Countering Violent Extremism:

Community Perspectives and Concerns

Countering violent extremism (CVE) is a counterterrorism approach focusing on civilian ideology and
psychology (including supposed risk factors for what is deemed extremism) as ostensible causes of
terrorism. CVE campaigns tend to de-emphasize, or actively discourage discussion of, the role of statesanctioned violence, human rights violations and impunity in contributing to conflicts. In promoting the
concept of violent extremism (rather than violence or political violence), CVE encourages conflation
of certain viewpoints with violence and advances the notion that certain lawful (non-criminal) speech or
behavior should be treated as pre-criminal.
CVE campaigns may employ a range of tactics. One involves engagement of non-law enforcement
entities1 in monitoring activities and speech protected, in the United States, by the First Amendment
(and universally by international human rights obligations) and deploying interventions against those
deemed potentially extremist. Another tactic involves counter-messaging of certain political or
religious views, especially via online media.
The following are some selected concerns of communities targeted by CVE, compiled by the Muslim
Justice League, a Boston2-based organization pursuing education, community organizing and advocacy
for human and civil rights that are violated or threatened under national security pretexts.
Fundamental premises of CVE have been empirically discredited. At the same time, they may be
used to justify political repression.
CVE approaches assume that terrorism results from radicalization/extremism and that there are
identifiable signs (distinct from leaking an actual plan) of vulnerability to engaging in terrorism. CVE
proponents often claim that possible progression to extremism may be evidenced by expression of
political grievances or moral outrage, reading or viewing certain violent materials, or following

These actors may include teachers, health and social service providers and Muslim religious leaders, nonprofit organizations and others.
2

Since 2014, Boston has been the site of a federal CVE pilot program, along with Los Angeles and Minneapolis.
Federally-driven CVE programs have subsequently expanded to additional cities through the Strong Cities Network, which includes Atlanta, Denver, Minneapolis and New York City.

certain conservative Islamic interpretations. However, such actions are not only constitutionally
protected but common among many who oppose terrorism.3
Studies purporting to identify factors leading to extremism, radicalization or predisposition to
commit political violence have not used sound empirical methods. A report by the Brennan Center for
Justice notes: [d]espite the impetus to find a terrorist profile or hallmarks of radicalization to hone in on
incipient terrorists, empirical research has emphatically and repeatedly concluded that there is no such
profile and no such easily identifiable hallmarks.4
CVE programs wrongly suggest common youth behaviors may be pre-criminal indicators.
Questioning authority, experimenting with new identities, forming independent political views
(including views deemed extreme by others), and showing solidarity with oppressed communities are
common youth behaviors and should not be pathologized. Yet, CVE approaches often treat such
behaviors as signs of vulnerability to extremism.5 Because such behaviors are so prevalent, it is
unlikely every youth who exhibits them would be labeled a potential extremist. Rather, these criteria
are more likely to be applied selectively against youth already viewed with suspicion, including Muslim
youth. All youth including Muslim youth deserve to pursue their imperfect transitions to
adulthood without becoming targets of interventions to reprogram their views. Political expression and

For example, though complaints about Western foreign policy are often cited as indicating potential vulnerability to violent extremism, researchers with the think tank DEMOS found foreign policy is a major and consistent grievance among Muslims, and disapproval is nearly unanimous. Jamie Bartlett, Jonathan Birdwell and
Michael King, DEMOS, The Edge of Violence: A Radical Approach to Extremism (2010) at 25 (hereinafter
The Edge of Violence), available at: www .demos.co.uk/files/Edge_of_Violence_-_full_-_web.pdf?
1291806916.
4

Faiza Patel, Brennan Center for Justice, Rethinking Radicalization (2011) at 8, available at: http://brennan.
3cdn.net/f737600b433d98d25e_6pm6beukt.pdf. See also The Edge of Violence, supra note 1. See also Arun
Kundani, A Decade Lost: Rethinking Radicalization and Extremism (2015), Available at http://www.claystone.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2015/01/Claystone-rethinking-radicalisation.pdf.
5

See, e.g., Remarks by Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism Lisa O. Monaco,
Countering Violent Extremism and the Power of Community (April 15, 2014), available at: https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/04/16/remarks-assistant-president-homeland-security-and-counterterrorism-lisa-.
(What kinds of behaviors are we talking about? For the most part, theyre not related directly to plotting attacks.
Theyre more subtle. For instance, parents might see sudden personality changes in their children at homebecoming confrontational. Religious leaders might notice unexpected clashes over ideological differences. Teachers might hear a student expressing an interest in traveling to a conflict zone overseas. Or friends might notice a
new interest in watching or sharing violent material.)

mobilization are formative activities for many young people; unwarranted surveillance and unjust
scrutiny can stifle leadership development and future activism.6
Federal law enforcement agencies outsource CVE activities to non-government actors, threatening
to obstruct First Amendment protections and evade accountability for CVEs impacts.
CVE is not a community-driven initiative, in spite of federal government messaging to the contrary. The
limited community interest in CVE that has arisen has generally been in response to announced funding
or networking opportunities, potential for perceived legitimization through alliances with government
authorities, and the hope of decreased demonization in the public sphere. Recognizing that the First
Amendment prohibits government promotion of religious interpretations or surveillance and policing on
the basis of First Amendment-protected activity,7 the agencies driving CVE campaigns in the United
States may seek to outsource ideological monitoring and deprogramming (interventions) to
non-government partners. Such outsourcing does not allay concerns about the chilling and policing of
First Amendment protected activity, but it may pose an obstacle to government transparency regarding
CVE program operation and accountability8 for CVEs results.

See e.g. MACLC, CLEAR and AALDEF, Mapping Muslims: NYPD Spying and Its Impact on American Muslims (2014), available at: www.law.cuny.edu/academics/clinics/immigration/clear/Mapping-Muslims.pdf.
7

See Executive Office of the President of the United States, Strategic Implementation Plan for Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism in the United States (2011) at 18, available at: http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/sip- final.pdf. (Countering the ideologies and narratives that legitimize violence is central
to our effort, but it is also the most challenging area of work, requiring careful consideration of a number of legal
issues, especially those related to the First Amendment. In many instances, it will be more effective to empower
communities to develop credible alternatives that challenge violent extremist narratives rather than having the
Federal Government attempt to do so.)
8

For example, in a meeting hosted by the US Attorneys Office for the District of Massachusetts (USAOMA) at
Suffolk Law School on November 10, 2015 titled Resilience to Violent Extremism: Effective Intervention Approaches, to which school counselors, mental health clinicians, law enforcement representatives and others were
invited, participants received a presentation about British and European CVE intervention approaches from
CVE proponents. When asked by civil rights advocates in attendance how the USAOMA reconciled constitutional
protections for speech and religious practice with some of the intervention approaches being advocated,
representatives of the USAOMA disclaimed responsibility for the impacts of the promoted methods by stating that
they were not providing solutions but simply a menu of options.

CVE programs may be used as vehicles for government promotion of an official Islam.9
Through funding or other means, government agencies may use CVE campaigns to encourage certain
Islamic interpretations, specifically those it deems moderate, and discourage others out of a misguided
belief that some religious interpretations predispose individuals to be vulnerable to extremism. CVE
initiatives may cause some Muslims to feel pressure to hide their religious beliefs, modify religious
practices, or avoid communal worship to avoid suspicions that they are prone to violence. Government
favoring of its preferred brand of Islam (or any religion), even indirectly through community partners,
would violate one of our most cherished constitutional liberties -- the right to be free from state-sanctioned religion. Even aside from First Amendment concerns, government promotion of any brand of
Islam undermines Muslims religious self-determination, and threatens to discredit various schools of
Islamic religious practice either because they are perceived as shaped by government influence or
because they are labeled extreme.
CVE has proven counterproductive in the UK.
The UKs Preventing Violent Extremism (or Prevent) program, operating for approximately a
decade, has stigmatized and marginalized communities and harmed British democracy. Prevents
impacts have included a significant focus on gathering intelligence on Muslim communities, the policing
of radical dissent and diminished youth confidence in democracy.10 UK Muslims have noted that,
though ostensibly neutral with regards to religion, Prevent polices British citizens behavior by two
different standards: one for Muslims and one for everyone else.11

See Policing Terrorists In the Community," 5 Harvard Nat'l Sec. J. 147 at 191 (2014) (herinafter Policing Terrorists), available at: http://harvardnsj.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/01/Aziz-Final.pdf, and Samuel J. Rascoff,
Establishing Official Islam? The Law and Strategy of Counter-Radicalization, 64 Stan. L. Rev. 125 (2012),
available at http://www.stanfordlawreview.org/print/article/establishing- official-islam.
ee also Jahangir Mohammed and Dr Adnan Siddiqui, CAGE, The Prevent Strategy: A Cradle to Grave Police
State (2014) (herinafter The Prevent Strategy), available at: http://cageuk.org/report.pdf.
11

See, e.g., The Prevent Strategy, supra note 8, at 8, 28.

CVE endangers confidential access to health care and other social services.
Among the announced CVE goals of the U.S. Attorneys Office for the District of Massachusetts
(USAOMA) are [assessment of] existing methods of communications among law enforcement (local,
state and federal), mental health and social service agencies so that methods can be enhanced12
raising serious questions about potential confidentiality violations in the mental health and social
services sectors.13 In the UK, Prevent was extended to the health sector, harming doctor-patient
confidentiality and increasing stigma toward mental health patients.14
Even in the absence of unethical information sharing, encouraging social services providers to monitor
patients or clients for vague (and discredited) signs of vulnerability to extremism may give false
license to profile and discriminate. That is because, in order to avoid labeling the virtual entirety of a
patient or client population potential extremists, overly broad vulnerability factors invite narrowing
through some additional criteria such as implicit bias. Increased discrimination and stigma against
suspect communities in social services provision is likely to chill those communities use of needed
services. Health, counseling and other social services should be available to all residents on a basis that
ensures confidentiality as well as respect for human dignity and the uniqueness of individuals.

12

U.S. Attorneys Office. District of Massachusetts, A Framework for Prevention and Intervention Strategies Incorporating Violent Extremism Into Violence Prevention (February 2015) at 15. Available at: http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/usao-ma/pages/attachments/2015/02/18/framework.pdf
13

The potential for information about mentally ill or otherwise struggling patients with law enforcement agencies,
in the absence of a serious threat of violence communicated to the provider that would permit breach of confidentiality, would be troubling regardless of the identity of the patient. For Muslim communities, who have witnessed
a pattern of prosecutions for terrorism-related charges against defendants who in many cases were mentally ill or
otherwise susceptible to intensive pressure by paid FBI informants, the prospect of information sharing between
mental health providers and law enforcement may bring additional warranted fears.
14

See The Prevent Strategyat 16 - 19. The Channel program, launched in 2007 to identify early on those considered vulnerable or, at risk of being drawn towards extremism or violence, . . . provides collaboration between the Police and other agencies such as schools and youth workers in identifying and referring individuals
and carrying out de-radicalising interventions. The Prevent Strategy at 12.

CVE harms learning environments.

Already, Muslim students report alarmingly high rates of bullying and discrimination in school,15 from
students as well as from teachers and administrators. The unjust treatment to which Ahmed Mohamed,16
a student in Irving Texas who brought a homemade clock to school, was subjected by his school and law
enforcement exemplifies the harms that occur when Muslim students are believed to warrant heightened
suspicion. Similarly troubling treatment of Muslim students has resulted from the U.K.s Prevent
program,17 and such occurrences are likely to increase in the United States as CVE programs are
deployed in schools.
CVE is coercive towards, and exploitative of, marginalized communities.
Federal agencies promoting CVE campaigns have sought to provide or locate funding to encourage
mosques and community-based organizations, schools, and health and social services providers to
implement CVE programs.18 As noted, some Muslim institutions may hope CVE funding could help
financially sustain their organizations or protect their organizations from labeling (by government
agencies or the press) as extremist. However, it is unjust and exploitative to encourage marginalized
15

See, e.g., San Fransisco Chronicle, Study finds majority of Muslims have faced bullying at school (October
30, 2015), Available at: http://www.sfchronicle.com/education/article/With-education-and-humor-taking-aim-atbullying-6601785.php.
16

See, e.g., Washington Post, Clock Kid Ahmed Mohamed and his family will move to Qatar, (October 20,
2015), Available at: https://www.washingtonpost.com/lifestyle/style/clock-kid-ahmed-mohamed-and-his-familywill-move-to-qatar/2015/10/20/a95ed296-7762-11e5-b9c1-f03c48c96ac2_story.html
17

See, e.g.,The Guardian, Student accused of being a terrorist for reading book on terrorism, (September 24,
2015), Available at: http://www.theguardian.com/education/2015/sep/24/student-accused-being-terrorist-readingbook-terrorism; The Guardian, School questioned Muslim pupil about Isis after discussion on ecoactivism, (September 22, 2015), Available at: http://www.theguardian.com/education/2015/sep/22/school-questioned-muslim-pupil-about-isis-after-discussion-on-eco-activism. See also, Association of Chief Police Officers,
Freedom of Information Request Reference Number: 000117/13 (January 2014), Available at: http://goo.gl/
a1okt3 (reporting, for example, between April 2007 and 2013, 547 referrals of youth were made by the education
sector to the UKs Channel program (a component of Prevent).)
18

For example, the US Attorneys Office for the District of Massachusetts (USAOMA) has entered into an agreement with the Massachusetts Executive Office of Health and Human Services (EOHHS) under which the two
agencies will cooperate in the distribution and management of funding for activities supporting the [Massachusetts CVE] Framework. Cooperative Agreement between the United States Attorneys Office for the District
of Massachusetts AND Massachusetts Executive Office of Health and Human Services for implementation of
strategies to enhance resilience to violence extremism (September 2015). On file with the Muslim Justice
League (contact serwin@muslimjusticeleague.org).

communities to barter privacy, rights and dignity in the hopes of financial sustainability or avoidance of
false and hateful publicity.
Growing anti-Muslim public sentiment and rhetoric are in part the results of systemic discrimination
against Muslims and the promotion of war on terror justifications for discrimination. Rather than
place onus on Muslim communities to solve a problem for which they do not actually bear
disproportionate responsibility (political violence), federal agencies including the Departments of Justice
and of Homeland Security should end policies and practices which, in casting heightened suspicion on
Muslims, falsely validate anti-Muslim sentiment.
Investment in social services should be made for all communities, including Muslim communities, for
the sake of all residents health and well-being. Such investments should not flow from law enforcement
agencies, nor should they ever be tied to counterterrorism tactics or objectives. Tying basic community
development needs to counterterrorism is predatory in that it coerces Muslims to accede to their suspect
community status.
CVE programs divide Muslim communities and undermine self-advocacy.
Pressure on Muslim community leaders to watch for warning signs (again, repeatedly discredited) of
vulnerability to extremism is likely damage their legitimacy and further alienate Muslims from
communal spaces. CVE has already proven highly polarizing within Muslim communities in the U.S.
cities in which it is being piloted. CVE has exacerbated false good Muslim/bad Muslim dynamics, in
which Muslims who cooperate with government agencies in an effort to demonstrate loyalty are viewed
as good Muslims, while those vocally resisting discriminatory or harmful programs are viewed as
bad Muslims. Within Muslim communities, those treated as good Muslims may be seen as
undermining the rights of the community, while those government agencies view as bad Muslims may
be seen as endangering Muslims reputation or as potential extremists.19 This dynamic undermines the
community resilience (in the true sense of that term) that is needed for effective, genuinely communitydriven organizing and advocacy.

19

For example, as reported in The Edge of Violence, one community member in the UK stated that, those who
take the money are seen as complicit with the government agenda and are sell-outs. Those who dont are seen as
borderline extremists. Supra note 2 at 63. See also Policing Terrorists, supra, note 4, Spooked, supra note

CVE drives dissent underground, chilling calls for state accountability and obstructing just peace.
A basic assumption underlying CVE that radicalization is the cause of political violence
obfuscates the role of state-sponsored violence in perpetuating conflict. Additionally, subjective labels
such as violent extremist invite arbitrary application. CVE thus chills criticism of state actions by (1)
encouraging scrutiny of civilians mindsets while treating state violence as only peripherally relevant, if
at all, to the problem of political violence and (2) threatening to subject political dissidents to ideological
interventions or other abusive treatment, by casting certain dissent20 especially that of suspect
communities as a sign of potential extremism.
CVE is likely to be used to suppress speech states view as threatening to their power in particular
certain advocacy through social media due to its role in democratizing information and aiding movement
organizing (as in the Arab Spring, and in current Black liberation and police accountability movements).
Extremism labels have already been used to seek to justify human rights abuses against activists.21
CVE therefore operates to silence dissent and dampen public awareness of state actions and responsibilities. Free and open public debate including strong criticism of state actions are essential
prerequisites to just and peaceful conflict resolution.
For more information, please contact Shannon Erwin, executive director of the Muslim Justice League:
serwin@muslimjusticeleague.org

20

For example, a National Counterterrorism Center CVE Guide for CVE Practitioners lists experience of discrimination, perceived sense of being treated unjustly and low or absent trust in institutions and law enforcement as risk factors. National Counterterrorism Center for CVE Practitioners, May 2014. Available at https://
www.documentcloud.org/documents/1657824-cve-guide.html. In the UK, Prevent guidance instructs: The
following are examples of grievances which may play an important part in the early indoctrination of vulnerable
individuals into the acceptance of a radical view and extremist ideology: [a] misconception and/or rejection of UK
foreign policy[, a] distrust of western media reporting[, or p]erceptions that UK government policy is discriminatory (e.g. counter-terrorist legislation). See The Prevent Strategy, supra note at 18.
21

For example, such labels were used against certain democracy activists among those executed by Saudi Arabia
January 2, 2016, including religious leader Sheikh Nimr al-Nimr who advocated for non-violent resistance to the
Saudi regime. See, e.g., The Guardian, Saudi executions put ball of regional conflict in Irans court, January 2,
2016, available at: http://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/jan/02/saudi-mass-execution-iran-syria-yemen-impact-sheikh-nimr; The Guardian, Execution of Shia cleric sparks international outrage - as it happened, January
2, 2016, available at: http://www.theguardian.com/world/live/2016/jan/02/middle-east-condemns-saudi-executionof-shia-cleric-live#block-5687eeb7e4b096b9dad43fd5 (Bahrain, where protesters clashed with police also
backed Riyadh in all deterrent and needed measures it takes to confront violence and extremism.).