When John Rabe Sees Nanking ——A Critique of John Rabe’s Diary —— Higashinakano Shudo Japanese and Chinese personal names are given with surname first, in accordance with the customs of these countries. A year and a half have elapsed since John Rabe’s diary Truth ab- out Nanking was published. Being the chairman of the International Committee for the Nanking Safety Zone, his diary has drawn con- siderable attention. The subject of his diary has already been discus- sed at length, however, I believe the six specialists have yet to deal exhaustively with it. Rabe’s diary, as it is referred to, is in a general sense composed of two portions. The first portion is the diary itself. Rabe, who re- turned to Berlin, rounded off his account written in Nanking under the title of Bombing of Nanking. It is a two volume work that was rounded off in October 1942. A period of four and a half years had passed between leaving his duties in Nanking in February 1938 and the completion of his dairy. One wonders if there was deletions and additions while he was rewriting his account. This is the first ques- tion that comes to mind. The next portion of Rabe’s diary is a report to Hitler. There would be no problem if the contents of his diary and his report to Hitler were the same. Yet, were they the same? This is the problem that we must turn to next. 14618 Higashinakano Shudo Perspective for examination We shall now take up the subject in question. In what manner should we examine Rabe’s diary? As for the method that I will em- ploy, I will focus on the only eyewitness account of the execution found in his diary (January 9) and exemplify on it. He writes: At eleven o'clock, Kroeger and Hatz come to the headquarters. They had come to report a small scale execution that had by chance caught their attention. A Japanese officer and soldier had driven a Chinese man (a civilian) into a pond on the Shansi Road. The soldier lied down behind a sandbag and fired at the man until he sank into the water. The same account is found in other sources. We shall list these sources so that they may not go unnoticed. They are the following: 1, H. Timperley(ed.), The Japanese Terror in China, Case No. 185, 1938, 1969, p. 159f.; . Hsii Shu-shi (ed.), Documents of the Nanking Safety Zone, Case No. 185, 1939, p. 78 (Contained are a series of protests to the Japanese Embassy in Nanking by the International Committee for the Nanking Safety Zone. They were signed by Rabe. Later these protest were compiled “under the Auspices of the Council of In- ternational Affairs, Chungking”); . Hora Tomio (ed.), Nicchu Sensou Nanking Dai Zangyaku Jiken Shiryoshu Dai Ni Kan (Contained is a translation of Timperley’s work listed above). In each of these three sources the account by Kroeger and Hatz appears as case No. 185. Do their contents match perfectly with Rabe’s diary? Not necessary so. Each of these sources cites the find- ings of the International Committee for the Nanking Safety Zone. They clearly refer to Rabe’s definition of ‘execution’ as ‘legitimate executions’. It should be noted here that Rabe’s diary makes no nN w 14519 mention of these findings. Through his deletion he suggests that the executions were butchery and illegal. “Executing” in sources no. 1 and 2 is mistranslated into Japanese as gyakusatsu, ‘massacre’. In this article | have employed the method of investigating the differences between the same accounts to prevent an oversight from among the many records. The documents that remain are docu- ments in English circulated by the Republic of China in those days, accounts by Americans residing in Nanking, the Deutsche Gesand- schaft! Botschaft in China: Japanisch-Chinesischer Konflikt (official documents of the German Embassy in Nanking in microfilm). An analysis of these would not be an impossible task. From my inves- tigation I conclude that Rabe’s the Truth about Nanking is com- posed of the following items: 1. A description of what really took place; 2. An excessive dramatization of facts; 3. Deletion of the vital points; 4. Accounts that he considered rumors spread by the Chinese in Nanking as true. The discussion which follows illustrates the above points. The discrepancies between Rabe’s private diary and official documents On page 98 of Rabe’s diary is a record of the casualties from shrapnel fallen in the Safety Zone: Howitzer shells had fallen. They had landed in front of and be- hind the Foo Chong Hotel. Twenty persons were killed and twelve were injured... In addition, another shell landed [this time the shells had fallen in the buildings of a middle school]. There were thirteen deaths. Rabe did not clearly state whether the casualties were soldiers or civilians. A clever maneuver. The facts of the matter is that the damage in the Safety Zone by stray shells was “very little”."” And 14420 Higashinakano Shudo this was certified by none other than Document Number 9 of the In- ternational Committee which was signed by Rabe. “Very little” could not have: been used if the casualties included civilians. What Rabe regarded as the dead were soldiers. An important matter has been omitted. In Robert Wilson’s letter, dated on December 14, 1937, it is written that “in the firing of guns the Japanese Army has apparently made special efforts to keep the Safety Zone intact”.” And we find in the document an expression of thanks by Rabe, the committee chairman, to the Japanese Army. Although Professor Hata Ikuhiko says this message of thanks did not exist, 1 think it ex- isted as Professor Watanabe Shoichi says. It is found in the Docu- ment Number 1. We come to thank you for the fine way your artillery spared the Safety Zone. Document Number 1 begins with these words. A matter that de- serves our attention is that in the Japanese translation the portion “the fine way” has been deleted, which is probably the reason why Professor Hata missed it. The inconsistencies of Rabe’s excessively dramatized diary Rabe's entry for December 13 (the first day after surrender) pro- vides ample materials for consideration. We proceed along the main street with extreme caution. Turn- ing to the Shanghai Road we found there also the dead bodies of many civilians. When we looked ahead we saw Japanese soldiers approaching from the other side. Among them was a military doc- tor who spoke German. He informed us that the Japanese com- mander would be coming in two days. There is mention of many dead bodies. If the burial account of the Red Swastika Society is correct, the number for the Shanghai 143ah Road would amount to twenty. In other words there were only twenty bodies there. Were they the corpses of “civilians” as Rabe describes? When defeated, regular soldiers of the Chinese Army would reg- ularly throw away their uniforms for civilian clothes and flee. The supervising unit of the Chinese Army normally shot their own troops in the back. A Chinese officer in the proximity of Rabe, who was urging the Chinese troops to give up their arms, fired his car- bine. Perhaps the dead bodies were flecing Chinese troops shot by that officer. On December 8, Tang Sheng-chih issued an evacuation order . The order restricted civilians to the Safety Zone. Mention of this order is found in Japanese and American accounts. Nevertheless, none is found in Rabe’s diary. On the other hand, Document Number 9 of the International Committee, signed by Rabe, states: {o]n the 13th when your troops entered the city, we had nearly all the civilian population gathered in a Zoné. We are led to believe that nearly all of the civilians had moved to the Safety Zone. And they could not have been in the battleground between the Shanghai Road and the Chung Shan North Road. This leads us to believe that ‘civilians’ in Rabe’s account were in fact ‘sol- diers’. If it is true that Japanese soldiers shot civilians, a record of the appeal by fourteen American residents of Nanking to Espy of the American Embassy should have mentioned the shooting. Yet there is nothing in that account. This also would mean that the Japanese Army did not shoot at civilians. Rabe’s conspicuous falsification Rabe of course did not specifically state that Japanese soldiers shot civilians. We should pay close attention to the fact that the 14222 Higashinakano Shudo contents of Rabe’s diary change subtly in his report to Hitler. According to a Japanese soldier on outpost duty who was riding bicycle, the supreme commander would be arriving as early as three days later. Here and there were the dead bodies of Chinese civilians. Upon examining several of them, I found that they had been shot in the back at point blank range. Perhaps when they were trying to flee. “Japanese soldier on outpost duty who was riding a bicycle”; “shot in the back at point-blank range”, “perhaps they were trying to flee” — these portions differ from Rabe’s earlier account. It would be less objectionable if the differences were subtle ones of two or three days. But Rabe’s diary in his report to Hitler includes mention of civilians shot in the back at point-blank range. His ori- ginal diary does not include this account. The act of altering the re- ports of others for one’s convenience is called ‘falsification’, and here it would be the undisguised falsification by Rabe himself — his magnified publicity. It would not fit the claim that Rabe made a “plain description” of the facts (Fukuda Kazuya). The Report to Hitler - Fictitious Stories Rabe’s report to Hitler further alleges: On the pretext of being former soldiers... thousands of per- sons were killed by machine gun fire or by hand grenades; Gasoline was poured on them and they were burned alive; Women from ages eight to seventy were raped . . . and beer bot- tles and bamboo could be seen protruding from the privates of the dead bodies. I had scen these victims within my own eyes; I wonder if half the population of the city has died from the pestilence. In his entry for December 24, Rabe was proud to express his de- sire to someday testify as a witness to Nanking and to do so he 14123 wished to confirm the events with his own eyes. Those who com- ment on the Facts of Nanking do not look carefully into these stories but extol it to be “the absolute document on the subject which is verified by Rabe himself”. The facts remains, however, that his original diary does not contain the statements “thousands of persons were killed by machine gun fire or by hand grenades”; “gasoline was poured on them and they were burned alive”; “beer bottles and bamboo”; and “pestilence”. It would be all the better if his report to Hitler were based upon an accurate report of each day’s events. Nevertheless, his report contains details that are not found in his di- ary. Wouldn’t this ordinarily be referred to as ‘fabrication’? Extensive use of the Safety Zone by the Chinese Army At 18.30 hours on December 12, several hours before the fall of Nanking Chinese soldiers came running like mad from the Chung Hwa Gate to the Safety Zone. Rabe witnessed this event. The escape by Chinese soldiers into the Safety Zone was not an emergency evacuation but a prescribed plan of action. Should this be an overstatement, we could probably call it a plan of action given tacit permission. As they approached the Zone, soldiers got back their mental balance and began to walk in a leisurely manner. This leads us to the following important conclusion. Except for the sol- diers who died fighting in the fortress, those who were shot by their supervising unit around the southern gate (Chung Hwa Gate) and the northern gate, the small number of troops that escaped from the walls, and those who had from the very start been stationed in the Safety Zone — except for these troops, almost all of the soldiers in the fortress (numbering in the tens of thousands) had escaped into the Safety Zone. And from the very start it sees that the neutral zone for refugees had become the zone for Chinese soldiers. Shields, the manager of the Nanking branch of the China Industrial Foreign Trade Association, was later to admit that such a shameful 14024 Higashinakano Shudo use of the Safety Zone was a failure. While possessing the authority to ignore the Safety Zone, the Japanese Army protected it. The Safety Zone was to be the cause of the Nanking problem. The Head of the Neutral Zone Committee assists the hiding and escape of enemy soldier At 20.00 hours on the 12th December, about the time when the commander of the Chinese forces Tang Sheng-chih escaped, Colonel Lung and Colonel Chow visit Rabe again. They asked that he shel- ter them. Rabe, who feels no pangs of conscience, took them in. Here, there is no trace of the enraged Rabe who two days earlier was angry with badly wounded soldiers invaded into the Safety Zone on the ground that it was “a violation of agreement”.”” If the presence of wounded soldicrs is a violation of agreement, isn’t pre- sence of high ranking officers in the Safety Zone an even more se- rious violation? Rabe’s seeming indifference indicates his bereft reason. His actions did not end there. From the very time after the fall, he had hidden such persons as Loh Fu-hsian (real name: Huang Kuang-han).”” In his diary, he made mention of this act seventy-one days later in his entry for February 22 on the following year. If a di- ary is supposed to be an honest record of each day’s events, Rabe’s diary is not necessarily that kind of diary. At a later date, his ex- periences were carefully compiled from a certain perspective, and while rearranging them he produced a diary that would serve his de- sired purpose. In his garden called ‘Siemens Camp’ there were 650 refugees that I think included Huang Kuang-han and many other soldiers. Later, on his return to Germany, Rabe got on board a steamship with a Chinese named Huang Kuang-han whom he reported as his servant and helped him escape to Hong Kong. He sheltered high ranking officers and assisted their escape. Rabe saw himself as a triumphant soldier, yet we see here a chairman of the neutral zone 13925 committee with his rational faculties perverted. What did the colonels do during their sixty-four daysof illegal residence? In his entry for February 15, 1938, Rabe wrote, “Lung and Chow left my home last night”.” The Chinese officers were illegal resi- dents of Rabe’s home for a sixty four day period. The efforts of the Japanese Army to unmask Chinese soldiers were a far cry from “an operation of thorough annihilation”.” Colonel Lung stated, “I and Chow had been left behind to look after the wounded and injured”.” As his statement indicates, their superior, Tang Sheng-chih, had intentionally made them remain. And if that was the case they should have gone directly to the di- plomatic office where the Red Cross hospital was arranged for the Chinese soldiers. But they went to Rabe’s house. I wonder what their purpose was. On the January 4, 1938, the New York Times article provides us with a powerful clue. Ara Kenichi that pointed out the article. So I searched for the article in the Nanking Jiken Shiryoushuu Dai I kan Amerika Kankei Shiryouhen (Collected materials of the Nanking In- cident, vol. 1, Materials Relating to America), which contains articles on the incident from the New York Times. The said article could not be found. I discovered, however, in the microfilm, ‘Ex-Chinese Officers Among U.S. Refugees - Colonel and His Aids Admits Blaming the Japanese for Crimes in Nanking’.”” It reads: American professors remaining at Ginling College in Nanking as foreign members of the Refugee Welfare Committee were seriously embarrassed to discover that they had been harboring a deserted Chinese Army colonel and six of his subordinate officers. The professors had, in fact, made the colonel second in authority at the refugee camp. The officers, who had dofted their uniforms during the Chinese 13826 Higashinakano Shudo retreat from Nanking, were discovered living in one of the college buildings. They confessed to their identity after Japanese Army searchers found they had hidden six rifles, five revolvers, a dis- mounted machine gun and ammunition in the building. The ex-Chinese officers in the presence of Americans and other foreigners confessed looting in Nanking and also that one night they dragged girls from the refugee camp into the darkness and the next day they blamed Japanese soldiers for the attacks. The ex-officers were arrested and will be punished under mar- tial law and probably executed. The throwing off of uniforms and the hiding of weapons and ammunition is an obvious violation of international law in time of war. The International Committee asserted repeatedly “[w]e can safely assure you that there are no groups of disarmed Chinese sol- diers in the Safety Zone”.” Their assertion was not the facts that were revealed in the New York Times article. There is no mention in Rabe’s diary about the looting and assault by Chinese officers. Documents the Nanking Safety Zone that are signed by Rabe also do not include such an information. Why is this? While Rabe visited the Japanese Embassy almost daily to state his protest, the details of the New York Times article went unchal- lenged. The facts were admitted, ignored, and finally fell into obli- vion. Covert anti-Japanese activities by Chinese officers In the official records of the German Embassy in Nanking, Janu- ary 25 issue of the China Press, an American English newspaper in Shanghai, is found. An article that is identical with what was re- ported in the New York Times is found there. According to the Chi- na Press article, up to December 28, 1,575 Chinese soldiers, which included 23 officers, were discovered in the Safety Zone, and machine guns and rifles had also been hidden there. Among the officers was the commander of the Nanking peace preservation 13727 corps, Wang Hsing-lau who pretended to be Chen Mi. Being in command of the fourth branch detachment of the International re- fugee zone, Chen Mi committed “looting, intimidating and raping” together with his three subordinates. On the other hand, a diary kept on January 4 by Major General Iinuma Mamoru reports the Vice Commander of the Chinese 88th Division was arrested. The entry indicates that the Vice Comman- der, Lieutenant General Ma Pou-Shang, had been active in “insti- gating anti-Japanese disorders” in the Safety Zone. Refugees in the Safety Zone were apparently aware of these hap- penings. Some came forward to attest to the fact that the looting, arson, and raping had been committed by Chinese soldiers. Some of the Chinese are even ready to prove that the looting, raping and burning was done by the Chinese and not the Japanese.” This is a line from McCallum’s diary (January 9, 1938) that was submitted to the Tokyo War Crimes Trial but not read. The act of breaching public peace is called “disturbance”. We probably could not deny the fact that Colonel Lung and Colonel Chow had been left behind to instigate disturbances. Rabe’s home and Tang Sheng- chih’s residence may have been the likely headquarters for such acti- Vities. The formal announcement of the closing of the Safety Zone was made on February 8. For the colonels, Nanking became a dangerous zone without the Safety Zone and they saw no point in staying there. It was six days later that they disappeared into the night from Rabe’s home. Who was Colonel Lung? And for the identity of Col- onel Chow? Rabe’s diary revealed that Loh Fu-hsian’s real name was Huang Kuang-han. But there is nothing said in Rabe’s diary and even in his later report to Hitler about the identities of these colonels whom he had hidden in bis home for sixty-four days. Rabe must have been concerned that a statement about their identity may 13628 Higashinakano Shudo Jead to a serious problem. Arson committed nearby Rabe’s residence Reading Rabe’s diary, one is almost puzzled by the occurrence that arson and raping cases concentrated in the vicinity of his home. For example, it is recorded on December 19 that a large fire broke out at the south and north of Rabe’s residence. On December 20, there was another arson. On January 3, three houses nearby were burned. On January 5, there was also an arson, and again flames were rising from the neighbor on the 9th. When Rabe and his ser- vant visited the Japan-China joint-store on December 27, a time when business were probably not open, a fire broke out as soon as they arrived. Rabe must have witnessed the fire. From his diary, however, there is nothing to prove conclusively that the fire were set by Japanese soldiers. In spite of the lack of evidence, Rabe writes, “there is already no reason to doubt that Japanese soldiers are burning away the city”.” The flames that seemed to be reaching out for Rabe had a telling effect. Self planned feigned assaults? How very strange are Rabe’s allegations! “The History of the Bat- tle of Nanking Based on Testimonies” (8) reported that the city within the wall was off the limits to Japanese soldiers. Yet many ‘Japanese soldiers’ visited Rabe’s home to commit rape. Their res- triction, however, was limited to the extent that when they came to the wall, there was Rabe’s cordon and also a warning whistle. In spite of this, Rabe claims that in the manner of raging waves, “the Japanese soldiers pounded at my back door, but when I went out to see, they ran away hurriedly”. In all times and places, the offender fears the presence of a wit- ness. Would it therefore not be the case that an assault would be conducted in a desolate place and away from a boisterous crowd? Why did the Japanese soldiers select the very moment when Rabe 13529 was just at home? Why did they not aim at the moment when he was away? On one occasion, Rabe returned home to find that a ‘Japanese soldier’ had broken in, as if almost waiting for his arrival. The sol- dier was about to commit assault, but Rabe saved the victim from danger “by a hair’s breath”. These visits were well-timed or even miraculous. We cannot help suspecting that these were intentionally made by someone who was very knowledgeable about Rabe’s schedule. My inference is that they were feigned assaults planned by the two colonels who were hiding at Rabe’s house on Siao Tao Yuen, the area of Rabe’s resi- dence. There existed the vast vegetable garden, the plantation, and the Nanking Language School that was a refugee camp. It was an ideal place for the Chinese soldiers to hide themselves after their sortie. Moreover, the westerns in the district could not clearly dis- tinguish between Japanese and Chinese. Chinese soldiers could dis- guise themselves as their Japanese counterparts without their identi- ty being known. Rabe, who believed the rumors and gossips to be true The assaults on women that seemed to ambush Rabe finally con- vinced him that the groundless rumors were actual facts. It is said that last night a thousand women were raped. Alone in the Ginling Girls College, more than a hundred young women were said to be raped. This is what Rabe put down in his diary on December 17, the day of the ceremony marking the entry of the Japanese Army into Nanking. Since Rabe had gone to the trouble of recording the tumor of the rape of a thousand women, wouldn’t his account of the attack on more than a hundred women at the College lone be part of the rumor? Professor Nakamura Akira inferred about this possi- bility, however, it was disclaimed by Professor Hata. 13430 Higashinakano Shudo A recall of Professor Minnie Vautrine, who created the largest re- fugee camp for women in the campus of Women’s College under question, appear in the combined July-August issue of the Chinese Recorder in 1938 under the title “Sharing the ‘abundant life’ in a re- fugee camp.” While it is impossible to cite her entire article here as the space docs not allow, we find in her writing no record of more than a hundred young women having been raped at Women’s College alone. In other words, mention of this rape had been omit- ted (denied) as being untrue. These rumors were probably the work of the colonels who were hiding in the College. As chancellor P. Scharffenberg also stated, “Und bei all den Ausschreitungen wird ja immer nur eine Seite gehért.” or “And as for all these excesses, one hears only one side of it, after all”. Discredited account of Japanese violations of wartime international law Document Number 4 of the International Committee (December 15) declares that the International Committee considered the regular soldiers of the Chinese Army to be the ‘lawful prisoners of war.” This is to be their first and the last claim. And this was not because of their being indifferent to wartime international law as claimed by Professor Hata. Rather it came from resignation to the fact that the Chinese soldiers did not fall under the category of prisoners in war- time international law. For this reason, the International Committee did never again refer to wartime international law. Why is it that the Chinese soldiers did not fall under the category of prisoners? Though we are keen on this matter, Rabe remains silent. Yet, even when the Chinese soldiers were, as Steele wrote, ex- ecuted “without a trial”.” no one was able to claim that the Japanese Army had violated the wartime international law. Any attempt to do so got nowhere: it just ended up in repeating Bates’ allegation in the fall of 1938 that the Japanese Army slaughtered 30,000 prisoners. Rabe and others twisted the facts by asserting con- 133al tinuously that the Japanese Army executed ‘former soldiers’ (i.c., civilians). By so doing the Japanese Army would be found guilty of killing civilians. Yet, the fact remains that they could do nothing but withdrawing their allegations about Japanese violations of wartime international law. No more than fifteen thousand bodies interred Let us leave Rabe’s diary for a while and examine the five records about the burials held during the time. In these records, the only burial organization entrusted with burials was the Red Swastika Society. There is also the Report of the Nanking International Relief Committee (Summer 1939) which was issued while Professor Bates was the chairman. The report states: For example, $2,540 was used to complete the necessary burial enterprises undertaken by the Red Swastika Society, which co- vered over 40,000 bodies otherwise uncared for. The burying in Nanking had absolutely no relation with the Suzendo (Tsun-shan-tang). It was completed by the Red Swastika Society. Moreover, the Report of the Nanking International Commit- tee claims that the work was done in “some 40 working days”.” On the other hand, Mr. Maruyama Susumu, a member of the Nankin Tokumu Kikan (the Special Service Agency) and a Manchuria Rail- ways employee in Shanghai office, who supervised the burial work, stated at my interview with him that the burial began during the first part of February and ended on or about March 15. In October last year, when I first started to read Rabe’s the Facts of Nanking, 1 read on hoping to find his account of the burials. When I discovered his inadvertent remark that the burying began on February 1, I was struck with surprise. Rabe’s diary supported Maruyama’s testimony. As already mentioned, the actual burial work took some forty days. The work started on February 1 and ended on March 15, or at 13232 Higashinakano Shudo the very latest, on the 20th. In other words, Red Swastika record of the burial in December, January and after March 15 is a made-up story. What about the actual number of bodies buried? I assume that in February, over a 25 day period (Rabe claims that 200 bodies were buried a day in February, while Maruyama says that the number was normally 180), 5,000 bodies were buried. In March, basing my estimate on Secretary Rosen’s report that “the Red Swastika Society daily buried 500 to 600 bodies” over a 15 day period (600 bodies a day), 9,000 bodies were buried. The most inflated calculation could therefore not exceed 15,000 bodies. This leads us then to the follow- ing conclusions. 1. The Red Swastika Society’s report of having buried about 43,000 bodies was a counterfeit which padded more than thrice the actual number of the dead bodies. 2. Rabe’s contention that we foreigners assume the number of the murdered to have ranged from 50,000 to 60,000 was an excessive- ly sensational report. There would be no murder without a dead body. 3. There is no basis for Professor Hata’s theory that 40,000 were massacred. In that case, were the estimated 15,000 bodies the victims of a massacre? Because of the limited space available, let me here only point out the fact that Bates’ argument that 40,000 massacred had been repeatedly erased (denied) from the Republic of China's offi- cial record. T have to leave a further discussion of his theory for another occasion, since I have already exceeded the limitations upon the space for this article. NOTES 1) Erwin Wickert (Hrsg), John Rabe. Der Gute Deutsche von Nanking, Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt 1997, p. 170. 2) Harold Timperley (ed.}, Japanese Terror in China, 1938, New York: Books for Libraries Press 1969, p. 159f. 13133 3) Wickert (Hrsg), p. 98. 4) Document No. 9 of the International Committee for the Nanking Safety Zone, dated on December 17, 1937, in: Hs Shushi (ed.), Documents of the Nank- ing Safety Zone, prepared under the auspices of the Council of International Affairs, Chunking 1939, p. 15. 5) Nankin Jiken Chousa Kenkyuukai (ed.), the Nankin Jiken Shiryoushuu Dai 1 kan Amerika Kankel Shiryouken (Collected materials of the Nanking Incident, vol. 1, Materials Relating to America), Tokyo: Aoki Shoten 1992, p. 277. 6) The Document No. 1, dated on December 14, in: Documents of the Nanking Safety Zone, p. }. 7) Wickert (Hrsg.), Join Rabe, p. 107. 8) Tillman Durdin, Chinese Make Stand, in: The New York Times, December 8, 1937. 9) The Document No, 9, in: Documents of the Nanking Safety Zone, p. 14s. 10) John Rabe, Hitler he no Joshinsho (a report to Hitler), in: John Rabe, Nankin no Shinjitsu (The Truth about Nanking, the Japanese translation of John Rabe. Der Gute Deutsche von Nanking), Tokyo: Kodansha 1997, p. $12. 11) Fukuda Kazuya, John Rabe no Nikki *Nankin dai gyakusatsu” wo dou yomuka Gohn Rabe's Diary, How do we read “Great Nanking Massacre"), Shokun, p.37, December 1997. 12) Rabe, Hitler he no Joshinsho, p. 314. 13) [bid., p. 315 14) Ibid. p. 316. 15) Tbid., p. 303. 16) Rabe, Nankin no Skinjitsu, ibid., p. 328. 17) Wickert (Hrsg), Join Rabe, p. 103 18) Ibid, p. 96. 19) Ibid., p. 275. 20) Tbid., p. 268. 21) Kasahara Tokushi, Nankin Jiken (The Nanking Incident), Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten 1997, p. 107. 22) Ibid., p. 105. 23) Ex-Chinese Officers among U.S. Refugees: Colonel and His Aides Admit Blaming the Japanese for Crimes in Nanking, in: the New York Times, January 4, 1938. 24) The Document No. 10, dated on December 18, 1937, in: Documents of the Nanking Safety Zone, p.20. 13034 Higashinakano Shudo 25) Chinese Troops Sought Refuge In Nanking's Camps, Japanese Say, in: China Press, February 2, 1938. See Deutsche Gesandschafl/ Botschaft in China. Japanisch- Chinesischer Konflikt (Mikrofilm), p.195. 26) Ibid. 27) Ibid. 28) MeCallum’s Diary, dated on January 9, 1938. in: Martha L. Smalley (ed.), American Missionary Eyewitnesses to the Nanking Massacre, 1937-1938, YALE Di- vinity School Library 1997, p. 43. 29) Wickert (Hirsg.), John Rabe, p. 121 30) Unemoto Masami (ed), Shougen ni yoru Nankin Sensi (The history of the battle of Nanking Based on Testimonies), Kaikou, November 1984, p. 7. 31) Wickert (Hrsg), fohn Rabe, p. 121 32) Ibid., p. 126. 33) Ibid. p. 122. 34) Minnie Vautrin, Sharing “The Abundant Life” in a Refugee Camp, in: The Chinese Recorder, July-August 1938. 35) Wickert (Hrsg.), John Rabe, p. 261. 36) The Document No. 4, dated on December 15, 1937, in: Documents of the Nank- ing Safety Zone, p. 5. 37) Chicago Daily News, December 18, 1937, and February 3, 1938, in: Nankin Jiken Chosa Kenkyukai (ed), The Nanking Jiken Shiryoshu Dai I kan Amerika Kankei Shiryohen, p. 471, 475. 38) Ibid., p. 337. 39) Report of the Nanking International Relief Committee, November 1937 10 April 1989, 1939, p. 19. 40) Ibid. 41) Higashinakano Shudo, Nankin Gyakusatsu no Teltei Kenshou (1 sacre: Fact versus Fiction), Tokyo: Tendensha 1998, p. 308. 42) Professor Bates of Nanking University asserted in his Memorandum, dated on January 25, 1938, that “/efoidences from burials indicate that close to forty thousand unarmed persons were killed within and near the walls of Nanking, of whom ie ‘Nanking mas- same peer cent had never been soldiers” (my italics). In other words, Bates infer. red that the Japanese army had illegally killed citizens and war prisoners and that forty thousand dead bodies emerged as result. This Memorandum was then sent to Timperley in Shanghai along with let. ters written by George Fitch. Compiling these informations, Timperley edited a book entitled the Japanese Terror in China. The chapter three of this book 129(pp. 46-51) was consisted entirely of the Memorandum. Now, Bates’ Memorandum are reprinted in the following four publications in English: @ Hsu Shu-shi (ed.) (1938) The War Conduct of the Japanese, Prepared under the auspices of the Council of International Affairs, Hankow, Preface written on April 12, pp. 139-146, especially p. 146. @Hsb Shu-shi (ed.) (1939) A Digest of Japanese War Conduct, Prepared under the auspices of the Council of International Affairs, Chunking, Preface on Janu- ary 28, pp. 5-12, especially p. 11 @® The Chinese Year book 1938-39, prepared from official sources by, the Council of International Affairs Chunking, Preface on 15 March, 1938, pp. 182-186, especially p. 185. @Hs Shu-shi (ed.) (1939) Documents of the Nanking Safety Zone, Prepared under the auspices of the Council of International Affairs, Chunking, Preface on May 9, pp. 100-107, especially p. 106. I would draw your attention to the fact that the above quoted part of Bates’ Memorandum (in my italics) have always been deleted in all these four publications and never ratified once. These materials were all ‘prepared under the auspices of the Council of International Affairs, Hankow (later Chungking)’, the capital of the Republic of China. Among them, the Chinese Yearbook 1938-39 clearly inscribed that the Yearbook is ‘prepared from offi- cial sources by the Council of International Affairs Chungking’ This is a modification of my article that appeared in the April 1998 issue of Seiron. 128