Crimes Against National Security (Arts.

114-123)
- Treason
88. Laurel v. Misa, 77 Phil 856
Petitioner filed a petition for habeas corpus claiming that a Filipino citizen who adhered to the enemy, giving
the latter aid and comfort during the Japanese occupation, cannot be prosecuted for the crime of treason for
the reasons that: (1) the sovereignty of the legitimate government in the Philippines and, consequently, the
correlative allegiance of Filipino citizens thereto was then suspended; and (2) that there was a change of
sovereignty over these Islands upon the proclamation of the Philippine Republic. The Supreme Court
dismissed the petition and ruled that the absolute and permanent allegiance of the inhabitants of a territory
occupied by the enemy of their legitimate government or sovereign is not abrogated or severed by the
enemy occupation because the sovereignty of the government or sovereign de jure is not transferred thereby
to the occupier, and if it is not transferred to the occupant it must necessarily remain vested in the legitimate
government.
89. People v. Perez, 83 Phil 314
7 counts of treason were filed against Perez for recruiting, apprehending and commandeering numerous girls
and women against their will for the purpose of using them to satisfy the immoral purposes of Japanese
officers. The Supreme Court held that his commandeering of women to satisfy the lust of Japanese officers
or men or to enliven the entertainment held in their honor was not treason even though the women and the
entertainment helped to make life more pleasant for the enemies and boost their spirit; he was not guilty any
more than the women themselves would have been if they voluntarily and willingly had surrendered their
bodies or organized the entertainment.
- Piracy
90. People v. Catantan, G.R. No. 118075. September 5, 1997
Under the definition of piracy in PD No. 532 as well as grave coercion as penalized in Art. 286 of the Revised
Penal Code, this case falls squarely within the purview of piracy. While it may be true that Eugene and Juan Jr.
were compelled to go elsewhere other than their place of destination, such compulsion was obviously part of
the act of seizing their boat.
Crimes Against Fundamental Laws of the State
- Arbitrary Detention
91. People v. Flores, G.R. No. 116488. May 31, 2001
Arbitrary detention is committed by any public officer or employee who, without legal grounds, detains a
person. Since it is settled that accused-appellants are public officers, the question that remains to be resolved
is whether or not the evidence adduced before the trial court proved that Samson Sayam was arbitrarily
detained by accused-appellants.
Jerry Manlangit, son of Carlito, also testified for the proseuction. According to him, he and Samson Sayam
went to Barangay Tabu to have a sack of palay milled on September 29, 1992. At around six in the evening,
while on their way home, they passed by the store of Terry Cabrillos to buy kerosene. There, he saw the four
accused drinking beer. Samson Sayam told him to go home because he had to show his residence certificate
and barangay clearance to accused-appellant Aaron Flores. Jerry Manlangit then proceeded to his residence in
Hacienda Shangrila, located about half a kilometer away from the center of Barangay Tabu. Later, he told his
father that Samson Sayam stayed behind and asked him to fetch Samson. He also testified that he heard
gunshots coming from the direction of the detachment headquarters.
The testimony of Jerry Manlangit does not prove any of the elements of the crime of arbitrary
detention. Neither does it support nor corroborate the testimony of his father, Carlito, for they dealt on a
different set of facts. Jerry Manlangit did not see any of accused-appellant apprehend or detain Samson
Sayam. He did not even see if accused-appellant Flores really inspected the residence certificate and
barangay clearance of Samson Sayam. The rest of his testimony comprised of hearsay evidence, which has
no probative value. In summary, Jerry Manlangits testimony failed to establish that accused-appellants were
guilty of arbitrary detention.
92. People v. Burgos, 144 SCRA 1
When the accused is arrested on the sole basis of a verbal report, the arrest without a warrant under Section
6(a) of Rule 113 is not lawful and legal since the offense must also be committed in his presence or within his
view. It is not enough that there is reasonable ground to believe that the person to be arrested has committed
a crime for an essential precondition under the rule is that the crime must in fact or actually have been
committed first.
93. Albor v. Aguis, A.M. No. P-01-1472, June 26, 2003
Respondent might have been motivated by a sincere desire to help the accused and his relatives. But as an
officer of the court, he should be aware that by issuing such detention order, he trampled upon a
fundamental human right of the accused. Because of the unauthorized order issued by respondent, the

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accused Edilberto Albior was deprived of liberty without due process of law for a total of 56 days, counted
from his unlawful detention on January 27, 1999 until the issuance of the appropriate order of commitment by
the municipal judge on March 25, 1999.
- Expulsion
94. Villavicencio v. Lukban, 39 Phil 778
The forcible taking of the women from Manila by officials of that city, who handed them over to other parties
and deposited them in a distant region, deprived these women of freedom of locomotion just as effectively as
if they had been imprisoned. There is no law expressly authorizing the deportation of prostitutes to a new
domicile against their will and in fact Article 127 punishes public officials, not expressly authorized by law or
regulation, who compel any person to change his residence.
- Search Warrants Maliciously Obtained
95. Burgos v Chief of Staff, 133 SCRA 800
When the search warrant applied for is directed against a newspaper publisher or editor in connection with
the publication of subversive materials, the application and/ or its supporting affidavits must contain a
specification, stating with particularity the alleged subversive material he has published or intending to
publish since mere generalization will not suffice. Also, ownership is of no consequence and it is sufficient that
the person against whom the warrant is directed has control or possession of the property sought to be
seized.
Crimes Against Public Order
-Rebellion
96. People v. Loverdioro, G.R. 112235, November 29, 1995
If no political motive is established and proved, the accused should be convicted of the common crime and
not of rebellion. In cases of rebellion, motive relates to the act, and mere membership in an organization
dedicated to the furtherance of rebellion would not, by and of itself, suffice.
97. People v. Geronimo, October 23, 1956 G.R. L-8936
Not every act of violence is deemed absorbed in the crime of rebellion solely because it was committed
simultaneously with or in the course of the rebellion. If the killing, robbing, etc. were done for private
purposes or profit, without any political motivation, the crime would be separately punishable and would not
be absorbed by the rebellion and the individual misdeed could not be taken with the rebellion to constitute a
complex crime, for the constitutive acts and intent would be unrelated to each other. The individual crime
would not be a means necessary for committing the rebellion, as it would not be done in preparation or in
furtherance of the latter.
- Sedition
98. People v. Hadji October 24, 1963 G.R. L-12686
The rule in this jurisdiction allows the treatment of the common offenses of murder etc. as distinct and
independent acts separable from sedition. Where the acts of violence were deemed absorbed in the crime of
rebellion, the same does not apply in the crime of sedition.
-Inciting to Sedition
99. Mendoza v. People, G.R. L-2990, December 17 1951
A published writing which calls our government one of crooks and dishonest persons (dirty) infested with
Nazis and Fascists i.e. dictators, and which reveals a tendency to produce dissatisfaction or a feeling
incompatible with the disposition to remain loyal to the government, is a scurrilous libel against the
Government. Any citizen may criticize his government and government officials and submit his criticism to
the free trade of ideas but such criticism should be specific and constructive, specifying particular
objectionable actuations of the government. It must be reasoned or tempered and not a contemptuous
condemnation of the entire government set-up.
Illegal Possession of Firearms
100. Celino v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 170562, June 29, 2007
When the other offense is one of those enumerated under RA 8294, any information for illegal possession of
firearms should be quashed because the illegal possession of firearm would have to be tried together with
such other offense, either considered as an aggravating circumstance in murder or homicide, or absorbed as
an element of rebellion, insurrection, sedition or attempted coup d etat and conversely, when the other
offense involved is not one of those enumerated under RA 8294, then the separate case for illegal possession
of firearm should continue to be prosecuted. The constitutional bar against double jeopardy will not apply
since these offenses are quite different from one another, with the first punished under the Revised Penal
Code and the second under a special law.
R.A 10591, SEC. 29. Use of Loose Firearm in the Commission of a Crime. The use of a loose
firearm, when inherent in the commission of a crime punishable under the Revised Penal Code or
other special laws, shall be considered as an aggravating circumstance: Provided, That if the

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crime committed with the use of a loose firearm is penalized by the law with a maximum penalty
which is lower than that prescribed in the preceding section for illegal possession of firearm, the
penalty for illegal possession of firearm shall be imposed in lieu of the penalty for the crime
charged: Provided, further, That if the crime committed with the use of a loose firearm is
penalized by the law with a maximum penalty which is equal to that imposed under the
preceding section for illegal possession of firearms, the penalty of prision mayor in its minimum
period shall be imposed in addition to the penalty for the crime punishable under the Revised
Penal Code or other special laws of which he/she is found guilty.
If the violation of this Act is in furtherance of, or incident to, or in connection with the crime of
rebellion of insurrection, or attempted coup d etat, such violation shall be absorbed as an
element of the crime of rebellion or insurrection, or attempted coup d etat.
If the crime is committed by the person without using the loose firearm, the violation of this Act
shall be considered as a distinct and separate offense.
- Direct Assault
101. Justo v. Court of Appeals, 99 Phil 453
The character of person in authority is not assumed or laid off at will, but attaches to a public official until he
ceases to be in office. Assuming that the complainant is not actually performing the duties of his office when
assaulted, this fact does not bar the existence of the crime of assault upon a person in authority, so long as
the impelling motive of the attack is the performance of official duty. Also, where there is a mutual agreement
to fight, an aggression ahead of the stipulated time and place would be unlawful since to hold otherwise
would be to sanction unexpected assaults contrary to all sense of loyalty and fair play.
102. People v. Dollantes, June 30, 1987 G.R. 70639
When a barangay Captain is in the act of trying to pacify a person who was making trouble in the dance hall,
he is therefore killed while in the performance of his duties. As the barangay captain, it was his duty to
enforce the laws and ordinances within the barangay and if in the enforcement thereof, he incurs, the enmity
of his people who thereafter treacherously slew him, the crime committed is murder with assault upon a
person in authority.
103. Gelig v. People, G.R. No. 173150, July 28, 2010
The prosecution adduced evidence to establish beyond reasonable doubt the commission of the
crime of direct assault. The appellate court must be consequently overruled in setting aside the
trial courts verdict. It erred in declaring that Lydia could not be held guilty of direct assault since
Gemma was no longer a person in authority at the time of the assault because she allegedly
descended to the level of a private person by fighting with Lydia. The fact remains that at the
moment Lydia initiated her tirades, Gemma was busy attending to her official functions as a
teacher. She tried to pacify Lydia by offering her a seat so that they could talk
properly, but Lydia refused and instead unleashed a barrage of verbal
invectives. WhenLydia continued with her abusive behavior, Gemma merely retaliated in kind as
would a similarly situated person. Lydia aggravated the situation by slapping Gemma and
violently pushing her against a wall divider while she was going to the principals office. No fault
could therefore be attributed to Gemma.
- Evasion of Service of Sentence
104. Pangan v. Gatbalite, G.R. No. 141718. January 21, 2005
Pursuant to Article 157 of the same Code, evasion of service of sentence can be committed only by those who
have been convicted by final judgment by escaping during the term of his sentence.
As correctly pointed out by the Solicitor General, escape in legal parlance and for purposes of Articles 93
and 157 of the RPC means unlawful departure of prisoner from the limits of his custody. Clearly, one who has
not been committed to prison cannot be said to have escaped therefrom.
Crimes Against Public Interest
-Falsification
105. Galeos v. People, G.R. Nos. 174730-37, February 9, 2011
In this case, the required disclosure or identification of relatives within the fourth civil degree of consanguinity
or affinity in the SALN involves merely a description of such relationship; it does not call for an application of
law in a particular set of facts. On the other hand, Articles 963 to 967 of the Civil Code simply explain the
concept of proximity of relationship and what constitute direct and collateral lines in relation to the rules on
succession. The question of whether or not persons are related to each other by consanguinity or affinity
within the fourth degree is one of fact. Contrary to petitioners assertion, statements concerning relationship
may be proved as to its truth or falsity, and thus do not amount to expression of opinion. When a government
employee is required to disclose his relatives in the government service, such information elicited therefore
qualifies as a narration of facts contemplated under Article 171 (4) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended.
Further, it bears to stress that the untruthful statements on relationship have no relevance to the employees

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eligibility for the position but pertains rather to prohibition or restriction imposed by law on the appointing
power.
Since petitioner Galeos answered No to the question in his 1993 SALN if he has relatives in the government
service within the fourth degree of consanguinity, he made an untruthful statement therein as in fact he was
related to Ong, who was then the municipal mayor, within the fourth degree of consanguinity, he and Ong
being first cousins (their mothers are sisters). As to his 1994, 1995 and 1996 SALN, Galeos left in blank the
boxes for the answer to the similar query. In Dela Cruz v. Mudlong, it was held that one is guilty of falsification
in the accomplishment of his information and personal data sheet if he withholds material facts which would
have affected the approval of his appointment and/or promotion to a government position. By withholding
information on his relative/s in the government service as required in the SALN, Galeos was guilty of
falsification considering that the disclosure of such relationship with then Municipal Mayor Ong would have
resulted in the disapproval of his permanent appointment pursuant to Article 168 (j) (Appointments), Rule XXII
of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local Government Code of 1991 (R.A. No. 7160)
106. Luagge v. CA, 112 SCRA 97
If the accused acted in good faith when she signed her spouses name to the checks and encashed them to
pay for the expenses of the spouses last illness and burial upon the belief that the accused is entitled to
them and considering that the government sustained no damage due to such encashment, criminal intent
may not be ascribed, and the accused should be acquitted to such crime.
107. People v. Sendaydiego, 81 SCRA 120
If the falsification is resorted to for the purpose of hiding the malversation, the falsification and malversation
are separate offenses. Thus, where the provincial treasurer, as the custodian of the money forming part of the
road and bridge fund, effected payments to his co-accused for construction materials supposedly delivered to
the province for various projects when in fact no such materials were delivered, and to camouflage or conceal
the defraudation, the accused used six vouchers which had genuine features and which appear to be
extrinsically authentic but which were intrinsically fake, the crimes committed are not complex but separate
crimes of falsification and malversation and the falsifications cannot be regarded as constituting one
continuing offense impelled by a single criminal impulse.
108. Tenenggee v. People, G.R. No. 179448, June 26, 2013
All the above-mentioned elements were established in this case. First, petitioner is a private
individual. Second, the acts of falsification consisted in petitioners (1) counterfeiting or
imitating the handwriting or signature of Tan and causing it to appear that the same is true and
genuine in all respects; and (2) causing it to appear that Tan has participated in an act or
proceeding when he did not in fact so participate. Third, the falsification was committed in
promissory notes and checks which are commercial documents. Commercial documents are, in
general, documents or instruments which are used by merchants or businessmen to promote or
facilitate trade or credit transactions. Promissory notes facilitate credit transactions while a
check is a means of payment used in business in lieu of money for convenience in business
transactions. A cashiers check necessarily facilitates bank transactions for it allows the person
whose name and signature appear thereon to encash the check and withdraw the amount
indicated therein.
-Usurpation
109. Ruzol v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 186739-960. April 17, 2013
We note that this case of usurpation against Ruzol rests principally on the prosecutions theory that the DENR
is the only government instrumentality that can issue the permits to transport salvaged forest products. The
prosecution asserted that Ruzol usurped the official functions that properly belong to the DENR.
But erstwhile discussed at length, the DENR is not the sole government agency vested with the authority to
issue permits relevant to the transportation of salvaged forest products, considering that, pursuant to the
general welfare clause, LGUs may also exercise such authority. Also, as can be gleaned from the records, the
permits to transport were meant to complement and not to replace the Wood Recovery Permit issued by the
DENR. In effect, Ruzol required the issuance of the subject permits under his authority as municipal mayor
and independently of the official functions granted to the DENR. The records are likewise bereft of any
showing that Ruzol made representations or false pretenses that said permits could be used in lieu of, or at
the least as an excuse not to obtain, the Wood Recovery Permit from the DENR.
Crimes Relative to Opium and Other Prohibited Drugs
110. People v. Edgardo Fermin, G.R. No. 179344, August, 3, 2011
While Section 21(a) of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of Republic Act No. 9165 excuses noncompliance with the afore-quoted procedure, the same holds true only for as long as the integrity and
evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending officers. Here, the failure of
the buy-bust team to comply with the procedural requirements cannot be excused since there was a break in
the chain of custody of the substance taken from appellant. It should be pointed out that the identity of the
seized substance is established by showing its chain of custody.

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The following are the links that must be established in the chain of custody in a buy-bust situation: first, the
seizure and marking, if practicable, of the illegal drug recovered from the accused by the apprehending
officer; second, the turnover of the illegal drug seized by the apprehending officer to the investigating officer;
third, the turnover by the investigating officer of the illegal drug to the forensic chemist for laboratory
examination; and fourth, the turnover and submission of the marked illegal drug seized from the forensic
chemist to the court.
111. People v. Chua 396 SCRA 657
The crime under consideration is malum prohibitum, hence, lack of criminal intent or good faith does not
exempt appellants from criminal liability. Mere possession of a regulated drug without legal authority is
punishable under the Dangerous Drugs Act.
112. Del Castillo v. People, G.R. No. 185128, January 30, 2012
While it is not necessary that the property to be searched or seized should be owned by the person against
whom the search warrant is issued, there must be sufficient showing that the property is under appellants
control or possession. The CA, in its Decision, referred to the possession of regulated drugs by the petitioner
as a constructive one. Constructive possession exists when the drug is under the dominion and control of the
accused or when he has the right to exercise dominion and control over the place where it is found. The
records are void of any evidence to show that petitioner owns the nipa hut in question nor was it established
that he used the said structure as a shop. The RTC, as well as the CA, merely presumed that petitioner used
the said structure due to the presence of electrical materials, the petitioner being an electrician by
profession.
113. David v. People, G.R. No. 181861, October 17, 2011
The deliberate elimination of the classification of dangerous drugs is the main reason that under R.A. 9165,
the possession of any kind of dangerous drugs is now penalized under the same section. The deliberations,
however, do not address a case wherein an individual is caught in possession of different kinds of dangerous
drugs. In the present case, petitioner was charged under two Informations, one for illegal possession of six (6)
plastic heat-sealed sachets containing dried marijuanaleaves weighing more or less 3.865 grams and the
other for illegal possession of three (3) plastic heat-sealed sachets containing shabu weighing more or less
0.327 gram.
114. People v. Sadablab, G.R. No. 186392, January 18, 2012
As this Court held in People v. Berdadero,[27] the foregoing provision, as well as the Internal Rules and
Regulations implementing the same, is silent as to the consequences of the failure on the part of the law
enforcers to seek the authority of the PDEA prior to conducting a buy-bust operation x x x. [T]his silence
cannot be interpreted as a legislative intent to make an arrest without the participation of PDEA illegal or
evidence obtained pursuant to such an arrest inadmissible.[28] In the case at bar, even if we assume for the
sake of argument that Narciso Sabadlab and accused-appellant Marcos Sabadlab y Narciso alias Bong Pango
could have been different persons, the established fact remains that it was accused-appellant who was
caught in flagrante delicto by the buy-bust team. Following the aforementioned jurisprudence, even the lack
of participation of PDEA would not make accused-appellants arrest illegal or the evidence obtained pursuant
thereto inadmissible. Neither is prior surveillance a necessity for the validity of the buy-bust operation.
115. People v. Amansec, G.R. No. 186131, December 14, 2011
The failure of the police officers to use ultraviolet powder on the buy-bust money is not an indication that the
buy-bust operation was a sham. The use of initials to mark the money used in [a] buy-bust operation has
been accepted by this Court.
116. People v. Dequina, G.R. No. 177570, January 19, 2011
Transport as used under the Dangerous Drugs Act is defined to mean to carry or convey from one place to
another. The evidence in this case shows that at the time of their arrest, accused-appellants were caught in
flagrante carrying/transporting dried marijuana leaves in their traveling bags. PO3 Masanggue and SPO1
Blanco need not even open Dequinas traveling bag to determine its content because when the latter noticed
the police officers presence, she walked briskly away and in her hurry, accidentally dropped her traveling bag,
causing the zipper to open and exposed the dried marijuana bricks therein. Since a crime was then actually
being committed by the accused-appellants, their warrantless arrest was legally justified, and the following
warantless search of their traveling bags was allowable as incidental to their lawful arrest.
117. People v. Dumalag, G.R. No. 180514, April 17, 2013
It has already been settled that the failure of police officers to mark the items seized from an accused in
illegal drugs cases immediately upon its confiscation at the place of arrest does not automatically impair the
integrity of the chain of custody and render the confiscated items inadmissible in evidence. In People v.
Resurreccion, the Court explained that marking of the seized items immediately after seizure and
confiscation may be undertaken at the police station rather than at the place of arrest for as long as it is
done in the presence of an accused in illegal drugs cases. It was further emphasized that what is of utmost

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importance is the preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items, as these would
be utilized in the determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused.
118. People v. Laylo, G.R. No. 192235, July 6, 2011
PO1 Reyes and PO1 Pastor testified that they were the poseur-buyers in the sale. Both positively identified
appellant as the seller of the substance contained in plastic sachets which were found to be positive
for shabu. The same plastic sachets were likewise identified by the prosecution witnesses when presented in
court. Even the consideration of P200.00 for each sachet had been made known by appellant to the police
officers. However, the sale was interrupted when the police officers introduced themselves as cops and
immediately arrested appellant and his live-in partner Ritwal. Thus, the sale was not consummated but
merely attempted. Thus, appellant was charged with attempted sale of dangerous drugs.
Crimes Against Public Morals
- Immoral Doctrines, Obscene Publications and Exhibits
119. Fernando v. CA, December 6, 2006 G.R. No. 159751
To be held liable for obscenity, the prosecution must prove that (a) the materials, publication, picture or
literature are obscene; and (b) the offender sold, exhibited, published or gave away such materials; that
which shocks the ordinary and common sense of men as an indecency. A picture being obscene or indecent
must depend upon the circumstances of the case, and that ultimately, the question is to be decided by the
judgment of the aggregate sense of the community reached by it. It is an issue proper for judicial
determination and should be treated on a case to case basis and on the judges sound discretion.
-AntiTrafficking Persons Act
120. People v. Lali y Purih, G.R. No. 195419, October 12, 2011
The testimony of Aringoys niece, Rachel, that Lolita had been travelling to Malaysia to work in bars cannot be
given credence. Lolita did not even have a passport to go to Malaysia and had to use her sisters passport
when Aringoy, Lalli and Relampagos first recruited her. It is questionable how she could have been travelling
to Malaysia previously without a passport, as Rachel claims. Moreover, even if it is true that Lolita had been
travelling to Malaysia to work in bars, the crime of Trafficking in Persons can exist even with the victims
consent or knowledge under Section 3(a) of RA 9208.
Trafficking in Persons under Sections 3(a) and 4 of RA 9208 is not only limited to transportation of victims, but
also includes the act of recruitment of victims for trafficking. In this case, since it has been sufficiently proven
beyond reasonable doubt, as discussed in Criminal Case No. 21930, that all the three accused (Aringoy, Lalli
and Relampagos) conspired and confederated with one another to illegally recruit Lolita to become a
prostitute in Malaysia, it follows that they are also guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Qualified
Trafficking in Persons committed by a syndicate under RA 9208 because the crime of recruitment for
prostitution also constitutes trafficking.
Crimes Committed by Public Officers
- Malversation
121. Torres v. People, G.R. No. 175074, August 31, 2011
Malversation may be committed either through a positive act of misappropriation of public funds or property,
or passively through negligence. To sustain a charge of malversation, there must either be criminal intent or
criminal negligence, and while the prevailing facts of a case may not show that deceit attended the
commission of the offense, it will not preclude the reception of evidence to prove the existence of negligence
because both are equally punishable under Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code.
More in point, the felony involves breach of public trust, and whether it is committed through deceit or
negligence, the law makes it punishable and prescribes a uniform penalty therefor. Even when the
Information charges willful malversation, conviction for malversation through negligence may still be
adjudged if the evidence ultimately proves the mode of commission of the offense.
122. Cua v. People, G.R. No. 166847, November 16, 2011
This Court has held that to justify conviction for malversation of public funds or property, the prosecution has
only to prove that the accused received public funds or property and that he could not account for them, or
did not have them in his possession and could not give a reasonable excuse for their disappearance. An
accountable public officer may be convicted of malversation even if there is no direct evidence of
misappropriation, and the only evidence is that there is a shortage in his accounts which he has not been able
to satisfactorily explain.
In the present case, considering that the shortage was duly proven by the prosecution, petitioners retaliation
against the BIR for not promoting him clearly does not constitute a satisfactory or reasonable explanation for
his failure to account for the missing amount.
123. Labatagos v. Sandiganbayan, 183 SCRA 415
When a collecting officer of a government institution assigns his or her work to another without the former
being the one to misappropriate a government fund or property malversation may still be at hand.

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Malversation consists not only in misappropriation or converting public funds or property to ones personal
use but also by knowingly allowing others to make use of them.
-Technical Malversation
124. Parungao v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. 96025, May 15, 1991
In malversation of public funds, the offender misappropriates public funds for his own personal use or allows
any other person to take such public funds for the latters personal use. In technical malversation, the public
officer applies public funds under his administration not for his or anothers personal use, but to a public use
other than that for which the fund was appropriated by law or ordinance.
Technical malversation is, therefore, not included in nor does it necessarily include the crime of malversation
of public funds charged in the information.
125. Abdulla v. People, G.R. No. 150129, April 6, 2005
The Court notes that there is no particular appropriation for salary differentials of secondary school teachers
of the Sulu State College in RA 6688. The third element of the crime of technical malversation which requires
that the public fund used should have been appropriated by law, is therefore absent. The authorization given
by the Department of Budget and Management for the use of the forty thousand pesos (P40,000.00)
allotment for payment of salary differentials of 34 secondary school teachers is not an ordinance or law
contemplated in Article 220 of the Revised Penal Code.
-Anti Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (R.A. 3019)
126. Ambil Jr. v. People, G.R. No. 175457, July 6, 2011
In drafting the Anti-Graft Law, the lawmakers opted to use private party rather than private person to
describe the recipient of the unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference for a reason. The term party is a
technical word having a precise meaning in legal parlance as distinguished from person which, in general
usage, refers to a human being. Thus, a private person simply pertains to one who is not a public
officer. While a private party is more comprehensive in scope to mean either a private person or a public
officer acting in a private capacity to protect his personal interest.
In the present case, when petitioners transferred Mayor Adalim from the provincial jail and detained him at
petitioner Ambil, Jr.s residence, they accorded such privilege to Adalim, not in his official capacity as a mayor,
but as a detainee charged with murder. Thus, for purposes of applying the provisions of Section 3(e), R.A. No.
3019, Adalim was a private party.
127. Alvarez v. People, G.R. No. 192591, June 29, 2011
Despite APIs obvious lack of financial qualification and absence of basic terms and conditions in the
submitted proposal, petitioner who chaired the PBAC, recommended the approval of APIs proposal just fortyfive (45) days after the last publication of the invitation for comparative proposals, and subsequently
requested the SB to pass a resolution authorizing him to enter into a MOA with API as the lone bidder for the
project. It was only in the MOA that the details of the construction, terms and conditions of the parties
obligations, were laid down at the time API was already awarded the project. Even the MOA provisions remain
vague as to the parameters of the project, which the Sandiganbayan found as placing API at an arbitrary
position where it can do as it pleases without being accountable to the municipality in any way whatsoever.
True enough, when API failed to execute the construction works and abandoned the project, the municipality
found itself at extreme disadvantage without recourse to a performance security that API likewise failed to
submit.
128. Plameras v. People, G.R. No. 187268, September 4, 2013
As correctly observed by the Sandiganbayan, certain established rules, regulations and policies of the
Commission on Audit and those mandated under the Local Government Code of 1991 (R.A. No. 7160) were
knowingly sidestepped and ignored by the petitioner which enabled CKL Enterprises/Dela Cruz to successfully
get full payment for the school desks and armchairs, despite non-delivery an act or omission evidencing bad
faith and manifest partiality.
129. Sanchez v. People, G.R. No. 187340, August 14, 2013
In the present case, petitioner is solely charged with violating Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019. He is being held
liable for gross and inexcusable negligence in performing the duties primarily vested in him by law, resulting
in undue injury to private complainant. The good faith of heads of offices in signing a document will only be
appreciated if they, with trust and confidence, have relied on their subordinates in whom the duty is primarily
lodged. Moreover, the undue injury to private complainant was established.
The cutting down of her palm trees and the construction of the canal were all done without her approval and
consent. As a result, she lost income from the sale of the palm leaves. She also lost control and use of a part
of her land. The damage to private complainant did not end with the canals construction. Informal settlers
dirtied her private property by using the canal constructed thereon as their lavatory, washroom, and waste
disposal site.
130. Go v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 172602, April 13, 2007

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As early as in 1970, through the erudite Justice J.B.L. Reyes in Luciano v. Estrella, the Court had ascertained
the scope of Section 3(g) of RA 3019 as applying to both public officers and private persons: x x x [T]he act
treated thereunder [referring to Section 3(g) of RA 3019] partakes the nature of malum prohibitum; it is the
commission of that act as defined by law, not the character or effect thereof, that determines whether or not
the provision has been violated. And this construction would be in consonance with the announced purpose
for which Republic Act 3019 was enacted, which is the repression of certain acts of public officers and private
persons constituting graft or corrupt practices act or which may lead thereto.
131. Caunan v. People, G.R. Nos. 181999 & 182001-04, September 2, 2009
In finding that the walis tingting purchase contracts were grossly and manifestly disadvantageous to the
government, the Sandiganbayan relied on the COAs finding of overpricing which was, in turn, based on the
special audit teams report. The audit teams conclusion on the standard price of a walis tingting was pegged
on the basis of the following documentary and object evidence: (1) samples of walis tingting without handle
actually used by the street sweepers; (2) survey forms on the walis tingting accomplished by the street
sweepers; (3) invoices from six merchandising stores where the audit team purchased walis tingting; (4) price
listing of the DBM Procurement Service; and (5) documents relative to the walis tingting purchases of Las Pias
City. These documents were then compared with the documents furnished by petitioners and the other
accused relative to Paraaque Citys walis tingting transactions.
Notably, however, and this the petitioners have consistently pointed out, the evidence of the prosecution did
not include a signed price quotation from the walis tingting suppliers of Paraaque City. In fact, even the walis
tingting furnished the audit team by petitioners and the other accused was different from the walis tingting
actually utilized by the Paraaque City street sweepers at the time of ocular inspection by the audit team. At
the barest minimum, the evidence presented by the prosecution, in order to substantiate the allegation of
overpricing, should have been identical to the walis tingting purchased in 1996-1998. Only then could it be
concluded that the walis tingting purchases were disadvantageous to the government because only then
could a determination have been made to show that the disadvantage was so manifest and gross as to make
a public official liable under Section 3(g) of R.A. No. 3019.
132. Trieste v. Sandiganbayan, 146 SCRA 508
An official involved need not dispose of his shares in a corporation as long as he does not do anything for the
firm in its contract with another. The matter contemplated in Section 3(h) of the Anti-Graft Law is the actual
intervention in the transaction in which one has financial or pecuniary interest in order that liability may
attach.
-Anti-Plunder Act
133. Estrada v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 148560, Nov. 2, 2001
The legislative declaration in R.A. No. 7659 that plunder is a heinous offense implies that it is a malum in
se. For when the acts punished are inherently immoral or inherently wrong, they are mala in se and it does
not matter that such acts are punished in a special law, especially since in the case of plunder the predicate
crimes are mainly mala in se. Indeed, it would be absurd to treat prosecutions for plunder as though they are
mere prosecutions for violations of the Bouncing Check Law (B.P. Blg. 22) or of an ordinance against
jaywalking, without regard to the inherent wrongness of the acts.
134. Garcia v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 170122, October12, 2009
Nowhere in RA 7080 can we find any provision that would indicate a repeal, expressly or impliedly, of RA
1379. RA 7080 is a penal statute which, at its most basic, aims to penalize the act of any public officer who by
himself or in connivance with members of his family amasses, accumulates or acquires ill-gotten wealth in
the aggregate amount of at least PhP 50 million. On the other hand, RA 1379 is not penal in nature, in that it
does not make a crime the act of a public official acquiring during his incumbency an amount of property
manifestly out of proportion of his salary and other legitimate income. RA 1379 aims to enforce the right of
the State to recover the properties which were not lawfully acquired by the officer.
Crimes Against Persons
Parricide
135. People v. Sales, R. No. 177218, October 3, 2011
Parricide is committed when: (1) a person is killed; (2) the deceased is killed by the accused; (3) the deceased
is the father, mother, or child, whether legitimate or illegitimate, or a legitimate other ascendant or other
descendant, or the legitimate spouse of accused.
In the case at bench, there is overwhelming evidence to prove the first element, that is, a person was killed.
Maria testified that her son Noemar did not regain consciousness after the severe beating he suffered from
the hands of his father. Thereafter, a quack doctor declared Noemar dead. Afterwards, as testified to by
Maria, they held a wake for Noemar the next day and then buried him the day after. Noemars Death
Certificate was also presented in evidence.
136. People v. De la Cruz, February 11, 2010 G.R. No. 187683

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In the case of Parricide of a spouse, the best proof of the relationship between the accused and the deceased
would be the marriage certificate. In this case, the testimony of the accused that he was married to the
victim, in itself, is ample proof of such relationship as the testimony can be taken as an admission against
penal interest. Clearly, then, it was established that Victoriano and Anna were husband and wife.
Death under Exceptional Circumstances
137. People v. Abarca, G.R. No. 74433, Sept.14, 1987
There is no question that the accused surprised his wife and her paramour, the victim in this case, in the act
of illicit copulation, as a result of which, he went out to kill the deceased in a fit of passionate outburst. Article
247 prescribes the following elements: (1) that a legally married person surprises his spouse in the act of
committing sexual intercourse with another person; and (2) that he kills any of them or both of them in the
act or immediately thereafter. These elements are present in this case. The trial court, in convicting the
accused-appellant of murder, therefore erred.
Murder
138. People v. Peteluna, G.R. No. 187048, January 23, 2013
To be convicted of murder, the following must be established: (1) a person was killed; (2) the accused killed
him; (3) the killing was with the attendance of any of the qualifying circumstances under Article 248 of the
Revised Penal Code; and (4) the killing neither constitutes parricide nor infanticide.
139. Aguilar v DOJ, G.R. No. 197522, September 11, 2013
Records bear out facts and circumstances which show that the elements of murder namely: (a) that a
person was killed; (b) that the accused killed him; (c) that the killing was attended by any of the qualifying
circumstances mentioned in Article 248 of the RPC; and (d) that the killing is not parricide or infanticide are,
in all reasonable likelihood, present in Dangupons case. As to the first and second elements, Dangupon
himself admitted that he shot and killed Tetet. Anent the third element, there lies sufficient basis to suppose
that the qualifying circumstance of treachery attended Tetets killing in view of the undisputed fact that he
was restrained by respondents and thereby, rendered defenseless. Finally, with respect to the fourth element,
Tetets killing can neither be considered as parricide nor infanticide as the evidence is bereft of any indication
that Tetet is related to Dangupon.
140. People v. Galicia, G.R. No. 191063, October 9, 2013
Since the crime has already been qualified to murder by the attendant circumstance of treachery, the other
proven circumstance of evident premeditation should be appreciated as a generic aggravating circumstance.
In this case, it was clearly shown that the two accused who were riding in tandem hatched the means on
how to carry out and facilitate the commission of the crime. The time that had elapsed while the accused
were waiting for their victim to pass by, is indicative of cool thought and reflection on their part that they
clung to their determination to commit the crime; hence evident premeditation is duly proved.
Homicide
141. Abella v. People, G.R. No. 198400, October 7, 2013
In cases of frustrated homicide, the main element is the accuseds intent to take his victims life. The
prosecution has to prove this clearly and convincingly to exclude every possible doubt regarding homicidal
intent. And the intent to kill is often inferred from, among other things, the means the offender used and the
nature, location, and number of wounds he inflicted on his victim.
142. Escamilla v. People, G.R. No. 188551, February 27, 2013
The intent to kill was shown by the continuous firing at the victim even after he was hit.
Anti-Hazing Law
143. Villareal v. People, G.R. No. 151258, February 1, 2012
In Vedaa v. Valencia (1998), we noted through Associate Justice (now retired Chief Justice) Hilario Davide that
in our nations very recent history, the people have spoken, through Congress, to deem conduct constitutive
of hazing, [an] act[] previously considered harmless by custom, as criminal. Although it may be regarded as a
simple obiter dictum, the statement nonetheless shows recognition that hazing or the conduct of initiation
rites through physical and/or psychological suffering has not been traditionally criminalized. Prior to the 1995
Anti-Hazing Law, there was to some extent a lacuna in the law; hazing was not clearly considered an
intentional felony. And when there is doubt on the interpretation of criminal laws, all must be resolved in favor
of the accused. In dubio pro reo.
For the foregoing reasons, and as a matter of law, the Court is constrained to rule against the trial courts
finding of malicious intent to inflict physical injuries on Lenny Villa, there being no proof beyond reasonable
doubt of the existence of malicious intent to inflict physical injuries or animus iniuriandi as required in mala in
se cases, considering the contextual background of his death, the unique nature of hazing, and absent a law
prohibiting hazing.
The accused fraternity members guilty of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide

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The absence of malicious intent does not automatically mean, however, that the accused fraternity members
are ultimately devoid of criminal liability. The Revised Penal Code also punishes felonies that are committed
by means of fault (culpa). According to Article 3 thereof, there is fault when the wrongful act results from
imprudence, negligence, lack of foresight, or lack of skill.
Unintentional Abortion
144. People v. Salufrania, G.R. No. L-50884, March 30, 1988
The Solicitor Generals brief makes it appear that appellant intended to cause an abortion because he boxed
his pregnant wife on the stomach which caused her to fall and then strangled her. We find that appellants
intent to cause an abortion has not been sufficiently established. Mere boxing on the stomach, taken together
with the immediate strangling of the victim in a fight, is not sufficient proof to show an intent to cause an
abortion. In fact, appellant must have merely intended to kill the victim but not necessarily to cause an
abortion.
Mutilation
145. Aguirre v. Secretary of Justice, G.R. No. 170723, March 3, 2008
A straightforward scrutiny of the above provision shows that the elements of mutilation under the first
paragraph of Art. 262 of the Revised Penal Code to be 1) that there be a castration, that is, mutilation of
organs necessary for generation; and 2) that the mutilation is caused purposely and deliberately, that is, to
deprive the offended party of some essential organ for reproduction. According to the public prosecutor, the
facts alleged did not amount to the crime of mutilation as defined and penalized above, i.e., [t]he vasectomy
operation did not in any way deprived (sic) Larry of his reproductive organ, which is still very much part of his
physical self. Petitioner Gloria Aguirre, however, would want this Court to make a ruling that bilateral
vasectomy constitutes the crime of mutilation. This we cannot do, for such an interpretation would be
contrary to the intentions of the framers of our penal code.
Less serious physical injuries
146. Pentecostes v. People, G.R. No. 167766, April 7, 2010
Petitioner only shot the victim once and did not hit any vital part of the latters body. If he intended to kill him,
petitioner could have shot the victim multiple times or even ran him over with the car. Favorably to petitioner,
the inference that intent to kill existed should not be drawn in the absence of circumstances sufficient to
prove this fact beyond reasonable doubt. When such intent is lacking but wounds are inflicted upon the
victim, the crime is not attempted murder but physical injuries only. Since the Medico-Legal Certificate issued
by the doctor who attended Rudy stated that the wound would only require ten (10) days of medical
attendance, and he was, in fact, discharged the following day, the crime committed is less serious physical
injuries only. The less serious physical injury suffered by Rudy is defined under Article 265 of the Revised
Penal Code, which provides that (A)ny person who inflicts upon another physical injuries not described as
serious physical injuries but which shall incapacitate the offended party for labor for ten (10) days or more, or
shall require medical attendance for the same period, shall be guilty of less serious physical injuries and shall
suffer the penalty of arresto mayor.
Rape
147. People v. Orita, G.R. No. 170723, March 3, 2008
For the consummation of rape, perfect penetration is not essential. Entry of the labia or lips of the female
organ without rupture of the hymen or laceration of the vagina is sufficient to warrant conviction. Necessarily,
rape is attempted if there is no penetration of the female organ because although the offender has
commenced the commission of a felony directly by overt acts, not all acts of execution was performed.
148. People v. Achas, G.R. No. 185712, August 4, 2009
The absence of external signs or physical injuries on the complainants body does not necessarily negate the
commission of rape. This is because hymenal laceration is not an element of the crime of rape, albeit a
healed or fresh laceration is a compelling proof of defloration.
149. People v. Cruz, G.R. No. 186129, August 4, 2009
Most important in a prosecution for statutory rape is to prove the following elements: 1. that the accused had
carnal knowledge with a woman; and (2) that the woman was below 12 years of age. These elements were
sufficiently established during trial and were not rebutted by the defense with any solid evidence to the
contrary.
150. De Castro v. Fernandez, G.R. No. 155041, February 14, 2007
Petitioner insists that a finger does not constitute an object or instrument in contemplation of RA 8353. The
insertion of ones finger into the genital of another constitutes rape through sexual assault. Hence, the
prosecutor did not err in charging petitioner with the crime of rape under Article 266-A, paragraph 2 of the
Revised Penal Code.
151. People v. Penilla, G.R. No. 189324, March 20, 2013

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In rape cases, the moral character of the victim is immaterial. Physical resistance need not be established in
rape when threats and intimidation are employed, and the victim submits herself to her attacker because of
fear. Physical resistance is not an essential element of rape. Also, delay in revealing the commission of a
crime such as rape does not necessarily render such charge unworthy of belief. This is because the victim
may choose to keep quiet rather than expose her defilement to the cruelty of public scrutiny. Only when the
delay is unreasonable or unexplained may it work to discredit the complainant. Neither does an inconclusive
medical report negate the finding of rape. A medical examination of the victim is not indispensable in a
prosecution for rape inasmuch as the victims testimony alone, if credible, is sufficient to convict the accused
of the crime and the medical certificate will then be rendered as merely corroborative.
152. People v. Funesto, G.R. No. 182237, August 3, 2011
In the present case, the prosecution failed to present any certificate of live birth or any similar authentic
document to prove the age of AAA when she was sexually violated.Neither did the appellant expressly admit
AAAs age.
This conclusion notwithstanding, we find that the prosecution sufficiently proved that force and intimidation
attended the commission of the crime, as alleged in the Information. Jurisprudence firmly holds that the force
or violence required in rape cases is relative; it does not need to be overpowering or irresistible; it is present
when it allows the offender to consummate his purpose. In this case, the appellant employed that amount of
force sufficient to consummate rape. In fact, the medical findings confirmed AAAs non-virgin state.
Thus, the appellant is guilty of simple rape under Article 335(2) of the Revised Penal Code, and was properly
sentenced with the penalty of reclusion perpetua
153. People v. Dahilig G.R. No. 187083, June 13, 2011
As elucidated by the RTC and the CA in their respective decisions, all the elements of both crimes are present
in this case. The case of People v. Abay, however, is enlightening and instructional on this issue. It was stated
in that case that if the victim is 12 years or older, the offender should be charged with either sexual
abuse under Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610 or rape under Article 266-A (except paragraph 1[d]) of the Revised
Penal Code. However, the offender cannot be accused of both crimes for the same act because his right
against double jeopardy will be prejudiced. A person cannot be subjected twice to criminal liability for a single
criminal act.
154. People v. Laog, G.R. No. 178321, October 5, 2011
In the special complex crime of rape with homicide, the term homicide is to be understood in its generic
sense, and includes murder and slight physical injuries committed by reason or on occasion of the
rape. Hence, even if any or all of the circumstances (treachery, abuse of superior strength and evident
premeditation) alleged in the information have been duly established by the prosecution, the same would not
qualify the killing to murder and the crime committed by appellant is still rape with homicide. As in the case
of robbery with homicide, the aggravating circumstance of treachery is to be considered as a generic
aggravating circumstance only.
155. People v. Cadellada, G.R. No. 189293, July 10, 2013
A father who rapes his own minor daughter do not need to use any physical force or intimidation because in
rape committed by a close kin, such as the victims father, it is not necessary that actual force or intimidation
be employed; moral influence or ascendancy takes the place of violence or intimidation.
Anti Child Abuse Law
156. Garingarao v. People, G.R. No. 192760, July 20, 2011
In this case, the prosecution established that Garingarao touched AAAs breasts and inserted his finger into
her private part for his sexual gratification. Garingarao used his influence as a nurse by pretending that his
actions were part of the physical examination he was doing. Garingarao persisted on what he was doing
despite AAAs objections. AAA twice asked Garingarao what he was doing and he answered that he was just
examining her.
The Court has ruled that a child is deemed subject to other sexual abuse when the child is the victim of
lascivious conduct under the coercion or influence of any adult.16 In lascivious conduct under the coercion or
influence of any adult, there must be some form of compulsion equivalent to intimidation which subdues the
free exercise of the offended partys free will.17 In this case, Garingarao coerced AAA into submitting to his
lascivious acts by pretending that he was examining her.
157. Roallos v. People, 198389, December 11, 2013
Roallos assertion that he is not liable for sexual abuse under Section 5(b), Article III of R.A. No. 7610 since
AAA is not a child engaged in prostitution is plainly without merit. [T]he law covers not only a situation in
which a child is abused for profit but also one in which a child, through coercion or intimidation, engages in
any lascivious conduct. The very title of Section 5, Article III (Child Prostitution and Other Sexual Abuse) of
R.A. No. 7610 shows that it applies not only to a child subjected to prostitution but also to a child subjected to
other sexual abuse. A child is deemed subjected to other sexual abuse when he or she indulges in
lascivious conduct under the coercion or influence of any adult.

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Crimes Against Personal Liberty and Security

Kidnapping
158. People v. Muit, G.R. No. 181043, October 8, 2008
The elements of the crime of kidnapping and serious illegal detention are the following: (a) the accused is a
private individual; (b) the accused kidnaps or detains another, or in any manner deprives the latter of his
liberty; (c) the act of detention or kidnapping is illegal; and (d) the commission of the offense, any of the four
circumstances mentioned in Article 267 is present. The totality of the prosecutions evidence in this case
established the commission of kidnapping for ransom with homicide.
159. People v. Niegas, G.R. No. 194582, November 27, 2013
If the victim of kidnapping and serious illegal detention is a minor, the duration of his detention is immaterial.
Likewise, if the victim is kidnapped and illegally detained for the purpose of extorting ransom, the duration of
his detention is immaterial.
160. People v. Baluya y Notarte, G.R. No. 181822, April 13, 2011
Appellants arguments that the victim is free to go home if he wanted to because he was not confined,
detained or deprived of his liberty and that there is no evidence to show that Glodil sustained any injury,
cannot hold water. The CA is correct in holding that for kidnapping to exist, it is not necessary that the
offender kept the victim in an enclosure or treated him harshly. Where the victim in a kidnapping case is a
minor, it becomes even more irrelevant whether the offender forcibly restrained the victim. As discussed
above, leaving a child in a place from which he did not know the way home, even if he had the freedom to
roam around the place of detention, would still amount to deprivation of liberty. For under such a situation,
the childs freedom remains at the mercy and control of the abductor. It remains undisputed that it was his
first time to reach Novaliches and that he did not know his way home from the place where he was left. It just
so happened that the victim had the presence of mind that, when he saw an opportunity to escape, he ran
away from the place where appellant left him. Moreover, he is intelligent enough to read the signboards of
the passenger jeepneys he saw and follow the route of the ones going to his place of residence.
161. People v. Jacalne, G.R. No. 168552, October 3, 2011
The essence of the crime of kidnapping is the actual deprivation of the victims liberty, coupled with the
intent of the accused to effect it. It includes not only the imprisonment of a person but also the deprivation of
his liberty in whatever form and for whatever length of time. It involves a situation where the victim cannot
go out of the place of confinement or detention, or is restricted or impeded in his liberty to move.
In this case, appellant dragged Jomarie, a minor, to his house after the latter refused to go with him. Upon
reaching the house, he tied her hands. When Jomarie pleaded that she be allowed to go home, he refused.
Although Jomarie only stayed outside the house, it was inside the gate of a fenced property which is high
enough such that people outside could not see what happens inside. Moreover, when appellant tied the
hands of Jomarie, the formers intention to deprive Jomarie of her liberty has been clearly shown. For there to
be kidnapping, it is enough that the victim is restrained from going home. Because of her tender age, and
because she did not know her way back home, she was then and there deprived of her liberty. This is
irrespective of the length of time that she stayed in such a situation. It has been repeatedly held that if the
victim is a minor, the duration of his detention is immaterial. This notwithstanding the fact also that
appellant, after more or less one hour, released Jomarie and instructed her on how she could go home.
162. People v. Mirandilla, Jr., G.R. No. 186417 July 27, 2011
Notably, however, no matter how many rapes had been committed in the special complex crime of
kidnapping with rape, the resultant crime is only one kidnapping with rape. This is because these composite
acts are regarded as a single indivisible offense as in fact R.A. No. 7659 punishes these acts with only one
single penalty. In a way, R.A. 7659 depreciated the seriousness of rape because no matter how many times
the victim was raped, like in the present case, there is only one crime committed the special complex crime
of kidnapping with rape.
However, for the crime of kidnapping with rape, as in this case, the offender should not have taken the victim
with lewd designs, otherwise, it would be complex crime of forcible abduction with rape. In People v. Garcia,
we explained that if the taking was by forcible abduction and the woman was raped several times, the crimes
committed is one complex crime of forcible abduction with rape, in as much as the forcible abduction was
only necessary for the first rape; and each of the other counts of rape constitutes distinct and separate count
of rape.
Kidnapping and Failure to Return a Minor
163. People v. Marquez, G.R. No. 181440, April 13, 2011
It is clear from the records of the case that Marquez was entrusted with the custody of Justine. Whether this is
due to Meranos version of Marquez borrowing Justine for the day, or due to Marquezs version that Merano left
Justine at her house, it is undeniable that in both versions, Marquez agreed to the arrangement, i.e., to
temporarily take custody of Justine. It does not matter, for the first element to be present, how long said

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custody lasted as it cannot be denied that Marquez was the one entrusted with the custody of the minor
Justine. Thus, the first element of the crime is satisfied.
As to the second element, neither party disputes that on September 6, 1998, the custody of Justine was
transferred or entrusted to Marquez. Whether this lasted for months or only for a couple of days, the fact
remains that Marquez had, at one point in time, physical and actual custody of Justine. Marquezs deliberate
failure to return Justine, a minor at that time, when demanded to do so by the latters mother, shows that the
second element is likewise undoubtedly present in this case.
Grave Threats
164. Caluag v. People, 171511, March 4, 2009
In grave threats, the wrong threatened amounts to a crime which may or may not be accompanied by a
condition. Considering the mauling incident which transpired earlier between petitioner and Julias husband,
petitioners act of pointing a gun at Julias forehead clearly enounces a threat to kill or to inflict serious
physical injury on her person which constituted grave threat.
Grave Coercion
165. Alejandro v. Bernas, G.R. No. 179243, September 7, 2011
We find that the mere presence of the security guards is insufficient to cause intimidation to the petitioners.
There is intimidation when one of the parties is compelled by a reasonable and well-grounded fear of an
imminent and grave evil upon his person or property, or upon the person or property of his spouse,
descendants or ascendants, to give his consent. Material violence is not indispensable for there to be
intimidation. Intense fear produced in the mind of the victim which restricts or hinders the exercise of the will
is sufficient.
In this case, petitioners claim that respondents padlocked the Unit and cut off the facilities in the presence of
security guards. As aptly held by the CA, it was not alleged that the security guards committed anything to
intimidate petitioners, nor was it alleged that the guards were not customarily stationed there and that they
produced fear on the part of petitioners. To determine the degree of the intimidation, the age, sex and
condition of the person shall be borne in mind. Here, the petitioners who were allegedly intimidated by the
guards are all lawyers who presumably know their rights. The presence of the guards in fact was not found by
petitioners to be significant because they failed to mention it in their Joint Affidavit-Complaint. What they
insist is that, the mere padlocking of the Unit prevented them from using it for the purpose for which it was
intended. This, according to the petitioners, is grave coercion on the part of respondents.
166. People v. Astorga, G.R. No. 110097. December 22, 1997
This narration does not adequately establish actual confinement or restraint of the victim, which is the
primary element of kidnapping. 31 Appellants apparent intention was to take Yvonne against her will towards
the direction of Tagum. Appellants plan did not materialize, however, because Fabilas group chanced upon
them. The evidence does not show that appellant wanted to detain Yvonne; much less, that he actually
detained her. Appellants forcible dragging of Yvonne to a place only he knew cannot be said to be an actual
confinement or restriction on the person of Yvonne. There was no lockup. Accordingly, appellant cannot be
convicted of kidnapping under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code.
Rather, the felony committed in this case is grave coercion under Article 286 of the same code. Grave
coercion or coaccion grave has three elements: (a) that any person is prevented by another from doing
something not prohibited by law, or compelled to do something against his or her will, be it right or wrong; (b)
that the prevention or compulsion is effected by violence, either by material force or such a display of it as
would produce intimidation and, consequently, control over the will of the offended party; and (c) that the
person who restrains the will and liberty of another has no right to do so or, in other words, that the restraint
is not made under authority of a law or in the exercise of any lawful right. When appellant forcibly dragged
and slapped Yvonne, he took away her right to go home to Binuangan. Appellant presented no justification for
preventing Yvonne from going home, and we cannot find any.
167. Consulta v. People, G.R. No. 179462, February 12, 2009
The difference in robbery and grave coercion lies in the intent in the commission of the act. The motives of
the accused are the prime criterion:
The distinction between the two lines of decisions, the one holding to robbery and the other to coercion, is
deemed to be the intention of the accused. Was the purpose with intent to gain to take the property of
another by use of force or intimidation? Then, conviction for robbery. Was the purpose, without authority of
law but still believing himself the owner or the creditor, to compel another to do something against his will
and to seize property? Then, conviction for coercion under Article 497 of the Penal Code. The motives of the
accused are the prime criterion. And there was no common robber in the present case, but a man who had
fought bitterly for title to his ancestral estate, taking the law into his own hands and attempting to collect
what he thought was due him. Animus furandi was lacking.
Unjust Vexation
168. Maderazo v. People, G.R. No. 165065, September 26, 2006

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Although Verutiao was not at her stall when it was unlocked, and the contents thereof taken from the stall and
brought to the police station, the crime of unjust vexation was nevertheless committed. For the crime to exist,
it is not necessary that the offended party be present when the crime was committed by said petitioners. It is
enough that the private complainant was embarrassed, annoyed, irritated or disturbed when she learned of
the overt acts of the petitioners. Indeed, by their collective acts, petitioners evicted Verutiao from her stall
and prevented her from selling therein, hence, losing income from the business. Verutiao was deprived of her
possession of the stall from January 21, 1997.
Anti-Wire Tapping Act
169. Gaanan vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 145 SCRA 112 (1986)
An extension telephone cannot be placed in the same category as a dictaphone, dictagraph or the other
devices enumerated in Section 1 of RA No. 4200 as the use thereof cannot be considered as tapping the
wire or cable of a telephone line. The telephone extension in this case was not installed for that purpose. It
just happened to be there for ordinary office use. It is a rule in statutory construction that in order to
determine the true intent of the legislature, the particular clauses and phrases of the statute should not be
taken as detached and isolated expressions, but the whole and every part thereof must be considered in
fixing the meaning of any of its parts.
170. Ramirez vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 93833, Sept. 28, 1995
Petitioners contention that the phrase private communication in Section 1 of R.A. 4200 does not include
private conversations narrows the ordinary meaning of the word communication to a point of absurdity.
The word communicate comes from the latin word communicare, meaning to share or to impart. In its
ordinary signification, communication connotes the act of sharing or imparting signification, communication
connotes the act of sharing or imparting, as in a conversation, or signifies the process by which meanings or
thoughts are shared between individuals through a common system of symbols (as language signs or
gestures) 16 These definitions are broad enough to include verbal or non-verbal, written or expressive
communications of meanings or thoughts which are likely to include the emotionally-charged exchange, on
February 22, 1988, between petitioner and private respondent, in the privacy of the latters office.
Crimes Against Property
Robbery with Homicide
171. People v. Comiling, G.R. No. 140405, March 4, 2004
The rule is, whenever homicide is committed as a consequence or on the occasion of a robbery, all those who
take part as principals in the robbery will also be held guilty as principals of the special complex crime of
robbery with homicide.
While we are convinced that appellants are guilty beyond reasonable doubt of robbery with homicide, we
cannot impose the penalty of death on them. Under Article 294 (1) of the Revised Penal Code, the crime of
robbery carries the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death. In imposing the death penalty, the trial court
appreciated the aggravating circumstances of band, evident premeditation, craft and disguise against
appellants. However, these circumstances were not specifically alleged in the information as required under
Rule 110, Section 8 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. Hence, inasmuch as no aggravating and
mitigating circumstances can be deemed to have attended the commission of the offense, the lower penalty
of reclusion perpetua should be imposed on them.
172. People v. Hijada, G.R. No. 123696, Mar. 11, 2004
There is no crime of Robbery with Multiple Homicide under the Revised Penal Code. The crime is Robbery with
Homicide notwithstanding the number of homicides committed on the occasion of the robbery and even if
murder, physical injuries and rape were also committed on the same occasion.
173. People v. Diu, G.R. No. 201449, April 3, 2013
In robbery with homicide, the original criminal design of the malefactor is to commit robbery, with homicide
perpetrated on the occasion or by reason of the robbery. The intent to commit robbery must precede the
taking of human life. The homicide may take place before, during or after the robbery. It is only the result
obtained, without reference or distinction as to the circumstances, causes or modes or persons intervening in
the commission of the crime that has to be taken into consideration. The constitutive elements of the crime,
namely, robbery and homicide, must be consummated.
It is immaterial that the death would supervene by mere accident; or that the victim of homicide is other than
the victim of robbery, or that two or more persons are killed or that aside from the homicide, rape, intentional
mutilation, or usurpation of authority, is committed by reason or on the occasion of the crime. Likewise
immaterial is the fact that the victim of homicide is one of the robbers; the felony would still be robbery with
homicide. Once a homicide is committed by or on the occasion of the robbery, the felony committed is
robbery with homicide. All the felonies committed by reason of or on the occasion of the robbery are
integrated into one and indivisible felony of robbery with homicide. The word homicide is used in its generic
sense. Homicide, thus, includes murder, parricide, and infanticide. When homicide is committed by reason or
on the occasion of robbery, all those who took part as principals in the robbery would also be held liable as
principals of the single and indivisible felony of robbery with homicide although they did not actually take part

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in the killing, unless it clearly appears that they endeavored to prevent the same. If a robber tries to prevent
the commission of homicide after the commission of the robbery, he is guilty only of robbery and not of
robbery with homicide. All those who conspire to commit robbery with homicide are guilty as principals of
such crime, although not all profited and gained from the robbery. One who joins a criminal conspiracy adopts
the criminal designs of his co-conspirators and can no longer repudiate the conspiracy once it has
materialized.
174. People v. Barra, G.R. No. 198020, July 10, 2013
In the present case, the crime of robbery remained unconsummated because the victim refused to give his
money to appellant and no personal property was shown to have been taken. It was for this reason that the
victim was shot. Accused can only be found guilty of attempted robbery with homicide. The fact of
asportation must be established beyond reasonable doubt. Since this fact was not duly established, accused
should be held liable only for the crime of attempted robbery with homicide.
Robbery with Rape
175. People v. Gallo, G.R. No. 181902, August 31, 2011
For a conviction of the crime of robbery with rape to stand, it must be shown that the rape was committed by
reason or on the occasion of a robbery and not the other way around. This special complex crime under
Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code contemplates a situation where the original intent of the accused was
to take, with intent to gain, personal property belonging to another and rape is committed on the occasion
thereof or as an accompanying crime. In the case at bar, the original intent of the appellant and his coaccused was to rob the victims and AAA was raped on the occasion of the robbery.
176. People v. Dinola, G.R. No. L-54567, March 22, 1990
If the intention of the accused was to commit robbery but rape was also committed even before the robbery,
the crime of robbery with rape is committed however, if the original design was to commit rape but the
accused after committing rape also committed robbery because the opportunity presented itself, the criminal
acts should be viewed as two distinct offenses. In the case at bar, after the complainant was raped by the
accused, the latter threatened to kill her if she did not give watch on her wrist to him and forcibly took it from
her. Hence, the accused was convicted for two crimes of rape and robbery.
177. People v. Moreno, G.R. No. 140033, January 25, 2002
Accused Juan Moreno, who took no part in the rape, is guilty of robbery only under Article 294, No. 5 of the
Revised Penal Code but as to appellant Reynaldo Maniquez, who had raped Mary Ann Galedo, he should be
guilty of the special complex crime of robbery with rape, under Article 294, No. 2 of the Revised Penal Code.
Theft
178. Pidelli v. People, G.R. No. 163437, February 13, 2008
There is, here, a confluence of the elements of theft. Petitioner received the final payment due the partners
Placido and Wilson under the pretext of paying off their obligation with the MTFSH. Under the terms of their
agreement, petitioner was to account for the remaining balance of the said funds and give each of the
partners their respective shares. He, however, failed to give private complainant Placido what was due him
under the construction contract.
Qualified theft
179. Zapanta v. People, G.R. No. 170863, March 20, 2013
The elements of qualified theft, punishable under Article 310 in relation to Articles 308 and 309 of the Revised
Penal Code (RPC), are: (a) the taking of personal property; (b) the said property belongs to another; (c) the
said taking be done with intent to gain; (d) it be done without the owners consent; (e) it be accomplished
without the use of violence or intimidation against persons, nor of force upon things; and (f) it be done under
any of the circumstances enumerated in Article 310 of the RPC, i.e., with grave abuse of confidence.18
All these elements are present in this case. The prosecutions evidence proved, through the prosecutions
eyewitnesses, that upon the petitioners instruction, several pieces of wide flange steel beams had been
delivered, twice in October 2001 and once in November 2001, along Marcos Highway and Mabini Street,
Baguio City; the petitioner betrayed the trust and confidence reposed on him when he, as project manager,
repeatedly took construction materials from the project site, without the authority and consent of Engr.
Marigondon, the owner of the construction materials.
180. Ringor v. People, G.R. No. 198904, December 11, 2013
Grave abuse of confidence, as an element of the felony of qualified theft, must be the result of the relation by
reason of dependence, guardianship, or vigilance, between the appellant and the offended party that might
create a high degree of confidence between them which the appellant abused. The element of grave abuse of
confidence is present in this case. Verily, the petitioner, as sales clerk/agent of PCS, is duty-bound to remit to
Ingan the payments which she collected from the customers of PCS. She would not have been able to take
the money paid by LACS if it were not for her position in PCS. In failing to remit to Ingan the money paid by
LACS, the petitioner indubitably gravely abused the confidence reposed on her by PCS.

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Anti-Carnapping Law
181. People v. Bustinera, G.R. No. 148233, June 8, 2004
Intent to gain or animus lucrandi is an internal act, presumed from the unlawful taking of the motor
vehicle. Actual gain is irrelevant as the important consideration is the intent to gain. The term gain is not
merely limited to pecuniary benefit but also includes the benefit which in any other sense may be derived or
expected from the act which is performed. Thus, the mere use of the thing which was taken without the
owners consent constitutes gain.
182. People v. Lagat, G.R. No. 187044, September 14, 2011
The tricycle, which was definitively ascertained to belong to Biag, as evidenced by the registration papers,
was found in Lagat and Palalays possession. Aside from this, the prosecution was also able to establish that
Lagat and Palalay fled the scene when the Alicia PNP tried to approach them at the palay buying station. To
top it all, Lagat and Palalay failed to give any reason why they had Biags tricycle. Their unexplained
possession raises the presumption that they were responsible for the unlawful taking of the tricycle.
183. People v. Garcia, G.R. No. 138470, April 1, 2003
The acts committed by appellant constituted the crime of carnapping even if the deceased was the driver of
the vehicle and not the owner. The settled rule is that, in crimes of unlawful taking of property through
intimidation or violence, it is not necessary that the person unlawfully divested of the personal property be
the owner thereof. What is simply required is that the property taken does not belong to the offender. Actual
possession of the property by the person dispossessed suffices. So long as there is apoderamiento of personal
property from another against the latters will through violence or intimidation, with animo de lucro, unlawful
taking of a property belonging to another is imputable to the offender.
184. People v. Nocom, G.R. No. 179041, April 1, 2013
To prove the special complex crime of carnapping with homicide, there must be proof not only of the essential
elements of carnapping, but also that it was the original criminal design of the culprit and the killing was
perpetrated in the course of the commission of the carnapping or on the occasion thereof.
Estafa
185. Espino v. People, G.R. No. 188217, July 3, 2013
When the information alleges the crime of estafa specified under paragraph 1(b) and yet what was proven
was estafa under paragraph 2(a) of the same Art. 315 of the RPC, what determines the real nature and cause
of the accusation against an accused is the actual recital of facts stated in the information and not the
caption of the information. The information in this case may be interpreted as charging the accused with both
estafa under paragraph 1 (b) and estafa under paragraph 2(a). It is a basic and fundamental principle of
criminal law that one act can give rise to two offenses, all the more when a single offense has multiple modes
of commission.
186. Brokmann v. People, G.R. No. 199150, February 6, 2012
the offense of estafa, in general, is committed either by (a) abuse of confidence or (b) means of deceit. The
acts constituting estafa committed with abuse of confidence are enumerated in item (1) of Article 315 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended; item (2) of Article 315 enumerates estafa committed by means of deceit.
Deceit is not an essential requisite of estafa by abuse of confidence; the breach of confidence takes the place
of fraud or deceit, which is a usual element in the other estafas. In this case, the charge against the petitioner
and her subsequent conviction was for estafa committed by abuse of confidence. Thus, it was not necessary
for the prosecution to prove deceit as this was not an element of the estafa that the petitioner was charged
with.
187. Lopez v. People, G.R. No. 199294, July 31, 2013
Unlike estafa under paragraph 1 (b) of Article 315 of the Code, estafa under paragraph 2(a) of that provision
does not require as an element of the crime proof that the accused misappropriated or converted the
swindled money or property. All that is required is proof of pecuniary damage sustained by the complainant
arising from his reliance on the fraudulent representation. The prosecution in this case discharged its
evidentiary burden by presenting the receipts of the installment payments made by Sy on the purchase price
for the Club share. Petitioner and Ragonjan knew that the Club was a bogus project.
188. Galvez v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 187919, February 20, 2013
Despite the charge against the respondent of qualified theft, the mere filing of a formal charge, to our mind,
does not automatically make the dismissal valid. Evidence submitted to support the charge should be
evaluated to see if the degree of proof is met to justify respondents termination. The affidavit executed by
Montegrico simply contained the accusations of Abis that respondents committed pilferage, which allegations
remain uncorroborated. Unsubstantiated suspicions, accusations, and conclusions of employers do not
provide for legal justification for dismissing employees. The other bits of evidence were also inadequate to
support the charge of pilferage.

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189. People v. Reyes, G.R. No. 157943, September 4, 2013

In every criminal prosecution, however, the identity of the offender, like the crime itself, must be established
by proof beyond reasonable doubt. In that regard, the Prosecution did not establish beyond reasonable doubt
that it was Wagas who had defrauded Ligaray by issuing the check. Hence, he cannot be convicted of estafa.
190. Milla v. People, G.R. No. 188726, Jan. 25, 2012
In the case at bar, the acceptance by MPI of the Equitable PCI checks tendered by Milla could not have
novated the original transaction, as the checks were only intended to secure the return of the P2 million the
former had already given him. Even then, these checks bounced and were thus unable to satisfy his liability.
Moreover, the estafa involved here was not for simple misappropriation or conversion, but was committed
through Millas falsification of public documents, the liability for which cannot be extinguished by mere
novation.
BP 22
191. People v. Ojeda, G.R. Nos. 104238-58. June 3, 2004
It is clear from the foregoing that complainant merely presumed that appellant received the demand letter
prepared and sent by her lawyer. She was not certain if appellant indeed received the notice of dishonor of
the checks. All she knew was that a demand letter was sent by her lawyer to the appellant. In fact, right after
complainant made that presumption, her lawyer filed the criminal cases against appellant at the Fiscals office
without any confirmation that the demand letter supposedly sent through registered mail was actually
received by appellant.
With the evident lack of notice of dishonor of the checks, appellant cannot be held guilty of violation of BP 22.
The lack of such notice violated appellants right to procedural due process. It is a general rule that when
service of notice is an issue, the person alleging that the notice was served must prove the fact of service.
The burden of proving receipt of notice rests upon the party asserting it and the quantum of proof required for
conviction in this criminal case is proof beyond reasonable doubt.
192. Rigor v. People, G.R. No. 144887, November 17, 2004
Violations of B.P. 22 are categorized as transitory or continuing crimes. A suit on the check can be filed in any
of the places where any of the elements of the offense occurred, that is, where the check is drawn, issued,
delivered or dishonored.
193. Dico v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 141669, February 28, 2005
A notice of dishonor received by the maker or drawer of the check is thus indispensable before a conviction
can ensue. The notice of dishonor may be sent by the offended party or the drawee bank. The notice must be
in writing. A mere oral notice to pay a dishonored check will not suffice. The lack of a written notice is fatal for
the prosecution.
The requirement of notice, its sending to, and its actual receipt by, the drawer or maker of the check gives
the latter the option to prevent criminal prosecution if he pays the holder of the check the amount due
thereon, or makes arrangements for payment in full by the drawee of such check within five (5) banking days
after receiving notice that the check has not been paid.
194. Resterio v. People, G.R. No. 177438, September 24, 2012
What Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 punished was the mere act of issuing a worthless check. The law did not look
either at the actual ownership of the check or of the account against which it was made, drawn, or issued, or
at the intention of the drawee, maker or issuer. Also, that the check was not intended to be deposited was
really of no consequence to her incurring criminal liability under Batas Pambansa Blg. 22.
195. Wong v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 117857, February 2, 2001
The clear import of the law is to establish a prima facie presumption of knowledge of such insufficiency of
funds under the following conditions (1) presentment within 90 days from date of the check, and (2) the
dishonor of the check and failure of the maker to make arrangements for payment in full within 5 banking
days after notice thereof. That the check must be deposited within ninety (90) days is simply one of the
conditions for the prima facie presumption of knowledge of lack of funds to arise. It is not an element of the
offense. Neither does it discharge petitioner from his duty to maintain sufficient funds in the account within a
reasonable time thereof. Under Section 186 of the Negotiable Instruments Law, a check must be presented
for payment within a reasonable time after its issue or the drawer will be discharged from liability thereon to
the extent of the loss caused by the delay. By current banking practice, a check becomes stale after more
than six (6) months,23 or 180 days. Private respondent herein deposited the checks 157 days after the date of
the check. Hence said checks cannot be considered stale. Only the presumption of knowledge of insufficiency
of funds was lost, but such knowledge could still be proven by direct or circumstantial evidence. As found by
the trial court, private respondent did not deposit the checks because of the reassurance of petitioner that he
would issue new checks. Upon his failure to do so, LPI was constrained to deposit the said checks. After the
checks were dishonored, petitioner was duly notified of such fact but failed to make arrangements for full
payment within five (5) banking days thereof. There is, on record, sufficient evidence that petitioner had

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knowledge of the insufficiency of his funds in or credit with the drawee bank at the time of issuance of the
checks. And despite petitioners insistent plea of innocence, we find no error in the respondent courts
affirmance of his conviction by the trial court for violations of the Bouncing Checks Law.
196. Tan v. People, G.R. No. 141466, January 19, 200
The check in question was not issued without sufficient funds and was not dishonored due to insufficiency of
funds. What was stamped on the check in question was Payment Stopped-Funded at the same time DAUD
meaning drawn against uncollected deposits. Even with uncollected deposits, the bank may honor the check
at its discretion in favor of favored clients, in which case there would be no violation of B.P. 22.
197. Nissan Gallery Ortigas v. Felipe, 199067, November 11, 2013
A person acquitted of a criminal charge, however, is not necessarily civilly free because the quantum of proof
required in criminal prosecution (proof beyond reasonable doubt) is greater than that required for civil liability
(mere preponderance of evidence). In order to be completely free from civil liability, a persons acquittal must
be based on the fact he did not commit the offense. If the acquittal is based merely on reasonable doubt, the
accused may still be held civilly liable since this does not mean he did not commit the act complained of.
Though the accused has been acquitted from the criminal charge, the acquittal was just based on reasonable
doubt and it did not change the fact that she issued the subject check which was subsequently dishonored
upon its presentment.
- Other Deceits
198. Guinhawa v. People, G.R. No. 162822, August 25, 2005
For one to be liable for other deceits under the law, it is required that the prosecution must prove the
following essential elements: (a) false pretense, fraudulent act or pretense other than those in the preceding
articles; (b) such false pretense, fraudulent act or pretense must be made or executed prior to or
simultaneously with the commission of the fraud; and (c) as a result, the offended party suffered damage or
prejudice.[40] It is essential that such false statement or fraudulent representation constitutes the very cause
or the only motive for the private complainant to part with her property.
The provision includes any kind of conceivable deceit other than those enumerated in Articles 315 to 317 of
the Revised Penal Code. It is intended as the catchall provision for that purpose with its broad scope and
intendment.
-Arson
199. People v. Malngan, G.R. No. 170470, September 26, 2006
In cases where both burning and death occur, in order to determine what crime/crimes was/were perpetrated
whether arson, murder or arson and homicide/murder, it is de rigueur to ascertain the main objective of the
malefactor: (a) if the main objective is the burning of the building or edifice, but death results by reason or on
the occasion of arson, the crime is simply arson, and the resulting homicide is absorbed; (b) if, on the other
hand, the main objective is to kill a particular person who may be in a building or edifice, when fire is resorted
to as the means to accomplish such goal the crime committed is murder only; lastly, (c) if the objective is,
likewise, to kill a particular person, and in fact the offender has already done so, but fire is resorted to as a
means to cover up the killing, then there are two separate and distinct crimes committed homicide/murder
and arson.
200. Lihaylihay v. People, G.R. No. 191219, July 31, 2013
Petitioners were property convicted of the crime of violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019 which has the
following essential elements: (a) the accused must be a public officer discharging administrative, judicial or
official functions; (b) he must have acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable
negligence; and (c) his action caused any undue injury to any party, including the government, or gave any
private party unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his functions. Having affixed
their signatures on the disputed documents despite the glaring defects found therein, petitioners were
properly found to have acted with evident bad faith in approving the ghost purchases. Their participation in
facilitating the payment of non-existent CCIE items resulted to a loss on the part of the government.
201. Buebos v. People, G.R. No. 163938, March 28, 2008
The elements of this form of arson are: (a) there is intentional burning; and (b) what is intentionally burned is
an inhabited house or dwelling. Admittedly, there is a confluence of the foregoing elements here. However,
the information failed to allege that what was intentionally burned was an inhabited house or dwelling. That is
fatal.
- Malicious Mischief
202. Taguinod v. People, G.R. No. 185833, October 12, 2011
Contrary to the contention of the petitioner, the evidence for the prosecution had proven beyond reasonable
doubt the existence of the foregoing elements. First, the hitting of the back portion of the CRV by the
petitioner was clearly deliberate as indicated by the evidence on record. The version of the private
complainant that the petitioner chased him and that the Vitara pushed the CRV until it reached the stairway

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railing was more believable than the petitioners version that it was private complainants CRV which moved
backward and deliberately hit the Vitara considering the steepness or angle of the elevation of the P2 exit
ramp. It would be too risky and dangerous for the private complainant and his family to move the CRV
backward when it would be hard for him to see his direction as well as to control his speed in view of the
gravitational pull. Second, the act of damaging the rear bumper of the CRV does not constitute arson or other
crimes involving destruction. Lastly, when the Vitara bumped the CRV, the petitioner was just giving vent to
his anger and hate as a result of a heated encounter between him and the private complainant.
In sum, this Court finds that the evidence on record shows that the prosecution had proven the guilt of the
petitioner beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of malicious mischief.
Crimes Against Chastity
-Qualified Seduction
203. People v. Fontanilla, G.R. No. L-25354, June 28, 1968
While deceit is an essential element of ordinary or simple seduction, it does not have to be proved or
established in a charge of qualified seduction. It is replaced by abuse of confidence. Under Art. 337 of the
Revised Penal Code, the seduction of a virgin over twelve and under eighteen years of age, committed by any
person in public authority, priest, house servant, domestic guardian, teacher, or any person who, in any
capacity, shall be entrusted with the education or custody of the woman seduced is constitutive of the
crime of qualified seduction even though no deceit intervenes or even when such carnal knowledge was
voluntary on the part of the virgin.
204. Perez v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-80838, November 29, 1988
There are similar elements between Consented Abduction and Qualified Seduction, namely: (1) that the
offended party is a virgin, and, (2) that she must be over twelve (12) and under eighteen (18) years of age.
However, Consented Abduction, in addition to the two common elements, requires that: (1) the taking away
of the offended party must be with her consent, after solicitation or cajolery from the offender, and, (2) the
taking away of the offended party must be with lewd designs while Qualified Seduction requires that: (1) the
crime be committed by abuse of authority, confidence or relationship, and, (2) the offender has sexual
intercourse with the woman.
- Acts of Lasciviousness
205. Sombilon v. People, G.R. No. 175528, September 30, 2009
In cases of acts of lasciviousness, it is not necessary that intimidation be irresistible. It being sufficient that
some compulsion equivalent to intimidation annuls or subdues the free exercise of the will of the offended
party. Here, the victim was locked inside a windowless room together with her aggressor who poked a gun at
her forehead. Even a grown man would be paralyzed with fear if threatened at gunpoint, what more the
hapless victim who was only 15 years old when she was subjected to such atrocity.
206. Perez v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 143838, May 9, 2002
Petitioners acts of lying on top of the complainant, embracing and kissing her, mashing her breasts, inserting
his hand inside her panty and touching her sexual organ, while admittedly obscene and detestable acts, do
not constitute attempted rape absent any showing that petitioner actually commenced to force his penis into
the complainants sexual organ. Rather, these acts constitute acts of lasciviousness. The elements of said
crime are: (1) that the offender commits any act of lasciviousness or lewdness; (2) that it is done (a) by using
force and intimidation or (b) when the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious, or (c)
when the offended party is under 12 years of age; and (3) that the offended party is another person of either
sex.
207. People v Bonaagua , G.R. No. 188897, June 6, 2011
Ireno guilty of the crime of Acts of Lasciviousness under Section 5 (b) of R.A. No. 7610. It must be
emphasized, however, that like in the crime of rape whereby the slightest penetration of the male organ or
even its slightest contact with the outer lip or the labia majora of the vagina already consummates the crime,
in like manner, if the tongue, in an act of cunnilingus, touches the outer lip of the vagina, the act should also
be considered as already consummating the crime of rape through sexual assault, not the crime of acts of
lasciviousness. Notwithstanding, in the present case, such logical interpretation could not be applied. It must
be pointed out that the victim testified that Ireno only touched her private part and licked it, but did not insert
his finger in her vagina. This testimony of the victim, however, is open to various interpretation, since it
cannot be identified what specific part of the vagina was defiled by Ireno. Thus, in conformity with the
principle that the guilt of an accused must be proven beyond reasonable doubt, the statement cannot be the
basis for convicting Ireno with the crime of rape through sexual assault.
-Forcible Abduction
208. People v. Ablaneda, G.R. No. 131914, April 30, 2001
The elements of the crime of forcible abduction, as defined in Article 342 of the Revised Penal Code, are: (1)
that the person abducted is any woman, regardless of her age, civil status, or reputation; (2) that she is taken
against her will; and (3) that the abduction is with lewd designs. On the other hand, rape is committed by

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having carnal knowledge of a woman by force or intimidation, or when the woman is deprived of reason or is
unconscious, or when she is under twelve years of age.
All these elements were proven in this case. The victim, who is a woman, was taken against her will, as shown
by the fact that she was intentionally directed by accused-appellant to a vacant hut. At her tender age,
Magdalena could not be expected to physically resist considering that the lewd designs of accused-appellant
could not have been apparent to her at that time. Physical resistance need not be demonstrated to show that
the taking was against her will. The employment of deception suffices to constitute the forcible taking,
especially since the victim is an unsuspecting young girl. Considering that it was raining, going to the hut was
not unusual to Magdalena, as probably the purpose was to seek shelter. Barrio girls are particularly prone to
deception. It is the taking advantage of their innocence that makes them easy culprits of deceiving minds.
Finally, the evidence shows that the taking of the young victim against her will was effected in furtherance of
lewd and unchaste designs. Such lewd designs in forcible abduction is established by the actual rape of the
victim.
209. People v. Sabadlab, G.R. No. 175924, March 14, 2012
The principal objective of Sabadlab and his two cohorts in abducting AAA from Dapitan Street and in bringing
her to another place was to rape and ravish her. This objective became evident from the successive acts of
Sabadlab immediately after she had alighted from the car in completely undressing her as to expose her
whole body (except the eyes due to the blindfold), in kissing her body from the neck down, and in having
carnal knowledge of her (in that order). Although forcible abduction was seemingly committed, we cannot
hold him guilty of the complex crime of forcible abduction with rape when the objective of the abduction was
to commit the rape. Under the circumstances, the rape absorbed the forcible abduction.
210. People v. Garcia, G.R. No. 141125, February 28, 2002
There can only be one complex crime of forcible abduction with rape. The crime of forcible abduction was
only necessary for the first rape. Thus, the subsequent acts of rape can no longer be considered as separate
complex crimes of forcible abduction with rape. They should be detached from and considered independently
of the forcible abduction. Therefore, accused-appellant should be convicted of one complex crime of forcible
abduction with rape and three separate acts of rape.
- Anti Sexual Harassment Act
211. Bacsin v. Wahiman, G.R. No. 146053, April 30, 2008
The formal charge, while not specifically mentioning RA 7877, The Anti-Sexual Harassment Act of 1995,
imputes on the petitioner acts covered and penalized by said law. Contrary to the argument of petitioner, the
demand of a sexual favor need not be explicit or stated. In Domingo v. Rayala, it was held, It is true that this
provision calls for a demand, request or requirement of a sexual favor. But it is not necessary that the
demand, request, or requirement of a sexual favor be articulated in a categorical oral or written statement. It
may be discerned, with equal certitude, from the acts of the offender. The CSC found, as did the CA, that even
without an explicit demand from petitioner his act of mashing the breast of AAA was sufficient to constitute
sexual harassment. Moreover, under Section 3 (b) (4) of RA 7877, sexual harassment in an education or
training environment is committed (w)hen the sexual advances result in an intimidating, hostile or offensive
environment for the student, trainee or apprentice. AAA even testified that she felt fear at the time petitioner
touched her. It cannot then be said that the CSC lacked basis for its ruling, when it had both the facts and the
law. The CSC found the evidence presented by the complainant sufficient to support a finding of grave
misconduct. It is basic that factual findings of administrative agencies, when supported by substantial
evidence, are binding upon the Court.
212. Alegria v Duque, A.M. No. RTJ-06-2019, 04 April 2007
Sexual harassment in the workplace is not about a man taking advantage of a woman by reason of sexual
desire it is about power being exercised by a superior over his women subordinates. That power emanates
from the fact that he can remove them if they refuse his amorous advances. Under Sec. 3 of A.M. No. 03-0313-SC (Re: Rule on Administrative Procedure in Sexual Harassment Cases and Guidelines on Proper Work
Decorum in the Judiciary), work-related sexual harassment is committed by an official or employee in the
Judiciary who, having authority, influence or moral ascendancy over another in a work environment,
demands, requests or otherwise requires any sexual favor from the other, regardless of whether the demand,
request or requirement for submission is accepted by the latter. It is committed when the sexual favor is
made as a condition in the hiring or in the employment, re-employment or continued employment of said
individual, or in granting said individual favorable compensation, terms, conditions, promotions, or privileges;
or the refusal to grant the sexual favor results in limiting, segregating or classifying the employee which in
any way would discriminate, deprive or diminish employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect said
employee.
In the case at bar, while it is true that the element of moral ascendancy is present, respondent being the
person who recommended complainant to her present position, complainant has failed to prove the alleged
sexual advances by evidence other than her bare allegations in the affidavit-complaint. Even her own actions
or omissions operate to cast doubt on her claim.

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Crimes Against Civil Status

-Bigamy
213. Teves v. People, G.R. No. 188775, August 24, 2011
The instant case has all the elements of the crime of bigamy. Thus, the CA was correct in affirming the
conviction of petitioner.
Petitioner was legally married to Thelma on 26 November 1992 at the Metropolitan Trial Court of Muntinlupa
City. He contracted a second or subsequent marriage with Edita on 10 December 2001 in Meycauayan,
Bulacan. At the time of his second marriage with Edita, his marriage with Thelma was legally subsisting. It is
noted that the finality of the decision declaring the nullity of his first marriage with Thelma was only on 27
June 2006 or about five (5) years after his second marriage to Edita. Finally, the second or subsequent
marriage of petitioner with Edita has all the essential requisites for validity. Petitioner has in fact not disputed
the validity of such subsequent marriage.
It is evident therefore that petitioner has committed the crime charged. His contention that he cannot be
charged with bigamy in view of the declaration of nullity of his first marriage is bereft of merit. The Family
Code has settled once and for all the conflicting jurisprudence on the matter. A declaration of the absolute
nullity of a marriage is now explicitly required either as a cause of action or a ground for defense. Where the
absolute nullity of a previous marriage is sought to be invoked for purposes of contracting a second marriage,
the sole basis acceptable in law for said projected marriage to be free from legal infirmity is a final judgment
declaring the previous marriage void.
214. Morigo v. People, G.R. No. 145226, February 6, 2004
The first element of bigamy as a crime requires that the accused must have been legally married. But in this
case, legally speaking, the petitioner was never married to Lucia Barrete. Thus, there is no first marriage to
speak of. Under the principle of retroactivity of a marriage being declared void ab initio, the two were never
married from the beginning. The contract of marriage is null; it bears no legal effect. Taking this argument
to its logical conclusion, for legal purposes, petitioner was not married to Lucia at the time he contracted the
marriage with Maria Jececha. The existence and the validity of the first marriage being an essential element
of the crime of bigamy, it is but logical that a conviction for said offense cannot be sustained where there is
no first marriage to speak of. The petitioner, must, perforce be acquitted of the instant charge.
No marriage ceremony at all was performed by a duly authorized solemnizing officer. Petitioner and Lucia
Barrete merely signed a marriage contract on their own. The mere private act of signing a marriage contract
bears no semblance to a valid marriage and thus, needs no judicial declaration of nullity. Such act alone,
without more, cannot be deemed to constitute an ostensibly valid marriage for which petitioner might be held
liable for bigamy unless he first secures a judicial declaration of nullity before he contracts a subsequent
marriage.
215. Tenebro v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 150758, February 18, 2004
Although the judicial declaration of the nullity of a marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity
retroacts to the date of the celebration of the marriage insofar as the vinculum between the spouses is
concerned, it is significant to note that said marriage is not without legal effects. Among these effects is that
children conceived or born before the judgment of absolute nullity of the marriage shall be considered
legitimate.28 There is therefore a recognition written into the law itself that such a marriage, although void ab
initio, may still produce legal consequences. Among these legal consequences is incurring criminal liability for
bigamy. To hold otherwise would render the States penal laws on bigamy completely nugatory, and allow
individuals to deliberately ensure that each marital contract be flawed in some manner, and to thus escape
the consequences of contracting multiple marriages, while beguiling throngs of hapless women with the
promise of futurity and commitment.
Crimes Against Honor
- Libel
216. Alcantara v. Ponce, G.R. No. 156183, February 28, 2007
The crime of libel, as defined in Article 353 of the Revised Penal Code, has the following elements: (1)
imputation of a crime, vice or defect, real or imaginary, or any act, omission, condition, status or
circumstance; (2) publicity or publication; (3) malice; (4) direction of such imputation at a natural or juridical
person, or even a dead person and (5) tendency to cause the dishonor, discredit, or contempt of the person
defamed.
217. Lopez v. People, G.R. No. 172203, February 14, 2011
An allegation is considered defamatory if it ascribes to a person the commission of a crime, the possession of
a vice or defect, real or imaginary or any act, omission, condition, status or circumstance which tends to
dishonor or discredit or put him in contempt or which tends to blacken the memory of one who is dead. To
determine whether a statement is defamatory, the words used are to be construed in their entirety and
should be taken in their plain, natural and ordinary meaning as they would naturally be understood by
persons reading them, unless it appears that they were used and understood in another sense. Moreover, [a]
charge is sufficient if the words are calculated to induce the hearers to suppose and understand that the

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person or persons against whom they were uttered were guilty of certain offenses or are sufficient to impeach
the honesty, virtue or reputation or to hold the person or persons up to public ridicule.
Tested under these established standards, we cannot subscribe to the appellate courts finding that the phrase
CADIZ FOREVER, BADING AND SAGAY NEVER tends to induce suspicion on private respondents character,
integrity and reputation as mayor of Cadiz City. There are no derogatory imputations of a crime, vice or defect
or any act, omission, condition, status or circumstance tending, directly or indirectly, to cause his dishonor.
Neither does the phrase in its entirety, employ any unpleasant language or somewhat harsh and uncalled for
that would reflect on private respondents integrity. Obviously, the controversial word NEVER used by
petitioner was plain and simple. In its ordinary sense, the word did not cast aspersion upon private
respondents integrity and reputation much less convey the idea that he was guilty of any offense. Simply
worded as it was with nary a notion of corruption and dishonesty in government service, it is our considered
view to appropriately consider it as mere epithet or personal reaction on private respondents performance of
official duty and not purposely designed to malign and besmirch his reputation and dignity more so to deprive
him of public confidence.
218. Diaz v. People, G.R. No. 159787, May 25, 2007
The last element of libel is that the victim is identified or identifiable from the contents of the libelous article.
In order to maintain a libel suit, it is essential that the victim be identifiable, although it is not necessary that
the person be named. It is enough if by intrinsic reference the allusion is apparent or if the publication
contains matters of description or reference to facts and circumstances from which others reading the article
may know the person alluded to, or if the latter is pointed out by extraneous circumstances so that those
knowing such person could and did understand that he was the person referred to.5 Kunkle v. CablenewsAmerican and Lyons6 laid the rule that this requirement is complied with where a third person recognized or
could identify the party vilified in the article.
The libelous article, while referring to Miss S, does not give a sufficient description or other indications
which identify Miss S. In short, the article fails to show that Miss S and Florinda Bagay are one and the
same person.
219. Fermin v. People, G.R. No. 157643, March 28, 2008
Proof adduced during the trial showed that accused was the manager of the publication without the
corresponding evidence that, as such, he was directly responsible for the writing, editing, or publishing of the
matter contained in the said libelous article. Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code, however, includes not only
the author but also the person who prints or published it. Thus, proof of knowledge or participation in the
publication of the offending article is not required.
220. Tulfo v. People, G.R. No. 161032, September 16, 2008
Neither the publisher nor the editors can disclaim liability for libelous articles that appear on their paper by
simply saying they had no participation in the preparation of the same. They cannot say that Tulfo was all
alone in the publication of Remate, on which the subject articles appeared, when they themselves clearly
hold positions of authority in the newspaper, or in the case of Pichay, as the president in the publishing
company.
As Tulfo cannot simply say that he is not liable because he did not fulfill his responsibility as a journalist, the
other petitioners cannot simply say that they are not liable because they did not fulfill their responsibilities as
editors and publishers. An editor or manager of a newspaper, who has active charge and control of its
management, conduct, and policy, generally is held to be equally liable with the owner for the publication
therein of a libelous article. On the theory that it is the duty of the editor or manager to know and control the
contents of the paper, it is held that said person cannot evade responsibility by abandoning the duties to
employees, so that it is immaterial whether or not the editor or manager knew the contents of the
publication.
221. Bonifacio v. RTC Makati, G.R. No. 184800, May 5, 2010
If the circumstances as to where the libel was printed and first published are used by the offended party as
basis for the venue in the criminal action, the Information must allege with particularity where the
defamatory article was printed and first published, as evidenced or supported by, for instance, the address of
their editorial or business offices in the case of newspapers, magazines or serial publications. This precondition becomes necessary in order to forestall any inclination to harass.
The same measure cannot be reasonably expected when it pertains to defamatory material appearing on a
website on the internet as there would be no way of determining the situs of its printing and first publication.
To credit Gimenezs premise of equating his first access to the defamatory article on petitioners website in
Makati with printing and first publication would spawn the very ills that the amendment to Article 360 of the
RPC sought to discourage and prevent. It hardly requires much imagination to see the chaos that would ensue
in situations where the websites author or writer, a blogger or anyone who posts messages therein could be
sued for libel anywhere in the Philippines that the private complainant may have allegedly accessed the
offending website.
- Slander

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222. Villanueva v. People, G.R. No. 160351, April 10, 2006

Moreover, pointing a dirty finger ordinarily connotes the phrase Fuck You, which is similar to the
expression Puta or Putang Ina mo, in local parlance. Such expression was not held to be libelous in Reyes v.
People, where the Court said that: This is a common enough expression in the dialect that is often employed,
not really to slander but rather to express anger or displeasure. It is seldom, if ever, taken in its literal sense
by the hearer, that is, as a reflection on the virtues of a mother. Following Reyes, and in light of the fact that
there was a perceived provocation coming from complainant, petitioners act of pointing a dirty finger at
complainant constitutes simple slander by deed, it appearing from the factual milieu of the case that the act
complained of was employed by petitioner to express anger or displeasure at complainant for
procrastinating the approval of his leave monetization. While it may have cast dishonor, discredit or contempt
upon complainant, said act is not of a serious nature, thus, the penalty shall bearresto menor meaning,
imprisonment from one day to 30 days or a fine not exceeding P200.00. We opt to impose a fine
following Mari.
223. Victorio v. CA, G.R. Nos. L-32836-37, May 3, 1989
Appellant-petitioner admitted having called Atty. Vivencio Ruiz, kayabang, tunaw na utak, swapang, and
estapador, which attributes to the latter the crime of estafa, a serious and insulting imputation. Defamatory
words uttered specifically against a lawyer when touching on his profession are libellous per se.
- Intriguing Against Honor
224. Betguen v Masangcay 238 Scra 475
Article 364 of the Revised Penal Code defines intriguing against honor as any intrigue which has for its
principal purpose to blemish the honor and reputation of a person. This felony undoubtedly falls under the
coverage of crimes involving moral turpitude, the latter term having been defined as an act of baseness,
vileness, depravity in the private and social duties which a man owes his fellow man, or to society in general,
contrary to the accepted and customary rule of right and duty between man and man, or conduct contrary to
justice, honesty, modesty and good morals.
Criminal Negligence
225. Ivler v. Modesto-San Pedro, 172716, November 17, 2010
Indeed, the notion that quasi-offenses, whether reckless or simple, are distinct species of crime, separately
defined and penalized under the framework of our penal laws, is nothing new. As early as the middle of the
last century, we already sought to bring clarity to this field by rejecting in Quizon v. Justice of the Peace of
Pampanga the proposition that reckless imprudence is not a crime in itself but simply a way of committing it x
x x on three points of analysis: (1) the object of punishment in quasi-crimes (as opposed to intentional
crimes); (2) the legislative intent to treat quasi-crimes as distinct offenses (as opposed to subsuming them
under the mitigating circumstance of minimal intent) and; (3) the different penalty structures for quasi-crimes
and intentional crimes

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