Natalie Davis

JSIS 201 Research Paper

March 19, 2013

From Rhodesia to Zimbabwe: Why did the Rhodesian Front Fail?

In the wave of decolonization that hit Africa in the 20th century, colonies scrambled to
claim independence and establish their own regimes. Many transitioning colonies found
themselves entangled in a variety of domestic and regional disputes as well as strained
negotiations with their ruling nations. Some of the most extreme contention occurred in Southern
Africa, where racial antagonism and inequality were driving factors in political activity. In South
Africa, this was manifested in the apartheid in which the Afrikaner minority operated a
segregated state that severely oppressed black Africans. The colony of Rhodesia consisted of a
similar white minority rule under the Rhodesian Front party; however, most of these whites were
post-World War II British immigrants (Saint Brides, 1980). Under their leader Ian Smith, they
unilaterally declare independence from Great Britain in 1965 (Smith, 2011). The British
attempted to negotiate terms of official independence that paved the way for black majority rule,
but Smith demanded compromises and did not accept these terms until 1977, upon which his
party quickly dissolved. Whereas South Africa ran an apartheid state for many years, why did the
Rhodesian Front fail? Ultimately, the deterioration of domestic and regional support left Smith
with no choice but to accept the independence conditions from Britain that quickly defaulted to
the formation of a black majority ruled Zimbabwe.
Well before the Rhodesian Front unilaterally declared independence, former British
Prime Minister Sir Alec Douglas-Home had asserted five basic conditions that Great Britain

required to be met in order for Rhodesian independence to be authorized. These conditions

outlined a guarantee that Rhodesian blacks would eventually attain majority rule, the prohibition
of retrogressive constitutional amendments, demanded enhanced political status of blacks as
well as some sign of advancement in terminating racial inequality, and a requirement of
evidence that both blacks and whites approved of the proposed independence agreement
(Rhodesia, 1971).
By the time the final terms of the agreement had been negotiated between Sir DouglasHome, now the British Foreign Secretary, and Rhodesian Front leader Ian Douglas Smith, not all
of these five conditions remained intact. Firstly, Douglas-Home abandoned his insistence upon
an oversight council to prevent retrogressive changes in the constitution, essentially leaving
the whites in power to modify the constitution to undermine the autonomy of blacks as they
pleased. Secondly, an eight week long investigation conducted by the British Pearce Commission
reported that the people of Rhodesia as a whole reject the settlement, and that black Africans
massively reject it, effectively invalidating condition number five that an agreement for
independence must be deemed acceptable by those of both races (Massive Rejection, 34). It is
easy to understand why the agreement in question was not favored by African nationals, seeing
as they remained politically inferior under those terms. However, it is important to note the fact
that Rhodesians as a whole opposed the settlement. This indicates that not all whites were on
board with the Rhodesian Fronts agenda, evidenced by reports that Smiths popularity was
declining among his constituents (Massive Rejection, 34). Despite the fact that contemporaries
of the agreement accused its compromises of enabling Rhodesia to become a second South
Africa, the popular dissatisfaction within the Rhodesian Front is essential, as the failure of the
Front was catalyzed by Smiths lack of domestic support (Rhodesia, 44).

It is quite likely, however, that the Rhodesian Front was in fact striving to imitate the
South African regime. South Africa is one of the most widely known examples of the potential
aftermath of post-colonial racial conflicts via its infamous apartheid and thus presents a point of
concern due to its relationship with Rhodesia. In a way South Africa functioned like a small scale
Soviet Union with the goal of being the dominant power in its region while extending and
maintaining its racial ideology among its neighbors; the focus of its foreign policy was centered
upon preserving the regime (Onslow 2006). As a potent South African power the regime, run by
Afrikaners with a background in Africa preceding the colonial era, was able to exert fairly heavy
influence over Rhodesia, a smaller group of British settlers hoping to maintain a similar minority
rule. This relationship fostered a sort of mentorship of Rhodesia by South Africa due to their
similar ideologies, although South Africa criticized Rhodesia for racial policies that they
believed to be too weak. The history of the two sets the stage for South African superiority, due
to a sense of Afrikaner hostility toward the Rhodesian white community, tainted by its past
close association with British imperialism (Onslow 2006). Although unexpected, South African
pressures in the interest of the regime would play a large part in the surrender of the Rhodesian
Front.
Deteriorating support from South Africa and other neighboring states proved detrimental
to the Rhodesian Front, especially when guerilla warfare broke out. When Rhodesia unilaterally
declared independence in 1965, they expected South Africa to support their endeavors; rather,
none of Rhodesias neighbors formally recognized their independence (Onslow 2006). With the
formation of the Patriotic Front came another fatal challenge. The Patriotic Front was the product
of the merging of the two foremost African nationalist guerilla organizations, the Zimbabwe
African National Union led by Mugabe and the Zimbabwe African Peoples Union led by

Nkomo (Saint Brides 1980). They waged a seven year war against the Rhodesian Front over
control of the territory with the ultimate goal of achieving majority rule. A key moment occurred
for them when Portugals Caetano regime fell in neighboring Mozambique and nearby Angola in
1975 and 1976, converting the former Smith supporters to launching grounds for guerilla
attacks (Saint Brides 1980). South Africa grew increasingly concerned as the guerilla movement
continued and strengthened with these developments; the question arose that if Rhodesia
becomes involved in war can South Africa remain on the outside? (Onslow 2006). South Africa
feared that if the war grew and international involvement increased that they would have to enter
on behalf of Rhodesia to preserve their regime. Previous Cuban intervention in a similar conflict
in Angola provided a tangible possibility that this could happen again (Onslow 2006). It
appeared to them that settlement of the festering Rhodesian conflict by encouraging Smith to
accept Britains terms of independence and allow majority rule was the best option for the sake
of self-preservation (Onslow 2006). Just one year later in 1977, with domestic and foreign
support all but vanished, Smith agreed to the terms of independence with Britain.
The transition from the initial surrender of the Rhodesian front to majority nationalist rule
took place swiftly after Smith gave in. When the final independence agreement was implemented
it established a government in which blacks and whites initially shared power and the country
was renamed Rhodesia-Zimbabwe to reflect this dual role. Two short years later, a new
constitution was negotiated in which the African nationalist Patriotic Front became the ruling
party of independent Zimbabwe under Mugabe (Smith, 2011). Blacks then officially attained
the majority rule that they had been fighting for and the Rhodesian Front was no longer. South
Africas sway as the regions dominant power, its choice not to support the Rhodesian Front in
the interest of the security of its regime and the Fronts own deterioration at home ultimately led

to the birth of independent, African-governed Zimbabwe, the end of white minority rule in the
former territory of Rhodesia, and finally the failure of the Rhodesian Front.

Works Cited
"A Massive Rejection." TIME 22 May 1972: 34. TIME Magazine. Web. 3 Feb. 2013.
Onslow, Sue. We Must Gain Time: South Africa, Rhodesia and the Kissinger Initiative of
1986. South African Historical Journal 56.1 (2006): 123-153.
"Rhodesia: In Civilized Hands." TIME 6 Dec. 1971. TIME Magazine. Web. 3 Feb. 2013.
Saint Brides, Lord. The Lessons of Zimbabwe-Rhodesia. International Security 4. 4,
(1980):177-184.
"Smith, Ian Douglas" Colombia Electronic Encyclopedia. 1 Nov. 2011. Web. 3 Feb. 2013.