that accused-appellant would touch Lenie only once during her four (4)-month captivity, as she herself admitted, if his chief or primordial intention had been to lay with her. Instead, what we discern from the evidence is that the intent to seduce the girl forms part and parcel of her forcible abduction and shares equal importance with the other element of the crime which was to remove the victim from her home or from whatever familiar place she may be and to take her to some other. Stated otherwise, the intention of accused-appellant as the evidence shows was not only to seduce the victim but also to separate her from her family, especially from her father Palmones, clearly tell-tale signs of forcible abduction
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Facts: On or about 7:00 oclock in the morning of February 18, 1993 at Barangay Camambugan, Municipality of Daet, province of Camarines Norte and within the j the accused-appellant Jaime Ablaneda, also known as Joey Capistrano with lewd design did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, abduct one Magdalena Salas, a minor, 7 years old by bringing her to a small hut in a grassy place and while thereat, said accused, unlawfully, feloniously, and criminally, did then and there have carnal knowledge of said Magdalena Salas against her will to her damage and prejudice. At the arraignment, accused-appellant pleaded not guilty. After trial, the lower court found the the accused GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the complex crime of forcible abduction with rape Issue: Whether there was sufficient evidence to sustain the conviction of the accused? Decision: The elements of the crime of forcible abduction, as defined in Article 342 of the Revised Penal Code, are: (1) that the person abducted is any woman, regardless of her age, civil status, or reputation; (2) that she is taken against her will; and (3) that the abduction is with lewd designs. On the other hand, rape is committed by having carnal knowledge of a woman by force or intimidation, or when the woman is deprived of reason or is unconscious, or when she is under twelve years of age. All these elements were proven in this case. The victim, who is a woman, was taken against her will, as shown by the fact that she was intentionally directed by accused-appellant to a vacant hut. At her tender age, Magdalena could not be expected to physically resist considering that the lewd designs of accused-appellant could not have been apparent to her at that time. Physical resistance need not be demonstrated to show that the taking was against her will. The employment of deception suffices to constitute the forcible taking, especially since the victim is an unsuspecting young girl. Considering that it was
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raining, going to the hut was not unusual to Magdalena, as probably the purpose was to seek shelter. Barrio girls are particularly prone to deception. It is the taking advantage of their innocence that makes them easy culprits of deceiving minds. Finally, the evidence shows that the taking of the young victim against her will was effected in furtherance of lewd and unchaste designs. Such lewd designs in forcible abduction is established by the actual rape of the victim In the case at bar, Magdalena testified in open court that accused-appellant inserted his penis into her private parts. The fact of sexual intercourse is corroborated by the medical findings wherein it was found that the victim suffered from complete hymenal laceration. Whether or not she consented to the sexual contact is immaterial considering that at the time thereof, she was below twelve years of age. Sex with a girl below twelve years, regardless of whether she consented thereto or not, constitutes statutory rape. The findings of facts of the trial court, when supported by evidence on record, are binding on this Court. No significant facts or circumstances were shown to have been overlooked or disregarded which, if considered, might substantially affect the outcome of this case. Consequently, the trial courts conclusions and assessments on the credibility of witness must be accorded respect on appeal The imposition of the penalty of reclusion perpetua, for the crime of forcible abduction with rape committed in 1993, was correct. No qualifying or aggravating circumstance was proven in this case and there was none alleged in the information. However, the trial court erred in failing to award civil indemnity to the victim. Whenever the crime of rape is committed, a civil indemnity is awarded to the victim without necessity of proof or pleading, and the same is automatically granted together with moral damages, generally in the amount of P50,000.00 each. In this connection, the prayer of the Solicitor General that the civil indemnity be increased to P75,000.00 cannot be granted, the same being contrary to jurisprudence In cases where the death penalty cannot be imposed, the civil indemnity is reduced from P75,000.00 to P50,000.00
Facts: Appellant is the uncle of Judeliza, the complainant. He is the younger brother of her father. Judeliza went to the well near their house, to take a bath. There, Jimmy grabbed and forcibly dragged her at knife's point, to the highway where he made her board a truck for Bogo, Cebu. Impelled by fear, she complied, since Jimmy continuously poked a knife under cover of his jacket at her. From Bogo, he took her by passenger motorboat to Placer, Masbate. Thence he brought her to Estampar, Cataingan, Masbate, where they stayed at the house of Conchita Tipnit, Jimmy's sister and Judeliza's aunt. Though aunt and niece did not know each other. In Estampar, Judeliza tried to escape but was caught by Jimmy, who severely mauled her until she lost consciousness On July 4, 1994, at around midnight, Jimmy, armed with a blade, sexually assaulted Judeliza. He covered her mouth to prevent her from shouting. After satisfying his lust, Jimmy inserted three fingers into her vaginal orifice and cruelly pinched it. Judeliza screamed and cried for help. Their host, Roberto, was awakened but could not do anything to assist her. Later, Jimmy struck Judeliza with a piece of wood, rendering her unconscious. Much later, he brought her to the house of his sister, Nilda Polloso, also at Cagba. Nilda noticed the victim's weak and wan condition and offered her medicine. Nilda brought her to the police where Judeliza reported her ordeal. After the initial police investigation, Judeliza was brought to Masbate Provincial Hospital, where she was confined for four days. The medico-legal officer examined her. An information for forcible abduction with rape was filed. The accused pleaded not guilty. During the trial, accused admitted having sexual relations with Judeliza, but insisted that it was consensual. He claimed that they were lovers and had been engaging in sexual intimacies for three months before running away. He explained that they had gone to Masbate after Judeliza had revealed to him that she was not really her father's daughter. They then lived together as husband and wife. He admitted having boxed and kicked her but claimed that he got mad at her after she confided that she really was his niece, contrary to what she earlier told him. He likewise admitted having pinched the
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victim's vagina, but only to punish her for deceiving him about their kinship. He claimed the instant case was filed against him because of the maltreatment she received. Pedsc The trial court found appellant's version of the incident preposterous and his defense untenable. |The trial Court found the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the complex crime of forcible abduction with rape under Article 48 in relation to Article[s] 335 and 342 of the Revised Penal Code and is meted the extreme penalty of death. Issue: Whether or not the trial court gravely err in its evaluation of the honesty of private complainant, in effect giving full weight and credence to the evidence of the prosecution than that of the defense? Whether or not the trial court gravely err in finding the accused appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged? Decision: There is no no reason to overturn the trial court's detailed evaluation of the evidence for both the prosecution and the defense. Complainant Judeliza's testimony was given in a straightforward, clear, and convincing manner, which remained consistent even under cross-examination. The trial court found her testimony believable and convincing, while appellant's version of events incredible and outrageous. Moreover, as testified by the medico-legal officer, he found that her body bore evidences of physical and sexual assault. Appellant's bare denial could not prevail over said positive evidence Appellant next insists that the intercourse between him and Judeliza was consensual, since they were sweethearts. A "sweetheart defense" should be substantiated by some documentary and/or other evidence of the relationship .In this case, there is no showing of mementos, love letters, notes, pictures, or any concrete proof of a romantic nature. Besides, as observed by the trial judge, it is contrary to human experience that a naive rural lass like Judeliza, barely nineteen years old, would willingly consent to be her uncle's paramour. Nor, would he if he were indeed
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her sweetheart maltreat her repeatedly for no justifiable cause, without over-straining our credulity The elements of forcible abduction are: (1) that the person abducted is any woman, regardless of age, civil status, or reputation; (2) that the abduction is against her will; and (3) that the abduction is with lewd designs. The prosecution's evidence clearly shows that the victim was forcibly taken at knifepoint from Borbon, Cebu by appellant and through threats and intimidation brought to various towns in Masbate, where he passed her off as his "wife". That appellant was moved by lewd designs was shown in regard to rape by his having carnal knowledge of private complainant, against her will, on July 4, 1994 at Cagba, Tugbo, Masbate. While it may appear at first blush that forcible abduction, as defined and penalized by Article 342 of the Revised Penal Code was also committed, we are not totally disposed to convict appellant for the complex crime of forcible abduction with rape. When a complex crime under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code is charged, such as forcible abduction with rape, it is axiomatic that the prosecution must allege and prove the presence of all the elements of forcible abduction, as well as all the elements of the crime of rape. When appellant, using a blade, forcibly took away complainant for the purpose of sexually assaulting her, as in fact he did rape her, the rape may then absorb forcible abduction. Hence, the crime committed by appellant is simple rape only. The imposable penalty for rape under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. No. 7659, is reclusion perpetua. But where the rape is committed with the use of deadly weapon or by two or more persons, the imposable penalty ranges from reclusion perpetua to death. The use of the bladed weapon already qualified the rape. Under Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code, the crucial factor in determining whether appellant should be meted the death penalty is the presence of an aggravating circumstance which attended the commission of the crime. A perusal of the record shows that none of the aggravating circumstances enumerated in Article 14 of the Revised Penal Code was alleged and proven by the prosecution. Where there is no aggravating circumstance proved in the commission of the offense, the lesser penalty shall be applied. In sentencing appellant to death, the trial court noted that the victim was his niece, a relative by consanguinity within the third civil degree. Section 11 (1) of R.A. No. 7659 imposes the death penalty when the rape victim is under 18
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years of age and the offender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the commonlaw spouse of the parent of the victim. However, R.A. No. 7659 cannot be made to apply in the instant case for two reasons: First, at the time the rape was committed, private complainant was already more than eighteen years of age. Second, the information did not allege that offender and offended party were relatives within the third degree of consanguinity. We have held that the seven circumstances in R.A. No. 7659 which warrant the automatic imposition of the death penalty partake of the nature of qualifying circumstances and as such should be alleged in the information to be appreciated as such. In view of the failure of the information to comply with this requirement, said degree of relation could not be taken into account in considering the penalty to be imposed. For these reasons, the sentence on appellant should only be reclusion perpetua
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Abunado v. People
Facts: Salvador Abunado married Narcisa Arceno on September 18, 1967. Salvador later contracted a second marriage with Zenaida Binas. On May 18, 1995, a case for bigamy was filed by Narcisa against Salvador and Zenaida. On May 18, 2001, the Trial Court of San Mateo Rizal convicted Salvador of the crime of bigamy. On Appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed with modification the ruling of the trial court appreciating the mitigating circumstance that the accuse s seventy six years of age then. Salvador avers that the information filed against him was defective as it stated that the alleged bigamous marriage was contracted in 1995 when in fact it should have been 1989. Issue: Whether or not petitioner has been sufficiently informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him? Decision: No, the statement in the information that the crime was committed in January 1995 was an obvious typographical error, for the same information clearly states that petitioner contracted a subsequent marriage to Zenaida Abunado on January 10, 1989. Also, petitioner failed to object to the alleged defect in the Information during the trial and only raised the same for the first time on appeal before the Court of Appeals.
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Cacho v. People
Facts: Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete married on August 30, 1990. On August 19, 1991, a decree of divorce by Ontario Court was granted unto them. On October 4, 2992, Lucio Morigo married Maria Jececha Lumbago. On September 321, 1993, accused filed a complaint for judicail declaration of nullity of marriage in the trial court of Bohol, on the ground that no marriage ceremony actually took place. On October 19, 1993, appelant was charged with bigamy filed by the City Prosecutor of Tagbilaran, with the Regional Trial Court of Bohol. On August 5, 1996, the Regional Trial Court of Bohol convicted Lucio Morigo of the crime of bigamy. Petitioner filed an appeal with the Court of Appeals and the same affirmed the decision of the trial court. Issue: Whether or not petitioner committed bigamy? Decision: No, the first element of bigamy as a crime requires that the accused must have been legally married. The existence and the validity of the first marriage being an essential element of the crime of bigamy, it is but logical that a conviction for said offense cannot be sustained where there is no first marriage to speak of.
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No marriage ceremony at all was performed by a duly authorized solemnizing officer. Petitioner and Lucia Barrete merely signed a marriage contract on their own. Under the aforementioned circumstance, the Court held that petitioner has not committed bigamy.
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NADISPALKO NILA SA STATES, MAY MGA ASUNTO ANNABELLE IMPOSIBLENG NASA AMERIKA NGAYON SI ANNABELLE DAHIL SA KALAT DIN ANG ASUNTO NILA DUN, BUKOD PA SA NAPAKARAMING PINOY NA HUMAHANTING SA KANILA MAS MALAKING PROBLEMA ANG KAILANGAN NIYANG HARAPIN SA STATES DAHIL SA PERANG NADISPALKO NILA, NAGHAHANAP LANG NG SAKIT NG
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KATAWAN
SI
ANNABELLE
KUNG
SA
STATES NGA NIYA MAIISIPANG PUMUNTA NGAYON PARA LANG TAKASAN NIYA SI LIGAYA SANTOS AT ANG SINTENSIYA SA KANYA when in truth and in fact, the accused very well knew that the same are entirely false and untrue but were publicly made for no other purpose than to expose said ANNABELLE RAMA GUTIERREZ to humiliation and disgrace, as it depicts her to be a fugitive from justice and a swindler, thereby causing dishonor, discredit and contempt upon the person of the offended party, to the damage and prejudice of the said ANNABELLE RAMA GUTIERREZ. CONTRARY TO LAW Upon arraignment, petitioner and co-accused Bogs C. Tugas both pleaded not guilty. After trial on the merits, the RTC of Quezon City, Branch 218, in its Joint Decisions dated January 27, 1997, found petitioner and Tugas guilty of libel. Petitioner and Tugas appealed to the CA. The appellate court, in its Decision dated September 3, 2002, affirmed the conviction of petitioner, but acquitted Tugas on account of non-participation in the publication of the libelous article. The CA denied petitioners motion for reconsideration for lack of merit in the Resolution dated March 24, 2003. Hence, this petition.
Issues: Whether or not Tugas and Fermin can be held liable for liable?
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Decision: The Supreme Court noted that, in the first issue, the CA erred in acquitting Tugas. It said that Tugas cannot feign lack of participation in the publication of the questioned article as was evident from his and petitioners Joint Counter-Affidavit and as gleaned from his testimony before the trial court, to wit: WITNESS: As editor-in-chief, I have no participation
in the writing of the questioned article and my only participation in the publication is the handling of the physical lay-outing, indication and allocation of typesize of the body of the article, before the same was printed and published in GOSSIP Tabloid Q: You do not deny the statements in this publication as executed by you in the counteraffidavit A: and sworn in before the City Prosecutor, is this correct? Yes, that is correct.
ATTY. ALENTAJAN: That is all for the witness, your Honor. COURT: Do we get it right from you, if you were acting as you were, you will not allow the said publication of this same article or same stories? A: If I were, if I was physically present, honestly I will because if you can see the article, your Honor, it is according to our source, it is not a direct comment. COURT: So whether you are there or not, [the] same article leading to them (sic) will still find its way to come out?
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A:
In U.S. v. Taylor, the accused was indicted under Section 6 of Act No. 277 which provides that: Every author, editor or proprietor of any book, newspaper, or serial publication is chargeable with the publication of any words contained in any part of said book or number of each newspaper or serial as fully as if he were the author of the same. However, proof adduced during the trial showed that accused was the manager of the publication without the corresponding evidence that, as such, he was directly responsible for the writing, editing, or publishing of the matter contained in the said libelous article. In People v. Topacio and Santiago, reference was made to the Spanish text of Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code which includes the verb publicar. Thus, it was held that Article 360 includes not only the author or the person who causes the libelous matter to be published, but also the person who prints or publishes it. Based on these cases, therefore, proof of knowledge of and participation in the publication of the offending article is not required, if the accused has been specifically identified as author, editor, or proprietor or printer/publisher of the publication, as petitioner and Tugas are in this case. Tugas testimony, in fact, confirms his actual participation in the preparation and publication of the controversial article and his approval thereof as it was written. Moreover, his alibi, which was considered meritorious by the CA, that he was confined at the Mother of Perpetual Help Clinic in Angeles City, is unavailing, in view of the testimony of his attending physician that Tugas medical condition did not prevent him from performing his work. However, the Supreme Court cannot reverse the findings of acquittal by the appellate court in view of the principle of double jeopardy. As the wordings of the Supreme Court, But, of course, we cannot reinstate the ruling of the trial court convicting Bogs Tugas because with his acquittal by the CA, we would run afoul of his constitutional right against double jeopardy. As regards to the second issue, petitioner Fermin argues that the subject article in the June 14, 1995 issue of Gossip Tabloid is not libelous, is covered by the mantle of press freedom, and is merely in the nature of a fair and honest comment. The Supreme Court disagrees on her arguments by analyzing the libelous articles, to wit:
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The banner headlines of the offending article read: KUNG TOTOONG NAKATAKAS NA SI ANNABELLE RAMA, IMPOSIBLENG SA STATES SIYA NAGPUNTA! MAS MALAKING HALAGA ANG NADISPALKO NILA SA STATES, MAY MGA NAIWAN DING ASUNTO DUN SI ANNABELLE! On the first page of the same issue of Gossip Tabloid, written in smaller but bold letters, are: HINDI SIYA MAKAKAPUNTA SA AMERIKA DAHIL NAPAKARAMI RIN NIYANG ASUNTONG INIWAN DUN NOON PA, NAKAPAG-ABROAD MAN SIYA, E, PIHADONG HINDI SIYA SA AMERIKA NAGTULOY, SA AMERIKA PA KAYA SIYA MAGTATAGO, E, ILANG TAON NA RIN SIYANG INAABANGAN DUN NG NGA KABABAYAN NATING NILOKO NIYA, IN ONE WAY OR ANOTHER?... NAAALALA PA BA NINYO YUNG MGA MAMAHALING KALDERO NA IBINEBENTA NILA NOON SA AMERIKA, DUN SILA NAGKAPROBLEMA, SA PILIPINAS NOON. MILYON-MILYON ANG INVOLVED, KAYA KINAILANGAN NILANG UMUWI
A libel is defined as a public and malicious imputation of a crime, or of a vice or defect, real or imaginary; or any act, omission, condition, status, or circumstance tending to cause the dishonor, discredit, or contempt of a natural or juridical person, or to blacken the memory of one who is dead. In determining whether the statement is defamatory, the words used are to be construed in their entirety and should be taken in their plain and ordinary meaning as they would naturally be understood by persons reading them, unless it appears that they were used and understood in another sense. To say that the article, in its entirety, is not libelous disturbs ones sensibilities; it would certainly prick ones conscience. There is evident imputation
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of the crime of malversation (that the complainants converted for their personal use the money paid to them by fellow Filipinos in America in their business of distributing high-end cookware); of vices or defects for being fugitives from the law (that complainants and their family returned to the Philippines to evade prosecution in America); and of being a wastrel (that Annabelle Rama Gutierrez lost the earnings from their business through irresponsible gambling in casinos). The attribution was made publicly, considering that Gossip Tabloid had a nationwide circulation. The victims were identified and identifiable. More importantly, the article reeks of malice, as it tends to cause the dishonor, discredit, or contempt of the complainants. Neither can petitioner take refuge in the constitutional guarantee of freedom of speech and of the press. Although a wide latitude is given to critical utterances made against public officials in the performance of their official duties, or against public figures on matters of public interest, such criticism does not automatically fall within the ambit of constitutionally protected speech. If the utterances are false, malicious or unrelated to a public officers performance of his duties or irrelevant to matters of public interest involving public figures, the same may give rise to criminal and civil liability. While complainants are considered public figures for being personalities in the entertainment business, media people, including gossip and intrigue writers and commentators such as petitioner, do not have the unbridled license to malign their honor and dignity by indiscriminately airing fabricated and malicious comments, whether in broadcast media or in print, about their personal lives. Thus, the Supreme Court held that the conviction of petitioner Fermin for libel should be upheld.
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Facts: This is a case for Libel committed by Dolores Magno on various occasions against Cerelito T. Alejandro, the formers neighbor for almost 20 years at PucayVillage, Marcos Highway, Baguio City. The antecedent facts are as follows: In the afternoon of March 2, 1991, Cerelito, while at the upper portion of his house, saw Dolores write on the wall at the back of her garage the following words: 'Huag Burahin Bawal Dumaan Dito ang Maniac at Magnanakaw ng Aso katulad ni Cere Lito O. Cedring. Feeling that he was the 'Cere', 'Lito or 'Cedring being alluded to, Cerelito reported the matter to the local police and filed an affidavitcomplaint with the Fiscal's Office. Subsequently, or on March 9, 1991, at around 4:00 p.m., Rodelito, Cerelito's 16-year old son, while on his way to buy bread at a nearby store, saw Dolores writing something on her garage's extension wall with the use of a paint brush and red paint. In full, the writing reads: " HUAG BURAHIN BAWAL DUMAAN ANG SUSPETSOSA BASTOS AT MAKAPAL NA MUKHA DITO LALO NA SA MANIAC AT MAGNANAKAW NG ASO KATULAD NI CERELITO." After reading what was thus written, Rodelito proceeded with his errand and, upon reaching home, related what he saw to his father. Again, feeling that he was the maniac and dog thief being referred to, Cerelito lost no time in filing a complaint with the Baguio City Police (BCP). Pictures were then taken of the aforesaid writing on the wall. Eventually, the Office of the City Prosecutor in Baguio, finding, following an investigation, probable cause for libel against Dolores, filed the corresponding information giving rise to Criminal Case No. 8804-R. Evidently apprised by the police of the complaint thus filed by Cerelito, Dolores, in the morning of March 15, 1991, went to the BCP sub-station to deliver her 3-page letter-answer written in yellow pad and addressed to the station subcommander.
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At around 12:20 p.m. of the same day, March 15, 1991, Dolores handed to and instructed Evelyn Arcartado, Cerelito's sister, to deliver an unsealed white, long, ordinary envelope to Fe Alejandro, Cerelito's wife.Since Fe was out of the house at that time, Evelyn gave the unsealed envelope to Cerelito, who immediately read the three (3) separate letters contained in the envelope. Evelyn followed suit afterwards. Fe read the contents of the envelope upon reaching home late in the afternoon of March 15, 1991. The first letter, unsigned and undated and written on yellow pad, was addressed to spouses Cerelito and Fe Alejandro. Quoted, in part, in the information in Criminal Case No. 8806-R, this unsigned letter reads: If your husband can't show any proof of his makating dila then comply & if your husband can't understand this simple English dahil mangmang, dayukdok na galing sa isang kahig isang tukang pamilya at walang pinagaralan, illiterate, mal educado kaya bastos eh huag na niya kaming idamay sa kaniyang katangahan na alam na trabaho eh humawak ng grasa sa Saudi.Kaya iyong pambabastos mo at pagdudumi niya sa pangalan naming at higit pa siyang marumi at putang ina rin niya.Galing siya sa p ng baboy at hindi sa p ng tao.Huag niyang ikumpara ang pinangalingan niya sa pinangalingan namin.Siya ang magnanakaw at mandaraya.Malinaw na ibidensiya iyan kinalagyan ng hagdan ninyo, di ba lampas kayo sa lote ninyo.Pinalakad ninyo ang mojon para lumaki ang lote ninyo.Bago kayo magsalita mambintang ng kapitbahay ninyo, tignan ninyo muna ang sarili ninyo. Mas mukha pang magnanakaw ang asawa mo para malinaw. The second letter is a photo-copy of the first, but with the following addendum written in ink at the back page thereof which reads: Ang tibay mo rin naman Mrs. Alejandro, makapal pa ang mukha mo at ikaw pa ang magpapablotter sa akin para pagtakpan mo ang maniac mong asawa. Kailan mo
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masasabi na pumasok sa bakuran mo para mamirhuesyo sa inyo. Tanga. The third letter, a photocopy of Dolores signed letter dated March 15, 1991, to the Sub-Station 5 Commander of BCP purportedly in reply to the statement given by Fe Alejandro to the police station on March 3, 1991, reads, in part, as follows: The Sub Station Commander Sub-Station 5 Marcos Highway, B.C. Dear sir: cralawxxxxxxxxx Allow me then to explain to you . . . why I call Mr. Alejandro a maniac.Pumasok siya sa lote ko sa garahe na naging shelter (temporary) namin ng pamilya ko pagkatapos ng lindol (3 weeks after) ng hatinggabi-lasing na lasing nakapaa, bukas ang zipper ng pantaloon nakayapak na walang sapin sa paa.Tulog na kami.We were awakened by the constant barking of my dogs.I have 3 native dogs but 1 was slaughtered by Mr. Cerelito Alejandro '.He is even a dognapper. My Manang Louie can relate the incident since we were out of the country x x x.I don't trust him as my kapitbahay na bantay salakay.In simple tagalog magnanakaw ng aso para may malamon dahil takaw na takaw at walang maibili. It is upon the foregoing factual backdrop that Dolores was charged with libel under four (4) separate informations filed with the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City, docketed as Criminal Cases No. 8803-R, 8804-R, 8805-R and 8806-R and raffled to Branch 6 of the court. Upon arraignment, Dolores, as accused, entered a plea of Not Guilty to each of the offenses charges in the four informations aforecited. Following a joint trial, the trial court rendered judgment on September 23,
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1993, finding her guilty of libel in both Criminal Cases Nos. 8804-R and 8806-R and sentencing her to suffer imprisonment and ordering her to indemnify the offended party a certain sum as moral damages. In Criminal Cases Nos. 8803-R and 8805-R, however, she was acquitted. On Appeal, the appellate court affirmed in toto the judgment of conviction of the RTC. The appellate court likewise denied the motion for reconsideration of Dolores Magno for lack of merit. Hence, this petition for review. Issue: Whether Magno could be held liable for libel? Decision: The Supreme Court held that to be liable for libel under Article 353 of the Revised Penal Code, the following elements must be shown to exist: (a) the allegation of a discreditable act or condition concerning another; (b) publication of the charge; (c) identity of the person defamed; and (d) existence of malice. There can be no quibbling about the defamatory nature of the written imputation or allegations hurled against Cerelito. And the derogatory writings were obviously made out of ill-will or revenge.The issue of defamation, malice or the identity of the person defamed is not even raised in this recourse. As earlier recited, the information in Criminal Case No. 8806-R arose out of what Dolores wrote about the spouses Cerelito and Fe Alejandro contained in an unsealed envelope and delivered, through Evelyn Arcartado, on March 15, 1991. Dolores contends that, from the time Evelyn was physically handed the unsealed envelope to the time the latter turned it over to Cerelito, no one opened or read the offending letter contained therein. Prescinding therefrom, Dolores argues against the existence of libel, citing, for the purpose, American jurisprudence holding that "where libelous matter is communicated only to a person defamed
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and he voluntarily discloses the contents of the libelous communication to others, the originator of the libel is not responsible for the publication."Dolores argues that since the obnoxious letter was addressed to spouses Cerelito and Fe Alejandro, Fe was, insofar as Cerelito is concerned, not a third person for purposes of publication. She further declares that to call the husband (Cerelito) a thief in connection with a charge that he and his wife had stolen goods, is not to speak words of defamation of him alone so as to make the utterance in the presence of his wife a publication. Publication, in the law of libel, means the making of the defamatory matter, after it has been written, known to someone other than the person to whom it has been written. If the statement is sent straight to a person for whom it is written there is no publication of it. The reason for this is that 'a communication of the defamatory matter to the person defamed cannot injure his reputation though it may wound his self-esteem. A man's reputation is not the good opinion he has of himself, but the estimation in which others hold him. In People vs. Silvela, the Court ruled that sending an unsealed libelous letter to the offended party constitutes publication. In the present case, there is no dispute that the unsealed envelope containing the libelous letter was handed by Dolores to Evelyn Arcartado. Contextually, there was a reasonable probability that the contents of the unsealed envelope, particularly the libelous letter, could have been exposed to be read by Evelyn before delivering the same to Cerelito. However, Evelyn categorically admitted not reading the letter at the first instance, reading it only after securing Cerelito's permission. Writing to a person other than the person defamed is sufficient to constitute publication, for the person to whom the letter is addressed is a third person in relation to its writer and the person defamed therein. Fe, the wife, is, in context, a third person to whom the publication was made. Finally, the Court cannot give credence to Dolores' allegation that she is not the author of the unsigned libelous letter. It cannot be overstressed that she herself handed the unsigned letter to Evelyn Arcartado with specific instructions to give the same to Fe Alejandro. Likewise, the contents of the letters are basically reiteration/elaborations of Dolores' previous writing on the wall and her letter to the BCP Sub-Station commander. What the Court of Appeals said on this point is basic common sense and deserving of acceptance.
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The Supreme Court finds all the elements of libel to have been sufficiently established. Accordingly, the ascription of reversible errors on the part of the CA and the trial court in adjudging Dolores guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two counts of libel cannot be sustained.
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Anent your letter dated August 18, 1995 addressed to one Mrs. Teresita Quingco
filing administrative charge against you and all persons behind these nefarious activities. Finally, it is a welcome opportunity for the undersigned to face you squarely in any courts of justice, so as we can prove 'who is who once and for all. Trusting that you are properly inform (sic) regarding these matters, I remain. Yours in Satan name; (Signed) JOSE ALEMANIA BUATIS, JR. Atty-in- Fact of the present Court Administrator of the entire Intestate Estate of Don Hermogenes Rodriguez Y. Reyes. Copy furnished: All concerned. Reacting to the insulting words used by Buatis, Jr., particularly: 'Satan, senile, stupid, [E]nglish carabao, Atty. Pieraz filed a complaint for libel against accused-appellant. Subject letter and its contents came to the knowledge not only of his wife but of his children as well and they all chided him telling him: 'Ginagawa ka lang gago dito. The defense forwarded by accused-appellant Buatis, Jr. was denial. According to him, it was at the behest of the president of the organization 'Nagkakaisang Samahan Ng Mga Taga Manggahan or NASATAMA, and of a member, Teresita Quingco, that he had dictated to one of his secretaries, a comment to the letter of private-complainant in the second week of August 1995. Initially during his testimony, Buatis, Jr. could not recall whether he had signed that letter-comment or if it was even addressed to Atty. Pieraz. Neither could he remember if he had made and sent another letter, this time dated August 24, 1995, to Atty. Pieraz. Confronted in court with the counter-affidavit which he filed before the Pasig City Prosecutor's Office, however, Buatis, Jr. could not deny its contents, among which was his admission that indeed, he had
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sent subject letter of August 18 and the letter dated August 24, 1995 to Atty. Pieraz. After trial on the merits, the RTC rendered its Decision dated April 30, 1997 finding petitioner guilty of the crime of libel. Subsequently, petitioner appealed the RTC's decision to the CA which, in its Decision dated January 18, 2000, affirmed in its entirety the decision of the trial court. The CA denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration in a Resolution dated March 13, 2000. Hence, the instant petition for review on certiorari filed by petitioner. Issue: Whether or not petitioner is guilty of libel? Decision: The Supreme Court denied the petition. Article 353 of the Revised Penal Code defines libel as a public and malicious imputation of a crime, or of a vice or defect, real or imaginary, or any act, omission, condition, status, or circumstance tending to cause the dishonor, discredit, or contempt of a natural or juridical person, or to blacken the memory of one who is dead. For an imputation to be libelous, the following requisites must concur: (a) it must be defamatory; (b) it must be malicious; (c) it must be given publicity;and (d) the victim must be identifiable. The last two elements have been duly established by the prosecution. There is publication in this case. In libel, publication means making the defamatory matter, after it is written, known to someone other than the person against whom it has been written. Petitioner's subject letter-reply itself states that the same was copy furnished to all concerned. Also, petitioner had dictated the
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letter to his secretary. It is enough that the author of the libel complained of has communicated it to a third person. Furthermore, the letter, when found in the mailbox, was open, not contained in an envelope thus, open to public. The victim of the libelous letter was identifiable as the subject letter-reply was addressed to respondent himself. In determining whether a statement is defamatory, the words used are to be construed in their entirety and should be taken in their plain, natural and ordinary meaning as they would naturally be understood by persons reading them, unless it appears that they were used and understood in another sense. For the purpose of determining the meaning of any publication alleged to be libelous, we laid down the rule in Jimenez v. Reyes, to wit: In Tawney vs. Simonson, Whitcomb & Hurley Co. (109 Minn., 341), the court had the following to say on this point:In determining whether the specified matter is libelous per se, two rules of construction are conspicuously applicable: (1)That construction must be adopted which will give to the matter such a meaning as is natural and obvious in the plain and ordinary sense in which the public would naturally understand what was uttered.(2)The published matter alleged to be libelous must be construed as a whole. In applying these rules to the language of an alleged libel, the court will disregard any subtle or ingenious explanation offered by the publisher on being called to account.The whole question being the effect the publication had upon the minds of the readers, and they not having been assisted by the offered explanation in reading the article, it comes too late to have the effect of removing the sting, if any there be, from the words used in the publication.ry Gauging from the abovementioned tests, the words used in the letter dated August 18, 1995 sent by petitioner to respondent is defamatory. In using words such as 'lousy', 'inutile', 'carabao English', 'stupidity', and 'satan', the letter, as it was written, casts aspersion on the character, integrity and reputation of respondent as a lawyer which exposed him to ridicule. No evidence aliunde need
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be adduced to prove it. As the CA said, these very words of petitioner have caused respondent to public ridicule as even his own family have told him: 'Ginagawa ka lang gago dito. Any of the imputations covered by Article 353 is defamatory; and, under the general rule laid down in Article 354, every defamatory imputation is presumed to be malicious, even if it be true, if no good intention and justifiable motive for making it is shown. Thus, when the imputation is defamatory, the prosecution need not prove malice on the part of petitioner (malice in fact), for the law already presumes that petitioner's imputation is malicious (malice in law). A reading of petitioner's subject letter-reply showed that he malevolently castigated respondent for writing such a demand letter to Mrs. Quingco. There was nothing in the said letter which showed petitioner's good intention and justifiable motive for writing the same in order to overcome the legal inference of malice. Thus, the Supreme Court find that the CA did not commit any error in affirming the findings of the trial court that petitioner is guilty of the crime of libel.
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defamatory words will fall under one or the other, depending not only upon their sense, grammatical significance, and accepted ordinary meaning judging them separately, but also upon the special circumstances of the case, antecedents or relationship between the offended party and the offender, which might tend to prove the intention of the offender at the time. In the case at bar, as a public official, petitioner, who was holding the position of Councilor at that time, is hidebound to be an exemplar to society against the use of intemperate language particularly because the offended party was a Vice-Mayor. However, it should be noted that such scathing words were uttered by petitioner in the heat of anger triggered by the fact, as found by the Court of Appeals, that complainant refused, without valid justification to approve the monetization of accrued leave credits of petitioner. The rule that all possible circumstances favorable to the accused must be taken in his favor. The slander committed by petitioner can be characterized as slight slander following the doctrine that uttering defamatory words in the heat of anger, with some provocation on the part of the offended party constitutes only a light felony.
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however, the factual backdrop of the case, the oral defamation was only slight. The parties were also neighbors; that petitioner was drunk at the time he uttered the defamatory words; and the fact that petitioners anger was instigated by what Atty. Escolango did when petitioners father died. In which case, the oral defamation was not of serious or insulting nature.
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The petition has no merit, The Court had continuously ruled that a single act or incident might offend against two or more entirely distinct and unrelated provisions of law thus justifying the prosecution of the accused for more than one offense. The only limit to this rule is the Constitutional prohibition that no person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for "the same offense. In P.D. 1067 (Philippines Water Code), the additional element to be established is the dumping of mine tailings into the Makulapnit River and the entire Boac River System without prior permit from the authorities concerned. In P.D. 984 (Anti-Pollution Law), the additional fact that must be proved is the existence of actual pollution. The gravamen is the pollution itself. In R.A. 7942 (Philippine Mining Act), the additional fact that must be established is the willful violation and gross neglect on the part of the accused to abide by the terms and conditions of the Environmental Compliance Certificate. On the other hand, the additional element that must be established in Art. 365 of the Revised Penal Code is the lack of necessary or adequate precaution, negligence, recklessness and imprudence on the part of the accused to prevent damage to property. This element is not required under the previous laws. The claim that the charge for violation of Article 365 of the RPC "absorbs" the charges for violation of PD 1067, PD 984, and RA 7942 must fail, suffice it to say that a mala in se felony (such as Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Damage to Property) cannot absorb mala prohibita crimes (such as those violating PD 1067, PD 984, and RA 7942). What makes the former a felony is criminal intent (dolo) or negligence (culpa); what makes the latter crimes are the special laws enacting them.
intelligence; (3) his physical condition; and (4) other circumstances regarding persons, time and place. Petitioner herein is a professional driver who has been in the employ of the bus company for 18 years and has undergone training courses and seminars to improve his skills as a driver. He is expected to be well aware of his responsibilities to his passengers. Not only must he make sure that they reach their destinations on time, he must also ensure their safety while they are boarding, during the entire trip, and upon disembarking from the vehicle. Having failed to exercise due diligence that resulted in the tragic incident, petitioners liability for the death of passenger Lourdes Mangruban, as found by the lower courts, must be sustained. No, The records show that petitioner stated under oath that he alighted from the bus and saw that several people were assisting the injured party and corroborated by other witnesses. The assistance required by Article 365, Revised Penal Code, is one which may be in the hands of the offender to give. We must therefore take into consideration the type and degree of assistance that the offender, at the time and place of the incident, is capable of giving. Under the circumstances of this case, the petitioner is not a hit-and-run driver. He exerted efforts to see to it that the victim had been attended to. There were several people assisting the victim, including his co-employees working for the bus company. The injured party was carried from the terminal, to a vehicle, then to the hospital. Before petitioner was given clearance by the dispatcher to leave, an hour later, he was assured that the victim was brought already to the hospital. We note that petitioner had a bus full of passengers requiring also his attention. He could only do so much, so that the burden of helping the injured party was shared by the bus company personnel and other good Samaritans.
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vehicle instead of applying his brakes, as shown by the absence of brake marks or skid marks along the traffic scene. For its part, the defense attributed the continuous movement of accused vehicle to the confluence that the Isuzu Elf truck, a huge vehicle, was moving fast that even if the brakes were applied the truck would have still proceeded further on account of its momentum, albeit at a reduced speed, and would have stopped only after a certain distance. It is a well-entrenched rule that if the inculpatory facts are capable of two or more explanations one consistent with the innocence or lesser degree of liability of the accused, and the other consistent with his guilt or graver responsibility the Court should adopt the explanation which is more favorable to the accused. The court is convinced that the incident, tragic though it was in light of the number of persons killed and seriously injured, was an accident and not an intentional felony. Although proof of motive is not indispensable to a conviction especially where the assailant is positively identified, such proof is, nonetheless, important in determining which of two conflicting theories of the incident is more likely to be true. The test for determining whether a person is negligent in doing an act whereby injury or damage results to the person or property of another is this: Could a prudent man, in the position of the person to whom negligence is attributed, foresee harm to the person injured as a reasonable consequence of the course actually pursued? If so, the law imposes a duty on the actor to refrain from that course or to take precautions to guard against its mischievous results, and the failure to do so constitutes negligence. Reasonable foresight of harm, followed by the ignoring of the admonition born of this prevision, is always necessary before negligence can be held to exist. GLENN showed an inexcusable lack of precaution and liable under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code. Considering that the incident was not a product of a malicious intent but rather the result of a single act of reckless driving, accused should be held guilty of the complex crime of reckless imprudence resulting in multiple homicide with serious physical injuries and less serious physical injuries.
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Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code provides that when the single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies, or when an offense is a necessary means for committing the other, the penalty for the most serious crime shall be imposed, the same to be applied in its maximum period. Since No, The slight physical injuries caused by the accused to the ten other victims through reckless imprudence, would, had they been intentional, have constituted light felonies. Being light felonies, which are not covered by Article 48, they should be treated and punished as separate offenses. Separate informations should have, therefore, been filed. However, It must be noted that only one information (for multiple murder, multiple frustrated murder and multiple attempted murder) was filed with the trial court. However, nothing appears in the record that GLENN objected to the multiplicity of the information in a motion to quash before his arraignment. Hence, he is deemed to have waived such defect. Under Section 3, Rule 120 of the Rules of Court, when two or more offenses are charged in a single complaint or information and the accused fails to object to it before trial, the court may convict the accused of as many offenses as are charged and proved, and impose on him the penalty for each of them.
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make such recordings is underscored by the use of a qualifier any. Consequently, as respondent CA correctly concluded, even a person (privy) to a communication who records his private conversation with another without the knowledge of the latter (will) qualify as a violator under this provision of R.A. No 4200. The nature of the conversation is immaterial to a violation of the statute. The substance of the same need not be specifically alleged in the information. What R.A. 4200 penalizes are the acts of secretly overhearing, intercepting or recording private communications by means of devices enumerated therein. Mere allegation that an individual made a secret recording of private communication by means of a tape recorder would suffice to constitute an offense under Sec. 1 of R.A. 4200. Petitioners contention that the phrase private communication in Sec.1 of R.A. 4200 does not include private conversations narrows the ordinary meaning of the word communication to a point of absurdity. The instant case turns on a different note, because the applicable facts and circumstances pointing to a violation of R.A. 4200 suffer from no ambiguity, and the statute itself explicitly mentions the unauthorized recording of private communications with the use of tape- recorders as among the acts punishable. Petition is hereby denied.
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forehead which floored him. Unknown to Navarro, Jalbuena was able to record on tape the exchange between petitioner and the deceased. The RTC of Lucena City rendered decision finding Petitioner Navarro guilty beyond reasonable doubt of homicide. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the RTC. Issue: Whether or not the tape recorder recorded by Jalbuena is admissible as evidence in view of R.A. No. 4200 which prohibits wire tapping? Held: Indeed, Jalbuenas testimony is confirmed by the voice recording he had made. It may be asked whether the tape is admissible in view of R.A. No. 4200, which prohibits wire tapping. The answer is in the affirmative. The law provides: x x x Thus, the law prohibits the overhearing, intercepting or recording of private communications. Since the exchange between petitioner Navarro and Lingan was not private, its tape recording is not prohibited. Nor is there any question that it was duly authenticated. A voice recording is authenticated by the testimony of a witness (1) that he personally recorded the conversation; (2) that the tape played in court was the one he recorded; and (3) that the voices on the tape are those of the persons such are claimed to belong. In the instant case, Jalbuena testified that he personally made the voice recording; that the tape played in court was the one he recorded; and that the speakers on the tape were petitioner Navarro and Lingan. A sufficient foundation was thus laid for the authentication of the tape presented by the prosecution. The voice recording made by Jalbuena established : (1) that there was a heated exchange between petitioner Navarro and Lingan on the placing in the police blotter of an entry against him and Jalbuena; and (2) that some form of violence occurred involving petitioner Navarro and Lingan, with the latter getting the worst of it. Wherefore, the decision of the CA is affirmed. Arlyn Barcelon
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2006-0021
Issue: Whether or not an extension telephone is covered by the term device or arrangement under R.A. 4200? Decision: An extension telephone cannot be placed in the same category as a Dictaphone, dictagraph or the other devices enumerated in Section 1 of R.A. 4200 as the use thereof cannot be considered as tapping the wire or cable of telephone line. The telephone extension in this case was not installed for that purpose. It just happened to be there for ordinary office use. It is a rule in statutory construction that in order to determine the true intent of the legislature, the particular clauses and phrases of the statute should not be taken as detached and isolated expressions, but the whole and every part must be considered in fixing the meaning of any of its parts. Hence, the phrase device or arrangement in Section 1 of RA 4200, although not exclusive to that enumerated therein, should be construed to comprehend instruments of the same or similar nature, that is, instruments the use of which would be tantamount to tapping the main line of the telephone. It refers to instruments whose installation or presence cannot be presumed by the party or parties overheard because, by their very nature, they are not of common usage and their purpose is precisely for tapping, intercepting, or recording a telephone conversation. Furthermore, it is a general rule that penal statutes must be construed strictly in favour of the accused. Thus, in case of doubt as in the case at bar, on whether or not an extension telephone is included in the phrase device or arrangement, the penal statute must be construed as not including an extension telephone. Consequently, the mere act of listening, in order to be punishable must strictly be with the use of the enumerated devices in R.A. No. 4200 or others of similar nature. We are of the view that an extension telephone is not among such devices or arrangements.
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Wherefore, the petition is granted. The petitioner is Acquitted of the crime of violation of Republic Act No. 4200, otherwise known as the Anti- Wiretapping Act.
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of fire, earthquake, typhoon, volcanic eruption, or any other calamity, vehicular accident or civil disturbance. Section 2 of Republic Act No. 6539, as amended defines "carnapping" as "the taking, with intent to gain, of a motor vehicle belonging to another without the latter's consent, or by means of violence against or intimidation of persons, or by using force upon things." The elements of carnapping are thus: (1) the taking of a motor vehicle which belongs to another; (2) the taking is without the consent of the owner or by means of violence against or intimidation of persons or by using force upon things; and (3) the taking is done with intent to gain. Carnapping is essentially the robbery or theft of a motorized vehicle, the concept of unlawful taking in theft, robbery and carnapping being the same. From the foregoing, since appellant is being accused of the unlawful taking of a Daewoo sedan, it is the anti-carnapping law and not the provisions of qualified theft which would apply as the said motor vehicle does not fall within the exceptions mentioned in the anti-carnapping law.
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himself; 4. That the taking is without the consent of the owner thereof; or that the taking was committed by means of violence against or intimidation of persons, or by using force upon things. A careful examination of the evidence presented shows that all the elements of carnapping were proved in this case. In the case at bar, it cannot be denied that the nature of the appellants possession of the Tamaraw FX was initially lawful. Nevertheless, the unlawful killing of the deceased for the purpose of taking the vehicle radically transformed the character of said possession into an unlawful one. Cortez categorically stated that during his first visit to the Moncada Police Station where appellant and his co-accused were detained, the two separately admitted to him that they killed the deceased when the latter refused to join their plan to sell the vehicle. Moreover, it must be stressed that the acts committed by appellant constituted the crime of carnapping even if the deceased was the driver of the vehicle and not the owner. The settled rule is that, in crimes of unlawful taking of property through intimidation or violence, it is not necessary that the person unlawfully divested of the personal property be the owner thereof. What is simply required is that the property taken does not belong to the offender. Actual possession of the property by the person dispossessed suffices. So long as there is apoderamiento of personal property from another against the latter's will through violence or intimidation, with animo de lucro, unlawful taking of a property belonging to another is imputable to the offender.
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the latters consent, or by means of violence against or intimidation of persons, or by using force upon things. It becomes qualified when in the course of the commission or on occasion of the carnapping, the owner, driver or occupant of the carnapped vehicle is killed or raped. When the carnapping is qualified, the penalty imposable is reclusion perpetua to death. In the case at bar, all the elements were duly proven by the prosecution. Based on the testimony of Sanchez, accused-appellant and his companions shot the driver of the tricycle, abandoned him and took possession of the vehicle. The testimony of Sanchez that the driver was unknown to the group clearly establishes the fact that the motive of accused-appellant was to steal the tricycle and that the killing of the driver was incidental thereto.
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Probation Law
Domingo Lagrosa and Osias Baguin v. People (G.R. No. 152044)
Facts: The Regional Trial Court of Tagbilaran City rendered a decision against the petitioners Lagrosa and Baguin for violation of Section 68 of P.D. 705, as amended (The Revised Forestry Code), for having in their possession forest products without the requisite permits. They were sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment from two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of prision correccional, as minimum, to eight (8) years of prision mayor, as maximum. Petitioners Motion for Reconsideration of the decision was denied by the trial court. Thereafter, they appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals. However, the appellate court affirmed the conviction of the petitioners, with the modification as to the penalty imposed, which was reduced to an indeterminate penalty ranging from six (6) months and one (1) day of Prision Correccional, as minimum, to one (1) year, eight (8) months and twenty one (21) days of Prision Correccional, as maximum. Said decision became final and executory. Petitioners filed an Application for Probation with the trial court but it was denied. Petitioners motion for reconsideration was also denied. Hence, petitioners filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals but it the latter only affirmed the decision of the trial court. Issue: Whether or not the petitioners should be allowed to apply for probation even if they had already appealed the decision of the trial court? Decision: The Supreme Court ruled in the negative. It held that probation may be granted whether the sentence imposes a term of imprisonment or a fine only. An application for probation shall be filed with the trial court. The filing of the application shall be deemed a waiver of the right to appeal. Under Section 9 (a)
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of the Probation Law, offenders who are sentenced to serve a maximum term of imprisonment of more than six years are disqualified from seeking probation. In the case at bar, upon interposing an appeal petitioners should be precluded from seeking probation. By perfecting their appeal, petitioners ipso facto relinquished the alternative remedy of availing of the Probation Law, the purpose of which is simply to prevent speculation or opportunism on the part of an accused who, although already eligible, does not at once apply for probation, but did so only after failing in his appeal.
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Alejandra Pablo v. Hon. Silverio Castillo and People (G.R. No. 125108)
Facts: Information was filed before the RTC of Dagupan against petitioner Pablo charging her with a violation for BP 22 (Bouncing Check Law) for issuing and delivering various checks to Nelson Mandap in partial payment of a loan she obtained from the latter. When Mandap draw those checks from the bank, it was dishonored upon presentment for payment because the current account of the petitioner had been closed. The trial court rendered its judgment convicting petitioner for the crime charged, sentencing her to pay a fine and to serve a prison term of 30 days. Thereafter, petitioner applied for probation. Her application was given due course and was given a favorable evaluation upon recommendation of the local probation office. However, such recommendation was overruled by the National Probation Office and denied petitioners application on the ground that she is disqualified under Section 9 ( c ) of the Probation Law: c) those who have previously been convicted by final judgment of an offense punished by imprisonment of not less than one month and one day and/or fine of not less than two hundred pesos. Respondent judge denied petitioners application for probation. Petitioner moved for reconsideration but the same was denied. Hence, this petition. Issue: Whether or not the respondent court acted with grave abuse of discretion in denying petitioners application for probation on the ground of disqualification from probation under Section 9 of P.D. 968? Decision: The Supreme Court ruled in the negative. It held that Section 9 paragraph (c) is in clear and plain language, to the effect that a person, who was previously convicted by final judgment of an offense punishable by imprisonment of not less than one month and one day and/or a fine of not less than two hundred pesos, is disqualified from applying for probation. This provision of law is definitive and unqualified. There is nothing in Section 9, paragraph (c) which qualifies "previous
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conviction" as referring to a conviction for a crime which is entirely different from that for which the offender is applying for probation or a crime which arose out of a single act or transaction as petitioner would have the court to understand. As held in Rura vs. Lopea, the word previous" refers to conviction, and not to commission of a crime. It is well-settled that the probation law is not a penal statute; and therefore, the principle of liberal interpretation is inapplicable. And when the meaning is clearly discernible from the language of the statute, there is no room for construction or interpretation.
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Anti-Fencing Law
Fransisco v. People (GR No. 146584)
Facts: The private complainant in this case, Jovita Rodriquez, was the wife of the former mayor of Rodriguez Rizal and was engaged in business as a general contractor. She and her husband own pieces of jewelry which they kept inside a locked cabinet in a locked room in their main house. Aside from her family, she also had under her employ one Macario Linghon and the latters sister, Pacita, who was their household helper charged with sweeping and cleaning the room periodically. Pacita later on left her employ. Sometime on August 1992, she was surprised to discover that the box where the jewelries were kept inside the cabinet were empty. There appears no indication however that the lock of the cabinet was broken. Among the pieces of jewelry missing were one heart-shaped diamond ring worth P100,000; one white gold bracelet with diamond stones worth P150,000; and a pair of diamond heartshaped earrings worth P400,000. Believing that Pacita, her previous helper, had taken said jewelries, she filed a complaint for theft against her and her mother Adoracion. When the latter was invited to the police station, she admitted selling one pair of heart-shaped earrings with diamond, one white gold bracelet, one heart-shaped diamond ring, and one ring with big and small stones to petitioner whom she identified as Mang Erning. The amount she obtained from said sale, was, according to her, intended for her fathers operation and for food. To confirm her admission, she accompanied the policemen to said Mang Erning, who refused to cooperate with them at first when Pacita identified him as the one who purchased the stolen jewelries. Despite his refusal, however, Jovita filed a complaint for violation of PD 1612 or Anti-Fencing Law, against him. To strengthen her accusations against petitioner, she obtained the written testimony of the policemen involved in the case and also convinced Macario to testify against him as Macario had once sold jewelries to him. In the meantime, the trial court found Pacita and her mother guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of theft and PD 1612 respectively.
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Subsequently, the trial court also rendered judgment in the case of petitioner and found him also guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating PD 1612. Wasting no time, petitioner appealed the adverse decision to the Court of Appeals alleging that the lower court erred in not finding that the testimony of prosecution witnesses are all hearsay evidence and that because of said failure, his guilt beyond reasonable doubt was not sufficiently established. The court of Appeals however affirmed the trial courts decision. Hence the present appeal to the Supreme Court. Issue: Whether or not the conviction of Pacita in the crime of theft is sufficient to establish petitioners conviction for violation of PD 1612? Whether or not the prosecution based on the pieces of evidence presented was able to prove petitioners guilt beyond reasonable doubt? Decision: No. We agree with the trial and appellate courts that the prosecution mustered the requisite quantum of evidence, on the basis of the testimony of Jovita, that Pacita stole the subject jewelry from the locked cabinet in the main house of her then employer. Jovita testified on her ownership of the jewelry and the loss thereof, and narrated that Pacita had access to the cabinet containing the pieces of jewelry. We, however, agree with the petitioner that the decision of the RTC of Rizal, Branch 76, in Criminal Case No. 2005 convicting Pacita of theft does not constitute proof against him in this case, that Pacita had, indeed, stolen the jewelry. There is no showing that the said decision in Criminal Case No. 2005 was already final and executory when the trial court rendered its decision in the instant case. No. The essential elements of the crime of fencing are as follows: (1) a crime of robbery or theft has been committed; (2) the accused, who is not a principal or accomplice in the commission of the crime of robbery or theft, buys, receives, possesses, keeps, acquires, conceals, sells or disposes, or buys and sells, or in
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any manner deals in any article, item, object or anything of value, which has been derived from the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft; (3) the accused knew or should have shown that the said article, item, object or anything of value has been derived from the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft; and, (4) there is, on the part of the accused, intent to gain for himself or for another. Fencing is malum prohibitum, and P.D. No. 1612 creates a prima facie presumption of fencing from evidence of possession by the accused of any good, article, item, object or anything of value which has been the subject of robbery or theft, and prescribes a higher penalty based on the value of the property.33 The stolen property subject of the charge is not indispensable to prove fencing. It is merely corroborative of the testimonies and other evidence adduced by the prosecution to prove the crime of fencing. On the second element of the crime, the trial and appellate courts held that the prosecution proved the same beyond reasonable doubt based on the testimony of Jovita during the trial in Criminal Cases Nos. 1992 and 2005; that Pacita had confessed to Jovita that she sold some of the jewelry to the petitioner; the joint affidavit of PO1 Roldan, Jr. and SPO1 Peralta on their investigation of the complaint of Jovita; the testimony of PO1 Roldan, Jr. relating to said investigation; the RTC decision in Criminal Cases Nos. 1992 and 2005; the testimonies of Pacita and her brother Macario during the preliminary investigation of Criminal Case No. 92-13841 before the MTC of Meycauayan as shown by the transcripts of the stenographic notes taken during the proceedings; the supplemental sworn statement of Pacita on August 23, 1992 in Camp Crame, Quezon City, and, the testimony of Macario before the trial court. First. Jovitas testimony in Criminal Cases Nos. 1992 and 2005, that Pacita had confessed to her that she had sold four pieces of jewelry to the petitioner, is inadmissible in evidence against the latter to prove the truth of the said admission. It bears stressing that the petitioner was not a party in the said criminal cases. The well-entrenched rule is that only parties to a case are bound by a judgment of the trial court. Strangers to a case are not bound by the judgment of said case.34 Jovita did not reiterate her testimony in the said criminal cases during the trial in the court a quo. The prosecution did not present Pacita as witness therein to testify on the admission she purportedly made to Jovita; hence, the petitioner was not able to cross-examine Pacita. The rule is that the acts or declarations of a person are not admissible in evidence against a third party.
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Second. The testimony of Pacita during the preliminary investigation in Criminal Case No. 92-13841, as well as her supplemental affidavit, is, likewise, inadmissible against the petitioner since Pacita did not testify in the court a quo. The petitioner was, thus, deprived of his constitutional right to confront and crossexamine a witness against him. Third. The testimony of PO1 Roldan, Jr., that on August 23, 1992, Pacita pointed to the petitioner, while the latter was having a drinking spree, as the person who bought the subject jewelry from her, is indeed admissible in evidence against the petitioner. It is, likewise, corroborative of the testimony of Macario. However, such testimony is admissible only to prove such fact - that Pacita pointed to the petitioner as the person to whom she sold the subject jewelry; it is inadmissible to prove the truth of Pacitas declaration to the policemen, that the petitioner was the one who purchased the jewelry from her. It must be stressed that the policemen had no personal knowledge of the said sale, and, more importantly, Pacita did not testify in the court a quo. Indeed, the petitioner was deprived of his right to cross-examine Pacita on the truth of what she told the policemen. Fourth. On the other hand, the testimony of Macario during the preliminary investigation of Criminal Case No. 92-13841 is admissible in evidence against the petitioner since he testified for the prosecution and was cross-examined on his testimony during the preliminary investigation. In fine, the only evidence of the prosecution to prove that the petitioner purchased the jewelry from Macario and Pacita are the following: the testimony and affidavit of PO1 Roldan, Jr.; and, the testimony of Macario during the preliminary investigation and trial in the court a quo. It bears stressing that, in the absence of direct evidence that the accused had knowledge that the jewelry was stolen, the prosecution is burdened to prove facts and circumstances from which it can be concluded that the accused should have known that the property sold to him were stolen. This requirement serves two basic purposes: (a) to prove one of the elements of the crime of fencing; and, (b) to enable the trial court to determine the imposable penalty for the crime, since the penalty depends on the value of the property; otherwise, the court will
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fix the value of the property at P5.00, conformably to our ruling in People v. Dator.
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Facts: Complainant Rosita Lim is a proprietor engaged in the business of manufacturing propellers or spare parts for boats. She had under her employ petitioner-accused, Manuelito Mendez, but later on left and went home to his province in Negros. After his employment however, Rosita discovered that some of her inventories in her business, amounting to P48,000, were missing. Suspecting that it was Manuelito who took them, she informed Victor Sy, her nephew, who was in turn Manuelitos uncle. Acting on the matter, Victor had Manuel arrested and brought to Manila. However, when asked about the incident, Manuel, after admitting the taking of the lost items asked for forgiveness from Rosita and as a result the latter did not file a complaint against him. Instead, she filed a complaint for violation of PD 1612, against Ramon Tan, the petitioner, whom Manuel identified as the person with whom he had sold the stolen items for P13,000. Despite the filing of said complaint, Rosita, however, failed to report the incident of theft with the police authorities. In the meantime, Rosita, together with the confessed thief Manuelito, and the latters uncle, Victor Sy, all testified for the prosecution. Manuelito testified that it was Mr. Tan who had personally accepted the stolen items and paid him P13,000. For his part, Ramon Tan, in his Counter-Affidavit, denied all the charges, alleging that while he is engaged in the selling hardware (marine spare parts) he did not buy the stolen spare parts and that he never talked nor met Manuelito. The trial court found him guilty of violating PD 1612. When he appealed, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial courts decision, hence the present appeal. Petitioner argued that the prosecution failed to establish his guilt beyond reasonable doubt hence he should be acquitted. Issue: Whether or not the prosecution had sufficiently established the elements of fencing as against the petitioner?
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Decision: No. Fencing, as defined in Section 2 of P.D. No. 1612 is the act of any person who, with intent to gain for himself or for another, shall buy, receive, possess, keep, acquire, conceal, sell or dispose of, or shall buy and sell, or in any manner deal in any article, item, object or anything of value which he knows, or should be known to him, to have been derived from the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft. The law on fencing does not require the accused to have participated in the criminal design to commit, or to have been in any wise involved in the commission of, the crime of robbery or theft. Before the enactment of P. D. No. 1612 in 1979, the fence could only be prosecuted as an accessory after the fact of robbery or theft, as the term is defined in Article 19 of the Revised Penal Code, but the penalty was light as it was two (2) degrees lower than that prescribed for the principal. P. D. No. 1612 was enacted to impose heavy penalties on persons who profit by the effects of the crimes of robbery and theft. Evidently, the accessory in the crimes of robbery and theft could be prosecuted as such under the Revised Penal Code or under P.D. No. 1612. However, in the latter case, the accused ceases to be a mere accessory but becomes a principal in the crime of fencing. Otherwise stated, the crimes of robbery and theft, on the one hand, and fencing, on the other, are separate and distinct offenses. The State may thus choose to prosecute him either under the Revised Penal Code or P. D. No. 1612, although the preference for the latter would seem inevitable considering that fencing is malum prohibitum, and P. D. No. 1612 creates a presumption of fencing[9] and prescribes a higher penalty based on the value of the property. In Dizon-Pamintuan vs. People of the Philippines, we set out the essential elements of the crime of fencing as follows: 1. A crime of robbery or theft has been committed; 2. The accused, who is not a principal or accomplice in the commission of the crime of robbery or theft, buys, receives, possesses, keeps, acquires, conceals, sells or disposes, or buys and sells, or in any manner
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deals in any article, item, object or anything of value, which has been derived from the proceeds of the said crime; 3. The accused knows or should have known that the said article, item, object or anything of value has been derived from the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft; and 4. There is on the part of the accused, intent to gain for himself or for another. Consequently, the prosecution must prove the guilt of the accused by establishing the existence of all the elements of the crime charged. Short of evidence establishing beyond reasonable doubt the existence of the essential elements of fencing, there can be no conviction for such offense. It is an ancient principle of our penal system that no one shall be found guilty of crime except upon proof beyond reasonable doubt (Perez vs. Sandiganbayan, 180 SCRA 9). In this case, what was the evidence of the commission of theft independently of fencing? Complainant Rosita Lim testified that she lost certain items and Manuelito Mendez confessed that he stole those items and sold them to the accused. However, Rosita Lim never reported the theft or even loss to the police. She admitted that after Manuelito Mendez, her former employee, confessed to the unlawful taking of the items, she forgave him, and did not prosecute him. Theft is a public crime. It can be prosecuted de oficio, or even without a private As complainant Rosita Lim complainant, but it cannot be without a victim.
reported no loss, we cannot hold for certain that there was committed a crime of theft. Thus, the first element of the crime of fencing is absent, that is, a crime of robbery or theft has been committed. There was no sufficient proof of the unlawful taking of anothers property. True, witness Mendez admitted in an extra-judicial confession that he sold the boat parts he had pilfered from complainant to petitioner. However, an admission or confession acknowledging guilt of an offense may be given in evidence only against the person admitting or confessing. Even on this, if given extra-judicially, the confessant must have the assistance of counsel; otherwise, the admission would be inadmissible in evidence against the person so
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admitting. Here, the extra-judicial confession of witness Mendez was not given with the assistance of counsel, hence, inadmissible against the witness. Neither may such extra-judicial confession be considered evidence against accused. There must be corroboration by evidence of corpus delicti to sustain a finding of guilt. Corpus delicti means the body or substance of the crime, and, in its primary sense, refers to the fact that the crime has been actually committed. The essential elements of theft are (1) the taking of personal property; (2) the property belongs to another; (3) the taking away was done with intent of gain; (4) the taking away was done without the consent of the owner; and (5) the taking away is accomplished without violence or intimidation against persons or force upon things (U. S. vs. De Vera, 43 Phil. 1000). In theft, corpus delicti has two elements, namely: (1) that the property was lost by the owner, and (2) that it was lost by felonious taking. In this case, the theft was not proved because complainant Rosita Lim did not complain to the public authorities of the felonious taking of her property. She sought out her former employee Manuelito Mendez, who confessed that he stole certain articles from the warehouse of the complainant and sold them to petitioner. convict, without evidence of corpus delicti. What is more, there was no showing at all that the accused knew or should have known that the very stolen articles were the ones sold to him. One is deemed to know a particular fact if he has the cognizance, consciousness or awareness thereof, or is aware of the existence of something, or has the acquaintance with facts, or if he has something within the minds grasp with certitude and clarity. When knowledge of the existence of a particular fact is an element of an offense, such knowledge is established if a person is aware of a high probability of its existence unless he actually believes that it does not exist. On the other hand, the words should know denote the fact that a person of reasonable prudence and intelligence would ascertain the fact in performance of his duty to another or would govern his conduct upon assumption that such fact exists. Knowledge refers to a mental state of awareness about a fact. Since the court cannot penetrate the mind of an accused and state with certainty what is contained therein, it must determine such knowledge with care from the overt acts of that person. And given two equally plausible states of cognition or mental awareness, the court should choose the one which sustains the constitutional presumption of innocence. Such confession is insufficient to
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Without petitioner knowing that he acquired stolen articles, he can not be guilty of fencing.
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Decision: Yes. The SC answered herein petitioners argument in the negative. First the Sc held that Sec. 2 of Act No. 3326 governs the computation of prescription of offenses defined and penalized by special laws. Wherein it provides that Prescription should begin from the day of the commission of the violation of the law, and if the same be not known at the time from the discovery thereof and institution of judicial proceedings. In other words if the commission of the crime is known, the prescriptive period shall commence to run on the day it was discovered, and the running of the prescriptive period is tolled by the institution of judicial proceeding. In the case at bar Pacificador allegedly committed the acts from Dec. of 1975 to Jan. of 1976. The Highcourt stated that the provision on R.A. 3019 in which crimes prescribed in 15 years could not be appreciated in this case because it seems to show that prior to the amendment of Sec. 11 of 3019 by B.P. 195 which was approved on March, 1982, the prescriptive period then was only 10 years, wherefore it could not be applied on the ground that such amendment is not favourable to the accused. The SC also held that while petitioners herein allegation of having no knowledge of the crime, well entrenched is the jurisprudential rule that the registration of deeds in the public real registry is a notice thereof to the whole world. All persons are charged with the knowledge of what it contains. Hence, even If the period of prescription is reckoned from Feb. 18, 1977, the crime had already prescribed when the Information in this case was filed with the Sandiganbayan on Oct. 27, 1988.
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infraction consists in the reliance in good faith, albeit misplaced, by a head of office on a subordinate upon whom the primary responsibility rests, absent a clear sense of conspiracy, the Arias doctrine must be held to prevail. Petitioner cannot seek refuge in the cases of Magsuci and Arias when she relied on the recommendations of her subordinates. Petitioner is an Assistant Regional Director, not the head of office or the final approving authority whom the Arias doctrine is applicable. In relation to the second issue of sufficiency of evidence, the Supreme Court elucidated the main elements of the crime provided for in sec. 3 R.A. NO. 3019 corrupt practices of officers, these are 1. The accused are public officers or private persons charged in conspiracy with them 2. Said public officers commit the prohibited acts during the performance of their official duties as in relation to their public position. 3. They caused undue injury to any party, whether the government or a private party 4. Such injury is caused by giving unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference to such parties; and 5. The public officers have acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. These requisites being attendant in this case, the SC held that indeed Petitioner is guilty with the crime.
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evidence adduced by the prosecution is not the violation of R.A. 3019 but that of robbery. Issue: Whether or not Mejorada could be prosecuted of the crime punishable under Section 3 ( e ) of R.A. 3019? Decision: Yes. The SC Held that the first argument of the petitioner as stated above is devoid of merit. It was clearly established that the petitioner took advantage of his position as right of way agent by making the claimants sign the aforementioned agreements to demolish and sworn statements which contained falsified declarations of the value of the improvements and lots. There was evident bad faith on the part of Mejorada when he inflated the values of the true claims and when he divested the claimants of a large share of the amounts due them. The SC also answered the second argument of herein petitioner in the negative. The High Court stated that it was duly proven that through badfaith, petitioner cased damage to the claimants and the Government. The Manner by which the petitioner divested the private individuals of the compensation they received was part of the scheme which commenced when the petitioner approached the claimants and informed them that he could work out their claims for payment of the values of their lots and improvements affected by the widening of the highway. The evidence clearly establish a violation of Section 3 ( e ) of R.A. 3019
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It has been ruled that possession of dangerous drugs constitutes prima facie evidence of knowledge or animus possidendi sufficient to convict an accused in the absence of a satisfactory explanation of such possession. Hence, the burden of evidence is shifted to the accused to explain the absence of knowledge or animus possidendi. The things in possession of a person are presumed by law to be owned by him. To overcome this presumption, it is necessary to present clear and convincing evidence to the contrary. In this case, the accused points to a certain Alican "Alex" Macapudi as the owner of the contraband, but presented no evidence to support his claim.
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recording thereof in an official record will not necessarily lead to an acquittal as long as the sale of the prohibited drug is adequately proven. In the case at bar, SPO2 Patio, the poseur-buyer, testified on the circumstances regarding the sale of the shabu for which petitioners were charged and convicted. Settled is the rule that in the prosecution for the sale of dangerous drugs, the absence of marked money does not create a hiatus in the evidence for the prosecution as long as the sale of dangerous drugs is adequately proven and the drug subject of the transaction is presented before the court. Neither law nor jurisprudence requires the presentation of any money used in the buy-bust operation What is material to a prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous drugs is the proof that the transaction or sale actually took place, coupled with the presentation in court of the corpus delicti as evidence. In the instant case, both were sufficiently shown by the prosecution. Petitioners deny that a buy-bust operation took place and claim that the evidence against them is planted evidence. Denial is a weak form of defense, particularly when it is not substantiated by clear and convincing evidence just like in the case before us.
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Under the facts and circumstances obtaining in this case, we find that appellants explanation of how she came into possession of the package without knowing that it contained shabu is credible and sufficient to rebut the prima facie presumption of animus possidendi.
CA
likewise denied Saycos petition for review as well as its Motion for
The corpus delicti in the crime of illegal possession of firearms is the accused's lack of license or permit to possess or carry the firearm, as possession itself is not prohibited by law. To establish the corpus delicti, the prosecution has the burden of proving that the firearm exists and that the accused who owned or possessed it does not have the corresponding license or permit to possess or carry the same. Sayco, a mere confidential civilian agent (as defined under Section 6(a) of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of P.D. No. 1866) is not authorized to receive the subject government-owned firearm and ammunitions. The memorandum receipt he signed to account for said government properties did not legitimize his possession thereof. Neither was Sayco authorized to bear the subject firearm and ammunitions outside of his residence. The mission order issued to petitioner was illegal, given that he is not a regular civilian agent but a mere confidential civilian agent. Worse, he was not even acting as such confidential civilian agent at the time he was carrying the subject firearm and ammunitions. While this Court sustains the conviction for illegal possession of firearms, a further revision of the penalty is warranted in view of the special provision in the Indeterminate Sentence Law applicable to crimes penalized by a special law. RA 8294, amending PD 1866, lowered the penalty to be imposed provided no other crime was committed. There being no attendant mitigating or aggravating circumstance, and considering that Sayco accepted the subject firearm and ammunitions from the government under the erroneous notion that the memorandum receipt and mission order issued to him legitimized the possession thereof, Sayco is sentenced to serve an indeterminate penalty of four (4) years, two (2) months and one (1) day of prision correccional as minimum, to five (5) years, four (4) months and twenty-one (21) days of prision correccional as maximum.
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amend the definition of murder under Article 248, but merely made the use of explosives an aggravating circumstance when resorted to in committing any of the crimes defined in the Revised Penal Code. The legislative purpose is to do away with the use of explosives as a separate crime and to make such use merely an aggravating circumstance in the commission of any crime already defined in the Revised Penal Code. Thus, RA No. 8294 merely added the use of unlicensed explosives as one of the aggravating circumstances specified in Article 14 of the Revised Penal Code. Like the aggravating circumstance of explosion in paragraph 12, evident premeditation in paragraph 13, or treachery in paragraph 16 of Article 14, the new aggravating circumstance added by RA No. 8294 does not change the definition of murder in Article 248. Issue: Whether or not the killing be qualified by explosion under Art. 248 of the Revised Penal Code or by the use of an explosive under the provisions of RA 8294? Decision: R.A. 8294 is inapplicable in the instant case and thus what may be properly considered, the accused-appellant having been sufficiently informed of the nature of the accusation against them, the crime is Murder committed by means of explosion in accordance with Article 248 (3) of the Revised Penal Code. R.A. No. 8294, even though favorable to the accused, cannot be made applicable in this case because before the use of unlawfully possessed explosives can be properly appreciated as an aggravating circumstance, it must be adequately established that the possession was illegal or unlawful, i.e., the accused is without the corresponding authority or permit to possess. This follows the same requisites in the prosecution of crimes involving illegal possession of firearm, which is a kindred or related offense under P.D. 1866, as amended. This proof does not obtain in the present case. Not only was it not alleged in the information, no evidence was also adduced by the prosecution to show that the possession by Comadre of the explosive was unlawful. What the law emphasizes is the acts lack of authority. What is per se aggravating is the
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use of unlawfully manufactured or possessed explosives. The mere use of explosives is not.
and homicide on one hand, and qualified illegal possession of firearms used in murder or homicide on the other. We have declared that the formulation in RA 8294, i.e., "[i]f homicide or murder is committed with the use of an unlicensed firearm, such use of an unlicensed firearm shall be considered as an aggravating circumstance," signifies a legislative intent to treat as a single offense the illegal possession of firearms and the commission of murder or homicide with the use of an unlicensed firearm. Thus where an accused used an unlicensed firearm in committing homicide or murder, he may no longer be charged with what used to be the two (2) separate offenses of homicide or murder under The Revised Penal Code and qualified illegal possession of firearms used in homicide or murder under PD 1866; in other words, where murder or homicide was committed, the penalty for illegal possession of firearms is no longer imposable since it becomes merely a special aggravating circumstance. The use of an unlicensed firearm cannot be considered however as a special aggravating circumstance in the Murder Case and Frustrated Murder Case. For one, it was not alleged as an aggravating circumstance in the Informations for murder and frustrated murder, which is necessary under our present Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. Moreover, even if alleged, the circumstance cannot be retroactively applied to prejudice accused-appellant; it must be stressed that RA 8294 took effect only on 6 July 1994 while the crimes involved herein were committed on 4 November 1993. In any event there is no evidence proving the illicit character of the .38 cal. revolver used by accusedappellant in killing Mayolito Cabatu and in trying to kill Florencia Cabatu, as to which requisite of the crime the record is eerily silent.
Jasmine Calaycay
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2005-0049
sold Jovitas jewelry. Thus, petitioner was invited for questioning in Camp Crame. Nonetheless, Pacita was charged with qualified theft and Adoracion was also charged with violating P.D. No. 1612 (Anti-Fencing Law). A criminal complaint against the petitioner for violation of P.D. No. 1612 was filed. During the preliminary investigation, Pacita and Macario testified that they sold pieces of jewelry to the petitioner at his shop in Meycauayan, Bulacan. The court found probable cause against the petitioner, and issued a warrant for his arrest. Thereafter, an Information was filed with the RTC charging the petitioner with violating P.D. No. 1612. Judgment was rendered finding Pacita guilty of theft and Adoracion guilty of fencing under P.D. No. 1612, beyond reasonable doubt. While the trial court rendered judgment finding the petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating P.D. No. 1612, which was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. Hence, this petition. Issue: Whether or not the trial court and the Court of Appeals erred in finding the petitioner guilty for violation of the Presidential Decree No. 1612, otherwise known as the Anti-Fencing Law? Decision: The essential elements of the crime of fencing are as follows: (1) a crime of robbery or theft has been committed; (2) the accused, who is not a principal or accomplice in the commission of the crime of robbery or theft, buys, receives, possesses, keeps, acquires, conceals, sells or disposes, or buys and sells, or in any manner deals in any article, item, object or anything of value, which has been derived from the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft; (3) the accused knew or should have shown that the said article, item, object or anything of value has been derived from the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft; and, (4) there is, on the part of the accused, intent to gain for himself or for another.
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In the absence of direct evidence that the accused had knowledge that the jewelry was stolen, the prosecution is burdened to prove facts and circumstances from which it can be concluded that the accused should have known that the property sold to him were stolen. This requirement serves two basic purposes: (a) to prove one of the elements of the crime of fencing; and, (b) to enable the trial court to determine the imposable penalty for the crime, since the penalty depends on the value of the property. Fencing is malum prohibitum, and P.D. No. 1612 creates a prima facie presumption of fencing from evidence of possession by the accused of any good, article, item, object or anything of value which has been the subject of robbery or theft, and prescribes a higher penalty based on the value of the property. The stolen property subject of the charge is not indispensable to prove fencing. It is merely corroborative of the testimonies and other evidence adduced by the prosecution to prove the crime of fencing. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in affirming the Decision of the trial court is reversed and set aside. The petitioner is acquitted of the crime of violating P.D. No. 1612 for the prosecutions failure to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
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second element of the crime. The drawee or maker of the check may overcome the prima facie evidence, either by paying the amount of the check, or by making arrangements for its payment in full within five banking days after receipt of notice that such check was not paid by the drawee bank. The ruling of the Court in Lao v. Court of Appeals is applicable in this case. In acquitting the petitioner therein, the Court explained that this statute actually offers the violator a compromise by allowing him to perform some act, which operates to preempt the criminal action, and if he opts to perform it the action is abated. In this light, the full payment of the amount appearing in the check within five banking days from notice of dishonor is a complete defense. The absence of a notice of dishonor necessarily deprives an accused an opportunity to preclude a criminal prosecution. Accordingly, procedural due process clearly enjoins that a notice of dishonor be actually served on the petitioner. The petitioner has a right to demand and the basic postulates of fairness require - that the notice of dishonor be actually sent to and received by her to afford her the opportunity to avert prosecution under B.P. 22. Moreover, the notice of dishonor must be in writing; a verbal notice is not enough. This is because while Section 2 of B.P. 22 does not state that the notice of dishonor be in writing, taken in conjunction, however, with Section 3 of the law, i.e., that where there are no sufficient funds in or credit with such drawee bank, such fact shall always be explicitly stated in the notice of dishonor or refusal, a mere oral notice or demand to pay would appear to be insufficient for conviction under the law. The Court is convinced that both the spirit and letter of the Bouncing Checks Law would require for the act to be punished thereunder not only that the accused issued a check that is dishonored, but that likewise the accused has actually been notified in writing of the fact of dishonor. State and liberally in favor of the accused. Thus, if the drawer or maker is an officer of a corporation, the notice of dishonor to the said corporation is not notice to the employee or officer who drew or issued the check for and in its behalf. The Court explained in Lao v. Court of Appeals, that there was no obligation to forward the notice addressed to it to the employee concerned, especially because the corporation itself incurs no criminal liability under BP 22 for the issuance of a bouncing check. Responsibility under B.P. 22 is personal to the accused; hence, personal knowledge of the notice of
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The
consistent rule is that penal statutes have to be construed strictly against the
dishonor is necessary. Consequently, constructive notice to the corporation is not enough to satisfy due process. Moreover, it is the petitioner, as an officer of the corporation, who is the latters agent for purposes of receiving notices and other documents, and not the other way around. It is but axiomatic that notice to the corporation, which has a personality distinct and separate from the petitioner, does not constitute notice to the latter. In this case, the prosecution failed to present any employee of the PT&T to prove that the telegrams from the offended party were in fact transmitted to INSURECO and that the latter received the same. Furthermore, there is no evidence on record that the petitioner ever received the said telegrams from INSURECO, or that separate copies thereof were transmitted to and received by the petitioner. In fine, the respondent failed to prove the second element of the crime. Hence, the petitioner should be acquitted of the crimes charged.
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After moving in his unit, petitioner complained, to FRC regarding defects in the unit and incomplete features of the townhouse project. FRC ignored the complaint. Dissatisfied, Sycip served on FRC two 2 notorial notices to the effect that he was suspending his installment payments on the unit pending compliance with the project plans and specifications, as approved by the HLURB. Petitioner filed a complaint with the HLURB. The complaint was dismissed as to the defect, but FRC was ordered by the HLURB to finish all incomplete features of its townhouse project. Sycip appealed the dismissal of the complaint as to the alleged defects.
Notwithstanding the notorial notices, FRC continued to present for encashment petitioners postdated checks in its possession. Petitioner sent stop payment orders to the bank. When FRC continued to present the other postdated checks to the bank as the due date fell, the bank advised petitioner to close his checking account to avoid paying bank charges every time he made a stop payment order on the forthcoming checks. Due to the closure of petitioners checking account, the drawee bank dishonored six postdated checks. FRC file a complaint against petitioner for violations of B.P. Blg. 22 involving said dishonored checks. Issue: Whether or not petitioner is liable for violation of B.P. 22?
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Decision: Under the provisions of the Bouncing Checks Law (B.P. No. 22), an offense is committed when the following elements are present: (1) the making, drawing and issuance of any check to apply for account or for value (2) the knowledge of the maker, drawer, or issuer that at the time of issue he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of such check in full upon its presentment; and (4) the subsequent dishonor of the check by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit or dishonor for the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid cause, ordered the bank to stop payment. In this case, the Court found that although the first element of the offense exists, the other elements have not been established beyond reasonable doubt. To begin with, the second element involves knowledge on the part of the issuer at the time of the check's issuance that he did not have enough funds or credit in the bank for payment thereof upon its presentment. B.P. No. 22 creates a presumption juris tantum that the second element prima facie exists when the first and third elements of the offense are present. But such evidence may be rebutted. If not rebutted or contradicted, it will suffice to sustain a judgment in favor of the issue, which it supports. As pointed out by the Solicitor General, such knowledge of the insufficiency of petitioner's funds "is legally presumed from the dishonor of his checks for insufficiency of funds." But such presumption cannot hold if there is evidence to the contrary. In this case, we find that the other party has presented evidence to contradict said presumption. Hence, the prosecution is duty bound to prove every element of the offense charged, and not merely rely on a rebuttable presumption. Admittedly, what are involved here are postdated checks. Postdating simply means that on the date indicated on its face, the check would be properly funded, not that the checks should be deemed as issued only then. The checks in this case were issued at the time of the signing of the Contract to Sell in August 1989. But we find from the records no showing that the time said checks were issued, petitioner had knowledge that his deposit or credit in the bank would be insufficient to cover them when presented for encashment. On the contrary, there
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is testimony by petitioner that at the time of presentation of the checks, he had P150,000.00 cash or credit with Citibank. To rely on the presumption created by B.P. No. 22 as the prosecution did in this case, would be to misconstrue the import of requirements for conviction under the law. It must be stressed that every element of the offense must be proved beyond reasonable doubt, never presumed. Furthermore, penal statutes are strictly construed against the State and liberally in favor of the accused. Under the Bouncing Checks Law, the punishable act must come clearly within both the spirit and letter of the statute.
from the bank the checks returned unpaid with a notation drawn against insufficient funds stamped or written on the dorsal side of the checks themselves, or in a notice attached to the dishonored checks duly given to the complainant, and that petitioner failed to pay complainant the value of the checks or make arrangements for their payment in full within five (5) banking days after receiving notice that such checks had not been paid by the drawee bank.
the house and saw his wife when they thought of raping her. The prosecution likewise established that appellant and his co-accused took chickens, a watch and money from complainants through violence.
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