MELLON BANK, N.A.

, petitioner,
vs.
HON. CELSO L. MAGSINO, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of Branch CLIX of the Regional Trial
Court at Pasig; MELCHOR JAVIER, JR., VICTORIA JAVIER; HEIRS OF HONORIO POBLADOR,
JR., namely: Elsa Alunan Poblador, Honorio Poblador III, Rafael Poblador, Manuel Poblador, Ma. Regina
Poblador, Ma. Concepcion Poblador & Ma. Dolores Poblador; F.C. HAGEDORN & CO., INC.;
DOMINGO JHOCSON, JR.; JOSE MARQUEZ; ROBERTO GARINO; ELNOR INVESTMENT CO.,
INC.; PARAMOUNT FINANCE CORPORATION; RAFAEL CABALLERO; and TRI-ARC
INVESTMENT and MANAGEMENT CO., INC. respondents.
FOC:
On May 27, 1977, Dolores Ventosa requested the transfer of $1,000 from the First National Bank of
Moundsville, West Virginia, U.S.A. to Victoria Javier in Manila through the Prudential Bank.
Accordingly, the First National Bank requested the petitioner, Mellon Bank, to effect the transfer.
Unfortunately the wire sent by Mellon Bank to Manufacturers Hanover Bank, a correspondent of
Prudential Bank, indicated the amount transferred as "US$1,000,000.00" instead of US$1,000.00. Hence
Manufacturers Hanover Bank transferred one million dollars less bank charges of $6.30 to the Prudential
Bank for the account of Victoria Javier.
On June 3, 1977, Javier opened a new dollar account (No. 343) in the Prudential Bank and deposited
$999,943.70. Immediately their, Victoria Javier and her husband, Melchor Javier, Jr., made withdrawals
from the account, deposited them in several banks only to withdraw them later in an apparent plan to
conceal, "launder" and dissipate the erroneously sent amount.
ISSUE:
Whether or not an account deposit which is relevant and material to the resolution of the case may be
covered under R.A. No. 1405.
HELD:
Yes. Section 2 of said law allows the disclosure of bank deposits in cases where the money deposited is
the subject matter of the litigation. 24 Inasmuch as Civil Case No. 26899 is aimed at recovering the
amount converted by the Javiers for their own benefit, necessarily, an inquiry into the whereabouts of the
illegally acquired amount extends to whatever is concealed by being held or recorded in the name of
persons other than the one responsible for the illegal acquisition.

LOURDES T. MARQUEZ, in her capacity as Branch Manager, UNION BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES,
petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE ANIANO A. DESIERTO, in his capacity as OMBUDSMAN, ANGEL C. MAYORALGO, JR., MARY
ANN CORPUZ-MANALAC AND JOSE T. DE JESUS, JR., in their capacity as Chairman and Members
of the
Panel, respectively, respondents.

FOC:
Respondent Ombudsman Desierto ordered petitioner Marquez to produce several bank documents
for purposes of inspection in camera relative to various accounts maintained at Union Bank of the
Philippines, Julia Vargas Branch, where petitioner is the branch manager.
The order is based on a pending investigation at the Office of the Ombudsman against Amado Lagdameo,
et. al. for violation of R.A. No. 3019, Sec. 3 (e) and (g) relative to the Joint Venture Agreement between
the Public Estates Authority and AMARI.
On August 21, 1998, petitioner received a copy of the motion to cite her for contempt, filed with the
Office of the
Ombudsman by Agapito B. Rosales, Director, Fact Finding and Intelligence Bureau (FFIB). On August
31, 1998, petitioner filed with the Ombudsman an opposition to the motion to cite her in contempt on the
ground that the filing thereof was premature due to the petition pending in the lower court. Petitioner
likewise
reiterated that she had no intention to disobey the orders of the Ombudsman. However, she wanted to be
clarified as to how she would comply with the orders without her breaking any law, particularly RA. No.
1405.18
ISSUE:
Whether petitioner may be cited for indirect contempt for her failure to produce the documents
requested by the Ombudsman. And whether the order of the Ombudsman to have an in camera inspection
of the questioned account is allowed as an exception to the law on secrecy of bank deposits (R.A.
No.1405).
HELD:
We rule that before an in camera inspection may be allowed, there must be a pending case before
a court of competent jurisdiction. Further, the account must be clearly identified, the inspection limited to
the subject matter of the pending case before the court of competent jurisdiction. The bank personnel and
the account holder must be notified to be present during the inspection, and such inspection may cover
only the account identified in the pending case.
In the case at bar, there is yet no pending litigation before any court of competent authority. What
is existing is an investigation by the Office of the Ombudsman. In short, what the office of the
ombudsman would wish to do is to fish for additional evidence to formally charge Amado Lagdameo, et.
al., with the Sandiganbayan. Clearly, there was no pending case in court which would warrant the opening
of the bank account for inspection.
G.R. Nos. 157294-95 November 30, 2006
JOSEPH VICTOR G. EJERCITO, Petitioner,
vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN (Special Division) and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
The Ombudsman has the power to issue subpoena duces tecum/ad testificandum in relation to cases
pending before it.

FACTS: The Office of the Ombudsman requested the Sandiganbayan to issue subpoena duces tecum
against the Urban Bank relative to the case against President Joseph Estrada.
Ms. Dela Paz, receiver of the Urban Bank, furnished the Office of the Ombudsman certified copies of
manager checks detailed in the subpoena duces tecum. The Sandiganbayan granted the same.
However, Ejercito claims that the subpoenas issued by the Sandiganbayan are invalid and may not be
enforced because the information found therein, given their extremely detailed in character and could
only have been obtained by the Special Prosecution Panel through an illegal disclosure by the bank
officials. Ejercito thus contended that, following the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine, the subpoenas
must be quashed. Moreover, the extremely-detailed information obtained by the Ombudsman from the
bank officials concerned during a previous investigation of the charges against him, such inquiry into his
bank accounts would itself be illegal.
ISSUE: Whether or not subpoena duces tecum/ad testificandum may be issued to order the production of
statement of bank accounts even before a case for plunder is filed in court
HELD: The Supreme Court held that plunder is analogous to bribery, and therefore, the exception to R.A.
1405 must also apply to cases of plunder. The court also reiterated the ruling in Marquez v. Desierto that
before an in camera inspection may be allowed there must be a pending case before a court of competent
jurisdiction. Further, the account must be clearly identified, the inspection limited to the subject matter of
pending case before the court of competent jurisdiction.
As no plunder case against then President Estrada had yet been filed before a court of competent
jurisdiction at the time the Ombudsman conducted an investigation, he concludes that the information
about his bank accounts were acquired illegally, hence, it may not be lawfully used to facilitate a
subsequent inquiry into the same bank accounts. Thus, his attempt to make the exclusionary rule
applicable to the instant case fails.
The high Court, however, rejected the arguments of the petitioner Ejercito that the bank accounts which
where demanded from certain banks even before the case was filed before the proper court is inadmissible
in evidence being fruits of poisonous tree. This is because the Ombudsman issued the subpoenas bearing
on the bank accounts of Ejercito about four months before Marquez was promulgated on June 27, 2001.
While judicial interpretations of statutes, such as that made in Marquez with respect to R.A. No. 6770 or
the Ombudsman Act of 1989, are deemed part of the statute as of the date it was originally passed, the
rule is not absolute. Thus, the Court referred to the teaching of Columbia Pictures Inc., v. Court of
Appeals, that: It is consequently clear that a judicial interpretation becomes a part of the law as of the date
that law was originally passed, subject only to the qualification that when a doctrine of this Court is
overruled and a different view is adopted, and more so when there is a reversal thereof, the new doctrine
should be applied prospectively and should not apply to parties who relied on the old doctrine and acted
in good faith.
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK and EDUARDO Z. ROMUALDEZ, in his capacity as President of the
Philippine
National Bank, plaintiffs-appellants,
vs.
EMILIO A. GANCAYCO and FLORENTINO FLOR, Special Prosecutors of the Dept. of Justice,
defendantsappellees.

FACTS:
Defendants Emilio Gancayco and Florentino Flor, as special prosecutors of the Department of Justice,
required the plaintiff Philippine National Bank to produce at a hearing the records of the bank deposits of
Ernesto Jimenez, former administrator of the Agricultural Credit and Cooperative Administration, who
was then under investigation for unexplained wealth. In declining to reveal its records, the plaintiff bank
invoked Section 2 of Republic Act No. 1405.
On the other hand, the defendants cited Section 8 of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (Republic
Act No. 3019) in support of their claim of authority,which allegedly provides an additional ground for the
examination of bank deposits.
ISSUE:
Whether Section 8 of Republic Act No. 3019 provides an additional ground for the examination of bank
deposits.
HELD:
Yes. The truth is that these laws are so repugnant to each other than no reconciliation is possible. x x x.
The only conclusion possible is that section 8 of the Anti-Graft Law is intended to amend section 2 of
Republic Act No. 1405 by providing additional exception to the rule against the disclosure of bank
deposits.
x x x [W]hile section 2 of Republic Act 1405 declares bank deposits to be "absolutely confidential," it
nevertheless allows such disclosure in the following instances:
(1) Upon written permission of the depositor;
(2) In cases of impeachment;
(3) Upon order of a competent court in cases of bribery or dereliction of duty of public officials;
(4) In cases where the money deposited is the subject matter of the litigation. Cases of unexplained wealth
are similar to cases of bribery or dereliction of duty x x x.
The court said that, by enacting section 8 of, the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Congress
clearly intended to provide an additional ground for the examination of bank deposits. Without such
provision, the court added prosecutors would be hampered if not altogether frustrated in the prosecution
of those charged with having acquired unexplained wealth while in public office.
Cases of unexplained wealth are similar to cases of bribery or dereliction of duty and no reason is
seen why these two classes of cases cannot be excempted from the rule making bank deposits
confidential.
CHINA BANKING CORPORATION and TAN KIM LIONG, petitioners-appellants,
vs.
HON. WENCESLAO ORTEGA, as Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch
VIII, and
VICENTE G. ACABAN, respondents-appellees.
FACTS:
On December 17, 1968 Vicente Acaban filed a complaint in the court a quo against Bautista
Logging Co., Inc., B & B Forest Development Corporation and Marino Bautista for the collection of a
sum of money. Upon motion of the plaintiff the trial court declared the defendants in default for failure to
answer within the reglementary period, and authorized the Branch Clerk of Court and/or Deputy Clerk to

receive the plaintiff's evidence. On January 20, 1970 judgment by default was rendered against the
defendants. To satisfy the judgment, the plaintiff sought the garnishment of the bank deposit of the
defendant B & B Forest Development Corporation with the China Banking Corporation. Accordingly, a
notice of garnishment was issued by the Deputy Sheriff of the trial court and served on said bank through
its cashier, Tan Kim Liong. In reply, the bank'
cashier invited the attention of the Deputy Sheriff to the provisions of Republic Act No. 1405 which, it
was alleged, prohibit the disclosure of any information relative to bank deposits. Thereupon the plaintiff
filed a motion to cite Tan Kim Liong for contempt of court.
The petitioners argue that the disclosure of the information required by the court does not fall
within any of the four (4) exceptions enumerated in Section 2, and that if the questioned orders are
complied with Tan Kim Liong may be criminally liable under Section 5 and the bank exposed to a
possible damage suit by B & B Forest Development Corporation. Specifically
ISSUE:
Whether or not a banking institution may validly refuse to comply with a court process garnishing
the bank deposit of a judgment debtor, by invoking the provisions of Republic Act No. 1405.
HELD:
The lower court did not order an examination of or inquiry into the deposit of B & B Forest
Development Corporation, as contemplated in the law. It merely required Tan Kim Liong to inform the
court whether or not the defendant B & B Forest Development Corporation had a deposit in the China
Banking
Corporation only for purposes of the garnishment issued by it, so that the bank would hold the same intact
and not allow any withdrawal until further order. It will be noted from the discussion of the conference
committee report on Senate Bill No. 351 and House Bill No. 3977, which later became Republic Act
1405, that it was not the intention of the lawmakers to place bank deposits beyond the reach of execution
to satisfy a final judgment.
Republic Act 1405 does not preclude its being garnished to insure satisfaction of a judgment.
HILARIO P. SORIANO,
Petitioner,
- versus HON. MERCEDITA N.
GUTIERREZ, Undersecretary of
Justice, and MELINDA S.
MANUZON,
Respondents.
FACTS:
On September 29, 2000, Mrs. Melinda S. Manuzon, the former Head of the Treasury Department of
RBSM, executed an affidavit where she disclosed that on December 1997, herein complainant Hilario P.
Soriano opened the following accounts with the San Miguel Branch of RBSM bank:
a) Savings Account No. 0104-08338-7
Signatories Mr. Hilario Soriano and
Mr. Marces Perez
b) Savings Account No. 0104-08339-5

Signatories Mr. Hilario Soriano and

Mrs. Melinda Manuzon
Mrs. Manuzon later on submitted the said affidavit with the Department of Justice, City of Manila. Thus,
on August 13, 2001, Mr. Soriano filed a criminal
complaint against Mrs. Manuzon for Violation of R.A. 1405, otherwise known as the Secrecy of Bank
Deposits Law. In her Counter-Affidavit, Mrs. Manuzon alleged that the prohibitions under R.A. 1405 do
not apply to a bank under
receivership like in the case of RBSM.
Held:
It must be noted that the RBSM (Rural Bank of San Miguel) was placed under receivership on
January 21, 2000, and it has been then under liquidation. Private respondent executed the affidavit on
September 29, 2000 long after RBSM was closed by BSP. Under Section 30 of R.A. 7653, otherwise
known as the New Central Bank Act, when a bank is placed under receivership or liquidation, it
presupposes that the BSP Monetary Board (MB) had already forbidden the bank from doing business in
the Philippines and, the MB had designated the Philippine Deposit Insurance Corporation (PDIC) as the
bank's statutory receiver.
Thus, logically, having forbidden to do business, RBSM could no longer perform the functions of
a banking institution, and the only reason for its existence is to wind up its corporate affairs, gather its
assets and settle its obligations. Thus, the disclosure by private respondent of the bank account is not a
prohibited act under R.A. 1405 inasmuch as RBSM is not anymore a banking institution within the
spirit and letter of the law.