justified?
Was Truman’s decision to drop the Atomic Bombs on Japan in World War II justified?
On 6 August 1945, the first atomic bomb was dropped by a B-29 Superfortress aircraft on
Hiroshima, Japan. This atomic bomb, dropped as a nuclear attack in an attempt to make
Japan surrender, destroyed Hiroshima and over 90,000 people were instantly killed.
Emperor Hirohito and the Japanese government refused to accept the United States’ terms
of surrender, and on 9 August 1945, the second atomic bomb was dropped over Nagasaki.
Many people opposed to the use of the atomic bombs, as the bombing off civilians was
considered a barbaric act. The aim of this investigation is to find out whether Truman’s
decision to drop the Atomic Bombs over Japan was justified. This investigation will
briefly cover the events that led to the United States’ involvement with World War II and
its interactions with Japan during the war before the atomic bombings, as well as
Truman’s decision to allow the bombs to be dropped over the cities. Research from
various official documents, eyewitness accounts, and transcripts from Truman’s speeches
and diary will indicate whether his decision to drop the atomic bombs over Japan in
remained neutral until the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. Pearl Harbor was a
naval base located in Hawaii, and as the Japanese forces pushed into China, the
United States started increasing defenses. However, a mock attack was conducted
Harbor and other US forces were attacked by the Empire of Japan’s Carrier
Striking Task Force. Thirty minutes prior to the attack, a message was sent to the
US, breaking off relations. This surprise attack left 2403 Americans dead and
1178 wounded. In addition, 188 aircraft were destroyed and numerous vessels
were sunk or damaged, including five battleships and three destroyers. In this
attack, Japan’s losses included 64 dead and 1 captured. In addition, 29 aircraft and
5 submarines were lost. The purpose of Japan’s surprise attack on Pearl Harbor
was to protect Japan’s advances into Singapore and the Dutch East Indies by
called a joint session of Congress and called the day of the attacks a “day which
will live in infamy”. Congress declared war on Japan, outraged at the attacks and
Japan’s late notification of their broken relations. Public opinion had been divided
as to whether the US should enter the war or not, but overnight it changed -
Japan
The atomic bombs were dropped both for diplomatic reasons and as a
method of forcing Japan to surrender. Russia was planning to join the war against
Japan 90 days after VE Day according to the Potsdam Agreement, but the US
wanted to win the war before the USSR joined in order to prevent Stalin from
decrease the potential Russian influence in post-war Japan, the Allies had to
defeat Japan before the USSR joined the fight. The atomic bomb was a diplomatic
way of keeping the USSR out of the fight and the decision over post-war Japan. In
addition, military simulations predicted that a land attack against Japan would
result in over 1,000,000 casualties, making the idea of dropping the atomic bombs
more strategic.
In 1941, the Manhattan Project was started to develop the first nuclear
weapons were successfully produced. The first, “Trinity”, was a test bomb,
detonated near Alamogordo, Mexico on July 16. The second bomb, “Little Boy”,
was detonated over Hiroshima, Japan, on August 6. The third and final bomb,
surrender from the Japanese emperor. Months before the Hiroshima bombings, the
Japanese government of the punishment of war criminals. However, this did not
meet the ultimatum, and ten days later, the first atomic bomb was dropped over
Hiroshima. Two days later, the Japanese still did not surrender, and the second
Wainstock, Dennis D. (1996). The Decision to Drop the Atomic Bomb. Praeger
Publishers.
This book is based on extensive research both in the United States and Japan
regarding the decision to drop the atomic bomb. The book follows both the
decisions made in Washington, USA and Tokyo, Japan that led to this deadly
decision and also investigates the possible opportunities that could have led away
from these decisions. This book analyzes the politics, diplomacy and military
actions that influenced both the United States and Japan. The book also looks into
topics such as the Manhattan Project and the numerous debates within the Truman
administration, such as whether to change the United States’ demands, plan a land
invasion of Japan, or bomb Japan to surrender. The book’s value lies mostly in
that the book offers a view from both the Japanese and American side as well as
comments were kept to the back of the book. However, this is limited because the
book does not cover the moral dilemma Truman face adequately.
Knebel, Fletcher and Bailey, Charles W. (1960). No High Ground. Harper and
Row.
This source is most valuable because it provides an objective view at both the
United States and Japan before and after the decision to drop the atomic bombs.
This was written by two American authors who wrote political books. The
limitations of this source could be that it does not provide any moral views
D: Analysis (5 marks)
The events leading up to the point where Truman decided to drop the
atomic bomb are critical points in this debate. The Germans had recently
explained in the Potsdam Declaration. If Japan did not surrender, it would face
utter destruction. The United States, USSR, and China (hereon referred to as the
Allies), after defeating Germany, had the upper hand against Japan.1 They had
more forces, more resources, far more land, and more leverage in the political
struggle.
with military units such as infantry, tanks, and aircraft, or any military fighting
which does not involve chemical, biological, or nuclear payloads), starting with
in a land invasion of Japan.2 The number of people killed by the atomic bombs in
Japan was merely a fraction compared to the number of soldiers that would be lost
in a land battle. One of the difficult morality issues Truman had to decide on was
whether to send in soldiers to invade Japan when he knew that there were going to
be many casualties or whether to drop the most powerful bomb the United States
had ever made on a Japanese city. Obviously one would think to go with the
strategy that involves the least deaths, but it was stated in the International Laws
and Customs of War on Land that “the attack or bombardment of towns, villages,
was a cruel means to win a war.3 However, Truman got around this issue by
referring to Hiroshima as a “military” base in a radio speech and told his diary
Truman also had to deal with the issue of the use of such a powerful
weapon. The “Trinity” test was dropped in Alamogordo, Mexico with several
eminent scientists observing from positions 10-25 miles away. The closest
scientist, Enrico Fermi, described the explosion as a “very intense flash of light
and a sensation of heat on the parts of my body that were exposed”. Similar
accounts were also reported by other scientists up to 25 miles away from the
bomb site. Fermi estimated the explosion of the blast to be about 10,000 tons of
TNT. This intense power shocked many of the scientists, including J. Robert
Oppenheimer, also known as “the father of the atomic bomb”, who felt that he
had become the “destroyer of worlds”, that, instead of using science to improve
humanity, he had used it to destroy.5,6 In fact, the thought of using such a powerful
weapon against other humans was such a shock to the physicists and scientists
that the Szilard Petition (1945) was written, signed by 69 members of the
Manhattan Project. These scientists strongly urged the President not to use the
atomic bomb for fear of bringing the world to a nuclear age where different
nations will have no limit to the amount of destructive power that can be
harnessed by the atomic bombs. The moral point was also raised, saying that
using such a weapon is not justified and would weaken the United States’ moral
position and that all the cities of the United States and other countries will be in
Hiroshima, despite the voiced concerns from many of the very scientists who had
designed and created the atomic bomb and felt that it was morally wrong to drop
the bomb.
However, it must be said that, despite the moral issues of this situation,
Truman had many reasons to make the decision to drop the atomic bomb. The
months, even years, fighting a war in Japan and suffering many losses, the
prospect of simply dropping a bomb over Japan and ending the war was more
unconditional surrender because Russia was to join the fight against Japan within
90 days after VE Day. If Russia joined the fight against Japan, the other countries
would result in the communist influence being spread over to Japan and
E: Conclusion (2 marks)
Truman’s decision to drop the atomic bombs on Japan was justified in the
sense that he was making the decision that would lead to what he thought would
be the best outcome, or rather the outcome with the least amount of loss and
be worse than dropping the atomic bomb, even with the moral issues.
Although Truman’s initial decision to drop the atomic bomb was justified,
the second atomic bombing was not. Before the first bombing, ten days were
warning them of the upcoming bombing. However, the second atomic bomb was
dropped only three days later. The Japanese citizens and government had very
little time to react and decide whether to surrender or not. Truman’s decision
should have been to wait another ten days to drop the second atomic bomb rather
than drop the second bomb three days later and run out of nuclear weapons. This
would have given the Japanese citizens more time to convince the government to
surrender, and could have possibly led to a more peaceful and less destructive
outcome.
Endnotes
<http://www.ndl.go.jp/constitution/e/etc/c06.html>.
2. Wainstock, Dennis D. (1996). The Decision to Drop the Atomic Bomb. Praeger
Publishers.
3. "The Avalon Project - Laws of War: Laws and Customs of War on Land (Hague,
II); July 29, 1899." Yale University. 1998. Yale University. 13 Jun 2007
<http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/lawofwar/hague02.htm>.
5. U.S. National Archives, Record Group 227, OSRD-S1 Committee, Box 82 folder
6, "Trinity."
6. U.S. National Archives, Record Group 77, Records of the Office of the Chief of
conversations.
7. U.S. National Archives, Record Group 77, Records of the Chief of Engineers,
Bibliography
2. Knebel, Fletcher and Bailey, Charles W. (1960). No High Ground. Harper and
Row.
<http://www.ndl.go.jp/constitution/e/etc/c06.html>.
4. "President Truman Did Not Understand." US News & World Report 15 Aug 1960:
68-71.
5. "The Avalon Project - Laws of War: Laws and Customs of War on Land (Hague,
II); July 29, 1899." Yale University. 1998. Yale University. 13 Jun 2007
<http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/lawofwar/hague02.htm>.
6. Truman, Harry S. Year of Decisions . Garden City, NY: Doubleday and Company,
1955.
7. U.S. National Archives, Record Group 77, Records of the Office of the Chief of
conversations.
9. U.S. National Archives, Record Group 77, Records of the Chief of Engineers,
10. U.S. National Archives, Record Group 227, OSRD-S1 Committee, Box 82 folder
6, "Trinity."
11. Wainstock, Dennis D. (1996). The Decision to Drop the Atomic Bomb. Praeger
Publishers.