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University of Pennsylvania

A Critique of Paul Kennedys Rise and Fall of Great Powers in the Face of
Twenty-First Century Conflict

Samantha Scheetz
Professor McDougall
History 202: Decline and Fall of Great Powers
12 May 2015

Abstract:
The aim of this paper is to prove Paul Kennedys thesis and prognosis for the
future of the United States obsolete given the changed counter-insurgent, counter-terrorist
nature of twenty-first century warfare. Kennedys narrow and exclusive body of historical
evidence subjects the United States to an inevitable future consistent with the lifespan of
any great power. However, the pattern which he deduces and thus projects on the United
States, is conditional to inter-state warfare between comparable opponents. When
Kennedys theory is extracted from his limited body of evidence, it is no longer
applicableand twenty-first century conflict does not exactly fit into his historical
narrative. My goal is to first deconstruct Kennedys argument: I will delve into why
reducing military victory to economics is problematic. From there, I will expose another
flaw in Kennedys thesis--the fact that he assumes all conflict to be great coalition interstate warsand prove that guerilla warfare is the historical norm, conventional warfare
the exception. I will then contend that the United States is experiencing relative decline,
but not for the reasons that Kennedy foresaw. Finally, I will discuss the ways in which the
United States must respond to its changed enemies in order to maintain its position as a
superpoweror whether its too late.
Introduction:
Paul Kennedys work, The Rise and Fall of Great Powers, tells the predictable
and cyclical tale of the ascent and relative decline of great hegemons. Published in 1987,
Kennedy gained international esteem, lauded for his historical precision and seemingly
forthright rationale. Most significant, however, was his forecast for the fate of the United
States.

His thesis is as goes: over time theres a general correlation between the rise and
fall of a nation-state relative to its economic and technological power and its strength and
capacity to influence world events. Moreover, military overstretch and concomitant
relative decline are the consistent threats facing powers whose ambitions and security
requirements are greater than their resource base can provide for.1 Thus, he purported
consistent with the fate of all other great powers-- the United States--faced with a budget
deficit and overstretch in defense spending-- will too undergo relative decline.
His argument, ostensibly benign, proved contentious to both historians and scholars. Paul
Johnson, English historian and journalist, criticized Kennedy for exaggerating the
economic factors [in history], while ignoring the human ones2 while Owen Harries,
foreign policy intellectual, objected: who can demonstrate convincingly that everything
is reducible to economics?3 Kennedys oversimplification of historical events posed
considerable issues for some, but in large, he successfully traced a predictable pattern of
state behavior that seemed to suggest the United States was destined for decline.
If one fast-forwards to present day, it appears that Kennedys prognosis was half correct.
The United States is indeed experiencing relative decline. In contrast to the mid twentieth
century--when the United States stood as the worlds largest creditor nation, producing 40
to 45 percent of the gross world products4the United States now stands as the second
1 Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of Great Powers (New York: Random House Inc.,
1987) 438-39.
2 Paul Johnson, Book Reviews: The Rise and Fall of Great Powers: Economic Change
and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000, The American Spectator Jul. 1988: 39-41.
3 Owen Harries, "The Rise of American Decline," Commentary 85 May 1988: 32-36.
4 Samuel Huntington, The U.S.Decline Or Renewal? (Annual Conference of the
International Institute for Strategic Studies) 1988: 76-96.

largest economy, recently surpassed by China.5 However, this relative decline is not
occurring for the reasons or during the time frame--that Kennedy alleged.
What Kennedy did not foreseeand what proves to be the fundamental flaw of his
argumentis the shift away from Great Power industrial era warfare to asymmetrical,
counter-insurgency, counter-terrorist conflict. The greatest problem in his argument is that
he uses an exclusive body of evidence to prove his thesis and thus assumes the fate of the
United States, disregarding most of human history and the historical nature of conflict.
The validity of his argument is both contingent upon and limited to coalition wars
amongst great powers of the West between the seventeenth and twentieth centuries. When
Kennedys thesis is isolated from this narrow window of time and context, it loses its
legitimacy. Moreover, when applied to the type of conflict the United States faces today,
his argument proves to be obsolete. In asymmetric conflict, the opponent with greater
economic and military resources does not always win. The United States may, in time,
cease to be the worlds superpower, but not in accordance with Kennedys formulaic
account.
The Problem With Reducing Military Victory to Economics
The direct correlation Kennedy draws between a nations military and economic
strength and its supremacy supposes that victory always goes to the side with the greatest
material resources. As Dr. Walter McDougall notes in his commentary, The Sick Eagle
and the Politics of Despair, Kennedys decisive evidence is that in great coalition wars
those that decided the rise and fall of great powersvictory invariably went to the side
5 Mike Bird, "China Just Overtakes US as the Worlds Largest Economy " Business
Insider. 8 Oct. 2014, 8 May 2015 <http://www.businessinsider.com/>.

with the more flourishing productive base, or as the Spanish captains used to say, to him
who has the last escudo.6 Kennedy attributes the victories of the Habsburg Dynasty,
Napoleonic France and the Allies during the First and Second World War to superior
economic production, which as a result produced greater military mobilization. He
supplements his argument by providing tables showing data of war expenditure and total
mobilized forces during these conflicts. The evidence is made visible to readers: during
the First World War, while the Allies totaled $57.7 billion in war expenditure in 1913 and
rounded 40.7 million mobilized forces, the Central Powers comparatively totaled $24.7
billion in war expenditure and 25.1 million mobilized forces7. At the end of Chapter 5,
Kennedy comments:
While it would be quite wrong to claim that the outcome of the First World War was
predetermined, the evidence presented here suggests that the overall course of that
conflict...correlates closely with the economic and industrial production and
effectively mobilized forces available to each alliance...What was enjoyed by one
side, particularly after 1917 was a marked superiority in productive forces...That
factor eventually turned out to be decisive.8
The problem, however, is that there are limited instances to which this direct correlation
economic superiority means military victory--applies. What Kennedy fails to recognize
is that the familiar mechanism of the balance of powerwhich, when disrupted, results
6 Walter McDougall, "The Sick Eagle and the Politics of Despair," The World and I May
1988: 394-401.
7 Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of Great Powers (New York: Random House Inc.,
1987) 274.
8 Ibid.

in great coalition warsis particularly unique to Western Civilization.9 McDougall


further contends, The last escudo argument is especially dubious when applied to
bilateral, shorter wars, not to mention the limited proxy wars of the mid-to-late twentieth
century.10
Underscoring McDougalls point, if one takes a look at the limited proxy wars of
the late twentieth century, the Vietnam War stands in stark contrast to Kennedys thesis.
In this instance, the United States faced an undoubtedly weaker opponenteconomically,
militarily and technologicallyyet was ultimately defeated. With a death count totaling
282,000 and an exhausted $175 billion in military expenditures (equivalent to $770
billion in 2003 dollars),11 the United Statessupposedly the greatest military power the
world had ever seenwas stymied by the poorly equipped North Vietnamese insurgent
guerrilla forces. This type of asymmetric conflict that the United States faced, however, is
no historical anomaly. In fact, when presented with a chronicle of human conflict, it
appears that guerilla warfare is the norm in history, and great coalition warfare, the
exception.
Guerilla Warfare, The Norm, Great Coalition Warfare, The Exception
Military historian, Max Boot, is a pioneer in the history and chronology of guerilla
warfare. In his recently published book, Invisible Armies, he sequences the evolution of
five-thousand-years of guerilla combat, deeming guerilla warfare ubiquitous
9 Walter McDougall, "The Sick Eagle and the Politics of Despair," The World and I May
1988: 394-401.
10 Walter McDougall, "The Sick Eagle and the Politics of Despair," The World and I
May 1988: 394-401.
11 Daggett, Stephen. Costs of Major U.S. Wars. 29 June 2010. RS22926.
GalleryWatch CRS Reports.

throughout history.12 He begins with prehistoric tribal warfare, continues to ancient


Mesopotamia, Rome and China, the guerrilla revolution campaigns of the eighteenth and
nineteenth centuries, and ultimately to the related growth of present day terrorism. Boot
proves that guerilla combat is as old as mankind;13 His goal is neither to advocate nor
condemn guerilla warfare, but to instead reveal its undeniable prevalence throughout
history, thus disrupting the notion that conventional warfare is the norm.
In his book, one particular story of asymmetric conflict resonates: it occurs in 512 BC
between the Persians and the Scythians. The Achaemenid Persian dynasty is described as
one of the greatest empires of the ancient world:
From colossal stone buildings ringed by imposing columns, bureaucrats presided
over a vast realm broken down into provinces governed by satraps (governors),
ruled according to a complex body of law, funded with an efficient system of tax
collection and some of the worlds first banks, linked together by all-weather
highways and a horse-borne postal system, and defended by a crack army whose
elite were known as the Immortals.14
The Scythians, in contrast, are described as a horse-riding nomadic tribe that survived
on whatever their livestock could provide.15 When King Darius assumed the Persian
throne in 512 BC, he decided to punish the Scythians for their raids into Persian territory.

12 Max Boot, Invisible Armies (New York: Liveright Publishing Corporation, 2013)
xxvi.
13 Ibid. 9.
14 Ibid. 16.
15 Ibid. 17.

The Scythiansknowing they were too weak to counter the Persians in open battle16
retreated, driving off their herds, choking up all the wells and springs, and leaving the
whole country bare of forage.17 An outraged Darius sent a message to Scythian chief,
Idanthryus, who replied: That is my way, Persian...We Scythians have neither towns nor
cultivated lands, which might induce us, through fear of their being taken or ravaged, to
be in any hurry to fight with you...We shall not join battle, unless it pleases us.18
This instance is both compelling and telling, as it neatly summarizes the gulf of
incomprehension that separates regular armies from their irregular foes.19 Boot
purports, it could have taken place between virtually any civilized king and nomad
chieftain...or between many a president or prime minister and guerilla or terrorist leader
today. At least Darius was smarter than many commanders who have been in his sandals.
He knew when he was beaten.20
The clash between the Persians and the Scythians is a classic tale of the underdog: against
all logic, the seemingly weaker opponent came out on top. It is evident, however, through
Boots chronicle, that an underdogs success is neither surprising nor at all unusuala
notion contrary to Kennedys thesis.
The appendix of Boots work is further telling, providing a database of guerilla
clashes from 1775 to present-day. The chart is organized as such: Regulars,
16 Ibid.
17 Ibid. 18.
18 Ibid.
19 Ibid.
20 Ibid.

Insurgents, Duration [of conflict], and Outcome. His evidence proves the multitude
of instances in which the Regular does not prevail. The American Revolution was a
battle between a Regular, the United Kingdom, and an Insurgent, the American Colonies.
After eight years of battle, the UKat the time a global hegemon--fell to their markedly
weaker opponent. Similarly, in the Haitian Revolution of 1791, the ill-equipped Haitian
insurgents stymied the dominant French army. This trend is pertinent through the Latin
American wars of independence: in the year 1811 alone, the superior Spanish fleet was
defeated by Uruguay, Peru and Venezuela.21
Taking a look at contemporary conflict, from Algeria to Afghanistan, Chechnya,
Lebanon, Somalia and Iraq, insurgents have shown a consistent ability to humble great
powers.22 Boots evidence undercuts Kennedys logic, suggesting that conflict is far
more nuanced than decisive economic superiority. Conventional tacticsmore advanced
and costlydo not prove effective when faced with an unconventional threat.23 Failures
result when strong and confident powers underestimate their enemies will to succeed.
Right and might do not inevitably prevail.24
Paul Johnson echoes this notion, arguing that such a deterministic approach makes far
too little allowance for the importance of will in the shaping of great events.25 Johnson
21 Ibid. Appendix.
22 Ibid. xx.
23 Ibid. 561.
24 Gerard DeGroot, "Book Review: Invisible Armies, A History of Guerrilla Warfare,
by Max Boot" Washington Post. 15 Feb. 2013, 8 May 2015
<http://www.washingtonpost.com/>.
25 Paul Johnson, Book Reviews: The Rise and Fall of Great Powers: Economic Change
and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000, The American Spectator Jul. 1988: 39-41.

goes as far to say that even in the great coalition wars of the twentieth century, victory
was not a direct result of economic preeminence: Germanys power collapsed as a result
of Hitlers reckless miscalculationsthe mistakes of a single individualrather than
because of some inexorable laws of military-economic correlation.26
The historical narrative told by Boot is enormously different than that of Kennedyits
inclusive, extensive, and arguably more realistic. A principal issue in Kennedys thesis is
this: it is irresponsible to deduce a dependable pattern of the life of a great power using
only three hundred years of history as evidence. As evidenced by Boot, great coalition
warfare is exceptional, and therefore treating it as the norm is both backwards and
incorrect. It also means that military victory is not always reducible to economicsin
fact, it seldom is. Had Kennedy taken a more comprehensive approach, he would have
perhaps realized the circumstantial nature of his argument. Moreover, perhaps he would
have foreseen a different future for the United States, a future more consistent with the
one it faces today.
The United States in Decline, But Not According to Kennedys Thesis
Based on the predictable rise and fall pattern that Kennedy traced, the post Cold
War world would have looked something like this: the United States and the Soviet
Union would have reluctantly accepted their new roles as retired superpowers, and the
European Economic Community and Japan would have experienced a rapid ascent to
world primacy. However, the years and decades following the end of the Cold War
proved contrary to what Kennedy had projected; in fact, for nearly two decades the

26 Ibid.

10

United States was stronger than ever, while Japan faced an unprecedented prolonged
economic crisis and the European Union was unable to project power on a global scale.
It is now nearly thirty years after Kennedys book was published. Some scholars
contend that he was indeed correct, just three decades belated. The United States is facing
the supposed dilemma of any great power: balancing guns and butter and investments for
economic growth.27 The SIPRI Military Database for 2015 shows that defense spending
currently accounts for 20 percent of all federal spending.28 Moreover, the United States
spends more on defense than China, Russia, Saudi Arabia, France, the United Kingdom,
India and Germany combined.29
However, the relative decline the United States is experiencing ought not to be mistaken
for that which Kennedy predicted. The United States is in relative decline--not because of
an inability to finance its military commitments--but because of a failure to adapt to an
unforeseen security threatone that Kennedy certainly did not anticipate. While a
strong economy is vital in providing resources to meet military challenges, the principal
issue is that the United States needs a defense budget that matches the new, asymmetric
security threats it faces--not the prior, conventional ones.
One of the greatest obstacles in this transition is the United States inability to
disassociate from the mentality that all warfare is inter-state and conventional which--as
evidencedis anything but. William Lind, author and columnist, contends that this is
27 Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of Great Powers (New York: Random House Inc.,
1987) 235.
28 Mark Koba, "U.S. Military Spending Dwarfs Rest of World" NBC News. 24 Feb.
2014, 8 May 2015 <http://www.nbcnews.com/>.
29 Ibid.

11

because after the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648, the state established a monopoly on war
and has since been the defining element of modern conflict. Previously, many different
entities had fought warsfamilies, tribes, religions, cities, business enterprisesusing
many different means, not just armies and navies.30 Now, however, state militaries find
it difficult to imagine war in any way other than fighting state armed forces similar to
themselves.31
In his article Understanding Fourth Generation War Lind develops a framework for
modern war, separating it into four definitive generations. The First Generation runs from
1648 to 1860. This was war of line and column tactics, where battles were formal and
the battlefield was orderly. The relevance of the First Generation springs from the fact
that the battlefield of order created a military culture of order.32 The Second Generation
developed by the French during and after World War I--attempted to reconcile the
contradiction between military culture and the increasing disorderliness of the
battlefield.33 The solution was mass firepower, most of which was indirect artillery fire.
Lind explains that Second Generation Warfare is relevant because it remains the
American way of war: to Americans, war means putting steel on target. Aviation has
replaced artillery as the source of most firepower, but otherwise, the American military
today is as French as white wine and Brie.34 He cites an instance at the Armys Army
30 William Lind, "Understanding Fourth Generation War," Military Review. Sept.-Oct.
2004: 12-16.
31 Ibid.
32 Ibid.
33 Ibid.
34 Ibid.

12

School at Fort Knox, where one instructor recently began his class by saying, I dont
know why I have to teach you all of this old French crap, but I do.35 The Third
Generation was too developed during World War I, but by the German army; it is known
as Blitzkrieg, or maneuver warfare. During the Third Generation, tactics and culture
changedinitiative became more important than obedience. In some sense, there was a
departure from the culture of order. The final generation thus far, the Fourth Generation,
is what the world faces today. Lind describes it as the most radical change36 since the
Peace of Westphalia: in Fourth Generation war, the state loses its monopoly on war. All
over the world state militaries find themselves fighting non-state opponents. Almost
everywhere, the state is losing.37 He continues, Fourth Generation war is marked by a
return to the world of cultures, not merely states, in conflict.38 Similar to Boot, Lind
points out that Fourth Generation is not a novel but a return...Now, as then, many
different entities will wage war...They will wage war for different reasons, not just the
extension of politics by other means.39 Moreover, 4GW tactics are nothing new:
opponents use standard guerilla tactics, classic cavalry warfare carried out with modern
technology at the operational and strategic, just not tactical levels.40

35 Ibid.
36 Ibid.
37 Ibid.
38 Ibid.
39 Ibid.
40 Ibid.

13

The problem for the United States is that it has failed to react to this marked shift in the
nature and behavior of its foreign enemies. A 2001 article in the Atlantic, Fourthgeneration Warfare comments:
For all of the tactical twists and turns in U.S. military planning during and since
the Cold War, the basic strategic template has remained more or less the
same...the emphasis has been on a doctrine of attrition and theater warfare against
large, identifiable foes with professional standing armies. This strategy has gone
hand-in-hand with an emphasis on costly high-tech weapons...[the U.S. military]
has tended to think far more about the kinds of battles [it] wont be fighting than
about the real-world conflicts [its] about to be embroiled in.41
Military analyst Chuck Spinney, Army Major Donald Vandergriff, and Marine
Lieutenant Colonel John Sayen add, ever since the end of the Cold War the Pentagon has
lagged in developing a correct military response to 4GWa response that calls for
reliance on smaller units versed in maneuver warfare. This kind of fighting eschews
heavy firepower, attrition, and long-range, high-altitude bombardment.42
The reluctance to react and adapt to changed military encounters has proved costly and
debatably fruitless for the United States. Below does the Stockholm International Peace
Research Institute (SIPRI) produce a chart (fig. 1). It measures U.S military spending
from 1988 to 2013. As shown, military spending rose sharply after the terrorist attacks in
2001 (see fig. 1).

41 Jason Vest, "Fourth-generation Warfare" The Atlantic. Dec. 2001, 8 May 2015
<http://www.theatlantic.com/>.
42 Ibid.

14

43

Spinney comments, The September 11 attacks, which cost the perpetrators all of fivehundred thousand dollars, dont justify an increase in the defense budgetwere
spending as much on defense as the next fifteen countries do combined. Look at where
the money is goingit purports to help us deal with this problem, but its going to fund
all the other crap.44 The 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review underscores Spinneys point.
Released on September 30, just two weeks after the terrorist attacks, the report seemingly
emphasizes a commitment to homeland defense over missile defense. Though
recognizing the changed nature of the enemy--the United States is likely to be
challenged by adversaries who possess a wide range of capabilities, including asymmetric
approaches to warfare45the report is short on specifics and indefinitely postpones

43 Dinah Walker, "Trends in U.S. Military Spending." CFR.org. Council on Foreign


Relations, 15 Jul. 2014 <http://www.cfr.org>.
44 Jason Vest, "Fourth-generation Warfare" The Atlantic. Dec. 2001, 8 May 2015
<http://www.theatlantic.com/>.
45 Department of Defense. Quadrennial Defense Review Report. Washington:
Government Printing Office, 2001.

15

crucial decisions notably on items such as personnel and procurement. Furthermore it


keeps three major fighter-aircraft projects alivea victory for 2GW.46
Kennedys thesis would suppose that a sharp increase in defense spending would prove
advantageous to military endeavors. However, over the past decade the United States has
spent over $4 trillion in an effort to counter the War on Terrorism yet it continues to be
thwarted by its enemies.47 With a total of 350,000 deaths, including civilians, troops and
insurgents--and no foreseeable end in sightthe War on Terrorism is projected to be the
most expensive and deadly war in United States history.48 Asymmetric warfare is far
more complex than a deterministic military-economic correlation. We must recognize in
4GW situations, we are the weaker, not the stronger party, despite all our firepower and
technology,49 urges Lind. The fate of the United States as a global hegemon will not be
dependent upon whether it can outspend its enemy, but rather whether it can allocate the
resources to strategically and appropriately respond to a non-state, insurgent opponent.
Combating 4GW enemies: Is the United States Too Late?
Around the same time that Kennedys book gained an international audience, another
article circulated positing the future of the United States. In October 1989, The
Changing Face of War: Into the Fourth Generation by William Lind, Colonel Keith
Nightengale, Captain John F. Schmitt, Colonel Joseph Sutton and Lieutenant Colonel
46 Jason Vest, "Fourth-generation Warfare" The Atlantic. Dec. 2001, 8 May 2015
<http://www.theatlantic.com/>.
47 Over 350,000 Killed by Violence, $4.4 Trillion Spent and Obligated Costs of War. 8
May 2015 <http://www.costsofwar.org/>.
48 Ibid.
49 William Lind, "Understanding Fourth Generation War," Military Review. SeptemberOctober 2004: 12-16.

16

Gary I. Wilson was featured in Marine Corps Gazette. The article predicted the
emergence of a fourth generation warfare and outlined its defining features and elements.
The authors contend, whoever is first to recognize, understand and implement a
generational change can gain a decisive advantage. Conversely, a nation that is slow to
adapt to generational change opens itself to catastrophic defeat.50 They assume the
fourth generation of war to be characterized as such:
Fourth generation warfare seems likely to be widely dispersed and largely undefined. It
will be nonlinear, possibly to the point of having no definable battlefields or
fronts. The distinction between civilian and military may disappear...success
will depend heavily on effectiveness in joint operations as lines between
responsibility and mission become very blurred.51
Moreover, the authors speculate that a fourth generation will emerge from non-Western
cultural traditions, such as Islamic or Asiatic traditions; The fact that some non-Western
areas, such as the Islamic world, are not strong in technology may lead them to develop a
fourth generation through ideas rather than technology. The genesis of an idea-based
fourth generation may be visible in terrorism.52
Despite their hauntingly accurate calculations, the authors were dismissed, their
considerations ignored by those living off a continuation of the status quo.53 Had the
50 William S. Lind, Colonel Keith Nightengale, Captain John F. Schmitt, Colonel Joseph
W. Sutton, & Lieutenant Colonel Gary I. Wilson, The Changing Face of War: Into the
Fourth Generation Marine Corps Gazette. Oct. 1989: 22-26.
51 Ibid.
52 Ibid.
53 Chuck Spinney, Is the Nation State Obsolete? The Blaster. 21 Sept. 2014, 8 May
2015 <http://chuckspinney.blogspot.com/>.

17

United Statesand the rest of the worldtaken the article with as much gravity as it had
taken Kennedys book, perhaps the United States would not be in the predicament it finds
itself today.
The failure to embrace and implement generational change has indeed proved
catastrophic. According to an article in the Washington Post published in 2011, the
Department of Defense has spent $32 billion on canceled weapons programs since
1997.54 Admiral Mike Mullen, past chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff comments, the
single greatest threat to our national security is our debt.55
The good news is that in recent years, the United States has taken significant measures to
address its debt and adjust its response to asymmetric opponents. In calendar year 2013,
military spending declined from $671 billion to $619 billion, in constant 2011 dollars (as
shown in fig. 1).56 Moreover, President Barack Obamas budget proposes cutting security
spending to 2.3% of GDP in 2024. This would represent the lowest allocation of GDP to
defense spending in the post-World War II era.57
The 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review further reflects the United States commitment to
aptly responding to insurgents. The major theme is rebalancing for the 21st century,

54 Marjorie Censer, Army report: Military has spent $32 billion since 95 on abandoned
weapons programs The Washington Post. 27 May 2011, 8 May 2015
<http://www.washingtonpost.com/>.
55 The U.S. Spends More on Defense Than the Next Seven Countries Combined Peter
G. Peterson Foundation. 13 Apr. 2015, 8 May 2015 <http://pgpf.org/>.
56 Dinah Walker, "Trends in U.S. Military Spending." CFR.org. Council on Foreign
Relations, 15 Jul. 2014 <http://www.cfr.org>.
57 Ibid.

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given geopolitical changes and changes in modern warfare.58 The information below
shows the direct ways in which the United States plans to address and effectively combat
asymmetric adversaries:

Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR). We will rebalance investments


toward systems that are operationally responsive and effective in highly contested
environments, while sustaining capabilities appropriate for more permissive
environments in order to support global situational awareness, counterterrorism, and

other operations.59
Counter Terror and Special Operations. We will grow overall Special Operations
Forces end strength to 69,700 personnel, protecting our ability to sustain persistent,
networked, distributed operations to defeat al Qaida, counter other emerging
transnational threats, counter WMD, build the capacity of our partners, and support

conventional operations.60
The ultimate question, however, is whether the United States response is too late. U.S.
Army General, Martin E. Dempsey echoes this fear. In the conclusion of the 2014 QDR
he writes:
My greatest concern is that we will not innovate quickly enough or deeply enough to be
prepared for the future, for the world we will face 2 decades from now. I urge
congressagainto move quickly to implement difficult decisions and to remove
limitations on our ability to make hard choices within the DoD. The changes required
for institutional reform are unpleasant and unpopular, but we need our elected leaders
58 Department of Defense. Quadrennial Defense Review Report. Washington:
Government Printing Office, 2014.
59 Ibid.
60 Ibid.

19

to work with us to reduce excess infrastructure, slow the growth in military pay and
compensation, and retire equipment we do not need. Savings from these and other
reforms will help us modernize, will add research and development investments, and
will provide needed funds to recover readiness. The lack of will to do what is
necessary may drain us of the will to pursue the more far-reaching ideas promised in
the QDR.61
Fortunately, as evidenced throughout this argument, the budget cuts facing the United
States will not by any means result in military defeatcountering an asymmetric
opponent does not require sophisticated equipment or technology. The foremast factor
that will determine the fate of the nation will be its strategic response to insurgent threats.
Boot offers important lessons for states to consider when dealing with asymmetric
adversaries, those of which are particularly relevant to the United States. The first is that
establishing legitimacy is vital for any successful counter-insurgency, and in modern
times that is hard to achieve for a foreign group or government. Theres a big difference
between battlefield wins and long-term political victory. No counterinsurgent, no matter
how talented, will win if he lacks legitimacy. He must prove to the people on the ground
that his interests are valid and his presence appropriate.62 Moreover, most insurgencies
are long-lasting; attempts to win a quick victory backfire. Though the quick win
strategy sometimes works, there are too many examples where leaders were eliminated
but the movement went on, sometimes stronger than everas both Hezbollah and Al
Qaeda in Iraq did.63
61 Ibid.
62 Max Boot, Invisible Armies (New York: Liveright Publishing Corporation, 2013) 563.
63 Ibid 565.
20

Lind also proposes ways in which state militaries can overcome Fourth Generation
enemies. He calls for true light infantry, infantry that can move farther and faster on its
feet than the enemy, has a full tactical repertoire and can fight with its own weapons
instead of depending on supporting arms. Further, the key to success will be integrating
U.S. troops as much as possible with local people. Finally he urges:
While war against another state may be necessary, one should seek to preserve
that state even as one defeats it. Grant the opposing armies the honors of war, tell
them what fine job they did, make their defeat civilized, so they can survive the
war institutionally intact and then work for your side. Humiliating the defeated
enemy troops especially in front of their own population is a serious mistake.64
The United States is not experiencing the inevitable decline forecasted by Kennedy; its
fate, however, will rest on whether it can take the lessons learned from historical
precedents and apply them to present conflicts. The United States has the tools and the
knowledge to counter asymmetric enemiesand its position as a great power is
depending on its application and execution.
Summary:
This essay has exposed the fundamental issues in Paul Kennedys argumentreducing
military victory to economics and judging all war as conventionalwhich weaken and
ultimately undermine his thesis. Furthermore, his wavering thesis proves to be obsolete in
the wake of twenty-first century conflict. Paul Kennedy was correct: the United States is
experiencing relative decline. However, its decline is due to an inability to properly adapt

64 William Lind, "Understanding Fourth Generation War," Military Review. Sept.-Oct.


2004: 12-16.

21

to the changed nature of its enemies-- not because it has overstretched and can no longer
fund its endeavors. The fate of the United States as a great power depends on its potential
in the coming years to respond to insurgent and terrorist opponentswhether it will
successfully do so is up to policymakers and military personnel.

Works Cited:
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