COMMISSION | MEMBERS Justice Javed Iqbal Abbas Khan President Member Ashraf Jehangir Qazi Lt. Gen. Nadeem Ahmed Member MemberTable of Contents Page Number Acronyms Used “Ts 9 Executive Summary ° 15 Chapter 1-Introductic 16 Composition and Mandate 19 Initial Decisions ofthe Commission au Context of Inguiry a 2 Mairi questions with reference to mandate 25 Make consequential recommendations . 31 Progress Review and Methodology 31 Layout fe Repo 3 Acknowledgment 33 Chapter 2 - The Fateful Night of May 35 Chapter 3- Accounts of Wives of OBL. 41 Rhairyya's Account 42 “Maryam’s story in Period before May 2 44 Chapter 4'- US Operation Nene LJA z E E RA 52 US raid on Abbottabad - 2 Table of Events on the night of May1/2, 2011 58 Chapter 5- Residents and officials of Kala Dhaka / Tor Ghar 57 ‘Abdul Muna, resident of Kandar, Hassanzai 7n Of cials, Abbottabad 60District Police Officer, Abbottabad Deputy Inspector General (DIG) Police, Hazara Division Chapter L1- Senior KPK Officials Inspector General Police, KPK ‘Home Secretary, Khyber Pakdtunkhwa Chief Secretary KPK Chief Minister KPK Chapter 12- Dr. Shakeel Afridi and SAVE the Children Dr. Shakeel Khan Afridi Executive Distict Officer (EDO) Heath, Abbottabad Provincial Coordinator, National Programme for Family Planning and Primary Health Care Ms, Amna, Lady Health Worker Ms. Mukhtar (Bakhto), LW Country Director, Save the Childven Pi Goa | / (Chapter 13 - Chairman National Datal Authority (WADRA) Chapter 14- Aviation and Explosives Experts Brigadier Khalil Dar, Army Avjti cooper ‘nd Maj. Haroon Ahmed Chapter 15- Visit to Ghazi Base, Tarbela Chapter 16- DG Military Operations and DG Joint Staff. Headquarters, Rawalpindi 87 9 92 2 95 39 102 109 109 ny 18 120 121 122 126 127 128 130 131i Joint Chapter 17 -Vis 0g Chapter 20- Inputs of former DCAS AM Shahid Latif ector Gedetall Director Gene 24- Huss; Haggani and the visa regime 138 162 167 79Chapter 25- Federal Secretaries and Ministers 219 Secretary Law 219 Secretary Information . 219 Secretary of Defence ai Minister of Defence 223 Foreign Secretary 21 Foreign Minister 232 Secretary of Interior 237 Minister of Interior oe 240 Chapter 26- Assessments of the Commission 244 ‘Was there good reason to believe OBL had died and to close the file on hits? 248 The Kiting of OBL 244, Killing one wife, sparing another 24s Loud shedding ~ coincidence or de 24s Choiee of Abbottabad 245 Only the two brothers and their fami the house? 246 Failure to detect the Incoming Helicopters 246 acca -ALJAZEERA Reinarks made by Pakissten's High Commissioner to UK 249 Chapter 27- Assessment of the GoP response 251 Chapter 28- Legal uspoets of the May 2 Incident ~ 255 Inputs by Abmer Bilal Sool 255 International legal opinions regarding the May 2 incident 257reed Need Nera i t a ‘ced tenrrisimpstie NADRA DatabaseCContro llegal Entry/Enit of Foreigners 330 ; Policy 31 bj, Seoul companies 331 1) Foreign spy networks 331 | Witness Protection Programs a 32 Dealing with Systemic Problems 332 Setting Priorities : 333 Chapter 32- Conclusion 334a a Acronyms Used 2 cas fi ae CEOcoas DAL DCAS-OPS pec Dco Crime Investigation Department ¢ Chief Minister _, Combined Military Hospital “conpieriad National Identity Card “Chief of Amy Staff ‘Commanding Officer i (Criminal Procedure Code Counter ‘Terrorism Counter Terrorism Directorate ‘Counter Tertorism Wing Directorate of Air Intelligence Deputy Chief of Air Staff Operations Commitice of the Cabinet eetorGeneral Miltary Operations ALJ RREER Arman Commitee Deputy Inspector General + Deoxyribonucleic acid Director Office of Revenue Defense Policy District Police Officer ‘Deputy Superintendent of Police 10I ty Assistance Force Chief of Staff CommitteeALJ o 6 é( 2 | Psint Services Hend Quarters > | Joint Special Operations Command i i Kemitet Gsudrstvennoy Bezoptsnos/ ~Conmpittee for Security : | adanate dette Dawlati / State Intelligence Agency i Kerry Lugar Bill | iyber ‘Pakhtunkhwa Province " sLow Altitude Radars | Law Enforcement Authorities 1 ‘Lady Health Supervisor i i jLady: ‘Health Worker i ilitary Intelligence. ilitary Land and Cantonment. © = tly of Interior AZEERA™ Memordndum of Understanding: National Counter Terrorism Authority ‘National Database and Registration Authority ‘National Aliens Registration Authority North Atlantic Treaty Organization ‘National Crisis Management Centerty Card National Security Policy North West Front CompanySector Operation Center 2 4 Standard Operating Procedures ie Sedge Superintendent of Police . save the Children : Paldsan Space and Upper Atmosphere Research Commission i. Terms of Reference Unifed Nations Security Council Unit es ‘Verification Services System ‘Water and Power Development Authority a. oF Nvtive SummaryIntroduction ion in Abbottabad, Khyber Pakbtunkhwa: (KPK) province, Pekistan, which’ reportedly ted in the killing of the Al-Qaeda leader and long time international fugitive, Osama bin fen (OBL) around 0100 hours, The body of OBL-was net found. Apart from OBL, the US inission Lille his son and three other persons including a woman who were Pakistani citizens. In dition, the killers wounded an Arab lady who sald she vfas a wife of OBL. The mission, code- pamed “Operation Neptune Spear” was launched from Jalalabad in Afghanistan, The wo Pakistani males Killed were brothers who worked as security guards-cum-facilitators-cum~ couriers for OBL and Al-Qeeda, The élain Pakislani lady was the wife of one of the slain brothers. 2- The Compound containing the house sion was executed was of significant size.It bad high walls and barbed wire, It {1 Town, a civilian residential area foceied in the Abbottabed Cantonment. The Wesidegtial area flls within the jurisdiction of the Abbottabad Catitonment Board. me “ey ; eee akilometer ina straight line from the Pakistan Military A‘ ALjA ZERRA ‘was also situated at aslight distance from the other houses of the neighborhood, except for one belonging to a local person who cecasionally worked in the OBL Compound. 3. The US mission was ordered by President Barack Obama and carried out in a US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) operation by a team of US Navy SEALs from the US Naval Special | On ite night of May 1-2, 2011 US Special Forces executed a covert special operations”18 foe, The people demanded an explanation not just from the US, but even more so from responsible for defending the country at home. \ They demanded an explanation of how the US vas able to execute a hostile military mission which lasted around three-hours deep ‘inside Pakistan, which involved an armed assault on a target in 0 cantonment area. They wanted to now how this could heppen-without any kind of sy response. The US raiding mission did not encounter any kind of military resistance sither on its way in, or om its way out of Pakistin, The people of Pakistan also demanded to I nor ts intelligence‘ cblihrnont are ad no en'tha wxnttna Fltve of the renowa or notoriety of OBL. was residing’ witli Abbottabad cantonment. Pakistan was, of course, legally obliged by several UN resolutions to cooperate in the search for OBL and te bring him to justice. allegations and insinuations were directed towards the government, the military and its itkigene agencies inthe inetd ah due ies RROD, capes tered o as the “incident of Mey 2", 9- A joint session of the National Assembly and the Senate of Pakistan was called on May 9~a ‘week afer the incident, The Director General Military Operations, (OGMO) and Chief of Air Staff Operations (DCAS-Ops) briefed the joint session. The DG ISI also briefed the Joint39 Parliamentary session and offered to resign.’ A joint resolution was unanimously adopted which, among other things, asked the government to hold a detailed probe into the incident? 10- Subsequently, some party leaders who had supported the joint parliamentary resolution of ‘May 14 to establish en independent Commission of Inquiry changed their minds and opposed the establishment of an independent Commission. Initially, concems were expressed that a government appointed Commission would not be suficiently independent to be credible, Later, it appeated that there were fears that it might be too independent, There appeared to be a transition among some political leaders and legislators from bitter criticism against the authorities and institutions held responsible in the aftermath of the May 2 incident, to a more conciliatory concera for the “motale” of the military. The militery also warned against “army. oe bashing.” 1+ It was not before June 21, 2011 — month and « half after the May 2 incident ~ that - the Government of Pakistan throy of Law, Justice and Parliamentary Affairs a. ‘sued notification setting up @ Cor \quife into the cirdumstancés that. ed/to the- N is « aa Abbottabad incident. Composition and Mandate C12. The abbitiabad Conk ale ‘Boke debe feuds was established under the Pakistan ‘Commission of Inquiry Act, 1956, and subsequently amended. It comprised the following:* "or more detail, please see Annex A 2 Text of paliamentary sesolution of Mey 14,2011 ean be seen as AniexB 3or details, please see Annex C ‘for details, please see Annex D ul * Pakistan Commission of Inquiry Act, 1956 is placed as Annéx E | © Official notification of the Abbottabad Commission is placed as Annex F20 President > ae Member ‘Amb (retd.) Ashraf Jehangir Qazi Member rector General, Institute of Strategie Studies, "Islamabad Lt. Gea (retd.) Nadeem Ahmed Member Cabinet Secretary, Ms. Nargis Sethi “+ Secretary anys and : @. Make cose EF Ae E ERA 14 The Joint Resolution stated thet the composition and modalities of the Commission were to be desided “after consultation between the Leader of the House and the Leader of the Opposition” Taece were llegations thi this didnot tae place. One distinguished former justice ‘and lawyer declined to take up his assignment as a member of the Commission. The Chief. Justice of Pakistan was appaiently not consulted before the nomination of the President of theor w= a ruisne Judge of the Supreme Court, As ¢ result he Cormission who was at the time the Seni eelined to take up his assigntuent until the Government wrote a Teter (9 the.Chief Justice soliitng bis assent. This was eventually done enabling the President of the ‘Commission to teke up bi8 assignment. These political ‘wranglings ‘threatened to undermine the credibility of the Coramission even before it stated. One newspaper as a result described the Commission as “still born”. y Initis] Deeisions of the Commission ing of the Conumission_took place in the Cabinet Division of the 15+ The first’ formal Government of Pakistan in Islamabad on Jily 5, 2011 ~ two months after the US raid on “Abbottabad. The Comrnission decided the following: a, The scope of is inquiry would be comprehensive and it would have the authority of a of rank or status. superior couit to summon any. Fines jrrespecth ent, impartial, thorough and credible ia b, The Commission would bé its work and its vould be kept through minute taking and «e, ‘The record of the Commission B ptoctedit not audio or video recording; , The proceedinggles EFAZ EERK™ But the publie would be kept ‘updated through press releases after each hearing childrewy att greufdebildede POD, the chi Of Ibrahim survived, OBL, his son Khalid,40 tinge the wives, children and grandchildren were taken avy from the Compownd by” secutty foros and Arnal was taken to the hospital fer her wounds tobe trate, the or tne Foje prayer could be heard, They were ble to take only a few possessions with Of their valuables they could find nothing exeept for two or three gold “biscuits” of ten . The Americans had taken away a jewel box with twenty gold biscuits and two gold tical end pertained only to personal and family related matters. Other reports suggested 3¢ will said his children should not seek the léedersiip of Al-Queda. oF ALJAZEERA Accounts of Wives of OBL and AL-Kuvaitis considering the length of six years, Asked why t fond .g to Abbottabad he had just three dition he had a black jack nents, they said OBL of adequate security arrang: two Pathan bi ing to the wives, only 1 swith his wives. The elder wives were well and Islamic Studie: for the two Pashtun biditler’’no one plumbing. Accordingly, there was w to the buying of food and provision ¢ family of OBL did not mix or socialize with the fami parating @ lives. OBL42 to Karachi. From there she accompanied) Skgrifa to Quetta again, Subsequently, ftom ‘possibly accompanied by her step-son, Saad, her son, Hamza, his wife, son and ghiet, Khairiyych travelled to Iran, apparently intending to go to Syria. Hoviever, they were ted in ea, probably Mashad. The ladies were sent to Tehran while the men were kept in fashad, Later they joined them in Tehran, Said, apparently escaped or was released from rison in Tehran, landed up in Weziristan where he was killed. 51- Sometime Jeter, Hamza and his family left Tehran, travelled by air to Zahidan and then obeeded by road through Quetta to Waziristan Khaitiyyah stayed in Tehran for nearly eight 8 {tom 2002 to 2010 befyre being released. She Had wanted to go to Qatar, but due to some at was approximately three month \RIAZE ERK apparently stayed on in Haripur from where she accompanied him to Quetta tll’ mid 2003 and then joined bbottabad, 52: A number of questions arise to which satisfactory-answers have not been received. How did ‘hey cross into Iran? Who made the travel arrangements? Were the Iranians aware of their entry and identity? Certainly, thelr intelligence and border controls seem to have been superior to those1 to have been quite co them to escape. Why did ey not allow her to pro om Hi of link with Osam erative or carel to Syria a, Khoitiyyeh, their family and escorts? Did in releasing them What information are ease of an Iranian Iranians would have bee r signifi on the Osama bin Laden ut tO thAwives of OBI if they HAG wished. HoWever ataets and operation witlutheieTranian counterpects, of the exact 10 took him to Kuwait to work as a bbottabad. The best witness account ayed at er. Her family was44 from Shangla in Swat the same as her husband Ibrahim. She was marsied around 2001 when she vyas just 14 years old. 54- After manage her husband took her to Kafachi-yhere they stayed, probably in Malir. There she attended 'a Walima dinner for her et the home of a Baloch woman. At the time she had no idea her husband, Ibrahim, was a Mujahid. After four:months she retumed to her home in Shangla for a visit and then travelled back to Karachi where their residence had changed. Iprahim apparenily visited Kuwait frequentlyor so he told her. One day he told her that he would no longer be travelling to Kuwait. In Karachi she inet Amal for the first time but had no idea who She was, Iban told her she was the wife of a find of his and that:she was with them temporarily because she had some problem with her passport. Amal had a baby daughter with her. While in Katachi she also met some Panjabi and Baloch women including a Panjabi lady called Umm-e-Rahima with whom she became quits ‘with several mea in the adjoining room of the she and her husband travelled by air fin sbawer with Amal and her daughter aecbinpanying them. Ibrahim explained to N the/pioblem of Amel’s passport. Amal had taugli Marjamn to speal Arabic, ‘55- Froth Peshawar they travelled “ALY ‘Set Bd HE ge dfby thee other persons, one a driver, another dressed in @ police uniform, and third, a clean shaven man, She was asleep such of the joumey and took no notice of them. All she noticed was that the clean shaven man ‘Was Very tall. In Swat they stayed in a beautiful area at a house with a rivet flowing behind it. Across the river was the road that went to Shangla - the home of Maryam and Ibrahim. A smal] town or bazear was just helf an hour away from where they stayed:m, Abrar wa fall Arab. Ouce when they wer man and they drove on. Sho asted/he bat hi ‘asyectually Khalid Shaikh Muhammad. Ibrahim was ex However, ated for Pest fat with Amal, Or jagyam and Bushra proce to Kobet. Bu d at her sister-in-law’s i.e, the sister of Ibrahim, called Yasin Aftidi. Mi ne still did not Id her not to pre45 jing Ibrahim’s absence fom Kohat, Maryam and Bushra were taken to Naseem Town, an fon the outskists of Haripur. It is not elear|who escorted them to Haripur. On reaching there ey found their husbands, Tbrahim and Albrgs, waiting for them. In addition, Amal was also . So io were Sharifa Siham, he son Khali bin Laden, end Mariam and Sumayya, the (wo ery of Osama bin Laden, Amal fold her she had stayed in Peshawar after they separated from there she had come to Haripur, The tall Arab was also there. Presumably, Tbrakim and hhad been involved in making the travel arrangenients of the OBL family. Whether or not “OBL also stayed in Peshawar with Amal is not known. 60- In Haripur (Naseem Town) they lived in'a big house’ with two hallways, three bedrooms, a lawn, etc. They stayed there for two years, during which time Amal twice gave birth to children. She went to a private clinic for the delivery but never stayed overnight. She was taken there by Abrar and Busha who told the lady doctor that shel deaf and durab (“goongi”). Apparently, the lady doctor did not suspect anything to report, Ibrahim’s mother visited the house from Kuwait and then went to Jhter, Haleema, Ibrahim, Maryam sid Bishra eécompanied her to Kohat. The tay with her sons who promised to build her a house. When Ibrahim accompenied his fhathior, wife and sister-in-law to Kohat, Abrar presumably stayed behind to guard ALKZEERK ever sent the sit away ftom OBL. 61- The men watched TV with a dish antenna to catch al Jazeera, They never used their mobile phones in Haripur. To make calls the brothers would visit Peshawar or Rawalpindi, possibly even Hassan Abdal, end they used public call booths. No guest ever visited Osama bin Laden in Hovipur. Apparently, he had terminated all personal contact with Al-Qaeda fellow Mujahideen after tie arrest of Khalid Shaikh Mohenumad, The men often dined together and ate the sameh plus additional money as 2: i a and Bushra fr ly Went to the parks and the b tren, The el cr, R One ‘the uncle who lives upst e never weit to the ba: 10 go out and buy anything. Fro poor uncle. Rahma used to visit ceme across OBL on t no After that, her interaction with the OBL family came t me on the screen upstairs ia the main hh s” access to TV. This episode family at mily of the two brothe im in a state of panic stopp ation as well al identity of the Y who Was always tofotred to as the Sheikh. He told | nplained he did not trust her a ed talking to hin, 1 fam that their dau t. Miskeen Ki asked Ibrahim how! self such a hug fect such a wanted man, Ibrabiim said it was the will of Allah that She told Ibrahim48 “martyrdom. But she did fear his arrest md torture. She would rather he was martyred tian ~ captured. In Order to reassure her, Torahim erpscty said he would be soon be relieved of his current responsibilities and given some property ig Saudi Arabia or elsewhere to compensate him ‘or all his services (64- According to Maryam, OBL reposed complete faith in her husband Ibrahim who had been with hint ever since he was introduced to him by Khalid Shaikh Mubamunad. Ibrabim and Khalid Sheikh Mubammad kad practically grown up together in Kuwait and were as close as brothers, '5- Maryam said the purdah observed by the OBL’ women was so strict that as soon as their girls reached the age of three years they began to observe it. The ladies of the house would go to the extent of observing purdah from men shown on TV! Maryam and Bushra did not have much social interaction with the ladies of the OBL fam: They would visit them for just ten to fifteen ‘minutes @ morith accompanied by their childre never visited Khariyysh. She had, of cour; aid. She never came to Haripur. 66- Ibrahim and Abrar taught their own hil not go to school, The brothers did their lily chores anil spent the night in the Compound. As EER A exceptions were only when ci! of ter sscmpaied te Make Moe Occasionally, according to Maryam, he complained of paia in the heatt and kidneys, But ho TL never left the premises, ever Visited a doctor, During ‘their six year stay in Abbottabad, Maryam never once saw OBLI Xilid occasionally visited a dentist, No visitors ever came at night. Presumably she meant no Visitors came at all. The men, including OBL, offered their Friday prayers together on the ground floor, where they often discussed matters amongst themselves,49 67- Maryem’s last visit to Shangla lasted seventeen days and she returned just three days before , ‘the Ametican raid on the he id only Ibrahim, Abrar and she, werergware of the identity of Osama bin Laden. 68+ Maryam According to her, Bushra never knew Sheikh, who was living on the top floor of the main any years,was Osama bin Laden. house and had been with them for so me 69- Since the TY incident five months before the fateful night, Bushra and Maryam had stopped visiting the main house. Ibrahim and Abrar told their faunilies that “the Sheik" and his family had gone away. Both Osama bin Laden and Ibrahim were not happy with Maryam's visits to to Kohat. According to Maryain, she and Bushra told m that they had come from Kuwait. In order to make the tory plausible they b sying they were purchased in Kuwait, m had alle Finally, Mary y told hex roger she was not happy in Kuwait and had moved to io go outside the Compound, the children fnsidesthe'premises. They were very quiet. Khalid looked ar would b fodder for it. A man called Shameaiz. who lived close by, was hired to plegh the field Sopot Veg¥tables. He apparently also sold the cow to Khelid bin Laden. But he never,met Osama bin Laden or any other member of his furnil 71- Macyém also cothmented on the vaccination issue, saying that once a female nurse came to house and administered polio drops to her children, but not to the Arab children, She did not zecall anyone coming inside the house for vaccination: Nor wasShe eware whether anyone came50 uy ‘vaccination during her absence from the house. She also noted that when the children fel ill, were taken to # Dr, Mehar Dil Wazir, a child sp ‘Commissions Observations " 7)- While Maryam’s testimony was generally credible, some parts were suspect. According to some reports the place in Swat where OBL stayed and met with Khalid ‘Shaikh Mohammad was ‘not unknown. It was her father's house in Shangla. This is not confirmed. The ISI however, has not provided any concrete information on this'point. If it was the father's house it would potentially provide a great insight fato the OBL support network. 73- Moreover, her claim that Bushra never leamed about the identity of OBL till the day she was killed and that their children were fooled by the story that OBL or ‘Miskeen Keka’ and his family (comprising 15 to 16 persons) had "gone|pway” soon after the TV incident when Reha, recognized ‘Miskeen Kaka’ on TV lacks ere ‘The TV incident happened several months before the raid. During that time the chi main building was empty especially living in it. Moreover, Abrar and Bushra and their children lived on the ground! have been deceived. Itis strange that the question such an unconvincing story. 74 Moreover, if Bushra, like ALJAZEER ifijusband wes also a Mujahid of ‘Al-Qaeda, and that the “Shaikh” was OBL, and she visited her family often enough to worry both OBL aad Ibrahim, this could suggest that information about the presence of OBL in the, Compound may have leaked ffom the Compound itself. The ISI was unable to develop any reliable information on this aspect.82 jn the operation, in addition to the crews of the helicopters. The raiding force had night vision devieés, weapons fitted With silencers, and helmets for protection; it also contained some Pashtor ind Urdu speaking people along with a dog sxcoding to published accounts. The helicopters entered‘ Pokstn’s cirspace between Giursal ‘aud Shilman in Khyber Ageney between sgproximately 2315 and 2330 using “nap of the eath™terrain mésking” (ie. rapid and low frying) techniques to avoid radar coverage. They were aware of the deployment of the radars and their radius of coverage. They flew over the rive:Kabul, Chaledarra, Kala Dhaka and ‘Abbottabad, Three of the four helicopters proceeded to Abbottabad for the raid operation, while a Chinook fended end stayed in Kander Hassanzai, Kala Dhaka (TorGhar) to provide refueling to the helicopters on their retum end possibly to observe any signs of a Pakistani: military response.US Navy SEALs carried out the opération and the US Air Force maintained a combat air patrol with an AWACS on the Afghanistad side Of the border, in order to respond to any possible threat of interception from the PAF. 76- There was no presence of the Pakistan A Pakistan's airspace and flew all the way to Al the border was approximately 20. miles. Som: ots may have dizectly or indirectly benefited from the US flood relief air operations of August-October, 2010 in the same general ara Its noteworthy thst ding thi pofed owt ir 90:0) the Americans a als identified the OBL compound in Abbottabad as his likely residence by tracking the movements of brahim and Abrar. Ti- ‘The ‘helicopters reached Abbottabad around 0030 hows - a flight from Jalalabad, Afghanistan, of approximately an bour and ten minutes. The raid commenced at approximately (0032 hours with the fast roping of the Navy SEALs on to the compound.troops on the roof top of Ibrahima's Annexe, side slipped towards the open Compound after it either encountered unanticipated weather stroke ditions or it devel échnical fault. As a resull,the helicopter 1 stealth helicopter dropped a team hours, two more helicopters, up by residents of A A Chinook landed in the fi é was stormed first, followed “by ii on the main house in qui explosives to ry SEAL’s I there was no ng to WAPDA's records the illed and his Annexe and one of the Pashto speaking that a security operation was was underway. This sound during the US the slairs,OBL,54 killed by the first shot fired at him or later when the soldiers stormed the room. He did not use.» pis wife or daughter as a shield to protect himself. He was not armed when he was shot, * §2- It had token the US Spetial Forees appypimetely 36-38 minutes to complete the killing seperation. Approximately 30 bullets were fired. All this time, one Chinook and one stealth Black Hawk Kept circling the Abbottabadvalley and came to theCompound after the killings were completed and materials were collected. The disabled Black Hewk was prepared for destruction. The US Navy SEALs, carrying the body of OBL, boarded the helicopter and as soon as they ‘were eisborne, the downed Black Hawk was blown up at 0106 hours.The body of OBL ccording to some American accounts’ was loaded on to the Black Hawk helicopter which landed at Kander Hassanzai for refireling which took about 10 minutes to complete. It then flew with the ‘clear the approach of the helicopters, the hiring ofa house in the vieinity of the OBL Compound Sy supposed USAID employees, ad LJAZEERA™ Cruisers from the a US embassy in Islamabad towards Peshawar/Abbottabad. The US embassy personnel coming from Islamabad and seen headed towards Abbottabad may have been CIA agents to assist the helicopters - ‘Table of Events on the nightof May1/2, 2011 "Mark Owen in his book “No Easy Day” maintains that the Black Hawk carying OBL's body got airbome first, followed by the destruction of the usserviceable Black Hawk and finally, the reserve Chinook landing and picking Up the rest ofthe SEALs.55 y the Commission, ce with, Pakistan iter Pakistan airspace Two Black Hawks reach Abbottabad ‘Oue Black Hawk becomes unserviceable aller oping troop [Noisy Chinook arrive: |(Condiict of operations Airborne, one flying straigh ‘Hawk and refueller Chinook exit amnotigothe To Armieri fBirciclibd At jon at the OBL compound com Abbottabad RAB dlat 903 0,fiow jon reaching A ‘at 0035)_| 0 the event, mmunities regarding the timings and the 's were at slight variant from the table abov , it may not be accurate to say that the ally considering that one of the ers had to safely exii 36 Abdel Munaf, resident of Kandar, Hassan’ ‘86- Hg mict with the Commission in Kandar, Hassandii on September 29, 2011, He was reported r up by the noise of the helicopters. His neighbours said that he was ‘ashamed to admit that he had ‘been tied up by the Americans, He was later summoned by the Commission to Abbottabad where he admitted to having walked toward the helicopters which had apparently landed on an area “ear his crops. He tried to greet the Americans thinking that they were Pakistanis, He was surrounded by them and tied up, and was later released. It was not clear whether he was releasedmoned to. Abbottaba 2011 he received information from the Administ tefS ony ttc Jeft bank of river Indus net 7 Bazua/Divisio: Administrator Kala Disaka Is of Kandar Hass 2aftt Divisiod accofupaniéd S9DIG Hazara Division visited his of 19,2011 and: 58 to the US helicopters that used the area as a refueling and observation site. It was indicative of + ‘the unhurried and laid back’ manner in which local officials charged their duties. . DPO, Tor Ghar {90- DPO Torghar, met with the Corimission on September 29, 2011. He assumed formal charge as DPO on Marsh 2, 2011, but took up his assignment on May 5, 2011, on receiving information about the landing of helicopters. The matter was reported to the DIG. No police force was available in Torghar and all matters were managed by the Administrator, Kala Dhaka. Commission's Observation aoe 91- He informed the Commission that after Torghar became a separate distict no police force indicative‘ of the mamer and environment in (Which security officials discharged their responsibilities. Needless to say, Torghar we ALJAZEERASEY OforBtor, PESCO, Rural tricity 0 portions of thepOBL Compoundeinethesreme Muhammad Arsh 2) from an meters were ain who % nily, Sahib Khan had lost his NIC which Khan lost his NIC wh working in the find it? Did the ISI interrogate him60 ‘Commission was not able to meet him. The gas consumption pattern was reportedly normal over the past five years. The austere living conditions and the division of consumption among fout meters may have contributed to this pattern. However, for the periad from December 2010 to “ON Februaiy 2011, gas consumption doubled, This, of course, was the coldest period of the year. Compound through which Arabic channels were available, Asked whether or not he believed ‘OBL lived on the premises the cable operator said he Was sure he did live there. This appeared {0 there were'many more’ people’ living in the Compound secretly and conveyed this to the ‘Security/intelligence authorities for any follow up actidns considered necessary.ry measures at the ti p title), were taken in view of the influx under the L aid the buyer was nied the right to pur ction of a to purchase property, Only the number of the ded. The DOR said the procedure followed in the purchase of te land was identity of the ‘ke sure of the during the “Sal in the3 62 ‘even strong probability of mischief. But taken together they suggested the possibility of > > something more sinister. ie ashis title suggests he coordinates the activities of other govemment departments in the districts. “He tlso heeded the Disttict Intelligence Coordination Committee (DIC) which shares _ Information with local security officials. However, the subject of OBL's possible presence inthe Aisret was never discussed by the DICC. No information regarding the possible presence of the Provincial Government. The DCO said “there was complete silence” from the Provincial Modest amount. of electricity consumed, the small quantity of dry rations and of food stored Inspec’ the Place could not have been en extended hideout for OBL and his family. The DCO OBL: must have changed his location frequently to reduce the risk of detection, ‘here were no elaborate security arrangements and no escape route from the building, ‘he Americans bombed Tora Bora, 149 Arabs who were crossing the border into Pakistan6 ‘were arrested, They were Said to be the guards of OBL and had indicated that, OBL, “had gone Noith.” This suggested he remained in ‘Afghanistan, (This could have beesi deception, Also the story of the 149 Arabs does not seem to ‘have been checked out. If they were indeed arrested ‘there eait be no doubt the CLA would have had access to them) Commissioner, Hazara Division 99- The Commissioner of Hazara Division met with the Commission on September 30, 2011. He said he was not responsible for counter tetrorisn in the area, His job was law and order. There had been a fe ing among the community that som®.suspicious people in the area could disturb ‘he law and order situation. While there had previously been talk of the possible presence of Baitvllah Maksud, he had not heard of anyone mentioning OBL. He was personally of the view thet OBL had not been present during th@US raid. He acknowledged there were orders regarding the registration of “outsiders” seit wea, But there were no proper investigations of people buying and renting ho ALJAZEERA64 Chapter 7 Cantonment and miita Director, Military Land and Cantonments {100--The Commission met with the Land and Cantonments (MLC), ee ? ‘Rawalpindi Region on November 1, ttabad caine" under the Rawalpindi al control of lands end property under the Centonment Board Act of roids FEB Avon Board. The Stationtaining { the Cémpound of OBL had been exantined matter with CEO, Abbot \d. The CEO at his direction visited the OBL F of the house was built without authorization, It had not through the records, negligence e Director was nvited to various flaws such as failure to ins mastruction, absence of a completion ce ate, failure to pursue tax, and unauthorized construction. He admit or it was limited s the Department h to him was ¢ job, accor no CEO, An inquiry into the n answer to a questipfie sift to significant corruptios ntonment Board had & vidual! offieersitheld charges in two or three ¢ circumstances. According to the: 65 Director this involved a degree of negligence. It was not deliberate, He estimated seven to eight thousand propertics in the Abbottabad Cantonment were unlisted with the Cantonment Board, = ‘Commission's Observations sk 105- In the purchase of land and building permission etc. for the OBL Compound in Bilal Town, allowing for the general deterioretion in administration and oversight standards it still appeared ; ‘to be more than just a case of negligence. There were explanations that the building was a private "construction on land, and the MLC generally had “a,soft comer” for private owners rather than ‘emporary rentiers living in the Cantonment area, etc, either OBL wes extremely foriunate to not to rin into anyone omitted’to doing his job honestly, or there was # complete collepse of local “the presciibed form. According to the Wed that no tax was paid. Other than filling up the prescribed form along with a copy of the applicant's (fake) NIC, no verification was done. No authentication of the details provided by “applicants was done as matter of common practice despite the formal requirement to do so.o documents arid building plans were in accordance with the Cantonment bye-laws. If everything. seemed okay a recommendation for final approval by the Board would be made. fe 107-,A tree storey house was eventually Gonstrited and the boundary walls, in places, were inuch higher then regulétions permitted, No further inspection visits were matie. A three storey house was @ Violation of the laws of the Cantonment Board. But a lot of illegal construction activity took place within the Cantonment area, 1 108- Regarding tex on property, a grace: period of one year was allowed. But there wes no comespondetice on the subject available with regazd tothe OBL Compound, No action was taken against the staff for this level of negligence with regard to the collection of taxes. It was common” for the-collection of taxes to be neglected. Similarly, it was common for unauthorized constructions to take place and be regularized later. Comiission’s Observation 109- Apparently no tax on thy ‘Compound was ever paid and no action was ever taken against any of the ght, This was explained es normal negligence. Similarly the violations of procediires*far the purchase of the land end the construction of the 3 storey building and its regulations were described as “technical . The CEO KUTA hZEE ay Stggestion of collaboration ot complicity which of illegal course could not be established, and’ may well not have occurred. But this collection of “abdication of responsibilities” created a dense fog in which anything could have happened. Security Officer, PMA68 j0- The Security Officer of PMA cleimed to be the first to'reach the site of the incident. On fing the site, the area was sealed and an immediate search was started. with the “ Commerdant PMA arriving on the site at around 0140 hours. On entering the house, the Security “Officer FMA said he saw two dead bodies (one male and one female) and another male dead "intelligence agency. He stated the Police were present and should have conducted their own " Jnvestigation. They were not stopped from doing so. Force (QRF) 19” Frontier Force received information from the the sound of helicopters at 0040 ed his Commanding Officer. At about {0105 hours as he and his CO,meved towards the PMA ef with the QRF they heard a loud | blast The CO directed that the oALAZE ‘brigade, They were informed that a helicopter had crashed’ in Bilal Town. As soon’as they A.. ambulances and a fire Teached the site of the blast they were joined by the Commandant of the PMA who was also the Garison Commander, He ordered the area to be cordoned off, 112- The Commander said his primary responsibility was to protect the PMA. He was asked ‘whether he thought entering the crash site was beyond his responsibility of protecting the PMA.69 He said he en $ on insteuctions from his CO. At ed the p moved into a they ion thought a the QRE while the local police and were asked to un outer cordon to sked whether the dant, PMA Who was the G ie ©: fF the incident ten mi he buildings. He QR of PMA, local police and e was mandated to co!: 70 not the ISI. Why was the Police not allowed to do its job? He replied that the Police authorities » ‘were present and it was for them to comply. with the necessary legal formalities. He also explained that as Garrison Commander he needed to put the Gartison on alert in such a situation. ‘ie also’ denied that local people entered the premises. Commission's Observations 116- A careful scrutiny of the statement of Commandant, PMA shows that the Police and civil adraiaistration y asked to forin an outer cordon outside the Compgund to prevent the public from entering. The not allowed to perform their duties in accordance with the law and were Commandant may have bes following instructions fiom his military superiors but he exceeded bis authority even if he was directed by the GHQ to take charge of the scene and to’hand over the investigation to the ISL. This situation which has endured for many years, however, justified, tends to underming the credibility and perf f other institutions that are formally required to discharg: Lécal Commanding Officer, IST 117- The Tocal Commanding Officer of th ‘his primary responsibility was counter- ‘ertorism The raid took place “"K his ove of reg LIKZEERA, His detachment had earlier “smashed ‘Umar Patek’s network” and wel A. he had not noticed any “facilitative activity” in the atéa With respect to-the OBL Compound. He was tracking Al-Qaeda ‘elements in the area for the past two years. The facilitator of Umar Patek lived in the Aram Bagh area and on a tip-off the ISI had raided his house and found Umar Patek. He had been in the area for a month and had been living in Aram Bagh for ten days, He had not contacted OBL. Commission's Observationimar Patek in Abbottabad reportedly in ai Least uring th cooperation of the civil edministratio ck members shoul aimed? Still to Abbottabad? H id claimer the US occupation. Thi to his cause in his own area civil administration, ek was shared with t information before he was ¢ Wie Of Torehinn, Patek sided nobid méeyA-Qaeda persoane but was unaware thet OBL no longer met Al-Qaeda members for fear they his own security ceagencies and could unwittingly at Umar Patek had come to fo seck martyrdom ng to Afuhanist routes to Afghanistan. Did the CIA have aece Moreover, Abbottabad does not lie on the us nin Pakistan? If not, they woul d to him in his d far more information from him than the ISI was able to. Itn would seem very likely that Patek, despite his denial, had come to seek instructions or inspiration OBL. Ifso, it shows that Patek knew where t0 look for hiin. sence, especially that of the Sipah-e-Szhaba. Moreover, according to the local ISI, in Dam and Nawan Sheher (whecé’ the OBL Compound was located) it was know that Al-Qaeda, ats were active and HVTs like Abu Faraj and Abu Turab had resided there. In fact the eof Abu Faraj-al-Libbi had been raided i a distance of only a kilometer or so from the ‘Compound. So the disconnect between the civilian and intelligence administration seems 10 been complete: the civilians by and large unaware of the extent to which the Abbottabad '- a was penetrated by militants including Al-Qaeda, and the local ISI well aware of theirLocal notables, Abbottabad Bilal Town singe 200 L Coumpound Ys located t of were residingalong With their famiies. They had con He said he us pip Bern id he never saw any strang74 ‘the spot, He did not see any dog or any of the assailants speaking Pushto. He was detained by the ISI for ebout 18 days. The Army then Kept hion for four days, After his release he learnt that iL ses residing inthe Compound. He had never seen OBL there, He stated that brahim and “Abrar were the only known residents of the house aloug with their families. The brothers used to "offer their prayers regularly in the nearby mosque and their conduct was polite and kind. His -imovements were restricted to the outside portion of the house as Abrer and Ibrahim told him that they were pardah observing people. Major Amir Aziz 123- The testimony of Major Amir Aziz was recotdett.on October 25, 2011. He wasreluctant to appear before the Commission, But when infor masequence of refusing to do so, he came and offered his apology. 124- According to the testimony of Major in the neighborhood of the OBL Coispound, at about 0030 hours hie heard the Hol very low. He saw a Chinook “ALA ACEER a He also saw a Black Haivk landing. inside the Compound and JA in descent outside A. ‘Compound, The Major helicopters and saw two helicopters flying said he saw soldiers in camouflage descending ftom the Black Hawk helicopter hovering over the OBL Compound. According to him, he saw one of the Black Hawks crash landing, He thought there might have been a third Blackhawk helicopter. At around 0040 hours Major Aziz said he heard gun shots which he thought were of M-16/M-4 weapons, Around 150 shots were fired according to him. This was much more gunfire than what the Army investigation reportjor heard five muffled sounds of small ound of g children that he heard from the house. cries of women or cording to the Major gut 10 to 1 n there was complete silence from the time). Th dows of his house, ed (0058 to 0105 hours when there was a loud explosion which ne of as a serving officer an¢ ymission that att joke to his Administration Officer Major Adnan. fficer why did h je said that he jon Officer, Major Adana, and s cough his Adminis n was not 5 told to remain in his house as the situa fe been attacked and that P as thaf ithe BMA m lear from Mi i2d'in foF sonte Find of rescue from his house was under at 1A. was und he OBL cof fra] about that a potbing ut ¢ on the boundary wal nthe Barbet s to whether OBL in the house, Major Aziz wes confus el h prevented ve in. He mentioned the hig d need at least a set that any family wor16 sty o So basic services such as a cook; driver, barber, carpenter ete et. But apparently, the family of OBL did not require any services fbr over five years. This he found hard to» * a: Major Adiz said that after the incident, he had questioned the local service. providers ie authorized to do s0 or doing it as a matier of personal curiosity?) He had spoken fo ician and plumbers ete, Bt no one adimittedtat they had provided any servioes to oBL spond. This, according to Major Aziz. was “unimaginable”, He also expressed atnazement at sy 15-16 children of different ages could be confined and controlled for over five years when “As aresult of all ofthese questions, Major Aziz slid That he and bis son regularly discussed ye question whether OBL could have really been'residing inthe ‘compound for so long. so visited the area” in connection’ + somewhat “contradictorily, that vailable there. It was according to cosured it against Suicidal atts fin J ¥443 RK’ sharm their own families. Moreover, the bodies of martyced militats, according f0 “Major Aziz “were buried with great "honour in Abbottabad”, i JB1- Major Aziz also told the Commission that when he was constricting his own house nesiave before tie incident of May 2, 2011 he came zeross tree Land Cruisers with tinted “glasses, Whether these Land Cruisers were the same as those which were Iner seen headingdon the eve of the inci is not known, But it rais lity thal, hese Land Cri tiie area before th incident and were present during:the He also mentioned that the ISI raided the OBL xchange of fire had also t place during said. Tue IST completely hhad taken place on a suspected nee of an Al-Qas from the OBL compound. it highlighted his ad shor faich was noise-cont fe in Bilél Town. M use of Col, SaBed Igbal was not only n ontrolled but bullet proo! -4 crdte rupees which a retired Colonel cannot afford by any stretch of soybavingithertatest Digital Camera which cannot be for purpose of aphs of pets only. Major Aziz informed the Com: ii that @ soni of Lt, Col worked as a privateB | 134 There was a gap of more than 30 minutes between the crash, or controlled landing of the \ cibotanced Black Hawk helicopter, and its deliberate destruction by the departing US raiders. But he saw apparently the helicopters lending, circling and unloading soldiers on to the house, sefonned his Conmending Ofer, Brig. Shujéof what he had witnessed. That would have been linost half an hour before the destruction of thé helicopter, This suggested the possibility that if ‘he Brigadier had passed on the information, the QRF and other ‘cantonment security forces right have been eble to reach the site earlier and encountered the Navy SEALs before they departed, Both Major Aziz and Constable ‘Nazar Mohammad also claimed they heard gunfire. ‘While Major Aziz was'a neighbor and a soldier, Constable ‘Nazar Mohammad was at some distance fom the house. These accounts appear inconsistent with the view thatthe Navy SEALS used silencers which the wives of OBL seem to confirm. Major Aziz also suggested there was & gun batle'for some minutes. But this is not the geheral view. The reliability of Major Aziz's testimony is questionable although he was spe: 135+ Major Azia’s remarks about Lt, Col $a otentially significant as they could reveal ebout CIA network in Pakistan. Lt. Co ‘cording to Major Aziz employed formier ISI employees in his security busty fe appears to be a very suspicious wv person and may well beve played an active role facilitating the Abbottabad incident the IST informed the Commission that fed Noh BARE Rh set Iqbal, despite their suspisious background play any such role. Tis conclusion is somewhat strange as Saeed Iqbal left Pakistan immediately after the incident and attempted to sell his properties, Shoaib Atharhe was tweeting on Ig- The Comthission has earefully examined the statement of Dr. Mohamad Suleman who was g near the OBL Compound told the Comungsion that in his view foreign government “agenties were involved as well as foreign NGO's were involved in the May 2, 2011 incident. appeared to be his personal opinion which he did not back up with any new information or However, he cid say that in 2010 somebody climbed up the pole located near the wall ‘the OBL Compound and was fired upon. According to him, no investigation was conducted | by the security establishment or the Police with regard to this incident. He also said that a school sttished in the house of Shamzaiz, whieh Wis Tan by some NGO under a National “movements at odd hours in the they do not séem to suspect him of any involvement, But given the fact that his house was in. of the OBL Compound and ftom time to tine he entered the Compound to plough the land cultivation of vegetables ctc,, it is difficult to believe that over six years, he rlever got 10n the two fantili Local wedin in Ab ttabad Jocel media met with the Cortnission on September 30, 201 leAbbottatad as arfous reasons, Militants vere rumored ed 10 have brought in their reluctance on the part without their knowing en had ph ricket with seen or suspected the presence of the Arab of Ibrahim aa2 " 4p- The General Sccretary of the Press Club of Abbottabad, however, thought it strange that the» the assistance of someone powerful.” This suggested there were some who did not see the fort ike structure as “nothing out of the ordinary” arid-acéordingly not worth looking into. Despite the fact that the meeting was by invitation, a member of the local intelligence establishments struggled himself into the meeting, He was identiffed by one of the local journalists and asked to leave. Chapter 10 er Constable Nazar Mohammad 143- Constable Nezer MobeeaeL Pp DBE GE Gp 25, 2011. He was among the ‘very first to arrive at the OBL’ Compound after the sound of the blast had been heard all over ee Abbottabad. He was on routine patrol duty from 0000 hours (midnight) to 0600 hours. His patrol “fvea was in the bazanr area but because the mobile pairol van which was supposed to patrol! Bilal ‘Town had broken down, he was asked to patrol Bilal Town instead. At around 0040 hours Police Control informed him that firing had been heard from the direction of his area of patrol and he should check out the sitviation and report back, At around 0105 hours like everybody else he83 the sound of . This would indicate that 25 minutes had elapsed from when he was fire to the time of the blast. In that time he had not located or reached the OBL. mpound. As the blast came from the ditection of Bilal Town he proceéded there and when he to Bilal Town, he saw’a gath: reached Thanda Chua which is ne ring of local people, They and billowing smoke ftom the site. He informed the closest police station, Nawanshaher, of tion. Meanwhile, an Army vehicle, carrying officers and personnel, arived at the scene. sin The SHO of Nawanshaher Police Station, Inspectér*Nazic Khan, also errived and asked Naz Mohammad to prevent people from approaching the house. 145- Constable Naz use. Asked why, he said a lot of people had gath ke Was coming out of the place. The Army, according to the ble, directed the a distance of about half a kilométer {for the OBL house till 0600 hours. inmad eleiited to héve heard the sound of a helicopter hovering over ie OBL Compound. (This is not ousistént with arriving there after the blast, unless what he ‘heard was the sound ofthe dgpaftingsbelicopters)pAsked whether the local people had gathered outside the Compound before or after the blast Nazar Mohammad said they had come out as a re It of the blast, Asked whetlier anyone thought of going inside to help possibly injured cons, the Constable said no one thought about that. (This, of course, was not a normal crowd cr police response to ea accident, especially if it was thought lives might still be saved. However,™ priay be said the circumstances were not normal and the people may ‘pave been too frightened peat he Cotnpound immediatly without being assured that it was safe to do so) "447. The Commission asked the Constable whueaeted like a spectator despite the fact chat he seid “people were coming in and out ofthe hous.” By “people” he may have meant officials and nat the public. Station House O'ficer 148- The Station House ‘Officer (SHO) met the ComGnissioa on September 15, 2011. He explained the Comission that he was respousible for the area in which the Compound was, accordingly, supposed to know what was going on in the immediate neighborhood. He said that though the local police maintained good contéels with the local population, no specific information was ever conveyed to them by the her authorities about the house where OBL stayed. Nor was any unusual activity noticed, All that the locality was avvare of was that two brothers lived there. chowkidar or watchman to guard the prem ‘that should’havé been noticed, it was the lack of activity around it that should have aroused local official curiosity), A LJ AZ E ERA Commission's Observations 149- At roinimum, police or other security/intelligence officials should have noticed a few other things. There wete no. visitors to the OBL Compound. There were no television cable or telephone lines. No rubbish was collected. There were 18 feet high walls at places and barbed vite, There was a7 foot sereening well on the top story. This was a security feature, not a purdahexpanded over time dren did not go to school. The size of the Compou rds, None of this neg ily implied connivance. Buti SHO and th at the ve t. Once again it is easy to blame thi tions to t om foutine ins instructed or provided gui by their principa! cies to be more conscious about odd buildings tha nply no due diligence. jon Officer (RCIO) who was p% sm (DCT) in Peshawa Department of Counter Terr 1. RCIC ‘ ed the Abo! ¢ Commission on September side : mat c of OBL in Abbotlabad The Criminal Investigasiof( Departineht (CID) powerful and effective Cepactment but was now aid: passed on inforndi¥fon! Tis fnatbow ontacis ‘vith th seb i ot frequently visited by the publ ing the ISI's curiosity should have bee86 snot think there was anything special about i OBL house. The wall of the Compound collapsed daring te 2005 earthquake and was rebuilt in 2006 (That, of course, would have been a * -coisiderable security hazard for OBL). High walls. wer rsletively common for the homes of athari families. The former RCIO snid he was “a hundred percent sure” that OBL was not present inthe house as be never heard a word that suggested he might be inthe area. The fact "that Ibrctiim never used his phone in Abbottabad and went to Hasan Abdal and other places to make phone cells was, according to him, futher reason for not believing OBL was in the house, However, he conceded, the family of OBL might have been inthe house. His final argument for the absonce of OBL was the fect thatthe American$ noter showed any pictures of his dead body. Since Mey 2,he made no effort to ascertain Whether ot not OBL was inthe building since the IST kad taken charge of the investigation, Accocding jo him, OBL “could have been brought to the house” as part of a CIA plot. The IST'was the lead gency. He spent more than two hours at the ‘Compound after the incident, (But it was not he had any clear idea of what he was supposed to be doing there). Commission's Observation 152- Although the CID is an impoztant constitu ‘the intelligence community it appeared that the RCIO had absolutely no Re KIER BpyComsot with igi to cither the presence of OBL or the erlininal act that was perpetrated in his area of responsibility on May 2. He visited the erime scene but was unable to explain what he did there or why he even bothered to go there. To be fair to him, however, his unprofessionalism and incompetence were almost certainly, at least in part, an outcome of the degradation of the institution he represented (Le. the Ci). In turn, the degradation of the CID and of so many other critically important stateimplosion syndrome (G ID). This explains a Police Officer, Abbottabad aaa n met Abbottab don September 29, around 0058 how egan to receive calls from a number of places g. After asking his control room to determine where tt ved at dhe tend se6NTi, MESSE gphstleta away aried investigation, He tion but the ISI and police that the took avvay vi r evidence the police had e asked why an FIR was not r why normal procedures ice from carrying out its normal pro; | i ; i i k i 88 ‘The police wrote to the provincial government about the matter. However, the incident was recorded in the daily diary and an inquiry was started under CRPC. : 156- The Commission said there was a difference tetween an inguiry and an investigation. An inquiry was conducted to find out the ‘truth about a-development whereas an investigation was conducted to find out who was responsible for committing a criminal att. This involved the professional collection and recording of evidence and incriminating material. That was why it was right to ask the police why it failed to investigate the crime which had obviously been cossmitted. The DPO seid the incideat dbviously involved national security and a very high level commission had been established. Accosdingly, it Was considered appropriate to wait for the findings of the Commission. He admitted that under the circumstances, the police was not capable of handling such en incident. (He seemed fo confuse the Commission of Inquizy with a police investigation.) 157- The PMA Comumandaat asked the poli tablish an outer cordon around the premises dnd ho eed in acconiance withthe insflotogs the Ganson Commande. He dened reports that local people entered the premises. Depuly Inspector General (DIG) Police, Har: 1: apy li llc EEA sto mse comin September 14, 2011, and said that on reaching the OBL Compound, the SHO informed him that according to “civilians” there were dead ‘bodies in the building. The DIG, along with the ‘Commissioner, the DPO, the DCO, the SSP/Investigations and the SHO went out of the main gate and re-entered the Compound through another side gate and entered the main house and met the CO 19-FF in a room where two dead bodies, that of a male and a female, were lying on thea9 where they found p computer had been ¢ collected by the SHO. Th iis "The DIG and his police officials proceeded fa young man on the landing ulties was not able to n everything over.” The (0 OBL has not b to Teave! Thé Cont ete wed by the. poliee. Hi e Comman DPO that slice was Noblalldwed to by the xr in the vwibo took liarfe 4 ye crime.” It was not an ordinary 7 ag that “it es t ned to involve two 4 not to rest tion, it was dec B the President of the Abo e an FIR. But the pet sest known to the petitioner. Whether or not he was “ad90 161- The Commission asked the DIG whether the CRPC had been amended to allow intelligence agencies to arrest suspects or to register a case against a person suspected of being involved in.a crime, The DIG replied in the negative, Ih that case, he was asked why there was a delay in registering an FIR and initiating an investiga, The DIG repeated what othe police officals said, which was that they were not allowed to remain in the house. He acknowledged that criminal investigation was the primary responsibility of the police, Even so, he was of the view particular that this case was beyond the scope of the police considering its extraordinary nature, 162- Regarding the helicopters, the DIG said that there was a time difference of 15 minutes between hearing the muffled sound of the Black Hawk and the much noisier Chinooks. 163- The DIG was asked about District Intelligence Coordination Committee (DICC) meetings and intelligence sharing with Police to which he replied that only matters pertaining to the area were shared in the DICC meetings. The presence of OBL was never discussed with the DCO ot Police. The DIG told the Comimission that a. rt was sent by him to the Provincial authorities on the Abbottabad incident of Commission’s view regarding the ‘testimor f District Police Officer and Deputy Inspector General (DIG) Police, er JAZ EERA 164- They were of the view that whatever the police's formal responsibilities in reality, it simply did not have the ability to discharge them with regard to the May 2 incident. Accordingly, they ‘were “pushed aside” by a more powerful and capable agency to do the job. This was an accurate ‘but pathetic explanation, They should have had the courage to insist on discharging theirChapter 11 Scnior KPK Officials statement. 8 unified st ig & case in the aftermath of the incident. It was wait instead for the out2 The IG outlined his charter of duties under the Police Order 2002, as: i) Protection of life and liberty of citizens ii) Ensuring discipline and training of Police Forces + iii) Maintenance of law and order in the Province iv) Interaction with other security agencies " 168- He made it clear that the DIG did not contact him when the Police was asked to leave the ‘crime scene by Commandant PMAJISI and no telephone contact was maintained with him from the scene of crime, He came to know about the detdils of incident from watching the news on the {elovision at around 0700 hours, when hie asked the DIG to do the same, (The DIG had been to the OBL Compound, but seems not to have informed his boss) The IG did not ask for any report of the incident and only discussed the matter on telephone, However, a report was received later Special Branch after the arrest of Unjér Patek fiom Abbottabad, He said “there 9 thing’ to my knowledge”, Regarding the tie province, he seid certain instructions were | Presence’ of militants and acts of militancy issued to all concerned to hold periodic coordination conferences with the Intelligence Agencies. He further explained that a in ALJAZEERA.. held in Islamabad but nothing about the presence of OBL came to light. (The subject was never brought up according tothe DIG) 110- The IG believed a aumber of criminals had taken shelter all over the province in the garb of IDPs. A survey was conducted in the province, including in Abbottabad, in order to ascertain the93 numbers of foreigners, The OBL Compound did not attract attention as its owners were living there: The IG informed the Commission that more thai 200 persons were under surycillance.-But ‘the OBL Compound and its residents were not among’ them. (There seems to have been the ecsuription that militants would ‘only rent but not buy properties. This would be generally correct. But there could always be exceptions.) 171-The IG was asked whether any report about the incident was sent to the Chief Minister and the Chief Secsetaty to which he replied that copies of insident reports were seat to therm but he id not recall gending any specific report on the incident of May 2. Asked if he gave any special ditetons in wating to the Pole, he replied that fe didnot remember, He was further asked if the Potice in Abbottabad were given any specific directions prior tothe incident, He replied that Glections were issued a number of times. Moreover, the CID was split up into DCT and Elite Force and their daily reports were senfite the DPOs and RPOs for action, while a mechanism for feedback was also evolved, Commission's Observatio: 172- The Commission took n my ‘the moming of May 2, 2011: It weSamezing that he was not kept informed of developments by his subordinate in “REY (Ob ie cite Te se ‘he contacted the DIG to advise him to atch the news on television, althougl the DIG had been to the crime scene. The IG did not indicate whether he had asked the DIG why he had not been Kept informed about developments on the grouitd immediately after the incident, 173- Nor did the IG instruct the security establishment to perform their duties according to the prescribed procedures of law, Instead he appeared to remain a silent spectator. Ifthe local police i | : :34 ws prevented from doing their duty he could have brought the situation to the notice of the ef Minister with the request to approach the Interior Minister or the DG ISI and DG ML. The = handled by the IST. 74- This was a shocking state of affairs, There seems to be the easy assumption that Abbottabad, Mansehra and Heripur were “peaceful areas” although it was well-known that militants and Taliban leaders were arrested from thé arefi as well as other parts of the country. inefficient and irresponsible and so was DIG Hazara Division, 177- However, the environment in which they and their institutions functioned was anything but Conducive to effective and responsible performance for which their principals as well as the highest officials and poli ians were primarily responsible, Even so, these officers had duties ‘and responsibilities to discharge, which they neglected to do.e Home Si jon whether ‘ary 2011 he took any special mea id wanted were residing in the ares. The Home Sécre ry said he had issued specific instruction du cemed authorities to «: a survey of houses 0 outsiders who had co and these instructions were also conveyed to ld functionaries. Periodi re held by C: s not clear wh y outsiders. Many of HYTs in the are ut the presence of being nilitants. He believed neetied {0 be acyiewed, especially the role of provincial aitth: with on of militants arid te y share information wit authorities were not able to apprebend HVTs No inform jon about OBL's possi source. The Special Bi h was compl are of of Umar Pa his arrest was never 1g to him it was ncial known by the pr96 © Home department to proceed on. Not was eny search mounted to hunt for other HYTs who were suspected of being in the area, The Home department was aware of the possible presence Of rifitans in the Torghar (Kala Dhaka) area. But it had no information about the Abbottabad area. 181- Although it was known that asa result of successive military operations in the surrounding areas many militants had indeed fled and settled in and around Abbottabad, the only action that was tak by the provincial government was to pass on whatever information was provided by the secusity agencies to the distict authorities elong with instructions to inform the generl public not to provide shelter to such elements; The Home Secretary neither asked the security ‘agentes to thar specific'information nor had he conveyed the need for ito his superiors. The Home Department did not interact with the security agencies. They interacted only with the Police. Specific information, if available, was Bobet i abtotetind: ‘Bes ine ly 10 be made available on request. (Apparently few ifeny requests were made.) 182- The Commission asked what actions came to know of the May 2 raid in Abbottabad. The Home Secretary said he Islamabad 2s he was required to agpeat before the Supreme Court. Howeveh 1¢ incident he immediately talked to the provinciel 1G and asked him to ensure peace) ‘the IG that the Abbottabad SU REIRECERA and all assistance should be extended to it 183- The Home Sectetary was asked by the Commission on what basis had he accepted that the incident was exclusively the concern of the federal government. In answer he said that when he was in the Supreme Court building in Islamabad he saw the Chief Minister of KPK on TVBeldstan/ were Violated he remained in touch ‘the Army had t eto the an was asked whether he c wey platedunder cor y the Home Acdocdingly, he felt the incident fell within th or no! acuum, The Home Sec the Commissioner Hazara Division that the Con ament bad asked him asked wh s considered an att with them on the he police dingly, the police Secretary said the on the jurisdiction of the esponsibility of the token charge of the crime scene and had failed to do Y did not agree. He said andant PMA / ‘ompound, n brought this to the98 potiee of the Chief Minister. The Home Secretary said he had not done so in writing, But the Chief Minister was informed oa the phone. Commission's Observations 187- The Home Secretary and the civilian provincial administration were similarly out of the Joop despite their clear responsibilities. Their actual role in counter-trrorism was at best rmarginal, and in the tracking of OBL it was precisely zero, While there can be no exeuse for this geceptance of realities” by senior officials, it has to be noted that they fumetioned in a very perverse political and administrative enviroament in which insistence on the correct performance of duty was often rewarded with severe punishment Chief Secretary KPC 188- The Chief Secretary, KPK, also sa ght that OBL could be in the settled areas of Pakistan, Oa the contrary, it wa bbe somewhere in the FATA region. There wes no specific hunt for OBL, because different stories and news oP EFAZ The Tatilizetes Bureau (IB) reported to the Federal Government end not the Provincial Goveinment. The Provineial Government had its re was nothing to go on. There were only Special Branch at the district level, But it only had a limited tole. 189- After the ‘earthquake of 2005, a lage number of national and intemational non- governmental organizations (NGOs) came to the province. They were involved in rehabilitation sand reconstruction work in various projects. There was @ mechanism for their registration andperations in Swat, and later the these NGOs diverted thei n tot as, They were supervised by the Jard operating e said the CID us tobe itants/ad accordingly requir 2 peaceful It Was atipof tuplassfal/ectivity. Moreover, it Rouse Hevere 2 campaign was as nigwiméde CBF nctioning desp is short-comings, There ‘eness of govemance, This was the dilemma the titations to follow their terms of refere © (TORS), retary's testimoiyy showed how the state of affai sin the province neet im: Some NGOs had been banned simply moved to other places100 resumed their activities. Officials of the DCT seemed to work:in Abbottabad but lived in Monsehral As a result, they were not available in emergency situations. This situation should be addressed. 193--The Chief Secretary's testimony seemed to be another instance of recognizing a systemic ‘problem but not accepting any responsibility for it, At the lowest levels of the bureaucracy this attitude may be understandable. But at the senior most lévels such resignation in the face of systemic reality should be much less eeceptable, The Chief Secretary's comment thet “it was never thought OBL could be in the settled areas" was surprising since approximately half of the |BVTs were apprehended in such areas. Itis tru thatthe Chief Sceretery was not responsible for FATA but Hazara was within his jurisdiction. 194- As Head of the Civil Bureaucracy in the province, the Chief Secretary should have been swell aware of all the details of the incident. Ne nsive report was prepared for the Chief provincial goveriment in all important matters.’No advice was ever tendered to the provineial government and neither was the ALJAZE ER ed to send a detailed and coniprehensive report on the incident. 195- The Commission cannot endorse the view of Chief ‘Secretary that he had obtained information by means of telephonic calls to various personnel, Given the importance of the ratier, he could have asked the Commandant PM¢ to allow the provincial Police and Civils sent to the Chief Minis the situation My Kip'be Se IKUIAU dou tele Ma . No offie102 the Comniissioner of Hazara Division. The Chief Seeretary had beew instructed to wait for the reaction and decisidn of the federal government ay the matter was of national concer and had rerationsl ioplieations Later the same day he mis withthe 1G Police, the DIG Muara, and Commissioner Hazara, to discuss the registering of an FIR. Once again it was decided to wait for the federal government's decision as the provincial government did not have enough evidence igh no formal meeting was held, foncerned officials, ‘The advice regarding the FIR wag net just that of the 1G utalso of the Chief Secretary, and other ‘dent cortainly: prepared by the provineial government, he CM responded by saying that the oceuuced in his province but, it was considered a national seeurity matter, Accordingly, the provincial government did not believe it could actin isolation, HL hal to work with the Federal government. An FIR could not be registered against President Obama, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, or US forces as such an action would have had consequences. Accordingly i€ wasic to Tet the federal goverment handle the mater in consultation with c OBL supy ad been taken against bealth off ved prior to the also been done in cons ith MoFA, the federal gove an p Tikadi elements und their families resided as Hance of the aren had been n dH Yas 2 CM said 1 incial gover had no whe presence of tabad or indeed in P Obvaining suck AP on iwlisathe op i We Leder! and provinei ie_ cht nd aml nce agenvies. He frankly admitted that the d regularly, and of their retaliat to the thetTTT a as 108 goverment were more focused on counterterrorism than on OBL, (wwont the search for OBL. a counter ferrorist effort?) He was asked whether the Daily Situation Reports (DSRs) hal ever incteded any information regarding Families or support networks of Jihadi groups and Al-Qaeda nthe Abbotisbad and Hazara region. He said there were sectarian issues Ghat were operative: reported. But tere was no Abbottabad-specific report. 202- The CM noted that a number of éevetopments fad taken place in Havzra Division where the demand for a separate province had emerged specially aller the renaming of the province front N FU to KPK. These issues had preoccupied the provincial government and explained why tention was nos given to other matters especially“when an information was. provided! Moreover, the provincial government had no eapaeity to focus on international tertovisi support networks that were operating in the region. It agencies such as the ISI and IB were with the,f +, \ normal nse and order and not to combat is being fought in KPK and PATA not equipped to meet this challenge. He said the Police in KEK was meant to mai especially en the magne LJAZEER: wellsarmed terrorists. A number of steps nd been taken to adress this situation. ‘The Police terrorist inst motivated, trained and force had been expanded frenn 45,000 to 75.000 personnel, and the loeal community police was built up to strength of 10,000. Salaries ancl allowances of the Police were increased by 150%. The widows of martyred policemen in counterterrorism operations were given compensation sion facilites for their ehildsen. Previously. more totaling Rs. 3 snlion, in addition to free ed than hall of Police personnel did not have automaiie weapons and these were now provided withcost and with basic trainin ional po: iG in created, The Pol political reporting, and terrorism was 1 to comment en the ge and Sbptrol their activities, He Ff thday NGOE date feilic taniaGing capabilitics o provincial governme: g the ad the country adhered to systent w rossed and the weaknesses af ay would not by ne political history of Pak onal path,206 pokisian, individuals including dictators mattered more than institutions and processes. This resulted ia poor governance and adversely affected political society as @ whole.-There was & * ‘widespread perception of i) ice aud arbitrariness and no country could make proyress on such basis. Moreover, after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the military govemment of the time had created a Frankenstein's Monster in the shape of militant organizations posing. as national sperators. 1¢ may have been in the national interest at the time (get so deeply involved in ‘Afghan affairs, But the faet was that the country had paid a massive prive for its many unwise decisions and it would take a generation or more fo deal with the consequences. In fact. the CM said, overcoming the situation would not be possible fintl all the stwkeholders sot together and agreed on a collective program of action, The bitter trith, according to the CM, was that the governments of the past had not displayed a real allegiance to Pakistan. However, he suggested that things were not yet as bad as s Pakistan woud still be able to surmount the eb 206- The CM was asked what steps in «taken (0 ensure that May 2 Tike incidents do aot oceur in future. He was, ft he felt that officials and public servanis al the hijghest levels bore a greater sh: lower levels of bureaucracy. The K tj KZEER Ke ‘was responsible should he nnale to bear responsibility. To who spe sore greater or Tesser share of réeponsibility than those at the middle and sponsibility, it would be up to the judgment of the Commission. - 207+ The CM's attention was drawn to statements made in the US to the effect that the writ of tbe Pakistan government did not run in certain areas where militant forces hed regrouped and crossed into Afghanistan border to inflict casualties on US andl Afghan forees. and that such forces should he held responsible for the violation of Pakistan's sovereignty, rather shan the US:103 Chapter 12 Dr. Shakeel Afri (the Chitéren Dr, Shakeel Khun Afridi 208- The Commission met Dr. Shakeel Alki J 2011, A yeritten statement duly signed by him was alse provided. He made it clear hehad signed no other statement wn osu im Ai il a BEER flo, ne the time of the US roid on the OBL Compound! in Abbottabad on May 2, 2011, said he was appointed to bis present job in 2008. The post was also known as Agency Surgeon Simultaneously, he had established his own hospital in Khyber Agency and wes “leading happy lie with his tamily:” ta March 2008, he attended a taining program at Hayat Shaheed Medical Comples in Peshawer. On returning home from the taining program he was kignayped109 Rs, 1.5 million for by persons belonging to the notorious Mangelbagh Group. They dem f the ransom w He was kept at a plac his release and 1 ed (0 Kill him 3s not pi om th Agency, Which was a meye four kilometers away rontier Constabular fort was also in the vicinity. Everyone was aware of cording to Affidi, but no one did anything to help s he was being held, Jie ved in the a ally the Air Foi ¢ ransom, They were only able to raise a million rup 2. He subuiitted an application to the Cor cting, I knowledged the contents of his te of Khyber Agency who inforr ii said He mest Pe nt im 10°his/offio# Ivete themselves involved in his kidnapping and ty, FATA S. retariat 8 not impPsitiOngto #lely him. Later, the Law Secre Mangelaagi ‘va8 fobttisir ne was “iotally helpless bvious implibation Was that if Mi man” they could tered him fipnn kiciapping cape yreo uk se.) potntment, as well as the ding to Afidi, as a FATA, ke decided to leave the country. He left Pakistan in 2 visa from the US and went to California with his family. A Pi110 cya the en suggested AGIdi stale that his Kidnapping was done with te eomnviaee of the government of Paksten, Afi sid he refused todo this, Accordingly, he was nol abe 1 aval of the option of asylums. 2) Moteover, he said the American way of li did not suit him and he did not want his daughter brought up in it Also, given his profession as a doctor he did not Lind it possible to work at ges stetions and restausants in order to earn a living, He returned (o Pakistan in 2009 and resumed his old job as Agency Surgeon in Khyber Agency. 214- Meanwhile, according to Afvidi, USAID lannehed a program with the well known NGO, Save the Chikdven (STC), to vaccinate and inoculate children against various diseases throughout Pais jon the District Health Olficers were the an, including the FATA region. tn the FATA 1 heads of the program in their Agencies, and they Reported to the Director Health Services, FATA, 215+ He said that the management of ST ns but the coordinators and the staff were locals. The progeamme was fora ing FATA. 216- Dr. Aftiui informed the Commission thi including training, vaccination “aL JAZE ER AK mismanaged and funds provided for projects were misused and wa TG programme bad various components, 217+ A training seminar for Coordinators and Agency Surgcons of FATA was arranged by Save dhe Children in Peshawar in late November or early December, 2009. During the seminar, Aftidi said met the head of Save the Children, an ‘Australian named Mr, Michael MeGroth, MeGirath asked Aftidi whether he was the person who had been kidnapped and held for ransom, He said he wanted 10 launch a Save the Children Program in Bara and asked for Afridi's adviee. Heuu = tn January 2011, Afridi wos réquested by the so-called “Kate” to launch a vaccination smpaign in Muzzafarabad, Bagh, Abbottabad and other places similar to the one that was sfully carried out in Khyber Agency. He told Kete he lad no experience of working in dl Kashmit. But he agreed to help in Abbottabad’on a voluntary basis, Kate did not specify zea for him to work in Abbottabad and according to him it was his own decision to extend program in Abbottabad to Nawan Sheher because most ofits inhabitants were poor. sist on the campaign being conducted in any specific loestty. There was also no secrecy. There banners and posters which were publicly displayed. The Lady Health Workers (LHW) e from the area and the program was female oriented as only women and children were to be gccinate. t received through the FATA the program only interacted Vth Afridi, The funds were deposited in hi fs his department “was not involved.” He was, asked by the Commission i modality of direct personal ment fo be appropriate. He was also asked why he did not inform the government of his tos sce involved te use of dh Andy Ada he Commision that he was id around Rs. 1.3 millicn, 24 As regards the actual procedure for the program, cards were given to the women who were inated, The vaccines were to be administered in three doses. The LUWs would indleate on ‘canls when the second dose was due and the ladies would be required to produce the cards113 the he second Is to account 17, Aldi received a call from another American ced him to extend McGrath S| allas) in Nawan Sheher. ey had a feud. id be altbuved ins Use brother was Swati’s s0 it Afidi’s suggestion the ell but rece c oon het pllen®\b os It was not lear whom sb © 10 of ftom wherd'sfe got Lbrahim’s or Abrar's amber, 226- Aftidi sa omipleting 1s Wace am he informed the so-called Kate, Sue nd Sarah accordingly. TROAV SUE ‘equently along with “their peop Pakidtsnid|pedforited Opetittions in the fi ‘ole campaign was compl ordi ii, was Rs. 54 million. This ecine for the women andhis satellite radio was switched on (He was obviously instructed to switch it on), while he fol osside she OBL Compo idl fit Hi FRM io was cpabe ofmnent was not involved, He snid that the campaign was not oi n Khyber he was recruited b was assigned by the CIA 10 conduc! males in Abbotinbad’s rural areas, In April the progra OB aphasis on Pathan Gali where the OBL Compo: rativ8§ on Rs. Raed: a the sojecy BL, ewes in IS/eus shawar, a 0 was the Naib eer ( Mbashgeree slam, was also in cus mber of the Shura of M a cS Afridi's hands were cuffed sound the cloe Khaninthed. nimi whyéhe Was being tweeted %0 harshly. Afridi told Mi n it wus id the people who had him in custody were th 1g. (The significance, or intent, ofthis account was Commission's Observationsus ‘he statement by the US Defence Secretary, Leon Panes, wino was the CIA Direeior when oy? happened, confirming the role of Dr. Aftidl in making the US assussination mission a _ rendered much of what Aft told the Commission very questionable if not outright Nevertheless, itis possible as he said that he*did nol know anything about the special tended target. Such information would not be shared even with tbe tions mission and handiers of Aftidi, He may well have suspected the truth, However, the fact is that he was 3 weeks afier the raid during which time the CIA could have ferreted him out of the | Only a fair tial based on due process cea establish the extent and nature of his fyysivement. While he should stond ia, convicting him on trumped up charges by a ment sponsored tribal Jirga was not a proper course as it completely undermined the " stid in March, 2011, Dz, Shakeel itt nd ll tel ileal ws ‘Shahcena, Assistant (LAW) contacted the office and informed that she had been investigated by some agencies, HeAltidi nor before, during or eafly out the vaccination campaign by Dr di was allowed the DCO, ki about the vaccinatis had any connection with 4 CIA project. The ISI app at Khattak, a social wo: YY operatives on instry Ms, Khattak tional Programme ‘edithe¢ he remained unter deienlighfor a fo 10 during this about bis fami tives, education and assets, about his working with a18 939- Regarding his relationship with Dr, Shakeel Afridi and the Free Medical Camp/Polio “campaign arranged by him in Abbottabad, he said that Dr. Afri was known to him as a doctor | svi told him that he was doing his post-praduation on the prevalence of Hepatitis B andl C in ‘Lady Health Workersin Abbottabad and needed the approval of the Government for arranging 2 Free Medical Camp for this purpose. He asked Dr. Aftidi 1 provide documentary evidence for bis thesis but to no avail, However after two days Affidi contacted him again on telephone and requested for permission again. Mr. Turabi seid he-made a telephone call to EDO (Health) | sbbottabad but could not contact him as he was undergoing some training in Peshawar. The Deputy EDO (Health) was also not available and accordingly he contacted Ms, Shaheens, Assistant 1 Coordinator and ditected her fo facilitate Dr. Shakeel Afridi after completion fall the formalities, Whatever was subsequently done by Dr. Shakeel Afridi was not within bis knowledge. 240- Tarebi farther said an informal inquiry y and Dr. Sohail Altaf, Secretary, Health, XPK was asked for permission ( y action against the LHW, But those who "kidnappad him” also directed ns st Ms, Stiaheena and others. He said be had acted in good faith and if somet rong he was prepared to face any punishment as may be deemed fi, He also pointe ze stente ek ob Roo tn cs. A. Committee and Scrutiny Cell has been set-up for this purpose and now MOUs are signed with ut certain precautionary measures which have been taken al the approval of the Provincial Governments. 2al- He also expressed his opinion about Save the Children, noting thet its reputation and intentions were not good as it was working for the Americans, He said that he had refused the job of Coordinator with a salary package of USS2000. He said that STC wos working in manyTae state nts, hady Health Worker ° 2011 Dr. Shahgens x forthe Yaedt st Bibi would also any hoe 2d- She Apri (ook them to Bilal Town a const s. ‘be teampledebyeDeyShakeel comprising Mukhtiar Bibi, Ama Bibi and N Ms, Amina, however, made it elear that d residents of the house were not that they wa way from home, She Furth320 id tat thereafter sho fell sick because of severe pain in her leg and could not accompany eaples also be obtained of the ladies residing sin the house ofS ae Dako, LY A JAZEERA 247- The statement of Ms, Mukhtior (Bakhto), Lady Health Worker, was recorded on 15" asked her to make a telephone eall to Gulltaz Sultan, Health Worker, and inform ber regarding « | meeting on 16" Mazeh, 2011 in a BHU. She attended the meeting, in which was also participatedDr, Shakeel told her to visit ever tions to Indies again within the id that she complied Limit of with the sa | pai 1 2011, Dr. Aftidi ong with Amna Bibi and OBL Compound. said that a ¢ of Mr. Shamu cel gave her a bag which she left in 1 but according to Ms Mukhtar, Dr. A get ty/yeRponse quest. Children Pakistan Mr. David Thi a th tiga the Children in Pakistan said that ST ‘outraged by this inisttqaf off BAS, the false ) to Save the Children’s life ad indeed ou a life-saving activity sich as a (Oe: AoR-sHedlical or non-humanitarian purpose id for STC and insist activ in Khyber when STC nited to the agencies of jnings for healtha2 workers and managers and Aftidi was nominated by the FA'TA Health Disectorate for some of the trainings. One was a training course on Health Planning and Budgeting in 2010 when he was Agency Surgeon Khyber. He was one of 50,000 health workers trained by STC. On two occasions Aftidi applied for job vacancies in STC but was unsuecessf 253+ Mr. Wright old the Commission that STC was an organization of world renown that had been working in Pakistan since 1979 and now worked in over half the districts of the county S10 followed the Code of Conduct of the Intemational Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) in all ils operations and was a fervent defendant of the principles of impartiality, neutrality and independence to which every staff member hed to coma STC never had a health or vaccination program in Abbottabad, It started its program in Pakistan in 1979 with the approval of the goverment when the Afghan refugees came to Pakistan, and was answerable (0 the government fori inn Pakistan, They applied for visas as volunteers to assess the needs of a countrys OUs were then signed. In the case of Pakistan the MOU was signed with the EAD binding agreement. No objection for Di is hising poople from the open market was req) 255 STC did not launch any vaccination programs it did net fallin its area of activities. Nor did it exlend financial essstance Prod bah € Bele Plbu®ves ever provided to De: Shakoel Afridi 256- Mr, Wright was asked about an STC worker who had been expelled from Pakistan and subsequently re-entered Pakistan under a different name, Mr. Wright admitted that had beppened and observed jhere were some grey areas which needed to be plugged. He had met bis predecessor McGrath in Singapore efier the US raid on Abbottabad. McGrath remeniberedAffidi in Peshawar but “categorically denied inviting him to Islamabad. Nor had ko with ira” 251. ed abo 's admission that he had visited ezted on Parveen mabad on vatious occasions, Mr. Weight worked for STC in Pakis I of them were bi sons. He was asked no time inf y. Decisions Government of Pakistan made ony statement SPtaken in response fo stories that Aftidi was as th STC, (Tbe dae itapllgaion wos thatthe Bovernment knew Afridi wa te STC) that the prevailing system for124 {G0 could start its work without oblaining approval. Such NGOs must be checked by the revrity establishment and visas should not be issued as routine unless the credentials of the sibers of the NGOs ate checked strictly binding agreement but even such MOUs must be vetted through the Law Division. Views ofthe curity establishment must be obtained prior to the execution of such MOUs. NGOs working in "pakistan were recruiting personnel in accordance with their own will, This should not be permitted end No Objection Certificates must be obtained fiom the security establishment with prior information regarding such appointments. Thore muSt be some methodology to verify the ALJAZEERAChai man Nati aba sor 1 the building of the OBL Compound. ¥ NA Authority (NADRA) fort able to obtain NICS. This wa a training se326 gs If appropriate dala were supplied it would be possible to ascertain whother or not Abrar ‘Arshad had been facilitated in being able to complete all the formalities for purchasing the - | opety on the basis of a forged NIC, The OBL Compound had the tag number of the house sneration that was carried out by the goverment. 's Observation Despite the extensive mandate of the FIA it appeared to act like a silent speettor, Nor did FIA concotn itself with the CIA sponsored vaccination campaign of Dr. Shakeel Afic - it «lot carried out any backround check on Dr Afridi. Registration of foreigners was still with |Special Branch and not the FIA. = Ghapter 14 Aviation and Explosives Experts {tof the incident, he was instructed nine the type of helicopter that had PMA stat. © 268- According to the Army Aviation findings mBab@F the area around tne era site was litered With “fiber glass honeycomb sandy! peg eh ervertiebsigoptors their stealth or low rador signature characteristics, Most of tie wreckoge wos completely burt. However, the til soior section was partially intact and lay outside the boundary wall, ‘The tail rotor blades were not damaged. The tail rotor shaft drive was extended over the wall, While the power train was sdentical to a Black Hawk, a new Kind of tail rotar section coupled with a honey eam encasedm7 1 rotor tips and no spr copter was burrs while on the ground when the rotors were stationary. The spread of struction of the instrument penels and communigation sets nd the neatly co The wreckage of the heli 270- Four wh Compound wind nd weeds indicated a low hover of another helicopter. This was a Black Hi \vintign( Si that within of the “erash’it was know a crnsh Ja spt ipgfautcg’ éoxtigiohs. \T seul 2 with ieless the pilot succeeded in landing the H Lorbed Ianuilig). pound duc to the foree of 1 of tReshelicBptet Was found outside the Cox at destroyed the helicopte® He confirmed that it was a specially built helicopter with restos tego at 0030 hours when the residents of t! ring 10 the Brigadier the helicopters eam npound were asleep. Even when they heard the helicopter, because of the design of its e direction from which the rotors it would not have been easy for anyone to precisely I me. The Chinook arrived after the Killing ope Major Amir helicopter. This was unlikely since witnesses8 Aziz) reported hearing and seeing the helicopter before the blast, According to the Brigndies, the oople of Abbottabad only heard the noise of the rtuming helicopters (In fact, they heard the sound of circulating helicopters before the blast.). He was of the view that only three helicopters came to Abbottabad including the two stealth Black Hawks and one Chinook. Group Captain Faheem Hashmi, Air Commodore, Jehanzeb Masood and Maj. Haroon Ahmed 273- Group Captuin Fuheem Hashmi inspected the wreckage of the helicopter recovered from the crash site on Sunday the 8" of May, 2011 at Army Ayiation Base in Rawalpindi, Based upon the theoretical and practical knowledge of structural and acrodynamie designs of aireraft and helicopters, he was able to clearly establish that the wreckage belonged to a Blackhawk helicopter converted into “Stealth Helicopter” 274- Air Commodore Jehanzeb Masood stated t on § May, 2011 with the following conclu, 8) Iwhad advanced radar abs 1b) It also had heat and sound sigh 215 ch Hac aos sn A ede ER pe ca 10h ‘The wreckage had already been removed. He could only inspect the debris, No discemsible signs sppression system, of explosives were detected, No live explosives were found in the vicinity.Ta : ofall Wing awe f Obnahsonder fr Ri US helitopters tse0 “D Why wes the Aviation Base established in Ghazi? ‘When was it established? bh) Where were the Americans accommodated? ‘a77- The Base Commander said four US trainers were om the base to train Pakistani pilots. They ‘vere esked to leave the arog after the Raymond Davis ineident, They artived in March 2009 and yeismned in August 2010. He said US pilots who flew food relief operations wore always secompanied by Pakistani pilots. No free miomtent was ever allowed. He denied any land bad been allorted tothe US, He also denied that OBL's bodj-was kept in cold storage at Ghavi Base. Chapter 16 , DG Mititory Operations aad DG Joint Staff Hendquarters, Rawalpindi DG Military Operations 218- Director General Military Operatior yovided the Commission a slide representation of the probable route th soplers involved in the raid on Abbottabad on May 1 and 2, 2011. 279- With regard to the actions in response to th afler ascertaining the immediately ‘Atl AZE eduthe COAS around 0200 hou The COAS got in touch with the CAS at'U207 hous endl asked lifm to seramble his aircraft to ster about the raid peration in Abbottabad, the DG suid that, shoot down the intruding helicopters”, The COAS informed the Prime % around 0300 hours and requested him to contact the US Ambassador for further information bout the operation, Around 0310 the COAS called the Foreign Secretary and also suggested that he talk to the US Ambassador. The Foreign Secretary had ulready been instructed by the Prime Minister to do so, Around 0645 hows the COAS informed the President of Pakistan who is theer in Chief of the Pakistan Armed f ate el 280- Regarcting previous US incurs loval in nature DGMO said th rotested, He said the Pakistan A n. Nevertheless due to the fength of Surveillance ty pilot from Pakisian who ensured against r jerage of the relief helicopters. firey the fest time. lief assistance was provi ich assistance had no idea of the nature of the support or those who may have been involved. f the Quick Reuetion Force of Abbottabarey exched the site within 20 minutes of the blast that was caused by the US destruction of its owned helicopter. ting down an intruding enemy aireraf. (f rders to the Air Chief to shoot down the intruding aircraft? He replied that air defence was \ ibility of PAE, which monitored air sppression and i provide carly warning, “286- He was asked whether according to his knowiedge OBL was residing in the Abbottabad Peer te es set pe VEER oi ete333 289- The DG identified the reasons for the suce £55 of US operation in Abbottabad 4) Stealth Technology i.e, low radar signatures which minimized the chances of tani feritory, low level valley fly &) Highly developed shills of US pilots in night-tim using Night Vision Goggles. al night ypter with refueling capability ie. tice dimensional digital map displays This allowed accurate mission planni lots to fly at higher sp les enabling the fe of the Arm Secacily lapse involving the fai fal of teust" tt vas Pakisten” against a commalteteay, The Commission e nsidered this to be an emotional and inadequate response by a se: Similar responses were made to such questions by other fe €StabYshment. The DG MO was unable to answer Ming de duels senior officers ot and satisfaetonily questions of the Commission profession Director ral, Joint Staff Headquarters (ISHQ), Rawalpindi 290- The statement of DG JSHQ was recorded on 18" October, 2011 anid he also Furnishe of DG JSI1Q since 28" Aptl rid is Principal ent, He held the appoint on st ONiees to the Chairman JCSC (Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee) for coordination betwe134 serious branches of JSHQ and inler-service organizations. He also acts as Secretary in the inetings of the JCSC and chatrs all the Standing Sub-Committees of the JCSC. He made it clear * shat JSHO does not command the three Armed Services, whose Chiefs aze directly responsible to the Government of Pakistan, 291 The DG, ISHQ informed the Commission that Chairman ICSC was ond visit to Austria from May 210 May 6, 2011 and was not ia the country at the time of the Abbottabad Operation, on his retum, He held consultations with the Service Chiefi, followed by a meeting of the Defence Committee of the Cabinet on May 12, 2011 to review the situntion, Based om these consultations, all possible end necessary measures were fnitiated, 292- The DG ISHQ made a dotailed presentation to the Commission which included a brosd perspective of the ISHQ and ICSC. The JSHQ is the|pighest military body mud responsible for integration and coordination between the three SqWiées Wor ensuring unified planning for war. “The DG also explained the charter of duties off who is Principal Advisor to the Goverament on defence matters and is preparation of Joint Strategic Direc policies having a bearing on war vos. He is also responsible to make te potential and national defence, He alsa coord the selection and acquisition of major EERA 293- Giving advice to the Government on define matters and on sweapon systems and equipments of ‘AL Sevices for future induction and replacement for final approval by the Governm strategy of national defence did fall within the jurisdiction of the JCSC. ff wes the ISHQ that advised the government fon national defence and strategie military matters, evaluated and reviewed joint warfarerections to the Armed For es, It was also one of the fa jespace, sea and ground violations, i what decisions gre taken by the JSHQ with respect to the Abbottabad inci hat all decisions were taken at the level of Defence Committer of 7 rarehy ane no deeision was taken at t was (aken by the t0 1 the future, The Aysticdny Wece tole ity ara would rot be tolerated. Comuission's Obsery:136 ighest military body for the consideration of the military aspects of national security. The CCheirmon JCSC is basically the person responsible for the final preparation of the JSD. Both the Defence Policy and the JSD seem to have remained fairly statie documents despite tectonic shifis | inthe stcetegic and security landscape since 9/11, The very fact that they have not been reviewed since 2004 ancl 2007 respectively indientes their irrelevance to the current security challenges confronting Pakistan. And yet the Commission was told they represent the “13ible” for the axmed services of Pakistan, Possibly, lke divine scripture they are not suppased to be chased. 298. The DG JSHIQ ssid that all possible measures had been taken on growl (o hovel a repeat of May 2. This was not consistent with the frank admfésions of other senior military officers. Moreover, the Salala incident of November 2011 revealed the emptiness and unprofessional nature of such claims. No one in Pakistan is deceived by the optimism of such statements, But confidence in those who make such self satisfying eroded. ALJAZEERAChapter 17 Visits of Commission fo ADC ing at the PAF HQ and Air D omni ‘aiair Det ¢ functioning a ing Opie AidDefedce C Jnr system as thd ecnt@rpiogd r © men inission visited the OpeFaligual Room where they were shown livity of the night « the US raid on Abbot sion with th138 Sate response fo the US raid on Abbottabad met with the Commission and gave accounts of je performance.” 100- The US may have violated Pakistan} airspace twice on May 2, 2011, first during the US "gpission over Abbottabad and later during the transport of OBL's body allegedly ina US CV-22 od thal the US-led | (Osprey) 10 the US sireralh cre in the Indian Oocan, The PAF expl ‘Coalition Forces (CF) in Afghanistan filed their entire flight plans for transiting through "pakistani airspace 24 hours in advance each day, Contrary to some published reports, no Osprey sien was scheduled or cleared to fy from Afghenston towards the sea over Pakistani tertory, On May 2, a total of 85 sorties of various (pes of aireraft flow from Afghanistan © towards the sea secording to filed Might plans, Given such heavy air trulfie of the CF, the body of OBL could have’ been on any aire capable off making a landing on an aircraft cate. ‘Altemately, the US could have flowa the Osprey,againet a flight plan fited for another nirerat. While the Osprey report was based on an inte frst iLlogal violation of Pakistan's cir violation appears to have never space is a confirmed reality(ie. the raid been fornially protested by the Government 301 With rogard 10 procedures for intercepting 2 finding oivraft the PAF explained that only the Sector Commander or a resp: K K at Strategic Operations Command (SOC) was able to WAL LAZEER Gah A... ‘There were standard procodutes for determining whether or not the “track” belonged to a friendly eountry and if it vas on an vnftiendly mission, There wore different interception procedures for (a) commercial sisliners and Light civil aireraft, (b) military transport, light aireralt and helicopters, combat aircraft of nonchostile countries, and (c) combat airecafl of hostile countries, *Sturements are atached at Annex G.2 shot down subject to a yy doubt about the hostile inter Salight Paints of PAL J 61/ingdity) on the Gvo countries Board of Inquir140 scrowledged the PAF? contibutons in the antterrovist campaign and PAP hod received Jmportant military hardware and conducted joint exercises with the US Air Foree, Neither the oP aor ISHQ had ever directed the PAF to be mindful of a direct mititary threat from the US and there was no prior intelligence or informatish with regard to an impending US raiding operation. As 8 resull, the PAF ir defence assots were not deployed in a manner to respond 10 such a raid. It needed to be understood that peacetime plans were entirely different from wartime deployment plans, The Board also concluded that given the current inventory of radars, & repetition of similar US raid in future would be dificult for the PAT to handle. The US was the only country in the world to have mastered stealth. technology at an operational level, and the PAF did not have radars that eould detect the intrusion of stealth objects. The capability of the PAF in terms of advanced hardware needed fo be enhanced tremendously in erder to respond to any filure development such as that occurred on May’ 2011 405- The PAF Board of Inquiry concluded , 2051 raid on Abbottabad was an ‘oulcome of “a combined faiture at all lev tentions of the USA." There was never any mistrisi between the Pakistan ees. As a result, there were no apprehensions regarding US intentions. ‘Thi as exploited by the US to lzunch its ALJAZEERA surprise raid Commission's Observation 306- The PAF Board of Inquiry report docs not assiga responsibility for the May 2, 2011 Incident to anyone despite it being a “combined failure at all levels.” Its assumplions appeared 10 be based on wishful thinking generated by Pakistan's status as a MNNA, its apparently “cordial relations” with the USAF and the supply of military hardware, The truth was that there was aand especially between the two military ity. Given the negative attention of the policy Ni N Security Policy/€ould hye beeh Wesigned to mitigate and minimize the challenges that Pakistan a sith1a 1 Air Staff (Ops) (DCAS) who began by g the Abbottabad incident was idles Ris chnast cit dlrs incidents in the history jf Pakistan It had tarished the image of the Pakistan Armed Forces, including the PAF, und had adversely impacted on the morale of the people of Pakistan, 308- The DCAS said thot in any efficient an effective defence system, the first and) foremost jirement was the identification of any threat to the country. There was a whole process for Ibis identification. Afier the identification of the threat and the encmy, if any, the government13 Policy of Pakistan, ‘The last Defence Policy document was issued in 2004 dia as the main mili ional ly identifi phasis on the maintenan ff good relations with ation with the U! mulation of the Joint Forces.” It was comprehensive 2s includis identified by the Defene: The last JSD was is stan,” The DCAS said none of 5 been and will con ¢ government deparizn: ta be cin borg ine contekt was respoRsible oF” ihe nck serepequhurespoasible for the gro ) and Vulnérable (VAS), using a the ad bot 14.0030 hours when, according to the DCAS, bad.” After “completion ofada even minutes Inter the PAF firs leamed of the attack when the COAS called the 19200 hour ‘Chie? of Air Siaf (CAS) and informed him that “one helicopter hud erashed neat PMA Kakul * Actually the raiding helicopters by that time bad “herets another was ying in the same ae ready exited from Abbottabad excep! for the one that had erased and was destroyed. The COAS told the CAS that “some sort of opetation was taking place aver Abbottabad near PMA " Kakul.” L wes clear the helicopters did not belong fo the Army or PAP. "313+ The CAS ordered the DCAS to scramble Air Defence Alert (ADA) fighter aircraft with ‘clear instructions to shoot down any aircraft or helicopter flying over Abbottabad or in the “The ADA pilots were soon airborne and proceeded fo Abbottabad under positive adjoining ar radar cover. They reached Abbottabad in 14 to 16 minutes approximately after take-off. 41d: PAF Air Defence Command wes also ordered (@\sean the area around Abbottabad and the entire airspace of Pakistan for any air activi rector General Military Operations ~ (DGMO) was asked to ensure that Army heli fying in the area in order to avoid ‘accidents in view of the shoot down onder, 315+ The Star Safire equipped Surveillance dered to get airborne and other necessary measures were also immediately put inHietion. ‘The entire air defence process was stl ct ess any Boe 316- But the situation on the night of May 1 / 2 was different, Instead of PAF radars detecting intruding siveraft and initiating the process, it was the phone call from the COAS that initiated the process “without any radar detection, oF any prior intelligence information which was situation that was not covered in any laid down procedures or SOPs.” it was 2 situation that vas “fraught with risk” because the PAF pilots had “entered into an area of combat with incompletess at all.” This was a serious tactical disadvantage, In craft monitored any abnormal none of the HARs, the LARs and PAF ident area, vily in Pakistan’ or Afghan airspace, and certainly nol over the i was not able to hat an ordinary Paki Tae DCAS said it was “understandal jtvation.” But the fact that the US_raid deep into Pakistan wiis not i during iss time in Pakistan’ can be credibly explained. Pakistan was not in a state of fo was a big diffe fe in a peacetime mod ly with regard to preparedness and response ly with regard to p ess and response aware of this difference and took Full advantage of it. The mes, The Americans were full ge of rada Americans deliberately planned their 2 pprouch route to avoid the cove: the US riding pilots used “ni ain masking” te the Mood that w ning of the Abbottabad ra fs, The US was also supposed to be an hove, the America: ally, and “was xpected to commit such a dastardly act.” ures to reduce the poss = ‘The DCAS said the PAF was imple (S had also noticed thes jeasures, Caul securrence of such a covert operatio146 ves required in oxder fo avoid getting into an uncontrollable situation. The DCAS said this > giuation was explajned during the join paiamentary session of May 12-13, 2011. The situation ‘yes complex and needed 19 be handled carefully on the bass ofan informed consensus. 400-Ths DCAS stid the incident of May 2 was not enused by any security Tnpse, human error of tock of follies, equipment end training. No single agency, department or organization cold be eld responsible, It was 1 collective failure atthe policy level sinee no one bud idontified the qveat of such an incident, Moreover, he ‘said the three armed services depended on the ISI, which was responsible forthe collection of intelligence and information and to submit to the headquarters ofthe three services and their intelligence services 431- The DCAS noted that because no LARs were deployed atthe entrance 10 valleys traversing the border with Afghanistan, tie entry of the raiding helicopters was not detected. Apavt from | this, of course, the Black Hawk helicopters used ste ise suppression technology which would have in any ease avoided redar and gromnddte 322- Explaining the reason for the peacelim nt of forces, the DCAS said there was no on-golag or immixent conflict wi A result of which air raids might have been anticipated. ne eas it wit ot Mca Be Ries soon se fron, He wos asked whether apart Grom the “main military threat” was any “auxiliary” or 32 “secondary” Uwreat source to Pakistan considered and was Pakistan Following a policy oF wot conffonting any U.S. military threat that might develop as was implicit in a one front defense polity. He was askvd if he regarded developments in U.S. Pakistan a ", as required by “pasitiv tbe Defence Policy of 2004. IF they were not, should the US have af eust been considered aeat, if not the main threat 19 P sial threst? The DCAS ideted by the Defence ast important thveat to US soldiers and US iad made clear that if necessary. he would not anistan came, Moreover, Ob: od whet ntersl action, DAS wa sialoments were ever thoroughly discussed along with eounte: 325- The DCAS said becausetabiacal Ace oF OBLadagm down ad adcordifely, the ”'Singe abither er service could “think of asicg Pakistan onyiaen military tay, the possibility was “never discussed of the US policy of conductin mission noted that there bad been an evol ty there was consullation with Pakistan rega is this not an indication of a much more148 " aggressive policy towends Pakistan? The DOAS said the PAF was never consulted although US sone policy may weil have been discussed. Z 327- The DCAS was asked what constituted a diret{ threat to Pakistan. Was it only the threat of military invasion, or did it also cover the threat of a military raid on Pakistani tertitory? If the fatter was included in threat perceptions the fact was that on move than ene oecasion raids hac been conducied on Pakistani territory against Pakistani military personnel and eivilinns from avross the wesiem border. In view of this how was the US altogether eliminated as a possible threat to Pakistan? 328- The DCAS siid a ditect threat was considered to emanate from a country with which there ‘existed a confict over tertitory or some other political oF resource issue. There was no such conflict with the US even if there were si olicy differences. As regards US military raids, they were largely restricted to countertegforist drone operations limited to the FATA region. He also clarified thet US raids before F discussed with the PAF. Ry channels, as Well as actions by the US military irspace and territorial integrity. Ak PAZEERA diminishing trust ond ‘cunfidence between the two countries, including thetr military and intelligence agencies. The 324+ Tae Commission referred to the conti sions, warnings and protests that were privately and public! through both civilian and military € sin violation of Pakistan's sovereignty, DCAS said that US warnings and analyses of their possible implications were never discussed in fo with the PAF. On a few occasions the politcal feadership was informed about the possible consequences of a direct conflict with the US, especially in the event of shooting down drones inside Pakistani lerritory,S that PAF pilots shoot down, space, These aircraft wi airspace after ta leave Pakistani ‘bome afier US. frees had ei ere was any prlor communicatios US to ensure against the possibility of a confiumtation between US and Woutd the US aircraft have been ¢ nilitary ed despite fed Was bes of the cvitflict which the DCAS ¢ DCAS said there was never any communication betwee ruding-aircraft would ha to avoid confronta n encountered in Pakiston was not Kno The Comm asked GyDCAG that in v a scenario have been consi USRATO Trees, shoulda’ anning exgreises. (The OCAS w the negative, sa ot considered a possibility ssid “there was AS hobigg ATiSoever bythe povemment for n evel te all the r| canfonment area. 150 por. But he wehnowledged the possibility of such a raid taking place inthe future, He referred to ihe length of Ure western border and the unfeasibility of installing enough LARs to cover atl of pecially with the eurtent inventory. Pakistan cnpld not beef up radar coverage of its western borders at the expense of inaclequately covering ils eastern border from where the main threat | gill emanated, The use of stealth technology also constituted a challenge that would be difficult fo counter 353- Finally, the DCAS seid that in retrospect it was possible to call Pakistan's poticy flawed. But atthe time it was diffienlt to be wise before the event, The reason was not because of blindly reposing too much trust in US goodwill towards Pakistan, 1t was due to the fact that no one could imagine OBL was residing in a settled area deep inside Pakistan and thet too in a military Commission's Observation 334. The wstimony of the DCAS was in Ly disappointing. Jt was quite incredibte that it took one hour and thirty se “AF to learn of the air raid in Abbottabad fiom the COAS himself. The D nission that in fact shortly after 0032 hours the PAF leamed about the raid from 4 nj TV channels, The PAF should Abd ilicopledagir AeA fy at night and taken all necessary actions. The CAS should have leamt of the developments in Abbottabad from the have immediately realized that PAF PAK itself instead of having to be informed an hour later by the COAS. 335- The DCAS claimed that the May 2 incident was not the resull of “any security lapse oF humen enor". However, immediately after this statement he acknowledged that the whole incident was the result of “a collective failure at the policy muking level since no one hadfied the threat.” What could be # more obvious security lapse and human error Uhan this, ded on the ISI for collective failuwe? Moreover, the DCAS said all three armed services dep: m had their own intellig on although, of course, each of th. ence and information to Inother the correct the 1S1 failed to p armed services regarding any developing of eminent threat. This, needless to say, was anotber serious lapse and error 336- The downplaying of explicit gs ftom the highest officials in the US Administration; that it had already the complete mis yy intentions behind actual border raid conducted across the westem border which resulted in Civilian and military ensually; and the lel aroas of Pakistan was be; jemont that “the presence of OBL deep down in the nal and irsesponsible approac! anybody's ina testified to an extremely 337- The staten CAS that adhe PAF intercepted US helicopters it would have cially 8, it wits‘Rov known at the time which country they belonged to, engaged them suggests that had the PAP\knowantlanthsy were USAF aircraft, it might not have them, Thy cover, no Pall foved by the politica! I for responding in sh Situftiots Air Chief Marshall Rao Qamar Suleman (former CAS) ‘Air Chief Marshall informed the Conumission that PAT Air Defence Plan was putt of vas formulated to counter the threats envisaged overall Defence Plan of Pakiston, whic (ISHQ) as ive (SD) issued by the Joint Services Headqu under the Jo Dire He referred to the information well as the Defence Policy given by the Government of Pakistan.152 amanding AOC Air already given to the Commission by the Deputy Chief of Air Staff (Ops), Cou Defence Command Chaklala, Base Commander Mushaf Air Base Sargodha, Air Defence Controllers, and the pilots of the F-16 aircraft involved in the aftermath ofthe May 2 incident. lent of May 2, the Air. Chief Marshall said the Defertce Plan was 539- With regard to the inc fesod on certain assumptions and threat peroeptions. Pakistan's threat perceptions were eeonined by eclevont rnilitary acd civilian departments that mode assessments stout eghbourng/regional countries based on issues and disputes with specific countries al a arioular ine, and necoringly identified counties as friendly or hos. The Ais Defence Fan ‘vas based on the overall defence plan. The Air Chief"noted that the PAE, despite being sn independent force, was a supporting service for the Army and Navy in their operations. 340- The Air Chief mentioned that making the overall defence policy was not a function of the PAF even though it provided inputs along wi .er services, When asked who sas tesponsible for formulating defence policy, it was the MoD-He said that in other counties defence policies were revie' whenever any developments in their regions necessitated a review. While [fh rovided their inputs, the MoD should be in a better position to comment on the tion of Pakistan's defence policy. ‘34l- In response to a question by ‘KEPAZ PERL’ review of the defence policy of 2004 in the light of subsequent developments, the Air Chief said ever recommended the issue had been deliberated by the Armed Forees in the JSHQ where the PAF gave its input Nevertheless he reiterated thet this responsibility was basically the domain of the government.tle suggested that thé Commission's recommendations with regard 19 the formulation of defence153 particularly in terms of periodic reviews. He further said the © should work for the review of all policies, including the defence policy, policy and JSD did not cha fy the US or the US was classified as a friendly coun com the US free Gf cost. It wes the cat lo Pakistan was perceived from the east i. from India, and no threat fror e US, Afghanistan or NATO from the-western Acconlingly, the Abbottabad incident v da be 7 Air Chief said after the ineident he had told the Americans about his Chief Marshall > had dhightigited the thee Air Chie! 1 1988 when the Soviet Union was still operating in beonsiticnet! san/ench the government of Pakistan, In tho: ow esPiessed by With rogard bad jncide eve that there was 2 ure on the palit Of thellbAR! HeWevdethgMeonceded that the mechanisms for threat Jing the defence p lic perceptions, the Air Chief Marshal said that people were nformed and did not know much about the hard facts ring important events. Paki cand the truth w differ fom public peteeptions andase © esd it 05.04 the job ef PAF or of other armed forces of Pakistan to g0 10 the public of "pakistan on such issues since this was the responsibly of the politiea! leadership. "346. Regarding radars, the Air Chief said thet PAB, bad not deployed low level radars on the western border since no threat was envisaged from that direction, PAF was not ina high state of © alert on the nig forthe same reasons. He informed the Comission that there were only a few ‘These were installed to [acilitale Pakistan's military operations © adars on the westem bord goin! insurgents. Their deployment vies known to the US asi had operated in the area during the loads of 2010. Accordingly whey flew their mission well outside the range of the radars, followed nap of the earth flying techniques, and used stealth technology to avoid radardetection ‘The Ait Chief also gave a detailed technical explanation to the Commission regarding how the aircratt stealth technology worked and reduced radar visibility manipulating radar data in the wven by complex software and recordings were done at more than one losat change or manipulate recorded data, It wo involve 30-40 people for 6-7 weeks, which would najor operation that could not be kept secret. Had! any data been manipulatedfhe at PPFEERK by PAF personnel aud vould have caused significant negative reaction. Accordingly, any suggestion that data hind ben manipulated after the May 2 incident was baseless. 348: Regarding defence capability, the Air Chief noted that Pakistan was facing threats on both its westem and easteen borders. A sespanse capability wes in place as far as the eastem border wvas concesned, Flowever, the capability for the western border nceded to be developed and thisuid require huge recourses. He said more than Rs. 17 billion had been speat in developing one PAF base ai Shahbaz, which would be completed in 2013. To develop an adequate defence capability on the western border, more bases and other infrastructure would be required.