GRAND STRATEGY FOR BURMA/MYANMAR VIII

by
Thang Za Dal

_____________________________
Words of Thank: I am using several news items in this paper without securing first the permission of the original
copyright owners. Since its not a commercial undertaking, I do hope that they all would have
understanding. And I am deeply grateful to them for their invaluable materials.

...........................
Grindelallee 141
20146 Hamburg
Germany
_________________________________________________________
- Updated from 3rd modified version of Update VII* in May 2016.

_______________________________________________

NOTES FOR THE PREVIOUS MODIFICATIONS AND THIS UPDATE

For this Update some information items are newly rearranged from its predecessor. An 81-page excerpt of my paper on
the Chin people has been taken out. A few information pieces are updated and added as well, but some 99% of the
main text remains unchanged. Although I could have changed some parts or added some new information to it in
light of several new developments since then, I havent done that.
And until now, there existed already in the internet four different previous versions, namely Grand Strategy for Burma VI*
and VI (I) and , VII* and VII (I) respectivly. So, in order to avoid confusion between those different versions in the future,
only the ones that are marked with an asterisk ( * ) shall be official, namely Grand Strategy for Burma VI* and Grand
Strategy for Burma VII*
As a case study for the plight of all non-Burmn indigenous nationalities in the land, I am including 12 items on my people
- the Chins - at the end of this paper.
As this paper is intended for people from all walks of life in Burma - that is, the ordinary man on the street as well - I am
using red and blue colours and bold profusely in order to highlight some key information so as to attract their attention.
Its just a simple information, and not an academic paper as its title may seem to suggest.

____________________________________________

PREFACE
Dealing With the Legacy of the Dark Age
19 Sep 2013 02:36
Written by Mizzima News

(Editorial) - In our country, successive governments in the past have signed many agreements
with various foreign companies for both short-term and long-term projects. Sometimes, signing
ceremonies of these agreements are reported in the state media. But, interestingly, they do not
report details of these agreements, such as who will be the beneficiaries? What are the
benefits? What is the opinion of local people on these projects? and most importantly, the social
and environmental impacts of these projects.
It is our right and duty as responsible citizens to investigate if these projects are beneficial to
the people and if they have any adverse impact on the environment, and if the projects turn out
to be hazardous to the lives of the people, who will bear responsibility? How will the government
deal with it?
Nowadays, people are aware of most of the mammoth projects taken up by foreign companies.
But, some of them remain hidden from the public eye until their negative impact on the people
and the environment is revealed. No one really know how many such projects are being
implemented in Myanmar right now.
However, the people will have to embrace the legacy of the past whether it is good or bad, and
whether they like it or not. The main questions that the projects lead us to are, firstly, how will
the current government tackle environmental hazards arising out of these projects? and
secondly, how will they resolve protest against the projects?
We firmly believe that arresting protesters and charging them under Section 18 of the Peaceful
Demonstration Act is not a viable solution. Neither is brushing unsavory facts about these
projects under the carpet a solution.
The current government inherited commitments made by their predecessors to allow huge
projects at the expense of the people and the environment. Therefore, most of them landed the
government in controversies; it led to numerous protests and criticism from the people.
Therefore, the government has prioritized to resolve them immediately.
We urge our leaders to resolve the legacy of the Dark Age with great patience, transparency,
sense of justice and take into consideration the long term interests of the people.

COUNTRY PROFILE
...The military government has been accused of gross human rights abuses, including the forcible relocation of civilians and
widespread use of forced labour, which includes children. Military-run enterprises control key industries, and corruption and
severe mismanagement are the hallmarks of a black-market-riven economy. The armed forces - and former rebels-opted by
the government - have been accused of large-scale trafficking in heroin, of which Burma is a major exporter. Prostitution
and Aids are major problems...
..............................................
(Country Profile: Burma/BBC News/16.03.2003)
____________________________________________
INTERNATIONAL CORRUPTION INDEX
- Burma/Myanmar is ranked 172 of 176 nations in Transparency Internationals 2012 corruption index.
After Burma come only four more countries, namely Sudan (173), Afghanistan (174), North Korea (175), and Somalia (176).
.........................................
(Report of the Transparency International, 2012. http://www.transparency.org/country#MMR)
_____________________________________________

Burma Still Among Worlds Most Corrupt Countries, Index Finds

By TIN HTET PAING / THE IRRAWADDY| Thursday, January 28, 2016 |
RANGOON ? Burma remains among the worlds most corrupt countries, according to a new index by Berlin-based graft monitor
Transparency International, though it has shown marginal improvement over the past year.
Perceived corruption levels were assessed for 168 countries on a scale of zero to 100, with higher scores representing cleaner
governance. Burmas global rank 147 out of 168 was a marked improvement over last years 156, though the country scored only one
point better than it did in the 2014 assessment.
Burma earned a score of 21 points, a slight improvement over last years 22. With some minor fluctuations, Burmas score has
improved by 15 points since 2012, indicating an initial upward trend that has slowed over the past two years...

http://www.irrawaddy.com/burma/burma-still-among-worlds-most-corrupt-countries-index-finds.html
______________________________________________

35% OF MYANMAR RURAL FOLKS DEPEND ON LOANS TO BUY FOOD: STUDY

Thirty-five per cent of the rural people in Myanmar have to seek loans all year round to buy food while half of the rural populace faces
food insecurity at least two months out of a year, according to a research by Michigan State University and Myanmar Development
Resource Institute (MDRI).
Myanmar has a population of over 60 million in Myanmar, about 70 per cent are living in rural areas. According to data collected by
Michigan State University and MDRI, family experiencing poverty and food problemst tends to be landless households, which
accounts for half of the rural population. They have become victims of unfair allocation of land, climate change, poor agricultural
management during increasingly untimely rainfalls, high transport cost, and rural monetary organisations lack of capability to
assist their needs... The paper highlighted the important role of rural education and the need to nurture agriculturalists because
80 per cent of students living in the rural areas usually drop out...
The poverty rate in the rural areas is two times higher than that in the urban areas, accounting for 80 per cent of the total populations
poverty rate. The largest number of poor households is concentrated in the states of Chin, Rakhine and Shan while the poverty rate is
getting high in the populous regions of Ayeyawady and Mandalay, according to the framework on economic and social change.

.....................................
(Asia News Network, News Desk, Eleven Media Group, Publication Date : 24-06-2013)
___________________________________________________________________

HOW THE FORMER UNION OF BURMA CAME INTO BEING - A BRIEF BACKGROUND HISTORY

What is known universally as Burma or Myanmar is comprised of several major and minor indigenous races. Some among the
major races are: Burmans, Chins, Kachins, Karennis (Kayahs), Kayins, Mons, Rakhines and Shans (under the term: Shans the following peoples are also included: Pa-O, En, Danu, Palaung, Lishu, Kokang, Wa, etc., besides the Tais who form the
majority). The Burmans, Mons, Rakhines and Shans had had kingdoms of their own for centuries. The British conquered
them after three wars in 1885.
The Chins, Kachins and Karennis were ruled by their own hereditary Chiefs and were never directly parts of the said
kingdoms. The first major armed conflicts between the British and western Chins (who were formerly known as Lushais or
Kukis and are now known as Mizos - the Chins have always called themselve in the following terms: Asho, Cho, Lai, Mizo,
Zomi, or simply Zo), for instance, took place in 1871-72 when the British launched a major expedition agaainst them which
is known as the Lushai Expedition 1871-72. The first serious armed conflicts between the British and the southern Chins
took place when the former made an expedition against the later in 1841-42 under what is known as the Arakan Frontier
Expedition; major armed encounters between the northern Chins and the British first took place when the later launched a
major expedition called the First Chin Expedition 1888-89 which was to be followed by Chin-Lushai Expedition 188990, Lushai Expedition 1889-92, and the Chin Hills Expedition 1892-93. Two British soldiers were awarded the Victoria
Cross (VC), the highest and most prestigious award for gallantry in the face of the enemy that can be awarded to British and
Commonwealth forces - one during the Lushai Expedition 1871-72, and the other during the First Chin Expedition 1888-89
(see the 337-page excerpt of my 663-page paper named The Chin/Zo People of Bangladesh, Burma and India - An
Introduction XVIII https://de.scribd.com/doc/18092021/The-Chin-Zo-People-of-Bangladesh-Burma-and-India-An-Introduction-XVIII ).
The British could bring them under their complete control only in 1919 at the end of two rebellions, namely the Haka and
Thadou-Kuki rebellions after two years between 1917 and 1919. The Kachins and Karennis also had bravely fought against the
British before being finally conquered.
At first what is now known as Burma was ruled as a province of the British India. And then in 1937 it was made as British
Burma. However, the Chins, Kachins, Karennis and Shans were separately ruled under the Frontier Areas Administration
(FAA) and not included in what was then known as Ministerial Burma or Burma Proper. When Burmese nationalists
demanded independence, the British made it a precondition that the opinion of the peoples under the Frontier Areas
Administration must first be asked whether they would like to be in a union with the Burmans. Had those peoples under
the FAA rejected to form up a union with the Burmans, the ministerial Burma alone would have become
independent. The British therefore urgently set up a committee under the official name of THE FRONTIER AREAS
COMMITTEE OF ENQUIRY to conduct enquiries about the wishes of those peoples under the FAA. The committee was
also known unoffcially as Rees-Williams Commission, after its chairmans name. It was this document that had given the
birth of the former Union of Burma.
The Territories under the FAA were as follows: 1. The Federated Shan States, including Kokang State and Mongpai & the
Northern and Southern Wa States [Shans and Lolo Moso, Palaung-Wa, Indians, Chinese and Others, Kachins & Burma
Group], ; 2. The Kachin Hills [Kachins, Shans & Burma Group]; 3. The Chin Hills [Chins], including the Arakan Hill Tracts
[Chins, Others, Burma Group]; 4. The Karenni States; 5. The Salween District [Karens, Shan (Tai), Burmese]; 6. The Naga
Hills [Nagas & Shans]; 7. Other Areas: a) Tamu Township [Chins & Shans]; b) Eastern Toungoo, Kyain, Myawadi and
Thaton Part II Area [Karens]; c) Thaungdut and Sinkaling Hkamti [Nagas, Chins and Shans]; d) The Homalin Subdivision
[Chins and Shans]; e) The Somra Tract [Chins & Nagas]; f) The Katha Part I Area [Kachins & Shans].
For full background historical facts about this commission, see the 6-page except of the 22-page REPORT OF THE
FRONTIER AREAS COMMITTEE OF ENQUIRY 1947, the full text itself plus a map of BURMA ADMINISTRATIVE
DISTRICTS, and another equally important document called THE PANGLONG AGREEMENT at the end of this paper.
under ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ITEMS HEREWITH ATTACHED.

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MAP 2
HEADiNGT MAP SHOIIING THE MIGRATION ROUTES Or THE TIBETO-BIJRMAN GROUPS INTO BURMA
Circled routes of misration are that of the Chins

- route(l)

Northern Chins

- route(2)

Central Chins
SouthernChins

- route(3 & 4)

(Routesare circled and numbered by myself for explanatory purpose)

- mE CHI{S
ofBurma:Cu.sdnns
andCulnreofIndignousPeaplzs
Sourceof Map - Uni.on
Publishedby the Burma SocialistProgrammeParty, February1968
- Created in this form by thangzadal/06.2014

Area: 261,220 sq.mi (676,560 km2)

Burma/Myanmar is made up of 7 non-Burman national States (Chin, Kachin, Kayin, Kayah, Mon, Rakhine and Shan), and
7 Divisions within the Burma Proper (Ayeyarwady, Bago, Magwe, Mandalay, Sagaing, Yangon and Taninthary)
Official Landmass of Non-Burman indigenous national races : Chin State (36,019 sq. km or 5.32 %); Kachin State (89,012
sq. km or 13.16 %); Kayin State (30,383 sq. km or 4.5 %); Kayah State (11,670 sq. km or 1.72 %); Mon State (12,155 sq. km or
1.8 %); Rakhaing/Rakhine State (36,780 sq. km or 5.44 %); Shan State (155,800 sq. km or 23.02 %). These territories
altogether make up about 55.14 % of the entire area of Burma. (Prepared in this form - except the map - by Thang Za Dal. 07/2013)

______________________________________________________________________________

MAP 8

______________________________________________________
The combined length of all motor roads in Chin State (36,019 sq km) - nearly as large as
Switzerland - is only about 1,200 km. And most of them are dry-season-only and jeepable!
(Created in this form by thangzadal/hamburg/06/.2014)

THE CRUCIAL ROLES OF CHIN/ZO SOLDIERS IN BURMA

THE BATTLE OF INSEIN NEVER REALLY ENDED *
by Aung Zaw
Although some foreign historians have depicted the Battle of Insein as a conflict between Burman troops and
Karen rebels, Tun Tin noted that soldiers from different regions of Burma helped to defend Rangoon. They
included Chin, Kayah, Shan, Gurkha and Kachin battalions (though some Kachin took up arms against the U Nu
government). The most decisive role in defendingInsein was played by the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Chin Rifles, fighting
on what is regarded as the most strategic battle front of all. Some insurgents, including communists, reinforced
Burmese forces before going back to the jungle to repel Burmese troops...

...........................................................................
(Monday, February 9, 2009)
Copyright 2008 Irrawaddy Publishing Group | www.irrawaddy.org
Note: U Aung Zaw is from Myanmar/Burma and is the founder and Chief-Editor of The Irrawaddy, a magazine
published in Chiang Mai, Thailand.
The Irrawaddy covers news and offers in-depth analysis of political and cultural affairs in Burma and Asia generally.
* See 16.2. The Outbreak of Civil War and the Crucial Roles of Chin Soldiers and Appendix DD for full text.

---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

STATEMENT OF THE CHIN COMMUNITY (GERMANY) ON RUMOURS ABOUT CHIN SOLDIERS

SHOOTING AT DEMONSTRATORS IN BURMA (DATED OCTOBER 2007) *
Ever since the first masssacres of the students in 1962, General Ne Win's Military Intelligence Service used
to spread words about Chin soldiers shooting at demonstrators. The same thing happened during the 1974
Labour and U Thant Strikes and again during the 1988-Uprisings after troops had mowed down thousands of
demonstrators. This is part of Ne Win's stratagem to reduce public hatred towards him and his Burma Army
and to instill ethnic hatred among the oppressed people. This stratagem proves to be successful as some of our
Burman brothers and sisters believe those rumours and even spread the words further, unwittingly serving the
interest of the military dictators. This is due to total ignorance of what happened inside the Burma Army under
General Ne Win...
.......................................................................................

* See Appendix S for full text!

________________________________________________________
WERE CHIN SOLDIERS MADE SCAPEGOATS? *
by Zaw Htwe Maung
Traditionally, Chins are warrior tribes and many Chins joined the Burma Rifles since Burma was under the
British Rule. The bulk of the soldiers in the British-trained Army were of minority ethnic groups such as Chins,
Kachins and Karens...Hence, many Chins were career soldiers and officers when Burma regained her
independence and they had a very good reputation as 'Loyalists to the Union', 'Real Soldiers Defending
Democracy' and so on, under U Nu's Regime...As mentioned earlier, Chins are traditionally warrior tribes and
well known to be good and disciplined soldiers... Nowadays, in Burma if one sees a minority soldier who speaks
Burmese with accent they just conclude that this is a Chin although they may be a Wa or Karen or Kachin or
of other minorities, because the reputation of Chin soldiers was totally destroyed since Ne Win's Era...There
is no doubt that the Chins were made Scapegoats by the Burmese Military for their propaganda purposes as
well as for their further 'divide and rule policy' because all opposition groups, whether they are Burmese or
ethnic minorities, have the same and single goal which is to topple down the Military Dictatorship in Burma
and the Junta is afraid that they will be united...
.................................................................................................................
- Source: Chinland Guardian
November 22, 2007
* See Appendix T for full text!
- Mr. Zaw Htwe Maung is an Arakanese scholar.

_________________________________________________________________________________________
Note: The above quotations are from my own 628-page paper: The Chin/Zo People of Bangladesh, Burma and India An Introduction (XVII)

PHOTO J
Some of the Most Prominent Chin/Zo Leaders of the Second Generation Inside Burma
(Chin/Zo Leaders of the First Generation Were the Chiefs and Elders Who Led Campaigns Against the British)

Front Row Sitting L - R: Lt. Col. Lian Cin Zam (CO., Chin Hills Bn); Mr. R. Tuang Hmung, W.K.H., B.A (Hons) - Deputy
Commissioner, Falam; Col. Dal Za Kam (Comd No. 2. Lt Inf Bde); Mr. Thawng Cin Thang, T.P.C (Secretary, Chin Ministry);
Lt. Col. Son Kho Pau (CO., 2nd Bn, Chin Rifles).
Standing L - R: Lt. Col. Po Kung (CO., 2 (E) Chin Bn); Mr. Za Hre Lian (Deputy Commissioner, Kampetlet); Sithu Mr. Vum Ko
Hau (Deputy Secretary, Foreign Office); Mr. Sa Vut, W.K.H.(Asst. Secretary, Chin Ministry); Major (later Colonel) Van Kulh,
BGM & Bar (Offg. Comd, 1st Chin Rifles)

____________________________________________

The information below is collected and prepared in this form by Thang Za Dal. 04.2016.
- At the peak of the Karen Uprising from early 1948 to mid 1949 a number of Chin battalion commanders, among them
Lt. Col. Lian Cin Zam, tried to remain neutral between the Karens and Burmans. U Nu, the then Prime Minister, was forced
to fly to Pegu to personally plead Col. Lian Cin Zam to side with the government. The Burmese politicians and military
top brass could never forget and forgive this humiliation. When he suddenly died in a military hospital under very
unusual circumstances in 1956, the government refused to transport his remains and family to Kalaymyo by Burma Air
Force planes. So, his body and family were flown to Kalaymyo by a company aeroplane of the Burmah Oil Company
(BOC). Its top managers were former intimate friends of the late colonel.
- Col. Dal Za Kam was forced to resign without pension because he also opposed to fight against the Karens, according to a
confidential War Office report, under the title of A Paper of the Chin Affairs in the Army (Sheet 1):
...At this conference, the authorities at War Office had their first insight into Col. Dal Za Kams unmilitary character and reactionary
mental attitude when he refused to recognise the country-wide uprisings as an insurrection against the legally constituted Government
but chose instead to regard them as a racial affair between the Burmans and the Karens in which Chin soldiers should not participate...
- Mr. Tuang Hmung later became a minister of Chin Affairs for a legislative period under the U Nu government.
- Mr. Thawng Cin Thang became Chief Commissioner of several Divisions.
- Lt. Colonel Son Kho Pau attained this rank at the age of 27! He was a hero of the Battle of Insein, commanding the 2nd Chin
Rifles. Several soldiers from his battalion were bestowed with outstanding awards (see Appendices P & DD). Born on July
1, 1920, at Thuklai, and after having passed 9th standard from Government Anglo-Vernacular High School in Falam, he joined
the 2nd Burma Rifles in 1939 and participated in the famous General Wingate Expedtion. He attained the rank of Major in
1945. He became CO of the 2nd Chin Rifles with the rank of Lt. Col. on Jan. 4, 1948 (Burmas Independence Day). He attended
Burma Army Staff College for one year run by the British and passed it with flying colours; he stood 1st in the class. Late in 1951
he was forced to resign without pay because of his disobedience to his superior, Brigadier Kyaw Zaw, who later took refuge in the
Peoples Republic of China where he died in mid 2012. Col. Son Kho Pau went underground in mid 1964 and went to East
Pakistan (now Bangladesh) with 150 men, where he got promises of military hardwares support for an armed force from the then
Pakistan government. He and his bodyguards were ambushed and captured by the 7th Assam Rifles inside Nagaland in 1965 on
their way back from East Pakistan. They were handed later over to the Burmese government. He was imprisoned in Mandalay for
ten years without trial before being released under a general amnesty.
His military carreer excerpted from: The Biography of Lt. Col. Son Kho Pau by Lt. Col. Thian Khaw Khai. 1994)
- Mr. Za Hre Lian later became a minster of Chin Affairs for one or two legislative periods and then served as Burmas
ambassador to Nepal, Egypt, France, Spain and the Netherlands. He died in 1997 in the US at the age of 74.
- Major (later Colonel) Van Kulh became a Minister of Housing for some years in the General Ne Win government.

_________________________________________________

Photo Courtesy - Dr. Huat Za Mang, M.B.B.S., F.R.C.S. (Thuklai, Chinland/Texas, USA) - 2012
Photo taken in Rangoon, Burma, 1950.

_____________________________________

CHINESE AND INDIANS: BURMAS TWO ALIEN ETHNIC GROUPS

THE CHINESE
The earliest records of Chinese migration into present-day Burma were in the Song and Ming dynasties.
[14] In the 18th century, Ming Dynasty princes settled in Kokang (the northern part of present-day Burma).
Another wave of immigration occurred in the 19th century under the British colonial administration.
Britain encouraged immigration of Indians and Chinese to British Burma, and such incentives for work
opportunities and enterprise and for accumulating wealth attracted many Chinese. They primarily came to
Burma via British Malaya.[14]
During the 1950s, Burma was one of the first countries to recognize the People's Republic of China as a
nation. However, its own Chinese population was treated as aliens. The Burmese Chinese were issued
foreign registration cards (FRC) in a tiered citizenship system adopted by the post-independence government.
Today, the majority of retail, wholesale and import trade businesses are run by the Burmese Chinese
today.[14] For example, Sein Gayha a major retailer that began in Yangon's Chinatown in 1985, is owned
by a Hakka Chinese family. Moreover, four of the five largest commercial banks in Myanmar, Myanmar
Universal Bank, Yoma Bank, Myanmar Mayflower Bank, and the Asia Wealth Bank, were all founded by
Sino-Burmese.[45]
Upper Burma has seen a demographic shift resulting from the recent immigration of many Mainland
Chinese to Mandalay Region, Shan,[46] and Kachin States.[47] Ethnic Chinese now constitute an
estimated 30 to 40% of Mandalay's population.[48] Huge swaths of land in city centre left vacant by the
fires were later purchased, mostly by the ethnic Chinese, many of whom were recent immigrants from
Yunnan.[49] The Chinese influx accelerated after the current military government came to power in 1988.
With the Burmese government turning a blind eye, many Chinese immigrants from Yunnan (and also from
Sichuan) poured into Upper Burma in the 1990s, settling in Mandalay.[19] In the 1990s alone, about
250,000 to 300,000 Yunnanese were estimated to have migrated to Mandalay.[48] Their arrival has been
vital in the doubling of Mandalay's population from about 500,000 in 1980 to one million in 2008. Chinese
festivals are now firmly embedded in the city's cultural calendar.[49] The influx of Mainland Chinese into
the city and the subsequent displacement of native Burmese to the outskirts of the city has created
racial tensions.[50] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chinese_people_in_Burma
THE INDIANS
Burmese Indians (Burmese) are a group of people of Indian ethnicity who live in Myanmar (Burma). While
Indians have lived in Burma for many centuries, most of the ancestors of the current Burmese Indian
community emigrated to Burma from the start of British rule in the mid 19th century to the separation of
British Burma from British India in 1937. During British times, ethnic Indians formed the backbone of the
government and economy serving as soldiers, civil servants, merchants and moneylenders. A series of
anti-Indian riots beginning in 1930 and mass emigration during the Japanese occupation of Burma followed
by the forced expulsion of 1962 left ethnic Indians with a much reduced role in Burma.
Historically, Burmese Indians have made their livelihoods as merchants, traders and shopkeepers as well
as manual labourers such as coolies, dockers, municipal workers, rickshaw men, pony cart drivers, malis
and durwans. They were also heavily represented in certain professions such as civil servants, university
lecturers, pharmacists, opticians, lawyers and doctors. They dominated several types of businesses such
as auto parts and electrical goods, ironmongery and hardware, printing and bookbinding, books and
stationery, paper and printing ink, tailoring and dry-cleaning, English tuition, and money lending.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Burmese_Indians
________________________________________________
Note: For more information on these two ethnic groups, visit the Wikipedia websites.

.{-

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ABECOR

COUNTRYREPORT

Withcompliments
of

Bank
Dresdner

Aktiengesellschaft

A B E C O Ri s a n a s s o c i a t i o no f E u r o p e a n b a n k s s e e k i n g t o i m p r o v e t h e s e r v i c e st h a t e a c h i n d i v i d u a lm e m b e r i s '
a b l e t o o f f e r t o i t s c u s t o m e r sb y d e v e l o p i n gb a n k i n ga n d f i n a n c i a lo b j e c t i v e so n t h e b a s i s o f m u t u a l c o - o p e r a t i o n .

Burma
Head ol State: PresidentU San Yu

of commodit

for e

re,
i nfrastructu
Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Planning & Finance:
ThuraU Tun Tin
Population:36.2 million(mid 1981estimate)
Gross Domestic Product (GDPI: US$5955million (year ending
March 1983)
Inflation Rate:7.9ok(12 monthsto July 1983)
ExchangeRate: US$1 : Kyat7.773(15.2.841
ForeignGurrencyReserves:US$75.1million(October1983)
Gold Holdings:0.251millionfine troy ounces(October1983)
lmport Cover: 0.8 months(June1983estimate)
Payments:Thereshouldbe no difficultywith paymentsfor exports
to Burma,providedthat the purchasehas been authorisedby the
appropriatestatetradingcorporation.
PresentSituation
earninqsareadverselvaffectinqthe balanceoJ
Shortfallsin e,xport
m e n t sa n d e c o n o m i c
is slowing.Inflation,however,is
v +

1,

i n c r e a s i n g tl yi m i t e d .
fq6twiiF6ia;,Ainilthe economic liberaIisationof recentyears,the
faralleleconomyis stillestimatedto be the equivalentof a third of
the officialeconomy so that, despitethe substantiallV
improved
budgetpositionarisingfrom the reform of publicsectorfinances,
revenuepotentialis still not fullv realised.Considerable
relianceis
thereforeplacedon publicsectorborrowingand althoughtherehai
been some Successin increasingthe level of private domestie
savingsin the past five years,heavvforeign borrowinghas beel
necessarvto helo furul=th_e
developrlqnt proqramme..
The 1982/83- 1985/86DevelopmentPlan
Overthe periodof the fourthplaneconomicgrowthis plannedto
per annum,slightlylower than in the previousplan.
average6.20/o
Targetsincludeannualaverageincreases
of 11.6%,5.5%
and 15.8%
in the production of gLoods,servicesand in exports respectively.
Fulfilmentof the targetsis criticallydependenrrpon-{heperfomsectorwhilethe privatesectorwill continue
anceof the agricultural
long-termpolicyto reduce
to playa prominentrole,notwithstanding
the role of the latterto only just over a quarterof GDPby 1993/94
recordedin the
comparedwith 57% at present.Followingthe 7.1o/o
first year of the plan,the overallgrowthtargetfor the secondyear
(1983/84)
hasbeenset at 5%, reflectingpublicinvestmentcutbacks.

Political Situation
In 1981,U NeWinsteppeddownfrom the Presidency,
a postwhich
he had heldsincethe presentconstitution
was promulgatedin 19-14. Agriculture
ppo rtinq two.However,the formerpresident,in his roleas Chairmanof the Burma
Agttigullutgis the d om i nant economic seglgl,_-s*u
for ground half gf GDPald
SocialistProgrammeParV (BSPP).the only recognisedpolitical thxd-q-ollb_e..poqulatign
and g.c.countjnq
party, continuesto play a prominent part in government.The
.exports. Followingthe abolitionof the absenteeand oversea's
term of office is due to expire in 1985.]@1
landlordsystem the sector is dominatedby smallholdings,
incumbentPresident's
with
administration'smain domestic oroblem continues to be thq l# nearly60% of the landheldin plotsof lessthanten acres.lmportant
|...,op'inc|udegroundnuts,SeSameseeds,jute,pu|sesandsuga
!'cane,grownmain|yfordomeSticconsumption.HoweVer,rice,which
is producedon around65% of the cultivatedarea,is the maincrop
Internationalrelationsare governedby strict applicationof the
principlesof non-alignmentalthoughthis does not precludethe
and the principlesource of foreign exchange.Productionis still
foreign aid. The
hamperedby the limiteduseof high-yielding
varietiesalthoughtheir
acceplanceof bilateral,as well as multi-lateral,
shareof totalriceproductionhasrisento aroundtwo-thirdsundera
bomb attackon SouthKoreanministersby NorthKoreanagentson
programmeintroducedin 1975/76.
Burmesesoil,hasled to Burma'sbreakingoff of diplomaticrelations
with North Korea.
Notwithstandingprogress with the programme, which was
the sectoris stilloperatingbelow
extendedto othercropsin 1979-80,
potential.Despiterecentincreases
for somecrops,notablyrice,low
GeneralEconomy
government agriculturalprocurementprices remain the major
Reformof governmentfinances,
liberalisation
of the economyand
greaterforeignparticipation
haveboostedeconomicgrowth.During
constraint.Moreover,only 10% of the land is irrigateddespitea
programmeof dam construction,
the third four-year development plan (1978/79-1981/821
real GDP
andthereis littlemultiplecropping
p'erannum,risingto 7J% in the fiscalyear
growth averaged6.7o/o
lt has beenestimatedthat land
or use of fertilisersand oesticides.
equalin areato that undercultivationis availablefor development,
ended 31 March 1983.Reflectingthe strategyof developingthe
traditionalexport strengths- agriculture.forestryand mining utilisation
of whichwouldexpandproduction,providinga livelihood
these sectorsrecordedsubstantialincreasesin output during the
for the increasingpopulationand boostingexports.
third plan, although that of mine;als fell below expectations,
principallybecauseof shortfallsin oil production.However,in the
financialyear ended 31 March 1983 all three sectorsregistered
with outputof mineralsrisingby 26.2%.
substantialincreases.
Althoughas a result of the policyof economicself-sufficiency
externaltradeis equivalentto a relativelysmallproportionof Gross 1
DomesticProduct(GDP),Burma has not completelyescapedthe ,
effects,ofthe recent world recession.$ major prCblgll!"s*lheg
I

l e v e l l e do f t a s w o r l d d e m a n d a n d o r i c e sf e l l f r o m t h e i r 1 9 8 0
esl prooucts sector rs
o
tte r
El]Ia-nsion of the
plantatrons.

The-s t an

Industry
The manufacturing sector, which accounts for around 10% of
G D P ,i s c o n c e n t r a t e db n f o o d p r o c e s s i n ga n d c l o t h i n gm a n u f a c t u r e .
A p r i n c i p l e f e a t u r e o f e c o n o m i c p l a n n i n g h a s b e e n t o e s t ab l i s h a f o o d
processing industry to complement the agricultural sector, so that
f o o d a n d b e v e r a g e p r o c e s s i n g n o w a c c o u n t sf o r s o m e t w o - t h i r d s o f
total value added in manufacturing. Indeed, manufacturing investment tends to be concentrated in areas, including fertiliser plants,
w h i c h p r o m o t e a g r i c u l t u r a lg r o w t h . . . . .
A i d e d b y e c o n o m i c r e f o r m s , p a r t i c u l a r l yt h e i n t r o d u c t i o n o f b o n u s
schemes and greater managementautonomy,the manufacturing
s e c t o r g r e w b y a r o u n d 9 % i n 1 9 8 0 / 8 1 a n d 1 9 8 1/ 8 2 , a l t h o u g h r e s u l t s
f e l l b e l o w e x p e c t a t i o n so v e r t h e f u l l p e r i o d o f t h e f o u r y e a r p l a n ,a n d
in 1982/83output growth felltoT.-17..lt is reported that many enterprises have been forced to operate below full capacity owing to
shortages of fuel.
Minerals and Energy
T h e r e a r e e x p l o i t a b l ed e p o s i t s o f t i n , t u n g s t e n , l e a d , z i n c , j a d e ,
c o p p e r , n i c k e l a n d s i l v e r , o f w h i c h l e a d - z i n co r e i s t h e m o s t
significant. The metals sector has regained some of its former
importance following the completion of the Bawdwin lead/zinc/s i l v e r m i n i n g c o m p l e x i n t h e n o r t h e r n S h a n s t a t e ,a c o p p e r m i n i n g
project at Monywa in Upper Burma and a tin smelting plant at
S y r i a m , n e a r R a n g o o n .C o m p l e t i o n o f a t i n d r e d g i n g p r o j e c t a n d
r e h a b i l i t a t i o no f t h e K a n b a u k m i n e r e s u l t e d i n a 4 5 Y ' i n c r e a s e i n t i n
a n d t u n g s t e n p r o d u c t i o ni n 1 9 8 1 / 8 2 .
t of crude oil has fallen bv 12on

rnarked slowdr:wn from the 15% increaseof the previous year.

W i t h i n t h i s b u d g e t t h e m a i n c h a n g e i s i n t h e i n v e s t m e n ta c c o u n t ,
which is budgeted to rise by only 7.37. compared with over 50%.in
t h e p r e v i o u s y e ar . T h e e f f e c t o f t h e s l o w d o w n i s t o l i m i t t h e r e d u c t i o n
i n t h e o v e r a l l s u r p l u s o n t h e a d m i n i s t r a t i v eb u d g e t t o l e s s t h a n 3 0 0
m i l l i o n k y a t s ( U S $ 3 8 m i l l i o n )c o m p a r e d w i t h a l m o s t s i x t i m e s t h a t
amount in the previous year. Investment in state economic
e n t e r p r i s e s ,w h i c h i s o v e r t h r e e t i m e s t h e l e v e l o f t h a t i n t h e a d m i n i strative budget, is also to slow sharply, falling by 3.8% compared
with a rise of 24.2% the previous year. While the increase in state
enterprise borrowing from the banking system is projected at only
l . 7 o k , b a n kb o r r o w i n g b y t h e s e o r g a n i s a t i o n sw i l l n e v e r t h e l e s sh a v e
risenby over 50% since 1980/81.
External Sector
Balance of Trade
(US$ million)

Exports
lmports(fob)
Balance

1979
362.9
732.2
-369.3

1980
421.7
785.6
-357.9

1981
530.9
860.2
-329.3

1982
421.5
881.9
460.4

e_V11g_r_trgqg_pgllg1t.
nce is distorted by smuqqlinq, but it Li
evi
d teak which
O e t w e e n I n e m a C C O U n t e Of O l b l " / o O TO i l l C l a l e X p O r I S I n l y U Z , n a v e I n

b e t w e e n 19 8 1 a n d t h e f i r s t q u a r t e r o f 1 _ 9 8 JT.h. e f a l I i n e x p o r t e a r n i n g s
ports this year. However,
h
officially recorded imports continue to be dominated by capital
goods and raw materials so that the scope for cutbacks without
adversely affecting development remains limited.llqleover, de,s:
Dite a substantial inflow of foreion aid and qrants. borrowino from
tnanctn

as the most promrsrng

estimated at 543 million barrels of oil. Total natural gas output rose
-[y*Se/" to 665 million
1 9 8 1/ 8 2 . F u r t h e r n a t u r a l g a s f i n d s h a v e b e e n r e p o r t e d f o l l o w i n g
ICsun,ptlo
In t e r e s t s .
--TE6-ificrease

in exploration activity for hydrocarbons is a

c o n s e q u e n c eo f t h e d r i v e t o e x p a n d m i n e r a l sp r o d u c t i o n .D u r i n gt h e
c u r r e n t f o u r y e a r p l a n a n a n n u a l a v e r a g e i n c r e a s eo I 1 2 . 8 o kf o r t h e
mining sector is envisaged, while for 1983/84 investment in the
sector is set at US$68 million. Burma also possessesconsiderable
hydro-electric potential, of which only about 10% has so far been
exploited. However, over half of total electricityoutput is generated
by hydro power and further expansion of the generating capacity is
unoerway.

m e d i u m a n d l o n g i e i m d e b t m o r e t h a n d o u b l e d b e t w e e n 1 9 7 8a n d
1981 to stand at US$1,755 million. Amonq the main source-i6TEid,

rom the UnitedStateswas resumedin 1

q ap .

Outlook
Furthee
r x p l o i t a t i oonf t h e a g r i c u l t u r aaln d m i n e r a b
l a s es h o u l d
enable steady economic growth to be maintained,given the
c o n t i n u e d a v a i l a b i l i t yo f f i n a n c e . H o w e v e r , i n v i e w q f t h e c q 1 g l f A i n l s

Public Finance
In the administrative budget for 1983/84, total expenditure is
targeted to increaseto 7.24 billion kyats (US$907 million),a rise of
around 5% comoared with orovisional fioures for 1982/83 and a

Prepared15 February1984

THEABECORGROUPCOMPRISES:
Members
Algemene Bank l.,lpderland
+ B a n c aN a z i o n a l ed e l L a v o r o
B a n q u e B r u x e l l e sL a m b e r t
B a n q u e N a t i o n a l ed e P a r i s
B a r c l a y sB a n k

Bayerische
Hypotheken-und
Wechsel-Bank
AG
(HYPO-BANK)
DresdnerBankAG
Osterreichische
Ldnd.erbank
AG
B a n q u eI n t e r n a t i o n adl eL u x e m b o u r g

AssociatedMember
B a n q u ed e l a S o c i 6 t 6F i n a n c i d r e
Europ6enne

*Denotesrepresentation
for Burma

n f t h e A B E C O Rb a n R sT. h e a b o v er e p o r th a s b e e n p r e p a r e df o r t h e m b y
fhis is a jointpublicatioo
Barclays Bank Group EconomicsDepartment, 54 Lombard Street, London.
T h e i n f o r m a t i o ni s b a s e do n s o u r c e sw h i c hw e c o n s i d e r e l i a b l eh, o w e v e rn e i t h e rA B E C O Rn o r i t s M e m b e rB a n k sa s s u m ea n y r e s p o n s i b i l i tf yo r i t s a c c u r a c y .
T h e c o n t e n t so f t h i s r e p o r ts h o u l dn o t b e r e p r o d u c e di n p a r t o r i n f u l l w i t h o u tp r i o ra p p r o v afl r o m A B E C O R .

AREA: 261,220 sq.mi (676,560 km2)

The former Union of Burma (since 1989: Union of Myanmar) is comprised of seven non-Burman national states, namely Chin, Kachin, Kaya (Karenni), Kayin (Karen), Mon, Rakhine and Shan (these and ethnic Burmans are officially defined by
the Burmans as indigenous peoples or indigenous national races), and seven divisions of the Proper Burma, namely,
Ayeyarwady, Bago, Magway, Mandalay, Sagaing, Taninthaya and Yangon.
More than 55.14 % of the land is inhabited by

these non-Burman indigenous peoples. And their territories are

strategically located along the international boundaries and are rich in natural resources.
Official Landmass of Non-Burman indegenous peoples territories are as follows: Chin State (36,019 sq. km or
5.32 %); Kachin State (89,012 sq. km or 13.16 %); Kayin State (30,383 sq. km or 4.5 %); Kayah State (11,670 sq. km
or 1.72 %); Mon State (12,155 sq. km or 1.8 %); Rakhaing/Rakhine State (36,780 sq. km or 5.44 %); Shan State
(155,800 sq. km or 23.02 %).
Population: 60 million (official)
- 55,000 000 (CIA - Factbook: 2012)
- 48,000 000 (Transparency International 2012)
Ethnicity (Calculaton based on the official figure): Burman: 68 %; Karen 7 %; Shan 9%; Rakhine: 4 %; Chin: 2 %;
Kachin: 5 %; Karennis (Kayahs): 0, 5 %; Naga: 0,1 % etc. And among the two alien nationals the Chinese make up
2.4 %, and the Indians about 2 %, etc.
Religions: Buddhist 89 %, Christian 4% (Baptist Church: 813,000; Roman Catholic Church: 380,000; Assembly of God:
51,000; Anglican Church: 45,000; Church of Christ: 42,000; Methodist Church: 35,000; Seventh Day Adventist Church:
32,000; United Pentecostal Church: 27,000, etc.), Muslim 4%, Animist 1%, others 2%. (Note: Statistics on Churches
membership were from 1995.)
Currency: Kyat or K. Exchange rates of hard currencies - 1 USD= K. 850; 1 Euro = K. 1,200
Foreign Exchange Reserves: $ 7 billion. (Source : Reuters/Thu, Feb 02, 2012)
Economy: The Economy of Burma (Myanmar) is an emerging economy with an estimated nominal GDP
of $51.93 billion[5] and a purchasing power adjusted GDP of $83.74 billion.[5] Real growth rate is estimated
at 5.5% for the 2011 fiscal year. (Sources: "Burma". The World Factbook. Central Intelligence Agency. Retrieved
24 November 2012; "Burma". Myanmar Country Report. Global Finance. Retrieved 24 Nov. 2012.)
TRADE
Yangon, Aug 16 (IANS) Myanmar posted a trade surplus of $8.65 million in July, official media quoted the Central Statistical
Organisation as saying Friday.
With a total foreign trade of $1.586 billion, Myanmar's export amounted to $797.78 million, while its import stood at $789.13
million during the month, reported Xinhua.
However, in the first four months (April-July) of the 2013-14 fiscal year, Myanmar's foreign trade totalled $6.5 billion, of
which export stood at $2.964 billion, while import represented $3.536 billion. In the 2012-13 fiscal year, Myanmar's foreign
trade totalled $18.421 billion, up by over $250 million, or 1.4 percent compared with $18.17 billion in the previous fiscal
year. Of the total, export valued at $9.08 billion, while import stood at $9.341 billion.
Export items include natural gas, jade, beans and pulses, rice, fish, rubber and teak, while import items include oil and
gas, auto spare parts, iron and steel, palm oil, pharmaceutical products, plastics, fertiliser, cement and electronic
equipment. (IANS - MYANMAR POSTS TRADE SURPLUS By Indo Asian News Service | IANS Fri, Aug 16, 2013)
COST OF LIVING INDICATORS (as of December 2012): A 50-kg bag of rice of poorest quality: circa K. 15,000; best
quality: K. 34,000; 1.75 kg of pork: K. 3,500,- Kyats; 1.75 kg of chicken: K. 5,000; 1.75 kg of beef: K. 3,500; 1.75 kg of
cooking oil: K. 3,500; 1.75 kg of salt K. 200; a chicken egg: K. 80; a cup of tea: K. 200; Average earning per day(10
hours) of an unskilled labourer: K. 2,000; 1.73 kg of yellow Indian bean (Dahl: K. 1,500, etc.(Source: Average prices
based on various websites from Burma on commodity prices)
EXTERNAL DEBT: USD 11 billion (Most of the debts were incurred decades ago, before the banks pulled out, with some $
8.4 billion in debts built up during the socialist military regime headed by the late strongman Gen. Ne Win between 1962 and

1988. Myanmar owes $ 489 million to the ADB; $ 802 million to the World Bank; $ 6.4 billion to Japan, $ 2.1 billion to
China and $ 580 million to Germany*, according to the Myanmar government. (Source: February 9, 2012, 9:11 AM SGT
Wall Street Journal (blog) - Too Bad, Burma: Big Bank Loans Unlikely Anytime Soon. By Patrick Barta)
BURMAS EXTERNAL DEBTS PRIOR TO 1988
(In millions of US Dollar)
ADB

= 356.935

IDA

= 800.598

Denmark

= 53.039

Germany

= 584.728*

Japan

= 6388.328

Canada

= 8.056

Finnland

= 4.812

France

= 84.006

Italy

= 6.080

Netherland

= 9.756

Norway

= 37.027

Australia

= 37.027

UK

= 36.552

___________________
Total

8408.348

==================
* Compilers (TZD) Remark: Only when Germanys President visited Burma in 2014, Burmas actual debt to Germany
became officially known. Before that time it was always known to be only between $ 500 and 600 million.
Burmas debt to Germany [! 1,084 million] has been halved in a deal presided over by German
President Joachim Gauck and his Burmese counterpart Thein Sein in Naypyidaw on Monday. It was
agreed that the remaining debt will stand at 542 million euro (US$740 million) and will be repaid
at a rate of 3 percent interest over the next 15 years. (DVB News, 11 February 2014)
.................................................................
Germany signed an agreement to waive half of the 1,084 million euros in debt it is owed by
Myanmar at a ceremony in Nay Pyi Taw on February 10. The agreement was signed in the presence
of President U Thein Sein and his visiting German counterpart, Mr Joachim Gauck. It provides
for Myanmar to repay the remaining 542 million euros (K. 731,393,142,295) over 15 years at an
interest rate of three percent, said Myanmar state radio. The waiving of alf the debt is in line
with an agreement reached by the Paris Club of nations, of which Germany is a member, and
Myanmar on February 28, 2013. (Eleven Media. Tuesday, 11 February 2014 18:57)
_________________________________________
Burmas External Debts After 1988
(In millions of US Dollar)
OPEC

= 22.648

India

= 110.389

ROK

= 50.277

Japan

= 68.536

Thailand

= 63.420

Malaysia

= 150.00

Serbia

= 17.936

PRC

= 2131.744

_______________________
Total

2614.950

===================

Revenues from Sales of Natural Gas for Fiscal Years

(In millions of US Dollar)
2006-2007

= 2039.13

2007-2008

= 2520.74

2008-2009

= 2384.69

2009-2010

= 2926.69

2010-2011

= 2522.92

2011-2012
2012-2013

= 3502.52
= 3700 and more*

Source: Eleven Media Group (Myanmar)

September 10, 2013

_________________________________
DEFENCE BUDGET
MYANMAR MILITARY HANDED $ 2.4 BILLION BUDGET
AFP News 6 hours ago
Myanmar's military has been granted a $2.4 billion annual budget, just over 12 percent of total government
spending in the poverty-stricken country, according to figures seen by AFP on Wednesday.
The sum, approved by parliament last Friday, is $100 million less than the previous year but still likely to dwarf
the money available for the crumbling education and health care systems in the nation of 60 million people. Under
the former military junta which ruled Myanmar for decades, the state budget was not released publicly or put up
for scrutiny and oversight. Analysts say the army helped itself to the country's funds, notably profiting from a
large portion of the oil revenues.
But in a sign of sweeping reforms since 2011, lawmakers have reviewed the 2013-14 budget -- which totals
$19.49 billion -- and in one case even queried the amount handed to the military, whose allies dominate parliament.
That figure equates to around 20 percent of the $6 billion overall capital spending of Myanmar's ministries,
according to the section of the budget seen by AFP, but does not include other costs such as salaries.
Myanmar has a record of committing just $7 per year per person to health care, a mere 1.8 percent of the total
budget and one of the lowest health spending rates in the world, according to a 2009 UN report.
[NLDmembrsnSupportersofCRPPnNLDnDASSK]
Burma Related News - March 03-06, 2013.
Von:Tin Kyi <mtinkyi7@yahoo.com>
An: NLDmembrsnSupportersofCRPPnNLDnDASSK Datum: Do, 7 Mrz 2013 6:13 am

..........................................................................
BURMA PARLIAMENT APPROVES CONTROVERSIAL DEFENSE BUDGET
By THA LUN ZAUNG HTET/ THE IRRAWADDY| March 1, 2013 |

It is the first time however, that the Ministry of Defense has shared details of its annual military budget.
The documents show that it will spend about $ 633 million will be spent on military hardware, with about $200
million spent on aircraft, $ 93 million ships, $ 30 million military vehicles, $195 million on military accessories,
$112 million on military industries and $ 1.1 million on weapons.
.................................................................................
FOREIGN INVESTMENT
GAS EXPORTS HIT $7.2 BN IN 2 YEARS *
Published on Thursday, 09 May 2013 22:30
Myanmar has earned a total of US$7.2 billion from natural gas, the top export product of the country, during
the two years of civil governments administration, according to the Ministry of Commerce. The country hit
a new record of gas exports in the fiscal year 2012-13 with a total earning of $3.7 billion. It also yielded
$3.5 billion in 2011-12, the statistics show. There has been a surge in gas exports since the civil government
took office from the military regime in 2011. Compared to 20 billion earning in 2006-07, the latest figures have

nearly doubled in six years. Even in 2010-11, it still earned only $2.5 billion from gas exports, according
to the ministrys statistics.
[NLDmembrsnSupportersofCRPPnNLDnDASSK] News & Articles on Burma
Von: zin linn <zinlinn@yahoo.com.au>
Datum: Fr, 10 Mai 2013 2:51 pm
http://www.elevenmyanmar.com/business/3416-gas-exports-hit-7-2-bn-in-2-years.

______________________________________
NATURAL RESOURCES AND FOREIGN INVESTMENT AS OF JULY.2013
75 % of the worlds teak forest reserves, over 15 million hectares of tropical forests,oil, natural gas, iron,
tungsten, coal, nickel, gold, jade, ruby, sapphire, pearls, etc.
.
Asia News Network - MYANMAR TO PRODUCE 186,650 TONS OF TEAK IN 2013
Myanmar is planning to produce 186,650 tons of teak during this fiscal year, said Win Tun, Minister for
Environmental Conservation and Forestry, at the Parliament session on July 29.
The amount is about 80,000 tons less than last year's production, he said. The ministrys policy is to permit teak
and other trees with similar growth pattern to grow for at least 30 years before they could be cut down. This is to
sustain the industry, the minister said.
The authorities took action against illegal logging by companies and local forest rangers, along with a
businessman and his accomplices who cut down teak illegally in Chin State.
Myanmar has produced 269,516 tons of teak and 1,355,227 tons of hardwood in 2012-2013 and planns to
produce 186,650 tons of teak and 787,600 tons of hardwood this year. Myanmar will end the export of raw teak
and timber starting from April 1, 2014 and will only allow the export of higher-earning finished products, he said.
Business Desk, Eleven Media Group
Publication Date : 31-07-2013

............................................................................
-

The country has 7.8 trillion cubic feet of proven natural gas reserves, worth about $75 billion at current U.K.

benchmark prices. Neighbors India and China covet the stuff. In a recent report, the McKinsey Global Institute estimated
that energy and industries such as agriculture need a combined $ 320 billion through 2030 for Myanmars economy to pull
off 8 percent annual growth.
.............................................
CHINA OPENS PIPELINE TO BRING GAS FROM MYANMAR AMID LOCAL CONCERN OVER BENEFITS OF THE PROJECT
Associated PressBy Louise Watt, Associated Press | Associated Press Mon, Jul 29, 2013 4:00 AM EDT
The 793-kilometer (493-mile) pipeline connects the Bay of Bengal with southwest China's Yunnan province and is expected
to transfer 12 billion cubic meters of natural gas to China annually, according to a news release on the website of China
National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC). A parallel 771-kilometer (479-mile) pipeline that will carry Middle East oil shipped
via the Indian Ocean is still under construction...
In April, hundreds of people protested in western Rakhine state against the pipeline, saying they had to give up their land
for too little compensation and that salaries offered for local pipeline workers were too low.
.............................................................

State-run OVL and GAIL (India) have announced $1.33 billion investment in China-Myanmar gas
pipeline project, according to the statement.
Von:

Tin Kyi <mtinkyi7@yahoo.com>

An:
Datum:

NLDmembrsnSupportersofCRPPnNLDnDASSK
Mo, 10 Jun 2013 6:22 am

____________________________________

FOREIGN INVESTMENT: CIRCA USD 7 BILLION (UP TO END OF 2002)

Singapore (1500); UK (1400); Thailand (1200); Malaysia (650); USA (590); France (470); Netherland (240); Indonesia (240);
Japan (227); The Philippines(146); Hong Kong (150); Korea (160); Austria (82); Austalia (72); Canada (60 m); China (65);
Panama (30); Germany (15); Denmark (14), etc.(Source: Foreign Investment of Permitted Enterprises up to 31-12-2002;
Country No. of Enterprises approved Investment Value (million US$) http://www.mofa.gov.mm/aboutmyanmar/am12.html)
Note: Im inserting the above data in this paper here because its very interesting to note that the investment mentioned
above were made despite the country-wide Great Massacres of 1988 in which between 3 000 and 10 000 peaceful
demonstrators are believed to have been mowed down by government troops cold-bloodedly!).
_____________________________________________
FOREIGN INVESTMENT TILL AUGUST 2013
- Major offshore natural gas projects are under development. A consortium of South Korean and Indian firms, in
partnership with the Myanmar Oil and Gas Enterprise, has made a large gas find off the coast of Arakan State in western
Burma. Known as the Shwe gas project, it is expected to produce massive revenues once it is in production. Estimates
of the gas yield of the Shwe deposits range between US$37 to US$52 billion, and could lead to a total gain in revenues to
the junta or future Burmese governments of US$12 to US$17 billion over 20 years.
At present the SPDC receives the bulk of its gas money from the onshore Yadana and Yetagun gas fields. The
Yadana consortium is led by Total of France and includes UNOCAL (now Chevron) of the United States and Thailands
state-controlled PTT Exploration and Production Co Ltd (PTTEP). The Yetagun consortium, led by Malaysias state-owned
Petronas, includes Japans Nippon Oil as well as PTTEP. PTTEP,
a subsidiary of the largely state-owned PTT Public Co Ltd (PTT) of Thailand, buys the gas for export to Thailand.(Source:
Burma: Foreign Investment Finances Regime. October 2, 2007.

http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2007/10/01/burma-foreign-investment-finances-regime )
............................................................................
- YANGON, Dec 31[2010]: Foreign investment in Myanmars oil and gas has hit 13.5 billion U.S. dollars since the
country opened to such investment in late 1988, the local Biweekly Eleven News reported today, reports Xinhua.
Leading in foreign investment line-up sectorally, the oil and gas sector is followed by electric power with 11.341 billion U.S.
dollars, mining 2.395 billion U.S. dollars, manufacturing 1.663 billion U.S. dollars, hotels and tourism 1.064 billion U.S.
dollars and agriculture 96.351 million U.S. dollars. In 2009-10, Myanmar produced nearly 7 million barrels of crude oil and
400 billion cubic-feet (11.32 billion cubic-meters) of gas, according to official statistics. The countrys gas export in 200910 amounted to 8.29 billion cubic meters, standing as the second largest gas exporter in Asia-Pacific region. Although
annual foreign investment in the oil and gas sector stood only 278.6 million U.S. dollars in 2009-10, it was raised sharply
to 9.81 billion dollars merely in the first five months(April-August) of 2010-11, a latest statistics showed.(Source: Foreign
Investment in Myanmars Oil, Gas Hits $54.5 billion.
(http://www.newstoday.com.bd/index.php?option=details&news_id=16213&date=2011-01-01)

..........................................................................
Contracted foreign investment in Myanmar from 32 countries and regions hit 42.95 billion U.S. dollars
as of the end of July 2013 since 1988, according to the latest official figures. Country-wise speaking,
China led with 14.188 billion U.S. dollars, accounting for 33.04 percent of the total.China was followed by
Thailand (9.979 billion dollars), China' s Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (6.404 billion dollars),
the United Kingdom (3.045 billion dollars), South Korea (3.018 billion dollars), Singapore (2.358 billion dollars)
and Malaysia ( 1.034 billion dollars).
Sector-wise speaking, power sector led all sectors, with 19.237 billion dollars, accounting for 44.79
percent of the total. It was followed by oil and gas (14.372 billion dollars), mining (2.829 billion dollars),
manufacturing (2.749 billion dollars), hotels and tourist (1.585 billion dollars) and real estate (1.056
billion dollars).
Source: Foreign investment in Myanmar hits 42.95 bln USD
* 19 Aug 2013 12:55
* Written by Xinhua
............................................................................................................

DVB NEWS - NORWAY UPS BURMA OIL INVESTMENTS

By FRANCIS WADE
Published: 24 March 2011

Figures released last week by the Norwegian government show that investments in oil and gas compa-nies
operating in Burma stand at close to $US 5 billion, despite heavy opposition from rights groups. The new sum
marks an increase of around $US 300 million on last years figures. The state-owned investment body, the
Norwegian Pension Fund, holds shares in 15 energy companies in Burma, a position that the campaign group
Norwegian Burma Committee this week criticised as double morale.
The Fund, which was founded on the countrys North Sea oil wealth, was the focus of a damming report in
December last year by EarthRights International (ERI), who accused it of contributing to grave unethical actions
in Burma through its investments.
The revelation coincides with reports of several extra-judicial executions last month close to pipelines operated
by two overseas companies, the US-based Chevron and French oil giant, Total. Both are targets of investment by
the Fund, which has shares of more than $US 2 billion in Total and $US 0.9 billon in Chevron. It has also doubled
its stake in the controversial Swiss-American drilling firm Transocean, which is being investigated by the US for its
work with a consortium of Burmese companies that includes a firm owned by junta crony Steven Law, who is a
target of US sanctions...
Norway was one of the first countries to accept Burmese refugees following the 1988 uprising, and in 1991
awarded the Nobel Peace Prize to opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi.
___________________________________________
MYANMAR RECEIVES OVER 730 MLN USD'S FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN A SINGLE MONTH
* 09 Sep 2013 12:08
* Written by Xinhua

Myanmar received 731 million U.S. dollars' contracted foreign investment in a single month of August, bringing
the total to over 43 billion dollars as of the end of the month since 1988, local media reported Sunday.
The investment, which came from six countries and regions, was mostly injected in the manufacturing, making it
the largest foreign-invested sector in 2013.
As of the end of August, official figures showed that China had put in 14.189 billion dollars, followed by the Hong
Kong Special Administrative Region with 6.446 billion dollars, South Korea with 3.037 billion dollars, Singapore with
2.436 billion dollars, Malaysia with 1.625 billion dollars and Japan with 274 million dollars.
Copyright 1998 - 2013 Mizzima News. All Rights Reserved
..........................................................................................

BURMA GOVT DENIES REPORTS THAT IT HOLDS $ 11B IN SINGAPOREAN BANKS

By SAW YAN NAING / THE IRRAWADDY On Friday, September 13, 2013 @ 7:31 pm

RANGOONBurmas government on Thursday denied reports that it holds up to US$11 billion worth of foreign
reserves in several bank accounts in Singapore.
The figure was first mentioned by an independent financial researcher, who said that World Bank and Asian
Development Bank (ADB) officials had provided him with estimates of Bumas overseas reserves.
It is believed that the billions of dollars were stashed in Singapore by Burmas former military junta, which for
many years earned hundreds of millions of dollars annually from natural gas exports, much of which was
siphoned off and pocketed by members of the regime.
On Thursday, Deputy Minister of Information Ye Htut refuted the allegations that Naypyidaw maintained vast
amounts of foreign reserves overseas, after these reports emerged in local media in recent days.
The government doesnt stash away the national budget in foreign banks. Give us the evidence regarding the
$11 billion in five accounts. The government is ready to take action on it, he said in a Facebook post.
Jelson Garcia, Asia Program Manager with the Banking Information Center (BIC), said World Bank, ADB and
International Monetary Fund (IMF) officials informed him last year that Burmas government held up to $11 billion

in several Singaporean bank accounts.

BIC is a Washington-based non-profit organization that monitors international financial institutions. The World
Bank, ADB and IMF began re-engaging with the Burmese government last year. Previously, the institutions were
not allowed to deal with the former military regime, which had grown isolated and failed to pay its outstanding
arrears of almost $1 billion to the banks.
In 2009, the US-based non-profit organization Earth Rights International (ERI) reported that the then ruling junta
had excluded almost $5 billion in revenuesgenerated from the Yadana Gas project operated by oil giants Total
and Chevronfrom the countrys national budget.
Article printed from The Irrawaddy Magazine: http://www.irrawaddy.org
URL to article: http://www.irrawaddy.org/archives/43996

..........................................................................
MYANMAR POSSESSION OF $ 11B IN FOREIGN BANK ACCOUNTS BASED ON INFORMATION FROM WB AND ADB

Eleven Media Group/Published on Sunday, 15 September 2013 14:22

The recent reports about Myanmar possessing US$ 11 billion in five foreign bank accounts have been based on
the information from the meetings between the World Bank and Asia Development Bank in March and April last
year.
The Asia Program manager of Bank of Information Center (BIC), Mr. Jelson Garcia, who disclosed the information
about the US$ 11 billion, sent an email including the above information to The Daily Eleven on Thursday. "It was
based on the information I and my colleagues received from our meetings with the World Bank and ADB in March
and April 2012. Based on combined notes from me and colleagues who attended those meetings, they highlighted
that Myanmar has reserves in some accounts but there were different estimated figures and they did not specify
which banks the accounts were located," said Mr. Jelson Garcia in his email.
However, he did not refute what he had said about the five foreign bank accounts and the US$ 11 billion.
On September 10, Mr. Jelson Garcia said the World Bank did not cancel the debts Myanmar owed to because of
the US$ 11 billion worth of foreign bank accounts. Myanmar owed over US$890 million to the World Bank but the
amount was not that large initially and it included the interests. Although the amount of debt is not just one billion,
the country has US$11 billion in five foreign bank accounts only, said Mr. Jelson Garcia.
Myanmar could not demand that the World Bank write off its debts because of the new government. The World
Bank would cancel the debts of other countries. The reason was that according to the World Bank's data,
Myanmar had five foreign bank accounts worth US$ 11 billion. That was why the World Bank raised the question
about this and did not cancel the debts, added Mr. Jelson Garcia.
The Daily Eleven in its September 12 issue covered a news article, "Government needs to expose the US$ 11
billion worth of five foreign bank accounts. The article did not, however, hint that the stash was the government's
possession.
The September 13 issue of The Daily Eleven also covered a cover story saying that Mr. Jelson Garcia revealed
Myanmar's US$ 11 billion worth of foreign bank accounts as a representative of BIC, not the World Bank. He is the
Asia Program manager of BIC, the news story stated, making a request for the wrong designation.
The Finance and Revenue Minister, Hla Tun, said Myanmar had US$ 7196.454 million in foreign exchange
reserves during a session of Union Parliament in Nay Pyi Taw on January 31, 2012.
Volume 11 No.34 of the local 7Day Journal dated November 1, 2012, covered a piece of news that the Myanmar
government had US$ 6 billion in at least five foreign bank accounts, according to Washington-based BIC's
manager Mr. Jelson Garcia. The news also quoted Maung Maung Win, director of the Budget Department under
the Ministry of Finance and Revenue, as saying "it is true the accounts have been opened but we cannot say it
exactly. The amount can be more than that ($ 6b)." Daw Khaing Khaing Nwe, a member of Myanmar
Investment Commission, said the Central Bank had US$ 7 billion in foreign exchange reserves and the
amount could reach nine billion by the end of the year during a seminar on Myanmar's foreign investment
opportunities and challenges held on July 20 of this year.
Ye Htut, spokesman for President Thein Sein and deputy information minister, issued the following statement on
his Facebook page on Thursday: The government has not used state funds to open five accounts in foreign
banks. If they have enough evidence to prove it, the government will be ready to take action.
The official statements of the two government officials are found to have contrasted with what spokesperson Ye

Htut has said. http://www.elevenmyanmar.com/national/3398-myanmar-possession-of-11b-in-foreign-bank-accounts-based-on-information-fromwb-and-adb

................................................................................
MYANMAR NAMED IN BANK OF TOKYOS $ 250 MILLION LAUNDERING CONVICTION
Friday, 21 June 2013 14:41 Mizzima News - Mizzima News
Japans Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi UFJ (BTMU) has been fined US$ 250,000 million by the state of New York for
illicit laundering transactions with countries under sanctions, including Myanmar.
The transactions are thought to total over $ 100 billion between 2002 and 2007. A press release from New Yorks
Department of Financial Services (NYDFS) suggests that there were up to 28,000 individual illegal transactions.
Other sanctioned countries mentioned in the violations include Iran and Sudan. The statement showed that BTMU
had handed written instructions to employees asking them to omit sensitive information in order to avoid freezing
of funds. No information has been released on just how much of the $ 100 billion worth of transactions were
funneled in Myanmar.
[NLDmembrsnSupportersofCRPPnNLDnDASSK] News & Articles on Burma
Von:
zin linn <zinlinn@yahoo.com.au>
Datum: Sa, 22 Jun 2013 6:37 pm
............................................................................................................................

Subject: [alumnimyanmarinstitutesofmedicine] JUNTA STOLE BILLIONS OF GAS REVENUE [the National &
Irrawaddy]
THE JUNTA HAS 'STOLEN BILLIONS' IN GAS REVENUE
Larry Jagan
Sep 13, 2009

BANGKOK // Myanmar's military leaders have siphoned billions of dollars into offshore accounts in Singapore
over the past nine years, according to a report just published by the US-based environmental group Earth Rights
International (ERI). The money comes from the Yadana gas project in Myanmar, once known as Burma, and
involves energy giants Chevron of the United States, France's Total and Thailand's PTTEP. More than 60 per
cent of the gas is pumped through a pipeline into Thailand.

China National Petroleum

"Since 2000, some $ 5 billion [Dh18.3bn] from the Yadana gas pipeline has been stolen from the Burmese
people," Mathew Smith, the main author of the report said in an interview. "Rather than contribute to Burma's
economic development, the billion-dollar revenues from the project have gone into the pockets of the top
generals." The money has been put in two Singapore banks, the Overseas Chinese Banking Corp and the DBS
Group, according to ERI. The monitor has sent the report's findings to the banks involved and the Singaporean
government. Both banks have issued statements dismissing the accusations and disclaim any involvement in
the Yadana project.
Sent: Friday, September 13, 2013 9:59 AM
____________________________________________________________

MYANMAR RANKED WORST IN RESOURCE GOVERNANCE

Thursday, 16 May 2013 16:45 Mizzima News
Myanmar has been ranked as the worst country in the world in terms of resource governance, according to a
report issued recently by US-based NGO Revenue Watch Institute. The international watchdog says its 2013
index rates the governance of oil, gas and mining sectors among 58 resource-rich countries around the globe. It
says that it concentrates exclusively on nations which are abundant in natural resources because these are
countries where poverty, corruption and armed conflict too often converge. Myanmar was ranked No. 58 out of
58 nations, sitting below Zimbabwe, Afghanistan, Equatorial Guinea and Turkmenistan.
_________________________________________________________________________________
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

MAIN TEXT ON GRAND STRATEGY

(Note: Some 99% of this main text remains unchanged as it appeared in the 3rd modification)
Since the preseent Burmese government (the Thein Sein government) came to power a few years ago
I have been closely watching what the government, the armed forces and the newly elected representatives
of the people, are saying and doing in the country. This paper is the product of my close observation and
analysis of Burmas general situation during the past several years, and especially since the current
government came to power.
So far until now, I have found out that five major Factors that are most crucially important for the survival and
development of a country and the society in it are still missing. (Since about the lack of human rights and the
rule of law, etc. in the country are already universally known, I shall not deal with these topics in this paper.)
The following are the said missing Factors:
- Visions or Visionary political leaders
- Strategic thoughts or Strategies
- Strategic and Systematic Plannings
- Grand Strategy
- Peace
These major factors certainly are the main reasons why all the key ministries such as defence, home,
commerce, trade, foreign affairs, education, industry, health, finance, social welfare, tourism, etc., keep
on doing as they have been doing in the past several years - that is, without setting any specific, realistic
goals and priorities, and without following any Strategies at all. (With the missing strategic thoughts or
strategies mentioned above, I mean the ones that would and could serve the long-term interests of the
country, and not the ones that would only serve the interests of a certain group of people or political
organizations - like the Burmese governments current strategical manoeuvres and tactical moves to court
the West and Japan, and for the safe-guarding of their private fortunes and political power!)
My main reason therefore for writing this paper is to point out at how and where the said factors could
be found and developed. Although this paper is prepared mainly for all the concerned ex and current citizens
of Burma from all walks of life and therefore is now written as simple and short as possible and only about the
fundamental ideas in general, my original intention, in fact, was to write a compact political treatise, rather
than a mere political article.
THE FIRST FACTOR:

VISIONS OR VISIONARY POLITICAL LEADERS

The Question:

What is a vision and who is a visionary political leader?

The Answers:
According to the Oxford Advanced Learners Dictionary, a vision is an idea
or a picture in ones imagination: An example: He had a vision of a world in which there would be no wars.
And a visionary is someone who has the ability to think about or plan the future in an intelligent, imaginative
way. According to my own definition a visionary political leader is someone who can foresee the coming
events years ahead and accordingly makes plans in advance in time to meet the coming challenges in the
necessary fields. One may probably think that a visionary is a day-dreamer and that his visions are nothing
more than wishful thinkings, but although the visions of a visionary may seem to be mere wishful thinkings to
a layman at the beginning, his visions may turn out to be realities sometime in the near or distant future.
Note: Since it is a generally accepted fact among learned community that a visionary is born, not trained,

I shall only give some hints below where and how such a person can be found.
THE SECOND FACTOR:

STRATEGIC THOUGHTS OR STRATEGIES

Question 1:

What is a strategic thought or a strategy?

The Answers:
There are several definitions for Strategic Thought or Strategy, depending on
the fields - that is, whether its military, or politics, or finance or economics, etc. The following are a few
selected from Wikipedia:
- A strategy is a long term plan of actions designed to achieve a particular goal.
- Military strategy is a set of ideas implemented by military organizations to pursue desired strategic
goal. Derived from the Greek strategos, strategy when it appeared in use during the 18th century,
was seen in its narrow sense as the "art of the general", 'the art of arrangement' of troops. Military
strategy deals with the planning and conduct of campaigns, the movement and disposition of forces,
and the deception of the enemy.
- A strategy is a plan of actions designed to achieve a specific goal. Strategy is all about gaining (or
being prepared to gain) a position of advantage over adversaries or best exploiting emerging
possibilities. As there is always an element of uncertainty about the future, strategy is more about a
set of options ("strategic choices") than a fixed plan.
- Strategy - A plan that is intentended to achieve a particular purpose; the process of planning something or carrying out a plan in a skilful way; the skill of planning the movements of armies in a battle
or war. (Oxford Advanced Learners Dictionary)
A layman may have great difficulty in understanding what the passages above really mean. Since its
indeed a complex and abstract field, I shall try to define it in some simpler ways, so that those who are still
blindly leading some armed or political movements without any strategies at all in Burma may learn some
basic lessons from these simplified definitions. To wage an armed struggle or organizing and lead a major
political movement without a well-laid realistic strategy, therefore, could be extremely costly in terms of
human life, material and time.

A Strategy in the simplest sense in general is a principal plan or guideline for the achievement of a
certain goal. It could be short-term or long-term depending on the situation. But in the fields of politics,
business, finance, economics, military, etc., it usually has a long-term characteristic. Let us say one wants to
go to Point B from Point A. Before he can make a realistic plan or guideline for the journey, he must first of all
thoroughly collect as many information as possible - like, the distance between Points A and B, the means by
which he has to travel, that is by air or by rail or by ship or by car, and the expenses that he will have to pay
out, and all the hurdles that he will have to encounter or overcome, etc. Only then that will he be able to
make a realistic and practical plan - or strategy or principal guideline - for the journey in advance.
How he earns the necessary expenses and materials, for instance, are to be understood as tactics. If he
started out the journey without having first collected the necessary information mentioned above, he would
most likely have to cancel his journey halfway, or he may even get lost somewhere along the journey. In
short, the wish or intention to reach Point B is the goal or aim and object, and the main plan laid down for
the whole journey is the strategy.
Actually, almost every human being uses several strategies in his entire lifetime for the achievement of
various goals, but most of them do not realize about it. Here is another even more simplified explanation

about strategy: Let us say, a man meets a woman and he immediately falls in love with her and he wants to
get her love. As the next step he must try to find out more about her. For instance, he will have to know first
what kind of man she likes or dislikes - that is, whether she is only interested in a rich man, or an academic,
or a kind man, or a generous man, or a handsome man, etc. But at the same time, he must also know his
own strong and weak points as well. Only then that would he know how much chance he has got to get her
love and be able to develop the right strategy.

Some of the characteristics of a Strategy or a Strategic thought are looking at things or problems from
a broader perspective and the making of plans on a long-term basis.

Someone who can think strategically, for instance, sees the whole forest, and not just a few trees in it.
In plain text: He can see a problem in its entirety - and not just a part of it. That is, he sees the root and
nature of a problem and also the consequences that that problem could cause, etc. His perspectives are
broad and far-sighted. And he thinks and plans accordingly. Just one example of the opposite of this:
Burmas successive political and military leaders of the past and present have always seen the problems of a
certain ethnic people or a union state, or a section of the society, as its own problems, but not as the
problems of the whole country. They therefore always try to solve these problems at local levels with the most
ruthless methods. Thats one major reason why there is no peace in the country until now.
I have been closely observing during the past several years how all the opposition political organizations,
including ethnic armed forces, were doing their political business. To my great disappointment, I found out
that all of them, with the exception of a single organization, did not have any strategies and strategic
plannings at all, exactly like the successive Burmese governments that they are fighting against, although
their leaders were always loudly and loosely talking about the importance of strategy and tactics! I have had
never heard of anyone of them ever seriously making some thorough analyses of the overall situations of their
own and that of their enemys from strategical and tactical points of view! Nor have they ever had seriously
sought the opinions and advices of some experts from outside of their organizations - nor even that of their
own rank-and-file members. Everytime they made a conference or a meeting, everybody only tried to impress
his comrades with his political knowledge and experience and other know-hows. They had never really even
listened seriously to each other.
This failure was due simply to their lack of understanding of the true nature of Strategy! If one doesnt fully
understand it, one would naturally not be able to make realistic and thorough analyses of the situations of
the enemys and that of ones own as well, and as a result a Strategy that would bring a movement to victory
could never be created or developed.
Political and military strategies are naturally much more complex than the simplified definitions mentioned
above, because several crucial factors shall need to be taken into consideration. Other powerful forces - like
highly qualified living adversaries, for example, that are outside of ones own control or influence - will also
play some decisive roles in the games. And one will encounter several surprises as well along the way that
could not be foreseen when one first developed such a strategy.
And above all else, there must be a well-organized and run organization with a cohesive and qualified
leadership to implement a well-laid strategy, or in other words, a political strategy - no matter how good it is can never be successfully implemented without a well-organized and run organization and a solid and
qualified leadership. Unless the leadership of an organization is solid and the organization well-organized,
it could be very easily destroyed by its adversaries.
Its the same with military strategy in general. No matter how good a military strategy is, a general will never
be able to successfully implement it unless the army he commands is well-trained, well-disciplined, wellequipped and well-fed. Or, in other words, no matter how well-trained, well-disciplined, well-equipped and
well-fed an army is, no general will ever be able to achieve an outstanding goal with it unless he himself is
well-qualified enough for the task and he has got an excellent strategy as well.
Question 2:

What could be the reasons of the missing of strategic thoughts on the

part of the countrys political leaders?

The Answers:
There could be several reasons, namely

First, it is possible that there are a number of people among them who have got strategic thoughts
or who fully understand what a strategy is and also the need for laying down strategies, but they are probably
not in a strong position to successfully implement their strategic thoughts or concepts.

Second, if in case there are no personalities among them who have got such strategic thoughts, then
it could be most likely that they are simply not aware of the important roles of strategic thoughts or strategies
in politics, foreign affairs (or diplomacy), military, finance, commerce, trade, industry, education, health, social
welfare, etc., in the first place. One can of course hear everywhere people loudly and loosely talking about
strategies, but in reality there seems to be not very many people who truly understand the real nature
of a strategy. And there are even less who can develop a good strategy in any given field.

Third, their lack of strategic thoughts could be the result of the absence of transparency, freedom
of expression, mutual-respect and trust among themselves so that they could not freely exchange opinions
and ideas, or the lack of the necessary facilities and resources such as reading materials, trainings or
courses, etc., for example, with which they could enrich themselves with the necessary knowledge.
Question 3:

What could/would be the results or outcomes of the absence of visions,

strategic thoughts, or strategies in key sectors for a country?

The Answers:

There could be a number of fatal setbacks, namely

If the political leaders of a country lack visions and they do not fully understand the true nature of a
strategy, and realistic strategies are not laid down in time for key sectors of the country, priorities cannot be
rightly recognized and set, and these failures in turn would result in the wasting of human and financial
resources needlessly; and the country would as a result be just drifting aimlessly like a ship without a good
captain and a good navigation system.

The countrys financial resources and economy would be concentrated in the hands of just a handful
of interest groups or personalities.

Investors - both domestic and foreign - could more easily exploit the countrys natural resources for
their own benefit without the need to make consideration for the welfare of the country as a whole, and for
the benefits of the environments as well; Or in other words, it would be very difficult for state authorities to
control such investors according to the law, etc.

The present leaders of Burma certainly underestimate the countrys very strong bargaining position both geopolitically and natural resources-wise, for example - that they are begging outsiders to invest in the
country by making so many concessions. This is a very clear sign of the void of strategic thoughts on the part
of those leaders. With such a strong position we could in fact dictate our own conditions upon potential
investors. There are more than enough potential investors in the outside world with hundreds of billions of
dollar at their disposal. We shall only need to provide them with political stability, skilled workforce and the rule
of law. (However, judging by the ways a great number of investors are doing business in poverty-stricken
countries, several of these investors even seem to actually prefer the absence of law and order in those
countries!)
Question 4:

How or where could people with strategic thoughts be found who could
develop excellent strategies for all key sectors in Burma?

The Answers:
There are a number of ways to find them, namely

The first place to find such people could be among the political, military and academic elites
themselves in the country. Its even possible that there are a number of people among them wih great visions
and strategic thoughts for the country, but they are probably not powerful enough to implement their visions

and strategic concepts. So its most important now to find them out. And one of the best ways to discover
such unknown qualified people would be to organize discussion and debate forums in which they could
discuss and debate on topics that are vitally important for the country with absolute freedom. And it would be
vitally important as well that the peoples elected representatives in the parliament (Pyithu Hlutthaw), too, are
fully included in the discussions and debates, because, as a number of them may have had been elected
purely on political platform, and not necessarily on their skills or qualifications, it would be a great pity for the
country to put its destiny entirely in the hands of such people alone. In this way, however, they may also have
a chance to learn the true nature of strategic thoughts and strategies.

The second possible place to find them would also be among the Burmese people themselves who
are living and working in the outside world in various professional fields for years; they certainly have had
accumulated a certain amount of knowledge, skills and experience in their professional life, which could be
of great value for the country if they could be persuaded to share their know-hows.

The third possible place would once again also be within the country itself - that is, among the highly
qualified and experienced professionals or experts in various important fields or departments.

The fourth possibilty would be to use the service of international consulting firms, or foreign experts
in various major sectors. (However, if one is forced by inevitable circumstances to sort to this last option, great
precaution may need to be taken in searching for the right firms or experts because the services of such a
firm or an expert is said to be extremely expensive and there are several bogus firms and experts.)
And similar free discussion forums should also be organized for armed forces and police personnel from
battalion commanders and township officers upwards, and from middle-ranking civilian officials upwards as
well, etc. Besides, these people and the peoples elected representatives should be sent out on first-hand
study tours to a number of neighbouring countries as a means to enrich their knowledge and widen their
perspectives in many important fields. Their newly-won knowledge would thus enable them to see the
multiple problems that the country is facing now from a different and more realistic point of view.
In writings on strategy and tactics - especially in the fields of politics and military - the following lines
can often be seen:
-

He thinks both strategically and tactically and plans accordingly.

He thinks only strategically, but not tactically.
He thinks only tactically, but not strategically, and thus plans only tactically.
He thinks and plans neither strategically nor tactically.

Note: Without a good strategy, a military or political goal can never be achieved. But a good strategy alone is
not enough, there also must be good tactics as well which support that strategy.
THE THIRD FACTOR:

STRATEGIC AND SYSTEMATIC PLANNINGS

The Question:

What are the main reasons for the missing of strategic and
systematic plannings in all major sectors in Burma?

The Answers:
There are several reasons. But the main reason, I believe, is the
absence of highly qualified political leaders with visions and strategic thoughts in the first place. For example,
there were - and still are - several plannings being undertaken at present in various sectors. But most of the
so-called plannings were and are from the very beginning doomed to failure, because there never were and
are simply reliable and up-to-date statistics and data in the related fields, and the people who made these
plannings - and the ones who supervise the implementation of the projects - themselves are not sufficiently
qualified enough for the tasks they are entrusted with. It is very clear that those who are in power apparently

do not realize that without systematically and thoroughly collected reliable data, statistics and information, it is
absolutely impossible to make a strategic and systematic planning for a project. Or, in other words, if one
cannot think strategically - or if he is not highly qualified enough in the field of his responsibility - he would not
understand either why a strategic and systematic planning is so crucial for the successful implementation of a
project.
The first major step, therefore, that the present and future governments have to take, if they really
sincerely wish to uplift the country, is first of all to collect and update reliable statistics and data in every major
sector, and to select and appoint the right person for the right job at the right time. In other words, only truly
qualified people must be selected and appointed for the responsible positions, but if there are not qualified
people in sufficient numbers, new ones must be trained for the tasks. To spend millions of dollar on badly
planned and poorly managed and implemented projects is a waste of the countrys scarce and precious
financial resources and therefore its an unforgivable crime against the countrys entire population.
Last but not least, radical and ruthless measures also must be introduced and effectively enforced to
reduce the corruption that has been ruining the whole society for decades.
Since the present government came to power a number of internationally well-known economic experts
have been invited to Burma to present their concepts for the countrys economic development. However, most
of their concepts were simply ignored. And until now foreign investment in the country is already more than
$ 40 billion and the government is still inviting more and more investment. But the country lacks highly
qualified local people to manage newly set-up business concerns. And the government doesnt do any
remarkable steps to solve this great gap. Just have a look at the followng two items as an example: Five Economic
Priorities for Myanmar and President Thein Seins latest announced economic plan called: TheSeven-Step Development
Road-Map under ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ITEMS HEREWITH ATTACHED.

And the following text will clearly confirm about the lack of this Factor. Its an excerpt from an article.
MOUN or MONE [Hate] WATER RESERVOIR AND HYDRO PROJECTS
1. Please forgive me for my borrowing the title of writer Thetkathoo Phone Naings novel. But, unfortunately,
this article is, unlike the famous writers novel, only full of heart-breaking stories.
2. The construction of the Moun Stream Water Reservoir bagan in 1995 and was finished in 2005 at a cost of
K. 13,800 million (13.8 billion). Its located in the Sidoktaya Township, Magway Division. The height of the
reservoir is 200 ft (60 m); and the length is16490 ft (5026 m). The estimated drinking water volume to be
gained was circa 108 000 acres (133 million cubic meters). And the estimated electricity power be gained
through three turbines was 75 mw (25 mw from each turbine). But in reality, in summer the water supply is
barely enough to run a single turbine and it produces 10-15 mw, according to Chief Engineer U Aung
Naing Win.
3. When some of the countrys top leaders visited the site in 1996, I accompanied them as a battalion
commander for their security. What U Myint Thein, the then Planning Chief Engineer (now Land and Water
Reservoirs Minister of Mandalay Division) had explained the visiting leaders on that occasion and what I
found out on April 29, 2013, when I visited it as a member of a Parliamentary Fact Finding Commission,
were poles apart.
4. 1311 households from 18 villages from the flooded areas are force-relocated at some virgin sites where
cultivation is impossible. Each family was given a compensation of K. 5000 (five thousand) - one viss
(1.6 kg) of pork costs already K. 6000! Many people were forced to sell their cattle and personal
ornaments - and their daughters for survival! 81 people have gone to Thailand to find a job..
............................................................................
Note. The author of the article is U Hla Swe. He is a member of the ruling party: Union Solidarity and Development Association
(USDA), and a MP of the Upper House, Magwe Constituency.) The above translation is done by myself. The original Burmese
version appeared in the Thithtoolwin blog on May 25, 2015.( http://www.thithtoolwin.com/2013/05/blog-post_1852.html )
The numbers above indicate the parts which are translated from the original text: MOUN or MONE [Hate] WATER RESERVOIR
AND HYDRO PROJECTS. See the original Burmese text under ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ITEMS HEREWITH ATTACHED

5. Reservoirs and bridges were built without any proper planning and without taking into consideration the
would-be consequences that would affect human beings and the environment - simply just in order to fulfil
the then governments motto: Every month a water reservoir and a bridge must be built!
6. When we came back from the site, all of us - members of the commission - were completely silent
throughout the return journey. Even U Myint Thein, the NLD MP from Magway Division, who is well-known as
a loud talkative, did not utter a single word... Oh Moun, how unlovely you are!

THE FOURTH FACTOR:

GRAND STRATEGY

Question 1:

What is Grand Strategy?

The Answers:
If one would make a thorough search in the Internet under Grand
Strategy he would find several materials with different interpretations about it, and judging by the various
contradicting titles and interpretations mentioned below as some examples, one has to conclude that even
those who regard themselves as experts on it from different disciplines still understand it quite differently.
Some interpretations are even very confusing indeed. And my own understanding of it - or the one I have in
mind - is also quite different from that of nearly all other experts, but I would not elaborate about it in details
in this paper.
Does the United States Need a Grand Strategy?, Does the United States Have a Grand
Strategy?, Does Obama have a Grand Strategy?, Obama needs a Grand Strategy, etc.)
Grand strategy is a term of art from academia, and refers to the collection of plans and policies that
comprise the state's deliberate effort to harness political, military, diplomatic, and economic tools
together to advance that state's national interest. Grand strategy is the art of reconciling ends and
means. It involves purposive action -- what leaders think and want. Such action is constrained by factors
leaders explicitly recognize (for instance, budget constraints and the limitations inherent in the tools of
statecraft) and by those they might only implicitly feel (cultural or cognitive screens that shape
worldviews). The study of grand strategy -- and arguing about grand strategy, for you cannot study
something without arguing about it --is experiencing a renaissance of sorts. Yale has pioneered an
extraordinarily popular Grand Strategy Program headed by distinguished historians, John Lewis Gaddis
and Paul Kennedy, and distinguished practitioner Charlie Hill. Several graduates of that program have
gone on to positions of responsibility in the Clinton, Bush, and now Obama administrations... (What is
grand strategy and why do we need it? Posted By Peter Feaver, Wednesday, April 8, 2009.)
http://shadow.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2009/04/08/what_is_grand_strategy_and_why_do_we_need_it)

...........................................
When my colleagues Paul Kennedy, Charlie Hill, and I first began talking about setting up a grand
strategy course at Yale in the late 1990s, at least half the people to whom we tried to explain this
thought we were talking about grant strategy: how do you get the next federal or foundation grant?...
(What Is Grand Strategy?* by John Lewis Gaddis, Yale University.)
www.duke.edu/web/agsp/grandstrategypaper.pdf

...........................................
The role of grand strategy higher strategy is to co-ordinate and direct all the resources of a nation,
or band of nations, towards the attainment of the political object of the war the goal defined by
fundamental policy...Furthermore, while the horizons of strategy is bounded by the war, grand strategy
looks beyond the war to the subsequent peace. It should not only combine the various instruments, but
so regulate their use as to avoid damage to the future state of peace for its security and prosperity.
Grand strategy expanded on the traditional idea of strategy in three ways: first, expanding strategy
beyond military means to also include diplomatic, financial, economic, informational, etc; second,
examining internal in addition to external forces - taking to account both the various instruments of
power and the internal policies necessary for their implementation (conscription, for example); third,
including periods of peacetime in addition to wartime.( http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Grand_strategy)

............................................................
Why America Needs a Grand Strategy
William C. Martel
Policymakers must ensure that grand strategy deals with complexities while providing guidance that
helps them formulate policies for dealing with the sources of disorder. Such disorder has disoriented our
vision of policy and demoralized the present generation of policymakers who have failed to formulate a
coherent grand strategy. Grand strategy should help the state deal with the expected ebbs and flows in
world politics. While such shifts are routine in the vicissitudes of geopolitics, these have destabilizing
consequences for policymakers who must be mindful of several sources of disorder in 2012
(Dr. William C. Martel is an Associate Professor of International Security Studies at the Fletcher
School of Law and Diplomacy: Tufts University. He is the recent author of Victory in War: Foundations of
Modern Strategy. http://thediplomat.com/2012/06/18/why-america-needs-a-grand-strategy/3
................................................
Strategic Studies Institute
Who is SSI?
The Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College publishes national security and strategic
research and analysis which serves to influence policy debate and bridge the gap between Military
and Academia.
Authored by Dr. Hal Brands.
The Promise and Pitfalls of Grand Strategy
Brief Synopsis
What is grand strategy, and why is it seemingly so important and so difficult? This monograph
explores the concept of grand strategy as it has developed over the past several decades. It explains
why the concept is so ubiquitous in discussions of present-day foreign policy, examines why American
officials often find the formulation of a successful grand strategy to be such an exacting task, and
explores the ways in which having a grand strategy can be both useful and problematic. It illustrates
these points via an analysis of two key periods in modern American grand strategythe Truman years
at the outset of the Cold War, and the Nixon-Kissinger years in the late 1960s and 1970sand
provides several suggestions for how U.S. officials might approach the challenges of grand strategy
in the 21st century. http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubid=1121
...............................................................
What is American Grand Strategy?
Generally defined, American grand strategy (AGS) is the collection of plans and policies by which the
leadership of the United States mobilizes and deploys the countrys resources and capabilities, both
military and non-military, to achieve its national goals. Grand strategy exists in the real world of
governing, whether it is carefully formulated and articulated in advance, or whether it evolves ad hoc
out of the world-views, predilections, and subjectivities of those who govern. It is a fruitful field for
scholars and students to study so that those who govern and those who are governed might have the
richest conceptual repertoire with which to construct and evaluate national policies.
(http://sites.duke.edu/agsp/)

________________________________________
Question 2:

Why does Burma need it?

The Answers:
For the survival of a nation in todays globalized world it needs
not only excellent Strategies in key sectors, but also a Grand Strategy as well which coordinates

all the Strategies in key sectors (for more answers to this question, please see Question 4 and its answers
below). However, by judging what those are now in power - both military and political elites - have been doing
since they came to power, it is very clear now that the most difficult part would be how to convince them
about the dire need for such a Grand Strategy.
The difficulty is due mainly to three major reasons:
-

The first reason is, if one looks at what they are doing these days, one easily gets the impression that
some elements among them seem to think or believe that not only regional powers but also even the
worlds major powers are playing to their tunes. The reality, however, seems to be the other way
round. Burma, in fact, is just a small pawn in their global strategies. The only reasons that they cannot
afford to ignore Burma are its rich natural resources, its strategic location between two rival giants,
China and India, and the Indian Ocean. And, of course, the Daw Aung San Suu Kyi factor also plays
an extremely important role.
The second reason is, the military and government are two almost entirely separate, independent
institutions according to the 2008 State Constitution, which was promulgated as the result of a
referendum cynically held in May 2008, after a week of the Nargis Cyclone that caused more than

138,000 deaths and left millions homeless and thus the whole country was mourning. Its therefore an
almost unsolvable dilemma for the country - that is, as long as the 2008 State Constitution exists as it
is today.
The third reason is, since the present ruling party, that is, the Union Solidarity and Development
Party (USDP),* is fully backed up by the military, the government, the military and the ruling party are
only a single entity in reality. The parliament therefore could just be called a rubber-stamp parliament
in the legal sense for all the opposition parties altogether make up only about 20 percent of the
parliamentary seats. And although many of the changes that are taking place these days seem to be
rather radical in comparison to what had happened in the past several decades, they are mostly just
cosmetic without much substance. Burmese government soldiers and policemen who are stationed in
civil war-torned ethnic regions, for instance, are still behaving and acting like warlords!
Now, before directly answering the above question - that is, Question 2: Why Burma needs a
Grand Strategy - a bit more in details, let us first have a brief look at the hidden aims and objects of
the government, the ruling party and the military, and the Strategy and Tactics that they are
deploying for the achievement of these goals. There is no doubt that their hidden aims and objects
are to retain the political power and the armed forces, and to keep all key economic and financial
sectors in their own hands as well, for a long time to come.
For the achievement of these goals, they apparently have been deploying a Strategy with
three major Stages and several tactics in them.

The First Stage

They have been loudly propagating about their intention to build up - according to their own term: an
_______________________________________
* - The Union Solidarity and Development Association (abbreviated USDA) was a Burmese organisation formed by Myanmars ruling military
junta, the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC), on 15 September 1993. The USDA comprised 1 Headquarters, 17 State and
Division Associations, 66 District Associations and 320 Township Associations. This social organisation was transformed into the Union
Solidarity and Development Party on 29 March 2010, and took part in the 2010 parliamentary elections. All assets of the USDA were transferred to the USDP. In the 2010 general election, the USDP won 883 seats out of 1154 total seats, 259 seats of 325 seats from Amyotha Hluttaw,
129 seats of 168 seats from Pyithu Hluttaw and 495 seats of 661 seats from Region and State Hluttaw (holding the majority in all, except the
Rakhine State Hluttaw). [All national cabinet members appointed from the Pyidaungsu Hluttaw are USDP politicians who resigned their
parliamentary posts, with the exception of ministers appointed from military ranks and 3 civilian-led ministries.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Union_Solidarity_and_Development_Association

eternal peace or in Burmese thawara nyeinchanyi - by negotiating and signing ceasefire

agreements with several armed organizations.
By using - or taking advantage of - the Daw Aung San Suu Kyi factor, they were able to establish
their relations with the West and Japan at a respectable level.
By persuading and subtly forcing Daw Aung San Suu Kyi to candidate for a parliamentary seat in
the recent general election, they succeeded in reducing her status as the Mother of the Nation and
her international reputation as the Icon of Democracy to a mere local politician. (In my opinion her
entering the parliamentary general election was a great strategic mistake for her personally and for
her party as well.)
They have partly succeeded in destroying the unity of armed organizations by separately negotiating
with them for ceasefire.
They have succeeded in destroying the solidarity of ethnic armed organizations with various ethnic
Burman democratic forces, including the National League for Democracy (NLD).
They have succeeded in minimizing the roles of various ethnic armed organizations by lulling them
with the idea of a future federal union which should even be far more broader in scope than the one
that was envisaged in the Panglong Agreement.
They have greatly succeeded in polishing their image in the international community as real reformers
by releasing a number of political prisoners,etc.

The Second Stage

It seems that this Stage is now still being implemented.

They are destroying gradually the unity within every ethnic armed organization, and ethnic Burmese
political party as well - especially the NLD. The tactics they are using are luring away some key and
opportunistic elements within these organizations with financial and attractive jop incentives. They
have already partly succeeded with the Chin National Front leadership by luring away one or two
persons within it with some irresistible job and financial incentives. The same thing had already
happened again on October 10, 2012 with the Karen National Union leadership. Commander-in-Chief
General Mutu Say Poe and two leading peace negotiators, David Htaw and Roger Khin. They were
dismissed over allegations that they colluded with the army to open an unauthorised liaison office in
the Karen State capital, Hpa-an. Brig-Gen Baw Kyaw Heh was swiftly appointed as the new
Commander-in-Chief. So, by corrupting and dividing some elements within every movement, these
organizations would soon lose mass support and they would thus become irrelevant. The sametactics
will surely be used sooner or later with all other ceasefire groups and other opposition political parties.
They are buying or dragging the time: With this tactic they are trying to frustrate opposition politicians,
political activists and ethnic armed organizations. These people and organizations would soon lose
their patience and hope and they would become resigned.
By buying or dragging the time, they are trying to outlive the active and energetic phase of Daw Aung
San Suu Kyi; when she is no more energetic and active someday as she still is today, her party would
gradually lose its driving force, because - at least until now - there seems to be nobody in the NLD
who could take her place and role over. Since several months ago her partys internal problems have
been coming out into the open. And there seem to be two main reasons for these problems: one,
since she had reached a secret agreement with President Thein Sein more than two years ago and
she is now acting as if she already were a member of the Establishment in several ways, the members
of her party as a whole are extremely confused and therefore losing their orientation; two, the
members of the younger generation are now loudly complaining about the lack of new blood, new
ideas and democratic process in the upper levels of the party leadership.

By relaxing restrictions on the domestic news media, reshuffling the Cabinet a couple of times until
now, admitting about the existence of a blacklist consisted of over 6 000 persons and then
subsequently deleting some 2 000 people from the lists, the government could give the outside world
once more the impression that they are serious about their reform processes.
They are weakening the powerful Buddhist Sangha organization by dividing it.
By giving the West a few hints about possible cooperation in some strategic fields and commercial
incentives as well, they had had neutralized the Wests attitude towards the opposition forces. And
as a result of this and due to the governments initiatives, there are no more opposition groups
outside Burma.

The Third Stage

Its most likely that this Stage is also being partly implemented by deploying the following major tactics so
that major political parties would become irrelevant and dispensable in the publics eyes. However, by judging
what they have done throughout the country for decades in the past, these undertakings would most likely
be just superficial or cosmetic anyway in the long-run.

Theyre trying to polish the image of the armed forces, the feared and hated secret services, and the
police by gradually reforming them from the bottom up to the top by removing those who were and
are stained in the internal social upheavals. A visible evidence of this reform is that nowadays agents
of various secret services keep very low profile.
They are trying to polish the image of the present ruling party, the USDP, by maintaining a low
profile at the moment. But its going to transform its image in the near future - when the general
election in 2015 is approaching - by changing its political programme - like stealing the political
programme of their other rival major adversaries, changing some leading personalities, implementing
some anti-corruption measures and important steps to enforce the rule of law, and changing methods
of doing their political business in general, etc. With regard to the changing of leading personalities,
the country indeed is now witnessing Thura U Shwe Mann and hearing about his opinions on various
topics more and more in the public; its a very clear sign that he is gradually taking President Thein
Seins position and role. He apparently is trying to polish his former image of being a former ruthless
general by giving now the impression that hes a broad-minded liberal. (Note. Thura is the third highest
award for bravery in Burma - after the Aung San Thuriya and Thiha Thura - and he had earned it in
fighting against the Karens.)
They would try to improve the living standard of the general masses to some extent through the
infusion of external investment, and by inviting and allowing NGOs to carry out all kinds of
humanitarian aid.
They would try to take steps to reconcile with the powerful Buddhist Sangha organization by making
concessions that it cannot afford to refuse.
They would try to lull the masses of ethnic peoples by granting them certain amounts of freedom in
restoring and improving their culture and languages, etc. Or a superficial form of federalism.
They would try to reform education, healthcare, social security, infrastructure, etc.

............................................................................................................................................................
- The House of Nationalities (Amyotha Hluttaw) is the Upper House of the Pyidaungsu Hluttaw (Union Parliament), the bicameral legislature of
Burma (Myanmar). It consists of 224 members of which 168 are directly elected and 56 appointed by Myanmar Armed Forces. The last elections
to the Amyotha Hluttaw were held in November 2010. At its first meeting on31 January 2011, Khin Aung Myint was elected Speaker of the
Amyotha Hluttaw and Chairman of the Pyidaungsu Hluttaw as a whole.
.......................................................................................
- The House of Representatives (Pyithu Hluttaw) is the Lower House of Pyidaungsu Hluttaw (Union Parliament), the bicameral legislature of
Burma (Myanmar). It consists of 440 members of which 330 are directly elected and 110 appointed by the Myanmar Armed Forces. The last
elections to the Pyithu Hluttaw were held in November 2010. At its first meeting on 31 January 2011, Thura Shwe Mann was elected Speaker
of the Pyithu Hluttaw. (Wikipedia)

Now, let us analyse the condition or position of the former military government until just before President Thein
Sein made a secret agreement with Daw Aung San Suu Kyi. In fact, the military government then was in a
desperately hopeless defensive position on the following reasons:

Due to the trade embargoes of the West, mismanagement, false policies and priorities, etc., the
economy of the country was nearly in complete ruins; the state treasury was almost empty.

Due to its mishandlings of the victims of the Nargis Cyclone, it had lost the support and trust of the
entire people, and its image as a result in the international community was at the bottom.

Due to the countless human rights violations throughout the country for several decades - and
especially because of the 1988 and 2007 mass-killings - the governments image in the international community was so damaged that it was beyond the point of repair.

Corruption was so wide-spread at every level of all state institutions that these institutions almost
ceased to function.

China, which had always given it a protecting hand at the United Nations, became very arrogant and
was only interested in her own benefits that the government urgently needed to find a way-out from
the Chinese grips.

Due to the Mitsone Project, the anti-Chinese sentiments among the people became so intense that
it nearly got out of control; the government had no idea anymore how to handle it.

The military government was extremely worried that the Arab Spring would sooner or later spread to
Burma.

All the non-Burman ethnic peoples demand for genuine federalism was getting momentum and this
demand found more and more strong support even among ethnic Burmans.

The bond between the Ethnic Burman opposition political organizations, especially that of the NLDs,
and the non-Burman ethnic forces - was getting ever stronger.

The pressure put upon it by the international community, especially that of the West and
human rights organizations from the West was getting increasingly so intense that the government
was cornerd into a helpless position.

The campaigns in the West by a number of states, and human rights organizations to bring the
military rulers before the International Court of Justice on crimes against humanity - or as war
criminals - was getting increasingly louder and louder that they felt their own survival was in great
danger.

Due to the trade embargoes imposed by the West, those in power could not access their fortunes
hidden in the West. (See the following attached informaton: Did RFA Really Report As Follows?;
CRS Report for Congress - Burma Sanctions: Background and Options; The European Union and
Burma: The Case for Targeted Sanctions; Council Decision 2003/461/CFSP of June 2003;
Switzerland Tightens Myanmar Sanctions)

Looking back at the then situation, its very clear now that there was nobody in the leaderships of the NLD
and other opposition movements, including non-Burman ethnic armed forces with the exception of the KIO,
who was fully aware of the weaknesses of the military government mentioned above! Thats exactly why the
military government could reverse its own position overnight and put them all on the defensive and started
dictating its own conditions upon them.
The first most devastating blow for them all - or the most effective weapon of the governments against
them - was its making of Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and her party as its allies by making a secret pact with her!
(From the very moment that this secret pact was made the NLD remains absolutely silent until today on all

major political and human rights issues in the country.) And then, the second most devastating blow for
them - or the second most effective weapon of the governments against them - was its stealing away of the
most powerful unifying force between the NLD and all other non-Burman ethnic peoples from them and
making it its own political programme - that is, its allegedly willingness to form up a new federal union which
should be even broader in scope than the one originally envisaged in the Panglong Agreement. With these
two strategic moves the government could all of a sudden deprive the NLD of its staunchest allies and the
ethnic peoples their most powerful ally without firing a single shot! It was like killing several birds with a single
stone. As the result of these brilliant strategic moves by the government, Daw Aung San Suu Kyis voice is
now slowly becoming just a voice in the wilderness which nobody really hears and listens to anymore.
Actually, what the military-dominated government has been doing could and should have been done by
the NLD itself a long time ago, if there were at least a few influential persons in its top leadership who were
well-versed in political strategy and tactics and if it had a long-term excellent political Strategy. But looking
back at what the NLD had done in the past several years, one has to conclude that it never really had such
a strategy at all, and it did not have some revolutionary and break-through concepts of its own for the solution
of the countrys most dire major problems, especially the ethnic issues that have been playing the most
important roles throughout the countrys existence as a sovereign state. Some of the main roots of these
shortcomings certainly were its top leaders incapability to analyse their own situation and that of their
adversaries and the countrys as well as a whole from a neutral and realistic point of view. A great number of
the NLD leaders would surely like to counter-argue on this point - that is, what the military-dominated
government has been doing could and should have been done by the NLD itself a long time ago - that its
simply a foolish idea to believe that the military could be forced or persuaded to freely let the NLD do the
things that the military itself has been doing without shedding blood. In my opinion this could have been
done through multiple strategies and tactics at several stages! But, anyway, its already too late to cry on the
spilt milk!
The outcomes of these failures on the part of the NLD leadership are devastating for the NLD itself and
for the whole country as well. In fact, the main essence of political or military Strategy is: When youre in a
defensive position, you must develop a defensive strategy so that your opponent could not wipe you out,
and at the same time you must try to find and develop ways to build up your own position and strength so
that you may be able to reverse your own position and that of your opponents as well by deploying an
offensive strategy. If you dont know the nature of defensive and offensive strategies and if you dont have
such strategies, then you would not be able to recognize opportunities when and if they arise and this failure
would finally lead to your own destruction. It seems now that it was exactly what had happened with the NLD.
It was always only reacting to the actions of the military government so that it missed several golden
opportunities throughout its existence to put the military regime on the defensive.
The NLDs main roles seem to be even more reduced down to the voicing for the establishment of the rule
of law and order and the amendment of the 2008 State Constitution. Nothing much more than that. At the
time of my writing of this present version, one doesnt see yet even any single revotionary political concept of
the NLDs for the solution of the countrys pressing problems and issues. However, its also possible that that
the NLD deliberately keeps a low profile until the coming general election of 2015, or it could also be that it
simply doesnt have such an idea at all.
So, since even Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, who, besides her late father Gen. Aung San, was the only
prominent ethnic Burman politician ever known to have sincere and genuine sympathy for the life-long
aspirations of all indigenous non-Burman ethnic peoples, and her party had betrayed these ideals in order
to become parts of the military-dominated governments secret master plan nearly two years ago, its simply
too naive for those non-Burman ethnic peoples to go on hoping for a genuine federal union purely on the
basis of ethnic Burman elites good-will. I do not believe that she personally and her party would ever be
able to regain the trust of these peoples.
So what a sorrowful, painful and ironical twist of fate for the countless victims of Burmas decadeslong military dictatorships it is! - that those whom they always wanted to send to the gallows are now

gradually transforming themselves to be their very own DELIVERERS whom they should be grateful
endlessly for their newly won freedom and well-being!
Question 3:

How could an expert on Grand Strategy be found?

The Answers:
A truly expert or experts in this field could probably be found within
the country itself, or in the outside world. A good method to find such a person would be to openly invite on
competition basis for the submission of conceptual papers from those who regard themselves to be experts
in this particular field.
Question 4:

How could he develop it - provided that the political leaders of

the country fully realize its importance?

The Answers:
If Im to admit honestly here, it would not be an easy task to develop
or create a Grand Strategy for a country Iike Burma, because due to the several totally unexpected major
political and social upheavels in the worlds most strategic regions, and also due to the great economic and
financial crises that are taking place nowadays around the world since a few years ago, even major industrial
nations are off-balance. And the whole world is changing so fast these days in every field! A normal human
being may therefore wonder that, if even the worlds major industrial nations are off-balance and the whole
world is so rapidly changing, why a poor and small country like Burma should need a Grand Strategy in the
first place! My counter argument would be that exactly because of all these reasons it needs a Grand
Strategy. As these global economic and financial crises are getting worse with each passing day, Burma
urgently needs to undertake some radical measures in time to counter the coming major crises. At least
Burma would lose nothing by having it, because someone who truly understands the nature of it may
probably still be able to develop some fundamental guidelines anyway for a couple of decades to come.
At first glance, the strategical manoeuvres and tactical moves of the government mentioned earlier may
seem to be some brilliant masterpieces. One could even very easily be tempted to wonder if the government
is already acting under the guidance of a Grand Strategy. However, for someone who really understands the
true nature of Grand Strategy these strategical manoeuvres and tactical moves have nothing to do with a
real Grand Strategy at all. The reason is that with these strategical manoeuvres and tactical moves only
short-term gains could be achieved, but not an eternal peace and true economic development for the whole
country in the long-run!
By implementing a few superficial development projects at some remote corners of the country with the
financial assistance of external donor countries and NGOs, like building a couple of hundreds of model
villages here and there, for example, but at the same time wasting the countrys meager financial resources
for the extremely costly and ruthless military campaigns against the countrys own indigenous peoples - and
with such rampant social injustices throughout the country mentioned in the first few pages I wonder if a
long-lasting peace and genuine development for the country could ever be achieved at all.
In the case of Burma, a true Grand Strategist (the kind of Grand Strategy that I have in my mind) would
therefore develop his Grand Strategy by taking into consideration such realities as: Burma is not Sri Lanka
and all non-Burman ethnic peoples are not Tamils, and that its not surrounded by Seas like Sri Lanka but by
two rival giants that are sharing over 2200 km and 1600 km of common borders respectively with it.
Some people may perhaps wonder now if I myself could be qualified enough to do the task of developing
the kind of Grand Strategy that I have in my mind. But I do not believe that I would be the right person
because my concepts may surely be too radical for those in power. It should better therefore be done
by someone else from outside who can still look at things from a completely neutral point of view.
The following, for instance, are some of the radical major concepts that I have in mind that should be taken
seriously into consideration in developing the Grand Strategy in question.

The main aim and object of the Grand Strategy should first of all be the sheer survival of Burma as a
country and a nation in the long-run in this globalized world.
In order to be able to achieve this ultimate goal, national reconciliation should be given the highest
priority.
All the existing structures of all key state institutions, especially the armed forces, should be radically
overhauled in accordance with the rapidly changing internal and external situations with the help of
domestic and external expert teams.
The present and future leaders of the country should try at all costs not to let the country to become
just a cog or a bargaining chip of any of the worlds rival major - or regional powers! Instead, they
should build it up to become a STABILIZING FORCE in this ever increasingly explosive Asia-Pacific
region. Burma has got all the necessary ingredients or requirements to become such a stabilizing
force. And one of the most important ingredients in this case, for instance, could be to strictly
adhere to the principle of neutrality as I have had clearly elaborated in my 2010-paper: Some
Strategic Concepts for the Rebuilding of Burma/Myanmar. Burma should and must try to be a
good friend to every nation and people around it and throughout the world as well, instead of
becoming just a cog or a bargaining chip for any of the super or regional powers!
The present and future leaders of the country should not allow themselves to be misled by the
seemingly national or ideological conflicts that are presently looming in the region and on global level
as well. In reality what appear to be national or ideological conflicts are nothing more than rivalries
for the accumulation of excessive wealth by powerful and wealthy nations. They are, actually,
lucratively and mutually trading and their combined annual trading volumes amount to trillions of
dollar. And several lifeless and faceless institutional investors that do not know national boundaries,
morals and human suffering, from these countries are investing hundreds of billions of dollar
everywhere. These institutions move trillions of dollar around the world in a matter of seconds.
Theoretically speaking, the only major powers (economically, militarily and politically) that could still
make wars against each other on regional or global scale these days are China, India, Japan, Russia
and the U.S. But the economic and financial inter-dependency of these five and all other powerful
and wealthy nations is so great that its almost unthinkable for them to go to war against each other
at the risk of their own extinction. Here are a few examples in this respect: Among the largest holders
of US Government Bonds as of January 12, 2013 are China (No. 3) with $ 1.2 trillion, Japan (No. 5)
with $ 1 trillion and Russia (No. 16) with $ 147 billion, etc. .(See the following two info items for more
details under ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ITEMS HEREWITH ATTACHED): Major Foreign Holders of US
Treasury Securities and List of Countries by Foreign-Exchange Reserves)

Besides, if, for any reason whatsoever, some of the five major powers mentioned above wanted to wage a
war against each other, the said powerful institutional investors would try to prevent it at all costs, because
such a major war would only ruin their interests - and above all else, even their own very existence! Actually,
almost all national governments, including the wealthy and powerful ones, around the world are powerless
against these institutional investors.
So the simple conclusion here is: The worlds powerful and wealthy nations themselves will never be able
to afford a global armed conflict for it would simply mean committing mutual-suicide. They are only interested
in using proxy wars at regional levels or in civil wars in the Third World for such conflicts at these levels and
regions are harmless and at the same time extremely lucrative for them - by selling all kinds of military hard and softwares at great profits. A most vivid example in this respect is the decades-long civil war in
Burma itself. Several institutional investors and defense industries from a number of major countries
have made great fortunes in the billions of dollar from this civil war alone.
And just have a look at another information piece below which firmly indicates why, for instance, a major
armed conflict between the United States and China on global scale can never take place:

THE EAST IS CRIMSON

Why is Harvard training the next generation of Chinese Communist Party leaders?
By William J. Dobson|Posted Wednesday, May 23, 2012, at 5:46 PM
Communist Party figure Bo Xilai stepped down in April. His son attended Harvard at the time.
Harvard and China have one thing in common: They both consider themselves to be the center of the
world. So, it was always inevitable that when the scandal that brought down Chongqing party boss Bo
Xilai broke, the repercussions would be felt, somehow, in Cambridge. The connection, it turned out, was
Bo Guagua, the son of the disgraced Communist official. The younger Bo was a graduate student at
Harvards Kennedy School of Government. In April, he stopped attending classes and was seen leaving
his off-campus apartment with what appeared to be a security detail.
The fact that Bo Guagua was a couple months from his Harvard degree has sparked interest in the
number of so-called princelingsthe offspring of powerful Chinese Communist Party officialsattending
elite U.S. universities. Its actually not very rare. Xi Jinping, Chinas vice president, is expected to
become Chinas top leader this fall. His daughter is a Harvard undergrad. Two recent top party
leadersZhao Ziyang and Jiang Zeminhad grandchildren who attended Harvard. Jia Qinglin, one of
Chinas most senior officials, has a granddaughter at Stanford. In fact, according to Andrew Higgins and
Maureen Fan, at least five of the nine members of the Politburo Standing Committee, Chinas top
decision-making body, have children or grandchildren who have studied in the United States. But there
are people far more important than the children of Chinese party leaders attending Harvard and other
elite U.S. universities: Chinese leaders themselves.
A little more than 10 years ago, the Chinese Communist Party embarked on an ambitious effort to give
its public officials the training, skills, and expertise they need to govern in the increasingly complex
situations that test an authoritarian regimes resilience. Carefully vetted officialsa selection of some of
the regimes rising starswere sent abroad to study in specially designed programs at some of the
worlds finest universities. The first crop was sent to Harvard. Today, Chinese authorities have expanded
the program to include Stanford, Oxford, Cambridge, the University of Tokyo, and others. A year ago I
met with Lu Mai, the head of the China Development Research Foundation, who oversees the program.
This was a big decision, he told me. We have already sent more than 4,000 [officials]. I dont know
any other country that sends on that scale.
(For more information on this topic see the full text as an appendix under ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
ITEMS HEREWITH ATTACHED )

It is so important fhat the present and future leaders of the country are fully aware of the fact that great
fortunes are made at the cost of blood, tears and sweats of countless innocent people around the world for
centuries. The following two well-known books could give them some insights into the realities of international
business, finance and politics: Merchants of Death by H.C. Engelbrecht and F.C. Hanighen, and The Money
Lenders by Anthony Sampson. Although these two books are already old (the former was published in 1934
and the later in 1981), and the major and minor players are now different, the basic methods are still in widely
use throughout the world - in many instances with more refined and sophisticated methods, naturally.
Hopefully, the new knowledge to be gained by the countrys leaders from these books could prevent
them from sacrificing the survival of millions of people in the country for the benefits of some unknown
strangers from the outside world.
For the great majority of Burmas poverty-stricken population, however, its a matter of day-to-day survival!
There is, therefore, really nothing to gain by becoming either a cog or a bargaining chip or both ot those
global or regional powers. It could even only help worsening the existing tensions in the whole region instead!
Theres no easy way out anymore, if you once get stuck in such a quagmire. And if one carefully looks at the
poor and small countries that have already become such cogs and bargaining chips, one can clearly see that
only a handful of political, military, economic and financial elites in those countries are reaping the benefits

while the great portions of the populations are starving! The peoples of Burma have been suffering more than
enough for two whole generations from one of the most brutal civil wars in the world, which has nearly
completely ruined the country!
And the long-term survival of the ethnic Burmans itself will largely be decided not only by how fairly
and sincerely the present and immediate future leaders of the country handle the life-long aspirations of
these non-Burman ethnic peoples, but also that of the great majority of the ethnic Burmans themselves
as well. The countrys present and future leaders should not forget that powerful external forces are
closely watching us like vultures!
THE FIFTH FACTOR:

PEACE

REFUGEES, CIVIL WARS AND THE CONSTITUTION

Tuesday, 10 September 2013 13:28 Mizzima News - Mizzima News

The Myanmar Constitution has been the most discussed subject recently; there are a series of
comments and criticisms from various circles. The Constitution should not only guarantee fundamental rights of citizens, but also be fair to affairs of ethnic nationalities. Otherwise growing
differences may lead to, alienation and consequently, end up in conflicts and civil wars. It will not
be wrong to infer that the ongoing civil war between the government and various ethnic nationalities is
due to loopholes and weaknesses in our current Constitution. After Myanmar gained independence
from the British, civil wars broke out in many regions, as ethnic groups demanded independence
and autonomy. The present generation inherited war refugees as a consequence.The issue of
Myanmar refugees is a complex one. While referring to refugees, we have to keep in mind that there
are not just war refugees seeking refuge in foreign countries. There are many more internally
displaced persons (IDPs) living in jungles, refugee camps and fleeing to different regions in the
country away from conflict zones.
According to the UNHCR (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees) office report, there are
100000 recognized refugees, protected under the mandate of their office in Thailand alone. There are
nine refugee camps along the Thai-Burma border. Some estimate that the actual number of refugees is
between 150000 and 200000. Recently, Myanmar refugees had to flee to neighboring China too.
Similarly, there are a sizeable number of refugees in Bangladesh and India. The issue has a
significant impact on the nations dignity. Myanmar has been severely criticized by the world for its
poor refugee records. However, previous Myanmar governments neither admitted to nor recognized
the existence of Myanmar refugees seeking refuge in foreign countries or IDPs. In fact, the government did not recognize them as Myanmar nationals. Therefore they made little effort to resolve the
issue. So how can we tackle this issue?
Frankly speaking, we must admit that the refugee issue cannot be solved easily. At the moment it is
next to impossible to resolve it conclusively and justly.
[NLDmembrsnSupportersofCRPPnNLDnDASSK]
Von:
zin linn <zinlinn@yahoo.com.au>
Datum: Mi, 11 Sept 2013 3:30 am
News & Articles on Burm

...........................................
It is a universally known and accepted reality that a country can never be developed unless theres an
absolute peace in it, no matter how rich it is in natural and human resources! This factor has been completely
absent in Burma since its independence in 1948.
Since the present Burmese government came to power it has been loudly propagating its willingness to
build up eternal peace or ever-lasting peace in the country by forming up a federal union which should
even be more far-reaching and broader in scope than the one that the Panglong Agreement signatory
peoples had originally envisioned. And it has also already signed cease-fire agreements with a number of

armed organizations in the meantime. But...

How can one believe that the government is sincerely willing to build up peace since its so-called
peace-making delegation is travelling around and negotiating with various armed movements, the
military has even been intensifying its ruthless military campaigns against these armed movements,
despite the fact that the President is said to have had ordered it three times until February 2013 to
stop its offensives?

How can one believe the sincerity of the government if it has alloted the military $ 2.4 billion for the
fiscal year (2013/2014), yet the government itself is still begging around in the international
community to defray the cost of the peace-building process?

How can one believe the sincerity of the government if its begging around in the international
community for the cost of its peace-making efforts without spending the countrys own billions of
dollar of financial resources - and the military is squandering hundreds of millions of dollars for its
military campaigns against ethnic armed movements? (See the following news items for more
information on this matter under ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ITEMS HEREWITH ATTACHED:
European Union Press Release on Myanmar Peace Center; The Japanese Way to Peace in
Burma; Response to The Japanese Way to Peace in Burma; Trust-building Is Vitally Important;
Calls for Myanmar Peace Center to Reveal Funding; Ethnic Activists Warn of Surge in Land Grabs
After Ceasefires)

How can one believe the sincerity of the government if it even doesnt care the suffering and plight
of tens of thousands of IDPs (Internally Displaced Persons) as the result of the military campaigns?
If one looks at the numerous latest information pieces already inserted above on several pages
and also under ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ITEMS HEREWITH ATTACHED, even a fool will find it
very hard to believe in the governments proclaimed intention and wish. The following few passages
are from the UNs Special Rapporteur, Mr. Toms Ojea Quintanas report on the situation of human rights in
Myanmar. He was in Burma from From 11 to 21 August 2013. (A/68/397/General Assembly Distr.: General/23
September 2013/Original: English/13-48420 (E) 141013)
F. Situation of ethnic and other minority groups
35. In his meeting with Aung Min, the Special Rapporteur welcomed the efforts of the Government to sign
a national ceasefire accord by the end of October 2013 that would permit armed groups that had not yet
signed a ceasefire agreement to join later. He also welcomed the commitment to proceed with political
dialogues withthe armed ethnic groups following the signing of the national accord.
36. The Special Rapporteur urges the Government and ethnic armed groups to ensure that political
dialogue to address underlying grievances is transparent and participatory. During his visits to Chin
State, Kachin State and Shan State, he was struck by the general lack of confidence in the sustainability of the ceasefire agreements and the prospect that subsequent political agreements would address
their concerns and meet their aspirations. He notes that, to this point, ceasefire negotiations have
involved only men at the highest levels of the decision-making apparatus on both sides, and calls for
greater involvement by those at the grass-roots level, in particular women, as negotiations proceed.
Furthermore, greater efforts need to be made to involve displaced populations inside and outside the
country.
38. During the Special Rapporteurs visit to Myitkyina, in Kachin State, he met state officials and visited
members of the Kachin Independence Organization at their technical liaison office. He welcomes the
seven-point agreement that was signed during peace talks held in May 2013 in Myitkyina, which were
attended by the Special Adviser to the Secretary-General on Myanmar, a representative of the Government of China and members of various ethnic groups. The agreement included points on troop repositioning, a monitoring and verification mechanism and the commencement of a dialogue on political issues.
39. The Special Rapporteur remains concerned about the continuing lack of access by international

humanitarian agencies to the more than 50,000 internally displaced persons in areas outside government
control in Kachin State, the inclusion in the seven-point agreement of a commitment to provide relief for
such persons notwithstanding. He has particular concerns regarding the access of people far from Laiza
to adequate food, water and sanitation, health care and education. United Nations humanitarian agencies
have been provided with access to areas outside government control only once (between July 2012 and
July 2013). During his visit, the Special Rapporteur sought to visit Laiza to assess the human rights
situation, which is particularly troubling given the allegations of serious and systematic human rights
violations in the context of the armed conflict. The experience of the Special Rapporteur, who spent four
hours in Myitkyina attempting to negotiate access to Laiza, appears to mirror the experience of United
Nations humanitarian agencies endeavouring to gain access to areas outside government control in
Kachin State. Neither the state nor the central government authorities explicitly denied access to the
Special Rapporteur, but no one appeared able to take the decision to actually grant permission, which in
effect prevented him from visiting Laiza. He urges the Government to clarify and simplify the
administrative procedures, which currently have the effect of denying humanitarian agencies access to
areas outside government control in Kachin State.9

................................................

In fact, if the government and the military sincerely wanted to build up peace, it should be very easy
to do so, because all non-Burman indigenous nationalities have always only been asking from the
successive Burmese governments to fully give them back their own birthrights - that is, the right to
create their own destiny, the right to use their own languages and scripts, their cultures and the
natural resources within their own territories! And they are fighting with arms for these birthrights which
are robbed by the governments. It was and is always the government troops that have been
committing all kinds of human rights violations within the rightful territories of these peoples. Even
then, the government and the military keep on pressing on them for more concessions - to transform
their armed forces into Border Guard Force (BGF), for instance, just to name one.
Just have a look at the following news piece!
CAN BURMA GO OUT OF RESOURCE CURSE?
Wed, 2013-10-16 08:06 editor By - Zin Linn

The bulk of profitable resources in Myanmar, including oil and gas, are unearthed from ethnic states
and sold out overseas especially to neighboring countries. The resource owner states have never been
enjoyed their quota revenues from the deal of those natural resources since the military authorities
monopolized the whole extractive industries.
These states such as Kachin, Shan, Kayah, Karen and Mon states - as well have never been enjoyed
rewarding funds for social or environmental damages despite the fact that they suffer the troubles
related to environmental destruction and human rights abuses that go with the extraction and export of
resources. It is regrettable that decision on the subject of the possession and exploitation of natural
resources or the equal sharing of earnings still remains as main reason of domestic war in Myanmar
nowadays. People as well as the Upper and Lower Parliaments have no knowledge about how revenues
from the sale of gas resources are spent since the previous juntas time. However, it is commonsensical
that government spending for social improvement is stingy while the military continues enjoying the lions
share of the state revenues.
Unfair sharing of resource benefits is also contributing to ethnic conflicts. Although a so-called civilian
government is now running day-to-day affairs, the military remains unwaveringly above the law under the
2008 constitution. Many analysts believe that the role of military conglomerate in Myanmars economy
and in managing countrys huge oil and gas revenues remain unknown and unfettered.
According to the Arakan Oil Watch (AOW), Foreign Oil Companies engaging in Myanmas oil and gas
sector also refuse to publish how much and how they pay the military regime.
Source:

[NLDmembrsnSupportersofCRPPnNLDnDASSK]
Von:

zin linn <zinlinn@yahoo.com.au>;

Datum: Mi, 16 Okt 2013 4:01 am

Asian Tribune - http://www.asiantribune.com/node/64899

............................................................................................

All indigenous non-Burman peoples should not forget the fact that their position has never been better
and stronger at the present time than at any other times since the countrys existence as a sovereign state.
The leaders of these peoples must therefore try their best to use this once-in-a-lifetime opportunity!
The following are some of these favourable conditions for them:

A certain degree of freedom is already at hand in the country.

A certain degree of Freedom of Press is at hand. It is now very encouraging to see that most of
the countrys news media are quite fair enough in reporting their plight.
The world is giving a keen attention to the overall political developments in the country and
they enjoy certain amount of the international communitys sympathy.
Their terrritories are extremely strategically located along the international boundaries and are full of
natural resources.
Great portions of the ethnic Burmese population are already fully aware of their plight. And they (the
Burmans) have also realized that their own short-and long-term survival also largely depends on how
fairly those peoples fundamental rights are respected and protected by the ruling authorities, and
also that a long-lasting peace can never be achieved without sincere and honest deeds on the
Burmans side. Some of the most vivid evidences are the sympathy that they (Burmans) had shown
towards them by making great efforts to relieve the suffering and hardship of tens of thousands of
the Kachin war victims since the army has been launching its merciless campaigns against the
KIO/KIA two years ago. The Burmans simply do not blindly believe in the militarys and governments
propaganda anymore that non-Burman nationalities are separatists.
There has always been absolute harmony and peaceful co-existence between ordinary ethnic
Burmans and all other nationalities for decades despite the successive governments chauvinistic
propaganda and misdeeds.
The image of the military has been very badly damaged almost beyond repair since it took the state
power on March 2, 1962. The following are some of the reasons why this could happen: The several
massacres that the military had committed against students, factory workers, innocent peaceful
demonstrators, monks, and indigenous non-Burman nationalities; their forced confiscation
of hundreds of thousands of acres of farmlands owned by poverty-stricken farmers; their monopoly
of the countrys key financial and economic resources; the excessive corruption within the upper
levels of the armed forces, etc., etc. The members of armed forces, therefore, are simply seen by
the general masses as oppressors, murderers and usurpers of power and national treasures, rather
than as protectors of the country and the people. Due mainly to such reasons, the military is no more
so solid and strong as many naive people are led to believe.
The West Factor: The West, especially the US and Britain, seem to prefer to work closely with an
intact and strong military in Burma for the protection of their own economic and geopolitical interests
and billions of their investment. However, as the militarys image among the general masses is so
negative as already mentioned above, they are in great dilemma. That certainly is one major reason
why they are trying now to help polishing the militarys image by giving them political training. (See for
details UK Military Chief Discusses Burma Training Link and Britain Preparing for Political Training for
Burma Army under ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ITEMS HEREWITH ATTACHED)
Personally, though, I am rather pessimistic about the chance of success for their endeavours
on the following grounds: In my opinion the main culprit behind the countless human rights violations
committed by the army, for instance, is not due to the lack of a proper political training on the part of
the rank-and-file, but rather instead to the basic structures of the military and the ideology or
ideologies that have been shaping the mindset of political and military elites. So, so long as these

fundamental issues are not satisfactorily solved, the problems mentioned would not easily
disappear away. However, with their tremendous military, economic and financial clouts they
(the US and Britain and in a broader sense, the West) may probably succeed in the end hopefully. If the West succeeds with their programme, the peoples of Burma would be so happy
and grateful for they see the West as their last and only hope for their salvation from the
militarys grips in their daily life.
(What is worth mentioning here is that the actions of Burmese political and military elites were and
still are absolutely unpredictable since Burmas independence day. Just one most vivid evidence in
hand: According to the official British version, Britains current programme of political training for
Burmas military personnel has been done at the request of Daw Aung San Suu Kyi. If thats really
true, then there will surely arise several unpleasant questions - both legal and constitutional. A few
among them, for instance, would be: How could such an extremely important programme involving two
sovereign states be implemented just on the request of her? She is just a normal MP and her party
has only 43 out of 663 seats in the parliament and she is not even a Cabinet member nor a member
of the all powerful 11-member National Defense and Security Council (NDSC)*. So in which capacity
could she do that? I have never heard that she has been authorized by either the government or
the parliament or the military to make such a major plan on behalf of them with the British government. If it really has happened purely on her request alone, then she must in reality be even more
powerful than President U Thein Sein and Senior General Min Aung Hlaing, Commander -in-Chief
of the Armed Forces, themselves. Even President U Thein Sein, who is also the president of the
NDSC, cannot influence the armys activities in non-Burman peoples territories. He is officially said to
have had ordered three times the army to stop its offensives against the KIO/KIA but the army simply
ignored his orders! Or, it could also be that Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and her party, the ruling USDP
party, the government and the military must have been much more closely working together behind
the scenes without the knowledge of the public. One can even easily speculate these days that the
coincidence of Daw Aung San Suu Kyis current European tour, Senior General Min Aung Hlaings
present visit to China, and the governments desperate efforts to hold a nationwide ceasefire
agreement signing ceremony with non-Burman armed organizations during next month could be wellorchestrated acts for the achievement of some hidden goals.)
The Wests intention may be good, but their Strategy probably is not!

The powerless and silent Burmese majority, including the members of the armed forces
themselvs at the lower and middle levels and their families, certainly realize that non-Burman
ethnic armed organizations - and the West - are the only forces left that still could give the
military pressure to reform. Or in other words, the silent Burmese majority may secretly wish
that these armed movements stand more firmly on their grounds in their negotiations with the
government and the military.
The entire people of the country are so tired of war since more than half a century!

At present 11 armed organizations under the umbrella organization of the United Nationalities Federal
Council (UNFC) are in the process of negotiating with the government. And so far as I know, the UNFCs
stance and art of negotiation are correct to some extent - that is, their demand that political dialogue must
________________________________________________
* Members of the NDSC is made up of the following persons: U Thein Sein, President; U Nyan Tun, Vice- President; U Mauk Kham, Vice-President; U
Shwe Mann, Peoples Assembly Speaker: U Khin Aung Myint, National Assembly Speaker; Sr. Gen. Min Aung Hlaing, Armed Forces Commander-inChief; Gen. Soe Win, Armed Forces Deputy Commander-in-Chief; Lt. Gen, Wai Lwin, Minister of Defense; Lt. Gen. Ko Ko, Minister of Home
Affairs; Wanno Maung Lwin, Minister of Foreign Affairs; Lt. Gen. Thet Naing Win, Minister of Border Affairs.

come first before cease-fire agreement can be signed, since once a political dialogue can be successfully
concluded, ceasefire would automatically follow; the drafting of a new constitution for a future genuine
federal union; and the conducting of negotiations outside Burma, and so on.
I strongly feel, however, that the leaders of the UNFC-member organizations should also consider the
following factors very seriously in developing a common Strategy for their negotiations with the government in
the coming months or years.

The real Union of Burma ceased to exist automatically the very moment General Ne Win took
political power by force on March 2, 1962. He had even officially abolished the then existing State
Constitution. Since then the former Union in fact existed only in name or de facto, but not de jure!
Then another Constitution was introduced in 1974 under highly questionable circumstances and
under coercion and cunning tricks. (See www.chinforum.org: Suppression of Chin National Movement
for Federalism Under the Revolutionary Council and the Burma Socialist Programme Party - 19621988). So, the so-called Union of Burma which continued its existence under this new Constitution
was also only in name or de facto, and not de jure. Then when the military seized state power
once again in 1988, it nullified the 1974 Constitution and ruled the country without a written constistution with iron fists under the names of SPDC and later SLORC (State Peace and Development
Council and State Law and Order Restoration Council respectively)* Then came the 2008 Constitution
once more which was promulgated under blatenly manipulated circumstances while the whole
country was mourning for the death and suffering of hundreds of thousands of people as the result
of Cyclone Nargis. So, in short, any State Constitution created for a legally non-existent Union can
never be legal at all! Besides, when the said 1974 and 2008 Constitutions were drafted and
promulgated, the masses under the control of various non-Burman ethnic armed organizations did
not have - or were given - the chance to give either their approval or disapproval of them. The abovementioned factors firmly confirm the fact that what the successive governments under the name of the
Union of Burma or Union of Myanmar have been doing absolutely lack legitimacy.

At the moment, as everybody knows and realizes the country is facing two extremely important
issues that could even decide the destiny of all the peoples in it in the near or distant future that is, whether a new constitution should be written or the existing one should be amended.

The UNFC is drafting now a completely new constitution for a future federal union and this draft
is said to be ready in three months from now. The parliament has also formed up on 25 July a
109-member Joint Committee to Review the 2008 Constitution with the intention of examining
possible changes in the 2008 Constitution with Members of Parliament, members of political parties,
military MPs and individuals, whereas the NLD is also planning to review which amendments could
and should be made. One can already foresee, however, that as the ruling USDP party and the
_______________________________________________
* The State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) was the official name of the military regime of Burma (also known as Myanmar), which seized
power in 1988. On 30 March 2011, Senior General Than Shwe signed a decree that officially dissolved the Council.[1]
From 1988 to 1997, the SPDC was known as State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC), which had replaced the role of Burma Socialist
Programme Party (BSPP).[2] In 1997, SLORC was abolished and reconstituted as the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC). The powerful
regional military commanders, who were members of SLORC, were promoted to new positions and transferred to the capital of Rangoon (now
Yangon). The new regional military commanders were not included in the membership of the SPDC. The SPDC consisted of eleven senior military
officers. The members of the junta[3] wielded a great deal more power than the cabinet ministers, who are more junior military officers, or civilians.
(The exception is the Defence Ministry portfolio, which was in the hands of junta leader Than Shwe himself.)
Although the regime retreated from the totalitarian Burmese Way to Socialism of BSPP when it took power in 1988, the regime was widely accused
of human rights abuses. It rejected the 1990 election results and kept Aung San Suu Kyi under house arrest until her release on 13 November 2010.[4]
The council was officially dissolved on 30 March 2011, with the inauguration of the newly elected government, led by its former member and Prime
Minister, President Thein Sein.[5]
Source: Wikipedia

military would not most likely accept the constitution that is being drafted by the UNFC, the UNFC
certainly would not accept the changes that would be proposed by the 109-member Joint Committee
either with the arguments that, since this Joint Committee is comprised of 52 USDP members and
25 military representatives, 7 members of the opposition NLD and 25 members from small ethnic
parties, its would-be proposals do not serve the real interests of non-Burman indigenous ethnic
nationalities. The formation of the Joint Committee indeed is clearly unbalanced since there are 77
pro-military members in it.
I, therefore, see only one solution for the UNFC to overcome this great hurdle: They should
simply deploy a completely new Strategy!
Their new Strategy should be like this: Simply wait patiently - without pushing on with their
newly drafted constitution - until the coming 2015 general election has finally been held without
trying to influence the process of the election in order to find out if the election was fair and
correct enough and if the winning parties and the would-be newly formed government are
powerful enough to bring the military under their control. It would make sense to negotiate
directly only with those who are really powerul enough to make the final decisions.
Since the present governments term in office is running out very soon anyway - and the military had
even openly and defiantly defied the Presidents orders for three times to stop its brutal offensives
against the KIO/KIA and a number of other cease-fire signatory armed organizations - its simply
senseless for the UNFC to either present their new constitution draft now, or to go on negotiating or to
sign a treaty with it (the present government). This point has been confirmed by U Aung Mins
statement to the KNPP (Karenni National Progressive Party) negotiating team which is still right now
[just before the first version of this paper was about to be released in October, 2014] negotiating with
the government in Loikaw, Kayah State. He told them that the draft treaty (the governments
national ceasefire accord draft) has yet to be approved by the countrys National Defense and
Security Council. This statement clearly shows where the real power lies! (See Where Is Ethnic
Reconciliation Going? under ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ITEMS HEREWITH ATTACHED)
If, in case, the UNFC-member organizations are using the drafting of a new constitution merely as
a tactical move in order to buy times, then its alright. But if it is intended to be used as a strategic
manoeuvre, I am rather pessimistic about its chance of bringing some major positive changes for
them. So, if they could have endured great hardship in the jungles for more than 60 years, why
shouldnt they be able to patiently wait for just another two more years?
Timing is one of the most decisive factors in Strategy, but now is absolutely not yet the right
timing - for them (non-Burman nationalities)!

Since a few years ago, one hears a lot about the holding of a Second Panglong Conference and
the signing of a Second Panglong Agreement - or a second Panglong-like Conference and a second
Panglong-like Treaty. The government itself has even been loudly propagating since it came to
power about the forming of a federal union which should even be more far-reaching and broader in
scope than the one originally envisioned by signatories of the Panglong Agreement. But in reality,
what they have been doing since then until now is exactly the opposite.
They are trying to lull the leaders of ethnic armed national movements with some childish tricks
as if they were underage children. The following are some examples:
- U Aung Min, Minister of the Presidents office, and Chief Negotiator of the government with all
armed organizations, had even derisively made this remark at a press conference one year ago:
Now I know from the Oxford Dictionary that federalism does not necessarily mean secession.

- Then even President U Thein Sein himself had publicly announced a few months ago that a
nation-wide ceasefire signing ceremony would be made at the end of October. But when things
did not turn out positively as they had expected and wished, they said now that this ceremony
would be made at the end of this month or in November. (See Govts Peacemaking Efforts Remain
Piecemeal, Observers Say; Where Is Ethnic Reconciliation Going? under ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ITEMS HEREWITH ATTACHED)
- U Aung Mins deputy chief negotiator said at a press conference in September in Chiangmai,
Thailand, that the ceasefire agreement paper would be left open in Naypyidaw, the countrys capital,
so that any ethnic armed movement, which did not want to sign it at the official signing ceremony,
may still be able to sign it later at its convenience - as if it were just a guest book.
- And then the government is right now trying to persuade armed movements that are still reluctant
to sign it wih the idea that the ceasefire signing ceremony would be attended also by some specially
invited internationally well-known prominents, including the UN Secretary-General and Senior General
Min Aung Hlaing, Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Burma.
In fact, its the contents of an agreement or a treaty that count, not who attend a signing
ceremony. The attendees of such an event will disappear after a few hours and they will not
care about what happens thereafter.
If the present or future governments, the ruling political parties and the military ever really wanted
to hold a second Panglong Conference with all non-Burman indigenous races, there must be two
separate conferences:
At first, a conference must be held solely among all the original Panglong Agreement signatory
peoples - that is, the Burmans, Chins, Kachins and Shans - plus the Kayahs or Karennis - in order to
review all the wrongdoings that have been committed by succesive Burmese governments against
Chins, Kachins, Karennis and Shans since the countrys independece in the name of the Union of
Burma to find out whether a reconciliation is still possible or not. (The reasons why the Kayahs or
Karennis must also participate is the fact that the four Karenni States became semi-independent and
British protectorates following a treaty signed between the Burmese King and the British in 1875. And
these four states became a union state under the name of Kayah State soon after independence.
(See Footnote below*, my 6-page excerpted version of the Report of the Frontier Areas Committee
of Enquiry 1947, and the 22-page original full text of the same document under ADDITIONAL
INFORMATION ITEMS HEREWITH ATTACHED for more information on this issue.)
At this conference the British government should be requested to present how the AttleeGovernment had understood and interpreted all the official documents that were directly related to
Burmas independence, including that of the Panglong Conference and Panglong Agreement. The
most important point here is: If the the Panglong Conference were not held nor had the Panglong
Agreement been signed, only ministerial Burma (Burma proper) would have become a sovereign
state without the other nationalities and their lands.
___________________________________________
* The Karenni States is the name formerly given to the three states of Kantarawadi (3,161 square miles or 8,190 square kilometres, pop (1931)
30,677), Kyebogyi (790 square miles or 2,000 square kilometres, pop (1931) 14,282) and Bawlake (568 square miles or 1,470 square kilometres,
pop (1931) 13,802), located south of the Federated Shan States and east of British Burma.
The British government recognized and guaranteed the independence of the Karenni States in an 1875 treaty with Burmese King Mindon Min,
by which both parties recognized the area as belonging neither to Burma nor to Great Britain. Consequently, the Karenni States were never
fully incorporated into British Burma. The Karenni States were recognized as tributary to British Burma in 1892, when their rulers agreed to accept
a stipend from the British government. In the 1930s, the Mawchi Mine in Bawlake was the most important source of tungsten in the world. The
Constitution of the Union of Burma in 1947 proclaimed that the three Karenni States be amalgamated into a single constituent state of the union,
called Karenni State. It also provided for the possibility of secession from the Union after 10 years. In 1952, the former Shan state of Mong Pai was
added, and the whole renamed Kayah State, possibly with the intent of driving a wedge between the Karenni (in Kayah State) and the rest of the
Karen people (in Karen State), both fighting for independence. ( http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Karenni_States )

And if in case should there be a deadlock at this conference, the British government in office
should even be requested to act as mediator in its capacity as the former Colonial Power and as a
leading Christian nation as well. Britain has got at least both political and religious moral responsibilities with regard to what have been happening in Burma for decades especially since 1948,
because a great number of these events are either direct or indirect consequences of her colonial
legacy. The reason why shes got moral responsibility from religious point of view as well is the fact
that among the millions of Christian victims of successive military dictators are also members of the
the Anglican Church. (There are about 4 million Christians in Burma and the great majority of them approximately 80 to 90 % - are non-Burman indigenous national races. The Anglican Church has
about 50 000 members at any given moment. Among the Chin people alone there are some 14 000 see below.) The state in Britain finances theological studies, pays the salaries of theology professors
and bishops (most of the bishops are also Members of the House of Lords, or the Upper House of
Parliament at the same time); select and appoints the archbishops of Canterbury who also act as
the Spiritual Heads of the worldwide Anglican Communion.
18.3.6 KHUMI-CHIN ANGLICANS
By Revd. Canon E.W. Francis & Mrs. Francis
An overview of the development of the Khumi-Chin Anglican Church, based in Paletwa, Chin State. The
Revd.(now Canon) E.W. FRANCIS went to Burma from England in 1932 with the Bible Churchmans
Missionary Society, now known as Crosslinks :
... The Anglican Church that Revd. Francis founded amongst the Khumis is thriving and is growing in 1999.
As of 1998, there are 2 Khumi Bishops, 28 ordained Priests, and 158 Catechists/Evangelists. The SITTWE
DIOCESE is covered by these two Bishops and there are 17 Townships in Rakhaine State and 4 Townships
in Chin State (Paletwa, Matupi, Mindat, Kanpetlet). The population is over 2,634,310. Amongst an estimated
92,000 Christians in the area, 13,114 are Anglicans. These Anglicans have 15 Youth Branches, 18 Mothers
Union Branches, 18 Religious Education Departments, 32 Mens Societies, and Sunday schools attached to
each congregation... (Centennial Highlights of Christianity in Chin Hills: 1899- 1999; published and
printed in the U.S., March 1999)
Source: The Chin/Zo People of Bangladesh, Burma and India: An Introduction [XVII], p. 157
________________________________________
The Archbishop of Canterbury
The Archbishop of Canterbury is the senior bishop and principal leader of the Church of England, the symbolic
head of the worldwide Anglican Communion and the diocesan bishop of the Diocese of Canterbury.
House of Lords
Of the 44 diocesan archbishops and bishops in the Church of England, 26 are permitted to sit in the House of
Lords. The Archbishops of Canterbury and York automatically have seats, as do the Bishops of London,
Durham and Winchester. The remaining 21 seats are filled in order of seniority by consecration. It may take
a diocesan bishop a number of years to reach the House of Lords, at which point he becomes a Lord Spiritual.
The Bishop of Sodor and Man and the Bishop of Gibraltar in Europe are not eligible to sit in the House of Lords
as their dioceses lie outside the United Kingdom.[48]
Financial situation
The Church of England manages an investment portfolio which is worth more than 8 billion.
Appointment of Church of England bishops
The appointment of Church of England diocesan bishops follows a somewhat convoluted process. The
committee produces a Statement of Needs assessing the needs of the diocese. It then sends this statement
to the Crown Nominations Commission (known until 2003 as the Crown Appointments Commission)...
Beyond these fourteen voting members, the Prime Minister's appointments secretary and the Archbishops'
appointments secretary meet with the commission and help supply it with information on possible candidates.
The commission meets several times in secret. The commission then forwards two names to the prime

minister, who chooses one of them, or (exceptionally) requests additional names from the commission.
In recent memory, the only prime minister who has not accepted the commission's preferred candidate
was Margaret Thatcher, who opposed James Lawton Thompsons nomination as Bishop of Birmingham,
due to his (perceived) liberal and left-leaning views. Since 2007 the convention has been that the prime
minister will choose the first-named recommendation.[2] If the chosen individual accepts the office, the
prime minister advises the Sovereign, who then formally nominates the prime minister's choice.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Church_of_England
____________________________________________________
The Ten Commandments
And God spoke all these words:
I am the LORD your God who brought you out of Egypt, out of the land of slavery;
1. You shall have no other gods before me.
2. You shall not make yourself an idol in the form of anything in heaven above or on
the earth beneath or in the waters below. You shall not bow down to them or
worship them; for I, the LORD your God, am a jealous God, punishing the children
for the sin of the fathers to the third and fourth generation of those who hate me, but
showing love to thousands who love me and keep my commandments.
3. You shall not misuse the name of the LORD your God, for the LORD will not hold
anyone guiltless who misuses his name.
4. Remember the Sabbath day by keeping it holy. Six days you shall labour and do
all your works, but the seventh day is a Sabbath to the LORD your God. On it you
shall do any work, neither you, your son or daughter, nor your manservant or
maidservant, nor your animals, nor the aliens within your gate. For in six days the
LORD made the heavens and the earth, the sea, and all that is in them, but he rested on
the seventh day. Therefore the LORD blessed the Sabbath day and made it holy.
5. Honour your father and mother, so that you may live long in the land the LORD
your God is giving you.
6. You shall not murder.
7. You shall not commit adultery.
8. You shall not steal.
9. You shall not give false testimony against your neighbour.
10. You shall not covet your neighbours house. You shall not covet your neighbours wife, or
his manservant or maidservant, his ox or donkey, or anything that belongs to your neighbour.
Source: Exodus 20:1-17 (Holy Bible: New International Version)
..........................................................
Sermon on the Mount
The Beatitudes
Now when Jesus saw the crowds, he went up on a mountainside
and sat down. His disciples came to him,
2 and he began to teach them, saying
3 Blessed are the poor in spirit,
for theirs is the kingdom of heaven.
4 Blessed are those who mourn,
for they will be comforted.
5 Blessed are the meek,
for they will inherit the earth.
6 Blessed are those who hunger and thirst for righteousness,
for they will be filled.
7 Blessed are the merciful,
for they will be shown mercy.
8 Blessed are the pure in heart,
for they will see God.
9 Blessed are the peacemakers,
for they will be called children of God.
10 Blessed are those who are persecuted because of righteousness,
for theirs is the kingdom of heaven.
11 Blessed are you when people insult you, persecute you and falsely say all kinds of

evil against you because of me.

12 Rejoice and be glad, because great is your reward in heaven, for in the same way
they persecuted the prophets who were before you.
Source: (Matthew 5:1-12)- Holy Bible: New International Version
_____________________________________________________________

Only when and if this conference (Second Panglong Conference) could be amiably concluded, it
would be meaningful to hold the second conference comprising of all indigenous national races.
Otherwise, all the same old problems that they have been troubling them will keep on haunting them
for generations to come. At this second conference ethnic Burmans and all other indigenous nonBurman peoples should try to map out detailed plans for their common future destiny - the kinds of
union and constitution they like, for instance.
Any union that would be formed up in the future must only be realized in accordance with the
genuine wishes of the majority of the peoples concerned after open and thorough discussions
and debates. Successive Burmese governments have always only been accusing non-Burman
peoples of being secessionists, but the Burmans themselves have had never been asked
whether they would prefer to live alone without any other non-Burman national races or not!
Those who would like to live together in a future union should also think about several options. One
option among them could be a confederation of sovereign states, for example.
Until now one hears and sees that all the ceasefire agreement signatory armed organizations are
talking only about political, development and military affairs. And they are being lulled by the
government with promises of being rewarded with a handful of Special Economic Zones in their own
territories! Actually, what they should do is directly inviting some influential international financial and
economic experts to give them advices on how best to develop their lands - and directly making
negotiations with potential investors - without meekly waiting for the governments generous
approval or guidance. In this way, they may be able to develop not only just one or two SEZs, but
several. However, if they would separately do that they may not be taken seriously by the government
itself and potential investors. So under the umbrella of the UNFC they should set up a special section
or department that would handle this task. In orther words, the UNFC should not limit itself as an ad
hoc organization to mainly undertake negotiations with the government, but it should try to develop
itself as an institution to oversee the interests of non-Burman national races on a long-term basis.
Last but not least: The signing of ceasefire agreement and making peace with non-Burman
indigenous nationalities alone will not be enough to build an eternal or lasting peace. It would be
equally important for the government - and especially the military - to make peace and reconciliation
with the entire ethnic Burmans as well, because the great majority of them have also been suffering
so much under the military since 1962. And a great number of injustices are still being committed
everywhere unti today by state authorities. So, until or unless the military is broadminded enough to
do this reconciliation to the fullest extent, there can never be a lasting peace in the country. And
extreme poverty is everywhere and if this poverty also is not addressed urgently and sufficiently
enough, there wlll be great social upheavels sooner or later.
Everyday one learns from news media about people demonstrating or striking at several places in the
country for the regain of their birthrights and for the return of their confiscated farmlands, and so on.
People of course need democray and freedom, but these alone are not enough. Every citizen must
enjoy a guaranteed minimum existence so that he can lead a respectable life, that is, at least he
must not be homeless; he must have enough clothes to cover his body; he must not be starving and
his health also taken care of, etc. As the country is rich enough in natural and human resources, the
elimination of extreme poverty should not be a big problem at all - provided of course that the
countrys financial resources are wisely managed and used.
And these days people are wondering whether or not the authorities would ever be able to put the
bloody religious and ethnic conflicts that are boiling in several parts of the country under their control.

Now, let us have a look at how the past and present negotiations are conducted between the
government and various armed organizations for this factor is so crucially important, especially for the armed
movements survival and success. So far as I have been observing nearly all armed movements have made
two major
fatal strategic mistakes in their negotiations with the government.

Their first and greatest strategic mistake of all was and still is their negotiating with the government
separately. The leaders of many movements said that they have to negotiate with the government
separately because every movement has its own unique physical and political situations. Although
this argument may seem at first to be logical, in my opinion its a very weak excuse. Its partly due to
their separate negotiations with the governmnt that has caused schism or paralysis in the leaderships
of some movements.
But since the 11 armed organizations are now negotiating with the government under the umbrella
organization of UNFC, their bargaining position has become much better again. They must stick
together, if they really want to achieve some outstanding results for their peoples!

Their second and greatest strategic mistake was and still is that they have broken nearly all the basic
art and rules of negotiation - as listed below - which normally are strictly observed and practised by
any belligerent parties everywhere. Leaders of these movements were and are apparently not fully
aware of the importance of these rules for the success of their negotiations.
The negotiating table is another battle field. Sometimes, it could be even more important than real
battles in the field, because what cannot be achieved on the battle field could be achieved on the
negotiating table.
The negotiating table is a so vitally important battle field for psychological warfare, propaganda,
publicity and public relations altogether. Every negotiating party, therefore, tries to use it as much as
possible for its own advantage. For instance, negotiations for the sitting arrangements alone for the
negotiating teams of the Americans and the North Vietnamese before the Vietnam Peace Talks
began in Paris in1975, took six months!
The negotiating team must be selected with extreme caution, and preparations for every negotiation
must be meticulously planned, especially the Strategy and Tactics that are to be deployed. But in
order to be able to develop the right strategy and tactics, for instance, one must be able to
realistically analyse his own - and his opponents - strong and weak points. If he cannot do this,
then he is doomed to failure from the very beginning, because he will not be able to use his own
strong points effectively and at the same time he will not be able to exploit his opponents weak
points for his own advantage.
Never go into your enemys territory unless youre going to sign a document of your own capitulation!
If you did that, you would be automatically on the defensive - both politically and physically! To be
physically on the defensive, for instance, means - just to name a few simple things - ones movements
can be put under surveillance; ones telephone calls and discussions can be secretly monitored;
ones contacts can be registered, etc. Choose therefore a friendly or at least an absolutely neutral
territory for the occasion.
The KIO fully understood this crucially important factor and thus were exploiting it to the fullest
extent. They conducted their negotiations with the government either in China or in Thailand under
the presence of high-ranking outside observers. Even when they made peace talks inside the
country, they made them only in Mitkyina, the capital of their own country, and again in the presence
of some prominent outside observers, including even UN observers, for instance.
Keep the members of the negotiating team at the minimum - at least until or unless more members
are absolutely necessary.
Never send high-ranking personalities - or top leaders - at least at the initial stages of the negotiations. If a negotiator of lesser rank makes a fatal mistake it could still be corrected by the higher

leadership, but if a top leader is sent and he makes such a fatal mistake the damage could no more
in most cases be remedied. Follow strictly the internationally practiced diplomatic protocols - that is,
at least the Chief Negotiators on all negotiating parties must be of the same rank or status in the
hierachies of command or leadership.

The chief negotiator and his immediate assistants must be those whom your adversary can fully
respect, even when the negotiating issues on all sides are poles apart. (Some tips for choosing the
negotiating team: In most instances, skillful and successful negotiators are the ones who are modest,
warm-hearted, sincere, patient, friendly, diplomatic, humorous and can listen to their adversaries
opinions. Whether a negotiation would be successful or not depends of course on several other
factors as well - like, whether it is used merely as a strategem by any negotiating party or what the
overall situation on all sides is, etc.

Take the utmost precaution to safeguard your own secrets on your part, unless of course you wish to
deliberately misinform your adversary by intentionally leaking some top secrets, for example.

Never let your adversary get any hints of disunity within your own negotiating team.

Never articulate more than what is absolutely necessary, unless of course you deliberately want to
deceive your adversary with some strategems.

News media or publicity must be very skilfully handled by only one or two persons who are specially
trained for this extremely crucial and sensitive task.
______________________________________________
Grindelallee 141
20146 Hamburg,
Germany
- Third modification: July, 2015
- Updated from 3rd modified version of Update VII* in May 2016.
................................................................
Some words on myself:
- Since 1964 I have been politically active against the successive Burmese regimes. Although Ive been living
in Germany since mid 1978, I havent applied for German citizenship. Im still retaining my status as a stateless
person and longingly waiting for the time when I can live again peacefully in a free homeland of my own where
the people fully enjoy freedom, justice and the right to create their own destiny as they so wish - and in dignity.
In the course of the times Ive authored a few political papers on Burma and the Chin people. Among them
are Grand Strategy for Burma (I to VIII), The Chin/Zo People of Bangladesh, Burma and India: An Introduction (I to
XVIII)I , Burmas 60-Year Old Civil War (1948-2008 ): A Brief Chronology, Some Strategic Concepts for the Rebuilding
of Burma, etc. Im writing these papers in my capacity as a full and proudful citizen of Chinland - the Land of
great warriors - and one of the Panglong Agreement signatory countries.
- The following four papers may be accessed at the given Links
1. Some Strategic Concepts for the Rebuilding of Burma/Myanmar
http://www.scribd.com/doc/30773435/
2. Burmas 60-Year Old Civil War (1948-2008 ): A Brief Chronology
http://www.scribd.com/doc/61798219/
3. Grand Strategy for Burma/Myanmar VIII
http://de.scribd.com/doc/223075248/Grand-Strategy-for-Burma-VII

THE FOLLOWING ARE THE ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ITEMS HEREWITH ATTACHED (IN PDFS)
Note. The Items listed below are not numbered, but arranged exactly as they appear on this page.
I.

FINANCIAL- AND TRADE-RELATED INFORMATION (BURMA & INTERNATIONAL)

01. Did RFA Really Report As Follow?

02. The European Council Decision 2003/CFSP
03. The European Union and Burma: The Case for Targeted Sanctions (2004)
04. CRF Report for Congress: Burma Sanctions Background and Options (10/2007)
05. Switzerland Tightens Myanmar Sanctions (06/2006)
06. What Happended to the Marcos Fotune?
07. Philippines law gives compensation to Marcos victims
08. Major Foreign Holders of US Treasury Securities (Oct. 2012)
09. List of Countries by Foreign-Exchange Reserves (Dec. 2012)
10. The East Is Crimson
II.

ECONOMIC-RELATED INFORMATION (BURMA)

01. Myanmars Five Economic Priorities

02. The Presidents Seven-Step Development Road-map
03. RIL, OVL, Cairn in Race for Myanmar Blocs
04. Chinese Nickel Industry
15. Myanmar Mining Information
06. A Brief Introduction of Mwetaung Nickel Deposit
07. Letpadaung Farmers Protest Over Bulldozed Crops, Fenced-Off Land
08. Moun or Mone Water Reservoir and Hydro Projects
01. Myanmars Shwe Gas aids Chinas bargaining with Russia
02. Despite criticisms, Myanmar signs US $ 100 m high interest-rate loan with China
03. Myanmar oil not working for the nation
04. Myanmar to build largest international airport
05. Burma unveils 'master plan' to boost tourism
06. Burma needs transparency extracting natural resources
07. 200 000 workers expelled from Htan gaing oil-field
08. Child labor around the globe (Myanmar)
09. Nearly 40% unemployment in Myanmar
10. Thousands of Burmese workers stranded in Myawaddy
11. No jobs at home for Burmese facing expulsion from thailand
12. Arakan cbos demand halt to all natural resource extraction projects
13. Myanmar calls on stake holders to cooperate in census
_________________________________________________________
III.

PEACE-RELATED INFORMATION

01. European Union Press Release on Myanmar Peace Center

02. The Japanese Way to Peace in Burma
03. Response to The Japanese Way to Peace in Burma
04. Trust-building Is Vitally Important
05. Calls for Myanmar Peace Center to Reveal Funding
06. Ethnic Activists Warn of Surge in Land Grabs After Ceasefires
07. No Child Soldiers Poster
08. Human Rights Violations Continue in Burmas Ethnic Areas
09. UK Military Chief Discusses Burma Training Link
10. Britain Preparing Political Training for Burma Army

11. Govts Peacemaking Efforts Remain Piecemeal, Observers Say

12. Where Is Ethnic Reconciliation Going?
13. EC President Barroso, Minister Aung Min sign joint declaration at Myanmar Peace Centre
14. Myanmar MPs discuss funding peace efforts
15. Myanmar, Australian aid agency consult on economic cooperation
16. Can Norway forge peace in Burma?
17. Democratic Voice of Burma forced to leave Norway
18. KIO refuses refugee relief from Kachin State Red Cross
19. UN aid reaches Laiza for first time in almost two years
20. Nhka Ga village women gang raped and abandoned naked in the forest
21. KNU Gen. Baw Kyaw Heh exposes how ceasefire agenda has shifted to business
22. Ceasefires facilitating land grabs: think tank
23. Mlitary involved in massive land grabs: parliamentary report
24. Army MP halts talks on military land-grabs in Burmas parliament
25. Land seizures amount to area larger than Yangon
26. Hundreds of farmers prosecuted after harrow battle
27. No inquiry on land seized before 1988
28. Burma army continues to persecute former child soldiers
29. Disabled veterans receive yearly support of $ 31 only
30. Child soldiers an ongoing problem in burma
31. US and Myanmar up military engagement
32. US to boost military ties with Burma, but warns of N Korea connection
33. Obama's plan to restore military ties with Myanmar 'too soon' for some us lawmakers
34. UK forces Chief in Burma to build ties with military
35. Britain denies breaching Burma arms embargo
36. 133 civil groups concerned over foreign military engagement in Burma
.......................................................
IV.

6-PAGE EXCERPT OF THE 22-PAGE ORIGINAL REPORT OF THE FRONTIER AREAS COMMITTEE OF ENQUIRY

V.

FULL TEXT OF THE 22-PAGE ORIGINAL REPORT OF THE FRONTIER AREAS COMMITTEE OF ENQUIRY+ MAP

VI.

THE PANGLONG AGREEMENT

VII.

INFORMATION CONCERNING THE CHIN STATE AND THE CHIN PEOPLE IN PARTICULAR

01. UN rights envoy awestruck by levels of poverty in Chin State

02. Demonstrations against Burma-China nickel project in Chin State
03. Institutionalized discrimination in Chin State
04. Matupi churches ask permission to erect Christian cross
05. Rats, bamboo and famine in Chin State, Burma!
06. 903 Danish computers for Chin State
07. Burmese soldiers in Chin State
08. Women protest sexual violence by soldiers in Chin State
09. Chin activists found guilty of illegal protest against rape
10. UN Chief calls for Burma to investigate military rape claims
11. APPENDIX P - LIST OF CHIN SOLDIERS WHO RECEIVED AWARDS DURING THE KAREN REBELLION
12. SOME SELECTED YOUTUBE THUMBNAILS OF THE CHIN/ZO PEOPLE FROM BURMA AND INDIA
_________________________________________________________________________

Did RFA really report as follows?

http://www.burmalibrary.org/reg.burma/archives/199801/msg...

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Did RFA really report as follows?

Subject: Did RFA really report as follows?
From: brelief@xxxxxxx
Date: Wed, 28 Jan 1998 03:54:00
INFORMATION SHEET
NO.A -0298(I)
28th January

1998

ASTONISHINGLY FICTITIOUS
On 27 January at 07:00 hrs the (Radio Free Asia) Myanmar Language
Version broadcast some news items in which one was on the dissolving of the
State Law and Order Restoration Council administration. It was quite an
interesting story which was heavily spiced with fabrications, exaggerations and
total untruth.
(a)
It also mentioned that the source of the news was from the diplomatic
circle and the people in Yangon.
(b)
It also mentioned that on the evening of 14 November barb-wired
barricades were put up in the crowded downtown areas and on the night of 15
November Lt.Gen.Tun Kyi was being arrested with a shoot-to-kill warrant if
he resisted arrest.
(c)
It also went on to say that several weapons were seized from
Lt.Gen.Tun Kyi and Lt.Gen.Kyaw Ba's residence and that (30) battalion
officers loyal to them were being demoted.
(d)
It also accused Lt-Gen Tun Kyi of being the person who was
behind the bombing of Secretary-2, Lt-Gen Tin Oo's residence in Yangon.
(e)
It also created a story that while Senior General Than Shwe and
Lt-Gen.Khin Nyunt were attending the summit in Malaysia there was an
attempted coup in Yangon. Another story stated funnily that the attempted
coup has been failed because of the timely information received by U Ne Win
and U Sein Lwin.
(f)
It mentioned that there was a serious conflict between Secretary-1,
Lt-Gen Khin Nyunt and Lt-Gen Sein Aung. Then it went on to say that the
writer and movie director Tin Than Oo was Lt-Gen Sein Aung's son-in-law and
that legal action has been taken against Tin Than Oo.
(g)
Finally, it concluded that it broadcast with a story where the
security troops when sent to search andd raid the residences the following
numbers of motor vehicles and gold were seized:(1)
Lt-Gen
(2)
Lt-Gen
jewellery.
(3)
Lt-Gen
(4)
Lt-Gen
unrefined gold

1 von 2

Tun Kyi -(23) motor vehicles and (3) tons of gold.

Myint Aung
-(3) tons of gold and over (400) million worth

of

Myo Nyunt
- (8) tons of gold bar.
Kyaw Ba -(5.5) tons of gold, over (700) million worth of
blocks, (44) motor vehicles and (105) apartment rooms.

05.12.12 12:18

Did RFA really report as follows?

(5)

http://www.burmalibrary.org/reg.burma/archives/199801/msg...

Lt-Gen Tun Kyi- Over Kyats (600) million.

It is also quite interesting and dissappointing to learn that Radio Free Asia
has become a platform for broadcasting fabricated and distorted news to its
listeners. Anyhow, this piece of story has opened the eyes of its listeners for
they can now clearly judge the credibility of R.F.A.which now has proven to
stand for "Rumours and Fabrications for Asia. (R.F.A.)"
http://www2.gol.com/users/brelief/Index.htm

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L 154/116

Official Journal of the European Union

EN

21.6.2003

(Acts adopted pursuant to Title V of the Treaty on European Union)

COUNCIL DECISION 2003/461/CFSP

of 20 June 2003
implementing Common Position 2003/297/CFSP on Burma/Myanmar
THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,

Having regard to Common Position 2003/297/CFSP of 28

April 2003 on Burma/Myanmar (1) and in particular Articles 8
and 9 thereof, in conjunction with Article 23(2) of the Treaty
on European Union,
Whereas:
(1)

In accordance with Article 9 of Common Position 2003/

297/CFSP, the extension of certain sanctions set out
therein as well as the prohibitions set out in Article 2(2)
of that Common Position were suspended until 29
October 2003 unless the Council decides otherwise.

(2)

In view of the further deterioration of the political situation in Burma/Myanmar, in particular the arrest of Aung
San Suu Kyi and other senior NLD members and the
closure of NLD offices, the Council has decided to
extend the scope of the visa ban and assets freeze to
include further members of the military regime, the military and security forces, the military regime's economic
interests and other individuals, groups, undertakings or
entities associated with the military regime who formulate, implement or benefit from policies that impede
Burma/Myanmar's transition to democracy and their
families and associates. The Council has also decided to
enforce the prohibition on technical training or assistance related to the provision, manufacture, maintenance
or use of arms, munitions and military equipment,

(1) OJ L 106, 29.4.2003, p. 36.

HAS DECIDED AS FOLLOWS:

Article 1
The list of persons set out in the Annex to Common Position
2003/297/CFSP is hereby replaced by the list set out in the
Annex.
Article 2
The suspension of the provisions of Article 2(2) of Common
Position 2003/297/CFSP, as provided for in Article 9(b) of that
Common Position, is hereby lifted.
Article 3
This Decision shall take effect on the date of its adoption.
Article 4
This Decision shall be published in the Official Journal of the
European Union.

Done at Brussels, 20 June 2003.

For the Council
The President
G. PAPANDREOU

21.6.2003

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

ANNEX
List of persons referred to in Article 1
A. State Peace and Development Council (SPDC)
1. Senior General Than Shwe

President (2.2.1933, Kyaukse)

2. Daw Kyaing Kyaing

Spouse of Senior General Than Shwe

3. Daw Thandar Shwe

Family member of Senior General Than Shwe

4. Daw Khin Pyone Shwe

Family member of Senior General Than Shwe

5. Daw Aye Aye Thit Shwe

Family member of Senior General Than Shwe

6. Ma Thidar Htun

Family member of Senior General Than Shwe

7. Vice-Senior General Maung Aye

Vice-President (25.12.1937, Kon Balu)

8. Daw Mya Mya San

Spouse of Vice-Senior General Maung Aye

9. Nandar Aye

Family member of Vice-Senior General Maung Aye

10. General Khin Nyunt

Secretary 1 (11.10.1939, Kyauktan)

11. Dr. Khin Win Shwe

Spouse of General Khin Nyunt

12. U Ye Naing Win

Family member of General Khin Nyunt

13. Lt-Col Zaw Naing Oo

Family member of General Khin Nyunt

14. Lt-Gen. Soe Win

Secretary 2

15. Daw Than Than Nwe

Spouse of Lt-Gen. Soe Win

16. Lt-Gen. Thura Shwe Mann

Chief of Staff, Coordinator of Special Operations

17. Daw Khin Lay Thet

Spouse of Lt-Gen. Thura Shwe Mann

18. Lt-Gen. Thein Sein

Adjutant-General

19. Daw Khin Khin Win

Spouse of Lt-Gen. Thein Sein

20. Lt-Gen. Thiha Thura Tin Aung Myint Oo

Quartermaster-General

21. Daw Khin Saw Hnin

Spouse of Lt-Gen. Thiha Thura Tin Aung Myint Oo

22. Lt-Gen. Kyaw Win

Chief of Armed Forces Training

23. Daw San San Yee

Spouse of Lt-Gen. Kyaw Win

24. Lt-Gen. Tin Aye

Chief of Military Ordnance, Head of UMEH

25. Daw Kyi Kyi Ohn

Spouse of Lt-Gen. Tin Aye

26. Lt-Gen. Ye Myint

Chief of Bureau of Special Operations 1 (Kachin, Chin,

Sagaing, Magwe, Mandalay)

27. Dr. Tin Lay Myint

Spouse of Lt-Gen. Ye Myint

28. Lt-Gen. Aung Htwe

Chief of Bureau of Special Operations 2 (Kayah, Shan)

29. Daw Khin Hnin Wai

Spouse of Lt-Gen. Aung Htwe

30. Lt-Gen. Khin Maung Than

Chief of Bureau of Special Operations 3 (Pegu, Rangoon,

Irrawaddy, Arakan)

31. Daw Marlar Tint

Spouse of Lt-Gen. Khin Maung Than

32. Lt-Gen. Maung Bo

Chief of Bureau of Special Operations 4 (Karen, Mon,

Tenasserim)

33. Daw Khin Lay Myint

Spouse of Lt-Gen. Maung Bo

B. Former members of SLORC and SPDC

1. Lt-Gen. Phone Myint (5.1.1931)
2. Lt-Gen. Aung Ye Kyaw (12.12.1930)
3. Lt-Gen. Chit Swe (18.1.1932)
4. Lt-Gen. Mya Thin (31.12.1931)

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5. Lt-Gen. Kyaw Ba (7.6.1932)

6. Lt-Gen. Tun Kyi (1.5.1938)
7. Lt-Gen. Myo Nyunt (30.9.1930)
8. Lt-Gen. Maung Thint (25.8.1932)
9. Lt-Gen. Aye Thoung (13.3.1930)
10. Lt-Gen. Kyaw Min (22.6.1932, Hanzada)
11. Lt-Gen. Maung Hla
12. Maj-Gen. Soe Myint
13. Commodore Nyunt Thein
14. Maj-Gen. Kyaw Than (14.6.1941, Bago)
C. Regional Commanders
1. Maj-Gen. Myint Swe

Rangoon

2. Daw Khin Thet Htay

Spouse of Maj-Gen. Myint Swe

3. Maj-Gen. Ye Myint

Central Mandalay Division

4. Daw Myat Ngwe

Spouse of Maj-Gen. Ye Myint

5. Maj-Gen. Soe Naing

North Western Sagaing Division

6. Daw Tin Tin Latt

Spouse of Maj-Gen. Soe Naing

7. Maj-Gen. Maung Maung Swe

North Kachin State

8. Daw Tin Tin Nwe

Spouse of Maj-Gen. Maung Maung Swe

9. Maj-Gen. Myint Hlaing

North Eastern Shan State (North)

10. Daw Khin Thant Sin

Spouse of Maj-Gen. Myint Hlaing

11. Maj-Gen. Khin Zaw

Triangle Shan State (East)

12. Daw Khin Pyone Win

Spouse of Maj-Gen. Khin Zaw

13. Maj-Gen. Khin Maung Myint

Eastern Shan State (South)

14. Daw Win Win Nu

Spouse of Maj-Gen. Khin Maung Myint

15. Maj-Gen. Thura Myint Aung

South Eastern Mon State

16. Daw Than Than Nwe

Spouse of Maj-Gen. Thura Myint Aung

17. Maj-Gen. Thar Aye

Coastal Tenasserim Division

18. Daw Wai Wai Khaing

Spouse of Maj-Gen. Thar Aye

19. Brig-Gen. Ko Ko

South Pegu Division

20. Daw Sat Nwan Khun Sum

Spouse of Brig-Gen. Ko Ko

21. Maj-Gen. Htay Oo

South Western Irrawaddy Division

22. Daw Ni Ni Win

Spouse of Maj-Gen. Htay Oo

23. Maj-Gen. Maung Oo

Western Arakan State

24. Dr Daw Nyunt Nyunt Oo

Spouse of Maj-Gen. Maung Oo

D. Deputy Regional Commanders

1. Brig-Gen. Hsan Hsint

Rangoon

2. Brig-Gen. Nay Win

Central

3. Brig-Gen. Soe Myint

North-Western Command

4. Brig-Gen. San Tun

Northern

5. Brig-Gen. Hla Myint

North-Eastern

6. Col Myint Aung

Eastern

7. Brig-Gen. Myo Hla

South-Eastern

8. Brig-Gen. Tin Latt

Coastal

9. Brig-Gen. Thura Maung Ni

Southern

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Official Journal of the European Union

10. Brig-Gen. Tint Swe

South-Western

11. Brig-Gen. Phone Swe

Western

E. Other State/Divisional Commanders

1. Col Thein Kyaing

Magwe Division

2. Col Aung Thwin

Chin State

3. Col Saw Khin Soe

Karen State

4. Col Thein Swe

Kayah State

F. Ministers
1. U Than Shwe

PM's Office

2. U Pan Aung

PM's Office

3. Daw Nyunt Nyunt Lwin

Spouse of U Pan Aung

4. Lt-Gen. Min Thein

Office of the Chairman of SPDC

5. Daw Khin Than Myint

Spouse of Lt-Gen. Min Thein

6. Brig-Gen. D O Abel

Office of the Chairman of SPDC

7. Daw Khin Thein Mu

Spouse of Brig-Gen. D O Abel

8. Maj-Gen. Nyunt Tin

Agriculture and Irrigation

9. Daw Khin Myo Oo

Spouse of Maj-Gen. Nyunt Tin

10. Brig-Gen. Pyi Sone

Commerce

11. Daw Aye Pyai Wai Khin

Spouse of Brig-Gen. Pyi Sone

12. Kalyar Pyay Wai Shan

Family member of Brig-Gen. Pyi Sone

13. Pan Thara Pyay Shan

Family member of Brig-Gen. Pyi Sone

14. Maj-Gen. Saw Tun

Construction

15. Daw Myint Myint Ko

Spouse of Maj-Gen. Saw Tun

16. Lt-Gen. Tin Ngwe

Cooperatives

17. Daw Khin Hla

Spouse of Lt-Gen. Tin Ngwe

18. Maj-Gen. Kyi Aung

Culture

19. Daw Khin Khin Lay

Spouse of Maj-Gen. Kyi Aung

20. U Than Aung

Education

21. Daw Win Shwe

Spouse of U Than Aung

22. Maj-Gen. Tin Htut

Electric Power

23. Daw Tin Tin Nyunt

Spouse of Maj-Gen. Tin Htut

24. Brig-Gen. Lun Thi

Energy

25. Daw Khin Mar Aye

Spouse of Brig-Gen. Lun Thi

26. Daw Mya Sein Aye

Family member of Brig-Gen. Lun Thi

27. Maj-Gen. Hla Tun

Finance and Revenue

28. U Win Aung

Foreign Affairs (28.2.1944, Dawei)

29. Daw San Yon

Spouse of U Win Aung

30. U Thaung Su Nyein

Family member of U Win Aung

31. U Aung Phone

Forestry

32. Daw Khin Sitt Aye

Spouse of U Aung Phone

33. U Sitt Thwe Aung

Family member of U Aung Phone

34. U Sitt Thaing Aung

Family member of U Aung Phone

35. Prof. Dr. Kyaw Myint

Health

36. Daw Nilar Thaw

Spouse of Prof. Dr Kyaw Myint

37. Col Tin Hlaing

Home Affairs

L 154/119

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38. Daw Khin Hla Hla

Spouse of Col Tin Hlaing

39. Maj-Gen. Sein Htwa

Immigration and Population, Social Welfare, Relief and

Resettlement

40. Daw Khin Aye

Spouse of Maj-Gen. Sein Htwa

41. U Aung Thaung

Industry I

42. Daw Khin Khin Yi

Spouse of U Aung Thaung

43. Maj-Gen. Saw Lwin

Industry II (1939)

44. Daw Moe Moe Myint

Spouse of Maj-Gen. Saw Lwin

45. Brig-Gen. Kyaw Hsan

Information

46. Daw Kyi Kyi Win

Spouse of Brig-Gen. Kyaw Hsan

47. U Tin Winn

Labour

48. Daw Khin Nu

Spouse of U Tin Winn

49. Daw May Khin Tin Win Nu

Family member of U Tin Winn

50. Brig-Gen. Maung Maung Thein

Livestock and Fisheries

51. Daw Myint Myint Aye

Spouse of Brig-Gen. Maung Maung Thein

52. Brig-Gen. Ohn Myint

Mines

53. Daw San San

Spouse of Brig-Gen. Ohn Myint

54. Maung Thet Naing Oo

Family member of Brig-Gen. Ohn Myint

55. Maung Min Thet Oo

Family member of Brig-Gen. Ohn Myint

56. U Soe Tha

National Planning and Economic Development

57. Daw Kyu Kyu Win

Spouse of U Soe Tha

58. Col Thein Nyunt

Progress of border areas and national races and development affairs

59. Daw Kyin Khine

Spouse of Col Thein Nyunt

60. Maj-Gen. Aung Min

Rail Transportation

61. Daw Wai Wai Thar

Spouse of Maj-Gen. Aung Min

62. U Aung Khin

Religious Affairs

63. Daw Yin Yin Nyunt

Spouse of U Aung Khin

64. U Thaung

Science and Technology

65. Daw May Kyi Sein

Spouse of U Thaung

66. Brig-Gen. Thura Aye Myint

Sports

67. Daw Aye Aye

Spouse of Brig-Gen. Thura Aye Myint

68. Brig-Gen. Thein Zaw

Telecommunications, Post & Telegraphs, Hotels and

Tourism

69. Daw Mu Mu Win

Spouse of Brig-Gen. Thein Zaw

70. Maj-Gen. Hla Myint Swe

Transports

71. Daw San San Myint

Spouse of Maj-Gen. Hla Myint Swe

72. Brig-Gen. Thein Zaw

Tourism

G. Deputy Ministers
1. U Hset Maung

Office of the Chairman of SPDC

2. Brig-Gen. Khin Maung

Agriculture and Irrigation

3. U Ohn Myint

Agriculture and Irrigation

4. Brig-Gen. Myint Thein

Construction

5. U Soe Nyunt

Culture

6. U Myo Nyunt

Education

7. Brig-Gen. Soe Win Maung

Education

8. U Myo Myint

Electric Power

9. U Tin Tun

Energy

21.6.2003

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Official Journal of the European Union

10. Brig-Gen. Thein Aung

Energy

11. U Khin Maung Win

Foreign Affairs

12. Brig-Gen. Than Tun

Finance & Revenue

13. Col Thaik Tun

Forestry

14. Prof. Dr. Mya Oo

Health

15. Brig-Gen. Thura Myint Maung

Home Affairs

16. Brig-Gen. Aye Myint Kyu

Hotels and Tourism

17. Daw Khin Swe Myint

Spouse of Brig-Gen. Aye Myint Kyu

18. U Mung Aung

Immigration and Population

19. Brig-Gen. Thein Tun

Industry I

20. Brig-Gen. Kyaw Win

Industry I

21. Brig-Gen. Aung Thein Lin

Industry II

22. Lt-Col Khin Maung Kyaw

Industry II

23. Brig-Gen.. Aung Thein

Information

24. Brig-Gen. Win Sein

Labour

25. U Aung Thein

Livestock and Fisheries

26. U Myint Thein

Mines

27. U Kyaw Tin

Progress of border areas and national races and development affairs

28. Brig-Gen. Than Tun

Progress of border areas and national races and development affairs

29. Thura U Thaung Lwin

Rail Transportation

30. Brig-Gen. Thura Aung Ko

Religious Affairs

31. U Nyi Hla Nge

Science and Technology

32. Dr Chan Nyein

Science and Technology

33. U Hlaing Win

Social Welfare, Relief and Resettlement

34. Brig-Gen. Maung Maung

Sports

35. Brig-Gen. Kyaw Myint

Transports

36. U Pe Than

Transports

H. Former Members of Government

1. U Khin Maung Thein

Minister for Finance and Revenue (retired 1.2.2003)

2. Daw Su Su Thein

Spouse of U Khin Maung Thein

3. Maj-Gen. Ket Sein

Minister for Health (retired 1.2.2003)

4. Daw Yin Yin Myint

Spouse of Maj-Gen. Ket Sein

5. U Nyunt Swe

Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs

I. Other tourism related appointments

1. Lt. Col (retired) Khin Maung Latt

Director General

2. Capt (retired) Htay Aung

Managing Director

3. U Tin Maung Swe

General Manager

4. U Khin Maung Soe

General Manager

5. U Tint Swe

General Manager

J. Ministry of Defence Senior Officers

1. Vice-Admiral Kyi Min

C-in-C (Navy)

2. Commodore Soe Thein

Chief of Staff (Navy)

3. Brig-Gen. Myat Hein

C-in-C (Air)

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4. Brig-Gen. Maung Nyo

V-Adjutant General

5. Brig-Gen. Soe Maung

Judge Advocate General

6. Maj-Gen. Lun Maung

Inspectorate General

7. Brig-Gen. Saw Hla

Provost Marshal

8. Col Sein Lin

Director of Ordnance

9. Brig-Gen. Kyi Win

Director of Artillery & Armour

10. Col Than Sein

CO Defence Services Hospital

11. Brig-Gen. Win Hlaing

Director of Procurement

12. Brig-Gen. Khin Aung Myint

Director of Public Relations and Psy.War

13. Brig-Gen. Than Maung

Director of Peoples' Militia and Frontier Forces

14. Brig-Gen. Aung Myint

Director of Signals

15. Brig-Gen. Than Htay

Director of Supply & Transport

16. Brig-Gen. Khin Maung Tint

Director of Security Printing Works

17. Brig-Gen. Hsan Hsint

Military Appointments General

18. Vice-Admiral Kyi Min

Commander-in-Chief (Marine)

19. Daw Aye Aye

Spouse of Vice-Admiral Kyi Min

20. Brig-Gen. Myat Hein

Commander-in-Chief (Air)

21. Daw Htwe Htwe Nyunt

Spouse of Brig-Gen. Myat Hein

K. Members of the Office of the Chief of Military Intelligence (OCMI)

1. Brig-Gen. Myint Aung Zaw

Administration

2. Brig-Gen. Hla Aung

Training

3. Brig-Gen. Thein Swe

International Relations and Foreign Relations

4. Brig-Gen. Kyaw Han

Science and Technology

5. Brig-Gen. Than Tun

Politics and Counter Intelligence

6. Col Hla Min

Deputy

7. Col Tin Hla

Deputy

8. Brig-Gen. Myint Zaw

Border Security and Intelligence

9. Brig-Gen. Kyaw Thein

Ethnic Nationalities and Ceasefire Groups. Drug Suppression. Naval and Air Intelligence

10. Col San Pwint

Deputy

L. Military officers running prisons and police

Col Ba Myint

Director-General of the Prisons Department (Ministry of

Home Affairs)

M. United Solidarity and Development Association (USDA)

1. U Ko Lay

Mayor and Chairman of the Yangon City Development

Committee (Secretary)

2. Daw Khin Khin

Spouse of U Ko Lay

3. San Win

Family member of U Ko Lay

4. Than Han

Family member of U Ko Lay

5. Khin Thida

Family member of U Ko Lay

6. U Thein Sein

Deputy Minister for Information (CEC Member)

7. Daw Khin Khin Wai

Spouse of U Thein Sein

8. Col Thaik Tun

Deputy Minister for Forestry (CEC Member)

9. Daw Nwe Nwe Kyi

Spouse of Col Thaik Tun

10. Myo Win Thaik

Family member of Col Thaik Tun

11. Khin Sandar Tun

Family member of Col Thaik Tun

21.6.2003

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12. Khin Nge Nge Tun

Family member of Col Thaik Tun

13. Khin Ei Shwe Zin Tun

Family member of Col Thaik Tun

14. Thura Aung Ko

Deputy Minister for Religious Affairs (CEC Member)

15. Brig-Gen. Thein Aung

Deputy Minister for Energy (CEC Member)

16. Brig-Gen. Thura Myint Maung

Deputy Minister for Home Affairs (CEC Member)

17. Zin Myint Maung

Family member of Brig-Gen. Thura Myint Maung

18. Col Maung Par

Vice Mayor of YCDC (CEC Member)

19. Daw Khin Nyunt Myaing

Spouse of Col Maung Par

20. Dr Naing Win Par

Family member of Col Maung Par

21. Aung Thein Lin

Deputy Minister for Industry II (CEC Member)

N. Persons who benefit from Government economic policies

1. U Khin Shwe

Zaykabar Co.

2. U Aung Ko Win (Saya Kyaung)

Kanbawza Bank

3. U Aik Tun

Asia Wealth Bank Olympic Co.

4. U Tun Myint Naing (Steven Law)

Asia World Co.

5. U Htay Myint

Yuzana Co.

6. Tayza

Htoo Trading

7. Daw Thidar Zaw

Spouse of Tayza

O. State economic enterprises

1. Col Myint Aung

MD Myawaddy Trading Company

2. Col Myo Myint

MD Bandoola Transportation Co. Ltd

3. Col Thant Zin (retired)

MD Myanmar Land and Development

4. Maj. Hla Kyaw

Director Myawaddy Advertising Enterprises

5. Col Aung Sun

Md Hsinmin Cement Plant Construction Project

6. Col Ye Htut

Myanmar Economic Corporation

L 154/123

The European Union and Burma:

The Case for Targeted Sanctions

Produced by the Burma Campaign UK

Tel: 020 7324 4710

March 2004

The report has been endorsed by the following organisations:

Actions Birmanie, Belgium

Asienhaus, Germany
Burma Bureau Germany
Burma Campaign UK
Burma Centrum Netherlands
Committee for the Restoration of Democracy in Burma (Germany)
Danish Burma Committee
Finnish Burma Committee
Infobirmanie, France
Norwegian Burma Committee
Swedish Burma Committee
The International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (endorses the recommendations of this report)

Table of Contents
Foreword........................................................................................................................................................ 4
Executive Summary ..................................................................................................................................... 5
Recommendations.................................................................................................................................. 6
1.

Introduction ................................................................................................................................................ 7

2.

The Problem ............................................................................................................................................... 7

3.

Fuelling the Oppression ........................................................................................................................... 7

4.

The Costs.................................................................................................................................................... 8

5.

The Impact of Sanctions on Burmas People ........................................................................................ 9

6.

How the Regime Maintains its Support Base ...................................................................................... 11

7.

The EU and Burma .................................................................................................................................. 12

8.

The European Unions Response.......................................................................................................... 14

9.

The UN and Burma .................................................................................................................................. 15

10.

UN Sanctions - CHAPTER VII............................................................................................................ 16

11.

What We Are Asking the EU and UN to Do ..................................................................................... 17

Summary: Your Questions Answered..................................................................................................... 18

Foreword
Burmas military regime has tested the will of the people of Burma; despite intimidation and violence,
the peoples desire for freedom and democracy remains strong. Our brothers and sisters in Burma
realise that non-violent resistance does not mean passive resistance. Sadly, tyrants choose not to
understand the language of diplomacy or constructive engagement, but rather respond only to the
action of intense pressure and sanctions.
As in South Africa, the people and legitimate leaders of Burma have called for sanctions.
In South Africa when we called for international action, we were often scorned, disregarded, or
disappointed. To dismantle apartheid took not only commitment faith and hard work, but also intense
international pressure and sanctions.
In Burma, the regime has ravaged the country, and the people, to fund its illegal rule. Governments
and international institutions must move past symbolic gestures and cut the lifelines to Burmas military
regime through well-implemented sanctions.
I maintain my belief that no one or no government should wait to take action; the journey begins with
one step. Businesses and governments have a choice if they want to do business with the oppressive
regime in Burma, or not. Business with the regime puts weapons in the hands of those who
massacred thousands in 1988; are responsible for creating more than a million Internally Displaced
People who cannot find shelter and security in their own country; those who systematically rape
women. It funds the vast intelligence system, the disgraceful incarceration and torture of Burmas
freedom heroes, and the egregious human rights violations perpetrated against Burmas ethnic
nationalities. Individuals and governments must take a stand against tyranny and those who protect
and fund it.
Apathy in the face of systematic human rights abuses is amoral. One either supports justice and
freedom or one supports injustice and bondage. Let us not forget that our responsibility is not
complete until the people of Burma are free. At a time when the military is professing promises of
freedom, one should bear in mind that actions speak louder than words. Freedom cannot be obtained
through a process embedded in discrimination and persecution. I am deeply concerned for my
courageous sister, Aung San Suu Kyi, and the more than 1,000 political prisoners, who have remained
steadfast and true to non-violent principles, but are being kept isolated from the people of Burma and
the international community. Their silenced voices are the most eloquent persuasion that the time to
stand for their freedom is now.
If the people of South Africa had compromised the struggle against apartheid, we may never have
gained our freedom. In Burma, to settle for anything less than freedom and justice, for the democratic
participation of all people, would be to accept the presence of oppression and to dishonour our brave
brothers and sisters who have dedicated themselves to the future of a democratic Burma.
I believe that truth and justice will prevail. Let a deep sense of faith and commitment to our principles
guide our actions and sustain our hope. Sowing the seeds of justice may not be easy, but the harvest
will be abundant.
The people of Burma will be free.
Archbishop Desmond Tutu
This foreword was written for Ready, Aim, Sanction Special Report published by Altsean-Burma in
November 2003. We are grateful for the permission to re-print it.

Executive Summary
The political stalemate in Burma will not be broken until the military regime considers it to be in its own
self-interest to commence serious negotiations with the democratic and ethnic forces within the
country. This paper outlines how the international community can bring about a political and economic
situation which will foster such negotiations.
Burma is ruled by a military dictatorship renowned for both oppressing and impoverishing its people,
while enriching itself and the foreign businesses that work with it. The regime continues to ignore the
1990 electoral victory of Aung San Suu Kyi and the National League for Democracy.
The regime has shown no commitment to three years of UN mediation efforts. It has failed to end the
practice of forced labour as required by its ILO treaty obligations and demanded by the International
Labour Organization. It continues to persecute Burmas ethnic peoples. It continues to detain more
than 1,350 political prisoners including Aung San Suu Kyi.
Any proposal of a road map to political change in Burma will fail to bring about democracy in this
country unless it is formulated and executed in an atmosphere in which fundamental political freedoms
are respected, all relevant stakeholders are included and committed to negotiate, a time frame for
change is provided, space is provided for necessary mediation, and the restrictive and undemocratic
objectives and principles imposed by the military through the National Convention (ensuring continued
military control even in a civilian state) are set aside.

Report Findings
1. Approved Foreign Direct Investment to Burma since 1989 was worth USD 6.6 billion, largely
for tourist infrastructure and natural resource extraction projects. Burmas exports in 2002
1
were valued at USD 2.98 billion . Both trade and investment have provided significant
resources to the regime and its support base. Since 1988 Burmas military has expanded from
200,000 personnel to more than 400,000 while the countrys health, education and public
services have almost collapsed.
2. The juntas support base is comprised of regional commanders, high and middle ranking
military officers and the families and business associates of the military establishment. This
constituency owns and controls much of the formal economy, which is largely dependent on
foreign investment and markets. Reducing the regimes ability to keep this constituency
satisfied will foster reform-oriented political pressure within the military establishment.
3. The majority of Burmas people, especially the poorest, work within the informal economy,
which is generally not dependent on foreign investment or markets. The impact of sanctions
that are targeted at the formal economy would therefore be minimal for the vast majority of
Burmas people.
4. The attempt by the United States to impact on the economic interests of the regime and its
constituency has been reduced by the inaction of the EU, Asian states and the UN. There has
never been any legal obstacle to Asian or European companies doing business in or with
Burma. There are no EU measures that effectively challenge the economic interests of
Burmas military establishment. A European Common Position on Burma has been in place
since 1996. This Common Position has failed to include measures that would seriously
threaten the Burmese military regime. It has not been fully implemented with regard to the
bank accounts of the regime's economic entities. European bank accounts of companies
owned by the regime should have been frozen but have not been.
5. Fifteen years of constructive engagement with the regime have failed to bring about a single
democratic reform. Anti-sanctions advocates have ignored the uncompromising nature of the
regime, the connection between the militarys economic base and its political support, and the
1

Xinhua News Agency. 9 April 2003.

leverage that sanctions would provide for the NLD in its negotiations with the military. Those
opposed to sanctions ask that we continue to allow the regime to reap financial benefits
through trade and investment knowing that such benefits will feed the juntas constituency
and those associated with it. This has been the prevailing policy and has impeded any
movement for reform within the military. Ultimately the anti-sanctions advocates are asking us
to allow the long-term entrenchment of military rule in Burma with all the oppression and
impoverishment this entails. Implicitly they argue that this is a price worth paying to save a
limited number of jobs in a few targeted export sectors.
6. A combined strategy of weakening the regimes support base while promoting a transition
process supported by the UN can achieve real political change in Burma. This paper outlines
the role played by targeted sanctions in getting the Burmese military regime to the negotiating
table.

Recommendations
EU:
-

To ban all European companies and citizens from investing in Burma;

To ban the import of goods and services from enterprises owned by the military, military
personnel and their associates;
To ban the import of strategically important goods from sectors of the economy under state
monopoly, such as gems and timber;
To ban international financial transfers and transactions either by a citizen or an entity of an
EU state or from the EU;
Member states to push for UN Security Council mandatory sanctions as set out below.

UN:
-

The imposition of targeted sanctions, including a mandatory arms embargo, investment ban
and a ban on Burmese exports of strategically important goods, including gas, oil, gems and
timber until there is irreversible progress toward political transition, or until a democratically
2
elected government in Burma requests that they be lifted ;
3
The UN Secretary General should take the lead in formulating a comprehensive road map
with a specific timeframe (no later than 2006) backed by the force of a UN Security Council
resolution and sanctions.

For a detailed outline of possible United Nations Security Council measures, see Burma UN Service Office, National Coalition
Government of the Union of Burma and The Burma Fund. October 2003. The Crisis in Burma: An Agenda for the United
Nations Security Council?. Online at
<www.ncgub.net/NCGUB/The%20Crisis%20in%20Burma%20An%20Agenda%20for%20United%20Nations%20Security%20Co
uncil.pdf>

National Coalition Government of the Union of Burma and National Council of the Union of Burma. 20 August 2003. Building
a Roadmap towards Democracy and Federalism in Burma, A Framework of Ideas on Scenarios, Issues and
Negotiation Options for Dialogue and National Reconciliation. Online at <www.ibiblio.org/obl/docs/NCGUB-roadmapshort.htm>.

1. Introduction
Burma, situated between India, China, Tibet, Laos, Bangladesh and Thailand, is one of the largest
countries in Southeast Asia. For the last forty years it has been ruled by a military dictatorship with a
reputation for brutality. In 1990 the National League for Democracy (NLD) won a landslide election
victory in Burma. But the result has never been honoured. The NLD, led by Nobel Peace laureate
Aung San Suu Kyi, has urged the international community to impose economic sanctions against the
dictatorship. This document explains why.

2. The Problem
Burmas ruling military has an appalling record:
-

Rape as a weapon of war against ethnic women and children ;

5
Widespread use of forced labour described by the ILO as a crime against humanity ;
6
More than 1,350 political prisoners, many of whom are routinely tortured ;
7
Between 600,000 and one million internally displaced people forced from their lands ;
A continuous exodus of Burmese to neighbouring countries. Thailand alone absorbs an
estimated million or more Burmese in search of better life opportunities;
8
One of the largest armies in Asia despite having no external enemies ;
Nearly half of the regimes budget is spent on the military and only two to four percent spent
9
on health ;
10
One in ten babies die before their fifth birthday .

3. Fuelling the Oppression

There is currently no legal barrier preventing European or Asian companies from fuelling Burmas
dictatorship through investment and trade. The regime survives through foreign investment, revenue
11
from exports and illegal narcotics .
It is clear that fifteen years of constructive engagement, whereby businesses and governments
4

Shan Womens Action Network and Shan Human Rights Foundation. May 2002. Licence to Rape. Chiang Mai: SWAN and
SHRF. Online at <www.shanwomen.org> and <www.ibiblio.org/obl/docs/License_to_rape.pdf>.

ILO Commission of Inquiry. July 1998. Forced Labour in Myanmar (Burma). Report by the Commission of Inquiry
appointed under article 26 of the International Labour Organization to examine the observance by Myanmar of the
Forced Labour Convention, 1930 (No. 29). Online at
<www.ilo.org/public/english/standards/relm/gb/docs/gb273/myanmar.htm>. For updated information on the practice of forced
labour in Burma, please see CEACR 2002. Observations Concerning ILO Convention No. 29, Forced Labour (1930)
Myanmar, online at <ilo.org/ilolex/cgilex/pdconv.pl?host=status01&textbase=iloeng&document=6601&chapter=6&query=%28C029%29+%40ref+%2B+%28Myanma
r%29+%40ref&highlight=&querytype=bool&context=0>

Amnesty International. 22 December 2003. Public Statement: Amnesty International's Second Visit to Myanmar. AI Index:
16/037/2003. Online at <web.amnesty.org/library/Index/ENGASA160372003?open&of=ENG-MMR>

Global IDP Database. Updated November 2003. Available online at <

http://www.db.idpproject.org/Sites/idpSurvey.nsf/wCountries/Myanmar+(Burma)>

The junta has expanded the military from 200,000 in 1988 to about 400,000 today. See Andrew Selth. 2002. Burmas Armed
Forces: Power without Glory. Norwalk: Eastbridge, pp. 77-79.
9

Figures from UNICEF cited in Oehlers, Alfred and Alice Khin Saw Win. November 2003. The Crisis in Burmas Public Health
System. Unpublished document.

10

United National Development Programme: Human Development Report 2003. Online at <www.undp.org/hdr2003/>

11

The Ministry of Defence is likely to account for a significant proportion of the central governments consumption of imported
goods and services, without this being accounted for in national accounts. See Andrew Selth. 2002. Burmas Armed Forces:
Power Without Glory. Norwalk: EastBridge, pp. 136-137.

cooperated with the regime in the hope that reform would result, have been a failure. The antisanctions advocates have ignored the uncompromising nature of the regime, the connection between
the militarys economic base and its political support, and the leverage that sanctions provide for the
12
NLD in its negotiations with the military .
One of the most worrying consequences of investment and trade with Burma is the way it has enabled
the regime to expand the armed forces. In 1988 there were 200,000 personnel, there are now an
13
estimated 400,000. The regimes ultimate target is half a million military personnel .
Military spending has fluctuated between a third and a half of the regimes budget during the 1990s. A
country of around 50 million people has one of the largest armies in Asia, and yet has no external
enemies.
Jane's Defence Weekly reported in July 2001 that Rangoon was buying 10 MiG-29 jet fighters from
14
Russia for USD 130 million and that the money was coming from Thai gas purchases . The downpayment for the MIGs (30 percent of the total) came in the same week that the state-owned Petroleum
Authority of Thailand paid Burma USD 100 million in royalties for gas due to be piped ashore from
fields in the Gulf of Martaban (operated by Total and Unocal). Before the Thais made this payment
under the terms of a 1995 contract, Burma had almost depleted its foreign exchange reserves.
15

According to Robert Karniol, Asia editor of Jane's Defence Weekly , the Russians were unwilling to
sell aircraft to Burma until revenue began to flow from the Martaban gas-field, which is one of the
country's few sources of significant foreign exchange.
According to the US Department of Commerce, the regimes ministry of finance has placed a ten
16
percent tax on exports in foreign exchange . Therefore in 2001 if Burmas legal exports were USD
2.782 billion, the regime could well have benefited by USD 278.2 million in taxation alone. Much more
of the total export figure would have benefited the regimes support base.

4. The Costs
Military expansion and politically motivated expenditure have been carried out at the expense of
Burma's people. The high proportion of the state budget spent on the military has resulted in an
allocation to education and health that ignores the needs of Burmas people (see figure 1). In 2000,
the World Health Organisation ranked Burma near rock bottom, 190 out of 191 countries, in health
care delivery. The people of this resource-rich country are slipping further into poverty. UNICEF
reports that 36 percent of children under five years in Burma are moderately to severely
17
underweight , while United National Development Programme (UNDP) reports one in ten babies die
18
before their fifth birthday .

12

Philip S. Robertson: "Sanctions Are Working in Burma. Online commentary, Irrawaddy, 26 August 2003. Online at
<www.irrawaddy.org/com/2003/com31.html>.
13

Andrew Selth. 2002. Burmas Armed Forces: Power Without Glory. Norwalk: EastBridge, pp. 77-79.

14

Bertil Lintner. Rangoon free to spend gas money on anything it wants; Purchase of MIGs a total separate deal. Bangkok
Post, 17 July 2001.
15

Bertil Lintner. Rangoon free to spend gas money on anything it wants; Purchase of MIGs a total separate deal. Bangkok
Post, 17 July 2001.
16

US Dept. of Commerce. Burma Country Commercial Guide FY2002. Online at: <www.ibiblio.org/obl/docs/CCG2002.pdf />.
Cited in Altsean Burma. 2003. Ready, aim, sanction. Special Report. Online at
</www.altsean.org/ReadyAimSanction112003.pdf>
17

UNICEF: At a Glance: Myanmar. Online at <www.unicef.org/infobycountry/myanmar.html>

18

United National Development Programme: Human Development Report 2003. Online at < www.undp.org/hdr2003/>.

60

Figure 1. Burmese
Government Expenditure as
Percent of Total Budget

50
40

Defence

30
20
10

Education

0
1995/96

1996/97

1997/98

1998/99

1999

Heatlh
Social Welfare and
Others

Year
Note: The percentages are calculated through the combination of current and capital spending
Source: International Monetary Fund. Myanmar: Recent Economic Development. December 10, 1999.

In table 1, Thailand has been chosen for comparison with Burma because of the nations shared
history, long border, similar population size and resource endowment. Also, and though not without
considerable problems of its own, Thailand provides a not unreasonable example of what might have
been in Burma. Perhaps surprising in the data of these selected social indicators is the extent to
which Burma trails not only newly industrialised Thailand but the record of developing countries
generally.
Table 1. Comparison between Burma and Thailand

Infant mortality rate

per 1,000 births)
Infants with
Low birth weight (%)
Public education
expenditure (%
GDP)
Public health
expenditure (%
GDP)

Burma

Thailand

All developing countries

80

30

64

24

n/a

1.2

4.8

3.8

0.2

1.7

2.2

UNDP Human Development Report 2000, and Burma Economic Watch

There can be no doubt that the greatest obstacle to peace and prosperity in Burma is the military
dictatorship itself.
The NLD has asked the world to cut the lifelines that keep the regime alive. Like Nelson Mandela and
the ANC during the Apartheid regime in South Africa, Aung San Suu Kyi and the NLD have called for
economic sanctions.

5. The Impact of Sanctions on Burmas People

The nature of Burmas economy is such that sanctions targeting foreign investments and international
trade will impact on the regime while having a minimal impact on the majority of ordinary civilians.
Burma is a country with two economies, the informal and the formal. The informal economy is where

the majority of Burmas people, especially the poorest, produce, trade and work. In rural Burma (where
75 percent of the population live) people are largely involved in subsistence agriculture (see figure 2).
In the urban areas, as in the rural, business units tend to be small and based around the extended
19
family, involved in small production, trade or services. As economist Alfred Oehlers of Auckland
University of Technology observes regarding the informal economy:
Forms and methods of business organisation and management are not very advanced, relying
principally on established customs, practices and traditions In the informal sector, the level of
exposure to external markets is extremely small.
20

He continues:
As sanctions will primarily affect the cross-border flows of goods, services and finance, this [informal]
sector with its low level exposure to external markets will be relatively insulated from any
consequences. The informal sector is by far the most important for ordinary people in Burma, around
which, most of their lives revolve.

The formal economy is very different from the informal and the two are largely independent of each
other. The formal economy relies much more heavily on foreign investment and markets. Enterprises
in this sector are larger, more advanced in organisation and management. When classified by the
management body, 80 percent of large-scale enterprises with more than 100 employees are state21
owned or state-affiliated enterprises . They are concentrated in the extractive industries,
22
manufacturing, tourism, finance and banking . The formal economy both historically and currently is in
the main owned by the military establishment, their families and their associates. This was the case
when these industries were nationalised after the military coup of 1962 and when they were
23
privatised during the 1990s. As Minoru Kiryu notes:
While deregulation of private investments has encouraged the establishment of many private
enterprises and important export enterprises, many of the entrepreneurs involved are retired
government officials and servicemen.

Therefore it is clear that the sanctions targeting the larger scale formal economy industries in Burma
will impact more directly on the economic interests of the military and its support base while having a
24
minimal impact on the vast majority of ordinary people. As Oehlers observes:
Given the highly centralised nature of the ownership of and control within the Burmese economy, it
may reasonably be presumed the negative consequences arising from sanctions will have greatest
impact on the military and its closest associates. Far from the blunt and indiscriminate tool it is often
accused of being, in the case of Burma at least, sanctions appear to be surprisingly well targeted and
capable of exerting considerable pressure on the military regime.

19

Alfred Oehlers. 2003. Sanctions and Burma: Revisiting the Case Against. Unpublished paper.

20

Alfred Oehlers. 2003. Sanctions and Burma: Revisiting the Case Against. Unpublished paper.

21

Minoru Kiryu. 1998. ASEAN and Japanese Perspectives on Industrial Development and Reforms in Myanmar: A
Survey of Selected Firms. A Report by the Sasakawa Peace Foundation. Bangkok: White Lotus Press.

22

Alfred Oehlers. 2003. Sanctions and Burma: Revisiting the Case Against. Unpublished paper.

23

Minoru Kiryu. 1998. ASEAN and Japanese Perspectives on Industrial Development and Reforms in Myanmar: A
Survey of Selected Firms. A Report by the Sasakawa Peace Foundation. Bangkok: White Lotus Press.

24

Alfred Oehlers. 2003. Sanctions and Burma: Revisiting the Case Against. Unpublished paper.

10

Figure 2. Employment in Burma 1997/1998

Number

(thousands)

14000
12000
10000
8000
6000
4000
2000

th

er

e
ad

dm

in

is

Tr

io
at
tr

rv
Se

So

ci

al

un
m
m
d

co

es
ic

io
at
ic

Po

uc
tr
ns

an
n
tio
ta
Tr

an

sp

or

uf
an
M

er
w

on
ti

ng
es
oc
pr

d
an
ac

Li

tu

ve

rin

st

oc

Co

in
M

re

an
k

si

in

ry
st

y
sh
Fi
d

Fo

er

re
tu
ul
ic
gr

Industry

Source: IMF Staff Country Reports 99/134 Myanmar Recent Economic Developments

Additionally the system of approval of foreign direct investment is such that the military is able to
control who benefits from large scale investment and investments in key sectors of the economy.
Foreign investment that needs approval under Burmas Foreign Investment Law is administered by the
Myanmar Investment Commission, in which a majority of the members come from the military cabinet
itself. The practices of the Commission ensure that the regime is able to direct resources towards the
quasi-military companies which dominate the economy, such as the Union of Myanmar Economic
Holdings (UMEH). Finally, the state has a monopoly on exports of rice, teak, petroleum, natural gas,
gems, pearls and a number of other items. The exports of these products require a permit from the
25
Ministry of Commerce . Imposing sanctions on the import of these products will therefore have a
direct impact on the military regime.

6. How the Regime Maintains its Support Base

The Union of Myanmar Economic Holdings Ltd (UMEH) and the Myanmar Economic Corporation
(MEC) are the two major industrial conglomerates controlled by the military. They dominate key
26
economic sectors. Shareholders of UMEH are limited to the military establishment .
According to the leaked 1995-96 annual report of UMEH, two of the main objectives of the UMEH are
'to support military personnel and their families' and 'to try and become the main logistics and support
27
organisation for the military by gradually establishing industries.'
The UMEH has current investments in banking, tourism, import and export of foodstuffs, gems and
jade mining and sales, construction materials, leasing of fishing boats, real estate, and general retail.
The UMEH has also been managing the armed forces pension funds, giving it a ready source of
28
financing. By 1999 the UMEH had established nearly 50 joint ventures with foreign firms .

25

US Dept. of Commerce. Burma Country Commercial Guide FY2002. Online at: < www.ibiblio.org/obl/docs/CCG2002.pdf />.

26

According to the leaked 1995-96 annual report of UMEH, this conglomerate was formed April 27, 1990 as a 'special public
company, with shareholders limited to the Directorate of Defence Procurement, Ministry of Defence, Defence Regimental
Institutes, and other bodies of the Defence Services and War Veterans.'., cited in Philip S. Robertson: "Sanctions Are Working in
Burma. Online commentary. Irrawaddy, 26 August 2003. Online at <www.irrawaddy.org/com/2003/com31.html>.
27

Philip S. Robertson: "Sanctions Are Working in Burma. Online commentary, Irrawaddy, 26 August 2003. Online at
<www.irrawaddy.org/com/2003/com31.html>.
28

Andrew Selth. 2002. Burmas Armed Forces: Power Without Glory. Norwalk: EastBridge, p. 147.

11

The MEC was established in order to shift defence expenses from the public to the private sector, i.e.
in order to decrease defence expenditure while providing funds for the welfare of military personnel
30
and to cover other military needs . The MEC is authorised to conduct business in almost any field of
31
commerce and industry and is not bound by the laws that control other economic activities in Burma .
The activities of UMEH and MEC are intended in part to build the military's resource base enabling
privileged economic treatment of army officers and their families. Economic sanctions will make it
harder for the military to maintain its defence expenditures at the current level and will reduce the size
of the 'economic pie' from which the regime can slice pieces for its patronage networks, and will create
32
hardship for mid-level military families . These form the main base of the juntas constituency, the
people the regime needs to keep happy. If discontent occurs in this constituency the pressure for
reform will be substantial.

7. The EU and Burma

EU policy on Burma is critical for two reasons, firstly because the EU has provided much of the
investment that has buttressed Burmas dictatorship, and secondly because the EUs role at the UN
and its relationship with ASEAN is key to the prospects for successful diplomatic initiatives on Burma.
EU investment in Burma has increased in importance over the last decade. Though estimates of
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) inflows to Burma vary according to different sources, it is clear that in
the energy sector EU investment has been vital. Between 1995/6 and 1999/00 total actual FDI in the
oil and gas sectors accounted for USD 1,531 million of a total actual FDI for all sectors of USD 2,765
33
million . In 1999 EU FDI accounted for 43 percent of all investment in Burma, and in 2000 the figure
34
rose to 71.2 percent .
Apart from EU investment in Burma, the EUs trade relations with Burma have increased significantly
over the last decade (see figure 3).
In total European from Burma and European investment to Burma between 1988 and 2002 has had a
combined value of at least USD 4 billion.
The fact that many European companies remain active in Burma can also be gauged from looking at
the lists of companies with links to Burma maintained by Global Unions. Of a total of 372 companies
35
mentioned, 104 are European companies .
There are growing concerns that where the US has tried to cut off finance to the regime (see table 2),
the EU will continue to be a source of economic comfort for Burmas military establishment.

30

Maung Aung Myoe. 1999. The Tatmadaw in Myanmar since 1988. An Interim Assessment. Working Paper No. 342.
Canberra: Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, RSPAS, p.13. Cited in Andrew Selth. 2002. Burmas Armed Forces: Power
Without Glory. Norwalk: EastBridge, p. 147.
31

Andrew Selth. 2002. Burmas Armed Forces: Power Without Glory. Norwalk: EastBridge, p.147.

32

Philip S. Robertson: "Sanctions Are Working in Burma. Online commentary, Irrawaddy, 26 August 2003. Online at <
www.irrawaddy.org/com/2003/com31.html>.
33

International Monetary Fund. 1997. Myanmar: Recent Economic Developments, Statistical Appendix. Table 39. Source
data provided by Myanmar authorities. Available at <netec.mcc.ac.uk/BibEc/data/imfimfscr1.html>

34

International Monetary Fund and Burma Economic Watch tables. Online at

<www.ibiblio.org/obl/docs/Tables%20and%20Data.htm>.
35

Online at the Global Unions Website <www.global-unions.org/burma/>.

12

Figure 3. Actual FDI by the EU in Burma

600

Million USD

500
400
300
200
100
0
91/92

92/93

93/94

94/95

95/96

96/97

97/98

99/00

00/01

Year

Source: Ministry of National Planning, Burma

Since the 2003 US ban on remittances, transfers and transactions denominated in dollars, the regime
has increasingly looked to the euro as its currency for international commercial activity.
One particular action that should be taken is to apply pressure on those service providing companies
that make international financial transactions possible, such as SWIFT, a business owned by leading
financial institutions. In Burma only a handful of banks are allowed to handle foreign transactions, the
Central Bank and three state-owned banks (the Myanmar Foreign Trade Bank, the Myanmar
Investment and Commercial Bank, and the Myanmar Economic Bank).
By collaborating with Burmese banks, SWIFT is in the process of making it possible for Burma to
conduct international transactions in euros and other currencies. As in the case with the ban on
remittances by the US, international transfers and transactions by an entity or an individual from an EU
state should in effect be banned.
We recall in this respect that the Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering (FATF) has urged
its members, which include the 15 EU member states as well as the European Commission, to impose
counter-measures against Burma to enhance surveillance and reporting of international financial
transactions as a consequence of the countrys failure to co-operate in combating money-laundering.
Table 2. Impact of current US Measures
Current US measures
1997 Ban on new investment

2003 US import ban

2003 Ban on remittances

Effect on economic interest of

regime/associates
Allows pre-97 investors to continue and increase
investment in the country i.e. Unocal. Has
prevented an unquantifiable amount of new US
capital to enter Burma.
Denies the regime and its associates export
revenue and tax revenue.
Significant impact on import/export businesses
with dollar bank accounts, and on the state run
banking system and the business associates of
the regime.

13

Figure 4. Burmese Exports to the EU

500
450
400
350
300
250
200
150
100
50
0
`88

`89

`90

`91

`92

`93

`94

`95

`96

`97

`98

`99

`00

`01

`02

Year
Data compiled from Eurostat data for Burmese imports to the EU 1988 2002 as well as from national
statistical bureaus in Sweden, Finland and Austria for 1988-1995.

8. The European Unions Response

Over the last decade the EU has taken a number of measures with regard to Burma. All of these
measures are largely symbolic and have been related to the EUs political and aid relationship with
Burma they do not have the effect or intention of applying severe economic pressure on the regime.
It is therefore wrong to come to the conclusion that sanctions have been tried and proven to have
failed based on the European Common Position which has been forwarded as an argument against
sanctions per se.
There is nothing in the EU Common Position that threatens the regimes economic interests and
therefore seriously represents any serious sanction on the Burmese government (see table 3). The EU
Common Position, currently comprises:
- An arms embargo;
- The expulsion of military personnel attached to the diplomatic representations of Burma in the
EU;
- A ban on non-humanitarian aid;
- A visa ban on all individual members of the SPDC, their families and some of their business
associates;
- A freeze on the personal assets held in Europe by the SPDC, their families and some of their
36
business associates ;
- The suspension of high level governmental (ministers and officials at the level of political
director or above) visits to Burma.
The EU has also withdrawn the preferential trading terms that Burma enjoyed as a developing country
37
under the General System of Preferences , and made a statement echoing the view of Aung San Suu
Kyi that tourism to Burma is inappropriate.
36

No evidence has been provided by the European Commission suggesting that the regime has any significant assets in
Europe.
37

After overwhelming evidence of the existence of forced labour was found, the European Commission recommended on 18
December 1996 that the Council of Foreign Ministers suspend Burmas trade preferences under the GSP for industrial products.
On 24 April 1997 GSP privileges for industrial and agricultural products were withdrawn from Burma in a unanimous vote of the
European Council of Ministers. GSP benefits provided 2-5 percent discount on EU import tariffs and saved Burma no more than
USD 365,000 in 1995.

14

Table 3. Impact of existing EU measures

Existing EU measures
An arms embargo
The expulsion of military attachs
A ban on non-humanitarian aid
A visa ban on SPDC and associates
Assets freeze on SPDC and associates
Suspension of governmental visits to Burma
Withdrawal of GSP trade preference

Effect on economic interest of regime/associates

so far
None
None
Negligible
None
Negligible
None
Negligible

Furthermore, the EU Common Position has not been fully implemented with regard to the bank
accounts of the regime's economic entities. European bank accounts of companies owned by the
regime should have been frozen but have not been. For instance, the Common Position calls for an
asset freeze for individuals and entities from Burma. However, attempts have not been made to freeze
assets owned by the UMEH or the MEC.
If Europe is serious about moving Burma beyond a political stalemate it must deal with the stark facts
that European trade and investment have acted to comfort the regime rather than push it towards
reform. If Europe starts to put its own house in order while pushing for an internationalised diplomatic
effort on Burma, it could bring very positive results.

9. The UN and Burma

In addition to stronger European measures, the EU should increase its efforts towards the imposition
of United Nations Security Council mandatory sanctions against Burma.
Since 1991 Burma has been the subject of annual resolutions by the UN General Assembly outlining
necessary reforms to move Burma from dictatorship towards democracy. The human rights situation in
Burma has been the object of scrutiny by the UN Human Rights Commission every year since 1992. In
2000 the International Labour Organization called upon its three constituencies to review their
relationship with Burma in order to ensure that they do not contribute to the continuation of forced
labour. Time has now come for the EU to work for the enforcement of these various resolutions.
The UN Special Envoy to Burma and the UN Special Rapporteur on Human Rights in Burma play a
key role in UN efforts to promote change in Burma. However, during the last three years of UN
mediation in Burma the regime has refused to release all political prisoners, has continued the use of
forced labour, continued the violent persecution of ethnic minorities throughout the country and
refused to start a dialogue with the pro-democracy movement. On 30 May 2003, Burmas military
dictatorship ended any pretense that it was ever genuine about reform. At a small town called
Depayin, 500 miles north of the capital Rangoon, Aung San Suu Kyis motorcade was attacked by the
juntas paramilitary wing. Aung San Suu Kyi, other NLD leaders and party members were detained.
Eyewitness accounts tell of women being grabbed from cars, stripped naked and beaten to death,
while others were chased and then killed. Aung San Suu Kyis personnel tried to protect her, and were
viciously beaten with sharpened bamboo staves. Some reports suggest that scores of people were
murdered by the regime. At the time of writing, Aung San Suu Kyi remains under house arrest for the
third time since taking up leadership of the democracy movement in 1988.
Newly appointed Prime Minister General Khin Nyunt announced a Road Map to democracy on 30
August 2003. This road map outlines seven steps, based on the reconvening of a National Convention
to complete the drafting of a new constitution for Burma. It does not provide a timeframe for reforms.
Neither does it formally provide a role for the NLD and the non-Burman nationalities in the country.
The road map refers to the constitution-drafting National Convention which was convened by the
military regime in 1993. In November 1995 the NLD sent a letter to the military requesting that the
proceedings of the National Convention be liberalised. The NLD began a boycott of the National

15

Convention in December following the rejection of its appeal by the military. All delegates from the
NLD were subsequently expelled by the military from the National Convention and the National
Convention was suspended in 1996.
The NLD together with participants from non-Burman ethnic groups have also disagreed over the six
objectives, the 104 basic principles and the Detailed Basic Principles set by the junta that would allow
the military to perpetuate its rule under the guise of a civilian government and even stage a coup if
38
they felt the country was in danger .
The regime has rejected the UNs mediation role, if not by words then by deeds. It is now time for a
more coherent international response to Rangoons intransigence. In light of the critical situation in
Burma, political intervention from the international community is essential to avert impending
confrontation and bloodshed. The Secretary General, Kofi Annan, has called on the regime to release
Aung San Suu Kyi and begin a "substantive" dialogue with her. He told the UN General Assembly that
Unless the parties concerned are able to engage in substantive dialogue, the international community
39
will have to conclude that the home-grown national reconciliation process no longer exists .

In this case, he said the UN would review the situation and decide on further possible action. Mr
Annan has set a deadline of 2006 for a transition to democratic rule in Burma, but has not outlined
how this stated goal will be achieved. The UN Secretary General should take the lead in formulating a
40
comprehensive road map with a specific timeframe backed by the force of a UN Security Council
resolution and sanctions under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. It is clear that essential elements of any
UN sponsored roadmap must include the release of Aung San Suu Kyi and all political prisoners; a
nation-wide ceasefire; freedom to operate for all political parties; and a dialogue between the NLD, the
ethnic nationalities and the regime, as well as an end to forced labour and to forced relocations. In
addition, the restrictive and undemocratic objectives and principles imposed by the military through the
National Convention (ensuring continued military control even in a civilian state) should be set aside.

10.

UN Sanctions - CHAPTER VII

Article 39 of Chapter VII of the UN Charter states:

The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or
act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken in
41
42
accordance with Articles 41 and 42 , to maintain or restore international peace and security.

The Security Council has the authority to interpret this article, and the interpretation has historically
been broad and political, rather than narrow and legal. In the cases of Haiti (1993) and Southern
Rhodesia (1965), both countries were said to constitute a threat to international peace and security.
Both cases constitute possible precedents to the UN Security Council taking up Burma.

38

See Euro-Burma Office. Highlights The military constitution Burma. Undated and unpublished document.

39

See The Human Rights Situation in Myanmar. Report of Secretary-General to United Nations General Assembly.
A/58/325. Dated: 28 August 2003. <//ods-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N03/482/57/PDF/N0348257.pdf?OpenElement or
http://www.ibiblio.org/obl/docs/SGreportA-58-325.pdf>
40

National Coalition Government of the Union of Burma and National Council of the Union of Burma. 20 August 2003. Building
a Roadmap towards Democracy and Federalism in Burma, A Framework of Ideas on Scenarios, Issues and
Negotiation Options for Dialogue and National Reconciliation. Online at <www.ibiblio.org/obl/docs/NCGUB-roadmapshort.htm>.
41

Article 41 states that The Security Council may decide what measures not involving the use of armed force are to be
employed to give effect to its decisions, and it may call upon the Members of the United Nations to apply such measures. These
may include complete or partial interruption of economic relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other
means of communication, and the severance of diplomatic relations.
42

Article 42 states that Should the Security Council consider that measures provided for in Article 41 would be inadequate or
have proved to be inadequate, it may take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore
international peace and security. Such action may include demonstrations, blockade, and other operations by air, sea, or land
forces of Members of the United Nations.

16

The disruption of democracy; the continued detention of Burmas elected representatives; the rapid
expansion of Burmas army to the second largest in Southeast Asia; the continued scorched-earth
policy against ethnic peoples close to external borders; the use of rape as a weapon of war against
women and children; the mass forced displacement of civilian populations close to external borders
producing large refugee flows to neighbouring countries; the widespread and systematic violation of
human rights; the largest use of child soldiers in the world; the production and export of illegal
narcotics to neighbouring countries; the spread of HIV/AIDS to neighbouring countries; and the
looming humanitarian crisis resulting from the collapse of public services as resources are directed to
military expenditure; all constitute a risk to internal and regional peace and stability.
The Security Council should recognise the situation in Burma is a threat to international peace and
security and take action under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter. The Council should
condemn the military regime's egregious human rights abuses, its non-adherence to humanitarian law,
and its refusal to engage in a substantive political dialogue with the pro-democracy movement and
ethnic groups towards establishing a democratic government.
The momentum for the Security Council to address and take action on the situation in Burma should
not halt merely if Aung San Suu Kyi is released from detention. The situation in Burma is dire and the
43
plight of the Burmese people as a whole deserves the Council's attention .

11.

What We Are Asking the EU and UN to Do

EU:
-

To ban all European companies and citizens from investing in Burma;

To ban the import of goods and services from enterprises owned by the military, military
personnel and their associates;
To ban the import of strategically important goods from sectors of the economy under state
monopoly, such as gems and timber;
To ban international financial transfers and transactions either by a citizen or an entity of an
EU state or from the EU;
Member states to push for UN Security Council mandatory sanctions as set out below.

UN:
-

The UN Security Council should impose targeted sanctions, including a mandatory arms
embargo, investment ban and a ban on Burmese exports of strategically important goods,
including gas, oil, gems and timber until there is irreversible progress toward political
transition, or until a democratically elected government in Burma requests that they be lifted;
44
The UN Secretary General should take the lead in formulating a comprehensive road map
with a specific timeframe backed by the force of a UN Security Council resolution and
sanctions.

43

Burma UN Service Office, National Coalition Government of the Union of Burma and The Burma Fund. October 2003. The
Crisis in Burma: An Agenda for the United Nations Security Council?. Online at
<www.ncgub.net/NCGUB/The%20Crisis%20in%20Burma%20An%20Agenda%20for%20United%20Nations%20Security%20Co
uncil.pdf>
44

National Coalition Government of the Union of Burma and National Council of the Union of Burma. 20 August 2003. Building
a Roadmap towards Democracy and Federalism in Burma, A Framework of Ideas on Scenarios, Issues and
Negotiation Options for Dialogue and National Reconciliation. Online at <www.ibiblio.org/obl/docs/NCGUB-roadmapshort.htm>.

17

Summary: Your Questions Answered

1. What right do we in Europe have to impose sanctions on another country?
The NLD, led by Aung San Suu Kyi, won 82 percent of the seats in Burmas 1990 election. It has
called for international sanctions against the regime. All the major ethnic leaderships from Burma have
whole-heartedly supported the case for sanctions. The mandate for such sanctions comes from within
Burma and could not be clearer or more legitimate.
2. Wont sanctions harm the Burmese people?
The sanctions we are calling for will cut off investment to Burma and ban a limited number of exports,
such as gems, from entering the EU. Three quarters of Burmas people live off the land, the vast
majority do not work in industries targeted by these sanctions. It is clear therefore that only a minority
of the population will be affected.
A minority of ordinary people will be affected but this has to be weighed against the plain fact that,
every day women are raped, villages are burned, prisoners are tortured, and Burmas 50 million
people are further impoverished by this regime. We are faced with a stark choice: allow the regime to
obtain finance that will ensure its survival, thereby condemning Burma to continued violence and
impoverishment; or make a concerted effort to cut the regimes financial lifelines while limiting the
effects on ordinary people. The first strategy is a surrender to tyranny; the second is a struggle for the
freedom and prosperity of a whole nation.
What will harm the Burmese people is the lack of will and ability of the international community to act
in a concerted manner and impose sanctions, thus allowing the Burmese military to perpetuate its rule.
3. Havent sanctions already failed to change Burma?
The US is the only country to have imposed tough economic sanctions on Burma. These sanctions
have only been in place since July 2003. Targeted sanctions by the EU or by the international
community as a whole have not really been tried yet and cannot be said to have failed. Burmas export
of gas, timber and gems continues to earn vital revenue for the regime. The total value of exports in
45
2002 was USD 2.98 billion .
4. Isnt it more effective to engage with the military?
Sanctions are an economic tool employed for political purposes. We are asking for sanctions in
combination with diplomatic intervention in order to apply the maximum impetus for political reform and
prevent the regime from playing one country against another.
It is a myth that you cant employ both sanctions and diplomatic engagement to promote political
change in Burma. Over the last two years the US, EU and Asia held back from taking action against
the regime hoping that it would respond to a softer approach. The regime responded by imprisoning
46
Aung San Suu Kyi and by massacring a large number of her supporters . There must be continued
efforts to persuade the regime to change, but at the same time there must be equal effort made to cut
its financial lifelines. It is now time for tough action backed by the UN Security Council and for an
international diplomatic effort led by the UN Secretary General.
5. How will sanctions influence the generals?
The regime depends on foreign investment and foreign trade for a substantial part of its income. It is
essential to cut those lifelines in order to force the regime to the negotiating table. As long as the
regime and its associates are financially secure they have no incentive to reform. Sanctions will affect
45

Xinhua News Agency. 9 April 2003.

46

On May 30, 2003 the regimes paramilitary forces attacked a motorcade carrying Aung San Suu Kyi and her supporters. Up to
100 NLD supporters were beaten to death in the attack.

18

the regimes own support base far more acutely than they will affect the majority of Burmas people.
6. Shouldnt we be trying to strengthen the pro-democracy forces in Burma?
The extension of economic sanctions provides critical bargaining leverage to Burmas democrats. The
NLD has consistently supported stronger economic sanctions by the international community. In a
situation where the NLD has only principles and popular support, the power to reduce the burden of
47
international sanctions is a significant bargaining chip . Sanctions are one way to strengthen Burmas
democrats and should be accompanied by other efforts to support their struggle, in consultation with
the NLD.
The Burmese people are suffering from the mismanagement of their countrys resources and the
dictatorships unwillingness to prioritise basic needs in health and education for the population over its
own needs and survival. Again, we are not asking for sanctions isolated from other political
instruments. Sanctions targeting the regime should also be combined with efforts to assist the people
of Burma thus in effect empowering them to be part of an effort to bring democracy to Burma.
7. Surely Europe and the West dont have influence because they dont have significant trade
or investment in Burma?
During 1990-2000 Western countries disbursed 65 percent of total actual foreign direct investment to
48
Burma . Some of the regimes most significant business partners have been Western multinationals
49
including, Total (French), Unocal (US) and British American Tobacco (UK) .
8. Dont we need to be sure that sanctions will work before imposing them?
We have to be clear what we mean by work. Some European governments have placed a unique
condition on any sanctions policy for Burma; that sanctions on Burma should only be imposed if we
can first be sure that they will work. There are in fact relatively few domestic or foreign policy
decisions that demand a policy is absolutely guaranteed to work before implementation. European
states have supported EU trade sanctions against other states which certainly dont fulfil this criteria.
Most policies are formulated out of a rational analysis of the issue at hand, with an understanding of
the limitations of what they can reasonably be expected to achieve.
Furthermore Burmas democracy movement does not see sanctions as a quick fix for regime change.
Sanctions are but one vital tool necessary to force the regime to the negotiating table. Sanctions
combined with a vigorous diplomatic initiative will assist the pragmatists in Burmas military and
amongst its associates to push for change.
9. If the EU pulls out and closes its markets, wont Asian companies and Asian markets just
fill the gaps?
It is often reported that the majority of investment in Burma comes from the Asian region. Again,
however, this is only true in terms of commitments to invest, with Asian countries committing
approximately USD 4.26 billion, or about 60 percent of total commitments since 1990. In the last ten
years Western countries only committed about USD 2.89 billion. However, Western countries
disbursed more than 80 percent of the investments that they committed. Asian countries only
50
disbursed about 31 percent of committed investment .
While European investments have been some of the strategically most important to the regime, the
47

Philip S. Robertson: "Sanctions Are Working in Burma. Online commentary, Irrawaddy, 26 August 2003. Online at
<www.irrawaddy.org/com/2003/com31.html>.
48

See Foreign Direct Investment and the Garments Industry in Burma. Burma Economic Watch, June 2001. Online at
<www.ibiblio.org/obl/docs/FDI_&_Garments_Industry_in_Burma.htm>
49

On 6 November 2003, BAT announced it was pulling out of Burma.

50

Burma Economic Watch. June 2001. Foreign Direct Investment and the Garments Industry in Burma. Online at
<www.ibiblio.org/obl/docs/FDI_&_Garments_Industry_in_Burma.htm>.

19

recent exodus of companies as well as the decision of many not to invest in Burma, provides an
opportunity to further undermine the regime's support base. Asian investors have not flooded into the
investment gap. Instead many have taken a cautious approach to investment in Burma as a result of
the regime's mismanagement of the economy. However, their attitude may well change and this is why
Europe must, in addition to applying an EU investment ban, push for UN mandatory sanctions on
Burma. Until such UN sanctions can be put in place, the EU can ensure that no major European
company tips the economic balance of power further towards the regime's advantage.
10. Wont Burmas neighbours like China and India break any embargo?
UN Security Council sanctions are legally binding, and would have to be respected by all of Burmas
neighbouring countries. In the absence of UN measures, EU sanctions could ban investment in Burma
from EU countries and the import of certain commodities into the EU.
If China looks carefully at the situation in Burma, it will see that its key interests are not well served by
the current military regime. Chinas military security may be served by maintaining good relations with
the military government in Rangoon. But increasingly Burma also poses some real problems for China,
and particularly Yunnan province. The Burmese regimes position is unsustainable in the longer run
with the threat of instability and civil unrest becoming a real possibility; drugs and HIV/AIDS are
crossing the border into China, and Burmas economy is flagging. It is no longer a promising market
for Chinese produce, nor can it be a driving force for the regional economy, particularly for Yunnan
and neighbouring provinces. The regime offers China less than may be assumed, and Chinas self
interest is becoming less well served by the ruling military in Rangoon.

Produced by
The Burma Campaign UK
28 Charles Square, London, N1 6HT
Tel: 020 7324 4710
Email: info@burmacampaign.org.uk
Website: www.burmacampaign.org.uk

20

Order Code RS22737

October 10, 2007

Burma Sanctions: Background and Options

Larry A. Niksch and Martin A. Weiss
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division

Summary
On September 25, 2007, President George W. Bush announced that sanctions
against Burma, which have been in place since 1997, would be tightened to specifically
target leading Burmese officials. On September 27, the Bush Administration imposed
financial and travel sanctions on 14 senior Burmese government officials. This report
provides background information on existing Burma sanctions and possible future
options. It will be updated as events warrant.

The following table provides summary information on existing Burma sanctions.

Exemption
Companies with investments in Burma prior to May 21,
1997, and companies or persons with an investment
agreement in place prior to May 21, 1997. The
exemption includes the U.S. corporation UNOCAL and
its investment with the French corporation Total in
natural gas exploration and pipeline offshore and across
Burma into Thailand. It is estimated that the project
provides $400 million to $647 million to the Burmese
government annually. (Seekins, Donald M. "Burma and
U.S. Sanctions: Punishing an Authoritarian Regime."
Asian Survey, May-June 2005. p. 452.)
The President may waive the prohibition on the import
of any product from Burma if the President determines
and notifies the appropriate congressional committees
that to do so is in the national interest of the United
States.

Sanction

Prohibits new investment in Burma by U.S. persons and companies on

or after May 21, 1997. New investment is defined as a contract with the
Government of Burma or a non-governmental entity in Burma for the
development of resources located in Burma, purchasing a share of
ownership in a project, or entering into an agreement that provides for a
participation in royalties, earnings, or profits from the economic
development of resources located in Burma.

Requires the President to ban the importation into the United States of
certain products of Burma, beginning 30 days after the date of
enactment. The import ban expires in one year unless renewed. The
President may impose a freeze on funds or assets in the United States of
the Burmese Government and individuals who hold senior positions in
that government. Requires the U.S. government to vote against the
extension of any financial assistance to Burma by international financial
institutions. Authorizes the President to deny visas and entry into the
United States to former and present leaders of the Burmese government
or the Union Solidarity Development Association (a pro-government
mass organization).

Statutory Action

Executive Order 13047,

May 20, 1997. Issued
under Section 570 of the
Foreign Appropriations
Act, 1997 (P.L. 104208)

P.L. 108-61, Burmese

Freedom and
Democracy Act of 2003,
July 28, 2003.
Extended by P.L. 108272 and P.L. 109-39.

Summary of U.S. Sanctions on Burma

CRS-2

Transactions prior to May 21, 1997, between a U.S.

person or company and any entity in Burma, but such
transactions with banks in Burma must be conducted
through a non-U.S. bank. No prohibition on the export
of goods and services other than financial services.
Exemption for transfer of personal remittances of less
than $300 to and from Burma for an individual
ordinarily resident in Burma, provided that the funds are
not being sent by, to or on behalf of a blocked party.
The U.S. Office of Foreign Assets Control can issue
licenses to non-government organizations to engage in
humanitarian or religious activities in Burma.

Issued to implement P.L. 108-61. Blocks property and property

interests of persons listed in the Annex to the Executive Order and
persons designated by the Treasury Department as being senior officials
of the Government of Burma and the Union Solidarity and
Development Association. Authorizes the Treasury to designate
individuals or entities that are owned or controlled by, or acting on
behalf of any of those officials or groups. Bans the importation into the
United States of products of Burma and the export or re-export of
financial services to Burma by U.S. persons. Prohibits a U.S. person or
company from approving, aiding, or supporting a foreign partys
investment in Burma. Prohibits U.S. persons from purchasing shares in
a third-country company if the companys profits are predominantly
derived from the companys development of resources in Burma.

Executive Order 13310:

July 28, 2003;
announced
modifications,
September 25 and 27,
2007

Source: Compiled by the Congressional Research Service.

On September 25 and 27, 2007, the White House and the Treasury
announced that under Executive Order 13310, officials of the Burmese
government and its supporting organizations would be designated by
name as coming under the restrictions of the Executive Order with
respect to the blocking of their property and financial interests in the
United States and visa restrictions on their travel to the United States.
On September 27, 2007, the Department of the Treasury announced that
it was freezing the assets under U.S. jurisdiction of 14 senior Burmese
government officials.

Exemption

Sanction

Statutory Action

CRS-3

CRS-4

Future Options to Expand Sanctions

Existing sanctions against Burma may be viewed as adequate and as necessitating
no further action. However, policymakers may seek to exercise additional options.
Options to expand sanctions include the following:
Steps to produce U.S. business disinvestment: Legislation could compel or place heavy
pressure on U.S. businesses to disinvest from natural resource projects in Burma.
Legislative provisions could include a ban on U.S. investment in Burma based on
investment agreements prior to May 20, 1997, a high or confiscatory tax on profits from
natural resource projects, or a prohibition on U.S. businesses access to Burmese banks
in connection with money associated with natural resource projects.
Impose provisions of the USA PATRIOT Act on third country banks and financial
institutions that do business with Burmese banks and individuals associated with the
Government of Burma: Under Section 311 of the USA PATRIOT Act, Special
Measures for Jurisdictions, Financial Institutions, or International Transactions of
Primary Money Laundering Concern, the Secretary of the Treasury is authorized to
impose any of five certain regulatory restrictions, known as special measures.1 These
can be used upon finding that a foreign jurisdiction, financial institution, or certain
transactions or accounts is of primary money laundering concern. Prior to making such
a finding, the Treasury Secretary must consult with the Secretary of State and the Attorney
General and consider certain factors relating to the foreign jurisdiction or the particular
institution targeted. Among the factors to be considered are: involvement with organized
crime or terrorists, bank secrecy laws and regulations, the existence of a mutual legal
assistance treaty with the United States, and level of official corruption.
Of the five types of special measures, four of the five impose information-gathering
and record-keeping requirements on U.S. financial institutions dealing either directly with
the jurisdiction designated as one of primary money laundering concern, or dealing with
those having direct dealings with the designated jurisdiction. Under the fifth special
measure, a U.S. financial institution may be prohibited from opening or maintaining in
the United States a correspondent or payable-through account2 for a foreign financial
institution if the account involves the designee.
On November 18, 2003, the Secretary of the Treasury designated Burma as a
jurisdiction of primary money laundering concern and applied a special measure under
Section 311 of the USA PATRIOT Act. The special measure prohibits covered U.S.
financial institutions from establishing, maintaining, administering, or managing in the
United States any correspondent or payable-through account for, or on behalf of, a
Burmese banking institution. Covered U.S. financial institutions also are similarly
prohibited with regard to any correspondent or payable-through account in the United

For more information on Title III of the USA PATRIOT Act, see CRS Report: RL31208,
International Money Laundering Abatement and Anti-Terrorist Financing Act of 2001, Title III
of P.L. 107-56 (USA PATRIOT Act), by M. Maureen Murphy.
2

A payable-through account is an account established at a U.S. financial institution that extends

check-writing privileges to the customers of other, often foreign, financial institutions.

CRS-5
States for any foreign bank if the account is used by the foreign bank to provide banking
services to a Burmese banking institution.
The special measure applied to Burmese banks does not prohibit U.S. financial
institutions from dealings with foreign banks overseas that allow Burmese banks or
individuals or companies connected with the Burmese government to maintain accounts
with those banks. This is in contrast to the Treasury Departments imposition of Section
311 on Banco Delta Asia in the Chinese territory of Macau for money laundering for
North Korea. Section 311 measures have arguably had their largest success in this
designation of Macau-based Banco Delta Asia in September 2005 and the full imposition
of Section 311 in March 2007. The North Korean government had used Banco Delta for
the majority of its international transactions. Reportedly, following the U.S. proposed
designation, over two dozen financial institutions ceased their transactions with North
Korea.3 Most importantly, China froze North Korean accounts in the Macau branch of
the Bank of China and reportedly cracked down on North Korean efforts to circulate
counterfeit U.S. dollars in China near the North Korean border.4
Reports of third country banks that do business with Burmese banks or individuals
connected to the Burmese government (including drug traffickers) are sparse. Past reports
have cited banks in Thailand, Singapore, and China. Burmese accounts in Chinese banks
were confirmed in January 2006 when the Bank of China ordered Chinese banks to
terminate all U.S. dollar business with the Myanmar Foreign Trade Bank and the
Myanmar Investment and Commercial Bank.5

Press reports indicate that some two dozen financial institutions across the globe have
voluntarily cut back or terminated their business with North Korea, notably including institutions
in China, Japan, Vietnam, Mongolia, and Singapore. The result of these voluntary actions is that
it is becoming very difficult for the Kim Jong-Il regime to benefit from its criminal conduct.
Testimony of Daniel Glaser, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Terrorist Financing and Financial
Crimes, U.S. Department of the Treasury before the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and
Urban Affairs. September 12, 2006.

4
5

Ibid.

Turnell, Sean. Burmas Economic Prospects. Testimony before the Subcommittee on East
Asian and Pacific Affairs, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, March 29, 2006. Sweeney, John.
"How Junta protects Mr. Heroin." The Observer (London, internet version), April 8, 2001.
Casanier, Francois. "A Narco-dictatorship in progress." BurmaNet News, June 13, 1996.

aolrich://29730421028/

Thema:
Datum:

[Women-Group-Burma] Switzerland
Donnerstag, 29. Juni 2006 9:02:33 Uhr

Von:

zinlinn@cscoms.com

tightens

Myanmar

sanctions

June 28, 2006 - 5:52 PM

Switzerland tightens Myanmar sanctions

[See the attached file]
A demonstrator protests outside the Myanmar embassy in Tokyo (Keystone)

Sanctions against Myanmar are to be tightened on Thursday because of the "precarious human rights
situation" in the south-east Asian country.
The decision, announced by cabinet on Wednesday, brings Swiss policy into line with the European Union
which introduced harsher measures in April.
As of Thursday, the ban on weapons exports and "instruments of repression" will be extended to include
any services related to these or any other military activities in Myanmar.
Financial sanctions will no longer be limited to the freezing of funds belonging to members of Myanmar's
military regime and the blocking of transactions.
They will be extended to include all "assets". The list of government members and their relatives
affected by the sanctions is being increased from 270 to 392.
Swiss firms will be forbidden from taking stakes in 39 state-controlled enterprises or from issuing
credit. However, the Swiss State Secretariat for Economic Affairs (Seco) said this did not amount to a
general ban on investing in Myanmar, since existing contracts would not be affected.
Roland Vock, head of Seco's sanctions department, told swissinfo that the Swiss government was taking
action now because Switzerland could not afford to be out of step with the EU.
"Switzerland does not want to become a safe haven for funds which have been frozen according to EU
sanctions," Vock said.
He said the issue of human rights violations was of continued concern for the government, especially
after the Myanmar authorities extended the house arrest of opposition leader, Aung San Suu Kyi, last
month.

Systematic

violations

Switzerland also bases its policy on resolutions adopted each year by the United Nations General
Assembly and its human rights body which have voiced their serious concern on systematic violations in
the south-east Asian state.
Also in line with the EU, the Swiss cabinet announced sanctions against Belarus.
It said it would freeze funds and impose a travel ban on members of the Belarus government in reaction
to "the breach of constitutional principles in the presidential elections" last March.

1 von 2

29.06.2006 13:25 Uhr

aolrich://29730421028/

Switzerland stopped financial aid to Belarus ten years ago due to the infringement of constitutional
principles.
It called on Belarus to respect its international commitments regarding human rights and basic freedoms.
swissinfo with agencies

CONTEXT
Current Myanmar sanctions:
Ban on export, sales, and passage in transit of military goods and instruments of repression.
Ban on granting of services of any kind relating to the above, as well as military activities in Burma.
Freezing of funds and economic assets of 270 members of Myanmar's military regime and relatives.
Ban on travel to or transiting through Switzerland for any of the people on the list mentioned above.
Ban on giving credit to, or investing in, state-controlled companies.

RELATED

SITES

Seco ( http://www.seco-admin.ch/index.html?lang=en)
Swiss foreign ministry ( http://www.eda.admin.ch/content/eda/e/home.html)

URL of this story: http://194.6.181.127/eng/swissinfo.html?siteSect=105&sid=6854786

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2 von 2

29.06.2006 13:25 Uhr

BBC News - What happened to the Marcos fortune?

http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-21022457?print=true

ASIA
25 January 2013 Last updated at 01:26 GMT

What happened to the Marcos fortune?

By Kate McGeown
BBC News, Philippines

Imelda Marcos: a name synonymous with wealth, greed and excess.

During her husband's 20 years as Philippine president, she amassed a huge collection of art, jewellery, property and - most
famously - at least 1,000 pairs of shoes.
Paintings by Van Gogh, Cezanne, Rembrandt, Rafael and Michelangelo; palatial homes in the US and the Philippines; silver
tableware, gold necklaces, diamond tiaras - the Marcoses collected the best the world had to offer.
When they were ousted in a "People Power" revolution in 1986, Philippine investigators estimated their wealth at about $10bn
(6.2bn).
The next president, Corazon Aquino, set up a special commission to recover these funds for the government coffers - but now,
more than 25 years later, just $4bn has been accounted for.
So what happened to rest of the Marcos collection?
The issue came to the fore again late last year, when Mrs Marcos' former aide, Vilma Bautista, appeared in a New York court
charged with illegally selling a Monet painting.
She was also found to have another three famous artworks in her possession.
The commission admitted that all four were on a list of 146 paintings once owned by the Marcoses which they had not been able
to track down.
Shoes and shares

Not surprisingly perhaps, Imelda's shoes are the part of the collection that is best accounted for.
Photographs of row upon row of designer footwear, left in the presidential palace when the Marcoses fled to Hawaii, became the
symbol which summed up their lavish lifestyle.
Many of these shoes are now in a special museum in Marikina, an area north of Manila known for its shoe manufacturing.
Others are in the National Museum, along with some of Mrs Marcos' gala dresses.
There was an outcry in September when it was revealed that much of the museum's collection had been eaten by termites.
But while the shoes and clothes are of undoubted historic interest, they do not have big monetary value.
The Commission on Good Government has been concentrating on the bigger-ticket items - it has sold real estate in New York and
millions of dollars-worth of shares, and obtained $600m in Swiss bank accounts.
It has also found a ruby and diamond tiara, locked in the vault of the Swiss central bank, which could fetch more than $8m.

1 von 3

29.01.13 09:19

BBC News - What happened to the Marcos fortune?

http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-21022457?print=true

But Andres Bautista, the head of the commission and no relation to Vilma, admits there is still a lot missing - especially the
paintings.
The commission started with a list of more than 300 missing paintings - many by the grand masters - and about half of these are
still unaccounted for.
"We really don't know where they are. They could be anywhere," Mr Bautista said.
'Confiscated'

I asked him if he thought that some of these artworks were still in the hands of Imelda Marcos herself (her husband Ferdinand
died in 1989).
His reply was careful: "Your guess is as good as mine".
Robert Sison, Mrs Marcos' lawyer, fears that is exactly what the commission thinks.
And while Mr Sison says he is unaware exactly what art the family still has, he believes that is not the right way to look at the
issue.
He refers to the Marcos wealth as being "confiscated" rather than recovered by the commission, insisting there is no legal basis to
take any of the assets.
"The Philippine government has no right to question why Mrs Marcos had this art," Mr Sison said.
"Ferdinand Marcos was a gold trader before he became president, and he made his money then."
Mr Sison also pointed out that, despite numerous cases being filed against the family, no-one has been successfully prosecuted.
Back in power

In defending the commission's actions, Mr Bautista refers to a Supreme Court decision from 2003, which found all but $320,000 of
the Marcos assets to be the result of ill-gotten wealth.
"This is a job we took an oath to do, and we want to do it well," he said.
But Mr Bautista faces an uphill battle - and not just because the art is proving difficult to find.
The commission itself is not well respected - previous members have been accused of corruption, or "taking eggs from the chicken
coop", as Mr Bautista euphemistically puts it.
He admits that the commission "needs to have the support of the public", and he is not sure whether it still does.
The Philippine judicial system is also frustratingly slow. Many of the legal cases filed against the Marcoses and their allies have
been stuck for years in the backlog, never reaching court.
But there is another major factor hampering the commission - the Marcoses are once again a political force.
Imelda is a congresswoman; her daughter Imee is a provincial governor; her son BongBong is a respected senator who has a
realistic chance of becoming president in 2016.
The fact the Marcoses are back in power "really doesn't help us," Mr Bautista conceded.
Given all this, it is perhaps not surprising that he wants to wind the commission down.
He is not quite ready to admit defeat - he suggests the Department of Justice still continues to investigate - but when I asked him if
he thought the whole Marcos collection would ever be recovered, he paused for a while, then laughed softly.
"Filipinos are too forgetful - and we forgive too easily," he said eventually.
New priorities

The emphasis now has shifted to another former president, and her alleged ill-gotten wealth.

2 von 3

29.01.13 09:19

BBC News - What happened to the Marcos fortune?

http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-21022457?print=true

Gloria Arroyo left office in 2010, and has already been accused of corruption as well as a string of other offences. Her trial looks
set to be expensive and time-consuming.
Time marches on, memories fade and new priorities take precedence.
Maybe the full Marcos collection will never be found. Maybe the missing paintings will remain in private homes, stores and bank
vaults around the world.
As for Mrs Marcos, she is now in her 80s but still as strong and flamboyant as ever - and still a keen art collector.
During one of my interviews with her, I asked for a photograph as a keepsake.
We posed next to a painting. "Wow, is that a Picasso?" I asked. "Yes," she said proudly.

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3 von 3

29.01.13 09:19

BBC News - Philippines law gives compensation to Marcos vi...

http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-21571051?print=true

ASIA
25 February 2013 Last updated at 08:05 GMT

Philippines law gives compensation to Marcos victims

The Philippine president has signed a law to give compensation to victims of the country's former leader, Ferdinand
Marcos.
The government has set aside at least 10bn pesos ($224m: 148m) to compensate thousands of people who suffered rights
abuses in the Marcos era.
The money was recovered from Swiss bank accounts secretly maintained by Marcos during his 20 years in power.
President Benigno Aquino said the move would "right the wrongs of the past".
"We may not bring back the time stolen from martial law victims, but we can assure them of the state's recognition of their
sufferings that will help bring them closer to the healing of their wounds," he said at a ceremony in Manila.
Marcos introduced martial law, under which thousands of people were detained, tortured or "disappeared" by the security forces.
The law marks 27 years since Marcos was ousted in the country's "People Power" revolution, which was headed by Mr Aquino's
mother, Corazon Aquino.
It calls for the establishment of a human rights board, which will assess each claim and award compensation accordingly.
The bill's sponsor, Senator Francis Escudero, said it would also offer non-monetary compensation where needed, including social
and psychological assistance, the Philippines Star reports.
Loretta Ann Rosales, head of the Philippines rights commission who was herself tortured under Marcos, said the law was
"essential in rectifying the abuses" of the era and would allow victims a sense of justice, AFP reports.
However another rights campaigner, Marie Hilao-Enriquez, told AFP there were "so many victims that when you divide it to
everyone it will not result to much".
Marcos died in exile in Hawaii in 1989.

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2 von 3

26.02.13 12:53

http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/data-chart-center/tic...

MAJOR FOREIGN HOLDERS OF TREASURY SECURITIES

(in billions of dollars)
HOLDINGS 1/ AT END OF PERIOD

Country

Oct
2012
------

Sep
2012*
------

Aug
2012*
------

Jul
2012*
------

Jun
2012*
------

May
2012*
------

Apr
2012*
------

Mar
2012*
------

Feb
2012*
------

Jan
2012*
------

Dec
2011*
------

Nov
2011
------

Oct
2011
------

China, Mainland
Japan
Oil Exporters 3/
Carib Bnkng Ctrs 4/
Brazil
Taiwan
Switzerland
Russia
Luxembourg
Hong Kong
Belgium
United Kingdom 2/
Singapore
Ireland
Norway
France
Canada
Germany
Mexico
India
Thailand
Turkey
Korea, South
Philippines
Chile
Poland
Colombia
Sweden
Netherlands
Italy
Australia
Spain
Israel
Malaysia
Denmark
Peru
South Africa
All Other
Grand Total

1161.5
1134.7
266.2
258.5
255.2
201.6
194.4
165.4
139.4
137.2
133.3
117.3
94.3
93.3
75.5
75.0
65.3
64.1
59.2
58.9
58.2
51.6
41.6
36.7
30.6
30.0
29.3
28.5
27.5
27.3
25.9
24.7
22.2
19.5
14.5
13.1
12.5
238.3
5482.2

1153.6
1129.5
267.0
261.1
251.2
201.7
193.5
163.5
147.6
137.1
133.2
137.9
94.4
96.9
73.9
59.3
60.6
65.5
56.5
59.7
64.3
42.6
42.1
37.0
30.3
30.0
29.3
27.6
27.0
27.6
25.7
25.5
25.8
19.4
15.2
11.9
13.0
238.5
5476.2

1155.2
1122.8
269.1
263.9
259.8
199.5
191.7
162.9
139.3
141.7
130.2
137.1
96.9
94.6
71.4
52.9
61.3
66.2
57.2
60.6
58.7
34.6
44.1
37.1
30.1
29.4
27.9
28.0
27.4
27.5
27.6
24.2
25.0
19.6
15.8
11.5
12.8
233.4
5448.8

1160.0
1121.8
266.3
247.6
256.5
194.4
184.8
156.2
135.5
137.1
141.3
135.4
96.4
93.2
68.2
55.1
61.3
66.5
53.9
59.3
53.0
30.3
46.5
36.9
29.7
28.8
27.6
28.5
25.8
27.7
26.7
24.5
23.1
20.1
15.6
11.9
13.0
221.7
5381.9

1147.0
1109.4
268.3
245.4
244.3
196.4
172.0
163.8
138.0
136.0
144.5
138.9
86.9
91.3
68.6
49.1
52.8
64.0
51.6
53.8
53.1
29.1
44.5
35.4
26.7
29.9
27.1
27.8
26.2
27.5
25.3
26.6
24.6
20.3
15.3
11.7
13.2
226.8
5313.2

1164.0
1109.2
258.4
244.2
245.8
190.0
155.1
156.3
131.0
143.8
132.0
137.3
83.1
93.9
67.9
50.6
55.8
65.1
45.8
50.0
53.5
27.1
46.3
36.5
26.4
28.4
26.5
27.4
26.2
27.1
29.7
21.7
24.8
20.3
15.1
11.4
12.6
227.4
5267.6

1164.4
1090.2
259.9
238.5
245.9
187.3
150.3
155.4
130.0
145.0
132.3
136.9
82.5
95.1
64.8
49.8
63.8
62.7
40.9
49.3
52.2
28.1
43.9
36.8
24.5
28.4
26.9
27.6
24.7
26.5
25.8
21.2
23.7
20.1
14.6
10.5
12.3
225.2
5218.2

1144.0
1082.8
260.0
235.4
238.1
190.1
150.7
151.1
140.0
140.3
141.7
126.4
84.7
94.2
61.0
45.9
54.2
64.6
35.9
46.7
54.7
30.4
42.7
37.1
21.9
27.5
26.7
27.6
23.4
24.1
22.6
21.1
22.8
20.5
15.4
10.1
12.2
222.2
5151.2

1155.2
1091.0
267.6
232.9
228.4
183.7
145.4
144.8
141.0
141.9
125.2
119.0
84.6
96.0
59.4
39.7
53.9
60.7
31.8
44.1
54.3
30.1
50.8
37.1
22.5
27.3
25.1
28.5
25.0
23.3
23.5
21.3
23.0
20.9
15.4
8.9
12.9
217.2
5113.5

1166.2
1083.2
267.6
224.6
228.2
178.4
146.5
145.7
140.0
134.3
131.5
116.2
74.8
86.2
57.3
42.5
48.0
60.9
30.1
42.8
54.5
27.4
49.9
35.7
22.3
28.7
25.2
29.2
25.2
22.7
22.2
23.7
22.7
20.6
15.9
8.9
12.9
214.0
5066.8

1151.9
1058.0
261.1
226.2
226.9
177.3
142.3
149.5
147.6
121.7
135.2
113.7
75.1
97.6
56.7
44.7
45.1
60.7
29.3
43.5
51.6
32.0
47.3
32.7
23.0
28.5
23.5
28.9
21.3
22.8
21.7
24.0
19.3
20.6
16.5
8.8
12.1
205.7
5004.2

1254.5
1066.0
254.2
222.2
226.6
166.9
126.1
145.1
127.1
107.9
133.2
124.7
70.0
69.6
40.3
59.4
48.7
67.8
31.6
38.4
56.0
40.2
42.1
31.7
24.9
27.9
20.0
30.4
23.7
21.2
24.0
16.3
19.3
18.5
13.6
8.5
11.3
195.1
5005.2

1256.0
1006.1
248.4
212.1
229.4
167.4
143.9
147.5
126.5
113.3
132.4
106.5
70.7
66.2
37.0
53.7
46.4
68.0
31.0
40.1
49.9
40.5
42.7
32.2
24.7
28.6
21.8
30.8
24.0
21.5
24.6
14.1
19.3
17.7
13.6
8.6
11.5
189.6
4918.3

Of which:
For. Official
Treasury Bills
T-Bonds & Notes

3962.0
379.4
3582.6

3958.1
383.8
3574.3

3957.1
373.0
3584.1

3915.5
355.0
3560.6

3852.9
362.2
3490.7

3826.3
359.8
3466.5

3781.1
345.7
3435.5

3720.3
356.0
3364.3

3711.1
360.7
3350.4

3687.4
349.6
3337.8

3621.0
357.6
3263.4

3628.9
379.0
3249.9

3600.9
374.6
3226.2

Department of the Treasury/Federal Reserve Board

December 17, 2012
*
1/

2/
3/
4/

1 von 1

Includes holdings of Treasury bonds and notes as reported on TIC Form SLT, "Aggregate Holdings of Long-Term Securities by U.S.
and Foreign Residents"
The data in this table are collected primarily from U.S.-based custodians and broker-dealers. Since U.S. securities held in
overseas custody accounts may not be attributed to the actual owners, the data may not provide a precise accounting of
individual country ownership of Treasury securities
(see TIC FAQ #7 at: http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/data-chart-center/tic/Pages/ticfaq1.aspx).
Estimated foreign holdings of U.S. Treasury marketable and non-marketable bills, bonds, and notes reported under the Treasury
International Capital (TIC) reporting system are based on annual Surveys of Foreign Holdings of U.S. Securities and on
monthly data.
United Kingdom includes Channel Islands and Isle of Man.
Oil exporters include Ecuador, Venezuela, Indonesia, Bahrain, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar,
Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Algeria, Gabon, Libya, and Nigeria.
Caribbean Banking Centers include Bahamas, Bermuda, Cayman Islands, Netherlands Antilles and Panama.
Beginning with new series for June 2006, also includes British Virgin Islands.

13.01.13 13:32

List of countries by foreign-exchange reserves - Wikipedia, th...

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_countries_by_foreign-ex...

List of countries by foreign-exchange reserves

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Foreign-exchange reserves (also called Forex reserves) in a strict sense are only the foreigncurrency deposits held by central banks and monetary authorities. However, the term foreignexchange reserves in popular usage (such as this list) commonly includes foreign exchange and gold,
special drawing rights (SDRs) and International Monetary Fund (IMF) reserve position as this total
figure is more readily available, however it is accurately deemed as official reserves or
international reserves. The list excludes currency swaps conducted by central banks.
These are assets of the central banks which are held in different reserve currencies such as the U.S.
dollar, euro, yen and pound, and which are used to back its liabilities, e.g., the local currency issued,
and the various bank reserves deposited with the central bank, by the government or financial
institutions. Before the end of the gold standard, gold was the preferred reserve. Some nations are
converting foreign exchange reserves into sovereign wealth funds, which can rival foreign exchange
reserves in size.
This is a list of countries and territories by foreign exchange reserves in U.S. dollar equivalence. The
People's Republic of China is unique because it has 3 different monetary authorities, i.e. one for
Mainland China and one each for its two autonomous Special administrative regions - Hong Kong
and Macau - which are therefore counted separately. Exchange rate fluctuations can have significant
impact on these numbers. While most nations report in US dollars, a few nations in Eastern Europe
report solely in Euros.

Contents
1 List of states by foreign-exchange reserves
2 See also
3 Notes
4 References
5 External links

List of states by foreign-exchange reserves

The list below is based on IMF data when available; Otherwise U.S. Central Intelligence Agency
data are indicated. For consistency, forward currency swap contracts are not included in this list
until they mature, figures that include them may be higher or lower than those listed here. IMF or
other outstanding loans are not shown here, and if accounted for many nations would list lower.

Rank
1

1 von 6

Country/monetary authority
People's Republic of China

Foreign exchange reserves

(Millions of US$)

Figures as of

3,285,090

Sep 2012[1]

13.01.13 12:59

List of countries by foreign-exchange reserves - Wikipedia, th...

Foreign exchange reserves

(Millions of US$)

Figures as of

Japan

1,270,848

Nov 2012[2]

Eurozone

903,027

Aug 2012[2]

Saudi Arabia

621,490

Sep 2012[3]

Russia

528,236

Nov 2012[4]

Switzerland

526,226

Nov 2012[2]

Republic of China (Taiwan) 403,170

Dec 2012[5]

Brazil

378,560

Nov 2012[2]

Republic of Korea

323,461

Oct 2012[2]

Hong Kong

301,733

Oct 2012[2]

India

294,510

Nov 2012[2]

10

Germany

256,455

Nov 2012[2]

11

Singapore

254,217

Oct 2012[2]

12

Algeria

200,000

May 2012[6]

13

France

189,580

Nov 2012[2]

14

Italy

186,907

Oct 2012[2]

15

Thailand

181,627

Nov 2012[2]

16

Mexico

168,286

Nov 2012[2]

17

United States

151,866

Dec 2012[2]

18

Malaysia

138,306

Oct 2012[2]

19

United Kingdom

132,131

Oct 2012[2]

20

Turkey

118,362

Nov 2012[2]

21

Indonesia

110,297

Oct 2012[2]

22

Iran

109,700

Dec 2011[7]

23

Poland

108,900

Dec 2012[2]

24

Denmark

90,178

Oct 2012[2]

25

Philippines

84,250

Dec 2012[2]

26

Israel

75,849

Oct 2012[2]

27

Libya

71,990

Dec 2011[7]

Rank
2

2 von 6

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_countries_by_foreign-ex...

Country/monetary authority

See
also

13.01.13 12:59

List of countries by foreign-exchange reserves - Wikipedia, th...

Rank

3 von 6

Country/monetary authority

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_countries_by_foreign-ex...

Foreign exchange reserves

(Millions of US$)

Figures as of

28

Canada

68,222

Nov 2012[2]

29

Peru

61,106

Oct 2012[2]

30

Netherlands

56,095

Oct 2012[2]

31

Norway

55,599

Sep 2012[2]

32

United Arab Emirates

55,290

Dec 2011[7]

33

Iraq

53,470

Dec 2011[7]

34

Sweden

52,372

Oct 2012[2]

35

Spain

51,312

Oct 2012[2]

36

South Africa

50,677

Oct 2012[2]

37

Australia

48,168

Nov 2012[2]

38

Lebanon

47,870

Dec 2011[7]

39

Romania

47,005

Oct 2012[2]

40

Hungary

45,440

Oct 2012[2]

41

Argentina

45,238

Nov 2012[2]

42

Czech Republic

44,164

Nov 2012[2]

43

Chile

39,719

Nov 2012[2]

44

Colombia

36,501

Nov 2012[2]

45

Nigeria

35,210

Dec 2011[7]

46

Belgium

31,327

Oct 2012[2]

47

Ukraine

29,255

Sep 2012[2]

48

Kazakhstan

29,061

Oct 2012[2]

49

Austria

27,736

Nov 2012[2]

50

Venezuela

26,910

Dec 2011[7]

51

Kuwait

25,930

Dec 2011[7]

52

Portugal

23,349

Oct 2012[2]

53

Qatar

20,390

Dec 2011[7]

54

Bulgaria

19,612

Oct 2012[2]

55

New Zealand

19,552

Oct 2012[2]

13.01.13 12:59

List of countries by foreign-exchange reserves - Wikipedia, th...

Rank

4 von 6

Country/monetary authority

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_countries_by_foreign-ex...

Foreign exchange reserves

(Millions of US$)

Figures as of

56

Macau

18,730

Mar 2010[7]

57

Pakistan

18,090

Dec 2011[7]

58

Morocco

16,758

Oct 2012[2]

59

Vietnam

16,760

Dec 2011[7]

60

Egypt

15,172

Sep 2012[2]

61

Croatia

14,677

Nov 2012[2]

62

Serbia

14,650

Dec 2011[7]

63

Bolivia

13,981

Nov 2012[8]

64

Uruguay

13,434

Nov 2012[2]

65

Bangladesh

13,040

Jan 2013[9]

66

Finland

11,161

Nov 2012[2]

67

Trinidad and Tobago

9,876

Dec 2011[7]

68

Jordan

9,287

Oct 2012[2]

69

Sri Lanka

8,400

Dec 2011[7]

70

Lithuania

8,385

Nov 2012[2]

71

Belarus

8,040

Oct 2012[2]

72

Greece

7,740

Nov 2012[2]

73

Azerbaijan

7,146

Dec 2011[7]

74

Latvia

6,897

Oct 2012[2]

75

Guatemala

6,800

Oct 2012[2]

76

Costa Rica

5,366

Oct 2012[2]

77

Paraguay

5,096

Dec 2011[7]

78

Dominican Republic

4,397

Jun 2011[7]

79

Iceland

4,314

Oct 2012[2]

80

Cambodia

4,113

Dec 2011[7]

81

Myanmar

3,762

Dec 2010[7]

82

Georgia

2,841

Nov 2012[2]

83

Mauritius

2,797

Jun 2012[2]

13.01.13 12:59

List of countries by foreign-exchange reserves - Wikipedia, th...

Rank

Country/monetary authority

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_countries_by_foreign-ex...

Foreign exchange reserves

(Millions of US$)

Figures as of

84

Honduras

2,751

Jun 2012[2]

85

Slovakia

2,640

Sep 2012[2]

86

El Salvador

2,519

Oct 2012[2]

87

Moldova

2,422

Oct 2012[2]

88

Kyrgyzstan

1,944

Oct 2012[2]

89

Nicaragua

1,856

Oct 2012[2]

90

Ireland

1,751

Oct 2012[2]

91

Armenia

1,709

Oct 2012[2]

92

Cyprus

1,258

Sep 2012[2]

93

Luxembourg

1,023

Sep 2012[2]

94

Slovenia

985

Sep 2012[2]

95

Laos

757

Dec 2011[7]

96

Malta

654

Jul 2012[2]

97

Estonia

300

Sep 2012[2]

Official gold reserves

Notes
^ Iranian government does not report the foreign exchange reserves as a matter of policy and
all figures are estimates calculated by international or foreign institutes which are
occasionally endorsed by Iranian officials without disclosing the exact numbers.

References
1. ^ "Bloomberg China Monthly Foreign Exchange Reserves" (http://www.bloomberg.com/quote
/CNGFOREX:IND) . Bloomberg. 2012-03-31. http://www.bloomberg.com/quote/CNGFOREX:IND.
Retrieved 2012-07-05.
2. ^ a b c d e f g h i j k l m n o p q r s t u v w x y z aa ab ac ad ae af ag ah ai aj ak al am an ao ap aq ar as at au av aw ax ay
az ba bb bc bd be bf bg bh bi bj bk bl bm bn bo bp bq br bs
"Data Template on International Reserves and Foreign
Currency Liquidity Reporting Countries" (http://www.imf.org/external/np/sta/ir/IRProcessWeb
/colist.aspx) . Imf.org. 2001-01-05. http://www.imf.org/external/np/sta/ir/IRProcessWeb/colist.aspx.
Retrieved 2010-07-08.
3. ^ "Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency" (http://www.sama.gov.sa/sites/SAMAEN/Pages/Home.aspx) .
Sama.gov.sa. http://www.sama.gov.sa/sites/SAMAEN/Pages/Home.aspx. Retrieved 2013-01-01.
4. ^ "Bank of Russian Federation" (http://www.cbr.ru/eng/hd_base/mrrf/main.asp?C_mes=12&
C_year=2012&To_mes=12&To_year=2013&mode=&x=36&y=9) . Cbr.ru. http://www.cbr.ru
/eng/hd_base/mrrf/main.asp?C_mes=12&C_year=2012&To_mes=12&To_year=2013&mode=&
x=36&y=9. Retrieved 2013-01-01.

5 von 6

13.01.13 12:59

THE EAST IS CRIMSON

Why is Harvard training the next generation of Chinese Communist Party leaders?
By William J. Dobson|Posted Wednesday, May 23, 2012, at 5:46 PM

Communist Party figure Bo Xilai stepped down in April. His son attended Harvard at the time. Harvard and
China have one thing in common: They both consider themselves to be the center of the world. So, it was
always inevitable that when the scandal that brought down Chongqing party boss Bo Xilai broke, the
repercussions would be felt, somehow, in Cambridge. The connection, it turned out, was Bo Guagua, the
son of the disgraced Communist official. The younger Bo was a graduate student at Harvards Kennedy
School of Government. In April, he stopped attending classes and was seen leaving his off- campus
apartment with what appeared to be a security detail.
The fact that Bo Guagua was a couple months from his Harvard degree has sparked interest in the number
of so-called princelingsthe offspring of powerful Chinese Communist Party officialsattending elite U.S.
universities.
Its actually not very rare. Xi Jinping, Chinas vice president, is expected to become Chinas top leader this
fall. His daughter is a Harvard undergrad. Two recent top party leadersZhao Ziyang and Jiang Zemin
had grandchildren who attended Harvard. Jia Qinglin , one of Chinas most senior officials, has a granddaughter at Stanford. In fact, according to Andrew Higgins and Maureen Fan, at least five of the nine
members of the Politburo Standing Committee, Chinas top decision-making body, have children or
grandchildren who have studied in the United States.
But there are people far more important than the children of Chinese party leaders attending Harvard and
other elite U.S. universities: Chinese leaders themselves.
A little more than 10 years ago, the Chinese Communist Party embarked on an ambitious effort to give its
public officials the training, skills, and expertise they need to govern in the increasingly complex situations
that test an authoritarian regimes resilience. Carefully vetted officialsa selection of some of the regimes
rising starswere sent abroad to study in specially designed programs at some of the worlds finest
universities. The first crop was sent to Harvard. Today, Chinese authorities have expanded the program
to include Stanford, Oxford, Cambridge, the University of Tokyo, and others. A year ago I met with Lu
Mai, the head of the China Development Research Foundation, who oversees the program. This was a
big decision, he told me. We have already sent more than 4,000 [officials]. I dont know any other
country that sends on that scale.
The Harvard curriculum, specially designed for this program, resembles a midcareer executive course.
Housed at the Kennedy Schools Ash Centerthe same graduate school Bo Xilais son attendedHarvard
faculty teach Chinese officials leadership, strategy, and public management. Some of the lectures are
given by big-name Harvard professors, including Roger Porter and Joseph Nye. Although the classes are
restricted to Chinese officials, these party members have ample opportunity to mix with the schools
faculty and general student body.
Borrowing from the case-study method made famous at the universitys business school, the coursework
zeroes in on specific topics such as U.S. policy and government, how the media operates, negotiation
strategy, and even social media. The classroom work is supplemented by site visits to places like the

Massachusetts State House, the Boston Redevelopment Authority, and larger institutions like the World
Bank, International Monetary Fund, and the United Nations. Besides its main leadership program, which
lasts eight weeks, Harvard runs more tailored courses, too. One is focused on crisis management. Another
is entirely devoted to the Shanghai municipal government. A new energy program will bring together
executives from the China Southern Grid Power Corporation. The goal is to help the Chinese government
work in this environment of globalization, says Lu. To catch up. Chinese Minister of the Organisational
Department Li Yuanchao on July 1, 2011 in Beijing, China.
Harvard may be a competitive institution, but its nothing compared to being selected by the partys Central
Organization Departmentthe highly secretive body that is in charge of making all party appointments
across China and chooses the handful of officials sent abroad to study each year. (The departments work
is done almost entirely in secret. It is housed in an unmarked building less than a mile from Tiananmen
Square. A phone call from the Organization Department shows up on your phone as a string of zeroes.)
The officials selected can vary: They include municipal officers, mayors, provincial governors, all the way
up to central government vice ministers. Its worth remembering that in a country as populous as China,
even a very junior official can have a portfolio that affects millions of people. What they all have in
common is that they distinguished themselves as comers. Lu sits proudly when he tells me more than half
of the officials sent to Harvard receive a promotion not long after they return to their duties at home,
although he admits, We dont know if its because of the training or because they are already so good.
But we try to claim it is because of the training.
Harvards program has been in place long enough to already boast an impressive list of alumni. Li Jiange is
now the chairman of the China International Capital Corporation, something akin to Chinas first investment
bank. Zhao Zhengyong is the governor of Shaanxi Province, and Chen Deming is the minister of commerce.
No one has risen higher than Li Yuanchao. Li is the first Harvard-trained member of the Politburo. Today,
he heads the Central Organization Department, the very body that vets those officials who go abroad for
study. Later this year, during the upcoming leadership shuffle, Li is expected to rise once more, joining the
Politburo Standing Committee. Li will then be one of the nine most powerful men in China.
Some people will find something sinister in Harvard giving a generation of Chinese leaders tips on how to
govern. They have a point. Because, no matter how thinly you slice it, Harvard is helping to hone, polish,
and professionalize an authoritarian regime that systematically commits human rights abuses on a nearly
unparalleled scale. Harvard isnt teaching anyone how to interrogate a human rights activistthe Chinese
authorities need no lessons therebut they are arguably helping to perpetuate the dominance of a party
that has no reservations about brutalizing those who do nothing beyond questioning its right to rule. That
said, there is more than one way to encourage reform and political opening. If a classroom in Cambridge
can open a Chinese bureaucrats eyes to governing in a different way, that could be worth much more than
barring them admission. International exchanges are generally something to be applauded. If we feel
differently in this case, its because we cant be sure what precisely these Chinese pupils are taking from
their lessons. We are hopeful that these programs contribute to a better understanding of global
governance around the world, says Julian Chang, an executive director at the Ash Center.
What matters more is what these programs say about China. Among authoritarian governments, China is
the most broad-minded about borrowing or adapting foreign forms of governance for its own use. In recent

years, it has experimented with elections, public hearings, polling, live-streaming municipal meetings, and
a host of other typically democratic mechanisms to improve its governance. You never saw scores of
officials from Muammar Qaddafis Libya or Robert Mugabes Zimbabwe enrolling in top Western universities.
If dictatorships do set up educational programs in the West, it is usually part of military-to-military
exchanges like the ones Indonesia had with the U.S. military under Suharto or Egypt under Hosni Mubarak.
Chinese officials are enrolling in courses on environmental policy and sustainability. Admittedly, it is good
governance in the name of keeping the party on top, but its good governance all the same.
A couple days before I met Lu Mai, I had spoken to a Chinese official and Communist Party member named
Yu Keping. Yu is a leading voice encouraging greater democratic experimentation within the Chinese
political system.
He has also studied at Harvard. Speaking of the Arab Spring, which was only a few weeks old at the time,
Yu said, The lesson we can learn from the chaos in the Middle Eastern countries is the need for better
public service and peoples participationtransparency, accountability, and social justice. He may not
have learned that at Harvard, but its nice to think he did.
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/foreigners/2012/05/harvard_and_the_chinese_communist_party_top_chinese_officials_are_studyin
g_at_elite_u_s_universities_in_large_numbers_.single.html

CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE - MYANMARS FIVE ECONOMIC PRIORITIES

ByVikram Nehru Commentary, April 23, 2012
Myanmars successful by-elections and Aung San Suu Kyis landslide victory deservedly captured the international
headlines a fortnight ago. But those headlines overshadowed an equally pathbreaking economic development. The
day the preliminary election results were announced, the government held Myanmars first foreign exchange auction
at which the U.S. dollar was traded at 818 kyat. The official rate had been 8.5. The challenge now is to keep the
reform momentum going without causing macroeconomic or political instability...
The exchange rate reform was just the first salvo in what many anticipate will be a steady effort to overhaul the
economy and build incentives and institutions for sustained and inclusive growth. In doing so, the government is
receiving advice from the IMF, the World Bank, the Asian Development Bank, and the United Nations Development
Program, as well as from many bilateral agencies (Japan, Australia, the UK, and Norway to name a few) and other
external advisers...
The unification of the official with the market exchange rate is a fundamental change. But a large proportion of
the population remains desperately poor, without a social safety net to help them survive further policy-induced
economic shocks. What must follow, therefore, are reforms that lead to quick wins in income generation and
poverty reduction. This will instill the belief in the country that economic reforms can bring prosperity and will build a
constituency for further change. In modern economic jargon, the government should focus on reforms that loosen
the binding constraints to growth.
There are three such immediate constraintsinadequate infrastructure that increases production costs,
making Myanmar uncompetitive even where it has a comparative advantage (as it does with rice); excessive
licensing and controls that suffocate private initiative and breed corruption; and tariff and non-tariff barriers
that inhibit trade in manufactures and agricultural products. Addressing these constraints constitutes the first
three priorities for economic reform, but two other initiatives are needed to help sustain growth and make it
more inclusive.
The Five Priorities
The first priority is to develop a financially viable government, which will allow the state to achieve two critical
objectives: It will increase certainty by financing local government and military organizations properly and
transparently through the budget. That way, the government can help curb random and arbitrary attempts by these
actors to extract revenues from the population. Financial viability will also help provide resources to build muchneeded infrastructure, especially ports and rural roads, to facilitate non-gas production and exports (rice, pulses,
beans, and labor-intensive manufactures in particular).
Fortunately, increased exports of gas, together with the new market-based exchange rate, will dramatically
increase the net earnings of the state-owned Myanma Oil and Gas Enterprise, the exclusive recipient of all gas
earnings. It is critical that these net earnings are transferred to the budget and used for social and infrastructure
development, especially in regions with ethnic minorities.
The second is to allow increased space for economic activity by private entrepreneurs that is free from state or
military patronageand to give banks increased freedom to lend to them (especially in agriculture). Myanmar is one
of the costliest places in the world to start a business. Formal laws governing economic activity either dont exist or
arent followed. And actions by the government currently tend to be as distortionary as they are unpredictable. For
example, farmers are restricted in their choice of crops, and rice production is subject to a levy...
Third, the government should eliminate the broad variety of restrictions on imports and exports and promote
foreign direct investment. Doing so will eliminate the supply bottlenecks that are throttling economic activity and
jumpstart non-oil and gas export production. The combination of a sensible exchange rate policy, substantial foreign
direct investment, and a comfortable external-reserves situation (equivalent to nearly nine months of imports) would
give the government considerable freedom to liberalize trade without fear of a balance of payments crisis.
The fourth priority is to develop Myanmars natural resourcesespecially natural gas, hydropower, timber, and
gemswithout falling prey to macroeconomic risks or incurring local environmental and social problems. Managed
badly, an abundance of natural resources can be a curse. Managed well, it can be a blessing. Myanmar would do
well to observe Hartwicks rule1: Rents from exhaustible resources should be reinvested in reproducible

capital.
This is all the more important in Myanmar, where the bulk of the countrys natural resources are located in
ethnic minority regions that have been seeking autonomy from the center for decades. Without adequate
safeguards, these regions could see their natural resources depleted rapidly with little long-term development
to show for it. One way to avoid this is to transfer natural resource rents into a transparent sovereign wealth
fund with watertight governance and clear rules, the long-term proceeds of which can be used for a sustainable
level of public investment, including in the ethnic minority regions. This may be a tall order in Myanmar today,
but certainly an objective toward which work should begin immediately.
And the fifth is to work with the international community to assist in clearing debts in arrears owed to the Asian
Development Bank and World Bank so that Myanmar can once again tap these institutions for concessional
resources (neither of these two multilaterals can lend money until their arrears are cleared). Myanmars external
debt arrears are about $5.5 billionamong bilateral agencies, Japan is the biggest creditor (with about $4
billion in arrears); among multilaterals, the Asian Development Bank and the World Bank, together, are owed
arrears in excess of $750 million. The government clearly does not have the resources to pay off these debts
(external reserves are only around $6 billion), so it will have to harness the goodwill of bilateral donors to do
so.
International Commitment
While setbacks will inevitably occur, the international community should be in it for the long haul. Myanmars
strategic location and its natural resource wealth give it advantages few countries have. There is a unique
opportunity at hand to use these advantages to build strong foundations for sustainable and inclusive growth.
**********************************************************
**********************************************************
BURMA RELATED NEWS - APRIL 20-25, 2012
**********************************************************
Tin Kyi an NLDmembrsnSupportersofCRPPnNLDnDASSK und 8888peoplepower - Von:
Tin Kyi <mtinkyi7@yahoo.com> Ausblenden
<NLDmembrsnSupportersofCRPPnNLDnDASSK@yahoogroups.com>
Datum: Mi, 25 Apr 2012 8:39 pm
......................................................................
Bolds are my own. Thang Za Dal

MIZZIMA NEWS - PRESIDENT ANNOUNCES SEVEN-STEP DEVELOPMENT ROAD-MAP

14 Aug 2013 08:41
The President office's official website posted a seven-step development road-map on August 12. The
President has given guidelines to implement various development initiatives within 30 months that are
left of his term.
He presented the development road-map on August 9 at a meeting with his Cabinet Ministers, Deputy
Ministers and Ministers of states and regions.
The road-map gives guided instructions to the Ministers to work for 24-hour electricity supply in Yangon
and Mandalay and increase supply in the remaining states and regions.
He has also mandated the Ministers to work towards meeting the demand of potable water in Yangon,
Mandalay and other states and regions. In the agricultural sector, there are directions to increase food
grains productivity and granting adequate cash loans to the farmers who need capital for farming and
other agricultural necessities.
Moreover, the road-map includes initiatives for providing employment, development of small and medium
size enterprises (SMEs) and implementing special economic zones.
For the development of hotels and tourism industry, and monetary policy, the President has directed the
Cabinet Ministers to work for development of the banking sector and provide small loans services. The
road-map also have guidelines on initiatives for substantial development of trade and investment
sectors.
At the meeting held on August 9, the President stressed on the poor performance of the government in
the past 30 months of his tenure, especially in the fields of management, administration and prevention
of corruption.
Furthermore the President said that he would oversee and supervise the reform processes himself.
Starting today, I will form a state-level reform leading committee and I shall personally lead and focus
on these reforms, he said.
...........................................
[NLDmembrsnSupportersofCRPPnNLDnDASSK] Burma Related News - August 13-14, 2013.
Von:
Tin Kyi <mtinkyi7@yahoo.com>
An:
NLDmembrsnSupportersofCRPPnNLDnDASSK
Datum: Do, 15 Aug 2013 6:06 am

The Irrawaddy Magazine Burma Awards Onshore Oil and Ga...

http://www.irrawaddy.org/burma/burma-awards-onshore-oil-g...

Burma Awards Onshore Oil and Gas Blocks to International

Firms
By SIMON LEWIS & SAN YAMIN AUNG / THE IRRAWADDY On Friday, October 11, 2013 @
5:59 pm

RANGOON Burmas Ministry of Energy has named nine international companies,

including Russian, Italian and Canadian firms, as winners of tenders to explore onshore
territory for oil and gas reserves, according to an official announcement.
An announcement posted on the ministrys website Thursday said 13 blocks had been
awarded to firms that, if they find oil or gas, will enter into production sharing contracts
with the Burmese government. Three improved petroleum recovery (IPR) blocks were also
awarded.
ONGC Videsh Limited of India, Eni of Italy, Petroleum Exploration (PVT) Ltd. of Pakistan
and Canadas Pacific Hunt Energy Corp. were awarded two blocks each to explore with a
view to entering profit-sharing agreements with the government.
Brunei National Petroleum Co., CAOG S.a.r.l. of Luxembourg, JSOC Bashneft of Russia and
a consortium of Thailands PTTEP South Asia Ltd. and Palang Sophon Offshore were all
awarded one block each.
The firms will enter into joint ventures with the state-owned Myanmar Oil and Gas
Enterprise (MOGE). According to the standard terms of onshore production sharing
contracts, posted on the Ministry of Energys website, companies will have to give MOGE
at least 60 percent of profits after they have recovered the expenses of exploration. They
will also pay 12.5 percent in royalties, as well as taxes on their own profits.
The terms say companies will have to sell at least 20 percent of crude oil and 25 percent
of natural gas produced to the domestic market at a 10 percent discount from the market
price.
Petronas Carigali, the exploration arm of Malaysias state-owned oil company, also won
one of the production sharing blocks, as well as an IPR block in Shwepyitha Township,
Rangoon Division. IPR refers to the use of advanced methods to extract more oil and gas
from a field than can be extracted through traditional drilling.
Two more IPR blocks, in Irrawaddy and Pegu divisions, were awarded to MPRL E & P Pte.,
Ltd., which is registered in the British Virgin Islands but run by Burmese businessman
Michael Moe Myint.
The blocks cover areas of varying size in the Irrawaddy River basin, a region known to
contain large deposits of hydrocarbons that the government hopes to tap into to fuel
Burmas development and provide state revenues.
Another round of bidding for 11 shallow-water and 19 deepwater offshore oil and gas
exploration blocks is also underway and the winners are expected to be announced early
next year.
Thursdays announcement said 26 companies submitted a total of 54 bids in the
competitive tender for the onshore blocks.
[The Ministry of Energy] chose from them based on the selection criteria: the specified

1 von 2

11.10.13 15:59

The Irrawaddy Magazine Burma Awards Onshore Oil and Ga...

http://www.irrawaddy.org/burma/burma-awards-onshore-oil-g...

exploration period, the plans of each company and the expected expenses, ratios of
sharing oil and gas [with the government], the experiences and financial conditions of
each company, the signing bonus proposed by the company, etc., it said.
Details of the winning bids have not been made public.
The announcement also said the companies would need to have an environmental impact
assessment and a social impact assessment approved by the Myanmar Investment
Commissionbefore they start work on the blocks.
Myint Zaw, deputy minister of energy, told a conference last month said he was hopeful
the new tenders would yield new onshorereserves, and improve the current level of oil and
gas production.
Total inland production of crude oil is [so far] only 600 million barrels plus, and natural
gas only 1.4 trillion cubic feet. However, Im told by my expert geologists that Myanmar
still has lots of onshore potential still remaining to be discovered, Myint Zaw said last
month.
Our country Myanmar is awaiting technology, expertise and funds to discover new
onshore reserves of petroleum.

Article printed from The Irrawaddy Magazine: http://www.irrawaddy.org

URL to article: http://www.irrawaddy.org/burma/burma-awards-onshore-oil-gasblocks-international-firms.html

Copyright 2012 The Irrawaddy Magazine. All rights reserved.

2 von 2

11.10.13 15:59

Deposits

http://www.freewebs.com/indawgyi/deposits.htm

Modified: Wednesday, October 20, 2004

Myanmar Mining Information

Welcome
News
Update
Occurrences
Deposits >
References
Contact Us

Deposits
Mwetaung Nickel Deposit- Location| Chin State, Tiddin Township Lat 23 25' N, Long
94 01' E.
Mwetaung nickel deposit is a nickeliferrous laterite ore deposit. It is formed by uneroded
remnants of hard, weakly serpentinized peridotite. Chemical analysis of Mwetaung nickel
ore is as follows:
Ni
-1.21 %
CaO
-0.77 %
Cu -29.99 ppm
Fe
-3.70 %
MgO
-26.76 % Pb -26.67 ppm
SiO
-46.42 %
Al O
-0.16 %
Co -150.00 ppm
2

2 3

Ore Reserves: Six ore bodies were found within (10) Km in Mwetaung area. Among these
ore bodies the ore body No (4) and No (6) are the most significant ones. In ore body No
(4), probable ore reserves is approximately (30) million tons with average nickel content of
1.19 %, where as in ore body No (6) potential ore reserves is (80) million tons with average
nickel content of 1 %.
Kathaing Taung Iron Ore Deposit- Location| Kachin State, Hpakant Township, Lat 25
32' 05" N, Long. 96 12' 50" E.
Geology
- (a) Major rocks in this area are metamorphic rocks consiting Biotite Schist, Talc Schist
and Graphitic Schist. These are Pre-Triassic in age. The Triassic Serpentinite - Peridotite
intruded the metamorphic rocks and Cretaceous Limestone overlies all of these rocks.
- (b) The Ultrabasic rocks (Serpentinite-Perdotite) are the source of the residual Iron
deposit in this area. The Ultrabasic are trending in NE-SW direction and inclining towards
NW from 5 to 10
- (c) The length of the Iron deposit is about 3.5 miles in NE direction and the width is
about 0.5 miles. Thickness of the deposit ranges from 55 to 74 feet.
- (d) The Petrograpic Study show that the Iron Ore comprises:
-Goethite/Limonite
75%
-Hematite
15%
-Magnetite
2%
Ore Reserves: Based on 94 diamond drill holes with a total depth of 8625.5 feet and 996
core samples, the average grade is Fe 50.56% and total reserve is estimated to be 223
million tons.
Platinum Group Minerals (PGM) Deposit- Location| Kachin State, Monyin Township,
Indawgyi, Ngagyan (2.89 sq.miles), Lat 25 04' N, Long. 96 07'.
Mwetaung nickel deposit is a nickeliferrous laterite ore deposit. It is formed by uneroded
remnants of hard, weakly serpentinized peridotite. Chemical analysis of Mwetaung nickel
ore is as follows:
Ni
-1.21 %
CaO
-0.77 %
Cu -29.99 ppm
Fe
-3.70 %
MgO
-26.76 % Pb -26.67 ppm
SiO
-46.42 %
Al O
-0.16 %
Co -150.00 ppm
2

2 3

Ore Reserves:
Block I :(1) Area covered
Average grade
Tonnage

1 von 2

-640,000 sq ft
-0.466 ppm (Pt & Pd)
-17.27 million tons (Potential)

06.09.13 15:38

Mwetaung Nickel Deposit

http://www.freewebs.com/popa-mines/data/mwetaung.htm

A Brief Introduction of Mwetaung Nickel Deposit

Location
Chin State, Tiddin Township Lat 23 25' N, Long 94 01' E.
Accessibility
380 Km northwest of Mandalay, connected by all weathered road from Kalemyo. Air service is
available to Kalemyo from Yangon as well as from Mandalay.
Background History
Exploration done by Department of Geological Survey & Mineral Exploration ( DGSE ) in 1964
65.
Geology
Silicate nickel ores ( garnierite ) were found as weathered product above ultrabasic rocks in many
places in the belt of ultrabasic rocks at the eastern edge of the Indo-Burman Ranges.
Ore Deposit
Mwetaung nickel deposit is a nickeliferrous laterite ore deposit. It is formed by uneroded remnants
of hard, weakly serpentinized peridotite. Chemical analysis of Mwetaung nickel ore is as follows:
Ni -1.21 %
Fe -3.70 %
SiO2 -46.42 %

CaO -0.77 %
MgO -26.76 %
Al2O3 -0.16 %

Cu -29.99 ppm
Pb -26.67 ppm
Co -150.00 ppm

Ore Reserve
Six ore bodies were found within (10) Km in Mwetaung area. Among these ore bodies the ore
body No (4) and No (6) are the most significant ones. In ore body No (4), probable ore reserves is
approximately (30) million tons with average nickel content of 1.19 %, where as in ore body No
(6) potential ore reserves is (80) million tons with average nickel content of 1 %.
Power Supply
Mwetaung nickel deposit is located about (40) Km from the Kalewa Coal Mine and most of the
coal produced could be utilized not only as material for reduction and combustion but also as
energy source for nickel smelting.
Investment Opportunity
This project can be implemented on a joint venture basis with equity participation or production
sharing basis.
Contact Address
No. (3) Mining Enterprise
No. 90, Kanbe Road, Yankin P.O, Yangon
Union of Myanmar.
Fax : +095-1-56224
Telex : 215 11 MCTWOBM

1 von 1

06.09.13 15:40

Letpadaung Farmers Protest Over Bulldozed Crops, Fenced-O...

http://www.rfa.org/english/news/myanmar/letpadaung-10252...

Letpadaung Farmers Protest Over Bulldozed Crops,

Fenced-Off Land
2013-10-25

Security forces move in to stop protesters plowing fields near the Letpadaung copper mine, April 25, 2013.
RFA

Farmers in northern Myanmar staged a fresh protest against the China-backed Letpadaung copper
mine on Friday after authorities bulldozed crops and fenced off farmland as part of the projects
controversial expansion program.
Local residents have refused compensation offers for land confiscated for the Sagaing region mine,
where operations resumed this month after a government-ordered hiatus prompted by a brutal
crackdown on local protests last year.
Since early this month, security guards have fenced off some 200 acres (80 hectares) of farmland
developed by local residents and destroyed another 100 acres (40 hectares) of crops, according to
residents.
Some 300 farmers protested in front of the Chinese project operator Myanmar Wanbao Copper
Mining Limiteds local communication office to demand compensation for the destroyed crops,
which they said were worth about 300,000 kyat (U.S. $300) per acre.

1 von 3

27.10.13 08:31

Letpadaung Farmers Protest Over Bulldozed Crops, Fenced-O...

http://www.rfa.org/english/news/myanmar/letpadaung-10252...

Local mining and security officials had the crops destroyed and fences built in a bid to get
residents to give up their claims on the land, they complained.
[They] had fences built around our land and had our crops destroyed on land that we had refused
compensation for, local protester Ma Sanda of Ton village told RFAs Myanmar Service.
They are clearing the crops on the fields by driving bulldozers across the land. So local farmers
are demanding compensation for the damaged crops, she said.
Local tensions
Residents calling for a complete halt to the project have staged regular protests against the project
in recent months, resulting in frequent standoffs with police.
Officials have allowed the Wanbao company to resume operations without fulfilling requirements
set by a parliamentary commission that reviewed the project, they complained at protests this
month.
Presidents Office Minister Hla Tun, who heads the committee charged with implementing the
recommendations, held a meeting with local residents last week but it did little to ease the
tensions.
We have lost our trust in the implementation committee, Ma Sanda said.
Land compensation refused
The parliamentary review commission, headed by opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi, had
recommended earlier this year that the project be allowed to continue with safeguards and higher
compensation offered for confiscated land.
But residents have said the new rates are still too low to make up for the loss of their farmland and
livelihoods, refusing the offers and allowing the Sept. 30 compensation deadline to lapse.
The commissions inquiry, prompted by a national outcry over the brutal police clampdown that
injured dozens of anti-mine protesters in November, also resulted in a revised deal for the mine,
which was initiated under Myanmars former military junta regime.
In an apparent bid to assuage public anger by giving the nation a share of the profits, the
agreement was updated in July to give the Myanmar government 51 percent of the mines
revenues, 30 percent to Wanbao, and 19 percent to the Myanmar military-backed Union of
Myanmar Economic Holdings (UMEHL).
The new terms also stipulate that two percent of net profits from the project go toward corporate
social responsibility with a focus on immediate communities.
Reported by Nay Rain Kyaw for RFAs Myanmar Service. Translated by Khet Mar. Written in

2 von 3

27.10.13 08:31

MOUN or MONE [Hate] WATER RESERVOIR AND HYDRO PROJECTS

(See THE FOURTH FACTOR: STRATEGIC AND SYSTEMATIC PLANNINGS)

1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

Please forgive me for my borrowing the title of writer Thetkathoo Phone Naings novel.
But, unfortunately, this article is, unlike the famouss writers novel, only full of heartbreaking stories.
The construction of the Moun Stream Water Reservior bagan in 1995 and was finished
in 2005 at a cost of K. 13,800 million (13.8 billion). Its located in the Sidoktaya Township,
Magway Division. The height of the reservoir is 200 ft (60 m); and the length is16490 ft
(5026 m). The estimated drinking water volume to be gained was circa 108 000 acres
(133 million cubic meters). And the estimated electricity power be gained through three
turbines was 75 mw (25 mw from each turbine). But in reality, in summer the water supply
is barely enough to run a single turbine and it produces 10-15 mw, according to Chief
Engineer U Aung Naing Win.
When some of the countrys top leaders visited the site in 1996, I accompanied them as a
battalion commander for their security. What U Myint Thein, the then Planning Chief Engineer
(now Land and Water Reserviors Minister of Mandalay Division) had explained the visiting
leaders on that occasion and what I found out on April 29, 2013, when I visited it as a
member of a Parliamentary Fact Finding Commission, were poles apart.
1311 households from 18 villages from the flooded areas are force-relocated at some virgin
sites where cultivation is impossible. Each family was given a compensation of K. 5000
(five thousand) - one viss (1.6 kg) of pork costs already K. 6000! Many people were forced
to sell their cattles and personal ornaments - and their daughters for survival!
81 people have gone to Thailand to find a job...
Reserviors and bridges were built without any proper planning and without taking into
consideration the would-be consequences that would affect human beings and the
environment - simply just in order to fulfil the then governments motto: Every month a
water reservior and a bridge must be built!
When we came back from the site, all of us - members of the commission - were completely
silent throughout the return journey. Even U Myint Thein, the NLD MP from Magway Division,
who is well-known as a loud talkative, did not utter a single word... Oh Moun, how unlovely
you are!
Note. The author of the article is U Hla Swe. He is a member of the ruling party: Union Solidarity and
Development Association (USDA), and a MP of the Upper House, Magwe Constituency.)
The above translation is done by myself. The original Burmese version appeared in the
Thithtoolwin blog on May 25, 2015. ( http://www.thithtoolwin.com/2013/05/blog-post_1852.html )
5/25/2013 09:10:00 PM
Ive translated only a few critical parts of the article to substantiate my statement - that there
never was a Strategic and Systematic Planning in the country! The spelling of the title - that is,
MOUN, Ive taken from the Myanmar-English Dictionary. p. 358. Published by Department of the
Myanmar Language Commission, Ministry of Education. 2001.) Actually, these days a great
number of Burmans are using Mone instead of Moun. This article, in fact, should be fullly
translated into several other languages and then distributed them as widely as possible!

Thang Za Dal. September 2013.

'MOUN* OR'MONE*WATERRESERVOIR
AND H\DRO PROJECTS

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Htoo
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http://www.thithtoolwin.com/2013/05/blog-post_1852.html
5/25/2013 09:10:00 PM

Mone Stream Reservoir, Sidoketaza Myo, Magywai Division.

ThitHtooLwin:!
http://www.thithtoolwin.com/2013/05/ blog-post_1852.html

Pipedream
MYANMARS SHWE GAS AIDS CHINAS BARGAINING WITH RUSSIA
The controversial Myanmar-to-China gas pipeline may be enabling authorities in Beijing to stall on a multi-billion
dollar Russian gas supply agreement while they try to bargain with Moscow for a cheaper price.
After eight years of wrangling, primarily over the price of hundreds of billions of cubic metres of gas to be
supplied by Russian state-owned Gazprom, Moscow and Beijing moved close to a full agreement earlier this year.
But in June it unravelled again, with China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) demanding that the gas price be
linked with the so-called Henry Hub index named after a gas pipeline system in the United States used for
gas futures contracts on the New York Mercantile Exchange.
However, Gazprom refuses to accept pricing for its gas being linked to the index because it would be less than
the price it wants. At the same time, Beijing knows that Russia is becoming increasingly dependent on energy
exports and needs new markets.
Beijings sudden stall on a firm gas deal with Moscow coincided with the safe completion of CNPCs 900kilometre pipeline through Myanmar into southwest China. It will soon be pumping 12 billion cubic metres of
gas per year from the Shwe field in Myanmars Bay of Bengal waters. China has bought most of the verified
200 billion cubic metres of gas in two blocks of the field. Two more blocks have still to be explored, so the
field could yield even more.
China consumed 147 billion cubic metres of gas in 2012, which was still only 4 per cent of the worlds total
consumption and less than Japan and South Korea combined. But the International Energy Agency has predicted
that Chinese gas consumption will reach 260 billion cubic metres a year by of the end of 2015.
State control of gas prices and other basic commodities as a means of controlling inflation has meant that
national oil companies are often forced to sell imported gas at less than the price they bought it for on the
international market.
If a Sino-Russian gas agreement is not finalised by the end of this year it will have very serious regional and
global implications towards gas trading business in the coming years, senior research fellow Keun-Wook Paik at
the Oxford Institute for Energy Studies told M-Zine+ this week.
Most of Gazproms gas fields are in western Siberia nearly 3,000 kilometres from the Chinese border.
However, with 30 new Myanmar offshore blocks on the verge of being contracted to international developers,
possibly including CNPC and CNOOC, perhaps Beijing sees a more pliable government in Naypyitaw as a better
long-term solution than dealing with Moscow.
This article first appeared in the August 29 edition of M-ZINE+.M-ZINE+ is a business weekly available in print in
Yangon through Innwa Bookstore and through online subscription at www.mzineplus.com
31 Aug 2013 02:18
Written by Gordon Brown
Category: Features
..........................
Copyright 1998 - 2013 Mizzima News. All Rights Reserved
____________________________________________________________
DESPITE CRITICISMS, MYANMAR SIGNS US$100 M HIGH INTEREST-RATE LOAN WITH CHINA
Published on Sunday, 20 October 2013 17:20
Myanmar government signed on Friday a loan agreement to borrow US$100 million from Chinese state-owned
Export-Import Bank (EXIM Bank), despite criticisms from some parliamentarians over the high interest rate.
China EXIM Bank offered to lend Myanmar US$100 million at 4.5 percent annual interest rate. Some members of
parliament protested against taking the high interest-rate Chinese loan, but the Parliament finally approved the
loan on August 22.
On October 18, Nyi Hla Phyu, Director General of Myanmar Foreign Trade Bank, and Mei Jianping, Deputy
General Manager of China EXIM Bank, signed the US$100 million loan agreement in Nay Pyi Taw. The loan-

agreement signing ceremony was attended by Nyan Tun, Vice President of Myanmar, and other senior officials
from both sides. Myanmar government said the loan will be used for micro-credit programmes in rural areas and
upgrading cooperatives. Therefore, Kyaw San, Minister for Cooperatives, and Win Shein, Minister for Finance
attended the loan-agreement signing ceremony.
Vice President Nyan Tun met separately with Mei Jianping, Deputy General Manager of China EXIM Bank. They
discussed enhancing bilateral economic ties, as well as further cooperation in rural development, agriculture,
energy, transportation, telecommunication, banking and finance.
Meanwhile, Myanmar government requested additional Ks 1.39 trillion (US$1.44bn) for the federal budget, as the
initially approved budget became insufficient to cover the governments expenses. The largest portion of it was
requested by the Ministry of Cooperatives, said Thurein Zaw, chairperson of Lower Houses Public Accounts
Committee on October 17.
( http://elevenmyanmar.com/business/3792-despite-criticisms-myanmar-signs-us-100m-high-interest-rate-loan-with-china )
[NLDmembrsnSupportersofCRPPnNLDnDASSK] News & Articles on Burma
Von:
zin linn <zinlinn@yahoo.com.au>
Datum: Mo, 21 Okt 2013 4:29 am

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------Ireland Business World - MYANMAR OIL NOT WORKING FOR THE NATION
Wednesday, June 12 07:34:37
In a few months, impoverished Myanmar plans to start pumping roughly $45 million worth of oil and gas a day
from the Bay of Bengal to China by pipeline. The vital fuel for China's growing economy will bypass the Malacca
Straits and U.S. ally Singapore.
It will mostly also bypass Myanmar.
Though rich in natural resources, Myanmar has little capacity to use them for its own development. For decades,
its leaders valued gas for the hard currency it could earn rather than the economic development it could fuel.
Today, only one in four of Myanmar's citizens have electricity.
Multinationals vying to drill for gas and oil off Myanmar will have to negotiate with the nation as a customer
instead of as a partner. And Myanmar's own customers, China and Thailand, already find themselves re-drawing
old purchase agreements.
"We're renegotiating already," said Pailin Chuchottaworn, CEO of Thai oil company PTT, which imports $2 billion
of gas a year from Myanmar. Last year, Myanmar approached PTT with a proposal to retain a fifth of the gas its
sells Thailand.
"The problem is not the gas, it's the overall capacity."
Myanmar produces gas equivalent to 10.2 million tons of oil a year, according to a report prepared for the forum
by Accenture and the Asian Development Bank (ADB). All but about 15 percent of it is sold to Thailand. A new
offshore gas field near Myanmar's maritime border with Bangladesh will boost output by 75 percent. The gas is
bound for China, earning state-owned Myanmar Oil and Gas Enterprise (MOGE) another $1.8 billion annually, the
report estimates. Though at least a portion of the gas has been reserved for domestic use, Myanmar lacks the
onshore infrastructure to make much use of it.
Von:
Tin Kyi <mtinkyi7@yahoo.com>
An:
NLDmembrsnSupportersofCRPPnNLDnDASSK
Datum: Do, 13 Jun 2013 5:08 am
_______________________________________________________
MYANMAR TO BUILD LARGEST INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT
* 14 Aug 2013 02:20
Myanmar is set to build a new international airport in central Bago region, which is nine times larger than the
existing Yangon International Airport, Deputy Director-General of the Department of Civil Aviation (DCA) U Win

Swe Tun told Xinhua in an exclusive interview Tuesday. South Korean Incheon Airport Consortium (IAC), which is
among seven prequalified foreign tenderers from Singapore, Japan, France and South Korea, won the tender for
building the Hanthawaddy International Airport on Aug. 10 and contract will be signed in two months, he said.
The IAC aims to complete the construction by the end of 2017 and start operating by the beginning of 2018, he
disclosed.
The Hanthawaddy International Airport is estimated to cost about 1.5 billion U.S. dollars and able to handle 12
million passengers per year, he said. The Hanthawaddy International Airport, 80 kilometers north of Yangon,
covers an area of 3,912 hectares and will be the fourth and the largest of its kind in Myanmar after that of
Yangon, Mandalay and Nay Pyi Taw.
Copyright 1998 - 2013 Mizzima News. All Rights Reserved
_________________________________________________________
BURMA UNVEILS 'MASTER PLAN' TO BOOST TOURISM
VOA News// June 05, 2013
Burma's government has unveiled a new "master plan" for its growing tourism industry, in the hopes of attracting
more foreign visitors to the rapidly changing country.
Government officials hope the new tourism plan can carry on that momentum and help improve Burma's tattered
economy, which has suffered from years of mismanagement and international sanctions.
The new plan, funded by the Norwegian government, outlines nearly $500 million worth of development
projects. It includes expansions to airports in Mandalay and Naypyidaw, infrastructure improvements in
and around key tourism sites, and the fast-tracking of hotels.
http://www.voanews.com/content/burma-unveils-master-plan-to-boost-tourism/1675513.html
_____________________________________________________
OpEdNews Op Eds 10/8/2013 at 06:41:35
BURMA NEEDS TRANSPARENCY EXTRACTING NATURAL RESOURCES
By Zin Linn

opednews.com

A new report released by Shwe Gas Movement on 17 July 2013, reveals glaring weaknesses in Myanmar/Burma's
legal framework regarding the extractive industries, resulting in human rights abuses, environmental damages
and poor revenue distribution.
The report - Good Governance and the Extractive Industry in Burma - examines the current laws and regulations
set, assessing what's missing in Myanmar/Burma against worldwide standards and ethics. Research for the
report shows major shortcomings in the areas of environmental conservation, human rights, revenue transparency
and natural resource management. The report released by Shwe Gas Movement further suggests that new
investments should be halted until these gaps in governance are put right.
In contrast, despite repetitively talk about change, questions such as civil war, extensive human rights abuses,
blatant disregard for rule of law, and other controversial topics continue to be amended in support of genuine
conciliatory trend for the majority population. For the time being, existing constitution continues to strengthen the
central government power, restrict basic citizens' rights as well as human freedoms, and put off persons who
work establishing sufficient, impartial and rightful societal change. In such a moment, the country's unbalanced
constitution is not competent to support the current reform process.
According to the Shwe Gas Movement's report, when the country begins to open up for the first time in more
than 60 years, foreign investors and energy consumers worldwide are beginning to look increasingly towards
the country's rich natural resources. Aimed at policy makers, investors, corporations, various governments,
intergovernmental groups and other stakeholders, the Shwe Gas Movement's report seeks to highlight the
necessity of a sound domestic legal framework in Myanmar/Burma through a critical analysis of the current
limitations and implications thereof.
As mentioned by the Shwe Gas Movement via its report, national governing body may possibly carry out
transparency of the extractive industry if the country lacks an adequate regulatory framework. According to The
Heritage Foundation, in partnership with the Wall Street Journal, "The 2013 Index of Economic Freedom' gave
Burma/Myanmar an overall economic freedom score of 39.2 out of 100, thus ranking at number 172 of freest

countries in the world, followed only by Eritrea (36.3), Venezuela (36.1), Zimbabwe (28.6), Cuba (28.5), and
North Korea (1.5). While Myanmar/Burma's score increased by 0.5 in comparison to 2012 figures thanks to
provisional institutional reforms in 2012, Burma is still ranked 40th out of the 41 countries in the Asia-Pacific.
It is in this light that the Heritage Foundation accuses Burma/Myanmar of maintaining a regulatory environment
that is "hampered by a lack of legal transparency" with much business activity concentrated inside of stateowned enterprises.
Moreover, pervasive corruption characteristic of Burma's military government is reportedly worsening, despite
the 2012 reforms.
_______________________________________________________
200 000 WORKERS EXPELLED FROM HTAN GAING OIL-FIELD
* 16 Sep 2013 04:45
* Written by Yayge (Pyi)
Over 200000 oil well workers, oil well drilling workers, vendors and crude oil traders received notice letters to
leave the Htan Gaing oilfield in Minhla Township, Magwe Region by September 16. The vendors have been told to
leave the oilfield by September 14.
The unsigned notice issued on September 9 states that Section 144 of the Criminal Procedural Code (CrPC) has
been imposed around the oilfield, banning assembly of more than five people in the area. It further states that
crude oil is a natural resource owned by the state and no one is authorized by the government to extract it.
The Secretary of Magwe Region government was contacted on September 15 for comments but was unreachable.
The Htan Gaing oilfield area was previously owned by 27 farmers. In 2007, the government seized 71 acres of
farmlands and gave it to private companies to extract crude oil. Section 144 of CrPC was imposed in the area at
that time too. Local oil workers said that more than 100 policemen had been deployed in the oil field area since
September 10 and security has been beefed up. Volunteers helping the farmers and workers in Htan Gaing
oilfield told Mizzima that over 200000 workers rely on the oilfield for livelihood and wanted the eviction order
revoked, since the Htan Gaing area has been rendered barren and unsuitable for farming crops.
Copyright 1998 - 2013 Mizzima News. All Rights Reserved
____________________________________________________
PRAVDA: CHILD LABOR AROUND THE GLOBE (MYANMAR)
09.08.2013 16:01
Today every third child between the age of 7 to 16 in Myanmar is employed. Usually children perform the hardest
work. Until recently, child labor has been extensively used in the military where thousands of children were used
as loaders in the army and where soldiers beat and raped them. During military conflicts children were used as
human shields, there were cases when they were used on minefields. Children are used in the army not only for
work but also service. According to ILO, Myanmar has approximately 70,000 soldiers under 18, and they are
given machine guns at the age of 12.
Under the pressure of international public organizations in recent years the regime in the country officially
somewhat softened, and thousands of children were sent to work at construction sites where mostly girls work.
The girls start heavy work at the age of six. Eight-year-old children have to carry twenty pound trays with cement
mortar. Entire families work in construction in Myanmar, but only adults are paid. Children do not receive
remuneration; at best they can be fed. Typically, adults watch children to perform slave labor, and if the family
has no children, women have to work. Children do not attend school. According to statistics, 40 percent of
children in Myanmar do not receive any education. It is considered good luck for children if the parents sell them
into slavery in neighboring countries where they are paid some money. The most desirable work is the work at tea
plantations where it is not too hard, and the kids have a chance to survive. Parents are the ones that bring
children to business owners, and the latter do not care which one of the family members are working for them.
http://english.pravda.ru/society/anomal/09-08-2013/125336-child_labor-0/#
.............................................................

Bangkok Post - NEARLY 40% UNEMPLOYMENT IN MYANMAR

Published: 25 Jan 2013 at 15.10
Online news:
Myanmars first ever nationwide survey of income and employment has revealed that unemployment in the
country is as high as 37% - with more than a quarter of its 60 million people living in poverty. A Myanmar
parliamentary planning and finance development committee has made sections of the survey available to
thepublic, following a discussion of its findings at the Lower House last week, according to Eleven Media.
The highest rates of poverty were found in Chin State (73%), Rakhine State (44%) and Shan State (33%).
Sixteen percent of Yangon households were reported to be living in poverty. The committees chairman,
MP Soe Tha, did not say what criteria were used to define poverty, but said the survey provided impetus
for the government to reduce it.
Thailand is home to around 1 million migrant workers from Myanmar, according to Labour Ministrty figures.
Activists say the figure is probably closer to 2 million, due to high numbers of undocumented workers, mainly
in low-paying jobs in the construction, fishing and service industries.
[NLDmembrsnSupportersofCRPPnNLDnDASSK] Burma Related News - January 25, 2013.
Von: Tin Kyi <mtinkyi7@yahoo.com>
An: NLDmembrsnSupportersofCRPPnNLDnDASSK
Datum: Sa, 26 Jan 2013 7:49 am

.............................................................................
BURMA
THOUSANDS OF BURMESE WORKERS STRANDED IN MYAWADDY
By LAWI WENG / THE IRRAWADDY| February 11, 2013 |
RANGOON Thousands of job-seekers from all over Burma have seen their hopes of finding work in neighboring
Thailand dissolve as agents fail to follow through on promises of employment, leaving many to languish in the
border town of Myawaddy as they try to decide their next move.
According to the Migrant Worker Rights Network (MWRN), a group that assists Burmese workers in Thailand,
around 10,000 would-be employees have been stranded in Myawaddy over the past three months after paying
high fees to agents in exchange for guaranteed jobs across the border.
While some of the workersmany of whom hail from as far afield as Magwe Division and Arakan Statehave
been provided temporary accommodation by the brokers who brought them to the town, many others have been
forced to seek shelter in local monasteries, says MRWN.
...............................................................................
NO JOBS AT HOME FOR BURMESE FACING EXPULSION FROM THAILAND
By WILLIAM BOOT / THE IRRAWADDY On Wednesday, September 4, 2013 @ 3:25 pm
Burmese migrant workers stand in line on the Mae Sot-Myawaddy Friendship Bridge. (Photo: The Irrawaddy)
Desperate behind-the-scenes diplomatic efforts by the government in Naypidaw to resolve the continuing migrant
labour mess with Thailand highlights the truly critical issue of the lack of employment opportunities in Burma, a
noted economist said.
Four-year work visas held by up to 100,000 Burmese migrant workers in Thailand have expired or are close to
ending, and the Bangkok government has sent confused signals about the workers fate. Tens of thousands more
visas will expire during 2014.
The visas were issued in administratively confused circumstances in 2009 and 2010, and Thai Ministry of Labour
officials in Bangkok contacted by The Irrawaddy this week were unable to say exactly how many migrant workers
were involved.
At present, Thai rules stipulate that workers whose visas expire must return to Burma and they cannot return to
Thailand for three years, the Thailand-based Migrant Worker Rights Network (MWRN) said.
.................................................................................................................

______________________________________________
ARAKAN CBOS DEMAND HALT TO ALL NATURAL RESOURCE EXTRACTION PROJECTS
By DVB

21 October 2013

An umbrella group of Arakanese civic organisations, NGOs and political parties issued a statement on Monday
demanding a halt to all natural resource extraction projects in Arakan state until a genuine federal system is
implemented in Burma.
The statement follows a three-day workshop in Mrauk-U on 14-16 October hosted by the Natural Resources for
the People (NRFP) group involving 55 representatives of diverse Arakanese organisations.
At the end of the workshop, the representatives signed a declaration calling for the following main points:
The provision of a 24-hour supply of electricity from the newly operational Shwe Gas project in Kyaukphyu to all
rural and urban areas across Arakan state at the same price as customers pay in Rangoon;
An inclusion in the Burmese constitution that all natural resources in Arakan state are controlled and managed by
the Rakhine [Arakanese] people;
To stop immediately the following projects in Arakan state: Maday Deep Oil Seaport Project: Laymro Hydro Power
Dam Project (Kyauk U): Kaladan Multi-Model Transit Transport Project: Titanium Mining Project: Large-scale
production of marble mining project; Special Economic Zone projects; hotel and agriculture projects; Tha Htay
Chaung Hydropower Dam Project; Ann Chaung Hydro Power Dam Project; and the Kyaukphyu-Kumin Railway
Project; To postpone all natural resource extraction projects until a real federal system is granted;
To give back lands confiscated by the military, cronies, and companies to the local owners;
To immediately release activists who were imprisoned for their activism regarding natural resource extraction;
To recognize and preserve Rakhine culture and historic infrastructure in line with UNESCOs standards.
Rakhine [Arakan] state is currently one of the least developed states and has the second largest poverty rate in
Myanmar [Burma], even though it is rich in natural resources such as oil and gas, and minerals, the statement
said. Currently, Shwe gas from Rakhine State is being exported to China, and mineral extraction projects, Special
Economic Zone projects and hydropower projects are being implemented throughout Rakhine State. None of
these projects have the consent of the Rakhine people.
http://english.dvb.no/news/33708-burma-myanmar/33708
...........................................................................................................................................
MYANMAR CALLS ON STAKE HOLDERS TO COOPERATE IN CENSUS
* 18 Sep 2013 11:56
* Written by Feng Yingqiu / Xinhua
U Khin Yi, Minister of Immigration and Population speaks at a press conference on the 2014 census held at the
Yangon Regional Parliament on September 15, 2013. Photo: Hein Htet / Mizzima
Myanmar has called for all stake holders to cooperate in taking first nationwide census in three decades in 2014
for working out national development plan.
Minister of Immigration and Population U Khin Yi spoke out to the media that the 12-day census taking, using a
work force of 120, 000, will be carried out from March 30 to April 10, 2014 in accordance with international
standard. The census taking will be based on 60-million population with 11 million households in 14 regions or
states covering 70 districts, 330 townships, 3,051 wards, 64,346 villages and 13,620 village-tracts inhabited by
135 nationalities with five major religious faiths.
Of the expected cost of 58.5 million U.S. dollars for the census taking process, Myanmar government
committed 15 million dollars, while the United Nations pledged 5 million dollars for materials and courses,
still lacking 38.5 million dollars, it was disclosed. Donation of 2.8 million dollars by AusAID and 16 million
dollars by the British government for the census-taking have been received and that from Norway and
Switzerland are being expected.
Experts from 13 countries and UN statistics division, UNFPA, ESCAP and the World Bank will also help Myanmar
in the process. The last two census in Myanmar were in 1973 and 1983 which respectively registered Myanmar's
population as 28.92 million and over 35 million.

 Copyright 1998 - 2013 Mizzima News. All Rights Reserved

.....................................................................
80% ERRORS DETECTED IN ETHNIC MON CENSUS ENTRIES
* 27 Sep 2013 03:30
* Written by Yuu Wei
* Category: Ethnic Issues
Mi Khin Lay Myint, member of the Ethnic Mon Census Committee, revealed on September 26 that more than
80% ethnic Mons have been wrongly categorized in the census that was conducted in the past.
She added that they previously estimated about 50% errors but further examinations have revealed more than
80% errors in entries made in the census.
The primary objective behind the ethnic Mon census in Yangon region is to get an ethnic Mon Affairs Minister in
the next Yangon region government after the 2015 general elections. As per provisions of the 2008 Constitution,
an ethnic race may have representation in regional or state government if their total population is more than 0.1%
of the total population in their respective states and regions.
Ethnic Mon census recording began in the first week of July and will be completed in December. Mi Khin Lay
Myint also said that the estimated population of ethnic Mons in Yangon region is about 150000. Nai Min Thaung
Shin, member of the census committee, said that field surveys conducted in the past wrongly recorded ethnic
Mons as ethnic Bamar in their house registrations and some have been wrongly categorized as ethnic Karens.
Another member of the committee, Nai Khin Maung Maung, said that in their pilot census recording project only
10 out of 30 households were correctly registered as Mons.
Min Soe Aung, Managing Director of the Ethnic Mon Census Committee informed that census experts were hired
to train the staff and volunteers for 2 days in August. The committee facilitated ethnic Mon census in Yangon
region by hiring staff and volunteers in each township.
Article printed from The Irrawaddy Magazine: http://www.irrawaddy.org
________________________________________________________________________

EC PRESIDENT BARROSO, MINISTER AUNG MIN SIGN JOINT DECLARATION AT MYANMAR PEACE CENTRE
The President of the European Commission, HE Mr. Jose Manuel Borroso, and the Minister of the Office of the
President of Myanmar, HE Mr. U Aung Min, today signed a Joint Declaration at the Myanmar Peace Centre (MCP)
in Yangon.
European Commission President Barroso said: Today is a truly momentous occasion. The establishment of the
Myanmar Peace Centre is a key step towards ethnic reconcilliation and lasting peace in Myanmar. I applaud the
initiative of President U Thein Sein and his team, lead by Minister U Aung Min. The EU will support the Government and all ethnic stakeholders on the challenging road that lies ahead. President Borroso underlined that the
EU funds the MPCs start-up with EUR 700,000, to be followed by a sizable package later this year, also
benefitting ethnic communities. In 2013, the EU will contribute a total of 30 million to Myanmars ethnic peace
process. Union Minister Aung Min added: A new chapter in Myanmars history is opening up. Creating the MPC
expresses the desire of President Thein Sein for inclusive and enduring peace, and of its will to work with all
stakeholders. Today, we have concluded initial ceasefires with ten out of eleven ethnic armed groups. The
President has stated clearly in his speech at the UNGA that this is not enough. Genuine peace shall satisfy
political aspirations and address grievances of ethnic communities in Myanmar. This can only happen with a nonpartisan platform for comprehensive dialogue. We are happy to work with the European Union - laureate of this
years Peace Nobel Prize.
Source: Press Release; Brussel, 3 November 2012
.......................................................................
Asia News Network - MYANMAR MPS DISCUSS FUNDING PEACE EFFORTS
A Myanmar parliamentary delegation including Lower House Speaker Thura Shwe Mann, MP Aung San Suu Kyi
and Aung Min of the Union Peacemaking Work Committee (UPWC) held a meeting on peace efforts at the
Myanmar Peace Centre in Yangon on July 21.
"The meeting highlighted the UPWCs ceasefire status, plans for holding political dialogue after ceasefire, legal
and political affairs necessary for political dialogue, the role of the parliament, reports on progress of peace
affairs," Aung Min told reporters.
The peace process implementation will be financed by the parliaments allocated budget in order to step up
negotiation efforts without waiting for international financial assistance. Thura Shwe Mann confirmed that the
UPWC could spend the international financial assistance if acquired.
"The speaker already told us about budget necessary for the peace process. If we wait for the international
financial assistance, we can find difficulty in fulfilling the needs of ethnic groups. Therefore the parliament will
allocate required budget," said Aung Min.
In meeting with President Thein Sein in Nay Pyi Taw on July 10, Australian Foreign Minister Bob Carr said that
Australia would grant AUS$ 5 million (US$ 4.6 million) for the peace process. That sum has not been
received, according to the president's office website.
News Desk, Eleven Media Group
Publication Date : 23-07-2013
--------------------------------------Global Times - MYANMAR, AUSTRALIAN AID AGENCY CONSULT ON ECONOMIC COOPERATION
Myanmar and the Australia have held their first high-level consultation in Nay Pyi Taw on a three-year economic
cooperation program, official media reported Tuesday... Australia pledged 100 million Australian dollars' (91.87
million US dollars) grant aid to Myanmar in July for its education reform, in addition to a grant of 5 million
Australian dollars for Myanmar's peace making process with its ethnic armed groups.
Von:

Tin Kyi <mtinkyi7@yahoo.com>

An:

NLDmembrsnSupportersofCRPPnNLDnDASSK

Datum: Mi, 31 Jul 2013 6:29 am

Xinhua | 2013-7-30 13:18:41

By Agencies
________________________________________________________
CAN NORWAY FORGE PEACE IN BURMA?
HANNA HINDSTROM
Published: 19 July 2012
At a glance the Myanmar Peace Support Initiative seems littered with good intentions. Agreed with Norwegian
Foreign Minister Jonas Gahr Store on a state visit to Burma in January, it promises hefty chunks of foreign aid to
develop the conflict-torn border regions from Karen to Kachin state. Punctuated with phrases like "positive
interaction" and "community development" it hits all the right notes.
But there are ample reasons to worry.
Civil society groups have already bemoaned the lack of transparency of a process they say has systematically
excluded them. Cross-border NGOs have haemorrhaged funding, as Norway redirect aid to inside Burma. Some
have openly questioned Norway's economic motives, while others fear it could coerce rebels into joining the
government under the 2008 constitution. All observers have been baffled by the sheer speed of the project
initially set to commence last month.
The most potent concern is of course that it risks derailing, rather than consolidating the fragile peace processes
in Burma's ethnic regions. This view is underpinned by the fact that the Scandinavian initiative much like the
Burmese government's three-step peace plan prioritises economic development ahead of political dialogue. The
draft plan conceptualises aid as a strategic tool to simultaneously "test and build confidence" in the nascent
peace processes, though ostensibly without supplanting political resolution.
However, this is not Norway's first application of such a peace model. In 2002, the Norwegians were invited to
assist the Sri Lankan government in ending their decades-long conflict with the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam
(LTTE) the military wing of the country's Tamil ethnic minority. It ended seven years later with the complete
annihilation of the Tamil Tigers at the hands of the government.
"We all thought Sri Lanka would be their last attempt," said Professor Stokke from the University of Oslo,
addressing a workshop of Burmese grassroots activists in Chiang Mai in June. "But now Norway is reappearing
as a peace actor in Burma..."
"Without a joint roadmap to peace, every step became a battle field," said Stokke. "Many people felt harmed by
the development process and it led to growing scepticism rather than support. The key lesson for Norway should
be that money cannot buy peace."
"The key lesson for Norway should be that money cannot buy peace". An independent assessment of the Sri
Lankan failure, commissioned by the Norwegian government, concluded that "Norwegian peace efforts were
largely constrained by [domestic political] dynamics, but also partly contributed to them." It criticised the
government for poor contextual awareness and underestimating the difficulty of the task ahead, subsequently
becoming a "pawn in Sri Lanka's domestic politics".
The inherent dangers of a similar outcome in Burma should be obvious. Most analysts agree that the country's
ethnic divisions will be the biggest challenge for the fragile democracy to resolve. It is difficult to envision this
happening without addressing deep-rooted concerns surrounding the 2008 constitution and political mechanisms
for self-determination. Foreign interference that trivialises or ignores these issues could be very dangerous.
The focus on aid and economic growth is particularly risky in the context of Burma's resource-rich ethnic
regions, where conflict and development are destructively entwined. A prominent reason behind the breakdown
of the 17-year ceasefire in Kachin state was the exploitation of hydropower resources by China at the expense
of the local population.
----Ursprngliche Mitteilung----Von: lintao_321 <lintao_321@yahoo.com>
An: Women-Group-Burma <Women-Group-Burma@yahoogroups.com>
Verschickt: Fr, 20 Jul 2012 8:28 am
Betreff: [Women-Group-Burma] Can Norway forge Peace in Burma?

-----------------------------------------------------------------------------Updated: DEMOCRATIC VOICE OF BURMA FORCED TO LEAVE NORWAY

Published on Tuesday, 15th February, 2011 at 11:09 under the news category,
by Michael Sandelson .
Last Updated on 15th February 2011 at 13:27.
Broadcaster the Democratic Voice of Burma announces it has to move to parts of its operations to another
country due to funding cuts. We have to move our radio production out of Norway and give up some space,
despite continued funding from the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Denmark, Sweden, and US Governmentcontrolled support, amongst others, Chief Editor Aye Chan Naing tells The Foreigner.
The station has been broadcasting from Oslo since 1992, exporting and importing news about Burma. However,
what with three million kroner less and a 50 percent cut in transmission time means only TV will remain.
The key problem is we only have little more than 10 donors, and funding generally comes for only 12 months
at a time, meaning we have to renegotiate every year. This has been a problem for a few years, but we have
managed to survive, somehow, he says.
Mr Naing believes there may be further cuts next year if they cannot secure multi-year donorships. We have
become and organisation with many activities, but the time has come for us to think about the future.
__________________________________________________________
KIO REFUSES REFUGEE RELIEF FROM KACHIN STATE RED CROSS
* 22 Aug 2013 06:40
* Written by Phanida
The Kachin Independence Organization (KIO) has refused to accept Kachin State Red Cross's offer to provide
household appliances for more than 1000 Kachin refugees living in KIO controlled areas.
The Kachin State Red Cross made the offer to the KIO through the Peace Coordination Group (PCG) but were
turned down, according to PCG member Lamai Gum Ja.
The Red Cross has already got permission from the Presidents Office and the Kachin State government, but
KIO said it will not accept the offer. We plan to give household appliances to more than 1300 families. But the
KIO refuse to accept the offer. So, we cannot go there. We cannot do anything, Gea Nit, Spokesman of the
Kachin State Red Cross, told Mizzima.
The KIO turned down the offer because in accordance with its central committee policy, they cannot accept
aid from the government until they establish stable peace with the government, according to Gae Nit. The
Kachin State Red Cross is a branch of Myanmar Red Cross and therefore, the KIO refused the offer. If donors
from Denmark and Singapore can make the donations directly without routing it through the government the
KIO might accept the offer, said Gae Nit.
The household appliances were donated by the Denmark Red Cross and the Singapore Red Cross, but their
representatives could not come to Myanmar. Therefore, the Kachin State Red Cross and Myanmar Red Cross
planned to travel to the area to distribute the household appliances.
Copyright 1998 - 2013 Mizzima News. All Rights Reserved
........................................................................
UN AID REACHES LAIZA FOR FIRST TIME IN ALMOST TWO YEARS
By HANNA HINDSTROM
9 September 2013
The United Nations has been allowed to deliver humanitarian aid to the Kachin rebel headquarters in northern
Burma for the first time since December 2011, but a spokesperson warned on Monday that it will not be enough.
A convoy of 11 trucks carrying food, medicines and other essential supplies for 4,300 people arrived in Laiza on
Saturday evening, according to the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs.
But speaking to DVB on Monday, UN spokesperson Aye Win said the aid would only last one month, and that

they were still waiting for approval from the Burmese authorities to deliver regular and more substantive supplies.
We hope to be able to deliver more as soon as possible, he said. Obviously [this delivery of aid] is not much
given that there are around 53,000 IDPs in non-government controlled areas, and 18,000 around Laiza alone.
The government has only authorised intermittent convoys of international aid to reach rebel-held camps in
northern Burma, where nearly 100,000 people have been displaced since a 17-year ceasefire between the Kachin
Independence Organisation (KIO) and the government broke down over two years ago. Local aid workers say
malnutrition, water and sanitation-related diseases including dengue, cholera and malaria are rife.
The KIO fought the former military dictatorship for greater autonomy and ethnic rights for several decades before
signing a ceasefire in 1994, which collapsed in June 2011 when the rebels refused to transform into a statecontrolled border guard force.
The UN has repeatedly called for a durable solution to the Kachin conflict. Ideally, IDPs should be able to return
home to their livelihoods and humanitarian aid would be unnecessary, said Aye Win.
http://www.dvb.no/news/un-aid-reaches-laiza-for-first-time-in-almost-two-years/32338
........................................................................
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Datum: Mo, 9 Sept 2013 3:51 am
News & Articles on Burma

08 September, 2013
NHKA GA VILLAGE WOMEN GANG RAPED AND ABANDONED NAKED IN THE FOREST
By KLN
Sunday, Sept 8, 2013
Burmese army troops gang raped Nhka Ga village women and abandoned them naked in the forest near Nhka Ga
village in northern Kachin State on Sept 3. Nhka Ga villagers were abused, interrogated, detained and gang-raped
by Burmese army troops after a series of battles fought between Burmese army backed by local militia led by
Danggu Dang and KIA troops backed by Kachin people militia (MHH in Kachin) troops around their village in
northern Kachin State. The two sides have been engaged in a series of battles since a combined force of
Burmese armys 137th LIR troops and Danggu Dangs men launched an attack on Nhka Ga post of Kachin people
militia troops under KIAs 7th Battalion on Aug 28 at 2:30 pm.
A witness who had fled from Nhka Ga to Machyang Baw said Burmese army soldiers arrested Nhka Ga villagers
and took them to an upstream village Nawng Hkai. Burmese army soldiers believed to be from 66th Light Infantry
Division (LID) bound and blindfolded Nhka Ga village elders Hkaw Dut and Yung Hka Hkyen and took them away
to an unknown location, said the witness. He said the government soldiers also arrested several Nhka Ga village
women and girls and took into a nearby forest, gang raped them and later released them in naked.
http://kachinlandnews.com/?p=23637
........................................................................................................
[Women-Group-Burma] KNU general exposes how ceasefire has shifted to business
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Datum:

Fr, 6 Sept 2013 4:53 am

KNU GEN. BAW KYAW HEH EXPOSES HOW CEASEFIRE AGENDA HAS SHIFTED TO BUSINESS
Thursday, 05 September 2013
In an exclusive interview with Karen News, General Baw Kyaw Heh, the Vice Chief of Staff of the Karen National
Liberation Army (KNLA) and is its second highest commander explained his concerns about the current peace
building process with the government and why he thinks the recent ceasefire focus is now on business and not
on peace.

Gen-Baw-Kyaw-HelGen Baw Kyaw Heh, a former Karen Special Forces officer is highly regarded by his soldiers
as a tough but disciplined military commander. Gen Baw Kyaw Heh is the former head of the KNLAs Brigade 5
and is renown within the Karen community as a cleanskin someone without the baggage of having conflicting
business interests. Gen Baw Kyaw Heh points out that the KNU and the government, despite the two years since
the signing of the ceasefire, that it is still only at the preliminary stage. We agreed that we would discuss a
ceasefire as the first step. The second step is how we are going to implement the ceasefire. We have talked
on several occasions to try to develop a ceasefire code of conduct. The third step has to be political dialogue.
The final stage will be to discuss the development process.
Gen Baw Kyaw Heh hit back at his critics within the KNU who claim his tough stance is destabilizing.
People claim I am a hardliner and I am not following the plan this is because the process is not going as
planned. If we are to achieve a sustainable ceasefire we have to discuss it. But the [ceasefire] discussions
have been stopped and business development and other issues have taken over the agenda. At the same time
the government is expanding their administration areas overlapping with our administration territory. And the
government is taking advantage [of the ceasefire] by carrying out its military activities and by preparing its
military.
Gen Baw Kyaw Heh stresses that now is not the time for businesses or developers to be pushing their
investments in Karen State.
Businesses want to come to our areas, but we ask them not to as this not the time, it is still too early. First we
need to create a sustainable situation. Because of this issue some people claim I am hardliner and not
cooperative. I am concern about these issues, because if we dont have rights that are guaranteed and if we let
any business or any developer in, we will not be able to control them. Ifwe cannot manage these issues
systematically it will create problems for us in the future.
Gen Baw Kyaw Heh said the international community in its haste to accept the new Burma it did not take the
time to properly understand the ceasefire conditions. Gen Baw Kyaw Heh points out that the government has
benefitted by the ceasefire talks by reinforcing its military presence in Karen State.
For over a year now the Burma Army has taken advantage [of the ceasefire], they continued to transported their
military supplies, rotate their troops, modify and fortify all of their bases. They also built and repaired their
helipads. In Mutraw district alone, since the cease-fire, the Burma Army has created 14 new military bases.
.......................................................................
CEASEFIRES FACILITATING LAND GRABS: THINK TANK
Wednesday, 22 May 2013 13:17 S.H.A.N.
A briefing paper jointly published earlier this month by the Netherlands-based think tank groups has asserted that
new ceasefires that have been signed since 2011 have further facilitated land grabbing in conflict-affected areas
where large development projects in resource-rich ethnic regions have already taken place. The ceasefires with
armed groups have made the land more accessible to commercial interests backed by the central government
and military, says Access Denied: Land Rights and Ehtnic Conflict in Burma, prepared by Transnational Institute
(TNI) and Burma Centrum Nederland/Burman Center Netherlands (BCN).
In some cases, as in Karen State as well as Shan State, land is being confiscated also by groups that had
made peace with the central government, like the Democratic Karen Buddhist Army (DKBA) in Karen and PaO
National Army (PNA) in Shan. To make things worse, few farmers in non-Burman ethnic areas have formallyrecognized land titles, not to mention identity cards. Indeed, the new laws do not recognize customary and
communal rights at all.
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Datum: Mi, 22 Mai 2013 12:50 pm

___________________________________________________________________

MILITARY INVOLVED IN MASSIVE LAND GRABS: PARLIAMENTARY REPORT

By HTET NAING ZAW and AYE KYAWT KHAING / THE IRRAWADDY On March 5, 2013 @ 12:41 pm
RANGOONLess than eight months after a parliamentary commission began investigating land-grabbing in
Burma, it has received complaints that the military has forcibly seized about 250,000 acres of farmland from
villagers, according to the commissions report.
The Farmland Investigation Commission submitted its first report to Burmas Union Parliament on Friday, which
focused on land seizures by the military. According to the report, the commission received 565 complaints
between late July and Jan. 24 that allege that the military had forcibly confiscated 247,077 acres (almost 100,000
hectares) of land. The cases occurred across central Burma and the countrys ethnic regions, although most
happened in Irrawaddy Division. The report said farmlands were confiscated for six different reasons: the
expansion of urban areas; expansion of industrial zones; expansion of army battalions and military units;
construction of state-owned factories; implementation of state-run agricultural and animal husbandry projects;
and land allocation to private companies with links the military.
................................................................................................................
ARMY MP HALTS TALKS ON MILITARY LAND-GRABS IN BURMAS PARLIAMENT
By LAWI WENG / THE IRRAWADDY| Friday, August 16, 2013 |
RANGOON A discussion about military land confiscations was halted on Thursday in Burmas Parliament,
after a representative from the army interrupted the proceedings and urged other lawmakers to move onto
another topic.
Brig-Gen Kyaw Oo Lwin, who was appointed to the legislature and not elected by the people, interrupted a
member of Parliaments Farmland Investigation Commission during a presentation of the commissions findings.
The military has forcibly seized about 250,000 acres of farmland in the country, according to a report by the
commission in March. The report was divided into three parts, to be discussed separately in Parliament...
During the former military regime, the government allowed the Army to confiscate land to build barracks.
However, the commission found that the Army abused its power by confiscating land and selling it back to others
for a profit. Shwe Mann, a former army general and the current Union House speaker, reportedly said during the
session on Thursday that he understood why the former regime allowed land confiscations for development
projects. However, he said the governments orders were not followed properly when the Army seized large plots
of land from the people.
Shwe Mann, who has expressed ambitions to be Burmas next president, was the third-ranking general of the
former regime.
Copyright (c) 2008 Irrawaddy Publishing Group. All Rights Reserved
................................................................................................
LAND SEIZURES AMOUNT TO AREA LARGER THAN YANGON
* 18 Jul 2013 03:46
* Written by Min Min & Theingi Htun
land-grab-1
The total amount of land confiscated by the army from farmers across Myanmar is equivalent to an area larger
than Yangon city district over 297,000 acres [460 sq miles], announced Minister for Defense Lt-Gen Wai
Lwin in parliament on July 16.
( http://www.mizzima.com/news/myanmar/9710-land-seizures-amount-to-area-larger-than-yangon )
...........................................................
DVB News - FARMERS IN RANGOON INCENSED AFTER AUTHORITIES SEIZE DISPUTED LAND
By YUZANA KO KO
According to a report published by the Centre for Strategic and International Studies, approximately 1.9 million

acres of land have been illegally transferred to private businesses in the past two decades in Burma, even
though 70 percent of that land has never been developed and is still used for farming by the original owners.
[NLDmembrsnSupportersofCRPPnNLDnDASSK] Burma Related News - July 03-08, 2013.
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.............................................................................
HUNDREDS OF FARMERS PROSECUTED AFTER HARROW BATTLE
By SALAI THANT SIN/ THE IRRAWADDY On Wednesday, September 11, 2013 @ 4:43 pm
More than 500 farmers are being prosecuted for illegally plowing land that was confiscated from them in Irrawaddy
Division, rights activists say.
Farmers from eight townships in the delta regionincluding Bassein Township, where the divisions capital is
locatedhave reportedly been charged with trespassing and damaging property after plowing the fields, which
were seized local and higher level authorities as well as private companies.
Five hundred and thirteen farmers are currently facing the aforementioned charges, of which more than 300 are in
Mawlamyinegyun Township, Htun Htun, an activist from the Human Rights Monitoring and Protection Network, told
The Irrawaddy. He said that last week on Wednesday and Thursday, 17 farmers were given two-month prison
sentences, including hard labor, by the township court in Mawlamyinegyun.
Imprisoning farmers with hard labor is very severeit shouldnt happen like that at all, said Kyi Lwin, an activist
from the Burmese Democracy Network. If this practice continues, there may be farmers uprisings, like the Saya
San Rebellion [1930-32], in the future.
Farmers from 13 of 26 townships in the division took part in the Harrow Battle in June and July, activists say.
They say more than 100,000 acres of farmland across the delta region have been confiscated by the army,
governmental institutions and private companies for various reasons.
Article printed from The Irrawaddy Magazine: http://www.irrawaddy.org
URL to article: http://www.irrawaddy.org/archives/43791
.......................................................................................................................
Mizzima News - NO INQUIRY ON LAND SEIZED BEFORE 1988
18 Sep 2013 03:00
Written by Nay Myo
The Farmlands and Other Land Acquisition Inquiry Commission said that they had no mandate to make inquiries
on land seized before 1988 across the country during the reign of the Revolution Council and the Burma Socialist
Programme Party (BSPP).
Our commission has mandate for the lands seized after 1988 and not land seized before. They will not be
included in our reports. First we met with the farmers and then, departmental officials to verify land records. It
was kind of a commission hearing, said MP Aung Zin, Chairman of the Mandalay region Commission.
There are many reported cases of land acquisitions by the Revolution Council and the BSPP before 1988. In
Patheingyi Township, Mandalay region, land were seized by the government but some of it are not yet utilized
and therefore, former owners have appealed the government to return these land.
Farmer Thein Win said that the BSPP seized a total of 159 acres (field number 501 Pathengyi Township) from
them in 1977 including 10 acres of his farmlands.
My father had submitted appeal letters to the government. I appealed again for land in eight places last time. We
did not get any compensation for our seized land. I lost 10 acres. he said.
Another farmer Myat Htein (72) who witnessed land acquisition by the BSPP government said, I lost three acres
and did not get any compensation for them. They bulldozed our land and built roads on them before we could
even harvest our crops.
[NLDmembrsnSupportersofCRPPnNLDnDASSK] Burma Related News - Sep 16-18, 2013.
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Datum:

Do, 19 Sept 2013 6:18 a

______________________________________________
DVB News - BURMA ARMY CONTINUES TO PERSECUTE FORMER CHILD SOLDIERS
At the age of 13, Wai Yan Naing went missing.
As the days turned to weeks and the weeks turned to months, the family finally began to piece together
what had happened. Their young son had been forcefully recruited into the Burmese military and was sent
to the armys training school in Hmawbi.
He served as a child soldier at the frontline, Wai Ya Naings mother told DVB. I cannot forgive the government
for its unjust treatment of my son. They have tormented him since he was 13, and now he is 20-years-old.
Wai Yan Naings story is a stark reminder that despite promises of openness and democracy, Burmas
transition to democracy is fraught with difficulties.
After completing his military training, Wai Yan Naing was forced to serve in the 285th Infantry Batallion
supporting the Tatmadaw in its fight against ethnic insurgencies. He deserted from the army three years later.
He was sixteen years old at the time.
I cannot forgive the government for its unjust treatment of my son
In April, Wai Yan Naing was arrested in his home and taken to court, where he was charged with desertion
and sentenced to one year in prison by the very same battalion that had kidnapped him as a child. I was
not informed about the jail sentence, Wai Yan Naings mother told DVB. I went to see the commander, but
they would not let me in. The army officers and military police threw me out, because they knew I had been
in touch with the International Labour Organisation.
Wai Yan Naings story is tragically common in Burma, where military commanders are ordered to fulfil quotas
of troop numbers and are rewarded with food or money when this is achieved, hence the ongoing forced
recruitment of children.
Despite signing an action plan with the UN last year and releasing dozens of child soldiers from time to
time, as the Tatmadaw did yesterday, experts assert that the military continues to recruit and use children
in its armed forces.
The ILOs representative in Rangoon Steve Marshall confirmed that he was aware of Wai Yan Naings
case and has initiated contact with the Burmese government in order to attain the former child soldiers
release. This case demonstrates the ongoing need to raise awareness of the issue of peoples rights,
said Mr. Marshall. There are lots of kids who have run away [from the army]. They think theyre safe,
but the fact is that you are never free from the army until you have an official discharge paper. Until then,
you are considered to be AWOL or to have deserted.
However, the ILO representative admitted that while attitudes towards child soldiers at the higher levels
of the military may have changed, at the lower levels the message has still not been understood that different
rules apply requiring different behaviours.
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Datum: Sa, 10 Aug 2013 6:07 am
By DVB, 8 August 2013

..............................................................................................................
DISABLED VETERANS RECEIVE YEARLY SUPPORT OF $ 31 ONLY
* 29 Aug 2013 05:13
* Written by Min Min
The Deputy Minister of the Ministry of Defense announced in the Parliament on August 28 that veterans who
sustained permanent disabilities while serving in the military receive only MMK 30000 (USD 31) per annum
as support. Three MPs of the Lower House called for providing better support and providing decent means of
livelihood to disabled veterans and their family members.
Deputy Minister General Kyaw Nyut replied to the three MPs that even veterans aged above 75 receive
support of only MMK 20000 (USD 21) per annum. At present, some disabled veterans make a living by selling
books and photos in different places.

It is difficult for disabled veterans to get jobs. They are struggling to provide education and health care to their
families, U Sai Than Naing, MP from Papon, Karen State pointed out in the Parliament. The Deputy Minister
responded that there are over 200000 veterans in Myanmar. The government is also building houses for them
through the U Paing Myanmar Economic Holding Limited, established by high ranking military officers. He added
that they are providing MMK 10 million in cash and 1000 bags of cement monthly.
However, the Deputy Minister did not provide details of the rank of the retired officers who will receive housing.
The law for supporting disabled veterans and family members of soldiers who die in the line of duty was
promulgated by President Thein Sein on March 30, 2012...
U Tin Maung Oo, Lower House representative from Shwe Pyi Thar stated in the Parliament, If our next
generation witnesses the difficulties that veterans are facing in trying to make ends meet, it will discourage them
from joining the army in the future. But if they saw that the veterans live a comfortable life, they will join the army.
Therefore, I suggest, that we should ensure some kind of guarantee for soldiers.
Copyright 1998 - 2013 Mizzima News. All Rights Reserved
...........................................................................
CHILD SOLDIERS AN ONGOING PROBLEM IN BURMA
By DVB

25 September 2013

In June 2012, the Burmese government signed a joint action plan with the United Nations to end the use of child
soldiers. Since then, 166 underage recruits have been released from the military, but reports suggest that
children continue to be forcibly enlisted and sent into combat.
Charu Lata from Child Soldiers International (CSI) spoke to Colin Hinshelwood from DVB about the current
situation of child soldiers in Burma and what the next steps towards ending child recruitment should be.
What kind of traditional methods have been used to recruit children into the army?
Any recruitment of children into a military force under the age of 18 is regarded as coerced, unless it happens at
the age of 16 and there is an obligation on the side of the force not to deploy the child. So any deployment of
anyone under the age of 18 would be coercive. In the Burmese military weve noticed civilian brokers have been
used to pick up children and present them to battalion commanders who in turn receive falsified documentation of
age and then recruit the children.
In other instances, we have had examples where military officials have gone out to public spaces, including
railway stations and bus stops, to identify separated and unaccompanied children; especially children whove
come from villages looking for work in the city. Often the children are given two options, either to produce their
national registration card or go to prison. Obviously the children who dont have the card agree to go with the
military official and thats when recruitment takes place...
( http://www.dvb.no/dvb-video/child-recruitment-an-ongoing-problem-burma-myanmar-military-soldiers-underage/32807 )
.......................................................................................................................

US AND MYANMAR UP MILITARY ENGAGEMENT

By Tim McLaughlin | Thursday, 01 August 2013
The United States plans to begin military engagement with Myanmar later this month, ambassador Derek Mitchell
said, as part of Washingtons efforts to encourage the Tatmadaw to transform into a professional security force
with civilian oversight. Speaking on August 1 in Yangon alongside US Deputy National Security Advisor for
Strategic Communications Ben Rhodes, who was in Myanmar on a three-day visit. Mr Mitchell said that initial
military engagement would focus on humanitarian issues, officer professionalisation and human rights.
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Datum: Fr, 2 Aug 2013 6:21 pm

......................................................................

US TO BOOST MILITARY TIES WITH BURMA, BUT WARNS OF N KOREA CONNECTION

By HANNA HINDSTROM
30 August 2013
US Ambassador Derek Mitchell met with the head of Burmas armed forces Min Aung Hlaing in the Burmese capital
this week to discuss legal practices in military combat. Burmese state media described the meeting as a cordial
effort to strengthen defence relations between the two countries, emphasising the armys important role in Burmas
democratisation process.
This dialogue is consistent with continuing efforts to build mutual understanding in order to promote human rights
awareness, and promote the values and activities of a modern, disciplined and respected military that acts
according to international norms, said Derek Mitchell on Thursday.
The decision has drawn scorn from some critics, who view it as a carrot and stick approach intended to bring
Burma into the USs geopolitical ambit. The US knows that the Burmese military are still dealing with the North
Koreans, veteran journalist and Burma expert, Bertil Lintner, told DVB on Friday.
Lintner has previously slammed the notion that Thein Htay, who heads Burmas Directorate of Defence Industries
(DDI), could have purchased military equipment from North Korea without authorisation from President Thein Sein
and Min Aung Hlaing as absolutely impossible.
Lintner explained that the US is sending a clear signal to the government that they must move away from North
Korea, while offering military training as a reward. Forget US talk about human rights and democracy, thats just
window dressing, he said. The US main concern in Burma is strategic: to keep China at bay and the North
Koreans out.
Burma has received international praise for introducing a series of democratic reforms since March 2011, but
continues to be plagued by civil strife, especially in its ethnic minority territories.
.........................................
Note: Bold is mine. tzd
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News & Articles on Burma - 31 August, 2013
Von:
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Datum: So, 1 Sept 2013 4:51 am
http://www.dvb.no/news/us-to-boost-military-ties-with-burma-but-warns-of-n-korea-connection/32040

...............................................................................................
[NLDmembrsnSupportersofCRPPnNLDnDASSK] Burma Related News - September 03-06, 2013.
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Sa, 7 Sept 2013 6:21 am

South China Morning Post - OBAMA'S PLAN TO RESTORE MILITARY TIES WITH MYANMAR 'TOO SOON' FOR
SOME US LAWMAKERS
Obama administration wants to re-establish defence training for Myanmar's military, but some Republican
lawmakers say it's too early
Friday, 06 September, 2013 [Updated: 4:13AM]

The Obama administration wants to restart US defence training for Myanmar that was cut 25 years ago after a
bloody crackdown on protesters.
While assistance would be non-lethal, some American lawmakers are resisting, concerned that Washington is
moving too fast in forging ties with a military still accused of attacking ethnic minorities and blocking humanitarian
aid. The administration has rolled back tough sanctions and hosted President Thein Sein, a former junta member,
at the White House to reward his heady rush towards democratic reform, but restoring military ties is particularly

sensitive and viewed as one of Washington's few remaining points of leverage.

The administration, which is looking to boost American influence in Asia, is moving carefully but swiftly.
With the backing of opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi, US defence legal experts last week made their
second trip to Myanmar in two months, scoping out what help they can provide on teaching about human rights
and rule of law. And last Thursday, Defence Secretary Chuck Hagel met on the sidelines of a regional
conference in Brunei with another former junta member, Lieutenant General Wai Lwin - the first bilateral
meeting between the US and Myanmese defence chiefs in two decades.
Military co-operation was severed after thousands of democracy protesters were gunned down during a 1988
popular uprising, and an arms embargo is still in force.
............................................................................
BBC NEWS - UK FORCES CHIEF IN BURMA TO BUILD TIES WITH MILITARY
General Sir David Richards met political leaders and his military counterpart
The head of the UK's armed forces, General Sir David Richards, is visiting Burma to try to build ties with the
country's powerful military. He is the first western military chief to go there since reforms began that have
transformed relations with the international community. Burma's generals, who once ruled the country, have
backed reforms so far. Gen Richards has met his Burmese counterpart, Commander-in-Chief Min Aung Hlaing,
and political leaders.
BBC South East Asia correspondent Jonathan Head said it was unusual for such a senior officer to make a highprofile visit so early in the diplomatic re-engagement with a once isolated country. But the decision to send Gen
Richards to Burma is a reflection of the importance attached by the UK to building relations with the country's
military, which remains a powerful but secretive institution, he added.
Currently in Burma, the military holds one quarter of the seats in parliament. Although the generals have
supported the reforms, the army has taken a tough line against ethnic insurgents in Kachin state. Late last
year, they launched a full-scale assault, even as the government was pursuing peace talks.
[NLDmembrsnSupportersofCRPPnNLDnDASSK] Burma Related News - June 01-03, 2013.
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Datum: Di, 4 Jun 2013 8:11 am
3 June 2013 Last updated at 09:04 ET

..............................................................................
DVB NEWS - BRITAIN DENIES BREACHING BURMA ARMS EMBARGO
By HANNA HINDSTROM
Published: 25 July 2013
The British government has denied breaching the EU arms embargo for Burma, after a parliamentary report
revealed that it has eight active arms export licences for the former military dictatorship.
With the increase in trade which is a welcome thing in terms of developing Burmas prosperity we need to
make sure, in conjunction with partners here in country, that what is traded is in line with legal requirements,
said Fisher. Britain has continued to step up diplomatic and economic ties with Burma, which is slowly emerging
from five decades of military rule, despite ongoing concerns about human rights.
Human rights groups say the British government has lost its bargaining power by prematurely shedding sanctions
and rekindling a military relationship with the quasi-civilian regime.
While the arms export licenses allowed so far do not appear to be cause for significant concern, the steps by the
British government to move closer to the Burmese military are very worrying, said Mark Farmaner, Campaign
Director of Burma Campaign UK.
We were originally told military to military contacts would be purely diplomatic, but already it has been expanded
to include training. Given the recent record of the British government, it wouldnt surprise us if they supported
lifting the arms embargo when its due for renewal next April.

Burma has been subject to an EU arms embargo since 1996 as a result of the former military regimes persistent
violations of human rights, including military attacks and abuses against civilians in ethnic minority regions.
Burma Related News - July 24-15, 2013.
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Fr, 26 Jul 2013 6:24 am

......................................................................................

133 CIVIL GROUPS CONCERNED OVER FOREIGN MILITARY ENGAGEMENT IN BURMA

* Thursday, 17 October 2013 16:42
* Written by Van Biak Thang (vanbiakthang@chinlandguardian.com)
133 ethnic civil society organizations have expressed their grave concerns over the military engagement of UK,
US and Australia with Burma Army forces. They submitted to leaders of the three countries a joint letter
containing a set of 'preconditions' that must be met if their engagement was to go ahead.
The preconditions include stopping attacks in both ceasefire and non-ceasefire areas, withdrawing military from
conflict zones, publicly acknowledging past human rights abuses, and establishing independent bodies to
investigate violations.
It also said: "While your intentions may be genuine, we are deeply concerned that your current approach to
military-to-military relations will neither prove beneficial to our mutual goals of ending the Burmese militarys
perpetration of human rights violations against us, nor bring us closer to national reconciliation. We urge you not
to pursue military-to-military engagement without taking into consideration our concerns."
The three countries have been urged to honor their commitment to the UN Declaration on the Rights of Persons
Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities and to protect the rights of the ethnic
minorities in Burma.
Their offers to cement military cooperation and ties with the nominally democratic country of Burma had come
following official visits to UK, US and Australia by military-turned-politician President Thein Sein earlier this year.
Accusing Burma's military of committing various types of human rights violations, the letter said: "They have
destroyed our villages, stolen our land, forced us to serve as their slave labor, to carry their equipment as they
hunt down, torture, kill, and enslave our fellow ethnic brothers and sisters, and rape, gang-rape, and sexually
assault our women and girls."
"We know the Burmese military intimately, like no one else could. We speak of the past, and we speak of the
present. We do not want this to be our future."
The letter of the 133 organizations, representing 15 of Burma's ethnic nationalities, was submitted today to
President Barack Obama of the United States, Prime Minister David Cameron of the United Kingdom, and Prime
Minister Tony Abbott of the Commonwealth of Australia.#
http://www.chinlandguardian.com/index.php/national-news/item/1967-civil-groups-concerned-over-foreign-military-engagement-in-burma

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APPENDIX R
Spiecial Note. This Appendix contains two parts. The first part is a 6-page excerpt of the 22-page original report; I used it as a medium in some
papers to briefly explain about the background history of the birth of the former Union of Burma that has had long ceased to exist de jure since March 2,
1962, when General Ne Win took state power by force and annulled the 1947 Constitution. Bolds, except headings and headings, are mine. A sentence
below and CHAPTER II, PART III: 5. Right of Secession are marked in red colour by myself. The second part is the 22-page

complete original report. Thang Za Dal/April 2016.

_____________________________________________________________________
REPORT OF THE FRONTIER AREAS COMMITTEE OF ENQUIRY, 1947
CHAPTER I
THE PROBLEM
1. Origin of Committee
The Committee originated from the conclusions reached in the conversations between His Majesty's Government and
the Executive Council of the Governor of Burma in London in January, 1947.
Paragraph 8(d) of these Conclusions states:"A Committee of Enquiry shall be set up forthwith as to the best method of associating the Frontier peoples with
the working out of the new constitution for Burma. Such Committee will consist of equal numbers of persons from
the Frontier Areas, nominated by the Governor after consultation with the leaders of those areas, with a neutral
Chairman from outside Burma selected by agreement. Such Committee shall be asked to report to the Government
of Burma and His Majesty's Government before the summoning of the Constituent Assembly."
2. Terms of Reference
The terms of reference of the Committee were those quoted above. They have, of course, to be considered in the light
of the statement of the agreed objective of His Majesty's Government and the Government of Burma with which
paragraph 8 of the Conclusions opens:- "To achieve the early unification of the Frontier Areas and Ministerial Burma
with the free consent of the inhabitants of those areas." (p. 1)
3. Scope of Committee
For the purposes of this Enquiry, Frontier peoples have been taken as those inhabiting the areas listed in both parts
of the Second Schedule to the Government of Burma Act, 1935. These areas fall into two divisions, Part I
administered by the Governor in his discretion and Part II administered by the Governor in his individual judgment.
It was also decided that, although the three States of Karenni were not part of the Scheduled Areas and did not
therefore necessarily come within the purview of the Committee, they should be invited to send representatives to
express their views, on account of their close economic and racial ties with both Scheduled Areas and Burma proper.
All three Karenni States duly accepted this invitation.
4. Administrative Units in Scheduled Areas
The Scheduled Areas as defined in the 1935 Act cover 113,000 square miles or about 47% of the
total area of Burma. The population, however, is only 2,400,000 or 16% of the total. The main
administrative units are the following:1) Federated Shan States. The Shan States, though British territory, are a quasi autonomous area
ruled by hereditary Shan Chiefs known as Sawbwas, under the general supervision of the
Governor of Burma. In 1922 the states were formed into a species of federation for purposes of common subjects
and foradministrative purposes were divided into southern and northern groups. Within the Federation are the notified
areas of Taunggyi, Kalaw and Lashio and the civil stations of Loilem and Loimwe, which were originally carved off

from the states and placed under the direct administration of the Government of Burma through the Federation
officials... (p. 2)
.............................................................................................................
5. Geographical and Historical Background of Frontier Areas
Reference to the map of Burma shows that the great river valleys of Burma proper are surrounded from the NorthWest to the South-East by and unbroken chain of mountain and hill country covering all land approaches from India
and China and all except the extreme South-Eastern approach from Siam. These hill areas contain more than 100
distinct tribes. The great majority, however, are too small to be of political importance and the four largest, Shans,
Kachins, Chins, and Karens, dominate more than 95 percent of the Frontier Areas between them.
Although there is a diversity of languages, dress and customs ethnological research discovers an intimate relationship
not only between the races of the Frontier Areas but also between them and the Burmans and the Karens. Most of
the races belong to the ethnological group known as Tibeto-Burmans, subdivided into Eastern Tibeto-Burmans and
Western Tibeto-Burmans. To the former class belong the Chins, the Kachins and the Nagas of Upper Burma and to
the latter the Burmese of the Irrawaddy Valley, the Marus and Lasis of the N'Maikha, the Lisaws of the Salween and
the Lahus and Akhas of the Mekong. There are signs of a common ancestry in the languages of the Burmese, the
Chins and the Kachins. The Shans, Palaungs and the Was, however, belong to a separate though allied ethnological
group known as the Tais.(pp. 5-6)
.........................................
The relationship between the Burmese and the Kachins was less close. As a race the Kachins
originate from the eastern portion of the Tibetan plateau and , as compared to the Burmese, the
Chins and the Shan, they are latecomers into Burma, though they have now reached as far south as the Shan
State of Kengtung and the concentration of hills in the Myitkyina, Bhamo and Katha districts. The Kachins did not
take easily to the idea of submitting to the British on the annexation of Upper Burma in 1886 and several British
expeditions had to be sent to the Kachin Hills, the Kachins resisting with considerable success. It was not until 1895
that the Kachins opposition could be broken and British administration introduced in the Kachin Hills by the Kachin
Hill Tribes Regulation of that year. As the Kachins are not self-sufficient in their hills they have always been obliged to
maintain contact with the plains population through Shan-Burmese villages in the foothills. Some Kachins know
Burmese. (p. 7)
...................................
Sections of the Chins who have migrated into Burma from the Tibetan plateau almost in a
straight line down south are to be found from the Somra Hill Tracts down to Cape Negrais. The
Chins, then mostly in north-western Burma, are known to have had social intercourse with the Burmese at the time
of the Kingdom of Pagan (1044-1287). There were Chin levies in the armies of King Bayinnaung of Toungoo (155181) and of King Alaungpaya of Ava (1752-60).
It is not within tribal memory that any full-scale organised war was ever waged between the Burmese kings and the
Chins, but minor hostilities used to occur at times in the foothill valleys, resulting in raids and skirmishes on the
border. British troops were in action against the Northern Chins after the annexation of Upper Burma for a
continued period of seven months or thereabouts among the foothills now passed by the Kalemyo-Fort White-Tiddim
road, at a place called Leisan (now known as the Basha hill). The Chins resisted the advance of British troops
fearlessly till they were subdued. It was not until 1892 that the northern people now inhabiting the Tiddim subdivision
were totally disarmed. The central Chins did not offer any full-scale resistance. Further down in the south, the
various tribes of the Haka subdivision resisted sternly the advance of the forces from the Gangaw Valley. (pp. 7-8)
....................................................................
The Karens of the Frontier Areas, apart from Karenni, are mostly found in the Salween District,
in certain portions of the Southern Shan States and in the hill areas of the Toungoo District. The
Karens in the Shan States naturally have close relations with the Shans, while the Karens of the Salween District live
intermingled with the Shans and other races, which form the minority population of this district. They were the earliest
settlers in Burma and, after migrating southwards through the hill areas, some penetrated into the plains of the
Irrawaddy Delta and the Tenasserim Division and lived peacefully with other races. Peace loving, shy and aloof by
nature, many preferred to remain in the seclusion of the hills. The Salween District was ruled by a Chief Sgaw Saw

Ku at the time of the British annnexation of Tenasserim, who surrendered the district to the British authorities. (p. 8)
...........................................
In 1875 the independence of Western Karenni was guaranteed as follows, by an agreement
between the British and the Burmese Governments:- "It is hereby agreed between the British
and Burmese Governments that the State of Western Karenni shall remain separate and
independent, and that no sovereignty or governing authority of any description shall be claimed
or exercised over that State."
After the annexation of Upper Burma in 1886 the British, in view of the Agreement of 1875, left Western Karenni
alone for some time. An attempt made in 1887 by the British to secure the peaceful submission of the Myosa of
Kantarawaddi in Eastern Karenni was unsuccessful and in 1888 the Myosa even raided the Shan State of Mawkmai
which had accepted British suzerainty. A British force despatched to Karenni in December of the same year subjugated the State. The Myosa was deposed and his son Sawlawi, the Kyem-mong was elected by the people Chief of
Kantarawadi and subsequently confirmed by the British authorities as Myosa under a sanad or patent of appointment in the same terms as Chiefs of Shan States. The status of the Myosa was later raised to that of Sawbwa.
In 1892 the Chiefs of Western Karenni, of whom there were four at the time, nominally independent, were formally
recognised as feudatories by the Government of India and were preented with sanads appointing them Myosas on
terms similar to the Myosa of Kantarawadi. These four states were later reduced to the present two by
amalgamations. The three Karenni States have never been annexed to the British Crown and have the status of
feudatory states. The Chiefs, under the sanads recognising their appointment, are required, among other condi-tions,
to pay an annual tribute and accept and act upon any advice given to them by the British political officer concerned.
(pp. 8-9)
6. British Administration of Frontier Areas up to 1942
The strategic importance of the Frontier Areas as a buffer between an inland invader and the valleys of Burma
proper prompted the British to extend their administration over these areas piecemeal, as necessity or opportunity
arose, in the years following 1886. Local advances continued in the far north as late as 1940, when the head-hunting
Naga tribes were first brought under some sort of administration. From the late 19th century until the 1935
Government of Burma Act came into force in 1937 the form of administration in the Frontier Areas, other than the
Shan States, did not materially change. They were ruled as part of Burma in the traditional manner by local chieftains
under the general supervision and control of the Governor of Burma.(p. 9)
8. The Panglong Agreement
The terms of the Panglong Agreement, which regulated relations between Burma and the major portion of the
Frontier Areas when the Committee of Exquiry began its work, were as follows:THE PANGLONG AGREEMENT, 1947.
A conference having been held at Panglong, attended by cortain Members of the Executive Council of the
Governor of Burma, all Saohpas and representatives of the Shan States, the Kachin Hills and the Chin Hills:
The Members of the Conference, believing that freedom will be more speedily achieved by the Shans, the Kachins
and Chins by their immediate co-operation with the Interim Burmese Government:
The Members of the Conference have accordingly, and without dissentients, agreed as follows:1. A representative of the Hill Peoples, selected by the Governor on the recommendation of representatives of the Supreme Council of the United Hill Peoples (SCOUHP), shall be appointed a
Counsellor to the Governor to deal with the Frontier Areas.
2. The said Counsellor shall also be appointed a Member of the Governor's Executive Council, without
portfolio, and the subject of Frontier Areas brought within the purview of the Executive Council by
Constitutional Convention as in the case of Defence and External Affairs. The Counsellor for Frontier
Areas shall be given executive authority by similar means.
3. The said Counsellor shall be assisted by two Deputy Counsellors representing races of which he is not

a member. While the twoDeputy Counsellors should deal in the first instance with the affairs of their
respective areas and the Counsellor with all the remaining parts of the Frontier Areas, they should by
Constitutional Convention act on the principle of joint responsibility.
4. While the Counsellor, in his capacity of Member of the Executive Council, will be the only representative
of the Frontier Areas on the Council, the Deputy Counsellors shall be entitled to attend meeting of the
Council when subjects pertaining to the Frontier Areas are discussed. Though the Governor's Executive
Council will be augmented as agreed above, it will not operate in respect of the Frontier Areas in any
manner which would deprive any portion of these Areas of the autonomy which it now enjoys in internal
administration. Full autonomy in internal administration for the Frontier Areas is accepted in principle.
5. Though the question of demarcating and establishing a separate Kachin State within a Unified Burma is
one which must be relegated for decision by the Constituent Assembly, it is agreed that such a State is
desirable. As a first step towards this end, the Counsellor for Frontier Areas and the Deputy Counsellor
shall be consulted in the administration of such areas in the Myitkyina and the Bhamo Districts as are
Part II Scheduled Areas under the Government of Burma Act of 1935.
6. Citizens of the Frontier Areas shall enjoy rights and privileges which are regarded as fundamental in
democratic countries.
7. The arrangements accepted in this Agreement are without prejudice to the financial autonomy now
vested in the Federated Shan States.
8. The arrangements accepted in this Agreement are without prejudice to the financial assistance which
the Kachin Hills and the Chin Hills are entitled to receive from the revenues of Burma, and the
Executive Council will examine with the Frontier Areas Counsellor and Deputy Counsellors the feasibility
of adopting for the Kachin Hills and the Chin Hill financial arrangements similar to those between Burma
and the Federated Shan States.
9. The importance of the Agreement lies not only in the fact that it settles the form of association during
the interim period, but also in its enunciation of certain principles, notably that the frontier peoples
should be entitled to fundamental democratic rights, that they should have the right to full autonomy in
the internal sphere, and that they should be entitled to receive a measure of assistance from the
revenues of Ministerial Burma, which are relevant to decision of the ultimate form of association. The
formation of the Supreme Council of the United Hill Peoples was also a noteworthy step forward in the
establishment of representative institutions among the frontier peoples.
9. Limitations of Panglong Agreement
When the Committee began its investigation, the Panglong Agreement had not been accepted by all the frontier
peoples. The Shans, Kachins and Chins had ratified it, and their actions may be assumed to cover the small racial
units within their areas. The Karens, however, of the Salween District and the Karenni States, who were not
represented by delegates at Panglong, were not parties to the Agreement. Others who were not present and whose
adherence could not be taken for granted were the Chins of the Arakan Hill Tracts, the Nagas and the Was. Such
was the situation when the Frontier Areas Committee of Enquiry began its work. (pp. 11-12)
CHAPTER II.
THE WORK OF THE COMMITTEE
PART II.
THE CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY.
(1) With the exception of the unfederated Shan States of Taungdut and Singkaling Hkamti, all the witnesses before us
expressed without hesitation the desire that representatives of their States or local areas should take part in the work
of the Constituent Assembly, the members of which, in respect of such portions of ministerial Burma as enjoy rights
of representation in the Legislature under the 1935 Act, have already been elected. We recommend accordingly that
their wishes be met and that the following areas be given representation in the Constituent Assembly:-

The Federated Shan States, including Kokang and Mongpai.

The Kachin Hills.
The Chin Hills with the Arakan Hill Tracts.
The Karenni States.
The Somra Tract.
The Salween District.
The Homalin Subdivision.
We have grouped Kokang with the Federated Shan States though its de jure position is not quite clear. We have,
however, ascertained from the Federated Shan States that one of the seats to be allocated to them for the Constituent
Assembly will be given to a representative of Kokang. We have grouped the Arakan Hill Tracts with the Chin Hills,
as the witnesses from the former area have shown a clear desire to be associated with the Chins of the Chin Hills, and
we have ascertained that one of the seats to be allocated to the Chin Hills will be given to the Arakan HillTracts.
Witnesses from the States of Thaungdut and Singkaling Hkamti not only expressed a desire to be incorporated in
ministerial Burma but stated that they are prepared to accept whatever future constitution is drawn up by the
Burmese. We found it impracticable to procure witnesses from the Naga Hills and the Wa States, but we have no
hesitation in recommending that representatives need not be sought from these areas for the Constituent Assembly on
account of the primitive nature of their civilisation and the impossibility of their finding persons who will be able to
assist in the drawing up of Burma's future constitution.(p. 16)
...............................................................................
PART III.
OBSERVATIONS.
1. The Future of the Frontier Areas
The view of the witnesses from the Federated Shan States and from the Kachin Hills are strongly in favour of a
federated Burma in which the Federated Shan States will form a state or unit and the Kachin Hills another. They
desire the fullest possible autonomy for the states within the federation but agree that certain subjects of general scope
should be entrusted to the federation. On the evidence tendered before us, representatives from the Chin Hills do not
desire to federate the Chin Hills with Burma proper but prefer an amalgamation of their area with ministerial Burma,
stipulating only that there should be no interference with their tribal customs and traditions and that their chieftains
should be allowed to administer their tracts as at present.
The Chin Hills would otherwise become one or more ordinary districts of Burma proper. On the day after they
had tendered this evidence, the witnesses submitted a letter saying that they had not understood the point
correctly and that they intended to say that the Chin Hills should form a separate state within a federated Burma.
The only conclusion we can safely draw is that the people of the Chin Hills are not yet in a position to come to a
firm conclusion on this matter and that it will have to be left to their representatives in the Constituent Assembly to
define their views precisely. The witnesses from the Arakan Hill Tracts, the majority population of which is Chin,
expressed no independent views but desire to follow the lead of the Chin Hills people. The witnesses from the
Somra Tract, Thaungdut, Singkaling Hkamti and the Homalin Subdivision expressed categorically the view that their
areas should be incorporated in ministerial Burma and should be given the same constituency and other rights as
other areas in Burma proper.
The representatives from the Karenni States, while stating clearly that they wished to be represented in the
Constituent Assembly, did not definitely commit themselves to any views in regard to the entry of the Karenni States
into a federated Burma. A group of witnesses from the Salween District, appearing before us early in our meetings,
expressed views in favour of forming a state within a Burma federation.
Another group, appearing before us later, supported by a letter from the leaders of the first group, stated that,
after further consideration at a mass meeting of the residents of the district, they now desire the incorporation of the
district as a part of ministerial Burma.(p. 18)

4. Common Subjects
The weight of opinion among the witnesses examined by us is that, if there should be a Burma federation, the federal
organ should deal with the following subjects:1. External affairs.
2. Defence.
3. Post and telegraphs.
4. Communications.
5. Currency and coinage.
6. Customs.
7. Titles and honours.
There is danger that the anxiety of the constituent states for the fullest possible internal autonomy
might lead to the constitution of a weak federal or central government which will be the government in Burma which
deals with the outside world. It is not for us to make recommendations regarding federal subjects, but we see obvious
omissions in the above list, which makes no mention of foreign trade or of inter-state commerce or of federal finance.
5. Right of Secession
The majority of the witnesses who favoured a federation of Burma asked for the right of secession by the states at
any time. Few federal constitutions contain provision for the secession of states. It seems to us that, if any such right
is to be contained in the federal constitution for Burma, it will have to be carefully limited and regulated. (p. 20)
_________________________
9. Acknowledgment.
Our task, enhanced in difficulty by the time factor, was facilitated by the energy and ability displayed by Mr.W.B.J.
Ledwidge of the Burma Office, our Secretary; U Tun Pe, B.Fr.S., our Joint Secretary; and Major Shan Lone,
O.B.E., M.C., B.Fr.S., our Assistant Secretary; and by the devoted and efficient services of our staff of reporters,
interpreters, typists, clerks and peons, all of whom worked overtime and throughout the Burmese New year holidays.
To each and every one of our Officers and Staff we wish to convey our grateful thanks and appreciation.
Signed:
1. D. R. REES-WILLIAMS, Chairman
2. THAKIN NU.
3. SAO SAM HTUN.
4. TIN TUT.
5. HSINWA NAWNG.
6. KHIN MAUNG GALE.
7. VUM KO HAU.
8. MYINT THEIN.
9. SAW SANKEY.
Maymyo,
24th April, 1947.
______________________________________________________________________________________________

TEXT IN THE NEXT 22 PAGES IS THE ORIGINAL COMPLETE REPORT

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REPORT OF THE FRONTIER AREAS

COMMITTEE OF ENQUIRY, 1947
CONTENTS
REPORT
CHAPTER I.

The Problem

CHAPTER II. The Work of the Committee

CHAPTER III. Recommendations and Observations:
Part I-

General

Part II-

The Constituent Assembly

Part III-

Observations

APPENDICES(not printed)
App. I.

Verbatim Record of Evidence heard by the Committee.

App. II.

Resolutions and Memorials communicated to the Committee.

App. III. Notes by the Frontier Areas Administration, Government of Burma, on

Economic Situation, Education, Health and Communications and
Mineral Resources in the Frontier Areas Administration.
App. IV. Administrative and Racial Maps of Burma.
REPORT OF THE FRONTIER AREAS COMMITTEE OF ENQUIRY, 1947
CHAPTER I
THE PROBLEM
1. Origin of Committee
The Committee originated from the conclusions reached in the conversations between His Majesty's
Government and the Executive Council of the Governor of Burma in London in January, 1947.
Paragraph 8(d) of these Conclusions states:"A Committee of Enquiry shall be set up forthwith as to the best method of associa-ting
the Frontier peoples with the working out of the new constitution for Burma. Such
Committee will consist of equal numbers of persons from the Frontier Areas, nominated
by the Governor after consultation with the leaders of those areas, with a neutral
Chairman from outside Burma selected by agreement. Such Committee shall be asked to
report to the Government of Burma and His Majesty's Government before the
summoning of the Constituent Assembly."
2. Terms of Reference
The terms of reference of the Committee were those quoted above. They have, of course, to be
considered in the light of the statement of the agreed objective of His Majesty's Government and the

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Government of Burma with which paragraph 8 of the Conclusions opens:"To achieve the early unification of the Frontier Areas and Ministerial Burma with the free consent of
the inhabitants of those areas."
3. Scope of Committee
For the purposes of this Enquiry, Frontier peoples have been taken as those inhabiting the areas listed
in both parts of the Second Schedule to the Government of Burma Act, 1935. These areas fall into two
divisions, Part I administered by the Governor in his discretion and Part II administered by the
Governor in his individual judgment. It was also decided that, although the three States of Karenni
were not part of the Scheduled Areas and did not therefore necessarily come within the purview of the
Committee, they should be invited to send representatives to express their views, on account of their
close economic and racial ties with both Scheduled Areas and Burma proper. All three Karenni States
duly accepted this invitation.
4. Administrative Units in Scheduled Areas
The Scheduled Areas as defined in the 1935 Act cover 113,000 square miles or about 47% of the total
area of Burma. The population, however, is only 2,400,000 or 16% of the total. The main
administrative units are the following:(i)
Federated Shan States. The Shan States, though British territory, are a quasi autonomous area ruled by
hereditary Shan Chiefs known as Sawbwas, under the general supervision of the Governor of Burma.
In 1922 the states were formed into a species of federation for purposes of common subjects and for
administrative purposes were divided into southern and northern groups. Within the Federation are the
notified areas of Taunggyi, Kalaw and Lashio and the civil stations of Loilem and Loimwe, which were
originally carved off from the states and placed under the direct administration of the Government of
Burma through the Federation officials.
The two groups are:(a) Southern Shan States.
Area
36,416 sq.mls.
Total Population * 927,000
"
* (Gross figures for population are taken from the 1941 Census. The 1941 figures for population by
race were lost as a result of the Japanese invasion. Figures in this paragraph are based on the
assumption that percentages given in the 1931 Census remained approximately the same in 1941 and
that the increase in population should be distributed between races accordingly.
Population by Races:Shan and Lolo Moso

515,412 or 55.6%

Karen Group
Burma Group

192,108 or 20.4%
152,955 or 16.5%

Palaung-Wa
50,985 or 5.5%
Indian, Chinese and Others 18,540 or 2.0%
(b) Northern Shan States.
Area 21,400 sq.mls.
.Total Population

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Federated States
690,000
Unfederated Wa States 82,614
Population by Races:Shan and Lolo Moso

333,960 or 44%

Palaung-Wa
220,000 or 28%
Indians, Chinese and Others 93,840 or 12%
Kachin
Burma Group

71,070 or 9%
53,130 or 7%

They are six states in the Northern group including the Wa State of Mong Lun. The other Wa States
which are not in the Federation were brought under administration only in 1935 and the Was are still
addicted to headhunting.
Kokang, a sub-state of North Hsenwi with a predominantly Chinese population and administered by a
Chinese Myosa. claimed to be a separate state during the war.
(ii)
(a) Bhamo District.
Area

4,148 sq.mls.

Total Population 129,000

Part I Population 52,000
Part II Population 77,000
Population by Races:Kachin
Shan

49,794 or 38.6%
36,765 or 28.5%

Burma Group
33,540 or 26.0%
Indian, Chinese and Others 8,901 or 6.9%
The Bhamo Part II Area is a Constituency Area, represented in the Burma Legislature and the
Constituent Assembly.
(b) Myitkyina District.
Area

19,762 sq.mls. (excluding the Triangle not measured).

Total Population
Part I Population

298,000
189,000

Part II Population

109,000

Population by Races:Kachin
Shan, Lolo Moso

157,642 or 53.2%
76,586 or 26.0%

Burma Group
40,230 or 13.7%
Indian, Chinese and Others 23,542 or 7.1%

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Almost all the Burma Group of the population live in the Part II Area. Of this Area, Myitkyina is
represented in the Burma Legislature and the Constituent Assembly, but Kamaing Township is
Non-Constituency. The Shan States in the Hkamti Long Area are included in Part I.
Katha District. This district is in Ministerial Burma, but includes a small Part I Area inhabited by a few
hundred Kachins.
(iii)
(a) Chin Hills District.
Area
10,337 sq.mls.
Total Population 186,000
Population by Races:Chins 183,768 or 98.8%
Others

2,232 or 1.2%

Kanpetlet Subdivision in the south of the district has close ties with the neighboruing Chin population
of Ministerial Burma.
(b) Arakan Hill Tracts.
Area
3,543 sq.mls.
Total Population 34,000
Population by Races:Chin

25,772 or 75.8%

Others
4,624 or 13.6%
Burma Group 3,570 or 10.6%
The Burma Group of the population who are Arakanese Buddhists nearly all live in the Southern part
of the Tract bordering on the Arakan Division.
(iv)
(a) Salween District.
Area

2,582 sq.mls.

Total Population

57,000

Population by Races:Karen Group 49,020 or 86.0%

Tai(Shan)
4,389 or 7.7%
Burmese
Others

2,223 or 3.9%
1,311 or 2.4%

(b) Karenni.
Area

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Total Population

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70,000

Population by Races:Karen
Shan

51,310 or 73.3%
13,580 or 19.4%

Burma Group 2,660 or 3.8%

Others
2,450 or 3.5%
(v) Naga Hills District.
Area

5,895 sq.mls. (excluding Homalin (Part II) Subdivision)

Total Population 84,000

+ Homalin approx 48,000 = 132,000

Population by Races, Part I Area only:Naga 71,736 or 85.4%

Tai 12,264 or 14.6%
Homalin Subdivision is a Part II Non-Constituency Area more advanced than the rest of the district. In
Part I, the Shan States of Thaungdut and Singkaling Hkamti, and the Somra Tract inhabited by Chins
and Shans, are more advanced than the rest of the district which is inhabited by the Naga tribes. These
are the most backward of all frontier peoples, still addicted to head-hunting and human sacrifice. They
were brought under administration only in 1940, and little progress in civilizing them has so far been
possible.
(vi)
Other Part II Areas.
(a) Tamu Township

Population 5,870

Tamu Township is a small Part II Non-Constituency Area on the India-Burma frontier in

the Upper Chindwin District. Details of the racial composition of the population are
lacking, but it is known to be predominantly Shan.
(b) Thaton Part II Areas Population 218,008
(c) Eastern Toungoo
(d) Kyain
(e) Myawaddi

160,000
59,897
8,360

Details of the racial composition of the population in these areas (b) to (e) bordering on the Salween
District, are lacking, but it is known to be predominantly Karen. All four areas are represented in the
Burma Legislature and the Constituent Assembly.
5. Geographical and Historical Background of Frontier Areas.
Reference to the map of Burma shows that the great river valleys of Burma proper are surrounded
from the North-West to the South-East by and unbroken chain of mountain and hill country covering
all land approaches from India and China and all except the extreme South-Eastern approach from
Siam. These hill areas contain more than 100 distinct tribes. The great majority, however, are too
small to be of political importance and the four largest, Shans, Kachins, Chins, and Karens, dominate
more than 95 percent of the Frontier Areas between them.

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Although there is a diversity of languages, dress and customs ethnological research discovers an
intimate relationship not only between the races of the Frontier Areas but also between them and the
Burmans and the Karens. Most of the races belong to the ethnological group known as
Tibeto-Burmans, subdivided into Eastern Tibeto-Burmans and Western Tibeto-Burmans. To the
former class belong the Chins, the Kachins and the Nagas of Upper Burma and to the latter the
Burmese of the Irrawaddy Valley, the Marus and Lasis of the N'Maikha, the Lisaws of the Salween and
the Lahus and Akhas of the Mekong. There are signs of a common ancestry in the languages of the
Burmese, the Chins and the Kachins. The Shans, Palaungs and the Was, however, belong to a separate
though allied ethnological group known as the Tais.
The historical and cultural links between the Burmese and the Shans have been particularly close. In
the middle of the 8th Century, the Shans formed a powerful state in Nanchao, the modern Yunnan,
and could resist Chinese attempts at conquest until 1253. About 1254 the ruler of Nanchao subjugated
certain tribes of the Upper Irrawaddy and had close relations with the Kingdom of Burma, composed
of Pyus, a race which later merged with others to form the Burmese.
In 1253 the Shan Kingdom of Nanchao was broken up by the Tartar Emperor Kublai Khan and the
Shans were forced to migrate mainly south and west. Some of them entered Siam and founded a
kingdom at Chieng Rai in 12762, another at Chieng Mai, in 1296, and a third at Ayuthiya in 1351,
after defeating older kingdoms established by the Mons. These kingdoms in later centuries were
consolidated into the Kingdoms of Siam. An earlier migration of Shans which took place before the
Chinese conquest of Nanchao was across northern Burma into Assam where they founded the once
powerful Kingdom of Ahom. There is an obvious connection between the words Ahon, Assam, Shan
and Siam.
In the period of the Kingdom of Pagan (1044-1287) the Shans had established in northern Burma a
state known as Maw and comprising Mogaung and Mohnyin, but though it is recorded in Burmese
chronicles the the Sawbwa of Maw sent tributes and a princess to wed King Anawrahta of Pagan, he
was probably independent. After the fall of Pagan before the Tartars in 1287, three Shan princes
dominated Upper Burma, one of them, Thihathu, becoming king in 1312 with his capital at Pinya. A
younger son of his set up an independent kingdom at Sagaing in 1315. There was at this period a large
penetration of Shans into Upper Burma, and even further south to Toungoo. The Shans of Maw, now
gradually strengthened by fresh Shan migration, invaded both the kingdoms of Pinya and Sagaing in
1364. After their departure the two kingdoms were united under another Shan King, Thadomingya,
who built his capital at Ava. By the time of his successor, Minkyiswasawke (1368-1401), the Shan
dynasty had merged with the remnants of the older Burmese dynasty of Pagan and many of the Shans
who had penetrated into Burma and had intermarried became indistinguishable from the Burmese.
There was a second invsion of Upper Burma by the Shans in 1507, this time by Sawlon, Chief of
Mohnyin, who attacked over a long front and began a systematic destruction of the Burmese kingdom,
until it fell in 1527 with the death of its king in battle. A great part of the Burmese population of Upper
Burma migrated southwards to the new Burmese kingdom of Toungoo. After the conquest, Sawlon set
up his son Thohanbwa (1527-43) as King of Ava who was afterwards assassinated and was succeeded
by the Sawbwa of Hsipaw under the title of Khonmaing in 1543. The dynasty founded by him ruled
Upper Burma until Bayinnaung, the Burmese King of Toungoo, reconquered it in 1555. The latter
King, as part of the process of consolidating the whole of Upper Burma in three campaigns, invaded
the Shan States, on after another, including Mohnyin and Mogaung and also two states, Chiengmai
and Linzin, which are now in Siam, The suzerainty of the Kings of Burma over the Shan Chiefs dates
from that period. Bayinnaung also established the Buddhist faith in the Shan States.
It was traditional Burmese policy not to interfere with the internal administration of their feudatory
states and Shan chieftains were left to rule their own states. Many young Shan princes and princesses
were, however, brought up at the Burmese court, many Shan princesses became Burmese queens and
Shan levies were from that period constantly present in the Burmese armies, being particularly noted
for their spearmanship and for their skill in fighting on elephants. Though the Shans preserve their

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own language, many Shans have learnt Burmese and in fact the two races share a common culture, and
almost a common literature. The last King of Burma, Thibaw, was half Shan. After the annexation of
Upper Burma in 1886 the British had succeeded to the rights of the Burmese kings. Many of the Shan
chieftains, however, looked askance at the claim and rallied round a Burmese prince, the Limbin
Mintha, in an attempt to resist the British, an attempt which they gave up when it proved hopeless.
The relationship between the Burmese and the Kachins was less close. As a race the Kachins originate
from the eastern portion of the Tibetan plateau and , as compared to the Burmese, the Chins and the
Shan, they are latecomers into Burma, though they have now reached as far south as the Shan State of
Kengtung and the concentration of hills in the Myitkyina, Bhamo and Katha districts. They are
scarcely mentioned in Burmese chronicles and inscriptions before the 15th century, but the Burmese
King Bayinnaung of Toungoo (1551-81) used Kachin levies for his army. It was their custom to obtain
permission from the ruler of the country or state before practising shifting cultivation in the hills and it
may be assumed that, though they governed themselves according to tribal customs, they
acknowledged the suzerainty of the Burmese or Shan ruler concerned. The armies of King Alaungpaya
(1752-60) contained Kachin levies.
The Burmese were not interested in the internal administration of the Kachins and the suzerainty
exercised did not mean much more than occasional persents or tribute from the Kachins and their
occasional service in Burmese armies. In some cases Kachin Duwas of importance received
appointment orders from the Burmese King. Thus the Kansi Duwa, a powerful chieftain, received his
appointment order and his badge of office from King Mindon (1853-1878) U Khaung in the same
period was appointed military commander in Hkamti Long by King Mindon and placed under the
orders of the Sawbwa of Wuntho.
The Kachins did not take easily to the idea of submitting to the British on the annexation of Upper
Burma in 1886 and several British expeditions had to be sent to the Kachin Hills, the Kachins
resisting with considerable success. It was not until 1895 that the Kachins opposition could be broken
and British administration introduced in the Kachin Hills by the Kachin Hill Tribes Regulation of that
year. As the Kachins are not self-sufficient in their hills they have always been obliged to maintain
contact with the plains population through Shan-Burmese villages in the foothills. Some Kachins know
Burmese.
Sections of the Chins who have migrated into Burma from the Tibetan plateau almost in a straight line
down south are to be found from the Somra Hill Tracts down to Cape Negrais. The Chins, then
mostly in north-western Burma, are known to have had social intercourse with the Burmese at the time
of the Kingdom of Pagan (1044-1287). There were Chin levies in the armies of King Bayinnaung of
Toungoo (1551-81) and of King Alaungpaya of Ava (1752-60).
Local tradition has it that the ancestors of some of the people forming the principal tribes ascended the
Chin lands from the Kale-Kabaw and the Myittha river valleys. One group went there by the foothill
Burmese village, Yazagyo, and are the clans now inhabiting the north-east region of Tiddim. Another
group went up Mount Kennedy from the Kale Valley. They then descended the western slope of
Mount Kennedy and settled in Zangpitam above Thuklai village, Siyin Valley. Later they continued
their move to Cimnuai near Saizang village, Sokte area. Their descendants spread along various routes
from Cimnuai and are believed to be the ancestors of the present tribes of SiYin, Dokte, Kamhau, Zo
and Thado. The remainder moved from the Myittha river valley into the central Chin country and
were the ancestors of the Zanniats, Zahaus, Tashons of Falam and various tribes of Haka.
It is not within tribal memory that any full-scale organised war was ever waged between the Burmese
kings and the Chins, but minor hostilities used to occur at times in the foothill valleys, resulting in
raids and skirmishes on the border.
British troops were in action against the Northern Chins after the annexation of Upper Burma for a
continued period of seven months or thereabouts among the foothills now passed by the Kalemyo-Fort

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White-Tiddim road, at a place called Leisan (now known as the Basha hill). The Chins resisted the
advance of British troops fearlessly till they were subdued. It was not until 1892 that the northern
people now inhabiting the Tiddim subdivision were totally disarmed. The central Chins did not offer
any full-scale resistance. Further down in the south, the various tribes of the Haka subdivision resisted
sternly the advance of the forces from the Gangaw Valley.
There is a great deal of social intercourse between the Chins and the Burmese and a considerable
number of Chins speak Burmese. Many Chins living in the Pakokku, Thayetmyo, Prome and Henzada
districts have become Burmanised, being mostly Buddhists. Even in respect of the Chins in the Chin
Hills District, those who inhabit the southern portion and those areas adjacent to the Kale-Kabaw
valley are in close touch with the Burmese. The Chins have frequently expressed a desire to have
Burmese as the medium of instruction in their schools.
The Karens of the Frontier Areas, apart from Karenni, are mostly found in the Salween District, in
certain portions of the Southern Shan States and in the hill areas of the Toungoo District. The Karens
in the Shan States naturally have close relations with the Shans, while the Karens of the Salween
District live intermingled with the Shans and other races, which form the minority population of this
district. They were the earliest settlers in Burma and, after migrating southwards through the hill areas,
some penetrated into the plains of the Irrawaddy Delta and the Tenasserim Division and lived
peacefully with other races. Peace loving, shy and aloof by nature, many preferred to remain in the
seclusion of the hills. The Salween District was ruled by a Chief Sgaw Saw Ku at the time of the British
annnexation of Tenasserim, who surrendered the district to the British authorities.
Karenni, the home of the Red Karens, is made up of the State of Kantarawaddi, forming Eastern
Karenni, and the States of Bawlake and Kyebogyi forming Western karenni. At some periods in the
history of Burma the Chiefs of Karenni were feudatories of the Burmese King. Thus King Minkyinyo
(1486-1531) received propitiatory tribute from the rulers of Karenni. Nevertheless no attempt was ever
made by Burmese kings to interfere with the States till 1845, when the Red Karens became aggressive
and raided the neighbouring Shan States in pursuit of slaves. The Burmese raised an expeditionary
force in the Shan States, raided Karenni and did not withdraw until the Red Karens submitted. After
this trouble the Chief of Kyebogyi, formerly an official of the Chief of Bawlake, received from the
Burmese King recognition as the ruler of a separate state in Karenni and the title of Myosa. In 1886
the Chief of Kantarawadi in Eastern Karenni assisted the Burmese King in suppressing a rebellion led
by the latter's son, the Prince of Mingun and in recognition of these services the Chief was granted by
King Mindon a letter of appointment under the title of Myosa of Kantarawadi. In 1881 the Chief sent
his son Sawlawi with presents to King Thibaw at Mandalay and Sawlawi received royal recognition as
Kyem-mong, or heir apparent, of the State.
A Burmese outpost was established at Loikaw in 1872 and another at Nammakon in 1873, but the
latter was withdrawn in 1876 on the representation of the British Government.
In 1875 the independence of Western Karenni was guaranteed as follows, by an agreement between
the British and the Burmese Governments:"It is hereby agreed between the British and Burmese Governments that the State of Western Karenni
shall remain separate and independent, and that no sovereignty or governing authority of any
description shall be claimed or exercised over that State."
After the annexation of Upper Burma in 1886 the British, in view of the Agreement of 1875, left
Western Karenni alone for some time. An attempt made in 1887 by the British to secure the peaceful
submission of the Myosa of Kantarawaddi in Eastern Karenni was unsuccessful and in 1888 the Myosa
even raided the Shan State of Mawkmai which had accepted British suzerainty. A British force
despatched to Karenni in December of the same year subjugated the State. The Myosa was deposed
and his son Sawlawi, the Kyem-mong was elected by the people Chief of Kantarawadi and
subsequently confirmed by the British authorities as Myosa under a sanad or patent of appointment in

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the same terms as Chiefs of Shan States. The status of the Myosa was later raised to that of Sawbwa.
In 1892 the Chiefs of Western Karenni, of whom there were four at the time, nominally independent,
were formally recognised as feudatories by the Government of India and were preented with sanads
appointing them Myosas on terms similar to the Myosa of Kantarawadi. These four states were later
reduced to the present two by amalgamations.
The three Karenni States have never been annexed to the British Crown and have the status of
feudatory states. The Chiefs, under the sanads recognising their appointment, are required, among
other conditions, to pay an annual tribute and accept and act upon any advice given to them by the
British political officer concerned.
6. British Administration of Frontier Areas up to 1942.
The strategic importance of the Frontier Areas as a buffer between an inland invader and the valleys of
Burma proper prompted the British to extend their administration over these areas piecemeal, as
necessity or opportunity arose, in the years following 1886. Local advances continued in the far north
as late as 1940, when the head-hunting Naga tribes were first brought under some sort of
administration.
From the late 19th century until the 1935 Government of Burma Act came into force in 1937 the form
of administration in the Frontier Areas, other than the Shan States, did not materially change. They
were ruled as part of Burma in the traditional manner by local chieftains under the general supervision
and control of the Governor of Burma.
British administration of the Shan States up to 1942 may be divided into four periods. First, in 1888,
leading Sawbwas were persuaded to accept the simple form of Sanad, one of the clauses in which
required a Sawbwa to accept the guidance of the "Superintendent." The actual administration during
the period 1886-1897 however was left in the hands of the Sawbwas. British advisers were attached to
the Sawbwas of Hsipaw and Yaunghwe. This was the origin of the system of "Assistant Superintendents"
in the Shan States.
The years 1897-1922 were marked by the introduction of local self-government in Burma and in the
Lieutenant Governor's Council a Shan Sawbwa was a member throughout this period.
The third period, 1922-1935, was an experimental one in federation. The federation of Northern and
southern Shan States came into effect on 1st October, 1922, which was a year before the introduction
of the dyarchical form of government in Burma. The Federal Council of Shan Chiefs, with a
Commissioner as President, was introduced. Through this Council the Sawbwas expressed their views
on federal and general matters, including the federal budget. The Burma Frontier Service came into
being with the introduction of federation. Towards the end of this period suggestions were made for
the creation of a Peoples' Council.
The fourth period, from 1935 to 1942, was marked by a series of reforms as a result of representations
by Sawbwas to His Majesty's Government. A significant feature was the creation of a small Standing
Committee of Council Chiefs composed of six representatives elected by the main Council. This
Standing Committee had direct dealings with the Governor periodically. Thus federal subjects came
under the general direction of the Council.
Although, however, the system of administration was different, the course of events forged a number of
new links between the Frontier peoples and Burma during this period. Many trading centres sprang up
in the valleys where Burmese, Indian and Chinese merchants settled and built up a considerable trade
with the people of the nearby hills. By 1935 the population of these centres and the surrounding
country had become rather more advanced than their neighbours in the hills.
The 1935 Act made allowances for the different stages of development in the different part of the

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Scheduled Areas by dividing them into less politically advanced regions, known as Part I areas, still to
be administered by the Governor in his discretion, and the more politically advanced Part II areas, the
administration of which was within the ministerial sphere, though the Governor had a special
responsibility over these and could over-rule the decision of ministers in respect of these areas. A
further division was made in Part II between the Constituency areas, which returned members to the
Burma Legislature in Rangoon, and the Non-Constituency areas.
It was contemplated that, as Part II Areas continued to develop, they should in time be completely
merged in Burma proper. The same course of development was open to Part I Areas. The Act allowed
Part I Areas to become Part II Areas, as they matured, and Part II Areas to be merged in Ministerial
Burma, but did not permit the reverse process in either case.
The 1935 Act remained in active operation until the Japanese invasion in 1942 and the process of
closer association between Burma and the frontier Areas continued. The links between the two were
not only commercial but also financial. For instance, Health, Education, and various other services
were financed in part by the revenues of Burma, since all the Frontier Areas with the possible exception
of the Federated Shan State were deficit.* Moreover, Kachins, Chins and Karens had all come to
regard service in the Burma Army and Police, both financed by Burma, as an important source of
income.
By the time of the Japanese occupation in 1942, the situation was that the frontier peoples had begun
to be accustomed to many amenities of which they had known nothing before 1886, and which they
could not afford to maintain out of their own resources. Thus, both political and economic links had
been strengthened between them and Burma since the British annexation of 1886.
* (The Shan States were self-supporting before the War, if the Shan States Federal Fund is taken into
account. This Fund was created in 1922 and maintained by contributions from the States and from the
funds of Burma and by receipts from minerals and forests. From 1937 the contribution from the
central revenues of Burma was not a gift to finance a deficit, but a carefully calculated allotment of
what was due to the States in consideration of revenue accruing to the Central Government from
taxation of commercial activity in their territories (e.g. the entire Petrol Tax accrued in the first place to
central revenues, although much petrol was consumed by transport operating in the Shan States). The
Fund has been in abeyance since 1941, but Articles 8 and 9 of the Panglong Agreement foreshadow its
renewal.)
7. British Re-occupation in 1945.
After the British re-occupation in 1945, it soon became apparent that administration under the 1935
Act would not for long satisfy the political aspirations of Burma. Burmese nationalism had greatly
increased both in strength and in the urgency of its demands, and a similar, though less marked,
development had taken place among the frontier peoples, who were anxious to take into their own
hands as soon as possible many of the powers formerly exercised by the British. It was realised that the
time had come when the traditional methods of personal rule must be modified by the development of
representative institutions, where they were in existence, and their creation where they were not. A start
was made by enhancing the importance of the Village Councils that had, according to customary law,
formerly advised the Chiefs in the exercise of their powers, and by fostering the growth of larger
District and Domain Councils to which the villages could send representatives. A hierarchy of Councils
with powers at first advisory and later executive was in fact envisaged. The process, however, was
bound by its very nature to take time, and was, by early 1947, still at a comparatively rudimentary
stage. As far as the Shan States were concerned the absorption in 1945 of the duties of the
Commissioner, Federated Shan States, in those of the Director, Frontier Areas Administration, with
headquarters in Rangoon, and the placing of the Federated Shan States under the charge of two
Residents, constituted a reversion to the system of administration before 1925, when there was no
separate Commissioner for the Shan States. This did away with the central executive within the
Federated Shan States and the control over federal departments. The Sawbwas therefore formed their
own Executive Council including the representatives of the people.

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At the same time, the more enlightened leaders of the frontier peoples realized that they were
economically as well as politically less advanced than Burma proper. They depended on Burma to
supplement the inadequate local production even of their staple foodstuff, rice, and, outside the Shan
States, the sparsity of population and difficulty of communications were serious obstacles to
development. They appreciated the fact that, in order to achieve a higher standard of living, they
needed a measure of outside assistance which would have to come from either Britain or Burma, and
that, in the conditions of the modern world, they had certain common interests with Burma which
precluded a continuance of the pre-war arrangements for entirely separate administrations.
Nonetheless, the historical fact that the frontier peoples had never been interfered with in their internal
affairs was not forgotten, and the desire for a large measure of autonomy was almost universal.
Various contacts between Burmese and frontier political leaders took place during 1945 and 1946,
and progress towards mutual understanding was made. In January, 1947, when the London Agreement
cleared the way for the speedy creation of a new constitution for Burma, the problem of relations
between the Frontier Areas and Burma acquired a new urgency. The Agreement, moreover, gave a
clear indication of the most desirable solution to the problem, by proclaiming that it was the agreed
objective of both H.M.G. and the Government of Burma "to achieve the early unification of the
Frontier Areas and Ministerial Burma with the free consent of the inhabitants of those areas."
In February, 1947, leaders and representatives of the majority of the frontier peoples met members of
the Burma Executive Council at Panglong, in pursuance of the terms of paragraph 8(b) of the London
Agreement, and agreed on a form of association during the interim period until the new constitution
came into force.
8. The Panglong Agreement
The terms of the Panglong Agreement, which regulated relations between Burma and the major
portion of the Frontier Areas when the Committee of Exquiry began its work, were as follows:THE PANGLONG AGREEMENT, 1947.
A conference having been held at Panglong, attended by cortain Members of the Executive Council of
the Governor of Burma, all Saohpas and representatives of the Shan States, the Kachin Hills and the
Chin Hills:
The Members of the Conference, believing that freedom will be more speedily achieved by the Shans,
the Kachins and Chins by their immediate co-operation with the Interim Burmese Government:
The Members of the Conference have accordingly, and without dissentients, agreed as follows:1. A representative of the Hill Peoples, selected by the Governor on the recommendation of
representatives of the Supreme Council of the United Hill Peoples (SCOUHP), shall be
appointed a Counsellor to the Governor to deal with the Frontier Areas.
2. The said Counsellor shall also be appointed a Member of the Governor's Executive Council,
without portfolio, and the subject of Frontier Areas brought within the purview of the Executive
Council by Constitutional Convention as in the case of Defence and External Affairs. The
Counsellor for Frontier Areas shall be given executive authority by similar means.
3. The said Counsellor shall be assisted by two Deputy Counsellors representing races of which
he is not a member. While the twoDeputy Counsellors should deal in the first instance with the
affairs of their respective areas and the Counsellor with all the remaining parts of the Frontier
Areas, they should by Constitutional Convention act on the principle of joint responsibility.
4. While the Counsellor, in his capacity of Member of the Executive Council, will be the only
representative of the Frontier Areas on the Council, the Deputy Counsellors shall be entitled to
attend meeting of the Council when subjects pertaining to the Frontier Areas are discussed.

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5. Though the Governor's Executive Council will be augmented as agreed above, it will not
operate in respect of the Frontier Areas in any manner which would deprive any portion of
these Areas of the autonomy which it now enjoys in internal administration. Full autonomy in
internal administration for the Frontier Areas is accepted in principle.
6. Though the question of demarcating and establishing a separate Kachin State within a Unified
Burma is one which must be relegated for decision by the Constituent Assembly, it is agreed
that such a State is desirable. As a first step towards this end, the Counsellor for Frontier Areas
and the Deputy Counsellor shall be consulted in the administration of such areas in the
Myitkyina and the Bhamo Districts as are Part II Scheduled Areas under the Government of
Burma Act of 1935.
7. Citizens of the Frontier Areas shall enjoy rights and privileges which are regarded as
fundamental in democratic countries.
8. The arrangements accepted in this Agreement are without prejudice to the financial autonomy
now vested in the Federated Shan States.
9. The arrangements accepted in this Agreement are without prejudice to the financial assistance
which the Kachin Hills and the Chin Hills are entitled to receive from the revenues of Burma,
and the Executive Council will examine with the Frontier Areas Counsellor and Deputy
Counsellors the feasibility of adopting for the Kachin Hills and the Chin Hill financial
arrangements similar to those between Burma and the Federated Shan States.
The importance of the Agreement lies not only in the fact that it settles the form of association during
the interim period, but also in its enunciation of certain principles, notably that the frontier peoples
should be entitled to fundamental democratic rights, that they should have the right to full autonomy
in the internal sphere, and that they should be entitled to receive a measure of assistance from the
revenues of Ministerial Burma, which are relevant to decision of the ultimate form of association. The
formation of the Supreme Council of the United Hill Peoples was also a noteworthy step forward in the
establishment of representative institutions among the frontier peoples.
9. Limitations of Panglong Agreement.
When the Committee began its investigation, the Panglong Agreement had not been accepted by all the
frontier peoples. The Shans, Kachins and Chins had ratified it, and their actions may be assumed to
cover the small racial units within their areas. The Karens, however, of the Salween District and the
Karenni States, who were not represented by delegates at Panglong, were not parties to the Agreement.
Others who were not present and whose adherence could not be taken for granted were the Chins of
the Arakan Hill Tracts, the Nagas and the Was.
Such was the situation when the Frontier Areas Committee of Enquiry began its work.
CHAPTER II.
THE WORK OF THE COMMITTEE.
1. Composition of the Committee.
The Members of the Committee were:Chairman:
Mr. D. R. Rees-Williams, M.P.

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Burma Members:

Frontier Areas Members:

The Hon. U Tin Tut, C.B.E.

Member without portfolio
of Executive Council.

The Hon. Sawbwa of

Mongpawn(Shan),
Counsellor to H.E. the
Governor for
the Frontier Areas, and
Member of Executive Council.

Thakin Nu, Vice-President

A.F.P.F.L.

Sima Hsinwa Nawng (Kachin),

Deputy Counsellor.

U Khin Maung Gale,

A.F.P.F.L

U Vum Ko Hau (Chin),

Deputy Counsellor.

Saw Myint Thein,

Karen Youth's Organization.

Saw Sankey,
Karen National Union.

Secretariat:
Mr.W.B.J.Ledwidge,
Burma Office,
Secretariat.
U Tun Pe, B.Fr.S.,
Joint Secretary.
Major Shan Lone, O.B.E., M.C., B.Fr.S.,
Assistant Secretary.

Saw Myint Thein joined the Committee when it moved to Maymyo, in place of the Hon'ble U Kyaw
Nyein, Home Member, who was a member in Rangoon, but was forced to resign owing to pressure of
other work.
2. Programme of the Committee.
It was clear that, in order to arrive at a solution, the Committee must hear the evidence of all interested
parties. Witnesses from every one of the Frontier Areas were therefore invited to testify before the
Committee. The selection of the main body of witnesses was carried out by the Councils in each area;
but it was also announced that any individual or organization who was dissatisfied with the selected list
of witnesses might apply to the Committee for a separate interview. A number of requests of this kind
were received and all were accepted.
It was decided that witnesses from the Arakan Hill Tracts and the Salween District should be heard at
Rangoon, and that those from the other Frontier Areas should be heard at Maymyo, which was more
accessible to them. The possibility of the Committee establishing its headquarters in every area in turn
in order to interview witnesses locally was considered, but rejected because of shortage of time and
transport, and administrative difficulties.
The Committee further decided that all meetings should be held in private and that the Chairman
together with two Members each from Burma and the Frontier Areas should constitute a quorum.
It was agreed that Advisers to Members should be allowed to attend all meetings but should not
participate in the discussions. Advisers who attended were:1. Sao Boon Waat, Political Secretary to the Hon. Sawbwa of Mongpawn.

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2. Labang Grong, Adviser to Sima Hsinwa Nawng.

3. U Thong Chin Tang, B.Fr.S., Adviser to U Vum Ko Hau.
The Hon.U Kyaw Nyein, who resigned from the Committee when it left Rangoon, was also permitted
to attend certain meetings in Maymyo as an observer.
3. Preliminary Tour.
The Chairman, accompanied by the Hon'ble Sawbwa of Mongpawn, the Hon'ble U Tin Tut and U
Khin Maung Gale, made a brief Preliminary tour of Kachin, Shan and Karen country from 7th to
17th March, 1947, and held informal meetings with local notabilities. Their programme was as
follows:7th March- Rangoon to Myitkyina by air.
9th March- Myitkyina to Bhamo by road.
10th March- Bhamo to Lashio by road.
12th March- Lashio to Loilem by road.
13th March- Loilem to Taunggyi by road.
14th March- Taunggyi to Loikaw by road.
15th March- Loikaw to Mawchi by road.
16th March- Mawchi to Toungoo by road.
17th March- Toungoo to Rangoon by road.
The Hon'ble U Tin Tut and U Khin Maung Gale left the party at Lashio to return to Rangoon by way
of Mandalay and Meiktila.
4. Meeting in Rangoon.
The Committee held is first formal meting in Rangoon on 18th March, 1947, and then proceeded to
hear witnesses as follows:
19th March- Director, Frontier Areas Administration (for factual evidence relation to Salween
District). Salween District witnesses.
21st March- Saw Marshall Shwin, President of Shwegyin Karen Association.
22nd Director, Frontier Areas Administration (for factual evidence on natural resources
March- of Frontier Areas).
24th March- Arakan Hill Tracts witnesses.
26th March- Karen Youths' Organisation witnesses.
5. Meeting in Maymyo.
On 27th March, 1947, the Committee moved to Maymyo, and resumed hearings in accordance with
the following programme:11th April- Witnesses from:(a) Shan States Peoples' Freedom Congress.
(b) Kalaw, Taunggyi and Lashio Notified Areas, and Loilem.
(c) Northern Wa States.
(d) Kokang State.

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12th April- Witnesses from:(a) Southern Wa States.

(b) North Hsenwi State.
(c) South Hsenwi State.
(d) Taungpeng State.
14th April- Witnesses from:(a) Karenni States.
(b) Mongmit and Kengtung States.
(c) Papun United Karen Organisation.
16th April- Witnesses from:(a) Myitkyina and Bhamo Council Kachins.
(b) Hkamti Long Shans.
(c) Kachin Youths' League.
(d) Jingpaw National Modern Civilisation Development Association.
(e) Northern Hsenwi- Mongmit Kachins.
(f) Army Kachins.
(g) Frontier Constabulary Kachins.
(h) Nepali Association, Myitkyina.
17th April- Witnesses from:(a) Karen National Union.
(b) Bhamo A.F.P.F.L.
19th April- Witnesses form:(a) Falam Chins.
(b) Haka Chins.
(c) Tiddim Chins.
(d) Chin Pensioners' Association.
(e) Kanpetlet Chins.
(f) Somra Tract (Part I Area) Chins.
(g) Thaungdut State (Part I Area) Chins.
(h) Singkaling Hkamti State (Part I Area) Shans.
(i) Homalin Subdivision (Part II Area) Burmanised Shans.
21st April- Witnesses from:(a) Supreme Council of United Hills Peoples.
(b) Shan Sawbwas.
(c) Other Southern Shan States.
(d) Tiddim and Kanpetlet Chins.
(e) Bhamo Part II Area Burman community.
6. Preparation of Report.
After completing the hearing of evidence, the Committee proceeded immediately to consideration of
their Report. On 23rd April they agreed unanimously on the Recommendations and Observations
contained in the following chapter and the Report was formally signed on 24th April. The Committee
held a total of 24 meetings, 17 devoted to the hearing of evidence and seven to private deliberations.
CHAPTER III.
RECOMMENDATIONS AND OBSERVATIONS.
PART I.
GENERAL

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The terms of reference of the Committee appear to restrict us to enquire and report on the best
method of associating the frontier peoples with the working out of the new constitution for Burma. We
make these recommendations in Part II of this chapter. It, however, proved difficult in the course of
our enquiry and in the examination of the witnesses who appeared before us to restrict the scope of our
investigations strictly to the objective set out in our terms of reference. In the minds of many of the
witnesses from the Frontier Areas the question of participation in the work of the Constituent Assembly
is inextricably intertwined with the question of the future of the frontier peoples under the new
constitution, and indeed, they appear to view the two questions as different facets of a single great
problem. Our tours and our enquiry have also given this Committee unprecedented opportunities of
contact with and insight into the minds of the frontier peoples. We would, therefore, be failing in our
duty if we were to refrain from adding to our recommendations a summary of the salient features that
emerge from the evidence on the second question and if we did not add to these certain observations
which may be of assistance to the Constituent Assembly when it deals with the difficult problem of
framing a constitution for the whole of Burma. These observations will be found in Part III of this
chapter.
PART II.
THE CONSTITUENTY ASSEMBLY.
(1) With the exception of the unfederated Shan States of Taungdut and Singkaling Hkamti, all the
witnesses before us expressed without hesitation the desire that representatives of their States or local
areas should take part in the work of the Constituent Assembly, the members of which, in respect of
such portions of ministerial Burma as enjoy rights of representation in the Legislature under the 1935
Act, have already been elected. We recommend accordingly that their wishes be met and that the
following areas be given representation in the Constituent Assembly:The Federated Shan States, including Kokang and Mongpai.
The Kachin Hills.
The Chin Hills with the Arakan Hill Tracts.
The Karenni States.
The Somra Tract.
The Salween District.
The Homalin Subdivision.
We have grouped Kokang with the Federated Shan States though its de jure position is not quite clear.
We have, however, ascertained from the Federated Shan States that one of the seats to be allocated to
them for the Constituent Assembly will be given to a representative of Kokang. We have grouped the
Arakan Hill Tracts with the Chin Hills, as the witnesses from the former area have shown a clear desire
to be associated with the Chins of the Chin Hills, and we have ascertained that one of the seats to be
allocated to the Chin Hills will be given to the Arakan HillTracts. Witnesses from the States of
Thaungdut and Singkaling Hkamti not only expressed a desire to be incorporated in ministerial Burma
but stated that they are prepared to accept whatever future constitution is drawn up by the Burmese.
We found it impracticable to procure witnesses from the Naga Hills and the Wa States, but we have no
hesitation in recommending that representatives need not be sought from these areas for the
Constituent Assembly on account of the primitive nature of their civilisation and the impossibility of
their finding persons who will be able to assist in the drawing up of Burma's future constitution.
(2) We have found the question of determining the number of seats to be allocated to the Frontier
Areas in the Constituent Assembly one of considerable difficulty. Strictly on a population basis they
would be entitled to a maximum of some 35 seats as against the 210 seats allocated to the constituency
areas of ministerial Burma. But some consideration is due to the fact that, though the population of
Frontier Areas is only one-sixth of the population of ministerial Burma, in point of area they constitute
some 47 per cent. of the whole of Burma, and also to the fact that many parts of the Frontier Areas are
sub-divided into numerous States or tribal areas and that too small a number may impede a satisfactory
division of seats within the same territorial unit. Thirdly, there are small units which, though they may

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not be entitled to one seat each on a population basis, cannot be given less than one member if they
are to be represented at all. We accordingly recommend that the Frontier Areas (by which we mean
here the areas set out in Part I of Schedule II of the Government of Burma Act, 1935) and the Karenni
States be allocated 44 seats and that the Homalin Subdivision, a Part II non-constituency are in the
same Schedule, be allocated one seat.
In regard to the distribution of the seats our recommendations are as below:Federated Shan States (incluting Kokang and Mongpai) 26
The Kachin Hills

The Chin Hills with the Arakan Hill Tracts

Karenni

2
41
.

The Salween District

The Somra Tract

The Homalin Subdivision

1
45

We have shown in the above table the Salween District, the Somra tract and the Homalin Subdivision
in a separate compartment for convenience, as witnesses from these areas expressed a desire for their
incorporation in ministerial Burma.
(3) The physical difficulties of travel in the Frontier Areas, the unfamiliarity of their peoples with the
system of expressing their will through the ballot box and the limiting factor of time preclude us from
recommending for the Frontier Areas elections to the Constituent Assembly the method of electoral
rolls and the ballot box, and, indeed, with the exception of a small section of the witnesses from the
Chin Hills, every witness before us to whom the question was put replied in fact that full-dress elections
are impracticable. Simpler and quicker measures are essential and for the Federated Shan States we
recommend that the Council of Shan States should form the electoral body for returning the members
for these States to the Constituent Assembly. This Council is a representative body, half of which
consists of representatives of the Shan Sawbwas and the other half of representatives of the people of
these States. There are no bodies of a sufficiently representative nature in the other Frontier Areas and
we make the following recommendations after taking due account of the local conditions:(i) For the Kachin Hills we recommend that the electoral body should consist of the
members of the District Council, the members of the subdivisional or domain councils,
the duwa in charge of each administrative unit and a peoples' representative from each
such unit. The peoples' representative should further be elected at a mass meeting of the
members of such unit.
(ii) For the Chin Hills we recommend that one representative be elected in the Arakan
Hill Tracts by a mass meeting, one be elected at a mass meeting in the Kanpetlet
subdivision and the remainder be elected at a joint mass meeting of the residents of the
remaining sudivisions, all these meetings to be held in such manner as may be approved
by the Deputy Counsellor in charge of the Chin Hills.
(iii) For the Karenni States we recommend that the chiefs or administrators of the three
States may be asked to consult the wishes of their peoples and to nominate jointly the
representatives for the Constituent Assembly .

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(iv) For the Salween District we recommend that the representatives be selected by a mass
meeting to be convened in such manner as many be approved by the Hon'ble Counsellor
in charge of the Frontier Areas.
(v) For the Somra tract and the Homalin Subdivision we recommend that the
representatives be selected at mass meetings to be convened by the principal civil officer
administering each area.
(4) We commend that the Frontier Areas members of the Constituent Assembly should have the same
status in the Assembly as members elected from ministerial Burma and that they be entitled to
participate fully in the deliberations of the Assembly and be eligible for places on such committees as
the Assembly may appoint. We further recommend that the participation of representatives from
various parts of the Frontier Areas in the work of the Constituent Assembly should not be regarded as
committing them to union or federation with Burma. As a further protection to the Frontier Areas, we
recommend that no proposal relating to the mode of government in the Federated Shan States, the
Kachin Hills, the Chin Hills and the Karenni States shall be deemed to have been carried in the
Constituent Assembly unless it has been voted for not only by a majority of the members of the
Assembly present, but also by the majority of the members present of the unit concerned. Similarly, we
recommend that no proposal relating to the constitution of a federated Burma shall be deemed to have
been carried in the Constituent Assembly unless it has been voted for not only by the majority of the
members of the Assembly present, but also by a majority of the members present of the Frontier Areas
which will from states in the federation.
PART III.
OBSERVATIONS.
1. The Future of the Frontier Areas.
The view of the witnesses from the Federated Shan States and from the Kachin Hills are strongly in
favour of a federated Burma in which the Federated Shan States will form a state or unit and the
Kachin Hills another. They desire the fullest possible autonomy for the states within the federation but
agree that certain subjects of general scope should be entrusted to the federation. On the evidence
tendered before us, representatives from the Chin Hills do not desire to federate the Chin Hills with
Burma proper but prefer an amalgamation of their area with ministerial Burma, stipulating only that
there should be no interference with their tribal customs and traditions and that their chieftains should
be allowed to administer their tracts as at present. The Chin Hills would otherwise become one or
more ordinary districts of Burma proper. On the day after they had tendered this evidence, the
witnesses submitted a letter saying that they had not understood the point correctly and that they
intended to say that the Chin Hills should form a separate state within a federated Burma. The only
conclusion we can safely draw is that the people of the Chin Hills are not yet in a position to come to a
firm conclusion on this matter and that it will have to be left to their representatives in the Constituent
Assembly to define their views precisely. The witnesses from the Arakan Hill Tracts, the majority
population of which is Chin, expressed no independent views but desire to follow the lead of the Chin
Hills people. The witnesses from the Somra Tract, Thaungdut, Singkaling Hkamti and the Homalin
Subdivision expressed categorically the view that their areas should be incorporated in ministerial
Burma and should be given the same constituency and other rights as other areas in Burma proper.
The representatives from the Karenni States, while stating clearly that they wished to be represented in
the Constituent Assembly, did not definitely commit themselves to any views in regard to the entry of
the Karenni States into a federated Burma. A group of witnesses from the Salween District, appearing
before us early in our meetings, expressed views in favour of forming a state within a Burma federation.
Another group, appearing before us later, supported by a letter from the leaders of the first group,
stated that, after further consideration at a mass meeting of the residents of the district, they now desire
the incorporation of the district as a part of ministerial Burma.
The picture that emerges from this welter of evidence is that of a federated Burma, with the federated
Shan States and the Kachin Hills as two constituent states and with the Karenni States possibly

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another, but with Burma proper enlarged by the possible incorporation of the Chin Hills, the probable
incorporation of the Salween District and the elimination in respect of many of the Part II Scheduled
areas of the political disabilities now suffered by them. These amalgamations should reduce the
craziness of the patchwork quilt which the present administration of the Frontier Areas resembles.
2. The Federal Council.
With due reference to the difference in political experience between Burma proper and the Frontier
Areas and between the Frontier Areas themselves, not to mention the present preponderating
importance of Burma proper, it may be found inexpedient for the Constituent Assembly to attempt to
draw up the constitution of a fully-fledged federation, even if the decision should be that the future
political structure should be in federal form. The present circumstances may call for an elastic interim
constitution establishing perhaps a Federal Council which will be somewhat on the lines of a
Legislature, with such subjects as may be allocated to the federal sphere. The majority of the members
of this council in equity be allocated to representatives of Burma proper in view of its present
preponderating importance. But, in determining the number of seats to be allocated to the other states,
we think that considerable weightage should be given, in order that these members should have a real
share in the control of the federation. In assessing this weightage due account must, we think, be taken
of the probability of party differences among the members from Burma proper.
3. Future Development.
In view of the fact that there exist differences in the stages of development between ministerial Burma
and the Frontier Areas and between the Frontier Areas themselves, the Constituent Assembly may find
it desirable to postpone the formation of a Federal Constitution on the lines adopted in other
countries, till such time as the Frontier Areas become more developed. The Federal Council, when
established by the Constituent Assembly, could then be elaborated into a Senate or a federal
Legislature. We note in this connection the existence of a Supreme Council of the United Hill Peoples,
representatives of which gave evidence before us, and which is at present a representative advisory
body dealing with Shan States, Kachin Hills and Chin Hills affairs and which also hopes to be
entrusted with Karenni affairs. We see scope for this Council playing a part of considerable importance
in advising Frontier Area states in the proposed Burma federation on subjects which are within state
jurisdiction and upon which joint action or a common doctrine is desirable.
4. Common Subjects.
The weight of opinion among the witnesses examined by us is that, if there should be a Burma
federation, the federal organ should deal with the following subjects:1. External affairs.
2. Defence.
3. Post and telegraphs.
4. Communications.
5. Currency and coinage.
6. Customs.
7. Titles and honours.
There is danger that the anxiety of the constituent states for the fullest possible internal autonomy
might lead to the constitution of a weak federal or central government which will be the government in
Burma which deals with the outside world. It is not for us to make recommendations regarding federal
subjects, but we see obvious omissions in the above list, which makes no mention of foreign trade or of
inter-state commerce or of federal finance.

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5. Right of Secession.
The majority of the witnesses who favoured a federation of Burma asked for the right of secession by
the states at any time. Few federal constitutions contain provision for the secession of states. It seems to
us that, if any such right is to be contained in the federal constitution for Burma, it will have to be
carefully limited and regulated.
6. Constitutional Safeguards.
The recommendations of the Constituent Assembly relating to the Frontier Areas should be
incorporated in the Burma Constitution and in the appropriate Act of Parliament.
7. Interim Arrangements.
During the transitional period, the Shan Counsellor and the Deputy Counsellors for the Kachins and
Chins should continue in office. The Frontier Areas Administration should also continue in this period
under the control of the Counsellor and his Deputies. Where possible, administrative officers should
be drawn from the indigenous peoples of the Frontier Areas.
8. States and other Territorial Units.
(1) The Federated Shan States.
(a) This federation should consist of the present States. The notified areas of Lashio,
Taunggyi and Kalaw and the civil stations of Loilem and Loimwe should, for
convenience in the administration of the federation, be incorporated in the respective
States in which they are situated.
(b) Mongpai State should continue to be grouped with the three Karenni States for
administrative purposes. Its political future should be decided by a Committee consisting
of representatives of the Shan States Council, Mongpai and Karenni.
(c) The Kokang State or Sub-State should remain as a Sub-State of North Hsenwi.
(2) The Kachin Hills.
If a Kachin State is to be established as a Constituent State in the Burma Federation, the question is
whether the Part I and the Part II areas should be amalgamated to form the new administrative and
economic unit. Evidence given by representatives of Part II areas in the Bhamo District indicated
probable unwillingness on the part of the Burmese and the Shan-Burmese population of the Part II
areas to be merged in the new State, particularly as some of these are constituency areas. We must
leave the point to be settled by negotiations in the Constituent Assembly. We agree, however, that the
Triangle should be included in the new State and also the Hkamti Long area. The Namwan Assigned
Tract should also be included in the State, but this inclusion will not of course, as such, affect its
position as an Assigned Tract. Kachin witnesses assured us that, if Part II areas should be united with
Part I areas to form the new state, they would willingly guarantee the rights and privileges of the
non-Kachin peoples and freedom to retain their own customs.
(3) The Chin Hills.
In view of the doubt regarding the wishes of the people of the Chin Hills and of the Arakan Hill Tracts
in regard to their political future, it must be left for negotiation and decision in the Constituent
Assembly.
(4) The Karenni States.
The representatives of the Karenni States expressed a desire for some form of association with the
other Frontier Areas. The exact form should be worked out in the Constituent Assembly.
The future of Mongpai State has already been referred to in paragraph 8(1)(b) above.
(5) The Salween District.
Evidence from the second group of representatives of this district indicated the desire for incorporation

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ministerial Burma as an ordinary district, but with the rider that, wherever possible, administrative
officers in the district should be Karens.
(6) The Naga Hills.
External government of some kind is, we think, still necessary in this area, till such time as its people
are fit for administering their area as a state in the Burma federation or a unit in ministerial Burma. We
have considered whether the Federal Council which was mentioned earlier in this report, might
suitably be entrusted with the supervision of the administration of this area. We think, however, that,
since the Homalin Subdivision, to which the Naga Hills adjoin, will be part of Burma proper, the Naga
Hills administration might be supervised by the Government of Burma proper. At present Homalin is
the headquarters of the Naga Hills District. In the meantime it is desirable that close liaison should be
maintained by the Burma Government with the Government of Assam, which also has Nagas on its
borders, in order that a common policy for the Nagas can be worked out and operated by these two
authorities.
(7) The Wa States.
The administration of these areas should be supervised either by the Federal Council or by the
government of the Federated Shan States, until their people are fit to take over the administration of
their own area either as a state in the Burma federation or as a unit of Burma proper. At present the Wa
States are under the charge of the Resident of the Northern Shan States. On the whole we are of
opinion that the Shan States government rather than the federal authorities would be in the best
position to supervise the administration of the Wa States.
(8) Other Areas.
(a) Tamu Township. This, we think, should be included in ministeria Burma and have
full constituency and other rights
(b) Eastern Toungoo, Kyain, Myawaddi and Thaton Part II Area. In our opinion, these
areas should be include in ministerial Burma and should have full constituency and other
rights, but negotiations to this end should take place in the Constituent Assembly.
(c) Thaungdut and Sinkaling Hkamti. These should, we think, be included in ministerial
Burma with full constituency and other rights. The Sawbwas in these states should
continue to perform their present functions.
(d) The Homalin Subdivision. This should also, in our opinion, be included in
ministerial Burma and have full constituency and other rights.
(e) The Somra Tract. We think that this should be included in ministerial Burma and
have full constituency and other rights.
(f) The Katha Part I Area should be, in our opinion, incorporated in ministerial Burma
and have full constituency and other rights, this is a matter to be negotiated in the
Constituent Assembly.
9. Acknowledgment.
Our task, enhanced in difficulty by the time factor, was facilitated by the energy and ability displayed
by Mr.W.B.J. Ledwidge of the Burma Office, our Secretary; U Tun Pe, B.Fr.S., our Joint Secretary;
and Major Shan Lone, O.B.E., M.C., B.Fr.S., our Assistant Secretary; and by the devoted and efficient
services of our staff of reporters, interpreters, typists, clerks and peons, all of whom worked overtime
and throughout the Burmese New year holidays. To each and every one of our Officers and Staff we
wish to convey our grateful thanks and appreciation.
Signed: 1. D. R. REES-WILLIAMS, Chairman.

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2. THAKIN NU.
3. SAO SAM HTUN.
4. TIN TUT.
5. HSINWA NAWNG.
6. KHIN MAUNG GALE.
7. VUM KO HAU.
8. MYINT THEIN.
9. SAW SANKEY.
Maymyo,
24th April, 1947.
(91966) 679/1820 6/47 M&C Ltd 440

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BURMA: ADMINISTRATIVE DISTRICTS (TILL 1947)

_______________________________________________
Created in this form by Thang Za Dal. Hamburg. Germany. Oct. 2013

The signing of the Panglong Agreement by the peoples representatives of Burmans, Shans, Kachins and Chins on
the 12th February 1947 at Panglong in Southern Shan State gave birth to the Union of Burma. If the Shans, Chins
and Kachins had not signed this treaty, only Burma Proper or Ministerial Burma would have gained independence
and there would never be a Union of Burma. The Kayahs or Karennis, who later joined the Union, did not sign this
treaty. The four Karenni states, which were later made into Kayah State, were de jure independent sovereign states
recognized in a treaty signed in 1875 by both the Burmese kings and the British. p. 82

15.2

THE PANGLONG AGREEMENT

Dated Panglong, the 12th February 1947
A conference having been held at Panglong, attended by certain Members of the
Executive Council of the Governor of Burma, all Saohpas and representative of the
Shan States, the Kachin Hills and the Chin Hills:
The Members of the conference, believing that freedom will be more speedily
achieved by the Shans, the Kachins and the Chins by their immediate co-operation
with the Interim Burmese Government:
1. A Representative of the Hill Peoples, selected by the Governor on the
recommendation of representatives of the Supreme Council of the United
Hill Peoples (SCOUHP), shall be appointed a Counsellor for Frontier
Areas shall be given executive authority by similar means.
2. The said Counsellor shall also be appointed a Member of the Governor's
Executive Council, without portfolio, and the subject of Frontier Areas
brought within the purview of the Executive Council by Constitutional
Convention as in the case of Defence and External Affairs. The
Counsellor for Frontier Areas shall be given executive authority by
similar means.
3. The said Counsellor shall be assisted by two Deputy Counsellors
representing races of which he is not a member. While the two Deputy
Counsellors should deal in the first instance with the affairs of their
respective areas and the Counsellor with all the remaining parts of the
Frontier Areas, they should by Constitutional Convention act on the
principle of joint responsibility.
4. While the Counsellor, in his capacity of Member of the Executive
Council, will be the only representative of the Frontier Areas on the
Council, the Deputy Counsellors shall be entitled to attend meetings of
the Council when subjects pertaining to the Frontier Areas are
discussed.
5. Though the Governor's Executive Council will be augmented as agreed
above, it will not operate in respect of the Frontier Areas in any
manner which would deprive any portion of those Areas of the autonomy
which it now enjoys in internal administration. Full autonomy in
internal administration for the Frontier Areas is accepted in principle.
6. Though the question of demarcating and establishing a separated Kachin
State within a Unified Burma is one which must be relegated for decision
by the Constituent Assembly, it is agreed that such a State is
desirable. As a first step towards this end, the Counsellor for Frontier
Areas and the Deputy Counsellors shall be consulted in the
administration of such areas in the Myitkyina and the Bhamo Districts as
are Part II Scheduled Areas under the Government of Burma Act of 1935.
7. Citizens of the Frontier Areas shall enjoy rights and privileges which
are regarded as fundamental in democratic countries.
8. The arrangements accepted in this Agreement are without prejudice to the
financial autonomy now vested in the Federated Shan States.

9. The arrangements accepted in this Agreement are without prejudice to the

financial assistance which the Kachin Hills and the Union Hills are
entitled to receive from the revenues of Burma, and the Exeutive Council
will examine with the Frontier Areas Counsellor and Deputy Counsellors
the feasibility of adopting for the Kachin Hills and the Chin Hills
financial arrangement similar to those between Burma and the Federated
Shan States.
Shan Committee.

Kachin Committee.

(Signed)
Saohpalong of Tawngpeng State.

Burmese Government.

(Signed)
(Signed)
(Sinwa Naw, Myitkyina)
(Aung San)

(Signed)

(Signed)

Saohpalong of Yawnghwe State.

(Signed)
Saohpalong of North Hsenwi State.

(Zau Rip, Myitkyina)

(Signed)
(Dinra Tang, Myitkyina)

(Signed)

(Signed)

Saohpalong of Laihka State.

(Zau La, Bhamo)

(Signed)
Saohpalong of Mong Pawn State.

(Signed)
(Zau Lawn, Bhamo)

(Signed)
Saohpalong of Hsamonghkam State.

(Signed)
(Labang Grong, Bhamo)

(Signed)
Representative of Hsahtung Saohpalong.
(Hkun Pung)

Chin Committee

(Signed)
(U Tin E)

(Signed)
(U Htun Myint)

(Signed)
(U Hlur Hmung, Falam)

(Signed)
(U Kya Bu)

(Signed)
(Hkun Saw)

(Signed)
(U Thawng Za Khup, Tiddim)

(Signed)
(Sao Yape Hpa)
pp. 88-89

(Signed)
(Hkun Htee)

(Signed)
(U Kio Mang, Haka)

THE 12 NEWS ITEMS LISTED BELOW ON THE CHIN PEOPLE ARE SO ARRANGED IN
THIS WAY SO THESE CAN ALSO SERVE AS A CASE STUDY FOR THE FATE OF ALL
OTHER NON-BURMAN INDIGENOUS NATIONALITIES IN BURMA.
______________________

Prepared by Thang Za Dal

April 2016

UN RIGHTS ENVOY AWESTRUCK BY LEVELS OF POVERTY IN CHIN STATE

* Thursday, 22 August 2013 13:40
* Written by Van Biak Thang (vanbiakthang@chinlandguardian.com)
22 August 2013:
The level of poverty in Chin State has alarmed Toms Ojea Quintana, the United Nations Special Rapporteur on the human
rights situation in Burma who made his first ever trip to one of the most isolated regions in Burma.Mr. Quintana said in his
statement yesterday that the Chin communities have suffered from neglect from the central government over the years.
"With the country opening up, development will come, but it is important that this process occurs in a participatory,
transparent, accountable and equal manner," he said. "The process of development and the exploitation natural resources there
should benefit the Chin communities," added the UN expert who had just returned from his first trip to Chin State. Over 70
percent of the population in Chin State live under the poverty line, making it the poorest state in the whole of Burma. During
his 8th trip to Burma, Mr. Quintana travelled to Mindat and Kanpetlet towns in southern Chin State, also visiting Christian
churches and government-controlled Na Ta La schools. The Na Ta La residential schools, run under military-dominated
Ministry for Border Affairs, has been accused of taking coercive measures to convert Chin Christian students to Buddhism.
Salai Za Uk Ling, Program Director of the Chin Human Rights Organization (CHRO), said: "Graduates of the Na Ta La schools
have guaranteed government positions, but only if they are Buddhists. This is a clear reflection that discrimination on the
ground of religious identity is entrenched within the Na Ta La school system.""This is why we have been calling for the
abolition of these schools and to instead properly finance the state education system where everyone can enjoy equal access
to good education."
The UN Special Rapporteur made a two-day trip to Chin State. He also visited other ethnic States of Rakhine, Shan and Kachin
as well as Meikhtila in Mandalay region. During his ten-day visit, Mr. Quinta was denied permission to visit Kachin State's
Laiza, the headquarters of the Kachin Independence Organization (KIO).
http://www.chinlandguardian.com/index.php/chin-news/item/1865-un-rights-envoy-awestruck-by-levels-of-poverty-in-chin-state

..................................................................................................................

DEMONSTRATIONS AGAINST BURMA-CHINA NICKEL PROJECT IN CHIN STATE

* Monday, 12 August 2013 08:38
* Written by Khaipi
* Published in Chin News
12 August 2013: Hundreds of demonstrators, mainly from the Zomi groups in exile, have protested against the Gullu Mual
nickel project in Tedim Township of Chin State, Burma. The events call for an immediate stop to the nickel mining project, a
joint venture between Burma's government and mining companies from China. A statement released by the World Zomi
Congress (WZC) said the groups condemned the partnership that would only exploit the natural resources of the indigenous
people in Chin State. Four nickel deposit areas in Mwe Hill, Webula Hill,
Hakhalay and Nat Hill and four chromites areas in Mwe Hill, Webula Hill, Hakhalay, Nat Hill, Bopibun, Muwelut, MaungtawHnamataw and Falam were found, according to the New Light of Myanmar on 27 September 2011. The government-run
newspaper said the record states that there would be 110.57 million tons of nickel ore and 38,100 million tons of chromites
ore in Chin State.
Several other Chin civil society groups including the Chin StudentUnion in Kalay and the Kuki Women's Human Rights
Organization (KWHRO) also raised their concerns over development projects in Chin State, the least developed state in the
country. The New Light of Myanmar in 2011 said North Mining Investment Co Ltd of China, China Nonferrous Metal
Industrys Foreign Engineering & Construction Co Ltd and Guiling Research Institute of Geology for Mineral Resources held
discussions on exploration and production of the deposit.

A 2008 report by the Earthrights International said Kingbao (Jinbao) Mining Co. signed agreements with the Ministry of
Mining No. 3 in Burma to conduct exploration and feasibility studies at the Mwetaung nickel deposit in Chin State that
contains proven nickel reserves in excess of 10 million tons.Kingbao (Jinbao) Mining Co. is a joint subsidiary of Gold
Mountain (Hong Kong) International Mining Co. and Wanbao Mining Co., both of which control 50% of the company. Gold
Mountain (Hong Kong) International Mining Co. is itself a wholly-owned subsidiary of Zijing Mining Co., while Wanbao
Mining Co. is a wholly-owned subsidiary of China North Industries (NORINCO).
"The entry of large, foreign-dominated mining companies goes beyond environmental issues. It is primarily a glaring face of
land grabbing," added the Kuki Women's Human Rights Organization (KWHRO). In recent months, the anti-Gullu nickel
project demonstrations took place in front of Burmese embassies in India, Australia and USA, with more protests being
organized in other foreign countries.

______________________________________________________________
INSTITUTIONALIZED DISCRIMINATION IN CHIN STATE
44. During his latest visit, the Special Rapporteur went to Chin State to look into allegations of discrimination against
Christian communities. He welcomed the open and frank discussion that he had with state government officials and township
elders. He visited Baptist churches in Mindat and Kanpalet and met clergy and members of the congregations. While the
Special Rapporteur appreciates that people of different faiths and beliefs generally live peacefully and harmoniously together
in Chin State, he is nevertheless concerned about a degree of institutionalized discrimination against Christians in Chin State
in state government structures and administrative procedures.
This includes discrimination in access to jobs, especially senior positions, within the civil service. Only 14 percent of
department head positions and 25 per cent of township administrative officer positions are held by Christians,
notwithstanding the fact that 87 per cent of people in Chin State are Christian (with 11 per cent Buddhist and 2 per cent
animist). Other areas of concern include local planning regulations and administrative requirements that render it more
difficult for Christians to secure permission to build and renovate structures for religious worship, as well as to buy property
and change residence.
Source: United Nations
A/68/397
General Assembly Distr.: General
23 September 2013 / Original: English
13-48420 (E) 141013
*1348420*
Sixty-eighth session/ Agenda item 69 (c)

___________________________________________________
MATUPI CHURCHES ASK PERMISSION TO ERECT CHRISTIAN CROSS
* SATURDAY, 24 AUGUST 2013 15:38
*Written by Thawng Zel Thang (thawngzelthang@gmail.com)
24 August 2013:
The Matupi Township Council of Churches (MTCC) said it has asked permission from the government of Chin State to plant a
new Christian cross on the mountain of Cangtak in Matupi township next year. Rev. Victor Lai Lian, MTCC's General
Secretary, said a letter requesting permission to construct the cross has been sent to Pu Hung Ngai, Chief Minister of the Chin
State government.
"We are waiting for the result from the State government," Rev. Victor Lai Lian was quoted as saying by the Hakha Post. The

attempts by churches in Matupi township aim to plant a new Christian cross as a substitute for Boltlang's 30-ft high cross,
which was destroyed by Burma's authorities in 2005. After demolition of the Boltlang cross, which was erected in 1987 under
the leadership of MTCC, the authorities confiscated the area and built a military camp in 2005 for Burma Army Light Infantry
Battalion No. 304.
A 2012 report covering incidents between March 2004 and April 2012 across Chin State by the Chin Human Rights
Organization (CHRO) documented destruction of 13 Christian crosses, of which four were demolished under Thein Sein's
government.

_______________
Source: Chinland Guardian
Last modified on Saturday, 24 August 2013 15:42
___________________________________________________________
August 6th, 2013

Rats, Bamboo and Famine in Chin State, Burma

It is estimated that in the late 1950s, 15,000 people died from famine in southern Chin State, Burma, due to a natural
recurring phenomenon: the Mautam. Every 50 years, a rat flood arises, due to the ecological cycle of flowering bamboo. This
can have disastrous effects on local crops and stored foods, resulting in huge food shortages for the Chin people. Today,
many communities in Chin State again face the devastating effects of famine and continued crop failure.
The Mautam
The Mautam, meaning bamboo death is a phrase often used in Mizo folklore and superstition. Yet its roots are based
inreality for the hundreds of thousands of people who suffer at the hands of this natural phenomenon. Melocanna
Baccifera is a particular species of bamboo which exists across large areas of northeast India in the states of Mizoram
and Manipur, as well as in regions of Bangladesh and in Chin State, Burma. Approximately every 50 years the bamboo
flowers; producing a fruit resembling an avocado, full of protein and other nutrients. For the local population of forest rats
this is a feast and they gorge themselves, stripping the bamboo of all its fruit and seeds. Consequently there is a huge surge in
the rat population, and once all the bamboo has been destroyed, they then turn to other sources of food. The rat flood
invades local farms and villages, devouring crops and other stored foodstuffs such as rice, potatoes, and vegetables.
Unfortunately, this natural phenomenon has a disastrous impact on local populations, causing widespread chronic food
shortages.
Government Responses
In 2001, the Indian Government called on the expertise of zoologists and botanists to explore responses to the Mautam.
A variety of measures were implemented, such as a rat cull and the construction of roads and helipads to allow for the
transport of food relief aid provided by the Government and NGOs.
By 2008, in the Hill Tracts of Bangladesh the effects of the bamboo flowering were becoming increasingly obvious. In
response to this the United Nations World Food Programme began the distribution of food relief aid to tens of thousands of
affected people.
Despite the predictability of the bamboo famine, preparation was limited in Chin State. For the southern Chin people who live
in dense bamboo forest, the bamboo is essential for housing, agriculture and as a source of food. It has been five years since
the flowering and dying of the thick bamboo forests in the southern Chin State of Burma, however its
devastating effects still has a serious impact on the local communities today. Unfortunately, State support has not been
sufficient to prevent hunger.
Current Situation in Chin State, Burma
Although Chin State has suffered from general food insecurity for the last 20 years due to the Mautam, the past year has been

critical. Dr Sasa who runs Health and Hope Society, one of HARTs partners, reports that communities in the southern Chin
State face a gap of approximately 7 months in their supply of cereals in 2013. Food is running out and the people of Chin
State are in desperate need of help if they are to prevent worsening famine.
In February 2013, Health and Hope Society produced a detailed survey revealing the extent of food insecurity within 374
communities in southern Chin State. The data reveals that 7 townships harvested enough cereals to feed them for 5
months, whilst some villages only harvested enough for 1 or 2 months. 123,033 people in Chin state face extreme food
shortages. Over 15,000 are children less than five years old, and over 2000 are pregnant women, unfortunately it is the most
vulnerable of society who suffer the most from food shortages. No effective alternative coping mechanisms have been found,
so external food assistance is necessary if the Chin people are to avoid losing many lives.
Impact On Individuals Health
Severe food shortages affect whole communities in both the short and long term: socially, culturally and economically.
The United Nations World Food Programme puts it well: A hungry mind cannot concentrate, a hungry body cannot take
initiative, a hungry child loses all desires to play and study.
The southern Chin people have faced constant food insecurity for the past 20 years and thus many suffer from
malnutrition; a severe form of hunger characterised by a lack of vitamins and minerals, which can have a serious impact
on a persons physical and mental abilities. Malnutrition can have a devastating effect on the bodys immune system
leaving it unable to fight off common infections such as diarrhoea or measles. The most vulnerable of society pregnant
women and young children are most at risk of a weakened immune system and can suffer from calamitous short and long
term effects.
Impact On The Chin Community
The impact of the Mautam infiltrates nearly every facet of Chin life. Uncontrollable wild fires have destroyed crops and
homes, crops have also been destroyed by rats, insects and wild animals, and the bamboo is failing to regrow and has
now been replaced with a new, highly allergenic bush. Many young people are fleeing the desperate situation in the Chin Hills
and moving to the relative safety of India, Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand. Their home land is uncertain with political
instability, economic uncertainty, food insecurity and lack of educational and livelihood opportunities.
Response From The International Community
Over the years some action has been taken by the international community on behalf of the people suffering from the
Mautam in Chin State. Southern Chin State Food Security Conferences were held in 2008, 2009 and 2011; participants such
as Baroness Caroline Cox, the BBC World Service, delegates from southern Chin State and others came together to discuss
relief efforts. In 2009 the Department For International Development (DFID) provided 1.5 million USD in emergency food aid
for the Chin people; this covered the food gap for 2009 and 2010. Later in 2012, a donation of emergency food aid was
provided by AusAid. This year a 4th Southern Chin State Food Security Conference was held as a renewed plea for help and
support from the national and international community.
Yet, despite the help and support previously provided, the people of southern Chin State face a continuing struggle. Each year
the harvests yield less and less; worsening the current food crisis. The majority of farmers are producing less than a third of
their expected harvest. Without external food assistance the people of Chin State fear a devastating future of starvation.
To learn more about HARTs work in Chin state, Burma, please visit:
http://www.hart-uk.org/health-and-hope/
http://www.hart-uk.org/hart-and-the-chin-people-western-burma/
Isabelle Darque
By Isabelle Darque
Isabelle is currently interning during her summer break, having finished her second year of studying History at Cardiff
University. Her particular interests are women's empowerment and the provision of healthcare.

____________________________________________________________________
903 Computers (plus printers and electrical generators) donated by the Danish
government for 30 State High Schools in Chin State in 2013 through the Chin National
Front. These are the only still functioning computers that these schools have got. As a
reward for the CNFs signing of a cease-fire agreement with the government late last
year, it is now very broad-mindedly permitted (in governments own words) by the
government to officially beg around in the international community for donations of all
kinds for the development of Chinland.

- http://vcth.net/cnf-ih-hlu-mi-computer-meicet-le-satellite-cazin (Supplied by Chin World Media Group)

(Date on the Website: 25th September 2013)
_____________________________________________________________

Meiset - Zarhkhat ah ni 5, nikhat nai 4 sung datsi pek sak si ding

Electricity for these instruments will be made available 5 days a week and 4 hours a day; the fuel cost
will be paid [by the Danish government].
The Burmese government supplied each State High School in Chin State in 2010 with two computers
and one printer, but without generators. Most of these high schools have to rely for electricity produced
by hydroelectric plants that were constructed by the local people with the help of a few religious or NGO
donors - or with their own financial resources. The government also had constructed a handful of
hydroelectic plants for a few towns, but all of them are very poorly maintained that they rarely function or they function only in the rainy seasons - that is, between June and September! Although every high
school student in Chin State is obliged to pay certain amount of monthly fees for the use of computers,
they are not allowed to use them. Only some teachers can - or are allowed to - use them. And most of
these computers had functioned only for a while following their delivery, but they were not repaired again for
lack of money. The present government doesnt have until today any programme or plan of its own to
supply these schools with more computers.
Note 1. Information marked in blue is my own free translation from the Falam/Laizo dialect, the officially
used Chin language on state radio and television broadcasting programme in Burma.
Note 2. Information (Tables above) is extracted from the Chinworld Media Group. and explanation about the
background history is provided by Mr. Thangpi of the CHINWORLD. Thang Za Dal, June 19. 2014

________________________________________________________________________________________________

HERES AN EXAMPLE WHY GOVERNMENT BURMESE SOLDIERS ARE SO

HATED AND FEARED BY NON-BURMAN NATIVE ETHNIC PEOPLES

______________________________________________
Source: Zo History by Dr. Vumson Suantak. Aizawl, Mizoram. 1968
Note 1. The word Zo is synonymous with the word Chin. A great majority of the
Chin people call themselves in these words Zo , Cho, Asho, etc., like Mizo or
Zomi (Zo person). Suantak uses this term.
Note 2. Zu is the traditional rice beer of the Chins. It waas an indispensible part of their
culture and daily life before they became Christian. In Burma only the Chins, Kachins,
Karennis, Karens and Nagas traditionally have it.
Note 3. The above incident was just one of several. It took place in 1967.
(Created in this form by Thang Za Dal. O5/2015)

The Irrawaddy Magazine Women Protest Sexual Violence by ...

http://www.irrawaddy.org/burma/women-protest-sexual-viole...

Women Protest Sexual Violence by Soldiers in Chin State

By NANG SENG NOM / THE IRRAWADDY On Wednesday, June 25, 2014 @ 8:13 pm

RANGOON More than 130 ethnic Chin women participate in a protest against the
Burmese militarys alleged use of rape as a weapon of war in Matupi Township.
Protest leaders said the demonstration on Tuesday aimed to draw attention to sexual
violence perpetrated by soldiers against women and children in Matupi, as well as to
enhance awareness of womens rights issues among local residents.
Al Li, secretary of the Chin Womens Association, said six local women in Matupi had been
raped by Tatamadaw soldiers, with the latest case on June 10.
The police arrested this rapist soldier, but we dont know yet what will happen next, the
protest organizer said.
Al Li said the Chin activists initial request seeking permission for the protest march was
rejected by local law enforcement, but was later allowed to proceed.
The police told us not to march to avoid traffic, but we marched as we said we would, to
raise the issue of women being abused, she said.
Many ethnic Chin women lack formal schooling and are poorly versed in womens rights
issues, Al Li said, adding that greater efforts to educate the women were needed.
The local women said increased Burmese Army troop deployments in Chin State since
2010 had left many locals fearing for their safety and reluctant to cultivate their farmlands
due to the presence of soldiers in the area.
Burma signed the United Nations Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against
Women (CEDAW) in 1997, but womens rights activists say the government has yet to
take meaningful steps to ensure the protection of womens rights.
In a January 2014 report, the Thailand-based Womens League of Burma accused
members of the military of raping more than 100 women since 2010. The rape incidents
widespread and systematic nature indicates a structural pattern: rape is still used as an
instrument of war and oppression, the report said.
In April, UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon also called for the Burmese government to
investigate the claims of rape by soldiers.

Article printed from The Irrawaddy Magazine: http://www.irrawaddy.org

URL to article: http://www.irrawaddy.org/burma/women-protest-sexual-violencesoldiers-chin-state.html

Copyright 2012 The Irrawaddy Magazine. All rights reserved.

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26.06.14 01:07

The activists ? Ngun Chin Par, Sui Sui Kyi, Kaw Htwe, Khin Khin Zi, Thang Zing, Khin Thluai Par, Maung
Han and Tei Maung ? were ordered to either pay a 30,000 kyat (US$30) fine or serve one-month prison
sentences.
A guilty verdict on the defendants was passed by the court on 23 July, with a sentence of either one
month in prison or 30,000 kyat fine, said Mai T Sui Leng, the director of Womens Hand Myanmar
Foundation, an NGO that has been assisting the group throughout their trial. Our foundation has
offered to pay the fines for each of them.
While her foundation has pledged financial support to avoid the prison sentences, Mai T Sui Leng

stressed that they are very disappointed with the courts for targeting activists instead of sexual
offenders.
We want to see effective legal action against the soldier who committed violence against a woman,
she said.
On 24 June, two demonstrations were held in Chin State in response to the alleged attempted rape of a
55-year-old woman by a Burma Army soldier from Light Infantry Battalion No. 269. About 400 people
were said to have turned out in Rezua, while another 200 gathered in Matupi.
Authorities in both towns denied requests for permission to hold demonstrations, and the organisers ?
four from Rezua and four from Matupi ? were subsequently charged for the violation of Burmas
controversial Peaceful Assembly and Peaceful Processions Act , which contains provisions
criminalising unauthorised gatherings.
Rights groups have condemned the charges from the outset, urging the government to immediately
drop the case and investigate sexual war crimes. The Chin Human Rights Organisation said that
they have documented multiple cases of sexual violence committed in the remote state since
President Thein Sein took power in 2011. The group said that the frequency and severity of
abuses warrants an international investigation in order to deter further violations and help end
the culture of impunity.
Similarly, Human Rights Watch (HRW) urged the international community to put pressure on the
Burmese government to acquit the demonstrators and take meaningful action towards ending
military impunity .
The military has long frowned on the citizenry calling for transparent justice, particularly in a case theyd
rather sweep under the rug, HRW said in a 9 July press statement. While commending the government
for signing onto a UN commitment to ending sexual crimes in conflict, the group said that the
countrys leaders will need a change of mindset to make that promise a reality.
The first step, said Mai T Sui Leng, is to make the justice system more transparent. Crimes allegedly
committed by soldiers are brought to military trials, which some say offers inherent protection to the
accused.
We would like the trial to be conducted at a civilian court rather than military trial, Mai T Sui Leng said
of the accused officer. We want to know how he will be punished.
Tags: Artilce 18Burma Armychin stateCHROPeaceful Assembly and Peaceful Procession Actsexual
violencewomen's rights

The Irrawaddy Magazine UN Chief Calls for Myanmar to Inve...

http://www.irrawaddy.org/burma/un-chief-calls-burma-investi...

UN Chief Calls for Burma to Investigate Military Rape Claims

By NYEIN NYEIN / THE IRRAWADDY On Thursday, April 24, 2014 @ 5:06 pm

The chief of the United Nations has officially called on the Burmese government to conduct
full investigations into allegations of rape and sexual assault made against its soldiers,
according to a document made public this week.
A report to the UN Security Council from Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon titled Conflictrelated Sexual Violence, addressed the issue of sexual violence in 20 countries around
the world, including Burma.
I call on the Government of Myanmar to fully investigate and respond to current and
historical human rights violations and abuses, including crimes of sexual violence, Ban
Ki-moon said in the report, which is dated March 13 but has only just been made public.
He urged the government to work to develop a comprehensive protection and service
response for survivors of sexual violence, with the UNs support.
Burmese womens organizations and campaigners, who have long called for allegations of
sexual violence by the military to be independently investigated, welcomed the secretarygenerals intervention.
The Thailand-based Womens League of Burma (WLB) in January said in a report it had
documented more than 100 cases of soldiers raping women and girlsthe majority in
war-torn Kachin and Shan statessince 2010. In a statement Thursday, the group said
that it welcomes this clear recognition of State failure to deal with past and present
military sexual violence in Burma.
WLB pointed out, however, that previous government-led investigations into military rape
have not only failed to deliver justice, but have led to further humiliation and intimidation
of rape survivors and their communities.
We are still concerned about how the government would conduct [investigations] if they
agreed to implement the UN secretary-generals recommendation, said Tin Tin Nyo,
secretary of WLB, an umbrella organization representing 13 different ethnic women
groups.
Ban Ki-moons report will be discussed at a Security Council debate on Friday on sexual
violence. The United Kingdom-based Burma Campaign group issued a statement urging
the British government to take a strong stance on the issue.
Burma Campaign UK welcomes the fact that the UN Secretary General is focusing more
on sexual violence in Burma, and has called for investigations, said Zoya Phan, the
groups campaigns manager.
However, the United Nations has made dozens of calls on the Burmese government to
hold credible investigations into human rights violations, and all have been ignored. It is
time the United Nations established its own investigation.
Campaigners say the secretary generals comments follow years of documenting the
abuses of Burma Army soldiers, and the impunity that usually follows allegations. Soldiers
accused of rape are regularly punished internally by the military rather than in the civilian
courts, if they are held to account at all.

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08.05.14 15:21

The Irrawaddy Magazine UN Chief Calls for Myanmar to Inve...

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WLBs report in January noted of rape allegations against the military that, Their
widespread and systematic nature indicates a structural pattern: rape is still used as an
instrument of war and oppression. It said allegations of rape by soldiers, which may
constitute war crimes, should be independently investigated.
Shortly after their report in January, presidential spokesman Ye Htut in an interview with
Reuters denied the groups allegation that the military uses rape as a weapon, and asked
for the group to share more detailed information about the allegations.
Jessica Nhkum, the joint-secretary of the Kachin Women Association Thailand, who
documents rape cases by the Burma Army, told The Irrawaddy that the problem was not
going away. In the first quarter of 2014, new allegations have continued to emerge, she
said.
Although we could not reach all areas in our war-torn Kachin State, even in the reachable
areassuch as near Myitkyina, Laiza, Mai Ja Yang and in northern Shan Statewe have
documented several cases of rape by Burmese soldiers in 2014, she said.
And with renewed fighting in Kachin State and northern Shan State breaking out during
Burmese New Year last week, activists stressed that more rape cases may soon be
reported.
Soldiers have been accused of raping girls as young as 7 in Kachin State, as in one case
from November 2013. And a 13-year-old girl in Mon State was allegedly raped by a soldier
in January 2014, just as the WLBs report documenting rape allegations was published.
The government in the past has repeatedly denied claims of rape by its troops.
In 2002, the Shan Women Action Network, a member of WLB, published a report including
such allegations, titled License to Rape. Following publication, women were allegedly
forced to sign denials refuting the facts in the report, according to WLBs Tin Tin Nyo.
We dont want the kind of reaction this time as we have examples of before, said Tin Tin
Nyo.
As for the presidents spokespersons suggestion to release information to them for
further investigation, it is impossible. We have to consider the safety of those women,
who are already being victimized.

Article printed from The Irrawaddy Magazine: http://www.irrawaddy.org

URL to article: http://www.irrawaddy.org/burma/un-chief-calls-burma-investigatemilitary-rape-claims.html

Copyright 2012 The Irrawaddy Magazine. All rights reserved.

2 von 2

08.05.14 15:21

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PHOTO 28
SOME SELECTED YOUTUBE THUMBNAILS ON CULTURAL, SOCIAL AND RELIGIOUS EVENTS OF THE CHIN/ZO PEOPLE OF INDIA AND BURMA
THESE PHOTOS ARE MEANT TO SERVE AS A VISUAL MEDIUM TO INTRODUCE THEM TO THE OUTSIDE WORLD AND TO SHOW THAT THEY TRY TO RETAIN
TOGETHER THEIR DISTINCTIVE COMMON IDENTITY CULTURALLY, RELIGIOUSLY AND SOCIALLY WHEREVER THEY ARE - BE IT IN ASIA, AUSTRALIA,
EUROPE, USA OR CANADA. (AS OF END OF 2015 AN ESTIMATED 170,000 OF THEM ARE BELIEVED TO BE LIVING OUTSIDE OF THEIR NATIVE LANDS.)
(ABOUT 99% OF A CONSERVATIVELY ESTIMATED COMBINED POPULATION OF 3 MILLION IS CHRISTIAN - AND THE REST ANIMIST AND BUDDHIST)

- Selected and created in this form by thangzadal. hamburg, germany. 04.2016.