Cases Land Titles: Chapter 6

Manotok vs. Heirs of Homer Barque

Reyes vs. Raval-Reyes
Abrigo vs. De Vera
Republic vs. Mendoza
Litam vs. Espiritu
Salas vs. Aguila
Boromeo vs Descallar
Cabrera vs. CA
Tiongco vs. Tiongco
Taparuc vs. Vda. De Mende
Rodriguez vs. Rodriguez
Ono vs. Lim
DBP vs. Register of Deeds of Nueva Ecija,
National Housing Authority vs. Augusto Basa
Durawood vs. Candice Bona
San Lorenzo Development Corporation vs. CA
Melencio vs. CA
Antonio vs Santos
Islamic Directorate of the Phils. Vs. CA
Legarda vs. CA

MANOTOK v. Heirs of BARQUE

G.R. Nos. 162335 & 162605
The Barques filed a petition for administrative reconstitution of TCT No.
210177 issued in the name of their predecessor, Homer L. Barque, which was
allegedly destroyed in the fire that gutted the Quezon City Hall, including the Office
of the Register of Deeds of Quezon City, sometime in 1988.
The Manotoks filed their opposition to the Barques petition, claiming that
the lot covered by the title sought to be reconstituted by the latter forms part of the
land covered by the formers own reconstituted title, TCT No. RT-22481, and alleging
that TCT No. 210177 in the name of Homer L. Barque is spurious.
On June 30, 1997, the reconstituting officer denied the reconstitution of
TCT No. 210177 on grounds that the two lots covered by the Barques title appear to
duplicate the lot covered by the Manotoks own reconstituted title; and that the
Barques plan, Fls-3168-D, is a spurious document.
On appeal by the Barques, the LRA reversed the reconstituting officer and
ordered that reconstitution of the Barques title be given due course, but only after
the Manotoks own title has been cancelled upon order of a court of competent
jurisdiction.
The parties separately appealed to the CA. The two divisions of the CA
where the cases landed similarly modified the LRA decision, ordering the Register of
Deeds of Quezon City to cancel the Manotoks title without a direct proceeding with
the RTC, and directing the LRA to reconstitute the Barques' title.
st

Thus, the Manotoks filed these petitions to the SC. SC 1 Division upheld
the CA decision.
st

On May 2, 2006, the decision of the 1 Division was entered in the Book of
Entries of Judgment. But when the Barques moved for the execution of the decision,
the Manotoks sought the referral of the motion to the Court en banc, which the
Court en banc accepted on July 26, 2006.
On September 7, 2006, the Manahans sought to intervene in the case,
alleging that their predecessor-in-interest, Vicente Manahan, was issued Sales
Certificate No. 511 covering the subject lot.
On December 18, 2008, the Court promulgated an en banc that SET
st
ASIDE the decision and resolutions of the 1 Division and RECALLED the entry of
judgment. The Court REVERSED the decisions and resolutions of the CA and the LRA,
and REMANDED the cases to the CA for further proceedings.

In due time, the CA received evidence with primary focus on whether the
Manotoks can trace their claim of title to a valid alienation by the Government of Lot
No. 823 of the Piedad Estate, which was a Friar Land. The Barques and Manahans
were likewise allowed to present evidence on their respective claims that may have
an impact on the correct determination of the status of the Manotok title.
The CA then submitted to the SC a Commissioners Report that served as
basis for Courts August 24, 2010 en banc decision.
ISSUE/S
st
1. W/N the Court en banc validly re-evaluate the decision of the 1 Division.
2. W/N the LRA and the CA have jurisdiction to annul the Manotoks title.
3. W/N the Supreme Court, after dismissing the Barques petition for
administrative reconstitution, should act further on the apparent problems
of the Manotoks title.
4. W/N the absence of approval of the Secretary of the Interior/Agriculture
and Natural Resources in Sale Certificate No. 1054 and Deed of Conveyance
No. 29204 in favor of the Manotoks warrant the annulment of their title`
HELD:
1. YES. no doctrine or principle of law laid down by the [C]ourt in a decision
rendered en banc or in division may be modified or reversed except by the
court sitting en banc. This, according to the Court, is necessitated by the
argument that the 2005 Decision of the First Division is inconsistent with
precedents of the Court, and leaving that decision alone without the
imprimatur of the Court en banc would lead to undue confusion . . . over
whether the earlier ruling of the Division constitutes the current standard
with respect to administrative reconstitution of titles.
2.
NO. Section 48 of Presidential Decree No. 1529 . . . provides that [a]
certificate of title shall not be subject to collateral attack [...and] cannot be altered,
modified, or cancelled except in a direct proceeding in accordance with
law. Clearly, the cancellation of the Manotok title cannot arise incidentally from the
administrative proceeding for reconstitution of the Barque title even if the evidence
from that proceeding revealed the Manotok title as fake. Nor could it have emerged
incidentally in the appellate review of the LRA's administrative proceeding.
Moreover, Nowhere in [Section 6 of P.D. No. 1529 where the general
functions of the Land Registration Commissioner are enumerated] is it stated that
the LRA has the power to cancel titles. Thus, for the appellate court to be able to
direct the cancellation of a Torrens title in the course of reviewing a decision of the
LRA, the LRA itself must have statutory authority to cancel a Torrens title in the first

place. Thus It is thus clear that neither the Court of Appeals nor the LRA had
jurisdiction to cancel the Manotok title.

first place. Sale Certificate No. 1054 dated March 10, 1919 (Exh. 10) purportedly on
file with the DENR-LMB, conspicuously lacks the signature of the Director of Lands
and the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources.

3.
YES. The SC said: It must be borne in mind that the disputed property is part
of the Friar Lands over which the Government holds title and are not public lands
but private or patrimonial property of the Government and can be alienated only
upon proper compliance with the requirements of Act No. 1120 or the Friar Lands
Act.

Possession of patrimonial property of the Government, whether spanning decades or

centuries, can not ipso facto ripen into ownership.

The Alonso [v. Country Club] approach [of declaring that a former friar land
still legally belongs to the national government for failure of the private claimant to
establish a clear title thereto] especially appeals to us because, as in this case, the
subject property therein was a Friar Land which under the Friar Lands Law (Act No.
1120) may be disposed of by the Government only under that law. Thus, there is
greater concern on the part of this Court to secure its proper transmission to private
hands, if at all.
At the same time, the Court recognizes that there is not yet any sufficient
evidence for us to warrant the annulment of the Manotok title. All that the record
indicates thus far is evidence not yet refuted by clear and convincing proof that the
Manotoks claim to title is flawed. To arrive at an ultimate determination, the formal
reception of evidence is in order. This Court is not a trier of fact or otherwise
structurally capacitated to receive and evaluate evidence de novo. However, the Court
of Appeals is sufficiently able to undertake such function.
4.
YES. Justice Villarama cited as the central legal basis of the Courts
rulingSection 18 of Act No. 1120, which provides: SECTION 18. No lease or sale
made by Chief of the Bureau of Public Lands under the provisions of this Act shall be
valid until approved by the Secretary of the Interior. He then explained:
It is clear from the foregoing provision that the sale of friar lands shall
be valid only if approved by the Secretary of the Interior (later the
Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce). . . [T]he approval by the
Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce is indispensable for the validity
of the sale of friar lands. xxx.
xxx
xxx
xxx
[T]he absence of approval by the Secretary of Agriculture and
Commerce in the sale certificate and assignment of sale certificate
made the sale null and void ab initio. Necessarily, there can be no valid
titles issued on the basis of such sale or assignment.
The Court said that the Manotoks could not have acquired ownership of the subject
lot as they had no valid certificate of sale issued to them by the Government in the

Considering that none of the parties has established a valid acquisition under the
provisions of Act No. 1120, as amended, we therefore adopt the recommendation of
the CA declaring the Manotok title as null and void ab initio, and Lot 823 of the Piedad
Estate as still part of the patrimonial property of the Government.
Digested by : JgR
PR by:JMM

MATEO H. REYES and JUAN H. REYES vs. MATEO RAVAL REYES

G.R. Nos. L-21703-04;
August 31, 1966
FACTS:
3 brothers, Mateo H., Huan H., and Francisco H., all surnamed Reyes, are registered
owners of several parcels of land of the Laoag (Ilocos Norte) Cadastre, embraced and
covered by OCT No. 22161 and OCT 8066, both of the Registry of Deeds of Ilocos
Norte.
On July 17, 1962, petitioners Mateo H. Reyes and Juan H. Reyes filed, in the
abovestated cadastral cases, a motion for issuance of writs of possession over all the
lots covered by both Certificate of Titles mentioned above.
Respondent Mateo Raval Reyes opposed the motion. He nonetheless admitted that
he is only in possession of the lots covered by OCT 22161 and denied that he
possesses the lots covered by OCT 8066; however, he claimed that he is entitled to
possession thereof through having acquired it by way of absolute sale from
petitioners brother, Francisco H. Reyes, the latters undivided 1/3 share, interest
and participation to these disputed lots.
CFI decided in favor of petitioners and issued a writ of possession with respect to the
aforementioned lots.
Subsequently, petitioners, then commenced on Jan 15, 1963 before the same court
an ordinary civil action to recover the products of the disputed lots, or their value
and claimed for moral damages against respondent Mateo Raval Reyes.
Respondent answered the complaint and pleaded a counterclaim for partition of all
disputed lots, alleging that he is their (plaintiffs) co-owner, he having bought from
their brother the latters undivided 1/3 share, interest & participation to the lots.
Pending trial on this ordinary civil case, petitioners presented on Feb 25, 1963, in the
cadastral cases aforementioned, a motion to compel respondent to surrender and
deliver to them the owners duplicates of OCTs 22161 & 8066.

CFI denied the motion on the ground that the parcel of lands are subjects of
litigation. MR denied.
ISSUE/S:
1. Who between petitioner-appelants or respondent-appellee has a better
right to the possession or custody of the disputed owners duplicates of
certificates of title.
HELD: Petitioners have the better right. The court reversed the CFIs decision and
ordered respondent to deliver to petitioners the owners duplicates of Original
Certificates of Title No. 22161 & 8066. With costs against respondent.
RATIO:
While we agree with the court a quo that the disputed lots are subjects of litigation
in Civil Case No. 3659, it appearing that respondent, as defendant therein, had
presented a counterclaim for partition of the lots covered by the titles, we see no
valid and plausible reason to justify, on this ground, the withholding from the
registered owners, such as the petitioners-appellants herein, the custody and
possession of the owners' duplicates of certificates of title. In a decided case, this
Court has already held that the owner of the land in whose favor and in whose name
said land is registered and inscribed in the certificate of title has a more preferential
right to the possession of the owners' duplicate than one whose name does not appear
in the certificate and has yet to establish his right to the possession thereto.
Digested by : JgR
PR by:JMM

Spouses NOEL and JULIE ABRIGO vs. ROMANA DE VERA,

MAIN Lesson:
Between two buyers of the same immovable property registered under the Torrens
system, the law gives ownership priority to (1) the first registrant in good faith; (2)
then, the first possessor in good faith; and (3) finally, the buyer who in good faith
presents the oldest title. This provision, however, does not apply if the property is not
registered under the Torrens system.
FACTS:
On May 27, 1993, Gloria Villafania sold a house and lot located at Banaoang,
Mangaldan, Pangasinan and covered by Tax Declaration No. 1406 to Rosenda TignoSalazar and Rosita Cave-Go. The said sale became a subject of a suit for annulment of
documents between the vendor and the vendees

On December 7, 1993, both parties entered into a Compromise Agreement which

was approved by the RTC. The agreement was: Gloria Villafania was given 1 year
from the date of the Compromise Agreement to buy back the house and lot, and
failure to do so would mean that the previous sale in favor of Rosenda Tigno-Salazar
and Rosita Cave-Go shall remain valid and binding & the plaintiff shall voluntarily
vacate the premises w/o need of a demand. Gloria failed to buy back the house and
lot, so the vendees declared the lot in their name.
Unknown, however to Rosenda Tigno-Salazar and Rosita Cave-Go, Gloria Villafania
obtained a free patent over the parcel of land involved [on March 15, 1988 as
evidenced by OCT No. P-30522]. The said free patent was later on cancelled by TCT
No. 212598 on April 11, 1996.
On October 16, 1997, Rosenda & Rosita sold the house and lot to herein petitioner,
Spouses Noel and Julie Abrigo.
On October 23, 1997, Gloria sold the same house and lot to Romana de Vera who
then registered the sale and as a consequence, TCT No. 22515 was issued in her
name.
On Nov 12, 1997, Roman de Vera filed an action for Forcible entry and Damages
against Spouses Abrigo, but was later dismissed due to an agreement between the
parties.
On Nov 21, 1997, petitioners Spouses Abrigo, filed the instant case w/ the RTC of
Dagupan City for annulment of documents, injunction, preliminary injunction,
restraining order and damage against respondent and Gloria Villafania.
RTC rendered a decision awarding the property to petitioners as well as damages.
Appealed to CA. CA awarded the property to respondent since she was a purchaser
in good faith and for value.

ISSUE: Who between petitioner-spouses and respondent has a better right to the
property?

HELD: Petition denied. Decision of the CA is affirmed.

RATIO:
Law on Double Sale

The present case involves what in legal contemplation was a double sale. On May 27,
1993, Gloria Villafania first sold the disputed property to Rosenda Tigno-Salazar and
Rosita Cave-Go, from whom petitioners, in turn, derived their right. Subsequently, on
October 23, 1997, a second sale was executed by Villafania with Respondent
Romana de Vera.
Article 1544 of the Civil Code states the law on double sale thus:
"Art. 1544. If the same thing should have been sold to different vendees,
the ownership shall be transferred to the person who may have first taken
possession thereof in good faith, if it should be movable property.
"Should it be immovable property, the ownership shall belong to the person
acquiring it who in good faith first recorded it in the Registry of Property.
"Should there be no inscription, the ownership shall pertain to the person
who in good faith was first in the possession; and, in the absence thereof, to
the person who presents the oldest title, provided there is good faith."
Otherwise stated, the law provides that a double sale of immovables transfers
ownership to (1) the first registrant in good faith; (2) then, the first possessor in good
13
faith; and (3) finally, the buyer who in good faith presents the oldest title. There is
no ambiguity in the application of this law with respect to lands registered under the
Torrens system.
14

This principle is in full accord with Section 51 of PD 1529 which provides that no
deed, mortgage, lease or other voluntary instrument -- except a will -- purporting to
convey or affect registered land shall take effect as a conveyance or bind the land
15
until its registration. Thus, if the sale is not registered, it is binding only between
16
the seller and the buyer but it does not affect innocent third persons.
In the instant case, both Petitioners Abrigo and respondent registered the sale of the
property. Since neither petitioners nor their predecessors (Tigno-Salazar and CaveGo) knew that the property was covered by the Torrens system, they registered their
17
respective sales under Act 3344. For her part, respondent registered the
18
transaction under the Torrens system because, during the sale, Villafania had
19
presented the transfer certificate of title (TCT) covering the property.
Respondent De Vera contends that her registration under the Torrens system should
prevail over that of petitioners who recorded theirs under Act 3344. De Vera relies
on the following insight of Justice Edgardo L. Paras:

"x x x If the land is registered under the Land Registration Act (and has
therefore a Torrens Title), and it is sold but the subsequent sale is
registered not under the Land Registration Act but under Act 3344, as
amended, such sale is not considered REGISTERED, as the term is used
20
under Art. 1544 x x x."
We agree with respondent. It is undisputed that Villafania had been issued a free
21
patent registered as Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. P-30522. The OCT was
later cancelled by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 212598, also in Villafanias
22
name. As a consequence of the sale, TCT No. 212598 was subsequently cancelled
and TCT No. 22515 thereafter issued to respondent.
23

Soriano v. Heirs of Magali held that registration must be done in the proper registry
in order to bind the land. Since the property in dispute in the present case was
already registered under the Torrens system, petitioners registration of the sale
under Act 3344 was not effective for purposes of Article 1544 of the Civil Code.
Petitioners cannot validly argue that they were fraudulently misled into believing
that the property was unregistered. A Torrens title, once registered, serves as a
29
notice to the whole world. All persons must take notice, and no one can plead
ignorance of the registration
Good-Faith Requirement
We have consistently held that Article 1544 requires the second buyer to acquire the
31
immovable in good faith andto register it in good faith. Mere registration of title is
not enough; good faith must concur with the registration
Moreover, the Court of Appeals examined the facts to determine whether
47
respondent was an innocent purchaser for value. After its factual findings revealed
that Respondent De Vera was in good faith.
Digested by : JgR
PR by:JMM

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, vs. DEMOCRITO T. MENDOZA, SR., GWENDOLYN

MENDOZA, VILMA MENDOZA, DEMOCRITO MENDOZA, JR., MENCA DEVELOPMENT
CORP., CARMEN VELEZ TING and JACINTO VELEZ, JR.,
[G.R. No. 153726. March 28, 2007.]
FACTS:
Democratico T. Mendoza (respondent) is in possession of 70 or so hectares in Silot
Bay through an Ordinary Fishpond Permit.

3.
On Jan 16, 1967, Pres. Marcos ordered a memorandum that about 700,000 shpond
areas (including respondents land) shall be released by the Bureau of Forestry to the
Bureau of Lands as alienable and disposable, but subject to the disposal of the
Bureau of Fisheries for fishpond purposes
Pursuant to that, respondent issued a sales patent application in order to purchase
the said land and was approved, thus an auction was scheduled.
Despite objection of the local Mayor, on 21 May 1974, then Presidential Executive
Assistant Jacobo C. Clave issued a Memorandum informing the Secretary of the
Department of Natural Resources that President Marcos had approved the
recommendation advising approval of the request of Democrito Mendoza, Sr. for the
issuance of a patent over the disputed property.
Prior to the approval, Democrito subdivided the lots and assigned rights and
interests in equal shares to each of his daughters.
On 26 June 1974, Acting Director of the Bureau of Lands Ramon N. Casanova issued
an Order awarding the sales patents over the disputed property to Democrito
Mendoza, Sr. and his three children Gwendolyn, Vilma, and Democrito, Jr.,
respectively
Sometime in 1988, a protest was led by the sherman-residents of Liloan against
the issuance of the sales patents to the Mendozas. Acting thereon, the Department
of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) Regional Oce No. 7, Cebu City,
conducted an investigation
On 23 October 1990, based on the information gathered by the DENR, showing that
there were alleged irregularities in the issuance of the sales patents awarded to the
Mendozas, the Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Director of the Land
Management Bureau, led with the RTC of Cebu, a complaint for Cancellation of
Sales Patents and Titles against Democrito Mendoza, Sr. and his three children
Gwendolyn, Vilma, and Democrito, Jr., together with the Register of Deeds of Cebu
City

After trial on the merits, the trial court, on 3 June 1996, rendered a Decision
declaring the sales patents, as well as the original certicates of title issued to the
Mendozas as null and void ab initio. Declaring that:
1. The sales patent issued be declared void ab initio
2. Ordering said defendants to surrender their OCTs to the register of deeds
and ordering the said register of deeds to cancel the same and all patent
titles emanating therefrom.

Declaring the lot as inalienable and non-disposable being parts of Silot Bay.

Aggrieved by the Decision, defendants appealed the Case of the CA, and
accordingly, CA reversed the RTCs decision:
ISSUE:
Whether or not said property is alienable and disposable and, therefore, subject to
private appropriation through modes recognized under the Public Land Act.
HELD:
Yes, the property is alienable and disposable. Despite petitioners' assertion that Silot
Bay is a navigable body of water and by its very nature and inherent character is of
public dominion, thus, there is no need for a declaration by any appropriate
government agency that it is a communal shing
ground before Silot Bay may be recognized as such, it cannot be gainsaid that the
prerogative of classifying public lands pertains to administrative agencies which have
been specially tasked by statutes to do so and that the courts will not interfere on
matters which are addressed to the sound discretion of government and/or quasijudicial agencies entrusted with the regulation of activities coming under their
special technical knowledge and training. It should be stressed that the function of
administering and disposing of lands of the public domain in the manner prescribed
by law is not entrusted to the courts but to executive ocials. And as such, courts
should refrain from looking into the underlying reasons or grounds which impelled
the classication and declaration of Silot Bay as timberland and its subsequent
release as alienable and disposable land. From the facts of the case, it is evident that
the Bureau of Forestry released Silot Bay as alienable and disposable by virtue of the
Memorandum issued by then President Marcos on 16 January 1967 which clearly
empowered said bureau to identify and locate the 700,000 hectares of shpond
areas and to release said areas as alienable and disposable. Hence, the courts, in
view of the clear legal directive by which said area was released as alienable and
disposable, will refrain from questioning the wisdom of such classification or
declaration. After a careful perusal of the records of the case, We rule that the sales
patents handed out to Democrito T. Mendoza, Sr., Gwendolyn Mendoza, Vilma
Mendoza and Democrito Mendoza, Jr., were properly issued.
Digested by : JgR
PR by:JMM

No digest: Litam vs. Espiritu

A perusal of the record shows that the documents submitted by [Salas] as

the properties allegedly registered in the name of [Aguila] are merely
photocopies and not certified true copies, hence, this Court cannot admit
the same as part of the records of this case.

JUAN SEVILLA SALAS, JR. vs. EDEN VILLENA AGUILA

FACTS:
Petitioner Juan Sevilla Salas, Jr. (Salas) and respondent Eden Villena Aguila (Aguila)
were married. Aguila gave birth to their daughter, Joan Jiselle. Five months later,
Salas left their conjugal dwelling. Since then, he no longer communicated with Aguila
or their daughter. Aguila filed a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage
(petition) citing psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code. The
petition states that they "have no conjugal properties whatsoever."
7
RTC rendered a Decision declaring the nullity of the marriage of Salas and Aguila
(RTC Decision). The RTC Decision further provides for the "dissolution of their
conjugal partnership of gains, if any.

On the other hand, Aguila proved that the Discovered Properties were acquired
by Salas during their marriage. Both the RTC and the CA agreed that the
Discovered Properties registered in Salas name were acquired during his
marriage with Aguila or during the validity of Salas and Aguilas marriage.
In a similar case where the ground for nullity of marriage was also psychological
incapacity, we held that the properties acquired during the union of the parties,
as found by both the RTC and the CA, would be governed by co30
ownership. Accordingly, the partition of the Discovered Properties as ordered
by the RTC and the CA should be sustained, but on the basis of co-ownership
and not on the regime of conjugal partnership of gains.

On 10 September 2007, Aguila filed a Manifestation and Motion stating that she
discovered two parcels of land registered under the name of Juan S. Salas, married
to Rubina C. Salas. During the hearing of Aguilas manifestation, she testified that
someone informed her of the existence of the discovered properties. Thereafter, she
verified the information and secured copies of the TCTs of the discovered properties.
When asked to clarify, Aguila testified that Rubina C. Salas is Salas common-law
wife.
Salas filed an Opposition to the Manifestation alleging that there is no conjugal
property to be partitioned based on Aguilas petition. Salas claimed that Aguila
waived her right to the discovered properties. Salas likewise enumerated properties
he allegedly waived in favor of Aguila (parcels of land with improvements, cash, and
motor vehicles). Thus Salas contended that the conjugal properties were deemed
partitioned.
RTC ruled in favor of Aguila. CA affirmed the order of the RTC.
ISSUES:
1. WON the CA erred in affirming the trial courts decision ordering the
partition of the parcels of land.
2. WON the CA erred in affirming the trial courts decision in not allowing
Rubina C. Cortez to intervene in this case.
HELD:
1.

Salas alleged that contrary to Aguilas petition stating that they had no
conjugal property, they actually acquired the Waived Properties during their
marriage. However, the RTC found, and the CA affirmed, that Salas failed to
prove the existence and acquisition of the Waived Properties during their
marriage.

On Salas allegation that he was not accorded due process for failing to attend
the hearing of Aguilas manifestation, we find the allegation untenable. The
essence of due process is opportunity to be heard. We hold that Salas was given
such opportunity when he filed his opposition to the manifestation, submitted
evidence and filed his appeal.
2.

On both Salas and Rubinas contention that Rubina owns the Discovered
Properties, we likewise find the contention unmeritorious. The TCTs state that
"Juan S. Salas, married to Rubina C. Salas" is the registered owner of the
Discovered Properties. A Torrens title is generally a conclusive evidence of the
ownership of the land referred to, because there is a strong presumption that it
is valid and regularly issued. The phrase "married to" is merely descriptive of the
civil status of the registered owner. Furthermore, Salas did not initially dispute
the ownership of the Discovered Properties in his opposition to the
manifestation. It was only when Rubina intervened that Salas supported
Rubinas statement that she owns the Discovered Properties.
Considering that Rubina failed to prove her title or her legal interest in the
Discovered Properties, she has no right to intervene in this case according to the
Rules of Court.
Digested by: RB
PR by: TDM

BORROMEO VS. DESCALLAR

FACTS:
Wilhelm Jambrich (the foreigner) and Antonietta Descallar (the Filipina girlfriend)
were designated as buyers in a Contract to Sell a house and lot located in AgroMacro subdivision, Mandaue City. They were also designated as buyers in the Deed
of Absolute Sale over the property.
When the Deed of Absolute Sale was presented for registration before the Register
of Deeds, the Register of Deeds refused registration on the ground that Wilhelm was
an alien and could not acquire land. Consequently, Wilhelms name was erased from
the Deed of Absolute Sale. However, his signature remained on the left hand margin
of page 1, beside Antoniettas signature as buyer on page 3, and at the bottom of
page 4 which is the last page of the deed. The Register of Deeds issued several TCTs
in Antoniettas name.
The couple parted ways. Subsequently, Wilhelm became indebted to Camilo, a real
estate dealer who repaired Wilhems speedboat. To pay his debt, Wilhelm sold his
rights and interests in the Agro-Macro property to Camilo for PhP250,000, as
evidenced by a Deed of Absolute Sale/Assignment.
When Camilo sought to register the Deed of Absolute Sale/Assignment with the
Register of Deeds, he discovered thatthe TCTs to the three lots have been
transferred in the name of Antonietta, and that the property has already been
mortgaged.
Camilo filed petitioner filed a complaint against Antonietta for recovery of real
property before the Regional Trial Court of Mandaue City. According to Camilo:
. . . the Contracts to Sell dated November 18, 1985 and March 10, 1986 and the
Deed of Absolute Sale dated November 16, 1987 over the properties which
identified both Jambrich and respondent as buyers do not reflect the true
agreement of the parties since respondent did not pay a single centavo of the
purchase price and was not in fact a buyer; that it was Jambrich alone who paid for
the properties using his exclusive funds; that Jambrich was the real and absolute
owner of the properties; and, that petitioner acquired absolute ownership by virtue
of the Deed of Absolute Sale/Assignment dated July 11, 1991 which Jambrich
executed in his favor.
On the other hand, Antonietta:
. . . belied the allegation that she did not pay a single centavo of the purchase price.
On the contrary, she claimed that she solely and exclusively used her own personal
funds to defray and pay for the purchase price of the subject lots in question, and
that Jambrich, being an alien, was prohibited to acquire or own real property in the
Philippines.

The regional trial court ruled in favor of Camilo. On the other hand, the Court of
Appeals ruled in favor of Antonietta.
ISSUES:
1. Who is the true buyer of the disputed property?
2. What is the effect of registration of the property in the name of Antonietta?
3. Whether the sale or assignment made by Jambrich to Borromeo is valid
considering that the former is disqualified to own real properties due to his
citizenship.
HELD:
The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals and agreed with the regional trial
court.
With respect to the issue of who purchased the house and lot, the Court stated that
the evidence presented before the trial court indicate that Wilhelm possessed the
financial capacity to purchase the Agro-Macro property and that Wilhelm was the
source of funds used to purchase the property. On the other hand, Antonietta (who
used to work as a waitress) was unemployed at the time of the purchase and did not
substantiate her alleged source of income.
Thus, the Court ruled that Wilhelm has all authority to transfer all his rights,
interests and participation over the subject properties to Camilo by virtue of the
Deed of Absolute Sale/Assignment he executed on July 11, 1991.
Having found that Wilhelm is the true owner of the properties, the Court then
addressed the issue of the effect of the registration of the property in the name of
Antonietta. The Court stated:
It is settled that registration is not a mode of acquiring ownership. It is only a means
of confirming the fact of its existence with notice to the world at large. Certificates of
title are not a source of right. The mere possession of a title does not make one the
true owner of the property. Thus, the mere fact that respondent has the titles of the
disputed properties in her name does not necessarily, conclusively and absolutely
make her the owner. The rule on indefeasibility of title likewise does not apply to
respondent. A certificate of title implies that the title is quiet, and that it is perfect,
absolute and indefeasible. However, there are well-defined exceptions to this rule,
as when the transferee is not a holder in good faith and did not acquire the subject
properties for a valuable consideration. This is the situation in the instant case.
Respondent did not contribute a single centavo in the acquisition of the properties.
She had no income of her own at that time, nor did she have any savings. She and
her two sons were then fully supported by Jambrich.

On the issue of Wilhelms ineligibility of acquire land, the Court reiterated its earlier
rulings that the while the acquisition of land by a foreigner violates the Constitution,
its subsequent transfer to a qualified Philippine national cured the defect in the
original transaction. According to the Court:
The transfer of land from Agro-Macro Development Corporation to Jambrich, who is
an Austrian, would have been declared invalid if challenged, had not Jambrich
conveyed the properties to petitioner who is a Filipino citizen. In United Church
Board for World Ministries v. Sebastian, the Court reiterated the consistent ruling in
a number of cases that if land is invalidly transferred to an alien who subsequently
becomes a Filipino citizen or transfers it to a Filipino, the flaw in the original
transaction is considered cured and the title of the transferee is rendered valid.
Digested by: RB
PR by: TDM

CABRERA VS CA
FACTS:
In 1950, a parcel of unregistered land which was owned in common by Daniel,
Albertana and Felicidad Teokemian, having inherited the same from their late father,
Domingo Teokemian, was sold to Andres Orais wherein Felicidad was not able to sign
in the Deed of Sale.
In 1957, Virgilia Orais, daughter of the vendee was issued a Free Patent and Original
Certificate of Title over the said property.
In 1972, the one-third share (eastern portion) of Felicidad Teokemian in her
possession was sold to spouses Elano and Felicidad Cabrera. The spouses
immediately took possession of the land. However they occupied the western
portion thereof.
In 1988, Virgilia Orais files a civil case for quieting of title against Felicidad Teokemian
and Felicided Cabrera.
The complaint alleged that sometime in 1972 and 1973 the late Elano Cabrera and
defendant Felicidad Cabrera, knowing that Lot 2239 was already registered in the
name of the plaintiff, prepared a document of sale and had Felicidad Teokemian sign
it conveying a portion of said lot to them as described in the Sketch Map, after which
they entered and possessed said portion and enjoyed the fruits thereon. Plaintiff
further averred that by reason of the document of sale and the declaration of the

property involved in the name of defendant Felicidad Vda. De Cabrera, there created
a cloud of doubt on the former's title on said property.
In their answer with counterclaim, defendants alleged that they acquired a portion
of Lot 2239 in good faith and for value; that said portion was owned by Felicidad
Teokemian who was not a party to the Deed of Sale executed by Daniel and
Albertana Teokemian on January 16, 1950 in favor of Andres Orais over Lot 2239;
that not having signed the Deed of Sale, Felicidad Teokemian's one-third share in Lot
2239 could not have been legally conveyed to Andres Orais; that Virgilia Orais
(successor-in-interest of Andres Orais) committed fraud in including the portion
owned by Felicidad Teokemian in her applying for free patent over Lot 2239 is
concerned pursuant to Art. 1456 of the Civil Code; and that plaintiff is guilty of laches
for not initiating an action against defendants to recover the western portion of Lot
2239 despite plaintiff's knowledge of defendant's acquisition thereof in 1972, as in
fact it was only in 1988 when the complaint for quieting of title was filed in court.
On April 27, 1989, the lower court rendered judgment in favor of defendants against
plaintiff, ruling that the latter can no longer recover the portion of land occupied by
the former due to laches.
The Court of Appeals reversed such findings upon appeal.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the action of the plaintiffs is barred by laches.
HELD:
Action of plaintiffs is barred by laches.
As can be discerned from the established facts, the Certificates of Title of the
vendees Orais are, to say the least, irregular, and were issued in a calculated move to
deprive Felicidad Teokemian of her dominical rights over the property reserved to
her by descent. Plaintiff could not have registered the part reserved to Felicidad
Teokemian, as this was not among those ceded in the Deed of Sale between
Daniel/Albertana Teokemian and Andres Orais. It must be remembered that
registration does not vest title, it is merely evidence of such title over a particular
property.
The defense of indefeasibility of the Torrens Title does not extend to a transferee
who takes the certificate of title with notice of a flaw in his title.
The right of the defendants for reconveyance of the subject property arising from an
implied trust under Article 1456 of the Civil Code is material to the instant case, since
this remedy has not yet lapsed, as erroneously submitted by the plaintiff, and, is
thus, a bar to the plaintiff's action.

In the instant case the defendants right to seek reconveyance, which in effect seeks
to quiet title to the property, does not prescribe due to the fact that they are the
ones claiming ownership and is in possession of the property.
The reason for this is that one who is in actual possession of a piece of land claiming
to be the owner thereof may wait until his possession is disturbed or his title is
attacked before taking steps to vindicate his right, the reason for the rule being, that
his undisturbed possession gives him a continuing right to seek the aid of a court of
equity to ascertain and determine the nature of the adverse claim of a third party
and its effect on his own title, which right can be claimed only by one who is in
possession.
Laches has been defined as the failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and
unexplained length of time, to do that which by exercising due diligence could or
should have been done earlier, it is negligence or omission to assert a right within a
reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either
has abandoned it or declined to assert it. In the instant case, the action for
reconveyance (quieting of title) of the plaintiff was instituted only in 1988, that is,
thirty years from the time the plaintiff's husband was able to acquire Certificate of
Title covering the properties inherited by the Teokemians, and apparently including
that portion belonging to Felicidad Teokemian. In the meantime, defendant Felicidad
vda. De Cabrera and her late husband have been actively in possession of the same,
tilling it, and constructing an irrigation system thereon.
In our jurisdiction, it is an enshrined rule that even a registered owner of property
may be barred from recovering possession of property by virtue of laches. Under the
Land Registration Act (now the Property Registration Decree), no title to registered
land in derogation to that of the registered owner shall be acquired by prescription
or adverse possession. The same is not true with regard to Laches
With regards to the argument that laches does not apply because what was sold to
the Cabreras was a definite portion of the community property, and therefore void,
is untenable.
Since the time of the sale of the two-third portion of the subject property to the
plaintiff, the latter had allowed Felicidad Teokemian to occupy that one-third portion
allotted to her. There has, therefore, been a partial partition, where the transferees
of an undivided portion of the land allowed a co-owner of the property to occupy a
definite portion thereof and has not disturbed the same, for a period too long to be
ignored--the possessor is in a better condition or right (Potior est conditio
possidentis).
Digested by: RB
PR by: TDM

TIONGCO VS TIONGCO
FACTS:
Matilde, Jose, Vicente, and Felipe, all surnamed Tiongco, were born to Atanacio and
Maria Luis Tiongco. Together they were known as the Heirs of Maria Luis de Tiongco.
The present dispute involves three parcels of land all located in Iloilo City. The lots
were registered in the names of Matilde, Jose, Vicente, and Felipe, and in the name
of Heirs of Maria Luis de Tiongco.
While all of the Heirs of Maria Luis de Tiongco have died, they were survived by their
children and descendants. Among the legitimate children of Jose were petitioner and
Carmelo Tiongco, the father of respondent Jose B. Tiongco. Sometime in 1965,
petitioner built her house on one lot and sustained herself by collecting rentals from
the tenants of the other lots. In 1968, petitioner, as one of the heirs of Jose, filed an
adverse claim affecting all the rights, interest and participation of her deceased
father on the disputed lots, but the adverse claim was annotated only on the
certificate of title covering two lots.
In 1983, respondent Jose prohibited petitioner from collecting rentals from the
tenants. In December 1983, respondent Jose filed a suit for recovery of possession
with preliminary injunction against several tenants wherein he obtained a judgment
in his favor. Respondent Jose also filed a case for unlawful detainer with damages
against petitioner as she was staying on the first lot. While the RTC, Branch 33, of
Iloilo City ruled in respondent Joses favor, the CA reversed the RTCs decision and
ruled in favor of petitioner.
As such, respondent Jose never took possession of the properties. However, Jose
averred that he has been paying real property taxes on the said properties for more
than ten (10) years and that petitioner collected rentals only because he allowed
her. In 1988, when petitioner inquired at the Office of the Register of Deeds of
Iloilo City, she discovered that respondent Jose had already executed an Affidavit
of Adjudication dated April17, 1974, declaring that he is the only surviving heir of
the registered owners and adjudicating unto himself all three lots. Consequently, the
Register of Deeds of Iloilo City issued transfer certificate of titles all in the name of
respondent Jose. Based on the records with the Register of Deeds, it also appears
that on May 10, 1974, the same day when the TCTs were issued, respondent Jose
sold the said lots to Catalino Torre. Certificates of title were also issued in the name
of Catalino Torre. The former then sold the properties to Antonio Doronila, Jr., and
back again to Jose.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner has a better right over the properties.
HELD: Yes.

The Court agrees with the CAs disquisition that an action for reconveyance can
indeed be barred by prescription. In a long line of cases decided by this Court, we
ruled that an action for reconveyance based on implied or constructive trust must
perforce prescribe in ten (10) years from the issuance of the Torrens title over the
property. However, there is an exception to this rule. There is but one instance when
prescription cannot be invoked in an action for reconveyance, that is, when the
plaintiff is in possession of the land to be reconveyed.
The exception was based on the theory that registration proceedings could not be
used as a shield for fraud or for enriching a person at the expense of another.
Prescription does not run against the plaintiff in actual possession of the disputed
land because such plaintiff has a right to wait until his possession is disturbed or his
title is questioned before initiating an action to vindicate his right. His undisturbed
possession gives him the continuing right to seek the aid of a court of equity to
determine the nature of the adverse claim of a third party and its effect on his title.
The Court held that where the plaintiff in an action for reconveyance remains in
possession of the subject land, the action for reconveyance becomes in effect an
action to quiet title to property, which is not subject to prescription.
In this case, petitioners possession was disturbed in 1983 when respondent Jose
filed a case for recovery of possession. The RTC of Iloilo City ruled in respondent
Joses favor but the CA on November 28, 1991, during the pendency of the present
controversy with the court a quo, ruled in favor of petitioner. Petitioner never lost
possession of the said properties, and as such, she is in a position to file the
complaint with the court a quo to protect her rights and clear whatever doubts has
been cast on her title by the issuance of TCTs in respondent Joses name.

Digested by: RB
PR by: TDM
TAPUROC VS VDA. DE MENDE
FACTS:
On 1996, in the RTC of Tagbilaran City, a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of
Deed of Sale and Cancellation of TCT was filed by the petitioners against respondents
Vda. de Mende et al. The Complaint alleges that petitioners Tapuroc and all the
successors-in-interest of deceased co-owner Antonia Ebe are the co-owners, coheirs and/or descendants of the original owners of the subject parcel of land situated
in Bohol and previously covered by a TCT; that sometime in 1992, when the
petitioners decided to partition the subject property, they discovered from the
Office of the City Assessor that the title covering the land was already in the name of
a certain Evans Mende by virtue of a Deed of Sale purportedly executed in favor of

the latter by their predecessors-in-interest on December 30 1967; that said Deed of

Sale is aforged document because the alleged vendors therein, who were Tapuroc
and the predecessors-in-interest of the other petitioners, did not sign the conveying
deed nor receive any consideration therefor; and that one of the alleged vendors,
Antonia Ebe, had already passed away in 1960, or long before the purported Deed of
Sale was said to have been executed in 1967. Petitioners, as plaintiffs, thus pray for
the nullification of the same Deed of Sale, the cancellation of the title issued in the
name of Evans Mende and the restoration of the previous title in their names, plus
damages.
In their Answer, the respondent Mendes denied the material allegations of the
Complaint and averred that the late Evans Mende, husband of respondent Vda. de
Mende and father of the herein co-respondents, bought the subject parcel of land
from its previous owners on December 12, 1967 as evidenced by a Deed of Sale duly
notarized by Atty. Rodolfo Yap. They further assert that they had been in open,
continuous, and peaceful possession of the land in question from the time of said
sale, and had been religiously paying the realty taxes due thereon.
On June 7, 1999, the trial court came out with its decision finding that the evidence
adduced by the plaintiffs Tapuroc et al was insufficient to establish their claim that
the questioned Deed of Sale was a forgery. The court explained that despite the
opportunity given them, the plaintiffs failed to present a handwriting expert to
determine whether the said Deed of Sale was indeed a forged instrument, adding
that laches had already set in because of plaintiffs inaction and neglect in
questioning the supposed forged character of the document after the lapse of more
than twenty-nine (29) years from the time of its execution.
The appellate court dismissed the petitioners appeal and affirmed that of the trial
court. Their MR having been denied by the CA ,the petitioners are now with this
Court via certiorari.
ISSUE:
1.
2.

WON the signatures of the petitioners predecessors-in-interest and

Tapuroc (the only surviving vendor to the alleged deed of sale) were forged
If they were, WON the declaration of nullity of the said deed of sale dated
December 13, 1967 is proper (sic).

HELD:
The instant petition is DENIED and the challenged decision of the CA is AFFIRMED.
1. It appears undisputed that the assailed Deed of Sale is a public document,
having been duly notarized by a certain Atty. Rodolfo Yap who,
unfortunately, had already passed away. Being a notarial instrument, the
deed in question is a public document and as such enjoys the presumption
of regularity in its execution. To overthrow that presumption, sufficient,

clear and convincing evidence is required, otherwise the document should

be upheld.
As a rule, forgery cannot be presumed. It must be proved by clear, positive and
convincing evidence. Mere allegation of forgery is not evidence and the burden of
proof lies on the party alleging it. Here, the petitioners failed to discharge their
burden.
2. With the Mendes possession in this case having been in the concept of an owner
and the land itself registered in their names for more than thirty (30) years now,
their title thereto had become indefeasible and their possession could no longer be
disturbed. The petitioners failure to take the necessary steps to assert their alleged
right for at least twenty-nine (29) years from date of registration of title is fatal to
their cause of action on the ground of laches.
Digested by: RB
PR by: TDM
CresenciaTubo Rodriguez v. Evangeline Rodriguez
G.R. No. 175720; September 11, 2007
Facts:
Juanito Rodriguez owned a 5-door apartment. In 1983, he executed a "Hulinghabilin
at testamento' giving petitioner CresenciaTubo Rodriguez, his live-in partner,
apartments D and E, and his children Benjamin(deceased husband of respondent),
apartment A; respondent Buenaventura, aprtment B; and Belen, apartment C.
However, in 1984, the deceased executed a deed of absolute sale over the property
in favor of the petitioner.
In 2001, petitioner filed a complaint for unlawful detainer against the respondents,
alleging that she is the lawful and registered owner of the property, and that in 1984,
she allowed respondents to occupy hte units. However, without her knowlege and
consent, the respondents separately leased the units to Magpantay, Navarro, and
Escota.
Respondents claimed ownership of hte property by succession. They alleged that the
deed of sale was simulated and void. The MTC rendered judgment in favor of the
respondents. The RTC reversed the decision of the MTC. The CA reversed the
decision of the RTC. MR denied.
Issue: Possession of the property/ Ownership

Ruling:
1. Petitioner alleges that as the registered owner of the subject property, she enjoys
the right of possession thereof and that question of ownership cannot be raised in
an ejectment case unless it is intertwined with the issue of possession. While the
court may look into the evidence of title or ownership and possession de jure to
determine the nature of possession, it cannot resolve the issue of ownership
because the resolution of said issue would effectan adjudication on ownership which
is not proper in the summary action for unlawful detainer. Petitioner insists that the
Court of Appeals erred in ruling that the HulingHabilin at Testamento transmitted
ownership of the specific apartments disregarding the fact that the same is not
probated yet and that the testator changed or revoked his will by selling the
property to petitioner prior to his death. -ya! duh!
Being a summary proceeding intended to provide an expeditious means of
protecting actual possession or right to possession of property, the question of title
is not involved and should be raised by the affected party in an appropriate action in
the proper court.
2. However, when the issue of ownership is raised the court is not ousted of its
jurisdiction. Section 16 of Rule 70.(ROC) All that the trial court can do is to make an
initial determination of who is the owner of the property so that it can resolve who is
entitled to its possession absent other evidence to resolve ownership. But this
adjudication is only provisional and does not bar or prejudice an action between the
same parties involving title to the property.
*Wills - The lower courts considered the following documentary evidence in arriving
attheir respective decisions: 1) HulingHabilin at Testamento 2) Deed of Sale 3) TCT
No. in the name of the petitioner; and 4) Partition Agreement executed by both the
respondents and the petitioner.
Based on the foregoing documentary evidence, we find that there is preponderance
of evidence in favor of the petitioners claim. Respondents failed to prove their right
of possession, as the HulingHabilin at Testamento and the Partition Agreement have
no legal effect since the will has not been probated. Before any will can have force or
validity itmust be probated. This cannot be dispensed with and is a matter of public
policy. Article
838 of the Civil Code mandates that [n]o will shall pass either real or personal
property unless it is proved and allowed in accordance with the Rules of Court. As
the will was not probated, the Partition Agreement which was executed pursuant
thereto cannot be given effect. Thus, the fact that petitioner was a party to said
agreement becomes immaterial in the determination of the issue of possession.

Moreover, at the time the deed of sale was executed in favor of the petitioner,
Juanito Rodriguez remained the owner thereof since ownership would only pass to
his heirs at the time of his death. Thus, as owner of the property, he had the
absolute right to dispose of it during his lifetime.
Digested by: AJG
PR by: DPS

Whether or not the confirmation of sale executed by Antonio in favor of Luisa

existed; and
Whether or not the signature purportedly of Antonio in that confirmation of sale was
genuine.
Held: Petition has no merit.

Teofisto Ono, etc. vs Vicente Lim G.R. No. 154270, March 9, 2010
Facts:
1992, Lim filed in RTC Cebu a petition for reconstitution of the owner's duplicate
copy of OCT, alleging that the same OCT was lost during World War 2 by his mother,
Luisa. This land was located in Balamban, Cebu which was sold to Luisa by spouses
Ono. Although the deed evidencing the sale was lost, the only legitimate son of Ono
had executed a notarized document in favor of Luisa denominated as confirmation
of the sale which was duly filed in Provincial Assessor's Office of Cebu.
Now, Spouses Ono's successors-in-interest opposed Lim's petition contending that
they had the certificate of title of the land.
Lim then converted the petition into a complaint for quieting of title, averring that
they had been in actual possession of the property since 1973, cultivating and
developing it, enjoying its fruits and paying taxes corresponding to it.

(1) Action for cancellation of title is not an attack on the title. The attack is direct
when the objective is to annul or set aside such judgment, or enjoin its enforcement.
On the other hand, the attack is indirect or collateral when, in an action to obtain a
different relief, an attack on the judgment is nevertheless made as an incident
thereof.
(2) Prescription was not relevant. Prescription, in general, is a mode of acquiring or
losing ownership and other real rights through the lapse of time in the manner and
under the conditions laid down by law. However, prescription was not relevant to
the determination of the dispute herein, considering that Lim did not base his right
of ownership on an adverse possession over a certain period. He insisted herein,
instead, that title to the land had been voluntarily transferred by the registered
owners themselves to Luisa, his predecessor-in-interest.
Digested by: AJG
PR by: DPS

The other party claimed that the land was never sold to Luisa, and that the
confirmation by the legitimate son was fabricated, the signature not being authentic.

No digests:

RTC ruled in favor of Lim. CA affirmed the RTC. The CA ruled that the action for
quieting of title was not a collateral, but a direct attack on the title; and that the
Lims' undisturbed possession had given them a continuing right to seek the aid of
the courts to determine the nature of the adverse claim of a third party and its effect
on their own title.

National Housing Authority vs. Augusto Basa, Jr., Luz Basa and Eduardo S. Basa, G.R.
No. 149121, April 20, 2010.

The petitioners raise the following issues:

DBP vs. Register of Deeds of Nueva Ecija,

Durawood vs. Candice Bona

Whether or not the ownership over registered land could be lost by prescription,
laches, or adverse possession;

Considering that the foreclosure sale and its subsequent registration with the
Register of Deeds were done validly, there is no reason for the non-issuance of the
writ of possession. A writ of possession is an order directing the sheriff to place a
person in possession of a real or personal property, such as when a property
is extrajudicially foreclosed. Section 7 of Act No. 3135 provides for the rule in the
issuance of the writ of possession involving extrajudicial foreclosure sales of real
estate mortgage, to wit:

Whether or not there was a deed of sale executed by Spouses Ono in favor of Luisa
and whether or not said deed was lost during World War II;

Sec. 7. In any sale made under the provisions of this Act, the purchaser may petition
the [Regional Trial Court] of the province or place where the property or any part

Whether or not the validity of the OCT could be collaterally attacked through an
ordinary civil action to quiet title;

thereof is situated, to give him possession thereof during the redemption period,
furnishing bond in an amount equivalent to the use of the property for a period of
twelve months, to indemnify the debtor in case it be shown that the sale was made
without violating the mortgage or without complying with the requirements of this
Act. Such petition shall be made under oath and filed in the form of
an ex parte motion in the registration or cadastral proceedings if the property is
registered, or in special proceedings in the case of property registered under the
Mortgage Law or under section one hundred and ninety-four of the Administrative
Code, or of any other real property encumbered with a mortgage duly registered in
the office of any register of deeds in accordance with any existing law, and in each
case the clerk of the court shall, upon the filing of such petition, collect the fees
specified in paragraph eleven of section one hundred and fourteen of Act Numbered
Four Hundred and ninety-six, as amended by Act Numbered Twenty-eight hundred
and sixty-six, and the court shall, upon approval of the bond, order that a writ of
possession issue, addressed to the sheriff of the province in which the property is
situated, who shall execute said order immediately.
This provision of law authorizes the purchaser in a foreclosure sale to apply for a writ
of possession during the redemption period by filing an ex parte motion under oath
for that purpose in the corresponding registration or cadastral proceeding in the
case of property with Torrens title. Upon the filing of such motion and the approval
of the corresponding bond, the law also in express terms directs the court to issue
the order for a writ of possession. The time-honored precept is that after the
consolidation of titles in the buyers name, for failure of the mortgagor to redeem,
the writ of possession becomes a matter of right. Its issuance to a purchaser in an
extrajudicial foreclosure is merely a ministerial function. The writ of possession
issues as a matter of course upon the filing of the proper motion and the approval of
the corresponding bond. The judge issuing the writ following these express
provisions of law neither exercises his official discretion nor judgment. As such, the
court granting the writ cannot be charged with having acted without jurisdiction or
with grave abuse of discretion. To accentuate the writs ministerial character, the
Court disallowed injunction to prohibit its issuance despite a pending action for
annulment of mortgage or the foreclosure itself.
Digested by: AJG
PR by: DPS

SAN LORENZO DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION vs. COURT OF APPEALS, PABLO S.

BABASANTA, SPS. MIGUEL LU and PACITA ZAVALLA LU
Facts:
Spouses Lu owned two parcels of land. On august 20, 1986, the spouses purportedly
sold the two parcels of land to respondent Pablo Babasanta for 15 pesos per square
meter. He made a down payment of 50,000 and several other payments ( 200,000)
were made.
Sometime on May 1989, Babasanta wrote a letter to Pacita Lu demanding the
execution of a final deed of sale so that he could effect a full payment of the
purchase price. However, the spouses declined to push through with the sale. They
claimed that when Babasanta requested for a discount and they refused, he
rescinded the agreement. Thus, Babasanta filed a case for Specific Performance.
On the other hand, San Lorenzo Development Corporation (SLDC) alleged that on 3
May 1989, the two parcels of land involved, namely Lot 1764-A and 1764-B, had
been sold to it in a Deed of Absolute Sale with Mortgage. It alleged that it was a
buyer in good faith and for value and therefore it had a better right over the
property in litigation.
Ruling of RTC
Applied Article 1544 of the civil Code and ruled that since both Babasanta and SLDC
did not register the respective sales in their favor, the ownership should pertain to
the buyer who first acquired possession of the property. The trial court equated the
execution of a public instrument in favor of SLDC as sufficient delivery of the
property.
Ruling of CA
Reversed. It declared the sale between Babasanta and spouses Lu as valid and
subsisting and ordered the spouses to execute necessary deed of conveyance in
favor of Babasanta. It ruled that Absolute Deed of Sale with Mortgage in favor of
SLDC was null and void on the ground that SLDC was a purchaser in bad faith.
Both the spouses Lu and SLDC filed a motion fro reconsideration, however in a
manifestation, Spouses Lu informed the appellate court that they are no longer
contesting its decision.
ISSUE:
Who between SLDC and Babasanta has a better right over the two parcels of land
RULING:

The receipt signed by Pacita Lu merely states that she accepted the sum of
50k as partial payment.The subsequent acts convince us that the Spouses
Lu never intended to transfer ownership to Babasanta except upon full

payment of the purchase price. Since there was no delivery whether actual
or constructive, there is no transfer ownership of the property.

SLDC registered the sale with an annotation of the notice of Lis Pendens.
Does this obliterates the effects of delivery and possession in good faith
which admittedly had occured prior to SLDC's knowledge of the transaction
in favor of Babasanta?
SC's answer in on the negative.
SLDC had no knowledge of the prior transaction of the Spouses Lu with
Babasanta. From the time of execution of the first deed up to the moment
of transfer and delivery of possession of the lands to SLDC, it had acted in
good faith and the subsequent annotation of lis pendens has no effect at all
on the consummated sale between SLDC and the Spouses Lu.
SC findsSLDC a buyer in good faith since there is no evidence extant in the
records that it had knowledge of the prior transaction in favor of Babasanta.
This Court has ruled that a person dealing with the owner of registered land
is not bound to go beyond the certificate of title as he is charged with
notice of burdens on the property which are noted on the face of the
register or on the certificate of title.
In assailing knowledge of the transaction between him and the Spouses Lu,
Babasanta apparently relies on the principle of constructive notice
incorporated in Section 52 of the Property Registration Decree (P.D. No.
1529) which reads, thus:
Sec. 52. Constructive notice upon registration. Every conveyance,
mortgage, lease, lien, attachment, order, judgment, instrument or entry
affecting registered land shall, if registered, filed, or entered in the office of
the Register of Deeds for the province or city where the land to which it
relates lies, be constructive notice to all persons from the time of such
registering, filing, or entering.
A notice of lis pendens, as the Court held in Natao v. Esteban,42 serves as
a warning to a prospective purchaser or incumbrancer that the particular
property is in litigation; and that he should keep his hands off the same,
unless he intends to gamble on the results of the litigation."
Precisely, in this case SLDC has intervened in the pending litigation to
protect its rights. Obviously, SLDCs faith in the merit of its cause has been
vindicated with the Courts present decision which is the ultimate
denouement on the controversy.

had the occasion to rule that if a vendee in a double sale registers the sale
after he has acquired knowledge of a previous sale, the registration
constitutes a registration in bad faith and does not confer upon him any
right. If the registration is done in bad faith, it is as if there is no registration
at all, and the buyer who has taken possession first of the property in good
faith shall be preferred.

Assuming ex gratia argumenti that SLDCs registration of the sale had been
tainted by the prior notice of lis pendens and assuming further for the same
nonce that this is a case of double sale, still Babasantas claim could not
prevail over that of SLDCs. In Abarquez v. Court of Appeals,46 this Court

The law speaks not only of one criterion. The first criterion is priority of entry in the
registry of property; there being no priority of such entry, the second is priority of
possession; and, in the absence of the two priorities, the third priority is of the date of
title, with good faith as the common critical element. Since SLDC acquired possession
of the property in good faith in contrast to Babasanta, who neither registered nor
possessed the property at any time, SLDCs right is definitely superior to that of
Babasanta's. Petition granted
Digested by : GN
PR by: MJB

AMODIA and GO KIM CHUAN -versus- HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and AZNAR
BROTHERS REALTY COMPANY
Facts:
The subject property was originally owned by Esteban Bonghanoy who had only one
child- Juana Bonghanoy-Amodia, mother of petitioners. The entire property was
brought under the operation of the Torrens System. However the title was lost
during the World War II.
the Amodias allegedly executed an extrajudicial partition of Real Estate with Deed of
Absolute Sale and settled that subject property is conveyed to respondent AZNAR
Brother for 10,000. Thereafter, the respondents made improvements and
constructed a beach house.
February 18. 1989, petitioners (Amodias) executed a deed of extrajudicial settlement
with Absolute Sale conveying subject property to Go kin Chuan for 70,000. The lost
title was reconstituted ( pursuant to RA 26). An original certificate of Title was issued
in the name of Esteban Bonghanoy and a derivative title was issued in the name of
Go Kim Chuan.
Aznar wrote a letter requesting to have the sale with Go KimChuan annulled and
cancelled. Petitioner did not heed AZNAR's demand. AZNAR. on that same date,

petitioners caused a notice of adverse claim to be annotated on the title. He filed a

case in RTC.
RTC's Decision
Dismissed the case. declared Go Kim Chuan as the real owner of the subject
property. The RTC ratiocinated that the signatures of the Amodias in the ExtraJudicial Partition of Real Estate with Deed of Absolute Sale executed in favor of
AZNAR were found by the document examiner of the Philippine Constabulary (PC)
Crime Laboratory to be forged, thus, the said deed did not convey anything in favor
of AZNAR. Moreover, the subject property had been brought under the Land
Registration Act; hence, all transactions involving the same should have complied
with the said law. Finally, the RTC held that AZNAR failed to show that Go Kim Chuan
acquired the subject property in bad faith.
CA's Decision:
Pursuant to ART. 1544 of the New Civil Code, the former deed should be given
preference over the latter. Since Aznar caused an annotation"Notice of Adverse
Claims", they (petitioners) should have respected such and made inquiries related to
it.
ISSUES:
who between Go Kim Chuan and AZNAR has the better right over the subject
property?

RULING:

undisturbed. From 1964 to 1989, AZNAR did not bother to have the lost title
reconstituted or even have the subject property declared under its name for taxation
purposes.
Vigilantibus, non dormientibus, jura subveniunt. Laws must come to the assistance of
the vigilant, not of the sleepy
Although it is obvious that Go Kim Chuan registered the sale in his favor under Act
496 while AZNAR did not, we still cannot make an outright award of the subject
property to the petitioners solely on that basis. For the law is clear: mere registration
of title is not enough. Good faith must accompany the registration. We need to
determine if Go Kim Chuan was a registrant in good faith.
As admitted by AZNAR, the Notice of Adverse Claim was annotated on TCT No.
20626 only after the lost certificate of title was reconstituted and after the issuance
of said TCT in the name of Go Kim Chuan. It is, therefore, absurd to say that Go Kim
Chuan should be bound by
an adverse claim which was not previously annotated on the lost title or on the new
one, or be shackled by a claim which he did not have any knowledge of.
Go Kim Chuan also made verifications in the office of the City Assessor and visited
property without anybody interposing adverse claim. After he decided to buy, he
paid all the taxes in arrears. With these, good faith cant be doubted.
AZNAR's complaint for cancellation of title contains no allegation that Go Kim Chuan
was aware of defects in his title. In the absence of such an allegation and proof of
bad faith, it would be grossly inappropriate for this Court to render judgment against
the purchaser who had already acquired title not only because of lack of evidence,
but also because of the indefeasibility and conclusiveness of such title. Petition
granted.
Digested by : GN

In this case, AZNAR knew that the subject property was under the operation of
Torrens System, still registered the property under ART 3344.

PR by: MJB

Act 3344 provides for the system of recording of transactions or claims over
unregistered real estatewithout prejudice to a third party with a better right.But if
the land is registered under the Land Registration Act (and therefore has a Torrens
Title), and it is sold and the sale is registered not under the Land Registration Act but
under Act 3344, as amended, such sale is not considered registered, as the term is
used under Art. 1544 of the New Civil Code.
In this case, since the Extra-Judicial Partition of Real Estate with Deed of Absolute
Sale in favor of AZNAR was registered under Act No. 3344 and not under Act No.
496, the said document is deemed not registered. Rather, it was the sale in favor of
Go Kim Chuan which was registered under Act No. 496..
It is unfortunate that, despite the sale of the subject property way back in 1964 and
the existence of the remedy of reconstitution at that time, AZNAR opted to register
the same under the improper registry (Act 3344) and allowed such status to lie

Sixto Antonio v. Sps. Santos & AURORA SANTOS, SPS. LUIS LIBERATO & ANGELINA
LIBERATO and SPS. MARIO CRUZ & VICTORIA CRUZ
Facts:
Anotio alleged that he is the absolute owner of the subject lot and that as evidence
by certificates of payment of realty taxes (1918 and 1919), and that it was previously
owned by his father . He filed an application for the registration of the two parcels of
land with RTC. The trial court declared him as true owner in fee simple of the two
parcels of land however it set aside its decision with respect to the subject lot to
avoid duplication the issuance of titles. It was discovered that the subject property
was already titled under the name of the respondents. Hence the complaint for
reconveyance, annulment of Title and damages was filed in RTC.

Antonio averred that respondents committed fraud in their application for titling
because they made it appear in their application for registration that the subject
property was located in Pinagbuhatan, Pasig, Rizal, when in fact, the property is
located in Barangay San Juan, Cainta, Rizal. He added, respondents also made it
appear in their application for registration that the subject property is bound on the
North East by the Pasig River when in fact it is bound on the North East by the
Tapayan River. Therefore, null and void because it was obtained through fraudulent
misrepresentations and machinations
Respondent's Answer:
They alleged that prior to the issuance of OCT No. 108, they, as registered owners,
had always been in peaceful possession of the property and at no time had Antonio
possessed the property, nor did he ever make any claim against the said property.
Both RTC and Ca dismissed the petition
ISSUES:
(1) Did the Court of Appeals err in not holding that the decision in LRC No. 142-A
was sufficient basis of petitioners claim of ownership over the subject property?
(2) Did the Court of Appeals and RTC erroneously treat petitioners action for
reconveyance as one for titling of a parcel of land?
RULING:
On the First Issue
In LRC No. 142-A, RTC had already rendered a decision adjusicating ownership to
him.Hence, he argues, his right of ownership over the land has already been fully
established, but no certificate of title was issued to him only because the property
was already registered in the name of respondents.
But we agree with respondents that petitioner cannot rely on the decision in LRC No.
142-A. As pointed out by the Court of Appeals, even if a title had been issued to
petitioner based on said decision, his title would be of a later date than the title of
respondents, hence inefficacious and ineffective. This Court has ruled that, when
two certificates of title are issued to different persons covering the same land in
whole or in part, the earlier in date must prevail; and in case of successive
registrations where more than one certificate is issued over the same land, the
person holding a prior certificate is entitled to the land as against a person who relies
on a subsequent certificate.
On the second issue, petitioner contends that it is very apparent the RTC and Court
of Appeals had the notion that his case a quo was not an action for reconveyance,
but rather an application for registration of land where the applicant and oppositor
had to prove their respective registrable titles. This, he adds, could be gleaned from
the RTCs findings that the claim of plaintiff on the basis of said documents cannot
prevail over the adverse, public, open, peaceful and continuous possession by the
defendants over the subject property, and that it was indubitably shown that the

defendants have occupied said property since time immemorial while plaintiff has
never at anytime taken possession of said property.
We find petitioners contentions unconvincing. For an action for reconveyance based
on fraud to prosper, this Court has held that the party seeking reconveyance must
prove by clear and convincing evidence his title to the property and the fact of
fraud.The RTC, in making the abovementioned findings, was not treating petitioners
action for reconveyance as one for titling of property. But it was weighing whether
petitioner has, by clear and convincing evidence, proven his title to the property.
Moreover, the RTC, in its decision, discussed the merits of petitioners ground for his
action for reconveyance, i.e. whether or not respondents committed fraud in titling
the subject property in their names. The RTC held that as shown by public records in
the custody of the RTC, Pasig City and the Land Registration Authority, petitioners
claim that the property was fraudulently titled in the names of respondents is
baseless. Thus, petitioners contention that the RTC and the Court of Appeals treated
his action for reconveyance as one for titling of property lacks any persuasive basis

An action for reconveyance resulting from fraud prescribes four years from the
discovery of the fraud. Such discovery is deemed to have taken place upon the
issuance of the certificate of title over the property. Registration of real property is
considered a constructive notice to all persons, thus, the four-year period shall be
counted therefrom. It appears that OCT No. 108 was issued to respondents by the
Register of Deeds for Metro Manila on May 20, 1977. From the time of registration
of the land in the name of respondents on May 20, 1977 to the filing of the
complaint on September 19, 1988, more than four years had already elapsed. Hence,
it cannot be denied that petitioners action had already prescribed.
Digested by : GN
PR by: MJB
No digests:

Islamic Directorate of the Phils. Vs. CA

Legarda vs. CA