BATAS PAMBANSA BLG.

22
AN ACT PENALIZING THE MAKING OR DRAWING AND
ISSUANCE OF A CHECK WITHOUT SUFFICIENT FUNDS OR
CREDIT AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES.
Section 1. Checks without sufficient funds. - Any person who
makes or draws and issues any check to apply on account or for
value, knowing at the time of issue that he does not have sufficient
funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of such
check in full upon its presentment, which check is subsequently
dishonored by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit
or would have been dishonored for the same reason had not the
drawer, without any valid reason, ordered the bank to stop
payment, shall be punished by imprisonment of not less than thirty
days but not more than one (1) year or by a fine of not less than
but not more than double the amount of the check which fine shall
in no case exceed Two Hundred Thousand Pesos, or both such fine
and imprisonment at the discretion of the court.
The same penalty shall be imposed upon any person who, having
sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank when he makes or
draws and issues a check, shall fail to keep sufficient funds or to
maintain a credit to cover the full amount of the check if presented
within a period of ninety (90) days from the date appearing
thereon, for which reason it is dishonored by the drawee bank.
Where the check is drawn by a corporation, company or entity, the
person or persons who actually signed the check in behalf of such
drawer shall be liable under this Act.
Section 2. Evidence of knowledge of insufficient funds. - The
making, drawing and issuance of a check payment of which is
refused by the drawee because of insufficient funds in or credit with
such bank, when presented within ninety (90) days from the date of
the check, shall be prima facie evidence of knowledge of such
insufficiency of funds or credit unless such maker or drawer pays
the holder thereof the amount due thereon, or makes
arrangements for payment in full by the drawee of such check
within (5) banking days after receiving notice that such check has
not been paid by the drawee.
Section 3. Duty of drawee; rules of evidence. - It shall be the duty
of the drawee of any check, when refusing to pay the same to the
holder thereof upon presentment, to cause to be written, printed,
or stamped in plain language thereon, or attached thereto, the

reason for drawee's dishonor or refusal to pay the same: Provided,

That where there are no sufficient funds in or credit with such
drawee bank, such fact shall always be explicitly stated in the
notice of dishonor or refusal. In all prosecutions under this Act, the
introduction in evidence of any unpaid and dishonored check,
having the drawee's refusal to pay stamped or written thereon or
attached thereto, with the reason therefor as aforesaid, shall be
prima facie evidence of the making or issuance of said check, and
the due presentment to the drawee for payment and the dishonor
thereof, and that the same was properly dishonored for the reason
written, stamped or attached by the drawee on such dishonored
check.
Not with standing receipt of an order to stop payment, the drawee
shall state in the notice that there were no sufficient funds in or
credit with such bank for the payment in full of such check, if such
be the fact.
Section 4. Credit construed. - The word "credit" as used herein
shall be construed to mean an arrangement or understanding with
the bank for the payment of such check.
Section 5. Liability under the Revised Penal Code. - Prosecution
under this Act shall be without prejudice to any liability for violation
of any provision of the Revised Penal Code.
Section 6. Separability clause. - If any separable provision of this
Act be declared unconstitutional, the remaining provisions shall
continue to be in force.
Section 7. Effectivity. - This Act shall take effect fifteen days after
publication in the Official Gazette.
Approved: April 3, 1979.
Bouncing Checks (BP 22): An Extended Discussion
(This is a four-part discussion on Bouncing Checks. See the pages
at bottom of post.)
Checks will always be an integral part of business, which is why we
have a number of discussions regarding checks (see Bouncing
Checks [BP 22]). This time lets have a more extensive discussion
on bouncing checks.
What is the law that punishes bounced checks?

The Bouncing Checks Law, or Batas Pambansa (BP) Blg. 22, is a law
that governs the criminal liability arising from the issuance of
bounced checks. The full title of BP 22: An Act Penalizing the
Making or Drawing and Issuance of a Check Without Sufficient
Funds or Credit and for Other Purposes (see full text here). In
certain instances, the same acts may also give rise to another
criminal liability for estafa under the Revised Penal Code (see
discussion in part 4 below).
Whats the reason or rationale for BP 22?
BP 22 is intended to prohibit the making of worthless checks and
putting them in circulation. Even years ago, the approximate value
of bouncing checks was about 200 million pesos per day. The
issuance of bouncing checks is a crime not only against property.
The magnitude of the crime has an adverse effect on the greater
public interest. The stability and commercial value of checks as
currency substitutes will be seriously affected. This, of course, has
serious repercussions in trade and in banking communities.
Does BP 22 violate the Constitutional mandate that no
person shall be imprisoned for debt?
It has been argued that BP 22 in reality punishes the non-payment
of debt. However, while it is true that no person can be imprisoned
for debt, what BP 22 punishes is the act of issuing bad checks, and
not the failure to pay a debt. Its not a bad debt law; its rather a
bad check law. Its not designed to coerce a debtor to pay his
debt.
Does BP 22 impairs the freedom of people to enter into
contracts?
The Constitution also guarantees the right to enter into contract.
Each one should be responsible for the contracts entered into. If
you get into a bad bargain, if you get a bad check, then its your
fault for not making sure that the other person is trustworthy.
Checks, however, are not simple contracts between two persons.
It is a commercial instrument which, in this modem day and age,
has become a convenient substitute for money. It is an integral
part of the banking system. Besides, what the law protects are
lawful contracts.
What are the acts punished under BP 22?
Section 1 of the Bouncing Checks Law penalizes two distinct acts:
1. Making or drawing and issuing any check to apply on
account or for value, knowing at the time of issue that the
drawer does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the
drawee bank.

2. Having sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank

shall fail to keep sufficient funds or to maintain a credit to
cover the full amount of the check if presented within a
period of 90 days from the date appearing thereon, for
which reason it is dishonored by the drawee bank.
What are the differences between the two?
In the first paragraph, the drawer knows that he does not
have sufficient funds to cover the check at the time of its
issuance, while in the second paragraph, the drawer has
sufficient funds at the time of issuance but fails to keep
sufficient funds or maintain credit within ninety (90) days
from the date appearing on the check. In both instances, the
offense is consummated by the dishonor of the check for
insufficiency of funds or credit.
The check involved in the first offense is worthless at the
time of issuance since the drawer had neither sufficient
funds in nor credit with the drawee bank at the time, while
that involved in the second offense is good when issued as
drawer had sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee
bank when issued.
Under the first offense, the 90-day presentment period is
not expressly provided, while such period is an express
element of the second offense.
What are the general elements of Bouncing Checks?
The elements of the offense (further discussed in the next pages)
under Section 1 of B.P. 22 are:
1. drawing and issuance of any check to apply on account or
for value;
2. knowledge by the maker, drawer, or issuer that at the time
of issue he did not have sufficient funds in or credit with the
drawee bank for the payment of such check in full upon
presentment; and
3. said check is subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank
for insufficiency of funds or credit, or would have been
dishonored for the same reason had not the drawer, without
any valid reason, ordered the bank to stop payment.
What are the applicable penalties?
Courts have a discretion of imposing the following: (1)
imprisonment only; (2) fine only; or (3) fine and imprisonment.
See: No imprisonment in BP 22 or Bouncing Checks cases?.
(1. Administrative Circular 12-2000 does not remove imprisonment
as an alternative penalty for violations ofB.P. Blg. 22;

2. The Judges concerned may, in the exercise of sound discretion,

and taking into consideration the peculiar circumstances of each
case, determine whether the imposition of a fine alone would best
serve the interests of justice or whether forbearing to impose
imprisonment would depreciate the seriousness of the offense,
work violence on the social order, or otherwise be contrary to the
imperatives of justice;
3. Should only a fine be imposed and the accused be unable to pay
the fine, there is no legal obstacle to the application of the Revised
Penal Code provisions on subsidiary imprisonment.
In other words, the circular establishes a rule of preference in the
application of the penal provisions of B.P. 22, such that where the
circumstances of both the offense and the offender clearly indicate
good faith or a clear mistake of fact without taint of negligence, the
imposition of a fine along should be considered as the more
appropriate penalty.)
What is the third element, i.e., fact of dishonor?
The introduction in evidence of any unpaid and dishonored check,
having the drawees refusal to pay stamped or written thereon, or
attached thereto, with the reason therefor as aforesaid, shall be
prima facie evidence of the making or issuance of said check, and
the due presentment to the drawee for payment and the dishonor
thereof, and that the same was properly dishonored for the reason
written, stamped, or attached by the drawee on such dishonored
check.
For instance, the prosecution presented the checks which were
stamped with the words ACCOUNT CLOSED, supported by the
returned check tickets issued by the depository bank stating that
the checks had been dishonored. The documents constitute prima
facie evidence that the drawee bank dishonored the checks, and no
evidence was presented to rebut the claim.
Could the same check give rise to a separate charge for
estafa?
Yes. Estafa by means of bouncing checks is separately punished
under under Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code. An issuer of one
worthless check could be separately charged with two offenses.
What are the elements of this kind of estafa?
For a person to be convicted with estafa by issuing a worthless
check, the following must be present: (1) postdating or issuance of
a check in payment of an obligation contracted at the time the
check was issued; (2) insufficiency of funds to cover the check; and
(3) damage to the payee.

How is this estafa different from BP 22?

The mere issuance of a worthless check is core of BP 22. It doesnt
require deceit or fraud. In estafa, the issuance of the worthless
check must be the very reason for the release of the goods or
performance of a service (or some other obligation). Deceit must be
present, which is why there could be no estafa if the bounced check
was issued as payment of a pre-existing obligation (for instance,
payment of a past debt or past delivery).
I.HOW
VIOLATED
A.DRAWING CHECK WITHOUT SUFFICIENT FUNDS (Sec. 1)

1. A person makes or draws and issues any check

2. The check is made or drawn and issued to apply on account
or for value
3. The person who makes or draws and issues the check knows
at the time of issue that he does not have sufficient funds in
or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of such
check in full upon its presentment
4. The check is subsequently dishonoured by the drawee bank
for insufficiency of funds or credit, or would have been
dishonoured for the same reason had not the drawer,
without any valid reason, ordered the bank to stop payment
B.FAILING

TO

KEEP

SUFFICIENT

FUNDS (Sec.

1,

par.

2)

1. A person has sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee

bank when he makes or draws and issues a check
2. He fails to keep sufficient funds or to maintain a credit to
cover the full amount of the check if presented within 90
days from the date appearing
3. The check is dishonoured by the drawee bank
II.EVIDENCE OF KNOWLEDGE OF INSUFFICIENT FUNDS (Sec.
2)
The making, drawing and issuance of a check payment of which is
refused by the drawee because of insufficient funds in or credit with
such bank, when presented within ninety (90) days from the date of
the check, shall be prima facie evidence of knowledge of such
insufficiency of funds or credit UNLESS such maker or
drawer pays the holder thereof the amount due thereon, or makes

arrangements for payment in full by the drawee of such

check within (5) banking days after receiving notice that such
check
has
not
been
paid
by
the
drawee
III.DUTY

OF

DRAWEE (Sec.

3)

It shall be the duty of the drawee of any check, when refusing to

pay the same to the holder thereof upon presentment, to cause to
be thereon, or attached thereto, the written, printed, or stamped in
plain languagereason for drawee's dishonor or refusal to pay the
same: Provided, That where there are no sufficient funds in or credit
with such drawee bank, such fact shall always be explicitly stated
in the notice of dishonor or refusal. In all prosecutions under this
Act, the introduction in evidence of any unpaid and dishonored
check, having the drawee's refusal to pay stamped or written
thereon or attached thereto, with the reason therefor as aforesaid,
shall be prima facie evidence of the making or issuance of
said check, and the due presentment to the drawee for
payment and the dishonor thereof, and that the same was
properly dishonored for the reason written, stamped or attached by
the
drawee
on
such
dishonored
check.
Not with standing receipt of an order to stop payment, the drawee
shall state in the notice that there were no sufficient funds in or
credit with such bank for the payment in full of such check, if such
be the fact.
Estafa by postdating a bad check and violation of the bouncing
checks law distinguished
In the crime of Estafa by postdating or issuing a bad check, deceit
and damage are essential elements of the offense (U.S. vs. Rivera,
23 Phil. 383-390) and have to be established with satisfactory proof
to warrant conviction. For Violation of the Bouncing Checks Law, on
the other hand, the elements of deceit and damage are not
essential nor required. An essential element of that offense is
knowledge on the part of the maker or drawer of the check of the
insufficiency of his funds (Lozano vs. Hon. Martinez, Nos. L-63419,
etc., December 18, 1986; 146 SCRA 323; Dingle vs. IAC, G.R. No.
75243, March 16, 1987, 148 SCRA 595). The Anti-Bouncing Checks
Law makes the mere act of issuing a worthless check a special
offense punishable thereunder (Cruz vs. IAC, No. L-66327, May 28,
1984, 129 SCRA 490. Malice and intent in issuing the worthless
check are immaterial, the offense being malum prohibitum (Que vs.
People of the Philippines, et. al., G.R. Nos. 75217-18, September 21,

1987). The gravamen of the offense is the issuance of a check, not

the non-payment of an obligation (Lozano vs. Hon. Martinez,
supra).
SAN MIGUEL CORPORATION, petitioners, vs. NATHANIEL M. GROSPE,
Presiding Judge, Branch 44, Regional Trial Court of Pampanga and
MANUEL PARULAN, respondents, [G.R. Nos. L-74053-54. January 20,
1988.]
Distinguished from Art. 315 of the Revised Penal Code Article
315 of the Revised Penal Code defining the crime of estafa reads as
follows: "Article 315. Swindling (estafa). - Any person who shall
defraud another by any of the means mentioned herein below shall
be punished by . . . 2. By means of any of the following false
pretenses or fraudulent acts executed prior to or simultaneously
with the commission of the fraud: (a) By using fictitious name, or
falsely pretending to possess power, influence, qualifications,
property, credit, agency, business or imaginary transactions, or by
means of other similar deceits; . . . (d) By postdating a check, or
issuing a check in payment of an obligation the offender knowing
that at the time he had no funds in the bank, or the funds
deposited by him were not sufficient to cover the amount of the
check without informing the payee of such circumstances." The
scope of paragraph 2 (d), however, was deemed to exclude checks
issued in payment of pre-existing obligations. The rationale of this
interpretation is that in estafa, the deceit causing the defraudation
must be prior to or simultaneous with the commission of the fraud.
In issuing a check as payment for a pre-existing debt, the drawer
does not derive any material benefit in return or as consideration
for its issuance. On the part of the payee, he had already parted
with his money or property before the check is issued to him,
hence, he is not defrauded by means of any "prior" or
"simultaneous" deceit perpetrated on him, by the drawer of the
check.
Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code as amended by R.A. 4885;
Payment of Pre-existing obligations not covered Article 315, as
amended by Republic Act 4885, does not cover checks issued in
payment of pre-existing obligations, again relying on the
concept underlying the crime of estafa through false pretense or
deceit - which is, that the deceit or false pretense must be prior to
or simultaneous with the commission of the fraud.
EN BANC, Justice Yap, FLORENTINA A. LOZANO, petitioner, vs. THE
HONORABLE ANTONIO M. MARTINEZ, in his capacity as Presiding
Judge, Regional Trial Court, National Capital Judicial Region, Branch
XX, Manila, and the HONORABLE JOSE B. FLAMINIANO, in his

capacity as City Fiscal of Manila, respondents.[G.R. Nos. L-6683942. December 18, 1986.]
Petitioner now raises the following issues before us in this petition
for review in certiorari: (a) whether the RTC of Manila acquired
jurisdiction over the violations of the Bouncing Checks Law, and (b)
whether the checks had been issued on account or for value. [6 Id.,
pp. 19-22.]
As regards the first issue, petitioner contends that the trial court
never acquired jurisdiction over the offenses under B.P. Blg. 22 and
that assuming for the sake of argument that she raised the matter
of jurisdiction only upon appeal to respondent appellate court, still
she cannot be estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the trial
court.
It is a fundamental rule that for jurisdiction to be acquired by courts
in criminal cases the offense should have been committed or any
one of its essential ingredients took place within the territorial
jurisdiction of the court. Territorial jurisdiction in criminal cases is
the territory where the court has jurisdiction to take cognizance or
to try the offense allegedly committed therein by the accused.
Thus, it cannot take jurisdiction over a person charged with an
offense
allegedly
committed
outside
of
that
limited
territory. [7 U.S. v. Cunanan, 26 Phil. 376-378 (1913)]. Furthermore,
the jurisdiction of a court over the criminal case is determined by
the allegations in the complaint or information. [8 Colmenares v.
Villar, No. L-27124, 29 May 1970, 33 SCRA 186] And once it is so
shown, the court may validly take cognizance of the case. However,
if the evidence adduced during the trial show that the offense was
committed somewhere else, the court should dismiss the action for
want of jurisdiction. [9 People v. Galano, No. L-42925, 31 January
1977, 75 SCRA 193.]
In the case at bar, the complaint for estafa and the various charges
under B.P. Blg. 22 were jointly tried before the Regional Trial Court
of Manila. Petitioner challenges the jurisdiction of the lower court
stating that none of the essential elements constitutive of violation
of B.P. Blg. 22 was shown to have been committed in the City of
Manila. She maintains that the evidence presented established that
(a) complainant was a resident of Makati; (b) petitioner was a
resident of Caloocan City; (c) the place of business of the alleged
partnership was located in Malabon; (d) the drawee bank was
located in Malabon; and, (e) the checks were all deposited for
collection in Makati. Taken altogether, petitioner concludes that the
said evidence would only show that none of the essential elements
of B.P. Blg. 22 occurred in Manila. Respondent People of the
Philippines through the Solicitor General on the one hand argues

that even if there is no showing of any evidence that the essential

ingredients took place or the offense was committed in Manila,
what is critical is the fact that the court acquired jurisdiction over
the estafa case because the same is the principal or main case and
that the cases for violations of Bouncing Checks Law are merely
incidental to the estafa case.
We disagree with respondent. The crimes of estafa and violation of
the Bouncing Checks Law are two (2) different offenses having
different elements and, necessarily, for a court to acquire
jurisdiction each of the essential ingredients of each crime has to
be satisfied.
In the crime of estafa, deceit and damage are essential elements of
the offense and have to be established with satisfactory proof to
warrant conviction. 10 [People v. Gorospe, G.R. Nos. 74053-54, 20
January 1988, 157 SCRA 154]. For violation of the Bouncing Checks
Law, on the other hand, the elements of deceit and damage are
neither essential nor required. Rather, the elements of B.P. Blg. 22
are (a) the making, drawing and issuance of any check to apply to
account or for value; (b) the maker, drawer or issuer knows at the
time of issuance that he does not have sufficient funds in or credit
with the drawee bank for the payment of such check in full upon its
presentment; and, (c) the check is subsequently dishonored by the
drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit or would have been
dishonored for the same reason had not the drawer, without valid
reason, ordered the bank to stop payment.[11Navarro v. Court of
Appeals, G.R. Nos. 112389-90, 1 August 1994, 234 SCRA
639.]Hence, it is incorrect for respondent People to conclude that
inasmuch as the Regional Trial Court of Manila acquired jurisdiction
over the estafa case then it also acquired jurisdiction over the
violations of B.P. Blg. 22. The crime of estafa and the violation of
B.P. Blg. 22 have to be treated as separate offenses and therefore
the essential ingredients of each offense have to be satisfied.
In this regard, the records clearly indicate that business dealings
were conducted in a restaurant in Manila where sums of money
were given to petitioner; hence, the acquisition of jurisdiction by
the lower court over the estafa case. The various charges for
violation of B.P. Blg. 22 however are on a different plain. There is no
scintilla of evidence to show that jurisdiction over the violation of
B.P. Blg. 22 had been acquired. On the contrary, all that the
evidence shows is that complainant is a resident of Makati; that
petitioner is a resident of Caloocan City; that the principal place of
business of the alleged partnership is located in Malabon; that the
drawee bank is likewise located in Malabon and that all the subject
checks were deposited for collection in Makati. Verily, no proof has
been offered that the checks were issued, delivered, dishonored or

knowledge of insufficiency of funds occurred in Manila, which are

essential elements necessary for the Manila Court to acquire
jurisdiction over the offense.
Upon the contention of respondent that knowledge on the part of
the maker or drawer of the check of the insufficiency of his funds is
by itself a continuing eventuality whether the accused be within
one territory or another, the same is still without merit. It may be
true that B.P. Blg. 22 is a transitory or continuing offense and such
being the case the theory is that a person indicted with a transitory
offense may be validly tried in any jurisdiction where the offense
was in part committed. We note however that knowledge by the
maker or drawer of the fact that he has no sufficient funds to cover
the check or of having sufficient funds is simultaneous to the
issuance of the instrument. We again find no iota of proof on the
records that at the time of issue, petitioner or complainant was in
Manila. As such, there would be no basis in upholding the
jurisdiction of the trial court over the offense.
In an attempt to salvage the issue that the RTC of Manila had
jurisdiction over the violations of B.P. Blg. 22, respondent relies on
the doctrine of jurisdiction by estoppel. Respondent posits that it
took some five (5) years of trial before petitioner raised the issue of
jurisdiction.
The Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, under Rule 117, Sec. 3,
provides that the accused may move to quash the complaint or
information on any of the following grounds: . . . (b) that the court
trying the case has no jurisdiction over the offense charge or over
the person of the accused. Moreover, under Sec. 8 of the same Rule
it is provided that the failure of the accused to assert any ground of
a motion to quash before he pleads to the complaint or information,
either because he did not file a motion to quash or failed to allege
the same in said motion, shall be deemed a waiver of the grounds
of a motion to quash, except the grounds of . . . lack of jurisdiction
over the offense charged . . . as provided for in paragraph . . . (b) . .
. of Section 3 of this Rule.[12 Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure.]
After a careful perusal of the records, it is crystal clear that
petitioner timely questioned the jurisdiction of the court in a
memorandum [13 Rollo. pp. 103-104] before the Regional Trial
Court and thereafter in succeeding pleadings. On this finding alone,
we cannot countenance the inadvertence committed by the court.
Clearly, from the abovequoted law, we can see that even if a party
fails to file a motion to quash, he may still question the jurisdiction
of the court later on. Moreover, these objections may be raised or
considered motu propio by the court at any stage of the
proceedings or an appeal. [14 Suy Sui v. People, 49 O.G. 967]

Assuming arguendo that there was a belated attempt to question

the jurisdiction of the court and hence, on the basis of the Tijam v.
Sibonghanoy case [15 Tijam v. Sibonghanoy, No. L-21450, 15 April
1968, 23 SCRA 29] in which respondent seeks refuge, the petitioner
should be estopped. We nonetheless find the jurisprudence of the
Sibonghanoy case not in point.
In Calimlim v. Ramirez, [16.No. L-34362, 19 November 1982, 118
SCRA 399, Dy v. NLRC, G.R. No. 68544, 27 OCTOBER 1989, 145
SCRA 211]. the Court held that the ruling in the Sibonghanoy case
is an exception to the general rule that the lack of jurisdiction of a
court may be raised at any stage of the proceedings, even on
appeal. The Court stated further that Tijam v. Sibonghanoy is an
exceptional case because of the presence of laches. The Court said:
A rule that had been settled by unquestioned acceptance and
upheld in decisions so numerous to cite is that the jurisdiction of a
court over the subject matter of the action is a matter of law and
may not be conferred by consent or agreement of the parties. The
lack of jurisdiction of a court may be raised at any stage of the
proceedings, even on appeal. This doctrine has been qualified by
recent pronouncements which stemmed principally from the ruling
in the cited case of Sibonghanoy. It is to be regretted, however, that
the holding in said case had been applied to situations which were
obviously not contemplated therein. The exceptional circumstance
involved in Sibonghanoy which justified the departure from the
accepted concept of non-waivability of objection to jurisdiction has
been ignored and, instead a blanket doctrine had been repeatedly
upheld that rendered the supposed ruling in Sibonghanoy not as
the exception, but rather the general rule, virtually overthrowing
altogether the time-honored principle that the issue of jurisdiction
is not lost by waiver or by estoppel. [17 People v. Eduarte, G.R. No.
88232, 26 February 1990, 182 SCRA 750, citing Calimlim v.
Ramirez, No. L-34362, 19 November 1982, 118 SCRA 399].
In Sibonghanoy, the defense of lack of jurisdiction of the court that
rendered the questioned ruling was held to be barred by laches. It
was ruled that the lack of jurisdiction having been raised for the
first time in a motion to dismiss filed almost fifteen (15) years after
the questioned ruling had been rendered, such a plea may no
longer be raised for being barred by laches. As defined in said case,
laches is failure or neglect for an unreasonable and unexplained
length of time, to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could
or should have been done earlier; it is the negligence or omission
to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a
presumption that the party entitled to assert has abandoned it or
declined to assert it. 18 [ibid]

The circumstances of the present case are very different from Tijam
v. Sibonghanoy. No judgment has yet been rendered by the trial
court in this case. As a matter of fact, as soon as the accused
discovered the jurisdictional defect, she did not fail or neglect to file
the appropriate motion to dismiss. They questioned the jurisdiction
of the trial court in a memorandum before the lower court. Hence,
finding the pivotal element of laches to be absent, we hold that the

ruling in Tijam v. Sibonghanoy does not control the present

controversy. Instead, the general rule that the question of
jurisdiction of a court may be raised at any stage of the
proceedings must apply. Petitioner is therefore not estopped from
questioning the jurisdiction of the trial court. 19 [ibid]