A EL COLEGIO IM DE MEXICO Bibloteca Danial Cost Vagus Goordinacién de Servicios [era] International Symposium Writing Histories in Japan Texts and Their Transformations from Ancient Times through the Meiji Era Edited by James C. Baxter and Joshua A. Fogel International Research Center forWriting Histories in Japan Texts and Their Transformations from Ancient Times through the Meiji Era Conrents Foreword it James C. Barer and Josbua A. Foce. Introduction: Texts and Ther Transformations 1 Kate Wildman Naxat “The Age ofthe Gods" in Medieval and Early Modern Historiography " HiromiTonomurs Rewting the Ubuya (Parturition Hus) Japanese names and cerms in this book are transliterated according to the modified Hepburn Its Historicity and Historiography 4 systém used in Kenkynshat New Japanese-Englch Dictionary. Chinese names and terms are ‘Wares Haruko “The Creation of Fabricated Myths in the Medical tranlterated according tothe pinyin romanization system except in the chapter by James Age: An Examination of Shintichi, Hetores MeMullen in which the Wade-Gile system is used. Korean names and terms are transite (Engi, Noh Plays, and Other Sources 85 ated according vo the McCune-Reischauer system of romanization. Japanese, Chinese, and c Korean names appear in their normal order, family name first, except in the cases of authors Taal aera {OilaNobuoaga. Guns, and Early Modern Warfare in ‘writing in Western languages who have chosen to adopt the given-name-first, family-name- Japan 108 insole off enticarion, James MeMuties _Reinterpreting the Analects: History and Uri in the Thought of Ogya Sorat 7 ‘Anne Waxrvaut Histories Official, Unocal, and Popular Shogunal Favorite in the Genroku Era 75 “Thomas Kesrsrea> Sanyo, Bakin, and the Reanimation of Japans Past 201 Like Roses The Diverse Political Languages of Edo-Petiod Histories ns Suzvnt Sadami “The Reformulaton ofthe Concept and Philosophy of History in Modern Japan 253 M. William Sresis Contesting the Record: Katsu Kaisha and the Historiography of the Meiji Restoration 299 James C. Bare Shaping National Historical Consciousness (©7007 by te Inenaonl Ren Center apne Sean Japanese History Textbooks in Meijcra eee Elementary Schools 37 Conteiburors 351 Fis English don publshed June 2007 by de tem Research Cer bapa Sains fide 35504 ‘Waxtra Haruko Nihon shoki FABER Nishida Nagao PUREE 3S ‘Nabiagongen no koro BVENESU otagi zishi 33 & SHAK Prince Sadafusa PUREE yah Shins BARGE Ry Nyo Onsara Majo Rte 99 ide ‘Sakanoue no Tamuramaro $1 ASTRIS Sametcka-k fi FPBOVEE Sanjonishi Sanctaka = SER Sarashina Goren EGR Sarashina Ji Kanemitsu UBB A saragal iB Seiya WIR Sebkyobuh 0 sean sis ESE Shakads Pim st Shikobuchi Myajin M0188 Shinmei 9 ‘Shinsé kongen sho PEERED Shinusha HSE shinabige deja 888% shivabyishi INE Shaka 323 Soma HN Sache HART ‘Séaon 041 Soroor-hime #6 Sava dai-myojn no Akiyama masur no koto BSAWI PRD ARLE D DE Suacadat-myéjn no stsuki mazar no kato RF KUMO TARY OB Swiva da-myéjinehotoba TER AIHW Sia engi na karo EARL OH Taiheiks KP Tamatsushima satarigami $29 #8 ‘sumadoi 850° ugar BE tusunaga BEA HY Uji Shinmei 291 Urabe Kanctane if Yamabushi Lt Shines #4 ARE Oda Nobunaga, Guns, and Early Modern Warfare in Japan Paul Varuey ‘The Introduction of Guns to Japan In 1543 a ship appeared, seemingly out of nowhere, off the coast of Tanegashime, an island about forty-four miles southeast of Kyushu.’ Mote than a hundred people were aboard the ship, people of unusual appearance who spoke a language unintelligible co the inhabitants of Tanegashima. Among these sca borne vistors was Chinese scholar who, by writing char- acters in the sand, was able to communicate with one of the Tanegashima village chifiains. When the chieftain leamed thatthe ship held passengers who were traders from the land of the “southern barbarians,” he had the ship directed to the island's main harbor, where the traders were taken to see Lord Tokitaka, the daimyo of Tanegashima, ‘Two of these alien traders showed the Lord a tubeclike abject “two or three feet long, straight on the outside with a passage inside, and made of a heavy substance.” Filing the tube with “powder and smal lad pellets” they applied fice to its aperture and produced an “explosion «like lightning... fand a] report like thunder.” The pellets ew from the tube and squarely struck a small whive target erected by the traders Let us for the moment, accept this story as true [Fis eruc, then the alin traders were Portuguese and the frse Europeans, so far as we know, to set foot on Japanese soil. The tube they fired was probably an arquebus, and their display ofits functioning before the Lord of ‘Tanegashima marked, it has been supposed, the beginning ofthe history of guns in Japan, Here is George Sansom’s (1883-1965) account, in his three-volume History f Japan, ofthis introduction of European guns to Japan: “The muskets which they caried caused excitement among the rescuers, and for a long time after this even che Japanese name for such firearms was Tancgashima, ‘The weapons were soon copied in considerable numbers, but ie would be a mistake to suppose that the use of firearms at once brought about a great change in meth- tds of warfare in Japan. For although they were used in the major battles ofthe sixteenth century, they remained in scarce supply fr a ceneury or more, and they Aid not displace racitional weapons—the sword, the bow, and the spear—unil an even later date. Sansom need not be criticized for stating that the first Portuguese brought muskers rather than arquebuses co Japan. Although itis believed (by those who accept the story a tue) that the weapons shown to che Lord of Tanegashima were the smaller arquebuses, which were ‘generally preferred by the Iberian peoples, the issue of “muskets or arquebuses?” i still a mat~ ter of debate106 Paul Vaniey ‘eons et chs wl sry is, on he ge given is thac they arrived with great suddenness right inthe middle of Japan x ao the Mongol Invasions of their country in 1274 and 1281, In a famous Japanese ne shell” (ppd) exploding over the head of «Japanese warrior charging pal sion invaders. Joseph Needham (1900-1995) cites a record, daved 1287, only: e see a = second Mongol invasion of Japan, thar strongly suggests the use: eset kin i ar ea firearm he cals a “fire-barrel’ may have been employed against the Japanese during the inva soguin pon i a eth cay AB po oli ary in 1466, on the eve of the Onin War (1467-77), ts a ila a visiting the ‘Onin War began, the Fasten Army in that conflict used a “fire speat” chat was probably ioe erica aol i is eechorbe agp eine Kanto, Héjé godai ki (Record. diapee bout ad been modified atlas several cies as it was transmied eastward from Turkey. st Sas gene Alea nd Shee (Oda Nobunaga, Guns, and Early Modern Warfare in Japan 107 nese rather than Japanese, and they very likly plied the waters of East and Southeast Asia in Chinese junks. Ifa Chinese junk landed at Tanegashima in 1543, i could well have been a ‘Wako ship. As Udagawa Takchisa (b, 1943) points out, the Wake of this age were probably more traders chan pirates. Udagawa goes so far as to suggest chat the “Chinese scholae” in Teppo i, whose name is given as Gohd, was a well-known Wako leader whose rel name (in the Japanese pronunciation) was Ochok." Both piracy and illicc cade were in large par che result of the Ming dynasty’ prohi- bition on overseas trade. With trade devolving into the hands of those private freebooters willing to defy Ming lav, i isnot surprising that these people should come into contact with the existing Wako bands and either employ them or merge with them, chus becoming Wako themselves. There may not be suficient documentary material available to provide a full pic- ture of how these processes occurred. But at the very leas it seems likely chat guns, perhaps of| a variety of kinds, were brought co Japan by Wakd or others before 1543. ‘Weaponry before the Gun. Ic is difficult to trace the history of weaponty in Japan before the gun because the re cords ae sparse and at times misleading, Thus, for example, we can assume. as Kajiwara Ma- szaki (1927-1998) points out, that all warriors or participants in battles in Hebe monogatari (Tale of the Heike) are mounted warriors using the bow as their primary weapon." Asa wat tale, the Heike cannot be accepted, of course, as a flly reliable primary source. But iti an important source and, if sed carefully, can tell us grea deal about late twelfth-century war- riots and watfare [n regard tothe point that Kajiwara makes, however, the Heike is probably misleading, because many ofthe participants in the battles of the Genpei War appear to have fought on foot and used other weapons, including polearms (naginata) and swords, as well as the bow.!° Fighters on foot in batles during earlier centuries can be found, for example, in such narrative scrolls (emakimona) as Zen-kunen kasenekotoba (Scroll of the Former Nine Years War) and Go-sannen kasenehoroba (Scroll ofthe Later Three Years War), Fighters on foor can also be observed although notin great number, even in the Famous Fei monogatari chotoba (Tale of the Heiji Scroll). Although these scrolls were painted long aftr che events they depict and therefore cannot be taken as absolute evidence of anything, they at least sug- ges the possibiliy—if not likelihood—chac men foughe on foot aswell as on horseback battles of the ancient age. There seems to be no question thatthe bow, whether wielded by men on horseback or Foot, was the primary weapon of battle uncil a least the sixteenth century. The way i was used, however, appears to have changed from the fourteenth century. Whereas until chat time mounted archers forthe most par fired at each other from fairy close range in the ta- ditional “one-against-one” (ibki-uch) style of combat, during the fourteenth century archers in bale tended! to maintain a greater distance from each other and shoot ther arrows from afar. Because they traversed greater distances co reach thei targets, arrows caused many more ‘wounds than deaths: tha is, the ratio of wounds-to-deaths by arrows increased dramatically108 Paul Vanusy “The weapon that was second in importance to the bow in the fourteenth century was the sword. One way to estimate the frequency of use and relative efficacy of all weapons in swatfare is 0 tabulate the numbers of wounds and deaths caused by cach as recorded in the petitions for rewards (gunchija) that warcors submicted to thei commanders after bates, “Tabulating wounds by weapons found inthe existing fourteenth-century petitions, Conlan cestimates that about three-quarters of wounds were caused by arrows and about one-third or less by swords. (The percentage of wounds inflicted by spears or pikes, yar, and rocks [which ‘were usually thrown by defenders during the sieges of fortifications) was negligible) * “The frequent use of swords during fourreenth-century warfare does not necessarily sean there was a great deal of “hand-to-hand” fighting with armies locked in close combat. In face, che numberof close encounters declined chroughout che century in tandem with the trend coward fighting fom a distance, as just discussed in regard tothe changing use of che bow in battle. The following remarks by Conlan tell us much about swords and how they ‘were used in fourteenth-cencury warfare “The prevalence of sword wounds in che fourceenth century does not indica that warsiors Fought in tightly massed groups. Rather, swords were better suited for conics among widely scarered clusters of men. Some swords reached seven feet in length and were useful in breaking the legs of charging horses. A few long swords (élahi) were only pardilly sharpened, with half of the blade near che hilt blunt and rounded like a “clam shell,” which indicates that they were used ro bludgeon ‘opponents instead of slashing them. (One surprising conclusion artved at by Conlan in his study is thatthe spear was litle used in fourteenth-century warfare, a least as judged by the rarity with which i appears as the weapon responsible for wounds in the petcions For reward. This conclusion fies in the face ofthe general belief thatthe fourteenth century saw the frst formation of infantry units and the equipping of those units primarily with spears.” In this regard, lee me quote a few more statements from Conan: Fourteenth century battle was fought by widely scatered troops. Most warring consisted of skirmishing, ... Even in the fiercest battles, only a few mustered the courage to ight hand-o-hand,...The onset of indeterminate warfare did nor lead to any changes in tactics, Squads of cavalry dominated the battlefield... . (TThe prevalence of long swords and the paucity of pike (spear) wounds indicares that no “massed” infantry Formations existed in the fourteenth century. ™ Suzuki Masaya (b. 1936), studying late fifteenth- and sixteenth-century warfare, con= firms that ewo related trends identified by Conlan in the fourteenth century continued in the centuties that followed: (1) most warfare was conducted by warriors who did not come together in close combat but fought while separated by a considerable distance fiom one another and employed such “distance weapons’ as arrows, rocks (and other objects that could A bagee. none anal 17) berrlos nenchnerdla Wiel (Oda Nobunaga, Guns, and Early Modern Warfare in Japan 109 and one-fourth by “close up weapons” is strikingly similar to Conlan’ arrows and swords ra tio. The main difference, ofcourse, is that Suzuki groups stones and other objects with arrows and spears with swords. ‘Imacani Akira (b, 1942), discussing the rise in importance of the spear as a weapon of war from at lease the Onin War, suggests, however, that there may have been more close combat and more faalites in warfare during the Onin-Sengoku age than Suzuki acknow- edges. He claims that, until the arrival of guns in the mid-siteenth cencury, the spear was the principal weapon of the ashigaru units that formed the infantry components of armies: and he cites a bale in 1547 berween Miyoshi Nagayoshi (1522-1564) and Yusa Nagano during which a clash berween spearmen from both armies lefe 2,000 dead. Although Imatani does not specify what kind of spears were used in this bate, he observes in the same discus- sion that speats were made longer and longer and chat some even reached about eighteen feet in length (Oda Nobunaga (1534-1582] became especially well-known for the cighteen-foot spears caried by some of his ashigery). Icis dificult ro imagine how an eighteen-foo spear could actually be wielded effectively in batle. But Imatani claims that long spears helped reduce the fear of ashigaru and other fighters of being forced into very close comb.” A Military Revolution? Ina lecture delivered in 1955, Michael Robert (1908-1997) enunciated what has be- come probably the most important interpretation of the role of military history in the mak- ing of early modern Europe. Icisan interpretation cha, although modified and in some cases rejected by others, has dominated the thinking of military historians during the intervening half-century.” In brief, Roberts asserted thar there occurred in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries a military revolution that accelerated or pethaps even eaused the forma- tion of Europe’ early moder, absolutist states. The revolution centered on the use of guns, especially hand-operated guns, on a uly large scale for che first cime. Peasants and others of the lower orders, who could readily lean to use guns (as compared 0 bows and arrows, spears/pikes), were recruited to form ever-larger infantry units chat, disciplined and trained in ‘ways unknown in the preceding medieval cencuries, became the nuclei of what can be called carly modern armies In the largest sense, the idea ofa military revolution causally links che simultaneous ap- pearance in history ofthe early modern stare and the gun-based army. This inking has been a boon to military historians who, so often pushed to the sidelines by historians who insist ‘on social, economic, and political explanations for the “progress” of history, now find their dlscipline atthe center of historical analysis. The military historian can even argue that the rilitary component was the most important in the phenomenon of state formation in the carly modern age. ‘Whatever the truth about exactly when Western-style guns were introduced Japan, they were certainly available o the Japanese in relatively large numbers by the second half of the sixteenth century—in other words, just about the time when, according to Michaelno Paul Vanuey prominent daimyo, including Oda Nobunaga, who led the way to unification of the country in the century's final decades, In short, Japan appears to have had, at roughly the same time, 4 miliary evolution similar to Europe’ Little about the idea ofa military revoluion has appeared in che English-language lit- eracure on sixteenth-century Japan. The major exception is Stephen Morillo’s article “Guns and Government: A Comparative Study of Europe and Japan,” which appeared in the Spring 1995 issue of the Journal of World History. A scholar of European history, Morillo turns co the case of Japan in quest of an answer to the question of which came first in Europe's military revolution, guns or government: that is, dd the gun-based army give ris to the early modern state or did the creation ofa gun-based army, with its attendant costs, require the prior forma- tion ofa strong, early modern state? Mosillo believes sha Japan provides a kind of laboratory ‘case for study, because European guns were introduced ata precise time: 1543 (a date based, ‘of course, on acceptance ofthe Tanegashima story), Stated simply, if there was a strong (ic early modern) government in Japan before 1543, it acquired its strength without che benefit of guns. If on the other hand, chere was no strong government, then guns were presumably 1 principal, if nor the principal, factor in the creation of the Oda, Toyotomi, and Tokugawa carly modern regimes. ‘Without going further into Morilo’ argunent, let ane summarize by saying chat he believes that, in the case of Japan (and probably also Europe), strong government came before guns, Of course, Japan in the mid-1500s had no strong central government, On the contrary iewas fragmented inco warring daimyo domains. But Morilo believes that a number of che claimyo domains, such as Nobunagais in Owari, had strong governments that were able to hhandle the cos o acquiring guns and training large armies centered on gun-bearing infanery units. With these (carly moder?) armies, leading daimyo were able to se out on the oad to unifiation. ‘Ar least one Japanese scholar, Suzuki Masaya, emphatically rejects che military revolu- tion theory. Citing more statistics on bate casualties during the sixtenth century, Suzuki argues that guns, which certainly became the most important weapon in late sixtoenth- and carly seventeenth-century warfare, in fact merely contributed to the long-term tendency t0- ward distance fighting.” In other words, they did nor cause a revolution but helped sustain an evolutionary proces. Suzuki argument seems tobe based on rather narrow view af how ‘guns may or may not have transformed warfare, and neglects such things as the sheer phys- cal power they introduced to fighting and ther role in prompting commanders ro undertake ‘greater organization of and insite stricter discipline among cher forces, Organization and. discipline ar, afer all, .wo of the hallmarks of early modem and modem armies; and we see, I would argue, significant organization and discipline in, for example, the gun units of uniformed men fring in unison that appear in a numberof the batle screens (kasen byabu) depicting late sinteenth-century warfare.” Early Modern Warfare in Japan ‘Oda Nobunags, Guns, and Early Modem Warfare in Japan m {In many respect his way of war was a continuation ofthat of che typical Sengoku daimyo of the preceding century (Nobunaga himself was a Sengoku daimyo who became 2 unfit). But he was also an innovator who raised warfare to a new level of intensity, destructivenes, and success. In s0 doing he ser che stage for Hideyoshi (1537-1598) and leyasu (1543-1616), ‘who became che great captains of Japan’ early modern warfare at its peak a the end of the sixteenth century “There is no simple definition of carly modern warfare in Japan, and we should be care= fal in making comparisons with warfare in early modern Europe. Conditions in Europe were vasily differen from those of Japan in their respective early modern ages, even though these ages overlapped chronologically and Europeans were in Japan at the time. ‘The only major contribution of Europeans to Japan’ early modern warfare was the gun, and we have already ‘observed that the gun’ significance as a weapon of war to the sixteenth-century Japanese is sill a matter of dispute among scholars. I will return to this subject later with commentary ‘on Nobunaga asa user of guns in bacte during che century's latter half ‘One of the most distinctive Features of Japan's early modern warfare was the increasingly important eole played by forts. Whereas open-field, pitched batles were by far the most com :mon form of organized fighting in earlier centuries, in the sixteenth century forts sprang up everywhere and boeing usually involved attacking and eryng tn ake them. Nabunaga, fe example, fought relatively few open-field bates. The great majority ofhis armed encounters involved cither attacking enemies in forts or defending against enemy attacks on his Fors. Unfortunately, we do nor have much derailed information about these forts: but since most of them seem to have fallen quite eadily to enemy attack during Nobunaga’s time, we can assume tha they were noc constructed to withstand severe and prolonged assault. There were, of course, exceptions, and Nobunaga himself took the lead in inaugurating the great age of| castle-building wich the erection of his principal fortress at Azuchi on Lake Biwa inthe late 1570s, Buc Nobunaga was assassinated {in 1582) before these massive, stone-based structures sssumed a central role in warfare. I was let to Hideyoshi and leyasu ro develop the strategy, tactics, and technology necessary to deal with castle warfare. Tn addition to guns and forts, early modern warfare in Japan was characterized bys the formation of standing armies, including organized and disciplined infancies divided into units by weaponry (e, gunners, spearmen, bowmen}: the cretion of leagues or alliances thar made posible fighting on a much larger geographical scale chan before: yearsound campaigning (most of Sengoku warfare was casonalls and a quantum increase in brutality, including the wancon slaughter of the vanquished. Let us turn now to Nobunaga’ style of carly modern warfare ‘Nobunaga and the Beginning of Military Unification Knowledge of Nobunaga military career comes primarily from one source: the Shinchi- 4 ki (Chronicle of Lord Nobunaga) of Ora Gyiichi (1527-16102). Gytichi, who was born in 1527 in Nobunagas province of Owati, was trained at a Buddhist cemple as a youth, a1 Paul Vantzy asa combat soldier, he entered military administration; and following Nobunaga death he served several other watior lords, including Hideyoshi and his son Hideyori (1593-1615), ee ry clan aa ich nd lle primary ue, Shnhod H ieie SK) isa detailed account of Nobunaga carer, especially asa military commander, from the time of his coming-of-age in 1546 unl his assassination in 1582. Fujimoto Masayuki (b 1948) has made particularly excelent use of this work in hs study of Nobunaga the military commander, Nobunaga no Sengoku gunjigaeu (Nobunaga Military Learning inthe Sengoku 7 ‘Nobunaga became commander ofthe Oda upon the deach of his father in 1551, For the remainder of the decade he strove—suecesfully—to bring order co his own house, which had qong been sundered by internal dispute. During cis time he displayed the ruthlessness thet seas 0 mark him asa commander by murdering his younger brother, whom he suspected of Treachery. In fac, fatrcide was nor uncommon during the Sengoku age, which frequently ‘witnessed brother killing brothers, sons killing fathers, and fathers killing sons. Rie ofthe Infonirg One ofthe most important development in warfare during the Sen- oka age, at cbserved, was the rise ofthe infantry in armies. By Nobunaga time, che infantry fad become dominanc in batle, raking the place ofthe cavalry a an army's prec: Gghing, atm, This development was noted even by a contemporary foreign observer, the Jesus Francis Xavier (1506-1552), who remarked: “They [the Japanese] are exellent archers and fight on ot aldhough there ae horses in the country.” Te en era nl athe ul abe of oo ag bates and even less about whether they fought on foot or on horseback. Thus we must look elsewhere in the attempt to estimate how many men in atypical army in Nobunagas day were infanry. Areas tenatve estimate of infantry sze canbe made from study ofthe bate screens that depict siateenth-century armies and ther encounters. One of these i the Kawanakajina kasen eu bydbu (Serens Uustating the Bartle of Kawanakajima)” which comprise two eight pane! seen, the right one showing the army of Takeda Shingen (1521 1573) in battle formation and the left portraying that army in combat at Kawanakajima in Shinano province in 1561 agains: che army of Uesugi Kenshin (1530-1578).” “The Kawanakajima Sereens were probably painted about oe ofthe seventeenth cenvury, nearly a century after the events they depict." Hence, they ae not primary sources fictionalized, but rather in the general information they provide about how the bale’ par- ticipants fought. This information, we may hypothesize, is likely ro have been eansmited through the generations without great distortion, since it does not desl directly with the tactics, strategy, and outcome of che batte—that is, with those things that most concerned the descendants of the Takeda and Uesugi families and their Tokugawa-petiod schools of iilitary sedy and that eame tobe described in differing versions by bot sets of flies and schools. (Oda Nobunaga, Guns, and Early Modern Warfare in Japan 13 Shingen's army is arrayed on the screen in linear formation and comprises fifteen or sixteen lines or cheir equivalent. Of ches lines, only one consists primarily of horsemen. There are also horsemen scattered elsewhere in the army, but they ae clearly the commanders of infan- try units. In short, only a small fraction of che men in the right screen of the Kawanakajima Screens—pethaps four or five percent of the total—are mounted. is overwhelmingly an army on foot. Ie is possible chat many, if nor most, of the relatively few warriors on horseback in atmics like Shingen’s at Kawanakajima in 1561 and Nobunaga’ before and aftr that date dis- ‘mounced when entering batle. Thus we find Nobunaga himself a che Battle of Okehazama “getting off his horse and contending with his wakarsushe (young warcirs) co take the lead in the battle, spearing enemies and striking them down.” The fighting at Okehazama occurred when Imagawa Yoshimoro (1519-1560) invaded Owari in 1560. With only some 5,000 troops, Nobunaga was able to defeat che invading army estimaced at 40,000. In the process he killed the Imagawa commander, Yoshimoto, and advanced himself 2s a leading contender co unify the country. ‘The left screen of the Kawanakajima pair shows various scenes from the 1561 clash of “Takeda and Uesugi, including the famous, but apocryphal, one-on-one encounter between Kenshin and Shingen, with Kenshin wielding a word from horseback and Shingen, on foot partying the sword with his gunpai (military Fan). This seren is interesting for what ie tells us (rather suggests to us since it was painted a century later) about the weapons used at Kawanakajima in 1561. Although there are units of gunners and archers on the right screen (Shingen’s pr ingenis army, as shoven, tle formation), I can discern no men with guns and only a few archers in the combat depicred on the left sercen. Nearly all ofthe fighting is being done by troops, largely on foot, armed with spears and swords; and of these two weapons, spears are by Far the more prevalent. ‘Another set of bate sercens that indicates the grea extent co which armies had become infantry armies by this ag isthe Shizugazate hasen zu byobu (Screens Illustrating the Bale of Shizugatake).** Comprising rwo six-panel screens, this set illustrates the clash between Hideyoshi and Shibata Katsuie (1530-83) in 1583 as these two chieftains ved to become the successor as unifier to Nobunaga, who was assassinated in 1582. The left sereen shows the ist day of the bate in which forces under the Shibata prevail seizing two of Hideyoshi’ forts.” ‘On the righe scren, depicting the second day, Hideyoshi himself has taken the field 2s com- sander of his army andl achieves victory by driving the enemy into fall-sale retreat. “There are hundreds of combatant figures on the Shizugatake sereens, yet only about fifien are mounced on horses. Both of the field commanders, Hideyoshi and Sakuma Mori- ‘masa (1554-1583, a Shibata lieutenane), are on foot. In other words, as depicted in the Shizugatake Sereens, the Batele of Shizugatake was almost exclusively a eontest beoween in- fanttics. And, as in che Kawanakajima Screens, most of the Fighting was done with spears, ‘There are clusters of gunners and archers firing from the ramparts of th forts, but nearly all of the many troops batting in the open fields are wielding spears ‘Nobunaed' Straterv and Battle Tactics, Nobunaes's vietorv over Imagawa Yoshimoto in14 Paul Vaatsy Fujimoto Masayuki insists thac these are no credible records co prove chat Nobunaga acack was actually a hid Aigek, but for centuries it has been regarded as one and, indeed, as che ‘classic example. Thus, in the days before Pearl Harbor in 1941, Admiral Yamamoto Isoroku (1884-1943) and many other Japanese military leaders referred to Okehazara in their letters and diaries as chey planned their surprise attack on the United States. For them, Okehazama was a synonym fora sudden, unannounced attack.** ‘Whether o not Nobunaga defeared the Imagawa with a surprise attack at Okehazama, he did not use that tactic during the remainder of his military career. Wherever possible, he tried to engage the enemy with a force greater than his.” Bur he also sought to avoid deci sive battles that were likely to be costly in men and materiel. He was & master of the arc of Sengoka-style diplomacy and negotiation. In arackng,fors, fr example, he often sed ro persuade of force the commander to surrender, frequently by devious means including the tse of undercover agents and turncoats, Thus, inthe seventh month of 1573, Nobunaga, ‘with the assistance of his lieurenanc Hideyoshi, persuaded two of che three commanders of Yodo fortress in Yamashiro province to pledge loyalty to him and turn against the third. The later, becrayed by his comrades, attempted to flee but was cut down by 2 retainer of another of Nobunaga’ lieutenants.” Nobunaga rook Fort Ibaraki in Setsu province by similar means in the eleventh month of 1578. In this case one of three commands, having sscrely com mitted to Nobunaga, suddenly opened the gates of che fort in the middle ofa stormy night toallow Nobunaga troops co enter and force the other two commanders and their followers ico disorganized fight.” “Treachery and betrayal were commonplace in Nobunaga’ time, and spies were every- where, Whereas Nobunaga himself was expert at using spies and enlisting tarncoats, he was aso alert co those who might be employed by che enemy. On the eve of the Bute of Oke- hhazama, for example, he refused to talk strategy when his commanders met with him in what ‘was supposed to be a war council. Instead, he prattled on about ierelevant matters. When the Commanders were returning to their quarters laer, they agreed chat Nobunaga was a fool." Bue Nobunaga had been concerned that one of his commanders might be a spy or turncoat ‘who would report his plans co the enemy (Imagawa Yoshimoto). ‘We have noted that much of Nobunaga’ fighting involved attacking and defending forts, Forts were ubiquitous in sixteenth-century Japan, varying in quality from those thar could hold our against prolonged sieges and were the forerunners of the grea castles con- structed in the last decades of the cencury w fimsy, hastily built defensive positions. Takeda Shingens father, Nobutora (1493-1573), destroyed no les han chiry-six ofthe flimsy type of forts in one day while campaigning in Shinano province in 1540." Among the stronger forts was che Odani fortress of the Asai in Omi province, which was nor only substantially buile but also benefited from its location atop a mountain.® Even afier Nobunaga, with “Tokugawa leyasus help, had defeated the combined forces ofthe Asai and Asakura ar che Battle of Ancgawain 1570 and had chased the Asai back 1o Odani, he was obliged to halt his pursuit because the forcress “would be difficult to take ina single assaule.™* 4 ne eer cae eT (Oda Nobunaga, Guns, and Farly Modern Warfare in Japan 5 recruited from che peasantry, could not afford to stay away too long, especially during che planting and harvesting seasons. This was also the principal reason why there were so few prolonged sieges in Sengoku. A daimyo could not risk a siege of any significane duration for fear that his soldiers would start deserting and return to thei villages and farms. {All this bogan co change during Nobunaga’ drive roward unification, Many of his cam- paigns continued for months at a time, and ic was not unusual for him vo dispatch lieuren- ants, such as Hideyoshi and Shibata Katsuie, to seek and engage the enemy in one region ‘while he campaigned in another. In other words, che intensity and scale of warfare increased considerably, largely because armies were becoming more and more asemblics of regular or fallkime officers and men.* In che ease of the officers, they were steadily drawn into castle towns (jokamachi), where they were permanently on call co their daimyos. With these eatly modern armics, commanders found the siege to be a more viable military sraegy. Thus Hideyoshi, campaigning to extend Nobunagas authority ineo western Honshu from the late 1577s until Nobunaga death in 1582, conducted several lengthy sieges, including one in Harima province against Fort Miki, which held out against him for more than a year. This was the first stage in Hideyoshi’ rise co fame as master ofthe siege in Japan’ shore age of castle warfare.” In hie campaigning, Nobunaga capmnred or destroyed! many af the forts he attacked (as described in SK) quite efficiently, often needing only one day or les per fort. In some cases hhe cook forts in clusters. One of his most effective tools in softening up fors for attack was fire. Time and again we read in SK of his army “burning down villages here and there” as they approached a fort. In preparing to attack Fort Konda in Kawachi province in 1574.4, for example, Nobunaga sent men out “co set fie to valley after valley” While engaged in this arsonous activity, they also cue down and discarded all the crops they came across. Once the fields and villages around a fort had been denuded and/or put to the torch i became, in the parlance of SK. a “naked for” (hadakajra) This was both economic and psychological warfare. [twas economic warfare because it eliminated the nearest sources of food to which forts defenders had access when they were nor directly under attack or sieges” and it was psychological warfare because in many fot most, cases the defenders of foes were recruied primarily from nearby villages, che very villages, containing their homes, that were being destroyed, ‘Asin the Sengoku age there continued ro be considerable instability in both wartior and soldier relations (refering to the officers [stmurai] as warriors and recruited peasants as soldiers) during the time of Nobunaga and unification. Vassal warriors Frequently aban- doned or rebelled agains their lords, Soldiers also often absconded and sometimes betrayed theit commanders. We se such betrayal, for example, in the case of Fore Uetsuki in Harima province, which Hideyoshi encircled and lad sige co in 1577.11. After seven days of siege, the men of the fore turned against their commander, took his head, and pleaded for mercy Buc Nobunaga, as Hideyoshi superios, reused mercy instead, he had them all crucified.” (On other occasions, however, Nobunaga not only allowed those who surrendered forts t0 g0 free but also incorporated them into his army. Often the quid pro quo for allowing a fort’s16 Paul Vantey constructed a “Fcing fort” (nha) from which to send fort his men: or he buils one ot more “annex forts” (uke ra), which [interpret (ftom the way the are describe in SK) to be forts designed to contend for physical contol of the land on which the enemy’ Fort was situated, In one of his many forays agains che great Ishiyama Honganji Temple, which held ‘ut against him fora decade (1570-80), Nobunaga in 1576.5 ordered the construction of no Jess than cen annex forts throughout che Osaka region.” Often he assigned leading liewren- ants co hold annex forts as well as enemy forts once they were tke. ‘We noted above Nobunaga’ refusal of mercy tothe defenders ofa fre who surrendered to him and his decision, instead, to crucify hem. Nobunaga has che repuation a perhaps the ‘most cruel and brutal warior in Japanese history. This reputation rests in large parton his de- struction in 1571 ofthe great remple complex of Enryakuj on Mt. Hiei, which refused either to support him orto remain neutal as he bated agains his encmics in the central provinces ‘specially the Asakura and Asa, Here isa patal descripcion by the Jesuit Luis Frdis of Nobu- apts destruction of Enryakuji and murder of ll ts monks and priests as wel as townspeople from villages atthe base of Mt. Hiei who had sought refuge on the mountain: “The bonzes began to resist [Nobunags's army] with their weapons ane wounded bows 150 saldiees. Bur they were unable o withstand such a furious assaule and ‘were all put to the sword, together with the men, women and children of Sake ‘moto, whieh is near the foot of the mounvain.... Then Nobunaga ordered a large ‘number of musketeers to go out into the hills and woods a iFon a hunts should they find any bonzes hiding there, they were not to sparc the life ofa single one of them, And this they duly di.”® Gihasly as the slaughter on Mr, Hiei was, it may have been exceeded in both numbers and cruelyy by Nobunaga’s destruction of several forts defended by Pure Land adherents at Nagashima in Ie province in 1574. When the occupants of one ofthe forts, their food ex- hated afer ewo months of siege pladed for mercy, Nobunaga refused and said he intended to se them starve to death (many already had). Meanwhile, he burned another of the for to the ground, incinerating everyone within. The forts contained people of both sexes and all ages, In total, Nobunaga is sad to have slaughtered as many as 20,000 members of the Nagashima confederacy at this time.* ‘Countless other eases of brutality and atrocity by Nobunaga canbe found i the pages of SK. In 1571.9, for example, he atacked Shimura Fort in Omi province from four direc- tions with reat force, smashed his way into the fore and rook 670 heads * And after capeur- 1g Fort Ibaraki in Sersu province by deception in 1578, as already discussed, Nobunaga and his army entered nearby Hyogo province and “slaughtered people without regard to whether they were press or laypeople, men of women. They put everything to the torch, including temple buildings, and Buddhist statues and suras. Smoke promptly rose up above che clouds. ‘They then continued on to Ichinotani in Harima province, burning and burning."* “The Battle of Nagashino. Uf chere was 2 military revolution in sixteenth-cencury Japan ry : ees Sheet Enea aha (Oda Nobunaga, Guns, and Early Modern Warfare in Japan 17 trays Nagashino as a decisive victory of Oda-Tokugawa guns (the nev) over Takeda cavalry (the old). In staging Kagemusha, Kurosawa did not simply engage in fanciful exaggeration. He adhered quite closely to what had long been accepted by scholars and others as the standard version (test) of how the batt was conducted According to this standard version, Nobunaga in his victory at Nagashino almost single- handedly effected the military revolution. Erecting wooden palisades (satu) to stop or at least slow down the Takeda cavary’s charging horses, he deployed some 3,000 gunners armed with arqucbuses oF muskets and divided them into three ranks of 1,000 each. When the Takeda attacked, the ranks of gunners fired in order. Thus, as one rank fired, the second made final ‘preparations co fire (the guns were muzzle-loading weapons that required time o reload), and the third, having just fied, begun to re-load. The historical significance ofthis form of volley fire as given in the standard version of the Battle of Nagashino has been recognized even by military historians of Europe. Thus, for example, we find these remarks by Geoffrey Parker (b. 1943) in The Military Revolution: [de the Batele of Nagashino che! warlord Oda Nobunaga deployed 3000 muske- ‘cers in ranks inthis ation, having trained chem to ire in volleys so as to maintain «constant barrage. The opposing [Takeda] cavaley .. was annihilated. {The} crucial defect ofthe muzale loading musket: the length of time required co recharge i... [The] only way oovereome tis disadvantage was to draw up muse kere in ranks, fing in sequence, so thatthe Font file could reload wile the oth- )!14E21 Onin St S11 Gea Geil KEE (Oda Nobunaga, Guns, and Early Modern Warfare in Japan sakes HE Sengoku ME Shibaca Katsuie 2268 BFE Shidaragahara #2 7 BE Shimura ash Shinc-ko bi BRAN Shizugaake kassen2u byabu > HR Fi Suzuki Masays SABER “Takeda Katsuyori a EGIL Takeda Shingen SFB ‘Tanegashima fF Bs sepps BGS Tipps ei SENG, “okitaka BASE sue iro (4 Udagawa Takehisa HJIIit Uceugh Kenshin ALBIS Uersuki ffi 4 swakamusha BBE Wako Yamamoto Isoroku [IAH+7% ari tt Yodo iit Zen-henen hasen cotoba WA AE EBC 125