DECISIONS OF PRINCIPLE

4.2.2 Ordinary men are not so fortunate as the man in our artificial example.
They start, indeed, without any knowledge of the future at all; and when they
acquire knowledge it is not of this intuitive kind. The kind of knowledge that we
have of the future -- unless we are clairvoyant -- is based upon principles of
prediction which we are taught, or form for ourselves. Principles of prediction
are one kind of principle of action; for to predict is to act in a certain way. Thus,
although there is nothing logically to prevent someone doing entirely without
principles, and making all his choices in the arbitrary manner exhibited in the
first kind of answer, this never in fact occurs. Moreover, our knowledge of the
future is fragmentary and only probable; and therefore in many cases the
principles which we are taught or form for ourselves say, not 'Choose this kind
of effect rather than that', but 'You do not know for certain what will be the
effects; but do this rather than that, and the effects are most likely to be such as
you would have chosen, if you had known them'. It is important to remember, in
this connexion, that 'likely' and 'probable' are value-words: in many contexts 'It
is probable (or likely) that P' is adequately rendered by 'There is good reason (or
evidence) for holding that P'.