Myla Ruth N.

Sara

Sanidad vs. Commission on Elections

Facts

On 2 September 1976, President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued PD 991 calling for a national

referendum on 16 October 1976 for the Citizens Assemblies ("barangays") to resolve the issues of martial

law, the interim assembly, its replacement, the powers of such replacement, the period of its existence,

the length of the period for the exercise by the President of his present powers.

On 22 September 1976, the President issued another PD 1031, amending the previous Presidential

Decree 991, by declaring the provisions of Presidential Decree 229 providing for the manner of voting and

canvass of votes in "barangays" (Citizens Assemblies) applicable to the national referendum-plebiscite of

16 October 1976. The President also issued PD 1033, stating the questions to be submitted to the people

in the referendum-plebiscite on 16 October 1976. The Decree recites in its "whereas" clauses that the

people's continued opposition to the convening of the interim National Assembly evinces their desire to

have such body abolished and replaced thru a constitutional amendment, providing for a new interim

legislative body, which will be submitted directly to the people in the referendum-plebiscite of October 16.

The Commission on Elections was vested with the exclusive supervision and control of the October 1976

National Referendum-Plebiscite.

Pablo C. Sanidad and Pablito V. Sanidad, father and son, commenced for Prohibition with

Preliminary Injunction seeking to enjoin the COMELEC from holding and conducting the Referendum

Plebiscite on October 16; to declare without force and effect PD 991, 1033 and 1031. They contend that

under the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions there is no grant to the incumbent President to exercise the

constituent power to propose amendments to the new Constitution.

On 30 September 1976, another action for Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction, was instituted

by Vicente M. Guzman, a delegate to the 1971 Constitutional Convention, asserting that the power to

propose amendments to, or revision of the Constitution during the transition period is expressly conferred
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on the interim National Assembly under action 16, Article XVII of the Sara

Constitution. Another petition for Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction was filed by Raul M. Gonzales, his

son, and Alfredo Salapantan, to restrain the implementation of Presidential Decrees.

Issue: W/N the President may call upon a referendum for the amendment of the Constitution.

Held:

Section 1 of Article XVI of the 1973 Constitution on Amendments ordains that "(1) Any amendment

to, or revision of, this Constitution may be proposed by the National Assembly upon a vote of three-fourths

of all its Members, or by a constitutional convention. (2) The National Assembly may, by a vote of two-

thirds of all its Members, call a constitutional convention or, by a majority vote of all its Members, submit

the question of calling such a convention to the electorate in an election." Section 2 thereof provides that

"Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution shall be valid when ratified by a majority of the votes

cast in a plebiscite which shall be held not later than three months a after the approval of such

amendment or revision."

In the present period of transition, the interim National Assembly instituted in the Transitory

Provisions is conferred with that amending power. Section 15 of the Transitory Provisions reads "The

interim National Assembly, upon special call by the interim Prime Minister, may, by a majority vote of all

its Members, propose amendments to this Constitution. Such amendments shall take effect when ratified

in accordance with Article 16 hereof."

There are, therefore, two periods contemplated in the constitutional life of the nation: period of

normalcy and period of transition. In times of normalcy, the amending process may be initiated by the

proposals of the (1) regular National Assembly upon a vote of three-fourths of all its members; or (2) by a

Constitutional Convention called by a vote of two-thirds of all the Members of the National Assembly.

However the calling of a Constitutional Convention may be submitted to the electorate in an election

voted upon by a majority vote of all the members of the National Assembly. In times of transition,
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amendments may be proposed by a majority vote of all the Members of theSara

interim National Assembly upon special call by the interim Prime Minister.

The Court in Aquino v. COMELEC, had already settled that the incumbent President is vested with

that prerogative of discretion as to when he shall initially convene the interim National Assembly. The

Constitutional Convention intended to leave to the President the determination of the time when he shall

initially convene the interim National Assembly, consistent with the prevailing conditions of peace and

order in the country.

When the Delegates to the Constitutional Convention voted on the Transitory Provisions, they were

aware of the fact that under the same, the incumbent President was given the discretion as to when he

could convene the interim National Assembly. The President's decision to defer the convening of the

interim National Assembly soon found support from the people themselves.

In the plebiscite of January 10-15, 1973, at which the ratification of the 1973 Constitution was

submitted, the people voted against the convening of the interim National Assembly. In the referendum of

24 July 1973, the Citizens Assemblies ("bagangays") reiterated their sovereign will to withhold the

convening of the interim National Assembly. Again, in the referendum of 27 February 1975, the proposed

question of whether the interim National Assembly shall be initially convened was eliminated, because

some of the members of Congress and delegates of the Constitutional Convention, who were deemed

automatically members of the interim National Assembly, were against its inclusion since in that

referendum of January, 1973 the people had already resolved against it.

In sensu striciore, when the legislative arm of the state undertakes the proposals of amendment to

a Constitution, that body is not in the usual function of lawmaking. It is not legislating when engaged in

the amending process. Rather, it is exercising a peculiar power bestowed upon it by the fundamental
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charter itself. In the Philippines, that power is provided for in Article XVI of theSara

1973 Constitution (for the regular National Assembly) or in Section 15 of the Transitory Provisions (for the

interim National Assembly). While ordinarily it is the business of the legislating body to legislate for the

nation by virtue of constitutional conferment, amending of the Constitution is not legislative in character.

In political science a distinction is made between constitutional content of an organic character and that of

a legislative character. The distinction, however, is one of policy, not of law. Such being the case, approval

of the President of any proposed amendment is a misnomer. The prerogative of the President to approve

or disapprove applies only to the ordinary cases of legislation. The President has nothing to do with

proposition or adoption of amendments to the Constitution.