REPUBLIC VS SANDIGANBAYAN

GR NO 104768
FACTS:
The petition for review on certiorari seeking to set aside the resolutions
of the sandiganbayan.
Immediately after successful EDSA Revolution, Pres. Aquino issued EO
No. 1 creating PCGG which is tasked to recover all ill-gotten wealth of former
Pres. Marcos, his immediate family, relatives, subodinates and close
associates. Accordingly, PCGG through Chairman Salonga created and AFP
Anti-graft Board (AFP Board) tasked to investigate reports of unexplained
wealth and corrupt practices by AFP personnel, whether in the active service
or retired. AFP Board investigated various reports of alleged unexplained
wealth of Maj. Gen. Ramas. Based on the findings, he owned a house and lot
in La vIsta in QC and the equipment/items of communication facilities were
found in the premises of Elizabeth Dimaano, the mistress of the reposndent,
which were likewise confiscated. It has been recomended that Maj. Gen.
Ramas be prosecuted and tried for violation of RA 3019 or Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices and RA 1379 An Act for the forfeiture of unlawfully
acquired property on which the PCGG has filed a petition for forfeiture under
RA 1379. An amendment complaint was filed alleging that Ramas acquired
funds, assets and properties by taking undue advantage of their public office
while Dimaano was confidential agent of RAmas.Sandiganbayan rendered a
decision dismissing the amendment of complaint for lack or merit and
ordered to return the confiscated stuff to Elizabeth dimaano. And MR wasfiled
by the petitioner. Sandiganbayan rendered A Reso denying the motion.
ISSUE: WON the respondent court seriously erred in declaring the properties
confiscated from Dimaanos house a illegally seized
HELD:
The EDSA Revolution took place on 23-25 February 1986. As succinctly
stated in President Aquinos Proclamation No. 3 dated 25 March 1986, the
EDSA Revolution was done in defiance of the provisions of the 1973
Constitution. The resulting government was indisputably a revolutionary
government bound by no constitution or legal limitations except treaty
obligations that the revolutionary government, as thede jure government in
the Philippines, assumed under international law.
We hold that the Bill of Rights under the 1973 Constitution was not
operative during the interregnum. However, we rule that the protection
accorded to individuals under the Covenant and the Declaration remained in
effect during the interregnum. During the interregnum, the directives and
orders of the revolutionary government were the supreme law because no
constitution limited the extent and scope of such directives and orders. With
the abrogation of the 1973 Constitution by the successful revolution, there
was no municipal law higher than the directives and orders of the
revolutionary government. Thus, during the interregnum, a person could not
invoke any exclusionary right under a Bill of Rights because there was
neither a constitution nor a Bill of Rights during the interregnum.
To hold that the Bill of Rights under the 1973 Constitution remained
operative during the interregnum would render void all sequestration orders
issued by the Philippine Commission on Good Government (PCGG) before
the adoption of the Freedom Constitution. The sequestration orders, which
direct the freezing and even the take-over of private property by mere
executive issuance without judicial action, would violate the due process and
search and seizure clauses of the Bill of Rights. During the interregnum, the
government in power was concededly a revolutionary government bound by

no constitution. No one could validly question the sequestration orders as

violative of the Bill of Rights because there was no Bill of Rights during the
interregnum. However, upon the adoption of the Freedom Constitution, the
sequestered companies assailed the sequestration orders as contrary to the
Bill of Rights of the Freedom Constitution.
ACCFA VS CUGCO
1989
FACTS:
G.R. No. L-21484 November 29, 1969
Facts:
1. ACCFA, a government agency created under RA 821, as amended was
reorganized and its name changed to Agricultural Credit Administration
(ACA) under the RA 3844 or Land Reform Code. While ACCFA
Supervisors' Association (ASA) and the ACCFA Workers' Association
(AWA), are labor organizations (the Unions) composed of the
supervisors and the rank-and-file employees in the ACCFA.
2. A CBA was agreed upon by labor unions (ASA and AWA) and ACCFA.
The said CBA was supposed to be effective on 1 July 1962. Due to nonimplementation of the CBA the unions held a strike. And 5 days later,
the Unions, with its mother union, the Confederation of Unions in
Government Corporations and Offices (CUGCO), filed a complaint
against ACCFA before the CIR on ground of alleged acts of unfair labor
practices; violation of the collective bargaining agreement in order to
discourage the members of the Unions in the exercise of their right to
self-organization, discrimination against said members in the matter of
promotions and refusal to bargain.
3. ACCFA moved for a reconsideration but while the appeal was pending,
RA 3844 was passed which effectively turned ACCFA to ACA. Then, ASA
and AWA petitioned that they obtain sole bargaining rights with ACA.
While this petition was not yet decided upon, EO 75 was also passed
which placed ACA under the Land Reform Project Administration.
Notwithstanding the latest legislation passed, the trial court and the
appellate court ruled in favor of ASA and AWA.
ISSUE: W/N ACA is a government entity
HELD:
Labor law; Land Reform Code; ACA is a government office engaged in
governmental, not propriatary function.The ACA is a government office
engaged in governmental, not proprietary functions. There can be no dispute
as to the fact that the land reform program contemplated in the Land Reform
Code is beyond the capabilities of any private enterprise to translate into
reality. It is a purely governmental function, no less than, say, the
establishment and maintenance of public schools and public hospitals. And
when, aside from the governmental objectives, of the ACA, geared as they
are to the implementation of the land reform program of the State, the law
itself declares that the ACA is a government office, with the formulation of
policies, plans and programs vested no longer in a Board of Governors, as in
the case of the ACCFA, but in the National Land Reform Council, itself a
government instrumentality; and that its personnel are subject to Civil
Service Laws and to rules of standardization with respect to positions and
salaries, any vestige 01 doubt as to the governmental character of its
functions disappears.
Same; Same; Same; Functions of ACA may not be strictly described
"constituent,"
as
distinguished
from
"ministrant,"
functions.The
governmental functions of ACA may not be strictly what President Wilson

described as "constituent" (as distinguished from "ministrant"), such as

those relating to the maintenance of peace and the prevention of crime,
those regulating property and property rights, those relating to the
administration of justice and the determination of political duties of citizens,
and those relating to national defense and foreign relations. Under this
traditional classification, such constituent functions are exercised by the
State as attributes of sovereignty, and not merely to promote the welfare,
progress and prosperity of the peoplethese latter functions being
ministrant, the exercise of which is optional on the part of the government
The growing complexities of modern society, however, have rendered this
traditional classification of the functions of government quite unrealistic, not
to say obsolete, The areas which used to be left to private enterprise and
initiative and which the government was called upon to enter optionally
continue to lose their well-defined boundaries and to be absorbed within
activities that the government must undertake in its sovereign capacity if it
is to meet the increasing social challenges of the times. In the Philippines as
abmost everywhere else the tendency is undoubtedly towards a greater
socialization of economic forces. Here of course this development was
envisioned, indeed adopted as a national policy, by the Constitution itself in
its declaration of principle concerning the promotion of social justice. It was
in furtherance of such policy that the Land Reform Code was enacted and the
various agencies, the ACA among them, established to carry out its
purposes.
In Bacani v. NACOCO, governmental functions are classified into constituent
and ministrant. The former are those which constitute the very bonds of
society and are compulsory in nature; the latter are those that are
undertaken only by way of advancing the general interests of society, and
are merely optional. President Wilson enunierates the constituent functions
as follows: (1) The keeping of order and providing for the protection of
persons and property from violence and robbery; (2) The fixing of the legal
relations between man and wife and between parents and children; (3) The
regulation of the holding, transmission, and interchange of property, and the
determination of its liabilities for debt or for crime; (4) The determination of
contractual rights between individuals; (5) The definition and punishment of
crime; (6) The administration of justice in civil cases; (7) The determination
of the political duties, privileges, and relations of citizens; (8) Dealings of the
state with foreign powers: the preservation of the state from external danger
or encroachment and the advancement of its international interests. The
most important of the ministrant functions are: public works, public
education, public charity, health and safety regulations, and regulations of
trade and industry. The principles determining whether or not a government
shall exercise certain of these optional functions are (1) that a government
should do for the public welfare those things which private capital would not
naturally undertake and (2)that a government should do these things which
by its very nature is better equipped to administer for the public welfare than
is any private individual or group of individuals.

GOVERNMENT VS MONTE DE PIEDAD

GR NO L-9959 DEC 13, 1916
FACTS:
Petitioner: Government of the Philippine Islands, represented by Executive
Treasurer
Respondent: El Monte de Piedad Y Caja de Ajorras de Manila
FACTS: On June 3, 1863, a devastating earthquake in the Philippines took
place. The Spanish dominions provided $400,000 aid as received by the
National Treasury as relief of the victims of the earthquake. The government
used the money as such but $80,000 was left untouched and was thus
invested to Monte de Piedad bank, which was in turn invested as jewelries,
equivalent to the same amount.
In June 1983, the Department of Finance called upon the same bank to return
the $80,000 deposited from before. The Monte de Piedad declined to comply
with this order on the ground that the Governor-General of the Philippine
Islands and not the Department of Finance had the right to order the
reimbursement because the Philippine government is not the affected party.
On account of various petitions of the persons, the Philippine Islands brought
a suit against Monte de Piedad for a recovery of the $80,000 together with
interest, for the benefit of those persons and their heirs. Respondent refuse
to provide the money, hence, this appeal.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Philippine government is authorized to file
reimbursement of the money of the people deposited in respondent bank.

HELD:
1.ID.; SUPERVISION AND CONTROL BY THE GOVERNMENT.The law of
June 20, 1849, the royal order of April 27, 1875, and the instructions
promulgated on the latter date conferred upon the former sovereign
authority to supervise and control certain private or special charities
of a temporary nature.

1.
ID.; TRANSFER OF SOVEREIGNTY; EFFECT ON THE LAWS.While there is a
total abrogation of the former political relations of the inhabitants of ceded
territory, and an abrogation of laws in conflict with the political character of
the substituted sovereign, the great body of municipal law regulating private
and domestic rights continues in force until abrogated or changed by the
new ruler. Laws conferring upon the Government power to supervise and
control special charities are not in conflict with the political character,
constitution or institutions of the United States.

SORIANO VS LA GUARDIA
G.R. No. 164785, April 29, 2009
FACTS
The Minister of INC felt directly alluded by an offending remark made by
Soriano in one of his episodein his regular program aired on UNTV 37, Ang
Dating Daan. This ensued 8 private complainants whoare members of INC
to file an affidavit-complaint against herein petition (Soriano) before the
MTRCB.Forthwith, the MTRCB sent petitioner a notice of the hearing in
relation to the alleged use of some cusswords in the said episode. After a
preliminary
conference
in
which
petitioner
appeared,
the
MTRCBo rd e re d p re v e n t i v e s u s p e n s i o n o f h i s p ro g r a m f o r 2 0 d a y
s , i n a c c o rd a n c e w i t h S e c t i o n 3 ( d ) o f Presidential Decree No. (PD)
1986, creating the MTRCB, in relation to Sec. 3, Chapter XIII of the
2004Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of PD 1986 and Sec.
7, Rule VII of the MTRCB Rules of Procedure. The petitioner
sought reconsideration of the preventive suspension order, praying
thatLaguardia and two other members of the adjudication board recuse
themselves from hearing the case,but withdrew the same two days
after, and, instead fi led with the SC of a petition for certiorari
andprohibition to
nullify
the preventive
suspension
order
thus
issued. Meanwhile, in the administrative case filed against the respondent
with the MTRCB, it was held that therespondent is liable for his
utterances and thereby imposing on him a penalty of three (3)
monthssuspension
from said program. He
then
fi led
petition
for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for injunctive relief on the
ground that the preventive suspension imposed against him and the relevant
IRRprovision authorizing it are invalid inasmuch as PD 1986 does not
expressly authorize the MTRCB toissue preventive suspension
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE MTRCB IS ENTITLED TO ISSUE PREVENTIVE
SUSPENSION
HELD:
Administrative Law; Movie and Television Review and Classification Board
(MTRCB); Powers of an administrative agency is ascertained from the law
itself which is liberally construed. Movie and Television Review and

Classification Board (MTRCB) has the power to issue a preventive suspension

order.Administrative agencies have powers and functions which may be
administrative, investigatory, regulatory, quasi-legislative, or quasi-judicial,
or a mix of the five, as may be conferred by the Constitution or by statute.
They have in fine only such powers or authority as are granted or delegated,
expressly or impliedly, by law. And in determining whether an agency has
certain powers, the inquiry should be from the law
Same; Same; Jurisdiction; Administrative Agencies.But the mere absence
of a provision on preventive suspension in PD 1986, without more, would not
work to deprive the MTRCB a basic disciplinary tool, such as preventive
suspension. Recall that the MTRCB is expressly empowered by statute to
regulate and supervise television programs to obviate the exhibition or
broadcast of, among others, indecent or immoral materials and to impose
sanctions for violations and, corollarily, to prevent further violations as it
investigates. Contrary to petitioners assertion, the aforequoted Sec. 3 of the
IRR neither amended PD 1986 nor extended the effect of the law. Neither did
the MTRCB, by imposing the assailed preventive suspension, outrun its
authority under the law. Far from it. The preventive suspension was actually
done in furtherance of the law, imposed pursuant, to repeat, to the MTRCBs
duty of regulating or supervising television programs, pending a
determination of whether or not there has actually been a violation. In the
final analysis, Sec. 3, Chapter XIII of the 2004 IRR merely formalized a power
which PD 1986 bestowed, albeit impliedly, on MTRCB.

DELA CRUZ VS GARCIA

GR NO. 177728 JULY 31, 2009
FACTS:
Jenie was denied the registration of her child's birth because the document
attached to the Affidavit to use the Surname of the Father (AUSF) entitled
"Autobiography," did not include the signature of the deceased father,
and because he was born out of wedlock and the father unfortunately died
prior to his birth and has no more capacity to acknowledge his paternity to
the
child.
Jenie and the child promptly filed a complaint for injunction/registration of
name against Gracia. The trial court held that even if Dominique, the father,
was the author of the unsigned handwritten Autobiography, the same does
not contain any express recognition of paternity.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the unsigned handwritten instrument of the deceased father
of minor Christian can be considered as a recognition of paternity.

STATE IMMUNITY
PHILIPPINE AGUILA SATELLITE VS LICHAUCO
GR NO. 134887 JULY 2006
FACTS:
On June 6, 1994, a Memorandum of Understanding1 (MOU) was entered into by
a consortium of privatetelecommunications carriers and the Department of
Transportation and Communications (DOTC), they formed acorporation and adopted
the corporate name Philippine Agila Satellite, Inc. (PASI). They requested the then
DOTCSecretary Amado S. Lagdameo, Jr. for official government confirmation of the
assignment of Philippine orbital slots 161Eand 153E to PASI for its AGILA satellites
by a letter dated June 28, 1996.When it was confirmed, PASI undertook preparations
for the launching, operation and management of its satellites by,among other
things, obtaining loans, increasing its capital, conducting negotiations with its
business partners, and makingan initial payment. When they requested the Land
banks confirmation of its participation in a club loan for thegovernments
assignment to PASI of orbital slots 161E and 153E, DOTC Undersecretary Josefina
T. Lichauco sent aletter to the bank controverting the said assignment, clearly
stating that orbital slot 153E can no longer be assigned toPASI. She subsequently
issued a Notice of Offer for several orbital slots including 153E in December
1997.PASI, claiming that the offer was without its knowledge and that it
subsequently came to learn that another companywhose identity had not been
disclosed had submitted a bid and won the award for orbital slot 153E, filed on
January 23,1998 a complaint7before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Mandaluyong
City against Lichauco and the "Unknown Awardee," for injunction to enjoin
the award of orbital slot 153E, declare its nullity, and for damages.PASI filed on
February 23, 1998 a complaint before the Office of the Ombudsman against
Secretary Josefina TrinidadLichauco. In his affidavit-complaint, de Guzman charged
Lichauco with gross violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No.3019, otherwise
known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, as amended, reading:(e) Causing

any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving any private
party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his
official, administrative or judicial functions through manifest partiality, evident bad
faith or gross inexcusable negligence. This provision shall apply to officers and
employees of officers or government corporations charged with the grant of licenses
or permits or other concessions. Because a prejudicial question was found by the
Evaluation and Preliminary Investigation Bureau (EPIB), the criminal suit was
dismissed and reconsideration was denied by Order dated July 17, 1998. Hence,
PASI is in petition for review oncertiorari, arguing that the Ombudsman erred in
dismissing the complaint.
Issue:
WON there exists a prejudicial question, and if in the affirmative, whether or not the
dismissal of the complainton that account is in order
R U L I N G :
Yes, there exists a prejudicial question because if the award to the undisclosed
bidder of the orbital lot 153Eis, in the civil case declared valid for being within
Lichaucos scope of authority to thus free her from liability for damages,there would
be no prohibited act to speak of nor would there be basis for undue injury claimed
to have been suffered bypetitioner.No, according to Yap v. Paras, Section 6, Rule
111 of the Rules of Court directs that the proceedings may only besuspended, not
dismissed, and that it may be made only upon petition, and not at the instance of
the judge alone or theinvestigating officer. It would sanction the extiguishment of
the criminal liability, if there be any, through prescriptionunder Article 89 vis a vis
Article 90 and 91 of the RPC.The Order dismissing OMB Case No. 0-98-0416 dated
July 17, 1998 against Lichauco was set aside. The Ombudsman wasOrdered to
reinstate the case for further proceedings.
R AT IO NA LE :
When a public officer acts without or in excess of jurisdiction, any injury caused by
him is his own personalliability and cannot be imputed to the State. (p.34, Political
Law, Isagani Cruz)

Prejudicial Questions; The rationale for the principle of prejudicial question is that
although it does not conclusively resolve the guilt or innocence of the accused, it
tests the sufficiency of the allegations in the complaint or information in order to
sustain the further prosecution of the criminal case.The rationale for the principle
of prejudicial question is that although it does not conclusively resolve the guilt or
innocence of the accused, it tests the sufficiency of the allegations in the complaint
or information in order to sustain the further prosecution of the criminal case.
Hence, the need for its prior resolution before further proceedings in the criminal
action may be had. [Philippine Agila Satellite, Inc. vs. Lichauco, 496 SCRA
588(2006)]
Prejudicial Questions; When, in the course of the actions taken by those to whom
the complaint is endorsed or forwarded, a prejudicial question is found to be
pending, Section 6, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court should be applied in a suppletory
character, which rule directs that the proceedings may only be suspended, not
dismissed, and that it may be made only upon petition, and not at the instance of
the judge alone or the investigating officer.When, in the course of the actions
taken by those to whom the complaint is endorsed or forwarded, a prejudicial
question is found to be pending, Section 6, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court should be
applied in a suppletory character. As laid down in Yap v. Paras, 205 SCRA 625
(1992), said rule directs that the proceedings may only be suspended, not
dismissed, and that it may be made only upon petition, and not at the instance of
the judge alone or as in this case, the investigating officer. To give imprimatur to the
Ombudsmans dismissal of petitioners criminal complaint due to prejudicial
question would not only run counter to the provision of Section 6 of Rule 111 of the

Rules of Court. It would sanction the extinguishment of criminal liability, if there be

any, through prescription under Article 89 vis--vis Articles 90 and 91 of the Revised
Penal Code. [Philippine Agila Satellite, Inc. vs. Lichauco, 496 SCRA 588(2006)]

VIGILAR VS AQUINO
GR NO 180388

Angelito M. Twano, petitioner, the OIC District Engr. of DPWH 2nd Engineering
District of Pampanga sent an Invitation to bid to respondent Arnulfo D.
Aquino (owner if AD Aquino Construction and supplies). The bidding was for
the construction of a dike by bull-dozing a part of the Porac River.On July 7,
1992, the project was awarded to respondent and a "Contract Agreement"
has been executed with amount of Php 1,873,790.69, to cover the project
cost.On. July 9, 1992, the project was completed. Respondent Aquino,
however claimedthat Php 1,262,696.20 was still due to him, but petitioners
refused to pay. He then, filed a complaint fort the collection of sum of money
with damages before RTC of Guagua. Petitioners has the following
contentions, that the Complaint wasa suit against the State, respondent
failed to exhaust administrative remedies,Contract of Agreement was void
for violating PD 1445 (Government Auditing Code)- appropriation and
Certificate of Availability of Funds.On November 28,2003, lower court ruled in
favor of the respondent. The lower court ordered DPWH to play Aquino the
amount for the completion of the project, Php 50,000 attorney's fees and
cost if thus unit.On appeal, CA reversed and set aside the decision. It said

that Contract Agreement is declared null and void.Dissatisfied with the

Decision the Court of Appeals, petitioners are seeking for the reversal of the
appellate court's decision and dismissal of the Complain in civil case
Issue: Whether the Court of Appeals erred in not dismissing the complaint for
failure or respondent to exhaust all administrative remediesWhether the
Court of Appeals erred in ordering the COA to allow payment to Respondent
on a Quantum Meruit Basis despite the latter's failure to comply with
therequirements of PD 1445Whether state immunity from suit could be
invoked by petitioners.
RULING:
Administrative Law; Doctrine of Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies;
Doctrine of Primary Administrative Jurisdiction; The doctrine of exhaustion of
administrative remedies and the doctrine of primary jurisdiction are not
ironclad rules.It has been established that the doctrine of exhaustion of
administrative remedies and the doctrine of primary jurisdiction are not
ironclad rules. In Republic of the Philippines v. Lacap, 517 SCRA 255 (2007),
this Court enumerated the numerous exceptions to these rules, namely: (a)
where there is estoppel on the part of the party invoking the doctrine; (b)
where the challenged administrative act is patently illegal, amounting to lack
of jurisdiction; (c) where there is unreasonable delay or official inaction that
will irretrievably prejudice the complainant; (d) where the amount involved is
relatively so small as to make the rule impractical and oppressive; (e) where
the question involved is purely legal and will ultimately have to be decided
by the courts of justice; (f) where judicial intervention is urgent; (g) where
the application of the doctrine may cause great and irreparable damage; (h)
where the controverted acts violate due process; (i) where the issue of nonexhaustion of administrative remedies has been rendered moot; (j) where
there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy; (k) where strong public
interest is involved; and (l) in quo warranto proceedings. [Vigilar vs. Aquino,
639 SCRA 772(2011)]

G.R. No. 152318 April 16,2009DEUTSCHE

GESELLSCHAFT
FRTECHNISCHE ZUSAMMENARBEIT,ET. AL. vs.HON. COURT OF
APPEALS, ET. AL.
FACTS:T h e g o v e r n m e n t s o f t h e
Fe de ra l
Republic
of
Germany and the Republic of the Philippines ratified an Agreement called
Social
Health InsuranceNetworking and
Empowerment
(SHINE
which
was
designed
to" e n a b l e P h i l i p p i n e f a m i l i e s e s p e c i a l l y p o o r o n e s t o m a i n t a i n
t h e i r h e a l t h a n d s e c u r e h e a l t h c a re o f s u s t a i n a b l e q u a l i t y. " Pr i
v a t e r e s p o n d e n t s w e r e e n g a g e d a s c o n t r a c t employees hired
by
GTZ
to
work
for
SHINE.Nicolay, a Belgian national, assumedt h e p o s t o f S H I N E
P r o j e c t M a n a g e r . Disagreements eventually arose bet
w e e n N i c o l a y a n d p r i v a t e re s p o n d e n t s i n m a t t e r s such as proposed
salary
adjustments,
and
the
c o u r s e N i c o l a y w a s t a k i n g i n t h e impleme
ntation of SHINE
diff erent from
her
predecessors.
The
dispute
culminated in a signed by the private respondents, addressed to Nicolay,

a n d c o p i e s f u r n i s h e d o ffi c i a l s o f t h e D O H , Philheath, and the

director
of
the
Manila
office
of
GTZ. The
letter
raised
several issues which private respondents claim had been brought up
several times in the past, but have not been given appropriate
response.
In
response,
Nicolay
wrote
each
of
the
p r i v a t e r e s p o n d e n t s a l e t t e r , a l l s i m i l a r l y worded except for
their respective addressees. She informed private respondents that they
could
no
longer
fi nd
any
reason
to
stay
with
the project unless ALL of these issues be
addressed
immediately and appropriately. Under the foregoing premises and
circumstances, it is now imperative that I am to accept your resignation,
which
I
expect
to
receive
as
soon
as possible.
Negotiations ensued between private respondents and Nicolay, but for
naught.
Each
of
the private respondents
received
a letterf r o m N i c o l a y , i n f o r m i n g t h e m o f t h e p r e - termination of
their
contracts of employmento n t h e g r o u n d s o f " s e r i o u s a n d
g r o s s i n s u b o rd i n a t i o n , a m o n g o t h e r s , re s u l t i n g t o loss
of
confidence and trust."HELD: NO. This self-description of GTZ in its own
official
website
gives
further
cause
for
pause
in
a d o p t i n g p e t i t i o n e r s a rg u m e n t t h a t GT Z i s entitled to immunity
from suit because it is "ani m p l e m e n t i n g a g e n c y. " T h e a b o v e quoteds t a t e m e n t
d o e s
n o t
d i s p u t e
t h e
characterization of GTZ as an "implementingagency of the Federal
Republic of Germany, "y e t i t b o l s t e r s t h e n o t i o n t h a t a s a
c o m p a n y o rg a n i z e d u n d e r p r i v a t e l a w , i t h a s a l e g a l personality
independent of that of the Federal Republic of Germany. T h e C o u r t i s t h u s
holds
and
so
rulest h a t GT Z c o n s i s t e n t l y h a s b e e n u n a b l e t o establish with
s a t i s f a c t i o n t h a t i t e n j o y s t h e immunity from suit generally enjoyed
by itsp a r e n t c o u n t r y , t h e F e d e r a l R e p u b l i c o f Germany

PEOPLE VS VERSOZA
RULING:
Same; Same; Same; While courts must exercise the greatest caution in
entertaining petitions for reconstitution of destroyed or lost certificates of
title, this caveat should not be taken to the extent of depriving a person who
had already fully complied with the jurisdictional requirements set forth in
R.A. No. 26 from being granted the reconstitution prayed forthe law does
not give the court discretion to deny the reconstitution if all the basic

requirements have been complied with.It is correct, as petitioner avers,

that courts must exercise the greatest caution in entertaining petitions for
reconstitution of destroyed or lost certificates of title. In Republic v. Holazo,
437 SCRA 345 (2004), the Court warned that: x x x However, this caveat
should not be taken to the extent of depriving a person who had already fully
complied with the jurisdictional requirements set forth in R.A. No. 26 from
being granted the reconstitution prayed for. When a court, after hearing of a
petition for reconstitution, finds that the evidence presented is sufficient and
proper to grant the same, that the petitioner therein is the registered owner
of the property, and that the certificate sought to be reconstituted was in
force at the time it was lost, it becomes the duty of the court to issue the
order of reconstitution. This duty is mandatory. The law does not give the
court discretion to deny the reconstitution if all the basic requirements have
been complied with. [Republic vs. Verzosa, 550 SCRA 382(2008)]
Estoppel; It is a well-settled rule that the state cannot be put in estoppel by
the mistakes or errors of its officials or agents, especially absent any showing
that it had dealt capriciously or dishonorably with its citizens.It is a wellsettled rule that the state cannot be put in estoppel by the mistakes or errors
of its officials or agents, especially absent any showing that it had dealt
capriciously or dishonorably with its citizens. Thus, the OSGs failure to raise
an effec- [Republic vs. Verzosa, 550 SCRA 382(2008)] tive objection to the
evidence presented in support of the petition does not bar petitioner from
assailing the propriety of the reconstitution ordered by the trial court and
affirmed by the Court of Appeals. [Republic vs. Verzosa, 550 SCRA
382(2008)]

BASES CONVERSION AND DEVELOPMENT

COMMISSION ON AUDIT, respondent.

AUTHORITY,

petitioner,

vs.

Republic Act No. 7227; Commission on Audit (COA); The Boards power to
adopt a compensation and benefit scheme is not unlimited; Members of the
Board shall receive a per diem of not more than Five thousand pesos

(P5,000) for every board meeting: Provided, however, That the per diem
collected per month does not exceed the equivalent of four (4) meetings.
The Boards power to adopt a compensation and benefit scheme is not
unlimited. Section 9 of RA No. 7227 states that Board members are entitled
to a per diem: Members of the Board shall receive a per diem of not more
than Five thousand pesos (P5,000) for every board meeting: Provided,
however, That the per diem collected per month does not exceed the
equivalent of four (4) meetings: Provided, further, That the amount of per
diem for every board meeting may be increased by the President but such
amount shall not be increased within two (2) years after its last increase.
Same; Same; The specification of compensation and limitation of the amount
of compensation in a statute indicate that Board members are entitled only
to the per diem authorized by law and no other.Section 9 specifies that
Board members shall receive a per diem for every board meeting; limits the
amount of per diem to not more than P5,000; and limits the total amount of
per diem for one month to not more than four meetings. In Magno v.
Commission on Audit, 531 SCRA 339 (2007), Cabili v. Civil Service
Commission, 492 SCRA 252 (2006), De Jesus v. Civil Service Commission, 471
SCRA 624 (2005), Molen, Jr. v. Commission on Audit, 453 SCRA 769 (2005)
and Baybay Water District v. Commission on Audit, 374 SCRA 482 (2002), the
Court held that the specification of compensation and limitation of the
amount of compensation in a statute indicate that Board members are
entitled only to the per diem authorized by law and no other. [Bases
Conversion and Development Authority vs. Commission on Audit, 580 SCRA
295(2009)]
Same; Same; Same; Department of Budget and Management (DBM) Circular
Letter No. 2002-2 states that, Members of the Board of Directors of
agencies are not salaried officials of the government. As non-salaried officials
they are not entitled to PERA, Adoption of a Compensation (ADCOM), YearEnd Benefit (YEB) and retirement benefits unless expressly provided by law.
Republic Act (RA) No. 7227 does not state that the Board members are
entitled to a year-end benefit.DBM Circular Letter No. 2002-2 states that,
Members of the Board of Directors of agencies are not salaried officials of
the government. As non-salaried officials they are not entitled to PERA,
ADCOM, YEB and retirement benefits unless expressly provided by law. RA
No. 7227 does not state that the Board members are entitled to a year-end
benefit.
Same; Same; Department of Budget and Management (DBM) Circular Letter
No. 2002-2 states that, Year-End Benefit (YEB) and retirement benefits, are
personnel benefits granted in addition to salaries. As fringe benefits, these
shall be paid only when the basic salary is also paid. The full-time
consultants are not part of the Bases Conversion and Development Authority
(BCDA) personnel and are not paid the basic salary.DBM Circular Letter No.
2002-2 states that, YEB and retirement benefits, are personnel benefits
granted in addition to salaries. As fringe benefits, these shall be paid only
when the basic salary is also paid. The full-time consultants are not part of
the BCDA personnel and are not paid the basic salary. The full-time
consultants consultancy contracts expressly state that there is no employeremployee relationship between the BCDA and the consultants, and that the
BCDA shall pay the consultants a contract price. [Bases Conversion and
Development Authority vs. Commission on Audit, 580 SCRA 295(2009)]

SHELL PHILIPPINES VS JALOS

GR NO. 179918 09-8-2010
FACTS

RULING
Same; Same; Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies; Resort must first be
made to the Pollution Adjudication Board (PAB) which is the agency
possessed of expertise in determining pollution-related matters before filing
the complaint before the regular courts.Jalos, et al. had, therefore, an
administrative recourse before filing their complaint with the regular courts.
The laws creating the PAB and vesting it with powers are wise. The definition
of the term pollution itself connotes the need for specialized knowledge
and skills, technical and scientific, in determining the presence, the cause,
and the effects of pollution. These knowledge and skills are not within the
competence of ordinary courts. Consequently, resort must first be made to
the PAB, which is the agency possessed of expertise in determining pollutionrelated matters. [Shell Philippines Exploration B.V. vs. Jalos, 630 SCRA
399(2010)]
Same; Same; Same; Shells primary obligation under the contract is not to
represent the Philippine government for the purpose of transacting business
with third persons; Its contractual commitment is to develop and manage
petroleum operations on behalf of the State.Shells main undertaking
under Service Contract 38 is to [p]erform all petroleum operations and
provide all necessary technology and finance as well as other connected
services to the Philippine government. As defined under the contract,
petroleum operation means the searching for and obtaining Petroleum
within the Philippines, including the transportation, storage, handling and
sale of petroleum whether for export or domestic consumption. Shells
primary obligation under the contract is not to represent the Philippine
government for the purpose of transacting business with third persons.
Rather, its contractual commitment is to develop and manage petroleum
operations on behalf of the State. [Shell Philippines Exploration B.V. vs. Jalos,
630 SCRA 399(2010)]

AGRA VS COA
Gr no. 167807 10-6-2011
Commission on Audit; Jurisdiction; The Commission on Audit (COA) had
exclusive jurisdiction to decide on the allowance or disallowance of money
claims arising from the implementation of Republic Act No. 6758.In
National Electrification Administration v. Morales, 528 SCRA 79 (2007), the
order of garnishment against the NEA funds to implement the RTC Decision
was in issue, and we said that the COA had exclusive jurisdiction to decide on
the allowance or disallowance of money claims arising from the
implementation of Republic Act No. 6758. We observed therein that the RTC
acted prudently in halting implementation of the writ of execution to allow
the parties recourse to the processes of the COA. In fact, we even stated
there that it is not for this Court to preempt the action of the COA on the
post-audit to be conducted by it per its Indorsement dated March 23, 2000.
Administrative Law; Public Officers; Definition of an Incumbent.We have
defined an incumbent as a person who is in present possession of an office;
one who is legally authorized to discharge the duties of an office. There is
no question that petitioners were not incumbents as of June 30, 1989. We
have likewise characterized NEA as a GOCC in National Electrification
Administration v. Morales, 528 SCRA 79 (2007). Thus, Section 5.5 quoted
above, issued pursuant to the authority given to the DBM under Section 12 of
Republic Act No. 6758, was correctly applied by the COA.
Same; Same; Allowances and Fringe Benefits; Requirements for the
continuous grant of allowances and fringe benefits on top of the
standardized salary rates for employees of Government-Owned and/or
Controlled Corporations (GOCCs) and Financial Institutions (GFIs).As
petitioners were hired after June 30, 1989, the COA was correct in disallowing
the grant of the benefit to them, as they were clearly not entitled to it. As
quoted above, we have repeatedly held that under Section 12 of Republic Act
No. 6758, the only requirements for the continuous grant of allowances and
fringe benefits on top of the standardized salary rates for employees of
GOCCs and GFIs are as follows: (1) the employee must be an incumbent as of
July 1, 1989; and (2) the allowance or benefit was not consolidated in the
standardized salary rate as prescribed by Republic Act No. 6758. [Agra vs.
Commission on Audit, 661 SCRA 563(2011)]

CHINA NATIONAL MACHINERY VS STA. MARIA

GR NO. 185572 2-7-2012

Constitutional Law; Immunity from Suit; Restrictive Theory; Since the

Philippines adheres to the restrictive theory, it is crucial to ascertain the legal
nature of the act involvedwhether the entity claiming immunity performs
governmental, as opposed to proprietary, functions.In JUSMAG v. National
Labor Relations Commission, 239 SCRA 224 (1994), this Court affirmed the
Philippines adherence to the restrictive theory as follows: The doctrine of
state immunity from suit has undergone further metamorphosis. The view
evolved that the existence of a contract does not, per se, mean that
sovereign states may, at all times, be sued in local courts. The complexity of
relationships between sovereign states, brought about by their increasing
commercial activities, mothered a more restrictive application of the
doctrine. xxxxxxxxx As it stands now, the application of the doctrine of
immunity from suit has been restricted to sovereign or governmental
activities (jure imperii). The mantle of state immunity cannot be extended
to commercial, private and proprietary acts (jure gestionis). Since the
Philippines adheres to the restrictive [China National Machinery & Equipment
Corp. (Group) vs. Santamaria, 665 SCRA 189(2012)] theory, it is crucial to
ascertain the legal nature of the act involvedwhether the entity claiming
immunity performs governmental, as opposed to proprietary, functions. As
held in United States of America v. Ruiz, 136 SCRA 487 (1985). The
restrictive application of State immunity is proper only when the proceedings
arise out of commercial transactions of the foreign sovereign, its commercial
activities or economic affairs. Stated differently, a State may be said to have
descended to the level of an individual and can thus be deemed to have
tacitly given its consent to be sued only when it enters into business
contracts. It does not apply where the contract relates to the exercise of its
sovereign functions. [China National Machinery & Equipment Corp. (Group)
vs. Santamaria, 665 SCRA 189(2012)]
Same; Same; Although China National Machinery & Equipment Corp. (Group)
(CNMEG) claims to be a government-owned corporation, it failed to adduce
evidence that it has not consented to be sued under Chinese law.It is
readily apparent that CNMEG cannot claim immunity from suit, even if it
contends that it performs governmental functions. Its designation as the
Primary Contractor does not automatically grant it immunity, just as the term
implementing agency has no precise definition for purposes of ascertaining
whether GTZ was immune from suit. Although CNMEG claims to be a
government-owned corporation, it failed to adduce evidence that it has not
consented to be sued under Chinese law. Thus, following this Courts ruling in
Deutsche Gesellschaft, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, CNMEG is

to be presumed to be a government-owned and -controlled corporation

without an original charter. As a result, it has the capacity to sue and be sued
under Section 36 of the Corporation Code.
Same; Same; In the United States, the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of
1976 provides for a waiver by implication of state immunity. Although there
is no similar law in the Philippines, there is reason to apply the legal
reasoning behind the waiver in this case.In the United States, the Foreign
Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 provides for a waiver by implication of
state immunity. In the said law, the agreement to submit disputes to
arbitration in a foreign country is construed as an implicit waiver of immunity
from suit. Although there is no similar law in the Philippines, there is reason
to apply the legal reasoning behind the waiver in this case. [China National
Machinery & Equipment Corp. (Group) vs. Santamaria, 665 SCRA 189(2012)]
International Law; Vienna Convention; Treaties; Executive Agreements;
Words and Phrases; Article 2(1) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties (Vienna Convention) defines a treaty as follows: [A]n international
agreement concluded between States in written form and governed by
international law, whether embodied in a single instrument or in two or more
related instruments and whatever its particular designation; An executive
agreement is similar to a treaty, except that the former (a) does not require
legislative concurrence; (b) is usually less formal; and (c) deals with a
narrower range of subject matters.Article 2(1) of the Vienna Convention on
the Law of Treaties (Vienna Convention) defines a treaty as follows: [A]n
international agreement conclu
ded between States in written form and governed by international law,
whether embodied in a single instrument or in two or more related
instruments and whatever its particular designation. In Bayan Muna v.
Romulo, 641 SCRA 244 (2011), this Court held that an executive agreement
is similar to a treaty, except that the former (a) does not require legislative
concurrence; (b) is usually less formal; and (c) deals with a narrower range of
subject matters. Despite these differences, to be considered an executive
agreement, the following three requisites provided under the Vienna
Convention must nevertheless concur: (a) the agreement must be between
states; (b) it must be written; and (c) it must governed by international law.
The first and the third requisites do not obtain in the case at bar.
Constitutional Law; Immunity from Suit; International Law; Since the Contract
Agreement explicitly provides that Philippine law shall be applicable, the
parties have effectively conceded that their rights and obligations
thereunder are not governed by international law.Article 2 of the
Conditions of Contract, which under Article 1.1 of the Contract Agreement is
an integral part of the latter, states: APPLICABLE LAW AND GOVERNING
LANGUAGE The contract shall in all respects be read and construed in
accordance with the laws of the Philippines. The contract shall be written in
English language. All correspondence and other documents pertaining to the
Contract which are exchanged by the parties shall be written in English
language. Since the Contract Agreement explicitly provides that Philippine
law shall be applicable, the parties have effectively conceded that their
rights and obligations thereunder are not governed by international law. It is
therefore clear from the foregoing reasons that the Contract Agreement does
not partake of the nature of an executive agreement. It is merely an ordinary

commercial contract that can be questioned before the local courts. [China
National Machinery & Equipment Corp. (Group) vs. Santamaria, 665 SCRA
189(2012)]

NHFMC VS ABAYARI
GR NO. 166508
Actions; Mandamus; Special Judgments; Words and Phrases; A writ of
mandamus is a command issuing from a court of law of competent
jurisdiction, in the name of the state or sovereign, directed to an inferior
court, tribunal, or board, or to some corporation or person, requiring the
performance of a particular duty therein specified, which duty results from
the official station of the party to whom the writ is directed, or from
operation of law; A favorable judgment rendered in a special civil action for
mandamus is in the nature of a special judgment and as such, it requires the
performance of any other act than the payment of money or the sale or
delivery of real or personal property.A writ of mandamus is a command
issuing from a court of law of competent jurisdiction, in the name of the state
or sovereign, directed to an inferior court, tribunal, or board, or to some
corporation or person, requiring the performance of a particular duty therein
specified, which duty results from the official station of the party to whom
the writ is directed, or from operation of law. It is employed to compel the
performance, when refused, of a ministerial duty which, as opposed to a
discretionary one, is that which an officer or tribunal performs in a given
state of facts, in a prescribed manner, in obedience to the mandate of legal
authority, without regard to or the exercise of his or its own judgment upon
the propriety or impropriety of the act done. A favorable judgment rendered
in a special civil action for mandamus is in the nature of a special judgment.
As such, it requires the performance of any other act than the payment of
money or the sale or delivery of real or personal property the execution of
which is governed by Section 11, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court. [National
Home Mortgage Finance Corporation vs. Abayari, 602 SCRA 242(2009)]
Same; Same; Garnishment; Garnishment is proper only when the judgment
to be enforced is one for payment of a sum of moneyit cannot be [National
Home Mortgage Finance Corporation vs. Abayari, 602 SCRA 242(2009)]

employed to implement a special judgment such as that rendered in a

special civil action for mandamus.While the April 17, 2001 Decision of the
trial court ordered petitioner to pay the benefits claimed by respondents, it
by no means ordered the payment of a specific sum of money and instead
merely directed petitioner to extend to respondents the benefits under R.A.
No. 6758 and its implementing rules. Being a special judgment, the decision
may not be executed in the same way as a judgment for money handed
down in an ordinary civil case governed by Section 9, Rule 39 of the Rules
Court which sanctions garnishment of debts and credits to satisfy a monetary
award. Garnishment is proper only when the judgment to be enforced is one
for payment of a sum of money. It cannot be employed to implement a
special judgment such as that rendered in a special civil action for
mandamus.
Money Claims; Commission on Audit; It is imperative in order to ensue that a
claim for the payment of the judgment award be first filed with the
Commission on Audit.Assuming for the sake of argument that execution by
garnishment could proceed in this case against the funds of petitioner, it
must bear stress that the latter is a government-owned or controlled
corporation with a charter of its own. Its juridical personality is separate and
distinct from the government and it can sue and be sued in its name. As
such, while indeed it cannot evade the effects of the execution of an adverse
judgment and may not ordinarily place its funds beyond an order of
garnishment issued in ordinary cases, it is imperative in order for execution
to ensue that a claim for the payment of the judgment award be first filed
with the Commission on Audit (COA).
Same; Same; The matter of allowing or disallowing a money claim against a
government-owned or controlled corporation is within the primary power of
the Commission on Audit (COA) to decide, and this includes money claims
arising from the implementation of Republic Act No. 6758the claim,
although it has already been validated by the trial courts final decision,
belongs to that class of claims which must first be filed with the Commission
on Audit (COA) before execution could proceed.The matter of allowing or
disallowing a money claim against petitioner is within the primary power of
the COA to decide. This no doubt includes money claims arising from the
implementation of R.A. No. 6758. Respondents claim against petitioner,
although it has already been validated by the trial courts final decision,
likewise belongs to that class of claims; hence, it must first be filed with the
COA before execution could proceed. And from the decision therein, the
aggrieved party is afforded a remedy by elevating [National Home Mortgage
Finance Corporation vs. Abayari, 602 SCRA 242(2009)] the matter to this
Court via a petition for certiorari in accordance with Section 1 Rule XI, of the
COA Rules of Procedure. [National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation vs.
Abayari, 602 SCRA 242(2009)]

G.R. No. 175299.September 14, 2011.*

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the Department of Public
Works and Highways, through the Hon. Secretary, HERMOGENES EBDANE,
petitioner, vs. ALBERTO A. DOMINGO, respondent.
Civil Procedure; Summons; Summons is a writ by which the defendant is
notified of the action brought against him; Jurisdiction over the person of the
defendant is acquired through coercive process.Summons is a writ by
which the defendant is notified of the [Republic vs. Domingo, 657 SCRA
621(2011)] action brought against him. Service of such writ is the means by
which the court acquires jurisdiction over his person. Jurisdiction over the
person of the defendant is acquired through coercive process, generally by
the service of summons issued by the court, or through the defendants
voluntary appearance or submission to the court.
Same; Same; When a suit is directed against an unincorporated government
agency, which, because it is unincorporated, possesses no juridical
personality of its own, the suit is against the agencys principal, i.e., the
State.Jurisprudence further instructs that when a suit is directed against an
unincorporated government agency, which, because it is unincorporated,
possesses no juridical personality of its own, the suit is against the agencys
principal, i.e., the State.

Same; Same; The Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH) and its
regional office are merely the agents of the former (the Republic), which is
the real party in interest in Civil Case No. 333-M-2002; The summons in this
case should have been served on the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG).
In the instant case, the Complaint for Specific Performance with Damages
filed by Domingo specifically named as defendant the DPWH Region III. As
correctly argued by the Republic, the DPWH and its regional office are merely
the agents of the former (the Republic), which is the real party in interest in
Civil Case No. 333-M-2002. Thus, as mandated by Section 13, Rule 14 of the
Rules of Court, the summons in this case should have been served on the
OSG.
Same; Parties; It is the duty of the plaintiff to implead all the necessary or
indispensable parties for the complete determination of the action.On the
other hand, Domingo opines that the DPWH Region III apparently neglected
to inform the OSG of the pendency of Civil Case No. 333-M-2002.
Accordingly, Domingo asserted that he should not be faulted therefor. The
Court disagrees. Domingo ought to bear in mind that it is the duty of the
plaintiff to implead all the necessary or indispensable parties for the
complete determination of the action. It was, thus, incumbent upon him to
name and implead the proper defendant in this case, i.e., the Republic, and
cause the service of summons to be made upon the officer mandated by law,
that is, the OSG. As Domingo failed to discharge this burden, he [Republic vs.
Domingo, 657 SCRA 621(2011)] cannot now be allowed to shift the blame on
the DPWH Region III or hold in estoppel the OSG.
Same; Annulment of Judgment; A judgment of annulment shall set aside the
questioned judgment or final order or resolution and render the same null
and void, without prejudice to the original action being refiled in the proper
court.In accordance with Section 7, Rule 47 of the Rules of Court, a
judgment of annulment shall set aside the questioned judgment or final
order or resolution and render the same null and void, without prejudice to
the original action being refiled in the proper court. [Republic vs. Domingo,
657 SCRA 621(2011)]

G.R. No. 171673.May 30, 2011.*

BANAHAW BROADCASTING CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. CAYETANO PACANA
III, NOE U. DACER, JOHNNY B. RACAZA, LEONARDO S. OREVILLO, ARACELI T.
LIBRE, GENOVEVO E. ROMITMAN, PORFERIA M. VALMORES, MENELEO G.
LACTUAN, DIONISIO G. BANGGA, FRANCISCO D. MANGA, NESTOR A.
AMPLAYO, LEILANI B. GASATAYA, LORETA G. LACTUAN, RICARDO B. PIDO,
RESIGOLO M. NACUA and ANACLETO C. REMEDIO, respondents.
Appeal Bonds; As a general rule, the government and all the attached
agencies with no legal personality distinct from the former are exempt from
posting appeal bonds, whereas government-owned and controlled
corporations (GOCCs) are not similarly exempted.As a general rule, the
government and all the attached agencies with no legal personality distinct
from the former are exempt from posting appeal bonds, whereas

government-owned and controlled corporations (GOCCs) are not similarly

exempted. This distinction is brought about by the very reason of the appeal
bond itself: to protect the presumptive judgment creditor against the
insolvency of the presumptive judgment debtor. When the State litigates, it is
not required to put up an appeal bond because it is presumed to be always
solvent. This exemption, however, does not, as a general rule, apply to
GOCCs for the reason that the latter has a personality distinct from its
shareholders. [Banahaw Broadcasting Corporation vs. Pacana III, 649 SCRA
196(2011)]
G.R. No. 182431.November 17, 2010.*
LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. ESTHER ANSON RIVERA,
ANTONIO G. ANSON AND CESAR G. ANSON, respondents.
Eminent Domain; Just Compensation; While the Court upholds the amount
derived from the old formula, since the application of the new formula is a
matter of law and thus, should be made applicable, the parties are not
precluded from asking for any additional amount as may be warranted by the
new formula.In the case before Us, the just compensation was computed
based on Executive Order No. 228, which computation the parties do not
contest. Consequently, we reiterate our rule in LBP v. Soriano, 620 SCRA 347
(2010), that while we uphold the amount derived from the old formula,
since the application of the new formula is a matter of law and thus, should
be made applicable, the parties are not precluded from asking for any
additional amount as may be warranted by the new formula.
Same; Same; Interest Rates; Court affirmed the award of 12% interest of just
compensation due to the landowner in Republic v. [Land Bank of the
Philippines vs. Rivera, 635 SCRA 285(2010)] Court of Appeals, 383 SCRA 611
(2002).In Republic v. Court of Appeals, 383 SCRA 611 (2002), we affirmed
the award of 12% interest on just compensation due to the landowner. The
court decreed: x x x Thus, if property is taken for public use before
compensation is deposited with the court having jurisdiction over the case,
the final compensation must include interest on its just value to be computed
from the time the property is taken to the time when compensation is
actually paid or deposited with the court. In fine, between the taking of the
property and the actual payment, legal interests accrue in order to place the
owner in a position as good as (but not better than) the position he was in
before the taking occurred.
Same; Same; Costs of Suit; Since Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) is
performing a governmental function in agrarian reform proceeding, it is
exempt from the payment of costs of suit as provided under Rule 142,
Section 1 of the Rules of Court.It is clear from the above discussions that
since LBP is performing a governmental function in agrarian reform
proceeding, it is exempt from the payment of costs of suit as provided under
Rule 142, Section 1 of the Rules of Court. [Land Bank of the Philippines vs.
Rivera, 635 SCRA 285(2010)]

G.R. No. 167000.June 8, 2011.*

GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM (GSIS), petitioner, vs. GROUP
MANAGEMENT CORPORATION (GMC) and LAPU-LAPU DEVELOPMENT &
HOUSING CORPORATION (LLDHC), respondents.

G.R. No. 169971.June 8, 2011.*

GROUP MANAGEMENT CORPORATION (GMC), petitioner, vs. LAPU-LAPU
DEVELOPMENT & HOUSING CORPORATION (LLDHC) and GOVERNMENT
SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM (GSIS), respondents.
Courts; Judgments; Finality of Judgments; Immutability of Judgments;
Exceptions; It is well-settled that once a judgment attains finality, it becomes
immutable and unalterablethis is referred to as the doctrine of finality of
judgments, and this doctrine applies even to the highest court of the land.
It is well-settled that once a judgment attains finality, it becomes immutable
and unalterable. It may not be changed, altered or modified in any way even
if the modification were for the purpose of correcting an erroneous
conclusion of fact or law. This is referred to as the doctrine of finality of
judgments, and this doctrine applies even to the highest court of the land.
This Court explained its rationale in this wise: The doctrine of finality of
judgment is grounded on fundamental considerations of public policy and
sound practice, and that, at the risk of occasional errors, the judgments or
orders of courts must become final at some definite time fixed by law;
otherwise, there would be no end to litigations, thus setting to naught the
main role of courts of justice which is to assist in the enforcement of the rule
of law and the maintenance of peace and order by settling justiciable
controversies with finality. This Court has, on several occasions, ruled that
the doctrine of finality of judgments admits of certain exceptions, namely:
the correction of clerical errors, the so-called nunc pro tunc entries which
cause no prejudice to any party, void judgments, and whenever
circumstances transpire after the finality of the decision which render its
execution unjust and inequitable.
Same; Same; Same; Same; In order for an event to be considered a
supervening event to justify the alteration or modification of a final
judgment, the event must have transpired after the judgment has become
final and executory.Both GSIS and LLDHC claim that the execution of the
decision and orders in Civil Case No. 2203-L should be stayed because of the
occurrence of supervening events which render the execution of the
judgment impossible, unfair, unjust and inequitable. However, in order for
an event to be considered a supervening event to justify the alteration or
modification of a final judgment, the event must have transpired after the
judgment has become final and executory, to wit: Supervening events refer
to facts which transpire after judgment has become final and executory or to
new circumstances which developed after the judgment has acquired finality,
including matters which the parties were not aware of prior to or during the
trial as they were not yet in existence at that time.
Same; Same; Same; Due Process; The winning party equally has the
correlative right to benefit from the finality of the resolution of the casea
final judgment vests in the prevailing party a right recognized and protected
by law under the due process clause of the Constitution.Just as LLDHC and
GSIS, as the losing parties, had the right to file their respective appeals
within the prescribed period, GMC, as the winning party in Civil Case No.
2203-L, equally had the correlative right to benefit from the finality of the
resolution of its case, to wit: A final judgment vests in the prevailing party a
right recognized and protected by law under the due process clause of the
Constitution. A final judgment is a vested interest which it is right and
equitable that the government should recognize and protect, and of which
the individual could not be deprived arbitrarily without injustice.

Same; Same; Same; It is settled in jurisprudence that to stay execution of a

final judgment, a supervening event must create a substantial change in the
rights or relations of the parties which would render execution of a final
judgment unjust, impossible or inequitable making it imperative to stay
immediate execution in the interest of justice.Since the Manila RTC decision
does not consti- [Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) vs. Group
Management Corporation (GMC), 651 SCRA 279(2011)] tute a supervening
event, there is therefore neither reason nor justification to alter, modify or
annul the Lapu-Lapu RTC Decision and Orders, which have long become final
and executory. Thus, in the present case, GMC must not be deprived of its
right to enjoy the fruits of a final verdict. It is settled in jurisprudence that to
stay execution of a final judgment, a supervening event must create a
substantial change in the rights or relations of the parties which would
render execution of a final judgment unjust, impossible or inequitable making
it imperative to stay immediate execution in the interest of justice.
Same; Same; Res Judicata; Elements; Res judicata lays the rule that an
existing final judgment or decree rendered on the merits, and without fraud
or collusion, by a court of competent jurisdiction, upon any matter within its
jurisdiction, is conclusive of the rights of the parties or their privies, in all
other actions or suits in the same or any other judicial tribunal of concurrent
jurisdiction on the points and matters in issue in the first suit.In Republic of
the Philippines (Civil Aeronautics Administration) v. Yu, 484 SCRA 416 (2006),
this Court expounded on the concept of res judicata and explained it in this
wise: Res judicata literally means a matter adjudged; a thing judicially acted
upon or decided; a thing or matter settled by judgment. Res judicata lays
the rule that an existing final judgment or decree rendered on the merits,
and without fraud or collusion, by a court of competent jurisdiction, upon any
matter within its jurisdiction, is conclusive of the rights of the parties or their
privies, in all other actions or suits in the same or any other judicial tribunal
of concurrent jurisdiction on the points and matters in issue in the first suit.
In Villanueva v. Court of Appeals, 285 SCRA 180 (1998), we enumerated the
elements of res judicata as follows: a) The former judgment or order must be
final; b) It must be a judgment or order on the merits, that is, it was rendered
after a consideration of the evidence or stipulations submitted by the parties
at the trial of the case; c) It must have been rendered by a court having
jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; and d) There must be,
between the first and second actions, identity of parties, of subject matter
and of cause of action. This requisite is satisfied if the two (2) actions are
substantially between the same parties.
Same; Same; Same; Words and Phrases; Bar by Prior Judgments and
Conclusiveness of Judgment, Explained.Res judicata [Government
Service Insurance System (GSIS) vs. Group Management Corporation (GMC),
651 SCRA 279(2011)] has two concepts: (1) bar by prior judgment as
enunciated in Rule 39, Section 47(b) of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure; and
(2) conclusiveness of judgment in Rule 39, Section 47(c), which reads as
follows: (b) In other cases, the judgment or final order is, with respect to the
matter directly adjudged or as to any other matter that could have been
raised in relation thereto, conclusive between the parties and their
successors in interest by title subsequent to the commencement of the
action or special proceeding, litigating for the same thing and under the
same title and in the same capacity; and (c) In any other litigation between

the same parties or their successors in interest, that only is deemed to have
been adjudged in a former judgment or final order which appears upon its
face to have been so adjudged, or which was actually and necessarily
included therein or necessary thereto. In explaining the two concepts of res
judicata, this Court held that: There is bar by prior judgment when, as
between the first case where the judgment was rendered, and the second
case that is sought to be barred, there is identity of parties, subject matter,
and causes of action. But where there is identity of parties and subject
matter in the first and second cases, but no identity of causes of action, the
first judgment is conclusive only as to those matters actually and directly
controverted and determined and not as to matters merely involved therein.
This is conclusiveness of judgment. Under the doctrine of conclusiveness of
judgment, facts and issues actually and directly resolved in a former suit
cannot again be raised in any future case between the same parties, even if
the latter suit may involve a different claim or cause of action. The identity of
causes of action is not required but merely identity of issues.
Same; Same; Same; Test to Determine Whether or Not the Causes of Action
are Identical.In Pealosa v. Tuason, 22 Phil. 303 (1912), we laid down the
test in determining whether or not the causes of action in the first and
second cases are identical: Would the same evidence support and establish
both the present and former cause of action? If so, the former recovery is a
bar; if otherwise, it does not stand in the way of the former action.
Government Service Insurance System; Execution of Judgments; The
Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) cannot claim immunity from
the enforcement of the final and executory judgment against it where the
monetary judgments against it arose [Government Service Insurance System
(GSIS) vs. Group Management Corporation (GMC), 651 SCRA 279(2011)] has
two concepts: (1) bar by prior judgment as enunciated in Rule 39, Section
47(b) of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure; and (2) conclusiveness of
judgment in Rule 39, Section 47(c), which reads as follows: (b) In other
cases, the judgment or final order is, with respect to the matter directly
adjudged or as to any other matter that could have been raised in relation
thereto, conclusive between the parties and their successors in interest by
title subsequent to the commencement of the action or special proceeding,
litigating for the same thing and under the same title and in the same
capacity; and (c) In any other litigation between the same parties or their
successors in interest, that only is deemed to have been adjudged in a
former judgment or final order which appears upon its face to have been so
adjudged, or which was actually and necessarily included therein or
necessary thereto. In explaining the two concepts of res judicata, this Court
held that: There is bar by prior judgment when, as between the first case
where the judgment was rendered, and the second case that is sought to be
barred, there is identity of parties, subject matter, and causes of action. But
where there is identity of parties and subject matter in the first and second
cases, but no identity of causes of action, the first judgment is conclusive
only as to those matters actually and directly controverted and determined
and not as to matters merely involved therein. This is conclusiveness of
judgment. Under the doctrine of conclusiveness of judgment, facts and
issues actually and directly resolved in a former suit cannot again be raised
in any future case between the same parties, even if the latter suit may
involve a different claim or cause of action. The identity of causes of action is
not required but merely identity of issues.

Same; Same; Same; Test to Determine Whether or Not the Causes of Action
are Identical.In Pealosa v. Tuason, 22 Phil. 303 (1912), we laid down the
test in determining whether or not the causes of action in the first and
second cases are identical: Would the same evidence support and establish
both the present and former cause of action? If so, the former recovery is a
bar; if otherwise, it does not stand in the way of the former action.
Government Service Insurance System; Execution of Judgments; The
Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) cannot claim immunity from
the enforcement of the final and executory judgment against it where the
monetary judgments against it arose [Government Service Insurance System
(GSIS) vs. Group Management Corporation (GMC), 651 SCRA 279(2011)] the
parties to assert their claims anew, the second is to determine which
judgment came first, and the third is to determine which of the judgments
had been rendered by a court of last resort. In Collantes, this Court applied
the first option and resolved the conflicting issues anew. However, resorting
to the first solution in the case at bar would entail disregarding not only the
final and executory decisions of the Lapu-Lapu RTC and the Manila RTC, but
also the final and executory decisions of the Court of Appeals and this Court.
Moreover, it would negate two decades worth of litigating. Thus, we find it
more equitable and practicable to apply the second and third options
consequently maintaining the finality of one of the conflicting judgments.
The primary criterion under the second option is the time when the decision
was rendered and became final and executory, such that earlier decisions
should prevail over the current ones since final and executory decisions vest
rights in the winning party. In the third solution, the main criterion is the
determination of which court or tribunal rendered the decision. Decisions of
this Court should be accorded more respect than those made by the lower
courts.
Same; Same; The interest of the judicial system in preventing relitigation of
the same dispute recognizes that judicial resources are finite and the number
of cases that can be heard by the court is limited.While this Court cannot
blame the parties for exhausting all available remedies to obtain a favorable
judgment, the issues involved in this case should have been resolved upon
the finality of this Courts decision in G.R. No. 141407. As pronounced by this
Court in Villanueva v. Court of Appeals, 285 SCRA 180 (1998): The interest of
the judicial system in preventing relitigation of the same dispute recognizes
that judicial resources are finite and the number of cases that can be heard
by the court is limited. Every dispute that is reheard means that another will
be delayed. In modern times when court dockets are filled to overflowing,
this concern is of critical importance.
[Government Service Insurance
System (GSIS) vs. Group Management Corporation (GMC), 651 SCRA
279(2011)]