Eia Vietnam Raff A2

Appendix 2
NSRP Refinery and Petrochemical Complex Project

Coarse QRA Bidder 1
Prepared for
Foster Wheeler Energy Ltd
by
ABS Consulting Ltd.
Report No. 2514054 R01

Issue 4
February 2011
Report N . 2514054 R01

Issue 4
DOCUMENT APPROVAL SHEET

Project No:
o
Report N :
Report Title:
Client:
Contact:
2514054
2514054 R01
NSRP Refinery and Petrochemical Complex Project Coarse QRA Bidder 1
Foster Wheeler Energy Ltd
Ken Smith
ABS Consulting Limited

This document and any information or descriptive matter set out herein is subject to copyright and/or design right
ownership.
All rights reserved. No part of this document, nor any information or descriptive matter within it, may be disclosed,
loaned, reproduced, copied, photocopied, translated or reduced to any electronic medium or machine readable form or
used for any purpose whatsoever without the written permission of the Company, except in accordance with established
contract conditions pertaining to the production of this document
ISSUE
DATE
PREPARED
REVIEWED
APPROVED
1
DRAFT
03/02/11
Matthew Hart
(Project Engineer)
Xin Hao
(Project Engineer)
Pradeep Prakash
(Project Manager)
11/02/11
Matthew Hart
(Project Engineer)
Xin Hao
(Project Engineer)
Pradeep Prakash
(Project Manager)
15/02/11
Matthew Hart
(Project Engineer)
Xin Hao
(Project Engineer)
Pradeep Prakash
(Project Manager)
22/02/11
Matthew Hart
(Project Engineer)
Pradeep Prakash
(Project Manager)
Pradeep Prakash
(Project Manager)
24/02/11
Matthew Hart
(Project Engineer)
Pradeep Prakash
(Project Manager)
Pradeep Prakash
(Project Manager)
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DOCUMENT REVISION HISTORY

ISSUE
DESCRIPTION
Issue 1
DRAFT
First Draft issue for client comment.
Issue 1
Updated Jetty Area and incorporated client comments from DRAFT.
Issue 2
Incorporated client comments from Issue 1
Issue 3
Incorporated client comments from Issue 2
Issue 4
Removed the future Jetty from the study.
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
ABS Consulting Ltd (ABSC) preformed a quantitative risk assessment QRA for the proposed NSRP
refinery in Nghi Son, Vietnam for the FEED stage of the project for Foster Wheeler Energy Ltd
(FWEL). The results of the study [14], in addition to the site buildings risks, were used to check the
risks to the nearby villages and the adjacent road users. Based on those risks appropriate actions were
recommended.
Following on from previous work, the Client has now solicited definitive design proposals from
various bidders. This study has assessed the risks to the site buildings for the new proposed layout
from Bidder 1 by updating the previous study [14]. All the previous assumptions remain the same.
The three stage process for BRA is aimed at providing a structured risk assessment such that the
complexity of assessment is commensurate with the magnitude of the problem. Stage 1 is the
occupancy filtering step. At this stage, buildings which are not occupied or are not significant for the
safety of the operation are eliminated from the assessment. For stage II, worst credible consequences
are simulated and the buildings which are unaffected by the modelled hazards or for which simple
mitigations can be designed are eliminated. All the buildings which are occupied or functionally
significant AND are affected by the postulated hazards are then taken to Stage III risk assessment
process where not only the magnitude of the hazard but the frequency is taken into account to
calculate the risks to building occupants. Where risks are higher than the accepted criteria,
mitigations are considered to lower the risks to acceptable levels.
Of the on site buildings, 48 were assessed in the Stage 1 preliminary building screening as being At
Risk, due to their occupancy and functionality requirements.
The building risk assessment concluded that all occupied buildings at this site are shown to have
negligible Individual Risk (IR) due to explosion and fire.
Detailed recommendations for the mitigations for each building considered within the assessment in
Section 7.2 and are based on industry general practice. This risk assessment does not account to any
mitigation that may already be in place such as local deluge or passive fire protection on vessels. In
addition to the risk mitigations outlined, due attention should be paid to ensuring that a robust escape
and evacuation plan is in place within the overall emergency preparedness for the site.
The public risk was analysed on a societal risk perspective by the use of an F-N curve. Societal risk
is a measure of the collective risk to which a certain population is subjected as a whole. It is usually
depicted in form of a so-called FN curve, which shows the frequency (F), that a given number, N
people or more (hence N+) will be exposed to lethal consequences.
Based on the results of the study, it can be seen that there is the potential for thermal heat radiation to
impact the adjacent road. Fire risk (BLEVE) is predicted to affect the neighboring villages. By
inspecting the F-N curves presented previously, it can be seen that the risks to the villagers at the east
side are unacceptable.
Detailed recommendations for the mitigations for each building considered within the assessment in
Section 8 and are based on industry general practice. This risk assessment does not account to any
mitigation that may already be in place such as local deluge or passive fire protection on vessels. In
addition to the risk mitigations outlined, due attention should be paid to ensuring that a robust escape
and evacuation plan is in place within the overall emergency preparedness for the site.
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It is recommended that relocation of the villages should be considered as one of the mitigation
options. The risks to the adjacent road, south of the plant, should be mitigated by the use of a 500m
barrier, and if possible traffic control measures.
It should be noted that this QRA presents the hydrocarbon releases risk results only; occupational
risk, non-hydrocarbon events (e.g. dropped objects etc), external events (e.g. structural failure due to
extreme weather, fatigue etc), structural events (e.g. structural failures, etc), and Transportation
accidents are excluded from the scope of this study. It is assumed that the plant and buildings at the
site will be designed to withstand the appropriate seismic loading such that the hydrocarbon release
frequencies are unaffected. In cases where the plant design takes seismic risk into account, it is usual
practice to ignore the seismic considerations from the QRA.
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LIST OF ACRONYMS
ABSC
ABS Consulting Ltd
ACPH
Air Changes per Hour
ALARP
As Low As Reasonably Practicable
ARU
Amine Regeneration Unit
BLEVE
Boiling Liquid Expanding Vapour Explosion
BRA
Building Risk Assessment
CAM
Congested area Assessment Methodology
CDU
Crude Distillation Unit
CMU
Concrete Masonry Units
DOM
Design, Operation, Maintenance
ERPG
Emergency Response Planning Guidelines
ESD
Emergency Shutdown
FEED
Front End Engineering and Design
FWEL
Foster Wheeler Energy Limited
GOHDS
Gas Oil Hydrodesulphuriser Unit
HAZID
Hazard Identification
HCDS
Hydrogen Compression and Distribution System
HMU
Hydrogen Manufacturing Unit
HVAC
Heating, Ventilation and Air Conditioning
IR
Individual Risk (or Incident Radiation)
IRPA
Individual Risk Per Annum
InAlk
Indirect Alkylation Units
KEC
Kuwait Export Crude
KHDS
Kerosene Hydrodesulphuriser Unit
LC
Lethal Concentration
LFL
Lower Flammable Limit
LPG
Liquefied Petroleum Gas
LSIR
Location Specific Individual Risk
NAC
Naphtha and Aromatics Complex
NSRP
Nghi Son Refinery and Petrochemical
PHA
Preliminary Hazard Analysis
P&ID
Piping and Instrumentation Diagram
PFD
Process Flow Diagram
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PPU
Polypropylene Unit
PRU
Propylene Recovery Unit
QRA
Quantitative Risk Assessment
RHDS
Residue Hydrodesulphuriser Unit
RFCC
Residue Fluid Catalytic Cracker Unit
R2P2
Reducing risks, protecting people
SHU
Selective Hydrogenation
SRU
Sulphur Recovery Unit
SWS
Sour Water Stripper Units
TGT
Tail Gas Treating
UPS
Uninterrupted Power Supply
SCEs
Safety Critical Elements
ppm
parts per million
VCE
Vapour Cloud Explosion
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CONTENTS
Page
Document Approval .............................................................................................................. 2
Revision Record ................................................................................................................... 3
Summary .............................................................................................................................. 4
List of Acronyms ................................................................................................................... 6
Contents ............................................................................................................................... 7
List of Tables ........................................................................................................................ 9
List of Figures ..................................................................................................................... 10
List of Appendices ............................................................................................................... 11
INTRODUCTION .........................................................................................................12
GENERAL METHODOLOGY .....................................................................................13
DESCRIPTION OF FACILITY.....................................................................................14
3.1 Plant Description ..................................................................................................................................................... 14

3.1.1
Process Units ................................................................................................................................................... 15
3.1.2
Buildings .......................................................................................................................................................... 16
STAGE 1 ASSESSMENT ...........................................................................................19
4.1 Screening Criterion ................................................................................................................................................. 19

4.1.1
Occupancy Screening ...................................................................................................................................... 19
4.1.2
Functionality Screening ................................................................................................................................... 19
4.2
Stage One Results .................................................................................................................................................... 19
STAGE 2 ASSESSMENT (CONSEQUENCE ANALYSES) .......................................26
5.1 Explosion Analyses .................................................................................................................................................. 26

5.1.1
Credible Explosion Hazards ............................................................................................................................ 26
5.1.2
CAM Assessment ............................................................................................................................................ 26
5.1.3
Review of Hazard Consequences..................................................................................................................... 26
5.2 Fire Analysis ............................................................................................................................................................ 32
5.2.1
Credible Fire Hazards ...................................................................................................................................... 32
5.2.2
Boiling Liquid Expanding Vapour Explosion (BLEVE) Hazards ................................................................... 35
5.3 Toxic Analysis .......................................................................................................................................................... 39
5.3.1
Credible Toxic Hazards ................................................................................................................................... 39
5.3.2
Review of Hazard Consequences..................................................................................................................... 40
5.4
Stage II Screening ................................................................................................................................................... 43
STAGE 3 ASSESSMENT (RISK ANALYSIS) ............................................................43
6.1
Model Development................................................................................................................................................. 43
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6.2 SHEPHERD Parameters ........................................................................................................................................ 46
6.2.1
Equipment Count and Leak Frequencies ......................................................................................................... 46
6.2.2
Design, Operation & Maintenance Factors ...................................................................................................... 47
6.2.3
Probability of Emergency Shutdown ............................................................................................................... 47
6.2.4
Building Performance ...................................................................................................................................... 47
6.3 Fire & Toxic Hazard Modelling ............................................................................................................................. 50
6.3.1
Fatality Probabilities ........................................................................................................................................ 50
6.3.2
Ignition Probabilities ....................................................................................................................................... 50
6.3.3
Building Protection Features ........................................................................................................................... 51
6.3.4
Fire Resistance of Buildings ............................................................................................................................ 52
6.3.5
Boiling Liquid Expanding Vapour Explosion (BLEVE) Scenario .................................................................. 53
6.4 Risk Acceptance Criteria ........................................................................................................................................ 53
6.4.1
Individual Risks ............................................................................................................................................... 53
6.5 Evaluation of Building Risks .................................................................................................................................. 55
6.5.1
Explosion Risks ............................................................................................................................................... 55
6.5.2
Fire Risk .......................................................................................................................................................... 70
RISK ASSESSMENT ..................................................................................................79
7.1
On Site Risk ............................................................................................................................................................. 79
7.2 Off-site Risk ............................................................................................................................................................. 85

7.2.1
Villages to the East of the site ......................................................................................................................... 85
7.2.2
Road to the South of the site ............................................................................................................................ 86
CONCLUSIONS & RECOMMENDATIONS ................................................................89
8.1
Buildings at the site ................................................................................................................................................. 89
8.2 Off-site Population .................................................................................................................................................. 93

8.2.1
Villages to the East of the site ......................................................................................................................... 93
8.2.2
Road to the South of the plant ......................................................................................................................... 94
UNCERTAINTY IN QRA .............................................................................................95
10
REFERENCES............................................................................................................96
List of Tables
Table 1 Stage 1 Assessment ........................................................................................................................................... 20
Table 2 - Maximum Credible Explosion Hazard ........................................................................................................... 27
Table 3 - Maximum Credible Fire Hazard ..................................................................................................................... 37
Table 4 Toxic Gas (H2S) Dispersion modelling results for the 150mm hole size ..................................................... 40
Table 5 - Leak Frequencies used within the Process Blocks ......................................................................................... 46
Table 6 - Definition of Shell building types used in SHEPHERD ................................................................................. 47
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Table 7 -Vulnerability dependence on damage thresholds............................................................................................ 49
Table 8 - Definition of damage categories ....................................................................................................................... 49
Table 9- Fatality Probabilities from Exposure to Fires and Toxins ............................................................................. 50
Table 10 Immediate Ignition Probabilities .................................................................................................................. 51
Table 11 Delayed Ignition Probabilities ....................................................................................................................... 51
Table 12 - Levels of Building Protection against Fire & Toxic Hazards...................................................................... 52
Table 13 - Thermal Radiation Limits for Structures and Plant ................................................................................... 53
Table 14- Summary Explosion Damage for the 10-4/yr Hazard .................................................................................... 55
Table 15 Frequency of 15kW/m2 at buildings ............................................................................................................. 76
Table 16 - Summary Occupancy Risk Values ................................................................................................................ 79
Table 17 Overall Risk to Functionally Significant Buildings ..................................................................................... 81
Table 18 Recommendations ........................................................................................................................................... 89
Table 19 Recommendations Functional Significant Buildings .................................................................................. 91
Table 20 Recommendations vulnerability ................................................................................................................... 94
List of Figures
Figure 1 - Proposed Location [Image taken from Google Earth] ................................................................................. 14
Figure 2 NSRP Main Plant Plot Plan [6] ..................................................................................................................... 17
Figure 3 NSRP Plant Plot Plan (Jetty area) [7] ........................................................................................................... 18
Figure 4 2nd Stage Buildings .......................................................................................................................................... 25
Figure 5 Maximum Credible Overpressures Main Plant ........................................................................................... 30
Figure 6 Maximum Credible Overpressures Jetty Area ............................................................................................ 31
Figure 7 Maximum Potential Incident Radiation Flux Contours Main Plant.......................................................... 33
Figure 8 Maximum Potential Incident Radiation Flux Contours Jetty Area ........................................................... 34
Figure 9 BLEVE Fireballs Diameters .......................................................................................................................... 36
Figure 10 ERPG Levels ................................................................................................................................................. 41
Figure 11 ERPG Contours for the SRU ....................................................................................................................... 42
Figure 12 SHEPHERD Model Main Plant .................................................................................................................. 44
Figure 13 SHEPHERD model Jetty Area .................................................................................................................... 45
Figure 14 Building vulnerability by type ..................................................................................................................... 48
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Figure 15 - Levels of Risk and ALARP ........................................................................................................................... 54
Figure 16 Flammable Gas Frequency across the Main Plant .................................................................................... 58
Figure 17 Flammable Gas Frequency across the Jetty Area ..................................................................................... 59
Figure 18 - Frequency of Overpressure Exceeding 100 mbar Main Plant .................................................................. 60
Figure 19 - Frequency of Overpressure Exceeding 100 mbar Jetty Area .................................................................... 61
Figure 20 - Frequency of Overpressure Exceeding 30 mbar Main Plant .................................................................... 62
Figure 21 - Frequency of Overpressure Exceeding 30 mbar Jetty Area ...................................................................... 63
Figure 22 - Explosion Risk Plot for Building Type B2 Main Plant .............................................................................. 64
Figure 23 - Explosion Risk Plot for Building Type B2 Jetty Area ................................................................................ 65
Figure 28 - Cloud Fire Frequency Contour Plot Main Plant ........................................................................................ 71
Figure 29 - Cloud Fire Frequency Contour Plot Jetty Area ......................................................................................... 72
Figure 30 - Frequency Contour Plot for Heat Flux above 15kW/m2 Main Plant........................................................ 73
Figure 31 - Frequency Contour Plot for Heat Flux above 15kW/m2 Jetty Area ......................................................... 74
Figure 32 BLEVE Risk Plot .......................................................................................................................................... 75
Figure 33 F-N Curve (Villagers only)........................................................................................................................... 85
Figure 34 Total Fire and Explosion Risk Contour Level Main Plant ....................................................................... 87
Figure 35 Total Fire and Explosion Risk Contour Level Jetty Area ......................................................................... 88
Figure 36 Proposed concrete wall and traffic warning/control ................................................................................. 94
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INTRODUCTION
ABS Consulting Ltd (ABSC) preformed a coarse quantitative risk assessment (QRA) for the
proposed NSRP refinery in Vietnam for the FEED stage of the project for Foster Wheeler Energy
Ltd (FWEL). The results of the study [14], in addition to the site buildings risks, were used to check
the risks to the nearby villages and the adjacent road users. Based on those risks appropriate actions
were recommended.
Following on from the earlier work, the Client has now solicited definitive design proposals from
various bidders. This study assesses the risks to the site buildings, for the new proposed layout from
Bidder 1 by updating the previous study [14], by incorporating the new information in the risk
model.
For this assessment all the previous assumptions about the process conditions, release frequencies,
ignition probabilities, etc remains the same.
The results of the revised risk assessment study are detailed within this report. Although unchanged
from the previous study [14], for the sake of completeness the general methodology adopted for this
study is described in Section 2. Section 3 provides a general description of the facility. Section 4
presents the results of the Stage 1 assessment. Section 5 deals with the Stage 2 consequence
modelling with Stage 3 risk analysis being covered in Section 6. Section 7 presents the Risk
Assessment, where the risks are compared to the risk acceptance criteria. Section 8 presents the
conclusions and suggests suitable risk mitigation measures for accomplishing them or showing that
the risks are As Low as Reasonably Practicable (ALARP). Finally, discussion on the QRA
uncertainties is presented in Section 9.
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GENERAL METHODOLOGY
The methodology adopted for the BRA follows the recommendations of in the American Institute of
Petroleums Recommended Practice API RP 752 [1]. The assessment follows a three step process.
The philosophy of the stepped approach is to perform as simple an analysis as is consistent with the
hazards. For example if the building is not occupied or is not significant from the plant operation
aspect then no further assessment is needed. If the building is occupied or is functionally significant
then the next consideration is to check if the building is subject to a credible hazard and if simple
mitigation is feasible to mitigate the effects. No further assessment is needed if the occupied or
functionally significant building is not subject to a credible major hazard or the effects of the hazard
can be mitigated in a cost effective manner. Where the building is occupied or functionally
significant and is subject to a credible hazard which cannot be easily designed out or mitigated, a risk
assessment is undertaken to check if the risks to the building occupants are acceptable or the
frequency of significant damage to unoccupied but functionally significant building is reasonably
low. Based on the risk assessment, cost effective and proportional mitigation options can be devised.
The QRA has been performed based initially on the three steps of the BRA methodology that are
summarized below:
1.
Stage 1: A screening assessment based on building occupancy and its functional significance.
Only buildings considered to be occupied or functionally significant are taken to the Stage II
assessment. This is generally undertaken by the plant and confirmed by the consultant.
2.
Stage 2: This phase involves analysis of worst credible consequences of the potential hazards
to assess building vulnerability for explosions, fires, flammable and toxic gases. Only
buildings considered to be vulnerable to the assessed hazards need to be taken to the 3rd stage
of assessment.
3.
Stage 3: The 3rd stage of assessment involves calculation of risk to the building occupants and
where risks are high considers risk reduction measures.
4.
In addition to the standard building risk assessment, the risks to the offsite population were
also assessed using the societal risk criteria for which the F-N curves were generated.
The tool used for the stage 2 consequence modelling was Shell FRED V 5.1 which is a suite of Fire,
Release, Explosion and Dispersion models used to predict the consequences of the accidental or
design release of product from process, storage, transport or distribution operations [3].
For the stage III risk assessment Shell SHEPHERD V2.1 was used. The Shell SHEPHERD Risk
Tool forms a family of graphical risk integrators. The tool has been developed to carry out fit-forpurpose Quantified Risk Assessment (QRA) for a broad range of onshore industrial sites such as
Refineries, Gas plants, Chemicals plants, LPG distribution sites, pipeline systems etc. SHEPHERD
is used to systematically build up risk contributions starting from a release and working through
ignition sources to the calculation of the effects of cloud fires, jet fires, toxic gas and explosions.
Escalation to other parts of the plant via vessel failure through explosion over-pressure and/or flame
engulfment is handled automatically. The input required includes the mass flow rate and dispersion
distances to lower flammable limit in process blocks or point sources [4].
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DESCRIPTION OF FACILITY
3.1
Plant Description
The NSRP Refinery and Petrochemical Project will process 200,000 BPSD of imported Kuwait
Export Crude (KEC) oil. The fuels section of the refinery includes Residue Hydrodesulphurisation
and Residue Catalytic Cracking as the main upgrading units. The refinery is integrated with
petrochemical production. The Aromatics plant produces Paraxylene and Benzene. A key product
from the Residue Cracker is Propylene which is used to produce Polypropylene product [5].
The products produced include the following:
LPG
Gasoline 92/ 95 RON
Kerosene / Jet A-1
Diesel Premium and Regular
Paraxylene / Benzene
Polypropylene
Sulphur
The refinery is situated in Nghi Son, Tinh Gia District, Thanh Hoa Province, Vietnam (approx. 200
km south of Hanoi) - See Figure 1.
Figure 1 - Proposed Location [Image taken from Google Earth]

The NSRP Project includes all process units and associated utility, offsite and infrastructure facilities
to support the refinery operation.
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Complete utility facilities designed to meet the refinerys demands for cooling water, fuels,
power, steam, water, instrument and plant air, inert gas, etc.
Offsite facilities including tankage for feedstocks plus intermediate and final products as well
as systems for import and export of feed and products.
Other offsite facilities including flare, effluent treatment, firewater, interconnecting piping
and pipelines, etc.
Marine facilities include an SPM/ Crude import line and product loading jetties
3.1.1
Process Units
The complex will comprise the following licensed processing blocks:

The following unit description were based on the Refinery Design basis overall [5] supplied by
FWEL.
Refinery Process Units
Crude Distillation Unit (CDU)
LPG Recovery Unit
Saturated LPG Treater Unit
Kerosene Hydrodesulphuriser Unit (KHDS)
Gas Oil Hydrodesulphuriser Unit (GOHDS)
Residue Hydrodesulphuriser Unit (RHDS)
Residue Fluid Catalytic Cracker Unit (RFCC)
Propylene Recovery Unit (PRU)
RFCC LPG Treater Unit
RFCC Light Gasoline Treater Unit
Selective Hydrogenation (SHU) and Indirect Alkylation Units (InAlk)
Hydrogen Manufacturing Unit (HMU) and Hydrogen Compression and Distribution System
(HCDS)
Sour Water Stripper Units (SWS)
Amine Regeneration Unit (ARU)
Sulphur Recovery Unit (SRU) and Tail Gas Treating (TGT)
Petrochemical Process Units
Naphtha and Aromatics Complex (NAC)
Polypropylene Unit (PPU)
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Offsite Systems
Crude Oil Import, Storage and Pumping System
Inter Unit Storage and Pumping System
Product Component Storage and Pumping System
Product Storage and Pumping System
Slop Storage and Pumping System
Product Truck Loading System
Sulphur Forming and Storage Unit
Utility Systems
Demineralised water system,
Raw water/potable systems
Cooling water system,
Steam Power generation system,
Flue gas Desulphurisation,
Plant air/Instrument Air System,
Nitrogen System
Fuel Oil System
Fuel Gas System
Flushing oil system
Chemical Supply
Electricity and steam is generated at the Cogeneration plant.

3.1.2
Buildings
In all 59 buildings have been identified on the plant layout (See Figure 2 and Figure 3). On the
previous study [14] ABSC numbered these buildings consecutively from number 1 to number 66. To
allow direct comparison this system has been retained. These buildings are tabulated in Table 1.
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Figure 2 NSRP Main Plant Plot Plan [6]
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Figure 3 NSRP Plant Plot Plan (Jetty area) [7]
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STAGE 1 ASSESSMENT
The scope of the Stage one assessment is to carry out a building screening exercise in order to
eliminate buildings of no safety concern (unoccupied and not functionally significant) from the risk
assessment process.
The stage I screening has been completed by FWEL using the API 752 [1] criteria described below;
4.1
Screening Criterion
4.1.1
Occupancy Screening
For the purposes of occupancy screening a building is considered occupied if the building occupancy
load is 300 or more man-hours per week or if during peak occupancy, 5 people or more are routinely
expected in the building for at least one hour. If this criteria is exceeded the building is selected for
second stage (Stage 2) analysis.
4.1.2
Functionality Screening
A stage-two building evaluation is required if a building is functionally significant. A building is

defined as functionally significant if either:
4.2
People are expected to remain or take refuge in the building during an emergency. Possible
reasons for people to remain in a building include a lack of suitable evacuation options or the
need for occupants to perform emergency shutdown procedures.
The building is required for emergency response, such as fire stations or clinics.
The building is necessary for continued operation of plant units that may be able to continue
to operate or may be unaffected by an incident in another area. This includes control
buildings, process interface buildings (PIBs), or substations that control or provide power to
multiple process units.
The economic impact on operations of loss of buildings is significant.
Stage One Results
A summary of the occupancy details is provided in Table 1 along with whether the building is
functionally critical or required to provide shelter during an emergency. Previously the buildings
were numbered 1 to 66. The building numbering system has been retained within this study to
facilitate a direct comparison. However, please note that numbers 17, 29, 35, 47, 61, 63 and 64 have
not been used as they were either missing on the plot plan [6] or have been revised.
Twelve building are assessed as being occupied and thirty eight as functionally significant. Six
buildings are both occupied and functionally significant. Eleven building have been screened out as
being neither occupied nor functionally significant.
The buildings taken to the second stage of this assessment are shown in Figure 4.
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Table 1 Stage 1 Assessment

Project
Peak
Building
Building Name
Occupancy
Occupancy
Number
Total
(hr/week)
5 people or more
Functionally
routinely expected in
Significant
the building for at

least an hour?
High Occupancy
(>300 man-hours
per week)
Carry
Forward
For
Stage 2
Administration Building
172
6880
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Canteen No1
120
6720
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Medical Center
756
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Main Guard House
756
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Central Control Room
90
6260
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
CCR Oil Movements
Yes
No
No
No
Laboratory
55
2200
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Maintenance Workshop
45
3812
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Warehouse
11
440
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
10
Central Chemical Store
126
No
No
No
No
11
Central Catalyst Store
252
No
No
No
No
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Project
Peak
Building
Building Name
Occupancy
Occupancy
Number
12
Canteen No2
13
Total
(hr/week)
5 people or more
Functionally
Significant
the building for at

least an hour?
High Occupancy
(>300 man-hours
per week)
Carry
Forward
For
Stage 2
120
6720
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Fire Station
504
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
14
Main Substation SS-M01
Yes
No
No
Yes
15
Emergency Generator
Yes
No
No
Yes
16
Truck Loading Office
160
No
No
No
No
18
SS- U04
Yes
No
No
Yes
19
SS-O04
Yes
No
No
Yes
20
SS- U01
Yes
No
No
Yes
21
SS- P09
Yes
No
No
Yes
22
SS- P07
Yes
No
No
Yes
23
SS-P02
Yes
No
No
Yes
24
SS-P06
Yes
No
No
Yes
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Project
Peak
Building
Building Name
Occupancy
Occupancy
Number
Total
(hr/week)
5 people or more
Functionally
Significant
the building for at

least an hour?
High Occupancy
(>300 man-hours
per week)
Carry
Forward
For
Stage 2
25
SS- P03
Yes
No
No
Yes
26
SS- P04
Yes
No
No
Yes
27
SS- P01
Yes
No
No
Yes
28
SS- P08
Yes
No
No
Yes
30
SS-P05
Yes
No
No
Yes
31
SS-U03
Yes
No
No
Yes
32
SS-O03
Yes
No
No
Yes
33
SS-U02
Yes
No
No
Yes
34
SS-O01
Yes
No
No
Yes
36
ISB-014
Yes
No
No
Yes
37
ISB-013
Yes
No
No
Yes
38
ISB-03
Yes
No
No
Yes
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Project
Peak
Building
Building Name
Occupancy
Occupancy
Number
Total
(hr/week)
5 people or more
Functionally
Significant
the building for at

least an hour?
High Occupancy
(>300 man-hours
per week)
Carry
Forward
For
Stage 2
39
ISB-011
Yes
No
No
Yes
40
ISB-06
Yes
No
No
Yes
41
ISB-05
Yes
No
No
Yes
42
ISB-04
Yes
No
No
Yes
43
ISB-02
Yes
No
No
Yes
44
ISB-12
Yes
No
No
Yes
45
ISB-01
Yes
No
No
Yes
46
ISB-10
Yes
No
No
Yes
48
ISB-08
Yes
No
No
Yes
49
ISB-07
Yes
No
No
Yes
50
ISB-18
Yes
No
No
Yes
51
ISB-17
Yes
No
No
Yes
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Project
Peak
Building
Building Name
Occupancy
Occupancy
Number
Total
(hr/week)
5 people or more
Functionally
Significant
the building for at

least an hour?
High Occupancy
(>300 man-hours
per week)
Carry
Forward
For
Stage 2
52
ISB-15
Yes
No
No
Yes
53
ISB-16
Yes
No
No
Yes
54
ISB-19
Yes
No
No
Yes
55
Local Guardhouse No1
252
No
No
No
No
56
Jetty Area Guardhouse
336
No
No
Yes
Yes
57
Operator Shelter No1
No
No
No
No
58
Operator Shelter No2
No
No
No
No
59
Solid Product Warehouse
No
No
No
No
60
Jetty Area Admin/Control Building
21
1442
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
62
Jetty Area Workshop
No
No
No
No
65
Jetty Area Storage Building
No
No
No
No
66
Crude Oil Terminal Spares Warehouse
No
No
No
No
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Figure 4 2nd Stage Buildings
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STAGE 2 ASSESSMENT (CONSEQUENCE ANALYSES)
5.1
Explosion Analyses
5.1.1
Credible Explosion Hazards
The flammable gas accumulating in a congested region and subsequent delayed ignition results in an
explosion. So for an explosion to occur there should be a source of flammable release near a
congested area. Considering both the PFD and the plot plan, the following potential sources of
explosion were identified for explosion consequence modeling.
CDU
LPG Recovery and Treater Unit
KHDS
GOHDS
RHDS
RFCC
PPU
SHU and Ind Alk
HMU
HCDS
NAC
Berth Area
Tanks pumping system
Fuel gas system
5.1.2
CAM Assessment
For the congested areas in the Aromatics Complex, RFCC Unit and Hydrogen Manufacturing plant,
the parameters were derived using Shells guidelines and based upon the plot plans provided. For the
remaining units an engineering judgment was use to set this parameters as more detailed plot plants
werent available at the time of this assessment.
5.1.3
Review of Hazard Consequences
The maximum credible overpressure and impulse for each building is provided in Table 2.
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Table 2 - Maximum Credible Explosion Hazard

Building
Building Name
Number
Overpressure
Impulse
(psi)
(psi-ms)
0.4
20
Canteen No1
0.3
18
Medical Center
0.3
17
Main Guard House
0.3
18
0.6
29
Laboratory
0.4
24
0.7
31
Warehouse
0.6
29
12
Canteen No2
0.4
22
13
Fire Station
0.4
24
14
Main Substation
3.2
94
15
Emergency Generator
1.5
58
18
SS- U04
0.6
25
19
SS-O04
3.2
94
20
SS- U01
43.5
761
21
SS- P09
37.7
725
22
SS- P07
20.3
580
23
SS-P02
10.2
236
24
SS-P06
23.2
471
25
SS- P03
13.8
326
26
SS- P04
0.4
20
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Building
Building Name
Number
Overpressure
Impulse
(psi)
(psi-ms)
27
SS- P01
7.3
181
28
SS- P08
7.0
44
30
SS-P05
6.4
145
31
SS-U03
2.3
109
32
SS-O03
0.6
31
33
SS-U02
2.0
47
34
SS-O01
1.2
34
36
ISB-014
2.6
87
37
ISB-013
43.5
1233
38
ISB-03
16.0
290
39
ISB-011
58.0
1305
40
ISB-06
21.8
580
41
ISB-05
21.8
580
42
ISB-04
8.7
160
43
ISB-02
2.0
80
44
ISB-12
7.0
174
45
ISB-01
7.3
181
46
ISB-10
8.0
181
48
ISB-08
3.8
174
49
ISB-07
4.6
145
50
ISB-18
1.0
44
51
ISB-17
7.3
181
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Building
Building Name
Number
Overpressure
Impulse
(psi)
(psi-ms)
52
ISB-15
7.0
44
53
ISB-16
0.6
31
54
ISB-19
1.5
36
56
Jetty Area Guard House
0.1
60
0.1
Figure 5 and Figure 6 shows the maximum credible overpressure values.
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Figure 5 Maximum Credible Overpressures Main Plant
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Figure 6 Maximum Credible Overpressures Jetty Area
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5.2
Fire Analysis
5.2.1
Credible Fire Hazards
The following list summarises the main potential fire sources for fire consequence modeling:
CDU
LPG Recovery and Treater Unit
KHDS
GOHDS
RHDS
RFCC
PPU
SHU and Ind Alk
HMU
HCDS
NAC
Berth Area
Storage Tanks and pumping system
Spheres
Propane loading
Fuel Gas system
Figure 7 and Figure 8 show the maximum potential incident radiation flux contours.
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Figure 7 Maximum Potential Incident Radiation Flux Contours Main Plant
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Figure 8 Maximum Potential Incident Radiation Flux Contours Jetty Area
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5.2.2
Boiling Liquid Expanding Vapour Explosion (BLEVE) Hazards
The potential BLEVE hazards identified are listed below. A consequence modeling has been
undertaken for these BLEVE scenarios.
Product storage (Spheres)
LPG Loading
True BLEVEs are associated with liquid gases such as propane which are stored as liquid by keeping
them under pressure at temperatures far in excess of the boiling points of the material. For example
the boiling point of propane is -42oC. Being kept at an ambient temperature of 30oC represents a very
large temperature difference for this liquid. Therefore, an increase in the temperature for the liquid
from a relatively small fire would tend to rapidly increase the pressure as the material tries to return
to a gaseous state. The material could go into a superheated state, and, given the sudden loss of
containment when the shell of the containing vessel fails due to the applied heat load and loss of
strength, the superheated liquid would instantly vaporize causing a rapid expansion in volume (of the
order of 100s of times the liquid volume) giving rise to the fireball that is inherent in the BLEVE
event.
The maximum fireball diameter contours are show in Figure 9.
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Figure 9 BLEVE Fireballs Diameters
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A summary of the Maximum Incident Radiation flux from the modeled fire scenarios for each
building is given in Table 3.
Table 3 - Maximum Credible Fire Hazard
Max. Incident
Building
Building Name
Number
Radiation
2
(kW/m )
Negligible
Canteen No1
Negligible
Medical Center
Negligible
Main Guard House
Negligible
Laboratory
Warehouse
12
Canteen No2
Negligible
13
Fire Station
Negligible
14
11
15
Emergency Generator
11
18
SS- U04
19
SS-O04
Negligible
20
SS- U01
23
21
SS- P09
>50
22
SS- P07
>50
23
SS-P02
>50
24
SS-P06
>50
4
Negligible
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Max. Incident
Building
Building Name
Number
Radiation
2
(kW/m )
25
SS- P03
>50
26
SS- P04
>50
27
SS- P01
>50
28
SS- P08
>50
30
SS-P05
>50
31
SS-U03
23
32
SS-O03
>50
33
SS-U02
>50
34
SS-O01
36
ISB-014
37
ISB-013
>50
38
ISB-03
>50
39
ISB-011
>50
40
ISB-06
>50
41
ISB-05
>50
42
ISB-04
>50
43
ISB-02
>50
44
ISB-12
>50
45
ISB-01
>50
46
ISB-10
>50
48
ISB-08
>50
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Max. Incident
Building
Building Name
Number
5.3
Radiation
2
(kW/m )
49
ISB-07
>50
50
ISB-18
>50
51
ISB-17
>50
52
ISB-15
53
ISB-16
20
54
ISB-19
>50
56
Local Guardhouse Jetty Area
60
Negligible
4
Toxic Analysis
5.3.1
Credible Toxic Hazards
The following list summarises the locations of potential sources for toxic gas release and thus
included in consequence modeling:
CDU
SWS
ARU
SRU
RFCC
GOHDS
KHDS
RHDS
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5.3.2
Review of Hazard Consequences
The hazard distances for toxic H2S gas from maximum credible release scenarios were calculated for
each of the three Emergency Response Planning Guide (ERPG) values and are provided in Table 4.
Table 4 Toxic Gas (H2S) Dispersion modelling results for the 150mm hole size
Downwind distance (m)
Unit
ERPG1
ERPG2
ERPG3
(0.1 ppm)
(30 ppm)
(100 ppm)
D5 Weather
F2 Weather
D5 Weather
F2 Weather
D5 Weather
F2 Weather
24723
106764
1702
10831
826
4252
1398
6664
1398
6664
672
2857
1089
7809
39
55
33
48
25294
106764
902
3700
446
1710
25551
106764
1089
9182
540
3700
35256
106764
2378
18031
1126
6664
GOHDS014
18031
106764
720
2537
330
440
KHDS 013
25551
106764
880
4252
410
960
CDU 010
18031
106764
720
2537
330
440
ARU 084
24723
106764
1702
10831
826
4252
RHDS 020
47641
106764
2149
21449
999
7809
SRU
086/087/088
RFCC 020
SWS 080
Note: The dispersion modeling was performed for two Pasquill-Gifford categories:
D5: atmospheric stability class D with 5m/s wind speed.
F2: atmospheric stability class F with 2m/s wind speed.
The Emergency Response Planning Guidelines (ERPGs) are intended to be a planning tool to help
anticipate human adverse health effects to the general public caused by toxic chemical exposure.
The ERPGs are three-tiered guidelines, with a common denominator: 1 hour exposure duration. The
levels are defined as follows in Figure 10:
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Figure 10 ERPG Levels

In this assessment the AIHA ERPG-2008 values were adopted to investigate the potential for off-site
adverse effects to humans due to toxic H2S exposure [10].
ERPG-1: 0.1 ppm
ERPG-2: 30 ppm
ERPG-3: 100 ppm
Figure 11 shows the ERPG-2 and 3 contours to the Amine Acid gas on the SRU unit considering a
150mm hole size release for D5 condition.
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Figure 11 ERPG Contours for the SRU
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5.4
Stage II Screening
From the review of the credible hazards modeled, it is apparent that most of the buildings taken to
stage II screening are subject to significant fire and /or explosion hazard. Conservatively therefore
all the buildings considered in the stage II assessment have been retained for the Stage III risk
assessment.
6
6.1
STAGE 3 ASSESSMENT (RISK ANALYSIS)

Model Development
The SHEPHERD model was updated using the plot plans [6].
The mass and energy balance was used to define the process condition within each of the main plant
items so that process specific fluid could be used in the consequence assessment.
The plot plans and other documents were used to define the process areas for the QRA and also used
to define the congested areas.
A plot of the SHEPHERD model is given in Figure 12 and Figure 13. The offsite area to the west,
South and East are termed areas A, B and C respectively.
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Figure 12 SHEPHERD Model Main Plant
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Figure 13 SHEPHERD model Jetty Area
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6.2
6.2.1
SHEPHERD Parameters
Equipment Count and Leak Frequencies
The main plant items were identified and grouped depending on the fluid composition, with process
pressure and process temperature in the same order of magnitude into process blocks, which were
entered into the Shell SHEPHERD model. The model uses the Multiple Object as a single place
holder for defining more than one process block in the model to reduce the number of physical
objects drawn in the model. Using the generic parts count (e.g. vessels or compressors), a
distribution of flanges and connections etc are applied internally within the SHEPHERD model
based on a distribution defined by Shell. Each of the flanges, connections and fittings etc associated
with a generic piece of equipment thus provides the leak source and associated frequency.
The leak frequencies are generally based on the generic data from the Hydrocarbon Leak and
Ignition Database, EP Forum Risk Assessment Data Directory, EP Forum Report No. 11.8/250, E&P
Forum, (1996) [8].
The leak frequencies for the LPG filling station used are generally accepted on the onshore industry.
A summary of the leak frequencies used is presented in Table 5 below.
Table 5 - Leak Frequencies used within the Process Blocks
Holes
Size
Leak Type
Leak Frequency/
year
Process
LPG
Process Blocks
-4
10mm
Flange Leak
1.5x10
10mm
Seal Leak
(pump)
7x10
25mm
Fitting Leak
2.35x10
50mm
Connection
Leak
3.8x10
Pipe Leak
(*1/D)
3.5x10
100mm
-3
-4
5.2x10
-4
-5
-6
LPG Filling Station

10mm
General
5.22E-01
25mm
General
3.86E-04
50mm
General
4.41E-04
100mm
General
5.17E-02
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6.2.2
Design, Operation & Maintenance Factors
The failure rate data applied in the study represents industry average values, although in order to take
plant condition into account within the risk calculation, SHEPHERD allows for the effectiveness of
prevention and shutdown measures to be taken into account. Factors including design, operation and
maintenance (DOM) are considered. A DOM factor is used by SHEPHERD and is applied to
account for the effectiveness of the prevention measures, categorised as high, average or low. In
order to obtain a site-specific failure frequency, the average value is modified using the input
DOM factor. In selecting a low effectiveness, the failure frequency is multiplied by the DOM
factor and divided by the DOM factor for high effectiveness. Hence selecting the average does
not change the failure frequency value.
For the base case quantitative risk assessment, the effectiveness of the design, operation and
maintenance was assumed to be average. Therefore, the industry average failure rate data was used.
6.2.3
Probability of Emergency Shutdown
Inventory isolation time (response time) is assumed to be 20 minutes after start of a release except
for the RFCC for which inventory isolation within 5 minutes with a 50% probability and isolation
following fire detection with a probability of 80% is assumed. This assumption affects the only the
escalation potential, all the releases are modelled.
6.2.4
Building Performance
A number of studies have sought to generate guidance on building damage and collapse, and
consequent fatality rates, for different categories of buildings. Some studies have considered both
the overpressure and impulse resulting from the explosion, while others have only correlated the
effects against the overpressure. Analytical tools have also been developed to assist with this
analysis. The work reported here is based on the results of the 1995 Petroleum and Chemical
Processing Industry Technology Co-operative report on Conventional Building Blast Performance
Capabilities.
API RP-752 [1] defines a set of building classifications included within Shell SHEPHERD
Exceedance, given in Table 6 [4].
Table 6 - Definition of Shell building types used in SHEPHERD
Shell
Building
Description
Type
B1
Wood, temporary buildings, trailers
B2
Steel frame with metal siding
B3
Brick/un-reinforced masonry (load bearing wall)
B4
Steel or concrete frame with masonry fill or cladding
B5
Blast resistant (reinforced concrete)
B6
Brick/moderately reinforced masonry load bearing
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Shell
Building
Description
Type
B7
Steel frame building with pre-cast walls and concrete roof

Custom type specify the design free-field overpressure at 100ms
B8
pulse duration
Each building type has its own unique resistance to blast damage. The blast damage resistance of
various building types is shown in Figure 14.
Overpressure Versus Vulnerability
14.0
Peak Incident Overpressure (psi)
12.0
10.0
8.0
B1,B2 & B4
B5
B6
B3
6.0
4.0
2.0
0.0
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.2
Probability of Serious Injury/Fatality
Figure 14 Building vulnerability by type

The Co-Operative has also suggested a relationship between vulnerability and building damage level.
These are given in Table 7.
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Table 7 -Vulnerability dependence on damage thresholds

Vulnerability
Damage level
interface
0.01
1/2A
0.1
2A/2B
0.3
2B/3
0.6
3/4
1.0
4/5
The definition of blast damage levels from the Co-Operative study are given in Table 8.
Table 8 - Definition of damage categories
Discrete
damage
level
Brief
Full description
description
Minor
damage
Onset of visible damage. Repairs are only needed

for cosmetic reasons.
Building is reusable
following an explosion.
Localised building damage.
2A
Building performs
Moderate
function and can be used; however, major repairs
damage
are required to restore integrity of structural

envelope. Total cost of repairs is moderate.
Widespread building damage. Building cannot be
2B
Moderate
used until major repairs are completed. Total cost
damage
of repairs is significant, approaching replacement

cost of building.
Building has lost structural integrity and may
Major
collapse due to environmental conditions (i.e.
damage
wind, snow, rain). Total cost of repairs exceeds

replacement cost of building.
Collapse
Building fails completely. Repair not feasible.
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Discrete
damage
level
5
6.3
Brief
Full description
description
Annihilation
Occupant survival is not possible.
Fire & Toxic Hazard Modelling
Within the SHEPHERD fire and toxic model a number of user defined probabilities are required
which have an influence on the calculation of the individual risk contours. These are described in the
following sections. As well as these requirements, the model also requires results from the
consequence assessment e.g. mass flow rate, LFL distance and distance to 1% fatalities due to
exposure to a toxic substance.
6.3.1
Fatality Probabilities
The fatality probabilities used for a person located outside are listed in Table 9.
Table 9- Fatality Probabilities from Exposure to Fires and Toxins
Consequence
Fatality Probability
2
Flame engulfment (>50kW/m )
Thermal radiation (>10kW/m )

Toxic Gas
0.7
Based on probit functions published in the
TNO Purple Book (CPR18).
1.9
H2S Probit = -11.5+ln(C t) where t is the

exposure time in minutes set at 30 min and C
3
is the calculated concentration in mg/m .
It is highlighted that the fatality risk from exposure to the effects of fires and toxics will be different
for people depending on the location of the person from the hazard and if they are inside or outside a
building, due to the protection afforded by the building, i.e. lower hazard frequency within the
building. For instance anyone outdoors caught within a flash fire (the LFL envelope) would be killed
(i.e. fatality probability of 1), but if adequately protected from the flames indoors may not be.
6.3.2
Ignition Probabilities
The immediate ignition probabilities adopted in this assessment were derived from Cox Lees and
Ang Classification of Hazardous Locations [9] who have related the probability of ignition of
release of flammable material and discharge rate. These probabilities are those given in Table 10.
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Table 10 Immediate Ignition Probabilities

Probability of Ignition
Leak Rate (kg/s)
Gas
Liquid
<1
0.01
0.01
1 50
0.07
0.03
>50
0.30
0.08
A site background ignition probability of 1E-4/m2 of the facility was adopted for this assessment, in
order to address the potential for delayed ignition with the fire modelling. For the offsite urban
location a probability of ignition of 0.25E-4/m2 as suggested by the UKHSE has been adopted. The
additional ignition probability for the road to the south of the site is based on the traffic conditions
assuming that a vehicle represents a probability of ignition of 0.1.
For explosion modelling, the exceedance module has been used which requires a delayed ignition
probability to be specified. The delayed ignition probability used for explosion modelling is given in
Table 11.
Table 11 Delayed Ignition Probabilities
Probability of Ignition
Leak Rate (kg/s)
6.3.3
Gas
Liquid
<1
0.0004
0.0004
1 50
0.008
0.0036
>50
0.09
0.024
Building Protection Features
People located inside buildings will be protected to some extend from external hazards depending on
the type of building construction. These building protection levels are used to modify the probability
of fatality and are explained in Table 12.
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Table 12 - Levels of Building Protection against Fire & Toxic Hazards

Protection
Level of protection used
Description
for all buildings

0% (Building Types B1)
Combustible Gas
Protection (%)
This is the effectiveness (%) of the

protection provided against the ingress
of combustible gas.
50% (Building Types

B2,B3,B4,B6+)
90% (Building Type B5)

Flame Protection
protection provided against jet flame

impingement.
90% (Building Types

B2,B3,B4,B6+)

Flux Protection
protection
provided
against
thermal
radiation.
90% (Building Types

B2,B3,B4,B6+)
0 ACPH (Building Types
To estimate the toxic gas concentration
B1)
within a building the number of air

Toxic Gas Protection
changes per hour is required.
This
concentration is used in the probability
2 ACPH (Building Types

B2,B3,B4,B6+)
equation to estimate the fatalities due to

toxic gas exposure
2 ACPH (Building Type

B5)
6.3.4
Fire Resistance of Buildings
Impairment of structural integrity is defined as loss of ability to support the buildings and facilities.
This may be due to loss of stability or structural failure due to fire or explosion.
Accordingly, loss of integrity within one hour of the following is considered:
Structural integrity, including the supporting structure,
Life support integrity, including prevention and mitigation of smoke and gas ingress, and
Command support integrity.
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Table 13 provides details of design limits for various types of structure and plant.
Table 13 - Thermal Radiation Limits for Structures and Plant
Thermal Radiation Intensity
Thermal Limit
(kW/m )
37.5
25
18-20
15.6
6.3.5
Intensity at which damage is caused to process equipment and

tanks
Intensity at which non-piloted ignition of wood occurs
Intensity at which cable insulation degrades
Intensity at which operators are unlikely to be performing and
where shelter is unavailable.
14
Intensity which normal buildings should be design to withstand
12
Intensity at which plastics may begin to melt
Boiling Liquid Expanding Vapour Explosion (BLEVE) Scenario
The failure time for the pressurised liquid gas vessel such as product spheres from flame
impingement resulting in a BLEVE was taken as 10 minutes, which is considered to be accepted
practice within the industry.
6.4
Risk Acceptance Criteria
The purpose of risk assessment is to aid decision making and in order to do this some form of criteria
is required. In many cases risk assessment is used for comparative purposes or to identify areas or
scenarios that present the greatest risk so that risk reduction can be carried out in a sensible and cost
effective way. The use of risk assessment, however, must be performed with care, because of the
uncertainties inherent in the assessment. Furthermore there is no clear consensus with respect to the
values of tolerable or unacceptable risks, as this varies between organisations and countries.
The parameter used as a measure of risk in this study is the Individual Risk (IR).
6.4.1
Individual Risks
Individual risks involve the definition of the following elements:
An upper risk level, beyond which risks are deemed unacceptable;
A lower risk level, below which risks are deemed not to warrant concern; and
An intermediate region between the upper and lower levels where risk reduction measures are
required to achieve a level deemed to be As Low As Reasonably Practicable (ALARP).
The ALARP risk review process is illustrated in Figure 15.
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INTOLERABLE
LEVEL
UNACCEPTABLE
REGION
(Risk cannot be justified save
in extraordinary circumstances)
Tolerable only if risk reduction is

impracticable or if its cost is
grossly disproportionate to the
improvement gained
ALARP
REGION
Benchmark representing
the standard to be met
by new plant
(Risk is undertaken only if a

benefit is desired)
Tolerable if cost of
reduction would exceed
the improvement gained
BROADLY
ACCEPTABLE
REGION
Necessary to maintain assurance

that risk remains at this level
(No need for detailed working

to demonstrate ALARP)
NEGLIGIBLE RISK
Figure 15 - Levels of Risk and ALARP

This assessment uses the following framework as agreed with FWEL:
For Industrial workers
>10-3/year - Level at which mitigation of risk is required,
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>10-3/year but <10-5/year - Level at which risk reduction should be considered

(i.e. ALARP region),
<10-5/year - Level at which further risk reduction need not be considered.
For general population
>10-4/year - Level at which mitigation of risk is required,
>10-4/year but <10-6/year - Level at which risk reduction should be considered

(i.e. ALARP region),
<10-6/year - Level at which further risk reduction need not be considered

6.5
Evaluation of Building Risks
6.5.1
Explosion Risks
The flammable gas frequency for the site is shown in Figure 16 and Figure 17. Figure 18 to Figure
21 show the frequency of exceeding an overpressure of 100 mbar and 30 mbar respectively.
The explosion risk to the workers is dependent on the protection afforded by various building as is
thus dependent on building types. Figure 22 and Figure 23, Figure 24 and Figure 25, Figure 26 and
Figure 27 show the explosion risks to building types B2, B4 and B5 respectively.
All the occupied buildings at this site are shown to have very low explosion risk. Table 14
summarizes the over-pressure and anticipated damage from a 10-4 per year explosion scenario.
Table 14- Summary Explosion Damage for the 10-4/yr Hazard
Building
Number
Building Name
Building
10-4 Peak
classification
Overpressure
(B1-B7)
(psi)
Explosion
Damage (10-4)
B4
0.2
Minor, Level 1
Canteen No1
B4
0.2
Minor, Level 1
Medical Center
B4
0.2
Minor, Level 1
Main Guard House
B4
0.2
Minor, Level 1
B5
0.3
Minor, Level 1
Laboratory
B4
0.2
Minor, Level 1
B2
0.3
Minor, Level 1
Warehouse
B2
0.2
Minor, Level 1
12
Canteen No2
B4
0.2
Minor, Level 1
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Building
Building Name
Number
Building
10-4 Peak
classification
Overpressure
(B1-B7)
(psi)
Explosion
Damage (10-4)
13
Fire Station
B4
0.2
Minor, Level 1
14
Main Substation
B5
0.4
Minor, Level 1
15
Emergency Generator
B5
0.4
Minor, Level 1
18
SS- U04
B4
0.3
Minor, Level 1
19
SS-O04
B4
0.2
Minor, Level 1
20
SS- U01
B4
0.4
Minor, Level 1
21
SS- P09
B4
1.0
Minor, Level 1
22
SS- P07
B4
1.1
Minor, Level 1
23
SS-P02
B4
1.1
Minor, Level 1
24
SS-P06
B4
0.7
Minor, Level 1
25
SS- P03
B4
0.9
Minor, Level 1
26
SS- P04
B4
3.5
Minor, Level 1
27
SS- P01
B4
0.5
Minor, Level 1
28
SS- P08
B4
0.5
Minor, Level 1
30
SS-P05
B4
0.8
Minor, Level 1
31
SS-U03
B4
0.6
Minor, Level 1
32
SS-O03
B4
0.3
Minor, Level 1
33
SS-U02
B4
0.0
Minor, Level 1
34
SS-O01
B4
0.1
Minor, Level 1
36
ISB-014
B5
0.3
Minor, Level 1
37
ISB-013
B5
0.4
Minor, Level 1
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Building
Building Name
Number
Building
10-4 Peak
classification
Overpressure
(B1-B7)
(psi)
Explosion
Damage (10-4)
38
ISB-03
B5
0.9
Minor, Level 1
39
ISB-011
B5
0.9
Minor, Level 1
40
ISB-06
B5
1.5
Minor, Level 1
41
ISB-05
B5
0.8
Minor, Level 1
42
ISB-04
B5
0.8
Minor, Level 1
43
ISB-02
B5
1.7
Minor, Level 1
44
ISB-12
B5
0.5
Minor, Level 1
45
ISB-01
B5
0.5
Minor, Level 1
46
ISB-10
B5
0.5
Minor, Level 1
48
ISB-08
B5
0.6
Minor, Level 1
49
ISB-07
B5
0.8
Minor, Level 1
50
ISB-18
B5
0.6
Minor, Level 1
51
ISB-17
B5
0.2
Minor, Level 1
52
ISB-15
B5
0.1
Minor, Level 1
53
ISB-16
B5
0.3
Minor, Level 1
54
ISB-19
B5
0.0
Minor, Level 1
56
B4
0.0
Minor, Level 1
60
B5
0.0
Minor, Level 1
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Figure 16 Flammable Gas Frequency across the Main Plant
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Figure 17 Flammable Gas Frequency across the Jetty Area
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Figure 18 - Frequency of Overpressure Exceeding 100 mbar Main Plant
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Figure 19 - Frequency of Overpressure Exceeding 100 mbar Jetty Area
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Figure 20 - Frequency of Overpressure Exceeding 30 mbar Main Plant
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Figure 21 - Frequency of Overpressure Exceeding 30 mbar Jetty Area
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Figure 22 - Explosion Risk Plot for Building Type B2 Main Plant
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Figure 23 - Explosion Risk Plot for Building Type B2 Jetty Area
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6.5.2
Fire Risk
The frequency of cloud fire, frequency contour plots for heat flux exceeding 15kW/m2 and BLEVE
frequency plots are shown in Figure 28, Figure 29, Figure 30, Figure 31 and Figure 32 respectively.
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Figure 28 - Cloud Fire Frequency Contour Plot Main Plant
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Figure 29 - Cloud Fire Frequency Contour Plot Jetty Area
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Figure 30 - Frequency Contour Plot for Heat Flux above 15kW/m2 Main Plant
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Figure 31 - Frequency Contour Plot for Heat Flux above 15kW/m2 Jetty Area
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Figure 32 BLEVE Risk Plot
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The Individual Risk (IR) from fire for the most exposed person within the occupied buildings was
found to be negligible. This is based on the building being type B2.
Table 15 summarises the frequency of exceeding heat flux of 15kW/m2 at various buildings.
Table 15 Frequency of 15kW/m2 at buildings
Building
Building Name
Number
Freq of 15
kW/m
Negligible
Canteen No1
Negligible
Medical Center
Negligible
Main Guard House
Negligible
Negligible
Laboratory
Negligible
Negligible
Warehouse
Negligible
12
Canteen No2
Negligible
13
Fire Station
Negligible
14
Negligible
15
Emergency Generator
Negligible
18
SS- U04
Negligible
19
SS - O04
Negligible
20
SS- U01
Negligible
21
SS- P09
3.27E-03
22
SS- P07
2.92E-03
23
SS-P02
1.45E-04
24
SS-P06
2.67E-03
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Issue 4
Building
Building Name
Number
Freq of 15
kW/m
25
SS- P03
2.83E-03
26
SS- P04
2.65E-02
27
SS- P01
1.01E-02
28
SS- P08
5.73E-03
30
SS-P05
1.52E-02
31
SS-U03
1.92E-06
32
SS-O03
5.42E-04
33
SS-U02
1.08E-03
34
SS-O01
Negligible
36
ISB-014
Negligible
37
ISB-013
1.72E-06
38
ISB-03
3.38E-03
39
ISB-011
9.62E-04
40
ISB-06
3.47E-03
41
ISB-05
1.99E-04
42
ISB-04
1.99E-04
43
ISB-02
8.23E-03
44
ISB-12
3.62E-06
45
ISB-01
1.01E-02
46
ISB-10
1.10E-03
48
ISB-08
2.98E-03
49
ISB-07
8.27E-03
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Issue 4
Building
Building Name
Number
Freq of 15
kW/m
50
ISB-18
3.26E-05
51
ISB-17
1.31E-05
52
ISB-15
Negligible
53
ISB-16
Negligible
54
ISB-19
1.45E-06
56
60
Local Guardhouse No2 (Jetty

Area)
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Negligible
Negligible

Issue 4
7
7.1
RISK ASSESSMENT
On Site Risk
This section compares the risks calculated in Section 6 with the acceptance criteria.
Table 16 summarises the occupancy risk for each building on the site and compares it against the
acceptance criteria defined in Section 6.4. It is highlighted that Table 16 includes the risk
contributions for explosion and fire scenarios in order to provide the total risk to particular building
occupants. It is noted that toxic risks for the building occupants at the site are not included in
accordance with the scope of this work.
All the occupied buildings are considered to be exposed to negligible risk from fire and explosion
events. Detailed recommendations for mitigations for each building considered within the assessment
are provided in Section 8 of this report.
Table 16 - Summary Occupancy Risk Values
Building
Number
Building
Building Name
classification
Tolerability
(B1-B7)
B4
Acceptable
Canteen No1
B4
Acceptable
Medical Center
B4
Acceptable
Main Guard House
B4
Acceptable
B5
Acceptable
Laboratory
B4
Acceptable
B2
Acceptable
Warehouse
B2
Acceptable
10
Central Chemical Store
B2
Acceptable
11
Central Catalyst Store
B2
Acceptable
12
Canteen No2
B4
Acceptable
13
Fire Station
B4
Acceptable
55
Local Guardhouse No1
B4
Acceptable
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Issue 4
Building
Building
Building Name
Number
56
Tolerability
(B1-B7)
Jetty Area Admin/Control
60
classification
Building
Page 80 of 96
B4
B5
Acceptable
Acceptable
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Issue 4
Table 17 Overall Risk to Functionally Significant Buildings

Building
Building Name
Number
Type
Frequency For
Cloud Fire
Damage > 2B
Frequency
Frequency of flux
Overall
greater than 15
Frequency of
kW/m2
Damage
Overall Risk
26
SS- P04
B4
Negligible
2.06E-03
2.65E-02
2.86E-02
Mitigate
30
SS-P05
B4
Negligible
2.72E-03
1.52E-02
1.79E-02
Mitigate
47
ISB-09
B5
2.90E-06
8.84E-03
8.84E-03
1.77E-02
Mitigate
45
ISB-01
B5
1.00E-06
5.38E-03
1.01E-02
1.55E-02
Mitigate
27
SS- P01
B4
Negligible
5.38E-03
1.01E-02
1.55E-02
Mitigate
49
ISB-07
B5
Negligible
2.57E-03
8.27E-03
1.08E-02
Mitigate
43
ISB-02
B5
Negligible
2.06E-03
8.23E-03
1.03E-02
Mitigate
28
SS- P08
B4
2.00E-05
1.12E-04
5.73E-03
5.86E-03
Mitigate
40
ISB-06
B5
Negligible
2.36E-03
3.47E-03
5.83E-03
Mitigate
21
SS- P09
B4
5.00E-06
1.22E-03
3.27E-03
4.50E-03
Mitigate
24
SS-P06
B4
Negligible
1.54E-03
2.67E-03
4.21E-03
Mitigate
48
ISB-08
B5
Negligible
1.03E-03
2.98E-03
4.01E-03
Mitigate
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Building
Building Name
Number
Type
Frequency For
Cloud Fire
Damage > 2B
Frequency
Frequency of flux
Overall
greater than 15
Frequency of
kW/m
Overall Risk
Damage
38
ISB-03
B5
Negligible
5.15E-04
3.38E-03
3.90E-03
Mitigate
22
SS- P07
B4
2.50E-06
5.15E-04
2.92E-03
3.44E-03
Mitigate
25
SS- P03
B4
Negligible
8.40E-05
2.83E-03
2.91E-03
Mitigate
39
ISB-011
B5
Negligible
1.76E-03
9.62E-04
2.72E-03
Mitigate
33
SS-U02
B4
Negligible
8.22E-04
1.08E-03
1.90E-03
Mitigate
46
ISB-10
B5
1.80E-05
1.03E-04
1.10E-03
1.22E-03
Mitigate
32
SS-O03
B4
Negligible
2.84E-07
5.42E-04
5.42E-04
ALARP
41
ISB-05
B5
Negligible
1.52E-04
1.99E-04
3.51E-04
ALARP
42
ISB-04
B5
Negligible
1.52E-04
1.99E-04
3.51E-04
ALARP
23
SS-P02
B4
2.00E-05
8.66E-05
1.45E-04
2.52E-04
ALARP
44
ISB-12
B5
Negligible
1.31E-04
3.62E-06
1.35E-04
ALARP
50
ISB-18
B5
Negligible
2.68E-05
3.26E-05
5.94E-05
ALARP
51
ISB-17
B5
Negligible
2.31E-05
1.31E-05
3.62E-05
ALARP
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Building
Building Name
Number
Type
Frequency For
Cloud Fire
Damage > 2B
Frequency
Frequency of flux
Overall
greater than 15
Frequency of
kW/m
Overall Risk
Damage
54
ISB-19
B5
Negligible
1.46E-05
1.45E-06
1.61E-05
ALARP
20
SS- U01
B4
1.30E-05
1.27E-06
3.60E-07
1.46E-05
ALARP
37
ISB-013
B5
Negligible
5.04E-06
1.72E-06
6.76E-06
Acceptable
31
SS-U03
B4
Negligible
3.49E-06
1.92E-06
5.41E-06
Acceptable
19
SS-O04
B4
2.50E-06
Negligible
Negligible
2.50E-06
Acceptable
14
B5
Negligible
1.27E-06
Negligible
1.27E-06
Acceptable
15
Emergency Generator
B5
Negligible
1.27E-06
Negligible
1.27E-06
Acceptable
36
ISB-014
B5
1.00E-06
Negligible
Negligible
1.00E-06
Acceptable
53
ISB-16
B5
Negligible
1.54E-08
1.87E-07
2.02E-07
Acceptable
B4
Negligible
Negligible
Negligible
Negligible
Acceptable
Canteen No1
B4
Negligible
Negligible
Negligible
Negligible
Acceptable
Medical Center
B4
Negligible
Negligible
Negligible
Negligible
Acceptable
Main Guard House
B4
Negligible
Negligible
Negligible
Negligible
Acceptable
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Building
Building Name
Number
Type
Frequency For
Cloud Fire
Damage > 2B
Frequency
Frequency of flux
Overall
greater than 15
Frequency of
kW/m
Overall Risk
Damage
B5
Negligible
Negligible
Negligible
Negligible
Acceptable
12
Canteen No2
B4
Negligible
Negligible
Negligible
Negligible
Acceptable
13
Fire Station
B4
Negligible
Negligible
Negligible
Negligible
Acceptable
18
SS- U04
B4
Negligible
Negligible
Negligible
Negligible
Acceptable
34
SS-O01
B4
Negligible
Negligible
Negligible
Negligible
Acceptable
52
ISB-15
B5
Negligible
Negligible
Negligible
Negligible
Acceptable
56
B4
Negligible
Negligible
Negligible
Negligible
Acceptable
60
B5
Negligible
Negligible
Negligible
Negligible
Acceptable
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7.2
Off-site Risk
7.2.1
Villages to the East of the site
7.2.1.1 Societal Risk

The societal risks are presented in the form of an F-N Curve in Figure 33. The villages are
considered to have approximately 320 dwellings with 5 people each on average. The construction of
the dwellings is assumed to be basic, affording little protection from fire or toxic gas ingress. The FN curve shows that the societal risks to the villages from the NSRP are unacceptable.
Figure 33 F-N Curve (Villagers only)

Note:
The risk levels in the F-N curve are represented as follow (See Section 6.4.2)
Red Region: Unacceptable;
Yellow & Green Region: Acceptable according to UK HSE document R2P2 definition [12];
Green Region: A conservative acceptability criteria used by some companies.
R2P2 states that death of more than 50 people in any incident should be less than 1 in 5000 years.
The F-N curve is constructed by using a slope of -1 from FN pair of 2x10-4, 50 and Nmax of 1000
[12]. The line is represented by the interface between the RED and YELLOW regions of Figure 33,
implying that values within the RED region are unacceptable.
7.2.1.2 Individual Risk
The Location Specific Individual Risk (LSIR) is shown in Figure 34 and Figure 35. The maximum
location specific individual risk (LSIR) at the villages is 5.42x10-3/year. LSIR represents an
individual risk (IR) to an individual who remains at the location at all the time. Considering that the
individual could move to different location from high risk to low risk, an occupancy ratio of 0.5 is
appropriate thus giving an individual risk (IR) of 2.71E-3 per year. This level of risk is considered
unacceptable (>1E-4 is unacceptable for general public). Even if the occupancy ratio is taken as 0.1,
i.e. an individual is only in the high risk area for less than 2.5 hours per day, the risks are still
unacceptable.
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It may therefore be concluded that the risk to the villages is unacceptable both from individual risk
and societal risk perspectives.
7.2.2
Road to the South of the site
7.2.2.1 Individual Risk

The Location Specific Individual Risk (LSIR) for the road is shown in Figure 34. The results show
that the maximum LSIR at the road area is 1.88x10-3/year. The occupancy ratio considered for the
road is 0.006 based on the traffic moving at 60 km/hour and any one individual travelling twice a
day, six days per week across the site on this road. Therefore, the maximum individual risk at the
road is 1.13x10-5/year which corresponds to the ALARP region based on the risk tolerability criteria
in Section 6.4. This implies that mitigation measures should be considered to reduce risks as long as
the cost of such measures is not disproportionate to the benefit.
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Figure 34 Total Fire and Explosion Risk Contour Level Main Plant
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Figure 35 Total Fire and Explosion Risk Contour Level Jetty Area
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CONCLUSIONS & RECOMMENDATIONS
8.1
Buildings at the site
The results from this coarse QRA indicate that there are a number of buildings at the site that require
risk reduction measures. This includes 18 buildings where risk mitigation must be undertaken and
10 buildings where risk mitigation should be considered, and implemented as necessary, in order to
demonstrate that the buildings risk status is ALARP. Total fire and explosion risk contour level
The focus of the Risk mitigation is to reduce the likelihood and/or consequences of explosions/Fire
on the site.
Based on this analysis, the following Table 18 provides a summary of recommendations for
refinement of the risk predicted for an area/building or for mitigation of its risk. The
recommendations are presented as General, Explosion and Fire.
Even though the explosion risk at NSRP is low, it is recommended that best industrial practice
should be used and building classification not be downgraded based on the results of this risk
assessment.
Furthermore, a detailed QRA must be undertaken once detailed plant design is in place to confirm or
update the explosion risks in particular which are sensitive to plant congestion but also other risks
which are based on the early plant information. At the detailed QRA stage, it may be possible to take
account of various mitigations in place such as the water deluge, shutdown and blowdown and risk
based inspection and maintenance and regular fugitive emission testing.
Table 18 Recommendations
Ref. No.
Description of Recommendations Options
General Recommendations
Reduce Event Likelihood
L1
Ensure that the design specifications for all plant include performance standards such that plant
failure, and thus hydrocarbon release scenarios, will be minimized through design.
L2
Reduce the hazard magnitude through the installation of gas (toxic and flammable) detectors
with emergency shutdown (ESD) systems within the critical hazard locations. Emergency
shutdown valves to be located outside fire impact zone. If the valve is located inside a
fire/explosion zone then fire proofing is necessary to provide protection for a specified period of
time in line with API 2001.
L3
Minimize the presence of ignition sources around the process units
L4
Where possible, consider leak point minimization for all equipment (e.g. welded, rather than
flanged pipe connections, fail safe valves, spring loaded manual valves, flange covers)
L5
Implement a risk-based inspection (RBI) and maintenance process such that the plant items
that pose the greatest risk to the plant receive the greatest levels of inspection and maintenance
L6
Since there is a risk of an event moving onto the public highway, provisions will need to be in
place to prevent traffic movement on the highway in the event of a site incident.
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Issue 4
Ref. No.
L7
Toxic and vapour cloud events, generally leave the site periphery it is suggested that a plan will
need to be in place to alert the populations to either end of the plant limit in the event of a site
incident. Such measures will form part of the Site Emergency Response Plan which is to be
detailed during the Detailed design.
Emergency procedures should be put in place and followed if a leak is detected. Good
procedures and training for emergency response are essential.
Reduce Vulnerability
V1
Reduce the vulnerability of the building occupants through the avoidance of windows within
buildings located within the process areas.
V2
Reduce the vulnerability of the building occupants to toxic ingress through the implementation of
toxic gas detection and dampers on the HVAC inlet ducts for putting into recycle as well as
manual shutdown.
Explosion Recommendations
V3
Reduce the vulnerability through relocation of road, provide a barrier between road and plant
(not always effective for blast but prevents missiles) and reduce congestion near the site
boundary.
V4
For buildings with cloud fire frequency >1E-4 p.a., positive pressurisation and double doors
should be provided in the building. LEL detection should also be incorporated into the ventilation
inlets & automatically shutdown the ventilation system providing alarms on LEL detection
V5
For buildings with cloud fire frequency between 1E-4 & 1E-5 p.a. self-closing doors with gas
tight seals should be provided in addition to LEL detection in the ventilation inlets providing
automatic shutdown of the ventilation system and alarms on LEL detection (See Table 28 and
Table 29).
V6
For Buildings with cloud fire frequency between 1E-5 & 1E-6 p.a., self-closing doors with gas
tight seals and LEL monitors alarms and manual HVAC shutdown should be provided.
V7
Buildings should be designed to withstand the 10-4/yr explosion overpressure as a minimum
Fire Recommendations
V8
Reduce the vulnerability of the buildings to flammable gas ingress through the implementation
of flammable gas detection and dampers on the HVAC inlet ducts, self-closing doors with gas
tight seals and LEL monitors, alarms and manual HVAC shutdown should be provided. As given
for explosion
V9
Reduce risk to building occupants from fire by ensuring building has safe refuge areas in case
of fire and /or the building has adequate fire proofing.
V10
Reduce BLEVE risk by insulating vessels, improve depressurisation and vessel deluge.
Depressurized the leaking section using blowdown system.
Toxic Recommendations
Page 90 of 96

Issue 4
Ref. No.
T1
The ERPG contours are based on gas dispersion modeling for free field flat terrain. Simple
consequence assessment models used in QRA are not appropriate for dealing with complex
terrain especially for near field effects. It is recommended that a Computational Fluid Dynamics
based H2S dispersion study should be undertaken in the detailed phase of the design to
ascertain the toxic risks and if there are any specific areas where high H2S concentrations
might develop due to the presence of the mountain to the west of the site.
Based on the mitigation options detailed in Table 18, recommendations in respect of explosion risk
for each functional but considered unoccupied building were assessed are provided in Table 19.
Table 19 Recommendations Functional Significant Buildings
Building
Cloud
LEL
Fire Risk
Detection
Manual
Automatic
HVAC
HVAC
Shutdown
Shutdown
Positive
Pressurisation
in building and
double doors
Self Closing
Doors with gas
tight seals
ISB-09
8.84E-03
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
No
SS- P01
5.38E-03
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
No
ISB-01
5.38E-03
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
No
SS-P05
2.72E-03
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
No
ISB-07
2.57E-03
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
No
ISB-06
2.36E-03
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
No
SS- P04
2.06E-03
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
No
ISB-02
2.06E-03
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
No
ISB-011
1.76E-03
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
No
SS-P06
1.54E-03
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
No
SS- P09
1.22E-03
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
No
ISB-08
1.03E-03
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
No
SS-U02
8.22E-04
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
No
SS- P07
5.15E-04
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
No
ISB-03
5.15E-04
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
No
Page 91 of 96

Issue 4
Building
Cloud
LEL
Fire Risk
Detection
Manual
Automatic
HVAC
HVAC
Shutdown
Shutdown
Positive
Pressurisation
in building and
double doors
Self Closing
Doors with gas
tight seals
ISB-05
1.52E-04
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
No
ISB-04
1.52E-04
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
No
ISB-12
1.31E-04
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
No
SS- P08
1.12E-04
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
No
ISB-10
1.03E-04
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
No
SS-P02
8.66E-05
Yes
No
Yes
No
Yes
SS- P03
8.40E-05
Yes
No
Yes
No
Yes
ISB-18
2.68E-05
Yes
No
Yes
No
Yes
ISB-17
2.31E-05
Yes
No
Yes
No
Yes
ISB-19
1.46E-05
Yes
No
Yes
No
Yes
ISB-013
5.04E-06
Yes
No
Yes
No
Yes
SS-U03
3.49E-06
Yes
No
Yes
No
Yes
1.27E-06
Yes
No
Yes
No
Yes
Generator
1.27E-06
Yes
No
Yes
No
Yes
SS- U01
1.27E-06
Yes
No
Yes
No
Yes
SS-O03
2.84E-07
No
Yes
No
No
Yes
ISB-16
1.54E-08
No
Yes
No
No
Yes
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
Main Substation
SS-M01
Emergency
Administration
Building
Canteen No1
Negligible
Negligible
Page 92 of 96

Issue 4
Building
Medical Center
Automatic
HVAC
HVAC
Shutdown
Shutdown
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
Cloud
LEL
Fire Risk
Detection
Negligible
Positive
Manual
Pressurisation
in building and
double doors
Self Closing
Doors with gas
tight seals
Main Guard
House
Negligible
Central Control
Room
Negligible
Canteen No2
Fire Station
SS- U04
SS-O04
Negligible
Negligible
Negligible
Negligible
SS-O01
Negligible
ISB-014
ISB-15
Negligible
Negligible
Jetty Area
Guard House
Negligible
Jetty Area
Admin/Control
Building
8.2
8.2.1
Negligible
Off-site Population
Villages to the East of the site
The risk to the villages, both in terms of individual and societal are unacceptable. Assuming that the
site location has been decided, the risk from the NSRP site to the villages are such that reasonable
measures of reducing risks to an acceptable level could be impractical. The Societal risks can be
reduced by reducing the population and reducing the frequency and magnitude of hazards from the
site. However, the risk assessment here does not take account of the fact that the villages are in
wooded area which is susceptible to fire escalation. In light of this, re-location of the villages to a
safer place should be given serious consideration.
Page 93 of 96

Issue 4
8.2.2
Road to the South of the plant
Although the risks to the road users for Bidder 1 option are lower than the FEED study case, the
road is nonetheless too close to the Plant boundary. It is prudent to keep the option of a barrier
between the Plant and the road as well as traffic control measures. The recommendations to reduce
risks to the road users are as follows in Table 20.
Table 20 Recommendations vulnerability
Ref. No.
Reduce Vulnerability to Offsite Road to the South
VR1
Reduce the vulnerability by adding a barrier along the high risk part of the plant boundary
between the plant and the road to the south to prevent direct fire impingement and to reduce
heat flux.
VR2
Reduce risk to road users by early warning on leak and closure of access.
It is proposed that a 500m long, 6m high concrete wall designed to withstand 30 mbar side-on
overpressure as shown on Figure 36, together with the traffic control measures should provide
practical mitigation solution.
Control barriers/stop
lights
Concrete Wall 500m (6m high to

withstand 30 mbar overpressure)
Figure 36 Proposed concrete wall and traffic warning/control
Page 94 of 96
Control barriers/stop
lights
Report N . 2514054 R01

Issue 4
UNCERTAINTY IN QRA
There will always be uncertainty as to whether certain events will occur or not, what the immediate
effects will be, and what the consequences for people, environment, or assets may be. This
uncertainty reflects the insufficient information and knowledge available for the analysis, in relation
to technical solutions, operations, and maintenance philosophies, logistic premises etc [13].
Uncertainties in the QRA will derive from the following examples:
Since the design is at FEED stage, the level of detail in the system drawings necessitates the
use of assumptions in terms of the equipment types and volumes.
The distribution of flanges, valves, connections, instruments and pipe sizes are assumed
based on work undertaken by Shell (default values in Shepherd) and are taken to be an
average reflection of the distribution that is to be expected. However, the actual distributions
may vary in the final design.
The consequence modelling of the release scenarios has made some simplifications in terms
of modelling the release of mixed fluids (e.g predominantly liquid material containing gases
that may flash). The analysis of this phenomenon is very complex and as such, the
consequence results for some scenarios are a best representation of the actual scenario.
The flow rates are taken conservatively as the instantaneous release rates. These rates could
be far in excess of the actual mass flow rates of materials through the process segments. This
is considered to be accepted methods of undertaking such studies since the results are on the
side of conservatism. However, if required, such conservatisms could be explored in detail if
considered necessary.
The explosion overpressures are derived from assumed congestion levels based on a simple
2D plant layout drawing and at the time of this assessment only were available for the RFCC,
ARC and HMU units. It is usual to visit the actual site to undertake such assessments of site
congestion. Clearly, this is not possible with a proposed plant; therefore, as the plant design
progresses, the explosion parameters should be re-visited.
A moderate damage to site buildings is assumed if thermal flux exceeds 15kW/m2. For
concrete or masonry infill buildings this is a conservative assumption. However this gives an
estimate as to which buildings should be considered to be at risk from fire and appropriate
insulation measures.
Page 95 of 96
Report N . 2514054 R01

Issue 4
10 REFERENCES
1. Management of hazards associated with location of process plant buildings, API
recommended practice 752, Second Edition, Nov. 2003.
2. HAZID-ENVID Review Report, 3550-8150-RP-0002 Rev.01, 01.05.2009, FWEL
3. FRED v 5.1 Technical manual, 2009.
4. SHEPHERD v2.1 Technical manual, 2009.
5. Refinery Design basis overall 3550-8110-PD-0005 Rev. 01, FWEL.
6. NSRP Refinery and Petrochemical Complex Plot plant, H-000-1225-501_5 REV 5,
FWEL.
7. NRSP Marine Facility Plot plant, 3550-8230-01-0002, FWEL.
8. Hydrocarbon Leak and Ignition Database, EP Forum Risk Assessment Data Directory, EP
Forum Report No. 11.8/250, E&P Forum, 1996.
9. Cox, A. W., Lees, F.W. and Ang M. Lm, Classification of Hazardous Locations,
IChemE, Rugby, England, 1990.
10. American Industrial Hygiene Association ERPG Table, 2008.
11. Frank P Lees, Loss Prevention in Process Industries, 2nd Edition, BH, 1996.
12. HSE, Reducing risks, protecting people - R2P2, 2001.
13. Nicolet-Monnier M. Gheorghe V. Andrian , Topics in Safety, Risk, Reliability and Quality
Quantitative Risk Assessment of Hazardous Material Transport Systems,. Kluwer
Academic Publishers, 1996.
14. NSRP Refinery and Petrochemical Complex Project Coarse QRA, Issue 4 FINAL, Report
No.2204898 R01, ABSC, Sep 2009
Page 96 of 96

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Appendix 2

NSRP Refinery and Petrochemical Complex Project

Report No. 2514054 R01

Report N . 2514054 R01

DOCUMENT APPROVAL SHEET

ABS Consulting Limited

Report N . 2514054 R01

DOCUMENT REVISION HISTORY

First Draft issue for client comment.

Updated Jetty Area and incorporated client comments from DRAFT.

Incorporated client comments from Issue 1

Incorporated client comments from Issue 2

Removed the future Jetty from the study.

Report N . 2514054 R01

Report N . 2514054 R01

Report N . 2514054 R01

ABS Consulting Ltd

Air Changes per Hour

As Low As Reasonably Practicable

Amine Regeneration Unit

Boiling Liquid Expanding Vapour Explosion

Building Risk Assessment

Congested area Assessment Methodology

Crude Distillation Unit

Concrete Masonry Units

Design, Operation, Maintenance

Emergency Response Planning Guidelines

Front End Engineering and Design

Foster Wheeler Energy Limited

Gas Oil Hydrodesulphuriser Unit

Hydrogen Compression and Distribution System

Hydrogen Manufacturing Unit

Heating, Ventilation and Air Conditioning

Individual Risk (or Incident Radiation)

Individual Risk Per Annum

Indirect Alkylation Units

Kuwait Export Crude

Kerosene Hydrodesulphuriser Unit

Lower Flammable Limit

Liquefied Petroleum Gas

Location Specific Individual Risk

Naphtha and Aromatics Complex

Nghi Son Refinery and Petrochemical

Preliminary Hazard Analysis

Piping and Instrumentation Diagram

Process Flow Diagram

Report N . 2514054 R01

Propylene Recovery Unit

Quantitative Risk Assessment

Residue Hydrodesulphuriser Unit

Residue Fluid Catalytic Cracker Unit

Reducing risks, protecting people

Sulphur Recovery Unit

Sour Water Stripper Units

Tail Gas Treating

Uninterrupted Power Supply

Safety Critical Elements

parts per million

Vapour Cloud Explosion

Report N . 2514054 R01

GENERAL METHODOLOGY .....................................................................................13

3.1 Plant Description ..................................................................................................................................................... 14

STAGE 1 ASSESSMENT ...........................................................................................19