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72 Self and Subject

42. Neuhouser, Fichte's Theory of Subjectivity, p. 79-80. Cf. n. 38 above, and


Neuhouser's talk of "ever-present" awareness that one is conscious. A similar tendency
is found in Pippin's work; cf. my analysis in "Recent Work on Hegel: The Rehabilitation
of an Epistemologist?" Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 52(1992), p. 196.
43. Cited at Neuhouser, Fichte's Theory of Subjectivity, p. 77.
44. Neuhouser, Fichte's Theory ofSubjectivity, p. 82. Cf. ibid., p. 88.
45. Neuhouser, ibid., p. 83.
46. Cf. Sturma's point (Kant aber Selbstbewuj3tsein, p. 117) that instead of taking
self-familiarity, as Fichte does, as both intuitive (immediate) and conceptual (cognitive),
we would be better to take it as "neither/nor." My way of putting it would be to say that,
as general or transcendental, this special self-familiarity is not immediate (it needs
something, anything, through which we are familiar to ourselves), but as particular or
empirical it is not a cognition of a particular empirical situation. Cf. Sturma's talk of the
self as a "quasi-object," or Kant's own talk of our special familiarity with the self as
involving both a "pure representation" and an "indeterminate empirical representa-
tion." Cf. also my "From Kant to Frank: The Ineliminable Subject."
47. Neuhouser, Fichte's Theory ofSubjectivity, p. 98.
48. Neuhouser, ibid., p. 99.
49. See above, at n. 33.
50. Neuhouser, Fichte's Theory ofSubjectivity, p. 109-10.
51. This is not to say that one need accept Neuhouser's claim (ibid., pp. 104-05)
that the notion of a noumenal cause is incoherent. Cf. my "Kant, Fichte, and Short
Arguments to Idealism."
52. Fichte, Siimtliche Werke, I, 97. Cited at Neuhouser, Fichte's Theory of Sub-
jectivity, p. 111. Cf. Neuhouser's formulation, ibid., p. 116: "The I is essentially a self-
referring activity that, only in referring to itself, is constituted as an existent."

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