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ISSUE:
Whether or not all the materials specified in the contracts had been delivered and installed
by respondent HOOVEN in petitioner Lagon's commercial building in Tacurong, Sultan
Kudarat.
RULING:
No. Respondent HOOVEN having the burden of establishing its affirmative allegations of
complete delivery and installation of the materials, and petitioners failure to pay therefor,
had not satisfactorily proved its case. The mass of documentary evidence adduced by
respondent HOOVEN suffered from patent irregularities and material inconsistencies that
depleted the weight of the evidence. As a result of the lack of the requisite quantum of
evidence, respondent dismally failed to discharge its burden necessary to prove that all
materials specified in the contracts had been delivered and installed in Lagons commercial
building in Tacurong, Sultan Kudarat.
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The fact sought to be established by the admission of Edithas exhibits, that her
"kidneys were both in their proper anatomical locations at the time" of her
operation, need not be proved as it is covered by mandatory judicial notice.
Unquestionably, the rules of evidence are merely the means for ascertaining the
truth respecting a matter of fact. Thus, they likewise provide for some facts which
are established and need not be proved, such as those covered by judicial notice,
both mandatory and discretionary. Laws of nature involving the physical sciences,
specifically biology, include the structural make-up and composition of living things
such as human beings. In this case, we may take judicial notice that Edithas kidneys
before, and at the time of, her operation, as with most human beings, were in their
proper anatomical locations.
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ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the testimony of the witness introduced by SIHI as documentary
evidence is admissible pursuant to the hearsay rule;
2. Whether or not the promissory note adduced by SIHI as documentary evidence is
admissible pursuant to the best evidence rule;
3. Whether or not SIHI is entitled for the award of attorneys fees.
RULINGS:
1. Yes. The court correctly found that the witness of SIHI was a competent witness as
he testified to facts, which he knew of his personal knowledge.
Rule 130, Section 36 reads:
SEC. 36. Testimony generally confined to personal knowledge; hearsay excluded. A
witness can testify only to those facts which he knows of his personal knowledge;
that is, which are derived from his own perception, except as otherwise provided in
these rules.
As a rule, hearsay evidence is excluded and carries no probative value. However, the
rule does admit of an exception. Where a party failed to object to hearsay evidence,
then the same is admissible. The rationale for this exception is to be found in the
right of a litigant to cross-examine. It is settled that it is the opportunity to crossexamine which negates the claim that the matters testified to by a witness are
hearsay. However, the right to cross-examine may be waived. The repeated failure
of Petitioner SCC to cross-examine the witness despite several opportunities
provided by the trial court is an implied waiver of such right.
Thus, the requirements of Section 36, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court as to the
admissibility of his testimony were satisfied.
2. Yes. SCCs admission as to the execution of the promissory note through private
respondent Arrieta and Bermudo at pre-trial sufficed to settle the question of the
genuineness of signatures. The admission of having been made in stipulation of
facts at pre-trial by the parties must be treated as a judicial admission wherein
under Section, 41 Rule 129 of the Rules of Court, a judicial admission requires no
proof. Thus, SCCs reliance on the best evidence rule, will not advance its cause
since there is no need to present the original of the documents as there was already
a judicial admission by petitioner at pre-trial of the execution of the promissory note
and receipt of the demand letter.
3. No. It is settled that the award of attorney's fees is the exception rather than the
rule; hence it is necessary for the trial court to make findings of fact and law, which
would bring the case within the exception and justify the grant of the award.
Otherwise stated, given the failure by the trial court to explicitly state the rationale
for the award of attorney's fees, the same shall be disallowed. In the present case, a
perusal of the records shows that the trial court failed to explain the award of
attorney's fees. Wherefore, the award of attorneys fees to SIHI should be
disregarded.
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thus, does not satisfy the requirement of Section 36, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court
as to the admissibility of his testimony.
The testimony of the lone eyewitness, Magno Gomez is not credible and therefore, a
weak evidence against the appellants, Rico Calumpang and Jovenal Omatang.
Wherefore, Appellants Rico Calumpang and Jovenal Omatang are ACQUITTED on
reasonable doubt.
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ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the evidence for the prosecution proves that petitioner committed
the crime charged beyond reasonable doubt.
RULING:
1. No. For the evidence to be believed, it must not only proceed from the mouth of a
credible witness, but must be credible in itself such as the common experience of
mankind can approve as probable under the circumstances, which in the case at bar,
the testimony of Galvan consists inconsistency with human nature. The fact that the
lone eyewitness, Galvan cannot remember things in general raises a strong
presumption of error in his testimony. Thus, the ordinary evidence adduced by the
prosecution does not pass the tests in determining its probative value. Wherefore,
petitioner Ubeles is acquitted of the crime of homicide on account of reasonable
doubt.
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Under Section 45 of the aforesaid Rule, a document is a commercial list if: (1) it is a
statement of matters of interest to persons engaged in an occupation (2) such
statement is contained in a list, register, periodical or other published compilation;
(3) said compilation is published for the use of persons engaged in that occupation,
and (4) it is generally used and relied upon by persons in the same occupation.
Based on these requisites, the price quotations are not commercial lists for these do
not belong to the category of other published compilations under Section 45.
Being mere hearsay evidence, failure to present the author of the letter renders its
contents suspect. Hearsay evidence, whether objected to or not, has no probative
value. Accordingly, as stated at the outset, damages may not be awarded on the
basis of hearsay evidence.
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the former case or any part of it, is actually withdrawn from the archives by the court's
direction, at the request or with the consent of the parties, and admitted as a part of the
record of the case then pending."
The appellate court should have cast aside strict technicalities and decided the case on
the basis of such uncontested return. Verily, it had the authority to "take judicial notice
of its records and of the facts that the record establishes."
Section 2 of Rule 129 provides that courts "may take judicial notice of matters x x x
ought to be known to judges because of their judicial functions." If the lower courts
really believed that petitioner was not entitled to a tax refund, they could have easily
required respondent to ascertain its veracity and accuracy and to prove that petitioner
did not suffer any net loss in 1996.
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