Republic Act No.

8294 June 6, 1997

AN ACT AMENDING THE PROVISIONS OF PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 1866, AS

AMENDED, ENTITLED "CODIFYING THE LAWS ON ILLEGAL/UNLAWFUL POSSESSION,
MANUFACTURE, DEALING IN, ACQUISITION OR DISPOSITION OF FIREARMS,
AMMUNITION OR EXPLOSIVES OR INSTRUMENTS USED IN THE MANUFACTURE OF
FIREARMS, AMMUNITION OR EXPLOSIVES, AND IMPOSING STIFFER PENALTIES FOR
CERTAIN VIOLATIONS THEREOF, AND FOR RELEVANT PURPOSES."

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in Congress

assembled::

Section 1. Sec. 1 Presidential Decree No. 1866, as amended, is hereby further amended to
read as follows:

"Sec. 1. Unlawful manufacture, sale, acquisition, disposition or possession of firearms or

ammunition or instruments used or intended to be used in the manufacture of firearms or
ammunition. – The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period and a fine of not
less than Fifteen thousand pesos (P15,000) shall be imposed upon any person who
shall unlawfully manufacture, deal in, acquire, dispose, or possess any low powered
firearm, such as rimfire handgun, .380 or .32 and other firearm of similar firepower, part
of firearm, ammunition, or machinery, tool or instrument used or intended to be used in
the manufacture of any firearm or ammunition: Provided, That no other crime was
committed.

"The penalty of prision mayor in its minimum period and a fine of Thirty thousand pesos
(P30,000) shall be imposed if the firearm is classified as high powered firearm which
includes those with bores bigger in diameter than .38 caliber and 9 millimeter such as
caliber .40, .41, .44, .45 and also lesser calibered firearms but considered powerful such
as caliber .357 and caliber .22 center-fire magnum and other firearms with firing
capability of full automatic and by burst of two or three: Provided, however, That no other
crime was committed by the person arrested.

"If homicide or murder is committed with the use of an unlicensed firearm, such use of
an unlicensed firearm shall be considered as an aggravating circumstance.

"If the violation of this Sec. is in furtherance of or incident to, or in connection with the
crime of rebellion or insurrection, sedition, or attempted coup d'etat, such violation shall
be absorbed as an element of the crime of rebellion, or insurrection, sedition, or
attempted coup d'etat.

"The same penalty shall be imposed upon the owner, president, manager, director or
other responsible officer of any public or private firm, company, corporation or entity, who
shall willfully or knowingly allow any of the firearms owned by such firm, company,
corporation or entity to be used by any person or persons found guilty of violating the
provisions of the preceding paragraphs or willfully or knowingly allow any of them to use
unlicensed firearms or firearms without any legal authority to be carried outside of their
residence in the course of their employment.
 "The penalty of arresto mayor shall be imposed upon any person who shall carry any
licensed firearm outside his residence without legal authority therefor."

Section 2. Sec. 3 of Presidential Decree No. 1866, as amended, is hereby further amended to
read as follows:

"Sec. 3. Unlawful manufacture, sale, acquisition, disposition or possession of explosives.

– The penalty of prision mayor in its maximum period to reclusion temporal and a fine of
not less than Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000) shall be imposed upon any person who
shall unlawfully manufacture, assemble, deal in, acquire, dispose or possess hand
grenade(s), rifle grenade(s), and other explosives, including but not limited to 'pillbox,'
'molotov cocktail bombs,' 'fire bombs,' or other incendiary devices capable of producing
destructive effect on contiguous objects or causing injury or death to any person.

"When a person commits any of the crimes defined in the Revised Penal Code or special
laws with the use of the aforementioned explosives, detonation agents or incendiary
devices, which results in the death of any person or persons, the use of such explosives,
detonation agents or incendiary devices shall be considered as an aggravating
circumstance.

"If the violation of this Sec. is in furtherance of, or incident to, or in connection with the
crime of rebellion, insurrection, sedition or attempted coup d'etat, such violation shall be
absorbed as an element of the crimes of rebellion, insurrection, sedition or attempted
coup d'etat.

"The same penalty shall be imposed upon the owner, president, manager, director or
other responsible officer of any public or private firm, company, corporation or entity, who
shall willfully or knowingly allow any of the explosives owned by such firm, company,
corporation or entity, to be used by any person or persons found guilty of violating the
provisions of the preceding paragraphs."

Section 3. Sec. 5 of Presidential Decree No. 1866, as amended, is hereby further amended to
read as follows:

"Sec. 5. Tampering of firearm's serial number. – The penalty of prision correccional shall
be imposed upon any person who shall unlawfully tamper, change, deface or erase the
serial number of any firearm."

Section 4. Sec. 6 of Presidential Decree No. 1866, as amended, is hereby further amended to
read as follows:

"Sec. 6. Repacking or altering the composition of lawfully manufactured explosives. –

The penalty of prision correccional shall be imposed upon any person who shall
unlawfully repack, alter or modify the composition of any lawfully manufactured
explosives."

Section 5. Coverage of the Term Unlicensed Firearm. – The term unlicensed firearm shall
include:

1) firearms with expired license; or

 2) unauthorized use of licensed firearm in the commission of the crime.

Section 6. Rules and regulations. – The Department of Justice and the Department of the
Interior and Local Government shall jointly issue, within ninety (90) days after the approval of
this Act, the necessary rules and regulations pertaining to the administrative aspect of the
provisions hereof, furnishing the Committee on Public Order and Security and the Committee on
Justice and Human Rights of both Houses of Congress copies of such rules and regulations
within thirty (30) days from the promulgation hereof.

Section 7. Separability clause. – If, for any reason, any Sec. or provision of this Act is
declared to be unconstitutional or invalid, the other Sec.s or provisions thereof which are not
affected thereby shall continue to be in full force and effect.

Section 8. Repealing clause. – All laws, decrees, orders, rules and regulations or parts thereof
inconsistent with the provisions of this Act are hereby repealed, amended, or modified
accordingly.

Section 9. Effectivity. – This Act shall take effect after fifteen (15) days following its publication
in the Official Gazette or in two (2) newspapers of general circulation.

Approved: June 6, 1997.

 G.R. Nos. 136149-51. September 19, 2000]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. WALPAN LADJAALAM y MIHAJIL alias

“WARPAN,” appellant.

DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:

Republic Act No. 8294 penalizes simple illegal possession of firearms, provided that the
person arrested committed “no other crime.” Furthermore, if the person is held liable for murder
or homicide, illegal possession of firearms is an aggravating circumstance, but not a separate
offense. Hence, where an accused was convicted of direct assault with multiple attempted
homicide for firing an unlicensed M-14 rifle at several policemen who were about to serve a
search warrant, he cannot be held guilty of the separate offense of illegal possession of
firearms. Neither can such unlawful act be considered to have aggravated the direct assault.

The Case

Walpan Ladjaalam y Mihajil, also known as “Warpan,” appeals before us the September 17,
1998 Decision[1] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Zamboanga City (Branch 16), which found
him guilty of three out of the four charges lodged against him.
Filed against appellant were four Informations, [2] all signed by Assistant Regional State
Prosecutor Ricardo G. Cabaron and dated September 25, 1997. The first Information[3]was for
maintaining a den for the use of regulated drugs. It reads as follows:

“That on or about September 24, 1997, in the City of Zamboanga, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, Walpan Ladjaalam being then
the owner of a residential house located at Rio Hondo,[4] this City, conspiring and confederating
together, mutually aiding and assisting x x x his co-accused wife Nur-in Ladjaalam and Ahmad
Sailabbi y Hajaraini, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, maintain said house
as a den, where regulated drug [was] used in any form.”[5]

The second Information[6] charged appellant with illegal possession of firearms and
ammunition. We quote it below:

“That on or about September 24, 1997, in the City of Zamboanga, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring and confederating
together, mutually aiding and assisting with one another, without any justifiable reason or
purpose other than to use it in the commission of crime, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully,
and feloniously have in their possession and under their custody and control, the following
weapons, to wit: one (1) M14 rifle with SN 1555225 with magazines and seven (7) rounds of live
ammunition; two (2) magazines with twenty (20) and twenty[-one] (21) rounds of live
[ammunition]; one (1) homemade caliber .38 revolver with five (5) live ammunition; one (1) M-79
(single) rifle with pouch and with five (5) empty shell[s]; one (1) home made caliber .38 with SN-
311092 with five live ammunition and one empty shell of [a] cal. 38 x x x Smith and Wesson; two
(2) .38 Caliber paltik revolver with Serial Number 311092 and one defaced M79 grenade
launcher paltik, without first having obtained the necessary license and or permit therefor from
authorities concerned, in flagrant violation of the aforementioned law.”[7]

The third Information,[8] for multiple attempted murder with direct assault, was worded thus:

“That on or about September 24, 1997, in the City of Zamboanga, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused being then armed with M-14
Armalite Rifles, M-16 Armalite Rifles and other assorted firearms and explosives, conspiring and
confederating together, mutually aiding and assisting x x x one another and with intent to kill, did
then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously try and attempt to kill SPO1 WILLIAM B.
JONES, JR., PO3 ENRIQUE C. RIVERA[,] SPO1 AMADO A. MIRASOL, JR., and SPO1
RICARDO J. LACASTESANTOS, in the following manner, to wit: by then and there firing their
M-14 x x x Armalite Rifles, M-16 Armalite Rifles and other assorted firearms and explosives,
aimed and directed at the fatal parts of the bodies of the above-named police officers, well
known to the accused as members of the Philippine National Police, Zamboanga City Police
Office, and as such, agents of a person in authority, who at the time of the attack were engaged
in the performance of their duties, that is, on the occasion when said officers were about to
serve the Search Warrant legally issued by the Regional Trial Court, this City, to the person of
the accused thus commencing the commission of crime of multiple murder directly by overt acts,
and if the accused did not accomplish their unlawful purpose, that is, to kill the above-named
Police Officers, it was not by reason of their own voluntary desistance but rather because of the
fact that all the above-named police officers were able to seek cover during the firing and were
not hit by the bullets and explosives fired by the accused and also by the fact said police officers
were able to wrestle with two (2) of the accused namely: Walpan Ladjaalam y Mihajil a.k.a.
‘Warpan’ and Ahmad Sailabbi y Hajairani, who were subdued and subsequently placed under
arrest; whereas accused PO2 Nurhakim T. Hadjula was able to make good his escape and has
remained at-large.”[9]

In the fourth Information, appellant was charged with illegal possession of drugs.[10]
On December 21, 1997, the cases against Nur-in Ladjaalam and Ahmad
Sailabbi y Hajaraini were dismissed upon motion of the Office of the City Prosecutor, which had
conducted a reinvestigation of the cases as ordered by the lower court. The accused were
consequently released from jail.
The arraignment of appellant on all four (4) charges took place on January 6, 1998, during
which he entered a plea of not guilty.[11] After pretrial, the assailed Decision was rendered, the
dispositive part of which reads:

“WHEREFORE, the Court finds accused WALPAN LADJAALAM y MIHAJIL a.k.a. ‘WARPAN’ -

“1. in Criminal Case No. 14636, GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT of Violation of
Section 15-A, Article III, of Republic Act No. 6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act
of 1972, as amended, and SENTENCES said accused to the penalty of RECLUSION
PERPETUA and to pay a fine of FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND (P500,000.00) and to pay the
costs;

“2. In Criminal Case No. 14637, NOT GUILTY of Violation of Section 16, Article III, in relation to
Section 21, Article IV, of Republic Act No. 6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act
of 1972, as amended, and ACQUITS him of said crime with costs de oficio;
“3. in Criminal Case No. 14638, GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT of the crime of
Illegal Possession of Firearm and Ammunition penalized under Presidential Decree No. 1866,
as amended by Republic Act. No. 8294, and SENTENCES said accused to suffer an
indeterminate penalty of SIX (6) YEARS of prision correccional as minimum to EIGHT (8)
YEARS of prision mayor as maximum and to pay a fine [of] THIRTY THOUSAND
(P30,000.00) and pay the costs;

“4. in Criminal Case No. 14639, GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT of the crime of
Direct Assault with Multiple Attempted Homicide and SENTENCES said accused to an
indeterminate penalty of TWO (2) YEARS and FOUR (4) MONTHS of prision correccional as
minimum to SIX (6) YEARS of prision correccional as maximum and to pay a fine of ONE
THOUSAND (P1,000.00)and to pay the costs.” (emphasis in the original)

Hence, this appeal.[12]

The Facts

Prosecution’s Version

In its Brief,[13] the Office of the Solicitor General presents the facts in this wise:

“At 1:45 p.m. of September 24, 1997, PO3 Allan Marcos Obut filed an application for the
issuance of a search warrant against appellant, his wife and some John Does (Exh. C). After the
search warrant was issued about 2:30 p.m. of the same day, a briefing was conducted inside
the office of the Anti-Vice/Narcotics Unit of the Zamboanga City Police Office in connection with
the service of the search warrant.The briefing was conducted by SPO2 Felipe Gaganting, Chief
of the Anti-Vice/Narcotics Unit. During the briefing, PO3 Renato Dela Peña was assigned as
presentor of the warrant. SPO1 Ricardo Lacastesantos and PO3 Enrique Rivera were
designated to conduct the search. Other policemen were assigned as perimeter guards (TSN,
March 3, 1998, pp. 33-36).

“After the briefing, more than thirty (30) policemen headed by Police Superintendent Edwin
Soledad proceeded to the house of appellant and his wife at Rio Hondo on board several police
vehicles (TSN, March 4, 1998, p. 32; April 22, 1998, p. 54). Before they could reach appellant’s
house, three (3) persons sitting at a nearby store ran towards the house shouting, ‘[P]olice, raid,
raid’ (Ibid., March 3, 1998, pp. 41, 43-44; April 23, 1998, p. 4). When the policemen were about
ten (10) meters from the main gate of the house, they were met by a rapid burst of gunfire
coming from the second floor of the house.There was also gunfire at the back of the house
(Ibid., March 5, 1998, pp. 14-16).

“SPO1 Mirasol, SPO2 Lacastesantos, PO3 Rivera, and PO3 Dela Peña who were with the first
group of policemen saw appellant fire an M14 rifle towards them. They all knew appellant. When
they were fired upon, the group, together with SPO2 Gaganting, PO3 Obut and Superintendent
Soledad, sought cover at the concrete fence to observe the movements at the second floor of
the house while other policemen surrounded the house (Ibid., March 4, 1998, pp. 50-51).

“In front of the house was an extension building connected to the concrete fence (Ibid., pp. 45-
46, 57-59, 73-76). Gaganting, Mirasol, Lacastesantos, Gregorio, and Obut entered the door of
the extension building. Gaganting opened the main (steel) gate of the house. The other
members of the team then entered. Lacastesantos and Mirasol entered the house through the
main door and went inside the sala of the ground floor while other policemen surrounded the
house. Two (2) old women were in the sala together with a young girl and three (3)
children. One of the old women took the children to the second floor while the young girl
remained seated at the corner (Ibid., pp. 19-21).

“Lacastesantos and Mirasol proceeded to the second floor where they earlier saw appellant
firing an M14 rifle at them through the window. While they were going upstairs, appellant noticed
their presence.He went inside the bedroom and, after breaking and removing the jalousies,
jumped from the window to the roof of a neighboring house. Seeing this, Mirasol rushed
downstairs and asked help from the other members of the raiding team to arrest
appellant. Lacastesantos went to the second floor and shouted to the policemen outside not to
fire in the direction of the second floor because there were children.Mirasol and SPO1 Cesar
Rabuya arrested appellant at the back of his house after a brief chase (Ibid., pp. 21-23).

“At the second floor, Lacastesantos saw an M14 rifle (Exh. B-3) with magazine on top of the
sofa at the sala on the second floor (Ibid., P. 27). The rifle bore Serial No. 1555225. He removed
the magazine from the rifle and the bullet inside the chamber of the rifle. He counted seventeen
(17) live ammunition inside the magazine. He saw two (2) more M14 rifle magazines on the
sofa, one with twenty (20) live ammunition (Exh. G-3) and another with twenty-one (21) live
ammunition (Exh. G-4). He likewise saw three (3) M16 rifle magazines (Exh. G-2) in a corner at
the second floor (TSN, March 5, 1998, pp. 23-32, 53-57).

“After Lacastesantos and Mirasol entered appellant’s house, Rivera, Dela Peña, Gregorio and
Obut followed and entered the house. After identifying themselves as members of the PNP Anti-
Vice/Narcotics Unit, Obut presented to the old women a copy of the search warrant. Dela Peña
and Rivera then searched appellant’s room on the ground floor in the presence of Punong
Barangay Elhano (TSN, March 3, 1998, pp. 41-43). On top of a table was a pencil case (Exh. J)
with fifty (50) folded aluminum foils inside (Exhs. J-1 to J-50), each containing
methamphetamine hydrochloride or ‘shabu’.

“Other items were found during the search, namely, assorted coins in different denominations
(Exh. W; TSN, April 28, 1998, pp. 23-25), one (1) homemade .38 caliber revolver (Exh. B-2) with
five (5) live [ammunition], one (1) M79 single rifle with [a] pouch containing five (5) empty shells
of an M79 rifle (Exh. B-4), and one (1) empty shell of an M14 rifle (TSN, April 23, 1998, pp. 30-
32).

“Rino Bartolome Locson was an informer of the Anti-Vice/Narcotics Unit of the Zamboanga
Police. [O]n the morning of September 24, 1997, he was instructed by SPO2 Gaganting to go to
appellant’s house to buy ‘shabu.’ Locson knew appellant as a seller of ‘shabu’ (TSN, April 22,
1998, p. 5) and had been to appellant’s house about fifteen (15) times before. He went to Rio
Hondo and arrived at appellant’s house at 3:20 p.m. He bought P300.00 worth of ‘shabu’ from
appellant. The latter got three (3) decks of shabu from his waist bag. Appellant instructed
Locson to go behind the curtain where there was a table. There were six (6) persons already
smoking. There was a lighted kerosene lamp made of a medicine bottle placed on the
table. They asked Locson to smoke ‘shabu’ and Locson obliged.He placed the three (3) decks
of ‘shabu’ he bought on the table (Ibid., pp. 8-15).

“While they were smoking ‘shabu,’ Locson heard gunfire coming from appellant’s house. They
all stood and entered appellant’s compound but were instructed to pass [through] the other
side. They met appellant at the back of his house. Appellant told them to escape ‘because the
police are already here.’ They scampered and ‘ran away because there were already shots.’
Locson jumped over the fence and ran towards the seashore. Upon reaching a place near the
Fisheries School, he took a tricycle and went home (Ibid., pp. 17-19).

“The following day, September 25, 1997, he went to the police station and executed an affidavit
(Exh. M) narrating what transpired at appellant’s house [o]n the afternoon of September 24,
1997.

“After the search and before returning to the police station, P03 Dela Peña prepared a ‘Receipt
for Property Seized’ (Exh. P & 3) listing the properties seized during the search. The receipt was
signed by Dela Peña as the seizure officer, and by Punong Barangay Hadji Hussin Elhano and
radio reporter Jun Cayona as witnesses. A copy of the receipt was given to appellant but he
refused to acknowledge the properties seized (TSN, April 23, 1998, pp. 11-12).

“An examination conducted by Police Inspector Mercedes D. Diestro, Forensic Chemist of the
PNP Crime Laboratory Service Office 9, on the paraffin casts taken from both hands of
appellant yielded positive for gunpowder nitrates (Exh. A-3), giving rise to the possibility that
appellant had fired a gun before the examination (TSN, March 3, 1998, p. 11). Gunpowder
residue examinations conducted on September 26, 1997 showed that the following firearms
‘were fired’ (Exh. B-5): a .38 caliber revolver (homemade) with Serial No. 311092 (Exh. B-1),
another .38 caliber revolver (homemade) without a serial number (Exh. B-2), a Cal. 7.62 mm
M14 U.S. rifle with Serial No. 1555225 (Exh. B-3), and an M79 rifle without a serial number
(Exh. B-4). They were fired within five (5) days prior to the examination (TSN, March 3, 1998,
pp. 16-21).

“With respect to the crystalline substances, an examination conducted by Police Inspector

Susan M. Cayabyab, likewise a Forensic Chemist of the PNP Crime Laboratory Service Office
9, on the fifty (50) pieces of folded aluminum foils each containing white crystalline granules with
a total weight of 1.7426 grams (Exh. J-1 to J-50) yielded positive results for the presence of
methamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu) (Exh. L). However, the examination of one (1)
crystalline stone weighing 83.2674 grams (Exh. K) yielded negative results for the presence of
methamphetamine hydrochloride (Exh. L).

“The records of the Regional Operation and Plans Division of the PNP Firearm and Explosive
Section show that appellant ‘had not applied/filed any application for license to possess firearm
and ammunition or x x x been given authority to carry [a] firearm outside of his residence’ (Exh.
X)”[14]

Defense’s Version

Appellant Ladjaalam agrees with the narration of facts given by the lower court. [15] Hence,
we quote the pertinent parts of the assailed Decision:

“Accused Walpan Ladjaalam y Mihajil a.k.a. ‘Warpan’, 30 years old, married, gave his
occupation as ‘smuggling’ (tsn, p. 2, May 4, 1998). He used to go to Labuan in Malaysia and
bring cigarettes to the Philippines without paying taxes (tsn, pp. 40-41, id). He said that his true
name [was] Abdul Nasser Abdurakman and that Warpan or Walpan Ladjaalam [was] only his
‘alias’. However, he admitted that more people kn[e]w him as Walpan Ladjaalam rather than
Abdul Nasser Abdurakman (tsn. pp. 39-40; 46-47, id). He testified that [o]n the afternoon of
September 24, 1997, when he was arrested by the police, he was sleeping in the house of
Dandao, a relative of his wife. He was alone. He slept in Dandao’s house and not in his house
because they ha[d] ‘a sort of a conference’ as Dandao’s daughter was leaving for Saudi
Arabia. He noticed the presence of policemen in his neighborhood at Aplaya, Rio Hondo when
he heard shots. He woke up and went out of the house and that was the time that he was
arrested. He said he was arrested ‘xxx [at] the other side of my house; at the other side of the
fence where I was sleeping. xxx. At the back of my house’ (tsn, p. 7, id.). He does not know who
arrested him ‘considering that the one who arrested me does not have nameplate.’ He was
arrested by four (4) persons. Not one of those who arrested him testified in Court. He was
handcuffed and placed inside a jeep parked at Rio Hondo Elementary School. According to him,
he did not fire a gun at the policemen from [t]he second floor of his house. He said the
‘policemen’ [were] ‘the one[s] who fire[d] at us’ (tsn, p. 5, id.). If he fired a gun at the policemen
for sure they [would] die ‘[b]ecause the door is very near x x x the vicinity of my house’. He does
not own the M14 rifle (Exh. ‘B-3’) which according to policemen, he used in firing at them. The
gun does not belong to him. He does not have a gun like that (tsn, p. 15, id.). A policeman also
owns an M14 rifle but he does not know the policeman (tsn, pp. 16-17, id). He said that the M79
rifle (Exh. ‘B-4’), the three (3) empty M16 rifle magazines (Exh. ‘G’; ‘G-1’ to ‘G-2’), the two (2)
M14 magazines with live ammunition (Exh. ‘G-3’; ‘G-4’); the two (2) caliber .38 revolvers (Exhs.
‘B-1’; ‘B-2’), the fifty (50) aluminum foils each containing shabu (Exhs. ‘J-1’ to ‘J-50’) placed
inside a pencil case (Exh. ‘J’, the assorted coins placed inside a blue bag (Exh. ‘W’) and the
white crystalline stone (Exh. ‘K’) all do not belong to him. He said that the policemen just
produced those things as their evidence. The firearms do not belong to him. They were brought
by the policemen (tsn, p. 43, May 4, 1998). Regarding the blue bag containing assorted coins,
he said: ‘that is not ours, I think this (is) theirs, xxx they just brought that as their evidence’ (tsn,
pp. 15-24, id.)

“Walpan Ladjaalam declared there were occupants who were renting his extension house. He
affirmed that he owns that house. Four (4) persons were staying in the extension house. He
could only recognize the husband whose name is Momoy. They are from Jolo. They left the
place already because they were afraid when the police raided the place. (tsn, pp. 8-10, May 4,
1998). He does not know prosecution witness Rino Locson y Bartolome. Although Locson
recognized him, in his case he does not know Locson and he does not recognize him (tsn, p.11,
id). He did not sell anything to Locson and did not entertain him. He is not selling shabu but he
knows ‘for a fact that there are plenty of person who are engaged in selling shabu in that place’,
in that area known as Aplaya, Rio Hondo. One of them is Hadji Agbi (tsn, pp.11-14, id).

“After his arrest Walpan Ladjaalam was brought to the police station where he stayed for one
day and one night before he was transferred to the City jail. While at the police station, he was
not able to take a bath. He smokes two packs of cigarette a day. While he was at the police
station, he smoked [a] cigarette given to him by his younger sister. He lighted the cigarettes with
[a] match. From the police station, he was brought to the PNP Regional Office at R.T. Lim
Boulevard where he was subject to paraffin examination (tsn, pp. 24-26, May 4, 1998).

“During the raid conducted on his house, his cousin Boy Ladjaalam, Ating Sapadi, and Jecar
(Sikkal) Usman, the younger brother of his wife were killed. Walpan Ladjaalam said that he saw
that ‘it was the policeman who shot them[,] only I do not know his name.” They were killed at the
back of his house. He said that no charges were filed against the one responsible for their death
(tsn, pp. 30-33- May 4, 1998).
“Anilhawa Ahamad, more or less 80 years old, a widow was in the house of Walpan Ladjaalam
whom he calls ‘Hadji Id’ at the time the police raided the house. She is the mother of Ahma
Sailabbi. She was together with Babo Dandan, two small children and a helper when ‘soldiers’
entered the house. ‘(W)hen they arrived, they kept on firing (their guns) even inside the house’
(tsn, p.5, May 5, 1998). They were armed with short and long firearms. They searched the
house and scattered things and got what they wanted. They entered the room of Walpan
Ladjaalam. They tried to open a bag containing jewelry.When Anilhawa tried to bring the bag
outside the room, they grabbed the bag from her and poked a gun at her. At that time Walpan
Ladjaalam was not in the house. Ahamad Sailabbi was also not in the house. A Search Warrant
was shown to Anilhawa after the search was conducted and just before the policemen left the
place. Anilhawa Ahamad said that ‘it was already late in the afternoon[;] before they left that
was the time the Search Warrant (was) given to us by xxx Barangay Captain Hussin Elhano’
(tsn, pp.6-8, May 5, 1998). Barangay Chairman Elhano arrived ‘already late in the afternoon,
almost sundown’ (tsn, p. 9, id). Anilhaw declared that aside from a bag containing jewelry and a
bag full of money, she had not seen anything else that was taken from Walpan Ladjaalam’s
house (tsn, pp. 9-12, id).

“Akmad (Ahmad) Sailabbi, 37 years old, married testified that about 4:00 o’clock [o]n the
afternoon of September 24, 1997, ha was standing in front of his house when policemen arrived
and immediately arrested him. He was about to go to the City Proper to buy articles he was
intending to bring to Sabah. He had ‘around P50,000.00’ placed inside a waist bag tied around
his waist. The policemen told him to lie down in prone position and a policeman searched his
back. They pulled his waist bag and took his DiaStar wrist watch. He was shot three times and
was hit on the forehead leaving a scar. His injury was not treated. He was taken to the police
station where he was detained for one day and one night. He was detained at the City Jail for
three months and five days after which he was released (tsn, pp. 25-29, May 5, 1998).

“Melba Usma, 20 years old, a widow, testified that [o]n the afternoon of September 24, 1997,
she was in the house of her parents lying together with her husband Sikkal Usma. There is only
one house between her parents’ house and the house of Walpan Ladjaalam. Her husband
Sikkal Usman is the brother of Nur-in Ladjaalam, Walpan’s wife. When Melba heard shots, she
went downstairs. A policeman was looking for her husband. The policeman called her
husband. When her husband went down, he was instructed by the policeman to lie down in
prone position. Then the policeman shot her husband. The policeman had two other
companions who also shot her husband while he was lying down in prone position (tsn, pp.2-7,
May 5, 1998).

“Murkisa Usman, 30 years old, married, declared that [o]n the afternoon of September 24, 1997,
she was sitting at the door of her house watching her children playing when a motorcyle, driven
by a person, stopped near her house. The driver was Gaganting whom she called a soldier. He
went down from his motorcycle, pulled a gun and poked it at Murkisa. Murkisa stood up and
raised her hands. She got her children and when she was about to enter the room of her house,
Gaganting again poked a gun at her and ‘there was a shot.’ As a result of firing, three persons
died, namely, Sikkal Usman, Boy Ladjaalam and Atip Sapali Sali (tsn, pp. 8-10, May 5, 1998).

“Barangay Captain Hadji Hussin Elhano, 51 years old, testified that about 4:00 o ‘clock [o]n the
afternoon of September 24, 1997, he was fetched by two policemen at Catabangan where he
was attending a seminar. Because of traffic along the way, they arrived at the Rio Hondo already
late in the afternoon. He saw policemen were already inside the house. Upon entering the gate,
he saw Walpan at the gate already handcuffed. Walpan called him but the police advised him
not to approach Walpan. The search was already over and things were already taken inside the
house. When he went inside the house, he saw ‘the things that they (policemen) searched, the
firearms and the shabu‘ (tsn, p. 17. May 8, 1998). He did not see the Search Warrant. What was
shown to him were the things recovered during the search which were being listed. They were
being counted and placed on a table. ‘Upon seeing the things that were recovered during the
search, I just signed the receipt (Exh. “P”; “P-1”) of the things x x x taken during the search”
(tsn, pp. 17-18. May 8, 1998). He saw three dead bodies at the side of the fence when he went
to the other side of the house. The three persons were killed outside the fence of Walpan
Ladjaalam (tsn, p. 18, id).”[16]

The Trial Court’s Ruling

The trial court observed that the house of appellant was raided on September 24, 1997 by
virtue of Search Warrant No. 20 issued on the same day. However, the lower court nullified the
said Warrant because it had been issued for more than one specific offense, [17] in violation of
Section 3, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court.[18] The court a quo ruled:

“It should be stated at the outset that Search Warrant No. 20 is totally ‘null and void’ because it
was issued for more than one specific offense x x x contrary to Section 3, Rule 1[2]6 of the
Rules of Court which provides that ‘A search warrant shall not issue but upon probable cause in
connection with one specific offense xxx’. In Tambasan vs. People, 246 SCRA 184 (1995), the
Supreme Court ruled that a search warrant for more than one offense - a ‘scatter shot warrant’ -
violates Section 3, Rule 126 of the [R]evised Rules of Court and is ‘totally null and
void.’”[19] (emphasis in the original)

Nevertheless, the trial court deemed appellant’s arrest as valid. It emphasized that he had
shot at the officers who were trying to serve the void search warrant. This fact was established
by the testimonies of several police officers, [20] who were participants in the raid, and confirmed
by the laboratory report on the paraffin tests conducted on the firearms and appellant.
[21]
Additionally, the judge noted that Appellant Ladjaalam, based on his statements in his
Counter Affidavit, impliedly contradicted his assertions in open court that there had been no
exchange of gunfire during the raid.[22] The trial court concluded that the testimonies of these
officers must prevail over appellant’s narration that he was not in his house when the raid was
conducted.
Prescinding from this point, the court a quo validated the arrest of appellant, reasoning
thus:

“Under the circumstances, the policemen ‘had authority to pursue and arrest Walpan Ladjaalam
and confiscate the firearm he used in shooting at the policemen and to enter his house to effect
said arrest and confiscation of the firearm.’ Under Rule 113, Section 5 (a), of the Rules of Court,
‘A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person xxx (w)hen in his
presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to
commit an offense.’ An offense is committed in the presence or within the view of an officer,
within the meaning of the rule authorizing an arrest without a warrant, when the officer sees the
offense, although at a distance, or hears the disturbances created thereby and proceeds at
once to the scene thereof. At the time the policemen entered the house of accused Walpan
Ladjaalam after he had fired shots at the policemen who intended to serve the Search Warrant
to him, the accused was engaged in the commission of a crime, and was pursued and arrested
after he committed the crime of shooting at the policemen who were about to serve the Search
Warrant.”[23]

As a consequence of the legal arrest, the seizure of the following was also deemed
valid: the M14 rifle (with a magazine containing seventeen live ammunition) [24] used by appellant
against the police elements, two M14 magazines, and three other M16 rifle magazines. [25] The
trial court observed that these items were in “plain view” of the pursuing police
officers. Moreover, it added that these same items were “evidence [of] the commission of a
crime and/or contraband and therefore, subject to seizure” [26] since appellant “had not applied
for a license to possess firearm and had not been given authority to carry firearm outside his
residence.”[27]
For being incredible and unsupported by evidence, appellant’s claim that the items that
were seized by the police officers had been planted was disbelieved by the trial court. It ruled
that if the police officers wanted to plant evidence to incriminate him, they could have done so
during the previous raids or those conducted after his arrest. To its mind, it was unbelievable
that they would choose to plant evidence, when they were accompanied by the barangay
chairman and a radio reporter who might testify against them. It then dismissed these
allegations, saying that frame-up, like alibi, was an inherently weak defense.[28]
The trial court also convicted the accused of the crime of maintaining a drug den. It
reasoned as follows:

“The testimony of Rino Bartolome Locson, corroborated by SPO1 Ricardo Lacastesantos and
SPO1 Amado Mirasol, Jr. clearly established that Walpan Ladjaalam operated and maintained a
drug den in his extension house where shabu or methamphetamine hydrochloride, a regulated
drug, was sold, and where persons or customers bought and used shabu or methamphetamine
hydrochloride by burning the said regulated drug and sniffing its smoke with the use of an
aluminum foil tooter. A drug den is a lair or hideaway where prohibited or regulated drugs are
used in any form or are found. Its existence [may be] proved not only by direct evidence but
may also be established by proof of facts and circumstances, including evidence of the general
reputation of the house, or its general reputation among police officers.The uncorroborated
testimony of accused Walpan Ladjaalam a.k.a. Warpan’ that he did not maintain an extension
house or a room where drug users who allegedly buy shabu from him inhales or smokes shabu
cannot prevail over the testimonies of Locson, SPO1 Lacastesantos, and SPO1 Mirasol. He
admitted that he is the owner of the extension house but he alleged that there were four (4)
occupants who rented that extension house. He knew the name of only one of the four
occupants who are allegedly from Jolo, a certain Momoy, the husband. Aside from being
uncorroborated, Walpan’s testimony was not elaborated by evidence as to when or for how long
was the extension house rented, the amount of rental paid, or by any other document showing
that the extension house was in fact rented. The defense of denial put up by accused Walpan
Ladjaalam a.k.a. 'Warpan’ is a weak defense. Denial is the weakest defense and cannot prevail
over the positive and categorical testimonies of the prosecution witnesses.Denials, if
unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence, are negative and self-serving evidence
which deserve no weight in law and cannot be given evidentiary weight over the testimony of
credible witnesses who testify on affirmative matters. As between the positive declaration of the
prosecution witnesses and the negative statements of the accused, the former deserve more
credence.”[29]

In conclusion, the trial court explained appellant’s liability in this manner:

“x x x. The act of the accused in firing an M14 rifle to the policemen who were about to enter his
house to serve a search warrant constitutes the crime of direct assault with multiple attempted
homicide[,] not multiple attempted murder with direct assault[,] considering that no policeman
was hit and injured by the accused and no circumstance was proved to qualify the attempted
killing to attempted murder.

“The accused Walpan Ladjaalam a.k.a. ‘Warpan’ cannot be held liable [for] the crime of
Violation of Section 16, Article III, in relation to Section 21, Article IV, of Republic Act 6425
otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1992, as amended, because the fifty (50)
pieces of folded aluminum foils having a total weight of 1.7426 grams all containing
methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu allegedly found in his house are inadmissible as
evidence against him considering that they were seized after [a] search conducted by virtue of
Search Warrant No. 20 which is totally null and void as it was issued for more than one offense,
and were not found in ‘plain view’ of the police officers who seized them. Neither could the
accused be held liable for illegal possession of firearms and ammunition except for the (1) M14
rifle with Serial Number 1555225 and with magazine containing fifteen (15) live ammunition and
two more M14 rifle magazines with twenty (20) and twenty-one (21) live ammunition
respectively considering that the policemen who recovered or seized the other firearms and
ammunition did not testify in court. The blue bag containing assorted coins cannot be returned
to the accused Walpan Ladjaalam a.k.a. ‘Warpan’ because according to the accused the blue
bag and assorted coins do not belong to him[;] instead the said assorted coins should be turned
over to the National Treasury.”[30]

The Issues

In his Brief, appellant submits the following Assignment of Errors:

I

“The trial court erred when it concluded that appellant Walpan Ladjaalam y Mihajil [had] fired
first at the police officers who went to his house to serve a search warrant upon him which led to
an exchange of fire between Ladjaalam and the police officer.

II

“The trial court erred when it denied the appellant the right and opportunity for an ocular
inspection of the scene of the firefight and where the house of the appellant [was] located.

III

“The trial court erred when it ruled that the presumption of regularity in the performance of their
duties [excluded] the claim of the appellant that the firearms and methamphetamine
hydrochloride (i.e. shabu) were planted by the police.”[31]

In the interest of simplicity, we shall take up these issues seriatim: (a) denial of the request
for ocular inspection, (b) credibility of the prosecution witnesses, and (c) the defense of frame-
up. In addition, we shall also discuss the proper crimes and penalties to be imposed on
appellant.
 The Court’s Ruling

The appeal has no merit.

First Issue: Denial of Request for Ocular Inspection

Appellant insists that the trial court erred in denying his request for an ocular inspection of
the Ladjaalam residence. He argues that an ocular inspection would have afforded the lower
court “a better perspective and an idea with respect to the scene of the crime.” [32] We do not
agree.
We fail to see the need for an ocular inspection in this case, especially in the light of the
clear testimonies of the prosecution witnesses.[33] We note in particular that the defense had
even requested SPO1 Amado Mirasol Jr. to sketch the subject premises to give the lower court
a fairly good idea of appellant’s house.[34] Viewing the site of the raid would have only delayed
the proceedings.[35] Moreover, the question whether to view the setting of a relevant event has
long been recognized to be within the discretion of the trial judge. [36] Here, there is no reason to
disturb the exercise of that discretion.[37]

Second Issue: Credibility of Prosecution Witnesses

Appellant, in essence, questions the credibility of the prosecution witnesses. [38] Suffice it to
state that the trial court’s assessment of their credibility is generally accorded respect, even
finality.[39] After carefully examining the records and finding no material inconsistencies to
support appellant’s claim, we cannot exempt this case from the general rule. [40] Quite the
contrary, the testimonies of these witnesses positively showed that appellant had fired upon the
approaching police elements, and that he had subsequently attempted to escape.SPO1 Amado
Mirasol Jr.[41] testified thus:
“PROSECUTOR NUVAL:
Q: And, this trail is towards the front of the house of the accused?
A: Yes.
Q: And it’s there where you were met by a volley of fire?
A: Yes, Your Honor.
COURT:
Q: How far were you from the concrete fen[c]e when you were met by a volley of fire? ... You
said you were fired upon?
A: More or less, five (5) meters.
xxxxxxxxx
PROSECUTOR NUVAL:
Q: Now, you said you were able to enter the house after the gate was opened by your
colleague Felipe Gaganting ... I will reform that question.
Q: Who opened the gate Mr. Witness?
A: SPO2 Felipe Gaganting, Efren Gregorio and Allan Marcos Obut.
Q: And, at that time you were hiding at the concrete fence?
A: Yes.
Q: Now, when this gate was opened, you said you went inside the house, right?
A: Yes.
Q: What did you see inside the house?
A: I, together with SPO1 Ricardo Lacastesantos, entered the main door of the house of
Walfran [sic] Ladjaalam at the ground floor. We went inside the sala on the ground floor
of his house[;] I saw two old woman.
xxxxxxxxx
PROSECUTOR NUVAL:
Q: Now, what did you do with these two old women?
A: I did not mind those two old women because those two women were sitting on the ground
floor. I was concentrating on the second floor because Ladjaalam was firing towards our
group so, I, together with Ricardo Lacastesantos, went upstairs to the second floor of the
house.
Q: Were you able to go to the second floor of the house?
A: Yes.
Q: What happened when you were already on the second floor?
A: While we were proceeding to the second floor, Walfan [sic] Ladjaalam, noticed our
presence and immediately went inside the bedroom [o]n the second floor and he went
immediately and jumped from the window of his house x x x leading to the roof of the
neighbor’s house.
xxxxxxxxx
COURT:
Reform. That is leading
Q: What happened when you entered and he jumped to the roofing of the neighbor’s house?
A: Immediately, I myself, we immediately went downstairs and asked the assistance of the
members of the raiding team to arrest Walfan Ladjaalam.
xxxxxxxxx
PROSECUTOR NUVAL:
Q: Were you able to go down?
A: Yes.
 Q: What happened when you were there?
A: We immediately went out and I asked the assistance of the members of the raiding team
and the investigator of the unit especially SPO1 Cesar Rabuya. I was able to manage to
arrest Walfan Ladjaalam.”[42]
What happened thereafter was narrated by Senior Police Officer Ricardo Lacastesantos,
[43]
as follows:
“Q: What did you notice [o]n the second floor?
A: I went where the firing came from, so, I saw [an] M14 rifle and I shouted from the outside,
‘do not fire at the second floor because there [are] a lot of children here.’
Q: Now, that rifle you said [was an] M14, where did you find this?
A: At the sala set.
Q: This sala set where is this located?
A: Located [on] the second floor of the house.
Q: Is there a sala [o]n the second floor?
A: Yes.
Q: Can you still identify that M14 rifle which you said you recovered from the sale set?
A: Yes.
Q: Why can you identify that?
A: The Serial No. of M14 is 1555225 and I marked it with my initial.
Q: Now, I have here M14 rifle[;] will you please tell us where is the Serial No. of this?
A: 1555225 and I put my initial, RJL.
FISCAL NUVAL:
This is already marked as our Exhibit ‘B-3’ with magazine, one magazine and seven round
[ammunition].
Q: After recovering this, what did you do with this firearm?
A: When I recovered it I removed the bullets inside the chamber[.] I removed the magazine
and I turned it over to the investigator.
Q: Where did you turn it over?
A: At the crime scene.
Q: Now, that magazine, can you still identify this?
A: Yes.
Q: Why?
A: I put x x x markings.
xxxxxxxxx
COURT:
 So, a[si]de from the magazine attached to the M14 rifle you found six more magazines?
A: Yes, so, all in all six magazines, three empty M16 rifle magazines and three M14.
Q: The M16 magazines [were] empty?
A: Empty.
Q: How about the M14?
A: Found with [ammunition].
xxxxxxxxx
Q: So, where are the three M16 magazines?
A: In the corner.
Q: What did you do with [these] three magazines of M16?
A: I turned [them] over to the investigator.
Q: Can you identify them?
A: Yes, because of my initials[.]
Q: Where are your initials?
A: On the magazines.
Q: RJL?
A: RJL.”[44]
These were confirmed by the results of the paraffin tests conducted on appellant and on the
weapons seized during the raid. Both of his hands as well as the weapons, particularly the M-14
which he had used, were positive for gunpowder nitrate. Police Inspector Mercedes Delfin-
Diestro explained in open court:
“Q: Okay. Now, what was the result of your examination, Madam Witness?
A: The result of the examination [was] that both hands of the subject person, ha[d] presence
of gun powder nitrates.
Q: What do you mean Madam Witness, what does that indicate?
A: It indicates there is presence of powder nitrates.
Q: Can we conclude that he fired a gun?
A: I cannot conclude that he fired a gun because there are so many circumstances [why] a
person [would be] positive on his hands for gun powder nitrates.
Q: But, most likely, he fired a gun?
A: Yes.
xxxxxxxxx
PROSECUTOR NUVAL:
Q: What about, Madam Witness this Exhibit ‘B-3’, which is the M14 rifle. What did you do
with this?
 A: SPO3 Abu did the swabbing both in the chamber and the barrel wherein I observed there
[were] black and traces of brown residue on the bolt, chamber and in the barrel.
Q: And, that indicates Madam Witness...?
A: It indicates that the gun was fired.
Q: Recently?
A: Because of the traces of brown residue, it could be possible that the gun was fired before
the incident x x x.
COURT:
Q: There is also black residue?
A: Yes.
Q: What does it indicate?
A: It indicates that the firearm was recently fired.
Q: And, where is this swab used at the time of the swabbing of this Exhibit?
A: This one.
PROSECUTOR NUVAL:
May we ask that this be marked as Exhibit ‘B-3-A’.
COURT:
Q: The firing there indicates that the gun was recently fired, during the incident?
A: Yes.
Q: And also before the incident it was fired because of the brown residue?
A: Yes, Your Honor.”[45] (emphasis supplied)
Duly proven from the foregoing were the two elements [46] of the crime of illegal possession
of firearms. Undoubtedly, the established fact that appellant had fired an M-14 rifle upon the
approaching police officers clearly showed the existence of the firearm or weapon and his
possession thereof. Sufficing to satisfy the second element was the prosecution’s
Certification[47] stating that he had not filed any application for license to possess a firearm, and
that he had not been given authority to carry any outside his residence. [48] Further, it should be
pointed out that his possession and use of an M-14 rifle were obviously unauthorized because
this weapon could not be licensed in favor of, or carried by, a private individual.[49]

Third Issue: Defense of Frame-up

From the convoluted arguments strewn before us by appellant, we gather that the main
defense he raises is frame-up. He claims that the items seized from his house were “planted,”
and that the entire Zamboanga police force was out to get him at all cost.
This Court has invariably held that the defense of frame-up is inherently weak, since it is
easy to fabricate, but terribly difficult to disprove. [50] Absent any showing of an improper motive
on the part of the police officers,[51] coupled with the presumption of regularity in the
performance of their duty, such defense cannot be given much credence. [52] Indeed, after
examining the records of this case, we conclude that appellant has failed to substantiate his
claim. On the contrary, his statements in his Counter Affidavit are inconsistent with his testimony
during the trial.[53] He testified thus:
“Q Now, Mr. Witness, do you remember having executed an Affidavit/ a Counter-Affidavit?
A I could not remember.
Q I have here a Counter-Affidavit and it was signed before this representation on the 8th day
of December 1997[;] tell us whose signature is this appearing above the typewritten
name
FISCAL NUVAL:
Q . . . . Walpan Ladjaalam, whose signature is this?
(Showing)
A Yes, Sir. This is mine.
Q Now, in paragraph[s] 1,2,3,4,5,6,7 and 8; you stated in this Counter-Affidavit which I quote:
‘that I was resting and sleeping when I heard the gunshots and I noticed that the shots
were directed towards our house.. and I inspected and x x x we were attacked by armed
persons.. and I was apprehended by the persons who attacked x x x our house’; [the]
house you are referring to [in] this paragraph, whose house [are you] referring to, is this
[what] you are referring to [as] your house or the house of your neighbors [from] which
you said you heard gunshots?
A Our house.
Q Now, in paragraph 6 of your Counter-Affidavit you stated and I quote: ‘that [o]n that
afternoon of September 24, 1997, I was at home in my house Aplaya, Riohondo, Bo.
Campo Muslim, my companions in my house [were] the two old women and my children,
is this correct?
A They were not there.
Q Now, in that statement Mr. Witness, you said that you were at home in [your] house at
Aplaya, Riohondo, Bo. Campo Muslim[;] which is which now, you were in your house or
you were in your neighbors[‘] house at that time when you heard gunshots?
A I was in the house near my house.
Q So, your statement particularly paragraph 6 of your Counter-Affidavit that you were at
home in [your] house at Aplaya Riohondo Bo. Campo Muslim, is x x x not correct?
A Yes, Sir. This is not correct.”[54]

Crime and Punishment

The trial court convicted appellant of three crimes: (1) maintenance of a drug den, (2) direct
assault with attempted homicide, and (3) illegal possession of firearms. We will discuss each of
these.
Maintenance of a Drug Den

We agree with the trial court that appellant was guilty of maintenance of a drug den, an
offense for which he was correctly sentenced to reclusion perpetua. His guilt was clearly
established by the testimony of Prosecution Witness Rino Bartolome Locson, who himself had
used the extension house of appellant as a drug den on several occasions, including the time of
the raid. The former’s testimony was corroborated by all the raiding police officers who testified
before the court. That appellant did not deny ownership of the house and its extension lent
credence to the prosecution’s story.

Direct Assault with Multiple Attempted Homicide

The trial court was also correct in convicting appellant of direct assault [55] with multiple
counts of attempted homicide. It found that “[t]he act of the accused [of] firing an M14 rifle [at]
the policemen[,] who were about to enter his house to serve a search warrant x x x” constituted
such complex crime.[56]
We note that direct assault with the use of a weapon carries the penalty of prision
correccional in its medium and maximum periods, while attempted homicide carries the penalty
of prision correccional.[57] Hence, for the present complex crime, the penalty for direct assault,
which constitutes the “most serious crime,” should be imposed and applied in its maximum
period.[58]

Illegal Possession of Firearms

Aside from finding appellant guilty of direct assault with multiple attempted homicide, the
trial court convicted him also of the separate offense of illegal possession of firearms under PD
1866, as amended by RA 8294, and sentenced him to 6 years of prision correccional to 8 years
of prision mayor.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) disagrees, on the ground that the trial court
should not have applied the new law. It contends that under the facts of the case, the applicable
law should have been PD 1866, as worded prior to its amendment by RA 8294.
The trial court’s ruling and the OSG’s submission exemplify the legal community’s difficulty
in grappling with the changes brought about by RA 8294. Hence, before us now are opposing
views on how to interpret Section 1 of the new law, which provides as follows:

“SECTION 1. Section 1 of Presidential Decree No. 1866, as amended, is hereby further

amended to read as follows:

“Section 1. Unlawful Manufacture, Sale, Acquisition, Disposition or Possession of Firearms or

Ammunition Instruments Used or Intended to be Used in the Manufacture of Firearms or
Ammunition. -- The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period and a fine of not less
than Fifteen thousand pesos (P15,000) shall be imposed upon any person who shall unlawfully
manufacture, deal in, acquire, dispose, or possess any low powered firearm, such as rimfire
handgun, .380 or .32 and other firearm of similar firepower, part of firearm, ammunition, or
machinery, tool or instrument used or intended to be used in the manufacture of any firearm or
ammunition: Provided, That no other crime was committed.

“The penalty of prision mayor in its minimum period and a fine of Thirty thousand pesos
(P30,000) shall be imposed if the firearm is classified as high powered firearm which includes
those with bores bigger in diameter than .30 caliber and 9 millimeter such as caliber .40, .41, .
44, .45 and also lesser calibered firearms but considered powerful such as caliber .357 and
caliber .22 centerfire magnum and other firearms with firing capability of full automatic and by
burst of two or three: Provided, however, That no other crime was committed by the person
arrested.

“If homicide or murder is committed with the use of an unlicensed firearm, such use of an
unlicensed firearm shall be considered as an aggravating circumstance.

“If the violation of this Section is in furtherance of or incident to, or in connection with the crime
of rebellion or insurrection, sedition, or attempted coup d’etat, such violation shall be absorbed
as an element of the crime of rebellion or insurrection, sedition, or attempted coup d’etat.

“The same penalty shall be imposed upon the owner, president, manager, director or other
responsible officer of any public or private firm, company, corporation or entity, who shall willfully
or knowingly allow any of the firearms owned by such firm, company, corporation or entity to be
used by any person or persons found guilty of violating the provisions of the preceding
paragraphs or willfully or knowingly allow any of them to use unlicensed firearms or firearms
without any legal authority to be carried outside of their residence in the course of their
employment.

“The penalty of arresto mayor shall be imposed upon any person who shall carry any licensed
firearm outside his residence without legal authority therefor.”

Citing People v. Jayson,[59] the OSG argues that the foregoing provision does not cover the
specific facts of this case. Since another crime -- direct assault with multiple unlawful homicide
-- was committed, appellant cannot be convicted of simple illegal possession of firearms under
the second paragraph of the aforecited provision. Furthermore, since there was no killing in this
case, illegal possession cannot be deemed as an aggravating circumstance under the third
paragraph of the provision. Based on these premises, the OSG concludes that the applicable
law is not RA 8294, but PD 1866 which, as worded prior the new law, penalizes simple illegal
possession of firearms even if another crime is committed at the same time.[60]
Applying a different interpretation, the trial court posits that appellant should be convicted of
illegal possession of firearms, in addition to direct assault with multiple attempted homicide. It
did not explain its ruling, however. Considering that it could not have been ignorant of
the proviso[61] in the second paragraph, it seemed to have construed “no other crime” as
referring only to homicide and murder, in both of which illegal possession of firearms is an
aggravating circumstance. In other words, if a crime other than murder or homicide is
committed, a person may still be convicted of illegal possession of firearms. In this case, the
other crime committed was direct assault with multiple attempted homicide; hence, the trial court
found appellant guilty of illegal possession of firearms.
We cannot accept either of these interpretations because they ignore the plain language of
the statute. A simple reading thereof shows that if an unlicensed firearm is used in the
commission of any crime, there can be no separate offense of simple illegal possession of
firearms. Hence, if the “other crime” is murder or homicide, illegal possession of firearms
becomes merely an aggravating circumstance, not a separate offense. Since direct assault with
multiple attempted homicide was committed in this case, appellant can no longer be held liable
for illegal possession of firearms.
Moreover, penal laws are construed liberally in favor of the accused. [62] In this case, the
plain meaning of RA 8294’s simple language is most favorable to herein appellant. Verily, no
other interpretation is justified, for the language of the new law demonstrates the legislative
intent to favor the accused.[63] Accordingly, appellant cannot be convicted of two separate
offenses of illegal possession of firearms and direct assault with attempted homicide. Moreover,
since the crime committed was direct assault and not homicide or murder, illegal possession of
firearms cannot be deemed an aggravating circumstance.
We reject the OSG’s contention that PD 1866, as worded prior to its amendment by RA
8294, should be applied in this case. When the crime was committed on September 24, 1997,
the original language of PD 1866 had already been expressly superseded by RA 8294 which
took effect on July 6, 1997. [64] In other words, no longer in existence was the earlier provision of
PD 1866, which justified a conviction for illegal possession of firearms separate from any other
crime. It was replaced by RA 8294 which, among other amendments to PD 1866, contained the
specific proviso that “no other crime was committed.”
Furthermore, the OSG’s reliance on People v. Jayson[65] is misplaced. True, this Court
sustained the conviction of appellant for illegal possession of firearms, although he had also
committed homicide. We explained, however, that “the criminal case for homicide [was] not
before us for consideration.”
Just as unacceptable is the interpretation of the trial court. We find no justification for
limiting the proviso in the second paragraph to murder and homicide. The law is clear: the
accused can be convicted of simple illegal possession of firearms, provided that “no other crime
was committed by the person arrested.” If the intention of the law in the second paragraph were
to refer only to homicide and murder, it should have expressly said so, as it did in the third
paragraph. Verily, where the law does not distinguish, neither should we.
The Court is aware that this ruling effectively exonerates appellant of illegal possession of
an M-14 rifle, an offense which normally carries a penalty heavier than that for direct
assault. While the penalty for the first is prision mayor, for the second it is only prision
correccional. Indeed, the accused may evade conviction for illegal possession of firearms by
using such weapons in committing an even lighter offense,[66] like alarm and scandal[67] or slight
physical injuries,[68] both of which are punishable by arresto menor.[69] This consequence,
however, necessarily arises from the language of RA 8294, whose wisdom is not subject to the
Court’s review. Any perception that the result reached here appears unwise should be
addressed to Congress. Indeed, the Court has no discretion to give statutes a new meaning
detached from the manifest intendment and language of the legislature.Our task is
constitutionally confined only to applying the law and jurisprudence [70] to the proven facts, and
we have done so in this case.
WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision is hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that
appellant is found guilty only of two offenses: (1) direct assault and multiple attempted homicide
with the use of a weapon, for which he is sentenced to 2 years and 4 months to 6 years
of prision correccional; and (2) maintaining a drug den, for which he was correctly sentenced by
the trial court to reclusion perpetua. Costs against appellant.
Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Congress of the Philippines for a possible
review, at its sound discretion, of RA 8294.
 SO ORDERED.
Melo, (Chairman), Vitug, Purisima, and Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ., concur.

ANGEL CELINO, SR., G.R. No. 170562

Petitioner,
Present:

QUISUMBING,* J., Chairperson,

- versus - CARPIO,**
CARPIO MORALES,
TINGA, and
VELASCO, JR., JJ.
COURT OF APPEALS, CEBU CITY, HON.
DELANO F. VILLARUZ, Presiding Judge,
Branch 16, Regional Trial Court,Capiz, Promulgated:
Roxas City, and PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES,
Respondents. June 29, 2007
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

CARPIO MORALES, J.:

This petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court assails the Court of
Appeals’ Decision dated April 18, 2005[1] affirming the trial court’s denial of petitioner Angel
Celino, Sr.’s Motion to Quash; and Resolution dated September 26, 2005 [2] denying petitioner’s
Motion for Reconsideration of the said Decision.

The following facts are not disputed:

Two separate informations were filed before the Regional Trial Court of Roxas City
charging petitioner with violation of Section 2(a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 6446 (gun ban),
[3]
and Section 1, Paragraph 2 of Republic Act No. (R.A.) 8294 [4] (illegal possession of firearm),
as follows:

Criminal Case No. C-137-04

That on or about the 12th day of May, 2004, in the City of Roxas,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused,
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and knowingly carry outside of his
residence an armalite rifle colt M16 with serial number 3210606 with two (2) long
magazines each loaded with thirty (30) live ammunitions of the same caliber
during the election period – December 15, 2005 to June 9, 2004 – without first
having obtained the proper authority in writing from the Commission on Elections,
Manila, Philippines.

CONTRARY TO LAW. [5]

Criminal Case No. C-138-04

That on or about the 12th day of May, 2004, in the City of Roxas,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused,
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and knowingly have in his possession and
control one (1) armalite rifle colt M16 with serial number 3210606 with two (2)
 long magazines each loaded with thirty (30) live ammunitions of the same caliber
without first having obtained the proper license or necessary permit to possess
the said firearm.

CONTRARY TO LAW.[6]

Upon arraignment in Criminal Case No. C-138-04, petitioner pleaded not guilty to the
gun ban violation charge.[7]

Prior to his arraignment in Criminal Case No. C-137-04, petitioner filed a Motion to
Quash[8] contending that he “cannot be prosecuted for illegal possession of firearms x x x if he
was also charged of having committed another crime of [sic] violating the Comelec gun ban
under the same set of facts x x x.”[9]

By Order of July 29, 2004,[10] the trial court denied the Motion to Quash on the basis of
this Court’s[11] affirmation in Margarejo v. Hon. Escoses[12] of therein respondent judge’s denial of
a similar motion to quash on the ground that “the other offense charged x x x is not one of those
enumerated under R.A. 8294 x x x.” [13]Petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration was likewise
denied by September 22, 2004 Resolution,[14] hence, petitioner filed a Petition
[15]
for Certiorari before the Court of Appeals.

By Decision dated April 18, 2005,[16] the appellate court affirmed the trial court’s denial of
the Motion to Quash. Petitioner’s May 9, 2005 Motion for Reconsideration[17] having been
denied by Resolution of September 26, 2005,[18] petitioner filed the present petition.

The petition fails.

Petitioner’s remedy to challenge the appellate court’s decision and resolution was to file
a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 on or before October 20, 2005 or 15 days after
he received a copy of the appellate court's resolution on October 5, 2005[ 1 9 ] denying his
motion for reconsideration. Instead, petitioner chose to file the present petition under Rule 65
only on December 2, 2005,[20] a good 58 days after he received the said resolution.

Certiorari cannot be used as a substitute for lost appeal. Certiorari lies only when there
is no appeal nor any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Why
the question being raised by petitioner, i.e., whether the appellate court committed grave abuse
of discretion, could not have been raised on appeal, no reason therefor has been advanced.[21]

While this Court, in accordance with the liberal spirit pervading the Rules of Court and in
the interest of justice, has the discretion to treat a petition for certiorarias having been filed
under Rule 45, especially if filed within the reglementary period under said Rule, it finds nothing
in the present case to warrant a liberal application of the Rules, no justification having been
proffered, as just stated, why the petition was filed beyond the reglementary period,[22] especially
considering that it is substantially just a replication of the petition earlier filed before the
appellate court.

Technicality aside, the petition fails just the same.

The relevant provision of R.A. 8294 reads:

SECTION 1. Section 1 of Presidential Decree No. 1866, as amended, is

hereby further amended to read as follows:

"SECTION 1. Unlawful Manufacture, Sale, Acquisition,

Disposition or Possession of Firearms or Ammunition or
Instruments Used or Intended to be Used in the Manufacture of
Firearms or Ammunition. — x x x.

"The penalty of prision mayor in its minimum period and a

fine of Thirty thousand pesos (P30,000) shall be imposed if the
firearm is classified as high powered firearm which includes those
with bores bigger in diameter than .38 caliber and 9 millimeter
such as caliber .40, .41, .44, .45 and also lesser calibered firearms
but considered powerful such as caliber .357 and caliber .22
center-fire magnum and other firearms with firing capability of full
automatic and by burst of two or three: Provided, however, That
no other crime was committed by the person arrested.

"If homicide or murder is committed with the use of an

unlicensed firearm, such use of an unlicensed firearm shall be
considered as an aggravating circumstance.

"If the violation of this Section is in furtherance of or

incident to, or in connection with the crime of rebellion or
insurrection, sedition, or attempted coup d'etat, such violation shall
 be absorbed as an element of the crime of rebellion, or
insurrection, sedition, or attempted coup d'etat.

xxxx

(Underscoring supplied)

The crux of the controversy lies in the interpretation of the underscored proviso.
Petitioner, citing Agote v. Lorenzo,[23] People v. Ladjaalam,[24] and other similar cases,[25] contends
that the mere filing of an information for gun ban violation against him necessarily bars his
prosecution for illegal possession of firearm. The Solicitor General contends otherwise on the
basis of Margarejo v. Hon. Escoses [26] and People v. Valdez.[27]

In Agote,[28] this Court affirmed the accused’s conviction for gun ban violation but
exonerated him of the illegal possession of firearm charge because it “cannot but set aside
petitioner’s conviction in Criminal Case No. 96-149820 for illegal possession of firearm since
another crime was committed at the same time, i.e., violation of COMELEC Resolution No. 2826
or the Gun Ban.”[29] Agote is based on Ladjaalam[30] where this Court held:

x x x A simple reading [of RA 8294] shows that if an unlicensed firearm is used in

the commission of any crime, there can be no separate offense of simple illegal
possession of firearms. Hence, if the “other crime” is murder or homicide, illegal
possession of firearms becomes merely an aggravating circumstance, not a
separate offense. Since direct assault with multiple attempted homicide was
committed in this case, appellant can no longer be held liable for illegal
possession of firearms.

Moreover, penal laws are construed liberally in favor of the accused. In

this case, the plain meaning of RA 8294's simple language is most favorable to
herein appellant. Verily, no other interpretation is justified, for the language of the
new law demonstrates the legislative intent to favor the accused. Accordingly,
appellant cannot be convicted of two separate offenses of illegal possession of
firearms and direct assault with attempted homicide. x x x

xxxx

x x x The law is clear: the accused can be convicted of simple illegal

possession of firearms, provided that “no other crime was committed by the
person arrested.” If the intention of the law in the second paragraph were to refer
only to homicide and murder, it should have expressly said so, as it did in the
third paragraph. Verily, where the law does not distinguish, neither should we.[31]

The law is indeed clear. The accused can be convicted of illegal possession of firearms,
provided no other crime was committed by the person arrested. The word “committed” taken in
its ordinary sense, and in light of the Constitutional presumption of innocence, [32] necessarily
implies a prior determination of guilt by final conviction resulting from successful prosecution or
voluntary admission.[33]

Petitioner’s reliance on Agote, Ladjaalam, Evangelista, Garcia, Pangilinan,

Almeida, and Bernal is, therefore, misplaced. In each one of these cases, the accused were
exonerated of illegal possession of firearms because of their commission, as shown by their
conviction, of some other crime.[34] In the present case, however, petitioner has only
been accused of committing a violation of the COMELEC gun ban. As accusation is not
synonymous with guilt, there is yet no showing that petitioner did in fact commit the other crime
charged.[35] Consequently, the proviso does not yet apply.

More applicable is Margarejo[36] where, as stated earlier, this Court affirmed the denial of
a motion to quash an information for illegal possession of firearm on the ground that “the other
offense charged [i.e., violation of gun ban] x x x is not one of those enumerated under R.A.
8294 x x x.”[37] in consonance with the earlier pronouncement in Valdez[38] that “all pending
cases involving illegal possession of firearm should continue to be prosecuted and tried if no
other crimes expressly indicated in Republic Act No. 8294 are involved x x x.”[39]

In sum, when the other offense involved is one of those enumerated under R.A. 8294,
any information for illegal possession of firearm should be quashed because the illegal
possession of firearm would have to be tried together with such other offense, either considered
as an aggravating circumstance in murder or homicide,[40] or absorbed as an element of
rebellion, insurrection, sedition or attempted coup d’etat.[41] Conversely, when the other offense
involved is not one of those enumerated under R.A. 8294, then the separate case for illegal
possession of firearm should continue to be prosecuted.

Finally, as a general rule, the remedy of an accused from the denial of his motion to
quash is for him to go to trial on the merits, and if an adverse decision is rendered, to
appeal therefrom in the manner authorized by law. [42] Although the special civil action
for certiorari may be availed of in case there is a grave abuse of discretion,[43] the appellate court
correctly dismissed the petition as that vitiating error is not attendant in the present case.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9165 June 7, 2002

AN ACT INSTITUTING THE COMPREHENSIVE DANGEROUS DRUGS ACT OF 2002,

REPEALING REPUBLIC ACT NO. 6425, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE DANGEROUS
DRUGS ACT OF 1972, AS AMENDED, PROVIDING FUNDS THEREFOR, AND FOR OTHER
PURPOSES

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in Congress

Section 1. Short Title. – This Act shall be known and cited as the "Comprehensive Dangerous
Drugs Act of 2002".

Section 2. Declaration of Policy. – It is the policy of the State to safeguard the integrity of its
territory and the well-being of its citizenry particularly the youth, from the harmful effects of
dangerous drugs on their physical and mental well-being, and to defend the same against acts
or omissions detrimental to their development and preservation. In view of the foregoing, the
State needs to enhance further the efficacy of the law against dangerous drugs, it being one of
today's more serious social ills.

Toward this end, the government shall pursue an intensive and unrelenting campaign against
the trafficking and use of dangerous drugs and other similar substances through an integrated
system of planning, implementation and enforcement of anti-drug abuse policies, programs, and
projects. The government shall however aim to achieve a balance in the national drug control
program so that people with legitimate medical needs are not prevented from being treated with
adequate amounts of appropriate medications, which include the use of dangerous drugs.

It is further declared the policy of the State to provide effective mechanisms or measures to re-
integrate into society individuals who have fallen victims to drug abuse or dangerous drug
dependence through sustainable programs of treatment and rehabilitation.

ARTICLE I

Definition of terms

Section 3. Definitions. As used in this Act, the following terms shall mean:

(a) Administer. – Any act of introducing any dangerous drug into the body of any person, with or
without his/her knowledge, by injection, inhalation, ingestion or other means, or of committing
any act of indispensable assistance to a person in administering a dangerous drug to
himself/herself unless administered by a duly licensed practitioner for purposes of medication.

(b) Board. - Refers to the Dangerous Drugs Board under Section 77, Article IX of this Act.

(c) Centers. - Any of the treatment and rehabilitation centers for drug dependents referred to in
Section 34, Article VIII of this Act.

(d) Chemical Diversion. – The sale, distribution, supply or transport of legitimately imported, in-
transit, manufactured or procured controlled precursors and essential chemicals, in diluted,
mixtures or in concentrated form, to any person or entity engaged in the manufacture of any
dangerous drug, and shall include packaging, repackaging, labeling, relabeling or concealment
of such transaction through fraud, destruction of documents, fraudulent use of permits,
misdeclaration, use of front companies or mail fraud.

(e) Clandestine Laboratory. – Any facility used for the illegal manufacture of any dangerous drug
and/or controlled precursor and essential chemical.
(f) Confirmatory Test. – An analytical test using a device, tool or equipment with a different
chemical or physical principle that is more specific which will validate and confirm the result of
the screening test.

(g) Controlled Delivery. – The investigative technique of allowing an unlawful or suspect

consignment of any dangerous drug and/or controlled precursor and essential chemical,
equipment or paraphernalia, or property believed to be derived directly or indirectly from any
offense, to pass into, through or out of the country under the supervision of an authorized
officer, with a view to gathering evidence to identify any person involved in any dangerous drugs
related offense, or to facilitate prosecution of that offense.

(h) Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals. – Include those listed in Tables I and II of
the 1988 UN Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances as
enumerated in the attached annex, which is an integral part of this Act.

(i) Cultivate or Culture. – Any act of knowingly planting, growing, raising, or permitting the
planting, growing or raising of any plant which is the source of a dangerous drug.

(j) Dangerous Drugs. – Include those listed in the Schedules annexed to the 1961 Single
Convention on Narcotic Drugs, as amended by the 1972 Protocol, and in the Schedules
annexed to the 1971 Single Convention on Psychotropic Substances as enumerated in the
attached annex which is an integral part of this Act.

(k) Deliver. – Any act of knowingly passing a dangerous drug to another, personally or
otherwise, and by any means, with or without consideration.

(l) Den, Dive or Resort. – A place where any dangerous drug and/or controlled precursor and
essential chemical is administered, delivered, stored for illegal purposes, distributed, sold or
used in any form.

(m) Dispense. – Any act of giving away, selling or distributing medicine or any dangerous drug
with or without the use of prescription.

(n) Drug Dependence. – As based on the World Health Organization definition, it is a cluster of
physiological, behavioral and cognitive phenomena of variable intensity, in which the use of
psychoactive drug takes on a high priority thereby involving, among others, a strong desire or a
sense of compulsion to take the substance and the difficulties in controlling substance-taking
behavior in terms of its onset, termination, or levels of use.

(o) Drug Syndicate. – Any organized group of two (2) or more persons forming or joining
together with the intention of committing any offense prescribed under this Act.

(p) Employee of Den, Dive or Resort. – The caretaker, helper, watchman, lookout, and other
persons working in the den, dive or resort, employed by the maintainer, owner and/or operator
where any dangerous drug and/or controlled precursor and essential chemical is administered,
delivered, distributed, sold or used, with or without compensation, in connection with the
operation thereof.

(q) Financier. – Any person who pays for, raises or supplies money for, or underwrites any of the
illegal activities prescribed under this Act.
(r) Illegal Trafficking. – The illegal cultivation, culture, delivery, administration, dispensation,
manufacture, sale, trading, transportation, distribution, importation, exportation and possession
of any dangerous drug and/or controlled precursor and essential chemical.

(s) Instrument. – Any thing that is used in or intended to be used in any manner in the
commission of illegal drug trafficking or related offenses.

(t) Laboratory Equipment. – The paraphernalia, apparatus, materials or appliances when used,
intended for use or designed for use in the manufacture of any dangerous drug and/or
controlled precursor and essential chemical, such as reaction vessel, preparative/purifying
equipment, fermentors, separatory funnel, flask, heating mantle, gas generator, or their
substitute.

(u) Manufacture. – The production, preparation, compounding or processing of any dangerous

drug and/or controlled precursor and essential chemical, either directly or indirectly or by
extraction from substances of natural origin, or independently by means of chemical synthesis
or by a combination of extraction and chemical synthesis, and shall include any packaging or
repackaging of such substances, design or configuration of its form, or labeling or relabeling of
its container; except that such terms do not include the preparation, compounding, packaging or
labeling of a drug or other substances by a duly authorized practitioner as an incident to his/her
administration or dispensation of such drug or substance in the course of his/her professional
practice including research, teaching and chemical analysis of dangerous drugs or such
substances that are not intended for sale or for any other purpose.

(v) Cannabis or commonly known as "Marijuana" or "Indian Hemp" or by its any other name. –
Embraces every kind, class, genus, or specie of the plant Cannabis sativa L. including, but not
limited to, Cannabis americana,hashish, bhang, guaza, churrus and ganjab, and embraces
every kind, class and character of marijuana, whether dried or fresh and flowering, flowering or
fruiting tops, or any part or portion of the plant and seeds thereof, and all its geographic
varieties, whether as a reefer, resin, extract, tincture or in any form whatsoever.

(w) Methylenedioxymethamphetamine (MDMA) or commonly known as "Ecstasy", or by its any

other name. – Refers to the drug having such chemical composition, including any of its isomers
or derivatives in any form.

(x) Methamphetamine Hydrochloride or commonly known as "Shabu", "Ice", "Meth", or by its

any other name. – Refers to the drug having such chemical composition, including any of its
isomers or derivatives in any form.

(y) Opium. – Refers to the coagulated juice of the opium poppy (Papaver somniferum L.) and
embraces every kind, class and character of opium, whether crude or prepared; the ashes or
refuse of the same; narcotic preparations thereof or therefrom; morphine or any alkaloid of
opium; preparations in which opium, morphine or any alkaloid of opium enters as an ingredient;
opium poppy; opium poppy straw; and leaves or wrappings of opium leaves, whether prepared
for use or not.

(z) Opium Poppy. – Refers to any part of the plant of the species Papaver somniferum L.,
Papaver setigerum DC, Papaver orientale, Papaver bracteatum and Papaver rhoeas, which
includes the seeds, straws, branches, leaves or any part thereof, or substances derived
therefrom, even for floral, decorative and culinary purposes.
(aa) PDEA. – Refers to the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency under Section 82, Article IX of
this Act.

(bb) Person. – Any entity, natural or juridical, including among others, a corporation, partnership,
trust or estate, joint stock company, association, syndicate, joint venture or other unincorporated
organization or group capable of acquiring rights or entering into obligations.

(cc) Planting of Evidence. – The willful act by any person of maliciously and surreptitiously
inserting, placing, adding or attaching directly or indirectly, through any overt or covert act,
whatever quantity of any dangerous drug and/or controlled precursor and essential chemical in
the person, house, effects or in the immediate vicinity of an innocent individual for the purpose
of implicating, incriminating or imputing the commission of any violation of this Act.

(dd) Practitioner. – Any person who is a licensed physician, dentist, chemist, medical
technologist, nurse, midwife, veterinarian or pharmacist in the Philippines.

(ee) Protector/Coddler. – Any person who knowingly and willfully consents to the unlawful acts
provided for in this Act and uses his/her influence, power or position in shielding, harboring,
screening or facilitating the escape of any person he/she knows, or has reasonable grounds to
believe on or suspects, has violated the provisions of this Act in order to prevent the arrest,
prosecution and conviction of the violator.

(ff) Pusher. – Any person who sells, trades, administers, dispenses, delivers or gives away to
another, on any terms whatsoever, or distributes, dispatches in transit or transports dangerous
drugs or who acts as a broker in any of such transactions, in violation of this Act.

(gg) School. – Any educational institution, private or public, undertaking educational operation
for pupils/students pursuing certain studies at defined levels, receiving instructions from
teachers, usually located in a building or a group of buildings in a particular physical or cyber
site.

(hh) Screening Test. – A rapid test performed to establish potential/presumptive positive result.

(ii) Sell. – Any act of giving away any dangerous drug and/or controlled precursor and essential
chemical whether for money or any other consideration.

(jj) Trading. – Transactions involving the illegal trafficking of dangerous drugs and/or controlled
precursors and essential chemicals using electronic devices such as, but not limited to, text
messages, email, mobile or landlines, two-way radios, internet, instant messengers and chat
rooms or acting as a broker in any of such transactions whether for money or any other
consideration in violation of this Act.

(kk) Use. – Any act of injecting, intravenously or intramuscularly, of consuming, either by

chewing, smoking, sniffing, eating, swallowing, drinking or otherwise introducing into the
physiological system of the body, and of the dangerous drugs.

ARTICLE II

Unlawful Acts and Penalties

Section 4. Importation of Dangerous Drugs and/or Controlled Precursors and Essential
Chemicals.- .The penalty of life imprisonment to death and a ranging from Five hundred
thousand pesos (P500,000.00) to Ten million pesos (P10,000,000.00) shall be imposed upon
any person, who, unless authorized by law, shall import or bring into the Philippines any
dangerous drug, regardless of the quantity and purity involved, including any and all species of
opium poppy or any part thereof or substances derived therefrom even for floral, decorative and
culinary purposes.

The penalty of imprisonment ranging from twelve (12) years and one (1) day to twenty (20)
years and a fine ranging from One hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00) to Five hundred
thousand pesos (P500,000.00) shall be imposed upon any person, who, unless authorized by
law, shall import any controlled precursor and essential chemical.

The maximum penalty provided for under this Section shall be imposed upon any person, who,
unless authorized under this Act, shall import or bring into the Philippines any dangerous drug
and/or controlled precursor and essential chemical through the use of a diplomatic passport,
diplomatic facilities or any other means involving his/her official status intended to facilitate the
unlawful entry of the same. In addition, the diplomatic passport shall be confiscated and
canceled.

The maximum penalty provided for under this Section shall be imposed upon any person, who
organizes, manages or acts as a "financier" of any of the illegal activities prescribed in this
Section.

The penalty of twelve (12) years and one (1) day to twenty (20) years of imprisonment and a
fine ranging from One hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00) to Five hundred thousand pesos
(P500,000.00) shall be imposed upon any person, who acts as a "protector/coddler" of any
violator of the provisions under this Section.

Section 5. Sale, Trading, Administration, Dispensation, Delivery, Distribution and Transportation

of Dangerous Drugs and/or Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals. - The penalty of life
imprisonment to death and a fine ranging from Five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00) to
Ten million pesos (P10,000,000.00) shall be imposed upon any person, who, unless authorized
by law, shall sell, trade, administer, dispense, deliver, give away to another, distribute dispatch in
transit or transport any dangerous drug, including any and all species of opium poppy
regardless of the quantity and purity involved, or shall act as a broker in any of such
transactions.

The penalty of imprisonment ranging from twelve (12) years and one (1) day to twenty (20)
years and a fine ranging from One hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00) to Five hundred
thousand pesos (P500,000.00) shall be imposed upon any person, who, unless authorized by
law, shall sell, trade, administer, dispense, deliver, give away to another, distribute, dispatch in
transit or transport any controlled precursor and essential chemical, or shall act as a broker in
such transactions.

If the sale, trading, administration, dispensation, delivery, distribution or transportation of any

dangerous drug and/or controlled precursor and essential chemical transpires within one
hundred (100) meters from the school, the maximum penalty shall be imposed in every case.
For drug pushers who use minors or mentally incapacitated individuals as runners, couriers and
messengers, or in any other capacity directly connected to the dangerous drugs and/or
controlled precursors and essential chemical trade, the maximum penalty shall be imposed in
every case.

If the victim of the offense is a minor or a mentally incapacitated individual, or should a

dangerous drug and/or a controlled precursor and essential chemical involved in any offense
herein provided be the proximate cause of death of a victim thereof, the maximum penalty
provided for under this Section shall be imposed.

The maximum penalty provided for under this Section shall be imposed upon any person who
organizes, manages or acts as a "financier" of any of the illegal activities prescribed in this
Section.

The penalty of twelve (12) years and one (1) day to twenty (20) years of imprisonment and a
fine ranging from One hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00) to Five hundred thousand pesos
(P500,000.00) shall be imposed upon any person, who acts as a "protector/coddler" of any
violator of the provisions under this Section.

Section 6. Maintenance of a Den, Dive or Resort. - The penalty of life imprisonment to death
and a fine ranging from Five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00) to Ten million pesos
(P10,000,000.00) shall be imposed upon any person or group of persons who shall maintain a
den, dive or resort where any dangerous drug is used or sold in any form.

The penalty of imprisonment ranging from twelve (12) years and one (1) day to twenty (20)
years and a fine ranging from One hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00) to Five hundred
thousand pesos (P500,000.00) shall be imposed upon any person or group of persons who
shall maintain a den, dive, or resort where any controlled precursor and essential chemical is
used or sold in any form.

The maximum penalty provided for under this Section shall be imposed in every case where any
dangerous drug is administered, delivered or sold to a minor who is allowed to use the same in
such a place.

Should any dangerous drug be the proximate cause of the death of a person using the same in
such den, dive or resort, the penalty of death and a fine ranging from One million
(P1,000,000.00) to Fifteen million pesos (P500,000.00) shall be imposed on the maintainer,
owner and/or operator.

If such den, dive or resort is owned by a third person, the same shall be confiscated and
escheated in favor of the government: Provided, That the criminal complaint shall specifically
allege that such place is intentionally used in the furtherance of the crime: Provided, further,
That the prosecution shall prove such intent on the part of the owner to use the property for
such purpose: Provided, finally, That the owner shall be included as an accused in the criminal
complaint.

The maximum penalty provided for under this Section shall be imposed upon any person who
organizes, manages or acts as a "financier" of any of the illegal activities prescribed in this
Section.
The penalty twelve (12) years and one (1) day to twenty (20) years of imprisonment and a fine
ranging from One hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00) to Five hundred thousand pesos
(P500,000.00) shall be imposed upon any person, who acts as a "protector/coddler" of any
violator of the provisions under this Section.

Section 7. Employees and Visitors of a Den, Dive or Resort. - The penalty of imprisonment
ranging from twelve (12) years and one (1) day to twenty (20) years and a fine ranging from
One hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00) to Five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00)
shall be imposed upon:

(a) Any employee of a den, dive or resort, who is aware of the nature of the place as
such; and

(b) Any person who, not being included in the provisions of the next preceding,
paragraph, is aware of the nature of the place as such and shall knowingly visit the same

Section 8. Manufacture of Dangerous Drugs and/or Controlled Precursors and Essential

Chemicals. - The penalty of life imprisonment to death and a fine ranging Five hundred
thousand pesos (P500,000.00) to Ten million pesos (P10,000,000.00) shall be imposed upon
any person, who, unless authorized by law, shall engage in the manufacture of any dangerous
drug.

The penalty of imprisonment ranging from twelve (12) years and one (1) day to twenty (20)
years and a fine ranging from One hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00) to Five hundred
thousand pesos (P500,000.00) shall be imposed upon any person, who, unless authorized by
law, shall manufacture any controlled precursor and essential chemical.

The presence of any controlled precursor and essential chemical or laboratory equipment in the
clandestine laboratory is a prima facie proof of manufacture of any dangerous drug. It shall be
considered an aggravating circumstance if the clandestine laboratory is undertaken or
established under the following circumstances:

(a) Any phase of the manufacturing process was conducted in the presence or with the
help of minor/s:

(b) Any phase or manufacturing process was established or undertaken within one
hundred (100) meters of a residential, business, church or school premises;

(c) Any clandestine laboratory was secured or protected with booby traps;

(d) Any clandestine laboratory was concealed with legitimate business operations; or

(e) Any employment of a practitioner, chemical engineer, public official or foreigner.

The maximum penalty provided for under this Section shall be imposed upon any person, who
organizes, manages or acts as a "financier" of any of the illegal activities prescribed in this
Section.
The penalty of twelve (12) years and one (1) day to twenty (20) years of imprisonment and a
fine ranging from One hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00) to Five hundred thousand pesos
(P500,000.00) shall be imposed upon any person, who acts as a "protector/coddler" of any
violator of the provisions under this Section.

Section 9. Illegal Chemical Diversion of Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals. - The
penalty of imprisonment ranging from twelve (12) years and one (1) day to twenty (20) years
and a fine ranging from One hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00) to Five hundred thousand
pesos (P500,000.00) shall be imposed upon any person, who, unless authorized by law, shall
illegally divert any controlled precursor and essential chemical.

Section 10. Manufacture or Delivery of Equipment, Instrument, Apparatus, and Other

Paraphernalia for Dangerous Drugs and/or Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals. -
The penalty of imprisonment ranging from twelve (12) years and one (1) day to twenty (20)
years and a fine ranging from One hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00) to Five hundred
thousand pesos (P500,000.00) shall be imposed upon any person who shall deliver, possess
with intent to deliver, or manufacture with intent to deliver equipment, instrument, apparatus and
other paraphernalia for dangerous drugs, knowing, or under circumstances where one
reasonably should know, that it will be used to plant, propagate, cultivate, grow, harvest,
manufacture, compound, convert, produce, process, prepare, test, analyze, pack, repack, store,
contain or conceal any dangerous drug and/or controlled precursor and essential chemical in
violation of this Act.

The penalty of imprisonment ranging from six (6) months and one (1) day to four (4) years and a
fine ranging from Ten thousand pesos (P10,000.00) to Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) shall
be imposed if it will be used to inject, ingest, inhale or otherwise introduce into the human body
a dangerous drug in violation of this Act.

The maximum penalty provided for under this Section shall be imposed upon any person, who
uses a minor or a mentally incapacitated individual to deliver such equipment, instrument,
apparatus and other paraphernalia for dangerous drugs.

Section 11. Possession of Dangerous Drugs. - The penalty of life imprisonment to death and a
fine ranging from Five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00) to Ten million pesos
(P10,000,000.00) shall be imposed upon any person, who, unless authorized by law, shall
possess any dangerous drug in the following quantities, regardless of the degree of purity
thereof:

(1) 10 grams or more of opium;

(2) 10 grams or more of morphine;

(3) 10 grams or more of heroin;

(4) 10 grams or more of cocaine or cocaine hydrochloride;

(5) 50 grams or more of methamphetamine hydrochloride or "shabu";

(6) 10 grams or more of marijuana resin or marijuana resin oil;

 (7) 500 grams or more of marijuana; and

(8) 10 grams or more of other dangerous drugs such as, but not limited to,
methylenedioxymethamphetamine (MDA) or "ecstasy", paramethoxyamphetamine
(PMA), trimethoxyamphetamine (TMA), lysergic acid diethylamine (LSD), gamma
hydroxyamphetamine (GHB), and those similarly designed or newly introduced drugs
and their derivatives, without having any therapeutic value or if the quantity possessed is
far beyond therapeutic requirements, as determined and promulgated by the Board in
accordance to Section 93, Article XI of this Act.

Otherwise, if the quantity involved is less than the foregoing quantities, the penalties shall be
graduated as follows:

(1) Life imprisonment and a fine ranging from Four hundred thousand pesos
(P400,000.00) to Five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00), if the quantity of
methamphetamine hydrochloride or "shabu" is ten (10) grams or more but less than fifty
(50) grams;

(2) Imprisonment of twenty (20) years and one (1) day to life imprisonment and a fine
ranging from Four hundred thousand pesos (P400,000.00) to Five hundred thousand
pesos (P500,000.00), if the quantities of dangerous drugs are five (5) grams or more but
less than ten (10) grams of opium, morphine, heroin, cocaine or cocaine hydrochloride,
marijuana resin or marijuana resin oil, methamphetamine hydrochloride or "shabu", or
other dangerous drugs such as, but not limited to, MDMA or "ecstasy", PMA, TMA, LSD,
GHB, and those similarly designed or newly introduced drugs and their derivatives,
without having any therapeutic value or if the quantity possessed is far beyond
therapeutic requirements; or three hundred (300) grams or more but less than five
(hundred) 500) grams of marijuana; and

(3) Imprisonment of twelve (12) years and one (1) day to twenty (20) years and a fine
ranging from Three hundred thousand pesos (P300,000.00) to Four hundred thousand
pesos (P400,000.00), if the quantities of dangerous drugs are less than five (5) grams of
opium, morphine, heroin, cocaine or cocaine hydrochloride, marijuana resin or marijuana
resin oil, methamphetamine hydrochloride or "shabu", or other dangerous drugs such as,
but not limited to, MDMA or "ecstasy", PMA, TMA, LSD, GHB, and those similarly
designed or newly introduced drugs and their derivatives, without having any therapeutic
value or if the quantity possessed is far beyond therapeutic requirements; or less than
three hundred (300) grams of marijuana.

Section 12. Possession of Equipment, Instrument, Apparatus and Other Paraphernalia for
Dangerous Drugs. -The penalty of imprisonment ranging from six (6) months and one (1) day to
four (4) years and a fine ranging from Ten thousand pesos (P10,000.00) to Fifty thousand pesos
(P50,000.00) shall be imposed upon any person, who, unless authorized by law, shall possess
or have under his/her control any equipment, instrument, apparatus and other paraphernalia fit
or intended for smoking, consuming, administering, injecting, ingesting, or introducing any
dangerous drug into the body: Provided, That in the case of medical practitioners and various
professionals who are required to carry such equipment, instrument, apparatus and other
paraphernalia in the practice of their profession, the Board shall prescribe the necessary
implementing guidelines thereof.
The possession of such equipment, instrument, apparatus and other paraphernalia fit or
intended for any of the purposes enumerated in the preceding paragraph shall be prima
facie evidence that the possessor has smoked, consumed, administered to himself/herself,
injected, ingested or used a dangerous drug and shall be presumed to have violated Section 15
of this Act.

Section 13. Possession of Dangerous Drugs During Parties, Social Gatherings or Meetings.
– Any person found possessing any dangerous drug during a party, or at a social gathering or
meeting, or in the proximate company of at least two (2) persons, shall suffer the maximum
penalties provided for in Section 11 of this Act, regardless of the quantity and purity of such
dangerous drugs.

Section 14. Possession of Equipment, Instrument, Apparatus and Other Paraphernalia for
Dangerous Drugs During Parties, Social Gatherings or Meetings. - The maximum penalty
provided for in Section 12 of this Act shall be imposed upon any person, who shall possess or
have under his/her control any equipment, instrument, apparatus and other paraphernalia fit or
intended for smoking, consuming, administering, injecting, ingesting, or introducing any
dangerous drug into the body, during parties, social gatherings or meetings, or in the proximate
company of at least two (2) persons.

Section 15. Use of Dangerous Drugs. – A person apprehended or arrested, who is found to be
positive for use of any dangerous drug, after a confirmatory test, shall be imposed a penalty of a
minimum of six (6) months rehabilitation in a government center for the first offense, subject to
the provisions of Article VIII of this Act. If apprehended using any dangerous drug for the second
time, he/she shall suffer the penalty of imprisonment ranging from six (6) years and one (1) day
to twelve (12) years and a fine ranging from Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) to Two hundred
thousand pesos (P200,000.00): Provided, That this Section shall not be applicable where the
person tested is also found to have in his/her possession such quantity of any dangerous drug
provided for under Section 11 of this Act, in which case the provisions stated therein shall apply.

Section 16. Cultivation or Culture of Plants Classified as Dangerous Drugs or are Sources
Thereof. - The penalty of life imprisonment to death and a fine ranging from Five hundred
thousand pesos (P500,000.00) to Ten million pesos (P10,000,000.00) shall be imposed upon
any person, who shall plant, cultivate or culture marijuana, opium poppy or any other plant
regardless of quantity, which is or may hereafter be classified as a dangerous drug or as a
source from which any dangerous drug may be manufactured or derived: Provided, That in the
case of medical laboratories and medical research centers which cultivate or culture marijuana,
opium poppy and other plants, or materials of such dangerous drugs for medical experiments
and research purposes, or for the creation of new types of medicine, the Board shall prescribe
the necessary implementing guidelines for the proper cultivation, culture, handling,
experimentation and disposal of such plants and materials.

The land or portions thereof and/or greenhouses on which any of said plants is cultivated or
cultured shall be confiscated and escheated in favor of the State, unless the owner thereof can
prove lack of knowledge of such cultivation or culture despite the exercise of due diligence on
his/her part. If the land involved is part of the public domain, the maximum penalty provided for
under this Section shall be imposed upon the offender.
The maximum penalty provided for under this Section shall be imposed upon any person, who
organizes, manages or acts as a "financier" of any of the illegal activities prescribed in this
Section.

The penalty of twelve (12) years and one (1) day to twenty (20) years of imprisonment and a
fine ranging from One hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00) to Five hundred thousand pesos
(P500,000.00) shall be imposed upon any person, who acts as a "protector/coddler" of any
violator of the provisions under this Section.

Section 17. Maintenance and Keeping of Original Records of Transactions on Dangerous

Drugs and/or Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals. - The penalty of imprisonment
ranging from one (1) year and one (1) day to six (6) years and a fine ranging from Ten thousand
pesos (P10,000.00) to Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) shall be imposed upon any
practitioner, manufacturer, wholesaler, importer, distributor, dealer or retailer who violates or fails
to comply with the maintenance and keeping of the original records of transactions on any
dangerous drug and/or controlled precursor and essential chemical in accordance with Section
40 of this Act.

An additional penalty shall be imposed through the revocation of the license to practice his/her
profession, in case of a practitioner, or of the business, in case of a manufacturer, seller,
importer, distributor, dealer or retailer.

Section 18. Unnecessary Prescription of Dangerous Drugs. – The penalty of imprisonment

ranging from twelve (12) years and one (1) day to twenty (20) years and a fine ranging from
One hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00) to Five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00)
and the additional penalty of the revocation of his/her license to practice shall be imposed upon
the practitioner, who shall prescribe any dangerous drug to any person whose physical or
physiological condition does not require the use or in the dosage prescribed therein, as
determined by the Board in consultation with recognized competent experts who are authorized
representatives of professional organizations of practitioners, particularly those who are
involved in the care of persons with severe pain.

Section 19. Unlawful Prescription of Dangerous Drugs. – The penalty of life imprisonment to
death and a fine ranging from Five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00) to Ten million pesos
(P10,000,000.00) shall be imposed upon any person, who, unless authorized by law, shall make
or issue a prescription or any other writing purporting to be a prescription for any dangerous
drug.

Section 20. Confiscation and Forfeiture of the Proceeds or Instruments of the Unlawful Act,
Including the Properties or Proceeds Derived from the Illegal Trafficking of Dangerous Drugs
and/or Precursors and Essential Chemicals. – Every penalty imposed for the unlawful
importation, sale, trading, administration, dispensation, delivery, distribution, transportation or
manufacture of any dangerous drug and/or controlled precursor and essential chemical, the
cultivation or culture of plants which are sources of dangerous drugs, and the possession of any
equipment, instrument, apparatus and other paraphernalia for dangerous drugs including other
laboratory equipment, shall carry with it the confiscation and forfeiture, in favor of the
government, of all the proceeds and properties derived from the unlawful act, including, but not
limited to, money and other assets obtained thereby, and the instruments or tools with which the
particular unlawful act was committed, unless they are the property of a third person not liable
for the unlawful act, but those which are not of lawful commerce shall be ordered destroyed
without delay pursuant to the provisions of Section 21 of this Act.

After conviction in the Regional Trial Court in the appropriate criminal case filed, the Court shall
immediately schedule a hearing for the confiscation and forfeiture of all the proceeds of the
offense and all the assets and properties of the accused either owned or held by him or in the
name of some other persons if the same shall be found to be manifestly out of proportion to
his/her lawful income: Provided, however, That if the forfeited property is a vehicle, the same
shall be auctioned off not later than five (5) days upon order of confiscation or forfeiture.

During the pendency of the case in the Regional Trial Court, no property, or income derived
therefrom, which may be confiscated and forfeited, shall be disposed, alienated or transferred
and the same shall be in custodia legisand no bond shall be admitted for the release of the
same.

The proceeds of any sale or disposition of any property confiscated or forfeited under this
Section shall be used to pay all proper expenses incurred in the proceedings for the
confiscation, forfeiture, custody and maintenance of the property pending disposition, as well as
expenses for publication and court costs. The proceeds in excess of the above expenses shall
accrue to the Board to be used in its campaign against illegal drugs.

Section 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized, and/or Surrendered Dangerous
Drugs, Plant Sources of Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals,
Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory Equipment. – The PDEA shall take charge and
have custody of all dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs, controlled precursors
and essential chemicals, as well as instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment so
confiscated, seized and/or surrendered, for proper disposition in the following manner:

(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall,
immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the
same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were
confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the
media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be
required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof;

(2) Within twenty-four (24) hours upon confiscation/seizure of dangerous drugs, plant
sources of dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and essential chemicals, as well as
instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment, the same shall be submitted to
the PDEA Forensic Laboratory for a qualitative and quantitative examination;

(3) A certification of the forensic laboratory examination results, which shall be done
under oath by the forensic laboratory examiner, shall be issued within twenty-four (24)
hours after the receipt of the subject item/s: Provided, That when the volume of the
dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs, and controlled precursors and
essential chemicals does not allow the completion of testing within the time frame, a
partial laboratory examination report shall be provisionally issued stating therein the
quantities of dangerous drugs still to be examined by the forensic laboratory: Provided,
however, That a final certification shall be issued on the completed forensic laboratory
examination on the same within the next twenty-four (24) hours;
 (4) After the filing of the criminal case, the Court shall, within seventy-two (72) hours,
conduct an ocular inspection of the confiscated, seized and/or surrendered dangerous
drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs, and controlled precursors and essential
chemicals, including the instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment, and
through the PDEA shall within twenty-four (24) hours thereafter proceed with the
destruction or burning of the same, in the presence of the accused or the person/s from
whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a
representative from the media and the DOJ, civil society groups and any elected public
official. The Board shall draw up the guidelines on the manner of proper disposition and
destruction of such item/s which shall be borne by the offender: Provided, That those
item/s of lawful commerce, as determined by the Board, shall be donated, used or
recycled for legitimate purposes: Provided, further, That a representative sample, duly
weighed and recorded is retained;

(5) The Board shall then issue a sworn certification as to the fact of destruction or
burning of the subject item/s which, together with the representative sample/s in the
custody of the PDEA, shall be submitted to the court having jurisdiction over the case. In
all instances, the representative sample/s shall be kept to a minimum quantity as
determined by the Board;

(6) The alleged offender or his/her representative or counsel shall be allowed to

personally observe all of the above proceedings and his/her presence shall not
constitute an admission of guilt. In case the said offender or accused refuses or fails to
appoint a representative after due notice in writing to the accused or his/her counsel
within seventy-two (72) hours before the actual burning or destruction of the evidence in
question, the Secretary of Justice shall appoint a member of the public attorney's office
to represent the former;

(7) After the promulgation and judgment in the criminal case wherein the representative
sample/s was presented as evidence in court, the trial prosecutor shall inform the Board
of the final termination of the case and, in turn, shall request the court for leave to turn
over the said representative sample/s to the PDEA for proper disposition and destruction
within twenty-four (24) hours from receipt of the same; and

(8) Transitory Provision: a) Within twenty-four (24) hours from the effectivity of this Act,
dangerous drugs defined herein which are presently in possession of law enforcement
agencies shall, with leave of court, be burned or destroyed, in the presence of
representatives of the Court, DOJ, Department of Health (DOH) and the accused/and or
his/her counsel, and, b) Pending the organization of the PDEA, the custody, disposition,
and burning or destruction of seized/surrendered dangerous drugs provided under this
Section shall be implemented by the DOH.

Section 22. Grant of Compensation, Reward and Award. – The Board shall recommend to the
concerned government agency the grant of compensation, reward and award to any person
providing information and to law enforcers participating in the operation, which results in the
successful confiscation, seizure or surrender of dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous
drugs, and controlled precursors and essential chemicals.
Section 23. Plea-Bargaining Provision. – Any person charged under any provision of this Act
regardless of the imposable penalty shall not be allowed to avail of the provision on plea-
bargaining.

Section 24. Non-Applicability of the Probation Law for Drug Traffickers and Pushers. – Any
person convicted for drug trafficking or pushing under this Act, regardless of the penalty
imposed by the Court, cannot avail of the privilege granted by the Probation Law or Presidential
Decree No. 968, as amended.

Section 25. Qualifying Aggravating Circumstances in the Commission of a Crime by an

Offender Under the Influence of Dangerous Drugs. – Notwithstanding the provisions of any law
to the contrary, a positive finding for the use of dangerous drugs shall be a qualifying
aggravating circumstance in the commission of a crime by an offender, and the application of
the penalty provided for in the Revised Penal Code shall be applicable.

Section 26. Attempt or Conspiracy. – Any attempt or conspiracy to commit the following
unlawful acts shall be penalized by the same penalty prescribed for the commission of the same
as provided under this Act:

(a) Importation of any dangerous drug and/or controlled precursor and essential
chemical;

(b) Sale, trading, administration, dispensation, delivery, distribution and transportation of

any dangerous drug and/or controlled precursor and essential chemical;

(c) Maintenance of a den, dive or resort where any dangerous drug is used in any form;

(d) Manufacture of any dangerous drug and/or controlled precursor and essential
chemical; and

(e) Cultivation or culture of plants which are sources of dangerous drugs.

Section 27. Criminal Liability of a Public Officer or Employee for Misappropriation,

Misapplication or Failure to Account for the Confiscated, Seized and/or Surrendered Dangerous
Drugs, Plant Sources of Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals,
Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory Equipment Including the Proceeds or Properties
Obtained from the Unlawful Act Committed. – The penalty of life imprisonment to death and a
fine ranging from Five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00) to Ten million pesos
(P10,000,000.00), in addition to absolute perpetual disqualification from any public office, shall
be imposed upon any public officer or employee who misappropriates, misapplies or fails to
account for confiscated, seized or surrendered dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous
drugs, controlled precursors and essential chemicals, instruments/paraphernalia and/or
laboratory equipment including the proceeds or properties obtained from the unlawful acts as
provided for in this Act.

Any elective local or national official found to have benefited from the proceeds of the trafficking
of dangerous drugs as prescribed in this Act, or have received any financial or material
contributions or donations from natural or juridical persons found guilty of trafficking dangerous
drugs as prescribed in this Act, shall be removed from office and perpetually disqualified from
holding any elective or appointive positions in the government, its divisions, subdivisions, and
intermediaries, including government-owned or –controlled corporations.

Section 28. Criminal Liability of Government Officials and Employees. – The maximum
penalties of the unlawful acts provided for in this Act shall be imposed, in addition to absolute
perpetual disqualification from any public office, if those found guilty of such unlawful acts are
government officials and employees.

Section 29. Criminal Liability for Planting of Evidence. – Any person who is found guilty of
"planting" any dangerous drug and/or controlled precursor and essential chemical, regardless of
quantity and purity, shall suffer the penalty of death.

Section 30. Criminal Liability of Officers of Partnerships, Corporations, Associations or Other

Juridical Entities. – In case any violation of this Act is committed by a partnership, corporation,
association or any juridical entity, the partner, president, director, manager, trustee, estate
administrator, or officer who consents to or knowingly tolerates such violation shall be held
criminally liable as a co-principal.

The penalty provided for the offense under this Act shall be imposed upon the partner,
president, director, manager, trustee, estate administrator, or officer who knowingly authorizes,
tolerates or consents to the use of a vehicle, vessel, aircraft, equipment or other facility, as an
instrument in the importation, sale, trading, administration, dispensation, delivery, distribution,
transportation or manufacture of dangerous drugs, or chemical diversion, if such vehicle, vessel,
aircraft, equipment or other instrument is owned by or under the control or supervision of the
partnership, corporation, association or juridical entity to which they are affiliated.

Section 31. Additional Penalty if Offender is an Alien. – In addition to the penalties prescribed in
the unlawful act committed, any alien who violates such provisions of this Act shall, after service
of sentence, be deported immediately without further proceedings, unless the penalty is death.

Section 32. Liability to a Person Violating Any Regulation Issued by the Board. – The penalty of
imprisonment ranging from six (6) months and one (1) day to four (4) years and a fine ranging
from Ten thousand pesos (P10,000.00) to Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) shall be imposed
upon any person found violating any regulation duly issued by the Board pursuant to this Act, in
addition to the administrative sanctions imposed by the Board.

Section 33. Immunity from Prosecution and Punishment. – Notwithstanding the provisions of
Section 17, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure and the provisions of Republic
Act No. 6981 or the Witness Protection, Security and Benefit Act of 1991, any person who has
violated Sections 7, 11, 12, 14, 15, and 19, Article II of this Act, who voluntarily gives information
about any violation of Sections 4, 5, 6, 8, 10, 13, and 16, Article II of this Act as well as any
violation of the offenses mentioned if committed by a drug syndicate, or any information leading
to the whereabouts, identities and arrest of all or any of the members thereof; and who willingly
testifies against such persons as described above, shall be exempted from prosecution or
punishment for the offense with reference to which his/her information of testimony were given,
and may plead or prove the giving of such information and testimony in bar of such
prosecution: Provided, That the following conditions concur:

(1) The information and testimony are necessary for the conviction of the persons
described above;
 (2) Such information and testimony are not yet in the possession of the State;

(3) Such information and testimony can be corroborated on its material points;

(4) the informant or witness has not been previously convicted of a crime involving moral
turpitude, except when there is no other direct evidence available for the State other
than the information and testimony of said informant or witness; and

(5) The informant or witness shall strictly and faithfully comply without delay, any
condition or undertaking, reduced into writing, lawfully imposed by the State as further
consideration for the grant of immunity from prosecution and punishment.

Provided, further, That this immunity may be enjoyed by such informant or witness who does
not appear to be most guilty for the offense with reference to which his/her information or
testimony were given: Provided, finally, That there is no direct evidence available for the State
except for the information and testimony of the said informant or witness.

Section 34. Termination of the Grant of Immunity. – The immunity granted to the informant or
witness, as prescribed in Section 33 of this Act, shall not attach should it turn out subsequently
that the information and/or testimony is false, malicious or made only for the purpose of
harassing, molesting or in any way prejudicing the persons described in the preceding Section
against whom such information or testimony is directed against. In such case, the informant or
witness shall be subject to prosecution and the enjoyment of all rights and benefits previously
accorded him under this Act or any other law, decree or order shall be deemed terminated.

In case an informant or witness under this Act fails or refuses to testify without just cause, and
when lawfully obliged to do so, or should he/she violate any condition accompanying such
immunity as provided above, his/her immunity shall be removed and he/she shall likewise be
subject to contempt and/or criminal prosecution, as the case may be, and the enjoyment of all
rights and benefits previously accorded him under this Act or in any other law, decree or order
shall be deemed terminated.

In case the informant or witness referred to under this Act falls under the applicability of this
Section hereof, such individual cannot avail of the provisions under Article VIII of this Act.

Section 35. Accessory Penalties. – A person convicted under this Act shall be disqualified to
exercise his/her civil rights such as but not limited to, the rights of parental authority or
guardianship, either as to the person or property of any ward, the rights to dispose of such
property by any act or any conveyance inter vivos, and political rights such as but not limited to,
the right to vote and be voted for. Such rights shall also be suspended during the pendency of
an appeal from such conviction.

ARTICLE III

Dangerous Drugs Test and Record Requirements

Section 36. Authorized Drug Testing. – Authorized drug testing shall be done by any
government forensic laboratories or by any of the drug testing laboratories accredited and
monitored by the DOH to safeguard the quality of test results. The DOH shall take steps in
setting the price of the drug test with DOH accredited drug testing centers to further reduce the
cost of such drug test. The drug testing shall employ, among others, two (2) testing methods,
the screening test which will determine the positive result as well as the type of the drug used
and the confirmatory test which will confirm a positive screening test. Drug test certificates
issued by accredited drug testing centers shall be valid for a one-year period from the date of
issue which may be used for other purposes. The following shall be subjected to undergo drug
testing:

(a) Applicants for driver's license. – No driver's license shall be issued or renewed to any
person unless he/she presents a certification that he/she has undergone a mandatory
drug test and indicating thereon that he/she is free from the use of dangerous drugs;

(b) Applicants for firearm's license and for permit to carry firearms outside of residence. –
All applicants for firearm's license and permit to carry firearms outside of residence shall
undergo a mandatory drug test to ensure that they are free from the use of dangerous
drugs: Provided, That all persons who by the nature of their profession carry firearms
shall undergo drug testing;

(c) Students of secondary and tertiary schools. – Students of secondary and tertiary
schools shall, pursuant to the related rules and regulations as contained in the school's
student handbook and with notice to the parents, undergo a random drug
testing: Provided, That all drug testing expenses whether in public or private schools
under this Section will be borne by the government;

(d) Officers and employees of public and private offices. – Officers and employees of
public and private offices, whether domestic or overseas, shall be subjected to undergo
a random drug test as contained in the company's work rules and regulations, which
shall be borne by the employer, for purposes of reducing the risk in the workplace. Any
officer or employee found positive for use of dangerous drugs shall be dealt with
administratively which shall be a ground for suspension or termination, subject to the
provisions of Article 282 of the Labor Code and pertinent provisions of the Civil Service
Law;

(e) Officers and members of the military, police and other law enforcement agencies. –
Officers and members of the military, police and other law enforcement agencies shall
undergo an annual mandatory drug test;

(f) All persons charged before the prosecutor's office with a criminal offense having an
imposable penalty of imprisonment of not less than six (6) years and one (1) day shall
have to undergo a mandatory drug test; and

(g) All candidates for public office whether appointed or elected both in the national or
local government shall undergo a mandatory drug test.

In addition to the above stated penalties in this Section, those found to be positive for
dangerous drugs use shall be subject to the provisions of Section 15 of this Act.

Section 37. Issuance of False or Fraudulent Drug Test Results. – Any person authorized,
licensed or accredited under this Act and its implementing rules to conduct drug examination or
test, who issues false or fraudulent drug test results knowingly, willfully or through gross
negligence, shall suffer the penalty of imprisonment ranging from six (6) years and one (1) day
to twelve (12) years and a fine ranging from One hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00) to
Five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00).

An additional penalty shall be imposed through the revocation of the license to practice his/her
profession in case of a practitioner, and the closure of the drug testing center.

Section 38. Laboratory Examination or Test on Apprehended/Arrested Offenders. – Subject to

Section 15 of this Act, any person apprehended or arrested for violating the provisions of this
Act shall be subjected to screening laboratory examination or test within twenty-four (24) hours,
if the apprehending or arresting officer has reasonable ground to believe that the person
apprehended or arrested, on account of physical signs or symptoms or other visible or outward
manifestation, is under the influence of dangerous drugs. If found to be positive, the results of
the screening laboratory examination or test shall be challenged within fifteen (15) days after
receipt of the result through a confirmatory test conducted in any accredited analytical
laboratory equipment with a gas chromatograph/mass spectrometry equipment or some such
modern and accepted method, if confirmed the same shall be prima facie evidence that such
person has used dangerous drugs, which is without prejudice for the prosecution for other
violations of the provisions of this Act: Provided, That a positive screening laboratory test must
be confirmed for it to be valid in a court of law.

Section 39. Accreditation of Drug Testing Centers and Physicians. – The DOH shall be tasked
to license and accredit drug testing centers in each province and city in order to assure their
capacity, competence, integrity and stability to conduct the laboratory examinations and tests
provided in this Article, and appoint such technical and other personnel as may be necessary for
the effective implementation of this provision. The DOH shall also accredit physicians who shall
conduct the drug dependency examination of a drug dependent as well as the after-care and
follow-up program for the said drug dependent. There shall be a control regulations, licensing
and accreditation division under the supervision of the DOH for this purpose.

For this purpose, the DOH shall establish, operate and maintain drug testing centers in
government hospitals, which must be provided at least with basic technologically advanced
equipment and materials, in order to conduct the laboratory examination and tests herein
provided, and appoint such qualified and duly trained technical and other personnel as may be
necessary for the effective implementation of this provision.

Section 40. Records Required for Transactions on Dangerous Drug and Precursors and
Essential Chemicals. –

a) Every pharmacist dealing in dangerous drugs and/or controlled precursors and

essential chemicals shall maintain and keep an original record of sales, purchases,
acquisitions and deliveries of dangerous drugs, indicating therein the following
information:

(1) License number and address of the pharmacist;

(2) Name, address and license of the manufacturer, importer or wholesaler from
whom the dangerous drugs have been purchased;

(3) Quantity and name of the dangerous drugs purchased or acquired;

 (4) Date of acquisition or purchase;

(5) Name, address and community tax certificate number of the buyer;

(6) Serial number of the prescription and the name of the physician, dentist,
veterinarian or practitioner issuing the same;

(7) Quantity and name of the dangerous drugs sold or delivered; and

(8) Date of sale or delivery.

A certified true copy of such record covering a period of six (6) months, duly signed by
the pharmacist or the owner of the drugstore, pharmacy or chemical establishment, shall
be forwarded to the Board within fifteen (15) days following the last day of June and
December of each year, with a copy thereof furnished the city or municipal health officer
concerned.

(b) A physician, dentist, veterinarian or practitioner authorized to prescribe any

dangerous drug shall issue the prescription therefor in one (1) original and two (2)
duplicate copies. The original, after the prescription has been filled, shall be retained by
the pharmacist for a period of one (1) year from the date of sale or delivery of such drug.
One (1) copy shall be retained by the buyer or by the person to whom the drug is
delivered until such drug is consumed, while the second copy shall be retained by the
person issuing the prescription.

For purposes of this Act, all prescriptions issued by physicians, dentists, veterinarians or
practitioners shall be written on forms exclusively issued by and obtainable from the
DOH. Such forms shall be made of a special kind of paper and shall be distributed in
such quantities and contain such information and other data as the DOH may, by rules
and regulations, require. Such forms shall only be issued by the DOH through its
authorized employees to licensed physicians, dentists, veterinarians and practitioners in
such quantities as the Board may authorize. In emergency cases, however, as the Board
may specify in the public interest, a prescription need not be accomplished on such
forms. The prescribing physician, dentist, veterinarian or practitioner shall, within three
(3) days after issuing such prescription, inform the DOH of the same in writing. No
prescription once served by the drugstore or pharmacy be reused nor any prescription
once issued be refilled.

(c) All manufacturers, wholesalers, distributors, importers, dealers and retailers of

dangerous drugs and/or controlled precursors and essential chemicals shall keep a
record of all inventories, sales, purchases, acquisitions and deliveries of the same as
well as the names, addresses and licenses of the persons from whom such items were
purchased or acquired or to whom such items were sold or delivered, the name and
quantity of the same and the date of the transactions. Such records may be subjected
anytime for review by the Board.

ARTICLE IV

Participation of the Family, Students, Teachers and School Authorities in the

Enforcement of this Act
Section 41. Involvement of the Family. – The family being the basic unit of the Filipino society
shall be primarily responsible for the education and awareness of the members of the family on
the ill effects of dangerous drugs and close monitoring of family members who may be
susceptible to drug abuse.

Section 42. Student Councils and Campus Organizations. – All elementary, secondary and
tertiary schools' student councils and campus organizations shall include in their activities a
program for the prevention of and deterrence in the use of dangerous drugs, and referral for
treatment and rehabilitation of students for drug dependence.

Section 43. School Curricula. – Instruction on drug abuse prevention and control shall be
integrated in the elementary, secondary and tertiary curricula of all public and private schools,
whether general, technical, vocational or agro-industrial as well as in non-formal, informal and
indigenous learning systems. Such instructions shall include:

(1) Adverse effects of the abuse and misuse of dangerous drugs on the person, the
family, the school and the community;

(2) Preventive measures against drug abuse;

(3) Health, socio-cultural, psychological, legal and economic dimensions and

implications of the drug problem;

(4) Steps to take when intervention on behalf of a drug dependent is needed, as well as
the services available for the treatment and rehabilitation of drug dependents; and

(5) Misconceptions about the use of dangerous drugs such as, but not limited to, the
importance and safety of dangerous drugs for medical and therapeutic use as well as
the differentiation between medical patients and drug dependents in order to avoid
confusion and accidental stigmatization in the consciousness of the students.

Section 44. Heads, Supervisors, and Teachers of Schools. – For the purpose of enforcing the
provisions of Article II of this Act, all school heads, supervisors and teachers shall be deemed
persons in authority and, as such, are hereby empowered to apprehend, arrest or cause the
apprehension or arrest of any person who shall violate any of the said provisions, pursuant to
Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court. They shall be deemed persons in authority if they are
in the school or within its immediate vicinity, or even beyond such immediate vicinity if they are
in attendance at any school or class function in their official capacity as school heads,
supervisors, and teachers.

Any teacher or school employee, who discovers or finds that any person in the school or within
its immediate vicinity is liable for violating any of said provisions, shall have the duty to report
the same to the school head or immediate superior who shall, in turn, report the matter to the
proper authorities.

Failure to do so in either case, within a reasonable period from the time of discovery of the
violation shall, after due hearing, constitute sufficient cause for disciplinary action by the school
authorities.
Section 45. Publication and Distribution of Materials on Dangerous Drugs. – With the
assistance of the Board, the Secretary of the Department of Education (DepEd), the Chairman
of the Commission on Higher Education (CHED) and the Director-General of the Technical
Education and Skills Development Authority (TESDA) shall cause the development, publication
and distribution of information and support educational materials on dangerous drugs to the
students, the faculty, the parents, and the community.

Section 46. Special Drug Education Center. – With the assistance of the Board, the Department
of the Interior and Local Government (DILG), the National Youth Commission (NYC), and the
Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD) shall establish in each of its provincial
office a special education drug center for out-of-school youth and street children. Such Center
which shall be headed by the Provincial Social. Welfare Development Officer shall sponsor drug
prevention programs and activities and information campaigns with the end in view of educating
the out-of-school youth and street children regarding the pernicious effects of drug abuse. The
programs initiated by the Center shall likewise be adopted in all public and private orphanage
and existing special centers for street children.

ARTICLE V

Promotion of a National Drug-Free Workplace Program With the Participation of Private

and Labor Sectors and the Department of Labor and Employment

Section 47. Drug-Free Workplace. – It is deemed a policy of the State to promote drug-free
workplaces using a tripartite approach. With the assistance of the Board, the Department of
Labor and Employment (DOLE) shall develop, promote and implement a national drug abuse
prevention program in the workplace to be adopted by private companies with ten (10) or more
employees. Such program shall include the mandatory drafting and adoption of company
policies against drug use in the workplace in close consultation and coordination with the DOLE,
labor and employer organizations, human resource development managers and other such
private sector organizations.

Section 48. Guidelines for the National Drug-Free Workplace Program. – The Board and the
DOLE shall formulate the necessary guidelines for the implementation of the national drug-free
workplace program. The amount necessary for the implementation of which shall be included in
the annual General Appropriations Act.

ARTICLE VI

Participation of the Private and Labor Sectors in the Enforcement of this Act

Section 49. Labor Organizations and the Private Sector. – All labor unions, federations,
associations, or organizations in cooperation with the respective private sector partners shall
include in their collective bargaining or any similar agreements, joint continuing programs and
information campaigns for the laborers similar to the programs provided under Section 47 of this
Act with the end in view of achieving a drug free workplace.

Section 50. Government Assistance. – The labor sector and the respective partners may, in
pursuit of the programs mentioned in the preceding Section, secure the technical assistance,
such as but not limited to, seminars and information dissemination campaigns of the appropriate
government and law enforcement agencies.
 ARTICLE VII

Participation of Local Government Units

Section 51. Local Government Units' Assistance. – Local government units shall appropriate a
substantial portion of their respective annual budgets to assist in or enhance the enforcement of
this Act giving priority to preventive or educational programs and the rehabilitation or treatment
of drug dependents.

Section 52. Abatement of Drug Related Public Nuisances. – Any place or premises which have
been used on two or more occasions as the site of the unlawful sale or delivery of dangerous
drugs may be declared to be a public nuisance, and such nuisance may be abated, pursuant to
the following procedures:

(1) Any city or municipality may, by ordinance, create an administrative board to hear
complaints regarding the nuisances;

(2) any employee, officer, or resident of the city or municipality may bring a complaint
before the Board after giving not less than three (3) days written notice of such complaint
to the owner of the place or premises at his/her last known address; and

(3) After hearing in which the Board may consider any evidence, including evidence of
the general reputation of the place or premises, and at which the owner of the premises
shall have an opportunity to present evidence in his/her defense, the Board may declare
the place or premises to be a public nuisance.

Section 53. Effect of Board Declaration. – If the Board declares a place or premises to be a
public nuisance, it may declare an order immediately prohibiting the conduct, operation, or
maintenance of any business or activity on the premises which is conducive to such nuisance.

An order entered under this Section shall expire after one (1) year or at such earlier time as
stated in the order. The Board may bring a complaint seeking a permanent injunction against
any nuisance described under this Section.

This Article does not restrict the right of any person to proceed under the Civil Code against any
public nuisance.

ARTICLE VIII

Program for Treatment and Rehabilitation of Drug Dependents

Section 54. Voluntary Submission of a Drug Dependent to Confinement, Treatment and

Rehabilitation. – A drug dependent or any person who violates Section 15 of this Act may, by
himself/herself or through his/her parent, spouse, guardian or relative within the fourth degree of
consanguinity or affinity, apply to the Board or its duly recognized representative, for treatment
and rehabilitation of the drug dependency. Upon such application, the Board shall bring forth the
matter to the Court which shall order that the applicant be examined for drug dependency. If the
examination by a DOH-accredited physician results in the issuance of a certification that the
applicant is a drug dependent, he/she shall be ordered by the Court to undergo treatment and
rehabilitation in a Center designated by the Board for a period of not less than six (6)
months: Provided, That a drug dependent may be placed under the care of a DOH-accredited
physician where there is no Center near or accessible to the residence of the drug dependent or
where said drug dependent is below eighteen (18) years of age and is a first-time offender and
non-confinement in a Center will not pose a serious danger to his/her family or the community.

Confinement in a Center for treatment and rehabilitation shall not exceed one (1) year, after
which time the Court, as well as the Board, shall be apprised by the head of the treatment and
rehabilitation center of the status of said drug dependent and determine whether further
confinement will be for the welfare of the drug dependent and his/her family or the community.

Section 55. Exemption from the Criminal Liability Under the Voluntary Submission Program. A
drug dependent under the voluntary submission program, who is finally discharged from
confinement, shall be exempt from the criminal liability under Section 15 of this act subject to
the following conditions:

(1) He/she has complied with the rules and regulations of the center, the applicable rules
and regulations of the Board, including the after-care and follow-up program for at least
eighteen (18) months following temporary discharge from confinement in the Center or,
in the case of a dependent placed under the care of the DOH-accredited physician, the
after-care program and follow-up schedule formulated by the DSWD and approved by
the Board: Provided, That capability-building of local government social workers shall be
undertaken by the DSWD;

(2) He/she has never been charged or convicted of any offense punishable under this
Act, the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 or Republic Act No. 6425, as amended; the
Revised Penal Code, as amended; or any special penal laws;

(3) He/she has no record of escape from a Center: Provided, That had he/she escaped,
he/she surrendered by himself/herself or through his/her parent, spouse, guardian or
relative within the fourth degree of consanguinity or affinity, within one (1) week from the
date of the said escape; and

(4) He/she poses no serious danger to himself/herself, his/her family or the community
by his/her exemption from criminal liability.

Section 56. Temporary Release From the Center; After-Care and Follow-Up Treatment Under
the Voluntary Submission Program. – Upon certification of the Center that the drug dependent
within the voluntary submission program may be temporarily released, the Court shall order
his/her release on condition that said drug dependent shall report to the DOH for after-care and
follow-up treatment, including urine testing, for a period not exceeding eighteen (18) months
under such terms and conditions that the Court may impose.

If during the period of after-care and follow-up, the drug dependent is certified to be
rehabilitated, he/she may be discharged by the Court, subject to the provisions of Section 55 of
this Act, without prejudice to the outcome of any pending case filed in court.

However, should the DOH find that during the initial after-care and follow-up program of
eighteen (18) months, the drug dependent requires further treatment and rehabilitation in the
Center, he/she shall be recommitted to the Center for confinement. Thereafter, he/she may
again be certified for temporary release and ordered released for another after-care and follow-
up program pursuant to this Section.

Section 57. Probation and Community Service Under the Voluntary Submission Program. – A
drug dependent who is discharged as rehabilitated by the DOH-accredited Center through the
voluntary submission program, but does not qualify for exemption from criminal liability under
Section 55 of this Act, may be charged under the provisions of this Act, but shall be placed on
probation and undergo a community service in lieu of imprisonment and/or fine in the discretion
of the court, without prejudice to the outcome of any pending case filed in court.

Such drug dependent shall undergo community service as part of his/her after-care and follow-
up program, which may be done in coordination with nongovernmental civil organizations
accredited by the DSWD, with the recommendation of the Board.

Section 58. Filing of Charges Against a Drug Dependent Who is Not Rehabilitated Under the
Voluntary Submission Program. – A drug dependent, who is not rehabilitated after the second
commitment to the Center under the voluntary submission program, shall, upon
recommendation of the Board, be charged for violation of Section 15 of this Act and prosecuted
like any other offender. If convicted, he/she shall be credited for the period of confinement and
rehabilitation in the Center in the service of his/her sentence.

Section 59. Escape and Recommitment for Confinement and Rehabilitation Under the
Voluntary Submission Program. – Should a drug dependent under the voluntary submission
program escape from the Center, he/she may submit himself/herself for recommitment within
one (1) week therefrom, or his/her parent, spouse, guardian or relative within the fourth degree
of consanguinity or affinity may, within said period, surrender him for recommitment, in which
case the corresponding order shall be issued by the Board.

Should the escapee fail to submit himself/herself or be surrendered after one (1) week, the
Board shall apply to the court for a recommitment order upon proof of previous commitment or
his/her voluntary submission by the Board, the court may issue an order for recommitment
within one (1) week.

If, subsequent to a recommitment, the dependent once again escapes from confinement, he/she
shall be charged for violation of Section 15 of this Act and he subjected under section 61 of this
Act, either upon order of the Board or upon order of the court, as the case may be.

Section 60. Confidentiality of Records Under the Voluntary Submission Program. – Judicial and
medical records of drug dependents under the voluntary submission program shall be
confidential and shall not be used against him for any purpose, except to determine how many
times, by himself/herself or through his/her parent, spouse, guardian or relative within the fourth
degree of consanguinity or affinity, he/she voluntarily submitted himself/herself for confinement,
treatment and rehabilitation or has been committed to a Center under this program.

Section 61. Compulsory Confinement of a Drug Dependent Who Refuses to Apply Under the
Voluntary Submission Program. – Notwithstanding any law, rule and regulation to the contrary,
any person determined and found to be dependent on dangerous drugs shall, upon petition by
the Board or any of its authorized representative, be confined for treatment and rehabilitation in
any Center duly designated or accredited for the purpose.
A petition for the confinement of a person alleged to be dependent on dangerous drugs to a
Center may be filed by any person authorized by the Board with the Regional Trial Court of the
province or city where such person is found.

After the petition is filed, the court, by an order, shall immediately fix a date for the hearing, and
a copy of such order shall be served on the person alleged to be dependent on dangerous
drugs, and to the one having charge of him.

If after such hearing and the facts so warrant, the court shall order the drug dependent to be
examined by two (2) physicians accredited by the Board. If both physicians conclude that the
respondent is not a drug dependent, the court shall order his/her discharge. If either physician
finds him to be a dependent, the court shall conduct a hearing and consider all relevant
evidence which may be offered. If the court finds him a drug dependent, it shall issue an order
for his/her commitment to a treatment and rehabilitation center under the supervision of the
DOH. In any event, the order of discharge or order of confinement or commitment shall be
issued not later than fifteen (15) days from the filing of the appropriate petition.

Section 62. Compulsory Submission of a Drug Dependent Charged with an Offense to

Treatment and Rehabilitation. – If a person charged with an offense where the imposable
penalty is imprisonment of less than six (6) years and one (1) day, and is found by the
prosecutor or by the court, at any stage of the proceedings, to be a drug dependent, the
prosecutor or the court as the case may be, shall suspend all further proceedings and transmit
copies of the record of the case to the Board.

In the event he Board determines, after medical examination, that public interest requires that
such drug dependent be committed to a center for treatment and rehabilitation, it shall file a
petition for his/her commitment with the regional trial court of the province or city where he/she
is being investigated or tried: Provided, That where a criminal case is pending in court, such
petition shall be filed in the said court. The court shall take judicial notice of the prior
proceedings in the case and shall proceed to hear the petition. If the court finds him to be a drug
dependent, it shall order his/her commitment to a Center for treatment and rehabilitation. The
head of said Center shall submit to the court every four (4) months, or as often as the court may
require, a written report on the progress of the treatment. If the dependent is rehabilitated, as
certified by the center and the Board, he/she shall be returned to the court, which committed
him, for his/her discharge therefrom.

Thereafter, his/her prosecution for any offense punishable by law shall be instituted or shall
continue, as the case may be. In case of conviction, the judgment shall, if the accused is
certified by the treatment and rehabilitation center to have maintained good behavior, indicate
that he/she shall be given full credit for the period he/she was confined in the Center: Provided,
however, That when the offense is for violation of Section 15 of this Act and the accused is not a
recidivist, the penalty thereof shall be deemed to have been served in the Center upon his/her
release therefrom after certification by the Center and the Board that he/she is rehabilitated.

Section 63. Prescription of the Offense Charged Against a Drug Dependent Under the
Compulsory Submission Program. – The period of prescription of the offense charged against a
drug dependent under the compulsory submission program shall not run during the time that the
drug dependent is under confinement in a Center or otherwise under the treatment and
rehabilitation program approved by the Board.
Upon certification of the Center that he/she may temporarily be discharged from the said Center,
the court shall order his/her release on condition that he/she shall report to the Board through
the DOH for after-care and follow-up treatment for a period not exceeding eighteen (18) months
under such terms and conditions as may be imposed by the Board.

If at anytime during the after-care and follow-up period, the Board certifies to his/her complete
rehabilitation, the court shall order his/her final discharge from confinement and order for the
immediate resumption of the trial of the case for which he/she is originally charged. Should the
Board through the DOH find at anytime during the after-care and follow-up period that he/she
requires further treatment and rehabilitation, it shall report to the court, which shall order his/her
recommitment to the Center.

Should the drug dependent, having been committed to a Center upon petition by the Board
escape therefrom, he/she may resubmit himself/herself for confinement within one (1) week
from the date of his/her escape; or his/her parent, spouse, guardian or relative within the fourth
degree of consanguinity or affinity may, within the same period, surrender him for
recommitment. If, however, the drug dependent does not resubmit himself/herself for
confinement or he/she is not surrendered for recommitment, the Board may apply with the court
for the issuance of the recommitment order. Upon proof of previous commitment, the court shall
issue an order for recommitment. If, subsequent to such recommitment, he/she should escape
again, he/she shall no longer be exempt from criminal liability for use of any dangerous drug.

A drug dependent committed under this particular Section who is finally discharged from
confinement shall be exempt from criminal liability under Section 15 of this Act, without prejudice
to the outcome of any pending case filed in court. On the other hand, a drug dependent who is
not rehabilitated after a second commitment to the Center shall, upon conviction by the
appropriate court, suffer the same penalties provided for under Section 15 of this Act again
without prejudice to the outcome of any pending case filed in court.

Section 64. Confidentiality of Records Under the Compulsory Submission Program. – The
records of a drug dependent who was rehabilitated and discharged from the Center under the
compulsory submission program, or who was charged for violation of Section 15 of this Act,
shall be covered by Section 60 of this Act. However, the records of a drug dependent who was
not rehabilitated, or who escaped but did not surrender himself/herself within the prescribed
period, shall be forwarded to the court and their use shall be determined by the court, taking into
consideration public interest and the welfare of the drug dependent.

Section 65. Duty of the Prosecutor in the Proceedings. – It shall be the duty of the provincial or
the city prosecutor or their assistants or state prosecutors to prepare the appropriate petition in
all proceedings arising from this Act.

Section 66. Suspension of Sentence of a First-Time Minor Offender. – An accused who is over
fifteen (15) years of age at the time of the commission of the offense mentioned in Section 11 of
this Act, but not more than eighteen (18) years of age at the time when judgment should have
been promulgated after having been found guilty of said offense, may be given the benefits of a
suspended sentence, subject to the following conditions:

(a) He/she has not been previously convicted of violating any provision of this Act, or of
the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended; or of the Revised Penal Code; or of any
special penal laws;
 (b) He/she has not been previously committed to a Center or to the care of a DOH-
accredited physician; and

(c) The Board favorably recommends that his/her sentence be suspended.

While under suspended sentence, he/she shall be under the supervision and rehabilitative
surveillance of the Board, under such conditions that the court may impose for a period ranging
from six (6) months to eighteen (18) months.

Upon recommendation of the Board, the court may commit the accused under suspended
sentence to a Center, or to the care of a DOH-accredited physician for at least six (6) months,
with after-care and follow-up program for not more than eighteen (18) months.

In the case of minors under fifteen (15) years of age at the time of the commission of any
offense penalized under this Act, Article 192 of Presidential Decree No. 603, otherwise known
as the Child and Youth Welfare Code, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1179 shall apply,
without prejudice to the application of the provisions of this Section.

Section 67. Discharge After Compliance with Conditions of Suspended Sentence of a First-
Time Minor Offender. – If the accused first time minor offender under suspended sentence
complies with the applicable rules and regulations of the Board, including confinement in a
Center, the court, upon a favorable recommendation of the Board for the final discharge of the
accused, shall discharge the accused and dismiss all proceedings.

Upon the dismissal of the proceedings against the accused, the court shall enter an order to
expunge all official records, other than the confidential record to be retained by the DOJ relating
to the case. Such an order, which shall be kept confidential, shall restore the accused to his/her
status prior to the case. He/she shall not be held thereafter to be guilty of perjury or of
concealment or misrepresentation by reason of his/her failure to acknowledge the case or recite
any fact related thereto in response to any inquiry made of him for any purpose.

Section 68. Privilege of Suspended Sentence to be Availed of Only Once by a First-Time Minor
Offender. – The privilege of suspended sentence shall be availed of only once by an accused
drug dependent who is a first-time offender over fifteen (15) years of age at the time of the
commission of the violation of Section 15 of this Act but not more than eighteen (18) years of
age at the time when judgment should have been promulgated.

Section 69. Promulgation of Sentence for First-Time Minor Offender. – If the accused first-time
minor offender violates any of the conditions of his/her suspended sentence, the applicable
rules and regulations of the Board exercising supervision and rehabilitative surveillance over
him, including the rules and regulations of the Center should confinement be required, the court
shall pronounce judgment of conviction and he/she shall serve sentence as any other convicted
person.

Section 70. Probation or Community Service for a First-Time Minor Offender in Lieu of
Imprisonment. – Upon promulgation of the sentence, the court may, in its discretion, place the
accused under probation, even if the sentence provided under this Act is higher than that
provided under existing law on probation, or impose community service in lieu of imprisonment.
In case of probation, the supervision and rehabilitative surveillance shall be undertaken by the
Board through the DOH in coordination with the Board of Pardons and Parole and the Probation
Administration. Upon compliance with the conditions of the probation, the Board shall submit a
written report to the court recommending termination of probation and a final discharge of the
probationer, whereupon the court shall issue such an order.

The community service shall be complied with under conditions, time and place as may be
determined by the court in its discretion and upon the recommendation of the Board and shall
apply only to violators of Section 15 of this Act. The completion of the community service shall
be under the supervision and rehabilitative surveillance of the Board during the period required
by the court. Thereafter, the Board shall render a report on the manner of compliance of said
community service. The court in its discretion may require extension of the community service
or order a final discharge.

In both cases, the judicial records shall be covered by the provisions of Sections 60 and 64 of
this Act.

If the sentence promulgated by the court requires imprisonment, the period spent in the Center
by the accused during the suspended sentence period shall be deducted from the sentence to
be served.

Section 71. Records to be kept by the Department of Justice. – The DOJ shall keep a
confidential record of the proceedings on suspension of sentence and shall not be used for any
purpose other than to determine whether or not a person accused under this Act is a first-time
minor offender.

Section 72. Liability of a Person Who Violates the Confidentiality of Records. – The penalty of
imprisonment ranging from six (6) months and one (1) day to six (6) years and a fine ranging
from One thousand pesos (P1,000.00) to Six thousand pesos (P6,000.00), shall be imposed
upon any person who, having official custody of or access to the confidential records of any
drug dependent under voluntary submission programs, or anyone who, having gained
possession of said records, whether lawfully or not, reveals their content to any person other
than those charged with the prosecution of the offenses under this Act and its implementation.
The maximum penalty shall be imposed, in addition to absolute perpetual disqualification from
any public office, when the offender is a government official or employee. Should the records be
used for unlawful purposes, such as blackmail of the drug dependent or the members of his/her
family, the penalty imposed for the crime of violation of confidentiality shall be in addition to
whatever crime he/she may be convicted of.

Section 73. Liability of a Parent, Spouse or Guardian Who Refuses to Cooperate with the
Board or any Concerned Agency. – Any parent, spouse or guardian who, without valid reason,
refuses to cooperate with the Board or any concerned agency in the treatment and rehabilitation
of a drug dependent who is a minor, or in any manner, prevents or delays the after-care, follow-
up or other programs for the welfare of the accused drug dependent, whether under voluntary
submission program or compulsory submission program, may be cited for contempt by the
court.

Section 74. Cost-Sharing in the Treatment and Rehabilitation of a Drug Dependent. – The
parent, spouse, guardian or any relative within the fourth degree of consanguinity of any person
who is confined under the voluntary submission program or compulsory submission program
shall be charged a certain percentage of the cost of his/her treatment and rehabilitation, the
guidelines of which shall be formulated by the DSWD taking into consideration the economic
status of the family of the person confined. The guidelines therein formulated shall be
implemented by a social worker of the local government unit.

Section 75. Treatment and Rehabilitation Centers. – The existing treatment and rehabilitation
centers for drug dependents operated and maintained by the NBI and the PNP shall be
operated, maintained and managed by the DOH in coordination with other concerned agencies.
For the purpose of enlarging the network of centers, the Board through the DOH shall
encourage, promote or whenever feasible, assist or support in the establishment, operations
and maintenance of private centers which shall be eligible to receive grants, donations or
subsidy from either government or private sources. It shall also support the establishment of
government-operated regional treatment and rehabilitation centers depending upon the
availability of funds. The national government, through its appropriate agencies shall give
priority funding for the increase of subsidy to existing government drug rehabilitation centers,
and shall establish at least one (1) drug rehabilitation center in each province, depending on the
availability of funds.

Section 76. The Duties and Responsibilities of the Department of health (DOH) Under this Act.
– The DOH shall:

(1) Oversee the monitor the integration, coordination and supervision of all drug
rehabilitation, intervention, after-care and follow-up programs, projects and activities as
well as the establishment, operations, maintenance and management of privately-owned
drug treatment rehabilitation centers and drug testing networks and laboratories
throughout the country in coordination with the DSWD and other agencies;

(2) License, accredit, establish and maintain drug test network and laboratory, initiate,
conduct and support scientific research on drugs and drug control;

(3) Encourage, assist and accredit private centers, promulgate rules and regulations
setting minimum standards for their accreditation to assure their competence, integrity
and stability;

(4) Prescribe and promulgate rules and regulations governing the establishment of such
Centers as it may deem necessary after conducting a feasibility study thereof;

(5) The DOH shall, without prejudice to the criminal prosecution of those found guilty of
violating this Act, order the closure of a Center for treatment and rehabilitation of drug
dependency when, after investigation it is found guilty of violating the provisions of this
Act or regulations issued by the Board; and

(6) Charge reasonable fees for drug dependency examinations, other medical and legal
services provided to the public, which shall accrue to the Board. All income derived from
these sources shall be part of the funds constituted as special funds for the
implementation of this Act under Section 87.

ARTICLE IX

Dangerous Drugs Board and Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency

Section 77. The Dangerous Drugs Board. – The Board shall be the policy-making and strategy-
formulating body in the planning and formulation of policies and programs on drug prevention
and control. It shall develop and adopt a comprehensive, integrated, unified and balanced
national drug abuse prevention and control strategy. It shall be under the Office of the President.

Section 78. Composition of the Board. – The Board shall be composed of seventeen (17)
members wherein three (3) of which are permanent members, the other twelve (12) members
shall be in an ex officio capacity and the two (2) shall be regular members.

The three (3) permanent members, who shall possess at least seven-year training and
experience in the field of dangerous drugs and in any of the following fields: in law, medicine,
criminology, psychology or social work, shall be appointed by the President of the Philippines.
The President shall designate a Chairman, who shall have the rank of a secretary from among
the three (3) permanent members who shall serve for six (6) years. Of the two (2) other
members, who shall both have the rank of undersecretary, one (1) shall serve for four (4) years
and the other for two (2) years. Thereafter, the persons appointed to succeed such members
shall hold office for a term of six (6) years and until their successors shall have been duly
appointed and qualified.

The other twelve (12) members who shall be ex officio members of the Board are the following:

(1) Secretary of the Department of Justice or his/her representative;

(2) Secretary of the Department of Health or his/her representative;

(3) Secretary of the Department of National Defense or his/her representative;

(4) Secretary of the Department of Finance or his/her representative;

(5) Secretary of the Department of Labor and Employment or his/her representative;

(6) Secretary of the Department of the Interior and Local Government or his/her
representative;

(7) Secretary of the Department of Social Welfare and Development or his/her

representative;

(8) Secretary of the Department of Foreign Affairs or his/her representative;

(9) Secretary of the Department of Education or his/her representative;

(10) Chairman of the Commission on Higher Education or his/her representative;

(11) Chairman of the National Youth Commission;

(12) Director General of the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency.

Cabinet secretaries who are members of the Board may designate their duly authorized and
permanent representatives whose ranks shall in no case be lower than undersecretary.
The two (2) regular members shall be as follows:

(a) The president of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines; and

(b) The chairman or president of a non-government organization involved in dangerous

drug campaign to be appointed by the President of the Philippines.

The Director of the NBI and the Chief of the PNP shall be the permanent consultants of the
Board, and shall attend all the meetings of the Board.

All members of the Board as well as its permanent consultants shall receive a per diem for
every meeting actually attended subject to the pertinent budgetary laws, rules and regulations
on compensation, honoraria and allowances: Provided, That where the representative of an ex
officio member or of the permanent consultant of the Board attends a meeting in behalf of the
latter, such representative shall be entitled to receive the per diem.

Section 79. Meetings of the Board. – The Board shall meet once a week or as often as
necessary at the discretion of the Chairman or at the call of any four (4) other members. The
presence of nine (9) members shall constitute a quorum.

Section 80. Secretariat of the Board. – The Board shall recommend to the President of the
Philippines the appointment of an Executive Director, with the rank of an undersecretary, who
shall be the Secretary of the Board and administrative officer of its secretariat, and shall perform
such other duties that may be assigned to him/her. He/she must possess adequate knowledge,
training and experience in the field of dangerous drugs, and in any of the following fields: law
enforcement, law, medicine, criminology, psychology or social work.

Two deputies executive director, for administration and operations, with the ranks of assistant
secretary, shall be appointed by the President upon recommendation of the Board. They shall
possess the same qualifications as those of the executive director. They shall receive a salary
corresponding to their position as prescribed by the Salary Standardization Law as a Career
Service Officer.

The existing secretariat of the Board shall be under the administrative control and supervision of
the Executive Director. It shall be composed of the following divisions, namely: Policy Studies,
Research and Statistics; Preventive Education, Training and Information; Legal Affairs; and the
Administrative and Financial Management.

Section 81. Powers and Duties of the Board. – The Board shall:

(a) Formulate, develop and establish a comprehensive, integrated, unified and balanced
national drug use prevention and control strategy;

(b) Promulgate such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the
purposes of this Act, including the manner of safekeeping, disposition, burning or
condemnation of any dangerous drug and/or controlled precursor and essential chemical
under its charge and custody, and prescribe administrative remedies or sanctions for the
violations of such rules and regulations;
(c) Conduct policy studies, program monitoring and evaluations and other researches on
drug prevention, control and enforcement;

(d) Initiate, conduct and support scientific, clinical, social, psychological, physical and
biological researches on dangerous drugs and dangerous drugs prevention and control
measures;

(e) Develop an educational program and information drive on the hazards and
prevention of illegal use of any dangerous drug and/or controlled precursor and essential
chemical based on factual data, and disseminate the same to the general public, for
which purpose the Board shall endeavor to make the general public aware of the
hazards of any dangerous drugs and/or controlled precursor and essential chemical by
providing among others, literature, films, displays or advertisements and by coordinating
with all institutions of learning as well as with all national and local enforcement agencies
in planning and conducting its educational campaign programs to be implemented by the
appropriate government agencies;

(f) Conduct continuing seminars for, and consultations with, and provide information
materials to judges and prosecutors in coordination with the Office of the Court
Administrator, in the case of judges, and the DOJ, in the case of prosecutors, which aim
to provide them with the current developments and programs of the Board pertinent to its
campaign against dangerous drugs and its scientific researches on dangerous drugs, its
prevention and control measures;

(g) Design special trainings in order to provide law enforcement officers, members of the
judiciary, and prosecutors, school authorities and personnel of centers with knowledge
and know-how in dangerous drugs and/or controlled precursors and essential chemicals
control in coordination with the Supreme Court to meet the objectives of the national
drug control programs;

(h) Design and develop, in consultation and coordination with the DOH, DSWD and
other agencies involved in drugs control, treatment and rehabilitation, both public and
private, a national treatment and rehabilitation program for drug dependents including a
standard aftercare and community service program for recovering drug dependents;

(i) Design and develop, jointly with the DOLE and in consultation with labor and
employer groups as well as nongovernment organizations a drug abuse prevention
program in the workplace that would include a provision for employee assistance
programs for emotionally-stressed employees;

(j) Initiate and authorize closure proceedings against non-accredited and/or substandard
rehabilitation centers based on verified reports of human rights violations, subhuman
conditions, inadequate medical training and assistance and excessive fees for
implementation by the PDEA;

(k) Prescribe and promulgate rules and regulations governing the establishment of such
centers, networks and laboratories as deemed necessary after conducting a feasibility
study in coordination with the DOH and other government agencies;
(l) Receive, gather, collect and evaluate all information on the importation, exportation,
production, manufacture, sale, stocks, seizures of and the estimated need for any
dangerous drug and/or controlled precursor and essential chemical, for which purpose
the Board may require from any official, instrumentality or agency of the government or
any private person or enterprise dealing in, or engaged in activities having to do with any
dangerous drug and/or controlled precursors and essential chemicals such data or
information as it may need to implement this Act;

(m) Gather and prepare detailed statistics on the importation, exportation, manufacture,
stocks, seizures of and estimates need for any dangerous drug and/or controlled
precursors and essential chemicals and such other statistical data on said drugs as may
be periodically required by the United Nations Narcotics Drug Commission, the World
Health Organization and other international organizations in consonance with the
country's international commitments;

(n) Develop and maintain international networking coordination with international drug
control agencies and organizations, and implement the provisions of international
conventions and agreements thereon which have been adopted and approved by the
Congress of the Philippines;

(o) Require all government and private hospitals, clinics, doctors, dentists and other
practitioners to submit a report to it, in coordination with the PDEA, about all dangerous
drugs and/or controlled precursors and essential chemicals-related cases to which they
have attended for statistics and research purposes;

(p) Receive in trust legacies, gifts and donations of real and personal properties of all
kinds, to administer and dispose the same when necessary for the benefit of government
and private rehabilitation centers subject to limitations, directions and instructions from
the donors, if any;

(q) Issue guidelines as to the approval or disapproval of applications for voluntary

treatment, rehabilitation or confinement, wherein it shall issue the necessary guidelines,
rules and regulations pertaining to the application and its enforcement;

(r) Formulate guidelines, in coordination with other government agencies, the

importation, distribution, production, manufacture, compounding, prescription,
dispensing and sale of, and other lawful acts in connection with any dangerous drug,
controlled precursors and essential chemicals and other similar or analogous
substances of such kind and in such quantity as it may deem necessary according to the
medical and research needs or requirements of the country including diet pills containing
ephedrine and other addictive chemicals and determine the quantity and/or quality of
dangerous drugs and controlled precursors and essential chemicals to be imported,
manufactured and held in stock at any given time by authorized importer, manufacturer
or distributor of such drugs;

(s) Develop the utilization of a controlled delivery scheme in addressing the

transshipment of dangerous drugs into and out of the country to neutralize transnational
crime syndicates involved in illegal trafficking of any dangerous drugs and/or controlled
precursors and essential chemicals;
 (t) Recommend the revocation of the professional license of any practitioner who is an
owner, co-owner, lessee, or in the employ of the drug establishment, or manager of a
partnership, corporation, association, or any juridical entity owning and/or controlling
such drug establishment, and who knowingly participates in, or consents to, tolerates, or
abets the commission of the act of violations as indicated in the preceding paragraph, all
without prejudice to the criminal prosecution of the person responsible for the said
violation;

(u) Appoint such technical, administrative and other personnel as may be necessary for
the effective implementation of this Act, subject to the Civil Service Law and its rules and
regulations;

(v) Establish a regular and continuing consultation with concerned government agencies
and medical professional organizations to determine if balance exists in policies,
procedures, rules and regulations on dangerous drugs and to provide recommendations
on how the lawful use of dangerous drugs can be improved and facilitated; and

(w) Submit an annual and periodic reports to the President, the Congress of the
Philippines and the Senate and House of Representatives committees concerned as
may be required from time to time, and perform such other functions as may be
authorized or required under existing laws and as directed by the President
himself/herself or as recommended by the congressional committees concerned.

Section 82. Creation of the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA). – To carry out the
provisions of this Act, the PDEA, which serves as the implementing arm of the Board, and shall
be responsible for the efficient and effective law enforcement of all the provisions on any
dangerous drug and/or controlled precursor and essential chemical as provided in this Act.

The PDEA shall be headed by a Director General with the rank of Undersecretary, who shall be
responsible for the general administration and management of the Agency. The Director General
of the PDEA shall be appointed by the President of the Philippines and shall perform such other
duties that may be assigned to him/her. He/she must possess adequate knowledge, training and
experience in the field of dangerous drugs, and in any of the following fields: law enforcement,
law, medicine, criminology, psychology or social work.

The Director General of the PDEA shall be assisted in the performance of his/her duties and
responsibilities by two (2) deputies director general with the rank of Assistant Secretary; one for
Operations and the other one for Administration. The two (2) deputies director general shall
likewise be appointed by the President of the Philippines upon recommendation of the Board.
The two (2) deputies director general shall possess the same qualifications as those of the
Director General of the PDEA. The Director General and the two (2) deputies director general
shall receive the compensation and salaries as prescribed by law.

Section 83. Organization of the PDEA. – The present Secretariat of the National Drug Law
Enforcement and Prevention Coordinating Center as created by Executive Order No. 61 shall
be accordingly modified and absorbed by the PDEA.

The Director General of the PDEA shall be responsible for the necessary changes in the
organizational set-up which shall be submitted to the Board for approval.
For purposes of carrying out its duties and powers as provided for in the succeeding Section of
this Act, the PDEA shall have the following Services, namely: Intelligence and Investigation;
International Cooperation and Foreign Affairs; Preventive Education and Community
Involvement; Plans and Operations; Compliance; Legal and Prosecution; Administrative and
Human Resource; Financial Management; Logistics Management; and Internal Affairs.

The PDEA shall establish and maintain regional offices in the different regions of the country
which shall be responsible for the implementation of this Act and the policies, programs, and
projects of said agency in their respective regions.

Section 84. Powers and Duties of the PDEA. – The PDEA shall:

(a) Implement or cause the efficient and effective implementation of the national drug
control strategy formulated by the Board thereby carrying out a national drug campaign
program which shall include drug law enforcement, control and prevention campaign
with the assistance of concerned government agencies;

(b) Undertake the enforcement of the provisions of Article II of this Act relative to the
unlawful acts and penalties involving any dangerous drug and/or controlled precursor
and essential chemical and investigate all violators and other matters involved in the
commission of any crime relative to the use, abuse or trafficking of any dangerous drug
and/or controlled precursor and essential chemical as provided for in this Act and the
provisions of Presidential Decree No. 1619;

(c) Administer oath, issue subpoena and subpoena duces tecum relative to the conduct
of investigation involving the violations of this Act;

(d) Arrest and apprehend as well as search all violators and seize or confiscate, the
effects or proceeds of the crimes as provided by law and take custody thereof, for this
purpose the prosecutors and enforcement agents are authorized to possess firearms, in
accordance with existing laws;

(e) Take charge and have custody of all dangerous drugs and/or controlled precursors
and essential chemicals seized, confiscated or surrendered to any national, provincial or
local law enforcement agency, if no longer needed for purposes of evidence in court;

(f) Establish forensic laboratories in each PNP office in every province and city in order
to facilitate action on seize or confiscated drugs, thereby hastening its destruction
without delay;

(g) Recommend to the DOJ the forfeiture of properties and other assets of persons
and/or corporations found to be violating the provisions of this Act and in accordance
with the pertinent provisions of the Anti-Money-Laundering Act of 2001;

(h) Prepare for prosecution or cause the filing of appropriate criminal and civil cases for
violation of all laws on dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and essential chemicals,
and other similar controlled substances, and assist, support and coordinate with other
government agencies for the proper and effective prosecution of the same;
(i) Monitor and if warranted by circumstances, in coordination with the Philippine Postal
Office and the Bureau of Customs, inspect all air cargo packages, parcels and mails in
the central post office, which appear from the package and address itself to be a
possible importation of dangerous drugs and/or controlled precursors and essential
chemicals, through on-line or cyber shops via the internet or cyberspace;

(j) Conduct eradication programs to destroy wild or illegal growth of plants from which
dangerous drugs may be extracted;

(k) Initiate and undertake the formation of a nationwide organization which shall
coordinate and supervise all activities against drug abuse in every province, city,
municipality and barangay with the active and direct participation of all such local
government units and nongovernmental organizations, including the citizenry, subject to
the provisions of previously formulated programs of action against dangerous drugs;

(l) Establish and maintain a national drug intelligence system in cooperation with law
enforcement agencies, other government agencies/offices and local government units
that will assist in its apprehension of big-time drug lords;

(m) Establish and maintain close coordination, cooperation and linkages with
international drug control and administration agencies and organizations, and implement
the applicable provisions of international conventions and agreements related to
dangerous drugs to which the Philippines is a signatory;

(n) Create and maintain an efficient special enforcement unit to conduct an investigation,
file charges and transmit evidence to the proper court, wherein members of the said unit
shall possess suitable and adequate firearms for their protection in connection with the
performance of their duties: Provided, That no previous special permit for such
possession shall be required;

(o) Require all government and private hospitals, clinics, doctors, dentists and other
practitioners to submit a report to it, in coordination with the Board, about all dangerous
drugs and/or controlled precursors and essential chemicals which they have attended to
for data and information purposes;

(p) Coordinate with the Board for the facilitation of the issuance of necessary guidelines,
rules and regulations for the proper implementation of this Act;

(q) Initiate and undertake a national campaign for drug prevention and drug control
programs, where it may enlist the assistance of any department, bureau, office, agency
or instrumentality of the government, including government-owned and or –controlled
corporations, in the anti-illegal drugs drive, which may include the use of their respective
personnel, facilities, and resources for a more resolute detection and investigation of
drug-related crimes and prosecution of the drug traffickers; and

(r) Submit an annual and periodic reports to the Board as may be required from time to
time, and perform such other functions as may be authorized or required under existing
laws and as directed by the President himself/herself or as recommended by the
congressional committees concerned.
Section 85. The PDEA Academy. – Upon the approval of the Board, the PDEA Academy shall
be established either in Baguio or Tagaytay City, and in such other places as may be necessary.
The PDEA Academy shall be responsible in the recruitment and training of all PDEA agents and
personnel. The Board shall provide for the qualifications and requirements of its recruits who
must be at least twenty-one (21) years old, of proven integrity and honesty and a Baccalaureate
degree holder.

The graduates of the Academy shall later comprise the operating units of the PDEA after the
termination of the transition period of five (5) years during which all the intelligence network and
standard operating procedures of the PDEA has been set up and operationalized.

The Academy shall be headed by a Superintendent, with the rank of Director. He/she shall be
appointed by the PDEA Director General.

Section 86. Transfer, Absorption, and Integration of All Operating Units on Illegal Drugs into the
PDEA and Transitory Provisions. – The Narcotics Group of the PNP, the Narcotics Division of
the NBI and the Customs Narcotics Interdiction Unit are hereby abolished; however they shall
continue with the performance of their task as detail service with the PDEA, subject to
screening, until such time that the organizational structure of the Agency is fully operational and
the number of graduates of the PDEA Academy is sufficient to do the task themselves:Provided,
That such personnel who are affected shall have the option of either being integrated into the
PDEA or remain with their original mother agencies and shall, thereafter, be immediately
reassigned to other units therein by the head of such agencies. Such personnel who are
transferred, absorbed and integrated in the PDEA shall be extended appointments to positions
similar in rank, salary, and other emoluments and privileges granted to their respective positions
in their original mother agencies.

The transfer, absorption and integration of the different offices and units provided for in this
Section shall take effect within eighteen (18) months from the effectivity of this Act: Provided,
That personnel absorbed and on detail service shall be given until five (5) years to finally decide
to join the PDEA.

Nothing in this Act shall mean a diminution of the investigative powers of the NBI and the PNP
on all other crimes as provided for in their respective organic laws: Provided, however, That
when the investigation being conducted by the NBI, PNP or any ad hoc anti-drug task force is
found to be a violation of any of the provisions of this Act, the PDEA shall be the lead agency.
The NBI, PNP or any of the task force shall immediately transfer the same to the
PDEA: Provided, further, That the NBI, PNP and the Bureau of Customs shall maintain close
coordination with the PDEA on all drug related matters.

ARTICLE X

Appropriations, Management of Funds and Annual Report

Section 87. Appropriations. – The amount necessary for the operation of the Board and the
PDEA shall be charged against the current year's appropriations of the Board, the National Drug
Law Enforcement and Prevention Coordinating Center, the Narcotics Group of the PNP, the
Narcotics Division of the NBI and other drug abuse units of the different law enforcement
agencies integrated into the PDEA in order to carry out the provisions of this Act. Thereafter,
such sums as may be necessary for the continued implementation of this Act shall be included
in the annual General Appropriations Act.

All receipts derived from fines, fees and other income authorized and imposed in this Act,
including ten percent (10%) of all unclaimed and forfeited sweepstakes and lotto prizes but not
less than twelve million pesos (P12,000,000.00) per year from the Philippine Charity
Sweepstakes Office (PCSO), are hereby constituted as a special account in the general fund for
the implementation of this Act: Provided, That no amount shall be disbursed to cover the
operating expenses of the Board and other concerned agencies: Provided, further, That at least
fifty percent (50%) of all the funds shall be reserved for assistance to government-owned and/or
operated rehabilitation centers.

The fines shall be remitted to the Board by the court imposing such fines within thirty (30) days
from the finality of its decisions or orders. The unclaimed and forfeited prizes shall be turned
over to the Board by the PCSO within thirty (30) days after these are collected and declared
forfeited.

A portion of the funds generated by the Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation
(PAGCOR) in the amount of Five million pesos (P5,000,000.00) a month shall be set aside for
the purpose of establishing adequate drug rehabilitation centers in the country and also for the
maintenance and operations of such centers: Provided, That the said amount shall be taken
from the fifty percent (50%) share of the National Government in the income of
PAGCOR: Provided, further, That the said amount shall automatically be remitted by PAGCOR
to the Board. The amount shall, in turn, be disbursed by the Dangerous Drugs Board, subject to
the rules and regulations of the Commission on Audit (COA).

The fund may be augmented by grants, donations, and endowment from various sources,
domestic or foreign, for purposes related to their functions, subject to the existing guidelines set
by the government.

Section 88. Management of Funds Under this Act; Annual Report by the Board and the
PDEA. – The Board shall manage the funds as it may deem proper for the attainment of the
objectives of this Act. In addition to the periodic reports as may be required under this Act, the
Chairman of the Board shall submit to the President of the Philippines and to the presiding
officers of both houses of Congress, within fifteen (15) days from the opening of the regular
session, an annual report on the dangerous drugs situation in the country which shall include
detailed account of the programs and projects undertaken, statistics on crimes related to
dangerous drugs, expenses incurred pursuant to the provisions of this Act, recommended
remedial legislation, if needed, and such other relevant facts as it may deem proper to cite.

Section 89. Auditing the Accounts and Expenses of the Board and the PDEA. – All accounts
and expenses of the Board and the PDEA shall be audited by the COA or its duly authorized
representative.

ARTICLE XI

Jurisdiction Over Dangerous Drugs Cases

Section 90. Jurisdiction. – The Supreme Court shall designate special courts from among the
existing Regional Trial Courts in each judicial region to exclusively try and hear cases involving
violations of this Act. The number of courts designated in each judicial region shall be based on
the population and the number of cases pending in their respective jurisdiction.

The DOJ shall designate special prosecutors to exclusively handle cases involving violations of
this Act.

The preliminary investigation of cases filed under this Act shall be terminated within a period of
thirty (30) days from the date of their filing.

When the preliminary investigation is conducted by a public prosecutor and a probable cause is
established, the corresponding information shall be filed in court within twenty-four (24) hours
from the termination of the investigation. If the preliminary investigation is conducted by a judge
and a probable cause is found to exist, the corresponding information shall be filed by the
proper prosecutor within forty-eight (48) hours from the date of receipt of the records of the
case.

Trial of the case under this Section shall be finished by the court not later than sixty (60) days
from the date of the filing of the information. Decision on said cases shall be rendered within a
period of fifteen (15) days from the date of submission of the case for resolution.

Section 91. Responsibility and Liability of Law Enforcement Agencies and other Government
Officials and Employees in Testifying as Prosecution Witnesses in Dangerous Drugs Cases. –
Any member of law enforcement agencies or any other government official and employee who,
after due notice, fails or refuses intentionally or negligently, to appear as a witness for the
prosecution in any proceedings, involving violations of this Act, without any valid reason, shall
be punished with imprisonment of not less than twelve (12) years and one (1) day to twenty (20)
years and a fine of not less than Five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00), in addition to the
administrative liability he/she may be meted out by his/her immediate superior and/or
appropriate body.

The immediate superior of the member of the law enforcement agency or any other government
employee mentioned in the preceding paragraph shall be penalized with imprisonment of not
less than two (2) months and one (1) day but not more than six (6) years and a fine of not less
than Ten thousand pesos (P10,000.00) but not more than Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00)
and in addition, perpetual absolute disqualification from public office if despite due notice to
them and to the witness concerned, the former does not exert reasonable effort to present the
latter to the court.

The member of the law enforcement agency or any other government employee mentioned in
the preceding paragraphs shall not be transferred or re-assigned to any other government office
located in another territorial jurisdiction during the pendency of the case in court. However, the
concerned member of the law enforcement agency or government employee may be transferred
or re-assigned for compelling reasons: Provided, That his/her immediate superior shall notify the
court where the case is pending of the order to transfer or re-assign, within twenty-four (24)
hours from its approval; Provided, further, That his/her immediate superior shall be penalized
with imprisonment of not less than two (2) months and one (1) day but not more than six (6)
years and a fine of not less than Ten thousand pesos (P10,000.00) but not more than Fifty
thousand pesos (P50,000.00) and in addition, perpetual absolute disqualification from public
office, should he/she fail to notify the court of such order to transfer or re-assign.
Prosecution and punishment under this Section shall be without prejudice to any liability for
violation of any existing law.

Section 92. Delay and Bungling in the Prosecution of Drug Cases. – Any government officer or
employee tasked with the prosecution of drug-related cases under this act, who, through patent
laxity, inexcusable neglect, unreasonable delay or deliberately causes the unsuccessful
prosecution and/or dismissal of the said drug cases, shall suffer the penalty of imprisonment
ranging from twelve (12) years and one (1) day to twenty (20) years without prejudice to his/her
prosecution under the pertinent provisions of the Revised Penal Code.

Section 93. Reclassification, Addition or Removal of Any Drug from the List of Dangerous
Drugs. – The Board shall have the power to reclassify, add to or remove from the list of
dangerous drugs. Proceedings to reclassify, add, or remove a drug or other substance may be
initiated by the PDEA, the DOH, or by petition from any interested party, including the
manufacturer of a drug, a medical society or association, a pharmacy association, a public
interest group concerned with drug abuse, a national or local government agency, or an
individual citizen. When a petition is received by the Board, it shall immediately begin its own
investigation of the drug. The PDEA also may begin an investigation of a drug at any time based
upon the information received from law enforcement laboratories, national and local law
enforcement and regulatory agencies, or other sources of information.

The Board after notice and hearing shall consider the following factors with respect to each
substance proposed to be reclassified, added or removed from control:

(a) Its actual or relative potential for abuse;

(b) Scientific evidence of its pharmacological effect if known;

(c) The state of current scientific knowledge regarding the drug or other substance;

(d) Its history and current pattern of abuse;

(e) The scope, duration, and significance of abuse;

(f) Risk to public health; and

(g) Whether the substance is an immediate precursor of a substance already controlled

under this Act.

The Board shall also take into accord the obligations and commitments to international treaties,
conventions and agreements to which the Philippines is a signatory.

The Dangerous Drugs Board shall give notice to the general public of the public hearing of the
reclassification, addition to or removal from the list of any drug by publishing such notice in any
newspaper of general circulation once a week for two (2) weeks.

The effect of such reclassification, addition or removal shall be as follows:

 (a) In case a dangerous drug is reclassified as precursors and essential chemicals, the
penalties for the violations of this Act involving the two latter categories of drugs shall, in
case of conviction, be imposed in all pending criminal prosecutions;

(b) In case a precursors and essential chemicals is reclassified as dangerous drug, the
penalties for violations of the Act involving precursors and essential chemicals shall, in
case of conviction, be imposed in all pending criminal prosecutions;

(c) In case of the addition of a new drug to the list of dangerous drugs and precursors
and essential chemicals, no criminal liability involving the same under this Act shall arise
until after the lapse of fifteen (15) days from the last publication of such notice;

(d) In case of removal of a drug from the list of dangerous drugs and precursors and
essential chemicals, all persons convicted and/or detained for the use and/or possession
of such a drug shall be automatically released and all pending criminal prosecution
involving such a drug under this Act shall forthwith be dismissed; and

(e) The Board shall, within five (5) days from the date of its promulgation submit to
Congress a detailed reclassification, addition, or removal of any drug from the list of
dangerous drugs.

ARTICLE XII

Implementing Rules and Regulations

Section 94. Implementing Rules and Regulations. – The present Board in consultation with the
DOH, DILG, DOJ, DepEd, DSWD, DOLE, PNP, NBI, PAGCOR and the PCSO and all other
concerned government agencies shall promulgate within sixty (60) days the Implementing Rules
and Regulations that shall be necessary to implement the provisions of this Act.

ARTICLE XIII

Final Provisions

Section 95. Congressional Oversight Committee. – There is hereby created a Congressional

Oversight Committee composed of seven (7) Members from the Senate and seven (7) Members
from the House of Representatives. The Members from the Senate shall be appointed by the
Senate President based on the proportional representation of the parties or coalitions therein
with at least two (2) Senators representing the Minority. The Members from the House of
Representatives shall be appointed by the Speaker, also based on proportional representation
of the parties or coalitions therein with at least two (2) Members representing the Minority.

The Committee shall be headed by the respective Chairpersons of the Senate Committee on
Public Order and Illegal Drugs and the House of Representatives Committee on Dangerous
Drugs.

Section 96. Powers and Functions of the Oversight Committee. – The Oversight Committee on
Dangerous Drugs shall, in aid of legislation, perform the following functions, among others:
 (a) To set the guidelines and overall framework to monitor and ensure the proper
implementation of this Act;

(b) To ensure transparency and require the submission of reports from government
agencies concerned on the conduct of programs, projects and policies relating to the
implementation of this act;

(c) To approve the budget for the programs of the Oversight Committee on Dangerous
Drugs and all disbursements therefrom, including compensation of all personnel;

(d) To submit periodic reports to the President of the Philippines and Congress on the
implementation of the provisions of this Act;

(e) To determine inherent weaknesses in the law and recommend the necessary
remedial legislation or executive measures; and

(f) To perform such other duties, functions and responsibilities as may be necessary to
effectively attain the objectives of this Act.

Section 97. Adoption of Committee Rules and Regulations, and Funding. – The Oversight
Committee on Dangerous Drugs shall adopt its internal rules of procedure, conduct hearings
and receive testimonies, reports, and technical advice, invite or summon by subpoena ad
testificandum any public official, private citizen, or any other person to testify before it, or require
any person by subpoena duces tecum documents or other materials as it may require
consistent with the provisions of this Act.

The Oversight Committee on Dangerous Drugs shall be assisted by a secretariat to be

composed by personnel who may be seconded from the Senate and the House of
Representatives and may retain consultants.

To carry out the powers and functions of the Oversight Committee on Dangerous Drugs, the
initial sum of Twenty-five million pesos (P25,000,000.00) shall be charged against the current
appropriations of the Senate. Thereafter, such amount necessary for its continued operations
shall be included in the annual General Appropriations Act.

The Oversight Committee on Dangerous Drugs shall exist for a period of ten (10) years from the
effectivity of this Act and may be extended by a joint concurrent resolution.

Section 98. Limited Applicability of the Revised Penal Code. – Notwithstanding any law, rule or
regulation to the contrary, the provisions of the Revised Penal Code (Act No. 3814), as
amended, shall not apply to the provisions of this Act, except in the case of minor offenders.
Where the offender is a minor, the penalty for acts punishable by life imprisonment to death
provided herein shall be reclusion perpetua to death.

Section 99. Separability Clause. – If for any reason any section or provision of this Act, or any
portion thereof, or the application of such section, provision or portion thereof to any person,
group or circumstance is declared invalid or unconstitutional, the remainder of this Act shall not
be affected by such declaration and shall remain in force and effect.
Section 100. Repealing Clause. – Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, is hereby repealed and
all other laws, administrative orders, rules and regulations, or parts thereof inconsistent with the
provisions of this Act, are hereby repealed or modified accordingly.

Section 101. Amending Clause. – Republic Act No. 7659 is hereby amended accordingly.

Section 102. Effectivity. – This Act shall take effect fifteen (15) days upon its publication in at
least two (2) national newspapers of general circulation.

G.R. No. L-35156 November 20, 1981

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
FLORO RODIL defendant-appellant.

MAKASIAR, J.:

Accused Floro Rodil was found guilty, beyond reasonable doubt, of the crime of murder by the
Circuit Criminal Court of Pasig, Rizal, for the death of Lt. Guillermo Masana of the Philippine
Constabulary. Accordingly, he was sentenced to death, to indemnify the heirs of the deceased in
the amount of P12,000.00, to pay the amount of P10,000.00 as moral damages and another
P10,000.00 as exemplary damages, and to pay the costs.

The information alleges:

That on or about April 24, 1971, in the Municipality of Indang, Province of Cavite,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, armed with a double-bladed dagger, with evident premeditation and
treachery, and with intent to kill, did, then and there, wilfully, unlawfully, and
feloniously, attack and stab PC Lt. Guillermo Masana while the latter was in the
performance of his official duties, inflicting upon him stab wounds on the different
parts of his body which directly caused his death.

Contrary to law

From the evidence adduced by the prosecution, We glean the following facts:

At about 1:00 o'clock in the afternoon of April 24, 1971, the deceased, PC Lt. Guillermo Masana
together with PC soldier Virgilio Fidel, Philippine Coast Guard serviceman Ricardo Ligsa and
Patrolman Felix Mojica of Indang, Cavite, was having lunch inside a restaurant in front of the
Indang market (pp. 2,3, t.s.n., Oct. 30, 1971; pp. 10, 19, t.s.n., Nov. 22, 1971; p. 21, t.s.n., Jan.
20, 1972). While they were eating, they saw, through the glass panel of the restaurant, appellant
outside the restaurant blowing his whistle. Their attention having been drawn to what appellant
was doing, Lt. Masana then in civilian clothing, accompanied by PC soldier Virgilio Fidel, went
out of the restaurant, approached appellant and asked the latter, after Identifying himself as a
PC officer, whether the gun that was tucked in his waist had a license. Instead of answering the
question of Lt. Masana appellant moved one step backward and attempted to draw his gun. PC
soldier Virgilio Fidel immediately grabbed appellant's gun from appellant's waist and gave it to
Lt. Masana After that, Lt. Masana told the appellant to go inside the restaurant. PC soldier
Virgilio Fidel followed. Lt. Masana and the appellant occupied a separate table about one and
one-half (1 1/2) meters from the table of Lt. Masana's three companions — Fidel, Ligsa and
Mojica (p. 10, t.s.n., Nov. 22, 1971). After the two were already seated, Lt. Masana placed
appellant's gun on the table. After that Lt. Masana pulled out a piece of coupon bond paper from
his pocket and wrote thereon the receipt for the gun, and after signing it, he asked appellant to
countersign the same, but appellant refused to do so. Instead, he asked Lt. Masana to return
the gun to him. Lt. Masana rejected appellant's plea, telling, the latter that they would talk the
matter over in the municipal building of Indang, Cavite. When Lt. Masana was about to stand
up, appellant suddenly pulled out a double-bladed dagger and with it he stabbed Lt. Masana
several times, on the chest and stomach causing his death several hours thereafter (pp. 4, 5, 6,
7, 8, t.s.n., Oct. 30, 1971; pp. 10, 11, 12, t.s.n., Nov. 22, 1971).

While the stabbing incident was taking place, the three companions of Lt. Masana — PC soldier
Virgilio Fidel, Coast Guard Ricardo Ligsa and policeman Felix Mojica — who were all seated at
a separate table about one and one-half (1 1/2) meters away from that occupied by the accused
and Lt. Masana stood up to assist Lt. Masana but Chief of Police Primo Panaligan of Indang,
Cavite, who happened to be taking his lunch in the same restaurant, was quicker than any of
them in going near the combatants and embraced and/or grabbed the accused from behind,
and thereafter wrested the dagger from the accused-appellant. Immediately thereafter, the Chief
of Police brought the accused to the municipal building of Indang, Cavite (p. 8, t.s.n., Oct. 30,
1971; pp. 19-20, t.s.n., Nov. 22, 1971; pp. 26, 28, t.s.n., Jan. 20, 1972), while the companions of
Lt. Masana brought the latter to the V. Luna Hospital in Quezon City where he expired several
hours later as a result of the stab wounds inflicted by the accused (pp. 21, 22, t.s.n., Nov. 22,
1971). Dr. Felicisimo del Rosario, Medico-Legal Officer of the Armed Forces of the Philippines,
conducted an autopsy of the cadaver of Lt. Masana and made the following findings, which are
embodied in his Report, Exhibits "D" and "D-1 " (pp. 88-89, rec.), and which reads as follows:

Postmortem findings.

General:

Fairly developed and nourished male subject in rigor mortis with postmortem
lividity over the dependent portions of the body. Pupils are dilated. Finger and toe
tips are pale. There is an exploratory laparotomy incision at the abdomen,
measuring 21 cm. long, 3 cm. left of the anterior midline, with eighteen (18)
stitches applied. There are surgical incisions at the left and right abdomen,
measuring 2 cm. long, 9 cm. from the anterior midline and 2 cm. long, 6.5 cm.
from the anterior midline with two (2) stitches applied and a rubber drain sticking
out of each, respectively.

TRUNK:

(1) Stab wound, left chest, measuring 0.9 by 0.4 cm., 5 cm. from the anterior
midline, 128 cm. above the heel, 1 cm. deep, directed posterior wards and
slightly upwards, passing superficially between muscles and tissues.

(2) Stab wound, left chest, measuring 1.2 by 0.4 cm., 9 cm. from the anterior
midline, 121 cm. above the heel, 5.5. cm. deep, directed posterior wards,
downwards and to the left, lacerating the muscles at the 4th intercostal space.

(3) Stab wound, abdomen, measuring 0.9 by 0.2 cm. just left of the anterior
midline, 96 cm. above the heel 11 cm. deep, directed posterior wards, upwards
and to the left, perforating the greater curvature of the stomach and the gastric
vessels, grazing the liver, perforating the diaphragm and infero-medial border of
the lower lobe of the right lung.

(4) Impact abrasion, right scapular region, measuring 2 by 0.2 cm., 12 cm. from
the posterior midline, 127 cm. above the heel.
 UPPER EXTREMITIES:

(5) Incised wound, anterior aspect of the distal third of the left arm, measuring 3
by 0.5 cm., just medial to its anterior midline.

(6) Incised wound, posterior aspect of the proximal phalange of the right index
finger, measuring 1 by 0.2 cm., just medial to its posterior midline.

Five hundred (500) cc. blood and blood clots accumulated in the thoracic cavity.

There are four (4) sutures applied at a lacerated wound at the greater curvature
of the stomach.

There is nothing remarkable in the unaffected organs internally.

REMARKS:

Cause of death is cardio-respiratory arrest due to severe shock and intrathoracic

hemorrhage as a result of multiple stab wounds of the body, perforating the
stomach, gastric vessels, liver, diaphragm and lower lobe of the right lung.

Claiming self-defense, the accused, on the other hand, maintains and relies on the following
facts:

At about 1: 00 o'clock in the afternoon of April 24, 1971, the accused and his wife were in a
restaurant near the market place of Indang, Cavite, in order to take their lunch. They had just
come from Mandaluyong, Rizal where they reside (pp. 21, 22, t.s.n., Dec. 10, 1971). Inside the
restaurant, the accused saw three persons to his right, eating, while to his left he saw a person
whom he later learned to be Lt. Guillermo Masana drinking beer alone. While the accused and
his wife were waiting for the food to be served, Lt. Masana approached him and asked him
whether he was Floro Rodil and whether he was a member of the Anti- Smuggling Unit. After
receiving an affirmative answer, Lt. Masana invited the accused to join him in his table. The
accused accepted the invitation so the two moved over to the officer's table where the deceased
offered beer to the accused who, however, refused saying he was still hungry. In the course of
their conversation, Lt. Masana told the accused not to report any matter about smuggling to the
PC. The accused informed the officer that he had not reported any smuggling activity to the
authorities. Lt. Masana then asked the accused for his identification card as a member of the
Anti-Smuggling Unit, which the latter did by showing his ID card, Exhibit " 1 ", bearing his picture
and indicating that he was an officer of the Anti-Communist League of the Philippines (pp. 62-
68, t.s.n., Dec. 7, 1971).

Thereupon, Lt. Masana told the accused that the latter's ID was fake, and after the accused
insisted that it was genuine, Lt. Masana tried to take it away from the accused when the latter
was about to put it back in his pocket. Because of his refusal to give his Id card to Lt. Masana
the latter got mad and, in an angry tone of voice, demanded: "Will you give it to me or not?" (P.
7 1, Ibid). Still the accused refused to surrender his ID to Lt. Masana Thereupon, the latter
pulled a gun from his waist and hit the accused on the head with its handle two (2) time
Immediately, blood gushed from his head and face. When Lt. Masana was about to hit the
accused for the third time, the latter parried the right hand of the officer, pulled his "pangsaksak"
and stabbed the officer two or three times and then pushed him away from him and ran out of
the restaurant (pp. 74,75,79, Ibid).

The accused went in the direction of the municipal building of Indang, Cavite, where he intended
to surrender to the authorities. But on his way, he met Primo Panaligan, the Chief of Police of
Indang, Cavite. The Chief of Police asked him why his head and face were bloody and he
answered that he was hit by Lt. Masana on the head with a gun (pp. 86, 89, t.s.n., Ibid). If here
upon, the Chief of Police asked somebody to accompany the accused to the municipal building.
Arriving there, one Victor, a policeman of Indang, Cavite, accompanied him to Dr. Ruben Ochoa,
whose clinic was just across the street where the municipal building is located (p. 9, t.s.n., Ibid;
p. 4, t.s.n., Dec. 15, 1971). After he was given first aid treatment, he was brought back by the
Indang policeman to the municipal, building where he was detained for two days before he was
picked up by the Philippine Constabulary operatives and transferred to the 121th PC
Headquarters in Tagaytay City (pp. 90-91, t.s.n., Ibid; pp. 4, 39, 40, t.s.n., Dec. 10, 1971; p. 6,
t.s.n., Dec. 15, 1971; p. 5, t.s.n., Jan. 20, 1972).

After due trial, the court a quo rendered a decision sentencing the accused as heretofore stated.

Self-defense is an affirmative allegation that must be proven by clear, sufficient, satisfactory and
convincing evidence (People vs. Libed 14 SCRA 410, 413; People vs. Mendoza, 13 SCRA 11,
17; People vs. Solaña, 6 SCRA 60, 65-66; People vs. Davis, 1 SCRA 473; 477; People vs.
Paras, 80 Phil. 149; 152; People vs. Berio 59 Phil. 533; 536; People vs. Gimena, 59 Phil. 509,
514). Moreover, to prove justification, the accused must rely on the strength of his own evidence
and not on the weakness of that of the prosecution, for even if it were weak, it could not be
disbelieved after the accused had admitted the killing (People vs. Llamera, 51 SCRA 48, 57;
People vs. Talaboc, 30 SCRA 87; People vs. Navarro, 25 SCRA 491; 496; People vs. Solaña, 6
SCRA 60, 65-66; People vs. Espenilla, 62 Phil. 264, 270; People vs. Apolinario, 58 Phil 586-
588; People vs. Ansoyon, 65 Phil. 7 7 2). The rationale for this jurisprudence is that, having
admitted the wounding or killing of the victim, the accused must be held criminally liable for the
crime unless he establishes to the satisfaction of the court the fact of legitimate self-defense.

In the case at bar, the accused contends that it was the deceased, Lt. Guillermo Masana who
committed unlawful aggression when the latter hit him on his head with the handle of his gun
after he refused to surrender his (accused's) ID to him.

This claim does not merit belief.

The accused claims that after he refused to give his ID to the deceased because the same was
his and he also spent money for it, the latter hit him with the handle of his (deceased's) gun. WE
cannot perceive how this refusal of the accused could have provoked or enraged the deceased
to the extent of initiating the aggression by drawing his pistol and hitting the accused with its
butt, knowing that the accused was no longer armed after the latter's gun had earlier been taken
away from him. Besides, an agent of authority, like the deceased, ordinarily is not authorized to
use force, except in an extreme case when he is attacked, or subject to active resistance, and
finds no other way to comply with his duty or cause himself to be obeyed by the offender.
Furthermore, the records reveal an unrebutted fact to the effect that the deceased was unarmed
when the incident happened, he being then on leave. As a matter of fact, he was then in civilian
clothing (pp. 29-30, t.s.n., Jan. 20, 1972). WE are, therefore, inclined to believe that it was the
accused who had every reason to be resentful of the deceased and to be enraged after the
deceased refused to heed his plea that his gun be returned him; because he might be
prosecuted for illegal possession of firearms. Accordingly, We are constrained to draw the
inescapable conclusion that it was the accused, not the deceased, who initiated the aggression
which ended in the fatal wounding of the deceased resulting in his death.

The accused further claims that he was hit twice by the deceased before he parried the third
blow. This claim is belied by the record. During the trial, the court a quo asked the accused to
show the scar produced by the injuries inflicted by the deceased when he refused to give his ID
thus —

Court

Q Where is that scar?

(Witness showing his right side of the head to the Court)"

[pp. 86,88, t.s.n., Dec. 7, 1971].

Dr. Ruben Ochoa who treated the injuries of the accused corroborated the foregoing testimony
in his medical findings, Exhibit "3", which reads:

Injuries:

(1) lacerated wound 1/2 inch, parietal region.

(2) lacerated wound, 1 1/2 inches, rt ear lobe

(3) contusion, right mastoid area [Exh. "3"; p. 116, rec] .

The record reveals that the deceased was a right-handed person (pp. 76-77, t.s.n., Dec. 7,
1971). It also shows that before the stabbing incident took place, the deceased and the accused
were facing each other. If that was the case, and considering that the deceased was, according
to the accused, holding the gun with his right hand, why was the accused hit on the right side of
his head and and on his right ear lobe WE find that this particular claim of the accused that it
was the deceased who first hit him twice with the handle of his gun before parrying the third
blow and then stabbing the latter is definitely belied not only by the location of the scar but also
by the medical finding of Dr. Ochoa aforequoted. Indeed, if the protagonists were facing each
other, and it appearing that they were both right- handed (p. 13, t.s.n., Nov. 22, 1971), the blow
given by one, if not parried by the other, would perforce land on the left, and not on the right,
side of the body of the recipient of the blow. WE, therefore, reject such claim for being
improbable, the same being contrary to the natural course of human behavior.

The fact of the matter, however, as testified to by state witness PC soldier Virgilio Fidel, is that
the victim parried with both hands the thrust of the appellant with such force that appellant
bumped his head on the edge of the table causing blood to ooze from the resulting injury on his
head.
When the accused allegedly met the Chief of Police of Indang, Cavite, on his way to the
municipal building from the scene of the stabbing incident purportedly to surrender to the
authorities, he claims that he told the Chief of Police that Lt. Masana hit him on his head with
the handle of his (Masana's) gun. On his return from the clinic of Dr. Ochoa where his injuries
were treated, he was detained in the municipal building of Indang, Cavite for two days before he
was transferred to the Tagaytay PC Headquarters. During all this time, he did not give any
written statement, much less inform any PC or other police agency that he stabbed Lt. Masana
in self-defense. It was only on July 8, 1971. after the lapse of more than two and one-half (2 1/2)
months that he claimed self-defense during the preliminary investigation of the case before the
municipal judge of Indang, Cavite (pp. 44, t.s.n., Dec. 10, 1971). If the accused had really acted
in self-defense, he would surely have so informed the Chief of Police at the first opportunity. He
only allegedly told the Chief of Police, who allegedly asked him why his head and face were
bloody, that Lt. Masana hit him with a gun. He did not tell the Police Chief that he was
surrendering for stabbing the deceased in self-defense. This claim of the accused made before
the municipal judge of Indang, Cavite, on July 8, 1971 aforesaid constitutes an exculpatory
statement made so long after the crime was committed on April 24, 1971. Such claim does not
deserve credence since the same is obviously an afterthought, which cannot overthrow the
straightforward testimony of prosecution witnesses PC soldier Virgilio Fidel and Coast Guard
serviceman Ricardo Ligsa both disinterested and unbiased witnesses, whose testimony as
peace officers, in the absence of any showing as to any motive that would impel them to distort
the truth, must be afforded full faith and credit as a whole.

The fact that the chief of police detained the accused that same day after he was treated by Dr.
Ochoa, confirms the testimony of the state witnesses that the police was present during the
incident between the appellant and the victim and that the police chief embraced appellant and
grabbed the knife from appellant, whom he thereafter brought to the municipal building.

II

Was the crime committed murder or homicide merely or murder or homicide complexed with
assault upon an agent of authority?

According to the Solicitor General, the crime committed was murder because "it was established
by the prosecution that during the stabbing incident, appellant suddenly and without giving the
victim a chance to defend himself, stabbed the latter several times with a dagger, inflicting upon
mortal wounds on the chest and stomach. ...Needless to say, such a sudden and unexpected
attack with a deadly weapon on an unarmed and unsuspecting victim, which made it impossible
for the latter to flee or defend himself before the fatal blow is delivered, is alevosia or treachery"
(p. 14, Appellee's brief).

In support of his contention, the Solicitor General cited the cases of U.S. vs. Cornejo (28 Phil.
475); People vs. Palomo (43 O.G. No. 10, 4190).

WE do not agree with the Solicitor General. Alevosia or treachery is belied by the following
testimony of Virgilio Fidel, star witness for the prosecution:

COURT

Q What is the truth?

 A The truth is that when I saw that Floro Rodil stabbed Lt.
Guillermo Masana, Masana parried him and his head (Rodil's
head) bumped on the edge of a table; that is why he sustained an
injury and blood oozed from his head (pp. 8-9, t.s.n., Jan. 20,
1972; emphasis supplied).

Then, on cross-examination, the same witness testified:

ATTY. MUÑOZ

Q You said that Floro Rodil's head was bumped on the edge of a
table and you saw blood oozing from his head, is that correct?

A Yes, sir.

Q Who bumped the head of Rodil on the table?

A When Masana parried his stab with his hands he accidentally

bumped his head on the table.

Q Is it not a fact that Floro Rodil is much bigger than Lt. Masana

A Yes, sir.

Q You mean, by simple parrying, Floro Rodil was pushed to the

extent that he bumped his head on the table?

A The force of Lt. Masana might have been strong in parrying.

xxx xxx xxx

Q When the head of Rodil bumped on the table, was Lt. Masana
already stabbed?

A It could be that he was already stabbed or he was not yet

stabbed.

pp 30-31, 33, t.s.n., Jan. 20, 1972; emphasis supplied].

After a thorough analysis of the aforequoted portions of the testimony of Virgilio Fidel, one of the
prosecution witnesses, WE can only conclude that the assailant and the victim were indeed face
to face when the stabbing took place. As such the attack was not treacherous because the
victim was able to ward off the same with his hand. As a matter of fact, the force he used in
warding off the attack was so strong that the accused bumped his head on a table nearby,
causing injuries to him which necessitated medical treatment. In short, the attack on the victim
was made on the spur of the moment. The suddenness of the attack does not by itself suffice to
support a finding of treachery (People vs. Torejas, et al., 43 SCRA 158, 167). Besides, the
record failed to show that the accused made any preparation to kill his victim so as to insure the
commission of the crime, making it at the same time possible or hard for the victim to defend
himself or retaliate (People vs. Saez, 1 11 Phil. 546, 553, citing the case of People vs. Tumaob,
83 Phil. 738). Neither does it show that the accused employed means directly and specially
tending to insure the killing without risk to himself. On the contrary, it shows that the accused
was easily within striking distance of his three companions, two of whom were police officers.
Furthermore, there was an altercation between the accused and the victim about the
confiscation by the latter of the gun belonging to the former, and at the moment when the victim
was about to stand up, the accused drew a knife from his pocket and with it stabbed the victim
in the chest. Clearly, therefore, the impelling motive for the attack by appellant on his victim was
the latter's performance of official duty, which the former resented. This kind of evidence does
not clearly show the presence of treachery in the commission of the crime. Alevosia is not to be
presumed, but must be proved as conclusively as the act which it qualifies (People vs. Abril, 51
Phil. 670, 675). This is so because in the explicit language of the Revised Penal
Code, alevosia or treachery exists when the offender commits any of the crimes against the
person, employing means, methods, or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and
specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the
offended party might make [Art. 14, par. 16, Revised Penal Code].

While the evidence definitely demonstrated that appellant knew because the victim, who was in
civilian clothing, told him that he was an agent of a person in authority; he cannot be convicted
of the complex crime of homicide with assault upon an agent of a person in authority, for the
simple reason that the information does not allege the fact that the accused then knew that,
before or at the time of the assault, the victim was an agent of a person in authority. The
information simply alleges that appellant did attack and stab PC Lt. Guillermo Masana while the
latter was in the performance of his official duties, ..." Such an allegation cannot be an adequate
substitute for the essential averment to justify a conviction of the complex crime, which
necessarily requires the imposition of the maximum period of the penalty prescribed for the
graver offense. Like a qualifying circumstance, such knowledge must be expressly and
specifically averred in the information; otherwise, in the absence of such allegation, the required
knowledge, like a qualifying circumstance, although proven, would only be appreciated as a
generic aggravating circumstance. Applying this principle, the attack on the victim, who was
known to the appellant as a peace officer, could be considered only as aggravating, being "in
contempt or with insult to the public authorities" (Par. 1, Art. XIV of the Revised Penal Code), or
as an "insult or in disregard of the respect due the offended party on account of his rank, ..."
(par. 3, Art. XIV, Revised Penal Code).

It is essential that the accused must have knowledge that the person attacked was a person in
authority or his agent in the exercise of his duties, because the accused must have the intention
to offend, injure, or assault the offended party as a person in authority or agent of a person in
authority (People vs. Villaseñor 35 SCRA 460 [19701, People vs. Rellin 72 Phil. 1038 [1947];
US vs. Alvear et al., 35 Phil. 626 [1916]).

In the case of People vs. Balbar (21 SCRA 1119, Nov. 29, 1967), it was held that failure
to expressly alleged in the information that the accused had knowledge that the person attacked
was a person in authority does not render the information defective so long as there are facts
alleged therein from which it can be implied that the accused knew that the person attacked was
a person in authority. Thus, the information for Direct Assault upon a person in authority reads
as follows:

The undersigned Assistant Provincial Fiscal accuses Tiburcio Balbar of the crime
of Assault upon a Person in Authority, committed as follows:
 That on or about the 29th day of August, 1960, in Barrio Cumba, Municipality of
Lian, Province of Batangas, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused did then and there wilfully, unlawfully
and feloniously assault Miss Ester Gonzales, a public school teacher in the
school bonding of Lian, duly qualified and appointed as such and while in the
performance of her official duties or on the occasion therefor, by then and there
pulling his dagger, embraced and kissed. and repeatedly trying to embrace and
kiss the said teacher, Miss Ester Gonzales. That the crime was committed with
the aggravating circumstances of having committed it inside the school building
and during school classes.

Contrary to law.

And the ruling of the Court was:

Direct assault is committed 'by any person or persons who, without a public
uprising, ... shall attack, employ force, or seriously intimidate or resist any person
in authority or any of his agents, while engaged in the performance of official
duties, or on occasion of such performance' (See Art. 148, Revised Penal Code).

By express provision of law (Com. Act No. 578, now part of Article 152 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 1978), "teachers,
professors, and persons charged with the supervision of public or duly
recognized private schools, colleges and universities shall be deemed persons in
authority, in applying the provisions of article 148." This special classification is
obviously intended to give teachers protection, dignity, and respect while in the
performance of their official duties. The lower court, however, dismissed the
information on the ground that there is no express allegation in the information
that the accused had knowledge that the person attacked was a person in
authority. This is clearly erroneous.

Complainant was a teacher. The information sufficiently alleges that the accused
knew that fact, since she was in her classroom and engaged in the performance
of her duties. He therefore knew that she was a person in authority, as she was
so by specific provision of law. It matters not that such knowledge on his part is
not expressly alleged, complainant's status as a person in authority being a
matter of law and not of fact, ignorance thereof could not excuse non-
compliance on his part (Article 3, Civil Code). This article applies to all kinds of
domestic laws, whether civil or penal (De Luna vs. Linatoc, 74 Phil 15) and
whether substantive or remedial (Zulueta vs. Zulueta, 1 Phil. 254) for reasons of
expediency, policy and necessity.

But, in the case of People vs. CFI of Quezon, Branch V (68 SCRA 305, Nov. 28, 1975), the
information for Direct Assault reads:

That on or about the 17th day of January, 1974, at Barrio Languyin, Municipality
of Potillo, Province of Quezon, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, Ernesto Busto, Paulo Coralde,
Dony Grande and Jose Astjada each of whom was armed with a piece of wood,
except Paulo Coraide conspiring and confederating together and mutually
 helping one another, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack,
assault, box and strike with said pieces of wood one Rufino Camonias a
councilman of barrio Languyin of said municipality, duly elected and qualified as
such while said councilman was engaged in the actual performance of his duties.

The trial court dismissed the same on the ground that:

Of importance in this case is the lack of allegation in the complaint or in the

information that the offended party was an agent of a person in authority and that
such fact was known to the accused. The absence of such allegation is fatal in
this case."

The People appealed to this Court through a petition for review on certiorari.

This Court held that the fiscal's proper course of action is not a petition for review on certiorari
but the refiling of a valid information against the accused, for the following considerations:

The Solicitor General in his comment of November 4, 1975 duly observed that
'(I)t is patent that the acquittal of the accused herein is not on the merits. There is
want of factual finding upon which their conviction or acquittal could have been
based.'

It need only be observed that contrary to the fiscal's contention, the information
was deficient in that it did not allege an essential element of the crime of direct
assault that the accused had knowledge of or knew the position of authority held
by the person attacked, viz. that of a barrio councilman (and hence the agent of a
person in authority under Article 152 of the Revised Penal Code as amended by
Republic Act No. 1978) [See U.S. vs. Alvear 35 Phil. 626; People vs. Rellin 77
Phil. 1038; Vol. 11, Padilla's Revised Penal Code, 10th Ed., p. 225].

What was held in People vs. Balbar 21 SCRA, 119,1123, cited by the fiscal is that
it is sufficient that the information alleged that the accused knew the position of
authority, held by the offended party, in that case a public school teacher, then
engaged in the performance of her official duties, and that it is not necessary to
allege further that the accused also knew that such position was that of a person
in authority, since 'this is a matter of law' thus:

Complainant was a teacher. The information sufficiently alleges

that the accused knew that fact, since she was in her classroom
and engaged in the performance of her duties. He therefore knew
that she was a person in authority, as she was so by specific
provision of law. It matters not that such knowledge on `his part is
not expressly alleged, complainant's status as a person in
authority being a matter of law and not of fact, ignorance whereof
could not excuse non-compliance on his part (Article 3, Civil
Code). This article applies to all kinds of domestic laws, whether
civil or penal (De Luna vs. Linatoc, 74 Phil. 15) and whether
substantive or remedial (Zulueta vs. Zulueta, 1 Phil, 254) for
reasons of expediency, policy and necessity.
 Since the 'decision' of acquittal was really a mere dismissal of the information for
failure to charge an offense and was not a decision on the merits with factual
findings as per the trial judge's own disavowal it is patent that the fiscal's proper
course is not the present petition but the refiling of a valid information against
respondents-accused, as herein indicated.

ACCORDINGLY, the petition is dismissed without prejudice to the refiling of a

valid information against respondents-accused as hereinabove indicated
(emphasis supplied).

The ruling in the aforementioned case of People vs. CFI of Quezon, etc., supra, applies to the
instant case; because the information in the former is strikingly similar to the information in the
latter and does not allege facts from which inference can be deduced that the accused knew
that the person assaulted is a person, or an agent of a person, in authority.

The aggravating circumstance of disregard of rank should be appreciated because it is obvious

that the victim, PC. Lt. Masana Identified himself as a PC officer to the accused who is merely a
member of the Anti-Smuggling Unit and therefore inferior both in rank and social status to the
victim.

The term "rank" should be given its plain, ordinary meaning, and as such, refers to a high social
position or standing as a grade in the armed forces (Webster's Third New International
Dictionary of the English Language Unabridged, p. 1881); or to a graded official standing or
social position or station (75 CJS 458); or to the order or place in which said officers are placed
in the army and navy in relation to others (Encyclopedic Law Dictionary, Third Edition, Walter A.
Shumaker and George Foster Longsdorf, p. 90); or to the designation or title of distinction
conferred upon an officer in order to fix his relative position in reference to other officers in
matters of privileges, precedence, and sometimes of command or by which to determine his pay
and emoluments as in the case of army staff officers (Bouvier's Law Dictionary, Third Edition, p.
2804); or to a grade or official standing, relative position in civil or social life, or in any scale of
comparison, status, grade, including its grade, status or scale of comparison within a position
(Vol. 36, Words and Phrases, Permanent Edition, p. 100).

Thus, rank aggravated the killing of a staff sergeant by his corporal (People vs. Mil 92 SCRA 89,
105-106, July 30, 1979), the killing of the Assistant Chief of Personnel Transaction of the Civil
Service Commission by a clerk therein (People vs. Benito, 62 SCRA 351, 357-358, Feb. 13,
1975), the murder by a pupil of his teacher (U.S. vs. Cabling, 7 Phil. 469. 474; People vs.
Aragon & Lopez, 107 Phil. 706, 709), the murder of a municipal mayor (People vs. Lopez de
Leon, et al., 69 Phil. 298), the murder -of a city chief of police by the chief of the secret service
division (People vs. Hollero 88 Phil. 167), assault upon a 66-year old District Judge of the Court
of First Instance by a justice of the peace (People vs. Torrecarreori CA 52 OG 7644), the killing
of a Spanish consul by his subordinate — a mere chancellor (People vs. Godinez, 106 Phil.
597, 606607), and the killing of an army general (People vs. Torres, et al., L-4642, May 29,
1953).

As explained by Mr. Justice Mariano Albert, then of the Court of Appeals, those "generally
considered of high station in life, on account of their rank (as well as age or sex), deserve to be
respected. Therefore, whenever there is a difference in social condition between the offender
and the offended party, this aggravating circumstance sometimes is present" (Albert M.A. —
The Revised Penal Code Annotated, 1946 Ed., p. 109).
The difference in official or social status between a P.C. lieutenant and a mere member of an
anti-smuggling unit, is patent.

If the accused herein were charged with the complex crime of murder with assault against an
agent of a person in authority, and not merely murder, then the aggravating circumstance of
disregard of rank or contempt of or insult to public authority cannot be appreciated as
aggravating because either circumstance is inherent in the charge of assault against a person in
authority or an agent of a person in authority. But in the case at bar, the appellant is accused of
murder only. Consequently, either aggravating circumstance should be considered in the
imposition of the penalty.

Thus, in the following cases where the charge was merely murder or frustrated murder, the
aggravating circumstance of disregard of rank was appreciated:

(1) People vs. Benito, supra — the appellant, a clerk in the Civil Service Commission, was
charged with and convicted of the murder of the assistant chief of the personnel transaction of
the said Commission;

(2) People vs. Torres, et al., supra — the appellants were charged with and convicted of murder
for the death of Army Col. Valentin Salgado and attempted murder for the injuries inflicted on
Army Gen. Mariano Castaneda;

(3) People vs. Valeriano, et al. — appellants were accused and convicted of robbery with
homicide for the killing of District Judge Bautista of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga [90
Phil. 15, 34-35]; and

(4) People vs. Hollero supra — where the accused chief of the Secret Division of the Bacolod
City Police Department was convicted of murder for the killing of the chief of police.

The aggravating circumstance of contempt of, or insult to, public authority under paragraph 2 of
Article 14 of the Revised Penal Code can likewise be appreciated in the case at bar.

The evidence of the prosecution clearly established that Chief of Police Primo Panaligan of
Indang was present as he was taking his lunch in the same restaurant when the incident
occurred.

As a matter of fact, the said chief of police was the one who embraced or grabbed the accused
from behind, wrested the dagger from him and thereafter brought him to the municipal building
of Indang. And appellant admittedly knew him even then as the town chief of police, although he
now claims that he went to the municipal building to surrender to the chief of police who was not
allegedly in the restaurant during the incident.

While it is true that in the cases of U.S. vs. Rodriguez, et al. (19 Phil. 150, 157-158), People vs.
Siojo (61 Phil. 307, 317), and People vs. Verzo (21 SCRA 1403), this Court ruled that the term
public authority refers to a person in authority and that a PC lieutenant or town chief of police is
not a public authority but merely an agent of a person in authority; there is need of re-examining
such a ruling since it is not justified by the employment of the termpublic authority in aforesaid
paragraph 2 of Article 14 instead of the term person in authority which is specifically used in
Articles 148 and 152 of the Revised Penal Code. There is no extended reasoning of the doctrine
enunciated in the aforesaid three (3) cases why the phrase public authority should comprehend
only persons in authority. The lawmaker could have easily utilized the term "persons in
authority" in the aforesaid paragraph 2 of Article 14 in much the same way that it employed the
said phrase in Articles 148 and 1452. The lawmaker must have intended a different meaning for
the term public authority, which may however include, but not limited topersons in authority.

Under the decided cases, a municipal mayor, barrio captain, barrio lieutenant or barangay
captain is a person in authority or a public authority. Even a public school teacher is now
considered a person in authority under CA 578 amending Article 152 of the Revised Penal Code
(Sarcepudes vs. People, 90 Phil 228). So is the town municipal health officer (People vs.
Quebral et al., 73 Phil 640), as well as a nurse, a municipal councilor or an agent of the Bureau
of Internal Revenue (People vs. Yosoya, CA-GR No. 8522-R, May 26, 1955; People vs. Reyes,
et al O.G.S. 11 p. 24).

The chief of police should therefore be considered a public authority or a person in authority; for
he is vested with jurisdiction or authority to maintain peace and order and is specifically duty
bound to prosecute and to apprehend violators of the laws and municipal ordinances, more than
the aforementioned officials who cannot prosecute and who are not even enjoined to arrest
malefactors although specifically mentioned as persons in authority by the decided cases and
by Article 152 of the Revised Penal Code as amended by R.A. 1978 of June 22, 1957. The town
chief of police heads and supervises the entire police force in the municipality as well as
exercises his authority over the entire territory of the municipality, which is patently greater than
and includes the school premises or the town clinic or barrio, to which small area the authority
or jurisdiction of the teacher, nurse, or barrio lieutenant, respectively, is limited.

With two aggravating circumstances and no mitigating circumstance, the appellant should
therefore be condemned to suffer the maximum period of reclusion temporal the penalty
prescribed for homicide.

WHEREFORE, HAVING BEEN FOUND GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF

HOMICIDE AGGRAVATED BY CONTEMPT FOR OR INSULT TO A PUBLIC AUTHORITY OR
DISREGARD OF THE RESPECT DUE THE OFFENDED PARTY ON ACCOUNT OF HIS
RANK, APPELLANT FLORO RODIL IS HEREBY SENTENCED TO SUFFER AN
INDETERMINATE TERM OF IMPRISONMENT RANGING FROM 12 YEARS OF RECLUSION
TEMPORAL AS MAXIMUM.

THUS MODIFIED, THE JUDGMENT APPEALED FROM IS HEREBY AFFIRMED IN ALL

OTHER RESPECTS.

Aquino, Concepcion Jr., Fernandez and Guerrero, JJ., concur.

Fernando, C.J., concur in the result.

G.R. No. L-30449 October 31, 1979

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
ANTONIO GARCIA Y CABARSE alias "TONY MANOK" and REYNALDO ARVISO V
REBELLEZA alias "RENE BISUGO," defendants-appellants.

Wenceslao B. Trinidad for appellants.

Solicitor General Felix Q. Antonio, Assistant Solicitor General Crispin V. Bautista and Solicitor
Adolfo J. Diaz for appellee.

ABAD SANTOS, J.:

This is an appeal from the decision of April 17, 1969 by the Circuit Criminal Court at Pasig,
Rizal, which found the accused guilty of murder and sentenced them to the death penalty.

The legal verdict hinges on the testimony of the lone eyewitness for the prosecution, Mrs.
Corazon Dioquino Paterno, sister of the deceased, Apolonio Dioquino, Jr. She testified that at
the time of the incident, she resided at Ventanilla Street, Pasay City. She lived at Pasay City for
about five months before moving to another dwelling at Timog Avenue, Quezon City. While
residing at Pasay City, she conceived a child and during this period, it was not unusual for her,
accompanied by her husband, to step out of the house in the wee hours of the morning. They
set out on these irregular walks about five times.

During her residence at Pasay City, her brother Apolonio visited her family for about twenty
times. Sometimes her brother would stay instead at their parents' house at Muntinlupa, Rizal.
He usually spent his weekends in his residence at Bo. Balubad, Porac, Pampanga. Apolonio
and her husband were very close to each other; whenever Apolonio paid them a visit, he usually
slept in the house and sought their help on various problems.

Before the incident which gave rise to this case, Corazon's husband informed her that he saw
Apolonio engaged in a drinking spree with his gang in front of an establishment known as Bill's
Place at M. de la Cruz Street. Pasay City. In her sworn statement before the Pasay City Police
executed on November 3, 1968, Corazon surmised that her husband must have been painting
the town red ("nag good time") in that same place. Upon learning this information from her
husband, Corazon obtained permission to leave the house at 3:00 a.m. so she could fetch her
brother. At that time, she had not been aware that Apolonio was in Pasay City; she had been of
the belief that he was with his family in Pampanga. She went to fetch him because she wanted
him to escape the untoward influence of his gang. In explaining the rationale for her noctural
mission, she employed in her sworn statement the following language: "Dahil itong si Junior ay
meron na kaming nabalitaan na naaakay ng barkada niya sa paggawa ng hindi mabuti."

On her way, as she rounded the corner of P.C. Santos Street, Corazon saw her brother fleeing a
group of about seven persons, including the two accused, Antonio Garcia and Reynaldo Arviso.
She recognized the two accused because they were former gangmates of her brother; in fact,
she knew them before the incident by their aliases of "Tony Manok" and "Rene Bisugo, "
respectively.
Corazon saw that the chase was led by the two accused, with Antonio carrying a long sharp
instrument. Later, in the course of giving her sworn statement before the Pasay City Police on ,
November 3, 1968, Corazon positively Identified Antonio and Reynaldo, who were then at the
office of the General Investigation Section, Secret Service Division, Pasay City Police
Department. She also stated that if she saw the other members of the group again, perhaps she
could likewise Identify them. At the trial, Corazon likewise pointed out the two accused. During
the incident, she exerted efforts to Identify the other group members, taking care to conceal
herself as she did so. She heard a gunshot which caused her to seek cover.

When she ventured to look from where she was hiding, about 20 meters away, she saw the
group catch up with her brother and maltreat him. Some beat him with pieces of wood, others
boxed him. Immediately afterwards, the group scampered away in different directions. Antonio
was left behind. He was sitting astride the prostrate figure of Apolonio, stabbing the latter in the
back with his long knife. Corazon was not able to observe where Antonio later fled, for she could
hardly bear to witness the scene.

When Corazon mustered the courage to approach her brother, she saw that he was bathed in a
pool of his own blood. The incident threw her in a state of nervous confusion, and she resolved
to report the incident to her younger sister, who lived at Lakandula Street, Pasay City. Her sister
in turn decided to break the news to their father at Muntinlupa.

Subsequently, Corazon learned that the police authorities were searching for her brother's
gangmates for having killed him. She also learned that the suspects were in hiding. On the
same day — October 19, 1968 — accompanied by her family, she went at 2:00 p.m. to the
Police Department to inquire about her brother's corpse. They were directed to the Funeraria
Popular, where an autopsy was held. Sometime later, on November 1, 1968, she transferred
residence to Quezon City.

Dr. Mariano Cueva, Jr. testified that he conducted a post-mortem examination on the cadaver of
the decedent Apolonio, and that he prepared the corresponding Necropsy Report. Dr. Cueva
found that the deceased suffered 22 stab wounds in the different portions of his hips; in the front
portion of the chest and neck; in the back portion of the torso; and in the right hand. He testified
that the wounds sustained by the deceased brought about a massive hemorrhage which caused
death. He also testified that it is possible that the instrument marked as Exhibit "B" could have
been used in inflicting the multiple stab wounds sustained by the deceased, except the stab
wounds on the neck.

Both the accused took refuge in the defense of alibi. Antonio Garcia claimed that at that time of
the incident — starting with the chase and ending with the victim's death — in the morning of
October 19, 1968, he was at a place called Pacita's Canteen which adjoins Bill's Place at M, de
la Cruz Street. Reynaldo Arviso claimed that in the evening of the preceding night (October 18,
1968) he went on a drinking spree with his friends at Pacita's Canteen. He went home at 10:30
p.m. and slept up to 7:00 a.m. of October 19, 1968. From 7:00 a.m. of that day, he performed
his duties as a bus conductor by calling for passengers near Pacita's Canteen.

The trial court pinpointed the issue as revolving around the Identity of the persons who
participated in the killing of the deceased. it banked on the testimony of the witness, Corazon
Dioquino, who positively Identified the accused as participants in the attack. Noting that "the
defense did not even attempt to present any evil motive on the part of the witness," the court
concluded that "the two accused took part in the perpetuation of the crime charged." It gave
short shrift to the defense of alibi presented by the two accused, noting that, by their own
admission, the two accused were residents of the vicinity of the crime.

In respect of the circumstances attending the crime it said:

But considering the aggravating circumstances of nighttime; superior strength;

and treachery, which three aggravating circumstances had been sufficiently
established by the prosecution, the same cannot be offset by said voluntary
surrender to a person in authority of his agent, plus the uncontested fact that
deceased, Apolonio Dioquino, Jr. suffered no less than 22 stab wounds,
convincing evidence of the apparent criminal perversity of the accused, the court,
therefore, has no alternative but to impose the supreme penalty.

And rendered judgment as follows:

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Court finds the accused, Antonio Garcia v
Cabarse and Reynaldo Arviso y Rebelleza, GUILTY, beyond reasonable doubt, of
the crime of Murder under Article 248, of the Revised Penal Code, as charged
under Article 248, of the Revised Penal Code, as charged in the information, and
considering the aggravating circumstances surrounding the commission of the
crime, each one of them is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of DEATH.

The two accused are further ordered to indemnify, the heirs of the deceased,
Apolonio Dioquino, Jr. in the amount of TWELVE 'THOUSAND (P12,000,00)
PESOS, jointly and severally and to pay their proportionate share of the costs.

In their Brief, the accused contended that the lower court erred: in not considering nighttime and
superior strength as absorbed in treachery: in finding nighttime as an aggravating circumstance
despite absolute absence of evidence that nighttime was purposely sought to insure the
execution of the crime; in finding superior strength as an aggravating circumstance despite
absence of evidence to sustain such a finding; in finding treachery as an aggravating
circumstance despite absence of evidence to that effect; in not stating the qualifying
circumstance of the alleged crime; in holding that the accused Reynaldo Arviso stabbed and hit
the victim when there is no evidence as to the participation of the said accused Arviso in the
execution of the alleged crime; and in failing to consider the material inconsistencies, prejudice
and other circumstances in the uncorroborated testimony of the only eyewitness, rendering said
testimony not worthy of belief.

The assignment of errors by the accused is anchored on their attempt to discredit the lone
eyewitness for the prosecution, a function which, if successfully undertaken, would totally
obliterate the nexus between the accused and the crime. The defense vigorously maintained
that the testimony of the only eyewitness is a fabrication, and that she was in fact absent from
the scene which she described in both her sworn statement and in her testimony at the trial.

The defense asserted that Corazon Dioquino's testimony was riddled by material
inconsistencies. The defense sought to capitalize on the discrepancy of a sketch made by
Corazon and the sketch made by Pasay City Electrical Engineer Jaime Arriola. Corazon's
sketch shows Juan Sumulong Elementary School to be right in front of P.C. Santos Street; while
Arriola's sketch shows that the school is about 135 meters from the corner of the street. The
defense contended that the discrepancy was a deliberate falsehood on the part of the witness,
Corazon testified that she was near the corner of P.C. Santos Street when she saw her brother
under chase in front of the school, and that she met the group in front of the school in a matter
of five seconds, more or less. The defense assailed her testimony on this point as incredible on
the ground that the distance between the point where she saw her brother being chased, up to
the point where she met them, is 135 meters, and no human being can cover that distance in
five seconds. Moreover, Corazon testified that she was 20 meters away from the place where
the accused caught up with her brother. Again, the defense criticized her testimony in this
respect by pointing out that the true distance is 175 meters.

The defense insisted that Corazon's sketch of the locale of the crime (Exhibit "1") constitutes
"the high point of falsity of her testimony." The defense sought to substantiate this claim by
arguing that from her sketch, it appears that she never crossed paths with her brother or his
pursuers. The witness testified that she saw her brother at the point which is four to five meters
from the corner of P.C. Santos Street. Yet she also testified that she saw the incident from 20
meters. The witness claimed she hid after hearing the shot at a point which is 170 meters from
the scene of the crime. The defense argued that she could not have covered the distance in
such a short time, and that this belies her claim that she was only 20 meters from the scene of
the crime. The defense pointed out that Arriola's sketch (Exhibit "2") shows that the school is
135 meters from the scene of the crime, and the point where the witness claimed she viewed
the crime is 170 meters from the scene of the crime thus giving the lie to her claim that she was
20 meters away.

The alleged inconsistencies in Corazon's testimony — which the defense makes much of — are
not irreconcilable with the physical facts, At the outset, it should not be overlooked that Corazon
was testifying as an eyewitness to the traumatic incident by which her brother met a violent
death at the hands of a mob. Naturally, Corazon can not be expected to deliver a testimony
which passes microscopic scrutiny and scrupulous armchair analysis of the facts, conducted
under circumstances far removed from the turbulence and emotional color of the event as it
actually transpired. Al contrario, if Corazon's testimony were meticulously accurate with respect
to distance covered and the time taken to negotiate it, an impartial observer would wonder
whether such exactitude were not the product of previous rehearsal, if not of fabrication. In
times of stress, the human mind is frequently overpowered by the ebb and flow of emotions in
turmoil; and it is only judicious to take into consideration the natural manifestations of human
conduct, when the physical senses are subdued by the psychological state of the individual.

Corazon was a resident of Pasay City for only about five months. She testified that she is not
familiar with the streets along M. de la Cruz Street. Moreover, Corazon did not categorically
testify that she covered the distance of 135 meters in five seconds. Mole accurately, she
testified that she walked for a period of from five to ten seconds, more or less. Put in this way,
the period was sufficient to allow her to negotiate the distance. Moreover, Corazon did not stay
rooted to one spot while the incident was taking place, but surreptitiously edged her way up to
Magtibay Street, which is closer to the place of the killing.

The defense also claims that the delay which Corazon allowed to transpire, before reporting the
crime to the authorities and giving her sworn statement (on November 3, 1968), is indicative of
fabrication. The killing took place before dawn of October 19, 1968, In the afternoon of the same
day, Corazon and her family went to the Police Department to inquire about the remains of her
brother. Corazon already knew that the police were taking steps to round up the killers. She
incurred no fault in waiting until the culprits were arrested before confronting them and giving
her statement. It would have been the better part of legal procedure if she had given her
statement earlier; but since she was only a 22-year old housekeeper at that tune, she can not
be held to a higher standard of discretion.

The defense further contends that the failure to present Corazon's husband in court indicates
that Corazon was not actually at the scene of the crime at 3:00 o'clock in the morning. It the
defense felt that the husband had a contribution to make in the cause of truth, there was nothing
which prevented them from compelling his process by summons. This they failed to do; and
their omission should not be taken to reflect adversely on the prosecution, who evidently
believed that the husband's testimony was unnecessary,

Finally, the defense claims that it was unnatural for Corazon, after viewing her brother's body, to
proceed to her sister's house one kilometer away, instead of returning to her own house, which
was just a block or so away. It is not unnatural for a witness to a gruesome event, to choose to
confer with a person bound to her by ties of consanguinity, even if such a conference
necessitates that she traverse a longer distance. The exercise of judgment, on the spot, should
not be gauged by reason applied in hindsight with a metrical yard stick.

The next major burden which the defense undertook to assume was to contend that the
accused Reynaldo Arviso is innocent because there is no evidence as to his participation in the
execution of the crime. It is claimed that there is absolute absence of evidence to show that
Reynaldo was a direct participant and that the only evidence against him is that he was seen
pursuing the victim. However, the finding of Reynaldo's guilt stems, not from his direct
participation in the criminal execution, but from his participation in the conspiracy to kill the
deceased. His participation in the conspiracy is supported by Corazon's testimony that he and
Antonio were the leaders of the pack following closely at the heels of the victim.

It is well established that conspiracy may be inferred from the acts of the accused themselves,
when such acts point to a joint purpose and design. A concerted assault upon the victim by the
defendants may indicate conspiracy. (PP v. Monroy & Idica, L-11177, Oct. 30, 1958, 104 Phil.
759). Conspiracy exists if, at the time of the commission of the offense, the defendants had the
same criminal purpose and were united in its execution. (PP v. Datu Dima Binahasing, L-4837,
April 28, 1956, 98 Phil. 902). Those who are members of the band of malefactors by which a
murder is committed and are present at the time and place of the commission of the crime, thus
contributing by their presence to augment the power of the band and to aid in the successful
realization of the crime, are guilty as principals even if they took no part in the material act of
killing the deceased. (US v. Abelinde, No. 945, Dec. 10, 1902, 1 Phil. 568; People v.
Carunungan, L-13283, Sept. 30, 1960, 109 Phil. 534). To establish conspiracy, it is not essential
that there be proof as to previous agreement to commit a crime. It is sufficient that the
malefactors have acted in concert, pursuant to the same objective. (PP vs. San Luis, L-2365,
May 29, 1950, 86 Phil. 485).

Conspiracy need not be established by direct evidence of acts charged, but may and generally
must be proven by a number of indefinite acts, conditions and circumstances which vary
according to the purpose to be accomplished. If it be proved that two or more persons aimed by
their acts towards accomplishment of the same unlawful object, each doing a part. so that their
acts, though apparently independent, were in fact connected and cooperative, indicating a
closeness of personal association and concurrence of sentiment, a conspiracy maybe inferred
though no actual meeting among them to concert is proven (PP v. Colman L-6652-54, Feb. 28,
1958, 103 Phil. 6). A conspiracy may be entered into after the commencement of overt acts
leading to the consummation of the crime. (PP v. Barredo, L-2728, Dec. 29, 1950, 87 Phil. 800).
Conspiracy implies concert of design and not participation in every detail of execution (PP v.
Carbonel, L-24177, March 15, 1926, 48 Phil. 868; PP v. Danan, L-1766, March 31, 1949, 83
Phil. 252).

When a group of seven men, more or less, give chase to a single unarmed individual running for
his life, and they overtake him and inflict wounds on his body by means of shooting, stabbing,
and hitting with pieces of wood, there is conspiracy to kill; and it does not detract from their
status as conspirators that there is no evidence of previous agreement, it being sufficient that
their wills have concurred and they labored to achieve the same end.

The defense submits that the failure of the lower court to specify the qualifying circumstance in
the crime of murder is violative of the Constitution and the Rules of Court. We find no such
infirmity. Since the principle concerned is "readily understood from the facts, the conclusion and
the penalty posed., an express specification of the statute or exposition of the law is not
necessary." (People vs. Silo, L-7916, May 25, 1956, 99 Phil. 216). In the absence of a
specification by the trial court, the defense surmised that the qualifying circumstance in this
case is evident premeditation: but the defense argued that evident premeditation was not
shown. We agree. Under normal conditions, conspiracy generally presupposes premeditation.
But in the case of implied conspiracy, evident premeditation may not be appreciated, in the
absence of proof as to how and when the plan to kill the victim was hatched or what time
elapsed before it was carried out, so that it can not be determined if the accused had "sufficient
time between its inception and its fulfillment dispassionately to consider and accept the
consequences." There should be a showing that the accused had the opportunity for reflection
and persisted in executing his criminal design. (PP v. Custodia, L-7442, October 24,1955, 97
Phil. 698; PP v. Mendoza and Sinu-ag, L-4146 and L-4147, March 28, 1952, 91 Phil. 58; PP v.
Yturiaga, L-2816, May 31, 1950, 86 Phil. 534; PP v. Lozada, No. 46998, Nov. 16, 1940, 70 Phil.
525; PP v. Upao Moro, L-6771, May 28, 1957, Phil. 101 Phil. 1226; PP v. Sakam, No. 41566,
Dec. 7, 1934, 61 Phil. 27: PP v. Peralta, L-19069, Oct. 29, 1968, 25 SCRA 759; PP v. Pareja, L-
21937, Nov. 29, 1969, 30 SCRA 693).

Even in the absence of evident premeditation, the crime of murder in this case might still be
qualified by treachery, which is alleged in the information. But the defense argued that treachery
was not present. We are so convinced. It is an elementary axiom that treachery can in no way
be presumed but must be fully proven. (US v. Asilo, No. 1957, Jan. 30, 1905, 4 Phil, 175; US v.
Arciga, No. 1129, April 6, 1903, 2 Phil. 110; PP v. Durante, No. 31101, Aug. 23, 1929, 53 Phil.
363; PP v. Pelago, L-24884, Aug. 31, 1968, 24 SCRA 1027), Where the manner of the attack
was not proven, the defendant should be given the benefit of the doubt, and the crime should be
considered homicide only. (Carpio, 83 Phil. 509; Amansec, So Phil, 424).

In People vs. Metran (L-4205, July 27, 1951, 89 Phil. 543). the aggravating circumstances of aid
of armed men, abuse of superiority, and nocturnity, were considered as constituting treachery,
which qualified the crime as murder, since there was no direct evidence as to the manner of the
attack. However, in this case we believe that the correct qualifying circumstance is not
treachery, but abuse of superiority. Here we are confronted with a helpless victim killed by
assailants superior to him in arms and in numbers. But the attack was not sudden nor
unexpected, and the element of surprise was lacking. The victim could have made a defense;
hence, the assault involved some risk to the assailants. There being no showing when the intent
to kill was formed, it can not be said that treachery has been proven. We believe the correct rule
is found in People vs. Proceso Bustos (No. 17763, July 23, 1923, 45 Phil. 9),
where alevosia was not appreciated because it was deemed included in abuse of superiority.
We find that abuse of superiority attended the offense, following a long line of cases which
made this finding on parallel facts Our jurisprudence is exemplified by the holding that where
four persons attacked an unarmed victim but there was no proof as to how the attack
commenced and treachery was not proven, the fact that there were four assailants would
constitute abuse of superiority. (People vs. Lasada, No. 6742, Jan. 26, 1912, 21 Phil. 287; US v.
Banagale, No. 7870, Jan. 10, 1913, 24 Phil. 69). However, the information does not allege the
qualifying circumstance of abuse of superiority; hence, this circumstance can only be Created
as generic aggravating. (People v. Acusar, L-1798, Dee. 29, 1948, 82 Phil. 490; People v. Beje,
L-8245, July 19, 1956, 99 Phil. 1052; People v. Bautista, L-23303, May 20, 1969, 28 SCRA
184).

The offense took place at 3:00 o'clock in the morning. It may therefore be said that it was
committed at night, which covers the period from sunset to sunrise, according to the New Civil
Code, Article 13. Is this basis for finding that nocturnity is aggravating? The Revised Penal
Code, Article 14, provides that it is an aggravating circumstance when the crime is committed in
the nighttime, whenever nocturnity may facilitate the commission of the offense. There are two
tests for nocturnity as an aggravating circumstance: the objective test, under which nocturnity is
aggravating because it facilitates the commission of the offense; and the subjective test, under
which nocturnity is aggravating because it was purposely sought by the offender. These two
tests should be applied in the alternative.

In this case, the subjective test is not passed because there is no showing that the accused
purposely sought the cover of night time. Next, we proceed and apply the objective test, to
determine whether nocturnity facilitated the killing of the victim. A group of men were engaged in
a drinking spree, in the course of which one of them fled, chased by seven others. The criminal
assault on the victim at 3:00 a.m. was invited by nocturnal cover, which handicapped the view of
eyewitnesses and encouraged impunity by persuading the malefactors that it would be difficult
to determine their Identity because of the darkness and the relative scarcity of people in the
streets. There circumstances combine to pass the objective test, and e find that nocturnity is
aggravating because it facilitated the commission of the offense. Nocturnity enticed those with
the lust to kill to follow their impulses with the false courage born out of the belief that they could
not be readily Identified.

The information alleges that the crime of murder was attended by the two qualifying
circumstances of treachery and evident premeditation. Neither of these qualifying circumstances
was proved; hence, the killing can not be qualified into murder, and constitutes instead the crime
of homicide, which is punished by reclusion temporal. It is not controverted that the accused
voluntarily surrendered to the authorities; they are therefore entitled to the mitigating
circumstance of voluntary surrender. This lone mitigating circumstance offset by the two generic
aggravating circumstances of abuse of superiority and nocturnity, produces the result that in the
crime of homicide, one aggravating circumstance remains.

WHEREFORE, the judgment of the court a quo is hereby modified in that the two accused,
Antonio Garcia y Cabarse and Reynaldo Arviso y Rebelleza, are sentenced to undergo an
indeterminate imprisonment of 10 years as minimum to 18 years as maximum, but in all other
respects affirmed.

SO ORDERED.
Fernando, C.J., Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio, Aquino, Concepcion, Jr., Santos Fernandez,
Guerrero, De Castro and -Melencio-Herrera, JJ., concur.

Teehankee J., took no part.

 [G.R. No. 136892. April 11, 2002]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. SUEENE DISCALSOTA y JUGAR, appellant.

DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:

Without any proven qualifying circumstance, a killing constitutes homicide which is

punishable by reclusion temporal, not death. Where the attack was made openly and the victim
had ample opportunity to escape, treachery cannot be appreciated.

The Case

For automatic review by this Court is the Decision [1] dated September 28, 1998, issued by
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bacolod City (Branch 53), finding Sueene Discalsota y Jugar
guilty of murder beyond reasonable doubt. The decretal portion of the Decision reads as
follows:

“WHEREFORE, the court finds the accused Sueene Discalsota, alias Ronnie de la Peña,
GUILTY of the crime of Murder, punished under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code as
amended by R.A. 7659, of Herbert Suarnaba. Applying Art. 63, of the Revised Penal Code,
paragraph 2, No. 1, on the application of indivisible penalties, which provides that whenever
‘there is present only one aggravating penalty, the greater penalty shall applied,’ and there is no
mitigating circumstance. The Court hereby imposes upon the accused Sueene Discalsota the
penalty of DEATH.

“The accused is further ordered to pay the heirs of the deceased the sum of P50,000.00, as civil
indemnity; P30,000.00 as moral damages, and P25,000.00 as actual expenses for the wake
and funeral, and costs.”[2]

The Information[3] against appellant reads as follows:

”That on or about the 24th day of January, 1996, in the City of Bacolod, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the herein accused, without any justifiable cause or
motive, being then armed with a bladed weapon, with intent to kill and by means of treachery
and evident premeditation, did, then and there wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously assault, attack
and stab with said weapon one HERBERT SUARNABA Y CATALAN, thereby inflicting upon the
person of the latter the following wounds:

‘I.W. 4 cm, left posterior lumbar area, level of L2 L4 penetrating Retroperiton[e]al Cavity
completely transacting left kidney, inferior pole, penetrating abdominal cavity completely
transacting pancreas, body, perforating posterior surface of Stomach, pundus with massive
gastric spillage.

‘Cause of Death: Hypovolemic Shock 2º

which were the direct and immediate cause of his death.”

When arraigned on July 9, 1997, appellant, with the assistance of counsel,[4] pleaded “not
guilty.”[5] In due course, the former was tried by the RTC which found him guilty of murder.

The Facts
Version of the Prosecution

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) summarized the evidence for the prosecution in
this wise:[6]

“At about 1:00 P.M. of January 24, 1996, the victim, Herbert Suarnaba, 16 years old, along with
his neighborhood friends, Jenny Aplaza (17 years old), Pedro Ramos (17 years old) and Rowell
Lavega (17 years old) left 6th Street, Bacolod City and went to Plaza Mart, a shopping mall,
where they loitered for about an hour or two. They decided to visit their friend, ‘Novieboy’ del
Rosario, who used to be their neighbor at Purok Pag-asa but who ha[d] since transferred to
Libertad Baybay. They took [a] jeepney and arrived there at around 3:00 P.M. They proceeded
to the inner portion of the barangay, passing by several houses [o]n a footwalk to the house of
‘Novieboy’ del Rosario. They were welcomed by the latter and [they] then listened to music on
the tape recorder. When ‘Novieboy’s’ mother arrived, she offered them ‘chorizo’ (sausage)
which she brought with her from Kalibo.

“While peacefully enjoying themselves, they were suddenly startled by shouts coming from a
group of men outside the house. Looking out, they saw about nine (9) men with their leader
shouting: ‘Gua kamo dira, kay pamatyon ta kamo! Nga-a nagsulod-sulod kamo diri sa amon
teritoryo? Gua kamo dira kay pamatyon ta kamo! (You there, get out and we will kill you!) The
four (4) teen-agers were terrified since they did not know the men who were threatening
them. Nor did they know of any grudge or misunderstanding between their group and the men
outside. They then called Mrs. Del Rosario (‘Novieboy’s’ mother) who advised them not to go
out of the house and called for the police. However, after waiting for some time, no police
assistance came. Mrs. Del Rosario then went out and returned with four (4) barangay
tanods. The tanods entered the house and talked to the teen-agers and assured them that no
harm would come to them and that there would be a police ‘Bac[k]-up’ waiting for them at the
road. The group was then escorted out of the house by the tanods and were accompanied by
two (2) of them and Mrs. Del Rosario towards the footpath leading to the main road. It was
already dusk by that time. The men threatening them were still outside when they went out of
the house and they followed the group. When the group reached the main road, no police
‘Bac[k]-up’ was in sight but Mrs. Del Rosario remained with them.

“There was a single ‘trisikad’ (pedicab) outside and the four (4) boarded it. Since the pedicab
could only accommodate two (2) persons inside, Rowell Lavega stood on the rail at the back of
the pedicab while the victim sat in front.

“The pedicab had not left when Rowell saw a man running towards them from the footwalk. He
was about 50 meters away when Rowell first saw him. The four jumped out of the pedicab
when Mrs. Del Rosario and the people there shouted at them to run. Despite efforts by the
barangay tanods to stop him, the man rushed headlong towards Rowell and the victim. He was
about to strike at Rowell when Mrs. Del Rosario pushed Rowell to run. When Mrs. Del Rosario
fell down as if to faint, the victim helped her stand up. Mrs. Del Rosario then told the victim to
run and he ran around the pedicab more than a foot long. While the victim was running away
trying to escape, the man holding the knife caught up with him and thrust his knife at the fleeing
victim who was hit at the back. The victim fell and crawled, while gasping for breath, and he
managed to enter a house pleading for help.

“Rowell saw what happened to his friend and wanted to help him but could not because the
attacker was still there. After seeing the victim fall down, bloodied, his attacker ran towards the
interior of the barangay. Meanwhile, Pedro, Jenny and Rowell ran as fast [as] they could
because the companions of the attacker also came rushing out of the footwalk and were
charging at them with drawn knives. They escaped being hurt when they sought refuge in the
house of a friend at the opposite side of the basketball court. Mrs. Del Rosario fainted upon
seeing the attack on the victim.

“Pedro and Rowell recognized the attacker as the one who earlier shouted at them while they
were still inside the house of Mrs. Del Rosario. They stayed for about an hour inside the house
of their friend where they sought refuge and there they learned that the man who chased them
and struck the victim was known by the nickname, ‘Yawa’ and is also known as Ronnie de la
Peña although his real name is Sueene Discalsota. Much later, when the police finally came
and investigated them, Pedro was shown pictures of the suspects and he picked out the picture
of accused-appellant.

“Louie Gregorio, a reluctant witness who testified only on pain of arrest for contempt of court,
declared that he was a ‘live-in’ partner of Nieves del Rosario; that while resting at the house of
Nieves del Rosario around 4:00 P.M. of January 24, 1996, he confirmed that the victim and
three (3) others were at the house and that no untoward incident happened while they were
inside the house. Several minutes after the boys were escorted out of the house by four (4)
barangay tanods, he learned that a stabbing incident happened outside and when he went out
to investigate, he saw accused-appellant running towards the house of his girlfriend. He was
only about five (5) armslength from accused-appellant who was carrying a bloodied long knife
which he did not even bother to conceal. He heard accused-appellant shouting, ‘Naigo ko gid!’
(I got him). He also confirmed that Ronnie de la Peña is the same accused-appellant Sueene
Discalsota.

“The victim was rushed to the Corazon Locsin Montelibano Memorial Hospital. He was still alive
when the police and his mother arrived. However, he was already breathing heavily, in a critical
condition, and could no longer respond. A few minutes later, he was pronounced dead by the
doctor.

“Dr. Hildegard B. Madalag conducted the autopsy on the body of the victim and submitted a
Report of his findings (Exhibit D). He confirmed his findings in open court and further testified
that upon examination, he found the kidney of the victim completely ‘transacted’ or totally
cut. The knife’s entry point was at the back, a direct and straight thrust which went through
three (3) vital organs – pancreas, stomach and the kidney, causing ‘massive gastric
spillage.’ He gave the cause of death in the Certificate of Death (Exhibit E) as ‘Hypo-volemic
shock.’

“Despite lack of cooperation from the residents of the area where the incident happened, the
police authorities were able to arrest accused-appellant on the identification of Pedro Ramos
and Rowell Lavega.”[7]
 Version of the Defense

On the other hand, the Public Attorney’s Office narrated appellants’ version of the incident
as follows:[8]

“SUEENE DISCALSOTA, denied that he was [the] one who stabbed and killed Herbert
Suarnaba. He testified that in the afternoon of January 24, 1996, he was in their house at Purok
Kingfisher, Libertad Baybay, Bacolod City, from 3:00 to 5:00 P.M. He was tending their store
where he acted as cashier. His companion thereat were older sister Aileen and younger sister
Yvette. He never left their store even after 5:00 P.M. When his mother Lilia Discalsota arrived
from the Central Market she took over the chores in the store. He only learned that there was a
stabbing incident on the following day (January 25, 1996).

“He learned that he was charged [with] Murder on April 7, 1997, when he was arrested by
policemen in the house of his wife, Christina at Purok Tulihaw, Brgy. 16, Bacolod City. He was
surprised when the policemen presented a warrant for his arrest. The policemen told him that
he was involved in a murder case in Libertad, Baybay, Bacolod City in January 1996. He did
not want to go with the policemen, but it was a certain Tiyo Erwin who prevailed upon him to go
with the arresting officers. He was then brought to Bac[k]-up I and later to headquarters. He
was subsequently detained at the ‘Lock-up’.

“He further testified that he [did] not know Louie Gregorio, one of the witnesses for the
prosecution. He [did] not know whether Louie Gregorio [was] the common law husband of
Nieves del Rosario but he met her only at the City jail, when she visited her common-law
husband Marcial Flores, in January 1998. Marcial Flores [was] his neighbor at Libertad,
Baybay.

“Discalsota also denied leaving Libertad, Baybay, Bacolod City after the incident. He was there
on January 25, 1996, and he was even able to leave their house that day. He continued staying
in their house x x x until April 1996. Eventually their house was demolished in 1997 and his
family transferred to Tangub. He nevertheless, remained in the area and stayed with his wife at
her house in Purok Tulinaw, which was just about 30 meters away from the house of Nieves del
Rosario.

“He denied membership [in] any fraternity, much less U-2. He declared that ‘Yawa,’ x x x Ming,
Michael Bartolo, Da-dan, were not his neighbors, but admitted they were residents of the
place. These persons are members of Red-O fraternity. He denied knowing Ulysses Tonggoy.
He admitted knowing x x x Alfonso one of the CVO’s mentioned by prosecution’s [witness]
Alfonso de la Cruz. He mentioned that he [was] not ‘Yawa’ but one Stephen.

“EVETTE DISCALSOTA corroborated the testimony of Suenne Discalsota. She testified that
she was tending their store the whole day of January 24, 1996. Her companions thereat were
her brother, Sueene[;] and sister, Aileen. Their store opened at 7:00 A.M. and closed on that
particular day, at 9:00 P.M. her brother Sueene never left the store from 7:00 A.M. to 9:00
P.M. Sueene was then acting as the cashier of their store.

“She also testified that she did not know that her brother Sueene was charged in court. When
her brother was arrested she went to the police station and inquired why Sueene was detained
and she was told he had a case. She then told the police that on the day the alleged stabbing
was committed Sueene was not able to leave the house the whole day.”[9]

Ruling of the Trial Court

The RTC ruled that appellant had positively been identified by the prosecution witnesses as
the culprit responsible for the death of Herbert Suarnaba. It gave no credence to the denial and
alibi proffered by appellant. It also appreciated evident premeditation and treachery as
qualifying and aggravating circumstances, respectively, and thus sentenced him to death.
Hence, this automatic review before us.[10]

Assignment of Errors

In his Brief, appellant faults the trial court with the following alleged errors:
“I

The trial court gravely erred in finding accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of murder as charged in the information despite the failure of the prosecution to prove the
qualifying circumstances of evident premeditation and treachery.

“II

The trial court erred in imposing the death penalty upon the accused-appellant.”[11]

The Court’s Ruling

The appeal is partly meritorious.

Preliminary Matter

Appellant no longer questions the finding of the RTC that he stabbed and killed Herbert
Suarnaba. However, an appeal in a criminal case opens the whole case to review. Thus, we
shall still pass upon the matter.
The prosecution witnesses were one in identifying appellant as the person who had wielded
a knife and stabbed the victim. Appellant had nothing to offer in his defense but an alibi
corroborated by his two sisters. A careful scrutiny of the records shows no reason to disbelieve
the prosecution witnesses and to overturn the court a quo’s finding that they were credible.
Basic is the rule that the findings of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses are entitled
to the highest respect and will not be disturbed on appeal in the absence of any showing that it
overlooked, misunderstood, or misapplied some facts or circumstances of weight and
substance.[12]
Also, the RTC was correct in disregarding the alibi of appellant. As it aptly ruled, his
“defense of alibi crumbles in the face of the positive identification of the accused by prosecution
witnesses as being present in the scene of the crime.”[13]

First Issue:
Evident Premeditation and Treachery

Appellant contends that evident premeditation should not have been appreciated by the trial
court as a qualifying circumstance.
It is settled that qualifying circumstances cannot be presumed, but must be established by
clear and convincing evidence as conclusively as the killing itself.[14]

“[F]or evident premeditation to be appreciated, there must be proof, as clear as the evidence of
the crime itself of the following elements thereof, viz: (a) the time when the accused determined
to commit the crime; (b) an act manifestly indicating that the accused has clung to his
determination, and (c) sufficient lapse of time between the determination and execution to allow
himself to reflect upon the consequences of his act.”[15]

In this case, the first two elements of evident premeditation are present. As found by the
RTC, the time appellant determined to commit the crime was when he started shouting at the
victim and the latter’s companions: “You, there, get out and we will kill you!” By staying outside
the house and following the victim’s companions when they came out, he manifestly indicated
that he clung to his determination.
As for the third element, the prosecution evidence shows that appellant started shouting
outside Mrs. del Rosario’s house at 3:30 p.m. [16] When the victim’s group left the house, it was
not yet dark;[17] it was only past four o’clock in the afternoon. [18] The police received information
on the stabbing incident at 4:30[19] p.m. on the same day. It took less than an hour from the time
appellant evinced a desire to commit the crime, as manifested by his shouts outside the house,
up to the time he stabbed the victim. The span of less than one hour could not have afforded
the former full opportunity for meditation and reflection on the consequences of the crime he
committed.
The essence of premeditation is that the execution of the criminal act must be preceded by
cool thought and reflection on the resolution to carry out the criminal intent during a space of
time sufficient to arrive at a calm judgment.[20]

“To justify the inference of deliberate premeditation, there must be a period sufficient in a judicial
sense to afford full opportunity for meditation and reflection and to allow the conscience of the
actor to overcome the resolution of his will if he desires to hearken to its warning.”[21]

Where no sufficient lapse of time is appreciable from the determination to commit the crime
until its execution, evident premeditation cannot be appreciated.[22] Hence, the lower court erred
in holding that evident premeditation qualified the killing to murder.
No Treachery
 Appellant also argues that treachery did not attend the commission of the crime.
There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against persons employing
means, methods, or forms of attack that tend directly and specially to insure the execution of the
crime without risk arising from the defense that the offended party might make.[23]
“For treachery to exist, two essential elements must concur: (a) the employment of means
of execution that gives the person attacked no opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate, and
(b) the said means of execution was deliberately or consciously adopted.” [24] Treachery cannot
be presumed; it must be proved by clear and convincing evidence or as conclusively as the
killing itself.[25]
In the present case, the victim had the opportunity to escape or to defend himself. Before
he and his group left the house of Mrs. del Rosario, they had already been forewarned of violent
aggression from appellant, whose words and stance while outside the house made its
imminence clear. The mode of attack adopted by appellant was not without risk to himself;
neither was it sudden. When he began his menacing approach, he was visible to the victim and
the latter’s companions. Appellant was out in the open and thus at risk from any defense which
the group might make. The presence of such risk and the existence of ample opportunity for
the victim to escape or defend himself negated treachery.

Second Issue:
Proper Penalty

In his Brief, appellant further claims to have been a minor at the time of the commission of
the crime. This matter was, however, not raised during the trial. Furthermore, in his direct
examination held on June 11, 1998, he stated for the record that he was a 20-year-old married
man. Hence, we cannot agree to appreciate minority as a privileged mitigating circumstance.
Absent any qualifying circumstance, appellant may be convicted of homicide
only. Considering further the absence of any aggravating or mitigating circumstance, the
imposable penalty of reclusion temporal should be in the medium period[26] and encompassed
by the Indeterminate Sentence Law.

Damages

We affirm the RTC’s award of P50,000 as civil indemnity and P30,000.00 as moral
damages. However, the grant of actual damages should be reduced to P10,890, since this is
the only amount duly supported by a statement of account and receipts. “To justify an award of
actual damages, it is necessary to prove with a reasonable degree of certainty, premised upon
competent proof and on the best evidence obtainable by the injured party, the actual amount of
loss.”[27]
WHEREFORE, the appeal is PARTLY GRANTED. Appellant is CONVICTED of homicide
and is SENTENCED to an indeterminate penalty of 10 years of prision mayor medium as
minimum to 17 years and 4 months of reclusion temporal medium as maximum. The grant of
civil indemnity and moral damages is AFFIRMED, but that of actual damages is reduced
to P10,890. No pronouncement as to costs.
 SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Quisumbing, Ynares-
Santiago, De Leon Jr., Sandoval-Gutierrez, and Carpio, JJ., concur.

[G.R. No. 140756. April 4, 2003]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. JUAN GONZALES ESCOTE, JR. @
Jun Mantika of Sta. Lucia, Angat, Bulacan and VICTOR ACUYAN y OCHOVILLOS
@ Vic Arroyo of Sto. Niño, Poblacion, Bustos, Bulacan, accused-appellants.

DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:

Robbery with homicide is classified as a crime against property. Nevertheless, treachery is

a generic aggravating circumstance in said crime if the victim of homicide is killed
treacherously. The Supreme Court of Spain so ruled. So does the Court rule in this case, as it
had done for decades.
Before the Court on automatic review is the Decision [1] of Branch 11 of the Regional Trial
Court of Bulacan in Criminal Case No. 443-M-97 convicting accused-appellants Juan Gonzales
Escote, Jr. and Victor Acuyan of the complex crime of robbery with homicide, meting on each of
them the supreme penalty of death, and ordering them to pay the heirs of the victim, SPO1 Jose
C. Manio, Jr., the total amount of P300,000.00 by way of actual and moral damages and to pay
to Five Star Bus, Inc., the amount of P6,000.00 by way of actual damages.

The Facts

The antecedent facts as established by the prosecution are as follows:

On September 28, 1996 at past midnight, Rodolfo Cacatian, the regular driver of Five Star
Passenger Bus bearing Plate No. ABS-793, drove the bus from its terminal at Pasay City to its
destination in Bolinao, Pangasinan. Also on board was Romulo Digap, the regular conductor of
the bus, as well as some passengers. At Camachile, Balintawak, six passengers boarded the
bus, including Victor Acuyan and Juan Gonzales Escote, Jr. who were wearing maong pants,
rubber shoes, hats and jackets. [2] Juan seated himself on the third seat near the aisle, in the
middle row of the passengers’ seats, while Victor stood by the door in the mid-portion of the bus
beside Romulo. Another passenger, SPO1 Jose C. Manio, Jr., a resident of Angeles City, was
seated at the rear portion of the bus on his way home to Angeles City. Tucked on his waist was
his service gun bearing Serial Number 769806. Every now and then, Rodolfo looked at the side
view mirror as well as the rear view and center mirrors installed atop the driver’s seat to monitor
any incoming and overtaking vehicles and to observe the passengers of the bus.
The lights of the bus were on even as some of the passengers slept. When the bus was
travelling along the highway in Plaridel, Bulacan, Juan and Victor suddenly stood up, whipped
out their handguns and announced a holdup. Petrified, Rodolfo glanced at the center mirror
towards the passengers’ seat and saw Juan and Victor armed with handguns. Juan fired his gun
upward to awaken and scare off the passengers. Victor followed suit and fired his gun
upward. Juan and Victor then accosted the passengers and divested them of their money and
valuables. Juan divested Romulo of the fares he had collected from the passengers. The
felons then went to the place Manio, Jr. was seated and demanded that he show them his
identification card and wallet. Manio, Jr. brought out his identification card bearing No. 00898.
[3]
Juan and Victor took the identification card of the police officer as well as his service gun and
told him: “Pasensya ka na Pare, papatayin ka namin, baril mo rin and papatay sa iyo.” The
police officer pleaded for mercy: “Pare maawa ka sa akin. May pamilya ako.” However, Victor
and Juan ignored the plea of the police officer and shot him on the mouth, right ear, chest and
right side of his body. Manio, Jr. sustained six entrance wounds. He fell to the floor of the
bus. Victor and Juan then moved towards the driver Rodolfo, seated themselves beside him
and ordered the latter to maintain the speed of the bus. Rodolfo heard one of the felons saying:
“Ganyan lang ang pumatay ng tao. Parang pumapatay ng manok.” The other said: “Ayos na
naman tayo pare. Malaki-laki ito.” Victor and Juan further told Rodolfo that after they (Victor
and Juan) shall have alighted from the bus, he (Rodolfo) should continue driving the bus and
not report the incident along the way. The robbers assured Rodolfo that if the latter will follow
their instructions, he will not be harmed. Victor and Juan ordered Rodolfo to stop the bus along
the overpass in Mexico, Pampanga where they alighted from the bus. The robbery was over in
25 minutes.
When the bus reached Dau, Mabalacat, Pampanga, Rodolfo and Romulo forthwith reported
the incident to the police authorities. The cadaver of SPO1 Manio, Jr. was brought to the
funeral parlor where Dr. Alejandro D. Tolentino, the Municipal Health Officer of Mabalacat,
Pampanga, performed an autopsy on the cadaver of the police officer. The doctor prepared and
signed an autopsy report detailing the wounds sustained by the police officer and the cause of
his death:

“Body still flaccid (not in rigor mortis) bathed with his own blood. There were 6 entrance wounds
and 6 exit wounds. All the entrance were located on his right side. An entrance (0.5 cm x 0.5
cm.) located infront of the right ear exited at the left side just below the ear lobe. Another
entrance through the mouth exited at the back of the head fracturing the occiput with an opening
of (1.5 cm x 2 cm). Blood CSF and brain tissues came out. Another fatal bullet entered at the
upper right cornea of the sternum, entered the chest cavity pierced the heart and left lung and
exited at the left axillary line. Severe hemorrhage in the chest cavity came from the heart and
left lung. The other 3 bullets entered the right side and exited on the same side. One entrance
at the top of the right shoulder exited at the medial side of the right arm. The other entered
above the right breast and exited at the right lateral abdominal wall travelling below muscles and
subcutaneous tissues without entering the cavities. Lastly another bullet entered above the
right iliac crest travelled superficially and exited above the right inguinal line.

Cause of Death:

Shock, massive internal and external hemorrhage, complete brain destruction and injury to the
heart and left lung caused by multiple gunshot wounds.”[4]

Rodolfo and Romulo proceeded to the police station of Plaridel, Bulacan where they
reported the robbery and gave their respective sworn statements. [5] SPO1 Manio, Jr. was
survived by his wife Rosario Manio and their four young children. Rosario spent P20,000.00 for
the coffin and P10,000.00 for the burial lot of the slain police officer. [6] Manio, Jr. was 38 years
old when he died and had a gross salary of P8,085.00 a month.[7]
Barely a month thereafter, or on October 25, 1996, at about midnight, SPO3 Romeo
Meneses, the team leader of Alert Team No. 1 of Tarlac Police Station, and PO3 Florante S.
Ferrer were at the police checkpoint along the national highway in Tarlac, Tarlac. At the time,
the Bambang-Concepcion bridge was closed to traffic and the police officers were tasked to
divert traffic to the Sta. Rosa road. Momentarily, a white colored taxi cab without any plate
number on its front fender came to view. Meneses stopped the cab and asked the driver, who
turned out to be the accused Juan Gonzales Escote, Jr., for his identification card. Juan told
Meneses that he was a policeman and handed over to Meneses the identification card of SPO1
Manio, Jr. and the money which Juan and Victor took from Manio, Jr. during the heist on
September 28, 1996.[8] Meneses became suspicious when he noted that the identification card
had already expired on March 16, 1995. He asked Juan if the latter had a new pay slip. Juan
could not produce any. He finally confessed to Meneses that he was not a
policeman. Meneses brought Juan to the police station. When police officers frisked Juan for
any deadly weapon, they found five live bullets of a 9 millimeter firearm in his pocket. The
police officers confiscated the ammunition. In the course of the investigation, Juan admitted to
the police investigators that he and Victor, alias Victor Arroyo, staged the robbery on board Five
Star Bus and are responsible for the death of SPO1 Manio, Jr. in Plaridel, Bulacan. Meneses
and Ferrer executed their joint affiavit of arrest of Juan.[9] Juan was subsequently turned over to
the Plaridel Police Station where Romulo identified him through the latter’s picture as one of
those who robbed the passengers of the Five Star Bus with Plate No. ABS-793 and killed SPO1
Manio, Jr. on September 28, 1996. In the course of their investigation, the Plaridel Police
Station Investigators learned that Victor was a native of Laoang, Northern Samar. [10] On April 4,
1997, an Information charging Juan Gonzales Escote, Jr. and Victor Acuyan with robbery with
homicide was filed with the Regional Trial Court of Bulacan. The Information reads:

That on or about the 28th day of September 1996, in the municipality of Plaridel, province of
Bulacan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, conspiring, confederating together and mutually helping each other, armed with
firearms, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with intent of (sic) gain and by
means of force, violence and intimidation, take, rob and carry away with one (1) necklace and
cash in [the] undetermine[d] amount of one SPO1 Jose C. Manio, Jr., to the damage and
prejudice of the said owner in the said undetermine[d] amount; that simultaneously or on the
occassion (sic) of said robbery, said accused by means of violence and intimidation and in
furtherance of their conspiracy attack, assault and shoot with the service firearm of the said
SPO1 Jose C. Manio, Jr., thereby inflicting serious physical injuries which resulted (sic) the
death of the said SPO1 Jose C. Manio, Jr.

Contrary to law.[11]

On the strength of a warrant of arrest, the police officers arrested Victor in Laoang,
Northern Samar and had him incarcerated in the Bulacan Provincial Jail. Assisted by Atty.
Ramiro Osorio, their counsel de parte, Juan and Victor were duly arraigned and entered their
plea of not guilty to the charge. Trial thereafter ensued. After the prosecution had rested its
case on August 26, 1998, Juan escaped from the provincial jail. [12] The trial court issued a bench
warrant on September 22, 1998 for the arrest of said accused-appellant. [13] In the meantime,
Victor adduced his evidence.
Victor denied the charge and interposed the defense of alibi. He testified that in 1996, he
worked as a tire man in the vulcanizing shop located in Banga I, Plaridel, Bulacan owned by
Tony Boy Negro. On one occasion, Ilarde Victorino, a customer of Tony Boy Negro, ordered
Victor to sell a tire. Victor sold the tire but did not turn over the proceeds of the sale to
Ilarde. The latter hated Victor for his misdeed. The shop was later demolished and after two
months of employment, Victor returned to Barangay Muwal-Buwal, Laoang, Northern
Samar. On September 26, 1996, at 9:30 p.m., Victor was at the town fiesta in Laoang. Victor
and his friends, Joseph Iringco and Rickey Lorcio were having a drinking spree in the house of
Barangay Captain Ike Baluya. At 11:30 p.m., the three left the house of the barangay captain
and attended the public dance at the town auditorium. Victor and his friends left the auditorium
at 5:30 a.m. of September 27, 1996. Victor likewise testified that he never met Juan until his
arrest and detention at the Bulacan Provincial Jail. One of the inmates in said provincial jail was
Ilarde Victorino. Victor learned that Ilarde implicated him for the robbery of the Five Star Bus
and the killing of SPO1 Manio, Jr. to hit back at him for his failure to turn over to Ilarde the
proceeds of the sale of the latter’s tire.
On January 14, 1999, Juan was rearrested in Daet, Camarines Norte. [14] However, he no
longer adduced any evidence in his behalf.

The Verdict of the Trial Court

On March 11, 1999, the trial court rendered its Decision judgment finding Juan and Victor
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged, meted on each of them the penalty of
death and ordered them to pay P300,000.00 as actual and moral damages to the heirs of the
victim and to pay the Five Star Bus Company the amount of P6,000.00 as actual damages. The
decretal portion of the decision reads:

WHEREFORE, this Court finds both accused, Juan Gonzales Escote, Jr. and Victor Acuyan
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of Robbery with Homicide as penalized under Art. 294 of the
Revised Penal Code as amended and hereby sentences both to suffer the supreme penalty of
Death and to indemnify the heirs of the late SPO1 Jose C. Manio, Jr., the amount of
P300,000.00 as actual and moral damages and to pay the Five Star Bus P6,000.00 as actual
damage.

SO ORDERED.[15]

Assignment of Errors

Juan and Victor assail the Decision of the trial court and contend that:
I

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT RODOLFO CACATIAN AND ROMULO
DIGAP, DRIVER AND CONDUCTOR OF THE FIVE STAR BUS, RESPECTIVELY, WERE ABLE
TO POSITIVELY IDENTIFY THE TWO (2) MEN WHO HELD-UP THEIR BUS AND KILLED ONE
PASSENGER THEREOF AT AROUND 3:00 O’CLOCK IN THE EARLY MORNING OF
SEPTEMBER 28, 1996.

II

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THE TWO (2) ACCUSED GUILTY BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE CRIME OF ROBBERY WITH HOMICIDE.[16]

The Court’s Verdict

Anent the first assignment of error, Juan and Victor contend that the trial court committed a
reversible error in relying on the testimony of Rodolfo, the bus conductor, for convicting them of
the crime charged. They aver that although their counsel was able to initially cross-examine
Rodolfo, the former failed to continue with and terminate his cross-examination of the said
witness through no fault of his as the witness failed to appear in subsequent proceedings. They
assert that even if the testimonies of Rodolfo and Romulo were to be considered, the two
witnesses were so petrified during the robbery that they were not able to look at the felons and
hence could not positively identify accused-appellants as the perpetrators of the crime. They
argue that the police investigators never conducted a police line-up for the identification of the
authors of the crime.
The contentions of Juan and Victor are not meritorious. There is no factual and legal basis
for their claim that they were illegally deprived of their constitutional and statutory right to fully
cross-examine Rodolfo. The Court agrees that the right to cross-examine is a constitutional
right anchored on due process.[17] It is a statutory right found in Section 1(f), Rule 115 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure which provides that the accused has the right to confront
and cross-examine the witnesses against him at the trial. However, the right has always been
understood as requiring not necessarily an actual cross-examination but merely an opportunity
to exercise the right to cross-examine if desired. [18] What is proscribed by statutory norm and
jurisprudential precept is the absence of the opportunity to cross-examine.[19] The right is a
personal one and may be waived expressly or impliedly. There is an implied waiver when the
party was given the opportunity to confront and cross-examine an opposing witness but failed to
take advantage of it for reasons attributable to himself alone. [20] If by his actuations, the accused
lost his opportunity to cross-examine wholly or in part the witnesses against him, his right to
cross-examine is impliedly waived.[21]The testimony given on direct examination of the witness
will be received or allowed to remain in the record.[22]
In this case, the original records show that after several resettings, the initial trial for the
presentation by the prosecution of its evidence-in-chief was set on November 18, 1997 and
December 5, 1997, both at 9:00 a.m. [23] Rodolfo testified on direct examination on November 18,
1997. The counsel of Juan and Victor forthwith commenced his cross-examination of the
witness but because of the manifestation of said counsel that he cannot finish his cross-
examination, the court ordered the continuation thereof to December 5, 1997. [24] On December
5, 1997, Rodolfo did not appear before the court for the continuation of his cross-examination
but Rosemarie Manio, the widow of the victim did. The prosecution presented her as
witness. Her testimony was terminated. The court ordered the continuation of the trial for the
cross-examination of Rodolfo on January 20, 1998 at 8:30 a.m. [25] During the trial on January
20, 1998, Rodolfo was present but accused-appellants’ counsel was absent. The court issued
an order declaring that for failure of said counsel to appear before the court for his cross-
examination of Rodolfo, Victor and Juan waived their right to continue with the cross-
examination of said witness.[26] During the trial set for February 3, 1998, the counsel of Juan and
Victor appeared but did not move for a reconsideration of the court’s order dated January 20,
1998 and for the recall of Rodolfo Cacatian for further cross-examination. It behooved counsel
for Juan and Victor to file said motion and pray that the trial court order the recall of Rodolfo on
the witness stand. Juan and Victor cannot just fold their arms and supinely wait for the
prosecution or for the trial court to initiate the recall of said witness. Indeed, the Court held
in Fulgado vs. Court of Appeals, et al:
xxx

The task of recalling a witness for cross examination is, in law, imposed on the party who
wishes to exercise said right. This is so because the right, being personal and waivable, the
intention to utilize it must be expressed. Silence or failure to assert it on time amounts to a
renunciation thereof. Thus, it should be the counsel for the opposing party who should move to
cross-examine plaintiff’s witnesses. It is absurd for the plaintiff himself to ask the court to
schedule the cross-examination of his own witnesses because it is not his obligation to ensure
that his deponents are cross-examined. Having presented his witnesses, the burden shifts to
his opponent who must now make the appropriate move. Indeed, the rule of placing the burden
of the case on plaintiff’s shoulders can be construed to extremes as what happened in the
instant proceedings. [27]

The trial was reset to March 31, April 17 and 24, 1998, all at 8:30 a.m. because of the non-
availability of the other witnesses of the prosecution. [28] On March 31, 1998, the prosecution
presented Dr. Alejandro Tolentino, PO2 Rene de la Cruz and Romulo Digap. During the trial on
April 17, 1998, the counsel of Juan and Victor failed to appear. The trial was reset to June 3, 19
and 26, 1998.[29] The trial scheduled on June 3, 1998 was cancelled due to the absence of the
counsel of Juan and Victor. The court issued an order appointing Atty. Roberto Ramirez as
counsel for accused-appellants.[30]
During the trial on August 26, 1998, Atty. Ramirez appeared in behalf of Juan and
Victor. The prosecution rested its case after the presentation of SPO2 Romeo Meneses and
formally offered its documentary evidence. The next trial was set on September 23, 1998 at
8:30 a.m.[31] On November 11, 1998, Juan and Victor commenced the presentation of their
evidence with the testimony of Victor. [32] They rested their case on January 27, 1999 without any
evidence adduced by Juan.
Juan and Victor did not even file any motion to reopen the case before the trial court
rendered its decision to allow them to cross-examine Rodolfo. They remained mute after
judgment was rendered against them by the trial court. Neither did they file any petition for
certiorari with the Court of Appeals for the nullification of the Order of the trial court dated
January 20, 1998 declaring that they had waived their right to cross-examine Rodolfo. It was
only on appeal to this Court that Juan and Victor averred for the first time that they were
deprived of their right to cross-examine Rodolfo. It is now too late in the day for Juan and Victor
to do so. The doctrine of estoppel states that if one maintains silence when in conscience he
ought to speak, equity will debar him from speaking when in conscience he ought to remain
silent. He who remains silent when he ought to speak cannot be heard to speak when he
should be silent.[33]
The contention of accused-appellants Juan and Victor that Rodolfo and Romulo failed to
identify them as the perpetrators of the crime charged is disbelieved by the trial court, thus:

As can be gathered from the testimonies of the witnesses for the prosecution, on September 28,
1996, the accused boarded at around 3:00 a.m. a Five Star Bus driven by Rodolfo Cacatian,
bound to Pangasinan, in Camachile, Balintawak, Quezon City. Twenty (20) minutes or so later,
when the bus reached the vicinity of Nabuag, Plaridel, Bulacan, along the North Espressway,
the accused with guns in hand suddenly stood up and announced a hold-up. Simultaneously
with the announcement of a hold-up, Escote fired his gun upwards. Acuyan, meanwhile, took
the gun of a man seated at the back. Both then went on to take the money and valuables of the
passengers, including the bus conductor’s collections in the amount of P6,000.00. Thereafter,
the duo approached the man at the back telling him in the vernacular “Pasensiya ka na pare,
papatayin ka namin. Baril mo rin ang papatay sa iyo.” They pointed their guns at him and fired
several shots oblivious of the plea for mercy of their victim. After the shooting, the latter
collapsed on the floor. The two (2) then went back at the front portion of the bus behind the
driver’s seat and were overheard by the bus driver, Cacatian, talking how easy it was to kill a
man. The robbery and the killing were over in 25 minutes. Upon reaching the Mexico overpass
of the Expressway in Pampanga, the two (2) got off the bus. The driver drove the bus to the
Mabalacat Police Station and reported the incident. During the investigation conducted by the
police, it was found out that the slain passenger was a policeman, SPO1 Jose C. Manio, Jr. of
the Caloocan City Police Department.

The above version came from Rodolfo Cacatian and Romulo Digap, bus driver and conductor,
respectively, of the ill-fated Five Star Bus.[34]

The Court agrees with the trial court. It may be true that Romulo was frightened when Juan
and Victor suddenly announced a holdup and fired their guns upward, but it does not follow that
he and Rodolfo failed to have a good look at Juan and Victor during the entire time the robbery
was taking place. The Court has held in a catena of cases that it is the most natural reaction of
victims of violence to strive to see the appearance of the perpetrators of the crime and to
observe the manner in which the crime was committed. [35] Rodolfo and Romulo had a good look
at both Juan and Victor before, during and after they staged the robbery and before they
alighted from the bus. The evidence on record shows that when Juan and Victor boarded the
bus and while the said vehicle was on its way to its destination, Romulo stationed himself by the
door of the bus located in the mid-section of the vehicle. The lights inside the bus were
on. Juan seated himself in the middle row of the passengers’ seat near the center aisle while
Victor stood near the door of the bus about a meter or so from Romulo. [36] Romulo, Juan and
Victor were near each other. Moreover, Juan divested Romulo of his collection of the fares from
the passengers.[37] Romulo thus had a face-to-face encounter with Juan. After shooting SPO1
Manio, Jr. at the rear portion of the bus, Juan and Victor passed by where Romulo was standing
and gave their instructions to him. Considering all the facts and circumstances, there is no iota
of doubt that Romulo saw and recognized Juan and Victor before, during and after the heist.
[38]
Rodolfo looked many times on the rear, side and center view mirrors to observe the center
and rear portions of the bus before and during the robbery. Rodolfo thus saw Juan and Victor
stage the robbery and kill SPO1 Manio, Jr. with impunity:
xxx
Q So, the announcement of hold-up was ahead of the firing of the gun?
A Yes, sir.
Q And before the actual firing of the gun it was even still said bad words before
saying the hold-up?
A After they fired the gun they uttered bad words, sir.
Q Mr. Witness before the announcement of the hold-up you do not have any idea that
you will encounter that nature which took place, is that correct?
A None, sir.
Q Within the two (2) year[s] period that you are plying the route of Manila to Bolinao
that was your first experience of hold-up?
A Yes, sir.
Q And the speed of above 70 kilometers per hour your total attention is focus in front
of the road, correct, Mr. witness?
A Once in a while the driver look at the side mirror and the rear view mirror, sir.
Q Before the announcement there was no reason for you to look at any at the rear
mirror, correct, Mr. witness?
Court:
Every now and then they usually look at the side mirror and on the rear, that was his
statement.
Atty. Osorio:
(to the witness)
Q I am asking him if there was no reason for him....
Fiscal:
Before the announcement of hold-up, there was no mention.
Court:
Every now and then.
Atty. Osorio:
(to the witness)
Q When you said every now and then, how often is it, Mr. witness?
A I cannot tell how often but I used to look at the mirror once in a while, sir.
Q How many mirror do you have, Mr. witness?
A Four (4), sir.
Q Where are these located?
A Two (2) on the side mirror, center mirror and rear view mirror, sir.
Q The two side mirror protruding outside the bus?
A Yes, sir, they are in the side of the bus, sir.
Q One of them is located on the left and the other on the right, correct?
A Yes, sir.
Q You only look at the side mirror when you are going to over take, Mr. witness?
A No, sir.
Q Where is this center mirror located, Mr. witness?
A In the center, sir.
Q What is the purpose of that?
A So that I can see the passengers if they are already settled so that I can start the
engine, sir.
Q What about the remaining mirror?
A Rear view mirror, sir.
Q What is the purpose and where is it located?
A The rear view is located just above my head just to check the passengers, sir.
Q So that the center mirror and the rear view mirror has the same purpose?
A They are different, sir.
Q How do you differentiate of (sic) one from the other?
A The center mirror is used to check the center aisle while the rear mirror is for the
whole view of the passengers, sir.
Q If you are going to look at any of your side mirrors, you will never see any
passengers, correct, Mr. witness?
A None, sir.
Q If you will look at your center mirror you will only see the aisle and you will never
see any portion of the body of your passengers?
A Yes, sir.
Q Seated passengers?
A It is only focus (sic) on the middle aisle sir.
Q If you look at your rear mirror, you will only see the top portion of the head of your
passengers, correct?
A Only the portion of their head because they have different hight (sic), sir.
Q You will never see any head of your passengers if they were seated from the rear
mirror portion, correct, Mr. witness?
A Yes, sir.
Q Before the announcement of hold-up, all of your passengers were actually
sleeping?
A Some of my passengers were sleeping, some were not, sir.
Q But you will agree Mr. witness that when you said every now and then you are
using your mirror? It is only a glance, correct?
A Yes, sir.
Q And by mere glancing, Mr. witness you were not able to identify any person on the
basis of any of your mirror, correct?
A If only a glance but when I look at him I can recognize him, sir.
Q You agree a while ago by every now and then it is by glancing, as a driver, Mr.
witness by your side mirror?
A Not all glancing, there are times when you want to recognize a person you look at
him intently, sir.
Q The purposes of your mirror inside your Bus is mainly of the safety of your
passengers on board, Mr. witness?
A Yes, sir.
Q And as a driver, Mr. witness, you do not used (sic) your mirror to identify the
person particularly when you are crossing (sic) at a speed of 70 kilometers per
hour?
A I do that, sir.
Q How long Mr. witness can you focus your eyes on any of these mirror before
getting back your eyes into the main road?
A Seconds only, sir.
Q When you said seconds, for how long the most Mr. witness that you can do to fix
your eyes on any of your mirrors and the return back of (sic) your eyes into the
main road?
A Two seconds, sir.
Q At that time Mr. witness, that you were travelling at about 70 kilometers you were
glancing every now and then on any of your mirrors at about two seconds, correct?
A Yes, sir.
Q And when you heard the announcement of hold-up your natural reaction is to look
either at the center mirror or rear mirror for two seconds, correct?
A Yes, sir.
Q And you were instructed Mr. witness to even accelerate your speed upon the
announcement of hold-up?
A No sir, they just told me to continue my driving, sir.
Fiscal:
May I request the vernacular “alalay ka lang, steady ka lang.
Atty. Osorio:
(to the witness)
Q Steady at what speed?
A 70 to 80, sir.
Q What is the minimum speed, Mr. witness for Buses along North Expressway?
A 60 kilometers, sir.
Q Are you sure of that 60 kilometers, minimum? Are you sure of that?
A Yes, sir.
Q That is what you know within the two (2) years that you are driving? Along the
North Expressway?
A Yes, sir.
Q And while you were at the precise moment, Mr. witness, you were being instructed
to continue driving, you were not looking to anybody except focus yours eyes in
front of the road?
Fiscal:
May I request the vernacular. Nakikiramdam ako.
Atty. Osorio:
(to the witness)
Q That’s what you are doing?
A During the time they were gathering the money from my passengers, that is the
time when I look at them, sir.
Q For two seconds, correct?
A Yes, sir.
Q Which of the four (4) mirrors that you are looking at within two seconds, Mr.
witness you said you are nakikiramdam?
A The rear view mirror, sir.
Q The Bus that you were driving is not an air con bus?
A Ordinary bus, sir.
Q And at what time your passengers, most of your passengers were already sleep
(sic), Mr. witness?
A Most of my passengers, sir. Some of my passengers were still sleep (sic), sir.
Q And the lights inside the Bus are off, correct Mr. witness?
A The lights were on, sir.
Q While the passengers were sleep (sic) the light was still on, Mr. witness, at the time
of the trip.?
A Yes, sir.
Q Now, Mr. witness when the hold-up was announced and then when you look for
two seconds in the rear mirror you were not able to see any one, you were only
sensing what is happening inside your bus?
A I saw something, sir.
Q You saw something in front of your Bus? You can only see inside when you are
going to look at the mirror?
A Yes, sir.
Q That is the only thing that you see every now and then, you said you were looking
at the mirror?
A Yes, sir.
Q How many times, Mr. witness did you look Mr. witness at the rear mirror during the
entire occurance (sic) of the alleged hold-up?
A There were many times, sir.
 Q The most that you can remember, please inform the Honorable Court? During the
occurance (sic) of the alleged hold-up, Mr. witness?
A I cannot estimate, sir.
Q How long did the alleged hold-up took place?
A More or less 25 minutes, sir.[39]
When Rodolfo gave his sworn statement to the police investigators in Plaridel, Bulacan
after the robbery, he described the felons. When asked by the police investigators if he could
identify the robbers if he see them again, Rodolfo declared that he would be able to identify
them:
8. T: Natatandaan mo ba kung ano ang itsura ng dalawang lalaki na nanghold-up
sa minamaneho mong bus?
S: Halos magkasing taas, 5’4” o 5’5” katam-taman ang pangangatawan,
parehong nakapantalon ng maong naka-suot ng jacket na maong, parehong naka
rubber shoes at pareho ring naka sumbrero.
9. T: Kung sakali bang makikita mo pa ang mga ito ay makikilala mo pa sila?
S: Makikilala ko po sila.[40]
When asked to identify the robbers during the trial, Rodolfo spontaneously pointed to and
identified Juan and Victor:
QFiscal:
(to the witness)
xxx
Q Those two man (sic) who stated that it was a hold-up inside the bus and who fired
the gun are they inside the Court room (sic) today?
A Yes, ma’am.
Q Point to us?
Interpreter:
Witness pointing to a man wearing red T-shirt and when asked his name answered
Victor Acuyan and the man wearing green T-shirt and when asked his name
answered Juan Gonzales.[41]
For his part, Romulo likewise spontaneously pointed to and identified Juan and Victor as
the culprits when asked by the prosecutor to identify the robbers from among those in the
courtroom:
xxx
Q You said that you were robbed inside the bus, how does (sic) the robbing took
place?
A They announced a hold up ma’am, afterwards, they confiscated the money of the
passengers including my collections.
 Q You said “they” who announced the hold up, whose (sic) these “they” you are
referring to?
A Those two (2), ma’am.
Interpreter:
Witness pointing to the two accused.
Public Pros.:
May we request that the accused be identified, Your Honor.
Court:
(to both accused)
What are your names?
A Juan Escote, Your Honor. Victor Acuyan, Your Honor.
Public Pros.:
May we know from the accused if his name is Juan Escote Gonzales because he
just said Juan Escote. In the Information, it is one Juan Gonzales, Jr., so, we can
change, Your Honor.[42]
Moreover, when he was accosted by SPO3 Romeo Meneses on October 25, 1997 in
Tarlac, Tarlac, Juan was in possession of the identification card [43] of the slain police
officer. Juan failed to explain to the trial court how and under what circumstances he came into
possession of said identification card. Juan must necessarily be considered the author of the
robbery and the killing of SPO1 Manio, Jr. In People v. Mantung,[44] we held:

xxx [T]he recovery of part of the loot from Mantung or the time of his arrest gave rise to a legal
presumption of his guilt. As this Court has held, ‘[I]n the absence of an explanation of how one
has come into possession of stolen effects belonging to a person wounded and treacherously
killed, he must necessarily be considered the author of the aggression and death of the said
person and of the robbery committed on him.’

While police investigators did not place Juan and Victor in a police line-up for proper
identification by Rodolfo and Romulo, it cannot thereby be concluded that absent such line-up,
their identification by Romulo and Rodolfo as the authors of the robbery with homicide was
unreliable. There is no law or police regulation requiring a police line-up for proper identification
in every case. Even if there was no police line-up, there could still be proper and reliable
identification as long as such identification was not suggested or instigated to the witness by the
police.[45] In this case, there is no evidence that the police officers had supplied or even
suggested to Rodolfo and Romulo the identities of Juan and Victor as the perpetrators of the
robbery and the killing of SPO1 Manio, Jr.

The Felony Committed by Juan and Victor

The Court finds that the trial court committed no error in convicting Juan and Victor of
robbery with homicide. Article 294, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by
Republic Act 7659, reads:
Art. 294. - Robbery with violence against or intimidation of persons. - Penalties. - Any person
guilty of robbery with the use of violence against or intimidation of any person shall suffer:

1. The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death, when by reason or on occasion of the robbery,
the crime of homicide shall have been committed, or when the robbery shall have been
accompanied by rape or intentional mutilation or arson.

To warrant the conviction of Juan and Victor for the said charge, the prosecution was
burdened to prove the confluence of the following essential elements:

xxx (a) the taking of personal property with the use of violence or intimidation against a person;
(b) the property thus taken belongs to another; (c) the taking is characterized by intent to gain
or animus lucrandi and (d) on the occasion of the robbery or by reason thereof, the crime of
homicide, which is therein used in a generic sense, was committed. xxx[46]

The intent to rob must precede the taking of human life.[47] In robbery with homicide, so long
as the intention of the felons was to rob, the killing may occur before, during or after the
robbery. In People v. Barut,[48] the Court held that:

In the controlling Spanish version of article 294, it is provided that there is robbery with homicide
“cuando con motivo o con ocasión del robo resultare homicidio”. “Basta que entre aquel este
exista una relación meramente ocasional. No se requiere que el homicidio se cometa como
medio de ejecución del robo, ni que el culpable tenga intención de matar, el delito existe según
constanta jurisprudencia, aun cuando no concurra animo homicida. Incluso si la muerte
sobreviniere por mero accidente, siempre que el homicidio se produzca con motivo con ocasión
del robo, siendo indiferente que la muerte sea anterior, coetánea o posterior a éste” (2 Cuello
Calon, Derecho Penal, 1975 14th Ed. P. 872).

Even if the victim of robbery is other than the victim of the homicide committed on the
occasion of or by reason of the robbery, nevertheless, there is only one single and indivisible
felony of robbery with homicide. All the crimes committed on the occasion or by reason of the
robbery are merged and integrated into a single and indivisible felony of robbery with homicide.
This was the ruling of the Supreme Court of Spain on September 9, 1886, et sequitur cited by
this Court in People v. Mangulabnan, et al.[49]

We see, therefore, that in order to determine the existence of the crime of robbery with homicide
it is enough that a homicide would result by reason or on the occasion of the robbery (Decision
of the Supreme Court of Spain of November 26, 1892, and January 7, 1878, quoted in 2
Hidalgo’s Penal Code, p. 267 and 259-260, respectively). This High Tribunal speaking of the
accessory character of the circumstances leading to the homicide, has also held that it is
immaterial that the death would supervene by mere accident (Decision of September 9, 1886;
October 22, 1907; April 30, 1910 and July 14, 1917), provided that the homicide be produced by
reason or on occasion of the robbery, inasmuch as it is only the result obtained, without
reference or distinction as to the circumstances, causes, modes or persons intervening in the
commission of the crime, that has to be taken into consideration (Decision of January 12, 1889
– see Cuello Calon’s Codigo Penal, p. 501-502).

Case law has it that whenever homicide has been committed by reason of or on the
occasion of the robbery, all those who took part as principals in the robbery will also be held
guilty as principals of robbery with homicide although they did not take part in the homicide,
unless it appears that they endeavored to prevent the homicide.[50]
In this case, the prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt that Juan and Victor
conspired and confabulated together in robbing the passengers of the Five Star Bus of their
money and valuables and Romulo of his collections of the fares of the passengers and in killing
SPO1 Manio, Jr. with impunity on the occasion of the robbery. Hence, both Juan and Victor are
guilty as principals by direct participation of the felony of robbery with homicide under paragraph
1, Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. 7659, punishable by reclusion
perpetua to death.

The Proper Penalty

The trial court imposed the supreme penalty of death on Juan and Victor for robbery with
homicide, defined in Article 294, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code, punishable
with reclusion perpetua. Under Article 63, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code, the felons
should be meted the supreme penalty of death when the crime is committed with an aggravating
circumstance attendant in the commission of the crime absent any mitigating circumstance. The
trial court did not specify in the decretal portion of its decision the aggravating circumstances
attendant in the commission of the crime mandating the imposition of the death penalty.
However, it is evident from the findings of facts contained in the body of the decision of the trial
court that it imposed the death penalty on Juan and Victor on its finding that they shot SPO1
Manio, Jr. treacherously on the occasion of or by reason of the robbery:
xxx

The two (2) accused are incomparable in their ruthlessness and base regard for human
life. After stripping the passengers of their money and valuables, including the firearm of the
victim, they came to decide to execute the latter seemingly because he was a police
officer. They lost no time pouncing him at the rear section of the bus, aimed their firearms at
him and, in a derisive and humiliating tone, told him, before pulling the trigger, that they were
rather sorry but they are going to kill him with his own gun; and thereafter, they simultaneously
fired point blank at the hapless policeman who was practically on his knees begging for his
life. Afterwhich, they calmly positioned themselves at the front boasting for all to hear, that
killing a man is like killing a chicken (“Parang pumapatay ng manok”). Escote, in particular, is a
class by himself in callousness. xxx.[51]

The Court agrees with the trial court that treachery was attendant in the commission of the
crime. There is treachery when the following essential elements are present, viz: (a) at the time
of the attack, the victim was not in a position to defend himself; and (b) the accused consciously
and deliberately adopted the particular means, methods or forms of attack employed by him.
[52]
The essence of treachery is the sudden and unexpected attack by an aggressor on the
unsuspecting victim, depriving the latter of any chance to defend himself and thereby ensuring
its commission without risk of himself. Treachery may also be appreciated even if the victim
was warned of the danger to his life where he was defenseless and unable to flee at the time of
the infliction of the coup de grace.[53] In the case at bar, the victim suffered six wounds, one on
the mouth, another on the right ear, one on the shoulder, another on the right breast, one on the
upper right cornea of the sternum and one above the right iliac crest. Juan and Victor were
armed with handguns. They first disarmed SPO1 Manio, Jr. and then shot him even as he
pleaded for dear life. When the victim was shot, he was defenseless. He was shot at close
range, thus insuring his death. The victim was on his way to rejoin his family after a hard day’s
work. Instead, he was mercilessly shot to death, leaving his family in grief for his untimely
demise. The killing is a grim example of the utter inhumanity of man to his fellowmen.
The issues that now come to fore are (1) whether or not treachery is a generic aggravating
circumstance in robbery with homicide; and if in the affirmative, (b) whether treachery may be
appreciated against Juan and Victor. On the first issue, we rule in the affirmative. This Court
has ruled over the years[54] that treachery is a generic aggravating circumstance in the felony of
robbery with homicide, a special complex crime (un delito especial complejo) and at the same
time a single and indivisible offense (uno solo indivisible).[55] However, this Court in two cases
has held that robbery with homicide is a crime against property and hence treachery which is
appreciated only to crimes against persons should not be appreciated as a generic aggravating
circumstance.[56] It held in another case that treachery is not appreciated in robbery with rape
precisely because robbery with rape is a crime against property. [57] These rulings of the Court
find support in case law that in robbery with homicide or robbery with rape, homicide or rape are
merely incidents of the robbery, with robbery being the main purpose and object of the criminal.
[58]
Indeed, in People vs. Cando,[59] two distinguished members of this Court advocated a review
of the doctrine that treachery is a generic aggravating circumstance in robbery with
homicide. They opined that treachery is applicable only to crimes against persons. After all,
in People vs. Bariquit,[60]this Court in a per curiam decision promulgated in year 2000 declared
that treachery is applicable only to crimes against persons. However, this Court held in People
vs. Cando that treachery is a generic aggravating circumstance in robbery with homicide, citing
its prior rulings that in robbery with homicide, treachery is a generic aggravating circumstance
when the victim of homicide is killed with treachery. This Court opted not to apply its ruling
earlier that year in People vs. Bariquit.
Legal Luminaries in criminal law and eminent commentators of the Revised Penal Code are
not in full accord either. Chief Justice Ramon C. Aquino (Retired) says that treachery is
appreciated only in crimes against persons as defined in Title 10, Book Two of the Code.
[61]
Chief Justice Luis B. Reyes (Retired) also is of the opinion that treachery is applicable only to
crimes against persons.[62] However, Justice Florenz D. Regalado (Retired) is of a different view.
[63]
He says that treachery cannot be considered in robbery but can be appreciated insofar as the
killing is concerned, citing the decisions of this Court in People vs. Balagtas[64] for the purpose of
determining the penalty to be meted on the felon when the victim of homicide is killed with
treachery.
It must be recalled that by Royal Order of December 17, 1886 the 1850 Penal Code in force
in Spain, as amended by the Codigo Penal Reformado de 1870 was applied in the Philippines.
The Penal Code of 1887 in the Philippines was amended by Act 3815, now known as the
Revised Penal Code, which was enacted and published in Spanish. In construing the Old Penal
Code and the Revised Penal Code, this Court had accorded respect and persuasive, if not
conclusive effect to the decisions of the Supreme Court of Spain interpreting and construing the
1850 Penal Code of Spain, as amended by Codigo Penal Reformado de 1870.[65]
Article 14, paragraph 16 of the Revised Penal Code reads:

ART. 14. Aggravating circumstances. – The following are aggravating circumstances:

xxx
16. That the act be committed with treachery (alevosia). There is treachery when the offender
commits any of the crimes against the person, employing means, methods, or forms in the
execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself
arising from the defense which the offended party might make.

The law was taken from Chapter IV, Article 10, paragraph 2 of the 1860 Penal Code and
the Codigo Penal Reformado de 1870 of Spain which reads:

Art. 10 ...2. Ejecutar el hecho con alevosia. Hay alevosia cuando el culpable comete cualquiera
de los delitos contra las personas empleando medios, modos o for mas en la ejecucion que
tiendan directa y especialmente a asegurarla sin riesgo para su persona, que proceda de la
defensa que pudiera hacer el ofendido. xxx

Article 14, paragraph 16 of the Revised Penal Code is a reproduction of the 1850 Penal
Code of Spain and the Codigo Penal Reformado de 1870 with a slight difference. In the latter
law, the words “las personas” (the persons) are used, whereas in Article 14, paragraph 6, of the
Revised Penal Code, the words “the person” are used.
Going by the letter of the law, treachery is applicable only to crimes against persons as
enumerated in Title Eight, Chapters One and Two, Book II of the Revised Penal Code. However,
the Supreme Court of Spain has consistently applied treachery to robbery with homicide,
classified as a crime against property. Citing decisions of the Supreme Court of Spain, Cuello
Calon, a noted commentator of the Spanish Penal Code says that despite the strict and express
reference of the penal code to treachery being applicable to persons, treachery also applies to
other crimes such as robbery with homicide:[66]

Aun cuando el Codigo solo se refiere a los delitos contra las personas, cabe estimarla en los
que no perteneciendo a este titulo se determinan por muerte o lesiones, como, en el robo con
homicidio, y en el homicidio del Jefe del Estado que es un delito contra la seguridad interior del
Estado, y no obstante la referencia estricta del texto legal a los delitos contra las personas no
es la alevosia aplicable a la mayoria de ellos, no lo es en el homicidio, pues como su
concurrencia lo cualifica lo transforma en delito distinto, en asesinato, ni en el homicidio
consentido (art. 409), ni en la riña tumultuaria (art. 408) ni en el infanticidio (art. 410). xxx. [67]

Viada also says that treachery is appreciated in crimes against persons (delitos contra
personas) and also in robbery with homicide (robo con homicidio).[68]

“Contra las personas. - Luego la circunstancia de alevosia solo puede apreciarse en los delitos
provistos desde el art. 417 al 447, y en algun otro, como el de robo con homicidio, atentario, a
la vez que contra la propriedad, contra la persona.”

Thus, treachery is a generic aggravating circumstance to robbery with homicide although

said crime is classified as a crime against property and a single and indivisible crime. Treachery
is not a qualifying circumstance because as ruled by the Supreme Court of Spain in its decision
dated September 11, 1878, the word “homicide” is used in its broadest and most generic sense.
[69]

Article 62, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code provides that in diminishing or
increasing the penalty for a crime, aggravating circumstances shall be taken into
account. However, aggravating circumstances which in themselves constitute a crime specially
punishable by law or which are included by the law in defining a crime and prescribing a penalty
therefor shall not be taken into account for the purpose of increasing the penalty. [70] Under
paragraph 2 of the law, the same rule shall apply with respect to any aggravating circumstances
inherent in the crime to such a degree that it must of necessity accompany the commission
thereof.

1. Aggravating circumstances which in themselves constitute a crime specially punishable by

law or which are included by the law in defining a crime and prescribing the penalty therefor
shall not be taken into account for the purpose of increasing the penalty.

xxx

2. The same rule shall apply with respect to any aggravating circumstances inherent in the
crime to such a degree that it must be of necessity accompany the commission thereof.

Treachery is not an element of robbery with homicide. Neither does it constitute a crime
specially punishable by law nor is it included by the law in defining the crime of robbery with
homicide and prescribing the penalty therefor. Treachery is likewise not inherent in the crime of
robbery with homicide. Hence, treachery should be considered as a generic aggravating
circumstance in robbery with homicide for the imposition of the proper penalty for the crime.
In its Sentencia dated March 14, 1877, the Supreme Court of Spain declared that treachery
is a generic aggravating circumstance not only in crimes against persons but also in robbery
with homicide. The high court of Spain applied Article 79 of the Spanish Penal Code (Article 62
of the Revised Penal Code) and ruled that since treachery is not a constitutive element of the
crime of robbery with homicide nor is it inherent in said crime, without which it cannot be
committed, treachery is an aggravating circumstance to said crime. The high court of Spain was
not impervious of the fact that robbery with homicide is classified as a crime against
property. Indeed, it specifically declared that the classification of robbery with homicide as a
crime against property is irrelevant and inconsequential in the application of treachery. It further
declared that it would be futile to argue that in crimes against property such as robbery with
homicide, treachery would have no application. This is so, the high tribunal ruled,
because when robbery is coupled with crimes committed against persons, the crime is not only
an assault (ataca) on the property of the victims but also of the victims themselves (ofende):

xxx que la circunstancia agravante de alevosia ni es constitutiva del delito complejo de robo y
homicidio, ni de tal modo inherente que sin ella no pueda cometerse, sin que quepa arguir que
en los delitos contra la propiedad no debe aquella tener aplicacion, porque cuando estos son
complejos de los que se cometen contra las personas, no solo se ataca a la propiedad, sino
que se ofende a estas. xxx[71]

In fine, in the application of treachery as a generic aggravating circumstance to

robbery with homicide, the law looks at the constituent crime of homicide which is a
crime against persons and not at the constituent crime of robbery which is a crime
against property. Treachery is applied to the constituent crime of “homicide” and not to
the constituent crime of “robbery” of the special complex crime of robbery with
homicide.
The crime of robbery with homicide does not lose its classification as a crime
against property or as a special complex and single and indivisible crime simply
because treachery is appreciated as a generic aggravating circumstance. Treachery
merely increases the penalty for the crime conformably with Article 63 of the Revised
Penal Code absent any generic mitigating circumstance.
In its Sentencia, dated July 9, 1877, the high tribunal of Spain also ruled that when the
victim of robbery is killed with treachery, the said circumstance should be appreciated as a
generic aggravating circumstance in robbery with homicide:

xxx que si aparece probado que el procesado y su co-reo convinieron en matar a un conocido
suyo, compañero de viaje, para lo cual desviaron cautelosamente los carros que guiaban, en
uno de los cuales iba el interfecto, dirigiendolos por otro camino que conducia a un aljibon, y al
llegar a este, valiendose de engaño para hacer bajar a dicho interfecto, se lanzaron de
improviso sobre el, tirandolo en tierra, robandole el dinero, la manta y los talegos que llevaba, y
atandole al pie una piedra de mucho peso, le arrojaron con ella a dicho aljibon, dados estos
hechos, no cabe duda que constituyen el delito complejo del art. 516, num. I, con la
circunstancia agravante de alevosia, puesto que los medios, forma y modos empleados en la
ejecucion del crimen tendieron directa y especialmente a asegurarla sin riesgo para sus
autores, procedente de la defensa del ofendido.[72]

In sum then, treachery is a generic aggravating circumstance in robbery with homicide

when the victim of homicide is killed by treachery.
On the second issue, we also rule in the affirmative. Article 62, paragraph 4 of the Revised
Penal Code which was taken from Article 80 of the Codigo Penal Reformado de 1870,
[73]
provides that circumstances which consist in the material execution of the act, or in the
means employed to accomplish it, shall serve to aggravate or mitigate the liability of those
persons only who had knowledge of them at the time of the execution of the act or their
cooperation therein. The circumstances attending the commission of a crime either relate to the
persons participating in the crime or into its manner of execution or to the means
employed. The latter has a direct bearing upon the criminal liability of all the accused who have
knowledge thereof at the time of the commission of the crime or of their cooperation thereon.
[74]
Accordingly, the Spanish Supreme Court held in its Sentencia dated December 17, 1875 that
where two or more persons perpetrate the crime of robbery with homicide, the generic
aggravating circumstance of treachery shall be appreciated against all of the felons who had
knowledge of the manner of the killing of victims of homicide, with the ratiocination that:

xxx si por la Ley basta haberse ejecutado un homicidio simple con motivo ú ocasión del robo
para la imposicion de la pena del art. 516, num. I, no puede sere ni aun discutible que,
concurriendo la agravante de alevosia, se aumente la criminalidad de los delincuentes; siendo
aplicable a todos los autores del hecho indivisible, porque no es circunstancia que afecte a la
personalidad del delincuente, de las que habla el art. 80 del Codigo penal en su primera parte,
sino que consiste en la ejecusion material del hecho y en los medios empleados para llevarle a
cabo, cuando de ellos tuvieron conocimiento todos los participantes en el mismo por el
concierto previo y con las condiciones establecidad en la segunda parte del citado articulo.[75]

Be that as it may, treachery cannot be appreciated against Juan and Victor in the case at
bar because the same was not alleged in the Information as mandated by Section 8, Rule 110
of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedures which reads:

Sec. 8. Designation of the offense. - The complaint or information shall state the designation of
the offense given by the statute, aver the acts or omissions constituting the offense and specify
its qualifying and aggravating circumstances. If there is no designation of the offense, reference
shall be made to the section or subsection of the statute punishing it.

Although at the time the crime was committed, generic aggravating circumstance need not
be alleged in the Information, however, the general rule had been applied retroactively because
if it is more favorable to the accused. [76] Even if treachery is proven but it is not alleged in the
information, treachery cannot aggravate the penalty for the crime.
There being no modifying circumstances in the commission of the felony of robbery with
homicide, Juan and Victor should each be meted the penalty of reclusion perpetuaconformably
with Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code.

Civil Liability of Juan and Victor

The trial court awarded the total amount of P300,000.00 to the heirs of SPO1 Manio,
Jr. The court did not specify whether the said amounts included civil indemnity for the death of
the victim, moral damages and the lost earnings of the victim as a police officer of the PNP. The
Court shall thus modify the awards granted by the trial court.
Since the penalty imposed on Juan and Victor is reclusion perpetua, the heirs of the victim
are entitled to civil indemnity in the amount of P50,000.00. The heirs are also entitled to moral
damages in the amount of P50,000.00, Rosemarie Manio having testified on the factual basis
thereof.[77] Considering that treachery aggravated the crime, the heirs are also entitled to
exemplary damages in the amount of P25,000.00. This Court held in People vs. Catubig[78] that
the retroactive application of Section 8, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure
should not impair the right of the heirs to exemplary damages which had already accrued when
the crime was committed prior to the effectivity of the said rule. Juan and Victor are also jointly
and severally liable to the said heirs in the total amount of P30,000.00 as actual damages, the
prosecution having adduced evidence receipts for said amounts. The heirs are not entitled to
expenses allegedly incurred by them during the wake as such expenses are not supported by
receipts.[79] However, in lieu thereof, the heirs are entitled to temperate damages in the amount
of P20,000.00.[80] The service firearm of the victim was turned over to the Evidence Custodian of
the Caloocan City Police Station per order of the trial court on October 22, 1997. [81] The
prosecution failed to adduce documentary evidence to prove the claim of Five Star Bus, Inc. in
the amount of P6,000.00. Hence, the award should be deleted. However, in lieu of actual
damages, the bus company is entitled to temperate damages in the amount of P3,000.00.[82]
The heirs are likewise entitled to damages for the lost earnings of the victim. The evidence
on record shows that SPO1 Manio, Jr. was born on August 25, 1958. He was killed on
September 28, 1996 at the age of 38. He had a gross monthly salary as a member of the
Philippine National Police of P8,065.00 or a gross annual salary of P96,780.00. Hence, the
heirs are entitled to the amount of P1,354,920.00 by way of lost earnings of the victim
computed, thus:

Age of the victim = 38 years old

Life expectancy = 2/3 x (80 – age of the victim at the time of death)

= 2/3 x (80-38)
 = 2/3 x 42

= 28 years

Gross Annual Income = gross monthly income x 12 months

= P8,065.00 x 12

= P96,780.00

Living Expenses = 50% of Gross Annual Income

= P96,780.00 x 0.5

= P48,390.00

Lost Earning Capacity = Life expectancy x [Gross Annual Income-

Living expenses]

= 28 x [P96,780.00 – P48,390.00]

= 28 x P48,390.00

= P1,354,920.00

IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Bulacan
is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS. Accused-appellants Juan Gonzales Escote, Jr.
and Victor Acuyan are hereby found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the felony of robbery
with homicide defined in Article 294, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code and, there being
no modifying circumstances in the commission of the felony, hereby metes on each of them the
penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA. Said accused-appellants are hereby ordered to pay jointly
and severally the heirs of the victim SPO1 Jose C. Manio, Jr. the amounts of P50,000.00 as
civil indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages,P1,349,920.00 for lost earnings, P30,000.00 as
actual damages and P25,000.00 as exemplary damages. The award of P6,000.00 to the Five
Star Bus, Inc. is deleted. However, the said corporation is awarded the amount of P3,000.00 as
temperate damages.
Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Puno, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Carpio, Austria-
Martinez, Corona, Carpio-Morales, and Azcuna, JJ., concur.
Vitug J., please see separate opinion.
Ynares-Santiago, and Sandoval-Gutierrez, JJ., join J. Vitug’s separate opinion.
 [G.R. Nos. 138306-07. December 21, 2001]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. SPO1 EDUARDO ANCHETA Y

RODIGOL, accused-appellant.

DECISION
BELLOSILLO, J.:

This is an appeal from the Decision of the Regional Trial Court Caloocan City finding SPO1
accused-appellant SPO1 Eduardo Ancheta y Rodigol guilty of Murder in Crim. Case No. C-
44939 and ofFrustrated Murder in Crim. Case No. 44940.[1]
SPO1 Eduardo Ancheta y Rodigol[2] was originally charged with Homicide in Crim. Case
No. C-44939 and Frustrated Homicide in Crim. Case No. C-44940. However, upon motion of
private complainant, a reinvestigation was conducted and the Informations were amended to
charge the accused with Murder in Crim. Case No. C-44939 and Frustrated Murder in Crim
Case No. C-44940.
In the amended Information for Murder, it was alleged that the accused "with deliberate
intent to kill and with treachery and evident premeditation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously shoot one Julian Ancheta y Rodigol on the left temple, thereby inflicting upon the
latter serious physical injuries, which injuries caused the victim’s death."[3] On the other hand, in
the amended Information forFrustrated Murder it was alleged that the accused "with deliberate
intent to kill and with treachery and evident premeditation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously shoot with a gun one Jonathan Aromin y Cardinez on the right cheek, thus
performing all the acts of execution which would constitute the crime of Murder as a
consequence but which nevertheless did not produce it by reason of causes independent of the
will of the herein accused, that is, due to timely, able and efficient medical attendance rendered
to the victim."[4]
During trial, the main witness for the prosecution, Jonathan Aromin, testified that on the
night of 2 September 1993 he and his neighbor Julian Ancheta went to the house of the
accused who lived just across them.[5] Julian told Jonathan to knock on the door first but when
no one answered Julian did the knocking himself.[6] When the accused opened the door,
Jonathan immediately noticed that SPO1 Ancheta was armed with a gun. Intimidated,
Jonathan began to move away.[7] As he left the house of the accused, Jonathan suddenly heard
two (2) shots which prompted him to hide behind the nearest wall. But when he looked back
the accused SPO1 Ancheta was already aiming his revolver directly at his face and without
hesitation shot him at close range.[8] Stunned by the gunshot wound, Jonathan momentarily
blacked out but soon regained consciousness when his neighbor, Leonila Lopez, came to his
aid and rushed him to the Jose Reyes Memorial Medical Center. [9] At the hospital, the slug that
pierced his right cheek was removed from his left shoulder and was subsequently released on 7
September 1993.[10]
Leonila Lopez narrated that her house was right across the house of the accused,
separated only by a narrow alley.[11] At around 8:00 o'clock in the evening of 2 September 1993
while she was preparing dinner, she was startled by the sound of two (2) gunshots coming from
the house of the accused. She immediately told her children to go inside and as she was about
to close her windows she saw Jonathan Aromin running towards her house, followed by the
accused. She then saw the accused shoot Jonathan Aromin on the right cheek. After the
accused left, she helped the hapless victim and brought him to the hospital. [12] She was
approximately a meter away when she witnessed the shooting.[13]
Virginia Ancheta, wife of Julian Ancheta, testified that she and her deceased husband had
two (2) children and that she incurred P54,200.00 as funeral expenses for his burial.[14]
Dr. Roberto Garcia, a Medico-Legal Officer of the NBI, testified that he autopsied the body
of Julian Ancheta on 3 September 1993. Julian sustained three (3) gunshot wounds. One (1)
bullet pierced the the back of his left forearm and exited in front thereof, another entered the
rear left portion of the neck and exited through the right rear portion thereof, while the fatal bullet
pierced the front portion of the left ear without an exit wound. [15] However, although Dr. Garcia
concluded that three (3) bullets hit the deceased, he did not discount the possibility that the
three (3) wounds could have been caused by only two (2) bullets as the left arm, being a
movable part of the body, might have been in the way when the bullet exited through the neck of
the victim.[16]
Police Officer 3 Feliciano Almojuela of the Intelligence and Investigation Division, PNP
Station, Caloocan City, claimed that in the early morning of 3 September 1993 he received a
report of a shooting incident at Block 36, Phase 3-F-1 Dagat-dagatan, Caloocan City. [17] Upon
reaching the crime scene he was informed that the slain victim was S/Sgt. Julian Ancheta of the
Philippine Air Force and the suspect was the deceased’s brother SPO1 Eduardo
Ancheta. When he learned that another victim was confined at the Jose Reyes Memorial
Medical Center he went there and found Jonathan Aromin in critical condition. Thinking that the
victim might not survive he immediately interviewed him and took an "ante-mortem" statement.
[18]
In the afternoon of the same day, the accused voluntarily surrendered himself as well as his
service firearm at the PNP Station in Caloocan City. [19] At around 11:00 p.m., PO3 Almojuela
brought the accused to the hospital where the latter was positively identified by Jonathan
Aromin as the assailant.[20]
Dr. Abraham Gonzales, the resident physician at the Jose Reyes Memorial Medical Center,
testified that he was on duty on 2 September 1993 when Jonathan Aromin was admitted. Upon
examination he observed that the victim sustained a gunshot wound on the right portion of his
jaw and no exit wound was visible.[21] During treatment, the lead slug was recovered from the left
side of the neck or from the "trapicious muscle." [22] He added that were it not for the timely
medical intervention Jonathan Aromin would have died.[23]
In his defense, the accused claimed that on the night of 2 September 1993 he was sleeping
at home with his wife and son when he was awakened by the sound of someone banging on his
door.[24] After a brief silence he heard him say: "Pare buksan mo ito." Sensing danger, the
accused took his gun from under his pillow and ordered the person to identify himself. But the
stranger just kept on banging the door and insisted that it be opened. [25] When he finally opened
the door, he saw his brother Julian Ancheta and his neighbor Jonathan Aromin. Upon seeing
them, he inquired as to why his brother addressed him as "pare" but instead of answering,
Julian Ancheta angrily asked him why he was holding a gun.[26] To appease his brother, the
accused lowered his pistol and explained that the gun was only for protection as he had no idea
who was banging his door in the middle of the night. He then invited them into the house, but
when he turned around his brother suddenly grabbed his hand from behind to disarm him.
[27]
As they grappled, the gun accidentally fired twice and the next thing he saw was his
brother sprawled on the ground and Jonathan Aromin was nowhere to be found. He never
knew what actually happened to Jonathan Aromin as his back was turned against him when the
gun went off.[28]
 Confused by the startling events, the accused just took his family to the house of his wife’s
cousin. His wife then convinced him to spend the night with them and postpone his surrender
until the next day.[29] At around 6:00 o'clock p.m.[30] of 3 September 1993 he surrendered at the
PNP Station in Caloocan City. After being taken into custody, PO3 Almojuela brought him to the
Jose Reyes Memorial Hospital where Jonathan Aromin identified him as the perpetrator.[31]
On 26 March 1999 the trial court, giving credence to the prosecution witnesses, found the
accused guilty of both charges.[32] In Crim. Case No. C- 44939, the accused was found guilty
of Murder and sentenced to reclusion perpetua. He was also ordered to pay the heirs of the
victim P50,000.00 as death indemnity, P54,200.00 as actual and compensatory damages and
the costs. In Crim. Case No. C-44940 the accused was found guilty of Frustrated Murder and
was sentenced to ten (10) years of prision mayor as minimum to fourteen (14) years and eight
(8) months of reclusion temporal as maximum. He was also ordered to pay Jonathan
Aromin P30,000.00 as moral damages and the costs.[33]
Accused-appellant, in his brief, raises two (2) points: First, his guilt was not proved beyond
reasonable doubt as the circumstantial evidence presented by the prosecution failed to
establish that he intended to kill Julian Ancheta and Jonathan Aromin. Second, the court a
quo gravely erred in convicting him of murder and frustrated murder since there was no proof
that the killing was attended by evident premeditation or treachery.[34]
The defense of accused-appellant is that the death of Julian Ancheta and the injury of
Jonathan Aromin were caused by the accidental gunshots which occurred when he and the
deceased grappled for the gun. Thus, absent any intent to kill the victims, he could not be
convicted of homicide or murder.
However, the evidence presented proves otherwise.
The autopsy of Julian Ancheta reveals that he sustained three (3) bullet wounds: one (1) in
the rear of the left forearm, another on the left rear portion of his neck and the most fatal one, on
the front portion of his left temple.
On the other hand, Jonathan Aromin sustained a gunshot wound on his right cheek which
would have caused his death had it not been for the timely medical attention. Based on the
number of bullet wounds and the location of the injuries sustained by the victims it is quite
impossible to believe that such wounds were caused by two (2) accidental gunshots which
ensued while the accused and the deceased wrestled for
the gun. On the contrary, the location of the injuries proves that accused-appellant
intentionally shot his own brother to death and thereafter shot the eyewitness at point blank to
permanently silence him.
Further, Jonathan Aromin categorically and positively identified accused-appellant as the
person who pursued and shot him at close range. This Court has no reason to doubt his
testimony for even accused-appellant admitted that he and the witness were in good terms prior
to the incident.[35] Neither does this Court have any ground to question the veracity of Leonila
Lopez’s testimony that she saw accused-appellant shoot Jonathan Aromin as there was no
proved ill motive on her part. Thus, where there is no evidence to show any dubious reason or
improper motive why prosecution witnesses should testify falsely against the accused or falsely
implicate him in a heinous crime, such testimonies are worthy of full faith and credit. [36] Besides,
it has been an established rule that unless the trial judge overlooked certain facts of substance
and value, which if considered might affect the result of the case, appellate courts will not
disturb the credence, or lack of it, accorded by the trial court to the testimonies of witnesses.
[37]
We find no reason to deviate from this well-entrenched principle.
 But although we affirm the factual findings of the trial court on the presence of "intent to
kill," we believe that the killing of Julian Ancheta and the shooting of Jonathan Aromin were not
qualified by treachery.
While it was established that accused-appellant intentionally shot his brother Julian, the
witnesses never saw how the killing started. Treachery cannot be considered where the
witnesses did not see the commencement of the assault and the importance of such testimonies
cannot be overemphasized considering that treachery cannot be presumed nor established from
mere suppositions.[38] And where no particulars are shown as to the manner by which the
aggression was commenced or how the act which resulted in the death of the victim began and
developed, treachery can in no way be established.[39]Hence, without the existence of treachery
accused-appellant can only be convicted of homicide in Crim. Case No. C-44939.
Neither was treachery established in the shooting of Jonathan Aromin. Two (2) conditions
must concur for treachery to exist, namely: (a) the employment of means of execution that gave
the person attacked no opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate; and, (b) the means or
method of execution was deliberately or consciously adopted. [40] Both these circumstances must
be proved as indubitably as the crime itself.[41]
In the case at bar, however, there is no sufficient proof to establish with certainty that
accused-appellant deliberately and consciously adopted the means of executing the crime
against Jonathan Aromin. Furthermore, the victim was already aware of the danger as he saw
accused-appellant carrying a gun and heard two (2) gunshots prompting him to run and hide
behind a wall.[42] Thus, there could be no treachery since prior to the attack the victim was
forewarned of the danger to his life and even managed to flee, albeit unsuccessfully.
[43]
Consequently, accused-appellant can only be convicted of frustrated homicide in Crim. Case
No.C-44940.
It must be noted that the testimonies of the witnesses show that accused-appellant
surrendered himself on 3 September 1993 at the PNP Station in Caloocan City. For voluntary
surrender to be appreciated as a mitigating circumstance the following requisites must
concur: (a) the offender had not been actually arrested; (b) the offender surrendered himself to
a person in authority; and, (c) the surrender was voluntary. [44] All these requisites were present
in this case as PO3 Feliciano Almojuela confirmed that on 3 September 1993, the day after the
incident, accused-appellant voluntarily gave himself up and his service firearm at the PNP
Station in Caloocan City.[45] Thus, the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender should be
appreciated in his favor.
Article 249 of The Revised Penal Code provides that the penalty for homicide is reclusion
temporal. There being one mitigating circumstance, namely, voluntary surrender, the imposable
penalty isreclusion temporal in its minimum period the range of which is twelve (12) years and
one (1) day to fourteen (14) years and eight (8) months. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence
Law, the maximum shall be taken from the minimum of the imposable penalty while the
minimum shall be taken from the penalty next lower in degree, which is prision mayor the
range of which is six (6) years and one (1) day to twelve (12) years.
Article 50 of The Revised Penal Code provides that the penalty next lower in degree than
that prescribed by law for the consummated felony shall be imposed upon the principal in a
frustrated felony. Thus, in Crim. Case No. C-44940, there also being one (1) mitigating
circumstance, the maximum term of the indeterminate sentence shall be taken from prision
mayor in its minimum period, the range of which is from six (6) years and one (1) day to eight
(8) years, while the minimum term shall be taken from the penalty next lower in degree which
is prision correccional, in any of its periods, the range of which is six (6) months and one (1) day
to six (6) years.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the trial court appealed from convicting accused-appellant
SPO1 Eduardo Ancheta y Rodigol of Murder in Crim. Case No. C-44939 and Frustrated
Murder inCrim. Case No. C-44940, is MODIFIED.
In G.R. No. 138306 (Crim. Case No C-44939), accused-appellant SPO1 Eduardo Ancheta y
Rodigol is found guilty of HOMICIDE and is sentenced to an indeterminate prison term of six (6)
years eight (8) months and ten (10) days of prision mayor minimum as minimum to twelve (12)
years six (6) months and twenty (20) days of reclusion temporal minimum as maximum. He is
also ordered to pay the heirs of Julian Ancheta P50,000.00 as death indemnity, P54,200.00 as
actual and compensatory damages, plus the costs.
In G.R. No. 138307 (Crim. Case No. C-44940), accused-appellant SPO1 Eduardo Ancheta
y Rodigol is found guilty of FRUSTRATED HOMICIDE and is sentenced to an indeterminate
prison term of two (2) years two (2) months and twenty (20) days of prision
correccional minimum as minimum to six (6) years four (4) months and ten (10) days of prision
mayor minimum as maximum. He is also ordered to pay Jonathan Aromin P30,000.00 as
moral damages plus the costs.
SO ORDERED.
Mendoza, Quisumbing, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.
Buena, J., on official business.
G.R. No. L-19491 August 30, 1968

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
APOLONIO APDUHAN, JR. alias JUNIOR, ET AL., defendants,
APOLONIO APDUHAN, JR. alias JUNIOR, defendant-appellant.

Office of the Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

Alberto M. Meer for defendant-appellant.

CASTRO, J.:

This is an automatic review of the judgment rendered on August 30, 1961 by the Court of First
Instance of Bohol (Judge Hipolito Alo presiding) convicting Apolonio Apduhan, Jr. of robbery with
homicide and sentencing him to death and "to idemnify the heirs of the deceased Geronimo
Miano in the amount of P6,000.00, to indemnify the heirs of the other deceased Norberto Aton in
the same amount of P6,000.00 ..."

On August 2, 1961 the accused Apduhan, then represented by Atty. David Ocangas, together
with his co-accused Rodulfo Huiso and Felipe Quimson, both represented by Atty. David Tirol,
pleaded not guilty to a second amended information which recites:.

The undersigned Provincial Fiscal accuses Apolonio Apduhan, Jr., alias Junior, Rodulfo
Huiso and Felipe Quimson of the crime of Robbery with Homicide, committed as follows:

That on or about the 23rd day of May, 1961, at about 7:00 o'clock in the evening, in the
Municipality of Mabini, Province of Bohol, Philippines, the above-named accused and
five (5) other persons whose true names are not yet known (they are presently known
only with their aliases of Bernabe Miano, Rudy, Angel-Angi, Romeo and Tony) and who
are still at large (they will be charged in separate information or informations as soon as
they are arrested and preliminary proceedings in Crim. Case No. 176 completed before
the Justice of the Peace Court), all of them armed with different unlicensed firearms,
daggers, and other deadly weapons, conspiring, confederating and helping one another,
with intent of gain, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously enter, by means
of violence, the dwelling house of the spouses Honorato Miano and Antonia Miano,
which was also the dwelling house of their children, the spouses Geronimo Miano and
Herminigilda de Miano; and, once inside the said dwelling house, the above-named
accused with their five (5) other companions, did attack, hack and shoot Geronimo
Miano and another person by the name of Norberto Aton, who happened to be also in
the said dwelling house, thereby inflicting upon the said two (2) persons physical injuries
which caused their death; and thereafter the same accused and their five (5) other
companions, did take and carry way from said dwelling house cash money amounting to
Three Hundred Twenty-two Pesos (P322.00), Philippine Currency, belonging to
Honorato Miano and Geronimo Miano, to the damage and prejudice of the said Honorato
Miano and the heirs of the deceased Geronimo Miano in the sum of Three Hundred
Twenty-two Pesos (P322.00) with respect to the amount robbed, and also to the damage
and prejudice of the heirs of deceased Geronimo Miano and Norberto Aton by reason of
the death of these two persons.
 Act committed contrary to the provisions of Art. 294, par. 1, of the Revised Penal Code
with the special aggravating circumstance that the crime was committed by a band with
the use of unlicensed firearms (Art. 296, Rev. Penal Code), and other aggravating
circumstances, as follows:

1. That the crime was committed in the dwelling of the offended parties without any
provocation from the latter;

2. That nighttime was purposely sought to facilitate the commission of the crime; and.

3. That advantage was taken of superior strength, accused and their companions, who
were fully armed, being numerically superior to the offended parties who were unarmed
and defenseless.

When the case was called for trial on August 9, 1961, Atty. Tirol informed the court a quo that he
was appearing also for Apduhan, but only as counsel de oficio. In view of this manifestation, the
trial court appointed Atty. Tirol as counsel de oficio for the said accused. Forthwith, Atty. Tirol
manifested that Apduhan would change his former plea of not guilty to a plea of guilty. The
record discloses that after the trial, judge had repeatedly apprised Apduhan of the severity of the
offense for which he was indicted and the strong possibility that the capital penalty might be
imposed upon him despite a plea of guilty, Apduhan persisted in his intention to plead guilty with
the request, however, that the death penalty be not imposed. Then after hearing the arguments
of Provincial Fiscal Jesus N. Borromeo and Atty. Tirol on the effect of articles 295 and 296 of the
Revised Penal Code on the case at bar, the trial judge advised the herein accused anew that he
could be sentenced to death notwithstanding his projected plea of guilty, but the latter reiterated
his desire to confess his guilt on the specific condition that he be sentenced to life
imprisonment. Eventually, however, Apduhan desisted from pleading guilty and let his previous
plea stand on record after further warnings that he faced the grave danger of being sentenced
to death in view of the circumstances of his case. But the aforesaid desistance was merely
momentary as it did not end the accused's equivocation on the matter of his plea. After a five-
minute recess requested by Atty. Tirol in order to confer with the accused, the former informed
the court a quo that his client would insist on entering a plea of guilty. The following appears on
record:

Atty. D. TIROL:

Your Honor, please, I had a conference with the accused and I apprised him with the
situation of the case and after hearing our apprisal he manifested that he will insist on
his entering a plea of guilty, Your Honor. I made it clear to him that we are not forcing him
to enter the plea of guilty.

COURT (To accused Apolonio Apduhan, Jr.)

Q. Is it true that you are withdrawing your plea of not guilty?

A. I will just enter the plea of guilty.

Q. Have you been forced to enter the plea of guilty by your lawyer?.

A. No, Sir.
 Q. And why do you said "I will JUST enter the plea of not guilty"?

A. I have proposed to enter the plea of guilty even before.

Q. Now the Court warns you again. Are you conscious of the fact that notwithstanding
your plea of guilty the Court may impose upon you the penalty of death?

A. I will just enter the plea of guilty, at the discretion of the Court.

Q. Even with all those dangers mentioned by the Court to you? .

A. Yes, Sir. (t.s.n. pp. 23-25).

Subsequently the prosecuting fiscal and the counsel de oficio resumed their oral arguments
regarding the effect on the instant case of articles 295 and 296, particularly the use of
unlicensed firearm as a special aggravating circumstance under the latter article. Also discuss
were the existence and effect of the alleged mitigating and aggravating circumstances. All of
these points will be later analyzed.

When the lower court subsequently reviewed the proceedings, it found that the accused's plea
of guilty was ambiguous. Hence, on August 30, 1961, the case was reopened with respect to
Apduhan, and on said date the latter entered a categorical plea of guilty, as evidenced by the
record:

COURT (To Accused Apduhan, Jr.):

The Court reopened this case because after a review of the proceedings it found that your plea
was not definite. In answer to a question of the Court you simply said "I will just enter the plea of
guilty". The Court wants to know whether you enter the plea of guilty of the crime charged in the
second amended information.

ACCUSED APDUHAN:.

I enter the plea of guilty.

COURT (To same accused Apduhan):

Q. Therefore, you admit that you have committed the crime charged in the second
information?

A. Yes, Your Honor.

Q. Is it necessary for you that the second amended information be read again?

A. No more; it is not necessary.

Q. Do you want that the second amended information be read to you again?

A. No more, Your Honor. (t.s.n. pp. 50-51).

On the same day, the court a quo rendered its decision, the pertinent dispositive portion of
which reads:.

PREMISES CONSIDERED, the Court renders judgment finding accused Apolonio

Apduhan, Jr., alias Junior guilty of the complex crime of robbery with homicide, punished
by Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code, in relation to Article 296 of the game Code, as
amended, and sentences him to suffer the penalty of death.

Considering that Apduhan had voluntarily confessed his guilt in open court, then the only aspect
of the case properly subject to review is the correctness of the penalty imposed by the court a
quo. In this respect, the appreciation of the use of unlicensed firearm as a special aggravating
circumstance (art. 296) in fixing the appropriate penalty for robbery with homicide (Art, 294 [1])
committed by a band with the use of unlicensed firearms, and the interplay and counter-
balancing of the attendant mitigating and aggravating circumstances, would determine the
severity of the penalty imposable.

The disposition of the question at hand necessitates a discussion of the interrelation among
articles 294, 295 and 296 of the Revised Penal Code. For this purpose the said articles are
hereunder quoted:

ART. 294. Robbery with violence against or intimidation of persons — Penalties. — Any
person guilty of robbery with the use of violence against or intimidation of any person
shall suffer:

1. The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death, when by reason or on occasion of

the robbery, the crime of homicide shall have been committed.

2. The penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium period to reclusion

perpetua, when the robbery shall have been accompanied by rape or intentional
mutilation, or if by reason or on occasion of such robbery, any of the physical
injuries penalized in subdivision 1 of article 263 shall have been inflicted.

3. The penalty of reclusion temporal, when by reason or on occasion of the

robbery, any of the physical injuries penalized in subdivision 2 of the article
mentioned in the next preceding paragraph, shall have been inflicted.

4. The penalty of prision mayor in its maximum period to reclusion temporal in its
medium period, if the violence or intimidation employed in the commission of the
robbery shall have been carried to a degree clearly unnecessary for the
commission of the crime, or when in the course of the execution, the offender
shall have inflicted upon any person not responsible for its commission any of the
physical injuries covered by subdivisions 3 and 4 of said article 263.

5. The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in

its medium period in other cases. (As amended by Rep. Act 18.).

ART 295. Robbery with physical injuries, committed in an uninhabited place and by a
band, or with the use of firearm on a street, road or alley. — If the offenses mentioned in
subdivisions three, four, and five of the next preceding article shall have been committed
in an uninhabited place or by a band, or by attacking a moving train, street car, motor
 vehicle or airship, or by entering the passengers' compartments in a train or, in any
manner, taking the passengers thereof by surprise in the respective conveyances, or on
a street, road highway, or alley, and the intimidation is made with the use of a firearm,
the offender shall be punished by the maximum period of the proper penalties. (As
amended by Rep. Acts Nos. 12 and 373.) (Emphasis supplied) .

ART. 296. Definition of a band and penalty incurred by the members thereof.— When
more than three armed malefactors take part in the commission of a robbery, it shall be
deemed to have been committed by a band. When any of the arms used in the
commission of the offense be an unlicensed firearm the penalty to be imposed upon all
the malefactors shall be the maximum of the corresponding penalty provided by
law,without prejudice to the criminal liability for illegal possession of such unlicensed
firearm.

Any member of a band who is present at the commission of a robbery by the band, shall
be punished as principal of any of the assaults committed by the band, unless it be
shown that he attempted to prevent the same. (As amended by Rep. Act No. 12).
(Emphasis supplied).

The afore-quoted art. 294 enumerates five classes of robbery with violence against or
intimidation of persons and prescribes the corresponding penalties. The case at bar falls
under art. 294(1) which defines robbery with homicide and fixes the penalty
from reclusion perpetua to death.

Article 295 provides, inter alia, that when the offenses described in subdivisions 3, 4 and 5 of
art. 294 are committed by a band, the proper penalties must be imposed in the maximum
periods. The circumstance of band is therefore qualifying only in robbery punished by
subdivisions 3, 4, and 5 of art. 294. Consequently, art. 295 is inapplicable to robbery with
homicide, rape, intentional mutilation, and lesiones graves resulting in insanity, imbecility,
impotency or blindness. If the foregoing classes of robbery which are described in art. 294(1)
and (2) are perpetrated by a band, they would not be punishable under art. 295, but
then cuadrilla would be a generic aggravating under Art. 14 of the Code.1 Hence, with the
present wording of art. 2952 there is no crime as "robbery with homicide in band." If robbery with
homicide is committed by a band, the indictable offense would still be denominated as "robbery
with homicide" under art. 294(1), but the element of band, as stated above, would be
appreciated as an ordinary aggravating circumstance.

Article 296, as quoted above, defines "band", creates the special aggravating circumstance of
use of unlicensed firearm, and provides the criminal liability incurred by the members of the
band. The ascertainment of the definite function and range of applicability of this article in
relation to articles 294 and 295 is essential in the disposition of the case at bar.

In imposing the death penalty, the trial court appears to have accorded validity to the Provincial
Fiscal's contention that in robbery with homicide committed by a band, the use of unlicensed
firearm must be appreciated as a special aggravating circumstance pursuant to art. 296. Thus
convinced, the trial judge stressed in his decision that "under the express mandate of the law,
we cannot escape the arduous task of imposing the death penalty." Subscribing to the said
position, the Solicitor General adds that the "penalty for robbery under the circumstances
mentioned in Articles 294, paragraph 1, and 296 of the Code is the maximum of reclusion
perpetua to death, or the supreme penalty of death. This is mandatory." .
On the other hand, Atty. Alberto M. Meer, the accused's counsel de oficio in the present review,
contends that the use of unlicensed firearm, if ever appreciated in the case at bar, must be
considered a generic aggravating factor which "may be off-set by the existence of mitigating
circumstances so that the penalty to be imposed should be the penalty of reclusion perpetua." .

Both the foregoing contentions are untenable.

After a perceptive analysis of the provisions of art. 296, we reach the considered opinion that
the said article is exclusively linked and singularly applicable to the immediately antecedent
provision of art. 295 on robbery in band, as the latter article, in turn, is explicitly limited in scope
to subdivisions 3, 4, and 5 of art. 294. Consequently, although the use of unlicensed firearm is a
special aggravating circumstance under art. 296, as amended by Rep. Act 12, 3 it cannot be
appreciated as such in relation to robbery with homicide, described and penalized under
paragraph 1 of art. 294.

As previously stated, art. 295 provides that if any of the classes of robbery described in
subdivisions 3, 4, and 5 of art. 294 is committed by a band, the offender shall be punished by
the maximum period of the proper penalty. Correspondingly, the immediately following
provisions of art. 296 define the term "band", prescribe the collective liability of the members of
the band, and state that "when any of the arms used in the commission of the offense be in
unlicensed firearm, the penalty to be imposed upon all the malefactors shall be the maximum of
the corresponding penalty provided by law." Viewed from the contextual relation of articles 295
and 296, the word "offense" mentioned in the above-quoted portion of the latter article logically
means the crime of robbery committed by a band, as the phrase "all the malefactors" indubitably
refers to the members of the band and the phrase "the corresponding penalty provided by law"
relates to the offenses of robbery described in the last three subdivisions of art. 294 which are
all encompassed within the ambit of art. 295. Evidently, therefore, art. 296 in its entirety is
designed to amplify and modify the provision on robbery in band which is nowhere to be found
but in art. 295 in relation to subdivisions 3, 4, and 5 of art. 294. Verily, in order that the aforesaid
special aggravating circumstance of use of unlicensed firearm may be appreciated to justify the
imposition of the maximum period of the proper penalty it is a condition sine qua non that the
offense charged be robbery committed by a band within the contemplation of art. 295. To
reiterate, since art. 295, does not apply to subdivision 1 and 2 of art. 294, then the special
aggravating factor in question, which is solely applicable to robbery in band under art. 295,
cannot be considered in fixing the penalty imposable for robbery with homicide under art.
294(1), even if the said crime was committed by a band with the use of unlicensed firearms.

The legislative intent of making art. 296 corollary to art. 295 with respect to robbery in band was
unmistakably articulated by Congressman Albano in his sponsorship speech on H. B. No. 124
(subsequently enacted as Rep. Act No. 12, amending, among others, articles 295 and 296 of
the Revised Penal Code). Said Congressman Albano: "Article 296 as a corollary of Article 295
would change the definition heretofore known of the term "band" under the law. The purpose of
this amendment is to inject therein the element of aggravation, when any member of the band
carries an unlicensed firearm . ." 4.

The special aggravating circumstance of use of unlicensed firearm, however, was initially
applicable to all the subdivisions of art. 294 since the said Rep. Act No. 12 also amended art.
295 to include within its scope all the classes of robbery described in art. 294. With the then
enlarged coverage of art. 295, art. 296, being corollary to the former, was perforce made
applicable to robbery with homicide (art. 294[1]). Thus, in People vs. Bersamin, 5 this Court, in
passing, opined: "The use of unlicensed firearm is a special aggravating circumstanceapplicable
only in cases of robbery in band (Art. 296, Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 3,
Republic Act No. 12)." .

In the said case, this Court declared in effect that in robo con homicidio the use of unlicensed
firearm is not a special aggravating circumstance when the said offense is not committed by a
band. Inferentially, had the robbery with homicide in Bersamin been perpetrated by a band, the
use of unlicensed firearm would have been appreciated. This implied pronouncement would
have been justified under art. 296 in relation to art. 295, as amended by Rep. Act 12. But the
aforesaid inference lost all legal moorings in 1949 with the enactment of Rep. Act 373 which
excluded subdivisions 1 and 2 of art. 294 from the coverage of art. 295. Since art. 296, as
repeatedly emphasized above, is corollary to art. 295, the diminution of the latter's scope
correspondingly reduced the former's extent of applicability. In other words, the passage of the
foregoing amendment did not only jettison the first two subdivisions of art. 294 from the
periphery of art. 295 but also removed the said subdivisions (which pertain, inter alia, to the
offense of robbery with homicide) from the effective range of art. 296.

Notwithstanding that the special aggravating circumstance of use of unlicensed firearm cannot
be appreciated in the instant case, we are constrained, in the final analysis, to observe that the
imposition of the death penalty on the accused Apduhan would appear to be a logical legal
consequence, because as against the attendant mitigating circumstances the aggravating
circumstances numerically and qualitatively preponderate.

After Apduhan had pleaded guilty, the defense counsel offered for consideration three mitigating
circumstances, namely, plea of guilty, intoxication, and lack of intent to commit so grave a
wrong. Subsequently, however, the defense withdrew the last mentioned mitigating
circumstance after the prosecution had withdrawn the aggravating circumstance of abuse of
superior strength. The following manifestations appear on record: .

"FISCAL BORROMEO: .

"In fairness to the accused, because the crime charged is robbery in band (the case at
bar is actually robbery with homicide), it is natural that in robbery in band there is already
abuse of superior strength, so we will just withdraw that superior strength.

"COURT (To Atty. D. Tirol): .

"What do you say now? .

"ATTY. D. TIROL: .

"Such being the case, we will not insist on presenting evidence in support of our
contention that the accused did not intend to commit so grave a wrong.

"COURT: .

"Moreover by the mere use of firearm the accused cannot claim that he did not intend to
commit so grave a wrong as that committed. So now you withdraw your petition that you
be allowed to present evidence to that effect? .
"ATTY. D. TIROL: .

"Yes, Your Honor." (t.s.n. pp. 47-48).

Thus, only two alleged mitigating circumstances remain for consideration.

Anent the plea of guilty, we believe that under art. 13 (7) its appreciation in the case at
bar is beyond controversion.

However, apropos the alternative circumstance of intoxication, we find no evidence on

record to support the defense's claim that it should be considered as a mitigating factor.
This absence of proof can be attributed to the defense's erroneous belief that it was not
anymore its burden to establish the state of intoxication of the accused when he
committed the offense charged since anyway the prosecution had already admitted the
attendance of the said mitigating circumstance on the ground that the State did not have
strong evidence to overthrow the accused's claim of non-habituality to drinking. The
record discloses the following pertinent discussion: .

"COURT (To Fiscal Borromeo):.

"Do you agree, Mr. Fiscal, that the non-habitual intoxication of the accused be also taken
into account in his favor as a mitigating circumstance? "FISCAL BORROMEO: .

"We have no evidence exactly to know at this time that the accused was intoxicated, but
his affidavit states that before the commission of the crime they took young coconuts
and there is no mention about the taking of any liquor, so that, as it is now, we are
constrained to object.

"COURT (To the Fiscal): .

"But do you have evidence to counteract that allegation? .

"FISCAL BORROMEO: .

"We do not have any evidence to counteract that.

"COURT (To the Fiscal): .

"But do you not admit the attendance of that circumstance? .

"FISCAL BORROMEO: With that manifestation we submit because actually we do not

have evidence to counteract that he was a habitual drinker. "COURT (To the Fiscal): .

"But do you prefer to admit that mitigating circumstance or you need that evidence be
presented to that effect? "FISCAL BORROMEO: .

"Inasmuch as we do not have strong evidence to contradict that circumstance in fairness

to the accused, we would rather submit.
 "COURT (To the Fiscal): .

"The attendance of the mitigating circumstance of non-habitual intoxication? .

"FISCAL BORROMEO: .

"Yes, Your Honor." (t.s.n. pp. 7-9) (Emphasis supplied) .

From the above proceedings in the trial court, it would appear that what the prosecution actually
intended to admit was the non-habituality of the accused to drinking liquor, not as a matter of
fact, but due to the State's inability to disprove the same. The prosecution apparently did not
concede the actual intoxication of the accused. We are of the firm conviction that, under the
environmental circumstances, the defense was not relieved of its burden to prove the accused's
actual state of intoxication. Otherwise, to appreciate the attendance of a mitigating factor on the
mere allegation of the accused, coupled with the dubious acquiescence of the prosecution,
would open wide the avenue for unscrupulous and deceitful collusion between defense and
prosecution in order to unduly and unjustly minimize the penalty imposable upon the accused.

The last paragraph of art. 15 of the Code provides:.

"The intoxication of the offender shall be taken into consideration as a mitigating circumstance
when the offender has committed a felony in a state of intoxication, if the same is not habitual or
subsequent to the plan to commit said felony but when the intoxication is habitual or intentional
it shall be considered as an aggravating circumstance. (Emphasis supplied).

Under the foregoing provision, intoxication is mitigating when it is not habitual or intentional, that
is, not subsequent to the plan to commit the crime. However, to be mitigating the accused's
state of intoxication must be proved. 6 Once intoxication is established by satisfactory evidence,
7 then in the absence of proof to the contrary" it is presumed to be non-habitual or unintentional.
8.

In People vs. Noble 9 the defendant testified that before the murder he took a bottle of wine and
drank little by little until he got drunk. The policeman who arrested the accused testified that the
latter smelled wine and vomited. The Court held that the evidence presented was not
satisfactory to warrant a mitigation of the penalty. Intoxication was likewise not competently
proved in a case 10 where the only evidence was that the defendant had a gallon of tuba with
him at the time he committed the crime.

In the case at bar the accused merely alleged that when he committed the offense charged he
was intoxicated although he was "not used to be drunk," 11This self-serving statement stands
uncorroborated. Obviously, it is devoid of any probative value.

To recapitulate, the accused has in his favor only one mitigating circumstance: plea of guilty. As
aforementioned, the defense withdrew its claim of "lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong"
and failed to substantiate its contention that intoxication should be considered mitigating.

While an unqualified plea of guilty is mitigating, it at the same time constitutes an admission of
all the material facts alleged in the information, including the aggravating circumstances therein
recited. 12 The four aggravating circumstances are (1) band; (2) dwelling; (3) nighttime; and (4)
abuse of superior strength. The circumstance of abuse of superiority was, however, withdrawn
by the prosecution on the ground that since the offense of robbery with homicide was committed
by a band, the element of cuadrilla necessarily absorbs the circumstance of abuse of superior
strength. We believe that said withdrawal was ill-advised since the circumstances of band and
abuse of superiority are separate and distinct legal concepts. The element of band is
appreciated when the offense is committed by more than three armed malefactors regardless of
the comparative strength of the victim or victims. Hence, the indispensable components of
cuadrilla are (1) at least four malefactors and (2) all of the four malefactors are armed. On the
other hand, the gravamen of abuse of superiority is the taking advantage by the culprits of their
collective strength to overpower their relatively weaker victim or victims. Hence, in the latter
aggravating factor, what is taken into account is not the number of aggressors nor the fact that
they are armed, but their relative physical might vis-a-vis the offended party.

Granting, however, that the said withdrawal was valid, there still remain three aggravating
circumstances which render inutile the solitary extenuating circumstance of plea of guilty. The
prosecution does not need to prove the said three circumstances (all alleged in the second
amended information) since the accused by his plea of guilty, has supplied the requisite proof.
13 Hence, we will not belabor our discussion of the attendance aggravating circumstances.

The settled rule is that dwelling is aggravating in robbery with violence or intimidation of
persons, 14 like the offense at bar. The rationale behind this pronouncement is that this class of
robbery could be committed without the necessity of transgressing the sanctity of the home.
Morada is inherent only in crimes which could be committed in no other place than in the house
of another, such as trespass and robbery in an inhabited house. 15 This Court in People vs.
Pinca, 16 citing People vs. Valdez, 17 ruled that the "circumstances (of dwelling and scaling)
were certainly not inherent in the crime committed, because, the crime being robbery with
violence or intimidation against persons (specifically, robbery with homicide) the authors thereof
could have committed it without the necessity of violating or scaling the domicile of their victim."
Cuello Calon opines that the commission of the crime in another's dwelling shows greater
perversity in the accused and produces greater alarm. 18.

Nocturnity is aggravating when it is purposely and deliberately sought by the accused to

facilitate the commission of the crime 19 or to prevent their being recognized or to insure
unmolested escape. 20 Nocturnidad must concur with the intent and design of the offender to
capitalize on the intrinsic impunity afforded by the darkness of night. 21 In the case at bar, the
affidavit (exh. I-1) of the accused Apduhan shows that he and his co-malefactors took
advantage of the nighttime in the perpetration of the offense as they waited until it was dark
before they came out of their hiding place to consummate their criminal designs.

In his decision, the trial judge recommends to, the President of the Republic the commutation of
the death sentence which he imposed on the accused to life imprisonment. The Solicitor
General supports this recommendation for executive clemency.

We find no compelling reason to justify such recommendation. Contrary to the trial judge's
observation, the accused's plea of guilty was far from "spontaneous" and "insistent". It will be
recalled that his initial plea was one of not guilty. Later, he changed his plea but with the
persistent condition that he be sentenced to life imprisonment, not death. It was only after much
equivocation that he finally decided to "just" plead guilty. Because his plea was still ambiguous,
the court a quo had to reopen the case to ascertain its real nature. Conceding, however, that his
plea was "spontaneous" and "insistent," such manifestation of sincere repentance cannot serve
to obliterate the attendant aggravating circumstances which patently reveal the accused's
criminal perversity.

It appears from a cursory reading of the decision under review that the trial judge also anchored
his recommendation on the ground that there is "the possibility that the firearm was used in
order to counteract the resistance of the deceased." This is no justification at all for executive
clemency. Firstly, the above observation is a mere conjecture - in the language of the presiding
judge, a "possibility." Secondly, even granting that the said observation relates to the actual
happening, to employ a firearm in subduing the lawful resistance of innocent persons is a
criminal act by any standard.

Even as we purge the decision under review of its errors, we must hasten to commend the trial
judge, the Hon. Hipolito Alo, for his earnest and patient efforts to forestall the entry of an
improvident plea of guilty by the accused Apduhan, notwithstanding that the latter was already
represented by a counsel de oficio and hence presumed to have been advised properly. Judge
Alo made sure that the accused clearly and fully understood the seriousness of the offense
charged and the severity of the penalty attached to it. When the accused proposed to confess
his guilt, Judge Alo repeatedly warned him that the death penalty might be imposed despite his
plea of guilty. As aforementioned, when it appeared that Apduhan's plea of guilty was
ambiguous, Judge Alo reopened the case to determine with definitiveness the nature of his plea.

The virtue of Judge Alo's efforts in ascertaining whether Apduhan pleaded guilty with full
knowledge of the significance and consequences of his act, recommends itself to all trial judges
who must refrain from accepting with alacrity an accused's plea of guilty, for while justice
demands a speedy administration, judges are duty bound to be extra solicitous in seeing to it
that when an accused pleads guilty he understands fully the meaning of his plea and the import
of an inevitable conviction.

As a final commentary on the criminal conduct of the accused herein, it must be emphasized
that the instant review was delayed for several years because he escaped from the New Bilibid
Prisons on June 17, 1963, less than six months after he was committed to the said penitentiary.
He was recommitted on July 10, 1964 with a new mittimus from the Court of First Instance of
Leyte for robbery in band in criminal case 10099, for which he was sentenced to serve a prison
term of from 8 years and 1 day to 12 years and 1 day commencing on October 31, 1963. 22 His
recommitment was reported to this Court only on July 5, 1966.

Notwithstanding the foregoing disquisition, for failure to secure the required number of votes,
the penalty of death cannot be legally imposed. The penalty next lower in degree - reclusion
perpetua - should consequently be imposed on the accused.

ACCORDINGLY, with the modification that the death sentence imposed upon Apolonio
Apduhan, Jr. by the court a quo is reduced to reclusion perpetua, the judgment a quo is affirmed
in all other respects, without pronouncement as to costs.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez, Angeles and Fernando,
JJ., concur.

[G.R. No. 125633. December 9, 1999]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ROLANDO ALFANTA y
ALO, accused-appellant.

DECISION
VITUG, J.:

Before this Court, by way of automatic review, is the decision, dated 29 July 1996, of the
Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 82, convicting [1] accused-appellant Rolando Alfanta y
Alo of rape with two aggravating circumstances and sentencing him to suffer the extreme
penalty of death.
Rolando Alfanta was charged with the crime of rape in an information that simply read:

“That on or about the 26th day of August, 1995, in the City of Makati, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, by means of force and
intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge upon
the person of one NITA FERNANDEZ y JOSEFA against her will and consent.”[2]

When arraigned on 27 September 1995, accused-appellant entered a plea of not guilty to the
crime charged. Trial thereupon ensued.
The evidence of the parties has been recited in good detail by the trial court in its decision
under review, thus:

“The first prosecution witness was Dr. Noel Minay, Medico Legal Officer of the National Bureau
of Investigation who testified that on August 27, 1995 at around 5:45 in the afternoon, he
performed a physical examination and medico genital examination on one Nita Fernandez for
alleged rape. Upon physical examination he found mark swelling on the left lower jaw or on the
mandibular area left portion; and, upon examination of the hymen, he found that the labia
majora and minora gaping, similar to the appearance of a woman who had just given birth; or a
normal appearance as a result of several sexual intercourses that had been performed. He
submitted a report on his findings (Exhibit ‘A’).

“The next witness was Nita Fernandez, the offended party alleged in the information who
testified that on August 26, 1995 at around 12:00 o'clock midnight, while asleep in the residence
of a friend at AFOVAI Fort Bonifacio, Makati city, a man whom she had not seen before
suddenly entered the house where she was sleeping, pulled her, boxed her jaw and put his
hand on her mouth, and told her that if she will not obey him, he will kill her. She resisted, but
could not do anything. Thereafter, she was forced to climb a fence. Because of fear, as the
man was holding a bolo, she followed. After climbing the fence, the man instructed her to go to
a vacant house. She followed, as instructed. While at the vacant house, she was told to
undress, she did because of fear, as the man was holding a bolo. Thereafter, the man
embraced and kissed her. Then she was told to lie down and told to separate her legs. The
man inserted his penis into her vagina. After inserting the man’s penis to her vagina, she was
told to lie face down. She complied, thereafter, the man inserted his penis into her anus. After
inserting the man’s penis into her anus, she was told to turn around face up. All these acts of
the man hurt her. After turning around face up, the man inserted his fingers in and out into her
private part. After the man had finished inserting his fingers in and out of her private part, she
was told to go near him and lie beside him, and not to dress up as he was going to take a rest
and at the same time telling her not to tell what happened to others saying that ‘lahat ng nirape
ko ay pinatay ko dahil sa ayokong may magsumbong.’ All the time the man was inserting his
penis and fingers into her private part and into her anus, she was shouting: ‘tulungan po ninyo
ako,' but nobody responded. Noticing that the man was already sleeping, she suddenly got the
knife at waist of the man and stab the man on his chest. The knife broke. She suddenly
grabbed the bolo and hack the man several times. Thereafter, she put on her dress, got hold of
the bolo and ran to the signal office of soldiers. When she arrived at the signal office of soldiers,
she told the persons she met that she killed a man. The bolo was taken from her by the
soldiers. With, soldiers, they went to the place where she was raped. They found the man lying
down still alive. The man was brought to the hospital. The man turned out to be accused
Rolando Alfanta y Alo. Thereafter, she executed an affidavit (Exh. C), narrating what happened
to her to the police; and was brought to the NBI Medico-Legal Officer for examination.

“On cross examination she testified that, from Valle Verde, Pasig City, where she worked as
housemaid, she went to her friend’s house named Patrick because she brought mongo and
because she and Patrick’s wife Inday, are friends, arriving in the house of Patrick at 6:30 in the
evening of August 26, 1995. She was not able to go back to her place of work at Valle Verde,
Pasig because it was already late at night and was told to sleep at Patrick’s house. Earlier that
evening, at 9:00, she saw accused passed by in front of the house. Aside from her two (2) other
persons slept in the house of Patrick, Inday and son. She slept in the sala, while Inday and her
son in a room. The door of the house was closed, but was not locked. In entering the house
were she slept, one has to reach the sala first. When awakened, she shouted, but nobody
heard her because they were sleeping and at the same time the accused placed his hand on
her mouth. She was really afraid because she was boxed on her chest and accused was
holding a bolo. While outside the house she was boxed. At the garage, which was not lighted,
she was told to undress. She followed, because of fear. Accused also undressed
himself. While accused was on top of her, holding a bolo, she cried. Accused is not her
sweetheart. She even said, why will I hack him if he is my sweetheart.

“The last witness for prosecution was Lilia Hogar of the Women’s Desk Unit, Makati Police
Station who testified that she came into the possession of the bolo, Exh. D, because Nita
Fernandez was brought to Sub-Station A. The bolo, which was brought by Nita Fernandez to
the Military Signal Village, was in turn given to the Central Police Desk wherein she is the
Investigator. After the bolo was handed to her by the soldiers of the Signal Village, she
conducted an investigation. Based on her investigation, she learned from Nita Fernandez that
when Nita Fernandez woke up at 12:00 midnight on August 26, 1995, Nita Fernandez saw a
man standing beside her. Nita was punched on the left portion of the face and ordered her to go
outside, instructed to climb over a fence on the other side of the house. After climbing the
fence, Nita Fernandez was told to undress, was boxed on her breast and was told to lie down in
a vacant house owned by Captain Pascua, where suspect raped Nita Fernandez. On their way
to the hospital on board the Makati Police car, she asked accused why he rape Nita
Fernandez. Accused answered that Fernandez was not telling the truth because they were
sweethearts.

“Defense presented the accused. Accused testified that on August 26, 1995, while at AFOVAI
Village, Municipality of Makati, fixing the fence of the house of General Renato Icarma together
with many other laborers, somebody told him that his wife was waiting for him in the house of
Captain Pascua. At 10:00 o’clock that evening, he went to the house of Captain Pascua; and
upon reaching the house, he knocked, and called Patrick Augusto Ablon, the caretaker of
Captain Pascua. Belinda Ablon, the cousin of Patrick Augusto Ablon, opened the door. After
opening the door, Nita Fernandez, his live-in partner for almost a year came out, in an angry
mood, because she has been waiting for him for long, and asked him why he was late. He
explained that he did not expect her to come, as his understanding with Nita Fernandez was, he
will call her by phone or write her before she comes. Then Nita Fernandez told him that they
talk outside as she was ashamed with the neighbor, and they will disturb the child who was
sleeping. After half hour talking, he invited Nita to sleep. He and Nita went to a vacant house,
owned by a Colonel passing a fence. When they arrived in the vacant house, it was closed, so
they slept in the terrace. He denied doing what Nita Fernandez claimed he did. He claimed
that, he was surprised why Fernandez hacked him, for he knows of no reason why Nita
Fernandez will hack him. He believes that Nita Fernandez concocted the story of rape because
of fear that he will file a case against Nita Fernandez for hacking him.

“On cross-examination, accused testified that, he has been staying in the house of General
Romeo Icarma (the house where he and 15 other workers were constructing a fence), since
1990. His livelihood was, as a Mason, since 1993. In February 1995, the daughter of Nita
Fernandez named, Lucia who is married to Lito introduced him to Nita. He and Nita became
sweethearts in February 1995. They have not live together because Nita was working at Valle
Verde. They only meet during Nita’s day off. He has been at Nita’s place of work, but he used
to call then at her telephone numbers which are 6326062 and 6356060. They used to see each
other at Gen. Icarma’s place where he lived. On August 26, 1995, when the incident in
questioned happened, Lucia and Lito were no longer residing at Gen. Icarma’s place because
they were told to leave in April 1993. On August 26, 1995, while in the squatters area, just 100
meters away from the house of Gen. Icarma, Nita came, looking for him. Because Nita does not
know the workers in Gen. Icarma’s house, Nita left and went to the house of Captain Pascua,
just at the back of the house of Gen. Icarma. While at the squatters area, Melchor Rudy Abella
told him that Nita was looking for him. He went to the house of Captain Pascua. At Captain
Pascua’s place, he met Nita. Present in the house of Captain Pascua were Augusto Ablon, his
wife Rubylin, Belinda, a cousin and a small child who were all awake, except the
child. Although Ablon was very much willing to accommodate him in Ablon’s house, he brought
Nita to the house of the Air Force Colonel because if it rains, there is a roof to protect them and
ashamed to stay at Ablon’s house. Even Nita does not like to sleep in Ablon’s place, saying that
instead of sleeping at Ablon’s place, she prefers to go back at Valle Verde. He did not allow Nita
to go back at Valle Verde because it was already late at night and if anything happens to her,
her daughter who knows his relationship with Nita will blame him. He did not bring Nita to Gen.
Icarma’s house because it is crowded and the Colonel’s house is just 20 meters from Captain
Pascua’s house. They went to the Colonel’s house, climbing the fence. When they climbed the
wall, he was carrying ‘banig, pillow and blanket,’ and did not notice that Nita was carrying a
knife. Nobody live in the Colonel’s house and was closed. They slept in the terrace of the
house on a cement flooring. While he was sleeping Nita hacked him with a kitchen knife. When
hacked, he just said ‘aray’. The bolo was not used in hacking him. After stabbing him, Nita left
and went to the Military Police leaving the kitchen knife. When the Military Police arrived, he
was no longer at the Colonel’s house because he went to another house, where he slept. After
he was stabbed, he asked the assistance of Ablon. Ablon was the one who called for the
Military Police. He did not leave the colonel’s house. He just stayed in the premises. Despite
his wounds, he was able to sleep and woke up at 5:00 in the morning. When asked why Nita
stabbed him, he said that it was because he hurt Nita by holding Nita's hand and pushing her on
her chest when Nita insisted in leaving for Valle Verde; and because he hurt Nita, he did not file
a complaint against Nita for hacking him.”[3]

In the decretal portion of the decision, the court a quo has pronounced judgment, thus:
“WHEREFORE, this court finds accused Rolando Alfanta y Alo guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime of rape, penalized by Art. 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, with
aggravating circumstances of nighttime and ignominy, he is hereby sentenced to suffer the
maximum penalty of death, and indemnify complainant Nita Fernandez the sum of P50,000.00,
plus the costs of the suit.”[4]

Now before the Court, accused-appellant seeks the reversal of the conviction and the
imposition of the death penalty decreed by the trial court; he contends that -

“I. THE TRIAL COURT [HAS] ERRED IN FINDING AND CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-
APPELLANT OF THE CRIME OF RAPE.

“II. THE TRIAL COURT [HAS] ERRED IN TAKING INTO CONSIDERATION THE
AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES OF NIGHTTIME AND IGNOMINY.”[5]

The case can be described as not really being too far from the typical rape cases that have
been previously reviewed by the Court. It is a case, like the instances before it, of two people,
each testifying on the same incident but making a clearly discordant testimony. Since only the
participants could directly testify on the sexual congress, here conceded to have taken place,
extreme care is observed in evaluating the respective declarations of the complainant and the
accused. The doctrinally accepted rule is to accord great respect over the assessment of the
trial court on the credibility of the witnesses and, in the usual words of similar import employed
by the Court, it would be best not to disturb the findings of the court which has heard the
evidence except only when a material or substantial fact has truly been overlooked or
misappreciated which if properly taken into account can alter the outcome of the case.
[6]
Regrettably for accused-appellant, no such exceptive instances of possible oversight are
perceived or evident in this case.
Complainant gave a thorough narrative account, so found to be credible by the trial court
and by this Court as well, of what had transpired during the late hour of the night in question.
“Prosecutor Manola:
“Q Mrs. Witness will you kindly tell the Honorable Court where you were on August 26, 1995
at around 12:00 o’clock midnight?
“A At Fort Bonifacio.
“Q What city or municipality?
“A I do not know but it must be here sir.
“Q Meaning Makati City?
“A Yes sir.
“Q Why were you there on that date and time Mrs. Witness?
“A I was sleeping in my friend’s residence.
“Court:
“Q What is the address of that friend’s residence at Fort Bonifacio?
“A At AFOVAI Fort Bonifacio Makati sir.
“Q Why were you there at that time?
“A Because I always go there and my son’s residence is beside the house of my friend
sir.
“Court: Proceed fiscal:
“Pros. Manola:
“Q Now, while you were there on that date and time at the house of your friend in AFOVAI
Fort Bonifacio Makati City do you recall of any unusual incident that happened?
“A There was sir.
“Q Will you kindly tell what that incident was?
“A During that time while I was sleeping in the residence of my friend suddenly there was a
man who entered the house where I was sleeping.
“Q So when you saw that man entered the house what did he do if any?
“A I stood up because he was pulling me and then he put his hand in my mouth sir.
“Q What else happened after that?
“A When I was resisting he boxed me and at that time he was holding a bolo and he said if I
will not obey him he will be going to kill me sir.
“Q After that what transpired next Mr. Witness?
“A He forced me to climb the fence and then I saw he was holding a bolo.
“Q Did you climb over the fence?
“A I climb sir because he forced me to climb the fence.
“Q Were you able to go over the fence?
“A When I was over the fence already he told me to go to a vacant house.
“Q How about the accused where was he when he ordered you to climb over the fence?
“A He was at my back and he told me to go first and then he followed.
“Q So after you went or cross over the fence what happened next Madam witness?
“A He told me to go to the vacant house and there he himself told me to undress and I took
off my clothes he embraced me and kissed me sir.
“Q Now when this man told you to go to the vacant house did you obey him?
“A I was told to go to the vacant house there he told me to undress.
“Q Did you obey him?
“A He told me to undress and he was holding a bolo.
“Court:
“Q The question of the prosecutor to you was did you obey the instruction of the accused
for you to undress?
“A Yes sir.
“Prosecutor Manola:
“Q Tell the Honorable Court why you do followed the instruction of that Man to go to that
vacant house and to undress why did you follow this instruction?
“A I was afraid that he might kill me sir.
“Q Why do you say that he might kill you?
“A He like to rape me sir.
“Court:
“Q You did not answer the question of the prosecutor why were you afraid?
“A Because he was holding a bolo and he was at the same time boxing me sir.
“Prosecutor Manola:
“Q So what happened after according to you you were instructed to undress?
“A He embraced me and kissed me and told me to lie down.
“Q And did you lie down as instructed by this Man?
“A He forced me to lie down and then he forced me to separate my legs sir.
“Q And what happened when you were forced to open your legs?
“A He told me not to shout because if I will shout he will kill me and the he inserted his penis
to my vagina sir.
“Q After this Man inserted his penis in your vagina or private part what happened next Mrs.
Witness?
“A He told me to lie front my face down and he inserted his penis to my anus sir.
“Q After that what happened next Mrs. Witness?
“A Then he told me again to lie down and at the same time he inserted his fingers to my
private parts going it and out sir.
“Q After that what happened next Mrs. Witness?
“A He lie down because he was already tired of molesting.
“Q How about you what were you doing at that time when the accused this person
according to you lie down after he put his fingers inside your private part?
“A He asked me to go near him and lie down beside him.
“Q Did you follow his instruction for you to lie near him?
“A Yes sir because he was holding a bolo sir.
“Q So what happened after you lie down beside this person?
“A He told me to put on my dress and at the same time he also told me that he does not
want me to tell it to anybody because he have raped many.
“Q Now if this person whom according to you raped you inside the court room would you be
able to recognize him?
“A Yes sir I could recognize him.
“Q Will you kindly look around the court room if you could recognize this person if he is
inside?
“Note: Witness pointed to a man who was pointed as the man who raped him and
when asked his name answered as Rolando Alfanta.
“Q Now after this person whom you just pointed to who answered by the name of Rolando
Alfanta uttered the words ‘lahat nang ni rape ko ay pinapatay ko dahil sa ayokong may
magsumbong’ what happened next Mrs. Witness?
“A I pleaded to him and he said not to put on my dress because he is going to take a rest.
“Q After that what happened next if any Mrs. Witness?
“A I saw him that he was sleeping already and then I suddenly got the knife and stab him in
the chest sir.
“Q After you stabbed him on his chest what happened next Mrs. Witness?
“A The knife broke and then I suddenly grabbed the bolo and hack and hack him sir.
“Q After you hacked this person who raped you what happened next Mrs. Witness?
“A I immediately put on my shirt and I got hold of the bolo and I run to the signal where the
soldiers were.
“Q Did you reach this place signal where there are soldiers according to you?
“A Yes sir.
“Q And what did you do when then when you arrived there?
“A I told him that I killed a person therein and give them the bolo.
“Q What happened after that when you informed the solders at signal that according to you
you have killed a person what happened next?
“A We went to the person who raped me sir.
“Q And did you see him there?
“A Yes sir.
“Q Who were with you when you went back to the place where you were allegedly raped?
“A The soldiers sir.
“Q Did you find this person who raped you?
“A Yes sir.
“Q What was he doing?
“A He was lying down sir.
“Q What happened after that?
“A When we arrived there he was still alive and he was brought to the hospital.
“Q Who brought him to the hospital?
“A The ambulance of the soldier.
“Q Now do you remember having given a statement to the Makati Police in connection with
what you have just narrated or told or testified to this afternoon?
“A I could remember.
“Q If that statement is shown to you would you be able to recognize it?
“A Yes sir.
“Q Now showing you a statement attached to the records of the prosecutor’s office
consisting of two pages kindly go over it and tell us if you recognize this statement?
“A Yes sir I could recognize this.
“Q Is that your statement”
“A Yes sir.
“xxx xxx xxx.
“Q Now this bolo which according to you surrendered to the soldier at the signal if you see
this bolo again would you be able to recognize it again?
“A Yes sir.
“Prosecutor Manola:
We would like to make reservation for this witness to identify this bolo when this bolo is
presented by the policeman who is in custody of this bolo.
“Court:
“Q How about the knife which according to you was seen by you at the waist line of the
accused did you bring it also?
“A I did not bring it sir because it was broken sir it was only the bolo that I brought.
“Q Now while you were being raped did you shout for help?
“A Yes sir.
“Q How did you ask for help?
“A I asked for help but they were sleeping they did not hear me sir.
“Q The question to you was how did you ask for help?
“A I cried and I said tulungan po ninyo ako.
“Q Did anybody respond to your cries for help?
“A None sir.
“Q Now how did you feel while the accused was inserting his private part to your private
part?
“A It hurt sir my vagina and my anus, my mouth that he boxed me sir.
“Q Now why did you say that the accused was able to insert his penis into your vagina?
“A He forced that to insert it.
“Q Forced it to where?
“A He forced it to enter my vagina sir.
“Q Did you feel when the private part of the accused entered to your vagina?
“A Yes sir I feel it sir.
“Q By the way do you know the accused prior to the date that you were awakened?
“A I do not know him.
“Q In short he is a complete stranger to you when he entered the room?
“A I saw him around 7:00 o’clock in the evening that he was passing thru the front of the
house of my friends where I was sleeping.
“Q At that time that you were awaken by the accused with whom were you sleeping?
“A Only me sir.
“Prosecutor Manola:
“Q Now you said that while you and the accused were lying down first you stab him with the
knife how many times have you stabbed him with the knife?
“A I was not able to count because I was afraid of him.
“Q You said that after stabbing him with the knife which you broke you got hold of the bolo
you hacked him how many times have you hacked him?
“A I failed to count how many times. I hacked him because I was afraid of him he might kill
me.
“Prosecutor Manola: That will be all for the witness.
“Court: Cross-examination.
“Atty. Manalo: With the permission of the Honorable Court.
“Court: Proceed.
“Atty. Manalo:
“Q Now who were with you at the time when you were sleeping at the house of your friend
at AFOVAI Fort Bonifacio?
“A One of their children so there were three and I was one.
“Q Were you sleeping in one room?
“A I was sleeping in the sala sir.
“Q Now before you sleep in that house at the sala did you close the door of that house?
“A It was closed but it was not locked.
“xxx xxx xxx.
“Q Now when why were you interested in sleeping in the house of your friend when you
could already at the house of your employer?
“A Because I was bringing mongo to my friend because I am indebted to them sir.
“Q Now why did you not return to your employer after giving or handing that mongo to your
friend?
“A They told me to sleep there because it was already late at night.
“Q By the way what time did you go there?
“A Around 6:00 to 6:30 in the evening.
“Q And what time did you reach your friend at AFOVAI?
“A 6:30 sir.
“Q And Valle Verde is just in Pasig isn’t?
“A Yes sir.
“Q It is near where you are employed and it will take you one ride only to reach that place
isn’t?
“A Three rides sir.
“Q Now which is first to be reached from the front door of the house where you were
sleeping at the time the place where you were sleeping or the place of the room where
the owner of the house were sleeping?
“A First it is the sala where he passed.
“Q Now you said that the door was not locked was there any other improvised locked
placed in that door like a wood?
“A They did not lock the door because they are in confident.
“Q Now what is the name of the owner of the house where you slept at that time?
“A Patrick sir.
“Q And how are you related to Patrick?
“A His wife is my friend sir.
“Q What is the name of his wife?
“A Inday sir.
“Q Now when you were awaken while you were sleeping in the sala of the house of your
friend Inday did you not shout when you saw a person pulling you holding a bolo?
“A I shouted but they did not hear me because they were sleeping and at the same time he
placed his hands on my mouth sir.
“Q Now you said that you were boxed on the chest by the accused how many times were
you boxed by the accused on the chest?
“A I do not know how many times I was boxed sir because I was really afraid of him.
“Q But you were sure that you were boxed at the chest?
“A Yes sir.
“Note: Witness demonstrating with her hands first pointing on her chest and also on
her mouth.
“Q Was it strong?
“A Yes sir it was strong because the following day it has marked.
“Note: Witness holding on his left chin.
“Q How about on the chest?
“Note: Witness demonstrating it was pointed on her chest.
“A It was not too strong sir.
“Q Did you fall down on your knee when you were hit by the blow?
“A Yes sir.
“Q Where?
“A I fell on the ground down.
“Q Where were you boxed by the accused?
“A Outside sir of the house.
“Q Now you said that you were ordered to undress and to lie down on the ground is that
correct?
“A Yes sir.
“Q And you followed him?
“A He told me to undress in the garage and he also undressed himself and because I was
afraid because he was holding a bolo sir.
“Q When he undressed himself was he still holding a bolo?
“A Yes sir one hand was holding the bolo the other one hand he was undressing himself.
“Q Was it lighted the place?
“A None sir.
“Q How far were you when the accused was undressing himself?
“A Near sir.
“Q Did you see his private part when he undressed himself?
“A Yes sir.
“Q How big?
“Prosecutor Manola: Immaterial your honor.
“Atty. Manalo: To test the credibility, your honor.
“Court: Answer
“A It was dark and I was able to see and I do not know because I was afraid.
“Atty. Manalo:
“Q And then you lie down?
 “A He told me to lie down and he placed himself on top of me.
“Q Was he still holding the bolo?
“A Yes sir he was holding the bolo on his one hand.
“Q How did you see him?
“A When he was holding the bolo with his one hand while I he was on top of me I cried and
he was holding the bolo.
Note: Witness demonstrating the accused holding the bolo upward.
“A When I cried he was on top of me sir.
“Q What was he doing when he was on top of you?
“A He was molesting me sir.”
“xxx xxx xxx
“Q Now what time did you see him passed by the house of your friend according to you?
“A 9:00 o’clock in the evening sir.
“Q Why were you sure that he was the one who passed by the house of your friend?
“A I saw him that he was passing.
“Q Where were you at the time?
“A I was seating by the window sir.”[7]
The testimony of the complainant about the incident is straightforward categorical, and
relatively free from any serious flaw. No compelling reason is advanced to sufficiently persuade
the Court to conclude that the trial court has erred in giving due weight and credence to the
testimony of the complainant. Neither is evidence adduced to show that the complainant has
had any ulterior motive to prevaricate and enmesh accused-appellant in a fabricated
charge. The Court repeats the familiar doctrine that when a woman claims that she has been
raped, she says in effect all that is necessary to show such a fact so long as her testimony can
meet the test of credibility, [8] for it is said that no woman in her right mind will cry rape, allow
examination of her private parts, or subject herself and her family to the humiliation concomitant
to the prosecution of the case, unless the story were true.[9]
Testifying in his defense, accused-appellant claimed that he and the complainant had been
lived-in partner for almost a year, and that while they did sleep together on 26 August 1995 at
the porch of the house of a certain Air Force officer, accused-appellant denied any carnal
knowledge of the victim that evening. In his appeal brief, accused-appellant sought to negate
any possible or likely use of violence or intimidation, considering that: (a) in the house where
the victim was sleeping on the night of 26 August 1995, there were at least three persons (the
caretaker of the house Patrick Augusto Ablon, his wife Rubylin and the couple’s son) who could
have responded to any shout for help from the victim; (b) the door of the house was purposely
left unlocked in order to enable accused-appellant to come into the house, and (c) when the
victim was made to climb a fence followed by the accused, she could have escaped but did not.
The “sweetheart theory” of accused-appellant would appear to be another worn out
strategy, often resorted to as a last ditch effort, to exculpate oneself from criminal liability. No
documentary evidence of any sort, like a letter or a photograph or any piece of memento, was
presented to confirm a romantic liaison between accused-appellant and the complainant. The
latter testified:
“Q Is it not a fact that you and the accused were sweethearts?
“A No sir.
“Q And that you went to that place AFOVAI just to meet him in that place?
“A No sir he is not my sweetheart. Why will I hack him if he is my sweetheart?
“Q You hacked him with the bolo because of you are too much jealousy is concerned
because your sweetheart was then womanizing?
“Prosecutor Manola: Misleading your honor.
“Atty. Manalo: I am on cross-examination your Honor.
“Court: Answer.
“A Why will I get jealous I have nothing to do with him. I do not know him sir.
“Atty. Manalo:
“Q Really?
“A I do not know him. I really do not know him sir.”[10]
It would be rather strange an occurrence for a love-partner, if true, to stab her beloved for
petty reasons. The trial court was not out of line when it made this evaluation; viz:

“This Court cannot accept the claim of accused that he and complainant Nita Fernandez were
sweethearts, for such a claim defies rationality, let alone common sense, because if they were
sweethearts, she will not hack him. Not only that, the manner on which she stabbed and
hacked him, first with a knife, then with a bolo, shows a complete anger to vindicate the outrage
on her. If they were sweethearts, she would not have acted in the manner she did in stabbing
and hacking him. At least, if they have some relationship, she would not show anger the way
she did.”[11]

Neither would the presence of at least three persons on the night of 26 August 1995 in the
house where victim was sleeping necessarily disprove the sexual assault. It was already close
to midnight when the incident occurred, and the other occupants of the house were by then
apparently all sound asleep. The evidence is to the effect that accused-appellant immediately
after getting into the house hit her on the jaw, put his hand on her mouth and threatened to kill
her if she dared refuse to yield to his demands. Understandably, the victim was shocked,
gripped by fear and then cowed into submission. Intimidation should be viewed in the light of
the perception and judgment of the victim at the time of the commission of the offense and not
by any kind of hard and fast rule. It would be unreasonable to expect the victim to act with
equanimity of disposition and to have the courage and intelligence to disregard the threat made
by accused-appellant.[12]
The claim that the unlocked door of the house was a sign that the complainant wanted
accused-appellant to have a chance to see her during the late evening indeed should deserve
scant consideration. The so-called love angle was properly ruled out by the trial court for lack of
concrete evidence to establish any such relationship.
 Anent the failure of the complainant to escape when accused-appellant ordered her to climb
a fence, it should be enough to state she did not appear to have had any real opportunity to flee
from the clutches of the intruder who was, in fact, just behind her. After scaling the fence and
while inside the abandoned and enclosed house, she could not have done any much better
since she was all the time within striking distance of the bolo-wielding malefactor.
And now on the propriety of an appreciation of the aggravating circumstances of nighttime
and ignominy.
Nighttime is said to be that period of darkness beginning at the end of dusk and ending at
dawn.[13] The law defines nights as being from sunset to sunrise. [14] By and of itself, nighttime
would not be an aggravating circumstance unless it is specially sought by the offender, or it is
specially taken advantage of by him, or it facilitates the commission of the crime by insuring the
offender’s immunity from capture.[15] As an ordinary aggravating circumstance, nighttime can be
so considered provided it is duly proved although not alleged in the information. [16] The Court
entertains no doubt that appellant has specially taken advantage of the cover of darkness to
facilitate the commission of the crime without being recognized. Accused-appellant has
abducted his victim, brought her to an abandoned and unlit house and then unleashed his
carnal desire on her, assured of the stillness of a sleeping world. [17] The Court has long held that
this aggravating circumstance can be considered when an accused takes advantage of the
silence and darkness of the night to ensure impunity from his illegal act.[18]
With respect to ignominy, the victim testified that after appellant had inserted his penis into
her vagina, appellant ordered her to lie face down and while in that position had his penis into
her anus. Thereafter, he ordered her to lie down again and this time he inserted his finger inside
her. The Solicitor General correctly invoked the case of People vs. Saylan,[19] where this Court
said:

“The trial court held that there was ignominy because the appellant used not only the missionary
position, i.e. male superior, female inferior, but also ‘the same position as dogs do’ i.e., entry
from behind. The appellant claims there was no ignominy because ‘The studies of many
experts in the matter have shown that this ‘position’ is not novel and has repeatedly and often
been resorted to by couples in the act of copulation.’ (Brief, p. 24.) This may well be if the
sexual act is performed by consenting partners but not otherwise.”[20]

Article 14, paragraph 17, of the Revised Penal Code considers to be an aggravating
circumstance any means employed or circumstance brought about which add ignominy to the
natural effects of the act. The circumstance, it is said,[21] "pertains to the moral order [and] adds
disagree and obloquy to the material injury caused by the crime.”
The crime of rape is committed by having carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the
following circumstances:

“1. By using force or intimidation;

“2. When the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; and

“3. When the woman is under twelve years of age or is demented.

“The crime of rape shall be punished by reclusion perpetua.

“Whenever the crime of rape is committed with the use of a deadly weapon or by two or more
persons, the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to death.”[22]

In the case at bar, it remained uncontroverted that accused-appellant was armed with
a bolo to realize his criminal objective. Nonetheless, the use of a deadly weapon could not be
considered as a qualifying circumstance in the crime of rape [23] for not having been
correspondingly alleged in the information as to make the offense fall under the jurisprudentially
referred “qualified rape” punishable byreclusion perpetua to death. In People vs. Garcia,[24] the
Court declared:

“One further observation. Article 335 originally provided only for simple rape
punishable by reclusion perpetua, but Republic Act No. 4111 introduced amendments
thereto by providing for qualified forms of rape carrying the death penalty, that is, when
committed with the use of a deadly weapon or by two or more persons, when by reason or
on the occasion of the rape the victim becomes insane, or, under the same circumstances, a
homicide is committed. The homicide in the last two instances in effect created a special
complex crime of rape with homicide. The first two attendant circumstances are considered
as equivalent to qualifying circumstances since they increase the penalties by degrees,
and not merely as aggravating circumstances which affect only the period of the penalty
but do not increase it to a higher degree. The original provisions of Article 335 and the
amendments of Republic Act No. 4111 are still maintained.

“xxx xxx xxx.

“Now, it has long been the rule that qualifying circumstances must be properly pleaded
in the indictment. If the same are not pleaded but proved, they shall be considered only
as aggravating circumstances, (People vs. Collado, 60 Phil. 610 [1934]; People vs. Jovellano,
et al., L-32421, March 27, 1974, 56 SCRA 156; People vs. Fuertes, G.R. No. 104067, January
17, 1994, 229 SCRA 289; People vs. Rodico, et al., G.R. No. 107101, October 16, 1995, 249
SCRA 309.) since the latter admit of proof even if not pleaded. (U.S. vs. Campo, 23 Phil. 368
[1912]; People vs. Domondon, 60 Phil. 729 [1934]; People vs. De Guzman, G.R. No. 73464,
August 1988, 164 SCRA 215.) Indeed, it would be a denial of the right of the accused to be
informed of the charges against him and, consequently, a denial of due process, if he is charged
with simple rape and be convicted of its qualified form punishable with death, although the
attendant circumstance qualifying the offense and resulting in capital punishment was not
alleged in the indictment on which he was arraigned.”[25]

Simple rape is punishable by a single indivisible penalty of reclusion perpetua. Thus, even
if there were aggravating circumstances of nighttime and ignominy in attendance the
appropriate penalty would still be reclusion perpetua under the law. Article 63 of the Revised
Penal Code provides that in “all cases in which the law prescribes a single indivisible penalty, it
shall be applied by the courts regardless of any mitigating or aggravating circumstances that
may have attended the commission of the deed.”
WHEREFORE, the decision of the trial court finding accused-appellant Rolando Alfanta
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape is AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION by
hereby lowering the penalty therein imposed from death to reclusion perpetua. An award
of P50,000.00 for moral damages is likewise ordered to be paid by accused-appellant Rolando
Alfanta to the victim Nita Hernandez in addition to the sum of P50,000.00 by way of
indemnity ex delictu granted by the trial court.
 SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing,
Purisima, Pardo, Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes, Ynares-Santiago, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.