Art 2 Consti Digests Script

Article II:
A. DECLARATION OF STATE PRINCIPLES
Section 1. The Philippines is a democratic and republican State. Sovereignty resides in the people and all
government authority emanates from them.
1.
Zacarias Villavicencio v Justo Lukban

G.R. No. L-14639 March 25, 1919.
Justo Lukban as Manila City's Mayor together with Anton Hohmann, the city's Chief of Police, took custody of
about 170 women at the night of October 25 beyond the latters consent and knowledge and thereafter were
shipped to Mindanao specifically in Davao where they were signed as laborers. Said women are inmates of the
houses of prostitution situated in Gardenia Street, in the district of Sampaloc.
That when the petitioner filed for habeas corpus, the respondent moved to dismiss the case saying that those
women were already out of their jurisdiction and that , it should be filed in the city of Davao instead.
The court ruled in favor of the petitioner with the instructions;
For the respondents to have fulfilled the court's order, three optional courses were open: (1) They could have
produced the bodies of the persons according to the command of the writ; or (2) they could have shown by
affidavit that on account of sickness or infirmity those persons could not safely be brought before the court;
or (3) they could have presented affidavits to show that the parties in question or their attorney waived the
right to be present.
Issue: WON the courts should permit a government of men or a government of laws to be established in the
Philippine Islands.
Held:
The court concluded the case by granting the parties aggrieved the sum of 400 pesos each, plus 100 pesos
for nominal damage due to contempt of court.
Ratio: The remedies of the citizen are three: (1) Civil action; (2) criminal action, and (3) habeas corpus. The writ
of habeas corpus was devised and exists as a speedy and effectual remedy to relieve persons from unlawful
restraint, and as the best and only sufficient defense of personal freedom. Any further rights of the parties
are left untouched by decision on the writ, whose principal purpose is to set the individual at liberty.
Reasoning further that if the chief executive of any municipality in the Philippines could forcibly and illegally
take a private citizen and place him beyond the boundaries of the municipality, and then, when called upon to
defend his official action, could calmly fold his hands and claim that the person was under no restraint and
that he, the official, had no jurisdiction over this other municipality.
We believe the true principle should be that, if the respondent is within the jurisdiction of the court and has it
in his power to obey the order of the court and thus to undo the wrong that he has inflicted, he should be
compelled to do so. Even if the party to whom the writ is addressed has illegally parted with the custody of a
person before the application for the writ is no reason why the writ should not issue. If the mayor and the
chief of police, acting under no authority of law, could deport these women from the city of Manila to Davao,
the same officials must necessarily have the same means to return them from Davao to Manila. The
respondents, within the reach of process, may not be permitted to restrain a fellow citizen of her liberty by
forcing her to change her domicile and to avow the act with impunity in the courts, while the person who has
lost her birthright of liberty has no effective recourse. The great writ of liberty may not thus be easily evaded.
Section 2. The Philippines renounces war as an instrument of national policy, adopts the generally accepted
principles of international law as part of the law of the land and adheres to the policy of peace, equality,
justice, freedom, cooperation, and amity with all nations.
Arcilla, Alexandra Myrna S.

Atty Gallant Soriano - Case Digests (After Midterms)
Some generally accepted principles of international law:
right of an alien to be released on bail while awaiting deportation when his failure to leave the country
is due to the fact that no country will accept him.
The right of a country to establish military commissions to try war criminals.
The duty to protect the premises of embassies and legations.
2.
Shigenori Kuroda v Maj Gen Rafael Jalandoni

G.R. No. L-2662. March 26, 1949
A Military commission was empaneled under the authority of Executive Order 68 of the President of the
Philippines, which was issued on July 29, 1947. This is an act establishing a national war crimes office and
prescribing rules and regulation governing the trial of accused war criminals. Shigenori Kuroda, formerly a
Lieutenant-General of the Japanese Imperial Army and Commanding General of the Japanese Imperial Forces
in The Philippines from 1943-1944, is charged before a military commission convened by the Chief of Staffof
the Armed forces of the Philippines with having unlawfully disregarded and failed "to discharge his duties as
such command, permitting them to commit brutal atrocities and other high crimes against noncombatant
civilians and prisoners of the Imperial Japanese Forces in violation of the laws and customs of war". Melville
Hussey and Robert Port, American lawyers, were appointed prosecutors in behalf of USA. Kuroda challenges
the legality of the EO No. 68 and the personality as prosecutors of Hussey and Port. Kurodas arguments
were: (1)EO No. is illegal on the gound that violates not only the provisions of our constitutional law but also
our local laws; (2) Military Commission has no Jurisdiction to try him for acts committed in violation of the
Hague Convention and the Geneva Convention because the Philippines is not a signatory to the first and
signed the second only in 1947 and, therefore, he is charged with crime not based on law, national or
international; and (3) Hussey and Port have no personality as prosecutors in this case because they are not
qualified to practice law in Philippines in accordance with our Rules of court and the appointment of said
attorneys as prosecutors is violative of our national sovereignty.
Issues/Held:
(1) WON EO No. 68 is valid and constitutional? [Yes it is a valid
because it is based on the generally accepted principles of international law which form part of our laws.]
(2) WON rules and regulations of the Hague and Geneva Conventions form part ofthe law of the nation even if
Philippines was not a signatory to the conventions embodying them? [Yes, they form part of our laws.]
(3) WON the American lawyers could participate in the prosecution of this case? [Yes, they can.]
Ratio:
1. The order is valid and constitutional. Article 2 of our Constitution provides in its section 3, that- The
Philippines renounces war as an instrument of national policy and adopts the generally accepted principles of
international law as part of the nation. In accordance with the generally accepted principle of international law
of the present day including the Hague Convention the Geneva Convention and significant precedents of
international jurisprudence established by the United Nation, all those person military or civilian who have
been guilty of planning preparing or waging a war of aggression and of the commission of crimes and
offenses consequential and incidental thereto in violation of the laws and customs of war, of humanity and
civilization are held accountable therefo. Consequently, in the promulgation and enforcement ofExecution
Order No. 68, the President of the Philippines has acted in conformity with the generally accepted and
policies of international law which are part of our Constitution. The promulgation of said executive order is an
exercise by the President of his power as Commander in chief of all our armed forces as upheld by this Court
in the case of Yamashita vs. Styer. Consequently, the President as Commander in Chief is fully empowered to
consummate this unfinished aspect of war namely the trial and punishment of war criminal through the
issuance and enforcement of Executive Order No. 68.
2. Rules and regulations of the Hague and Geneva conventions form part of and are wholly based on the
generally accepted principals of international law. In fact, these rules and principles were accepted by the two
belligerent nations, the United States and Japan, who were signatories to the two Conventions. Such rule and
principles therefore form part of the law of our nation even if the Philippines was not a signatory to the
conventions embodying them, for our Constitution has been deliberately general and extensive in its scope
and is not confined to the recognition of rules and principles of international law as contained in treaties to
which our government may have been or shall be a signatory. Furthermore when the crimes charged against
petitioner were allegedly committed the Philippines was under the sovereignty of United States and thus we
were equally bound together with the United States and with Japan to the right and obligation contained in
the treaties between the belligerent countries.
3. There is nothing in said executive order which requires that counsel appearing before said commission
must be attorneys qualified to practice law in the Philippines in accordance with the Rules of Court.
Respondent Military Commission is a special military tribunal governed by a special law and not by the Rules
of court which govern ordinary civil court. Secondly, the appointment of the two American attorneys is not
violative of our nation sovereignty. It is only fair and proper that United States, which has submitted the
vindication of crimes against her government and her people to a tribunal of our nation, should be allowed
representation in the trial of those very crimes. If there has been any relinquishment of sovereignty it has not
been by our government but by the United States.
3.
Lao Ichong vs Jaime Hernandez

G.R. No. L-7995. May 31, 1957.
The Legislature passed R.A. 1180 (An Act to Regulate the Retail Business). Its purpose was to prevent persons
who are not citizens of the Phil. from having a stranglehold upon the peoples economic life.
1.
a prohibition against aliens and against associations, partnerships, or corporations the capital of
which are not wholly owned by Filipinos, from engaging directly or indirectly in the retail trade
2.
aliens actually engaged in the retail business on May 15, 1954 are allowed to continue their business,
unless their licenses are forfeited in accordance with law, until their death or voluntary retirement. In
case of juridical persons, ten years after the approval of the Act or until the expiration of term.
Citizens and juridical entities of the United States were exempted from this Act.
provision for the forfeiture of licenses to engage in the retail business for violation of the laws on
nationalization, economic control weights and measures and labor and other laws relating to trade,
commerce and industry.
provision against the establishment or opening by aliens actually engaged in the retail business of
additional stores or branches of retail business
Lao Ichong, in his own behalf and behalf of other alien residents, corporations and partnerships affected by
the Act, filed an action to declare it unconstitutional for the ff: reasons:
it denies to alien residents the equal protection of the laws and deprives them of their liberty and
property without due process
the subject of the Act is not expressed in the title
the Act violates international and treaty obligations
the provisions of the Act against the transmission by aliens of their retail business thru hereditary
succession
Issue : WON it violates international treaties and obligations?

Held: No. the court denied the petition.
Ratio: The law does not violate international treaties and obligations. The United Nations Charter imposes no
strict or legal obligations regarding the rights and freedom of their and the Declaration of Human Rights
contains nothing more than a mere recommendation, or a common standard of achievement for all peoples
and all nations. The Treaty of Amity between the Republic of the Philippines and the Republic of China of
April 18, 1947 guarantees equality of treatment to the Chinese nationals "upon the same terms as the
nationals of any other country". But the nationals of China are not discriminated against because nationals of
all other countries, except those of the United States, who are granted special rights by the Constitution, are
all Prohibited from engaging in the retail trade. But even supposing that the law infringes upon the said
treaty, the treaty is always subject to qualification or amendment by a subsequent law and the same may
never curtail or restrict the scope of the police power of the State.
4.
Secretary of Justice v Hon. Ralph Lantion

G.R. No. 139465. January 18, 2000.
On January 13, 1977, then President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Presidential Decree No. 1069 "Prescribing
the Procedure for the Extradition of Persons Who Have Committed Crimes in a Foreign Country." The Decree
is founded on: the doctrine of incorporation under the Constitution; the mutual concern for the suppression
of crime both in the state where it was committed and the state where the criminal may have escaped; the
extradition treaty with the Republic of Indonesia and the intention of the Philippines to enter into similar
treaties with other interested countries;
On November 13, 1994, then Secretary of Justice Franklin M. Drilon, signed in Manila the "Extradition Treaty
Between the Government of the Republic of the Philippines and the Government of the United States of
America"
The Senate, by way of Resolution No. 11, expressed its concurrence in the ratification of said treaty. It also
expressed its concurrence in the Diplomatic Notes correcting some paragraphs
On June 18, 1999, the Department of Justice received from the Department of Foreign Affairs U.S. Note
Verbale No. 0522 containing a request for the extradition of private respondent Mark Jimenez to the United
States. Attached to the Note Verbale were the Grand Jury Indictment, the warrant of arrest issued by the U.S.
District Court, Southern District of Florida, and other supporting documents for said extradition.
Crimes committed by Mark.
Conspiracy to commit offense or to defraud the United States;
Attempt to evade or defeat tax
Fraud by wire, radio, or television;
False statement or entries
Election contributions in name of another
During the pending evaluation respondent requesting copies of the official extradition request from the U.S.
Government, as well as all documents and papers and be given ample time to file a comment. DOJ gave a
reply dated July 1, 199 but was received by the other party August 4, 1999.
Premature to furnish you with copies of the extradition request and supporting documents from the
United States Government, pending evaluation by this Department of the sufficiency of the
extradition. Article 7 of the Extradition Treaty between the Philippines and the United States
enumerates the documentary requirements and establishes the procedures under which the
documents submitted shall be received and admitted as evidence. Evidentiary requirements under
our domestic law are also set forth in Section 4 of P.D. No. 1069.
It is only after the filing of the petition for extradition when the person sought to be extradited will be
furnished by the court with copies of the petition, request and extradition documents and this
Department will not pose any objection to a request for ample time to evaluate said documents.
Department is not in a position to hold in abeyance proceedings in connection with an extradition request.
Article 26 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, to which we are a party provides that " [E]very
treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it and must be performed by them in good faith." Extradition is a
tool of criminal law enforcement and to be effective, requests for extradition or surrender of accused or
convicted persons must be processed expeditiously.

This Court orders the Secretary of Justice, the Secretary of Foreign Affairs and the Director of the
National Bureau of Investigation, their agents and/or representatives to maintain the status quo by
refraining from committing the acts complained of; from conducting further proceedings in
connection with the request of the United States Government for the extradition of the petitioner;
from filing the corresponding Petition with a Regional Trial court; and from performing any act
directed to the extradition of the petitioner to the United States, for a period of twenty (20) days
from service on respondents of this Order, pursuant to Section 5, Rule 58 of the 1997 Rules of Court.
The hearing as to whether or not this Court shall issue the preliminary injunction, as agreed upon by
the counsels for the parties herein, is set on August 17, 1999 at 9:00 o'clock in the morning. The
respondents are, likewise, ordered to file their written comment and/or opposition to the issuance of
a Preliminary Injunction on or before said date.
WON PETITIONER WAS UNQUALIFIEDLY PREVENTED FROM PERFORMING LEGAL DUTIES UNDER THE
EXTRADITION TREATY AND THE PHILIPPINE EXTRADITION LAW
Held: Petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
Ratio: The rule of pacta sunt servanda, one of the oldest and most fundamental maxims of international law,
requires the parties to a treaty to keep their agreement therein in good faith. The observance of our country's
legal duties under a treaty is also compelled by Section 2, Article II of the Constitution which provides that
"[t]he Philippines renounces war as an instrument of national policy, adopts the generally accepted principles
of international law as part of the law of the land, and adheres to the policy of peace, equality, justice,
freedom, cooperation and amity with all nations."
Under the doctrine of incorporation, rules of international law form part of the law of the land and no further
legislative action is needed to make such rules applicable in the domestic sphere. The doctrine of
incorporation is applied whenever municipal tribunals (or local courts) are confronted with situations in which
there appears to be a conflict between a rule of international law and the provisions of the constitution or
statute of the local state. Efforts should first be exerted to harmonize them, so as to give effect to both since
it is to be presumed that municipal law was enacted with proper regard for the generally accepted principles
of international law in observance of the Incorporation Clause in the above-cited constitutional provision. In a
situation, however, where the conflict is irreconcilable and a choice has to be made between a rule of
international law and municipal law, jurisprudence dictates that municipal law should be upheld by the
municipal for the reason that such courts are organs of municipal law and are accordingly bound by it in all
circumstances
The body has no power to adjudicate in regard to the rights and obligations of both the Requesting State and
the prospective extraditee. Its only power is to determine whether the papers comply with the requirements
of the law and the treaty and, therefore, sufficient to be the basis of an extradition petition. Such finding is
thus merely initial and not final. The body has no power to determine whether or not the extradition should
be effected. That is the role of the court. The body's power is limited to an initial finding of whether or not the
extradition petition can be filed in court.
The fact that international law has been made part of the law of the land does not pertain to or imply the
primacy of international law over national or municipal law in the municipal sphere. The doctrine of
incorporation, as applied in most countries, decrees that rules of international law are given equal standing
with, but are not superior to, national legislative enactments. Accordingly, the principle lex posterior derogat
priori takes effect a treaty may repeal a statute and a statute may repeal a treaty. In states where the
constitution is the highest law of the land, such as the Republic of the Philippines, both statutes and treaties
may be invalidated if they are in conflict with the constitution
In the absence of a law or principle of law, we must apply the rules of fair play. An application of the basic
twin due process rights of notice and hearing will not go against the treaty or the implementing law. Neither
the Treaty nor the Extradition Law precludes these rights from a prospective extradites. Similarly, American
jurisprudence and procedures on extradition pose no proscription. In fact, in interstate extradition

proceedings as explained above, the prospective extraditee may even request for copies of the extradition
documents from the governor of the asylum state, and if he does, his right to be supplied the same becomes
a demandable right
5.
In Re Arturo Garcia
UNAV. August 15, 1961.
Arturo E. Garcia has applied for admission to the practice of law in the Philippines without submitting to the
required bar examinations. he is a Filipino citizen born in Bacolod City. that he had taken and finished in
Spain, the course of "Bachillerato Superior"; that he was approved, selected and qualified for admission to the
Central University of Madrid where he studied and finished the law course graduating there as "Licenciado En
Derecho"; he was allowed to practice the law profession in Spain; and that under the provisions of the Treaty
on Academic Degrees and the Exercise of Professions between the Republic of the Philippines and the
Spanish state, he is entitled to practice the law profession in the Philippines without submitting to the
required bar examinations.
Issue: WON he is entitled under the treaty on Academic Degrees?
Held: No. His petition was denied
Ratio: Treaty was intended to govern Filipino citizens desiring to practice their profession in Spain, and the
citizens of Spain desiring to practice their professions in the Philippines. Applicant is a Filipino citizen desiring
to practice the legal profession in the Philippines. He is therefore subject to the laws of his own country and is
not entitled to the privileges extended to Spanish nationals desiring to practice in the Philippines.
Section 3. Civilian authority is, at all times, supreme over the military. The Armed Forces of the Philippines is
the protector of the people and the State. Its goal is to secure the sovereignty of the State and the integrity
of the national territory.
6.
Rizal Alih v Maj. Gen. Delfin Gastro

G.R. No. L-69401. June 23, 1987.
On November 25, 1984, a contingent of more than two hundred Philippine marines and elements of the home
defense forces raided the compound occupied by the petitioners at Zamboanga City, in search of loose
firearms, ammunition and other explosives. The military operation was commonly known and dreaded as a
"zona,". The initial reaction of the people inside the compound was to resist the invasion with a burst of
gunfire. No one was hurt as presumably the purpose was merely to warn the intruders and deter them from
entering. the situation aggravated soon enough. The soldiers returned fire and a bloody shoot-out ensued,
resulting in a number of casualties The besieged compound surrendered the following morning, and sixteen
male occupants w ere arrested, later to be finger-printed, paraffin tested and photographed over their
objection. The military also inventoried and confiscated nine M16 rifles, one M14 rifle, nine rifle grenades, and
several rounds of ammunition found in the premises.
On December 21, 1984, the petitioners came to this Court in a petition for prohibition and mandamus with
preliminary injunction and restraining order. Their purpose was to recover the articles seized from them, to
prevent these from being used as evidence against them, and to challenge their finger-printing,
photographing and paraffin testing as violative of their right against self- incrimination. The petitioners
demand the return of the arms and ammunition on the ground that they were taken without a search
warrant as required by the Bill of Rights.
WON The petitioners can invoke

Held: Yes. The search of the petitioners' premises on November 25, 1984, is hereby declared ILLEGAL and all
the articles seized as a result thereof are inadmissible in evidence against the petitioners in any proceedings.
However, the said articles shall remain in custodia legis pending the outcome of the criminal cases that have
been or may later be filed against the petitioners.
Ratio:
Article IV, Section 3, of the 1973 Constitution
The rights of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall not be violated,
and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined
by the judge
Article IV, Section 4(2)
Sec. 4(2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be inadmissible for
any purpose in any proceeding."
"Superior orders" cannot countermand the Constitution. The fact that the petitioners were suspected of the
Climaco killing did not excuse the constitutional short-cuts the respondents took. State of lawlessness in
Zamboanga City at the time in question certainly did not excuse the non-observance of the constitutional
guaranty against unreasonable searches and seizures. There was no state of hostilities in the area to justify
the repressions committed against the petitioners. The record does not disclose that the petitioners were
wanted criminals or fugitives from justice. At the time of the "zona," they were merely suspected of the
mayor's slaying and had not in fact even been investigated for it. As mere suspects, they were presumed
innocent and not guilty as summarily pronounced by the military. The respondents cannot even plead the
urgency of the raid because it was in fact not urgent. They knew where the petitioners were. They had every
opportunity to get a search warrant before making the raid. If they were worried that the weapons inside the
compound would be spirited away, they could have surrounded the premises in the meantime, as a preventive
measure. There was absolutely no reason at all why they should disregard the orderly processes required by
the Constitution and instead insist on arbitrarily forcing their way into the petitioner's premises with all the
menace of a military invasion.
7.
Integrated Bar of the Philippines v Hon. Ronaldo Zamora

G.R. No. 141284. August 15, 2000.
The President Joseph Estrada, in a verbal directive, ordered the PNP and the Marines to conduct joint visibility
patrols for the purpose of crime prevention and suppression. In compliance with the presidential mandate, the
PNP Chief, through Police Chief Superintendent Edgar B. Aglipay, formulated Letter of Instruction 02/2000
(the "LOI") which detailed the manner by which the joint visibility patrols, called Task Force Tulungan, would
be conducted. Task Force Tulungan was placed under the leadership of the Police Chief of Metro Manila.
Invoking his powers as Commander-in-Chief under Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution, the President
directed the AFP Chief of Staff and PNP Chief to coordinate with each other for the proper deployment and
utilization of the Marines to assist the PNP in preventing or suppressing criminal or lawless violence. The
President also declared that the services of the Marines in the anti-crime campaign are merely temporary in
nature and for a reasonable period only, until such time when the situation shall have improved. The
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (the "IBP") filed the instant petition to annul LOI and to declare the
deployment of the Philippine Marines null and void and unconstitutional, arguing that the deployment of
marines in Metro Manila is violative of the Constitution because no emergency situation obtains in Metro
Manila as would justify, even only remotely, the deployment of soldiers for law enforcement work; hence, said
deployment in derogation of Article II, Section 3 of the Constitution.
Issue: WON the deployment is valid?
Held: Yes.
Ratio: The Supreme Court found no merit in the petition. When the President calls the armed forces to
prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion, he necessarily exercises a discretionary power
solely vested in his wisdom. This is clear from the intent of the framers and from the text of the Constitution
itself. The Court, thus, cannot be called upon to overrule the President's wisdom or substitute its own. It does
not, however, prevent an examination of whether such power was exercised within permissible constitutional
limits or whether it was exercised in a manner constituting grave abuse of discretion. In view of the
constitutional intent to give the President full discretionary power to determine the necessity of calling out
the armed forces, it is incumbent upon the petitioner to show that the President's decision is totally bereft of
factual basis. The petition failed to discharge such heavy burden as there was no evidence to support the
assertion that there exists no justification for calling out the armed forces nor was grave abuse committed
because the power to call was exercised in such a manner as to violate the constitutional provision on civilian
supremacy over the military. In the performance of the Court's duty of "purposeful hesitation" before
declaring an act of another branch as unconstitutional, only where such grave abuse of discretion is clearly
shown shall the Court interfere with the President's judgment and to doubt is to sustain. The Court also ruled
that the calling of the Marines in this case constitutes permissible use of military assets for civilian law
enforcement. The participation of the Marines in the conduct of joint visibility patrols is appropriately
circumscribed. The limited participation of the Marines is evident in the provisions of the LOI itself, which
sufficiently provides the metes and bounds of the Marines' authority. It is noteworthy that the local police
forces are the ones in charge of the visibility patrols at all times, the real authority belonging to the PNP.
Under the LOI, the police forces are tasked to brief or orient the soldiers on police patrol procedures. It is their
responsibility to direct and manage the deployment of the Marines. It is, likewise, their duty to provide the
necessary equipment to the Marines and render logistical support to these soldiers. It cannot be properly
argued then that military authority is supreme over civilian authority. Moreover, the deployment of the
Marines to assist the PNP does not unmake the civilian character of the police force. Neither does it amount to
an "insidious incursion" of the military in the task of law enforcement in violation of Section 5(4), Article XVI of
the Constitution.
Section 4. The prime duty of the Government is to serve and protect the people. The Government may call
upon the people to defend the State and, in the fulfillment thereof, all citizens may be required, under
conditions provided by law, to render personal, military or civil service.
8.
People v Tranquilino Lagman & Primitivo de Sosa

G.R. No. 45892. July 13, 1938 ; G.R. No. 45893. July 13, 1938.
Tranquilino Lagman and Primitivo de Sosa are charged with a violation of section 60 of Commonwealth Act
No. 1, known as the National Defense Law. It is alleged that these two appellants, being Filipinos and having
reached the age of twenty years in 1936, willfully and unlawfully refused to register in the military service
between the 1st and 7th of April of said year, notwithstanding the fact that they had been required to do so.
The evidence shows that these two appellants were duly notified by the corresponding authorities to appear
before the Acceptance Board in order to register for military service in accordance with law, and that the said
appellants, in spite of these notices, had not registered up to the date of filing of the information.
Issue: WON National Defense Law is constitutional?
Held: Yes . Court ruled in favor of the People of the Philippines
Ratio: The National Defense Law establishes compulsory military service, does not go against section 2, Article
II of the Philippine Constitution. The duty of the Government to defend the State cannot be performed except
through an army. To leave the organization of an army to the will of the citizens would be to make this duty
of the Government excusable should there be no sufficient men who volunteer to enlist therein. The
circumstance that the appellants have dependent families to support does not excuse them from their duty to
present themselves before the Acceptance Board because, if such circumstances exists, the can ask for
deferment in complying with their duty and, at all events, they can obtain the proper pecuniary allowance to
attend to these family responsibilities

Section 5. The maintenance of peace and order, the protection of life, liberty, and property, and promotion of
the general welfare are essential for the enjoyment by all the people of the blessings of democracy.
Section 6. The separation of Church and State shall be inviolable.
B. STATE POLICIES
Section 7. The State shall pursue an independent foreign policy. In its relations with other states, the
paramount consideration shall be national sovereignty, territorial integrity, national interest, and the right to
self-determination.
9.
Arthur Lim v Executive Secretary

G.R. No. 151445. April 11, 2002.
January 2002, personnel from the armed forces of the United States of America started arriving in Mindanao
to take part, in conjunction with the Philippine military, in "Balikatan 02-1. A simulation of joint military
maneuvers pursuant to the Mutual Defense Treaty, 1 a bilateral defense agreement entered into by the
Philippines and the United States in 1951. The entry of American troops into Philippine soil is proximately
rooted in the international anti-terrorism campaign declared by President George W. Bush reaction to the
tragic events that occurred on September 11, 2001. On February 1, 2002, petitioners Arthur D. Lim and
Paulino P. Ersando filed this petition for certiorari and prohibition, attacking the constitutionality of the joint
exercise.2 They were joined subsequently by SANLAKAS and PARTIDO NG MANGGAGAWA, both party-list
organizations, who filed a petition-in-intervention on February 11, 2002. Lim and Ersando filed suit in their
capacities as citizens, lawyers and taxpayers. SANLAKAS and PARTIDO, on the other hand, aver that certain
members of their organization are residents of Zamboanga and Sulu, and hence will be directly affected by
the operations being conducted in Mindanao. They likewise pray for a relaxation on the rules relative to locus
standi citing the unprecedented importance of the issue involved.
Issue: Balikatan-02-1 inconsistent with the Philippine Constitution
Held: No. Court denied the petition of the petitioners
Ratio: The MDT has been described as the "core" of the defense relationship between the Philippines and its
traditional ally with the US. Its aim is to enhance the strategic and technological capabilities of our armed
forces through joint training with its American counterparts; the "Balikatan" is the largest such training
exercise directly supporting the MDT's objectives. It is this treaty to which the VFA adverts and the obligations
thereunder which it seeks to reaffirm. VFA provides the "regulatory mechanism" by which "United States
military and civilian personnel [may visit] temporarily in the Philippines in connection with activities approved
by the Philippine Government."
It is the VFA which gives continued relevance to the MDT despite the passage of years. Its primary goal is to
facilitate the promotion of optimal cooperation between American and Philippine military forces in the event
of an attack by a common foe. The VFA permits United States personnel to engage, on an impermanent
basis, in "activities," The joint exercises may include training on new techniques of patrol and surveillance to
protect the nation's marine resources, sea search-and-rescue operations to assist vessels in distress, disaster
relief operations, civic action projects such as the building of school houses, medical and humanitarian
missions, and the like. It is only logical to assume that "Balikatan 02-1," a "mutual anti-terrorism advising,
assisting and training exercise," falls under the umbrella of sanctioned or allowable activities in the context of
the agreement. Both the history and intent of the Mutual Defense Treaty and the VFA support the conclusion
that combat-related activities as opposed to combat itself such as the one subject of the instant petition,
are indeed authorized.

Section 8. The Philippines, consistent with the national interest, adopts and pursues a policy of freedom from
nuclear weapons in its territory.
The policy is freedom from nuclear weapons exception to this policy however can be made when made by
political departments and justified by demands of the national interest (the policy doesnt prohibit the use of
nuclear energy).
Section 9. The State shall promote a just and dynamic social order that will ensure the prosperity and
independence of the nation and free the people from poverty through policies that provide adequate social
services, promote full employment, a rising standard of living, and an improved quality of life for all.
Section 10. The State shall promote social justice in all phases of national development.
Social justice: equalization of economic, political, and social opportunities with special emphasis on the duty of
the state to tilt the balance of social forces by favoring the disadvantaged in life.
10. Maximo Calalng v A.D Williams
G.R. No. 47800. December 2, 1940.
Maximo Calalang filed a petition for a writ of prohibition against the respondents, A. D. Williams, as Chairman
of the National Traffic Commission; Vicente Fragante, as Director of Public Works; Sergio Bayan, as Acting
Secretary of Public Works and Communications; Eulogio Rodriguez, as Mayor of the City of Manila; and Juan
Dominguez, as Acting Chief of Police of Manila.
Petitioners pray for the National Traffic Commission, to recommend to the Director of Public Works and to the
Secretary of Public Works and Communications that animal- drawn vehicles be prohibited from passing along
Rosario Street extending from Plaza Calderon de la Barca to Dasmarias Street and along Rizal Avenue
extending from the railroad crossing at Antipolo Street to Echague Street from a period of one year from the
date of the opening of the Colgante Bridge to traffic. That the Chairman of the National Traffic Commission,
recommended to the Director of Public Works the adoption of the measure proposed in the resolution in
pursuance of the provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 548 which authorizes said Director of Public Works,
with the approval of the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, to promulgate rules and regulations
to regulate and control the use of and traffic on national roads; Petitioners assail the unconstitutionality of
Commonwealth Act No. 548 which authorizes the promulgation of rules and regulations for the regulation
and control of the use of and traffic on national roads and streets because it constitutes an undue delegation
of legislative power.
WON CA 548 is unconstitutional?
Held: No. Court ruled in favor of Williams
Ratio: The provisions of section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 648 do not confer legislative power upon the
Director of Public Works and the Secretary of Public Works and Communications. The authority is not to
determine what public policy demands but merely to carry out the legislative policy laid down by the National
Assembly in said "to promote safe transit upon, and avoid obstructions on, roads and streets designated as
national roads by acts of the National Assembly or by executive orders of the President of the Philippines"
and to close them temporarily to any or all classes of traffic "whenever the condition of the road or the traffic
thereon makes such action necessary or advisable in the public convenience and interest." The delegated
power is not the determination of what the law shall be, but merely the ascertainment of the facts and
circumstances upon which the application of said law is to be predicated. To promulgate rules and regulations
on the use of national roads and to determine when and how long a national road should be closed to traffic,
in view of the condition of the road or the traffic thereon and the requirements of public convenience and
interest, is an administrative function which cannot be directly discharged by the National Assembly. It must
depend on the discretion of some other government official to whom is confided the duty of determining
whether the proper occasion exists for executing the law. But it cannot be said that the exercise of such
discretion is the making of the law.

10
Social justice is "neither communism, nor despotism, nor atomism, nor anarchy," but the humanization of laws
and the equalization of social and economic forces by the State so that justice in its rational and objectively
secular conception may at least be approximated. Social justice means the promotion of the welfare of all the
people, the adoption by the Government of measures calculated to insure economic stability of all the
competent elements of society, through the maintenance of a proper economic and social equilibrium in the
interrelations of the members of the community, constitutionally, through the adoption of measures legally
justifiable, or extra- constitutionally, through the exercise of powers underlying the existence of all
governments on the time-honored principle of salus populi est suprema lex. Social justice, must be founded on
the recognition of the necessity of interdependence among divers and diverse units of a society and of the
protection that should be equally and evenly extended to all groups as a combined force in our social and
economic life, consistent with the fundamental and paramount objective of the state of promoting the health,
comfort, and quiet of all persons, and of bringing about "the greatest good to the greatest number."
11. Justa Guido v Rural Progress Administration
GR No: L-2089. October 31, 1949
Petition for prohibition to prevent the Rural Progress Administration and Judge Oscar Castelo of the Court of
First Instance of Rizal from proceeding with the expropriation of petitioner Justa G. Guido's land, two adjoining
lots, part commercial, with a combined area of 22,655 square meters, situated in Maypajo, Caloocan, Rizal
1.
RPA (Rural Progress Administration) acted without jurisdiction or corporate power in filing the
expropriation complaint and has no authority
2.
land sought to be expropriated is commercial and therefore excluded within the purview of the
provisions of Act 539.
3.
majority of the tenants have entered with the petitioner valid contracts for lease, or option to buy at
an agreed price, and expropriation would impair those existing obligation of contract.
4.
Judge erred in fixing the provisional value of the land at P118,780 only and in ordering its delivery to
the respondent RPA."
SECTION 1. The President of the Philippines is authorized to acquire private lands or any interest therein,
through purchase or expropriation, and to subdivide the same into home lots or small farms for resale at
reasonable prices
"SEC. 2. The President may designate any department, bureau, office, or instrumentality of the National
Government, or he may organize a new agency
WON The land is excluded from Act 539?
Act No. 539 should be construed in a manner consonant with that intention. It is to be presumed that the
National Assembly did not intend to go beyond the constitutional scope of its powers. It would be in
derogation of individual rights and the time-honored constitutional guarantee that no private property shall
be taken for private use without due process of law. The taking of private property for private use relieves the
owner of his property without due process of law; and the prohibition that "private property should not be
taken for public use without just compensation". The promotion of social justice to insure the well-being and
economic security of all the people should be the concern of the state," is a declaration, with which the former
should be reconciled, that "the Philippines is a Republican state" created to secure to the Filipino people "the
blessings of independence under a regime of justice, liberty and democracy." Democracy, as a way of life
enshrined in the Constitution, embraces as its necessary components freedom of conscience, freedom of
expression, and freedom in the pursuit of happiness. Along with these freedoms are included economic
freedom and freedom of enterprise within reasonable bounds and under proper control. In paving the way for
the breaking up of existing large estates, trusts in perpetuity, feudalism, and their concomitant evils, the
Constitution did not propose to destroy or undermine property rights, or to advocate equal distribution of
wealth, or to authorize the taking of what is in excess of one's personal needs and the giving of it to another.

11
Section 11. The State values the dignity of every human person and guarantees full respect for human rights.
12. Hon. Isisdro Carino (DepEd) v Commission on Human Rights
G.R. No. 96681. December 2, 1991.
Some 800 public school teachers, among them members ofMPSTA and ACT undertook "mass concerted
actions" after the protest rallywithout disrupting classes as a last call for the government to negotiate the
granting of demands had elicited no response from the Secretary of Education. The "mass actions" consisted
in staying away from their classes, converging at the Liwasang Bonifacio, gathering in peaceable assembly.
Secretary of Education issued a return to work in 24 hours or face dismissal and a memorandum directing the
DECS officials and to initiate dismissal proceedings against those who did not comply. After failure to heed
the order, the CHR complainant (private respondents) were administratively charged and preventively
suspended for 90 days. The private respondents moved "for suspension of the administrative proceedings
pending resolution by the Supreme Court of their application for issuance of an injunctive writ/temporary
restraining order. The motion was denied. The respondent staged a walkout. The case was eventually decided
ordering the dismissal of Esber and suspension of others. The petition for certiorari in RTC was dismissed.
Petition for Certiorari to the Supreme Court was also denied.
Respondent complainant filed a complaint on the Commission of Human Rights alleging they were denied due
process and dismissed without due notice. The Commission issued an order to Cario to appear and enlighten
the commission so that they can be accordingly guided in its investigation and resolution of the matter.
Cario filed a petition to Supreme Court for certiorari and prohibition whether the Commission has the
jurisdiction to try and decide on the issue regarding denial of due process and whether or not grievances
justify their mass action or strike.
Issue: WON CHR has the power to adjudicate alleged human rights violations
Held: No. The Court ruled to annul the case and prohibit CHR to hear the case.
Ratio: The Commission evidently intends to itself adjudicate, that is to say, determine with the character of
finality and definiteness, the same issues which have been passed upon and decided by the Secretary of
Education and subject to appeal to CSC, this Court having in fact, as aforementioned, declared that the
teachers affected may take appeals to the CSC on said matter, if still timely. The threshold question is whether
or not the CHR has the power under the constitution to do so; whether or not, like a court of justice or even a
quasi-judicial agency, it has jurisdiction or adjudicatory powers over, or the power to try and decide, or dear
and determine, certain specific type of cases, like alleged human rights violations involving civil or political
rights.
The Court declares that the CHR to have no such power, and it was not meant by the fundamental law to be
another court or quasi-judicial agency in this country, or duplicate much less take over the functions of the
latter. The most that may be conceded to the Commission in the way of adjudicative power is that it may
investigate, i.e. receive evidence and make findings of fact as regards claimed human rights violations
involving civil and political rights. But fact-finding is not adjudication, and cannot be likened to judicial
function of a court of justice, or even a quasi judicial agency or official. The function of receiving evidence and
ascertaining therefrom the facts of a controversy is not a judicial function, properly speaking. To be
considered such, the faculty of receiving evidence and making factual conclusions in a controversy must be
accompanied by the authority of applying the law to those factual conclusions to the end that the
controversy be decided or determined authoritatively, finally and definitely, subject to such appeals or modes
of review as may be provided by law. This function, to repeat, the Commission does not have. Hence it is that
the CHR having merely the power to investigate, cannot and not try and resolve on the merits (adjudicate)
the matters involved in Striking Teachers HRC Case No. 90-775, as it has announced it means to do; and
cannot do so even if there be a claim that in the administrative disciplinary proceedings against the teachers
in question, initiated and conducted by the DECS, their human rights, or civil or political rights had been
transgressed.

12
Section 12. The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall protect and strengthen the family as a
basic autonomous social institution. It shall equally protect the life of the mother and the life of the unborn
from conception. The natural and primary right and duty of parents in the rearing of the youth for civic
efficiency and the development of moral character shall receive the support of the Government.
13. Meyer v Nebraska
Mere knowledge of the German language cannot reasonably be regarded as harmful. Granted, the state of
Nebraska enacted this law to promote civic development by inhibiting training and education of the
immature in foreign tongues and ideals before they could learn English and acquire American ideals because
they are being reared in the US. However, the law infringes upon ones fundamental rights and is, therefore,
not justified. The protection of the Constitution extends to all to those born with English on the tongue and
those who speak other languages as well. A desirable end cannot be promoted by prohibited means. The
statute, as applied, is arbitrary & w/o reasonable relation to any end within the competency of the state. It is
well known that proficiency in a foreign language is not injurious to the health, morals or understanding of
the ordinary child.
14. Pierce v Society Sisters
The Compulsory Education Act unreasonably interferes w/ the liberty of parents/guardians to direct the
upbringing & education of children under their control. Rights guaranteed in the Constitution may not be
abridged by legislation w/c has no reasonable relation to some purpose w/in the competency of the state.
The respondents as corporations have business & property for w/c they can claim protection. These are
threatened w/ destruction through the unwarranted compulsion w/c the appellants are exercising over
present & prospective patrons of their schools. Appellees asked protection against arbitrary, unreasonable,
and unlawful interference with their patrons and the consequent destruction of their business and property.
The suits were not premature. Their interest is clear and immediate and injury was not a mere possibility in
the remote future. The inevitable result of enforcing the act would be the destruction of appellees' primary
schools, and perhaps all other private primary schools in the state of Oregon. In addition, they are engaged in
undertakings that are useful and meritorious and there is also nothing that indicates that they have failed to
discharge their obligations to patrons, students, or the state.
15. Department of Education Culture and Sports v Roberto Rey San Diego
G.R. No. 89572. December 21, 1989.
Roberto Rey San Diego graduated from UE with a degree of Zoology he claims that he took the NMAT three
times and flunked it as many times. When he applied to take it again, the petitioner rejected his application
on the basis of the rule that a person can only take the NMAT 3x max. He then went to the Regional Trial
Court of Valenzuela. In his original petition for mandamus, he first invoked his constitutional rights to
academic freedom and quality education. San Diego was allowed to take the NMAT. After which he filed
another case challenging the constitutionality of MECS Order No. 12. The additional grounds raised were due
process and equal protection. The Judges of the RTC granted his petition.
WON the RTC Judge was correct?
Held: NO. SC reversed the ruling of the RTC
Ratio: Court upheld the constitutionality of the NMAT as a measure intended to limit the admission to medical
schools only to those who have initially proved their competence and preparation for a medical education.
The three-flunk rule is intended to insulate the medical schools and ultimately the medical profession from the
intrusion of those not qualified to be doctors. While every person is entitled to aspire to be a doctor, he does
not have a constitutional right to be a doctor. The Constitution also provides that "every citizen has the right
to choose a profession or course of study, subject to fair, reasonable and equitable admission and academic
requirements." The Court feels that it is not enough to simply invoke the right to quality education as a
guarantee of the Constitution: one must show that he is entitled to it because of his preparation and promise.
13
The private respondent has failed the NMAT five times. While his persistence is noteworthy, to say the least, it
is certainly misplaced, like a hopeless love.
16. Francisco Virtouso v. Municipal Judge
G.R. No. L-47841. March 21, 1978.
Francisco Virtouso filed an application for habeas corpus with the Supreme Court on the grounds that the
preliminary investigation conducted by respondent Judge which led to the issuance of a warrant for his arrest
was constitutionally deficient, and that the bail recommended was excessive (P16,000.00, the alleged robbery
of a TV set). During the oral argument it was ascertained that petitioner was a 17 years old minor entitled to
the protection and the benefits of the Child and Youth Welfare Code, the provision affording youthful
offenders the opportunity to be provisionally released on recognizance at the discretion of the Court.
Issue: WON he should be granted a habeas corpus?
Held: Yes. Court ruled in favor of Virtouso.
Ratio: This Court should, whenever appropriate, give vitality and force to the Youth and Welfare Code, which is
an implementation of this specific constitutional mandate: "The State recognizes the vital role of the youth in
nation-building and shall promote their physical, intellectual, and social well-being." The Supreme Court
without passing upon the issue of whether or not the preliminary investigation conducted w as
constitutionally deficient resolved to release petitioner on recognizance pursuant to the provision of the Child
and Youth Welfare Code without prejudice to further proceedings of his pending criminal case.
Section 13. The State recognizes the vital role of the youth in nation-building and shall promote and protect
their physical, moral, spiritual, intellectual, and social well-being. It shall inculcate in the youth patriotism and
nationalism, and encourage their involvement in public and civic affairs.
Section 14. The State recognizes the role of women in nation-building, and shall ensure the fundamental
equality before the law of women and men.
17. Philippine Telegraph & Telephone Company v National Labor Relations Commission
GR No: 118979. May 23, 1997
PT&T (Philippine Telegraph & Telephone Company) initially hired Grace de Guzman specifically as
Supernumerary Project Worker, for a fixed period from November 21, 1990 until April 20, 1991 as reliever
for C.F. Tenorio who went on maternity leave. She was again invited for employment as replacement of Erlina
F. Dizon who went on leave on 2 periods, from June 10, 1991 to July 1, 1991 and July 19, 1991 to August 8,
1991.On September 2, 1991, de Guzman was again asked to join PT&T as a probationary employee where
probationary period will cover 150 days. She indicated in the portion of the job application form under civil
status that she was single although she had contracted marriage a few months earlier. When petitioner
learned later about the marriage, its branch supervisor, Delia M. Oficial, sent de Guzman a memorandum
requiring her to explain the discrepancy. Included in the memorandum, was a reminder about the companys
policy of not accepting married women for employment. She was dismissed from the company effective
January 29, 1992. Labor Arbiter handed down decision on November 23, 1993 declaring that petitioner
illegally dismissed De Guzman, who had already gained the status of a regular employee. Furthermore, it was
apparent that she had been discriminated on account of her having contracted marriage in violation of
company policies.
ISSUE:Whether the alleged concealment of civil status can be grounds to terminate the services of an
employee.
Held: NO. Court ruled for reinstating De Guzman with reimbursement of salary.
Ratio: Petitioner's policy of not accepting or considering as disqualified from work any woman worker who
contracts marriage runs afoul of the test of, and the right against, discrimination, afforded all women workers
14
by our labor laws and by no less than the Constitution. Petitioner's policy is not only in derogation of the
provisions of Article 136 of the Labor Code on the right of a woman to be free from any kind of stipulation
against marriage in connection with her employment, but it likewise assaults good morals and public policy,
tending as it does to deprive a woman of the freedom to choose her status, a privilege that by all accounts
inheres in the individual as an intangible and inalienable right. Hence, while it is true that the parties to a
contract may establish any agreements, terms, and conditions that they may deem convenient the same
should not be contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order, or public policy. Carried to its logical
consequences, it may even be said that petitioner's policy against legitimate marital bonds would encourage
illicit or common-law relations and subvert the sacrament of marriage.
Section 15. The State shall protect and promote the right to health of the people and instill health
consciousness among them.
Section 16. The State shall protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology in
accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature.
18. Oposa v Hon. Flugencio Factoran
G.R. No. 101083. July 30, 1993.
The petitioners, all minors duly represented and joined by their respective parents, filed a petition to cancel all
existing timber license agreements (TLAs) in the country and to cease and desist from receiving, accepting,
processing, renewing or approving new timber license agreements. This case is filed not only on the
appellants right as taxpayers, but they are also suing in behalf of succeeding generations based on the
concept of intergenerational responsibility in so far as the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is
concerned.
Together with the Philippine Ecological Network, Inc. (PENI), the petitioners presented scientific evidence that
deforestation have resulted in a host of environmental tragedies. One of these is the reduction of the earths
capacity to process carbon dioxide, otherwise known as the greenhouse effect.
Continued issuance by the defendant of TLAs to cut and deforest the remaining forest stands will work great
damage and irreparable injury to the plaintiffs. Appellants have exhausted all administrative remedies with the
defendants office regarding the plea to cancel the said TLAs. The defendant, however, fails and refuses to
cancel existing TLAs.
Issue: Whether or not the petitioners have legal standing on the said case
The SC held that the case involved a class suit where all have a common and general interest representing
their generations and generations yet unborn (intergenerational responsibility). There is a cause of action
based on Art. 2, S. 16 of the Constitution which was deemed self-executing. These basic rights need not even
be written in the Constitution for they are assumed to exist from the inception of humankind. If they are now
explicitly mentioned in the fundamental charter, it is because of the fear of its framers that without such
mention, there will come a time when all would be lost. Thereby highlighting their continuing importance and
imposing upon the state a solemn obligation to preserve the first and protect and advance the second, the
day would not be too far when all else would be lost not only for the present generation, but also for those to
come generations which stand to inherit nothing but parched earth incapable of sustaining life. The right
to a balanced and healthful ecology carries with it the correlative duty to refrain from impairing the
environment.
Such right carries with it the correlative duty to refrain from impairing the environment.
Section 17. The State shall give priority to education, science and technology, arts, culture, and sports to
foster patriotism and nationalism, accelerate social progress, and promote total human liberation and
development.

15
19. Teofisto Guingona Jr & Aquilino Pimentel v Hon. Guillermo Carague

G.R. No. 94571. April 22, 1991.
1990 budget had a total of 233.5B where P98.4B (P86.8B for debt services) was allocated for the automatic
appropriation and P155.3B under RA 6831 or the General Appropriations Act while DECS has 27, 017,813,
000.00 Automatic Appropriation for debt services is authorized under PD No 81 Amending Certain Provisions
of RA 4860 and PD No 1177 Revising the Budget Process in Institutionalize the Budgetary Innovations of the
New Society PD 1967 An Act Strengthening the Guarantee and Payment Positions of the Republic of the PH
on its contingent liabilities arising out of relent and guaranteed loans by appropriating funds for the
purpose.
Petitioners argue that the automatic appropriations under the decrees of then President Marcos became
functus oficio when he was ousted in February, 1986; the legislative power was restored to Congress when
the Constitution was ratified and there is a need for a new legislation but Congress, has not approved any
law; and the said P86.8 Billion automatic appropriation in the 1990 budget is an administrative act that rests
on no law, and thus, it cannot be enforced. They argue that assuming arguendo on P.D. No. 81, P.D. No. 1177
and P.D. No. 1967 did not expire Marcos, after the adoption of the 1987 Constitution.
The petitioner seek the declaration of the unconstitutionality of P.D. No. 81, Sections 31 of P.D. 1177, and P.D.
No. 1967. The petition also seeks to restrain the disbursement for debt service under the 1990 budget
pursuant to said decrees.
Issue: WON it is unconstitutional?
Held: No. Case was dismissed in favor of the respondents (Carague)
Ratio: There is no provision in our Constitution that provides or prescribes any particular form of words or
religious recitals in which an authorization or appropriation by Congress shall be made, except that it be
made by law, such as precisely the authorization or appropriation under the questioned presidential
decrees. In other words, in terms of time horizons, an appropriation may be made impliedly (as by past but
subsisting legislations) as well as expressly for the current fiscal year (as by enactment of laws by the present
Congress), just as said appropriation may be made in general as well as in specific terms. The Congressional
authorization may be embodied in annual laws, such as a general appropriations act or in special provisions of
laws of general or special application which appropriate public funds for specific public purposes, such as the
questioned decrees. An appropriation measure is sufficient if the legislative intention clearly and certainly
appears from the language employed (In re Continuing Appropriations, 32 P. 272), whether in the past or in
the present.
The Government budgetary process has 4 major phases
(1) Budget preparation where the executive branch estimation of government revenues and the
determination of budgetary priorities and activities. It starts with the budget call by the Department
of budget and management. Where each agency is required to submit agency budget estimates
consistent with the general ceilings set by the Department Budget Coordinating Council (DBCC).
Upon issuance of the budget call the Bureau of Treasury computes for the interest and principal
payments for the year.
(2) Legislative Authorization Congress deliberates or acts on the budget proposals of the President and
Congress formulates an appropriation act following the process established by the Constitution
**(Debt service is not included in the General Appropriations Act since there is RA 4860 and 245 as
amended and PD 1967)
(3) Budget Execution: Executive department establishes the obligation authority ceilings, evaluation of
work and financial plans for individual activities and the continuing review of government fiscal
position, regulation of fund release and implementation of cash payment schedules.
** (The releases of debt services fund are by request of the Bureau of treasury one quarter in
advance of paying schedule.)
(4) Budget accountability: Evaluation of actual performance and initially approved work targets,

16
obligations incurred, personnel hired and work accomplishment are being compared with the targets
at the time the budgets were approved.
The Court ruled that PD NO 81, section 31 of PD 1177 and PD 1967 and RA 4860 are constitutional
unless repealed or amended by Congress.
Section 18. The State affirms labor as a primary social economic force. It shall protect the rights of workers
and promote their welfare.
20. Philippine Association of Service Exporters, Inc. (PASEI) v Hon. Franklin Drilon
G.R. No. 81958. June 30, 1988.
Philippine Association of Service Exporters, Inc. (PASEI, for short), a firm "engaged principally in the
recruitment of Filipino workers, male and female, for overseas placement," challenges the Constitutional
validity of Department Order No. 1 of the Department of Labor and Employment, in the character of
"GUIDELINES GOVERNING THE TEMPORARY SUSPENSION OF DEPLOYMENT OF FILIPINO DOMESTIC AND
HOUSEHOLD WORKERS," in this petition for certiorari and prohibition. Specifically, the measure is assailed for
"discrimination against males or females;" that it "does not apply to all Filipino workers but only to domestic
helpers and females with similar skills;" and that it is violative of the right to travel. It is held likewise to be an
invalid exercise of the lawmaking power, police power being legislative, and not executive, in character. PASEI
invokes Section 3, of Article XIII, of the Constitution, providing for worker participation "in policy and decisionmaking processes affecting their rights and benefits as may be provided by law."
Issue: WON Department order 1 is valid?
Held: No. The Court ruled to dismiss the petition in favor of Drilon
Ratio:
State authority to enact legislation that may interfere with personal liberty or property in order to promote
the general welfare." As defined, it consists of (1) an imposition of restraint upon liberty or property, (2) in
order to foster the common good. It is not capable of an exact definition but has been, purposely, veiled in
general terms to underscore its all-comprehensive embrace.
The petitioner has shown no satisfactory reason why the contested measure should be nullified. There is no
question that Department Order No. 1 applies only to "female contract workers," but it does not mean an
undue discrimination between the sexes. It is well-settled that "equality before the law" under the Constitution
does not import a perfect identity of rights among all men and women. It admits of classifications, provided
that (1) such classifications rest on substantial distinctions; (2) they are germane to the purposes of the law;
(3) they are not confined to existing conditions; and (4) they apply equally to all members of the same class.
What the Constitution prohibits is the singling out of a select person or group of persons within an existing
class, to the prejudice of such a person or group or resulting in an unfair advantage to another person or
group of persons. Deployment ban has on the right to travel does not impair the right. The right to travel is
subject, among other things, to the requirements of "public safety," "as may be provided by law." Department
Order No. 1 is a valid implementation of the Labor Code, in particular, its basic policy to "afford protection to
labor,"
Section 19. The State shall develop a self-reliant and independent national economy effectively controlled by
Filipinos.
21. Wigberto Tanada v Edgardo Angara

G.R. No. 118295 May 2, 1997
This is a petition seeking to nullify the Philippine ratification of the World Trade Organization (WTO)
Agreement. Petitioners question the concurrence of herein respondents acting in their capacities as Senators
via signing the said agreement.
The WTO opens access to foreign markets, especially its major trading partners, through the reduction of
tariffs on its exports, particularly agricultural and industrial products. Thus, provides new opportunities for the
17
service sector cost and uncertainty associated with exporting and more investment in the country. These are
the predicted benefits as reflected in the agreement and as viewed by the signatory Senators, a free market
espoused by WTO.
Petitioners on the other hand viewed the WTO agreement as one that limits, restricts and impair Philippine
economic sovereignty and legislative power. That the Filipino First policy of the Constitution was taken for
granted as it gives foreign trading intervention.
Issue : Whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
on the part of the Senate in giving its concurrence of the said WTO agreement.
Held: Petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit
Ratio: In its Declaration of Principles and state policies, the Constitution adopts the generally accepted
principles of international law as part of the law of the land, and adheres to the policy of peace, equality,
justice, freedom, cooperation and amity , with all nations. By the doctrine of incorporation, the country is
bound by generally accepted principles of international law, which are considered automatically part of our
own laws. Pacta sunt servanda international agreements must be performed in good faith. A treaty is not a
mere moral obligation but creates a legally binding obligation on the parties.
Through WTO the sovereignty of the state cannot in fact and reality be considered as absolute because it is a
regulation of commercial relations among nations. Such as when Philippines joined the United Nations (UN) it
consented to restrict its sovereignty right under the concept of sovereignty as auto limitation. What Senate
did was a valid exercise of authority. As to determine whether such exercise is wise, beneficial or viable is
outside the realm of judicial inquiry and review. The act of signing the said agreement is not a legislative
restriction as WTO allows withdrawal of membership should this be the political desire of a member. Also, it
should not be viewed as a limitation of economic sovereignty. WTO remains as the only viable structure for
multilateral trading and the veritable forum for the development of international trade law. Its alternative is
isolation, stagnation if not economic self-destruction. Thus, the people be allowed, through their duly elected
officers, make their free choice.
Section 20. The State recognizes the indispensable role of the private sector, encourages private enterprise,
and provides incentives to needed investments.
Section 21. The State shall promote comprehensive rural development and agrarian reform.
22. Association of Small Landowners v Secretary of Agrarian Reform
G.R. No. 78742. July 14, 1989.
The Association of Small Landowners in this case invoke the right of retention granted by P.D. No. 27 to
owners of rice and corn lands not exceeding seven hectares as long as they are cultivating or intend to
cultivate the same. Their respective lands do not exceed the statutory limit but are occupied by tenants who
are actually cultivating such lands.
According to P.D. No. 316, which was promulgated in implementation of P.D. No. 27:
No tenant-farmer in agricultural lands primarily devoted to rice and corn shall be ejected or removed from
his farmholding until such time as the respective rights of the tenant-farmers and the landowner shall have
been determined in accordance with the rules and regulations implementing P.D. No. 27.
They ask the Court for a writ of mandamus to make Secretary of Agrarian Reform to issue the implementing
rules required.
Department of Agrarian reform argues that P.D. No. 27 has been amended by LOI 474 removing any right of
retention from persons w ho own other agricultural lands of more than 7 hectares in aggregate area or lands
used for residential, commercial, industrial or other purposes from which they derive adequate income for
their family. The regulations implementing P.D. No. 27 have already been issued thru a Memorandum.

18
ASL insist that the above-cited measures are not applicable to them because they do not own more than
seven hectares and that the said measures are nevertheless not in force because they have not been
published as required by law and the ruling of this Court in Taada v. Tuvera. As for LOI 474, the same is
ineffective for the additional reason that a mere letter of instruction could not have repealed the presidential
decree.
The argument of some of the petitioners that Proc. No. 131 and E.O. No. 229 should be invalidated because
they do not provide for retention limits as required by Article XIII, Section 4 of the Constitution is no longer
tenable. R.A. No. 6657 does provide for such limits now in Section 6 of the law
Retention Limits. Except as otherwise provided in this Act, no person may own or retain, directly or
indirectly, any public or private agricultural land, the size of which shall vary according to factors
governing a viable family-sized farm, such as commodity produced, terrain, infrastructure, and soil
fertility as determined by the Presidential Agrarian Reform Council (PARC) created hereunder, but in
no case shall retention by the landowner exceed five (5) hectares. Three (3) hectares may be awarded
to each child of the landowner, subject to the following qualifications: (1) that he is at least fifteen
(15) years of age; and (2) that he is actually tilling the land or directly managing the farm; Provided,
That landowners whose lands have been covered by Presidential Decree No. 27 shall be allowed to
keep the area originally retained by them thereunder, further, That original homestead grantees or
direct compulsory heirs who still own the original homestead at the time of the approval of this Act
shall retain the same areas as long as they continue to cultivate said homestead.
Issue: Whether or not PD 27 is constitutional?
Held: The court ruled that the tenant-farmers rights under P.D. No. 27 are retained and recognized.
Landowners who were unable to exercise their rights of retention under P.D. No. 27 shall enjoy the retention
rights granted by R.A. No. 6657 under the conditions therein prescribed.
Ratio: The Court observes that during the past dictatorship, every presidential issuance, by whatever name it
was called, had the force and effect of law because it came from President Marcos. Such are the ways of
despots. Hence, it is futile to argue, as the petitioners do in G.R. No. 79744, that LOI 474 could not have
repealed P.D. No. 27 because the former was only a letter of instruction. The important thing is that it was
issued by President Marcos, whose word was law during that time.
According to Justice Holmes: Every restriction upon the use of property imposed in the exercise of the police
power deprives the owner of some right theretofore enjoyed, and is, in that sense, an abridgment by the
State of rights in property without making compensation. But restriction imposed to protect the public health,
safety or morals from dangers threatened is not a taking. The restriction here in question is merely the
prohibition of a noxious use. The property so restricted remains in the possession of its owner. The state does
not appropriate it or make any use of it. The state merely prevents the owner from making a use which
interferes with paramount rights of the public. Whenever the use prohibited ceases to be noxious as it may
because of further changes in local or social conditions the restriction will have to be removed and the
owner will again be free to enjoy his property as heretofore.
23. Luz Farms v Secretary of Agrarian Reform
G.R. No. 86889. December 4, 1990.
June 10, 1988, the President of the Philippines approved R.A. No. 6657, which includes the raising of livestock,
poultry and swine in its coverage. January 2, 1989, the Secretary of Agrarian Reform promulgated the
Guidelines and Procedures Implementing Production and Profit S haring as embodied in Sections 13 and 32 of
R.A. No. 6657.
Luz Farms is a corporation engaged in the livestock and poultry business stands to be affected by the
enforcement of Section 3(b), Section 11, Section 13, Section 16(d) and 17 and Section 32 of R.A. No. 6657

19
otherwise known as Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law and of the Guidelines and Procedures Implementing
Production and Profit Sharing under R.A. No. 6657
Petitioners are invoking their right of retention granted by P.D. No. 27 to owners of rice and corn lands not
exceeding seven hectares as long as they are cultivating or intend to cultivate the same. Their respective
lands do not exceed the statutory limit but are occupied by tenants who are actually cultivating such lands.
Luz Farms contended that it does not seek the nullification of R.A. 6657 in its entirety. However, argued that
Congress in enacting the said law has transcended the mandate of the Constitution, in including land devoted
to the raising of livestock, poultry and swine in its coverage Livestock or poultry raising is not similar to crop
or tree farming
Issue: Whether or not Congress exceeded in including raising of lifestock?
Held: The court granted their petition. Sections 3(b), 11, 13 and 32 of R.A. No. 6657 including the raising of
livestock, poultry and swine in its coverage as well as the Implementing Rules and Guidelines promulgated in
accordance therewith, are hereby declared null and void for being unconstitutional and the writ of preliminary
injunction issued is hereby made permanent.
Ratio: The transcripts of the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission of 1986 on the meaning of the
word "agricultural," clearly show that it was never the intention of the framers of the Constitution to include
livestock and poultry industry in the coverage of the constitutionally-mandated agrarian reform program of
the Government.
It is evident from the foregoing discussion that Section 11 of R.A. 6657 which includes "private agricultural
lands devoted to commercial livestock, poultry and swine raising" in the definition of "commercial farms" is
invalid, to the extent that the aforecited agro-industrial activities are made to be covered by the agrarian
reform program of the State. There is simply no reason to include livestock and poultry lands in the coverage
of agrarian reform.
Section 22. The State recognizes and promotes the rights of indigenous cultural communities within the
framework of national unity and development.
Section 23. The State shall encourage non-governmental, community-based, or sectoral organizations that
promote the welfare of the nation.
Section 24. The State recognizes the vital role of communication and information in nation-building.
Section 25. The State shall ensure the autonomy of local governments.
24. Humberto Basco v PAGCOR
G.R. No. 91649 May 14, 1991
The Philippine Amusements and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR) was created by virtue of P.D. 1067-A dated
January 1, 1977 and was granted a franchise under P.D. 1067-B also dated January 1, 1977 "to establish,
operate and maintain gambling casinos on land or water within the territorial jurisdiction of the Philippines."
Petitioners filed an instant petition seeking to annul the Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation
(PAGCOR) Charter PD 1869, because it is allegedly contrary to morals, public policy and order. Petitioners
claim that P.D. 1869 constitutes a waiver of the right of the City of Manila to impose taxes and legal fees; that
the exemption clause in P.D. 1869 is in violation of the principle of local autonomy.
Section 13 par. (2) of P.D. 1869 exempts PAGCOR, as the franchise holder from paying any "tax of
any kind or form, income or otherwise, as well as fees, charges or levies of whatevernature, whether
National or Local."

20
Issue:
Does the local Government of Manila have the power to impose taxes on PAGCOR?
Held: No, the court rules that The City government of Manila has no power to impose taxes on PAGCOR.
Reason: The principle of Local autonomy does not make local governments sovereign within the state; the
principle of local autonomy within the constitution simply means decentralization. It cannot be an Imperium
in imperio it can only act intra sovereign, or as an arm of the National Government. PAGCOR has a dual role,
to operate and to regulate gambling casinos. The latter role is governmental,
which places it in the category of an agency or instrumentality of the Government. Being an instrumentality
of the Government, PAGCOR should be and actually is exempt from local taxes. The power of local
government to "impose taxes and fees" is always subject to "limitations" which Congress may provide by law.
Since PD 1869 remains an "operative" law until "amended, repealed or revoked" (Sec. 3, Art. XVIII, 1987
Constitution), its "exemption clause" remains as an exception to the exercise of the power of local
governments to impose taxes and fees. It cannot therefore be violative but rather is consistent with the
principle of local autonomy.
25. Hon. MTC Judge Mercedes Dadole v COA
G.R. No. 125350. December 3, 2002.
In 1986, the RTC and MTC judges of Mandaue City started receiving monthly allowances through the yearly
appropriation ordinance enacted by the Sangguniang Panlungsod of the said city. In 1991, Mandaue City
increased the amount to P1,500 for each judge. On March 15, 1994, the Department of Budget and
Management (DBM) issued the disputed Local Budget Circular No. 55 (LBC 55) which provided that such
additional allowances in the form of honorarium at rates shall be granted but it shall not exceed P1,000.00 in
provinces and cities andP700.00 in municipalities subject to the following conditions:
a.
That the grant is not mandatory on the part of the LGUs;
b.
That all contractual and statutory obligations of the LGU including the implementation of R.A.
6758 shall have been fully provided in the budget;
c.
That the budgetary requirements/limitations under Section 324 and 325 of R.A. 7160 should be
satisfied and/or complied with; and
d.
That the LGU has fully implemented the devolution of functions/personnel in accordance with
R.A. 7160.
Acting on the DBM directive, the Mandaue City Auditor issued notices of disallowance to petitioners.
Beginning October, 1994, the additional monthly allowances of the petitioner judges were reduced to P1,000
each. They were also asked to reimburse the amount they received in excess of P1,000 from April to
September, 1994. The petitioner judges filed with the Office of the City Auditor a protest against the notices
of disallowance. But the City Auditor treated the protest as a motion for reconsideration and indorsed the
same to the COA Regional Office No. 7. In turn, the COA Regional Office referred the motion to the head
office with a recommendation that the same be denied. On November 27, 1995, Executive Judge Mercedes
Gozo-Dadole, for and in behalf of the petitioner judges, filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision of
the COA. In a resolution dated May 28, 1996, the COA denied the motion. Hence, this petition. Petitioner
judges argue that LBC 55 is void for infringing on the local autonomy of Mandaue City. They also maintain
that said circular is not supported by any law and therefore goes beyond the supervisory powers of the
President. Respondent COA, on the other hand, insists that the constitutional and statutory authority of a city
government to provide allowances to judges stationed therein is not absolute. Congress may set limitations on
the exercise of autonomy. It is for the President, through the DBM, to check whether these legislative
limitations are being followed by the local government units
Issue: WON the City Ordinance of Mandaue which provides a higher rate of allowances to the appellant judges
may prevail over that fixed by the DBM under Local Budget Circular No. 55
Held: No. The court ruled in favor of Dadole.

21
Ratio: Although our Constitution guarantees autonomy to local government units, the exercise of local
autonomy remains subject to the power of control by Congress and the power of supervision by the
President. Section 4 of Article X of the 1987 Philippine Constitution provides that: "Sec. 4. The President of the
Philippines shall exercise general supervision over local governments. . . . "
Section 458, par. (a)(1)(xi), of RA 7160, the law that supposedly serves as the legal basis of LBC 55, allows the
grant of additional allowances to judges "when the finances of the city government allow." The said provision
does not authorize setting a definite maximum limit to the additional allowances granted to judges. Thus, this
Court need not belabor the point that the finances of a city government may allow the grant of additional
allowances higher than P1,000 if the revenues of the said city government exceed its annual expenditures.
Setting a uniform amount for the grant of additional allowances is an inappropriate way of enforcing the
criterion found in Section 458, par. (a)(l)(xi), of RA 7160. The DBM over-stepped its power of supervision over
local government units by imposing a prohibition that did not correspond with the law it sought to implement.
In other words, the prohibitory nature of the circular had no legal basis. LBC 55 is void on account of its lack
of publication, in violation of our ruling in Taada vs. Tuvera where we held that: ". . . . Administrative rules
and regulations must also be published if their purpose is to enforce or implement existing law pursuant to a
valid delegation. Interpretative regulations and those merely internal in nature, that is, regulating only the
personnel of an administrative agency and the public, need not be published.
Section 26. The State shall guarantee equal access to opportunities for public service and prohibit political
dynasties as may be defined by law.
26. Rev. Elly Chavez Pamatog v Comelec

G.R. No. 161872. April 13, 2004.
Rev. Elly Velez Pamatong filed his Certificate of Candidacy for President on December 17, 2003. Respondent
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) refused to give due course to petitioners Certificate of Candidacy. He
filed a motion for reconsideration together with other applicants. The COMELEC declared petitioner and
thirty-five (35) others nuisance candidates who could not wage a nationwide campaign and/or are not
nominated by a political party or are not supported by a registered political party with a national
constituency.
Petitioner seeks to reverse the resolutions which w ere allegedly rendered in violation of his right to equal
access to opportunities for public service under Section 26, Article II of the 1987 Constitution, by limiting the
number of qualified candidates only to those who can afford to wage a nationwide campaign and/or are
nominated by political parties.
Petitioner, filed a petition alleging that his right to equal access to opportunities for public service under
Section 26, Article II of the Constitution has been violated.
Issue: WON it is a constitutional right to run or hold office?
Held: No. The SC however remanded COMELEC to collect evidence to determine WON Elly Velez Lao
Pamatong is a nuisance candidate
Ratio: The provisions under the Article II are generally considered not self-executing, and there is no plausible
reason for according a different treatment to the equal access provision. Like the rest of the policies
enumerated in Article II, the provision does not contain any judicially enforceable constitutional right but
merely specifies a guideline for legislative or executive action. The disregard of the provision does not give rise
to any cause of action before the courts. Equality is not sacrificed as long as the burdens engendered by the
limitations are meant to be borne by any one who is minded to file a certificate of candidacy. In the case at
bar, there is no showing that any person is exempt from the limitations or the burdens which they create.
The Supreme Court held that there is no constitutional right to run for or hold public office, Section 26
neither bestows such a right nor elevates the privilege to the level of an enforceable right. There is merely a
privilege subject to limitations imposed by law. Moreover, the SC explained, that provisions under Article II are
generally considered not self-executing.
22
The privilege of equal access to opportunities to public office may be subjected to limitations. Nuisance
Candidates wherein the COMELEC may motu proprio refuse to give due course to or cancel a Certificate of
Candidacy. Rationale against nuisance candidates and the disqualification of candidates who have not evinced
a bona fide intention to run for office is easy to divine. The State has a compelling interest to ensure that its
electoral exercises are rational, objective, and orderly. Towards this end, the State takes into account the
practical considerations in conducting elections. Inevitably, the greater the number of candidates, the greater
the opportunities for logistical confusion, not to mention the increased allocation of time and resources in
preparation for the election.
** Section 69. Nuisance Candidates. The Commission may, motu proprio or upon a verified petition of an
interested party, refuse to give due course or cancel a certificate of candidacy if it is shown that said
certificate has been filed to put the election process in mockery or disrepute or to cause confusion among the
voters by the similarity of the names of the registered candidates or by other circumstances or acts which
clearly demonstrate that the candidate has no bona fide intention to run for the office for which the
certificate of candidacy has been filed and thus prevent a faithful determination of the true will of the
electorate.
Section 27. The State shall maintain honesty and integrity in the public service and take positive and effective
measures against graft and corruption.
Section 28. Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the State adopts and implements a policy of
full public disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest.
27. Ma. Carmen Aquino- Sarmiento v Manuel L. Morato.
G.R. No. 92541. November 13, 1991.
In February 1989, petitioner, herself a member of respondent Movie and Television Review and Classification
Board (MTRCB), wrote its records officer requesting that she be allowed to examine the board's records
pertaining to the voting slips accomplished by the individual board members after a review of the movies and
television productions. It is on the basis of said slips that films are either banned, cut or classified accordingly.
She was told by the Records officer that she has to secure prior clearance from respondent Manuel Morato,
as chairman of MTRCB, to gain access to the records sought to be examined. Request was denied on the
ground that whenever the members of the board sit in judgment over a film, their decisions as reflected in the
individual voting slips partake the nature of conscience votes and as such, are purely and completely private
and personal. Petitioner argues, that the records she wishes to examine are public in character and other than
providing for reasonable respondents Morato and the classification board have no authority to deny any
citizen seeking examination of the board's records. On February 27, 1989, respondent Morato called an
executive meeting of the MTRCB to discuss, among others, the issue raised by petitioner. In said meeting,
seventeen (17) members of the board voted to declare their individual voting records as classified documents
which rendered the same inaccessible to the public without clearance from the chairman. Thereafter,
respondent Morato denied petitioner's request to examine the voting slips. However, it was only much later,
i.e., on July 27, 1989, that respondent Board issued Resolution No. 10-89 which declared as confidential,
private and personal, the decision of the reviewing committee and the voting slips of the members.
Issue: WON Reso No. 10-89 is valid?
Held: No. Instant petition is GRANTED. Resolution Nos. 10-89 and 88-1-25 issued by the respondent Board is
hereby declared null and void.
Ratio: The term private has been defined as "belonging to or concerning, an individual person, company, or
interest"; whereas, public means "pertaining to, or belonging to, or affecting a nation, state, or community at
large". May the decisions of respondent Board and the individual members concerned, arrived at in an official
capacity, be considered private? Certainly not. As may be gleaned from the decree (PD 1986) creating the
respondent classification board, there is no doubt that its very existence is public in character; it is an office
created to serve public interest. It being the case, respondents can lay no valid claim to privacy. The right to
23
privacy belongs to the individual acting in his private capacity and not to a governmental agency or officers
tasked with, and acting in, the discharge of public duties There can be no invasion of privacy in the case at
bar since what is sought to be divulged is a product of action undertaken in the course of performing official
functions. To declare otherwise would be to clothe every public official with an impregnable mantle of
protection against public scrutiny for his or her official acts.
The decisions of the Board and the individual voting slips accomplished by the members concerned are acts
made pursuant to their official functions, and as such, are neither personal nor private in nature but rather
public in character. They are, therefore, public records access to which is guaranteed to the citizenry by no
less than the fundamental law of the land. Being a public right, the exercise thereof cannot be made
contingent on the discretion, nay, whim and caprice, of the agency charged with the custody of the official
records sought to be examined.

24

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Article II:

A. DECLARATION OF STATE PRINCIPLES

Zacarias Villavicencio v Justo Lukban

Arcilla, Alexandra Myrna S.

Some generally accepted principles of international law:

The right of a country to establish military commissions to try war criminals.

The duty to protect the premises of embassies and legations.

Shigenori Kuroda v Maj Gen Rafael Jalandoni

Lao Ichong vs Jaime Hernandez

the subject of the Act is not expressed in the title

the Act violates international and treaty obligations

Issue : WON it violates international treaties and obligations?

Secretary of Justice v Hon. Ralph Lantion

Conspiracy to commit offense or to defraud the United States;

Attempt to evade or defeat tax

Fraud by wire, radio, or television;

False statement or entries

Election contributions in name of another

Arcilla, Alexandra Myrna S.

jurisprudence and procedures on extradition pose no proscription. In fact, in interstate extradition

Rizal Alih v Maj. Gen. Delfin Gastro

Arcilla, Alexandra Myrna S.

Integrated Bar of the Philippines v Hon. Ronaldo Zamora

People v Tranquilino Lagman & Primitivo de Sosa

Arcilla, Alexandra Myrna S.

Arthur Lim v Executive Secretary

Arcilla, Alexandra Myrna S.

Arcilla, Alexandra Myrna S.

Arcilla, Alexandra Myrna S.

Arcilla, Alexandra Myrna S.

Arcilla, Alexandra Myrna S.

19. Teofisto Guingona Jr & Aquilino Pimentel v Hon. Guillermo Carague

amended and PD 1967)

Arcilla, Alexandra Myrna S.

21. Wigberto Tanada v Edgardo Angara

Arcilla, Alexandra Myrna S.

Arcilla, Alexandra Myrna S.

Arcilla, Alexandra Myrna S.

That the grant is not mandatory on the part of the LGUs;

Arcilla, Alexandra Myrna S.

26. Rev. Elly Chavez Pamatog v Comelec

Arcilla, Alexandra Myrna S.

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