CRT Research | Credit Intensive and

Special Situations
Kevin Starke
(203) 569-6421 kstarke@crtllc.com
Managing Director
Patrick Marshall
(203) 569-4373 pmarshall@crtllc.com
Research Associate

Iconix Brand Group Inc

(ICON, NR, PT: None, Close: $5.67)

Company Note

NR - PT: None

ICON: Another Blow to Confidence Before Exiting 2015

December
December
29,29,
2015
2015

The announcement of a formal SEC investigation increases the steepness and slipperiness of the slope on
which ICON has been treading since it announced the comment letter process in early August.
Bankruptcy risk has been introduced into the equation, and longer-dated bonds trading in the 50s are the
market's verification of this point.
Yes it may still be able to get a refinancing done, but the cost of that financing could singlehandedly crush
free cash flow yield, by at least one conservative measure.
This could undermine the speculative attraction of the stock unless it breaches the key $5 trading level, at
which stocks typically lose a lot of institutional investor support.
In this note, we provide context on ICON against other stocks under SEC investigation, as well as context on
its other legal distractions, including two disputes with trade partners that may be indicative of a house in
disarray.

Iconix Brand Group Inc. (ICON, or the Company) yesterday dropped the third in a series of 2015 bombshells on
the market in the waning days of the year, announcing that it was under formal investigation by the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC). The full text of the announcement is as follows, with emphasis added:
Iconix Brand Group, Inc. (Nasdaq: ICON) announced that the Company received a formal order of investigation
from the Staff of the SEC. The Company intends to fully cooperate with the SEC.
As previously disclosed, the Company is currently in a comment letter process with the Staff of the SEC related
to the accounting treatment for the formation of certain joint ventures. Additionally, the Company formed a
Special Committee of the Board of Directors to conduct a review of the accounting treatment related to certain
of the Company's transactions.
As announced in a Form 8-K filed on November 5, 2015, the Company's current management team determined,
based in part on the Special Committee's review, that ICON would restate its historical financial statements in
respect of (i) the 2013 fiscal year and the fourth quarter thereof, (ii) the 2014 fiscal year and each quarterly
period thereof and (iii) the first and second quarters of 2015, to correct certain errors in accounting. The Company
completed these restatements, which were filed at the end of November 2015.
Iconix will continue to focus on building its brand management platform across the globe and is committed to
driving the long-term success of the Company. The Company is currently in active discussions with potential
lenders and continues to expect to be in a position to refinance its 2016 convertible notes.
The amount of detail in this release is dissatisfying, to say the least. What dissatisfies is the lack of disclosure about
what information the SEC is seeking. And bear in mind that the SEC makes no public statement at the outset of a
formal investigation, so all we have to rely upon is the Companys telling of it.
Please find important disclosures on page 8 of this report.

CRT Research | Credit Intensive and Special Situations

Iconix Brand Group Inc
December 29, 2015

Iconix Brand Group Inc (ICON, NA, PT:NA)

Exhibit 1. Iconix Capital Structure

LTM Figures as of
LTM EBITDA
Settlement Date

($ in millions)
Restricted cash
Unrestricted cash
Secured
$100MM Variable Funding Facility due 2043
2012-1 Sr. Secured Notes due 2043
2013-1 Sr. Secured Notes due 2043

9/30/2015
184.8

Cap.
Face

12/31/2015
Cum.
Cap.
Face

Balance
64.9
117.9
182.8

LTM
EBITDA
184.8
Mult. (x)

Net
Cum.
Cap.
Face

Net Cap.
Market

LTM
EBITDA
184.8
Mult. (x)

828.2

4.5x

645.4

3.5x

300.0
400.0

277.8

LTM
EBITDA
184.8
Mult. (x)

100.0
494.5
233.7
828.2

645.4

1,528.2

8.3x

1,345.4

1,806.0

9.8x

1,623.2

Price
-100.0

YTM
(%)

Interest Exp.
Analysis

Mat.

Rate/
Coup.
(%)

Est.
Int. Exp.

7.3x

491.0

8.8x

277.8

1,345.4
1,623.2

100.00
100.00
100.00

4.14% 01/25/43
4.23% 01/25/43
4.35% 01/25/43

4.14%
4.23%
4.35%

4.1
20.9
10.2

89.00
56.00

32.18% 06/01/16
30.26% 03/15/18

2.50%
1.50%

7.5
6.0

Int Exp

48.7

3.5x

267.0
224.0

Equity
Common Stock (ICON)

Net
Cum.
Cap.
Mkt

Price / YTM
Analysis

(182.8)

100.0
494.5
233.7

700.0

Cap.
Mkt

(182.8)

828.2
Senior Unsecured
2.5% Convertible Sr. Sub. Note due 2016
1.5% Convertible Sr. Sub. Note due 2018

Net Cap.
Face

7.3x
8.8x

5.74

48.4 MM Shrs

Source: Company reports; Bloomberg; CRT Capital Group LLC estimates.

The press release as worded creates doubt as to whether there might be something that the special committee did not
find and publish in the November 5 8-K, or did its prior review root out all of the restatements that needed to be done?
This question is of more than academic importance, because it gives clues as to whether the SECs interests go beyond
the transactions reclassified in the November 5 8-K or whether they are limited thereto.
And that matters, in turn, because it partly determines how plausible the last statement in the press release is, namely
that the Company is in a position to refinance its 2016 convertible notes. If theres a truism that the ICON situation
proves, it is that one thing leads to another. And yet we, like other investors, have continually taken the view that the
Companys situation vis--vis the SEC was not likely to degrade further. Such a stance has led to burned fingers. The
comment letter process was followed by the restatement. The restatement has been followed by a formal investigation.
What next? A civil settlement? A Wells notice? Nothing can be ruled out.
We nonetheless still think it more likely than not that the restatement captures the full extent of ICONs accounting
issues, and that the SEC is investigating to see whether there was fraudulent intent behind them. It may seek to levy
fines or prosecute individuals accordingly, but the accounting statements as they now stand may be accurate. If this
scenario does unfold, the Company likely can issue its 10-K, helping to provide a basis for lenders to help the Company
refinance the $300 million in 2.5% convertible notes that come due in June 2016. Those notes were thinly traded
yesterday, but quotes did seem to drop by only about three points, to 88-90, while the longer-dated 1.5% notes were off
more markedly by about five points, to 55-57. The Company apparently said at the annual meeting that it can reduce the
amount needed to borrow by $100-$150 million, such that any replacement debt could be in the amount of $150-$200
million. Given the elevated risks, and credit market volatility generally, ICON is likely being driven into distressed lender
hands, and coupon expectations in the sub-10% range should probably now be pinned in the 10-15% range. Lenders on
the new deal will probably not want to be temporally junior to the $400 million in 1.5% convertible notes due 2018, so
we could see step-coupons, springing maturities or other mechanisms that motivate the Company to deal with the 2018
maturity in a proactive fashion.
The problem is that the confidence one can have in this relatively favorable scenario is less than it was a week ago. ICON
was already on a slippery slope. That slope just got steeper and icier. Ways that one thing can lead to another include
announcement of potential further restatements, outright fraud allegations, the aforementioned Wells notices,

Page 2

CRT Research | Credit Intensive and Special Situations

Iconix Brand Group Inc
December 29, 2015

Iconix Brand Group Inc (ICON, NA, PT:NA)

customer defections and, finally, lender unwillingness to refinance the 2016 maturity. We do bankruptcies as an asset
class, and while we cant say that ICON has started the backward slide down the slope into Ch 11, it has elevated the risk
of such an outcome. Bear in mind, of course, that the SEC doesnt typically try to drive companies into bankruptcy. Its
enforcement activities are not generally undertaken at the expense of a companys creditors, and any fine the SEC might
levy is arguably subject to subordination under the Bankruptcy Code in any case. Anyone interested to read more on SEC
fine magnitudes and trends should see the Wall Street Journals July 13, 2015 edition.
The impact of formal SEC investigations on stock prices has been the subject of only very modest academic attention. A
paper entitled Market Efficiency and Investor Reactions to SEC Fraud Investigations in the Journal of Forensic &
Investigative Accounting (Vol. 2, Issue 3, Special Issue, 2010) by Theodore E. Christensen, Daniel Gyung H. Paik, and
Christopher D. Williams is probably the most instructive on the topic (a couple of other student papers that get
circulated seemed less rigorous to us). Differentiating between informal and formal investigations, the authors found
that the biggest impact of SEC scrutiny is usually found at the onset of the informal investigation. In the three-day
window (day -1 to day +1) surrounding the announcement of an informal investigation, fraud firms experienced a 29%
decline. At the onset of the formal investigation, the impact is more muted, with a negative 7.6% return in the three-day
window surrounding its announcement. How has ICON stacked up? We can liken its announcement of the comment
letter process to an informal investigation, and note that between August 6 and August 10 (day -1 and day +1, spanning
a weekend) the stock dropped to $14.57 from $19.60, or 26%, relatively in line with the results of Christensen et al.
The three-day window we are now in surrounding of a formal SEC investigation is obviously not complete, but the stock
is down 24% from its Friday close of $7.45 to $5.67. We should also note that the stock had a leg down when it
announced the restatement, dropping 56% to $7.05 on November 9 from $16.14 on November 5. It had risen notably in
the interim between August 10 and November 5. Thus, from August 6 to today, the stock is down a cumulative 72%.
Christensen et al did not study the performance of stocks over an entire period like this, so it is difficult to say if ICON
has been penalized too harshly, other than to say that the markets reaction today is well above average for fraud
firms when a formal investigation is announced. The study showed little significant abnormal return in the +2 to +5 day
windows and did not go beyond that. The situation in ICON is exacerbated by a looming debt maturity and management
turnover, to be sure. But these factors may be hallmarks in other fraud firms as well, so there is some chance that
ICON stock could move toward the historical mean, i.e., outperform.
When we raise bankruptcy risk, we are not speaking idly. Christensen et al found that among the various firm
characteristics that fraud firms demonstrated were notably worse Altman-Z scores and increasing leverage ratios
(both measures of bankruptcy risk) in the years leading up to the run-in with the SEC. Unfortunately the study did not go
on to say how many members of the sample did eventually go bankrupt. The study found evidence consistent with prior
studies that fraud firms have incentives to manage earnings to attract external financing at a lower cost, but may
experience significant increases in the cost of capital when such manipulations are made. Our assessment that the new
coupon is likely to exceed 10% has some empirical basis. Another prior study cited in Christensens literature review
found that as failing firms approach bankruptcy, they are more likely to overstate earnings, and their financial
statements reflect significantly greater income-increasing accrual magnitudes than do control firms. (See Earnings
Manipulation in Failing Firms, by R.L. Rosner, in Contemporary Accounting Research, 20, (2): 361-408, 2003.) One key
potential standout factor for ICON is, of course, that it does appear to generate very significant amounts of free cash
flow (depending on the measure used), and it is very difficult to see how this can be undercut by potential fraud
allegations.
Page 3

CRT Research | Credit Intensive and Special Situations

Iconix Brand Group Inc
December 29, 2015

Iconix Brand Group Inc (ICON, NA, PT:NA)

Fraud firm, it should be noted, is just a shorthand. Some companies, including many in the study, are (were) ultimately
exonerated. So could ICON. The study we have been citing does not encompass the results of SEC investigation. Into this
void comes a 2012 student paper entitled Market Reaction to the SEC Enforcement Action, by Haicha Sha of Tilburg
University. In this paper, Sha finds that wrongly judged firms see their stock appreciate by an average of 2.8%, while
fraudulent firms whose fraud is confirmed see a positive 1% increase in the -1 day to +1 day window surrounding
conclusion of an SEC action. This may not be a reward worth waiting around for. And Shas other contribution to the
literature is to tell us just how long that wait may be. The study found that:
A significant period of time generally elapses between the markets discovery of a firms fraudulent conduct and
the completion of the SEC investigation of the case as well as the issuance of an AAER [Accounting and Auditing
Enforcement Releases] report. In the sample of Fraud Group, the average lag time is 36 months with a standard
deviation of 20 months. However, this period varies widely for each individual case from a minimum of 3 months
to a maximum of 87 months.
This further calls to mind another factor here, namely variance. We all know that duration of investigation periods can
vary widely, as can the amount of fines ultimately imposed and the degree to which a stock reacts. ICON could be quite
idiosyncratic, for all we know. If one believes the refinancing of the 2016 notes is more likely than not, then a rebound in
the stock is also more likely than not, and this view is supported by the academic literature that suggests it is oversold.
The one thing wed be mindful of is the cost of the refinancing. Weve tended to think that it may be better to think of
the free cash flow (FCF) yield on ICON stock to contain both cash flows from operations and investing in the numerator,
not just operational cash flow. If we were to take this sum as averaged over the past four years, and divide by the
current market capitalization, ICON stock would have a 12% FCF yield. But if we assume that $200 million in debt is
refinanced at, say, a 12% rate, then the yield would drop to low single digits. Maybe we are being onerous versus
managements alternative calculation of FCF, but this is something to consider. To us stock might be more interesting at
penny-stock levels (i.e., sub-$5), and in the meantime, is probably best avoided.

ICONs Other Legal Distractions

While were on the subject of legal worries, we figured we would run through a couple of more minor ones that may not
be on everyones radar.
Anthony L&S LLC v US PONY Holdings LLC. On December 15, 2015, US PONY Holdings LLC, a unit of Iconix, was sued by
its business partner Anthony L&S LLC in the Supreme Court of New York, New York County. The case was docketed as
no. 654199/2015. The poor prose of the complaint undercuts its venom, but the accusations it makes are probably
worth noting, especially because they are supported by evidence of interactions between the business partners that
may not reflect well on ICON.
Our best interpretation of the fact pattern is that Anthony L&S (AL&S) was previously the sole licensee of the PONY
trademark in North America. Iconix seems to have approached AL&S, touting its experience in brand management, in a
bid for ICON to have AL&S contribute its rights to a JV of which the parties would own 75% and 25%, respectively. Under
the terms of the deal, ICON would market PONY and AL&S would pay an upfront $4 million royalty to ICON and $20
million in the first five years. The complaint provides no dates for these actions, but we know that ICON announced the
PONY acquisition on February 3, 2015.

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CRT Research | Credit Intensive and Special Situations

Iconix Brand Group Inc
December 29, 2015

Iconix Brand Group Inc (ICON, NA, PT:NA)

The complaint alleges that ICON knew that a substantial marketing effort would be needed to revive a brand so dormant
as PONY. It further alleges that ICON would attempt to recruit Derek Jeter and Kemba Walker as endorsers of the brand.
The complaint says that ICON was initially obligated to spend $1 million in 2015 on marketing efforts, but this was
amended to $800,000 and later to some unspecified amount as ICON kept delaying its efforts. AL&S for its part says it
spent $2 million on minimum royalty payments and untold millions on product development and production.
AL&S argues that the parties agreed to a go-to-market initiative set for June 1, 2015. It developed and produced new
footwear models between March and June to gear up for this initiative. The complaint lacks specificity as to what
promises ICON made in this interim from its side. The complaint contains excerpts of numerous emails from AL&S to
Iconix asking what progress had been made on the marketing front. No specific deadlines are mentioned in the replies
from Iconixs Alexander Cole. AL&S was on the verge of meeting with footwear retailers in late May and was seeking to
have a marketing deck from ICON ready for those meetings. The facts cited by the complaint do not strongly support an
inference that ICON was misleading AL&S but rather than the parties were simply on different pages as to the
appropriate timeline for the revival of the PONY brand. AL&S nonetheless made a $1 million royalty payment on May 30.
In June 2015, communications between AL&S and ICON shifted to Neil Cole for some unknown reason. The spring
initiatives having fallen flat, AL&S was moving on to fall 2015 opportunities. Again the parties seemed to be on different
pages. A reply from some unspecified person at ICON said, It is my understanding that Iconix is funding 2016 initiatives
not 2015. In a subsequent communication in July, ICON agreed to support fall and winter 20-15 marketing activities up
to 150K. For spring 2016, ICON committed to have a plan, a campaign, and athletes, because we want the SS16 launch
to be special. AL&S requested a meeting with Cole, but, per the complaint, it alleges that Cole declined to meet until
after August 6. Assuming this allegation is accurate, it raises questions as to why the August 6 date (when Cole resigned)
was seen to be important in early July.
No evidence of specific ICON deliverable deadlines is presented in the complaint, but an October 9 communication from
AL&S to ICON reads poorly for the latter:
Two weeks have passed since our last meeting. As it stands now, we still do not have firm marketing
commitments from Iconix in place. We have been out selling since June and we have been consistently shut
down from our retailers partners, due to not having firm brand marketing commitments in place. At this point, Q
1 & Q2 are now closed and it does not look like we will be making our Open Order sales projections for first
ha[lf] of 2016. We are now in an inventory situation with our financial partner Samsung, as we have 250,000 unsold units corning in for the Spring 2016 selling seasons. Units which we had planned to sell. We were promised
time and time again that we would be receiving marketing support for our initial market sell-in, but we still have
not. We have now lost the first half of 2016 selling opportunity and our business is in distress.
No specific reply to this communication from ICON is cited in the complaint.
The complaint finally alleges that ICON caused the PONY Holdings LLC entity to make a $1.2 million distribution to ICON
and a $400, 000 distribution to AL&S, despite the allegation that ICON had not lived up to its marketing obligations.
Without ICONs response to the complaint, we dont know if there is another side to the story. But the alleged fact
pattern fits conspicuously with what is in the public domain about ICON. Interim CEO Peter Cuneo said on the 3Q15
earnings call that the Company could do a better job on its marketing support of its brands. PONY does appear to be a

Page 5

CRT Research | Credit Intensive and Special Situations

Iconix Brand Group Inc
December 29, 2015

Iconix Brand Group Inc (ICON, NA, PT:NA)

recently acquired brand that is underperforming expectations. AL&S may have a legitimate grievance. The dispute is not
likely to have a major financial impact, but casts a deeper shadow on ICONs business practices.
IP Holdings Unltd LLC v Marcraft Clothes Inc. The plaintiff here is a unit of ICON that initiated the suit on April 22, 2015
to recover unpaid guaranteed minimum royalty payments totaling $4.6 million (case no. 651344/2015, also in New York
state court). Marcraft is a manufacturer licensed by ICON to sell Mark Ecko and Cut & Sew brands. Under the
agreement, Marcraft was selling the two brands primarily to Mens Wearhouse and Burlington Stores. The agreement
envisioned the following minimums:
Exhibit 2. Mark Ecko and Cut & Sew Contract Terms ($ in 000s)
Contract Year

2011
2012
2013
2014
Source: Court documents.

Minimum Net Sales

$5,000
8,000
12,000
15,000

Actual Net Sales

$5,780
6,220
7,020
NA

Guaranteed Minimum
Royalties (8% of Min.
Net Sales)
$400
640
960
1,200

Guaranteed Minimum
Marketing Fees (3% of
Min. Net Sales)
$150
240
360
450

IP Holdings was only 51%-owned by ICON until May 2013, when it bought out the remaining 49% from companies
controlled by Seth Gerszberg. Prior to this acquisition, it had been the partners managing the licensing of the brands.
After the acquisition, wholly owned IP Holdings began promoting the Ecko brand in Dillards and JCPenney, among
others. Not long after, Mens Wearhouse acquired the Joseph Abboud brand, leading to a reduction in its orders of
similarly priced Mark Ecko product. These developments were part of what prompted Marcraft to seek a revision in
guaranteed minimums. The parties then agreed to set royalties at 8% and marketing fees at 1% of the greater of actual
net sales or $10 million from 2015 to 2018. For 2014 they agreed on a fixed $900,000 royalty payment against $10
million of sales.
The complaint alleges that Marcraft failed to make a modified payment of $225,000 for 1Q14. A notice of default was
sent on June 10, 2014 and the license agreement was terminated on June 25. The terms of the contract allegedly
provide that all future royalty and marketing payments are also due upon an event of default.
On August 26, 2015, Marcraft came back swinging with an answer and counterclaims of its own. It alleges that it was
duped by Iconix and Cole when it signed the amended agreement. It was deceived because Iconix employees
negotiating on Plaintiffs behalf at the direction of Cole purposefully concealed vital information in order to induce
Marcraft into the Letter Amendment. The information concealed, the counterclaims allege, included the looming Mark
Ecko Enterprises bankruptcy, the falling out between Cole and Gerszberg over the direction of the Ecko brand
(Gerszberg continued to license the brand after the sale of the 49% stake), Coles alleged direct attempt to bankrupt
Gerszberg, the fact that other retailers selling Ecko products were also failing to meet their guaranteed minimums, and
ICONs attempts to dilute the brand by pitching it to new direct-to-retail (DRM) accounts. In support of its counterclaims,
Marcraft cites a pattern of misbehavior allegedly evidenced by shareholder lawsuits against ICON and its need for
restatement of its financial information.
The counterclaims here admittedly sound like a Hail Mary pass into document discovery, in that the allegations dont
sound like much unless they can be backed up with documents that eventually get produced. ICONs grounds are a bit
firmer, since it can point to line and verse of the amended agreement and demonstrate both default and remedy. Still,
the fact pattern alleged by Marcraft may fit what the public knows about the apparent implosion of the Ecko brand, and

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CRT Research | Credit Intensive and Special Situations

Iconix Brand Group Inc
December 29, 2015

Iconix Brand Group Inc (ICON, NA, PT:NA)

thereby derive some credibility. In short, investors will want to know How did ICON let this happen? and the lawsuit
may provide some answers.

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CRT Research | Credit Intensive and Special Situations

Iconix Brand Group Inc
December 29, 2015

Iconix Brand Group Inc (ICON, NA, PT:NA)

REQUIRED DISCLOSURES
The recommendations and guidance expressed in this research report accurately reflect the personal recommendations and guidance of the research
analyst principally responsible for the preparation of this report
No part of the compensation received by the analyst principally responsible for the preparation of this report was, is or will be directly or indirectly
related to the specific recommendations and guidance expressed in this report. Direct or indirect analyst compensation may be based on performancerelated considerations associated with the recommendations and guidance expressed by the analyst in this report
The research analyst primarily responsible for the preparation of this report received compensation that is based upon CRT Capital Group LLCs total
business revenues, including revenues derived from CRTs investment banking business

Please Note
On April 20, 2015, CRT Capital Group LLC ("CRT") completed its acquisition of the Institutional Equity business of Sterne Agee Group, Inc. (the combined
Institutional Equity businesses, Sterne Agee CRT). As a result, research report publication previously produced separately has been merged into a single
production platform, including the Definitions of Investment Ratings, as of November 01, 2015.
Prior to November 01, 2015 the Legacy CRT Equity Analysts, listed below, assigned ratings based on the following definitions:
**Legacy CRT Platform (prior to November 01, 2015) - Investment Ratings Definitions:
Buy - Expected rate of return on investment at current prices levels is above that rate required, in CRT's view, to undertake the attendant risks perceivedpositive risk/reward investment balance.
Fair Value - Expected rate of return on investment at current prices levels is in line with that rate required, in CRT's view, to undertake the attendant risks
perceived- equitable/reward investment balance.
Sell - Expected rate of return on investment at current prices levels is below that rate required, in CRT's view, to undertake the attendant risks perceivednegative risk/reward investment balance
Legacy CRT Research Analysts:
Shagun Singh Chadha
Robert Coolbrith
Michael Derchin
David Epstein, CFA
Lee Giordano, CFA
Brett Levy
Kirk Ludtke
Kevin Starke, CFA
Amer Tiwana
Lance Vitanza, CFA
Rating and Price Target History
Regarding Research Reports authored by Legacy CRT Research Analysts ONLY:
For disclosure purposes; ratings noted within this reports Rating and Price Target History graph for dates prior to November 01, 2015, only, are reflective
of the **Legacy CRT Platform Investment Ratings Definitions, seen in these disclosures.
Rating

Meaning

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CRT Research | Credit Intensive and Special Situations

Iconix Brand Group Inc
December 29, 2015

Iconix Brand Group Inc (ICON, NA, PT:NA)

Buy (B)
Neutral (N)
Underperform (UP)

We expect this stock to outperform the industry over the next 12 months.
We expect this stock to perform in line with the industry over the next 12 months.
We expect this stock to underperform the industry over the next 12 months.

Ratings Percentages
As of December 29, 2015

Percentage of Banking Clients Within Each Rating Category

As of December 29, 2015

Buy 56.55%
6.18%
Neutral* 41.95%
4.17%
Underperform 1.50%
0.00%
*FINRA Rule 2711 (H)(5)(A)- Regardless of the rating system that a member employs, a member must disclose in each research report the
percentage of all securities rated by the member to which the member would assign a "buy,""hold/neutral," or "sell" rating. For purposes of
this Rule, Fair Value would be assigned as "hold/neutral".
Valuations are based on estimates using traditional industry methods including, inter alia, analysis of earnings multiples, discounted cash flow calculations
and net asset value assessments. Price targets should be considered in the context of all prior CRT research published in connection with the subject
issuer, which may or may not have included price targets, as well as developments relating to the company, its industry and financial markets. Risks that
may impede achievement of the stated price target, if any, include, but are not limited to, broad market and macroeconomic fluctuations and unforeseen
changes in the subject companys fundamentals or business trends.
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CRT Research | Credit Intensive and Special Situations

Iconix Brand Group Inc

December 29, 2015

Iconix Brand Group Inc (ICON, NA, PT:NA)

William Jump
Jon Schenk

Dir Equity Sales, Trading & Res

Dir of Equity Sales & Sales Trading

470.419.6651
646.205.4952

CONSUMER
Automotive Aftermarket
Ali Faghri
| afaghri@sterneageecrt.com
George Kasiaras
| gkasiaras@sterneageecrt.com

646.293.6744
646.293.6752

Broadlines & Hardlines Retail

Charles Grom, CFA
| cgrom@sterneageecrt.com
Renato Basanta, CFA
| rbasanta@sterneageecrt.com
John Parke
| jparke@sterneageecrt.com

646.293.6726
646.293.6740
646.293.6738

Consumer Packaged Goods

April Scee
| ascee@sterneageecrt.com
Mark Salama, CFA
| msalama@sterneageecrt.com
Theo Brito
| tbrito@sterneageecrt.com
Footwear & Apparel
Sam Poser
Ben Shamsian
Elizabeth Bean
Gaming & Lodging
David Bain
Sherry Yin

Leisure & Lifestyle Products

Lee J. Giordano, CFA
| lgiordano@sterneageecrt.com
Media
Lance Vitanza, CFA
Brian Denes

| lvitanza@crtllc.com
| bdenes@crtllc.com

Restaurants
Lynne Collier
Philip May

| lcollier@sterneageecrt.com
| pmay@sterneageecrt.com

Dir of Equity Research

Dir of Credit Research

646.293.6701
203.569.4361

HEALTHCARE

646.293.6760
646.293-6724
646.293-6762

| sposer@sterneageecrt.com
646.293.6748
| bshamsian@sterneageecrt.com 646.293.6747
| ebean@sterneageecrt.com
646.293.6746
| dbain@sterneageecrt.com
| syin@sterneageecrt.com

Stuart Linde
Kirk Ludtke

949.721.6651
949.721-6651
212.915.3163

Healthcare Services
Brian Wright
Ryan Amberger

| bwright@sterneageecrt.com
646.293.6737
| ramberger@sterneageecrt.com 646.293.6736

Medical Technology
Gregory P. Chodaczek
Caitlin Howard

| gchodaczek@sterneageecrt.com 484.532.5406
| choward@sterneageecrt.com
646.293.6706

Shagun Singh Chadha

Angel Krustev

| ssingh@crtllc.com
| akrustev@crtllc.com

203.569.4345
203.569.4305

INDUSTRIALS
Aerospace & Defense
Peter Arment
Josh W. Sullivan
Asher Carey
John Ayling

|
|
|
|

parment@sterneageecrt.com
jsullivan@sterneageecrt.com
acarey@sterneageecrt.com
jayling@sterneageecrt.com

646.293-6732
646.293.6730
646.293.6741
646.293.6743

Auto, Auto Parts and Auto Retailers

Michael P. Ward, CFA
| mward@sterneageecrt.com
646.293-6731
Tim Vecchione
| tvecchionei@sterneageecrt.com 646.293.6743
Automotive
Kirk Ludtke

| kludtke@crtllc.com

203.569.4361

203.569.4337
203.569.4376

Coal, Metals & Mining, Engineering & Construction

Michael S. Dudas, CFA | mdudas@sterneageecrt.com
Satyadeep Jain, CFA
| sjain@sterneageecrt.com
Patrick Uotila, CPA
| puotila@sterneageecrt.com

646.293.6749
646.293.6742
646.293.6720

469.899.3306
469.899.3307

Construction Materials & Diversified Industrials

Todd Vencil, CFA
| tvencil@sterneageecrt.com
Teresa Nguyen, CFA
| tnguyen@sterneageecrt.com

804.729.8025
804.729.8026

CREDIT/DISTRESSED & SPECIAL SITUATIONS

David Epstein, CFA
| depstein@crtllc.com
203.569.4328
Jack Chan
| jchan@crtllc.com
203.569.4351
Brett M. Levy
| blevy@crtllc.com
203.569.4336
Kevin Starke, CFA
| kstarke@crtllc.com
203.569.6421
Patrick Marshall, CFA
| pmarshall@crtllc.com
203.569.4373
Amer Tiwana
| atiwana@crtllc.com
203.569.4318

Homebuilding
Jay McCanless
Warner Watkins

Water and Flow Control

Kevin Bennett, CFA
| kbennett@sterneageecrt.com
Ed Riley
| eriley@sterneageecrt.com

804.729.8024
804.729.8027

ENERGY
Exploration & Production
Tim Rezvan, CFA
| trezvan@sterneageecrt.com
James Lizzul
| jlizzul@sterneageecrt.com

646.293.6729
646.293.6722

TECHNOLOGY
Data Networking and Storage
Alex Kurtz
| akurtz@sterneageecrt.com
Amelia Harris
| aharris@sterneageecrt.com

415.762.4881
415.762.4880

Oilfield Services & Equipment

Stephen D. Gengaro
| sgengaro@sterneageecrt.com
Ivan Suleiman
| isuleiman@sterneageecrt.com

646.293.6728
646.293.6727

Interactive Entertainment / Internet

Arvind Bhatia, CFA
| abhatia@sterneageecrt.com
Brett Strauser
| bstrauser@sterneageecrt.com

469.899.3304
469.899.3305

Internet
Robert Coolbrith

| rcoolbrith@crtllc.com

415.762.4890

IT Services
Moshe Katri

| mkatri@sterneageecrt.com

646.293.6751
646.293.6733
212.915.3172

FINANCIAL SERVICES
Banks
Peter J. Winter
Amir Jairazbhoy

| pwinter@sterneageecrt.com
646.293.6761
| ajairazbhoy@sterneageecrt.com 646.293.6725

| jmccanless@sterneageecrt.com 615.645.7325
| wwatkins@sterneageecrt.com 615.645.7327

Property / Casualty Insurance

Vinay Misquith
| vmisquith@sterneageecrt.com
Vignesh Murali
| vmurali@sterneageecrt.com

212.915.3169
646.293.6735

Mobile and Consumer Computing

Rob Cihra
| rcihra@sterneageecrt.com
Edison Yu
| xyu@sterneageecrt.com

Specialty/Real Estate Finance

Henry J. Coffey, Jr., CFA | hcoffey@sterneageecrt.com
Jason P. Weaver, CFA
| jweaver@sterneageecrt.com
Yi Fu Lee, CFA, CPA
| ylee@crtllc.com
Pedro Saboia
| psaboia@sterneageecrt.com

615.645.7322
615.645.7320
212.915.3168
203.569.4324

Semiconductors
Douglas Freedman
Kevin Chen

| dfreedman@sterneageecrt.com 415.762.4887
| kchen@sterneageecrt.com
415.762.4886

TRANSPORTATION, SERVICES & EQUIPMENT

Airlines
Michael Derchin
| mderchin@crtllc.com
203.569.4354
Adam Hackel
| ahackel@crtllc.com
203.569.4378

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