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A similar tendency is found in Pippin's work; cf. Analysis in "recent work on hegel" 43. Neuhouser, Fichte's Theory of Subjectivity, p. 77. A special self-familiarity is not immediate, but as particular or empirical it is not cognition.
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A similar tendency is found in Pippin's work; cf. Analysis in "recent work on hegel" 43. Neuhouser, Fichte's Theory of Subjectivity, p. 77. A special self-familiarity is not immediate, but as particular or empirical it is not cognition.
A similar tendency is found in Pippin's work; cf. Analysis in "recent work on hegel" 43. Neuhouser, Fichte's Theory of Subjectivity, p. 77. A special self-familiarity is not immediate, but as particular or empirical it is not cognition.
42. Neuhouser, Fichte's Theory of Subjectivity, p. 79-80. Cf. n. 38 above, and
Neuhouser's talk of "ever-present" awareness that one is conscious. A similar tendency is found in Pippin's work; cf. my analysis in "Recent Work on Hegel: The Rehabilitation of an Epistemologist?" Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 52(1992), p. 196. 43. Cited at Neuhouser, Fichte's Theory of Subjectivity, p. 77. 44. Neuhouser, Fichte's Theory ofSubjectivity, p. 82. Cf. ibid., p. 88. 45. Neuhouser, ibid., p. 83. 46. Cf. Sturma's point (Kant aber Selbstbewuj3tsein, p. 117) that instead of taking self-familiarity, as Fichte does, as both intuitive (immediate) and conceptual (cognitive), we would be better to take it as "neither/nor." My way of putting it would be to say that, as general or transcendental, this special self-familiarity is not immediate (it needs something, anything, through which we are familiar to ourselves), but as particular or empirical it is not a cognition of a particular empirical situation. Cf. Sturma's talk of the self as a "quasi-object," or Kant's own talk of our special familiarity with the self as involving both a "pure representation" and an "indeterminate empirical representa- tion." Cf. also my "From Kant to Frank: The Ineliminable Subject." 47. Neuhouser, Fichte's Theory ofSubjectivity, p. 98. 48. Neuhouser, ibid., p. 99. 49. See above, at n. 33. 50. Neuhouser, Fichte's Theory ofSubjectivity, p. 109-10. 51. This is not to say that one need accept Neuhouser's claim (ibid., pp. 104-05) that the notion of a noumenal cause is incoherent. Cf. my "Kant, Fichte, and Short Arguments to Idealism." 52. Fichte, Siimtliche Werke, I, 97. Cited at Neuhouser, Fichte's Theory of Sub- jectivity, p. 111. Cf. Neuhouser's formulation, ibid., p. 116: "The I is essentially a self- referring activity that, only in referring to itself, is constituted as an existent."