Jane
Dick
Up
aj , 0
0, ad
Up
Down
Down
0, ad
aj , 0
= p 0 + (1 p) aj
=
1/2
The same calculation can be done for Dick. Assuming that aj , ad 6= 0 the only equilibrium
has each player following the strategies (Up, Down) with probability (1/2, 1/2).
b) Dominant strategies (5 points):
Neither player has a dominant strategy. If one driver swerves then the other driver doesnt
want to swerve. If one driver doesnt swerve then the other wants to swerve.
Pure strategy equilibria (5 points):
This games has two pure strategy equilibria: (S, DS) and (DS, S) where the first entry is
driver As strategy and the second is Driver Bs strategy.
Mixed strategy equilibria (5 points):
This games has one mixed strategy equilibrium. To compute it follow the same logic as
above. Let p be the probability that driver B swerves.
2 p + (1 p) 2
= p
= p 6 + (1 p) 0
= 1/3
The game is symmetric across players so the same equation holds for driver B. The equilibrium has each player swerving with 1/3 probability and not swerving with probability
2/3.