Jennifer Fendrick

GLOA 720: Global Problems and Quantitative Evidence

Does Foreign Intervention Work?

A Case Study of the Syrian Civil War

As the Syrian civil war enters its fifth year, policymakers and world leaders
continue to debate whether, and how, the conflict can be brought to an end. The fighting
is no longer confined to Syria alonethe Islamic State has carved out a safe haven in the
countrys northern floodplains, while the violence spills over to Iraq and Lebanon and
millions of refugees pour into Turkey, Jordan, and Lebanon. Meanwhile, would-be
jihadists are flocking to Syria from dozens of countries, and their eventual return could
pose a threat to countries around the world. While Russia and Iran continue to supply the
Assad regime with billions of dollars in weapons and manpower, most Western powers
have been pushing for a political solution. The two competing approaches are grounded
in realist and liberal theories, respectively (some U.S. policymakers have even pushed for
a neoconservative tack). In this case, however, I believe that none of these approaches
offers a clear way out. Instead, I argue that a focus on strengthening the domestic
political sphere, with an emphasis on civil society groups, may be the last best solution
for this war-torn Levantine country.
The Russo-Iranian response is clearly rooted in the Hobbesian, realist worldview.
Under this paradigm, the state is the primary actorthat is, the structure of the
international system is based on interactions between statesstates that compete with
one another for power in an anarchic world. Only fear, instilled by a display of

overwhelming strength, can eliminate the threat posed by the competition for power in
the absence of an overall governing authority. As Thucydides wrote, the strong do what
they can, and they weak suffer what they must.1 The Russians and the Iranians, in
arming Bashar Assads ruthless Syrian Arab Army, exemplify this worldview: they are
protecting what they believe to be their spheres of influence, and in so doing, projecting
power. However, evidence suggests that outside interference only exacerbates the
problem, and arming either side only fuels the conflict.
One report, co-written by Madani and the London School of Economics, found
that in areas in Syria where with high levels of outside interference, ceasefires tended to
burn out the fastest.2 In Homs, the success of ceasefire negotiations were often entirely
dependent on the willingness of outside parties, including Saudi Arabia and Iran, to come
to an agreementan unlikely proposition, in light of the countries enduring rivalry. In
another city, Ras al-Ain, ceasefire negotiations were hampered by the fact that Turkey
was backing the Free Syrian Army forces, while the Kurdish regional government
supported their opponents. By contrast, in areas with the lowest levels of regional
interference, such as Barzeh, ceasefires had the most staying power. Thus, under the
realist paradigmwhich, as demonstrated above, would advocate for more robust state
interventionSyria would continue to burn.
At the other end of the state-centric spectrum is the liberal worldview. According
to this worldview, nation states or nongovernmental organizations are the basic unit of
analysis. Unlike realists, however, liberal theorists believe that compromise is the key
1 Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War, Perseus Project, 1998.
2 Turkmani, Rim, Kaldor, Mary, et al, Hungry for Peace: Positives and
Pitfalls of Local Truces and Ceasefires in Syria, London School of
Economics, 2014.
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behavioral assumption underlying state-to-state interaction. Liberals advocate

cooperation, with an emphasis on mutual interests, above all else. They reject the notion
that states will always defect (a la prisoners dilemma), and must operate under the
assumptions that other states will defect as well. However, like realists, adherents to this
worldview do not necessarily believe in a strong relationship between a states domestic
attributes and international conflict behavior.
In Syria, there is some evidence that the liberal approach would have some
positive effects, but these would only be short term. For instance, Madani and LSE found
that high-level talks led to an immediate reduction in the number of daily deaths:
following the Kofi Anan-led ceasefire negotiations in 2012, deaths were reduced by as
much as 85%. The deployment of the United Nations Observer Mission in Syria in May
of 2012 led to a further 24% decrease in deaths. Both of these reductions were shortlived, however: within six months, violence had returned to pre-ceasefire levels.3
Ultimately, there is no easy solution to the Syrian civil war. However, harnessing
the power of domestic politics, which Daniel Drezner describes as the structure of
domestic institutions, the state of public opinion, or the constellation of interest group
pressures,4 seems to be the most likely (successful) way forward. According to this
theory, domestic political actors are the main player in international relationsthat is,
these actors are the primary variables on the international stage. I suggest that only these
groupsparticularly civil society actors, but also the media, and government and nongovernment organizationshave the capacity, and more importantly the legitimacy, to
3 Turkmani, Rim, et al, Hungry for Peace, London School of
Economics, 2014.
4 Daniel Drezner, Theories of International Politics Zombies, Princeton
University Press, Princeton, 2011.
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bring this conflict to an end. While liberals and realists argue that the differences
between states are they crucial elements in international relations, I argue that
particularly in this instancethe characteristics of the individual state is the key variable.
In the case of the Syrian civil war, there is quite a bit of quantitative evidence in
support of this hypothesis. In her research article, Desire Nilsson finds that peace is
more likely to prevail when civil society actors are included in the negotiations (see graph
following this paper).5 Indeed, negotiations, which lie at the cornerstone of the liberal
internationalist worldview, are more likely to succeed when local civil society
organizations are included in the process. Including these groups can also lend more
legitimacy to a deal once it has been struck. Unfortunately, these organizations were not
at the table during the failed Geneva II talks in January; the opposition was represented
by the Syrian National Coalition, which is backed by Qatar and has tenuous links to
groups on the ground. Madani and LSE also found that ceasefires lasted longest when
local civil society organizations and civilians were involved. In al-Waar, internal
pressure (primarily from civil society actors) led to talks between the warring parties,
eventually resulting in a partial lifting of siege conditions.
Ultimately, neither liberal nor realist paradigms offer a solution to this bloody
conflict. Today, Assads Syria is looking more like a criminal enterprise than a state.
Even if he survives, domestic political actorsespecially civil society groupswill
remain critical to the well-being and survival of millions of Syrians. And if he does not,
these organizations will play a decisive part in shaping that countrys future.

5 Nilsson, Desire, Anchoring the Peace: Civil Society Actors in Peace

Accords and Durable Peace, Jan. 31 2012.
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