A summary Report on
FPSO Lessons Learned, gathered
from 4 Norwegian FPSOs - May 2002
20 September 2002
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Preface
In 2001 OLF formed an Floating Production, Storage and Offloading (FPSO)
Experience Transfer Workgroup. The groups objectives are to facilitate
experience transfer between Norwegian FPSO operators and potential
operators to reduce capital and operating costs and improve overall
effectiveness.
A decision was made in 2002 to interview Operating and Project staff
involved in 4 Norwegian FPSOs. The contractor RGU had been involved in a
similar study in the UK and was therefore able to make comparisons between
UK and Norwegian experience. A team from RGU, OLF and Marintec
conducted the interviews and prepared the interview summaries. The team
consisted of;
Mark Capsey (RGU)
David Llewelyn (OLF)
Erik Dyrkoren (Marintek)
The OLF workgroup members provided the essential guidance and support for
the interviews and can be contacted if further information is required. The
workgroup members were;
Torbjrn Huslende (ExxonMobil)
Nils Kjr (Norsk Hydro)
Stig Mjen (Statoil)
Erik Vogsberg ( Enterprise/Shell)
Stavanger 20.9.02
David Llewelyn
Workgroup Facilitator OLF
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Contents
1.
Executive Summary
2.
Introduction
3.
4.
Methodology
5.
6.
Industry Challenges
17
7.
23
8.
25
Appendix1
Home Page
27
Table 1
28
Table 2
37
Table 3
66
Table 4:
67
Table 5:
UK FPSO Checklist
68
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1.
Executive Summary
In April/May 2002 the Norwegian Oil Industry Association (OLF) initiated a research
project to collect specific lessons learned from the operation of four Norwegian
Floating Production Storage and Offloading vessels (FPSOs).
The findings were jointly written up by the project team against 64 topics and
categorised for importance and underlying causes.
The most significant of these issues and related lessons learned are summarised in
Chapter 5 and the Appendix Table 1.
Approximately 350 FPSO related issues/problems were reported. Where the primary
underlying cause was identified the percentage number of attributions were design
issues (63%), operational issues (16%), construction issues (12%), and
commissioning issues (9%). It would appear that during the first 18 months
problems are often down to poor construction and commissioning after that issues
are usually attributable to design.
Most lessons learned arise from the experience of problem resolution. Although
selected feedback on Norwegian FPSO successes is presented in Chapter 7 and
Appendix, Table 3; this was not the primary emphasis in the information collection
and respondents feedback.
A similar research exercise into lessons learned was undertaken for UKCS FPSOs in
2001. In Chapter 8 and Appendix Tables 4 and 5 some general and selected
links have been drawn between the Norwegian and UK experiences.
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lessons
2.
Introduction
The Norwegian Oil Industry Association (OLF) initiated this preliminary research
exercise. It was undertaken by David Llewelyn (OLF FPSO Workgroup Facilitator,
Stavanger), Mark Capsey (General Manager, Offshore Management Centre, Robert
Gordon University, Aberdeen) and Erik Dyrkoren (Research Engineer, Norwegian Marine
Technology Research Institute, Trondheim).
3.
The purpose of this joint industry initiative has been to collect lessons learned from the
experiences of operators of Norwegian Floating Production Storage and Offloading
vessels (FPSOs). Information was collected from three operators responsible for four
FPSOs; ExxonMobil (Jotun A), Norsk Hydro (Varg) and Statoil (Asgrd & Norne) and the
DNV. The objective has been to ensure that project and operating experience is not lost
but that generic lessons learned are widely disseminated to allow continuous
improvement, to assist common problem resolution and to seek to minimise repetition of
mistakes.
4.
Methodology
The project team together with contributions from the participating company
representatives identified a suite of categories of FPSO issues for investigation. These
were formatted into a survey tool under seven main headings: Hull & Marine; Turret;
Layout; Project Management; Operations & Support; Codes/Classification; Manning &
Safety.
The survey tool invited respondents to identify issues/problems related to
FPSOs, to rank their relative level of importance, and to identify the underlying cause as
either design, construction, commissioning or operational related. Where remedial
actions had been undertaken comments on the effectiveness of these were invited.
Finally respondents were asked to comment on any lessons learned.
Experience suggests that the most valuable feedback is derived from respondents who
have had a chance to consider the subject matter in advance. Therefore the survey tool
was issued for completion to the interviewees some days prior to their formal interviews
as a catalyst for meaningful discussion. It was observed however that the majority of
participants had not completed the form before their interview, but preferred to
brainstorm on the day.
Between 22-26 April 2002 the project team met with and interviewed 23 representatives
of ExxonMobil, Norsk Hydro, Statoil and DNV in Stavanger, Sandvika and Stordal plus a
videoconference with Harstad.
The project team would like to thank all the participating companies for the excellent
timetabling arrangements and the useful feedback supplied by all their representatives.
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Once reviewed the interviewees comments were collated by FPSO Company. These
were then returned to each participating company for any additional feedback
comments and amendments. To maintain client confidentiality in this final report all
indications of information source including specific FPSO references and mentions of
vendors have been removed.
Part of this project has also involved linking the Norwegian FPSO experience with
information collected by the Robert Gordon University, Offshore Management Centre for
a UK FPSO research exercise conducted in 2001.
In this exercise a substantial amount of information related to FPSO operations has been
gathered. To best review the data it is recommended that the Appendix be
viewed on-line. A large number of hyperlinks have been created to assist users to
move from one data set to another. The Norwegian interview notes have been
evaluated and synthesised by the project team and compiled into a simple MS Excel
database. From this considerable information set a summary of the key issues, lessons
learned and challenges still to be faced have been compiled in Table 1. The bulk of the
raw data on which this interpretation is based is presented in Table 2. Where given,
insights into the perceived successes of Norwegian FPSO projects are documented in
Table 3.
The most widely reported issues/problems relating to UK FPSOs are presented in Table
4. A particularly useful output from the UK research exercise was a checklist of design,
construction, commissioning and operational issues, which if acknowledged might assist
avoidance of decisions, and actions, that potentially could lead to problems during startup and operations. A version of this is reproduced in Table 5 with hyperlinks to the
Norwegian case study material.
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5.
Accommodation (critical)
The FPSO accommodation has insufficient beds (3 out of 4 FPSOs). The situation is
worsened by recent proposals from the unions that two people should not sleep in the
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Cranes (Major)
The choice of cranes - solid boom for 3 out of 4 FPSOs was not optimum. These heavily
built booms are strongly affected by the wind and due to their weight, are insufficiently
responsive when offloading a supply vessel or for working on equipment. The general
view is that these cranes were not designed for active load handling but for in-port
offloading.
A number of upgrades have been made or considered - increased hydraulic power,
installation of coolers, emergency power pack, boom arc limit switches. However these
modifications have only partially solved the problem.
Helicopters (Major)
The forward positioned accommodation and helideck on all Norwegian FPSOs is not
optimum for helicopter landing - misaligned approach, no forward visual reference-point
and increased vertical movement (cf. aft helidecks). However it does have the
advantage of clean air (no vessel-induced turbulence and no take off obstructions.
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Moorings (Major)
Different approaches have been taken by Norwegian FPSOs. Use of individual anchor
winches has the advantage of facilitating winter installation, allowing active
management of the mooring system and enabling movement of the chain wear point.
The permanently stopped design is simpler with reduced maintenance and lower capex.
It is not yet known if wear will be a problem for the permanently stopped design,
however there is as yet no straightforward method to inspect the top of the chain and
service the fairlead. Good experience with such a design may lead to increased use of
this lower cost approach. To date (other than minor drilling rig damage - better
monitoring is required here) there have been no problems with the mooring lines and
anchors.
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However operating experience for at least one FPSO has shown roll limits to be underestimated. This has required an upgrade of the topsides fatigue design.
HVAC (Moderate)
There have been a number of examples of poor HVAC design. The most serious was
the level of noise, which failed to meet Working Environment rules. Modifications after
construction are expensive and disruptive. Other problems are balancing difficulties,
lack of external air locks; poor access for maintenance, stuck dampers and excessive
dryness in the air.
HVAC design is a key area of design as a safety critical system. A contractor familiar
with North Sea conditions and Norwegian Working Environment legislation should
manage the work.
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Workshops (Moderate)
Workshop design and locations vary on the FPSOs. The most successful are accessible
via forklift, on the same level and close to stores, well equipped with mechanical
handling equipment, separate from the accommodation (for noise) and in a safe area
allowing welding (forward).
Getting the workshop design right is important for maintenance efficiency and crew
morale. The working environment, access and conditions in the workshop will reduce
repair costs, as the crew becomes confident to repair and service equipment on board.
Turret
A total of 30 turret related issues/problems were reported. Where the primary
underlying cause was identified the number of attributions were design issues (15),
operational issues (5) and construction issues (2).
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Risers (Major)
Risers are a critical component of the FPSO system. Damage to the outer sheath and
seawater ingress can reduce fatigue life significantly. Gas permeation can have
unexpected effects including collapse, and HP gas flow can cause vibration or loosening
of the inner carcass. To date however, there have been no catastrophic failures of risers.
Good riser design and operational management is a key success factor. Monitoring
systems, the ability to flush the annulus and protect the riser from damage, particularly
on installation are needed to ensure long and trouble free life.
Swivels (Major)
Overall the performance of swivels on the 3 FPSOs has been good. There have been no
significant leaks; the only major problem was two failures and an explosion in the oil
filled 11KV-power transfer swivel. This was due to water entering the insulation oil
medium.
Initial worries about swivel reliability have now been reduced. However, only one FPSO
has continuous swivel movement (free turret) and this has only been in service two
years, so long term wear concerns and repair methods remain untested.
Layout
A total of 19 layout related issues/problems were reported. Where the primary
underlying cause was identified the number of attributions were design issues (12),
commissioning issues (2) and operational issues (1).
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Layout (Critical)
The layout of equipment on an FPSO is a critical design phase. Concerns noted include
placing main generators too close to the accommodation, poor mechanical handling
solutions, exhaust and flare radiation problems, module overcrowding when others are
very spacious, poorly placed vents, access and escape routes restricted by cable and
pipework, poor workshop and store locations.
It is recommended that when a basic FPSO layout is outlined more time is spent with all
interested parties both informally and through formal design reviews to ensure the best
compromises are achieved. Relevant specialists must carefully consider all Capex, Opex
and Safety issues.
Project Management
A total of 29-project management related issues/problems were reported. Where the
primary underlying cause was identified the number of attributions were design issues
(11), commissioning issues (6) and construction issues (4).
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Compression
A). (Critical) 2 out of 4 FPSOs had serious compression problems (gas seal failures,
repeated bundle change-outs and cracked pistons) due to undersized scrubbers and
liquid carry-over. Upgrades, improved instrumentation and online equipment monitoring
solved problems. The cost of these failures which includes; service costs, spares, CO2
tax, substitute diesel fuel, and lost gas export income was substantial.
A number of factors contributed to these problems, poor instrumentation, and vessel
movement reducing efficiency of separation train, liquid hold up in pipes and slugging
and poor performance of internals. It would seem a good investment to install larger
scrubbers than normal to provide a safety factor for unknowns.
B). (Major) Vibration from reciprocating compressors can be a serious problem. On one
FPSO poor mounting of the compressors and failure to fit bellows and flexible hoses has
led to an ongoing sequence of high potential leaks and failures. Vibration has also
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Process (Moderate)
There is often inadequate provision for sand and solids in the separation system.
Although wells are predicted to be sand free, when water arrives they often produce
sand. It is also useful to be able to clean up wells directly through the test separator,
which should have sand jetting installed.
Provision for sand and solids handling is generally a good long-term investment, despite
optimistic predictions from the reservoir engineers.
Codes/Classification
A total of 16 codes/classification related issues/problems were reported. Where the
primary underlying cause was identified the number of attributions were design issues
(4), and commissioning issues (2).
Crew (Major)
All FPSOs operate with a base crew of 35-40. This required a number of staff
particularly crane operators and mariners to be multi-skilled.
However most FPSOs
carry typical POB levels of 55-70. This can cause significant problems for major
maintenance or upgrade projects.
A significant realisation has been importance of carrying multi-skilled mariners within
base crew. Their experience is particularly important for emergency situations, cargo
management/offloading and maintaining equipment exposed to sea spray and corrosion.
The low crew level also increases the level of mandatory training required for certain
positions eg crane driver.
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6.
Industry Challenges
Respondents highlighted a number of challenges that not only they, but also the FPSO
community in general faced.
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Painting (Major)
All 4 FPSOs have suffered from inadequate paintwork. The underlying problem is lack of
priority and time allocated to this activity. Quality control of preparation and finishing
has also been lacking. Painting in Singapore has been particularly poor due to the
humid conditions. There has been a serious problem on several FPSOs with a topsides
paint system failure in Norway - premature thickening of the paint, that has led to
extensive remedial work.
Painting of FPSOs is a critical area to ensure a low maintenance facility over a long
period offshore. The inability to dry dock the vessel and its limited accommodation
demand that the initial paint finish is to the highest standard. However this work is
often conducted late when the pressure for sailaway is high.
The challenge is to
develop painting technology and methods compatible with project demands and a 20year offshore life.
Thrusters (Major)
Service or repair of thrusters is a major challenge, particularly as reliability has not been
as high as expected. Most FPSOs require thrusters at all times; a failure in winter could
impact safety and production. Most thrusters have to be withdrawn externally and ROV
work is weather sensitive and high risk. Use of FPSO cranes while helpful, is not always
feasible due to thruster weights and position.
Methods for removal and repair of thrusters in field need to be developed and shared.
One solution for the future is that thrusters are not safety critical (this is true of one
FPSO), and thrusters should be designed for internal retrieval and service. This design
has been achieved on one FPSO.
Painting (Moderate)
Painting the hull in the area of the water line will present a challenge as this is normally
done at 5-year dry dock. The vessel can be raised under light ballast however the work,
if required, will be very exposed with no provision for scaffolding.
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Turret
Swivels/Tie-backs (Major)
Increasingly opportunities to tie back new fields are being considered. This allows
volumes to be maintained while the primary field reaches tail end production. There are
a number of constraints including available riser slots, swivel capacity or paths, ability to
produce separate streams, metering and control upgrades.
Typically the swivel and turret are the most challenging areas for upgrade. A low cost
method is required to upgrade swivel capacity and pull in new risers with minimum shut
down time.
Swivels (Moderate)
While swivel repairs have not yet been required, a methodology to simplify repair and
seal replacement is required. At present a repair to a key seal may take up to 5 days.
Project Management
Design Input from Operations (Major)
It is agreed that Operations input a key to good design, however on 3/4 FPSOs staff
consider operations input inadequate. Reasons are lack of an operating organisation,
lack of operations experience, concern at capex over-runs, lack of data for operations to
justify more expenditure and information provided too late.
The challenge for operations staff is to be able to provide a reasoned justification for
Capex vs. Opex trade offs based on past operating experience. Data must be presented
in a quantitative way and early enough to support investment decisions in appropriate
design and quality requirements.
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Process (Major)
Failure of separator or coalescer internals due to sloshing is a common problem of
FPSOs (reported by 3 out of4). Reason is fatigue of internals due to poor support. The
cost of such failures is very high - shut down and repair costs.
It appears that suppliers have not adequately understood loads associated with
separators on FPSOs. Work is required to define fluid loading and build an industry
specification for moving separation equipment to eliminate the problem.
Documentation (Moderate)
Every Operator has complained of inadequate documentation. Primary problems have
been late documentation from suppliers, missing data from subcontractors (particularly
marine suppliers), inability to get paperless systems up and running even one year after
start-up, missing as built drawing and loop diagrams, incompatible tags and poor links
to maintenance databases.
The problem appears to arise from inadequate specification of documentation
requirements at order placement. It is also a low priority for suppliers after the
equipment is delivered and paid for. Follow up is often inadequate. Different
specifications from Operators are also a problem. This is an opportunity for a joint
industry initiative, perhaps building further on Norsok standards.
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Codes/Classification
Approvals & Safety Verification (Major)
While all FPSOs were built to Class, 3 out of 4 have now dropped Classification. Their
view is that there is little to be gained from remaining within the "marine" inspection
and approval regime offered by leading classification societies. NPD do not require
ongoing classification.
There is potential value in classification, but there is a view that the societies have not
kept up with the demanding design, build and manning requirements of FPSOs. The
challenge is for Classification Societies and Operators to tighten FPSOs class
specifications so they become fully effective both for Operators, builders and regulators,
in both build and operation phases.
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7.
Evidence suggests that what goes wrong is more likely to be remembered than what
goes right. In both the Norwegian and the UK research exercises the interviewees were
more forthcoming with information about problems and challenges faced, solutions
identified, remedial actions undertaken and lessons learned. People were often reticent
or unsure about classifying something as a success or a potential best practice. This is
often in part because of the difficulty people have in comparing their experiences with
those of others and then coming to an informed conclusion as to what is a good or bad
practice or performance relative to a norm. It is hoped that these type of knowledge
exchange initiatives will in future assist FPSO specialists to report both positive and
negative experiences relative to established best practice.
Reported Norwegian success stories are highlighted in Table 3 of the Appendix. These
include:
Turret
Swivels (Major)
Overall the performance of swivels on the 3 FPSOs has been good. There have been no
significant leaks; the only major problem was two failures and an explosion in the oil
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Project Management
Project Learning/input (Moderate)
There is evidence to suggest that a number of Norwegian FPSO projects benefited
significantly from knowledge sharing of lessons learned from other projects in
development at the same time. Operators staff and nominees working in the yards
during construction and commissioning phases appear to have been adept at seeking
out and implementing good practices from other operators and the DNV.
Safety Performance
All operators reported good FPSO safety performances, backed up by proactive safety
cultures to enhance and extend good safety practices within project contractors and
shipyards.
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8.
In 2001 the Offshore Management Centre at the Robert Gordon University in Aberdeen
completed a similar knowledge sharing research exercise on behalf of the FPSO
committee of the United Kingdom Offshore Operators Association (UKOOA). Part of the
research involved the collection of lessons learned from the first 12-18 months operation
of FPSOs on the UKCS. Like the OLF project a number of specialists representing ten
FPSOs were interviewed and their views collated. Whereas the emphasis and
information reporting in the UK study were slightly different, it is worthwhile trying to
align some of the experiences and lessons learned from the two areas.
The main conclusions from the UK work were as follows:
It appears that the majority of problems arose because of the way the projects were
structured and managed.
Decision and actions taken in the design and construction phase are the most
probable causes of problems in commissioning and early operation.
Problems have also been caused by lack of communication between isolated groups
involved in design.
It appears that the responsibility for QA/QC was not clear and this has led to
problems with equipment delivered which was not fit for purpose.
A major cause of early operational problems was that FPSOs were sailed to their
location before their construction was complete and before their systems had been
fully tested.
Knowledge of lessons learned does not seem to be shared readily across the UK
FPSO industry. A change of attitude will probably be needed before the situation will
improve.
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It is essential that lessons learned feedback from knowledge sharing initiatives such as
this are channelled back to the FPSO design companies and their staff. It is equally
important the customer maintains an adequate degree of internal competency and
understanding to ensure the operational design specification is fully fit for purpose.
There have been a number of problematic issues common to both Norwegian and UK
FPSOs. These have included:
Crane design and mechanical handling issues. Many FPSOs have been designed with
inefficient cranes, poor crane coverage and inadequate lay-down areas, bumper bars
and mechanical handling capabilities. This appears to be due to lack of familiarity of
operational needs by designers.
Both Norwegian and UKCS FPSOs have struggled with accommodation POB restrictions.
Prioritisation of construction and engineering work presents real challenges because of
limited POB flexibility.
There are examples from both the Norwegian and UK project experiences that too much
faith can be placed in the knowledge of the supplier. This can be a significant problem if
functional specifications are not clarified down the supply chain. There are many
examples of suppliers and even constructors not appreciating the distinctive nature of
FPSO operations i.e. assuming that the vessel can be taken off station and brought into
port if there are any problems. Designers have not adequately faced up to the
challenges of simplifying failed equipment removal mechanisms for FPSOs. The change
out of power generation systems and thrusters has and will continue to represent a
major operational challenge.
Both Norwegian and UK FPSOs have had experiences of poor quality painting and
coatings during the construction phase. When not properly addressed at the time this
factor has the potential to create significant POB scheduling problems at a later stage.
Some problems attributable to the effects of motion have been reported from both
Norwegian and UK FPSOs. These appear to be mainly where there has been insufficient
attention to the effects of sloshing inside tanks and damage to separator internals as a
consequence of fatigue.
Vessel orientation and location of venting problems resulting in exhausts and other
emissions being blown over vessels have been experienced in both the UK and Norway.
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