#1

China Banking Corp. vs. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 129644, March 7, 2000
Held: The assignment was done in fraud of creditors. China Bank is, therefore entitled
to rescind the same. Under Article 1381(3) of the Civil Code, contracts which are
undertaken in fraud of creditors when the latter cannot in any manner collect the claims
due them, are rescissible. The existence of fraud with intent to defraud creditor may
either be presumed in accordance with Article 1387, NCC or duly proved in accordance
with the ordinary rules of evidence. Hence, the law presumes that there is fraud of
creditors when:
a) There is alienation of property by gratuitous title by the debtor who has not reserved
sufficient property to pay his debts contracted before such alienation; or
b) There is alienation of property by onerous title made by a debtor against whom some
judgment has been rendered in any instance or some writ of attachment has been issued.
The decision or attachment need not refer to the property alienated and need not have
been obtained by the party seeking rescission.
#2
G.R. No. L-11075
June 30, 1960
COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS vs. CARIDAD CAPISTRANO
Held: We believe that Philippine peso bills come within the concept of "merchandise," as
this term is understood in Section 1363(f) of the Revised Administrative Code. As
defined by the same Code, merchandise, when used with reference to importations or
exportations, includes goods, wares, and in general anything that may be the subject of
importation or exportation. (Sec. 1419.) It cannot be gainsaid that money may be a
commodity an object of trade.
Money in the country where it is current, is both a measure of value and a
medium of exchange, while in other countries it is a commodity bought and sold
in the market, and its value fluctuates in the market like that of other
commodities. (58 C. J. S. 845, citing Richard vs. American Union Bank, 170 N.
E. 532, 535, 69 A. L. R. 667.)
In the same manner that in the Philippines the United States dollar bills which have
ceased to be legal tender, are considered merchandise, the Philippine peso bills when
attempted to be exported, as in the present case, may be deemed to have been taken out of
domestic circulation as legal tender and treated as commodity. Hence, they may be
forfeited pursuant to Central Bank Circular No. 37 in relation to Section 1363 (f) of the
Revised Administrative Code.
#3
Standard Oil Co. vs Jaranillo
44 PHIL 631
GR No. L-20329
March 16, 1923
Held: The Registrar's duty is MINISTERIAL in character.
There is no legal provision conferring upon him any judicial or quasi-judicial power to
determine or qualify the nature of the document presented before him.
The determination of the nature of the property lies with the courts of justice, and not by
the Register of Deeds.
Moreover, the act of recording a chattel mortgage operates as constructive notice of the
existence of the contract, and the legal effects of the contract must be discovered in the
instrument itself in relation with the fact of notice. As such, the Registrar should therefore
accept the legal fees being tendered, and place the document on record.

#4
Bicerra v. Teneza
[G.R. No. L-16218. November 29, 1962.]
HELD:
House is immovable property even if situated on land belonging to a different owner;
Exception, when demolished.
A house is classified as immovable property by reason of its adherence to the soil on
which it is built (Article 415, paragraph 1, Civil Code). This classification holds true
regardless of the fact that the house may be situated on land belonging to a different
owner. But once the house is demolished, as in this case, it ceases to exist as such and
hence its character as an immovable likewise ceases.
#5
Ladera, et. al. vs. Hodges, et. al. , O.G No. 8027-R, September 23, 1952
Held: The sale of the land was not made without the proper publication required by law
of the sale of immovable property. In this instance, the determination of whether or not
the house in dispute is an immovable or movable property is vital. The undisputed rule is
whether it is immovable by destination (place by the owner of the tenement), an
immovable by incorporation(attachment not necessarily made by the owner of the
tenement) or an accession. A true building is an immovable or real property whether the
owner of the land is a usufructuary or lessee erects it. Moreover, when Ladera built the
house in question, she was not a mere lessee but occupied the land under a valid contract
with Hodges to sell it to her. Thus, the object of the levy and the sale was real property.
The publication in a newspaper in a general circulation was made making the execution
sale void and conferred no title to the purchaser. Furthermore, there was a valid exercise
of redemption. So, at the time Magno sold the property to Villa, Magno no longer had
title over the property strengthening the fact that since there was no title, the subsequent
sale was null and void.
#6
Lopez v. Orosa, Jr., and Plaza Theatre, Inc.
G.R. No. L-10817-18, February 28, 1958, 103 Phil. 98
HELD: While it is true that generally, real estate connotes the land and the building
constructed thereon, it is obvious that the inclusion of the building, separate and distinct
from the land, in the enumeration of what may constitute real properties could only mean
one thingthat a building is by itself an immovable property. In view of the absence of
any specific provision to the contrary, a building is an immovable property irrespective of
whether or not said structure and the land on which it is adhered to belong to the same
owner. The lien so created attaches merely to the immovable property for the construction
or repair of which the obligation was incurred. Therefore, the lien in favor of appellant
for the unpaid value of the lumber used in the construction of the building attaches only
to said structure and to no other property of the obligors.
#7
Santos Evangelista v. Alto Surety and Insurance Co., Inc.
G.R. No. L-11139, April 23, 1958, 103 Phil. 401
HELD: The house is not personal property, much less a debt, credit or other personal
property not capable of manual delivery, but immovable property. As explicitly held, in
Ladera vs. Hodges (48 OG 5374), "a true building (not merely superimposed on the soil)
is immovable or real property, whether it is erected by the owner of the land or by a
usufructuary or lessee. The opinion that the house of Rivera should have been attached in
accordance with subsection (c) of said section 7, as "personal property capable of manual
delivery, by taking and safely keeping in his custody", for it declared that "Evangelista
could not have validly purchased Ricardo Rivera's house from the sheriff as the latter was
not in possession thereof at the time he sold it at a public auction is untenable.
#8
G.R. No. L -11658 (February 15, 1918)
LEUNG YEE vs. FRANK L. STRONG MACHINERY COMPANY and J.G.
WILLIAMSON

Ruling:
The building is real property, therefore, its sale as annotated in the Chattel Mortgage
Registry cannot be given the legal effect of registration in the Registryof Real Property.
The mere fact that the parties decided to deal with the building as personal property does
not change its character as real property. Thus neither the original registry in the chattel
mortgage registry nor the annotation in said registry of the sale of the mortgaged property
had any effect on the building. However, since the land and the building had first been
purchased by Strong Machinery (ahead of Leung Yee), and this fact was known to
Leung Yee, it follows that Leung Yee was not a purchaser in good faith, and should
therefore not be entitled to the property. Strong Machinery thus has a better right to the
property.
#9
Bautista, et. al. v. Supnad, (CA) 59 O.G. 1575, 1578
Buildings are always immovable under the Code. While there is a holding to the
effect that a building which is merely superimposed on the soil or is sold for immediate
demolition may be considered as a movable or personal property, Justice J.B.L. Reyes
clarified that the rule that a building is immovable or real property has reference only to a
true building or one which is not merely superimposed on the soil.
#10
Tsai v. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 120098, October 2, 2001, 366 SCRA 324
HELD: While it is true that the questioned properties appear to be immobile, a perusal of
the contract of Real and Chattel Mortgage executed by the parties gives a contrary
indication. In the case at bar, the true intention of PBCOM and the owner, EVERTEX, is
to treat machinery and equipment as chattels. Assuming that the properties in question are
immovable by nature, nothing detracts the parties from treating it as chattels to secure an
obligation under the principle of estoppel. It has been held that an immovable may be
considered a personal property if there is a stipulation as when it is used as security in the
payment of an obligation where a chattel mortgage is executed over it, as in the case at
bar.
#11
Yap v. Taada
G.R. No. L-32917, July 18, 1988, 163 SCRA 464
HELD: Yap's argument is untenable. The Civil Code considers as immovable property,
among others, anything "attached to an immovable in a fixed manner, in such a way that
it cannot be separated therefrom without breaking the material or deterioration of the
object." The pump does not fit this description. It could be, and was in fact separated
from Yap's premises without being broken or suffering deterioration. Obviously, the
separation or removal of the pump involved nothing more complicated than the loosening
of bolts or dismantling of other fasteners.
#12
Mindanao Bus Company v. The City Assessor and Treasurer
G.R. No. L-17870, September 29, 1962, 6 SCRA 197
HELD: The equipment in question is movable. So that movable equipment to be
immobilized in contemplation of the law, it must first be "essential and principal
elements" of an industry or works without which such industry or works would be
"unable to function or carry on the industrial purpose for which it was established." Thus,
the Court distinguished those movable which become immobilized by destination
because they are essential and principal elements in the industry from those which may
not be so considered immobilized because they are merely incidental, not essential and
principal.
The tools and equipment in question in this instant case are, by their nature, not essential
and principle municipal elements of petitioner's business of transporting passengers and
cargoes by motor trucks. They are merely incidentalsacquired as movables and used
only for expediency to facilitate and/or improve its service. Even without such tools and
equipment, its business may be carried on, as petitioner has carried on, without such

equipment, before the war. The transportation business could be carried on without the
repair or service shop if its rolling equipment is repaired or serviced in another shop
belonging to another.
#13
Fels Energy, Inc. v. The Province of Batangas and the Office of the Provincial Assessor of
Batangas, G.R. No. 168557, 16 February 2007
HELD
Section 226 of R.A. No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991,
provides: SECTION 226. Local Board of Assessment Appeals. Any owner or person
having legal interest in the property who is not satisfied with the action of the provincial,
city or municipal assessor in the assessment of his property may, within sixty (60) days
from the date of receipt of the written notice of assessment, appeal to the Board of
Assessment Appeals of the province or city by filing a petition under oath in the form
prescribed for the purpose, together with copies of the tax declarations and such
affidavits or documents submitted in support of the appeal. Instead of appealing to the
Board of Assessment Appeals (as stated in the notice), NPC opted to file a motion for
reconsideration of the Provincial Assessors decision, a remedy not sanctioned by law.
#14
Machinery and Engineering Supplies, Inc. v. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. L-7057, October 29, 1954, 96 Phil. 70
HELD: Replevin is applicable only to personal property. The machinery and equipment
in question appeared to be attached to the land, particularly to the concrete foundation of
said premises, in a fixed manner, in such a way that the former could not be separated
from the latter without breaking the material or deterioration of the object. Hence, in
order to remove the said outfit, it became necessary not only to unbolt the same, but also
to cut some of its wooden supports. Moreover, said machinery and equipment were
intended by the owner of the tenement for an industry carried on said immovable. For
these reasons, they were already immovable pursuant to paragraphs 3 and 5 of Article
415 of the Civil Code.
#15
Board of Assessment Appeals v. MERALCO [G.R. No. L-15334. January 31, 1964.]
Held: The steel towers are personal (not real) properties. Be it noted that:
a. they do not come under paragraph 1of Article 415 because they are neither
buildings or constructions adhered to the soil;
b. they do not come under paragraph 3 of Article 415 because they are not attached to
an immovable in a fixed manner, i. e., they can be separated without breaking the
material or causing deterioration of the object to which they are attached;
c. they do not come under paragraph 5, because they are not machineries, receptacles, or
instruments, but even if they were, they are not intended for an industry to be carried
on in the premises.

#16
PHILIPPINE REFINING CO. vs. JARQUE,COROMINAS G.R. No. L-41506
RULING: Personal property includes vessels. They are subject to the provisions of the
Chattel Mortgage Law. The Chattel Mortgage Law says that a good chattel mortgage
includes an affidavit of good faith. The absence of such affidavit makes mortgage
unenforceable against creditors and subsequent encumbrances.

A mortgage on a vessel is generally like other chattel mortgages. The only difference
between a chattel mortgage of a vessel and a chattel mortgage of other personalty is that
the first must be noted in the registry of the register of deeds.
#17
RUBISO VS. RIVERA, 37 PHIL 72
HELD:
1. The legal rule set down in the Mercantile Code subsists, inasmuch as the amendment
solely refers to the official who shall make the entry; but, with respect to the rights of the
two purchasers, whichever of them first registered his acquisition of the vessel is the one
entitled to enjoy the protection of the law, which considers him the absolute owner of the
purchased boat, and this latter to be free of all encumbrance and all claims by strangers
for, pursuant to article 582 of the said code, after the bill of the judicial sale at auction has
been executed and recorded in the commercial registry, all the other liabilities of the
vessel in favor of the creditors shall be considered canceled. 1awphil.net
The purchaser at public auction, FaustoRubiso, who was careful to record his acquisition,
opportunely and on a prior date, has, according to the law, a better right than the
defendant Rivera who subsequently recorded his purchase. The latter is a third person,
who was directly affected by the registration which the plaintiff made of his acquisition.
2. Ships or vessels, whether moved by steam or by sail, partake, to a certain extent, of the
nature and conditions of real property, on account of their value and importance in the
world commerce; and for this reason the provisions of article 573 of the Code of
Commerce are nearly identical with those of article 1473 of the Civil Code.

#18
Sibalvs Valdez G.R. No. L-26278 August 4, 1927
Held:
The Supreme Court concludes that par. 2 of Article 334 (415) has been modified by
section 450 of the Code of Civil Procedure and by Act No. 1508 in the sense that for the
purpose of attachments and execution, and for the purposes of the Chattel Mortgage Law,
ungathered products have the nature of personal property. The lower court therefore did
not commit any error in holding that the sugar cane in question was personal property
and, as such, was not subject to redemption.
#19
US vs Carlos
G.R. No. 6295, 21 Phil 543September 1, 1911
HELD:
While electric current is not a fluid, still, its manifestations and effects like those of gas
may be seen and felt. The true test of what may be stolen is not whether it is corporeal or
incorporeal, but whether, being possessed of value, a person other than the owner may
appropriate the same. Electricity, like gas, is a valuable merchandise and may thus be
stolen. (See also U.S. v. Tambunting, 41 Phil. 364).
#20
Salas v. Jarencio
L-29788, August 30, 1972

HELD: There being no proof that the lot had been acquired by the City with its own
funds, the presumption is that it was given to it by the State IN TRUST for the benefit of
the inhabitants. Residual control remained in the State, and therefore the STATE can
lawfully dispose of the lot. Thus, Republic Act 4118 is valid and constitutional and this is
so even if the City of Manila will receive NO COMPENSATION from the State.
#21
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. T.A.N. PROPERTIES, INC.
G.R. No. 154953 June 26, 2008
HELD:
On the first issue, the well-entrenched rule is that all lands not appearing to be clearly of
private dominion presumably belong to the State. The onus to overturn, by
incontrovertible evidence, the presumption that the land subject of an application for
registration is alienable and disposable rests with the applicant.
As to the second issue, the tax declarations presented were only for the years starting
1955. While tax declarations are not conclusive evidence of ownership, they constitute
proof of claim of ownership. Respondent did not present any credible explanation why
the realty taxes were only paid starting 1955 considering the claim that the Dimayugas
were allegedly in possession of the land before 1945. The payment of the realty taxes
starting 1955 gives rise to the presumption that the Dimayugas claimed ownership or
possession of the land only in that year.
As to the third issue, the 1987 Constitution absolutely prohibits private corporations
from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public domain.
Admittedly, a corporation can at present still apply for original registration of land under
the doctrine in Director of Lands. Republic Act No. 9176 (RA 9176) further amended the
Public Land Act and extended the period for the filing of applications for judicial
confirmation of imperfect and incomplete titles to alienable and disposable lands of the
public domain until 31 December 2020. Thus:
Under RA 9176, the application for judicial confirmation is limited only to 12 hectares,
consistent with Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution that a private individual
may only acquire not more than 12 hectares of alienable and disposable land. Hence,
respondent, as successor-in-interest of an individual owner of the land, cannot apply for
registration of land in excess of 12 hectares. Since respondent applied for 56.4007
hectares, the application for the excess area of 44.4007 hectares is contrary to law, and
thus void ab initio. In applying for land registration, a private corporation cannot have
any right higher than its predecessor-in-interest from whom it derived its right. This
assumes, of course, that the corporation acquired the land, not exceeding 12 hectares,
when the land had already become private land by operation of law. In the present case,
respondent has failed to prove that any portion of the land was already private land when
respondent acquired it from Porting in 1997.
#22
G.R. No. 46373
January 29, 1940
Carlos Palanca vs. THE COMMONWEALTH OF THE PHILIPPINES
Ruling:
River and navigable estuary, useful for commerce, navigation and boating and fishing,
have the character of public domain and their legal status in this regard has not been
affected by the possession of Carlos Palanca, either that was the time of this possession,
that there can be no prescription against the state on public property.
For these reasons the appeal is denied and the decision of the Court of Appeals
confirmed.

#23
G.R. No. 92013 July 25, 1990
Salvador H. Laurel vs. Ramon Garcia, Raul Manglapus, and CatalinoMacaraig
Ruling: It is not for the President to convey valuable real property of the government on
his or her own sole will. Any such conveyance must be authorized and approved by a law
enacted by the Congress. It requires executive and legislative concurrence. It is indeed
true that the Roppongi property is valuable not so much because of the inflated prices
fetched by real property in Tokyo but more so because of its symbolic value to all
Filipinos, veterans and civilians alike. Whether or not the Roppongi and related
properties will eventually be sold is a policy determination where both the President and
Congress must concur. Considering the properties' importance and value, the laws on
conversion and disposition of property of public dominion must be faithfully followed.
#24
Natividad vs. Director of Lands, (CA) 37 Off. Gaz., 2905
Article 4 of the Law of Waters of 1866 provides that when a portion of the shore is no
longer washed by the waters of the sea and is not necessary for purposes of public utility,
or for the establishment of special industries, or for coastguard service, the government
shall declare it to be the property of the owners of the estates adjacent thereto and as an
increment thereof. We believe that only the executive and possibly the legislative
departments have the authority and the power to make the declaration that any land so
gained by the sea, is not necessary for purposes of public utility, or for the establishment
of special industries, on for coast-guard service. If no such declaration has been made by
said departments, the lot in question forms part of the public domain. (Natividad vs.
Director of Lands, supra.)

#25
MANILA INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT AUTHORITY vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 155650. July 20, 2006.
HELD: There is no dispute that a government-owned or controlled corporation (GOCC)
is not exempt from real estate tax. However, the Court ruled that MIAA is NOT a GOCC.
Firstly, under the Administrative Code, a GOCC is defined as any agency organized as a
stock or non-stock corporation, vested with functions relating to public needs whether
governmental or proprietary in nature, and owned by the Government directly or through
its instrumentalities either wholly, or, where applicable as in the case of stock
corporations, to the extent of at least 51% of its capital stock. MIAA is not organized as
a stock or non-stock corporation. MIAA is not a stock corporation because it has no
capital stock divided into shares. MIAA has no stockholders or voting shares. While
MIAA has capital, it is not divided into shares of stock and hence it is not a stock
corporation. MIAA is also NOT a non-stock corporation because it has no members. The
Court opined that even if we assume that the government is considered as the sole
member of MIAA, this will not make MIAA a non-stock corporation. Non-stock
corporations cannot distribute any part of their income to their members. Moreover, it
was said that MIAA is not organized for any of the purposes that a non-stock corporation
is established under the Corporation Code, namely charitable, religious, educational,
professional, cultural, recreational, fraternal, literary, scientific, social, civil service or
similar purposes. Rather, it is organized to operate an international and domestic airport
for public use. Hence, the Court noted that MIAA is a government instrumentality vested
with corporate powers to perform efficiently its governmental functions. Pursuant to this
ruling, it was noted that MIAA does not need to meet the two conditions set forth by the
Constitution for GOCCs with special charters, to wit: (1) that it must be established for
common good; and (2) that it must meet the test of economic viability. The second test is
further elucidated as one that applies to GOCCs that perform economic or commercial

activities and need to compete in the market place. Economic viability refers to more than
financial viability but also includes capability to make profit and generate benefits not
quantifiable in financial terms. MIAA, a government instrumentality vested with
corporate powers and performing governmental or public functions, need NOT meet the
test of economic viability. These instrumentalities need not be economically viable since
the government may even subsidize their entire operations for they perform essential
public services for the common good.
#26
Chavez v Public Estate Authority
GR No. 133250, July 9, 2002
Ratio Decidendi:
The petitioner has standing to bring the taxpayers suit because the petition seeks to
compel PEA to comply with its constitutional duties. These duties are particularly in
answer of the right of citizens to information on matters of public concern, and of a
constitutional provision intended to insure the equitable distribution of alienable lands of
the public domain among Filipino citizens.
Furthermore, the court considered that the petition raised matters of transcendental
importance to the public. The mere fact that the petitioner is a citizen satisfies the
requirement of personal interest when the proceeding involves the assertion of a public
right. Also, ordinary taxpayers have a right to initiate and prosecute actions questioning
the validity of acts or orders of government agencies or instrumentalities if the issues
raise are of paramount public interest and if they immediately affect the social, economic
and moral well-being of the people.
The amended JVA does not make the issue moot and academic since this compels the
court to insure the government itself does not violate a provision of the Constitution
intended to safeguard the national patrimony. The content of the amended JVA seeks to
transfer title and ownership of reclaimed lands to a single corporation. The court does not
hesitate to resolve the legal or constitutional issues raised to formulate controlling
principles to guide the bench, bar and the public.
The instant case raises constitutional issues of transcendental importance to the public.
Court can resolve this case without determining any factual issue related to the case. The
instant case is a petition for mandamus which falls under the original jurisdiction of the
Court. Furthermore, PEA was under a positive legal duty to disclose to the public the
terms and conditions for the sale of its lands. The principle of exhaustion of
administrative remedies does not apply when the issue involved is purely legal or
constitutional question.
The right to information includes official information on on-going negotiations before a
final agreement as required by the constitution.
The Supreme Court granted the petition. PEA and Amari Coastal Bay Development
Corporation are permanently enjoined from implementing the amended JVA which is
hereby declared null and void ab initio.
#27
Chavez v. National Housing Authority
G.R. No. 164527, August 15, 2007
HELD: The National Housing Authority (NHA) is a government agency not tasked to
dispose of public lands under its charter it is an end-user agency authorized by law to
administer and dispose of reclaimed lands. The moment titles over reclaimed lands based
on the special patents are transferred to the National Housing Authority (NHA) by the
Register of Deeds, they are automatically converted to patrimonial properties of the State
which can be sold to Filipino citizens and private corporations, 60% of which are owned
by Filipinos. The combined and collective effect of Proclamations Nos. 39 and 465 with
Special Patents Nos. 3592 and 3598 is tantamount to and can be considered to be an
official declaration that the reclaimed lots are alienable or disposable lands of the public
domain. Even if it is conceded that there was no explicit declaration that the lands are no
longer needed for public use or public service, there was however an implicit executive
declaration that the reclaimed areas are not necessary anymore for public use or public
service when President Aquino through MO 415 conveyed the same to the National

Housing Authority (NHA) partly for housing project and related commercial/industrial
development intended for disposition to and enjoyment of certain beneficiaries and not
the public in general and partly as enabling component to finance the project.
#28
Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 100709, November 14, 1997, 281 SCRA 639
HELD: The lease was an encumbrance included in the prohibitions of the patent because
it impairs the use of the land by Morato herself. As for the mortgage, it is a legal limit on
the title and if there will be foreclosure because Morato was not able to pay her debts, the
property will be auctioned. It is also a limitation on Morato's right to enjoy and possess
the land for herself. Encumbrance, as defined, is an impairment on the use or transfer of
property, or a claim or lien on the property where there is a burden on the title. Thus,
Morato clearly violated the terms of the patent on these points. Moreover, the property
became a foreshore land because it turned into a portion of land which was covered most
of the time with water, whether it was low or high tide. Foreshore is defined as land
between high and low waters which is dry depending on the reflux or ebb of the tides. In
accordance with this land reclassification, the land can no longer be subject to a pending
patent application and must be returned to the State.
29. Taleon vs Secretary of Public Works
Appellants' contentions are without merit. First of all, full trial was not
needed. The issues raised before the court a quo were all purely legal and
thus could be resolved on the basis of the pleadings and memoranda filed
and the administrative records sent up to it. No necessity was there for
further reception of evidence. Anent the jurisdiction of the Secretary of Public
Works, this point has been squarely covered in Lovina v. Moreno, L-17821,
November 29, 1963.1 There We upheld the power of the Public Works
Secretary under Republic Act 2056 to declare as a public navigable stream
any alleged depression or bodies of water even inside titled properties.
Regarding the alleged second decision of the Secretary, its non-existence has
been officially certified by the Chief of the Records Division of the Department
of Public Works, the official custodian.4 This alone is proof enough that there
is no such decision.5 But even granting that there is really such a decision, it
would not help appellants' cause any. Said decision would still be wanting of
legal force and effect since Secretary Moreno had already lost jurisdiction to
revoke the former ruling because of the appeal then already taken by
appellants themselves to the Office of the President, which affirmed the
former ruling. All the necessary facts being already before the court a quo, no
further trial was required. Its decision rendered at that stage was therefore
sanctioned by the Rules.
Wherefore, the judgment appealed from is hereby affirmed, with costs
against petitioners-appellants.
30. Baguios Citizen Action vs City Council
The Ordinance in question is a patent nullity. It considered all squatters
of public land in the City of Baguio as bona-fide occupants of their respective
lots. No amount of acquiescence on the part of the city officials will elevate
squatting from being an unlawful act into lawful. The land occupied by the
squatters are portions of water sheds, reservations, scattered portions of the
public domain within the Baguio townsite. Certainly, there is more reason
then to void the actions taken by the City of Baguio through the questioned
ordinance.
31. Manila Lodge No. 761 vs Court of Appeals
The petitions were denied for lack of merit. The court found it
necessary to analyze all the provisions of Act No. 1360, as amended, in order
to unravel the legislative intent. The grant made by Act No. 1360 of the
reclaimed land to the City of Manila is a grant of a public nature. Such
grants have always been strictly construed against the grantee because it is
a gratuitous donation of public money or resources, which resulted in an
unfair advantage to the grantee. In the case at bar, the area reclaimed would
be filled at the expense of the Insular Government and without cost to the
City of Manila. Hence, the letter of the statute should be narrowed to exclude

matters, which, if included, would defeat the policy of legislation.

32. Rabuco vs Villegas
No. The Court herein upholds the constitutionality of Republic Act 3120
on the strength of the established doctrine that the subdivision of communal
land of the State (although titled in the name of the municipal corporation)
and conveyance of the resulting subdivision lots by sale on installment basis
to bona fide occupants by Congressional authorization and disposition does
not constitute infringements of the due process clause or the eminent domain
provisions of the Constitution but operates simply as a manifestation of the
legislatures right of control and power to deal with State property. When a
property is owned by a political subdivision in its public and governmental
capacity, the Congress has absolute control as distinguished from patrimonial
property owned by it in its private or proprietary capacity of which it could
not be deprived without due process and without just compensation.
33. Province of Zamboanga del Norte vs City of Zamboanga
If we follow the Civil Code classification, only the high school
playgrounds are for public use since it is the only one that is available
to the general public, and all the rest are patrimonial property since
they are not devoted to public use but to public service. But if we
follow the law on Municipal Corporations, as long as the purpose is for
a public service, the property should be considered for PUBLIC USE.
If the Civil Code classification is used, since almost all the
properties involved are patrimonial, the law would be unconstitutional
since the province would be deprived of its own property without just
compensation. If the law on Municipal Corporations would be followed,
the properties would be of public dominion, and therefore NO
COMPENSATION would be required. It is the law on Municipal
Corporations that should be followed. Firstly, while the Civil Code may
classify them as patrimonial, they should not be regarded as ordinary
private property. They should fall under the control of the State,
otherwise certain governmental activities would be impaired. Secondly,
Art. 424, 2nd paragraph itself says "without prejudice to the provisions
of special laws."
34. Macasiano vs Diokno
No. The ordinance or resolution authorizing the lease and use of
public streets or thoroughfares as sites for a flea market is invalid.
Property for public use, in the provinces, cities and municipalities,
consists of the provincial roads, city streets, the squares, fountains,
public waters, promenades, and public works for public service paid for
by said provinces, cities or municipalities. All other property possessed
by any of them is patrimonial and shall be governed by this Code,
without prejudice to the provisions of special laws.
Based on the foregoing, J. Gabriel G.G. Cruz, Bayanihan, Lt.
Garcia Extension and Opena streets are local roads used for public
service and are therefore considered public properties of respondent
municipality. Properties of the local government which are devoted to
public service are deemed public and are under the absolute control of
Congress. Hence, local governments have no authority whatsoever to
control or regulate the use of public properties unless specific authority
is vested upon them by Congress.
Even assuming, in gratia argumenti, that respondent
municipality has the authority to pass the disputed ordinance, the
same cannot be validly implemented because it cannot be considered
approved by the Metropolitan Manila Authority due to non-compliance
by respondent municipality of the conditions imposed by the former for
the approval of the ordinance.
35. Quirubin vs Alconcel
This Court has invariably held that a possessory information inscribed
in the property registry demonstrates prima facie that the possessor of the
land to which it refers is the owner thereof. 5 Further, under the provisions of
sections 39, 40, and 41 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the lapse of a period
ten years was sufficient for the possessor of realty inscribed in the registry to
be regarded thereafter as the legitimate owner of said realty, when his
possession had been inscribed in the registry for over ten years. 6 In the case

at bar, the trial court found that Fulgencio Querubin, the father of the
petitioner, had inscribed his possessory information in the Registry of
Property of Vigan, Ilocos Sur, as early as April 26, 1895, and had been in
continuous possession of the land therein described for more than 10 years,
excluding the time that the property was submerged. Thus, the petitioner
Querubin must be deemed to have conclusively proved his ownership of the
property in dispute, or, in the very least, shown a prima facie title of
ownership thereto. In the latter situation, the respondents Alconcel et al. may
dislodge Querubin from his claim only by a superior title. Considering,
however, that Alconcel, et al. have no more than mere tax declarations
covering their respective claims the earliest of which dates back only to 1939
(contrasted with Querubin's tax declaration dated 1934), it follows that
Querubin's claim must prevail over that of Alconcel, et al.
36. Santos vs Estejada
This contract, as may be seen by its contents, did not transfer the
ownership of the property to the parties Victoriano Santos and Andrea
Espinosa, neither does it show that these spouses had any legal reason to
support their possession of the said land. In the decision rendered in the case
of Compaia General de Tabacos de Filipinas vs. Miguel Topio et al., (4 Phil.
Rep., 33), the rule was laid down that: "In an action of ejectment the plaintiff
seeking to recover possession of land must recover upon the strength of his
own title rather than upon the weakness of the title of the defendant, and the
burden of showing his title rests upon him who asserts it."1awphi1.net
In the decision of Belen Vs. Belen (13 Phil. Rep., 202), it is stated:
"Mere possession of the thing claimed is sufficient to insure respect for the
present holder, while no other person appears to show and prove a better
right, in accordance with the doctrine of the courts."
In the same decision of the following was likewise laid down: "If the plaintiff,
upon whom rests the burden of proving his cause of action, fails to show in a
satisfactory manner the facts upon which he bases his claim, the defendant is
under no obligation to prove his exceptions or defense."
In view of the fact that the plaintiffs have not duly proved their title to
the land actually occupied by the defendants, the Estejadas, as the tenantson-shares and representatives of Domingo Balugay, who is found to be the
lawful owner of the said land, although the proofs adduced by him are
somewhat deficient, there exists no legal ground upon which to deprive him
of the possession he now enjoys as owner.
37. Garcia vs Court of Appeals
No. Garcias possession which started only in 1986 could not ripen into
ownership. He has no valid title thereto. His possession in fact was that of an
intruder, one done in bad faith (to defeat PBComs Writ of Possession). His
possession is certainly not in the concept of an owner.
The Court stressed that possession and ownership are distinct legal
concepts. Ownership exists when a thing pertaining to one person is
completely subjected to his will in a manner not prohibited by law and
consistent with the rights of others. On the other hand, possession is defined
as the holding of a thing or the enjoyment of a right. Literally, to possess
means to actually and physically occupy a thing with or without right.
Possession may be had in one of two ways: possession in the concept of an
owner and possession of a holder.
The records show that petitioner occupied the property not in the
concept of an owner for his stay was merely tolerated by his parents.
Consequently, it is of no moment that petitioner was in possession of the
property at the time of the sale to the Magpayo spouses. On the other hand,
petitioners subsequent claim of ownership as successor to his mothers
share in the conjugal asset is belied by the fact that the property was not
included in the inventory of the estate submitted by his father to the
intestate court. This buttresses the ruling that indeed the property was no
longer considered owned by petitioners parents.
38. Javier vs Veridiano
No. The following are the requisites of res judicata: a) there is final
judgment or order; b) the court have jurisdiction over the subject matter; c)
former judgment is a judgment on merits; and d) identity of parties, of

subject matter, and of causes of action. The first three are present. There is
identity of parties in the case. What is required is not absolute but substantial
identity of parties. In the case, Rosete is a successor in interest of Babol by
title. Nevertheless, there is no identity of cause of action. CC 926 is a
complaint of forcible entry or accion interdictal where the issue is physical or
material possession of real property. In this case, Javier merely claimed a
better right or prior possession over the land without asserting title. CC 22030 is an action to recover a parcel of land or accion reivindicatori. In this case,
Javier expressly alleged ownership (by virtue of the Original Certificate of Title
issued) and specifically prayed that she be declared the rightful owner and be
given possession of the disputed portion. A judgement in forcible entry or
detainer case disposes of no other issue than possession and declares only
who has the right of possession, but by no means constitutes a bar to an
action for determination of who has the right or title of ownership.
39. German Management & Services vs Court of Appeals
No. The Doctrine of Self-help is not applicable because at the time
when German Management excluded the farmers, theres no longer an actual
or threatened unlawful physical invasion or usurpation. That actual or
threatened unlawful physical invasion by the farmers have already lapsed 12
years ago when they began occupying the said land. In fact, they were
already peaceably farming the land.
Regardless of the actual condition of the title to the property, the party
in peaceable quiet possession shall not be turned out by a strong hand,
violence or terror. Further, there is now a presumption of ownership in favor
of the farmers since they are the ones occupying the said property. They can
only be ejected either by accion publiciana or accion reivindicatoria through
which the spouses Joses better right may be proven.
40. Yu vs De Lara et al
The circumstances adverted to are insufficient to constitute
abandonment, which requires not only physical relinquishment of the thing
but also a clear intention not to reclaim or reassume ownership or enjoyment
thereof. No possessory rights whatsoever can be recognized in favor of
appellants, because they are in fact nothing but squatters, who settled on the
land without any agreement with the owner paying neither rents to him, nor
land taxes to the government, and who impliedly recognized their squatters'
status by purchasing only the houses built by the original settlers. Their
occupancy of the land was at the owner's sufference, and their acts were
merely tolerated which could not affect the owner's possession.
The implication of the argument is that this action of unlawful detainer
was improperly brought against them in the Justice of the Peace Court of
Caloocan. A person who occupies the land of another at the latter's tolerance
or permission, without any contract between them, is necessarily bound by
an implied promise that he will vacate upon demand, failing which a
summary fiction for ejectment is the property remedy against him.

41. Gumiran vs Gumiran

In the present case the allegation in the complaint is simply that the
plaintiff has been "deprived" of the land of which he is and has been the legal
owner for a long period. This allegation is not sufficient to show that the
action is based upon the provisions of said section 80. Moreover, upon an
examination of the prayer of the complaint, it is seen that the plaintiff is not
only seeking to be repossessed of the land but desires also a declaration that
he is the owner of the same.
It is not believed that it was the intention of the legislature in giving
justices of the peace original, exclusive jurisdiction in the cases mentioned in
the section 80, to thereby deprive the Courts of First Instance of original
jurisdiction in other cases of dispossession, where the plaintiff desires to have
the question of his title determined at the same time, even thought the
action should be commenced in the Court of First Instance within the year. For
all of the foregoing reasons, we are of the opinion and so decide that, under
the facts alleged in the complaint in the present case, the Court of First
Instance had jurisdiction and therefore the demurrer presented by the

defendant should have been overruled.

42. Gutierrez vs Rosario
With reference to the first assignment of error, the lower court did not
decide that the plaintiff was not entitled to the possession of the land in
question. The decision of the lower court was to the effect that an action for
the possession of the land in question could not be maintained in the court of
the justice of the peace for the reason that more than one year had elapsed
after the alleged illegal possession and before the commencement of the
action. It is possible that in an action of ejectment, commenced in the proper
court, the plaintiff may be able to show that he is entitled to the possession
of the land in question.
The action being one for forcible entry and detainer, commenced in the court
of the justice of the peace, not be changed to an action of ejectment by an
amendment of the pleadings in the Court of First Instance. The above
conclusion, of course, in now way indicates that the plaintiff is not entitled to
the possession of the land in question. The conclusion is simply that the
alleged wrongful possession having extended over a period of more than one
year, the justice of the peace had no jurisdiction to consider it.
43. Isaguirre vs De Lara
As a general rule, the mortgagor retains possession of the mortgaged
property since a mortgage is merely a lien and title to the property does not
pass to the mortgagee. However, even though a mortgagee does not have
possession of the property, there is no impairment of his security since the
mortgage directly and immediately subjects the property upon which it is
imposed, whoever the possessor may be, to the fulfillment of the obligation
for whose security it was constituted. If the debtor is unable to pay his debt,
the mortgage creditor may institute an action to foreclose the mortgage,
whether judicially or extrajudicially, whereby the mortgaged property will
then be sold at a public auction and the proceeds there from given to the
creditor to the extent necessary to discharge the mortgage loan. The trial
court correctly issued the writ of possession in favor of respondent. Such writ
was but a necessary consequence of affirming the validity of the original
certificate of title in the name of respondent Felicitas de Lara, while at the
same time nullifying the original certificate of title in the name of petitioner
Cornelio Isaguirre. Possession is an essential attribute of ownership; thus, it
would be redundant for respondent to go back to court simply to establish her
right to possess subject property.
44. Heirs of Roman Soriano vs Court of Appeals
No. It should be noted that the meat of the post decisional agreement
sought to be executed was the creation of a sub- lessor and sub-lessee
relationship between the de Veras and Roman Soriano. While it appears from
the above resolution of the trial court that there was a basis for private
respondents demand for reasonable compensation for the use of the
premises and for joint possession as a co-owner, the filing of a motion for
execution of the post decisional agreement between the de Vera spouses and
the petitioners predecessor, Roman Soriano, was not the proper remedy. The
pleading filed with the trial court was captioned Motion for Execution.
However, it was very clear that, under the circumstances they were in, the
relief demanded by the private respondents can properly be asked for in an
unlawful detainer case or in other proper proceedings. A case for unlawful
detainer was already brought by the private respondents against the
petitioner but the former sought its dismissal for reasons not known. Be that
as it may, there is still a pending civil action between the parties (Civil Case
No. 15958) where possession is one of the issues to be resolved.

45. Caisip vs People

Article 429 is inapplicable, Cabalag was given 20 days from June 6,
1959 within which to vacate the premises. Cabalag did not, on June 17, 1959
or within said period invade or usurp said lot. She had merely remained
in possession thereof, even though the hacienda owner may have become its
co-possessor. Appellants did not repel or prevent in actual or threatened . . .
physical invasion or usurpation. They expelled Gloria from a property of

which she and her husband were in possession. It is, accordingly, clear that
appellants herein had, by means of violence, and without legal authority
therefor, prevented the complainant from doing something not prohibited by
law, (weeding and being in Lot 105-A), and compelled her to do something
against her will (stopping the weeding and leaving said lot), whether it be
right or wrong, thereby taking the law into their hands, in violation of Art.
286 of the Revised Penal Code.
46. People vs Pletcha
Yes. The principle of self-help authorizes the lawful possessor to use
force not only to prevent a threatened unlawful invasion or usurpation
thereof; it is sort of self-defense. It is lawful to repel force by force. He who
merely uses force to defend his possession does not possess by force. The
use of such necessary force to protect proprietary or possessory rights
constitutes a justifying circumstance under our penal laws.
The appellant need not rush to court to seek redress before reasonably
resisting the invasion of property. The situation required immediate action
and Article 429 gave him the self-executory mechanics of self-defense and
self-reliance.
47. Custodio vs CA
No. The award is not proper. This is an instance of damnum absque
injuria.
There is a material distinction between damages and injury. Injury is the
illegal invasion of a legal right; damage is the loss, hurt, or harm which
results from the injury; and damages are the recompense or compensation
awarded for the damage suffered. Thus, there can be damage without injury
in those instances in which the loss or harm was not the result of a violation
of a legal duty.
In this case, it is true that Mabasa may have incurred losses (damage) when
his tenants left because of the fence made by the Santoses. However, when
Santos built the fence, he was well within his right. He built the fence inside
his property. There was no existing easement agreement, either by contract
or by operation of law, on his property. Hence, Santos has all the right to build
the fence. It was only after the judgment in the trial court that the easement
was created which was even conditioned on the payment of Mabasa of the
just compensation. Santos did not commit a legal injury against Mabasa when
he built the fence, therefore, there is no actionable wrong as basis for the
award of damages. In this case, the damage has to be borne by Mabasa.
48. Andamo vs IAC
Yes. A careful examination of the aforequoted complaint shows that the
civil action is one under Articles 2176 and 2177 of the Civil Code on quasidelicts. Clearly, from petitioners complaint, the waterpaths and contrivances
built by respondent corporation are alleged to have inundated the land of
petitioners. It must be stressed that the use of ones property is not without
limitations. Article 431 of the Civil Code provides that the owner of a thing
cannot make use thereof in such a manner as to injure the rights of a third
person. SIC UTERE TUO UT ALIENUM NON LAEDAS. Moreover, adjoining
landowners have mutual and reciprocal duties which require that each must
use his own land in a reasonable manner so as not to infringe upon the rights
and interests of others.
49. Higgins Oil & Fuel Co. vs Guaranty Oil Co.
Courts have seen before them the interest of the owner of the land
where such minerals are found, and from this view have stated the absolute
ownership doctrine, namely, that the landowner is the absolute owner of the
minerals either solid or fluid or gaseous found on or in his land. This rule was
found to do injustice to the neighboring landowner, and the opposite extreme
was then suggested, that it, that the one does not own such minerals until
they are definitely appropriated. It does not seem to have been perceived
that ownership was merely a term referring to an aggregate of legal relations
in the owner and hence denoted the number of such relations beyond
which the ownership would be absolute instead of qualified.

50. Republic vs CA, Dela Rosa

No. Our holding is that Benguet and Atok have exclusive rights to the
property in question by virtue of their respective mining claims which they
validly acquired before the Constitution of 1935 prohibited the alienation of
all lands of the public domain except agricultural lands, subject to vested
rights existing at the time of its adoption.
The Court feels that the rights over the land are indivisible and that the
land itself cannot be half agricultural and half mineral. The classification must
be categorical; the land must be either completely mineral or completely
agricultural.
The flaw in the reasoning of the respondent court is in supposing that
the rights over the land could be used for both mining and non-mining
purposes simultaneously. The correct interpretation is that once minerals are
discovered in the land, whatever the use to which it is being devoted at the
time, such use may be discontinued by the State to enable it to extract the
minerals therein in the exercise of its sovereign prerogative. The land is thus
converted to mineral land and may not be used by any private party,
including the registered owner thereof, for any other purpose that will impede
the mining operations to be undertaken therein.
51. Villanueva vs Claustro
First. The law provides that the beds of rivers which remain abandoned
because the course of the water has naturally changed belong to the owners
of the riparian lands throughout their respective lengths. Second. The right in
re to the principal is likewise a right in re to the accessory, as it is a mode of
acquisition, provided by law, as the result of the right of accretion, since the
accessory follows the nature of the principal, and there need not be any
tendency to the thing or manifestation of the purpose to subject it to our
ownership, as it is subject thereto ipso jure from the moment the mode of
acquisition becomes evident. Third. The occupation of a thing belonging to
another may lead to another mode of acquisition, which is the prescription of
ownership, whenever the possession of such thing under ordinary
prescription, which is that alleged of twenty years, is accompanied by the
other requisites prescribed by law, such as good faith, proper title and legal
period of time. Mere occupation is not a title of acquisition except when it
concerns "things which can be appropriated by reason of their nature, which
have no owners, such as animals which are the object of hunting and fishing,
hidden treasure and abandoned property."
52. Morales vs CA
We cannot sustain the Court of Appeals. Under the aforequoted
provisions, a Regional Trial Court, in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction,
should remand a case in the event it reverses a decision of the MTC which
ruled on a question of law, provided that there was no trial on the merits. A
remand is a due process requirement, because it affords the parties an
opportunity to present evidence on the merits of the case. In the case at bar,
it is clear that the MTC afforded due process to the parties; it received
relevant evidence sufficient to decide the ejectment case on its merits. As
borne by its decision. As to the manner of entry into possession by the
defendant, this Court finds it difficult to believe that he did so through stealth
and strategy. Being relatives and not estranged at least up to the time when
the issue in this case cropped up, possession of the defendant was open and
known to the plaintiff. Likewise, the use of the land is also known to remain
as agricultural, particularly devoted to rice production. The Court, therefore,
finds no compelling reason to remand the case to the MTC, as the underlying
purpose and objective for such remand is already fait accompli. As previously
noted, the MTC observed due process. On appeal, the decision of the RTC was
based on the facts adduced by the parties before the MTC. Consequently,
remanding the case to the MTC serves no useful purpose, for the parties have
already presented their evidence. Besides, there was no allegation that the
parties intended to present additional evidence which might warrant a
change in the resolution of the case.
53. Ignao vs Intermediate Appellate Court
Petitioner has the right whether to appropriate the houses or to sell his
land. The ruling of the RTC and IAC contravened the explicit provisions of Art

448 which granted him the explicit right to choose. The law is clear when it
bestows choice upon the aggrieved land owner and not upon the builders or
the courts.
54. Macasaet vs Macasaet
In actions for unlawful detainer, possession that was originally lawful
becomes unlawful upon the expiration or termination of the defendants right
to possess, arising from an express or implied contract. To show a cause of
action in an unlawful detainer, an allegation that the defendant is illegally
withholding possession from the plaintiff is sufficient. This Court has
consistently held that those who occupy the land of another at the latters
tolerance or permission, without any contract between them, are necessarily
bound by an implied promise that the occupants will vacate the property
upon demand. In terms of the rights of a builder in good faith the court ruled
that article 448 covers only cases in which the builders, sowers or planters
believe themselves to be owners of the land or, at least, to have a claim of
title thereto. It does not apply when the interest is merely that of a holder,
such as a mere tenant, agent or usufructuary. From these pronouncements,
good faith is identified by the belief that the land is owned; or that -- by some
title -- one has the right to build, plant, or sow thereon. Consequently,
respondents have the right to appropriate -- as their own -- the building and
other improvements on the subject lots, but only after (1) refunding the
expenses of petitioners or (2) paying the increase in value acquired by the
properties by reason thereof. They have the option to oblige petitioners to
pay the price of the land, unless its value is considerably more than that of
the structures -- in which case, petitioners shall pay reasonable rent.
55. Munar vs CA
The Munars next contend that the Nieveses cannot anymore collect the
rentals because the special power of attorney executed in their favor was
revoked by the Palisocs. This contention is without merit. The trial court found
that the contract of lease was between the Munars and Nieveses. The
Palisocs were not parties to the said lease contract. We have ruled that a
tenant cannot, in an action involving the possession of the leased premises,
controvert the title of his landlord or assert any rights adverse to that title.
Neither can he set up any inconsistent right to change the relation existing
between himself and his landlord. Well-settled is the rule that the mere
allegation of ownership of the property in dispute by the defendant in an
ejectment suit or the pendency of an action for reconveyance of title over the
same property does not divest the inferior court of its jurisdiction over the
ejectment suit. The only exception to this rule is where the question of de
facto possession cannot be determined properly without settling that of
ownership because the latter is inseparably linked with the former (Guzman
v. Court of Appeals, 177 SCRA 604 [1989]). The exception does not apply to
the instant case. The Nieveses, by virtue of the notarized Conditional Deed of
Sale executed in their favor by the Palisocs, transferred possession of the
questioned property to the former. The execution of a sale, thru a public
instrument, shall be equivalent to the delivery of the thing, unless there is
stipulation to the contrary.
56. Feliciano vs Spouses Zaldivar
It has been consistently ruled that when the owners duplicate
certificate of title has not been lost, but is in fact in the possession of another
person, then the reconstituted certificate is void, because the court that
rendered the decision had no jurisdiction. Reconstitution can validly be made
only in case of loss of the original certificate.
As registered owners of the lots in question, the private respondents
have a right to eject any person illegally occupying their property. This right is
imprescriptible. Even if it be supposed that they were aware of the
petitioners occupation of the property, and regardless of the length of that
possession, the lawful owners have a right to demand the return of their
property at any time as long as the possession was unauthorized or merely
tolerated, if at all. This right is never barred by laches.
It is understood that there is bad faith on the part of the landowner
whenever the act was done with his knowledge and without opposition on his
part.
Under the circumstances, respondents and Remegia are in mutual bad faith

and, as such, would entitle the former to the application of Article 448 of the
Civil Code governing builders in good faith
57. Pecson vs CA
With regard to Art. 448, the provision on indemnity may be applied in
analogy. Whoever is the owner of the land may appropriate whatever has
been built, planted or sown after paying indemnity. However, it does not
apply when the owner of the land is also the builder of the works on his own
land who later on loses ownership by sale or donation.
Art. 546 refers to the necessary and useful expenses which shall be
refunded to the possessor in good faith with right of retention. However, it
does not state how to determine the value of the useful improvement. The
case was remanded to the trial court for determination of the current market
value of the apartment bldg and ordered the Sps to pay Pecson otherwise it
shall be restored to Pecson until payment of indemnity.

58. Pecson vs CA
By its clear language, Article 448 refers to a land whose ownership is
claimed by two or more parties, one of whom has built some works, or sown
or planted something. The building, sowing or planting may have been made
in good faith or in bad faith. The rule on good faith laid down in Article 526 of
the Civil Code shall be applied in determining whether a builder, sower or
planter had acted in good faith. Thus in strict point of law, Article 448 is not
apposite to the case at bar.
The trial court also erred in ordering the petitioner to pay monthly
rentals equal to the aggregate rentals paid by the lessees of the apartment
building. Since the private respondents have opted to appropriate the
apartment building, the petitioner is thus entitled to the possession and
enjoyment of the apartment building, until he is paid the proper indemnity, as
well as of the portion of the lot where the building has been constructed. This
is so because the right to retain the improvements while the corresponding
indemnity is not paid implies the tenancy or possession in fact of the land on
which it is built, planted or sown.
59. Nuguid vs CA
The Supreme Court reinstated the decision of the CFI of Bataan. The
basis for the Court of Appeals' conclusion that petitioners were buyers in bad
faith is ambiguous because said court relied on the singular circumstance
that the petitioners are from Orani, Bataan, and should have personally
known that the private respondents were the persons in actual possession.
However, at the time of the purchase, the spouses Nuguid dealt with Pedro
Guevarra and Pascuala Tolentino, the latter being the actual occupants. The
respondents Guevarras, children of the said Pedro and Pascuala Guevarra,
came into the picture only after their parents died. As for the respondent
heirs of Victorino dela Rosa, their being in actual possession of any portion of
the property was, likewise, simply presumed or taken for granted by the
Court of Appeals.
60. Rosales et al vs Castellfort
Affirmative. Both parties having acted in good faith at least until
August 21, 1995, Art. 448 should apply. Respondents good faith ceased
when petitioner personally appraised him of the title over the questioned lot.
Should petitioner opt to appropriate the house they should only be made to
pay for the part of the improvement built by respondent until Aug. 21. Said
part should be pegged at its current fair market value. The commencement of
respondents payment of reasonable rent should start on Aug. 21, 1995 as
well to be paid until such time that the possession of the property is delivered
to the petitioners subject to reimbursement of expenses.
However, appellants ceased as builders in good faith at the time
appellant was notified of the appellees lawful title over the property. The
payment of the reasonable rent should accordingly commence at that time
(notice was given) since he can no longer avail of the rights for builders in
good faith.

61. Ignacio vs Hilario

No. The owner in good faith has to make a choice. He cannot
dispense the options under the law and then eject the builder in good faith.
This is because both are in good faith. However, if after the owner in good
faith chose to sell his land to the builder in good faith and the latter fails to
pay the value of the land within the agree period. Only then can the owner in
good faith compel the builder in good faith to remove the building he erected.
62. Filipinas Colleges Inc. vs Timbang
NO, THE APPELLANTS CONTENTION IS SUPERFLUOUS. There is nothing
in the language of these two articles, 448 and 546, which would justify the
conclusion of appellants that, upon the failure of the builder to pay the value
of the land, when such is demanded by the land-owner, the latter becomes
automatically the owner of the improvement under Article 445. Although it is
true, it was declared therein that in the event of the failure of the builder to
pay the land after the owner thereof has chosen this alternative, the builder's
right of retention provided in Article 546 is lost, nevertheless there was
nothing said that as a consequence thereof, the builder loses entirely all
rights over his own building. The second contention was without merit. In the
instant case, the Court of Appeals has already adjudged that appellee
Blas is entitled to the payment of the unpaid balance of the purchase price of
the school building. With respect to the order of the court declaring appellee
Filipinas Colleges, Inc. part owner of the land to the extent of the value of its
personal properties sold at public auction in favor of the Timbang, this Court
likewise finds the same as justified, for such amount represents, in effect, a
partial payment of the value of the land. Failure of the Timbang spouses to
pay to the Sheriff or to Manila Gervacio Blas said sum of P5,750.00 within
fifteen (15) days from notice of the final judgment, an order of execution shall
issue in favor of Maria Gervasio Blas to be levied upon all properties of the
Timbang spouses not exempt from execution for the satisfaction of the said
amount.
63. Quemuel vs Olaes
A cause of action presupposes a right of the plaintiff and a violation of
such right by the defendant. According to the complaint itself, the rental of
P20.00 monthly and the order to vacate, were provided in a prior judgment,
which is final and its validity is not assailed. The defendants are not
compelling the plaintiffs to rent the property but wanted them to vacate the
premises. If the rental determined by the trial court were excessive, the
plaintiffs are free to vacate the property. For plaintiffs to insist on possessing
the property and fixing the rentals themselves, would have no legal sanction
at all.
The plaintiffs claim that their second cause of action is based on Article
448 in connection with Art. 546, of the new Civil Code. A cursory reading of
these provisions, however, will show that they are not applicable to plaintiffs'
case. Under Article 448, the right to appropriate the works or improvements
or "to oblige the one who built or planted to pay the price of the land belongs
to the owner of the land. The only right given to the builder in good faith is
the right to reimbursement for the improvements; the builder, cannot compel
the owner of the land to sell such land to the former. This is assuming that
the plaintiffs are builders in good faith. But the plaintiffs are not builders in
good faith.
64. Germiniano et al vs CA et al
No, they were not builders in good faith. The respondents knew that
their stay would end after the lease contract expires. They cant bank on the
promise, which was not in writing, of the petitioners that the latter will sell
the land to them. According to 1403, an agreement for the sale of real
property or an interest therein is unenforceable, unless some note or
memorandum thereof be produced. Other than the alleged promise by
petitioner, respondents had no other evidence to prove their claim.
They are mere lessees in good faith; therefore Art 1678 may apply if
the lessor chooses to appropriate the improvements. But since the petitioners
refused to exercise that option, the private respondents cant compel them to
reimburse the one-half value of the house and improvements. Neither can
they retain the premises until reimbursement is made. The private

respondents sole right then is to remove the improvements without causing

any more impairment upon the property leased than is necessary.
65. Tayag vs Yuseco
Once a choice is made by the landowner it is generally irrevocable.
Thus, if the landowner has opted/elected to appropriate the building but he is
unable to pay for the indemnity or amount, the landowner CANNOT
afterwards opt/elect to sell the land. Since Tayags first choice had already
been communicated to the court and she had already been ordered to pay,
her duty has been converted into a monetary obligation which can be
enforced by a writ of execution.
66. Depra vs Dumlao
In the first issue, res judicata would not apply should the first case be
one for ejectment and the other for quieting of title. Article 448 of the Civil
Code provides that the land owner has 2 options to buy the building or to
sell/rent his land. This is so because the rights of the owner of the land is
older, and by the principle of accession, he also has a right to the
accessories.
The Court remanded the case to the RTC to determine the fair price of
the land, the expenses incurred by the BPS (Dumlao), the increase in value of
the land, and whether the value of the land is considerably more than the
value of the kitchen built on it. The RTC shall then give Depra 15 days to
exercise such option.
67. Heirs of E. Navarro vs IAC
It cannot be registered. This is land of Public domain. Pascual claimed
ownership under Article 457 of the Civil Code saying that the disputed 14hectare land is an accretion caused by the joint action of the Talisay and
Bulacan Rivers Art 457: Accretion as a mode of acquiring property and
requires the concurrence of the following requisites: (1) that the accumulation
of soil or sediment be gradual and imperceptible; (2) that it be the result of
the action of the waters of the river; and (3) that the land where the accretion
takes place is adjacent to the bank of the river. Unfortunately, Pasucal and
Heirs claim of ownership based on Art 457 is misplaced. If theres any land to
be claimed, it should be land ADJACENT to the rivers Talisay and Bulacan. The
law is clear on this. Accretion of land along the river bank may be registered.
This is not the case of accretion of land on the property adjacent to Manila
Bay.
Furthermore, Manila Bay is a sea. Accretion on a sea bank is foreshore land
and the applicable law is not Art 457 but Art 4 of the Spanish Law of Waters
of 1866.
68. Agustin vs IAC
Art. 457 states that the owner of the lands adjoining river banks own
the accretion which they gradually receive from the effects of the currents of
the waters. Accretion benefits a riparian owner provided that these elements
are present: 1) deposit be gradual and imperceptible 2) it resulted from the
effects of the current of the water and 3) the land is adjacent to the river
bank. When the River moved from 1919 to 1968, there was alluvium
deposited and it was gradual and imperceptible.
Also, respondents ownership over said lots was not removed when due
to the sudden and abrupt change in the course of the river; their accretions
were transferred to the other side. Art. 459 states when the current of a river
x x x segregates from an estate on its bank a known portion of land and
transfers it to another estate, the owner of segregated portion retains
ownership provided he removes the same w/in 2 years. And Art. 463 states
that whenever the current of a river divides itself into branches, leaving a
piece of land or part thereof isolated, the owner of the land retains
ownership. He also retains it if a portion of land is separated from the estate
by the current.
69. Govt vs Colegio De San Jose
Inasmuch as, according to article 407 of the Civil Code, lakes and their
beds belong to the public domain, and inasmuch as, according to article 74 of
the Law of Waters, the bed of lake is the ground covered by its waters at their
highest ordinary depth; whereas the waters of Laguna de Bay at their highest
depth reach no farther than the northeastern boundary of the two parcels of

land in question, said parcels are outside said bed and, consequently, do not
belong to the public domain. The Government of the Philippine Islands also
contends that as the waters of Laguna de Bay have receded very much, as a
result of which the two parcels of land, which had been under water before,
were left uncovered, the claimant Colegio de San Jose which owned the
estate bordering upon said Laguna de Bay, did not acquire said two parcels of
land, in accordance with the provisions of article 367 of the Civil Code. As
may be seen, the legal provision, cited by the appellant in support of its
contention, refers to ponds and lagoons, and has therefore no application to
the case at bar,
70. Viajar vs CA
It was established in the trial that for a period of 40 years the Suague
river overflowed its banks yearly and the property of the defendant gradually
received deposits of soil from the effects of the current of the river. It is a well
settled rule that registration under the Torrens System does not protect the
riparian owner against the dimunition of the area of his registered land
through gradual changes in the course of an adjoining stream or river.
Accretions which the banks of the river may gradually receive from the effect
of the current become the property of the owners of the banks.
71. Reynante vs CA
While it is true that alluvial deposits shall belong to the owner of the lot
adjoining such accretion, it does not automatically bestow an
imprescriptibility. If the owners of said land have not registered this with the
proper entity, said land will be subject to acquisition by prescription, which
was what occurred in this case. Since the affidavits prove that Reynante has
been in possession of these lands for more than 50 years, the SC rightly held
that the land belongs to him.
72. Republic vs CA
The inundation of a portion of the land is not due to "flux and reflux of
tides" it
cannot be considered a foreshore land, hence it is not a public land and
therefore capable of registration as private property provided that the
applicant proves that he has a registerable title. The purpose of land
registration under the Torrens System is not the acquisition of lands but only
the registration of title which applicant already possesses over the land.
While it is true that by themselves tax receipts and declarations of ownership
for taxation purposes are not incontrovertible evidence of ownership, they
become strong evidence of ownership acquired by prescription when
accompanied by proof of actual possession of the property. Applicant by
himself and through his father before him, has been in open, continuous,
public, peaceful, exclusive and adverse possession of the disputed land for
more than thirty (30) years and has presented tax declarations and tax
receipts. Applicant has more than satisfied the legal requirements. Thus, he is
clearly entitled to the registration in his favor of said land.

73. Vda. De Nazareno, et al vs CA

Petitioners claim that the subject land is private land being an
accretion to his titled
property, applying Art. 457
To the owner of lands adjoining the banks of river belong
gradually receive from the effect of the current of the water.
In the case of Meneses v. CA, 2 this Court held that accretion, as a mode of
acquiring property
under Art. 457 of the Civil Code, requires the concurrence of these requisites.
a.
b.
c.
These are called the rules on alluvion which if present in a case, give to
the owner of lands adjoining the bank of rivers or stream any accretion
gradually received from the effect of the current of waters. Furthermore, the
Bureau of Lands, classified the subject land as an accretion are which was
formed by deposits of sawdust in Balacanas Creek and the Cagayan river, in

accordance with the ocular inspection conducted by the Bureau of Land.

74. Payatas-Estate Improvement Co. vs Tuason
No. Article 366 of the [Old] Civil Code provides: any accretions which
the banks of rivers may gradually receive from the effect of the current
belong to the owners of the estates bordering thereon. This provision applies
even to Torrens titled lands.
Accretions of that character are natural incidents to land bordering on
running streams and are not affected by the registration laws. It follows that
registration does not protect the riparian owner (Payatas Estate) against
diminution of the area of his land through gradual changes in the course of
the adjoining stream.
Avulsion cannot be raised as well as a ground to lay claim over the 22
hectares land now forming part of the Mariquina estate. There was no
evidence presented to show that the increase was due to avulsion. The
presumption is that the change was gradual and cause by erosion of the
Payatas bank of the river and consequent accretion to the Mariquina estate. It
follows that the land in question is now a part of that estate and no longer
pertains to the Payatas estate.
75. C.N. Hodges vs Garcia
It should here be stated that in the cadastral proceedings wherein the
land object of this action was sought to be registered by herein defendant
Amador D. Garcia, plaintiff C.N. Hodges did not file any opposition despite
due publication of the notice of the application and hearing. The record also
shows that the land now being claimed by plaintiff had been litigated in three
civil cases. In those cases, herein defendant was recognized as the owner of
the land and held legally entitled to its possession. In fact, the land in
question had been adjudged to be owned by him as an accretion to his lot No.
2290.
It clearly appearing that the land in question has become part of
defendant's estate as a result of accretion, it follows that said land now
belongs to him. The fact that the accretion to his land used to pertain to
plaintiff's estate, which is covered by a Torrens certificate of title, cannot
preclude him (defendant) from being the owner thereof. Registration does not
protect the riparian owner against the diminution of the area of his land
through gradual changes in the course of the adjoining stream. Accretions
which the banks of rivers may gradually receive from the effect of the current
become the property of the owners of the banks. (Art. 366 of the old Civil
Code; art. 457 of the new.)