Anna Tomlinson

2-15-15
Pol 449
Prof. Carlson
There are several factors or causes of the Vietnam War that could be considered misperceptions,
and others that are true but should be considered misperceptions. Initially, one misperception, according
to Berman and Routh, is that the United States could have supported the Viet Minh in their struggle
against French Colonial occupiers in 1945. Some believe that the early contacts by members of OSS
could have produced a situation in which the United States could have been supportive, thus avoiding the
war. However, Ho Chi Minh would have sided with Communists and Socialists instead.
According to Volume 1, Chapter 2, Section 2 of the Gravel Edition of the Pentagon Papers, the
Domino Theory was a worrisome idea, as the separate identities of the Asian states were not taken into
consideration. The homogeneity of the nations of Southeast Asia was taken as a given, as the linkage in
their ability to remain democratic, or at an acceptable minimum, non-communist nation. It was thought
that if one country in Indochina were to become communist, each of the other countries would follow,
and the United States dream of stopping communism would become a distant memory. But the fallacy
was neither evident then, nor is it demonstrable now in retrospect. Not losing Southeast Asia thus
became the goal of the United States. The U.S. was afraid that communism would take over Asia if one
small country toppled, then the rest would follow. So we ultimately went to war to stop communism.
Another misperception that the Pentagon Papers draws on is that America did not come to the aid
of the French because of the U.S. governments anti-colonialist views. Fall felt that president Roosevelt
was determined to eliminate the French from Indochina at all costs, pressuring allies to help Indochina
assume full independence.

On the other hand, there was the misperception that because we ultimately supported France
militarily and financially in 1950 at the beginning of the Korean War, it was thought that the U.S.
government was pro colonialism. In reality, neither was the case as at the time, the United States was
less concerned over Indochina, and less purposeful than either assumes. Neither misperception was
reality. Ambivalence characterized U.S. policy during WWII and was the root of much subsequent
misunderstanding. (Pentagon Papers, volume 1, chapter 1).
In the Berman and Routh article, they say the 1954 division of Vietnam led the revolution to
adopt two goals socialization in the North and liberation in the South. By 1959, it had become evident
to northerners and southerners that it was necessary to take up arms in the South in order to overthrow
Diem and liberate South Vietnam. (191). The misperception of this is that the U.S. felt the need to
become involved and aide the South in defending itself. This action ultimately led to the United States
involvement in their fight against Communism.
In 1961 President Kennedy initiated a campaign in South Vietnam as a limited war that could be
fought only in the South in the hopes of winning the hearts and minds of the civilian population, but the
people had their attention diverted by the regular armed forces of the North. When President Johnson
took office, he believed the United States would be responsible for the security of South Vietnam. He
believed that the overthrow of Diem had given the United States this responsibility for future
governments in South Vietnam. Many believed that it was the assassination of Diem that forced Johnson
to choose between defeat and starting the war by introducing combat troops. The Diem coup was one of
those critical events in the history of U.S. policy that could have altered our commitment, with the
choices being standing by Diem or encouraging the overthrow, or to disengage completely. In making
the choice to do nothing to prevent the coup, the U.S. inadvertently deepened its involvement. (Pentagon
Papers, Volume 2, chapter 4, page 201).
In the Berman and Routh article it says that after the communist victory in China in 1949 and the
outbreak of the Korean War in 1950, new pressures were added to the mix. There was a domestic

incentive for the Truman administration to prevent a communist victory in Vietnam or anywhere else in
Indochina. The loss of Southeast Asia was defined as threatening the security of the United States, and
other Free World nations. In other words, Vietnam became important for what its loss to the
communists would portend. This cause of the Vietnam War should be considered a misperception.
Berman and Routh go on to say that Lyndon Johnson had other options and that there was a
window of opportunity for avoiding war because Hanoi was willing to compromise and accept a
temporarily neutralized South Vietnam fearing a massive U.S. escalation. This is a misperception that
caused the war because the article also states polling data from 1964 shows that the public was illinformed and had not formed strong opinions on Vietnam (192). Perhaps if the public knew all the facts
about Hanoi being willing to compromise, a war could have been avoided.
Were there windows of opportunity to avoid the Vietnam War? The Berman and Routh article
says once policies were implemented under Eisenhower that supported the Diem regime, it became
increasingly difficult for subsequent presidents to roll back those obligations because the costs of losing
increased with each presidential promise to maintain the government in the South, and that the original
commitment was to a noble goal ensuring that a separate, autonomous, sovereign, anticommunist and
pro-American state would survive in Vietnam. Yet no one seemed interested in debating whether the
nobler cause might have been in supporting the Viet Minh in their struggle for independence and selfdetermination. (193). This factor of the war should not be considered a misperception. Its almost as if
a train wreck had been put into motion, and the subsequent presidents hands were tied behind their
backs. They promised to help maintain the government of South Vietnam and didnt want to go down in
history as the president that was responsible for losing South Vietnam to the North. Lyndon Johnson,
especially, dramatically escalated the war for this reason.

In his article Changing Interpretations of the Vietnam War, Robert J. McMahon said, there is
broad agreement among early writers that the Vietnam War represented a colossal mistake for the United

States, and that American policy was plagued persistently by errors, blunders, misperceptions, and
miscalculations, significant interpretive differences still existed... McMahon goes on to say that there
were two distinct views that are still echoed in todays debates. The first characterizes American
involvement in the war as an avoidable tragedy. He says that policymakers exaggerated Vietnams
importance to the United States. Had the American people not been fooled into thinking the United
States would be facing such a great loss economically and in the form of security, such a tragedy could
have been avoided. McMahon claims that, That view remains the dominant interpretation of the
Vietnam War. The second view offers a more radical critique of American intentions and behavior. It
depicts the United States as a global hegemony, concerned primarily with its own economic expansion,
and reflexively opposed to communism, indigenous revolution, or any other challenge to its authority.
Both these perceptions ring true to the ears of those who belief them. Was the whole thing just a huge
mistake full of errors, or was the United States a big bully? Was the United States being the Policeman
of the World? People hold both those arguments to be true, and in my opinion both arguments are
accurate. We are strong as a country, but try to prevent the slaughter of millions of people. We thought
we could go to Vietnam to quickly save people from being killed and to help stop Communism, but paid
a very high price for our shortsighted mistakes.

Works Cited
Berman, Larry, and Stephen R. Routh. "Why The United States Fought In Vietnam." Annual Review Of
Political Science 6.1 (2003): 181-204. Academic Search Premier. Web. 15 Feb. 2015.
McMahon, Robert. "Changing Interpretations of the Vietnam War." Changing Interpretations of the
Vietnam War. Web. 16 Feb. 2015.
"Pentagon Papers, Gravel Edition, Summary and Chapter I." Pentagon Papers, Gravel Edition, Summary
and Chapter I. Web. 16 Feb. 2015.
<https://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/pentagon/pent1.html>.
"The Pentagon Papers, Gravel Edition, Chapter 2, "US Involvement in the Franco-Viet Minh War, 19501954." The Pentagon Papers, Gravel Edition, Chapter 2, "US Involvement in the Franco-Viet
Minh War, 1950-1954. Web. 16 Feb. 2015.
<https://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/pentagon/pent5.htm>.
"The Pentagon Papers, Gravel Edition, Volume 3, Chapter 2, "Military Pressures Against North Vietnam,
February 1964-January 1965," Pp. 106-268." The Pentagon Papers, Gravel Edition, Volume 3,
Chapter 2, "Military Pressures Against North Vietnam, February 1964-January 1965," Pp. 106268. Web. 16 Feb. 2015. <https://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/pentagon3/pent3.htm>.