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WHAT IS AN APPARATUS? and Other Essays Giorgio Agamben Translated by David Kihik and Stefn Pedatella ————————— Sef Unive Press Sf, Caloris Contents ‘Baglsh canton and Tanston? Note 2009 bythe Bourd of Tues ofthe Leland Stanfoed Junior Unive Al ight rove "What ban para” was exgally publi nln n 2006 under the tke Geo? un diese? ® 2006, Noceempo, “The Friend” was ‘xigaly published in alin in 2007 unde the ile Camien © 207, Noetepo."Whac Is the Contemporary” wat eign published in eal ian 208 under dhe de Chea eomomponeney? © 2008, Nonetepo. No pat ftir book may be mxprodod r tasted in ey rs or by any meas, decors ot mechs inlding phoreopying and recnd ‘Translators’ Note ix Jing ocin any information org orectend sem withou the pot “wtnen pemiion of Safad Unive Pres § What Js an Apparatus? 1 Prinad inthe United Ses of Anus on aie, archival qi paper nce ae Library of Congess Cataloging Pubcon Data : : fee § What Is the Contemporary? [says Engh, Selections (Eas Eagl 3 ee i What isan spats and cher ays / Giorgio Agnes ‘tandatl by David Kaki and Sean Pell P. n.—{Metiin, cossing aesthetics) Includes bibliograplelreeence ISBN 9780-30479 (loch le pape) ISBN 978-0-8047-u30-4 (ple alle paper) 4 Power Phloropy) 2. Knowledge, Theory of. Foucal, Michel, 16-964, 4 Finds. 5. Contemporary The J. Tide. Th, Sees: Meridian (Srnford, Calif) By6inAgaBs 2009 1g5—dea ostagss Frontpiecs image: Dex of Govan Seodine, The Ape rand Peal \. ete Roan Baryon (24-490 onc Rome, Paso Barbet at ‘Terminological questions are important in philoso- phy. As a philosopher for whom I have the greatest re spect once said, terminology is the poetic moment of thought, This is not to say that philosophers must al- ‘ways necessarily define theie technical terms. Plato never defined idea, his most important term. Others, like Spinoza and Leibniz, preferred instead co define their terminology more geomerrico. ‘The hypothesis thac I wish to propose is thae the word dispastif or “apparatus” in English, is a decisive technical term in the strategy of Foucault's thought! He uses it quite often, especially from the mid 19708, ‘when he begins co concern himself with what he calls “governmentality” or the “government of men.” ‘Though he never offers a complete definition, he 2 Whet isan Appanatus? comes close to something like it in an interview from 177: What ying co ingle ue with shi er i stand semast, a thoroughly heterogeneous set consisting of discourses, institutions, architeecral forms, regula- tory decisions, laws, adminisrative measures, scientific statements, philosophical, moral, and philanthropic repesions—in thos, themida mucha the unsaid uch ae the elements of the apparatus. The apparatus ic selfis the network that can be established between these elements by the term “apparatus” I mean a kind of a forma- tos, wpe that at given histori momen ha its major function the response to an urgency. The a ramus therefore as a dominant suatgie funtion Usaid thac the nature ofan apparatus is essentially seracegic, which means thar we are speaking about a sertain manipulation of relations of forces, of a rational and concrete intéfvention in the relations of forces, ether 03 to develop chem in a particule direction, or 9 block them, to stabilize them, and to utilize them. The apparatus is chusalorays inscribed into a play of power, but ic isalso always linked to cera Timits of knowledge that atte from it and, to an equal degree, condition it ‘The apparatus is precisely cis a et of strategies of the relations of forces supporting, and supported by, certain types of knowledge? Let ie biiefly summarize three points: 4a. Iris heterogeneous set that includes vireually anything, linguistic and nonlinguistic, under the What han Apparatus? 3 same heading: discourses, institutions, buildings, laws, police measures, philosophical proposi- the net. tions, and so on. The apparatus itsl work that is established between these elements b. The apparatus always has a concrete strate- gic funccion and is always located in a power relation . As such, ic appears atthe intersection of power relations and relations of knowledge. 1 would like now to try and trace a brief genealogy of this term, first in the work of Foucault, and then in a broader historical context, At the end of the 1960s, more or less at the time vwhen he was writing The Archeology of Knowledge, Foucault docs not yet use the term “apparatus” in or der to define the object of his research. Instead, he uses the term positivité, “positivity.” an etymological neigh- bor of disposi again without offering us a definition J often asked myself where Foucault found this teem, until the moment when, a few months ago, I re- read a book by Jean Hyppolite entitled Introduction & la philosophie de U’bisoire de Hegel. You probably know about the serong link that ties Foucault ro Hyppolire, 4 What Is an Apparatus? 4 person whom he referred to ae times as “my mas- tet” (Hyppolite was in fact his teacher, first during the Hhignein the Lycée Henri-lV (the preparatory course for the Ecole normale supéticure] and then in the Ecole normale), The third part of Hyppolite’s book bears the title “Raison et histoire: Les ides de posiivité et de des- tin” (Reason and History: The Ideas of Positivity and Destiny). The focus here is on the analysis of wo ‘works that dare from Hegel’s years in Bern and Franke fare (795-96): The first is “The Spicit of Christianity and Its Destiny,” and the second—where we find the ‘erm that interests us—"The Positivity of the Chris- tian Religion” (Die Positivitas der chrstiche Religion), According to Hyppolite, “destiny” and “positviey” are two key concepts in Hegel's thought. In particu lar, the erm “positivity” finds in Hegel its proper place in the opposition between “natural religion” and “posi- tive religon.” While natural religion is concerned with the immediaté and general relation of human reason with the divine, positive or historical religion encom- passes the set of beliefs, rules, and rites that in a cer tain society and at a certain historical moment are ex: ‘erally imposed on individuals. “A positive religion,” Hegel writes in a passage cited by Hyppolice, “implies feelings that are more or les impressed through con- straint on souls; these are actions that are the effect of What Is an Apparatus? 5 ‘command and the resylt of obedience and are accom- plished without direct interest.”> ~ Hyppolite shows how the opposition between na- ture and positivity corresponds, in this sense, to the dialectics of freedom and obligation, as well as of rea- son and history. Ina passage that could not have failed to provoke Foucaul’s curiosity, because it in a way presages the notion of apparatus, Hyppolite writes: ‘We se here the knot of questions implicit inthe concept of positivity, a well as Hegel’ successive atemprs to Bring opeterdaketcally-— alesis char nore conscious of itself pure reason (theoretical and above all practical) and positivity, cba is, the boreal element. In a certain sense, Hegel considers positivity 2s an obstacle so the freedom of man, and as such its condemned. To investigate the positive clements of a religion, and we might add, ofa social state, means to discover in them that which is imposed through a constraint on man, chat which obfuscates the purity of reason. Bur, in anocher Scnse—and ths isthe axpect chat ends up having the upper hand in the course of Hegel’ development—pos- iivty mast be reconciled with reason, which chen loses | its abstrace character and adapts to the concrete richness coffe, We ace then why the concepe of positivity i the center of Hegelian perspecives* If “positivity” is the name that, according to Hyp- polite, the young Hegel gives to the historical ele- ment—loaded as i is with rules, rites, and institutions that are imposed on the individual by an external 6 What bran Apparatus? powes, but that become, so to speak, internalized in the systems of belief and feelings—then Foucault, by borrowring this term (later to become “apparatus”, ‘takes a position with respect to a decisive problem, , Which is actually also his own problem: the relation | between individuals as living beings and the histori- cal element, By “the historical element,” I mean the set of instcucions, of processes of subjectfication, and of tules it: which power relations become concrete. Fou- caules ultimate aim is not, then, as in Hegel, the rec- onciliation of the two elements it is nor even to em- phasize their conflict. For Foucault, what is at stake is rather the investigation of concrete modes in which the positivicies (or the apparatuses) act within the rela- tions, mechanisms, and “plays” of power. 3. Ik should now be clear in what sense I have ad- vanced the liypothesis that “apparatus” is an essen- tial technical term in Foucault’ thought. What is at stake here is not a particular term that refers only to this or that technology of power. Ie is a general term that has the same breadth as the term “positivity” had, according to Hyppolite, for the young Hegel. Within Foucaul’s strategy, it comes to occupy the place of ‘one of taose tetms that he defines, critically, as “the What lean Apparatus? 7 universal” (les wnversaua), Foucault, as you know, al+ sways refused to deal with the general categories or rental constructs that he calls “che universal,” such as the State, Sovereignty, Lave, and Power. Buc this is not to say thar there aze no operative concepts with 2 general character in his thought. Apparatuses are, in point of fact, what take the place of the universals in the Foucauldian strategy: not simply this or that po- lice measure, this or that technology of power, and not cven the generality obtained by their abstraction, In- stead, as he claims in che interview from 1977, an appa- ratus is “the network (e réseau) chat can be esablished becween these elements.” If we now try to examine the definition of “sppara- tus” that can be found in common French dictionar- ies, we see that they distinguish between three mean- ings of the term: a. A sticly juridical sense: “Apparatus is che part ofa jdgmene chat contains the decision separate from the opinion.” That is, the section of sentence that decides, or the enacting clause ofl b. A technological meaning: “The way in which she parts of a machine or ofa mechanism and, by exter sion, the mechanism itself are aranged.” cA military use: “The set of means arranged fa confor: rity with a plan” 8 What lean Apparatus? ‘To some extent, the three definitions are all pres- cnt in Foucault, But dictionaries, in particular those that lack a historical-etymological character, divide and separate this term into a variety of meanings. This fragmercation, nevertheless, generally corresponds to the historical development and articulation of a Unique original meaning that we should not lose sight of, What i this original meaning for the retm “appa- ‘atus”? The term certainly refers, in its common Fou- cauldian use, o a set of practices and mechanisms (both linguistic and nonlinguistic, juridical, rechni- cal, and military) that aim to face an urgent need and to obrain an effece that is more or less immediate, But what is the strategy of practices or of thought, what is the historical context, from which the modern term originates? 4 Over the past three years, Ihave found myself in-

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