CHANAKYA NATIONAL LAW UNIVERSITY

A PROJECT
ON
ombudsman

Subject: Administrative Law

Submitted To: Submitted By: -Anubha Raj
Roll No: 720
6 th
semester, 3rd year

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
1

I am feeling highly elated to work on the topic Ombudsman Under the guidance of
my Administrative Law teacher. I am very grateful to him for the exemplary guidance. I
would like to enlighten my readers regarding this topic and I hope I have tried my best to
pave the way for bringing more luminosity to this topic.
I also want to thank all of my friends, without whose cooperation this project was
not possible. Apart from all these, I want to give special thanks to the librarian of my
university who made every relevant materials regarding to my topic available to me at
the time of my busy research work and gave me assistance. And at last I am very much
obliged to the God who provided me the potential for the rigorous research work.
At finally yet importantly I would like to thank my parents for the financial support

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

The project is basically based on the doctrinal method of research as no field work is done on
this topic. The whole project is made with the use of secondary source.

AIMS AND OBJECTIVES

The aim of the project is to present a detailed study of Ombudsman through decisions and
suggestions.

SOURCES OF DATA:
The following secondary sources of data have been used in the project1

Books

Websites

Journals

TABLE OF CONTENT:
1 Introduction
3

2
3
4
5
6

Appointment of ombudsman
Role and function of ombudsman
Proceedings
Ombudsman in relation to Lokpal and lokyukta
Conclusion

INTRODUCTION:
4

An ombudsman or public advocate is usually appointed by the government or by parliament,

but with a significant degree of independence, who is charged with representing the interests
of the public by investigating and addressing complaints of maladministration or a violation
of rights. In some countries an Inspector General, Citizen Advocate or other official may have
duties similar to those of a national ombudsman, and may also be appointed by a legislature.
Below the national level an ombudsman may be appointed by a state, local or municipal
government. Unofficial ombudsmen may be appointed by, or even work for, a corporation
such as a utility supplier, newspaper, NGO, or professional regulatory body1. The typical
duties of an ombudsman are to investigate complaints and attempt to resolve them, usually
through recommendations (binding or not) or mediation. Ombudsmen sometimes also aim to
identify systematic issues leading to poor service or breaches of people's rights. At the
national level, most ombudsmen have a wide mandate to deal with the entire public sector,
and sometimes also elements of the private sector (for example, contracted service providers).
In some cases, there is a more restricted mandate, for example with particular sectors of
society. More recent developments have included the creation of specialized Children's
Ombudsman and Information Commissioner agencies.
In some jurisdictions an ombudsman charged with handling concerns about national
government is more formally referred to as the "Parliamentary Commissioner" (e.g. the
United Kingdom Parliamentary Commissioner for Administration, and the Western
Australian state Ombudsman). In many countries where the ombudsman's responsibility
includes protecting human rights, the ombudsman is recognized as the national human rights
institution. The post of ombudsman had by the end of the 20th century been instituted by
most governments and by some intergovernmental organizations such as the European
Union2.
In general, an ombudsman is a state official appointed to provide a check on government
activity in the interests of the citizen, and to oversee the investigation of complaints of
improper government activity against the citizen. If the ombudsman finds a complaint to be
substantiated, the problem may get rectified, or an ombudsman report is published making
recommendations for change. Further redress depends on the laws of the country concerned,
1 An Article, Instilling public confidence in administration: The need for an Ombudsman like
institution in India,from ssrn.com as visited on 3rd October 2011
2 Wade & Forsyth, Administrative Law,( Oxford University Press, Oxford Eighth Edition, 2000) p.
88 from
5

but this typically involves financial compensation. Ombudsmen in most countries do not have
the power to initiate legal proceedings or prosecution on the grounds of a complaint. This role
is sometimes referred to as a "tribunitian" role, and has been traditionally fulfilled by elected
representatives the term refers to the ancient Roman "tribunes of the plebeians" (tribuni
plebis), whose role was to intercede in the political process on behalf of common citizens3.
The major advantage of an ombudsman is that he or she examines complaints from outside
the offending state institution, thus avoiding the conflicts of interest inherent in self-policing.
However, the ombudsman system relies heavily on the selection of an appropriate individual
for the office, and on the cooperation of at least some effective official from within the
apparatus of the state

3 www.socialissuesindia.wordpress.com as visited on 3rd October 2011

6

APPOINTMENT OF OMBUDSMAN4:
3. There shall be appointed as an Officer of Parliament a Commissioner for Administrative
Investigations to be called the Ombudsman, who shall be appointed by the President acting in
accordance with a resolution of the House of Representatives supported by the votes of not
less than two-thirds of all the members of the House: Provided that when a person who is not
a member of the House of Representatives is elected to be the Speaker of the House of
Representatives he shall not be treated as a member of the House for the purpose of
establishing the majority required by this article.
4. (1) A person shall not be qualified to be appointed to the office of Ombudsman if he is a
member of the House of Representatives, a member of a local council, or if he is a public
officer.
(2) The office of Ombudsman shall be incompatible with the exercise of any professional,
banking, commercial or trade union activity, or other activity for profit or reward.
(3) The Ombudsman shall not hold any position which is incompatible with the correct
performance of his official duties or with his impartiality and independence or with public
confidence therein. The Ombudsman shall declare to, and seek the approval of, the Speaker
of the House of Representatives to any positions, trusts or memberships which the
Ombudsman considers do not affect impartiality, or independence and public confidence, and
which it is desired to retain during the term of office. Term of office.
5. (1) Except as otherwise provided in this Act, an Ombudsman shall hold office for a term
of five years, and shall be eligible for reappointment for one consecutive term of five years.
(2) Unless his office sooner becomes vacant, a person appointed as an Ombudsman shall hold
office until his successor is appointed.
(3) An Ombudsman may at any time resign his office by writing addressed to the President.
Removal or suspension from office.

4 Ombudsman act 1997

7

6. (1) An Ombudsman may at any time be removed or suspended from his office by the
President, upon an address from the House of Representatives supported by the votes of not
less than two-thirds of all members of the House, praying for such removal on the ground of
proved inability to perform the functions of his office (whether arising from infirmity of body
or mind or any other cause) or proved misbehaviour, and the provisions of the proviso to
article 3 shall also apply for the purpose of establishing the majority required under this sub
article.
(2) At any time when Parliament is not in session, an Ombudsman may be suspended from
his office by the President acting in accordance with his own discretion for inability to
perform the functions of his office or misbehaviour proved to the satisfaction of the
President; but any such suspension shall notcontinue in force beyond two months after the
beginning of thenext ensuing session of Parliament. Filling of vacancy.
7. (1) If an Ombudsman dies, or resigns from office, orvacates his office or is removed from
office, the vacancy thereby created shall be filled in accordance with this article.
(2) If the vacancy in the office of an Ombudsman occurs at any time while Parliament is in
session, it shall be filled by the appointment of the Ombudsman by the President on the
recommendation of the House of Representatives in accordance with article 3: Provided that
if the vacancy occurs less than two months before the close of that session and no such
recommendation is made in that session, the provisions of sub article (3) shall apply as if the
vacancy had occurred while Parliament was not in session.
(3) If any such vacancy occurs at any time while Parliament is not in session, the President
shall appoint an Ombudsman to fill the vacancy, and the person so appointed shall, unless his
office sooner becomes vacant, hold office until an Ombudsman is appointed in accordance
with article 3.
.8. (1) The President may - (a) at any time during the illness or absence of the
Ombudsman, or (b) for any other temporary purpose where the Ombudsman considers it
necessary not to conduct an investigation himself because of such circumstances, that were he
a judge of the superior courts, he would abstain, appoint an Ombudsman to hold office in
accordance with this article, and such an Ombudsman shall be paid such salary, not exceeding
the amount payable to the Ombudsman, as the President thinks fit.

(2) The power conferred by article (1)(b) shall be exercised only on a certificate signed by the
Ombudsman to the effect that, in his opinion, it is necessary for the due conduct of the
business of the Ombudsman under this Act that an additional Ombudsman should be
temporarily appointed.
(3) An Ombudsman appointed under this article on account of the illness or absence of the
Ombudsman shall hold office until the resumption of office of the Ombudsman, and every
other Ombudsman appointed for a temporary purpose shall hold office until he performs the
function assigned to him.
(4) (a) A person shall not be qualified to be approved under this article if he is disqualified to
be appointed to the Office of Ombudsman under article 4(1).
(b) The provisions of articles 4(2) and (3) shall apply to a person appointed under this article:
Provided that a person appointed under this article may exercise any activity for profit or
reward which is not in any way incompatible with the provisions of article 4(3).
9. (1) Before entering upon the exercise of the duties of his Oath of Office. office an
Ombudsman shall take an oath that he will faithfully and impartially perform the duties of his
office, and that he will not, except in accordance with article 21, divulge any information
acquired by him under this Act.
(2) The oath shall be administered by the Speaker of the House of Representatives.
10. (1) Subject to the provisions of the Constitution and of Resources. any other enactment
applicable thereto, and subject to the provisions of this article the Ombudsman may appoint
such officers and employees as may be necessary for the carrying out of the functions,
powers and duties under this Act. This power to appoint includes approval to the numbers of
persons that may be appointed under this article whether generally or in respect of any
specific duties or classes of duties, their salaries and conditions of appointment.
(2) The Ombudsman may in the conduct of an investigation engage, in a consultative
capacity, any person whose particular expertise is essential to the effectiveness of the
investigation: Provided that if the consultant required is a public officer the Prime Minister
may, at the request of the Ombudsman, designate the public officer to assist.

(3) Subject to the provisions of this article the Ombudsman shall be responsible for approving
the level of capital equipment, furnishings, materials, and administrative activities for the
carrying out of the functions, powers and duties under this Act.
(4) The finance required for the Ombudsmans salary and allowances, and for the resources
described in subarticles (1), (2) and (3) shall not exceed a maximum amount indicated in an
Ombudsplan approved by the House of Representatives and shall be a charge on the
Consolidated Fund without any further appropriation other than this Act: Provided that the
Ombudsman shall present to the House by the l5th day of September of each year, an
Ombudsplan which will indicate the ensuing years activities.
(5) The salary, allowances and expenses payable to the Ombudsman shall be at rates
equivalent to those applicable to ajudge of the superior courts. The salary is not to be
diminished during the continuance of the Ombudsmans appointment.
(6) The officers and employees appointed in accordance with subarticle (1) shall before
entering into the exercise of their office or employment take an oath that they will faithfully
and impartially perform the duties of their office or employment, and that they will not,
except in accordance with article 21, divulge any information acquired by them under this
Act. Such oath shall be administered by the Ombudsman.
11. The accounts of the office of the Ombudsman shall be audited by the Auditor General and
the Financial Administration and Audit Act shall apply.

10

ROLE AND FUNCTION:

The Office of the Ombudsman shall have the following powers, functions and duties
Investigate and prosecute on its own or on complaint by any person, any act or omission of
any public officer or employee, office or agency, when such act or omission appears to be
illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient5. It has primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by
the Sandiganbayan and, in the exercise of his primary jurisdiction, it may take over, at any
stage, from any investigatory agency of Government, the investigation of such cases (Sec.
15(1) R.A. No. 6770; see also Sec. 13(1), Article XI, 1987 Constitution);
Direct, upon complaint or at its own instance, any officer or employee of the Government, or
of any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, as well as any government-owned or
controlled corporations with original charter, to perform and expedite any act or duty required
by law, or to stop, prevent, and correct any abuse or impropriety in the performance of duties
(Sec. 15(2) R.A. No. 6770; Sec 13(2) Article XI, 1987 Constitution); Direct the officer
concerned to take appropriate action against a public officer or employee at fault or who
neglects to perform an act or discharge a duty required by law, and recommend his removal,
suspension, demotion, fine, censure, or prosecution, and ensure compliance therewith; or
enforce its disciplinary authority as provided in Section 21 or this Act: Provided, That the
refusal by any officer without just cause to comply with an order of the Ombudsman to
remove, suspend, demote, fine, censure, or prosecute an officer or employee who is at fault or
who neglects to perform an act or discharge a duty required by law shall be ground for
disciplinary action against said officer (Sec. 15(3) R.A. No. 6770; see also Sec 13(3), Article
XI, 1987 Constitution);
Direct the officer concerned, in any appropriate case, and subject to such limitations as it may
provide in its rules of procedure, to furnish it with copies of documents relating to contracts
5 Manindigan kontra Katiwalian, Power Duties and Function, available at
http://www.ombudsman.gov.ph/index.php?home=1&navId=MQ==&subNavId=ODY, accesed on
21.4.2015
11

or transactions entered into by his office involving the disbursement or use of public funds or
properties, and report any irregularity to the Commission on Audit for appropriate action
(Sec. 15(4) R.A. No. 6770; see also Sec. 13(4), Article XI, 1987 Constitution);
Request any government agency for assistance and information necessary in the discharge of
its responsibilities, and to examine, if necessary, pertinent records and documents (Sec. 15(5),
R.A. No.6770; see also Sec. 13(5), Article XI, 1987 Constitution);
Publicize matters covered by its investigation of the matters mentioned in paragraphs (1), (2),
(3) and (4) hereof, when circumstances so warrant and with due determine what cases may
not be made public: Provided further, That any publicity issued by the Ombudsman shall be
balanced, fair, and true (Sec 15(6) R.A. No. 6770; see also Sec 13(6), Article XI, 1987
Constitution);
Determine the causes of inefficiency, red tape, mismanagement, fraud, and corruption in the
Government and make recommendations for their elimination and the observance of high
standards of ethics and efficiency (Sec 15(7) R.A. No. 6770; see also Sec 13(7), Article XI,
1987 Constitution);
Administer oaths, issue subpoena and subpoena duces tecum, and take testimony in any
investigation or inquiry, including the power to examine and have access to bank accounts
and records (Sec 15(8), R.A. No. 6770);
Punish for contempt in accordance with the Rules of Court and under the same procedure and
with the same penalties provided therein (Sec 15(9), R.A. No. 6770);
Delegate to the Deputies, or its investigators or representatives such authority or duty as shall
ensure the effective exercise of performance of the powers, functions, and duties herein or
hereinafter provided (Sec 15(10), R.A. No. 6770); investigate and initiate the proper action
for the recovery of ill-gotten and/or unexplained wealth amassed after February 25, 1986 and
the prosecution of the parties involved therein (Sec 15(11), R.A. No. 6770);
Promulgate its rules of procedure and exercise such other powers or perform such functions
or duties as may be provided by law (Sec 13(7), Article XI, 1987 Constitution; see also Sec.
18, R.A. No. 6770);

12

PROCEEDINGS6:
18. (1) Before investigating any matter under this Act the Proceedings. Ombudsman shall
inform the head of department concerned, or, as the case may require, the chief executive
officer of the organization concerned, or the mayor of the local council concerned, of his
intention to make the investigation.
(2) Every investigation by the Ombudsman under this Act shall be conducted in private.
(3) The Ombudsman may hear or obtain information from such persons as he thinks fit, and
may make such enquiries as he thinks fit. It shall not be necessary for the Ombudsman to
hold any hearing, and no person shall be entitled as of right to be heard by the Ombudsman:
Provided that if at any time during the course of an investigation it appears to the
Ombudsman that there may be sufficient grounds for his making any report or
recommendation that may adversely affect any department, organisation, local council or
person, he shall give to that department, organisation, local council or person an opportunity
to be heard.
(4) In the case of an investigation relating to a department, organisation or local council, the
Ombudsman may in his discretion at any time during or after the investigation consult a
Minister, head of department, chief executive, mayor or any other person who is concerned in
the matter of the investigation, and the Ombudsman shall consult any Minister, head of
department, chief executive, mayor or any other person who so requests or to whom a
recommendation which is the subject of the investigation has been made, after the
Ombudsman had made the investigation and before he has formed a final opinion on any of
the matters referred to in articles 22(1) and (2).
(5) If, during or after any investigation, the Ombudsman is of the opinion that there is
substantial evidence of any significant breach of duty or misconduct on the part of any officer
or employee of any department, organisation or local council, he shall refer the matter to the
6 Ombudsman Act 1997
13

appropriate authority including the Police: Provided that the Ombudsman may continue
further with his investigation after having referred the matter as aforesaid.
(6) Subject to the provisions of this Act and of any rules made thereunder, the Ombudsman
may regulate his procedure in such manner as he thinks fit.
19. (1) Subject to the provisions of this article and of article 20 of this Act, the Ombudsman
may from time to time require any person who in his opinion is able to give any information
relating to any matter that is being investigated by the Ombudsman to furnish to him any such
information, and to produce any documents or papers or things which in the Ombudsmans
opinion relate to any such matter as aforesaid and which may be in the possession or under
the control of that person. This subarticle shall apply whether or not the person is an officer,
employee, or member of any department, organisation or local council, and whether or not
such documents, papers, or things are in the custody or under the control of any department,
organisation or local council.
(2) The Ombudsman shall have power to summon witnesses and to administer an oath to any
witness and to any person concerned in the investigation, and require them to give evidence.
(3) Any person summoned as aforesaid who refuses, or without sufficient cause fails, to
attend at the time and place mentioned in the summons, or refuses, without sufficient cause to
answer or to answer fully and satisfactorily, to the best of his knowledge and belief all
questions put to him by the Ombudsman, or refuses or fails, without sufficient cause, to
produce any document he was required to produce by the Ombudsman shall be guilty of an
offence and shall be liable on conviction to a fine (multa) not exceeding one thousand and
one hundred and sixty euro (1,160) or to imprisonment not exceeding three months, or to
both such fine and imprisonment: Provided that, without prejudice to the generality of the
provisions of subarticle (2), no person giving evidence before the Ombudsman may be
compelled to answer any question which tends to expose him to any criminal prosecution,
and every such person shall, in respect of any evidence given by him before the Ombudsman,
be entitled to the same privileges to which a witnessgiving evidence before a court of law is
entitled.
20. (1) Where the Prime Minister certifies that the giving of any information or the answering
of any question or the production of anything, paper or other document -

14

(a) affects the security or defence of Malta or relations or dealings between the Government
of Malta and any other Government or any international organisation of States or
Governments; or
(b) is likely to damage seriously the national economy; or
(c) involves the disclosure of the deliberations or proceedings of Cabinet or any committee of
Cabinet; or
(d) prejudices the investigation or detection of offences, the Ombudsman shall not require the
information or answer to be given or, as the case may be, the thing, paper or other document
to be produced.
(2) Subject to the provisions of sub article (1), the rule of law which authorises or requires the
withholding of any document, thing, or paper, or the refusal to answer any question, on the
ground that the disclosure of the document, thing or paper or the answering of the question
would be injurious to the public interest shall not apply in respect of any investigation by or
proceedings before the Ombudsman. Secrecy of information.
21. (1) Information obtained by the Ombudsman and every person holding any office,
appointment or designation under the Ombudsman, in the course of or for the purpose of an
investigation under this Act, shall not be disclosed except for the purposes of the
investigation and of any report to be made thereon under this Act, or for the purpose of any
proceedings relating to an offence under this Act, and the Ombudsman and members of his
staff shall not be called upon to give evidence in any proceedings, other than such as
aforesaid, of matters coming to their knowledge in the course of an investigation under this
Act.
(2) Article 133 of the Criminal Code shall apply to and in Cap. 9. relation to the Ombudsman
and his staff as they apply to or in relation to a public officer or servant referred to in article
133 of the Criminal Code.
PROCEDURE AFTER INVESTIGATION
22. (1) The provisions of this article shall apply in every case where, after making any
investigation under this Act, the Ombudsman is of opinion that the decision,
recommendation, act or omission which was the subject-matter of the investigation - (a)
appears to have been contrary to law; or (b) was unreasonable, unjust, oppressive, or
15

improperly discriminatory, or was in accordance with a law or a practice that is or may be

unreasonable, unjust, oppressive, or improperly discriminatory; or
(c) was based wholly or partly on a mistake of law or fact; 10 CAP. 385.] OMBUDSMAN or
(d) was wrong.
(2) The provisions of this article shall also apply in any case where the Ombudsman is of
opinion that in the making of the decision or recommendation, or in the doing or omission of
the act, a discretionary power has been exercised for an improper purpose or on irrelevant
grounds or on the taking into account of irrelevant considerations, or that, in the case of a
decision made in the exercise of any discretionary power, reasons should have been given for
the decision.
(3) If in any case to which this article applies the Ombudsman is of opinion (a) that the matter should be referred to the appropriate authority for further consideration; or
(b) that the omission should be rectified; or
(c) that the decision should be cancelled or varied; or
(d) that any practice on which the decision, recommendation, act, or omission was based
should be
altered; or
(e) that any law on which the decision, recommendation, act, or omission was based should
be reconsidered; or
(f) that reasons should have been given for the decision; or
(g) that any other steps should be taken, the Ombudsman shall report his opinion, and his
reasons therefor, to the appropriate department, organisation or local council, and may make
such recommendations as he thinks fit. In any such case he may request the department,
organisation or local council to notify him, within a specified time, of the steps (if any) that it
proposes to take to give effect to his recommendations. The Ombudsman shall also, in the
case of an investigation send a copy of his report or recommendations to the Minister
concerned and to the mayor in the case relating to a local council.

16

(4) If within a reasonable time after the report is made no action is taken which seems to the
Ombudsman to be adequate and appropriate, the Ombudsman, in his discretion, after
considering the comments (if any) made by or on behalf of any department, organisation or
local council affected, may send a copy of the report and recommendations to the Prime
Minister, and may thereafter make such report to the House of Representatives on the matter
as he thinks fit.
(5) The Ombudsman shall attach to every report sent under sub article (4) a copy of any
comments made by or on behalf of the department, organization or local council affected.
(6) Notwithstanding anything in this article, the Ombudsman shall not, in any report made
under this Act, make any comment that is adverse to any person unless the person has been
given an opportunity to be heard.
23. (1) Where, on any investigation following a complaint, the Ombudsman makes a
recommendation under article 22(3) and no action which seems to the Ombudsman to be
adequate and appropriate is taken thereon within a reasonable time, the Ombudsman shall
inform the complainant of his recommendation, and may make such comments on the matter
as he thinks fit.
(2) The Ombudsman shall in any case inform the complainant, in such manner and at such
time as he thinks proper, of the result of the investigation. Proceedings not subject to review.
24. Except on the ground of lack of jurisdiction, no proceeding or recommendation of the
Ombudsman may be challenged in any court.
25. (1) No proceedings, civil or criminal, shall lie against the Ombudsman or against any
member of his staff for anything he may do or report or say in the course of the exercise or
intended exercise of his functions under this Act unless it is shown that he acted in bad faith.
(2) The Ombudsman and such persons as aforesaid, shall not be called to give evidence in
any court, or in any proceedings of a judicial nature, in respect of anything coming to his
knowledge in the exercise of his functions under this Act.
(3) Anything said or any information supplied or any document, paper or thing produced by
any person in the course of any inquiry by or proceedings before the Ombudsman under this
Act shall be privileged in the same manner as if the inquiry or proceedings were proceedings
in a court.
17

OMBUDSMAN IN REFRENCE TO LOKPAL AND LOKAYUKTA:

The Indian Lokpal is synonymous to the institution of Ombudsman 7 existing in the
Scandinavian countries. The institution of Ombudsman first came into being in Sweden in
1713 when a Chancellor of Justice was appointed by the King to act as invigilator to look
into the functioning of war-time government. Thereafter, a new beginning was made in 1809,
when it was laid down that the Ombudsman would be made thereafter by the legislature.
Thereafter, this institution remained confined only to Scandinavian countries such as Finland
and Denmark. The first Commonwealth country where the institution of Ombudsman was
accepted was New Zealand where this office came into being in 1962. A modified version of
the Ombudsman, that is, the Office of the Parliamentary Commissioner was established in the
United Kingdom in 1967. Since then, the institution office of the ombudsman had spread to
several countries from the sixties. The ombudsmen can investigate a complaint by themselves
or through any public or private agency. After investigation, in Sweden and Finland, the
Ombudsman has the power to prosecute erring public servants; whereas in Denmark, he can
only order prosecution. However, the power of prosecution is very rarely used. The strength
of the ombudsman lies in the publicity attached to the office, and the negative view that
attaches itself to all that the office it scrutinizes. In Sweden and Finland, ombudsmen can also
supervise the courts. In other countries, their authority is only over the non-judicial public
servants. In almost all the cases they deal with complaints relating to both corruption and
mal-administration.
Context
After independence, increasing magnitude of developmental and welfare responsibilities of
the government has boosted the proliferation of the administrative machinery. Consequently,
over the years numerous cases of corruption, maladministration and misuse of authority and
resources have started coming to light. Since such practices couldnt be curbed by the
7 Ombudsman a Swedish word stands for an officer appointed by the legislature to handle
complaints against administrative and judicial action.
18

existing measures, under the Indian Penal Code 1860 and the Prevention of Corruption Act,
1988.(The Code of Criminal Procedure and the Prevention of Corruption Act requires the
investigating/prosecuting agency to get prior sanction of the central or state government
before it can initiate the prosecution process in a court). Therefore, the need for an agency
independent of the executive, legislative and judiciary, to look into citizens grievances and
cases of corruption have been widely felt and the central government have at several times
considered the introduction of a Lok Pal Bill to put it in place as a mechanism to tackle
corruption.
There have been animated discussions in Parliament on various facets of the problems of
corruption at the time of consideration of the Prevention of Corruption Bill, the Criminal Law
Amendment Bill and the Commissions of Inquiry Bill. In 1959, Shri C.D. Deshmukh had
suggested for the establishment of, a high-level impartial standing judicial tribunal to
investigate and report on complaints pertaining to corruption 8. On 3 April 1963, during a
debate on the Demands for Grants of the Ministry of Law, Dr. L. M. Singhvi stressed the
need for setting up of a Parliamentary Commissioner- an Ombudsman like institution-and
suggested an amendment of the Constitution to set up such an office and define its function
and possibly even the procedure which it had to follow 9.The same year Shri P. B.
Gajendrakar, the then Chief Justice of India, pleaded for the establishment of an independent
authority for the redress of public grievances 10.In September 1963, the Administrative
Reforms Committee of Rajasthan under the Chairmanship of Shri H.C. Mathur,
recommended the appointment of an Ombudsman to look into the complaints against high
State officials and Ministers. In December 1963, while accepting the recommendation of the
Santhanam Committee11 for the setting up of the Central Vigilance Commission, the
Government promised to examine further the question of evolving machinery for dealing
8 Shri C. D. Deshmukh, Chairman UGC, who had earlier held the position of Union Finance
Minister, suggested this while delivering a lecture in Madras on 11 July 1959
9 L.S. Deb., 3 April 1963, c 7556-58 and 7589-93
10 In his Convocation address at the Indian Institute of Public Administration, New Delhi on 15 July
1963,
11 The Committee, officially known as the Committee on Prevention of Corruption was set up in
1962
19

with the grievances of citizens against the administration. Dr. L.M. Singhvi moved a
resolution in the Lok Sabha on 3 April 1964, reiterating his demand for setting up an officer
of Parliament known as Peoples Procurator 12. The resolution was discussed in detail by all
sections of the House but was withdrawn on the assurance of the Government that it would
look into the matter13. In pursuance of this assurance, the Government constituted a Special
Consultative Group of Members of Parliament on administrative reforms, in early 1965,
which favoured a high powered inquiry commission on administrative reforms. Accordingly,
an Administrative Reforms Commission (ARC) was appointed in January 1966, for making
recommendations on the reorganization of the administrative system of the country.
The ARC was required to consider, among other things, problems of existing arrangement
and need for a special institution for the redress of citizens grievances keeping in mind the
need for ensuring the highest standards of efficiency and integrity in public services, and also
for making public administration responsive to the people.

More specifically, the

commission was expected to examine:

(i) The adequacy of the existing arrangements for the redress of grievances; and
(ii) The need for introduction of any new machinery or special institution for redress of
grievances.
The ARC appointed on 25 June 1966, a study group to go into these problems. On the basis
of recommendations of this group, the ARC made an interim report on 20 October 1966, in
which it took note of the often expressed public outcry against the prevalence of corruption,
the existence of widespread inefficiency and the unresponsiveness of administration to
popular needs. It felt that the answer to this lay in the provision of a machinery which would
examine public complaints ans sift the genuine from the false or the untenable so that failures
and achievements of the administration could be publicly viewed in the correct perspective.
Such an institution was regard necessary even from the point of view of affording protection
to the services. The Commission, therefore, recommended that there should be a statutory
machinery to equire into complaints alleging corruption or injustice arising out of
12 The resolution sought to express the opionion of the House that an officer of Parliament to be
known as the Peoples Procurator
13 L.S. Deb., 3 April 1964, c. 9163-71
20

maladministration. In other words, the ARC while preparing its report had three ends in
view:
(i) Evolution of a suitable grievance procedure for the individuals to invoke in complaints of
maladministration:
(ii) Creation of a mechanism which would reduce corruption in the administrative services;
and
(iii) Setting up a mechanism which would take cognizance of complaints of favoritism and
nepotism against Central and State Ministers14.
The Administrative Reforms Commission (ARC) also appended to its report a draft Bill on
the subject with a view to enable the Government to take a prompt and speedy action to set
up the institution of Lokpal and Lokayukta15.

LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF LOKPAL IN INDIA

THE LOKPAL AND LOKAYUKTAS BILL, 1966 The first major attempt on the
legislative plans for providing an Ombudsman like institution in India was made with the
introduction of the Lokpal and Lokayukta Bill in the Lok Sabha, on 9 May 1968 16. The Bill
was referred to a Joint Committee of the Houses of Parliament which presented its report to
the Lok Sabha on 26 March 196917. The Bill, as reported by the Joint Committee, was passed
14 Interim Report of the Administrative Reforms Commission on Problems of Citizens Grievances,
1966, p.8-15.
15 It was Dr. L.M. Singhvi who, for first time, suggested the term Lokayukta as a Hindi equivalent
of the term Peoples Procurator contained in his resolution moved in 1964. See, L.S. Deb., 3 April
1964, c.9163-72.
16 The Committee consisted of 45 members ( 30 members from the Lok Sabha and 15 from the
Rajya Sabha) which worked under the Chairmanship of Shri M.B.Rana
17 The Committee consisted of 45 members ( 30 members from the Lok Sabha and 15 from the
Rajya Sabha) which worked under the Chairmanship of Shri M.B.Rana
21

by the Lik Sabha after being discussed elaborately18. The Bill, as passed by the Lok Sabha,
was sent to the Rajya Sabha on 22 August 1969. But, while it was pending in the Rajya
Sabha, the fourth Lok Sabha was dissolved on 27 December 1970. The Bill consequently
lapsed19.
The Bill sought to give effect to the recommendations of the ARC in so far as they related to
matters within the purview of the Union Government. In its scope, it differed from the draft
Bill proposed by the ARC in two major respects. It did not extend to public servants in the
States. Secondly, it did not confine itself to Ministers and Secretaries alone. In other words,
the Bill sought to provide a statutory machinery to enquire into complaints based on actions
of the all Union public servants, including Ministers.

THE LOKPAL AND LOKAYUKTAS BILL, 1971 Since the earlier Bill had lapsed, the
Bill as passed by the Lok Sabha in 1969 was reintroduced in the Lok Sabha on 11 August
197120. This Bill also lapsed due to dissolution of the fifth Lok Sabha.

THE LOKPAL BILL, 1977 After the Janata Party came to power in 1977, the matter was
re-examined having regard to the recommendations of the ARC, the provisions of the 1971
Bill and other laws on the subject enacted in various States from time to time and the
experience of the functioning of such institutions in the States where they had been set up. In
the light of this re-examination, it was proposed to alter the scheme of the Lokpal as
incorporated in the 1971 Bill in material respects for making the institutions of Lokpal an
effective instrument to combat the problems posed by corruption.
18 It was discussed in the House on 13, 14, 18 and 20 August 1969. See L.S. Deb., 13 August
1969, c.213-301, 14 August, c . 236-66; 18 August, c. 267-88; and 20 August, c.445-534
19 Art. 107(5) of the Constitution provides that a Bill originating in the Lok Sabha and transmitted to
the Rajya Sabha subject to the provisions of the article 108 lapses, if the Lok Sabha is dissolved in the
meantime
20 The Bill was introduced by the them Minister of State in the Ministry of Home Affairs, Shri Ram
Niwas Mirdha.
22

Accordingly, a fresh Bill called the Lokpal Bill, 1977 was introduced in the Lok Sabha on
28 July 1977. This Bill was referred to a Joint Committee of the Houses of Parliament which
submitted its report on 20 July 197821. While the Bill was under consideration of the Lok
Sabha, the sixth Lok Sabha got dissolved. Consequenly this Bill also lapsed.
Under the scheme proposed by the Lokpal Bill, 1977, the jurisdiction of the Lokpal was to
cover any complaints of misconduct against the Prime Minister, Members of Parliament and
Chief Ministers of States. Allegations against civil servants were excluded from the purview
of the Lokpal. Grivances due to mal-administration, etc. as distinct from allegations of
misconduct, were also excluded from its jurisdiction.

THE LOKPAL BILL, 1985 Yet another Lokpal Bill was introduced in the Lok Sabha on 26
August 198522. The 1985 Bill empowered the Lokpal to inquire into complaints against a
public functionary ( as defined in the Bill) alleging that he has committed an offence
punishable under Chapter IX of the Indian Penal Code or under the Prevention of Corruption
Act, 1947. The expression public functionary covered Ministers, Ministers of State,
Deputy Ministers and Parliamentary Secretaries of the Union.

The Bill was referred to a

Joint Committee23 which recommended withdrawal of the Bill as several of its members felt
that the Bill in its then existing form would not, if enacted, serve the purpose for which it
was intended . The Government argued that the Bill did not make any provision for the
redress of grievances arising out of any act or omission of the Government or a public
functionary or an emplo9yees of the Government which did not involve any element of
corruption. It was common experience that many grievances of citizens arose because of
inefficiency, tardiness, delay, red-tape, outmoded rules and procedures which did not involve
any corrupt motive. It was, therefore, necessary, the Government emphasized, to evolve a
system or machinery to redress the grievances of citizens, otherwise the Lokpal would not
21 The Committee consisted of 45 members ( 30 from the Lok Sabha and 15 from the Rajya Sabha)
with Shri Shayamnandan Mishra as its Chairman.
22 The Bill was introduced by Shri A.K.Sen, Minister of Law & Justice
23 The Joint Committee, like the earlier ones, consisted of 30 members from the Lok Sabha and 15
from the Rajya Sabha with Shri Brahma Dutt as its Chairman. Consequent upon his resignation from
the Committee, Shri Somnath Rath was appointed the Chairman w.e.f. 24 July 1987
23

serve the objectives which were envisaged by the ARC. The Government offered to reexamine the entire issue relating to the establishment of Lokpal, its powers and jurisdiction.

The withdrawal of the Bill was opposed vehemently by the Members belonging to the
opposition not only on the floor of the Lok Sabha when the report of the Joint Committee
was tabled but a strong note of dissent was also appended to the Report. Nine Members24 of
the Committee belonging to opposition parties described the Bill as the most anemic in
content and the most restricted in scope. They, however, felt that the withdrawal of the Bill at
that stage would render the three years labour of the Committee as extravagant and futile.
They held that the need for the institutions of Lokpal was overdue which should not be
shelved on any pretext whatsoever and the amendments suggested by them, if incorporated,
would provide the Bill with necessary teeth 25. They felt that the Committee was fully
competent or enlarge the definition of complaint so as to cover complaints about abuse of
power, gross misconduct, maladministration causing harassment to citizens, etc. Two other
reasons advanced by the Government for not proceeding with the Bill. i.e., passing of the
Prevention of Corruption act, 1988, and setting up a Directorate of Public Grievances were
also found by them to be unconvincing. They contended that any subordinate department
cannot be a substitute for the Lokpal. The members belonging to the opposition further
demanded that the office of the Prime Minister should also be brought under the purview of
the Lokpal as was done by the Lokpal Bill, 1977. They cited, in this regard example of
several States where the Chief Ministers have been put under the jurisdiction of their
respective Lokayuktas. The Bill was, however, withdrawn by the leave of the House.

THE LOKPAL BILL, 1989 The Lokpal Bill, 1989 was introduced in the Lok Sabha on 29
December 1989 for constituting the institution of Lokpal to combat the problem of corruption
at higher levels. Like the previous two Lokpal Bills, the Lokpal Bill, 1989 did not cover
24 Members were S/Shri L.K. Advani, P. Upendra, Aladi Aruna, K.P. Unnikrishan,
Jaipal Reddy, C.Madhav Reddy, Zainal Abedin, Indrajit Gupta and Virendra Verma.
25 A consolidated list of more than 200 amendments was circulated to members
of the Committee
24

public servant under its ambit. Instead the Bill sought to deal with the problem of corruption
at higher political levels.
The Bill sought to equip Lokpal with necessary powers and immunities to create greater
assurance of justice and firplay in the mind of all. It proposed that the jurisdiction of Lokpal
should cover the complaints of corruption within the meaning of the Prevention of Corruption
Act, 1988, against the Council of Ministers including the Prime Minister. It also provided
that in case of complaints against a Minister, the competent authority should be the Prime
Minister to decide about the action to be taken on the recommendation of the Lokpal, and in
the case of the Prime Minister, it should be the House of the People. The Lokpal Bill, 1989,
lapsed with the dissolution of the ninth Lok Sabha.

THE LOKPAL BILL, 1996 After coming to power at the Centre, the United Front
Government introduced a fresh Lokpal Bill on 13 September 1996, with a view to providing
for the institution of Lokpal to inquire into allegations of corruption against public
functionaries and for matters connected therewith. The Bill sought to provide the citizen a
convenient and effective forum for determination of complaints and thereby save him from
pursuing his remedy through the process of Courts, which is usually expensive or dilatory.
The Bill sought to ensure that the Lokpal was able to act independently and discharge his
functions without fear or favour.
The Bill too was referred to the Standing Committee on Home Affairs for examination and
report. The Standing Committee presented its Report to the Parliament on 9.5.1997 making
wide ranging amendments to the various provisions of this Bill. Before the Government
could finalise its stand on the various recommendations of the Standing Committee, the
Eleventh

Lok

Sabha

was

dissolved

and

consequently

the

Bill

also

lapsed.

THE LOKPAL BILL, 1998 The NDA government under Atal Bihari Vajpayee introduced a
new Lokpal Bill (on 03.08.1998) and it was also referred to the Department related
Parliamentary Standing Committee on Home Affairs for examination and report. The
Standing Committee presented its report to the Parliament on 25.02.1999. However, before
the Government could take a view on the various recommendations made by the
25

Parliamentary Standing Committee, the Twelfth Lok Sabha was dissolved on 26.4.1999 and
consequently the Bill also lapsed.

THE LOKPAL BILL, 2001 The Lokpal Bill, 2001 (introduced on 14.08.2001) was the
eighth attempt26 by the Government to establish the institution of Lokpal at the federal level
during the last six decades. The 2001 Lok Pal Bill, provided for the establishment of the
institution of Lokpal to inquire into allegations of corruption against public functionaries,
including the Prime Minister and it proposed to appoint the Lokpal and two members by the
President on the recommendation of a committee headed by the Vice-President and
comprising the Prime Minister, the Lok Sabha Speaker, the Home Minister, Leader of the
House other than the House in which the Prime Minister is a member and Leaders of the
Opposition in the Lok Sabha and the Rajya Sabha. The 2001 Bill provided for a fixed tenure
of three years for the Chairperson and the members.The Lokpal would inquire into
complaints alleging that a public functionary has committed an offence punishable under the
Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. The public functionary will cover the Prime Minister,
the Ministers, the Ministers of State, the Deputy Ministers and the Members of Parliament.
Other constitutional functionaries such as Judges of the Supreme Court, the Election
Commissioners have been kept out of the purview of the bill. With a view to ensuring that the
Lokpal is able to act independently and discharge its functions without fear or favour, the bill
provided that the Chairperson or a Member of the Lokpal shall not be removed from office,
except by an order made by the President on the ground of proved misbehaviour or incapacity
after an inquiry by a committee consisting of the Chief Justice of India and two other Judges
of the Supreme Court next to the Chief Justice in seniority.

JAN LOKPAL BILL, 2011(CITIZENS OMBUDSMAN BILL) Justice Santosh Hedge,

Lokayukta of Karnataka, and Prashant Bhushan, Supreme Court lawyer in consultation with
other Members of Civil Society, have drafted an alternative Lokpal Bill with the aim of
replacing the existing, mutually exclusive anti-corruption agencies with a single, autonomous
apex body empowered to investigate and prosecute politicians, bureaucrats and judges. The
26 Six times Private Member Bills were also introduced in Lok Sabha in 1967, 1977,1982, 1983,
1984 and 1998,
26

draft bill also aims to bring whistleblower protection, currently in the form of a separate bill,
within the ambit of the Lokpal. This Jan Lok Pal Bill proposes a single, autonomous Lokpal
combining within it the powers and mandate of the CBI and the CVC and with jurisdiction
over politicians, bureaucrats and judges. Besides being able to independently initiate
investigation and prosecution without prior permission from any other agency, the body will
act as an appellate authority in respect of public grievances linked to bribery. The
whistleblowers, currently under the supervision of the CVC, will also come under the
protective purview of the Lokpal. The members and the chairperson of the Lokpal, 11 in all,
will be selected by a transparent and participatory process and any complaint of wrongdoing
against a member will be required by law to be investigated and acted upon within a month
through a transparent process. In the event that the charges are upheld, the loss to the
exchequer by the officers wrongdoing will be recovered.
It would be seen that the Lok Pal Bill was introduced for the first time in 1968 but it lapsed
with the dissolution of the Lok Sabha. Thereafter, it was introduced seven more times in
Parliament, the last time in 2001. However, the Bill lapsed each time except in 1985 when it
was withdrawn. Out of Eight Bills, Six Bills were referred to the Committees of Parliament
three to Joint Select Committee27 and three to the Standing Committee on Home
Affair28s . Though the attempts at the Union/Central level to institute Lokpal were
unsuccessful for one reason or other, some State Governments have set up Lokayuktas/UpaLokayuktas for redressal of public grievances against administrative acts of that Government
in pursuance of the recommendations of ARC. The States like Orissa, Maharashtra,
Rajasthan and Bihar were the leading States29 in setting up the institution of Lokayuktas. At
the state level, so far 18 states30 have created the institution of the Lokayukta through the
Lokayukta Acts.

27 Chaired by Shri M.B. Rana, MP (LS) on the Lokpal and Lokayuktas Bill, 1968, presented its
Report on 26 March, 1969.
28 Chaired by Shri Pranab Mukherjee, MP (RS) presented its Eighty-Fourth report on Lokpal Bill,
2001 on 31st Dec., 2001
29 Orissa became the first State to enact the Lokayukta Act i.e. Lokpal and Lokayukta Act, 1971
30 Till 2010, 18 states have enacted laws to establish Lokayuktas
27

In 2002, the report of the National Commission to Review the Working of the Constitution
(headed by Justice M.N. Venkatachiliah) urged that the Constitution should provide for the
appointment of the Lok Pal and Lokayuktas in the states but suggested that the Prime
Minister should be kept out of the purview of the authority31. In 2004, the UPA governments
National Common Minimum Programme promised that the Lok Pal Bill would be
enacted32. The Second Administrative Commission (chaired by Shri Veerappa Moily), formed
in 2005, also recommended that the office of the Lok Pal be established without delay33.
In January 2011, the government formed a Group of Ministers, chaired by Shri Pranab
Mukherjee to suggest measures to tackle corruption, including examination of the proposal of
a Lok Pal Bill.34 Throughout its arduous journey, the concept of Lokpal has undergone many
a change both in its form and content. So much so, the original concept of Lokpal as
suggested by the Administrative Reforms Commission (ARC), appears to have undergone a
metamorphosis. Even the first Bill which was brought with a view to giving effect to the
recommendations of the ARC was different in its scope from the draft Bill proposed by the
Commission. The first two Bills ( 1968 and 1971) had recommended two separate
institutions, Lokpal and Lokayukta. Former was meant to look into complaints against
Ministers and Secretaries while the latter was to deal with those against all lower level public
servants. The Bill brought in 1971, except for some modifications of formal nature, was an
exact replaica of the 1968 Bill. Both the Bills were named as the Lokpal and Lokayuktas
Bill. The scheme of the Lokpal under the 1977 Bill prepared by the Janata Government was
materially different in many important respects from the earlier Bills. Unlike the 1968 and
1971 Bills, the Lokpal Bill, 1977, did not talk about the Lokayukta; it provided instead for the
appointment of Special Lokpal(s) for the expeditious disposal of cases. Secondly, it
included the Prime Minister also in its ambit whereas the other Bills did not include him.
31 Executive and Public Administration, Chapter 6 of the National Commission to Review the
Working of the Constitution (Chairperson: Shri M.N. Venkatachiliah), March 31, 2002
32 National Common Minimum Programme of the Government of India May 2004.
http://pib.nic.in/archieve/upareport/upa_3_year_highlights.pdf)
33 Ethics in Governance, Fourth Report of the Second Administrative Reforms Commission, Jan
2007
34 GoM on Corruption to Firm Up Lok Pal Bill at the Earliest, Outlook, January 21, 2011.
28

Thirdly, while the earlier Bills covered both allegations of misconduct and grievances,
the 1977 Bill excluded the latter from its jurisdiction. It defined the word misconduct in
wider terms. Fourthly, unlike the earlier Bills, the 1977 Bill embraced Ministers and
Members of Parliament but excluded bureaucracy from its purview. Finally, while earlier
Bills provided for consulting the Leader of the Opposition in the appointment of Lokpal, the
1977 Bill was silent about it.
In 1985, the Government introduced another Bill which was, again, different in certain
respects from the earlier Bills. First, the Prime Minister and members of Parliament were
excluded from the purview of this Bill. Secondly, the all-inclusive nature of the definition of
corruption given in the 1977 Bill, was done away with the scope of complaints was
restricted to the relevant provisions of the Prevention of Corruption Act and the Indian Penal
Code and thirdly, prosecution on allegations held unproved or false by the Lokpal was
barred.
The fifth Bill, introduced on 29 December 1989 in the Lok Sabha, aimed at curbing
corruption at the higher political levels, as claimed in its Statement of Objects and Reasons.
This Bill made many departures from those brought forward previously in terian important
respects. First, the Prime Minister once again was brought within the purview of the Lokpal.
Secondly, the competent authority to whom the Lokpal was to forward his report in the 1989
Bill in relation to Prime Minister was the House of the People and about a public functionary,
other than the Prime Minister, was the Prime Minister. In contrast, the Lokpal Bill, 1985,
provided that the competent authority to whom the report would be sent by the Lokpal was
the Prime Minister. The 1985 Bill empowered the President to appoint as Lokpal a person
who is or has been or is qualified to be a Judge of the Supreme Court, while the 1989 Bill
said that the President would appoint persons who are or have been Judges of the Supreme
Court as the Chairman and members of the Lokpal. Besides, unlike all the previous Bills, the
1989 Bill proposed to set up a three-Member Lokpal with a Chairman and two Members.
Like the Lokpal Bill 1989, the Lokpal Bill 1996 also proposed to set up a three-member
Lokpal. However, the Lokpal was to be appointed by the President on the recommendation of
the Committee consisting of seven members viz., the Prime Minister who will be the
chairman of the committee, Speaker of the Lok Sabha, Minister-in-charge of the Ministry of
Home Affairs, Minister-in-charge of the Ministry of Personnel, Public Grievances and

29

Pensions, Leader of the Opposition in the Rajya Sabha and the Lok Sabha and the Deputy
Chairman of the Rajya Sabha.
Upon perusal of all eight Government Bills, one finds that there is perceptible shift in the
central focus of the legislation from the issue of redressal of public grievances to corruption
at high places. This radical departure can be observed from the Lokpal Bill, 1977 and Bills
introduced thereafter have no provision for redressal of citizens grievances and thereby
stripped off Lokpal its intrinsic concept. In the first two Bills (Lokpal and Lokayuktas Bill,
1968 and Lokpal and Lokayktas Bill, 1971) clause 2 contained definition of the terms
grievance and mal-administrations which were conspicuously missing in the proposed
legislations introduced from 1977 onwards. Rest of the Bills in their clause 2 had inter-alia
the definition of the terms complaint or corruption instead of grievance or
maladministration. Therefore, it is evident that over the years Parliaments concern appears
to have been growing more with matters relating to corruption than with the citizens
grievances. While in the first two Bills ( 1968 and 1971) the emphasis was on complaints
and grievances of mal-administration against public servants, in the latter Bills of 1977,
1985, 1989, 1996, 1998 and 2001 the emphasis had shifted to allegations of corruption
against public functionaries.
Lokayukta has been making news in the recent weeks. Be it in the coverage about the
appointment of Retired Justice R.A. Mehta as the authority of Gujarat Lokayukta or in the
news about the investigation of corruption charges against Karnatakas deputy chief minister
K.S. Eshwarappa. We also heard this word quite often during the debate on Lokpal bill in
2011. But Lokayukta is not a new concept; it was mooted in 1966, when the Administrative
Reforms Commission (ARC) headed by Morarji Desai submitted a proposal for Lokayukta as
an anti-corruption body in every State.

What/who is Lokayukta35?

35 R. KEERTHANA, The Hindu, All about lokayukta

30

The Lokayukta is an anti-corruption authority orombudsman (An ombudsman is an official,

appointed by the government or by parliament to represent the interests of the public). He
works along with the Income Tax Department and the Anti Corruption Bureau. The
Lokayukta (sometimes referred to the institution itself) investigates allegations of corruption
and mal-administration against public servants and is tasked with speedy redressal of public
grievances.
Which are the States that have this authority?
Only 19 Indian States have Lokayukta.Maharashtra was the first State to introduce the
institution of Lokayukta in 1971. There are no Lokayuktas in Arunachal Pradesh, Jammu and
Kashmir, Manipur, Meghalaya, Mizoram, Nagaland, Sikkim, Tamil

Nadu, Tripura and West

Bengal. The process to set up Lokayukta in Goa is in progress.

Karnatakas Lokayukta is considered one of the strongest. N. Santosh Hegde, former
Lokayukta of Karnataka, uncovered one of the biggest mining scams (quantified at Rs.12,
228 crore) of the country in 2011. His activism and strong evidences resulted in the then
Chief Minister Yeddyurappa being jailed for 21 days in October 2011.
Who is appointed as the Lokayukta?
The Lokayukta is usually a former High Court Chief Justice or former Supreme Court judge
and has a fixed tenure.
What are his roles?
Any citizen can make his/her complaints of corruption directly to the Lokayukta against any
government official or elected representative. Lokayuktas power varies from State to State.
In some States, the Lokayukta inquires into allegations against public functionaries including
Chief Minister, Ministers and MLAs. While some has the power to investigate into civil
servants/bureaucrats, judiciary and police.

What are the shortcomings?

31

Lack of prosecution powers, adequate staff, funds and lack of independence are some of the
limitation of the Lokayukta.
In many States, the office of the Lokayukta is vacant. For instance, Gujarat did not have a
lokayukta for eight years until Governor Kamla Beniwal appointed Justice R.A. Mehta to the
post. But the Narendra Modi government challenged it at the Supreme Court and the court
upheld the appointment on January 2. Besides these, many cases are pending before the
Lokayukta36.
How different is it from Lokpal?
The Administrative Reforms Commission, (1966-70), had recommended the creation of the
Lokpal at the Centre and Lokayukta in the States. The Centre is yet to get a Lokpal.

CONCLUSION:
36 PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION AND PUBLIC POLICY-vol II-The Ombudsman Office-S.
E.Aufrecht:E1-34-05-08.pdf
32

In a welfare State like India, citizens have a variety of interactions with the Government in its
myriad forms as a service provider, a regulator, as a provider of social and physical
infrastructure etc. Meeting the expectations of the citizens is a challenging task for any
Government. In India, the Ombudsman is known as the Lokpal or Lokayukta. The concept of
a constitutional ombudsman was first proposed by the Law Minister Ashoke Kumar Sen in
parliament in the early 1960s. The term Lokpal and Lokayukta were coined by Dr. L. M.
Singhvi as the Indian model of Ombudsman for redressal of public grievances.The office of
the LokPal is the Indian version of the office of an Ombudsman who is appointed to inquire
into complaints made by citizens against public officials. The Lok Pal is a forum where the
citizen can send a complaint against a public official, which would then be inquired into and
the citizen would be provided some redressal. Lokpal is an officer who investigates
complaints of citizens of unfair treatment meted out to them by Government Departments and
suggests remedy thereof, if he finds that a complaint is justified.
The main objective behind the institution of Lokpal is to give strength to citizens so that they
can raise their voice against corruption without any fear. The existing devices like CVC and
CBI for checks on elected and administrative officials have not been effective, as the growing
instances of corruption cases suggest. All these have necessitated the creation of Lokpal with
its own investigating team.
Therefore, there is a need for a mechanism that would adopt very simple, independent,
speedy and cheaper means of delivering justice by redressing the grievances of the people.
But our Country is famous for its beautiful numerous laws and its poor execution. Most of the
laws have been proved fail to achieve its goal. No law or institution would have been helped
to remove deep roots of corruption from our country without its proper execution.
It is rightly said by Publius Comelius Tecitus that the more corrupt the state, the more laws.

BIBLIOGRAPHY:
33

BOOKS:
1. Centre for Media Studies, India Corruption Study 2005: To Improve
Governance: Volume I Key Highlights, New Delhi: Transparency
International India
2. Upadhaya, J.J.R, Administrative Law, Allahabad: Central Law Agency,
2011
3. Jain M.P, Principles of Administrative Law, Nagpur: Lexis Nexis, 2008
4. Gaig P.P., Administrative Law, New Delhi: Sweet & Maxwell, 2008
5. Messy I.P., Administrative law, New Delhi: Eastern Book Company, 2009
WEBSITES:
1.
2.
3.
4.

Legal-dictionary.thefreelegaldictionary.com
http://www.hindu.com/thehindu/holnus/002200804051550.htm
www.indiatoday.in
http://pib.nic.in/archieve/upareport/upa_3_year_highlights.pdf)

34