G.R. No.

201363

March 18, 2013

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.
NAZARENO VILLAREAL y LUALHATI, Accused-Appellant.
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
This is an appeal from the May 25, 2011 Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R.
CR No. 31320 which affirmed in toto the December 11, 2007 Decision 2
of the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City, Branch 123 (RTC), convicting appellant
Nazareno Villareal y Lualhati (appellant) of violation of Section 11, Article II of Republic Act
No. 91653 (RA 9165) and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of imprisonment for twelve
(12) years and one (1) day to fourteen (14) years and eight (8) months and to pay a fine
of P300,000.00.
The Factual Antecedents
On December 25, 2006 at around 11:30 in the morning, as PO3 Renato de Leon (PO3 de
Leon) was driving his motorcycle on his way home along 5th Avenue, he saw appellant from
a distance of about 8 to 10 meters, holding and scrutinizing in his hand a plastic sachet of
shabu. Thus, PO3 de Leon, a member of the Station Anti-Illegal Drugs-Special Operation
Unit (SAID-SOU) in Caloocan City, alighted from his motorcycle and approached the
appellant whom he recognized as someone he had previously arrested for illegal drug
possession.4
Upon seeing PO3 de Leon, appellant tried to escape but was quickly apprehended with the
help of a tricycle driver. Despite appellants attempts to resist arrest, PO3 de Leon was able
to board appellant onto his motorcycle and confiscate the plastic sachet of shabu in his
possession. Thereafter, PO3 de Leon brought appellant to the 9th Avenue Police Station to
fix his handcuffs, and then they proceeded to the SAID-SOU office where PO3 de Leon
marked the seized plastic sachet with "RZL/NV 12-25-06," representing his and appellants
initials and the date of the arrest.5
Subsequently, PO3 de Leon turned over the marked evidence as well as the person of
appellant to the investigator, PO2 Randulfo Hipolito (PO2 Hipolito) who, in turn, executed an
acknowledgment receipt6 and prepared a letter request7 for the laboratory examination of
the seized substance. PO2 Hipolito personally delivered the request and the confiscated
item to the Philippine National Police (PNP) Crime Laboratory, which were received by
Police Senior Inspector Albert Arturo (PSI Arturo), the forensic chemist. 8

Upon qualitative examination, the plastic sachet, which contained 0.03 gram of white
crystalline substance, tested positive for methylamphetamine hydrochloride, a dangerous
drug.9
Consequently, appellant was charged with violation of Section 11, Article II of RA 9165 for
illegal possession of dangerous drugs in an Information 10 which reads:
That on or about the 25th day of December, 2006 in Caloocan City, Metro Manila and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, without being authorized
by law, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in his possession,
custody and control, METHYLAMPHETAMINE HYDROCHLORIDE (Shabu) weighing 0.03
gram which, when subjected to chemistry examination gave positive result of
METHYLAMPHETAMIME HYDROCHLORIDE, a dangerous drug.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
When arraigned, appellant, assisted by counsel de oficio, entered a plea of not guilty to the
offense charged.11
In his defense, appellant denied PO3 de Leons allegations and instead claimed that on the
date and time of the incident, he was walking alone along Avenida, Rizal headed towards
5th
Avenue when someone who was riding a motorcycle called him from behind. Appellant
approached the person, who turned out to be PO3 de Leon, who then told him not to run,
frisked him, and took his wallet which containedP1,000.00.12
Appellant was brought to the 9th Avenue police station where he was detained and mauled
by eight other detainees under the orders of PO3 de Leon. Subsequently, he was brought to
the Sangandaan Headquarters where two other police officers, whose names he recalled
were "Michelle" and "Hipolito," took him to the headquarters firing range. There, "Michelle"
and "Hipolito" forced him to answer questions about a stolen cellphone, firing a gun right
beside his ear each time he failed to answer and eventually mauling him when he continued
to deny knowledge about the cellphone.13 Thus, appellant sustained head injuries for which
he was brought to the Diosdado Macapagal Hospital for proper treatment. 14
The following day, he underwent inquest proceedings before one Fiscal Guiyab, who
informed him that he was being charged with resisting arrest and "Section 11." 15 The first
charge was eventually dismissed.
The RTC Ruling

After trial on the merits, the RTC convicted appellant as charged upon a finding that all the
elements of the crime of illegal possession of dangerous drugs have been established, to
wit: (1) the appellant is in possession of an item or object which is identified to be a
prohibited drug; (2) that such possession is not authorized by law; and (3) that the accused
freely and consciously possesses said drug. Finding no ill motive on the part of PO3 de
Leon to testify falsely against appellant, coupled with the fact that the former had previously
arrested the latter for illegal possession of drugs under Republic Act No. 6425 16 (RA 6425),
the RTC gave full faith and credit to PO3 de Leons testimony. Moreover, the RTC found the
plain view doctrine to be applicable, as the confiscated item was in plain view of PO3 de
Leon at the place and time of the arrest.
On the other hand, the RTC gave scant consideration to the defenses of denial and frameup proffered by the appellant, being uncorroborated, and in the light of the positive
assertions of PO3 de Leon. It refused to give credence to appellants claim that PO3 de
Leon robbed him of his money, since he failed to bring the incident to the attention of PO3
de Leons superiors or to institute any action against the latter.
Consequently, the RTC sentenced appellant to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of twelve
(12) years and one (1) day to fourteen (14) years and eight (8) months and to pay a fine
of P300,000.00.
The CA Ruling
In its assailed Decision, the CA sustained appellants conviction, finding "a clear case of in
flagrante delicto warrantless arrest"17 as provided under Section 5, Rule 113 of the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure. The CA held that appellant "exhibited an overt act or strange
conduct that would reasonably arouse suspicion," 18aggravated by the existence of his past
criminal citations and his attempt to flee when PO3 de Leon approached him.
Citing jurisprudence, the appellate court likewise ruled that the prosecution had adequately
shown the continuous and unbroken chain of custody of the seized item, from the time it
was confiscated from appellant by PO3 de Leon, marked at the police station, turned over
to PO2 Hipolito and delivered to the crime laboratory, where it was received by PSI Arturo,
the forensic chemist, up to the time it was presented in court for proper identification.
The Issue
The sole issue advanced before the Court for resolution is whether the CA erred in affirming
in toto the RTCs Decision convicting appellant of the offense charged.
The Ruling of the Court
The appeal is meritorious.

Section 5, Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure lays down the basic rules
on lawful warrantless arrests, either by a peace officer or a private person, as follows:
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. A peace officer or a private person may,
without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe
based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be
arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal
establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily confined
while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one
confinement to another.
xxx
For the warrantless arrest under paragraph (a) of Section 5 to operate, two elements must
concur: (1) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has just
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such overt act
is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer.19 On the other hand,
paragraph (b) of Section 5 requires for its application that at the time of the arrest, an
offense had in fact just been committed and the arresting officer had personal knowledge of
facts indicating that the appellant had committed it. 20
In both instances, the officers personal knowledge of the fact of the commission of an
offense is absolutely required. Under paragraph (a), the officer himself witnesses the crime
while under paragraph (b), he knows for a fact that a crime has just been committed.
In sustaining appellants conviction in this case, the appellate court ratiocinated that this
was a clear case of an "in flagrante delicto warrantless arrest" under paragraphs (a) and (b)
of Section 5, Rule 113 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, as above-quoted.
The Court disagrees.
A punctilious assessment of the factual backdrop of this case shows that there could have
been no lawful warrantless arrest. A portion of PO3 de Leons testimony on direct
examination in court is revelatory:
FISCAL LARIEGO: While you were there at 5th

Avenue, was there anything unusual that transpired?

PO3 DE LEON: Yes Maam.
Q: What was this incident?
A: While I was on board my motorcycle on my home, I saw a man looking at the shabu in
his hand, Maam.
Q: And exactly what time was this?
A: Around 11:30 in the morning, Maam.
Q: How far were you from this person that you said was verifying something in his hand?
A: Eight to ten meters, Maam.
Q: What exactly did you see he was verifying? A: The shabu that he was holding, Maam.
Q: After seeing what the man was doing, what did you do next?
A: I alighted from my motorcycle and approached him, Maam.
Q: In the first place why do you say that what he was examining and holding in his hand
was a shabu?
A: Because of the numerous arrests that I have done, they were all shabu,
Maam.21 (Underscoring supplied)
On the basis of the foregoing testimony, the Court finds it inconceivable how PO3 de Leon,
even with his presumably perfect vision, would be able to identify with reasonable accuracy,
from a distance of about 8 to 10 meters and while simultaneously driving a motorcycle, a
negligible and minuscule amount of powdery substance (0.03 gram) inside the plastic
sachet allegedly held by appellant. That he had previously effected numerous arrests, all
involving shabu, is insufficient to create a conclusion that what he purportedly saw in
appellants hands was indeed shabu.
Absent any other circumstance upon which to anchor a lawful arrest, no other overt act
could be properly attributed to appellant as to rouse suspicion in the mind of PO3 de Leon
that he (appellant) had just committed, was committing, or was about to commit a crime, for
the acts per se of walking along the street and examining something in ones hands cannot
in any way be considered criminal acts. In fact, even if appellant had been exhibiting
unusual or strange acts, or at the very least appeared suspicious, the same would not have

been sufficient in order for PO3 de Leon to effect a lawful warrantless arrest under
paragraph (a) of Section 5, Rule 113.
Neither has it been established that the rigorous conditions set forth in paragraph (b) of
Section 5, Rule 113 have been complied with, i.e., that an offense had in fact just been
committed and the arresting officer had personal knowledge of facts indicating that the
appellant had committed it.
The factual circumstances of the case failed to show that PO3 de Leon had personal
knowledge that a crime had been indisputably committed by the appellant. It is not enough
that PO3 de Leon had reasonable ground to believe that appellant had just committed a
crime; a crime must in fact have been committed first, which does not obtain in this case.
Without the overt act that would pin liability against appellant, it is therefore clear that PO3
de Leon was merely impelled to apprehend appellant on account of the latters previous
charge22 for the same offense. The CA stressed this point when it said:
It is common for drugs, being illegal in nature, to be concealed from view. PO3 Renato de
Leon saw appellant holding and scrutinizing a piece of plastic wrapper containing a white
powderly substance. PO3 Renato de Leon was quite familiar with appellant, having arrested
him twice before for the same illegal possession of drug. It was not just a hollow suspicion.
The third time around, PO3 de Leon had reasonably assumed that the piece of plastic
wrapper appellant was holding and scrutinizing also contained shabu as he had personal
knowledge of facts regarding appellants person and past criminal record. He would have
been irresponsible to just wait and see and give appellant a chance to scamper away. For
his part, appellant being, in fact, in possession of illegal drug, sensing trouble from an
equally familiar face of authority, ran away. Luckily, however, PO3 de Leon caught up with
him through the aid of a tricycle driver. Appellants act of running away, indeed, validated
PO3 de Leons reasonable suspicion that appellant was actually in possession of illegal
drug. x x x23
1wphi1

However, a previous arrest or existing criminal record, even for the same offense, will not
suffice to satisfy the exacting requirements provided under Section 5, Rule 113 in order to
justify a lawful warrantless arrest. "Personal knowledge" of the arresting officer that a crime
had in fact just been committed is required. To interpret "personal knowledge" as referring to
a persons reputation or past criminal citations would create a dangerous precedent and
unnecessarily stretch the authority and power of police officers to effect warrantless arrests
based solely on knowledge of a persons previous criminal infractions, rendering nugatory
the rigorous requisites laid out under Section 5.
It was therefore error on the part of the CA to rule on the validity of appellants arrest based
on "personal knowledge of facts regarding appellants person and past criminal record," as

this is unquestionably not what "personal knowledge" under the law contemplates, which
must be strictly construed.24
Furthermore, appellants act of darting away when PO3 de Leon approached him should not
be construed against him. Flight per se is not synonymous with guilt and must not always
be attributed to ones consciousness of guilt. 25 It is not a reliable indicator of guilt without
other circumstances,26 for even in high crime areas there are many innocent reasons for
flight, including fear of retribution for speaking to officers, unwillingness to appear as
witnesses, and fear of being wrongfully apprehended as a guilty party.27 Thus, appellants
attempt to run away from PO3 de Leon is susceptible of various explanations; it could easily
have meant guilt just as it could likewise signify innocence.
In fine, appellants acts of walking along the street and holding something in his hands,
even if they appeared to be dubious, coupled with his previous criminal charge for the same
offense, are not by themselves sufficient to incite suspicion of criminal activity or to create
probable cause enough to justify a warrantless arrest under Section 5 above-quoted.
"Probable cause" has been understood to mean a reasonable ground of suspicion
supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a cautious man's
belief that the person accused is guilty of the offense with which he is charged. 28 Specifically
with respect to arrests, it is such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably
discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed by the person
sought to be arrested,29 which clearly do not obtain in appellants case.
Thus, while it is true that the legality of an arrest depends upon the reasonable discretion of
the officer or functionary to whom the law at the moment leaves the decision to characterize
the nature of the act or deed of the person for the urgent purpose of suspending his
liberty,30 it cannot be arbitrarily or capriciously exercised without unduly compromising a
citizens constitutionally-guaranteed right to liberty. As the Court succinctly explained in the
case of People v. Tudtud:31
The right of a person to be secure against any unreasonable seizure of his body and any
deprivation of his liberty is a most basic and fundamental one. The statute or rule which
allows exceptions to the requirement of warrants of arrest is strictly construed. Any
exception must clearly fall within the situations when securing a warrant would be absurd or
is manifestly unnecessary as provided by the Rule. We cannot liberally construe the rule on
arrests without warrant or extend its application beyond the cases specifically provided by
law. To do so would infringe upon personal liberty and set back a basic right so often
violated and so deserving of full protection.
Consequently, there being no lawful warrantless arrest, the shabu purportedly seized from
appellant is rendered inadmissible in evidence for being the proverbial fruit of the poisonous
tree. As the confiscated shabu is the very corpus delicti of the crime charged, appellant
must be acquitted and exonerated from all criminal liability.

WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 31320 is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Appellant Nazareno Villareal y Lualhati is ACQUITTED on
reasonable doubt of the offense charged and ordered immediately released from detention,
unless his continued confinement is warranted by some other cause or ground.
SO ORDERED.
ESTELA M. PERLAS-B
G.R. No. 87059 June 22, 1992
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ROGELIO MENGOTE y TEJAS, accused-appellant.

CRUZ, J.:
Accused-appellant Rogelio Mengote was convicted of illegal possession of firearms on the
strength mainly of the stolen pistol found on his person at the moment of his warrantless
arrest. In this appeal, he pleads that the weapon was not admissible as evidence against
him because it had been illegally seized and was therefore the fruit of the poisonous tree.
The Government disagrees. It insists that the revolver was validly received in evidence by
the trial judge because its seizure was incidental to an arrest that was doubtless lawful even
if admittedly without warrant.
The incident occurred shortly before noon of August 8, 1987, after the Western Police
District received a telephone call from an informer that there were three suspicious-looking
persons at the corner of Juan Luna and North Bay Boulevard in Tondo, Manila. A
surveillance team of plainclothesmen was forthwith dispatched to the place. As later
narrated at the trial by Patrolmen Rolando Mercado and Alberto Juan, 1 they there saw two
men "looking from side to side," one of whom was holding his abdomen. They approached these persons
and identified themselves as policemen, whereupon the two tried to run away but were unable to escape
because the other lawmen had surrounded them. The suspects were then searched. One of them, who
turned out to be the accused-appellant, was found with a .38 caliber Smith and Wesson revolver with six
live bullets in the chamber. His companion, later identified as Nicanor Morellos, had a fan knife secreted
in his front right pants pocket. The weapons were taken from them. Mengote and Morellos were then
turned over to police headquarters for investigation by the Intelligence Division.

On August 11, 1987, the following information was filed against the accused-appellant
before the Regional Trial Court of Manila:

The undersigned accuses ROGELIO MENGOTE y TEJAS of a violation of

Presidential Decree No. 1866, committed as follows:
That on or about August 8, 1987, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said
accused did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and knowingly have in his
possession and under his custody and control a firearm, to wit:
one (1) cal. 38 "S & W" bearing
Serial No. 8720-T
without first having secured the necessary license or permit therefor from the
proper authorities.
Besides the police officers, one other witness presented by the prosecution was Rigoberto
Danganan, who identified the subject weapon as among the articles stolen from him during
the robbery in his house in Malabon on June 13, 1987. He pointed to Mengote as one of the
robbers. He had duly reported the robbery to the police, indicating the articles stolen from
him, including the revolver. 2 For his part, Mengote made no effort to prove that he owned the firearm
or that he was licensed to possess it and claimed instead that the weapon had been "Planted" on him at
the time of his arrest. 3

The gun, together with the live bullets and its holster, were offered as Exhibits A, B, and C
and admitted over the objection of the defense. As previously stated, the weapon was the
principal evidence that led to Mengote's conviction for violation of P.D. 1866. He was
sentenced to reclusion
perpetua. 4
It is submitted in the Appellant's Brief that the revolver should not have been admitted in
evidence because of its illegal seizure. no warrant therefor having been previously obtained.
Neither could it have been seized as an incident of a lawful arrest because the arrest of
Mengote was itself unlawful, having been also effected without a warrant. The defense also
contends that the testimony regarding the alleged robbery in Danganan's house was
irrelevant and should also have been disregarded by the trial court.
The following are the pertinent provision of the Bill of Rights:
Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature
and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of
arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by
the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and
the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be
searched and the persons or things to be seized.

Sec. 3 (1). The privacy of communication and correspondence shall be

inviolable except upon lawful order of the court, or when public safety or order
requires otherwise as prescribed by law.
(2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be
inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.
There is no question that evidence obtained as a result of an illegal search or seizure is
inadmissible in any proceeding for any purpose. That is the absolute prohibition of Article III,
Section 3(2), of the Constitution. This is the celebrated exclusionary rule based on the
justification given by Judge Learned Hand that "only in case the prosecution, which itself
controls the seizing officials, knows that it cannot profit by their wrong will the wrong be
repressed." The Solicitor General, while conceding the rule, maintains that it is not
applicable in the case at bar. His reason is that the arrest and search of Mengote and the
seizure of the revolver from him were lawful under Rule 113, Section 5, of the Rules of
Court reading as follows:
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant when lawful. A peace officer or private
person may, without a warrant, arrest a person;
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is
actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal
knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it;
and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a
penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or
temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being
transferred from one confinement to another.
In cases failing under paragraphs (a) and (b) hereof, the person arrested
without a warrant shall be forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or
jail, and he shall be proceeded against in accordance with Rule 112, Section
7.
We have carefully examined the wording of this Rule and cannot see how we can agree
with the prosecution.
Par. (c) of Section 5 is obviously inapplicable as Mengote was not an escapee from a penal
institution when he was arrested. We therefore confine ourselves to determining the
lawfulness of his arrest under either Par. (a) or Par. (b) of this section.

Par. (a) requires that the person be arrested (1) after he has committed or while he is
actually committing or is at least attempting to commit an offense, (2) in the presence of the
arresting officer.
These requirements have not been established in the case at bar. At the time of the arrest in
question, the accused-appellant was merely "looking from side to side" and "holding his
abdomen," according to the arresting officers themselves. There was apparently no offense
that had just been committed or was being actually committed or at least being attempted
by Mengote in their presence.
The Solicitor General submits that the actual existence of an offense was not necessary as
long as Mengote's acts "created a reasonable suspicion on the part of the arresting officers
and induced in them the belief that an offense had been committed and that the accusedappellant had committed it." The question is, What offense? What offense could possibly
have been suggested by a person "looking from side to side" and "holding his abdomen"
and in a place not exactly forsaken?
These are certainly not sinister acts. And the setting of the arrest made them less so, if at
all. It might have been different if Mengote bad been apprehended at an ungodly hour and
in a place where he had no reason to be, like a darkened alley at 3 o'clock in the morning.
But he was arrested at 11:30 in the morning and in a crowded street shortly after alighting
from a passenger jeep with I his companion. He was not skulking in the shadows but
walking in the clear light of day. There was nothing clandestine about his being on that
street at that busy hour in the blaze of the noonday sun.
On the other hand, there could have been a number of reasons, all of them innocent, why
his eyes were darting from side to side and be was holding his abdomen. If they excited
suspicion in the minds of the arresting officers, as the prosecution suggests, it has
nevertheless not been shown what their suspicion was all about. In fact, the policemen
themselves testified that they were dispatched to that place only because of the telephone
call from the informer that there were "suspicious-looking" persons in that vicinity who were
about to commit a robbery at North Bay Boulevard. The caller did not explain why he
thought the men looked suspicious nor did he elaborate on the impending crime.
In the recent case of People v. Malmstedt, 5 the Court sustained the warrantless arrest of the
accused because there was a bulge in his waist that excited the suspicion of the arresting officer and,
upon inspection, turned out to be a pouch containing hashish. In People v. Claudio, 6 the accused
boarded a bus and placed the buri bag she was carrying behind the seat of the arresting officer while she
herself sat in the seat before him. His suspicion aroused, be surreptitiously examined the bag, which he
found to contain marijuana. He then and there made the warrantless arrest and seizure that we
subsequently upheld on the ground that probable cause had been sufficiently established.

The case before us is different because there was nothing to support the arresting officers'
suspicion other than Mengote's darting eyes and his hand on his abdomen. By no stretch of

the imagination could it have been inferred from these acts that an offense had just been
committed, or was actually being committed, or was at least being attempted in their
presence.
This case is similar to People v. Aminnudin, 7 where the Court held that the warrantless arrest of
the accused was unconstitutional. This was effected while be was coming down a vessel, to all
appearances no less innocent than the other disembarking passengers. He had not committed nor was
be actually committing or attempting to commit an offense in the presence of the arresting officers. He
was not even acting suspiciously. In short, there was no probable cause that, as the prosecution
incorrectly suggested, dispensed with the constitutional requirement of a warrant.

Par. (b) is no less applicable because its no less stringent requirements have also not been
satisfied. The prosecution has not shown that at the time of Mengote's arrest an offense had
in fact just been committed and that the arresting officers had personal knowledge of facts
indicating that Mengote had committed it. All they had was hearsay information from the
telephone caller, and about a crime that had yet to be committed.
The truth is that they did not know then what offense, if at all, had been committed and
neither were they aware of the participation therein of the accused-appellant. It was only
later, after Danganan had appeared at the Police headquarters, that they learned of the
robbery in his house and of Mengote's supposed involvement therein. 8 As for the illegal possession of
the firearm found on Mengote's person, the policemen discovered this only after he had been searched and the investigation conducted later
revealed that he was not its owners nor was he licensed to possess it.

Before these events, the Peace officers had no knowledge even of Mengote' identity, let
alone the fact (or suspicion) that he was unlawfully carrying a firearm or that he was
involved in the robbery of Danganan's house.
In the landmark case of People v. Burgos, 9 this Court declared:
Under Section 6(a) of Rule 113, the officer arresting a person who has just
committed, is committing, or is about to commit an offense must
have personal knowledge of the fact. The offense must also be committed in
his presence or within his view. (Sayo v. Chief of Police, 80 Phil. 859).
(Emphasis supplied)
xxx xxx xxx
In arrests without a warrant under Section 6(b), however, it is not enough that
there is reasonable ground to believe that the person to be arrested has
committed a crime. A crime must in fact or actually have been committed first.
That a crime has actually been committed is an essential precondition. It is
not enough to suspect that a crime may have been committed. The fact of the

commission of the offense must be undisputed. The test of reasonable

ground applies only to the identity of the perpetrator. (Emphasis supplied)
This doctrine was affirmed in Alih v. Castro, 10 thus:
If the arrest was made under Rule 113, Section 5, of the Rules of Court in
connection with a crime about to be committed, being committed, or just
committed, what was that crime? There is no allegation in the record of such
a falsification. Parenthetically, it may be observed that under the Revised
Rule 113, Section 5(b), the officer making the arrest must have personal
knowledge of the ground therefor as stressed in the recent case of People v.
Burgos. (Emphasis supplied)
It would be a sad day, indeed, if any person could be summarily arrested and searched just
because he is holding his abdomen, even if it be possibly because of a stomach-ache, or if
a peace officer could clamp handcuffs on any person with a shifty look on suspicion that he
may have committed a criminal act or is actually committing or attempting it. This simply
cannot be done in a free society. This is not a police state where order is exalted over liberty
or, worse, personal malice on the part of the arresting officer may be justified in the name of
security.
There is no need to discuss the other issues raised by the accused-appellant as the ruling
we here make is sufficient to sustain his exoneration. Without the evidence of the firearm
taken from him at the time of his illegal arrest, the prosecution has lost its most important
exhibit and must therefore fail. The testimonial evidence against Mengote (which is based
on the said firearm) is not sufficient to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
imputed to him.
We commend Atty. Violeta Calvo-Drilon for her able and spirited defense of the accusedappellant not only in the brief but also in the reply brief, which she did not have to file but did
so just the same to stress the constitutional rights of her client. The fact that she was acting
only as a counsel de oficio with no expectation of material reward makes her representation
even more commendable.
The Court feels that if the peace officers had been more mindful of the provisions of the Bill
of Rights, the prosecution of the accused-appellant might have succeeded. As it happened,
they allowed their over-zealousness to get the better of them, resulting in their disregard of
the requirements of a valid search and seizure that rendered inadmissible the vital evidence
they had invalidly seized.
This should be a lesson to other peace officers. Their impulsiveness may be the very cause
of the acquittal of persons who deserve to be convicted, escaping the clutches of the law

because, ironically enough, it has not been observed by those who are supposed to enforce
it.
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The accusedappellant is ACQUITTED and ordered released immediately unless he is validly detained for
other offenses. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 182348

November 20, 2008

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee

vs.
CARLOS DELA CRUZ, accused-appellant.
DECISION
VELASCO, JR., J.:
This is an appeal from the November 29, 2007 Decision of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 02286 entitled People of the
Philippines v. Carlos Dela Cruz which affirmed the September 16, 2005
Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 77 in San Mateo, Rizal in
Criminal Case Nos. 6517 (Illegal Possession of Firearm and Ammunition) and
6518 (Possession of Dangerous Drug). The RTC found accused- appellant
Carlos Dela Cruz guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Section 11(2)
of Republic Act No. (RA) 9165 or The Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act
of 2002.
The Facts
On November 15, 2002, charges against accused-appellant were made
before the RTC. The Informations read as follows:
Criminal Case No. 6517
That, on or about the 20th day of October 2002, in the Municipality of
San Mateo, Province of Rizal, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, being then a private

citizen, without any lawful authority, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully, and knowingly have in his possession and under his custody
and control One (1) Gauge Shotgun marked ARMSCOR with Serial No.
1108533 loaded with four (4) live ammunition, which are high powered
firearm and ammunition respectively, without first securing the
necessary license to possess or permit to carry said firearm and
ammunition from the proper authorities.
Criminal Case No. 6518
That on or about the 20th day of October 2002, in the Municipality of San
Mateo, Province of Rizal, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, not being authorized by
law, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and knowingly have in his
possession, direct custody and control one (1) heat-sealed transparent
plastic bag weighing 49.84 grams of white crystalline substance, which
gave positive results for Methamphetamine Hydrochloride, a dangerous
drug.1
Accused-appellant entered a not guilty plea and trial ensued.
The facts, according to the prosecution, showed that in the morning of
October 20, 2002, an informant tipped off the Drug Enforcement Unit of the
Marikina Police Station that wanted drug pusher Wifredo Loilo alias "Boy
Bicol" was at his nipa hut hideout in San Mateo, Rizal. A team was organized
to arrest Boy Bicol. Once there, they saw Boy Bicol by a table talking with
accused-appellant. They shouted "Boy Bicol sumuko ka na may warrant of
arrest ka. (Surrender yourself Boy Bicol you have a warrant of arrest.)" Upon
hearing this, Boy Bicol engaged them in a shootout and was fatally shot.
Accused-appellant was seen holding a shotgun through a window. He
dropped his shotgun when a police officer pointed his firearm at him. The
team entered the nipa hut and apprehended accused-appellant. They saw a
plastic bag of suspected shabu, a digital weighing scale, drug paraphernalia,
ammunition, and magazines lying on the table. PO1 Calanoga, Jr. put the
markings "CVDC," the initials of accused-appellant, on the bag containing the
seized drug.

Accused-appellant was subsequently arrested. The substance seized from the

hideout was sent to the Philippine National Police crime laboratory for
examination and tested positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride
or shabu. He was thus separately indicted for violation of RA 9165 and for
illegal possession of firearm.
According to the defense, accused-appellant was at Boy Bicol's house having
been asked to do a welding job for Boy Bicol's motorcycle. While accusedappellant was there, persons who identified themselves as police officers
approached the place, prompting accused-appellant to scamper away. He lied
face down when gunshots rang. The buy-bust team then helped him get up.
He saw the police officers searching the premises and finding shabu and
firearms, which were on top of a table or drawer.2 When he asked the reason
for his apprehension, he was told that it was because he was a companion of
Boy Bicol. He denied under oath that the gun and drugs seized were found in
his possession and testified that he was only invited by Boy Bicol to get the
motorcycle from his house.3
The RTC acquitted accused-appellant of illegal possession of firearm and
ammunition but convicted him of possession of dangerous drugs. The
dispositive portion of the RTC Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the Court based on insufficiency of evidence hereby
ACQUITS accused CARLOS DELA CRUZ Y VICTORINO in Criminal
Case No. 6517 for violation of P.D. 1866 as amended by RA 8294.
In Criminal Case No. 6518 for Possession of Dangerous Drug under
Section 11, 2nd paragraph of Republic Act 9165, the Court finds said
accused CARLOS DELA CRUZ Y VICTORINO, GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt and is hereby sentenced to Life Imprisonment and to
Pay a Fine of FOUR HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P400,000.00).
SO ORDERED.4
On December 7, 2005, accused-appellant filed a Notice of Appeal of the RTC
Decision.

In his appeal to the CA, accused-appellant claimed that: (1) the version of the
prosecution should not have been given full credence; (2) the prosecution
failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt that he was guilty of possession of
an illegal drug; (3) his arrest was patently illegal; and (4) the prosecution failed
to establish the chain of custody of the illegal drug allegedly in his possession.
The CA sustained accused-appellant's conviction.5 It pointed out that accusedappellant was positively identified by prosecution witnesses, rendering his
uncorroborated denial and allegation of frame-up weak. As to accusedappellant's alleged illegal arrest, the CA held that he is deemed to have
waived his objection when he entered his plea, applied for bail, and actively
participated in the trial without questioning such arrest.
On the supposedly broken chain of custody of the illegal drug, the appellate
court held that accused-appellant's claim is unpersuasive absent any
evidence showing that the plastic sachet of shabu had been tampered or
meddled with.
On December 20, 2007, accused-appellant filed his Notice of Appeal of the
CA Decision.
On June 25, 2008, this Court required the parties to submit supplemental
briefs if they so desired. The parties later signified their willingness to submit
the case on the basis of the records already with the Court.
Accused-appellant presents the following issues before us:
I
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING FULL CREDENCE
TO THE VERSION OF THE PROSECUTION
II
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSEDAPPELLANT GUILTY OF VIOLATION OF SECTION 11, ARTICLE II, RA
9165 DESPITE THE FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION TO PROVE

THE COMMISSION OF THE OFFENSE CHARGED BEYOND

REASONABLE DOUBT
III
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE
ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF THE OFFENSE CHARGED DESPITE
THE PATENT ILLEGALITY OF HIS ARREST
IV
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE
ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF VIOLATION OF SECTION 11, ARTICLE II,
RA 9165 DESPITE THE FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION TO
ESTABLISH THE CHAIN OF CUSTODY OF THE ILLEGAL DRUG
ALLEGEDLY FOUND IN HIS POSSESSION
Accused-appellant claims that the presence of all the elements of the offense
of possession of dangerous drug was not proved beyond reasonable doubt
since both actual and constructive possessions were not proved. He asserts
that the shabu was not found in his actual possession, for which reason the
prosecution was required to establish that he had constructive possession
over theshabu. He maintains that as he had no control and dominion over the
drug or over the place where it was found, the prosecution likewise failed to
prove constructive possession.
The Court's Ruling
The appeal has merit.
The elements in illegal possession of dangerous drug are: (1) the accused is
in possession of an item or object which is identified to be a prohibited drug;
(2) such possession is not authorized by law; and (3) the accused freely and
consciously possessed the said drug.6 On the third element, we have held that
the possession must be with knowledge of the accused or that animus
possidendi existed with the possession or control of said articles.7 Considering
that as to this knowledge, a person's mental state of awareness of a fact is
involved, we have ruled that:

Since courts cannot penetrate the mind of an accused and thereafter

state its perceptions with certainty, resort to other evidence is
necessary. Animus possidendi, as a state of mind, may be determined
on a case-to-case basis by taking into consideration the prior or
contemporaneous acts of the accused, as well as the surrounding
circumstances. Its existence may and usually must be inferred from the
attendant events in each particular case.8
The prior or contemporaneous acts of accused-appellant show that: he was
inside the nipa hut at the time the buy-bust operation was taking place; he
was talking to Boy Bicol inside the nipa hut; he was seen holding a shotgun;
when PO1 Calanoga, Jr. pointed his firearm at accused-appellant, the latter
dropped his shotgun; and when apprehended, he was in a room which had
the seized shabu, digital weighing scale, drug paraphernalia, ammunition, and
magazines. Accused-appellant later admitted that he knew what the content of
the seized plastic bag was.9
Given the circumstances, we find that the prosecution failed to establish
possession of the shabu, whether in its actual or constructive sense, on the
part of accused-appellant.
The two buy-bust team members corroborated each other's testimonies on
how they saw Boy Bicol talking to accused-appellant by a table inside the nipa
hut. That table, they testified, was the same table where they saw
the shabu once inside the nipa hut. This fact was used by the prosecution to
show that accused-appellant exercised dominion and control over
the shabu on the table. We, however, find this too broad an application of the
concept of constructive possession.
In People v. Torres,10 we held there was constructive possession of prohibited
drugs even when the accused was not home when the prohibited drugs were
found in the master's bedroom of his house.
In People v. Tira,11 we sustained the conviction of the accused husband and
wife for illegal possession of dangerous drugs. Their residence was searched
and their bed was found to be concealing illegal drugs underneath. We held

that the wife cannot feign ignorance of the drugs' existence as she had full
access to the room, including the space under the bed.
In Abuan v. People,12 we affirmed the finding that the accused was in
constructive possession of prohibited drugs which had been found in the
drawer located in her bedroom.
In all these cases, the accused was held to be in constructive possession of
illegal drugs since they were shown to enjoy dominion and control over the
premises where these drugs were found.
In the instant case, however, there is no question that accused-appellant was
not the owner of the nipa hut that was subject of the buy-bust operation. He
did not have dominion or control over the nipa hut. Neither was accusedappellant a tenant or occupant of the nipa hut, a fact not disputed by the
prosecution. The target of the operation was Boy Bicol. Accused-appellant
was merely a guest of Boy Bicol. But in spite of the lack of evidence pinning
accused-appellant to illegal possession of drugs, the trial court declared the
following:
It cannot be denied that when the accused was talking with Boy Bicol he
knew that the shabuwas on the table with other items that were
confiscated by the police operatives. The court [surmises] that the
accused and boy Bicol were members of a gang hiding in that nipa hut
where they were caught red-handed with prohibited items and
dangerous [drugs].13
The trial court cannot assume, based on the prosecution's evidence, that
accused-appellant was part of a gang dealing in illegal activities. Apart from
his presence in Boy Bicol's nipa hut, the prosecution was not able to show his
participation in any drug-dealing. He was not even in possession of drugs in
his person. He was merely found inside a room with shabu, not as the room's
owner or occupant but as a guest. While he allegedly pointed a firearm at the
buy-bust team, the prosecution curiously failed to produce the firearm that
accused-appellant supposedly used.

The prosecution in this case clearly failed to show all the elements of the
crime absent a showing of either actual or constructive possession by the
accused-appellant.
Since accused-appellant was not in possession of the illegal drugs in Boy
Bicol's nipa hut, his subsequent arrest was also invalid. Rule 113 of the Rules
on Criminal Procedure on warrantless arrest provides:
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful.--A peace officer or a private
person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is
actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
b) When an offense has just been committed, and he has probable
cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or
circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it; and
c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from
a penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or is
temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while
being transferred from one confinement to another.
The warrantless arrest of accused-appellant was effected under Sec. 5(a),
arrest of a suspect in flagrante delicto. For this type of warrantless arrest to be
valid, two requisites must concur: (1) the person to be arrested must execute
an overt act indicating that he has just committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is done in the presence
or within the view of the arresting officer.14
Accused-appellant's act of pointing a firearm at the buy-bust team would have
been sufficient basis for his arrest in flagrante delicto; however, the
prosecution was not able to adequately prove that accused-appellant was
committing an offense. Although accused-appellant merely denied possessing
the firearm, the prosecution's charge was weak absent the presentation of the
alleged firearm. He was eventually acquitted by the trial court because of this

gaffe. His arrest, independent of the buy-bust operation targeting Boy Bicol,
was therefore not lawful as he was not proved to be committing any offense.
In sum, we find that there is insufficient evidence to show accused-appellant's
guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Having ruled on the lack of material or
constructive possession by accused-appellant of the seized shabu and his
succeeding illegal arrest, we deem it unnecessary to deal with the other issue
raised.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is GRANTED. The CA Decision dated November
29, 2007 in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 02286 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Accused-appellant Carlos Dela Cruz isACQUITTED of violation of Sec. 11(2)
of RA 9165 in Criminal Case No. 6518 of the RTC, Branch 77 in San Mateo,
Rizal.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 199042

November 17, 2014

DANILO VILLANUEVA y ALCARAZ, Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
SERENO, CJ:
We resolve the Petition filed by Danilo Villanueva y Alcaraz from the Decision dated 4 May
2011 and Resolution dated 18 October 2011 issued by the Fourteenth Division of the Court
of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. C.R. No. 32582.
1

THE ANTECEDENT FACTS

Petitioner Danilo Villanueva was charged with violation of Section 11, Article II of Republic
Act (R.A.) No. 9165 or The Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002. The
Information reads:
4

That on or about the 15th day of June 2004 in Caloocan City, Metro Manila, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above named accused, without being authorized by
law, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in his possession, custody

and control METHAMPHETAMINE HYDROCHLORIDE (Shabu) weighing 0.63 gram

knowing the same to [be a] dangerous drug under the provisions of the above-cited law.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
On 15 July 2004, the accused, duly assisted by counsel de oficio, pleaded not guilty to the
offense charged.
5

PROSECUTIONS VERSION
Four witnesses testified for the prosecution: (1) Police Senior Inspector (PSI) Albert Arturo,
(2) Police Officer (PO) 3 Jonathan Coralde, (3) PO2 Reynante Mananghaya, and (4) Senior
Police Officer 1 (SPO1) Antonio Asiones. Their testimonies reveal that a Complaint was filed
by Brian Resco against Danilo Villanueva for allegedly shooting the former along C-3 Road,
Navotas City. After recording the incident in the police blotter, PO3 Jonathan Coralde, SPO3
Enrique de Jesus, SPO2 Henry Martin and SPO1 Anthony Asiones, together with Resco,
proceeded to the house of Villanueva. They informed Villanueva about the Complaint
lodged against him. They invited him to the police station. There, he was subjected to a
body search and, in the process, a plastic sachet of shabu was recovered from the left
pocket of his pants. PO3 Coralde marked the sachet with the initial "DAV 06-15-04", and
PO2 Reynante Mananghaya brought it to the National Police District Scene of the Crime
Operatives (NPD-SOCO) for examination. DEFENSES VERSION
6

The accused testified that at the time of the incident, he was at home watching TV when
PO3 Coralde, along with three others, invited him to go with them to the police station.
Informed that he had been identified as responsible for shooting Resco, the accused was
then frisked and detained at the police station.
8

RULING OF THE RTC

The Regional Trial Court (RTC) Branch 127 of Caloocan City, in its Decision dated 6 April
2009, convicted petitioner of the offense charged. The dispositive portion of the Decision
reads:
9

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered declaring accused

DANILO VILLANUEVA y ALCARAZ, GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT of the
offense of Violation of Section 11, Article II,R.A. 9165. Henceforth, this Court hereby
sentences him to suffer an imprisonment of twelve (12) years and one (1) day as the
minimum to seventeen (17) years and eight (8) months as the maximum and to pay the fine
of Three Hundred Thousand Pesos (P300,000.00).
The drugs subject matter of this case is ordered confiscated and forfeited in favor of the
government to be dealt with in accordance with the law.

SO ORDERED.

10

The CA reviewed the appeal, which hinged on one issue, viz:

THE COURT A QUOGRAVELY ERRED IN NOT FINDING AS ILLEGAL THE ACCUSEDAPPELLANTS WARRANTLESS ARREST AND SEARCH.
11

RULING OF THE CA
On 4 May 2011, the CA affirmed the ruling of the lower court:
WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision dated April 6, 2009 of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 127, Caloocan City in Criminal Case No. 70854 finding the accused-appellant guilty
beyond reasonable doubt is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

12

On 27 May 2011, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which the CA denied in a
Resolution dated 18 October 2011.
13

14

Hence, the instant Petition, which revolves around the following lone issue:
WHETHER THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE
PETITIONERS CONVICTION FOR VIOLATION OF SECTION 11 OF REPUBLIC ACT NO.
9165 DESPITE THE ILLEGALITY OF THE ARREST AND THE LAPSES ON THE PART OF
THE POLICE OFFICERS IN THE HANDLING OF THE CONFISCATED DRUG.
15

Petitioner claims that his arrest does not fall within the purview of valid warrantless arrests,
since it took place on the day of the alleged shooting incident. Hence, to "invite" him to the
precinct without any warrant of arrest was illegal. The evidence obtained is, consequently,
inadmissible. The Office of the Solicitor General filed its Comment stating that the shabu
confiscated from petitioner was admissible in evidence against him; that the search
conducted on him was valid; and that he cannot raise the issue regarding the apprehending
officers non-compliance with Section 21, Article II of R.A. 9165 for the first time on appeal.
16

OUR RULING
We find the instant appeal meritorious.
Accused-appellant is estopped from questioning the legality of his arrest.

Accused-appellant was arrested without a warrant. Section 5, Rule 113 of the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure, lays down the basic rules on lawful warrantless arrests either
by a peace officer or a private person, as follows:
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. A peace officer or a private person may,
without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe
based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be
arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal
establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily confined
while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one
confinement to another.
The circumstances that transpired between accused-appellant and the arresting officer
show none of the above that would make the warrantless arrest lawful. Nevertheless,
records reveal that accused-appellant never objected to the irregularity of his arrest before
his arraignment. He pleaded not guilty upon arraignment. He actively participated in the trial
of the case. Thus, he is considered as one who had properly and voluntarily submitted
himself to the jurisdiction of the trial court and waived his right to question the validity of his
arrest.
17

The warrantless search conducted is not among those allowed by law.

A waiver of an illegal arrest, however, is not a waiver of an illegal search. Records have
established that both the arrest and the search were made without a warrant. While the
accused has already waived his right to contest the legality of his arrest, he is not deemed
to have equally waived his right to contest the legality of the search.
18

Jurisprudence is replete with pronouncements on when a warrantless search can be

conducted. These searches include: (1) search of a moving vehicle; (2) seizure in plain
view; (3) customs search; (4) waiver or consented search; (5) stop-and-frisk situation; (6)
search incidental to a lawful arrest and (7) exigent and emergency circumstance.
1wphi1

19

The search made was not among the enumerated instances. Certainly, it was not of a
moving vehicle, a customs search, or a search incidental to a lawful arrest. There could not
have been a seizure in plain view as the seized item was allegedly found inside the left
pocket of accused-appellants pants. Neither was it a stop-and-frisk situation. While thistype

may seemingly fall under the consented search exception, we reiterate that "[c]onsent to a
search is not to be lightly inferred, but shown by clear and convincing evidence."
20

Consent must also be voluntary inorder to validate an otherwise illegal search; that is, the
consent mustbe unequivocal, specific, intelligently given, and uncontaminated by any
duress or coercion. In this case, petitioner was merely "ordered" to take out the contents of
his pocket. The testimony of the police officer on the matter is clear:
21

Q: And what did you do when you frisked a small plastic sachet?
A: When I felt something inside his pocket, I ordered him to bring out the thing which I felt.
Q. : And what did Danilo Villanueva do when you instructed him to bring out the contents of
his pocket?
A: He took out the contents of his pocket and I saw the plastic containing shabu.

22

The evidence obtained is not admissible.

Having been obtained through an unlawful search, the seized item is thus inadmissible in
evidence against accused-appellant. Obviously, this is an instance of seizure of the "fruit of
the poisonous tree." Hence, the confiscated item is inadmissible in evidence consonant with
Article III, Section 3(2) of the 1987 Constitution: "Any evidence obtained in violation of this
or the preceding section shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding." Without
the seized item, therefore, the conviction of accused appellant cannot be sustained. This
being the case, we see no more reason to discuss the alleged lapses of the officers in the
handling of the confiscated drug.
23

As a final word, we reiterate that "[ w ]hile this Court appreciates and encourages the efforts
of law enforcers to uphold the law and to preserve the peace and security of society, we
nevertheless admonish them to act with deliberate care and within the parameters set by
the Constitution and the law. Truly, the end never justifies the means."
24

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed Decision dated 4 May 2011 and
Resolution dated 18 October 2011 issued by the Fourteenth Division of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. C.R. No. 32582 are SET ASIDE. Petitioner is hereby ACQUITTED.
SO ORDERED.
MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO
Chief Justice, Chairperson
WE CONCUR:

FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 199042

November 17, 2014

DANILO VILLANUEVA y ALCARAZ, Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
SERENO, CJ:
We resolve the Petition filed by Danilo Villanueva y Alcaraz from the Decision dated 4 May
2011 and Resolution dated 18 October 2011 issued by the Fourteenth Division of the Court
of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. C.R. No. 32582.
1

THE ANTECEDENT FACTS

Petitioner Danilo Villanueva was charged with violation of Section 11, Article II of Republic
Act (R.A.) No. 9165 or The Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002. The
Information reads:
4

That on or about the 15th day of June 2004 in Caloocan City, Metro Manila, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above named accused, without being authorized by
law, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in his possession, custody
and control METHAMPHETAMINE HYDROCHLORIDE (Shabu) weighing 0.63 gram
knowing the same to [be a] dangerous drug under the provisions of the above-cited law.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
On 15 July 2004, the accused, duly assisted by counsel de oficio, pleaded not guilty to the
offense charged.
5

PROSECUTIONS VERSION
Four witnesses testified for the prosecution: (1) Police Senior Inspector (PSI) Albert Arturo,
(2) Police Officer (PO) 3 Jonathan Coralde, (3) PO2 Reynante Mananghaya, and (4) Senior
Police Officer 1 (SPO1) Antonio Asiones. Their testimonies reveal that a Complaint was filed
by Brian Resco against Danilo Villanueva for allegedly shooting the former along C-3 Road,
Navotas City. After recording the incident in the police blotter, PO3 Jonathan Coralde, SPO3
Enrique de Jesus, SPO2 Henry Martin and SPO1 Anthony Asiones, together with Resco,
proceeded to the house of Villanueva. They informed Villanueva about the Complaint
lodged against him. They invited him to the police station. There, he was subjected to a
6

body search and, in the process, a plastic sachet of shabu was recovered from the left
pocket of his pants. PO3 Coralde marked the sachet with the initial "DAV 06-15-04", and
PO2 Reynante Mananghaya brought it to the National Police District Scene of the Crime
Operatives (NPD-SOCO) for examination. DEFENSES VERSION
7

The accused testified that at the time of the incident, he was at home watching TV when
PO3 Coralde, along with three others, invited him to go with them to the police station.
Informed that he had been identified as responsible for shooting Resco, the accused was
then frisked and detained at the police station.
8

RULING OF THE RTC

The Regional Trial Court (RTC) Branch 127 of Caloocan City, in its Decision dated 6 April
2009, convicted petitioner of the offense charged. The dispositive portion of the Decision
reads:
9

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered declaring accused

DANILO VILLANUEVA y ALCARAZ, GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT of the
offense of Violation of Section 11, Article II,R.A. 9165. Henceforth, this Court hereby
sentences him to suffer an imprisonment of twelve (12) years and one (1) day as the
minimum to seventeen (17) years and eight (8) months as the maximum and to pay the fine
of Three Hundred Thousand Pesos (P300,000.00).
The drugs subject matter of this case is ordered confiscated and forfeited in favor of the
government to be dealt with in accordance with the law.
SO ORDERED.

10

The CA reviewed the appeal, which hinged on one issue, viz:

THE COURT A QUOGRAVELY ERRED IN NOT FINDING AS ILLEGAL THE ACCUSEDAPPELLANTS WARRANTLESS ARREST AND SEARCH.
11

RULING OF THE CA
On 4 May 2011, the CA affirmed the ruling of the lower court:
WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision dated April 6, 2009 of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 127, Caloocan City in Criminal Case No. 70854 finding the accused-appellant guilty
beyond reasonable doubt is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

12

On 27 May 2011, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which the CA denied in a
Resolution dated 18 October 2011.
13

14

Hence, the instant Petition, which revolves around the following lone issue:
WHETHER THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE
PETITIONERS CONVICTION FOR VIOLATION OF SECTION 11 OF REPUBLIC ACT NO.
9165 DESPITE THE ILLEGALITY OF THE ARREST AND THE LAPSES ON THE PART OF
THE POLICE OFFICERS IN THE HANDLING OF THE CONFISCATED DRUG.
15

Petitioner claims that his arrest does not fall within the purview of valid warrantless arrests,
since it took place on the day of the alleged shooting incident. Hence, to "invite" him to the
precinct without any warrant of arrest was illegal. The evidence obtained is, consequently,
inadmissible. The Office of the Solicitor General filed its Comment stating that the shabu
confiscated from petitioner was admissible in evidence against him; that the search
conducted on him was valid; and that he cannot raise the issue regarding the apprehending
officers non-compliance with Section 21, Article II of R.A. 9165 for the first time on appeal.
16

OUR RULING
We find the instant appeal meritorious.
Accused-appellant is estopped from questioning the legality of his arrest.
Accused-appellant was arrested without a warrant. Section 5, Rule 113 of the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure, lays down the basic rules on lawful warrantless arrests either
by a peace officer or a private person, as follows:
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. A peace officer or a private person may,
without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe
based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be
arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal
establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily confined
while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one
confinement to another.

The circumstances that transpired between accused-appellant and the arresting officer
show none of the above that would make the warrantless arrest lawful. Nevertheless,
records reveal that accused-appellant never objected to the irregularity of his arrest before
his arraignment. He pleaded not guilty upon arraignment. He actively participated in the trial
of the case. Thus, he is considered as one who had properly and voluntarily submitted
himself to the jurisdiction of the trial court and waived his right to question the validity of his
arrest.
17

The warrantless search conducted is not among those allowed by law.

A waiver of an illegal arrest, however, is not a waiver of an illegal search. Records have
established that both the arrest and the search were made without a warrant. While the
accused has already waived his right to contest the legality of his arrest, he is not deemed
to have equally waived his right to contest the legality of the search.
18

Jurisprudence is replete with pronouncements on when a warrantless search can be

conducted. These searches include: (1) search of a moving vehicle; (2) seizure in plain
view; (3) customs search; (4) waiver or consented search; (5) stop-and-frisk situation; (6)
search incidental to a lawful arrest and (7) exigent and emergency circumstance.
1wphi1

19

The search made was not among the enumerated instances. Certainly, it was not of a
moving vehicle, a customs search, or a search incidental to a lawful arrest. There could not
have been a seizure in plain view as the seized item was allegedly found inside the left
pocket of accused-appellants pants. Neither was it a stop-and-frisk situation. While thistype
may seemingly fall under the consented search exception, we reiterate that "[c]onsent to a
search is not to be lightly inferred, but shown by clear and convincing evidence."
20

Consent must also be voluntary inorder to validate an otherwise illegal search; that is, the
consent mustbe unequivocal, specific, intelligently given, and uncontaminated by any
duress or coercion. In this case, petitioner was merely "ordered" to take out the contents of
his pocket. The testimony of the police officer on the matter is clear:
21

Q: And what did you do when you frisked a small plastic sachet?
A: When I felt something inside his pocket, I ordered him to bring out the thing which I felt.
Q. : And what did Danilo Villanueva do when you instructed him to bring out the contents of
his pocket?
A: He took out the contents of his pocket and I saw the plastic containing shabu.
The evidence obtained is not admissible.

22

Having been obtained through an unlawful search, the seized item is thus inadmissible in
evidence against accused-appellant. Obviously, this is an instance of seizure of the "fruit of
the poisonous tree." Hence, the confiscated item is inadmissible in evidence consonant with
Article III, Section 3(2) of the 1987 Constitution: "Any evidence obtained in violation of this
or the preceding section shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding." Without
the seized item, therefore, the conviction of accused appellant cannot be sustained. This
being the case, we see no more reason to discuss the alleged lapses of the officers in the
handling of the confiscated drug.
23

As a final word, we reiterate that "[ w ]hile this Court appreciates and encourages the efforts
of law enforcers to uphold the law and to preserve the peace and security of society, we
nevertheless admonish them to act with deliberate care and within the parameters set by
the Constitution and the law. Truly, the end never justifies the means."
24

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed Decision dated 4 May 2011 and
Resolution dated 18 October 2011 issued by the Fourteenth Division of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. C.R. No. 32582 are SET ASIDE. Petitioner is hereby ACQUITTED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 190889

January 10, 2011

ELENITA C. FAJARDO, Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
At bar is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking the
reversal of the February 10, 2009 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA), which affirmed
with modification the August 29, 2006 decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 5,
Kalibo, Aklan, finding petitioner guilty of violating Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1866, as
amended.
The facts:
Petitioner, Elenita Fajardo, and one Zaldy Valerio (Valerio) were charged with violation of
P.D. No. 1866, as amended, before the RTC, Branch 5, Kalibo, Aklan, committed as follows:
That on or about the 28th day of August, 2002, in the morning, in Barangay Andagao,
Municipality of Kalibo, Province of Aklan, Republic of the Philippines, and within the

jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating

and mutually helping one another, without authority of law, permit or license, did then and
there, knowingly, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in their possession, custody and
control two (2) receivers of caliber .45 pistol, [M]odel [No.] M1911A1 US with SN 763025
and Model [No.] M1911A1 US with defaced serial number, two (2) pieces short magazine of
M16 Armalite rifle, thirty-five (35) pieces live M16 ammunition 5.56 caliber and fourteen (14)
pieces live caliber .45 ammunition, which items were confiscated and recovered from their
possession during a search conducted by members of the Provincial Intelligence Special
Operation Group, Aklan Police Provincial Office, Kalibo, Aklan, by virtue of Search Warrant
No. 01 (9) 03 issued by OIC Executive Judge Dean Telan of the Regional Trial Court of
Aklan.3
When arraigned on March 25, 2004, both pleaded not guilty to the offense charged. 4 During
pre-trial, they agreed to the following stipulation of facts:
1. The search warrant subject of this case exists;
2. Accused Elenita Fajardo is the same person subject of the search warrant in this
case who is a resident of Sampaguita Road, Park Homes, Andagao, Kalibo, Aklan;
3. Accused Zaldy Valerio was in the house of Elenita Fajardo in the evening of
August 27, 2002 but does not live therein;
4. Both accused were not duly licensed firearm holders;
5. The search warrant was served in the house of accused Elenita Fajardo in the
morning of August 28, 2002; and
6. The accused Elenita Fajardo and Valerio were not arrested immediately upon the
arrival of the military personnel despite the fact that the latter allegedly saw them in
possession of a firearm in the evening of August 27, 2002. 5
As culled from the similar factual findings of the RTC and the CA, 6 these are the chain of
events that led to the filing of the information:
In the evening of August 27, 2002, members of the Provincial Intelligence Special
Operations Group (PISOG) were instructed by Provincial Director Police Superintendent
Edgardo Mendoza (P/Supt. Mendoza) to respond to the complaint of concerned citizens
residing on Ilang-Ilang and Sampaguita Roads, Park Homes III Subdivision, Barangay
Andagao, Kalibo, Aklan, that armed men drinking liquor at the residence of petitioner were
indiscriminately firing guns.

Along with the members of the Aklan Police Provincial Office, the elements of the PISOG
proceeded to the area. Upon arrival thereat, they noticed that several persons scampered
and ran in different directions. The responding team saw Valerio holding two .45 caliber
pistols. He fired shots at the policemen before entering the house of petitioner.
Petitioner was seen tucking a .45 caliber handgun between her waist and the waistband of
her shorts, after which, she entered the house and locked the main door.
To prevent any violent commotion, the policemen desisted from entering petitioners house
but, in order to deter Valerio from evading apprehension, they cordoned the perimeter of the
house as they waited for further instructions from P/Supt. Mendoza. A few minutes later,
petitioner went out of the house and negotiated for the pull-out of the police troops. No
agreement materialized.
At around 2:00 a.m. and 4:00 a.m. of August 28, 2002, Senior Police Officer 2 Clemencio
Nava (SPO2 Nava), who was posted at the back portion of the house, saw Valerio emerge
twice on top of the house and throw something. The discarded objects landed near the wall
of petitioners house and inside the compound of a neighboring residence. SPO2 Nava,
together with SPO1 Teodoro Neron and Jerome T. Vega (Vega), radio announcer/reporter of
RMN DYKR, as witness, recovered the discarded objects, which turned out to be two (2)
receivers of .45 caliber pistol, model no. M1911A1 US, with serial number (SN) 763025, and
model no. M1911A1 US, with a defaced serial number. The recovered items were then
surrendered to SPO1 Nathaniel A. Tan (SPO1 Tan), Group Investigator, who utilized them in
applying for and obtaining a search warrant.
The warrant was served on petitioner at 9:30 a.m. Together with a barangay captain,
barangay kagawad, and members of the media, as witnesses, the police team proceeded to
search petitioners house. The team found and was able to confiscate the following:
1. Two (2) pieces of Short Magazine of M16 Armalite Rifle;
2. Thirty five (35) pieces of live M16 ammos 5.56 Caliber; and
3. Fourteen (14) pieces of live ammos of Caliber 45 pistol.
Since petitioner and Valerio failed to present any documents showing their authority to
possess the confiscated firearms and the two recovered receivers, a criminal information for
violation of P.D. No. 1866, as amended by Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8294, was filed against
them.
For their exoneration, petitioner and Valerio argued that the issuance of the search warrant
was defective because the allegation contained in the application filed and signed by SPO1

Tan was not based on his personal knowledge. They quoted this pertinent portion of the
application:
That this application was founded on confidential information received by the Provincial
Director, Police Supt. Edgardo Mendoza.7
They further asserted that the execution of the search warrant was infirm since petitioner,
who was inside the house at the time of the search, was not asked to accompany the
policemen as they explored the place, but was instead ordered to remain in the living room
(sala).
Petitioner disowned the confiscated items. She refused to sign the inventory/receipt
prepared by the raiding team, because the items allegedly belonged to her brother, Benito
Fajardo, a staff sergeant of the Philippine Army.
Petitioner denied that she had a .45 caliber pistol tucked in her waistband when the raiding
team arrived. She averred that such situation was implausible because she was wearing
garterized shorts and a spaghetti-strapped hanging blouse. 8
Ruling of the RTC
The RTC rejected the defenses advanced by accused, holding that the same were already
denied in the Orders dated December 31, 2002 and April 20, 2005, respectively denying the
Motion to Quash Search Warrant and Demurrer to Evidence. The said Orders were not
appealed and have thus attained finality. The RTC also ruled that petitioner and Valerio
were estopped from assailing the legality of their arrest since they participated in the trial by
presenting evidence for their defense. Likewise, by applying for bail, they have effectively
waived such irregularities and defects.
In finding the accused liable for illegal possession of firearms, the RTC explained:
Zaldy Valerio, the bodyguard of Elenita Fajardo, is a former soldier, having served with the
Philippine Army prior to his separation from his service for going on absence without leave
(AWOL). With his military background, it is safe to conclude that Zaldy Valerio is familiar
with and knowledgeable about different types of firearms and ammunitions. As a former
soldier, undoubtedly, he can assemble and disassemble firearms.
It must not be de-emphasize[d] that the residence of Elenita Fajardo is definitely not an
armory or arsenal which are the usual depositories for firearms, explosives and ammunition.
Granting arguendo that those firearms and ammunition were left behind by Benito Fajardo,
a member of the Philippine army, the fact remains that it is a government property. If it is so,
the residence of Elenita Fajardo is not the proper place to store those items. The logical
explanation is that those items are stolen property.

xxxx
The rule is that ownership is not an essential element of illegal possession of firearms and
ammunition. What the law requires is merely possession which includes not only actual
physical possession but also constructive possession or the subjection of the thing to ones
control and management. This has to be so if the manifest intent of the law is to be
effective. The same evils, the same perils to public security, which the law penalizes exist
whether the unlicensed holder of a prohibited weapon be its owner or a borrower. To
accomplish the object of this law[,] the proprietary concept of the possession can have no
bearing whatsoever.
xxxx
x x x. [I]n order that one may be found guilty of a violation of the decree, it is sufficient that
the accused had no authority or license to possess a firearm, and that he intended to
possess the same, even if such possession was made in good faith and without criminal
intent.
xxxx
To convict an accused for illegal possession of firearms and explosive under P.D. 1866, as
amended, two (2) essential elements must be indubitably established, viz.: (a) the existence
of the subject firearm ammunition or explosive which may be proved by the presentation of
the subject firearm or explosive or by the testimony of witnesses who saw accused in
possession of the same, and (b) the negative fact that the accused has no license or permit
to own or possess the firearm, ammunition or explosive which fact may be established by
the testimony or certification of a representative of the PNP Firearms and Explosives Unit
that the accused has no license or permit to possess the subject firearm or explosive
(Exhibit G).
The judicial admission of the accused that they do not have permit or license on the two (2)
receivers of caliber .45 pistol, model M1911A1 US with SN 763025 and model M1911A1 of
M16 Armalite rifle, thirty-five (35) pieces live M16 ammunition, 5.56 caliber and fourteen (14)
pieces live caliber .45 ammunition confiscated and recovered from their possession during
the search conducted by members of the PISOG, Aklan Police Provincial Office by virtue of
Search Warrant No. 01 (9) 03 fall under Section 4 of Rule 129 of the Revised Rules of
Court.9
Consequently, petitioner and Valerio were convicted of illegal possession of firearms and
explosives, punishable under paragraph 2, Section 1 of P.D. No. 1866, as amended by R.A.
No. 8294, which provides:

The penalty of prision mayor in its minimum period and a fine of Thirty thousand pesos
(P30,000.00) shall be imposed if the firearm is classified as high powered firearm which
includes those with bores bigger in diameter than .38 caliber and 9 millimeter such as
caliber .40, .41, .44, .45 and also lesser calibered firearms but considered powerful such as
caliber .357 and caliber .22 center-fire magnum and other firearms with firing capability of
full automatic and by burst of two or three: Provided, however, That no other crime was
committed by the person arrested.
Both were sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of six (6) years and one (1) day
to twelve (12) years of prision mayor, and to pay a fine of P30,000.00.
On September 1, 2006, only petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was denied
in an Order dated October 25, 2006. Petitioner then filed a Notice of Appeal with the CA.
Ruling of the CA
The CA concurred with the factual findings of the RTC, but disagreed with its conclusions of
law, and held that the search warrant was void based on the following observations:
[A]t the time of applying for a search warrant, SPO1 Nathaniel A. Tan did not have personal
knowledge of the fact that appellants had no license to possess firearms as required by law.
For one, he failed to make a categorical statement on that point during the application. Also,
he failed to attach to the application a certification to that effect from the Firearms and
Explosives Office of the Philippine National Police. x x x, this certification is the best
evidence obtainable to prove that appellant indeed has no license or permit to possess a
firearm. There was also no explanation given why said certification was not presented, or
even deemed no longer necessary, during the application for the warrant. Such vital
evidence was simply ignored.10
Resultantly, all firearms and explosives seized inside petitioners residence were declared
inadmissible in evidence. However, the 2 receivers recovered by the policemen outside the
house of petitioner before the warrant was served were admitted as evidence, pursuant to
the plain view doctrine.
Accordingly, petitioner and Valerio were convicted of illegal possession of a part of a
firearm, punishable under paragraph 1, Section 1 of P.D. No. 1866, as amended. They were
sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of three (3) years, six (6) months, and twenty-one
(21) days to five (5) years, four (4) months, and twenty (20) days of prision correccional,
and ordered to pay a P20,000.00 fine.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration,11 but the motion was denied in the CA Resolution
dated December 3, 2009.12 Hence, the present recourse.

At the onset, it must be emphasized that the information filed against petitioner and Valerio
charged duplicitous offenses contrary to Section 13 of Rule 110 of the Rules of Criminal
Procedure, viz.:
Sec. 13. Duplicity of offense. A complaint or information must charge but one offense,
except only in those cases in which existing laws prescribe a single punishment for various
offenses.
A reading of the information clearly shows that possession of the enumerated articles
confiscated from Valerio and petitioner are punishable under separate provisions of Section
1, P.D. No. 1866, as amended by R.A. No. 8294.13 Illegal possession of two (2) pieces of
short magazine of M16 Armalite rifle, thirty-five (35) pieces of live M16 ammunition 5.56
caliber, and fourteen (14) pieces of live caliber .45 ammunition is punishable under
paragraph 2 of the said section, viz.:
The penalty of prision mayor in its minimum period and a fine of Thirty thousand pesos
(P30,000.00) shall be imposed if the firearm is classified as high powered firearm which
includes those with bores bigger in diameter than .38 caliber and 9 millimeter such as
caliber .40, 41, .44, .45 and also lesser calibered firearms but considered powerful such as
caliber .357 and caliber .22 center-fire magnum and other firearms with firing capability of
full automatic and by burst of two or three: Provided, however, That no other crime was
committed by the person arrested.14
On the other hand, illegal possession of the two (2) receivers of a .45 caliber pistol, model
no. M1911A1 US, with SN 763025, and Model M1911A1 US, with a defaced serial
number, is penalized under paragraph 1, which states:
Sec. 1. Unlawful manufacture, sale, acquisition, disposition or possession of firearms or
ammunition or instruments used or intended to be used in the manufacture of firearms or
ammunition. The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period and a fine of not
less than Fifteen thousand pesos (P15,000.00) shall be imposed upon any person who shall
unlawfully manufacture, deal in, acquire, dispose, or possess any low powered firearm,
such as rimfire handgun, .380 or .32 and other firearm of similar firepower, part of firearm,
ammunition, or machinery, tool or instrument used or intended to be used in the
manufacture of any firearm or ammunition: Provided, That no other crime was committed. 15
This is the necessary consequence of the amendment introduced by R.A. No. 8294, which
categorized the kinds of firearms proscribed from being possessed without a license,
according to their firing power and caliber. R.A. No. 8294 likewise mandated different
penalties for illegal possession of firearm according to the above classification, unlike in the
old P.D. No. 1866 which set a standard penalty for the illegal possession of any kind of
firearm. Section 1 of the old law reads:

Section 1. Unlawful Manufacture, Sale, Acquisition, Disposition or Possession of Firearms

or Ammunition or Instruments Used or Intended to be Used in the Manufacture of Firearms
of Ammunition. The penalty of reclusion temporal in its maximum period to reclusion
perpetua shall be imposed upon any person who shall unlawfully manufacture, deal in,
acquire dispose, or possess any firearms, part of firearm, ammunition, or machinery, tool or
instrument used or intended to be used in the manufacture of any firearm or ammunition.
(Emphasis ours.)
By virtue of such changes, an information for illegal possession of firearm should now
particularly refer to the paragraph of Section 1 under which the seized firearm is classified,
and should there be numerous guns confiscated, each must be sorted and then grouped
according to the categories stated in Section 1 of R.A. No. 8294, amending P.D. No. 1866. It
will no longer suffice to lump all of the seized firearms in one information, and state Section
1, P.D. No. 1866 as the violated provision, as in the instant case, 16 because different
penalties are imposed by the law, depending on the caliber of the weapon. To do so would
result in duplicitous charges.
Ordinarily, an information that charges multiple offenses merits a quashal, but petitioner and
Valerio failed to raise this issue during arraignment. Their failure constitutes a waiver, and
they could be convicted of as many offenses as there were charged in the
information.17 This accords propriety to the diverse convictions handed down by the courts a
quo.
Further, the charge of illegal possession of firearms and ammunition under paragraph 2,
Section 1 of P.D. No. 1866, as amended by R.A. No. 8294, including the validity of the
search warrant that led to their confiscation, is now beyond the province of our review since,
by virtue of the CAs Decision, petitioner and Valerio have been effectively acquitted from
the said charges. The present review is consequently only with regard to the conviction for
illegal possession of a part of a firearm.
The Issues
Petitioner insists on an acquittal and avers that the discovery of the two (2) receivers does
not come within the purview of the plain view doctrine. She argues that no valid intrusion
was attendant and that no evidence was adduced to prove that she was with Valerio when
he threw the receivers. Likewise absent is a positive showing that any of the two receivers
recovered by the policemen matched the .45 caliber pistol allegedly seen tucked in the
waistband of her shorts when the police elements arrived. Neither is there any proof that
petitioner had knowledge of or consented to the alleged throwing of the receivers.
Our Ruling
We find merit in the petition.

First, we rule on the admissibility of the receivers. We hold that the receivers were seized in
plain view, hence, admissible.
No less than our Constitution recognizes the right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures. This
right is encapsulated in Article III, Section 2, of the Constitution, which states:
Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall
be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable
cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation
of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place
to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
Complementing this provision is the exclusionary rule embodied in Section 3(2) of the same
article
(2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be inadmissible
for any purpose in any proceeding.
There are, however, several well-recognized exceptions to the foregoing rule. Thus,
evidence obtained through a warrantless search and seizure may be admissible under any
of the following circumstances: (1) search incident to a lawful arrest; (2) search of a moving
motor vehicle; (3) search in violation of custom laws; (4) seizure of evidence in plain view;
and (5) when the accused himself waives his right against unreasonable searches and
seizures.18
Under the plain view doctrine, objects falling in the "plain view" of an officer, who has a right
to be in the position to have that view, are subject to seizure and may be presented as
evidence.19 It applies when the following requisites concur: (a) the law enforcement officer in
search of the evidence has a prior justification for an intrusion or is in a position from which
he can view a particular area; (b) the discovery of the evidence in plain view is inadvertent;
and (c) it is immediately apparent to the officer that the item he observes may be evidence
of a crime, contraband, or otherwise subject to seizure. The law enforcement officer must
lawfully make an initial intrusion or properly be in a position from which he can particularly
view the area. In the course of such lawful intrusion, he came inadvertently across a piece
of evidence incriminating the accused. The object must be open to eye and hand, and its
discovery inadvertent.20
Tested against these standards, we find that the seizure of the two receivers of the .45
caliber pistol outside petitioners house falls within the purview of the plain view doctrine.

First, the presence of SPO2 Nava at the back of the house and of the other law enforcers
around the premises was justified by the fact that petitioner and Valerio were earlier seen
respectively holding .45 caliber pistols before they ran inside the structure and sought
refuge. The attendant circumstances and the evasive actions of petitioner and Valerio when
the law enforcers arrived engendered a reasonable ground for the latter to believe that a
crime was being committed. There was thus sufficient probable cause for the policemen to
cordon off the house as they waited for daybreak to apply for a search warrant.
Secondly, from where he was situated, SPO2 Nava clearly saw, on two different instances,
Valerio emerge on top of the subject dwelling and throw suspicious objects. Lastly,
considering the earlier sighting of Valerio holding a pistol, SPO2 Nava had reasonable
ground to believe that the things thrown might be contraband items, or evidence of the
offense they were then suspected of committing. Indeed, when subsequently recovered,
they turned out to be two (2) receivers of .45 caliber pistol.
The pertinent portions of SPO2 Navas testimony are elucidating:
Q When you arrived in that place, you saw policemen?
A Yes, sir.
Q What were they doing?
A They were cordoning the house.
Q You said that you asked your assistant team leader Deluso about that incident.
What did he tell you?
A Deluso told me that a person ran inside the house carrying with him a gun.
Q And this house you are referring to is the house which you mentioned is the police
officers were surrounding?
A Yes, sir.
Q Now, how long did you stay in that place, Mr. Witness?
A I stayed there when I arrived at past 10:00 oclock up to 12:00 oclock the following
day.
Q At about 2:00 oclock in the early morning of August 28, 2002, can you recall
where were you?

A Yes, sir.
Q Where were you?
A I was at the back of the house that is being cordoned by the police.
Q While you were at the back of this house, do you recall any unusual incident?
A Yes, sir.
Q Can you tell the Honorable Court what was that incident?
A Yes, sir. A person went out at the top of the house and threw something.
Q And did you see the person who threw something out of this house?
A Yes, sir.
xxxx
Q Can you tell the Honorable Court who was that person who threw that something
outside the house?
A It was Zaldy Valerio.
COURT: (to witness)
Q Before the incident, you know this person Zaldy Valerio?
A Yes, sir.
Q Why do you know him?
A Because we were formerly members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines.
xxxx
PROS. PERALTA:
Q When you saw something thrown out at the top of the house, did you do
something if any?
A I shouted to seek cover.

xxxx
Q So, what else did you do if any after you shouted, "take cover?"
A I took hold of a flashlight after five minutes and focused the beam of the flashlight
on the place where something was thrown.
Q What did you see if any?
A I saw there the lower [part] of the receiver of cal. 45.
xxxx
Q Mr. Witness, at around 4:00 oclock that early morning of August 28, 2002, do you
recall another unusual incident?
A Yes, sir.
Q And can you tell us what was that incident?
A I saw a person throwing something there and the one that was thrown fell on top of
the roof of another house.
Q And you saw that person who again threw something from the rooftop of the
house?
A Yes, sir.
Q Did you recognize him?
A Yes, sir.
Q Who was that person?
A Zaldy Valerio again.
xxxx
Q Where were you when you saw this Zaldy Valerio thr[o]w something out of the
house?
A I was on the road in front of the house.
Q Where was Zaldy Valerio when you saw him thr[o]w something out of the house?

A He was on top of the house.

xxxx
Q Later on, were you able to know what was that something thrown out?
A Yes, sir.
Q What was that?
A Another lower receiver of a cal. 45.
xxxx
Q And what did he tell you?
A It [was] on the wall of another house and it [could] be seen right away.
xxxx
Q What did you do if any?
A We waited for the owner of the house to wake up.
xxxx
Q Who opened the fence for you?
A It was a lady who is the owner of the house.
Q When you entered the premises of the house of the lady, what did you find?
A We saw the lower receiver of this .45 cal. (sic) 21
The ensuing recovery of the receivers may have been deliberate; nonetheless, their initial
discovery was indubitably inadvertent. It is not crucial that at initial sighting the seized
contraband be identified and known to be so. The law merely requires that the law enforcer
observes that the seized item may be evidence of a crime, contraband, or otherwise subject
to seizure.
Hence, as correctly declared by the CA, the two receivers were admissible as evidence.
The liability for their possession, however, should fall only on Valerio and not on petitioner.

1avvphil

The foregoing disquisition notwithstanding, we find that petitioner is not liable for illegal
possession of part of a firearm.
In dissecting how and when liability for illegal possession of firearms attaches, the following
disquisitions in People v. De Gracia22 are instructive:
The rule is that ownership is not an essential element of illegal possession of firearms and
ammunition. What the law requires is merely possession which includes not only actual
physical possession but also constructive possession or the subjection of the thing to one's
control and management. This has to be so if the manifest intent of the law is to be
effective. The same evils, the same perils to public security, which the law penalizes exist
whether the unlicensed holder of a prohibited weapon be its owner or a borrower. To
accomplish the object of this law the proprietary concept of the possession can have no
bearing whatsoever.
But is the mere fact of physical or constructive possession sufficient to convict a person for
unlawful possession of firearms or must there be an intent to possess to constitute a
violation of the law? This query assumes significance since the offense of illegal possession
of firearms is a malum prohibitum punished by a special law, in which case good faith and
absence of criminal intent are not valid defenses.
When the crime is punished by a special law, as a rule, intent to commit the crime is not
necessary. It is sufficient that the offender has the intent to perpetrate the act prohibited by
the special law. Intent to commit the crime and intent to perpetrate the act must be
distinguished. A person may not have consciously intended to commit a crime; but he did
intend to commit an act, and that act is, by the very nature of things, the crime itself. In the
first (intent to commit the crime), there must be criminal intent; in the second (intent to
perpetrate the act) it is enough that the prohibited act is done freely and consciously.
In the present case, a distinction should be made between criminal intent and intent to
possess. While mere possession, without criminal intent, is sufficient to convict a person for
illegal possession of a firearm, it must still be shown that there was animus possidendi or an
intent to possess on the part of the accused. Such intent to possess is, however, without
regard to any other criminal or felonious intent which the accused may have harbored in
possessing the firearm. Criminal intent here refers to the intention of the accused to commit
an offense with the use of an unlicensed firearm. This is not important in convicting a person
under Presidential Decree No. 1866. Hence, in order that one may be found guilty of a
violation of the decree, it is sufficient that the accused had no authority or license to
possess a firearm, and that he intended to possess the same, even if such possession was
made in good faith and without criminal intent.
Concomitantly, a temporary, incidental, casual, or harmless possession or control of a
firearm cannot be considered a violation of a statute prohibiting the possession of this kind

of weapon, such as Presidential Decree No. 1866. Thus, although there is physical or
constructive possession, for as long as the animus possidendi is absent, there is no offense
committed.23
Certainly, illegal possession of firearms, or, in this case, part of a firearm, is committed when
the holder thereof:
(1) possesses a firearm or a part thereof
(2) lacks the authority or license to possess the firearm. 24
We find that petitioner was neither in physical nor constructive possession of the subject
receivers. The testimony of SPO2 Nava clearly bared that he only saw Valerio on top of the
house when the receivers were thrown. None of the witnesses saw petitioner holding the
receivers, before or during their disposal.
At the very least, petitioners possession of the receivers was merely incidental because
Valerio, the one in actual physical possession, was seen at the rooftop of petitioners house.
Absent any evidence pointing to petitioners participation, knowledge or consent in Valerios
actions, she cannot be held liable for illegal possession of the receivers.
Petitioners apparent liability for illegal possession of part of a firearm can only proceed from
the assumption that one of the thrown receivers matches the gun seen tucked in the
waistband of her shorts earlier that night. Unfortunately, the prosecution failed to convert
such assumption into concrete evidence.
Mere speculations and probabilities cannot substitute for proof required to establish the guilt
of an accused beyond reasonable doubt. The rule is the same whether the offenses are
punishable under the Revised Penal Code, which are mala in se, or in crimes, which
are malum prohibitum by virtue of special law.25 The quantum of proof required by law was
not adequately met in this case in so far as petitioner is concerned.
The gun allegedly seen tucked in petitioners waistband was not identified with sufficient
particularity; as such, it is impossible to match the same with any of the seized receivers.
Moreover, SPO1 Tan categorically stated that he saw Valerio holding two guns when he and
the rest of the PISOG arrived in petitioners house. It is not unlikely then that the receivers
later on discarded were components of the two (2) pistols seen with Valerio.
These findings also debunk the allegation in the information that petitioner conspired with
Valerio in committing illegal possession of part of a firearm. There is no evidence indubitably
proving that petitioner participated in the decision to commit the criminal act committed by
Valerio.

Hence, this Court is constrained to acquit petitioner on the ground of reasonable doubt. The
constitutional presumption of innocence in her favor was not adequately overcome by the
evidence adduced by the prosecution.
The CA correctly convicted Valerio with illegal possession of part of a firearm.
In illegal possession of a firearm, two (2) things must be shown to exist: (a) the existence of
the subject firearm; and (b) the fact that the accused who possessed the same does not
have the corresponding license for it.26
By analogy then, a successful conviction for illegal possession of part of a firearm must
yield these requisites:
(a) the existence of the part of the firearm; and
(b) the accused who possessed the same does not have the license for the firearm
to which the seized part/component corresponds.
In the instant case, the prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt the
elements of the crime. The subject receivers - one with the markings "United States
Property" and the other bearing Serial No. 763025 - were duly presented to the court as
Exhibits E and E-1, respectively. They were also identified by SPO2 Nava as the firearm
parts he retrieved af ter Valerio discarded them. 27 His testimony was corroborated by DYKR
radio announcer Vega, who witnessed the recovery of the receivers. 28
Anent the lack of authority, SPO1 Tan testified that, upon verification, it was ascertained that
Valerio is not a duly licensed/registered firearm holder of any type, kind, or caliber of
firearms.29 To substantiate his statement, he submitted a certification 30 to that effect and
identified the same in court.31 The testimony of SPO1 Tan, or the certification, would suffice
to prove beyond reasonable doubt the second element. 32
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the February 10, 2009 Decision of the Court of
Appeals is hereby REVERSED with respect to petitioner Elenita Fajardo y Castro, who is
hereby ACQUITTED on the ground that her guilt was not proved beyond reasonable doubt.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 191366

December 13, 2010

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.
ARNOLD MARTINEZ Y NGELES, EDGAR DIZON Y FERRER, REZIN MARTINEZ Y
CAROLINO, and RAFAEL GONZALES Y CUNANAN, Accused-Appellants.

DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This is an appeal from the August 7, 2009 Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals (CA), in CAG.R. HC-NO. 03269, which affirmed the February 13, 2008 Decision 2 of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 41, Dagupan City (RTC), in Criminal Case No. 2006-0525-D, finding the
accused guilty of violating Section 13, in relation to Section 11, Article II of Republic Act No.
9165 for Possession of Dangerous Drugs During Parties, Social Gatherings or Meetings.
The Facts
The Information indicting the accused reads:
That on or about the 2nd day of September 2006, in the City of Dagupan, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, ARNOLD
MARTINEZ y ANGELES, EDGAR DIZON y FERRER, REZIN MARTINEZ y CAROLINO,
ROLAND DORIA y DIAZ and RAFAEL GONZALES y CUNANAN, without authority of law,
confederating together, acting jointly and helping one another, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and criminally, sniff and possess dangerous drugs (shabu residues) contained in
empty plastic sachets and rolled aluminum foil, during a party, or at a social gathering or
meeting, or in the proximate company of at least two (2) person[s].
Contrary to Section 13, Article II, R.A. 9165. 3
Version of the Prosecution
As culled from the testimonies of prosecution witnesses, Police Officer 1 Bernard Azardon
(PO1 Azardon), one of the apprehending officers, and Police Inspector Lady Ellen Maranion
(P/Insp. Maranion), the forensic chemical officer, it appears that on September 2, 2006, at
around 12:45 oclock in the afternoon, PO1 Azardon was on duty at the Police Community
Precinct II along Arellano Street, Dagupan City, when a concerned citizen entered the
precinct and reported that a pot session was going on in the house of accused Rafael
Gonzales (Gonzales) in Trinidad Subdivision, Dagupan City. Upon receipt of the report, PO1
Azardon, PO1 Alejandro Dela Cruz (PO1 Dela Cruz), and members of the Special Weapons
and Tactics (SWAT) team hied to Trinidad Subdivision, Dagupan City. Upon inquiry from
people in the area, the house of Gonzales was located.
As the police officers entered the gate of the house, they saw accused Orlando
Doria (Doria) coming out of the side door and immediately arrested him. Inside the house,
they saw accused Gonzales, Arnold Martinez (A. Martinez), Edgar Dizon (Dizon), and Rezin
Martinez (R. Martinez) in a room. The four were surprised by the presence of the police. In
front of them were open plastic sachets (containing shabu residue), pieces of rolled used
aluminum foil and pieces of used aluminum foil.
The accused were arrested and brought to the police precinct. The items found in the room
were seized and turned over to the Pangasinan Provincial Police Crime Laboratory Officer,
P/Insp. Maranion. The latter conducted a laboratory examination on the seized items and all

115 plastic sachets, 11 pieces of rolled used aluminum foil, and 27 of the 49 pieces of used
aluminum foil tested positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride. The accused were
subjected to a drug test and, except for Doria, they were found to be positive for
methamphetamine hydrochloride.
Version of the Defense
The defense, through its witnesses, accused A. Martinez, Dizon, and R. Martinez, claimed
that in the morning of September 2, 2006, the three of them were along Arellano Street in
Trinidad Subdivision, Dagupan City, to meet with a certain Apper who bumped the
passenger jeep of R. Martinez and who was to give the materials for the painting of said
jeep. As they were going around the subdivision looking for Apper, they saw Gonzales in
front of his house and asked him if he noticed a person pass by. While they were talking,
Doria arrived. It was then that five to seven policemen emerged and apprehended them.
They were handcuffed and brought to the police station in Perez, Dagupan City, where they
were incarcerated and charged with sniffing shabu.
The Ruling of the RTC
The case against Doria was dismissed on a demurrer to evidence.
On February 13, 2008, the RTC rendered its decision, the dispositve portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered finding accused
ARNOLD MARTINEZ y Angeles, EDGAR DIZON y Ferrer, REZIN MARTINEZ y Carolino,
and RAFAEL GONZALES y Cunanan GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Possession of Dangerous Drugs During Parties, Social Gatherings or Meetings defined and
penalized under Section 13 in relation to Section 11, Article II of Republic Act 9165, and
each of them is sentenced to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and to pay the fine in
the amount of P500,000.00, and to pay the cost of suit.
The subject items are hereby forfeited in favor of the government and to be disposed of in
accordance with the law.
SO ORDERED.4
The RTC was of the view that the positive testimony of prosecution witness PO1 Azardon,
without any showing of ill-motive on his part, prevailed over the defenses of denial and alibi
put up by the accused. The accused were held to have been in constructive possession of
the subject items. A conspiracy was also found present as there was a common purpose to
possess the dangerous drug.
The Ruling of the CA
The CA ruled that there was sufficient evidence to support the findings of the RTC as to the
constructive possession of the dangerous drugs by the accused. It further held that although
the procedure regarding the custody and disposition of evidence prescribed by Section 21
of R.A. No. 9165 was not strictly complied with, the integrity and evidentiary value of the

evidence were nonetheless safeguarded. The CA was of the view that the presumption of
regularity in the performance of official duty was not sufficiently controverted by the
accused.
Not in conformity, the accused now interposes this appeal before this Court praying for the
reversal of the subject decision, presenting the following
Assignment of Errors
For accused Arnold Martinez, Edgar Dizon and Rezin Martinez
1. The lower court erred in finding the accused-appellants to be having a pot
session at the time of their arrest;
2. The lower court erred in not seeing through the antics of the police to plant
the shabu paraphernalia to justify the arrest of the accused-appellants without
warrant;
3. The lower court erred in not finding that the corpus delicti has not been
sufficiently established;
4. The lower court erred in not finding the uncorroborated testimony of PO1
Azardon insufficient to convict the accused-appellants of the crime charged;
5. The lower court erred in not acquitting the accused-appellants.
For accused Rafael Gonzales
I
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT
DESPITE THE PROSECUTIONS FAILURE TO OVERTHROW THE CONSTITUTIONAL
PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE.
II
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT
DESPITE THE PROSECUTIONS FAILURE TO ESTABLISH THE CHAIN OF CUSTODY
OF THE ALLEGED CONFISCATED DRUG.
After an assiduous assessment of the evidentiary records, the Court finds that the
prosecution failed to prove the guilt of the accused. The principal reasons are 1] that the
evidence against the accused are inadmissible; and 2] that granting the same to be
admissible, the chain of custody has not been duly established.
Illegal Arrest, Search and Seizure

Indeed, the accused is estopped from assailing the legality of his arrest if he fails to raise
such issue before arraignment.5 However, this waiver is limited only to the arrest. The
legality of an arrest affects only the jurisdiction of the court over the person of the accused.
A waiver of an illegal warrantless arrest does not carry with it a waiver of the inadmissibility
of evidence seized during the illegal warrantless arrest. 6
Although the admissibility of the evidence was not raised as in issue by the accused, it has
been held that this Court has the power to correct any error, even if unassigned, if such is
necessary in arriving at a just decision,7especially when the transcendental matter of life
and liberty is at stake.8 While it is true that rules of procedure are intended to promote rather
than frustrate the ends of justice, they nevertheless must not be met at the expense of
substantial justice. Time and again, this Court has reiterated the doctrine that the rules of
procedure are mere tools intended to facilitate the attainment of justice, rather than frustrate
it. Technicalities should never be used to defeat substantive rights. 9 Thus, despite the
procedural lapses of the accused, this Court shall rule on the admissibility of the evidence in
the case at bench. The clear infringement of the accuseds right to be protected against
unreasonable searches and seizures cannot be ignored.
The State cannot, in a manner contrary to its constitutional guarantee, intrude into the
persons of its citizens as well as into their houses, papers and effects. 10 Sec. 2, Art. III, of
the 1987 Constitution provides:
Section 2. - The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any
purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except
upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath
or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly
describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
This constitutional guarantee, however, is not a blanket prohibition against all searches and
seizures without warrant. Arrests and seizures in the following instances are allowed even in
the absence of a warrant (i) warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest; 11 (ii) search
of evidence in "plain view;" (iii) search of a moving vehicle; (iv) consented warrantless
search; (v) customs search; (vi) stop and frisk; and (vii) exigent and emergency
circumstances.12
This case would appear to fall under either a warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest
or a plain view search, both of which require a lawful arrest in order to be considered valid
exceptions to the constitutional guarantee. Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure provides for the circumstances under which a warrantless arrest is lawful. Thus:
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. A peace officer or a private person may,
without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;

(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe
based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be
arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal
establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily confined
while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one
confinement to another.
In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) above, the person arrested without a warrant
shall be forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or jail and shall be proceeded
against in accordance with section 7 of Rule 112.
A review of the facts reveal that the arrest of the accused was illegal and the subject items
were confiscated as an incident thereof. According to the testimony of PO1 Azardon and his
Joint Affidavit13 with PO1 Dela Cruz, they proceeded to, and entered, the house of accused
Gonzales based solely on the report of a concerned citizen that a pot session was going on
in said house, to wit:
Q: I go back to the information referred to you by the informant, did he not tell you
how many persons were actually conducting the pot session?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: When you went to the place of Rafael Gonzales, of course you were not armed
with a search warrant, correct?
A: None, sir.
Q: Before the information was given to you by your alleged informant, you did not
know personally Rafael Gonzales?
A: I have not met [him] yet but I heard his name, sir.
Q: When this informant told you that he was told that there was [an] ongoing pot
session in the house of Rafael Gonzales, was this report to you placed in the police
blotter before you proceeded to the house of Rafael Gonzales?
A: I think it was no longer recorded, sir.
Q: In other words, you did not even bother to get the personal data or identity of the
person who told you that he was allegedly informed that there was an ongoing pot
session in the house of Rafael Gonzales?
A: What I know is that he is a jeepney driver of a downtown jeepney but he does not
want to be identified because he was afraid, sir.

Q: And likewise, he did not inform you who told him that there was an ongoing pot
session in the house of Rafael Gonzales?
A: No more, sir.
Q: But upon receiving such report from that jeepney driver you immediately formed a
group and went to the place of Rafael Gonzales?
A: Yes, sir.
xxx
Q: When you were at the open gate of the premises of Rafael Gonzales, you could
not see what is happening inside the house of Rafael Gonzales?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: You did not also see the alleged paraphernalia as well as the plastic sachet of
shabu on the table while you were outside the premises of the property of Rafael
Gonzales?
xxx
Q: Before they entered the premises they could not see the paraphernalia?
COURT: Answer.
A: Of course because they were inside the room, how could we see them, sir.
Q: But still you entered the premises, only because a certain person who told you
that he was informed by another person that there was an ongoing pot session going
on inside the house of Rafael Gonzales?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And that is the only reason why you barged in inside the house of Rafael
Gonzales and you arrested the persons you saw?
A: Yes, sir.14
Paragraph (c) of Rule 113 is clearly inapplicable to this case. Paragraphs (a) and (b), on the
other hand, may be applicable and both require probable cause to be present in order for a
warrantless arrest to be valid. Probable cause has been held to signify a reasonable ground
of suspicion supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a
cautious mans belief that the person accused is guilty of the offense with which he is
charged.15

Although this Court has ruled in several dangerous drugs cases 16 that tipped information is
sufficient probable cause to effect a warrantless search, 17 such rulings cannot be applied in
the case at bench because said cases involve either a buy-bust operation or drugs in
transit, basically, circumstances other than the sole tip of an informer as basis for the arrest.
None of these drug cases involve police officers entering a house without warrant to effect
arrest and seizure based solely on an informers tip. The case of People v. Bolasa 18 is
informative on this matter.
In People v. Bolasa, an anonymous caller tipped off the police that a man and a woman
were repacking prohibited drugs at a certain house. The police immediately proceeded to
the house of the suspects. They walked towards the house accompanied by their informer.
When they reached the house, they peeped inside through a small window and saw a man
and woman repacking marijuana. They then entered the house, introduced themselves as
police officers, confiscated the drug paraphernalia, and arrested the suspects. This Court
ruled:
The manner by which accused-appellants were apprehended does not fall under any of the
above-enumerated categories. Perforce, their arrest is illegal. First, the arresting officers
had no personal knowledge that at the time of their arrest, accused-appellants had just
committed, were committing, or were about to commit a crime. Second, the arresting
officers had no personal knowledge that a crime was committed nor did they have any
reasonable ground to believe that accused-appellants committed it. Third, accusedappellants were not prisoners who have escaped from a penal establishment.
Neither can it be said that the objects were seized in plain view. First, there was no valid
intrusion. As already discussed, accused-appellants were illegally arrested. Second, the
evidence, i.e., the tea bags later on found to contain marijuana, was not inadvertently
discovered. The police officers intentionally peeped first through the window before they
saw and ascertained the activities of accused-appellants inside the room. In like manner,
the search cannot be categorized as a search of a moving vehicle, a consented warrantless
search, a customs search, or a stop and frisk; it cannot even fall under exigent and
emergency circumstances, for the evidence at hand is bereft of any such showing.
On the contrary, it indicates that the apprehending officers should have conducted first a
surveillance considering that the identities and address of the suspected culprits were
already ascertained. After conducting the surveillance and determining the existence of
probable cause for arresting accused-appellants, they should have secured a search
warrant prior to effecting a valid arrest and seizure. The arrest being illegal ab initio, the
accompanying search was likewise illegal. Every evidence thus obtained during the illegal
search cannot be used against accused-appellants; hence, their acquittal must follow in
faithful obeisance to the fundamental law.19
It has been held that personal knowledge of facts in arrests without warrant must be based
upon probable cause, which means an actual belief or reasonable grounds of suspicion.
The grounds of suspicion are reasonable when the suspicion, that the person to be arrested
is probably guilty of committing an offense, is based on actual facts, that is, supported by
circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to create the probable cause of guilt of the
person to be arrested. 20

As to paragraph (a) of Section 5 of Rule 113, the arresting officers had no personal
knowledge that at the time of the arrest, accused had just committed, were committing, or
were about to commit a crime, as they had no probable cause to enter the house of
accused Rafael Gonzales in order to arrest them. As to paragraph (b), the arresting officers
had no personal knowledge of facts and circumstances that would lead them to believe that
the accused had just committed an offense. As admitted in the testimony of PO1 Azardon,
the tip originated from a concerned citizen who himself had no personal knowledge of the
information that was reported to the police:
Q: Mr. Witness, you claimed that the reason for apprehending all the accused was
based on a tip-off by an informant?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: What exactly [did] that informant tell you?
A: He told us that somebody told him that there was an ongoing pot session in the
house of one of the accused Rafael Gonzales, sir.
Q: You mean to say that it was not the informant himself to whom the information
originated but from somebody else?
A: That was what he told me, sir.
Q: Because of that you proceeded to where the alleged pot session was going on?
[No Answer]
Q: Did you[r] informant particularly pinpointed [sic] to where the alleged pot session
was going on?
A: No more because he did not go with us, sir.
Q: So you merely relied on what he said that something or a pot session was going
on somewhere in Arellano but you dont know the exact place where the pot session
was going on?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And your informant has no personal knowledge as to the veracity of the
alleged pot session because he claimed that he derived that information from
somebody else?
A: This is what he told us that somebody told him that there was an ongoing pot
session, sir.
Q: Despite of [sic] that information you proceeded to where?
A: Trinidad Subdivision, sir.

xxx
Q: Mr. Witness, did your informant named [sic] those included in the alleged pot
session?
A: No, sir.
Q: That was, because your informant dont [sic] know physically what was really
happening there?
A: He was told by another person that there was an ongoing pot session there,
sir.21 [Emphasis supplied]
Neither can it be said that the subject items were seized in plain view. The elements of
plainview are: (a) a prior valid intrusion based on the valid warrantless arrest in which the
police are legally present in the pursuit of their official duties; (b) the evidence was
inadvertently discovered by the police who have the right to be where they are; (c) the
evidence must be immediately apparent; and, (d) "plain view" justified mere seizure of
evidence without further search.22
The evidence was not inadvertently discovered as the police officers intentionally entered
the house with no prior surveillance or investigation before they discovered the accused
with the subject items. If the prior peeking of the police officers in Bolasa was held to be
insufficient to constitute plain view, then more so should the warrantless search in this case
be struck down. Neither can the search be considered as a search of a moving vehicle, a
consented warrantless search, a customs search, a stop and frisk, or one under exigent and
emergency circumstances.
The apprehending officers should have first conducted a surveillance considering that the
identity and address of one of the accused were already ascertained. After conducting the
surveillance and determining the existence of probable cause, then a search warrant should
have been secured prior to effecting arrest and seizure. The arrest being illegal, the ensuing
search as a result thereof is likewise illegal. Evidence procured on the occasion of an
unreasonable search and seizure is deemed tainted for being the proverbial fruit of a
poisonous tree and should be excluded.23 The subject items seized during the illegal arrest
are thus inadmissible. The drug, being the verycorpus delicti of the crime of illegal
possession of dangerous drugs, its inadmissibility thus precludes conviction, and calls for
the acquittal of the accused.
As has been noted previously by this Court, some lawmen, prosecutors and judges have
glossed over illegal searches and seizures in cases where law enforcers are able to present
the alleged evidence of the crime, regardless of the methods by which they were obtained.
This attitude tramples on constitutionally-guaranteed rights in the name of law enforcement.
It is ironic that such enforcement of the law fosters the breakdown of our system of justice
and the eventual denigration of society. While this Court appreciates and encourages the
efforts of law enforcers to uphold the law and to preserve the peace and security of society,
we nevertheless admonish them to act with deliberate care and within the parameters set
by the Constitution and the law.24

Chain of Custody
Even granting that the seized items are admissible as evidence, the acquittal of the accused
would still be in order for failure of the apprehending officers to comply with the chain of
custody requirement in dangerous drugs cases.
The accused contend that the identity of the seized drug was not established with moral
certainty as the chain of custody appears to be questionable, the authorities having failed to
comply with Sections 21 and 86 of R.A. No. 9165, and Dangerous Drug
Board (DDB) Resolution No. 03, Series of 1979, as amended by Board Regulation No. 2,
Series of 1990. They argue that there was no prior coordination with the Philippine Drug
Enforcement Agency (PDEA), no inventory of the confiscated items conducted at the crime
scene, no photograph of the items taken, no compliance with the rule requiring the accused
to sign the inventory and to give them copies thereof, and no showing of how the items
were handled from the time of confiscation up to the time of submission to the crime
laboratory for testing. Therefore, the corpus delicti was not proven, thereby producing
reasonable doubt as to their guilt. Thus, they assert that the presumption of innocence in
their favor was not overcome by the presumption of regularity in the performance of official
duty.
The essential requisites to establish illegal possession of dangerous drugs are: (i) the
accused was in possession of the dangerous drug, (ii) such possession is not authorized by
law, and (iii) the accused freely and consciously possessed the dangerous
drug.25 Additionally, this being a case for violation of Section 13 of R.A. No. 9165, an
additional element of the crime is (iv) the possession of the dangerous drug must have
occurred during a party, or at a social gathering or meeting, or in the proximate company of
at least two (2) persons.
The existence of the drug is the very corpus delicti of the crime of illegal possession of
dangerous drugs and, thus, a condition sine qua non for conviction. In order to establish the
existence of the drug, its chain of custodymust be sufficiently established. The chain of
custody requirement is essential to ensure that doubts regarding the identity of the evidence
are removed through the monitoring and tracking of the movements of the seized drugs
from the accused, to the police, to the forensic chemist, and finally to the court. 26 Malillin v.
People was the first in a growing number of cases to explain the importance of chain of
custody in dangerous drugs cases, to wit:
As a method of authenticating evidence, the chain of custody rule requires that the
admission of an exhibit be preceded by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the
matter in question is what the proponent claims it to be. It would include testimony about
every link in the chain, from the moment the item was picked up to the time it is offered into
evidence, in such a way that every person who touched the exhibit would describe how and
from whom it was received, where it was and what happened to it while in the witness'
possession, the condition in which it was received and the condition in which it was
delivered to the next link in the chain. These witnesses would then describe the precautions
taken to ensure that there had been no change in the condition of the item and no
opportunity for someone not in the chain to have possession of the same. 27

Section 1(b) of DDB Regulation No. 1, Series of 2002, 28 defines chain of custody as follows:
b. "Chain of Custody" means the duly recorded authorized movements and custody of
seized drugs or controlled chemicals or plant sources of dangerous drugs or laboratory
equipment of each stage, from the time of seizure/confiscation to receipt in the forensic
laboratory to safekeeping to presentation in court for destruction. Such record of
movements and custody of seized item shall include the identity and signature of the person
who held temporary custody of the seized item, the date and time when such transfer of
custody were made in the course of safekeeping and used in court as evidence, and the
final disposition;
Paragraph 1, Section 21, Article II of R.A. No. 9165, provides for safeguards for the
protection of the identity and integrity of dangerous drugs seized, to wit:
SEC. 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized, and/or Surrendered Dangerous
Drugs, Plant Sources of Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals,
Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory Equipment. The PDEA shall take charge
and have custody of all dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs controlled
precursors and essential chemicals, as well as instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory
equipment so confiscated, seized and/or surrendered, for proper disposition in the following
manner:
(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately
after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the
presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or
seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the
Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign
the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof.
People v. Habana thoroughly discusses the proper procedure for the custody of seized or
confiscated items in dangerous drugs cases in order to ensure their identity and integrity, as
follows:
Usually, the police officer who seizes the suspected substance turns it over to a supervising
officer, who would then send it by courier to the police crime laboratory for testing. Since it is
unavoidable that possession of the substance changes hand a number of times, it is
imperative for the officer who seized the substance from the suspect to place his marking
on its plastic container and seal the same, preferably with adhesive tape that cannot be
removed without leaving a tear on the plastic container. At the trial, the officer can then
identify the seized substance and the procedure he observed to preserve its integrity until it
reaches the crime laboratory.
If the substance is not in a plastic container, the officer should put it in one and seal the
same. In this way the substance would assuredly reach the laboratory in the same condition
it was seized from the accused. Further, after the laboratory technician tests and verifies the
nature of the substance in the container, he should put his own mark on the plastic
container and seal it again with a new seal since the police officers seal has been broken.
At the trial, the technician can then describe the sealed condition of the plastic container

when it was handed to him and testify on the procedure he took afterwards to preserve its
integrity.
If the sealing of the seized substance has not been made, the prosecution would have to
present every police officer, messenger, laboratory technician, and storage personnel, the
entire chain of custody, no matter how briefly ones possession has been. Each of them has
to testify that the substance, although unsealed, has not been tampered with or substituted
while in his care.29
Section 21(a) of the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of R.A. No. 9165 further
elaborates, and provides for, the possibility of non-compliance with the prescribed
procedure:
(a) The apprehending officer/team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall,
immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in
the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or
seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the
Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign
the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof: Provided, that the physical
inventory and photograph shall be conducted at the place where the search warrant is
served; or at the nearest police station or at the nearest office of the apprehending
officer/team, whichever is practicable, in case of warrantless seizures; Provided, further that
non-compliance with these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity
and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending
officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures of and custody over said items.
[Emphasis supplied]
Accordingly, non-compliance with the prescribed procedural requirements will not
necessarily render the seizure and custody of the items void and invalid, provided that (i)
there is a justifiable ground for such non-compliance, and (ii) the integrity and evidentiary
value of the seized items are properly preserved. In this case, however, no justifiable
ground is found availing, and it is apparent that there was a failure to properly preserve the
integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items to ensure the identity of the corpus
delicti from the time of seizure to the time of presentation in court. A review of the
testimonies of the prosecution witnesses and the documentary records of the case reveals
irreparably broken links in the chain of custody.
According to the apprehending police officers in their Joint Affidavit, the following were
confiscated from the accused, to wit:
a) Several pcs of used empty plastic sachets containing suspected shabu residues.
b) Eight used (8) disposable lighters ( two (2) pcs colored orange, two (2) pcs
colored yellow, one (1) pc colored green & one (1) pc colored white ).
c) Several pcs of used rolled aluminum foil containing suspected shabu residues.
d) Several pcs of used cut aluminum foil containing suspected shabu residues.

e) One (1) pc glass tube containing suspected shabu residues.30

[Emphases supplied]
At the police station, the case, the accused, and the above-mentioned items were indorsed
to Duty Investigator Senior Police Officer 1 Pedro Urbano, Jr. (SPO1 Urbano) for proper
disposition.31 A letter-request for laboratory examination was prepared by Police
Superintendent Edgar Orduna Basbag for the following items:
a) Pieces of used empty small plastic sachets with suspected shabu residues
marked "DC&A-1."
b) Pieces of used rolled and cut aluminum foil with suspected shabu residues
marked "DC&A-2."
c) Pieces of used cut aluminum foil with suspected shabu residues marked "DC&A3."32
[Emphases supplied]
The letter-request and above-mentioned items were submitted to P/Insp. Maranion by
SPO3 Froilan Esteban (SPO3 Esteban). Final Chemistry Report No. D-042-06L listed the
specimens which were submitted for testing, to wit:
SPECIMENS SUBMITTED:
A A1 to A115 One Hundred fifteen (115) open transparent plastic sachet with
tag each containing suspected shabu residue without markings.
B B1 to B11 Eleven (11) rolled used aluminum foil with tag each containing
suspected shabu residuewithout markings.
C C1 to C49 Forty-nine (49) used aluminum foil with tag each containing
suspected shabu residuewithout markings.33
[Emphases supplied]
Three days after the subject items were seized, or on September 5, 2006, a Confiscation
Receipt was issued by PO1 Azardon and PO1 Dela Cruz, which reads:
DCPS AID SOTG 05 September 2006
CONFISCATION RECEIPT
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:
THIS IS TO CERTIFY that on or about 12:45 noon of September 4, 2006, we together with
our precinct supervisor, SPO4 Pedro Belen Jr., and SWAT members composed of SPO1

Marlon Decano, PO3 Manuel Garcia, PO2 Adriano Cepiroto and PO1 Aldrin Guarin
apprehended the following names of persons of ARNOLD MARTINEZ Y ANGELES, 37 yrs
old, married, jobless, a resident of Lucao Dist., this city; EDGAR DIZON Y FERRER, 36 yrs
old, single, tricycle driver, a resident of 471 Lucao Dist., this city. REZIN MARTINEZ Y
CAROLINO, 44 yrs old, married, jitney driver, a resident of Lucao Disttrict this city; ROLAND
DORIA Y DIAZ, 39 yrs old, married, businessman, resident of Cabeldatan, Malasiqui,
Pangasinan and RAFAEL GONZALES Y CUNANAN, 49 yrs old, separated, jobless and a
resident of Trinidad Subd., Arellano-Bani this city.
Suspects were duly informed of their constitutional rights and were brought to Dagupan City
Police Station, Perez Market Site Dagupan City and indorsed to Duty Desk Officer to record
the incident andthe sachet of suspected Shabu Paraphernalias were brought to PNP
Crime Laboratory, Lingayen, Pangasinan for Laboratory Examination.
Seizing Officer:
(sgd.)
PO1 Bernard B Azardon
Affiant

(sgd.)
PO1 Alejandro Dela Cruz
Affiant

Remarks:
Refused to Signed
Refused to Signed
Refused to Signed
Refused to Signed
Refused to Signed34
[Emphases supplied]
The 115 open transparent plastic sachets, 11 pieces of rolled used aluminum foil, and 27 (of
the 49) pieces of used aluminum foil, all containing shabu residue, as identified in the Final
Chemistry Report, were presented in court and marked as Exhibits "H" and series, "I" and
series, and "J" and series, respectively. Said items were identified by PO1 Azardon and
P/Insp. Maranion at the witness stand.35
The CA ruled that the integrity and evidentiary value of the subject items were properly
preserved as there was sufficient evidence to prove that the items seized from the accused
were the same ones forwarded to the crime laboratory for examination, as shown in the
Confiscation Receipt and the letter-request for laboratory examination.
A review of the chain of custody indicates, however, that the CA is mistaken.

First, the apprehending team failed to comply with Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165. After
seizure and confiscation of the subject items, no physical inventory was conducted in the
presence of the accused, or their representative or counsel, a representative from the
media and the DOJ, and any elected public official. Thus, no inventory was prepared,
signed, and provided to the accused in the manner required by law. PO1 Azardon, in his
testimony,36admitted that no photographs were taken. The only discernable reason proffered
by him for the failure to comply with the prescribed procedure was that the situation
happened so suddenly. Thus:
Q: But upon receiving such report from that jeepney driver you immediately formed a
group and went to the place of Rafael Gonzales?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Such that you did not even inform the PDEA before you barged in that place of
Rafael Gonzales?
A: It was so suddenly, [sic] sir.
Q: And that explains the reason why you were not able to have pictures taken, is that
correct?
A: Yes, sir.37
[Emphasis supplied]
The Court does not find such to be a justifiable ground to excuse non-compliance. The
suddenness of the situation cannot justify non-compliance with the requirements. The police
officers were not prevented from preparing an inventory and taking photographs. In fact,
Section 21(a) of the IRR of R.A. No. 9165 provides specifically that in case of warrantless
seizures, the inventory and photographs shall be done at the nearest police station or at the
nearest office of the apprehending officer/team. Whatever effect the suddenness of the
situation may have had should have dissipated by the time they reached the police station,
as the suspects had already been arrested and the items seized. Moreover, it has been held
that in case of warrantless seizures nothing prevents the apprehending officer from
immediately conducting the physical inventory and photography of the items at their place of
seizure, as it is more in keeping with the laws intent to preserve their integrity and
evidentiary value.38
This Court has repeatedly reversed conviction in drug cases for failure to comply with
Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165, resulting in the failure to properly preserve the integrity and
evidentiary value of the seized items. Some cases are People v. Garcia,39 People v. Dela
Cruz,40 People v. Dela Cruz,41 People v. Santos, Jr.,42 People v. Nazareno,43 People v.
Orteza,44 Zarraga v. People,45 and People v. Kimura.46
Second, the subject items were not properly marked. The case of People v. Sanchez is
instructive on the requirement of marking, to wit:

What Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 and its implementing rule do not expressly specify is the
matter of "marking" of the seized items in warrantless seizures to ensure that the evidence
seized upon apprehension is the same evidence subjected to inventory and photography
when these activities are undertaken at the police station rather than at the place of arrest.
Consistency with the "chain of custody" rule requires that the "marking" of the seized items to truly ensure that they are the same items that enter the chain and are eventually the ones
offered in evidence - should be done (1) in the presence of the apprehended
violator (2) immediately upon confiscation. This step initiates the process of protecting
innocent persons from dubious and concocted searches, and of protecting as well the
apprehending officers from harassment suits based on planting of evidence under Section
29 and on allegations of robbery or theft.
For greater specificity, "marking" means the placing by the apprehending officer or
the poseur-buyer of his/her initials and signature on the item/s seized. x x x Thereafter, the
seized items shall be placed in an envelope or an evidence bag unless the type and
quantity of the seized items require a different type of handling and/or container. The
evidence bag or container shall accordingly be signed by the handling officer and turned
over to the next officer in the chain of custody.47 [Emphasis in the original]
Nowhere in the testimony of PO1 Azardon or in his Joint Affidavit with PO1 Dela Cruz does
it appear that the subject items were at all marked. It was only in the letter-request for
laboratory examination that the subject items were indicated to have been marked with
"DC&A-1," "DC&A-2" and "DC&A-3." There is no showing, however, as to who made those
markings and when they were made. Moreover, those purported markings were never
mentioned when the subject items were identified by the prosecution witnesses when they
took the stand.
The markings appear to pertain to a group of items, that is, empty plastic sachets, rolled
and cut aluminium foil, and cut aluminium foil, but do not specifically pertain to any
individual item in each group. Furthermore, it was only in the Chemistry Report 48 that the
precise number of each type of item was indicated and enumerated. The Court notes that in
all documents prior to said report, the subject items were never accurately quantified but
only described as "pieces,"49 "several pcs,"50 and "shabu paraphernallas."51 Strangely, the
Chemistry Report indicates that all the subject items had "no markings," although each item
was reported to have been marked by P/Insp. Maranion in the course of processing the
subject items during laboratory examination and testing. 52Doubt, therefore, arises as to the
identity of the subject items. It cannot be determined with moral certainty that the subject
items seized from the accused were the same ones subjected to the laboratory examination
and presented in court.
This Court has acquitted the accused for the failure and irregularity in the marking of seized
items in dangerous drugs cases, such as Zarraga v. People,53 People v.
Kimura,54 and People v. Laxa.55
Third, the Confiscation Receipt relied upon by the prosecution and the courts below gives
rise to more uncertainty. Instead of being prepared on the day of the seizure of the items, it
was prepared only three days after. More important, the receipt did not even indicate exactly
what items were confiscated and their quantity. These are basic information that a

confiscation receipt should provide. The only information contained in the Confiscation
Receipt was the fact of arrest of the accused and the general description of the subject
items as "the sachet of suspected Shabu paraphernallas were brought to the PNP Crime
Laboratory." The receipt is made even more dubious by PO1 Azardons admission in his
testimony56 that he did not personally prepare the Confiscation Receipt and he did not know
exactly who did so.
Fourth, according to the Certification57 issued by the Dagupan Police Station, the subject
items were indorsed by PO1 Dela Cruz to Duty Investigator SPO1 Urbano for proper
disposition. These were later turned over by SPO3 Esteban to P/Insp. Maranion. There is,
however, no showing of how and when the subject items were transferred from SPO1
Urbano to SPO3 Esteban.
Fifth, P/Insp. Maranion appears to be the last person in the chain of custody. No witness
testified on how the subject items were kept after they were tested prior to their presentation
in court. This Court has highlighted similar shortcomings in People v. Cervantes,58 People v.
Garcia,59 People v. Sanchez,60 and Malillin v. People.61
More irregularities further darken the cloud as to the guilt of the accused. Contrary to PO1
Azardons testimony62that they were tipped off by a concerned citizen while at the police
station, the Letter63 to the Executive Director of the DDB states that the apprehending
officers were tipped off "while conducting monitoring/surveillance." Said letter also indicates,
as does the Confiscation Receipt, that the arrest and seizure occurred on September 4,
2006, and not September 2, 2006, as alleged in the Information. It was also mentioned in
the aforementioned Certification of the Dagupan Police and Joint Affidavit of the police
officers that a glass tube suspected to contain shabu residue was also confiscated from the
accused. Interestingly, no glass tube was submitted for laboratory examination.
In sum, numerous lapses and irregularities in the chain of custody belie the prosecutions
position that the integrity and evidentiary value of the subject items were properly
preserved. The two documents specifically relied on by the CA, the Confiscation Receipt
and the letter-request for laboratory examination, have been shown to be grossly insufficient
in proving the identity of the corpus delicti. The corpus delicti in dangerous drugs cases
constitutes the drug itself. This means that proof beyond reasonable doubt of the identity of
the prohibited drug is essential before the accused can be found guilty.64
Regarding the lack of prior coordination with the PDEA provided in Section 86 of R.A. No.
9165, in People v. Sta. Maria,65 this Court held that said section was silent as to the
consequences of such failure, and said silence could not be interpreted as a legislative
intent to make an arrest without the participation of PDEA illegal, nor evidence obtained
pursuant to such an arrest inadmissible. Section 86 is explicit only in saying that the PDEA
shall be the "lead agency" in the investigation and prosecution of drug-related cases.
Therefore, other law enforcement bodies still possess authority to perform similar functions
as the PDEA as long as illegal drugs cases will eventually be transferred to the latter.
Let it be stressed that non-compliance with Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 does not affect the
admissibility of the evidence but only its weight. 66 Thus, had the subject items in this case

been admissible, their evidentiary merit and probative value would be insufficient to warrant
conviction.
It may be true that where no ill motive can be attributed to the police officers, the
presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty should prevail. However, such
presumption obtains only when there is no deviation from the regular performance of
duty.67 Where the official act in question is irregular on its face, the presumption of regularity
cannot stand.
In this case, the official acts of the law enforcers were clearly shown and proven to be
irregular. When challenged by the evidence of a flawed chain of custody, the presumption of
regularity cannot prevail over the presumption of innocence of the accused. 68
This Court once again takes note of the growing number of acquittals for dangerous drugs
cases due to the failure of law enforcers to observe the proper arrest, search and seizure
procedure under the law.69 Some bona fide arrests and seizures in dangerous drugs cases
result in the acquittal of the accused because drug enforcement operatives compromise the
integrity and evidentiary worth of the seized items. It behooves this Court to remind law
enforcement agencies to exert greater effort to apply the rules and procedures governing
the custody, control, and handling of seized drugs.
It is recognized that strict compliance with the legal prescriptions of R.A. No. 9165 may not
always be possible. Thus, as earlier stated, non-compliance therewith is not necessarily
fatal. However, the lapses in procedure must be recognized, addressed and explained in
terms of their justifiable grounds, and the integrity and evidentiary value of the evidence
seized must be shown to have been preserved.70
On a final note, this Court takes the opportunity to be instructive on Sec. 1171 (Possession of
Dangerous Drugs) and Sec. 1572 (Use of Dangerous Drugs) of R.A. No. 9165, with regard to
the charges that are filed by law enforcers. This Court notes the practice of law enforcers of
filing charges under Sec. 11 in cases where the presence of dangerous drugs as basis for
possession is only and solely in the form of residue, being subsumed under the last
paragraph of Sec. 11. Although not incorrect, it would be more in keeping with the intent of
the law to file charges under Sec. 15 instead in order to rehabilitate first time offenders of
drug use, provided that there is a positive confirmatory test result as required under Sec.
15. The minimum penalty under the last paragraph of Sec. 11 for the possession of residue
is imprisonment of twelve years and one day, while the penalty under Sec. 15 for first time
offenders of drug use is a minimum of six months rehabilitation in a government center. To
file charges under Sec. 11 on the basis of residue alone would frustrate the objective of the
law to rehabilitate drug users and provide them with an opportunity to recover for a second
chance at life.
In the case at bench, the presence of dangerous drugs was only in the form of residue on
the drug paraphernalia, and the accused were found positive for use of dangerous drugs.
Granting that the arrest was legal, the evidence obtained admissible, and the chain of
custody intact, the law enforcers should have filed charges under Sec. 15, R.A. No. 9165 or
for use of dangerous drugs and, if there was no residue at all, they should have been
charged under Sec. 1473 (Possession of Equipment, Instrument, Apparatus and Other

Paraphernalia for Dangerous Drugs During Parties, Social Gatherings or Meetings). Sec. 14
provides that the maximum penalty under Sec. 12 74(Possession of Possession of
Equipment, Instrument, Apparatus and Other Paraphernalia for Dangerous Drugs) shall be
imposed on any person who shall possess any equipment, instrument, apparatus and other
paraphernalia for dangerous drugs. Under Sec. 12, the maximum penalty is imprisonment
of four years and a fine of P50,000.00. In fact, under the same section, the possession of
such equipment, apparatus or other paraphernalia is prima facie evidence that the
possessor has used a dangerous drug and shall be presumed to have violated Sec. 15.
1avvphi1

In order to effectively fulfill the intent of the law to rehabilitate drug users, this Court thus
calls on law enforcers and prosecutors in dangerous drugs cases to exercise proper
discretion in filing charges when the presence of dangerous drugs is only and solely in the
form of residue and the confirmatory test required under Sec. 15 is positive for use of
dangerous drugs. In such cases, to afford the accused a chance to be rehabilitated, the
filing of charges for or involving possession of dangerous drugs should only be done when
another separate quantity of dangerous drugs, other than mere residue, is found in the
possession of the accused as provided for in Sec. 15.
WHEREFORE, the August 7, 2009 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. HC-NO.
03269 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and another judgment entered ACQUITTING the
accused and ordering their immediate release from detention, unless they are confined for
any other lawful cause.
Let a copy of this decision be furnished the Director of the Bureau of Corrections,
Muntinlupa City, for immediate implementation. The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is
directed to report to this Court within five days from receipt of this decision the action he has
taken. Copies shall also be furnished the Director-General, Philippine National Police, and
the Director-General, Philippine Drugs Enforcement Agency, for their information and
guidance.
The Regional Trial Court, Branch 41, Dagupan City, is directed to turn over the seized items
to the Dangerous Drugs Board for destruction in accordance with law.
G.R. No. 173474

August 29, 2012

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.
REYNALDO BELOCURA y PEREZ, Accused-Appellant.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
The credibility of the evidence of the corpus delicti in a prosecution for illegal possession of
marij11ana under Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, depends on the integrity of the chain
of custody of the marijuana from the time of its seizure until the time of its presentation as

evidence in court. Short of that, the accused is entitled to an acquittal because the State
fails to establish the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt.
The Case
Reynaldo Belocura y Perez, a police officer charged with illegal possession of 1,789.823
grams of marijuana in violation of Republic Act No. 6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972), as
amended by Republic Act No. 7659, was found guilty of the crime charged on April 22, 2003
by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Manila, and sentenced to suffer reclusion perpetua and
to pay a fine of P 500,000.00.1
On appeal, the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the conviction on January 23, 2006. 2 Hence,
this final appeal for his acquittal.
Antecedents
Belocura was charged on April 13, 1999 by the Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila with a
violation of Section 8 of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, in
the Manila RTC through the information:
That on or about March 22, 1999, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and knowingly have in his possession and under his
custody and control one (1) plastic bag colored red and white, with label "SHIN TON YON",
containing the following:
One (1) newspaper leaf used to wrap one (1) brick of dried marijuana fruiting tops weighing
830.532 grams;
One (1) newspaper leaf used to wrap one (1) brick of dried marijuana fruiting tops weighing
959.291 grams.
With a total weight of 1,789.823 grams, a prohibited drug.
Contrary to law.3
After Belocura pleaded not guilty,4 the State presented three witnesses, namely: Insp.
Arlene Valdez Coronel, Chief Insp. Ferdinand Ortales Divina, and SPO1 Gregorio P. Rojas.
On the other hand, the Defense presented Belocura as its sole witness.
I
The States Evidence

On March 22, 1999, at 11 oclock in the morning, Chief Insp. Divina was in his office in the
headquarters of the Western Police District (WPD) on United Nations Avenue in Manila
when he received a call from a male person who refused to identify himself for fear of
reprisal. The caller tipped him off about a robbery to be staged along Lopez Street, Tondo,
Manila. After relaying the tip to his superior officer, he was immediately ordered to form a
team composed of operatives of the District Intelligence Group and to coordinate with the
Special Weapons and Attack Team (SWAT) and the Mobile Patrol of the WPD.
After a briefing, Chief Insp. Divina and the other operatives proceeded to Lopez Street,
reaching the site before 1:00 pm. Chief Insp. Divina and PO2 Eraldo Santos positioned
themselves along Vitas Street. At around 2:00 pm, Chief Insp. Divina spotted an owner-type
jeep bearing a spurious government plate (SBM-510) cruising along Vitas Street and told
the rest of the team about it. The numbers of the car plate were painted white. The driver
was later identified as Belocura. Chief Insp. Divina signaled for Belocura to stop for
verification but the latter ignored the signal and sped off towards Balut, Tondo. The team
pursued Belocuras jeep until they blocked its path with their Tamaraw FX vehicle, forcing
Belocura to stop. At this point, Chief Insp. Divina and the rest of the team approached the
jeep and introduced themselves to Belocura as policemen. Chief Insp. Divina queried
Belocura on the government plate. SPO1 Rojas confiscated Belocuras Berreta 9 mm. pistol
(Serial Number M13086Z) that was tucked in his waist and its fully loaded magazine when
he could not produce the appropriate documents for the pistol and the government plate.
They arrested him.
PO2 Santos searched Belocuras jeep, and recovered a red plastic bag under the drivers
seat. Chief Insp. Divina directed PO2 Santos to inspect the contents of the red plastic bag,
which turned out to be two bricks of marijuanawrapped in newspaper.
Afterwards, the team returned with Belocura to the WPD Headquarters on board the
Tamaraw FX. The team turned over the jeep and the red plastic bag with its contents to the
General Assignment Section for proper disposition. 5
Chief Insp. Divina said that the caller did not mention anything about any vehicle; that he
and his men were in civilian clothes at the time; that it was PO2 Santos who recovered the
red plastic bag containing the marijuanabricks; and that SPO1 Rojas examined the contents
of the bag in his presence.6
SPO1 Rojas confirmed his part in the operation. 7 He conceded that he was not present
when the red plastic bag containing the bricks of marijuana was seized, and saw
the marijuana bricks for the first time only at the police station. 8
Forensic Chemist Insp. Coronel attested that her office received from the General
Assignment Section of the WPD one red plastic bag labeled "SHIN TON YON" containing

two bricks of dried suspected marijuana fruiting tops individually wrapped in newspaper at
about 12:30 pm of March
23, 1999. The first brick bore the marking "RB-1" and weighed 830.532 grams while the
other bore the marking "RB-2" and weighed 959.291 grams, for a total weight of 1,789.823
grams. She conducted a chemical examination of the marijuana bricks pursuant to the
request for laboratory examination from Chief Insp. Nelson Yabut of the WPD; and
concluded as the result of three qualitative examinations that the submitted specimen tested
positive for marijuana, a prohibited drug.9
II
Evidence of the Defense
Belocura denied the charge. His version, which differed from that of the Prosecution, was as
follows.
On March 22, 1999, Belocura was a police officer assigned in Police Station 6 of the WPD
with a tour of duty from 3:00 pm to 11:00 pm. At 2:00 pm of that day, he was on his way to
work on board his owner-type jeep when about thirty police officers blocked his path. He
introduced himself to them as a police officer, but they ignored him. Instead, they disarmed
and handcuffed him, and confiscated the memorandum receipt covering his firearm, his
money and his police ID card. He recognized some of his arrestors as former members of
the CIS. They forced him into their jeep, and brought him to the WPD headquarters, where
they locked him up in a room that looked like a bodega. They subjected him to interrogation
on his alleged involvement in a robbery hold-up. They informed him of the drug-related
charge to be filed against him only three days later.
Belocura denied owning or possessing the bricks of marijuana, saying that he saw the
bricks of marijuana for the first time only in court. He insisted that it was physically
impossible for the bricks of marijuana to be found under the drivers seat of his jeep on
account of the clearance from the flooring being only about three inches. At the time of his
arrest, he was in Type-B uniform (i.e., blue pants with white side piping and blue T-shirt)
because he was reporting to work that afternoon. Belocura said that his arrest was effected
possibly because he had incurred the ire of a superior; that it was not unusual for a
policeman like him to incur the ire of a superior officer or a fellow policeman; that he had
arrested a suspect for drug pushing and had detained him in Police Precinct 2, but the
suspect turned out to be the nephew of Captain Sukila of Precinct 2 who admitted to him
that Captain Sukila owned the drugs; that on the day following the arrest of the suspect,
Captain Sukila called Belocura to request the release of the suspect (ina-arbor ang huli ko);
that he told Captain Sukila that they should meet the next day so that he could turn over the
suspect; and that on the next day, he was surprised to learn that the suspect had already
been released.10

Belocura did not personally know Chief Insp. Divina prior to his arrest, 11 or the other
arresting policemen. He mentioned that his owner-type jeep had been assembled in 1995,
and that he had attached the plate number assigned to his old vehicle pending the
registration of the jeep despite knowing that doing so was a violation of law; and that the
incident involving the arrest of the nephew of Captain Sukila was the only reason he could
think of why charges were filed against him. 12
On re-direct examination, Belocura replied that he did not see the bricks
of marijuana whether at the time of his arrest, or at the police precinct, or during the inquest
proceedings. On re-cross, he clarified that while the drivers seat were fixed to the jeep, the
bricks of marijuana could nevertheless be placed under the drivers seat only if pressed
hard enough, but in that case the wrappings would get torn because the wirings of the car
underneath the seat were exposed. He recalled that the wrappings of the bricks
of marijuana were intact.13
On April 22, 2003, the RTC convicted Belocura of the crime charged and sentenced him to
suffer reclusion perpetua and to pay the fine of P 500,000.00.14
As already stated, the CA affirmed the conviction. 15
Issues
Belocura now submits that:16
I.
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF
THE CRIME CHARGED NOTWITHSTANDING THE PHYSICIAL IMPOSSIBILITY FOR THE
DRIED BRICKS OF MARIJUANA PLACED UNDER THE DRIVERS SEAT (sic).
II.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF THE
CRIME CHARGED BASED ON THE INCONSISTENT AND CONTRADICTORY
STATEMENTS OF THE PROSECUTION WITNESS.
III.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING IN EVIDENCE THE MARIJUANA DESPITE
THE ILLEGALITY OF ITS SEIZURE DUE TO THE ABSENSE (sic) OF A VALID SEARCH
WARRANT.
IV.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF THE

CRIME CHARGED WHEN HIS GUILT WAS NOT PROVEN BEYOND REASONABLE
DOUBT.
Belocura argues that the Prosecution did not establish his guilt for the crime charged
beyond reasonable doubt; that his warrantless arrest was unlawful considering that his only
violation was only a breach of traffic rules and regulations involving the illegal use of a
government plate on his newly-assembled jeep; that the warrantless search of his jeep was
contrary to law for violating his right against illegal search and seizure protected under
Section 17, Article III (Bill of Rights) of the 1987 Constitution;17 and that the bricks
of marijuana supposedly seized from him, being the fruit of a poisonous tree, were
inadmissible against him.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) counters that Belocuras arrest and the ensuing
search of the jeep were valid, the search being incidental to a valid, albeit warrantless,
arrest; that the arresting policemen had a reasonable ground to effect his warrantless
arrest; that it became their duty following the lawful arrest to conduct the warrantless search
not only of the person of Belocura as the arrestee but also of the areas within his reach,
which then resulted in the recovery of the dried bricks of marijuana from under the drivers
seat; and that any irregularity attendant to the arrest was cured by Belocuras failure to
object to the validity of his arrest before entering his plea and by his submission to the
jurisdiction of the RTC when he entered his plea and participated in the trial. 18
Ruling
After a meticulous examination of the records, the Court concludes that a reversal of the
conviction is justified and called for.
No arrest, search and seizure can be made without a valid warrant issued by a competent
judicial authority. So sacred are the right of personal security and privacy and the right from
unreasonable searches and seizures that no less than the Constitution ordains in Section 2
of its Article III, viz:
Section 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose, shall
be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable
cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation
of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place
to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
The consequence of a violation of the guarantees against a violation of personal security
and privacy and against unreasonable searches and seizures is the exclusion of the

evidence thereby obtained. This rule of exclusion is set down in Section 3(2), Article III of
the Constitution, to wit:
Section 3. xxx
(2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be inadmissible
for any purpose in any proceeding.
Even so, the right against warrantless arrest, and the right against warrantless search and
seizure are not absolute. There are circumstances in which the arrest, or search and
seizure, although warrantless, are nonetheless valid or reasonable. Among the
circumstances are those mentioned in Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, which lists
down when a warrantless arrest may be lawfully made by a peace officer or a private
person, namely:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing,
or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of
facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal
establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his
case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.
On the other hand, the constitutional proscription against warrantless searches and
seizures admits of the following exceptions, namely: (a) warrantless search incidental to a
lawful arrest recognized under Section 13, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court; 19 (b) seizure of
evidence under plain view; (c) search of a moving vehicle; (d) consented warrantless
search; (e) customs search; (f) stop-and-frisk situations (Terry search); and (g) exigent and
emergency circumstances.20 In these exceptional situations, the necessity for a search
warrant is dispensed with.
Belocura argues that his arrest and the ensuing search of his vehicle and recovery of the
incriminating bricks ofmarijuana were in violation of his aforementioned rights under the
Constitution because he was then violating only a simple traffic rule on the illegal use of a
government plate. He claims that the arresting policemen had no probable cause to search
his vehicle for anything.
The argument of Belocura does not persuade.
Belocura was caught in flagrante delicto violating Section 31 of Republic Act No. 4139 (The
Land Transportation and Traffic Code).21 In flagrante delicto means in the very act of

committing the crime. To be caught in flagrante delicto necessarily implies the positive
identification of the culprit by an eyewitness or eyewitnesses. Such identification is a direct
evidence of culpability, because it "proves the fact in dispute without the aid of any inference
or presumption."22 Even by his own admission, he was actually committing a crime in the
presence or within the view of the arresting policemen. Such manner by which Belocura
was apprehended fell under the first category in Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court.
The arrest was valid, therefore, and the arresting policemen thereby became cloaked with
the authority to validly search his person and effects for weapons or any other article he
might use in the commission of the crime or was the fruit of the crime or might be used as
evidence in the trial of the case, and to seize from him and the area within his reach or
under his control, like the jeep, such weapon or other article. The evident purpose of the
incidental search was to protect the arresting policemen from being harmed by him with the
use of a concealed weapon. Accordingly, the warrantless character of the arrest could not
by itself be the basis of his acquittal. 23
In convicting Belocura as charged, the RTC relied on the testimonies of Chief Insp. Divina
and SPO1 Rojas to establish the fact of possession of the marijuana bricks. An evaluation
of the totality of the evidence on record indicates, however, that the corpus delicti of the
crime charged was not established beyond reasonable doubt.
The elements of illegal possession of marijuana under Republic Act No. 6425, as amended,
are that: (a) the accused is in possession of an item or object that is identified to
be marijuana, a prohibited drug; (b) such possession is not authorized by law; and (c) the
accused freely and consciously possessed the said drug. 24 What must be proved beyond
reasonable doubt is the fact of possession of the prohibited drug itself. This may be done by
presenting the police officer who actually recovered the prohibited drugs as a witness, being
the person who has the direct knowledge of the possession.
Chief Insp. Divina who headed the team of policemen disclosed that it was PO2 Santos, a
member of the team, who had discovered and had actually recovered the red plastic bag
containing the bricks of marijuana from the jeep. Excerpts of Chief Insp. Divinas relevant
declarations follow:
ATTY LEE:
q Mr. Witness, it was SPO1 Rojas who examined the contents of the plastic bag. That is
correct?
a I had testified that it was SPO1 Rojas who examined the contents.
q Okay, it was Mr. Rojas who retrieved the plastic bag? Is that correct?
a No sir, It was not SPO1 Rojas.

q It was not you who retrieved that plastic bag from the jeep?
a No, Sir. I was not the one.
q It was Dela Cruz?
a No, Sir.
q Who retrieved the plastic bag from the jeep?
WITNESS:
A It was PO2 Reynaldo Santos, Sir.
ATTY LEE :
q It was Santos who brought the plastic bag to the headquarters. Is that correct?
A Yes, Sir.
q And you never had a chance to examine that plastic bag, the contents of that plastic bag
is that correct?
a I had a chance to see it at the place where we had flagged down a vehicle.
q You saw only the plastic bag. Is that correct?
a No, Sir. When the bag was recovered from under the drivers seat and when it was
opened, I had the chance to see it.
THE COURT:
q Including the contents?
WITNESS:
a Yes, your Honor.
ATTY LEE:
q It was not you who bring that bag to xxx
THE COURT:

Already answered.
ATTY LEE:
q And after that, you never had the chance to see that bag again. Is that correct?
a Not anymore Sir.25
The Prosecution also presented SPO1 Rojas, another member of the team, but he provided
no direct evidence about the possession by Belocura of the confiscated marijuana bricks,
and actually stated that he did not witness the recovery of the marijuana bricks from
Belocura, viz:
PUB. PROS. TAN, JR:
q While you were taking the gun of this accused what were your other companion
specifically Major Divina doing?
WITNESS:
a Since I was the first one who approached Reynaldo Belocura I was the one who took the
gun from his waistline and I informed Major Divina that I already took the gun and place it
inside the Tamaraw FX and when I left the members of the SWAT arrive at the scene and I
dont know what transpired.
PUB. PROS. TAN, JR:
q And where was Major Divina then?
a Beside the owner type jeep, sir.
q You are referring to the owner type jeep of the accused?
a Yes, sir.
q Did you go back to the said jeep?
a I did not return there anymore sir because the members of the other group surrounded the
place, sir.
q Since you were then at that scene did you come to know if there is any other thing that
was retrieved from the herein accused in the said vehicle? 26
xxx

WITNESS:
a Yes. When I was there according to them marijuana was taken from the owner type jeep.
PUB. PROS. TAN, JR:
q Who said that?27
xxx
WITNESS:
a The member of the SWAT and other team, sir were there.
q And then what else happen after such recovery?
a Actually sir at the scene I did not see anything recovered but it was only in the office that I
heard their conversation about it.
q What did you see or observe while in your office?
a He was investigated.
q Investigated for what?
a According to them the recovery of the plate number and the expired MR of the gun and
themarijuana recovered.
PUB. PROS. TAN, JR:
q Before whom was he investigated?
WITNESS:
a General Assignment Section, sir.28
xxx
On further examination, SPO1 Rojas reiterated that he did not actually witness the seizure
of the marijuana bricks from Belocuras possession, to wit:
ATTY LEE:

q Mr. Witness, so you did not see the actual the alleged recovery of marijuana, is that
correct?
WITNESS:
a Yes sir.
ATTY LEE:
q And you have never that marijuana?
WITNESS:
a Yes sir. But only in the office.
q What do you only took from the accused is a gun, is that correct?
a Yes sir.
q So you cannot say positively that there was a marijuana recovered from the accused
because you did not see?
a I just got the information from my co-police officer, sir.29
xxx
PUB. PROS TAN, JR:
q Were you able to see the marijuana in the police station?
WITNESS:
a Yes sir.
q You mean to say that was the first time that you saw the marijuana?
a Yes, sir.30
The Prosecution presented no other witnesses to establish the seizure of
the marijuana bricks from Belocura.
Based on the foregoing, Chief Insp. Divina and SPO1 Rojas declarations were insufficient
to incriminate Belocura, much less to convict him. If neither of them was personally
competent to be an eyewitness regarding the seizure of the marijuana bricks from Belocura,

their testimonies could not be accorded probative value, considering that the Rules of Court
requires that a witness could testify only to facts that he knew of his own knowledge, that is,
only to those facts derived from his own perception. 31
Indeed, only PO2 Santos could reliably establish Belocuras illegal possession of
the marijuana bricks, if Chief Insp. Divinas account was to be believed. Surprisingly, the
RTC did not give due and proper significance to the failure to present PO2 Santos as a
witness against Belocura.
Nonetheless, the OSG contends that the State had no need to present PO2 Santos
because his testimony would only be corroborative; and that the testimonies of Chief Insp.
Divina and SPO1 Rojas sufficed to establish Belocuras guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
The OSGs contention is grossly erroneous.
As the arresting officer who alone actually seized the marijuana bricks from Belocuras
vehicle beyond the viewing distance of his fellow arresting officers, PO2 Santos was the
Prosecutions only witness who could have reliably established the recovery from Belocura
of the marijuana bricks contained in the red plastic bag labeled as "SHIN TON YON."
Without PO2 Santos testimony, Chief Insp. Divinas declaration of seeing PO2 Santos
recover the red plastic bag from under the drivers seat of Belocuras jeep was worthless.
The explanation why none of the other police officers could credibly attest to Belocuras
possession of the marijuana bricks was that they were at the time supposedly performing
different tasks during the operation. Under the circumstances, only PO2 Santos was
competent to prove Belocuras possession.
Worse, the Prosecution failed to establish the identity of the prohibited drug that constituted
the corpus delicti itself. The omission naturally raises grave doubt about any search being
actually conducted and warrants the suspicion that the prohibited drugs were planted
evidence.
In every criminal prosecution for possession of illegal drugs, the Prosecution must account
for the custody of the incriminating evidence from the moment of seizure and confiscation
until the moment it is offered in evidence. That account goes to the weight of evidence. 32 It is
not enough that the evidence offered has probative value on the issues, for the evidence
must also be sufficiently connected to and tied with the facts in issue. The evidence is not
relevant merely because it is available but that it has an actual connection with the
transaction involved and with the parties thereto. This is the reason why authentication and
laying a foundation for the introduction of evidence are important. 33
Yet, no such accounting was made herein, as the following excerpts from the testimony of
Chief Insp. Divina bear out, to wit:

PUB. PROS TAN, JR:

q How about the plastic bag containing the suspected stuff, what did you do with the same?
You did not know?
WITNESS:
a I think it was turned over to the investigator of the General Assignment Section who made
the proper disposition.
q Who is the investigator again, Mr. witness?
a I remember SPO4 Boy Guzman
q Did you know what SPO4 Boy Guzman did with the accused as well as the confiscated
stuff?
xxx
WITNESS:
a The items upon turn over to the investigator on case were handed to the custodian with
proper receipt and after those disposition, there were case filed against the subject.
PUB. PROS. TAN, JR:
q Were you able to know what did they do with the accused as well as the confiscated stuff
if you know?
a I remember appearing in the MTC court Br, 20, I saw the exhibits, firearm and plate
number, two blocks of marijuana. I dont have any idea where did the investigator brought
them or have done.34
xxx
q You never had a knowledge of what happened to that bag and the contents thereof?
a I learned later that the items that were confiscated were turned over to the General
Assignment Section which held the investigation.
q So, it was not your group who conducted the examination and the alleged things that were
recovered from the alleged accused?35
xxx

a No, Sir.
q How about the things that were allegedly recovered from the accused?
a I just said that it was the General Assignment Section who handled the investigation. 36
The Prosecution thereby failed to establish the linkage between the bricks
of marijuana supposedly seized by PO2 Santos from Belocuras jeep following his arrest
and the bricks of marijuana that the Prosecution later presented as evidence in court. That
linkage was not dispensable, because the failure to prove that the specimens
of marijuana submitted to the forensic chemist for examination were the
same marijuana allegedly seized from Belocura irreparably broke the chain of custody that
linked the confiscated marijuana to the marijuanaultimately presented as evidence against
Belocura during the trial. Proof beyond reasonable doubt demanded that unwavering
exactitude must be observed in establishing the corpus delicti the body of the crime
whose core was the confiscated prohibited substances. Thus, every fact necessary to
constitute the crime must be established. 37
1wphi1

The chain-of-custody requirement ensures that all doubts concerning the identity of the
evidence are removed.38The requirement has come to be associated with prosecutions for
violations of Republic Act No. 9165 (Comprehensive Drugs Act of 2002), 39 by reason of
Section 2140 of Republic Act No. 9165 expressly regulating the actual custody and
disposition of confiscated and surrendered dangerous drugs, controlled precursors,
essential chemicals, instruments, paraphernalia, and laboratory equipment. Section 21(a) of
the Implementing Rules and Regulations of Republic Act No. 9165 issued by the Dangerous
Drugs Board pursuant to its mandate under Section 94 of Republic Act No. 9165 reiterates
the requirement, stating:
xxx
(a) The apprehending officer/team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall,
immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in
the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or
seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the
Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign
the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof: Provided, that the physical
inventory and photograph shall be conducted at the place where the search warrant is
served; or at the nearest police station or at the nearest office of the apprehending
officer/team, whichever is practicable, in case of warrantless seizures; Provided, further that
non-compliance with these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity
and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending
officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures of and custody over said items.

xxx
That this case was a prosecution brought under Republic Act No. 6425 (Dangerous Drugs
Act of 1972), as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, did not matter. The chain-of-custody
requirement applied under both laws by virtue of the universal need to competently and
sufficiently establish the corpus delicti. It is basic under the Rules of Court, indeed, that
evidence, to be relevant, must throw light upon, or have a logical relation to, the facts in
issue to be established by one party or disproved by the other.41 The test of relevancy is
whether an item of evidence will have any value, as determined by logic and experience, in
proving the proposition for which it is offered, or whether it would reasonably and actually
tend to prove or disprove any matter of fact in issue, or corroborate other relevant evidence.
The test is satisfied if there is some logical connection either directly or by inference
between the fact offered and the fact to be proved. 42
The chain of custody is essential in establishing the link between the article confiscated
from the accused to the evidence that is ultimately presented to the court for its
appreciation. As the Court said in Mallillin v. People:43
As a method of authenticating evidence, the chain of custody rule requires that the
admission of an exhibit be preceded by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the
matter in question is what the proponent claims it to be. It would include testimony about
every link in the chain, from the moment the item was picked up to the time it is offered into
evidence, in such a way that every person who touched the exhibit would describe how and
from whom it was received, where it was and what happened to it while in the witness
possession, the condition in which it was received and the condition in which it was
delivered to the next link in the chain. These witnesses would then describe the precautions
taken to ensure that there had been no change in the condition of the item and no
opportunity for someone not in the chain to have possession of the same.
While testimony about a perfect chain is not always the standard because it is almost
always impossible to obtain, an unbroken chain of custody becomes indispensable and
essential when the item of real evidence is not distinctive and is not readily identifiable, or
when its condition at the time of testing or trial is critical, or when a witness has failed to
observe its uniqueness. The same standard likewise obtains in case the evidence is
susceptible to alteration, tampering, contamination and even substitution and exchange. In
other words, the exhibits level of susceptibility to fungibility, alteration or tamperingwithout
regard to whether the same is advertent or otherwise notdictates the level of strictness in
the application of the chain of custody rule. 44
The first link in the chain of custody started with the seizure from the jeep of Belocura of the
red plastic bag said to contain the marijuana bricks. The first link was immediately missing
because the Prosecution did not present PO2 Santos, the only person with direct
knowledge of the seizure and confiscation of the marijuana bricks. Without his testimony,

proof that the marijuana bricks were really taken from the jeep of Belocura did not exist. The
second link was the turnover of the marijuana bricks by PO2 Santos to another officer back
at the WPD Headquarters. As to this, Chief Insp. Divina stated that he learned following the
seizure by PO2 Santos that themarijuana bricks were turned over to the General
Assignment Section for investigation. That was all. On the other hand, SPO1 Rojas
testimony contributed nothing to the establishment of the second link because he had
immediately left after seizing the gun from Belocura. As for the subsequent links, the
records45 showed that themarijuana bricks were forwarded to the General Assignment
Section on March 22, 1999, but the Prosecution did not prove the identities of the officer
from the General Assignment Section who received the red plastic bag containing
the marijuana bricks, and the officer from whom the receiving officer received
the marijuana bricks. Although Chief Insp. Nelson Yabut prepared the request for laboratory
examination of the marijuana bricks,46which were thereafter examined by Forensic Chemist
Valdez, the records did not show if Chief Insp. Yabut was the officer who had received
the marijuana bricks from the arresting team. The request for laboratory examination was
dated March 23, 1999, or the day following Belocuras arrest and the seizure of
the marijuana bricks from his jeep; however, the Prosecution did not identify the person
from whom Chief Insp. Yabut had received themarijuana bricks.
Sadly, the Prosecution did not establish the links in the chain of custody. This meant that the
corpus delicti was not credibly proved. This further meant that the seizure and confiscation
of the marijuana bricks might easily be open to doubt and suspicion, and thus the
incriminatory evidence would not stand judicial scrutiny.
Thirdly, Belocuras denial assumed strength in the face of the Prosecutions weak
incriminating evidence. In that regard, Belocura denied possession of the marijuana bricks
and knowledge of them as well, to wit:
q Were you able to view the alleged marijuana that were confiscated from you?
a: I saw it for the first time when it was presented in Court, Sir.
q: Now, according to Inspector Divina, it was police officer Santos who was able to recover
from your vehicle these two bricks of marijuana. What can you say about this?
a: At first, I did not see this marijuana, Sir, that they are saying because they immediately
handcuffed me and disarmed me even before I could board my owner type jeepney.47
The Court holds that the guilt of Belocura for the crime charged was not proved beyond
reasonable doubt. Mere suspicion of his guilt, no matter how strong, should not sway
judgment against him. Every evidence favoring him must be duly considered. Indeed, the
presumption of innocence in his favor was not overcome. Hence, his acquittal should follow,
for, as the Court fittingly said in Patula v. People:48

xxx in all criminal prosecutions, the Prosecution bears the burden to establish the guilt of
the accused beyond reasonable doubt. In discharging this burden, the Prosecutions duty is
to prove each and every element of the crime charged in the information to warrant a finding
of guilt for that crime or for any other crime necessarily included therein. The Prosecution
must further prove the participation of the accused in the commission of the offense. In
doing all these, the Prosecution must rely on the strength of its own evidence, and not
anchor its success upon the weakness of the evidence of the accused. The burden of proof
placed on the Prosecution arises from the presumption of innocence in favor of the accused
that no less than the Constitution has guaranteed. Conversely, as to his innocence, the
accused has no burden of proof, that he must then be acquitted and set free should the
Prosecution not overcome the presumption of innocence in his favor. In other words, the
weakness of the defense put up by the accused is inconsequential in the proceedings for as
long as the Prosecution has not discharged its burden of proof in establishing the
commission of the crime charged and in identifying the accused as the malefactor
responsible for it.49
WHEREFORE, we REVERSE and SET ASIDE the decision promulgated on January 23,
2006; ACQUIT accusedREYNALDO BELOCURA y PEREZ for failure of the Prosecution to
prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt;DIRECT the immediate release from detention
of REYNALDO BELOCURA y PEREZ, unless he is also detained for some other lawful
cause; and ORDER the Director of the Bureau of Corrections to forthwith implement this
decision upon receipt and to report his action hereon to this Court within 10 days from
receipt. No pronouncement on costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.