SUPREME COURT STATE OF LOUISIANA DOCKET NO. 201 A ROBERT L. WALTON, BONNIE TROUILLE WALTON, a HN KEITH LAMM, AND REBECCA BROUSSARD LAMM. a PlaintiffS-Applicants a VERSUS “EXXON MOBIL CORPORATION, EXXON MOBIL OI. CORPORATION, “BP AMERICAPRODUCTION COMPANY, AND MONCLOVA PLANTATION, L.L.C, Defendants-Respondents ON APPEAL FROM THE JUDGMENTS OF THE SECOND CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEAL, DOCKET NO. CA 14-49569 AND THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, DOCKET NO. 21407, PARISH OF TENSAS, DISMISSING CLAIMS OF PLAINTIFFS AGAINST DEFENDANTS FOR PRE-PURCHASE DAMAGES HONORABLE MICHAEL E. LANCASTER, PRESIDING JUDGE CIVIL PROCEEDING MOTION TO RECUSE JUSTICE HUGHES BY DEFENDANTS-RESPONDENTS NOW INTO COURT, through undersigned counsel, come Exxon Mobil Corporation, Exxon Mobil Oi! Corporation, BP America Production Company, Ann Butts Bums, Cleada N. Butts, Edgar Reed Butts, the fate of Sara L. Muskelley, MeGowan Working Partners, Inc., and John W. McGowan (“Defendants”), to move this Court to recuse Justice Hughes from consideration of the Application for Writs of Certiorari and Review filed by Plaintiffs-Applicants Robert L, Walton, Bonnie Trouille Walton, John Keith Lamm, and Rebecca Broussard Lamm (“Plaintiffs”) pursuant to the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Louisiana's Code of Civil Procedure articles 151 and 159 and Code of Judicial Conduct! * Motions to Recuse asserting the same grounds and factual support herein are contemporancously being, filed by the respective Defendants-Respondents in Global Marketing Solutions, LC. v. Blue Mill Farms, Inc., et al., Docket No. 14-C-2572 and Vincent Charles Bundrick, et al. v. Anadarko Petrolewn Corp., et al, Docket No, 15-C-557.Factual Background A recusal motion should never be filed lightly. And this motion has been filed only after careful deliberation and consideration by all the movants. At the outset, this filing does not represent a challenge to the long standing practice in this State of attomey campaign contributions in judicial elections, Instead, this motion is directed to a very unique set of circumstances and what, in fairness, can only be viewed as significant and targeted contributions made by a defined set of attorneys who have a direct interest in a discrete set of lawsuits, Since this Court’s landmark decision in Corbello v. lowa Production, 02-826 (La 2/2103), $50 So. 2d 686, which affirmed a $33,000,000 jury verdict for the estimated cost of restoring environmentally damaged property resulting from oil and gas operations, “legacy” lawsuits have emerged as an extensive subset of litigation in Louisiana.? So many of these suits have been filed since Corhello was decided that they have eamed their own appellation: “Legacy litigation” refers to hundreds of cases filed by landowners seeking damages from oil and gas exploration companies for alleged environmental damage in the wake of this Court’s decision in Corhello v. lowa Production, 02- 0826 (La. 2/25/03), 850 So.2d 683. These types of actions are known as “legacy litigation” because they often arise fom operations conducted many decades ago, leaving an unwanted “legacy” in the form of actual or alleged contamination. Marin v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 09-2368, 09-2371 (La, 10/19/10), 48 So, 3d 234, 238 n.i (quoting Loulan Pitre, Jr., “Legacy Litigation” and Act 312 of 2006, 20 Tul. Envtl. L.J. 347, 348 (2007)) (internal quotation marks omitted), ‘The plaintiffs in these lawsuits generally seek hundreds of millions (sometimes billions) of doliars related to the purported costs of remediation of their allegedly damaged property. And the plaintiffs are often represented by a discrete group of trial attorneys. ‘These attomeys have a substantial financial stake in these suits.’ The attorveys involved on behalf of the Plaintiffs in this matter, the Talhot, Carmouehe, & Marcello firm, have by far the greatest share of this litigation, Indeed, out of the 385 legacy cases identified by the Louisiana Department of . 182 (or 47.3%), involve the Talbot, Natural Resources, the overwhelming majority of cas See Tensas Poppadoc, inc. v. Chevron, 07-927 (La, App. 3 Cir. 5/21/08), 984 So, 2d 223, 226 (Following the Louisiana Supreme Court’s decision in Cordelia v. lowa Production, 02-826 (La. 2/25/03), 850 So. 2d 686, the number of ‘legacy cases? rose drastically.”). * Legacy lawsuits almost uniformly involve contingency fee contracts between the plaintiffs and their attorneys. 42808041‘Carmouche & Marcello firm. ‘The Talbot, Carmouche, & Marcello firm filed the instant legacy lawsuit in 2004, Defendants responded with motions and exceptions based on the “subsequent purchaser doctrine"—-on which the judgment challenged by Plaintiffs in their application is based—which were heard by the trial court in 2009 and were stayed at the request of the parties, until 2013 On December 8, 2012, while this lawsuit (and the pleadings on which Plaintiffs? application is based) was pending, Justice Hughes won a seat on this Court. Justice Hughes was primarily supported in the election by the Talbot, Carmouche, & Marcello firm and other members of the distinct group of trial attorneys that represent plaintiffs in fegacy litigation in Louisiana (collectively referred to hereinafter as “Plaintiff Legacy Attomeys”).° Specifically, effective June 20, 2012, attomey John Carmouche, of the Talbot, Carmouche, & Marcello firm, formed a PAC named “Citizens for Clean Water and Land PAC, LLC® (hereinafter, “the PAC”) to support the candidacy of then Judge Jeff Hughes of the First Circuit Court of Appeal for a seat on the Louisiana Supreme Court.’ The PAC collected a total of $775,595 prior to Justice Hughes’ victory," including $360,025 from attorneys of the Talbot, Carmouche, & Marcello firm,’ and an additional $365,000 from other plaintiff attorneys and * See Legacy Lawsuits -- Court Case Contacts by Role, attached hereto as Exhibit “A” (available at sonris.com, Legacy Lawsuits, Court Cases, Court Case Contacts by Role, last visited April 22, 2015). * The election was decided in a run-off in favor of Justice Hughes by a margin of 33% to 47% (@ difference of 5,680 votes out of 100,198 total votes cast). See Louisiana Secretary of State Official Election Results from December 8, 2012, attached hereto as Exhibit “BY (available at https:/voterportal sos.la.gov/Graphical (select Election: Sat Dec 8 2012, Multi Parish tab). * To be sure, out of the 385 legacy cases identified by the Louisiana Department of Natural Resources, 279 (or approximately 72.5%) involve the following firms on behalf of the plaintiffs: Tafbot, Carmouche & Mareello, Mud and Bruchhaus, LLC, Veron Bice Palermo & Wison LLC, Weeks and Gonzaler, APLC, Jones Swanson Huddell & Garrison LIC, Murray Law Firm, Smith Stag LLC, Martzell & Bickford, Davidson Meaux Sonnier McEiligott Fontenot, Smith Taliaferro & Purvis, Due Price Guidry Piedrahita & Andrews, and The Goodell Law Firm. See Legacy Lawsuits ~ Court Case Contacts by Role, attached hereto as Exhibit “A” (available at sonris.com, Legacy Lawsuits, Court Cases, Court Case Contacts by Role, last visited April 22, 2075). The remaining firms and attomeys whose contributions are included in the calculations herein, while not identified by the DNR, ae involved in legacy matters based on the personal knowledge of Defendants. See Louisiana Secretary of State filing, attached hereto as Exhibit “C”. 5 See Committee’s Reports Nos, 33501 and 34140, attached hereto as Exhibits “Di” and “D2” (available at http: /swww-ethios state. ta.us/CampaignPinanceSearchyShowEFormn.aspx?Repori{D=33501 and httpsi/www ethics statela.us/CampaignFinanceSearch/ShowEForm.aspx?ReportiD=34140), ° ‘This total includes contributions from Donald T, Carmouche Attorney LLC, John H. Carmouche Attomey LLC, Carmouche & Associates LLC, William R. Coenen, If, and Victor L. Marcello Attorney LLC. 42100041firms involved in legacy litigation.'” ‘Thus, the Plaintiff Legacy Attorneys are responsible for approximately 93.5% of the money collected by the PAC,'! The PAC expended $486,124 in support of Justice Hughes in the primary and run-off ny : itt elections.’ ‘These expenditures included airtime on television stations broadcasting in. the District 5 area, radio advertisements, mailers to voters, signage, and voter polling.'? Given that the Plaintiff Legacy Attorneys were responsible for approximately 93.5% of the money collected by the PAC, approximately $454,525,94 of the total amount the PAC expended in support of Justice Hughes js attributable to the Plaintiff Legacy Attorneys.'* In addition, at least one of the same fi ns that contributed to the PAC, and several others, also contributed directly to Jeff Hughes Campaign Fund in an amount totaling $21,000."* Thus, the total amount contributed by the Plaintiff Legacy Attomeys in support of Justice Hughes was approximately $475,525.94. The total amount spent in support of Justice Hughes was $1,076,020. This sum includes the expenditures by the PAC and the amount spent by Jeff Hughes Campaign Fund.'® In total, the contributions from the Piaintiff Legacy Attorneys account for approximately 44.2%—nearty half—of the amount spent to elect Justice Hughes"? Notably, the PAC spent the vast majority of its expenditures—approximately $416,454 out of the $486,124 total (and thus, $389,384.49 attributable to the Plaintiff Legacy Attorneys)— This total includes contributions from David Bruchhaus, Chad Mudd, Mudd and Bruckhaus, LLC, Veron Bice Palermo & Wilson LLC, Weeks and Gonzalez, APLC, Jones Swanson Huddell & Garrison LLC, Murray Law Firm, and Smith Stag LLC. “' The figure was calculated by adding 360,025 and 365,000 and dividing that amount by 775,595. ” See Exhibits “D1” and “D2”; see also Response to Motion to Recuse filed by Justice Hughes in No. 2013-CC-777, Noble Energy, Inc. v. The State of Louisiana and The Cameron Parish School Board, attached hereto as Exhibit “6” (noting the parties’ agreement that “{rlhe PAC expended $486,124 in support of the Hughes campaign?) xhibits “D1” and “D2”, bg See "This figure wes calculated by multiplying 93.5% (.935) times 486,124, '* This amount ineludes contributions from Cossich Sumich Parsiola & Taylor LIC, Paul H. Due, Martin K. Maley St. APLC, Martzell & Bickford, Murray Law Firm, Randolph A. Piedrahita, and Belinda B. or Donald W. Price, See Candidate's Report No. 40090, attached hereto as Exhibit “4” (available at Iitp:fworw ethies state la. us/CampaignF inanceSearch/ShowEForm aspx? ReporttD=40090), '* See Candidate’s Reports Nos. 40094, 40092, 40091, and 40090, attached hereto as Exhibits “FT “FS”, and “Par (available hutp://vwww ethies.state.ta.us/CampaignFinanceSearch/ShowEForm.aspx?ReportiD 40094, http://www ethics. state. la.ns/CampaignF inanceSearch/ShowEForm.aspx?Reportii2=40092, huiptwww ethics. state-la.us/CampaignF inanceSearch/ShowEForm.aspx?ReportfD=4009 1, and bttp:/Awww ethics. state la.us/CampaignF inanceSearch/ShowEForm.aspx?ReportD=40090}, see also Response to Motion to Recuse filed by Justice Hughes in No. 2013-CC-777, Noble Energy, Inc. v. The State of Louisiana amd The Cameron Parish School Board, attached hereto as Exhibit “E” ' This figure was calculated by dividing the total amount spent by the Plaintiff Legacy Attomeys (475,525.94) by the total amount spent in support of Justice Hughes (1,076,020) 4 4210604_4in support of the primary election, thereby enabling Justice Hughes to advance to the run-off, which he ultimately won.' In contrast, while the Jeff Hughes Campaign Fund expended approximately $250,832 during the primary election, at that point, outside sources had only contributed $69,450 to the campaign." The remaining funds came from a loan teceived by the campaign prior to the primary.” Thus, the Plaintiff Legacy Attomeys expended over 5 and 1/2 times the amount otherwise raised by Justice Hughes in support of his primary election, In addition, since Justice Hughes was elected to the Louisiana Supreme Court, the Plaintiff Legacy Atiomeys have contributed an additional $8 0 to Justice Hughes to assist in retiring his debt from both his successful 2012 clecti mn and his prior unsuccessful campaign for the Louisiana Supreme Court in 2008.” All of the contributions by the Plaintiff Legacy Attomeys to Justice Hughes were made while this case, and the pleadings at issue in Plaintiffs’ writ application, were pending Defendants now face opponents in this case that are represented by counsel who, along with a particular group of other counse! similarly interested in the issue raised in the application, contributed half a million dollars (nearly half of the total amount expended) to Justice Hughes” successful campaign, exponentially more than the total contributions raised prior to the primary, and subsequently close to an additional $100,000 to help alleviate the debt incurred by Justice Hughes in connection with his Supreme Court campaigns. Defendants do not suggest that any routine campaign contribution to a sitting judge should serve as a basis for his or her recusal But these careful and deliberate contributions made by a discrete group of attorneys who focus '* See Response to Motion to Recuse filed by Justice Hughes in No. 2013-CC-777, Noble Energy, Inc. v The State of Louisiana and The Cameron Parish Schoo! Board, attached hereto as Exhibit “E" (stating that “[fJhe PAC independently spent $69,670 during the general lection in support of the Hughes campaign”), see also Committee's Report No. 33501, attached hereto as Exhibit “D1 " See Response to Motion to Recuse filed by Justice Hughes in No, 2013-Ct Noble Energy, Ine. v The State of Louisiana and The Cameron Parish School Board, attached hereto as Exhibit “E” (stating that “{t}he Jeff Hughes Campaign Fund expended $339,064 during the general election.”); see also Candidate’s Reports Nos. 40094 and 40091, attached hereto as Exhibits “Fi” and “F3”. * See Candidate’s Reports No, 40094, attached hereto as Exhibit “FI”, 2" This amount includes contributions from Davidson Meaux Sonnier McEiligott Fontenot, Smith Stag LLC, Smith Taliaferro & Purvis, Veron Bice Palermo & Wilson, LLC, Due Price Guidry Piedrabita & Andrews, Jones Swanson Huddell & Garrison LLC, Murray Law Firm, Mr. or Mrs. J. Rock Palermo, The Knoll Law Firm LLC, Lewis Unglesby, J. Michael Veron, William W. Goodell Jr. PLC, Cossich Surnich Parsiola & Taylor LLC. See Candidate’s Reports Nos. 47097, 40803, 47132, 40854, attached hereto as i globo Exhibit “G” (available at http://www ethies state.ta.us/CampaignF inanceSearch/ ViewScannedFiler aspx F ilert12=10658 hatp://vanw-ethies.state.ta.us/CampaignF inanceSearch/ShowEFormPDP .aspx?Save=PDF&ReportD=408 03, http:/fwww ethics. state. t.us/CampaignFinanceSeareh/ShowEForm.aspx?ReportID=47 132, and hutp:t/www ethics state.fa.us/CampaignF inanceSearch/ShowEForm.aspx?RepartID=40854) 42108044on narrowly defined lawsuits, ie., legacy litigation, stand in stark contrast from other routine campaign contributions. Accordingly, given the substantial amount of contributions at issue, from a distinet group of attomeys that represent approximately two-thirds of the plaintiffs in a specific and prevalent subset of litigation in this state, Defendants respectfully submit that these extreme circumstances warrant recusal of Justice Hughes. Tt, Law and Argument . __ Recusal of Justice Hughes is mandated by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Due process of law is a fundamental right protected by the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article [, section 2 of the Louisiana Constitution. “It is axiomatic that *{a] fair trial in a fair tribunal is a basic requirement of due process.”” Caperton vy, ALT. Massey Coal Co., 556 US. 868, 876 (2009) (quoting fn re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955), In a case very similar to this one. the United States Supreme Court recently held that the failure of a justice of the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals to recuse himself from a case involving a large contributor to his election campaign constituted a violation of the Due Process Clause. Indeed, in Caperton, a West Virginia state court jury had rendered a $50 million verdict against the defendant A.T. Massey Coal Co. (“Massey”). Following the verdict, but before Massey appealed, West Virginia held its judicial elections, which included a seat on the Supreme Court of Appeals. Aware that the Supreme Court of Appeals would consider the appeal in the case, Massey’s chairman, CEO, and president, Don Blankenship (“Blankenship”) made significant campaign contributions and expenditures in support of Brent Benjamin (“Benjamin”), the candidate seeking to unseat the current Justice. Benjamin ultimately won by a 53.3% to 46.7% margin, Prior to Massey's appeal, Caperion moved to disqualify Benjamin from considering the case, which Benjamin denied, Massey subsequently filed its petition for appeal, which the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals granted, and the majority, including Benjamin, reversed the $50 million verdict in a 3-2 decision. Caperton sought rehearing, and again moved unsuecessfully to disqualify Benjamin. The court granted rehearing, and for a third time, Caperton moved for disqualification of Benjamin. Benjamin again refused to withdraw, and the 4210804,4court upheld the reversal of the jury verdict in another 3-2 decision. Caperton filed a petition for writ of certiorari in the United States Supreme Court, which was granted. ‘The United States Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the West Virginia Supreme Court, on the grounds that Benjamin's participation in deciding Massey's appeal effectively denied Caperton due process of law. ‘The Court explained that the due process clause does not require a proof of actual bias, but has instead been implemented by objective standards that ask “whether, ‘under a realistic appraisal of psychological tendencies and human weakness,’ the interest “poses such a risk of actual bias or prejudgment that the practice must be forbidden if the guarantee of due process is to be adequately implemented.” 556 at 883-884 (quoting Withrow, 424 U. at 47), Applying these principles in the context of campaign contributions, the Court concluded: {Where is a serious risk of actual bias-based on objective and reasonable perceptions--when a person with a personal stake in a particular case had a significant and disproportionate influence in placing the judge on the case by raising funds or directing the judge’s election campaign when the case was pending or imminent. Id. at 884, Among the factors considered in the Court’s analysis were the contribution’s relative size in comparison to the total amount of money contributed to the campaign, the apparent effect such contribution had on the outcome of the election, and the temporal relationship between the ‘campaign contributions, the justice’s election, and the penden y of the case. Notably, the Court explained that “[w]hether Blankenship’s campaign contributions were « nevessary and sufficient cause of Benjamin’s victory is not the proper inquiry.” 556 U.S. at 885. Rather, Jue process requires en objective inquiry into whether the contributor’s influence on the election under all the circumstances ‘would offer a possible temptation to the average . .. judge to... . lead him not to hold the balance nice, clear and true.” Jel. (quoting Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S, $10, $32 (1927) Here, it is undeniable that the contributions and expenditures by the Plaintiff Legacy Attorneys had a “significant and disproportionate influence” in placing Justice Hughes on this, case, The amount expended by the Plaintiff Legacy Attorneys through the PAC to the primary election, which enabled Justice Hughes to move forward to the run-off where he uitimately won, his seat on this Court, exceeded the total amount of contributions received by Justice Hughes’ campaign at that time by over $ and 1/2 times. The total amount of contributions and expenditures by the Plaintiff Legacy Attorneys for both the primary election and the run-off was om 4210604 4close to $500,000 and comprised nearly half of the total amount of money spent to ensure a victory for Justice Hughes. ‘These expenditures included airtime on television stations broadcasting in the District 5 area, radio advertisements, mailers to voters, signage, and voter potting, which undoubtedly raised awareness and contributed to the outcome of the election. Moreover, not only was this case, and the pleadings at issue in Plaintiffs’ writ application, pending at the time of the contributions and the election, but the subsequent purchaser rule is—and has been—one of the most prevalent and hotly contested issues in the context of legacy litigation, The issue has been the subject of numerous writ applications to this, Court, filed by both plaintiffs and defendants, Thus, as in Caperton, “[iJt was reasonably foreseeable, when the campaign contributions were made, that the pending case would be before the newly elected justice.” Caperton, 556 U.S. at 886. And in addition to the factors considered in Caperton, the Plaintiff Legacy Attorneys have continued to make substantial contributions to Justice Hughes since his election to the Louisiana Supreme Court to assist in retiring his campaign debt, Accordingly, Defendants respectfully submit that the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution requires the recusal of Justice Hughes from this Court's determination of whether to grant Plaintitis? pending Application for Writs of Certiorari and Review and any subsequent determinations in this matter Justice Hughes should be recused pursuant to Article 151 of the Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure. The Louisiana Code of Ci Procedure also requires the recusal of Justice Hughes. Article 151(A)(4) provides that a judge “shall be recused when he is... biased or prejudiced toward or against the parties or the parties’ attomeys . . . to such an extent that he would be s” is defined as “an inclination unable to conduct fair and impartial proceedings.” The word “bi of temperament or outlook; a highly personal and unreasoned distortion of judgment.” Webster's Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary (1983). Thus, in the context of Article 151, a judge aust be recused when he has a pre-existing inclination, or tendency, to form a judgment in a certain way. As in Caperton, the Louisiana Supreme Court has considered the recusal analysis under Article 151 based on an objective inquiry. For example, in Tolmas v. Parish of Jefferson, 2012+ 0555 (La. 4/27/12), 87 So. 3d 855, the issue involved was whether a large tract of land on Veterans Highway could be used for commercial purposes despite being zoned residential, The Be 210604, 1appellate court reversed the triel court’s ruling in favor of the plaintiff, and the plaintiff sought rehearing and moved to recuse the author of the majority opinion on the grounds that the judge had an interest in a corporation that leased commercial property adjacent to the subject property and was in direct commercial competition with the plaintiff. The other judges on the panel denied the motion to recuse, and the Louisiana Supreme Court granted the plaintiff's petition for certiorari. ‘The court considered the issue objectively and ordered secusal, stating: “Certainly, neighboring landowners and lessees would logically have an interest in the eause and its outcome s therefore, the judge’s recusal was warranted pursuant to La, Code Civ. Pro, Art. 151(A)(4).” 87 So. 3d at 856. Canon 3C of the Louisiana Code of Judicial Conduct likewise provides an objective standard of reasonableness for recusal: “A judge should disqualify hims if... ina proceeding in which the judge’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned, and shall disqualify himself... in a proceeding in which disqualification is required by law.” A reasonable, objective analysis of the citoumstances at issue in this case leads to the inevitable conclusion that Justice Hughes bas a pre-existing inclination toward the Plaintiffs counsel in this case sufficient to warrant recusal under Article 151 of the Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure. Plaintiffs’ counsel were responsible for forming the PAC that contributed an expended nearly half of the total amount spent to Justice Hughes’ successful election campaign, and more than 5 and 1/2 times the total amount of contributions raised by Justice Hughes in support of his primary election, The Plaintiff Legacy Attorneys exerted extraordinary efforts and contributed substantial amounts to ensure a vietory for Justice Hughes, and have since contributed additional significant amounts to assist in the retirement of the debt Justice Hughes incurred from his campaigns. It is certainly logical and objectively reasonable for Justice Hughes to have a personal tendency toward Plaintiffs’ counsel such that his impartiality might reasonably be questioned. Again, Defendants are not suggesting that any routine campaign contribution to a sitting judge should automatically serve as a basis for his or her recusal However, considering the exceptional facts of this case, inchiding the uniqueness of the diserete amount of attorneys and firms that represent plaintiffs in legacy litigation, the amount of the conitibutions from those attomeys and firms, the prevalence of legacy lawsuits in Louisiana, and thus, the near certainty that the issue raised in the Plaintiffs” application would come before this, Court, Defendants respectfully submit that recusal is warranted here. 22106044WHEREFORE, Defendants-Respondents pray that Justice Hughes be recused from this Court's determination of whether to grant Plaintiffs’ pending Application for Writs of Certiorari and Review and any subsequent determinations in this matter «2105041 Respectfully submitted, aa a, - —“Toe BoNorman (Ba Signing with permission for: Joe B. Norman (Bar # 8160) Robert B. McNeal (Bar # 14211) Mark L. McNamara (Bar # 25170) James E. Lapeze (Bar # 28377) LISKOW & LEWIS 701 Poydras Street, Suite $000 New Orleans, Louisiana 70139-5099 Tel.: (504) 581-7979 Fax: (504) 556-4108 Michael P. Cash (Bar # 31655) LISKOW & LEWIS 1001 Fannin Street, Suite 1800 Houston, Texas 77002 Tel: (713) 651-2900 Fax: (713) 651-2908 April L. Rolen-Ogden (Bar # 30698) LISKOW & LEWIS 822 Harding Street Lafayette, Louisiana 70502 P.O, Box 52008 Lafayette, Louisiana 70505-2008 Tel: (337) 232-7424 Fax: (337) 267-2399 Attorneys for ExxonMobil Oil Corporation and Exxon Mobil Corporation Pamela R. Mascari R. Benn Vincent, Jr. KEAN MILLER LLP P.O, Box 3513, Baton Rouge, Louisiana 70821-3513 Attorneys for BP America Production Company -10-42106044 Al Begrae ae Sy feu Wear, fr vy é SHOTWELL BROWN & SPERRY APLC P.O, Box 14140 Monroe, 1A 71207-4140 Attorney for Ann Butts Burns, Cleada N. Butts, Edgar Reed Butts, and the Estate of Sara L. Muskelley be} Nobex (Cc Srnsk Bee ek Teansonndl in? IEANSONNE & REMONDET, LLC 200 West Congress St, Suite 1100 P.O. Box 91530 Lafayette, LA 70509-1530 -and John A, Jeansonne, HT ATTORNEY AT LAW 617 Rosewood Drive Metairie, LA 70001 Attorneys for McGowan Working Partners, Inc., and John W. McGowan oleCERTIFICATE OF SERVIC THEREBY CERTIFY that a copy of the above and foregoing pleading has been served upon counsel of record via email and/or United States mail, properly addressed and postage prepaid, this 23rd day of April, 2015, as specitied below: Donatd T. Carmouche Victor L. Marcello John H, Carmouche William R. Coenen, 111 Brian T. Carmouche Ross J. Donnes D. Adele Owen Leah Cotton Caroline H. Martin TALBOT, CARMOUCHE & MARCELLO. 17405 Perkins Rd. Baton Rouge, LA 70810 Robert C. Vines ATTORNEY AT LAW 300 Boas Ave, ‘New Iberia, LA James E. Paxton ATTORNEY AT LAW 24 Hancock St. P.O. Box 97 St. Joseph, LA Attorneys for Plaintiffi-Applicants 210604 1SUPREME COURT STATE OF LOUISIANA DOCKET NO, 2015-C-869 ROBERT L. WALTON, BONNIE TROUILLE WALTON, JOHN KEITH LAMM, AND REBECCA BROUSSARD LAMM Plaintiffs-Applicants, VERSUS EXXON MOBIL CORPORATION, EXXON MOBIL OH. CORPORATION, BP AMERICA PRODUCTION COMPANY, AND MONCLOVA PLANTATION, L.L.C. Defendants-Respondents ON APPEAL FROM THE JUDGMENTS OF THE SECOND CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEAL, DOCKET NO, CA 14-49569 AND THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, DOCKET NO. 21407, PARISH OF TENSAS, DISMISSING CLAIMS OF PLAINTIFFS AGAINST DEFENDANTS FOR PRE-PURCHASE DAMAGES HONORABLE MICHAEL E. LANCASTER, PRESIDING JUDGE, CIVIL PROCEEDING: ORDER Considering the Motion for Recusal, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the motion is granted, and that Justice Hughes is hereby recused from this Court's determination of whether to grant Plaintifis’ pending Application for Writs of Certiorari and Review and any subsequent determinations in this matter. » 2015. New Orleans, Louisiana, this __ day of