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DIGEST poli review SEPTEMBER 5 2015

People v. Perfecto, G.R. No. L-18463, October 4, 1922

FACTS: The issue started when the Secretary of the Philippine Senate, Fernando
Guerrero, discovered that the documents regarding the testimony of the
witnesses in an investigation of oil companies had disappeared from his office.
Then, the day following the convening of Senate, the newspaper La Nacion
edited by herein respondent Gregorio Perfecto published an article against the
Philippine Senate. Here, Mr. Perfecto was alleged to have violated Article 256 of
the Spanish Penal Code provision that punishes those who insults the Ministers
of the Crown. Hence, the issue.

ISSUE: Whether or not Article 256 of the Spanish Penal Code (SPC) is still in
force and can be applied in the case at bar?

HELD: No.

REASONING: The Court stated that during the Spanish Government, Article 256
of the SPC was enacted to protect Spanish officials as representatives of the King.
However, the Court explains that in the present case, we no longer have Kings
nor its representatives for the provision to protect. Also, with the change
of sovereignty over the Philippines from Spanish to American, it means
that the invoked provision of the SPC had been automatically abrogated. The
Court determined Article 256 of the SPC to be political in nature for it is about
the relation of the State to its inhabitants, thus, the Court emphasized that it is a
general principle of the public law that on acquisition of territory, the previous
political relations of the ceded region are totally abrogated. Hence, Article 256 of
the SPC is considered no longer in force and cannot be applied to the present
case. Therefore, respondent was acquitted.

De Leon v. Esguerra Case Digest


De Leon v. Esguerra, 153 SCRA 602, August, 31, 1987
(En Banc), J. Melencio-Herrera

Facts: On May 17, 1982, petitioner Alfredo M. De Leon was elected Barangay
Captain together with the other petitioners as Barangay Councilmen of Barangay
Dolores, Muncipality of Taytay, Province of Rizal in a Barangay election held under
Batas Pambansa Blg. 222, otherwise known as Barangay Election Act of 1982.

On February 9, 1987, petitioner De Leon received a Memorandum antedated


December 1, 1986 but signed by respondent OIC Governor Benjamin Esguerra on
February 8, 1987 designating respondent Florentino G. Magno as Barangay
Captain of Barangay Dolores and the other respondents as members of Barangay
Council of the same Barangay and Municipality.

Petitoners prayed to the Supreme Court that the subject Memoranda of February
8, 1987 be declared null and void and that respondents be prohibited by taking
over their positions of Barangay Captain and Barangay Councilmen.

Petitioners maintain that pursuant to Section 3 of the Barangay Election Act of


1982 (BP Blg. 222), their terms of office shall be six years which shall commence
on June 7, 1988 and shall continue until their successors shall have elected and
shall have qualified. It was also their position that with the ratification of the 1987
Philippine Constitution, respondent OIC Governor no longer has the authority to
replace them and to designate their successors.

On the other hand, respondents contend that the terms of office of elective and
appointive officials were abolished and that petitioners continued in office by
virtue of Sec. 2, Art. 3 of the Provisional Constitution and not because their term
of six years had not yet expired; and that the provision in the Barangay Election
Act fixing the term of office of Barangay officials to six years must be deemed to

have been repealed for being inconsistent with Sec. 2, Art. 3 of the Provisional
Constitution.

Issue: Whether or not the designation of respondents to replace petitioners was


validly made during the one-year period which ended on Feb 25, 1987.

Ruling: Supreme Court declared that the Memoranda issued by respondent OIC
Gov on Feb 8, 1987 designating respondents as Barangay Captain and Barangay
Councilmen of Barangay Dolores, Taytay, Rizal has no legal force and effect.

The 1987 Constitution was ratified in a plebiscite on Feb 2, 1987, therefore, the
Provisional Constitution must be deemed to have superseded. Having become
inoperative, respondent OIC Gov could no longer rely on Sec 2, Art 3, thereof to
designate respondents to the elective positions occupied by petitioners.
Relevantly, Sec 8, Art 1 of the 1987 Constitution further provides in part:

"Sec. 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials,
which shall be determined by law, shall be three years x x x."

Until the term of office of barangay officials has been determined by aw,
therefore, the term of office of 6 years provided for in the Barangay Election Act
of 1982 should still govern.
Francisco vs. HR
Ernesto Francisco, Jr. vs. The House of Representatives
G.R. No. 160261 November 10, 2003
Carpio Morales, J.:
Facts: On July 22, 2002, the House of Representatives adopted a Resolution
which directed the Committee on Justice to conduct an investigation, in aid of
legislation, on the manner of disbursements and expenditures by the Chief Justice
of the Supreme Court of the Judiciary Development Fund (JDF). Then on June 2,

2003, former President Joseph Estrada filed an impeachment complaint against


Chief Justice Hilario Davide Jr. and seven Associate Justices. The complaint was
endorsed and was referred to the House Committee in accordance with Section
3(2) of Article XI of the Constitution.
The House Committee on Justice ruled on October 13, 2003 that the first
impeachment complaint was sufficient in form, but voted to dismiss the same on
October 22, 2003 for being insufficient in substance. On October 23, 2003, a
second impeachment complaint was filed against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide,
Jr., founded on the alleged results of the legislative inquiry initiated by abovementioned House Resolution. This second impeachment complaint was
accompanied by a Resolution of Endorsement/Impeachment signed by at least
one-third (1/3) of all the Members of the House of Representatives.
Issues:
1. Can the Court make a determination of what constitutes an impeachable
offense?
2. Whether or not Sections 15 and 16 of Rule V of the Rules on Impeachment
adopted by the 12th Congress are unconstitutional.
3. Whether or not the second impeachment complaint is barred under Section
3(5) of Article XI of the Constitution.
Held:
1. No. Such a determination is a purely political question which the Constitution
has left to the sound discretion of the legislation. Although Section 2 of Article XI
of the Constitution enumerates six grounds for impeachment, two of these,
namely, other high crimes and betrayal of public trust, elude a precise definition.
2. Yes. The provisions of Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the House Impeachment
Rules contravene Section 3 (5) of Article XI as they give the term initiate a
meaning different from filing.
3. Yes. Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing of the
impeachment complaint and referral to the House Committee on Justice, the
initial action taken thereon, the meaning of Section 3 (5) of Article XI becomes
clear. Once an impeachment complaint has been initiated in the foregoing
manner, another may not be filed against the same official within a one year
period following Article XI, Section 3(5) of the Constitution.

In fine, considering that the first impeachment complaint, was filed on June 2,
2003 and the second impeachment complaint filed was on October 23, 2003, it
violates the constitutional prohibition against the initiation of impeachment
proceedings against the same impeachable officer within a one-year period.
July 22, 2012
Chavez vs. Judicial and Bar Council, G.R. No. 202242, July 17, 2012
Facts: In 1994, instead of having only seven members, an eighth member was
added to the JBC as two representatives from Congress began sitting in the JBC
one from the House of Representatives and one from the Senate, with each
having one-half (1/2) of a vote. Then, the JBC En Banc, in separate meetings held
in 2000 and 2001, decided to allow the representatives from the Senate and the
House of Representatives one full vote each. At present, Senator Francis Joseph
G. Escudero and Congressman Niel C. Tupas, Jr. (respondents) simultaneously sit
in the JBC as representatives of the legislature. It is this practice that petitioner
has questioned in this petition. Respondents argued that the crux of the
controversy is the phrase a representative of Congress. It is their theory that
the two houses, the Senate and the House of Representatives, are permanent
and mandatory components of Congress, such that the absence of either
divests the term of its substantive meaning as expressed under the Constitution.
Bicameralism, as the system of choice by the Framers, requires that both houses
exercise their respective powers in the performance of its mandated duty which is
to legislate. Thus, when Section 8(1), Article VIII of the Constitution speaks of a
representative from Congress, it should mean one representative each from both
Houses which comprise the entire Congress. Respondents further argue that
petitioner has no real interest in questioning the constitutionality of the JBCs
current composition. The respondents also question petitioners belated filing of
the petition.

Issues:
(1) Whether or not the conditions sine qua non for the exercise of the power of
judicial review have been met in this case; and
(2) Whether or not the current practice of the JBC to perform its functions with
eight (8) members, two (2) of whom are members of Congress, runs counter to
the letter and spirit of the 1987 Constitution.

Held:
(1) Yes. The Courts power of judicial review is subject to several limitations,
namely: (a) there must be an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise
of judicial power; (b) the person challenging the act must have standing to
challenge; he must have a personal and substantial interest in the case, such that
he has sustained or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement; (c)
the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest possible
opportunity; and (d) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the
case. Generally, a party will be allowed to litigate only when these conditions sine
qua non are present, especially when the constitutionality of an act by a co-equal
branch of government is put in issue.The Court disagrees with the respondents
contention that petitioner lost his standing to sue because he is not an official
nominee for the post of Chief Justice. While it is true that a personal stake on
the case is imperative to have locus standi, this is not to say that only official
nominees for the post of Chief Justice can come to the Court and question the
JBC composition for being unconstitutional. The JBC likewise screens and
nominates other members of the Judiciary. Albeit heavily publicized in this
regard, the JBCs duty is not at all limited to the nominations for the highest
magistrate in the land. A vast number of aspirants to judicial posts all over the
country may be affected by the Courts ruling. More importantly, the legality of
the very process of nominations to the positions in the Judiciary is the nucleus of
the controversy. The claim that the composition of the JBC is illegal and
unconstitutional is an object of concern, not just for a nominee to a judicial post,
but for all citizens who have the right to seek judicial intervention for rectification
of legal blunders.

(2) Yes. The word Congress used in Article VIII, Section 8(1) of the Constitution
is used in its generic sense. No particular allusion whatsoever is made on whether
the Senate or the House of Representatives is being referred to, but that, in
either case, only a singular representative may be allowed to sit in the JBC. The
seven-member composition of the JBC serves a practical purpose, that is, to
provide a solution should there be a stalemate in voting.

It is evident that the definition of Congress as a bicameral body refers to its


primary function in government to legislate. In the passage of laws, the
Constitution is explicit in the distinction of the role of each house in the process.

The same holds true in Congress non-legislative powers. An inter-play between


the two houses is necessary in the realization of these powers causing a vivid
dichotomy that the Court cannot simply discount. This, however, cannot be said
in the case of JBC representation because no liaison between the two houses
exists in the workings of the JBC. Hence, the term Congress must be taken to
mean the entire legislative department. The Constitution mandates that the JBC
be composed of seven (7) members only.

Notwithstanding its finding of unconstitutionality in the current composition of the


JBC, all its prior official actions are nonetheless valid. Under the doctrine of
operative facts, actions previous to the declaration of unconstitutionality are
legally recognized. They are not nullified.

Manila Prince Hotel v. GSIS Digested


Manila Prince Hotel v. GSIS GR 122156, 3 February 1997

WHETHER OR NOT THE COSNTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS ARE SELFEXECUTING

FACTS:

The Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), pursuant to the privatization


program of the Philippine Government under Proclamation 50 dated 8 December
1986, decided to sell through public bidding 30% to 51% of the issued and
outstanding shares of the Manila Hotel (MHC). In a close bidding held on 18
September 1995 only two bidders participated: Manila Prince Hotel Corporation, a
Filipino corporation, which offered to buy 51% of the MHC or 15,300,000 shares
at P41.58 per share, and Renong Berhad, a Malaysian firm, with ITT-Sheraton as
its hotel operator, which bid for the same number of shares at P44.00 per share,
or P2.42 more than the bid of petitioner. Pending the declaration of Renong
Berhard as the winning bidder/strategic partner and the execution of the
necessary contracts, the Manila Prince Hotel matched the bid price of P44.00 per
share tendered by Renong Berhad in a letter to GSIS dated 28 September 1995.
Manila Prince Hotel sent a managers check to the GSIS in a subsequent letter,

but which GSIS refused to accept. On 17 October 1995, perhaps apprehensive


that GSIS has disregarded the tender of the matching bid and that the sale of
51% of the MHC may be hastened by GSIS and consummated with Renong
Berhad, Manila Prince Hotel came to the Court on prohibition and mandamus.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the provisions of the Constitution, particularly Article XII


Section 10, are self-executing. Section 10. The Congress shall, upon
recommendation of the economic and planning agency, when the national interest
dictates, reserve to citizens of the Philippines or to corporations or associations at
least sixty per centum of whose capital is owned by such citizens, or such higher
percentage as Congress may prescribe, certain areas of investments. The
Congress shall enact measures that will encourage the formation and operation of
enterprises whose capital is wholly owned by Filipinos.
In the grant of rights, privileges, and concessions covering the national economy
and patrimony, the State shall give preference to qualified Filipinos.
The State shall regulate and exercise authority over foreign investments within its
national jurisdiction and in accordance with its national goals and priorities.

RULING:

A provision which lays down a general principle, such as those found in


Article II of the 1987 Constitution, is usually not self-executing. But a provision
which is complete in itself and becomes operative without the aid of
supplementary or enabling legislation, or that which supplies sufficient rule by
means of which the right it grants may be enjoyed or protected, is self-executing.
Thus a constitutional provision is self-executing if the nature and extent of the
right conferred and the liability imposed are fixed by the constitution itself, so
that they can be determined by an examination and construction of its terms, and

there is no language indicating that the subject is referred to the legislature for
action. In self-executing constitutional provisions, the legislature may still enact
legislation to facilitate the exercise of powers directly granted by the constitution,
further the operation of such a provision, prescribe a practice to be used for its
enforcement, provide a convenient remedy for the protection of the rights
secured or the determination thereof, or place reasonable safeguards around the
exercise of the right. The mere fact that legislation may supplement and add to or
prescribe a penalty for the violation of a self-executing constitutional provision
does not render such a provision ineffective in the absence of such legislation.
The omission from a constitution of any express provision for a remedy for
enforcing a right or liability is not necessarily an indication that it was not
intended to be self-executing. The rule is that a self-executing provision of the
constitution does not necessarily exhaust legislative power on the subject, but
any legislation must be in harmony with the constitution, further the exercise of
constitutional right and make it more available. Subsequent legislation however
does not necessarily mean that the subject constitutional provision is not, by
itself, fully enforceable. As against constitutions of the past, modern constitutions
have been generally drafted upon a different principle and have often become in
effect extensive codes of laws intended to operate directly upon the people in a
manner similar to that of statutory enactments, and the function of constitutional
conventions has evolved into one more like that of a legislative body. Hence,
unless it is expressly provided that a legislative act is necessary to enforce a
constitutional mandate, the presumption now is that all provisions of the
constitution are self-executing. If the constitutional provisions are treated as
requiring legislation instead of self-executing, the legislature would have the
power to ignore and practically nullify the mandate of the fundamental law. In
fine, Section 10, second paragraph, Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution is a
mandatory, positive command which is complete in itself and which needs no
further guidelines or implementing laws or rules for its enforcement. From its
very words the provision does not require any legislation to put it in operation.

Case Digest: Pamatong vs. Comelec

Prefatory Statement:
Under the Constitution (Article II, Section 26), "the State shall guarantee equal
access to opportunities for public service xxx." Would the Comelec's act of
disqualifying the so-called "nuisance" candidates violate this

Rev. Ely Velez Pamatong Vs. Commission on Elections


G.R. No. 161872, April 13, 2004
FACTS:
Petitioner Pamatong filed his Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for President.
Respondent COMELEC declared petitioner and 35 others as nuisance candidates
who could not wage a nationwide campaign and/or are not nominated by a
political party or are not supported by a registered political party with a national
constituency.
Pamatong filed a Petition For Writ of Certiorari with the Supreme Court claiming
that the COMELEC violated his right to "equal access to opportunities for public
service" under Section 26, Article II of the 1987 Constitution, by limiting the
number of qualified candidates only to those who can afford to wage a nationwide
campaign and/or are nominated by political parties. The COMELEC supposedly
erred in disqualifying him since he is the most qualified among all the presidential
candidates, i.e., he possesses all the constitutional and legal qualifications for the
office of the president, he is capable of waging a national campaign since he has
numerous national organizations under his leadership, he also has the capacity to
wage an international campaign since he has practiced law in other countries, and
he has a platform of government.

ISSUE:

Is there a constitutional right to run for or hold public office?

RULING:
No. What is recognized in Section 26, Article II of the Constitution is merely a
privilege subject to limitations imposed by law. It neither bestows such a right
nor elevates the privilege to the level of an enforceable right. There is nothing in
the plain language of the provision which suggests such a thrust or justifies an
interpretation of the sort.The "equal access" provision is a subsumed part of
Article II of the Constitution, entitled "Declaration of Principles and State
Policies." The provisions under the Article are generally considered not selfexecuting, and there is no plausible reason for according a different treatment to
the "equal access" provision. Like the rest of the policies enumerated in Article II,

the provision does not contain any judicially enforceable constitutional right but
merely specifies a guideline for legislative or executive action. The disregard of
the provision does not give rise to any cause of action before the
courts.Obviously, the provision is not intended to compel the State to enact
positive measures that would accommodate as many people as possible into
public office. Moreover, the provision as written leaves much to be desired if it is
to be regarded as the source of positive rights. It is difficult to interpret the
clause as operative in the absence of legislation since its effective means and
reach are not properly defined. Broadly written, the myriad of claims that can be
subsumed under this rubric appear to be entirely open-ended. Words and phrases
such as "equal access," "opportunities," and "public service" are susceptible to
countless interpretations owing to their inherent impreciseness. Certainly, it was
not the intention of the framers to inflict on the people an operative but
amorphous foundation from which innately unenforceable rights may be
sourced.The privilege of equal access to opportunities to public office may be
subjected to limitations. Some valid limitations specifically on the privilege to
seek elective office are found in the provisions of the Omnibus Election Code on
"Nuisance Candidates. As long as the limitations apply to everybody equally
without discrimination, however, the equal access clause is not violated. Equality
is not sacrificed as long as the burdens engendered by the limitations are meant
to be borne by any one who is minded to file a certificate of candidacy. In the
case at bar, there is no showing that any person is exempt from the limitations or
the burdens which they create.The rationale behind the prohibition against
nuisance candidates and the disqualification of candidates who have not evinced a
bona fide intention to run for office is easy to divine. The State has a compelling
interest to ensure that its electoral exercises are rational, objective, and orderly.
Towards this end, the State takes into account the practical considerations in
conducting elections. Inevitably, the greater the number of candidates, the
greater the opportunities for logistical confusion, not to mention the increased
allocation of time and resources in preparation for the election. The organization
of an election with bona fide candidates standing is onerous enough. To add into
the mix candidates with no serious intentions or capabilities to run a viable
campaign would actually impair the electoral process. This is not to mention the
candidacies which are palpably ridiculous so as to constitute a one-note joke. The
poll body would be bogged by irrelevant minutiae covering every step of the
electoral process, most probably posed at the instance of these nuisance
candidates. It would be a senseless sacrifice on the part of the State.

The question of whether a candidate is a nuisance candidate or not is both legal


and factual. The basis of the factual determination is not before this Court. Thus,
the remand of this case for the reception of further evidence is in order. The SC
remanded to the COMELEC for the reception of further evidence, to determine the
question on whether petitioner Elly Velez Lao Pamatong is a nuisance candidate
as contemplated in Section 69 of the Omnibus Election Code.

Obiter Dictum: One of Pamatong's contentions was that he was an international


lawyer and is thus more qualified compared to the likes of Erap, who was only a
high school dropout. Under the Constitution (Article VII, Section 2), the only
requirements are the following: (1) natural-born citizen of the Philippines; (2)
registered voter; (3) able to read and write; (4) at least forty years of age on the
day of the election; and (5) resident of the Philippines for at least ten years
immediately preceding such election.

At any rate, Pamatong was eventually declared a nuisance candidate and was
disqualified.

Collector of Internal Revenue vs Antonio Campos Rueda [G.R. L-13250] October


29, 1971
Maria Cerdiera is a Spanish national (Filipina married to a Spanish citizen), lived
in Morocco and died there. In the Philippines, she left intangible properties. The
person tasked as administrator of the intangible properties is Antonio Campos
Rueda. He filed a provisional estate and inheritance tax return on all properties
left by her. The Collector of Internal Revenue, the respondent, pending the
investigation of the tax value of the properties, issued an assessment for estate
tax worth P111,592.48 and inheritance tax worth P187,791.48 with a total
amount of P369,383.96. These tax liabilities were paid by Antonio Rueda.
Later, Campos Rueda filed an amended tax return wherein the properties worth
P396,308.90 are claimed as exempted from taxes. Respondent, still pending

investigation on the same subject, issued another assessment for estate tax
worth P202,262.40 and inheritance taxed worth P267,402.84 with a total amount
of P469,665.24. In January 1955, Maria Cerdeira died in Tangier, Morocco (an
international zone [foreign country] in North Africa). At the time of her death, she
was a Spanish citizen and was a resident of Tangier. She however left some
personal properties (shares of stocks and other intangibles) in the Philippines.
The designated administrator of her estate here is Antonio Campos Rueda.

In the same year, the Collector of Internal Revenue (CIR) assessed the estate for
deficiency tax amounting to about P161k. Campos Rueda refused to pay the
assessed tax as he claimed that the estate is exempt from the payment of said
taxes pursuant to section 122 of the Tax Code which provides:

That no tax shall be collected under this Title in respect of intangible personal
property (a) if the decedent at the time of his death was a resident of a foreign
country which at the time of his death did not impose a transfer tax or death tax
of any character in respect of intangible person property of the Philippines not
residing in that foreign country, or (b) if the laws of the foreign country of which
the decedent was a resident at the time of his death allow a similar exemption
from transfer taxes or death taxes of every character in respect of intangible
personal property owned by citizens of the Philippines not residing in that foreign
country.Campos Rueda was able to prove that there is reciprocity between
Tangier and the Philippines.However, the CIR still denied any tax exemption in
favor of the estate as it averred that Tangier is not a state as contemplated by
Section 22 of the Tax Code and that the Philippines does not recognize Tangier as
a foreign country.
Issues:
Respondents reply to the request for exemption of taxes, etc.:
(1) There is no reciprocity as it did not meet the requirements mentioned in
Section 122 of the National Internal Revenue Code. Tangier is a mere principality
and not a foreign country.

(Note: As argued, section 122, in relation to the case, grants certain exemption of
taxes provided that reciprocity be met and for reciprocity to be met, Tangier
must be a foreign country within the meaning of Section 122).
(2) Respondent denied request for exemption because the law of Tangier is not
reciprocal to Section 122 of the National Internal Revenue Code.
(3) Respondent demanded the payment of the sums of 239,439.49 representing
deficiency estate and inheritance tax including ad valorem penalties, surcharges,
interests and compromise penalties.
The Court of Tax Appeals ruled:
(1) Tangier allows a similar law for the exemption of taxes. Such exemption is
sufficient to entitle Antonio Rueda to the exemption benefits. There is no lacking
of reciprocity.
The Collector of Internal Revenue asked a question of law:
(1) Whether the requisites of statehood is necessary (sine qua non) for the
acquisition of international personality.
(2) Whether acquisition of international personality is required for a foreign
country to fall within the exemption of Section 122 of the National Internal
Revenue Code.
The Supreme Court referred the case back to the Court of Tax Appeals to
determine whether the alleged law of Tangier did grant the reciprocal tax
exemption required by Section 122.
Held:
(1) Requisite of Statehood is necessary.
It does not admit of doubt that if a foreign country is to be identified with a state,
it is required in line with Pounds formulation that:it be a politically organized
sovereign community independent of outside control bound by penalties of

nationhood, legally supreme within its territory, acting through a government


functioning under a regime of law.
(2) Tangier is a state.
(3) Section 122 does not require that the foreign country possess an
international personality. In other words, international personality is not a
requisite.
(4) Supreme Court affirms Court of Tax Appeals ruling. (Note: Look at the ruling
of the Court of Appeals found in the issue.)
HELD: Yes. For purposes of the Tax Code, Tangier is a foreign country.
A foreign country to be identified as a state must be a politically organized
sovereign community independent of outside control bound by penalties of
nationhood, legally supreme within its territory, acting through a government
functioning under a regime of law. The stress is on its being a nation, its people
occupying a definite territory, politically organized, exercising by means of its
government its sovereign will over the individuals within it and maintaining its
separate international personality.
Further, the Supreme Court noted that there is already an existing jurisprudence
(Collector vs De Lara) which provides that even a tiny principality, that of
Liechtenstein, hardly an international personality in the sense, did fall under
the exempt category provided for in Section 22 of the Tax Code. Thus,
recognition is not necessary. Hence, since it was proven that Tangier provides
such exemption to personal properties of Filipinos found therein so must the
Philippines honor the exemption as provided for by our tax law with respect to the
doctrine of reciprocity.

Reagan vs. CIR (G.R. No. L-26379, December 27, 1969)


Post
under case
digests, Taxation at Saturday,
March
10,
by Schizophrenic Mind

2012 Posted

Facts: William Reagan imported a tax-free 1960 Cadillac car with accessories
valued at US $ 6,443.83, including freight, insurance and other charges. After
acquiring a permit to sell the car from the base commander of Clark Air Base,

Reagan sold the car to a certain Willie Johnson Jr. of the US Marine
Corps stationed in Sangley Point, Cavite for US$ 6,600. Johnson sold the same,
on the same day to Fred Meneses, a Filipino. As a result of the transaction, the
Commissioner rendered Reagan liable for income tax in the sum of P2,970.
Reagan claimed that he was exempt as the transaction occurred in Clark Air Base,
which as he contends is a base outside the Philippines.

Issue: Whether or not petitioner Reagan was covered by the tax exemption.

Held: The court ruled in the negative. The Philippines, as an independent and
sovereign country, exercises its authority over its entire domain. Any state may,
however, by its consent, express or implied, submit to a restriction of its
sovereign rights. It may allow another power to participate in the exercise of
jurisdictional right over certain portions of its territory. By doing so, it by no
means follows that such areas become impressed with an alien character. The
areas retain their status as native soil. Clark Air Base is within Philippine
territorial jurisdiction to tax, and thus, Reagan was liable for the income
tax arising from the sale of his automobile in Clark. The law does not look with
favor on tax exemptions and that he who would seek to be thus privileged must
justify it by words too plain to be mistaken and too categorical to be
misinterpreted. Reagan has not done so, and cannot do so.
Republic v Sandiganbayan (G.R. No. 155832)
FACTS:
Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) Commissioner Daza gave
written authority to two lawyers to sequester any property, documents, money,
and other assets in Leyte belonging to Imelda Marcos. A sequestration order was
issued against the Olot Resthouse in Tolosa, Leyte. Imelda Marcos filed a motion
to quash claiming that such order was void for failing to observe Sec. 3 of the
PCGG Rules and Regulations. The Rules required the signatures of at least 2
PCGG Commissioners.The Republic opposed claiming that Imelda is estopped
from questioning the sequestration since by her acts ( such as seeking permission
from the PCGG to repair the resthouse and entertain guests), she had conceded
to the validity of the sequestration. The Republic also claims that Imelda failed to

exhaust administrative remedies by first seeking its lifting as provided in the


Rules; that the rule requiring the two signatures did not yet exist when the Olot
Resthouse was sequestered; and that she intended to delay proceedings by filing
the motion to quash.Sandiganbayan granted the motion to quash and ruled that
the sequestration order was void because it was signed not by the 2
commissioners but by 2 agents. Hence the certiorari.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the sequestration order is valid.
HELD:
No. The Order is not valid. Under Sec. 26, Art 18 of the Constitution, a
sequestration order may be issued upon a showing of a prima facie case that the
properties are ill-gotten wealth. When the court nullifies an Order, the court does
not substitute its judgment for that of the PCGG. In the case, the PCGG did not
make a prior determination of the existence of the prima facie case. The Republic
presented no evidence to the Sandiganbayan. Nor did the Republic demonstrate
that the the 2 PCGG representatives were given the quasi-judicial authority to
receive and consider evidence that would warrant a prima facie finding. The
Republic's evidence does not show how the Marcoses' acquired the property, what
makes it ill-gotten wealth,and how Ferdinand Marcos intervened in its
acquisition.As regards the issue on estoppel, a void order produces no effect and
cannot be validated under the doctine of estoppel. The Court cannot accept the
view that Imelda should have first sought the lifiting of the sequestration order.
Being void, the Sandiganbayan has the power to strike it down on sight.

Estrada vs Desierto G.R. No. 146710-15; Estrada vs Arroyo G.R. No.


146738, March 2 2001

[Immunity from Suit; Resignation of the President; Justiciable controversy]

FACTS:
It began in October 2000 when allegations of wrong doings involving bribetaking, illegal gambling, and other forms of corruption were made against Estrada
before the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee. On November 13, 2000, Estrada was
impeached by the Hor and, on December 7, impeachment proceedings were

begun in the Senate during which more serious allegations of graft and corruption
against Estrada were made and were only stopped on January 16, 2001 when 11
senators, sympathetic to the President, succeeded in suppressing damaging
evidence against Estrada. As a result, the impeachment trial was thrown into an
uproar as the entire prosecution panel walked out and Senate President Pimentel
resigned after casting his vote against Estrada
On January 19, PNP and the AFP also withdrew their support for Estrada and
joined the crowd at EDSA Shrine. Estrada called for a snap presidential election to
be held concurrently with congressional and local elections on May 14, 2001. He
added that he will not run in this election. On January 20, SC declared that the
seat of presidency was vacant, saying that Estrada constructively resigned his
post. At noon, Arroyo took her oath of office in the presence of the crowd at
EDSA as the 14th President. Estrada and his family later left Malacaang Palace.
Erap, after his fall, filed petition for prohibition with prayer for WPI. It sought to
enjoin the respondent Ombudsman from conducting any further proceedings in
cases filed against him not until his term as president ends. He also prayed for
judgment confirming Estrada to be the lawful and incumbent President of the
Republic of the Philippines temporarily unable to discharge the duties of his office.

ISSUE(S):
1. WoN the petition presents a justiciable controversy.
2. WoN Estrada resigned as President.
3. WoN Arroyo is only an acting President.
4. WoN the President enjoys immunity from suit.
5. WoN the prosecution of Estrada should be enjoined due to prejudicial publicity.

RULING:

1. Political questions- "to those questions which, under the Constitution, are to
be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full
discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch
of the government. It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not
legality of a particular measure."

Legal distinction between EDSA People Power I EDSA People Power II:
EDSA I
EDSA II
exercise of the people power of revolution which overthrew the whole
government.
exercise of people power of freedom of speech and freedom of assembly to
petition the government for redress of grievances which only affected the office of
the President.
extra constitutional and the legitimacy of the new government that resulted from
it cannot be the subject of judicial review

intra constitutional and the resignation of the sitting President that it caused and
the succession of the Vice President as President are subject to judicial review.
presented a political question;
involves legal questions.
The cases at bar pose legal and not political questions. The principal issues for
resolution require the proper interpretation of certain provisions in the 1987
Constitution: Sec 1 of Art II, and Sec 8 of Art VII, and the allocation of
governmental powers under Sec 11 of Art VII. The issues likewise call for a ruling
on the scope of presidential immunity from suit. They also involve the correct
calibration of the right of petitioner against prejudicial publicity.

2. Elements of valid resignation: (a)an intent to resign and (b) acts of


relinquishment. Both were present when President Estrada left the Palace.
Totality of prior contemporaneous posterior facts and circumstantial evidence
bearing material relevant issuesPresident Estrada is deemed to have resigned
constructive resignation.
SC declared that the resignation of President Estrada could not be doubted as
confirmed by his leaving Malacaan Palace. In the press release containing his
final statement:
1. He acknowledged the oath-taking of the respondent as President;

2. He emphasized he was leaving the Palace for the sake of peace and in order to
begin the healing process (he did not say that he was leaving due to any kind of
disability and that he was going to reassume the Presidency as soon as the
disability disappears);
3. He expressed his gratitude to the people for the opportunity to serve them as
President (without doubt referring to the past opportunity);
4. He assured that he will not shirk from any future challenge that may come in
the same service of the country;
5. He called on his supporters to join him in promotion of a constructive national
spirit of reconciliation and solidarity.
Intent to resignmust be accompanied by act of relinquishmentact or omission
before, during and after January 20, 2001.

3. The Congress passed House Resolution No. 176 expressly stating its support to
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo as President of the Republic of the Philippines and
subsequently passed H.R. 178 confirms the nomination of Teofisto T. Guingona
Jr. As Vice President. Senate passed HR No. 83 declaring the Impeachment
Courts as Functius Officio and has been terminated. It is clear is that both houses
of Congress recognized Arroyo as the President. Implicitly clear in that
recognition is the premise that the inability of Estrada is no longer temporary as
the Congress has clearly rejected his claim of inability.
The Court therefore cannot exercise its judicial power for this is political in nature
and addressed solely to Congress by constitutional fiat. In fine, even if Estrada
can prove that he did not resign, still, he cannot successfully claim that he is a
President on leave on the ground that he is merely unable to govern temporarily.
That claim has been laid to rest by Congress and the decision that Arroyo is the
de jure, president made by a co-equal branch of government cannot be reviewed
by this Court.

4. The cases filed against Estrada are criminal in character. They involve plunder,
bribery and graft and corruption. By no stretch of the imagination can these
crimes, especially plunder which carries the death penalty, be covered by the
alleged mantle of immunity of a non-sitting president. He cannot cite any decision
of this Court licensing the President to commit criminal acts and wrapping him
with post-tenure immunity from liability. The rule is that unlawful acts of public

officials are not acts of the State and the officer who acts illegally is not acting as
such but stands in the same footing as any trespasser.

5. No. Case law will tell us that a right to a fair trial and the free press are
incompatible. Also, since our justice system does not use the jury system, the
judge, who is a learned and legally enlightened individual, cannot be easily
manipulated by mere publicity. The Court also said that Estrada did not present
enough evidence to show that the publicity given the trial has influenced the
judge so as to render the judge unable to perform. Finally, the Court said that the
cases against Estrada were still undergoing preliminary investigation, so the
publicity of the case would really have no permanent effect on the judge and that
the prosecutor should be more concerned with justice and less with prosecution.

Merlin Magallona vs Secretary Eduardo Ermita


655 SCRA 476 Political Law National Territory RA 9522 is Constitutional
In March 2009, Republic Act 9522, an act defining the archipelagic baselines of
the Philippines was enacted the law is also known as the Baselines Law. This
law was meant to comply with the terms of the third United Nations Convention
on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III), ratified by the Philippines in February 1984.
Professor Merlin Magallona et al questioned the validity of RA 9522 as they
contend, among others, that the law decreased the national territory of the
Philippines hence the law is unconstitutional. Some of their particular arguments
are as follows:
a. the law abandoned the demarcation set by the Treaty of Paris and other
ancillary treaties this also resulted to the exclusion of our claim over Sabah;
b. the law, as well as UNCLOS itself, describes the Philippine waters as
archipelagic waters which, in international law, opens our waters landward of
the baselines to maritime passage by all vessels (innocent passage) and aircrafts
(overflight), undermining Philippine sovereignty and national security,
contravening the countrys nuclear-free policy, and damaging marine resources,
in violation of relevant constitutional provisions;
c. the classification of the Kalayaan Island Group (KIG), as well as the
Scarborough Shoal (bajo de masinloc), as a regime of islands pursuant to

UNCLOS results in the loss of a large maritime area but also prejudices the
livelihood of subsistence fishermen.
ISSUE: Whether or not the contentions of Magallona et al are tenable.
HELD: No. The Supreme Court emphasized that RA 9522, or UNCLOS, itself is not
a means to acquire, or lose, territory. The treaty and the baseline law has nothing
to do with the acquisition, enlargement, or diminution of the Philippine territory.
What controls when it comes to acquisition or loss of territory is the international
law principle on occupation, accretion, cession and prescription and NOT the
execution of multilateral treaties on the regulations of sea-use rights or enacting
statutes to comply with the treatys terms to delimit maritime zones and
continental shelves.
The law did not decrease the demarcation of our territory. In fact it increased it.
Under the old law amended by RA 9522 (RA 3046), we adhered with the
rectangular lines enclosing the Philippines. The area that it covered was 440,994
square nautical miles (sq. na. mi.). But under 9522, and with the inclusion of the
exclusive economic zone, the extent of our maritime was increased to 586,210
sq. na. mi. (See image below for comparison)
If any, the baselines law is a notice to the international community of the scope
of the maritime space and submarine areas within which States parties exercise
treaty-based rights.

Anent their particular contentions:


a. The law did not abandon the Sabah claim. This is evident on the provision of
Section 2 of RA 9522:
Section 2. The definition of the baselines of the territorial sea of the Philippine
Archipelago as provided in this Act is without prejudice to the delineation of
the baselines of the territorial sea around the territory of Sabah, situated
in North Borneo, over which the Republic of the Philippines has acquired
dominion and sovereignty.
b. UNCLOS may term our waters as archipelagic waters and that we may term
it as our internal waters, but the bottom line is that our country exercises
sovereignty over these waters and UNCLOS itself recognizes that. However, due
to our observance of international law, we allow the exercise of others of their

right of innocent passage. No modern State can validly invoke its sovereignty to
absolutely forbid innocent passage that is exercised in accordance with customary
international law without risking retaliatory measures from the international
community.
c. The classification of the KIG (or the Spratlys), as well as the Scarborough
Shoal, as a regime of islands did not diminish our maritime area. Under UNCLOS
and under the baselines law, since they are regimes of islands, they generate
their own maritime zones in short, they are not to be enclosed within the
baselines of the main archipelago (which is the Philippine Island group). This is
because if we do that, then we will be enclosing a larger area which would already
depart from the provisions of UNCLOS that the demarcation should follow the
natural contour of the archipelago.
Nevertheless, we still continue to lay claim over the KIG and the Scarborough
Shoal through effective occupation.
NOTES:
Under UNCLOS and the baselines law, we have three levels of maritime zones
where we exercisetreaty-based rights:
a. territorial waters 12 nautical miles from the baselines; where we exercise
sovereignty
b. contiguous zone 24 nautical miles from the baselines; jurisdiction where we
can enforcecustoms, fiscal, immigration, and sanitation laws (CFIS).
c. exclusive economic zone 200 nautical miles from the baselines; where we
have the right to exploit the living and non-living resources in the exclusive
economic zone
Note: a fourth zone may be added which is the continental shelf this is covered
by Article 77 of the UNCLOS.
Razon v. Tagitis
December 3, 2009
Brion
Paolo Q. Bernardo
If you can, please go beyond the summary-doctrine boxes; especially so you
understand the ratio of the Court. Apologies for the delay AND length; as for the
length, I omitted a lot of facts I deemed irrelevant. Lastly, please see the
dispositive.
SUMMARY: Engr. Morced N. Tagitis was last
seen in Jolo, Sulu. His disappearance was
reported to the Jolo Police Station. It was
unacted upon for a month and hencee Mary B. Tagitis

(Tagitis), Engr. Tagitis's wife, filed a Petition for the Writ

with the Court of Appeals


members of the the PNP.

of Amparo
against certain

The CA issued the Writ of Amparo.


The PNP members appealed the decision of the CA to the Supreme Court.
They mainly

dispute:
1. the sufficiency in form and substance
of the Amparo petition filed before
the CA;
2. the sufficiency of the legal remedies
the Tagitis took before petitioning for
the writ;
3. the finding that the rights to life,
liberty and security of Tagitis had
been violated;
4. the
sufficiency
of
evidence
supporting the conclusion that Tagitis
was abducted;
5.
the conclusion that the CIDG
Zamboanga was responsible for the
abduction; and,
6. generally, the ruling that the respondent discharged the

burden of proving the allegations of the petition by


substantial evidence

DOCTRINE:
On the test for the sufficiency of a petition for
writ of amparo:
To read the Rules of Court requirement on
pleadings while addressing the unique Amparo
situation, the test in reading the petition should
be to determine whether it contains the details
available to the one filing the petition under the
circumstances, WHILE presenting a cause of
action showing a violation of the victims rights
to life, liberty and security through State or
private party action.
On whether enforced disappearance is a proper
ground for a writ of amparo:
The Amparo Rule expressly provides that the

"writ shall cover extralegal killings and enforced


disappearances or threats thereof.
However, while the Rule covers "enforced
disappearances" this concept is neither defined
nor penalized in this jurisdiction.
However, this not a stumbling block that will
prevent the issuance of a writ of amparo,
because
UNDERLYING
every
enforced
disappearance is a violation of the constitutional
rights to life, liberty and security that the
Supreme Court is mandated by the Constitution
to protect through its rule-making powers.
Furthermore,
the
Court
has
surveyed
international law and states that enforced
disappearance as a State practice has been
repudiated by the international community, so
that the ban on it is now a generally accepted
principle of international law, which should be
considered a part of the law of the land, and
which should act upon to the extent already
allowed under our laws and the international
conventions that bind us.
On
the
elements
of
an
enforced
disappearance:
Under the definition in the UN Convention, the
elements that constitute enforced disappearance
are essentially fourfold:
i. arrest, detention, abduction or any form of
deprivation of liberty;
ii. carried out by agents of the State or
persons or groups of persons acting with
the authorization, support or acquiescence
of the State;
iii. followed by a refusal to acknowledge the
detention, or a concealment of the fate of
the disappeared person; and
iv. placement of the disappeared person
outside the protection of the law.
On relaxing the general rules of evidence in
amparo proceedings:
To give full meaning to our Constitution and the

rights it protects, the Court declares that courts


in amparo proceedings should at least take a
close look at the available evidence to determine
the correct import of every piece of evidence;
and this should include those usually considered
inadmissible under the general rules of evidence

FACTS:
Engr. Morced N. Tagitis is a consultant for the World Bank and the Senior
Honorary Counselor for the Islamic Development Bank (IDB) Scholarship
Programme
He was last seen in Jolo, Sulu.
Kunnong and Muhammad Abdulnazeir N. Matli, a UP professor of

Muslim studies and Tagitis fellow


student counselor at the IDB reported Tagitis disappearance to the Jolo Police
Station.
More than a month later , the Mary B. Tagitis (Tagitis), Engr. Tagitis's wife, filed a Petition for the Writ

of Amparo

(petition) with the Court of Appeals (CA).


The petition was directed against certain members of the Armed Forces of
the Philippines (AFP) and the Philippine National Police (PNP):
Lt. Gen. Alexander Yano, Commanding General, Philippine Army; Gen.
Avelino I. Razon, Chief, PNP; Gen. Edgardo M. Doromal, Chief,
Criminal Investigation and Detention Group (CIDG); Sr. Supt.
Leonardo A. Espina, Chief, Police Anti-Crime and Emergency
Response; Gen. Joel Goltiao, Regional Director, ARMM-PNP; and Gen.
Ruben Rafael, Chief, Anti-Terror Task Force Comet [collectively
referred to as petitioners].
The petition went on to state:
Soon after the Tagitis left the room, Engr. Tagitis went out of the pension house to take his

early lunch but


while out on the street, a couple of burly men believed to be police
intelligence operatives, forcibly took him
When Kunnong could not locate Engr. Tagitis, the former sought the help of another IDB

scholar and

reported the matter to the local police agency.


Kunnong including his friends and companions in Jolo, exerted efforts in
trying to locate the whereabouts of Engr. Tagitis and when he reported the
matter to the police authorities in Jolo, he was immediately given a ready

answer that Engr. Tagitis could have been abducted by the Abu Sayyaf
group;
Information from persons in the military who do not want to be identified stated that Engr. Tagitis is in

the
hands of the uniformed men; and according to reliable information received by Tagitis, subject
Engr. Tagitis is in
the custody of police intelligence operatives, specifically with
the CIDG, PNP Zamboanga City, being held against his will in an earnest
attempt of the police to involve and connect Engr. Tagitis with the different
terrorist groups.
Tagitis filed her complaint with the PNP Police Station in the ARMM in Cotobato

and in Jolo, seeking


their help to find her husband, but Tagitis's request and pleadings failed to
produce any positive results.
The unexplained uncooperative behavior of the [petitioners] to Tagitis's request

for help and failure


and refusal of the [petitioners] to extend the needed help, support and
assistance in locating the whereabouts of Engr. Tagitis who had been
declared missing since October 30, 2007 which is almost two (2) months
now, clearly indicates that the [petitioners] are actually in physical
possession and custody of Engr. Tagitis.
Tagitis has exhausted all administrative avenues and remedies but to no avail,

and under the


circumstances, Tagitis has no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy to
protect and get the release of subject Engr. Morced Tagitis from the illegal
clutches of the [petitioners], their intelligence operatives and the like which
are in total violation of thesubjects human and constitutional rights, except
the issuance of a WRIT OF AMPARO.
On the same day the petition was filed, the CA immediately issued the Writ of Amparo. The basis for the issuance by the
Court of the Writ is as follows:

At the same time, the CA dismissed the petition against the Tagitis from the military, Lt. Gen Alexander Yano and Gen.
Ruben Rafael, based on the finding that it was PNP-CIDG, not the military, that was involved.
Thereafter, the CA issued an ALARM WARNING that Task Force Tagitis of the PNP did not

appear to be exerting

extraordinary efforts in resolving Tagitis disappearance.


Petitioners appealed the decision of the CA to the Supreme Court/They mainly

dispute:

1. the sufficiency in form and substance of the Amparo petition filed


before the CA;
2. the sufficiency of the legal remedies the Tagitis took before
petitioning for the writ;

3. the finding that the rights to life, liberty and security of Tagitis had
been violated; t
4. the sufficiency of evidence supporting the conclusion that Tagitis was
abducted;
5. the conclusion that the CIDG Zamboanga was responsible for the
abduction; and,
6. generally, the ruling that the respondent discharged the burden of
proving the allegations of the petition by substantial evidence
ISSUES:
1. WON the petition for writ of amparo filed is sufficent in form and substance;
2. WON an enforced disappearance is a proper ground for issuance of a writ of
amparo;
3. WON there was an enforced disappearance in this case;
4. WON the PNP may be held accountable;
RULING:
1. Yes;
2. Yes;
3. Yes;
4. Yes;
RATIO:
1. In questioning the sufficiency in form and substance of the respondents
Amparo petition, the petitioners contend that the petition violated Section
5(c), (d), and (e) of the Amparo Rule.
a. SPECIFICALLY, the petitioners allege that Tagitis failed to, in her
petition:
i. allege:
any ACT or OMISSION the petitioners committed in violation of
Tagitis rights to LIFE, LIBERTY, and SECURITY
in a complete manner HOW Tagitis was ABDUCTED, the persons
RESPONSIBLE for his DISAPPEARANCE, and the respondents
SOURCE of INFORMATION;
the abduction was committed at the petitioners instructions or
with their consent;
any action or inaction attributable to the petitioners in the
performance of their duties in the investigation of Tagitis
disappearance;
ii. implead the members of PNP-CIDG regional office in Zamboanga
alleged to have custody over her husband;
iii. attach the affidavits of witnesses to support her accusations;
iv. specify what legally available efforts she took to determine the fate or
whereabouts of her husband.

b. The petitioners state that a petition for the Writ of Amparo shall be
signed and verified and shall allege, among others, as stated in Section 5
of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo:
i. (c) The right to life, liberty and security of the aggrieved party
violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission of
the respondent, and how such threat or violation is committed with
the attendant circumstances detailed in supporting affidavits;
ii. (d) The investigation conducted, if any, specifying the names,
personal circumstances, and addresses of the investigating authority
or individuals, as well as the manner and conduct of the investigation,
together with any report;
iii. (e) The actions and recourses taken by the petitioner to determine
the fate or whereabouts of the aggrieved party and the identity of the
person responsible for the threat, act or omission; and
c. The framers of the Amparo Rule never intended Section 5(c) of the Rule
to be complete in every detail in stating the threatened or actual
violation of a victims rights.
i. As in any other initiatory pleading,the pleader must of course state
the ultimate facts constituting the cause of action, omitting the
evidentiary details.
ii. In an Amparo petition, however, this requirement must be read in
light of the nature and purpose of the proceeding, which addresses a
situation of uncertainty; hence the one filing the petition may not be
able to describe with certainty how the victim exactly disappeared, or
who actually acted to kidnap, abduct or arrest him or her, or where
the victim is detained, because these information may purposely be
hidden or covered up by those who caused the disappearance.
d. To read the Rules of Court requirement on pleadings while addressing
the unique Amparo situation, the test in reading the petition should
be to determine whether it contains the details available to the
one filing the petition under the circumstances, WHILE
presenting a cause of action showing a violation of the victims
rights to life, liberty and security through State or private party
action.
i. The petition should likewise be read in its totality, to determine if the
required elements--namely, of the disappearance, the State or
private action, and the actual or threatened violations of the rights to
life, liberty or security-- are present.
e. Applying these rules in the present case, the petition amply recites in its
paragraphs 4 to 11 the circumstances under which Tagitis suddenly
dropped out of sight after engaging in normal activities, and thereafter
was nowhere to be found despite efforts to locate him.
i. The petition alleged, too, under its paragraph 7, in relation to
paragraphs 15 and 16, that according to reliable information, police
operatives were the perpetrators of the abduction.

ii. It also clearly alleged how Tagitis rights to life, liberty and security
were violated when he was "forcibly taken and boarded on a motor
vehicle by a couple of burly men believed to be police intelligence
operatives," and then taken "into custody by the respondents police
intelligence operatives since October 30, 2007, specifically by the
CIDG, PNP Zamboanga City, x x x held against his will in an earnest
attempt of the police to involve and connect [him] with different
terrorist groups."
f. If a defect can at all be attributed to the petition, this defect is its lack of
supporting affidavit, as required by Section 5(c) of the Amparo Rule.
i. This requirement, however, should not be read as an absolute one
that necessarily leads to the dismissal of the petition if not strictly
followed.
g. Where, as in this case, the petitioner has substantially complied with the
requirement by submitting a verified petition sufficiently detailing the
facts relied upon, the strict need for the sworn statement that an
affidavit represents is essentially fulfilled.
h. Section 5(d) of the Amparo Rule requires that prior investigation of an
alleged disappearance must have been made, specifying the manner and
results of the investigation.
i. The Court rejected the petitioners argument that the Tagitis's petition
did not comply with the Section 5(d) requirements of the Amparo
Rule, as the petition specifies in its paragraph 11 that Kunnong and
his companions immediately reported Tagitis disappearance to the
police authorities in Jolo, Sulu as soon as they were relatively certain
that he indeed had disappeared.
2. The present case is one of first impression in the use and application of the
Rule on the Writ of Amparo in an ENFORCED DISAPPEARANCE situation.
a. The Amparo Rule expressly provides that the "writ shall cover extralegal
killings and enforced disappearances or threats thereof."
i. However, while the Rule covers "enforced disappearances"
this concept is neither defined nor penalized in this
jurisdiction.
b. The Court clarifies that it does not rule on any issue of criminal
culpability for the extrajudicial killing or enforced disappearance. This is
an issue that requires criminal action before our criminal courts based on
existing penal laws.
i. Its intervention is in determining whether an enforced disappearance
has taken place and who is responsible or accountable for this
disappearance, and to define and impose the appropriate remedies to
address it.
c. The burden for the public authorities to discharge in these situations,
under the Rule on the Writ of Amparo, is twofold.
i. The first is to ensure that all efforts at disclosure and investigation are
undertaken under pain of indirect contempt from this Court when

d.

e.

f.

g.

h.

governmental efforts are less than what the individual situations


require.
ii. The second is to address the disappearance, so that the life of the
victim is preserved and his or her liberty and security restored.
The absence of a specific penal law in the Philippines, however,
is not a stumbling block for action from this Court through the
issuance of a writ of amparo.
i. Because UNDERLYING every enforced disappearance is a
violation of the constitutional rights to life, liberty and security
that the Supreme Court is mandated by the Constitution to
protect through its rule-making powers.
Furthermore, the Court has surveyed international law and states that
enforced disappearance as a State practice has been repudiated by the
international community, so that the ban on it is now a generally
accepted principle of international law, which should be considered a part
of the law of the land, and which we should act upon to the extent
already allowed under our laws and the international conventions that
bind us.
i. This should serve as the backdrop for the Rule on the Writ of Amparo.
Although the Amparo Rule still has gaps waiting to be filled through
substantive law, as evidenced primarily by the lack of a concrete
definition of "enforced disappearance," the some material, among
others, provide ample guidance and standards on how, through the
medium of the Amparo Rule, the Court can provide remedies.
The Court also states that certain evidentiary difficulties are
present in the Amparo proceeding:
i. First, there may be a deliberate concealment of the identities of the
direct perpetrators.
Experts note that abductors are well organized, armed and usually
members of the military or police forces.
ii. Second, deliberate concealment of pertinent evidence of the
disappearance;
The central piece of evidence in an enforced disappearance--i.e.,
the corpus delicti or the victims body--is usually concealed to
effectively thwart any investigation
The problem for the victims family is the States virtual monopoly
of access to pertinent evidence.
iii. Third is the element of denial;
In many cases, the State authorities deliberately deny that the
enforced disappearance ever occurred.
"Deniability" is central to the policy of enforced disappearances, as
the absence of any proven disappearance makes it easier to
escape the application of legal standards ensuring the victims
human rights.
The characteristics an amparo proceeding of being summary and
of the use of substantial evidence as the required level of proof

(in contrast to the usual preponderance of evidence or proof


beyond reasonable doubt in court proceedings) reveals the clear
intent of the framers of the Amparo Rule to have it become
similar to an administrative proceeding.
i. Thus, in these proceedings, the Amparo petitioner needs only to properly
comply with the substance and form requirements of a Writ of Amparo
petition, as discussed above, and prove the allegations by substantial
evidence.
3. The threshold question for our resolution is: was there an enforced
disappearance within the meaning of this term under the UN Declaration we
have cited?
a. The Convention defines enforced disappearance as "the arrest,
detention, abduction or any other form of deprivation of liberty
by agents of the State or by persons or groups of persons acting
with the authorization, support or acquiescence of the State,
followed by a refusal to acknowledge the deprivation of liberty or
by concealment of the fate or whereabouts of the disappeared
person, which place such a person outside the protection of the
law."
b. Under this definition, the elements that constitute enforced
disappearance are essentially fourfold:
i. arrest, detention, abduction or any form of deprivation of
liberty;
ii. carried out by agents of the State or persons or groups of
persons acting with the authorization, support or acquiescence
of the State;
iii. followed by a refusal to acknowledge the detention, or a
concealment of the fate of the disappeared person; and
iv. placement of the disappeared person outside the protection of
the law.
c. There is no DIRECT evidence indicating how the victim actually
disappeared. The direct evidence at hand only shows that Tagitis went
out of the ASY Pension House after depositing his room key with the
hotel desk and was never seen nor heard of again.
d. The undisputed conclusion, however, from all concerned--the
petitioner, Engr. Tagitis colleagues and even the police authorities--is
that Engr Tagistis disappeared under mysterious circumstances and was
never seen again.
e. Likewise, there is no direct evidence showing that operatives of PNP
CIDG Zamboanga abducted or arrested Tagitis.
f. Col. Kasim never denied that he met with the Tatigits and her friends,
and that he provided them information that Tagitis was being held by
police officials.
i. However, this is based on the input of an unnamed asset.

g.

h.

i.

j.

ii. He simply claimed in his testimony that the "informal letter" he


received from his informant in Sulu did not indicate that Tagitis was in
the custody of the CIDG.
iii. He also stressed that the information he provided the respondent was
merely a "raw report" from "barangay intelligence" that still needed
confirmation and "follow up" as to its veracity.
To be sure, Tagitiss and Mrs. Talbins testimonies were far from perfect,
as the petitioners pointed out.
i. The inconsistencies the petitioners point out relate, more than
anything else, to details that should not affect the credibility of the
respondent and Mrs. Talbin; the inconsistencies are not on material
points.
To consider also that some pieces of evidence are incompetent and
inadmissible evidence of is to state that in the absence of any direct
evidence, a court should dismiss the petition.
i. An immediate dismissal for this reason would make the Amparo Rule
ineffective, since it cannot allow for the special evidentiary difficulties
that are unavoidably present in Amparo situations, particularly in
extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances.
ii. To give full meaning to our Constitution and the rights it
protects, the Court declares that courts in amparo proceedings
should at least take a close look at the available evidence to
determine the correct import of every piece of evidence; and
this should include those usually considered inadmissible
under the general rules of evidence
But the Court must take into account the surrounding
circumstances and the test of reason which shall be used as a
basic minimum admissibility requirement.
The Court gleans from all these admitted pieces of evidence and
developments a consistency in the governments denial of any complicity
in the disappearance of Tagitis, which is disrupted only by the report
made by Col. Kasim to Tagitis about her husband. Even Col. Kasim,
however, eventually denied that he ever made the disclosure that Tagitis
was under custodial investigation for complicity in terrorism.
Based on these considerations, we conclude that Col. Kasims disclosure,
made in an unguarded moment, unequivocally point to some
government complicity in the disappearance.

4. The PNP and CIDG are accountable because Section 24 of Republic Act No.
6975, otherwise known as the "PNP Law," specifies the PNP as the
governmental office with the mandate "to investigate and prevent crimes,
effect the arrest of criminal offenders, bring offenders to justice and assist
in their prosecution."
a. The PNP-CIDG is the "investigative arm" of the PNP and is mandated to
"investigate and prosecute all cases involving violations of the Revised
Penal Code, particularly those considered as heinous crimes."

b. Under the PNP organizational structure, the PNP-CIDG is tasked to


investigate all major crimes involving violations of the Revised Penal
Code and operates against organized crime groups, unless the President
assigns the case exclusively to the National Bureau of Investigation
(NBI).
c. Given their mandates, the PNP and PNP-CIDG officials and members
were the ones who were remiss in their duties when the government
completely failed to exercise its duties in entertaining the complaints of
Tagitis.
d. To fully enforce the Amparo remedy, the Court refers this case back to
the CA for appropriate proceedings directed at the monitoring of the PNP
and the PNP-CIDG investigations and actions, and the validation of their
results through hearings the CA may deem appropriate to conduct.
DISPOSITIVE:
The Court:
a. Ruled that the disapperance of Engr. Tagitis is an enforced disappearance
covered by the Rule on the Writ of Amparo;
b. Without any specific pronouncement on exact authorship and
responsibility, declaring the government accountable for the enforced
disappearance of Engr.Tagitis;
c. Holding the PNP directly responsible for the disclosure of material facts
known to the government and to their offices regarding the disappearance
of Engr. Morced N. Tagitis, and for the conduct of proper investigations
using extraordinary diligence, with the obligation to show investigation
results acceptable to this Court;
d. Ordering Col. Kasim impleaded in this case and holding him accountable
with the obligation to disclose information known to him and to his "assets"
in relation with the enforced disappearance of Engr. Tagitis;
e. Referring this case back to the CA for appropriate proceedings directed at
the monitoring of the PNP investigations, actions and the validation of their
results;
f. Requiring the CA to submit to this Court a quarterly report with its
recommendations,
g. The PNP shall have one (1) full year to undertake their investigations;
the CA shall submit its full report for the consideration of this Court at the
end of the 4th quarter counted from the finality of this Decision;

>NORTH COTABATO VS. GRP GR NO. 183591


Posted on May 7, 2010 by krizsexzy
>FACTS: The Memorandum of Agreement on the Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD)
brought about by the Government of the republic of the Philippines (GRP) and the
Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) as an aspect of Tripoli Agreement of Peace in
2001 is scheduled to be signed in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia.
This agreement was petitioned by the Province of North Cotabato for Mandamus
and Prohibition with Prayer for the Issuance of Writ of Preliminary Injunction and
Temporary Restraining Order. The agreement mentions Bangsamoro Juridical
Entity (BJE) to which it grants the authority and jurisdiction over the Ancestral
Domain and Ancestral Lands of the Bangsamoro; authority and jurisdiction over
all natural resources within internal waters. The agreement is composed of two
local statutes: the organic act for autonomous region in Muslim Mindanao and the
Indigenous Peoples Rights Act (IPRA).
ISSUE: Whether or not the GRP violated the Constitutional and statutory
provisions on public consultation and the right to information when they
negotiated and initiated the MOA-AD and Whether or not the MOA-AD brought by
the GRP and MILF is constitutional
HELD:GRP violated the Constitutional and statutory provisions on public
consultation and the right to information when they negotiated and initiated the
MOA-AD and it are unconstitutional because it is contrary to law and the
provisions of the constitution thereof.
REASONING: The GRP is required by this law to carry out public consultations on
both national and local levels to build consensus for peace agenda and process
and the mobilization and facilitation of peoples participation in the peace process.
Article III (Bill of Rights)
Sec. 7. The right of people on matters of public concern shall be recognized,
access to official records and to documents and papers pertaining to official acts,
transactions, or decisions, as well as to government research data used as basis
for policy development shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as
may be provided by law.
Article II
Sec. 28. Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law , that state adopts
and implements a policy of full public disclosure of all its transactions involving
public interest.

LGC (1991), require all national agencies and officers to conduct periodic
consultations. No project or program be implemented unless such consultations
are complied with and approval mus be obtained.
Article VII (Executive Department)
Sec. 21. No treaty or international agreement shall be valid and effective unless
concurred in by at least two-thirds of all the Members of the Senate.
Article X. (Local Government)
Sec. 1. The territorial and political subdivisions of the Republic of the Philippines
are the province, cities, municipalities and barangays. There shall be autonomous
regions on Muslim Mindanao and the Cordillera as hereinafter provided.
Sec. 15. There shall be created autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and in
the Cordilleras consisting of provinces, cities, municipalities and geographical
areas sharing common and distinctive historical and cultural heritage, economic
and social structures and other relevant characteristics within the framework of
this constitution and the national sovereignty as well as territorial integrity of the
Republic of the Philippines.
Section 16. The President shall exercise general supervision over autonomous
regions to ensure that laws are faithfully executed.
Sec. 18. The creation of autonomous region shall be effective when approved by
a majority of the votes cast by the constituents units in a plebiscite called for the
purpose, provided that only provinces, cities and geographic areas voting
favourably in such plebiscite shall be included in the autonomous region.
Sec. 20. Within its territorial jurisdiction and subject to the provisions of this
Constitution and national laws, the organic act of autonomous regions shall
provide for legislative powers over:
1. Administrative organization;
2. Creation of sources of revenues;
3. Ancestral domain and natural resources;
4. Personal, family, and property relations;
5. Regional urban and rural planning development;
6. Economic, social, and tourism development;
7. Educational policies;
8. Preservation and development of the cultural heritage; and

9. Such other matters as may be authorized by law for the promotion of the
general welfare of the people of the region.
The President has sole authority in the treaty-making.
ARTICLE XVII (AMENDMENTS OR REVISIONS)
Section 1. Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution may be proposed
by:
1. The Congress, upon a vote of three-fourths of all its Members; or
2. A constitutional convention.
Section 4. Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution under Section 1
hereof shall be valid when ratified by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite
which shall be held not earlier than sixty days nor later than ninety days after the
approval of such amendment or revision.
MOA-AD states that all provisions thereof which cannot be reconciled with the
present constitution and laws shall come into force upon signing of a
comprehensive compact and upon effecting the necessary changes to the legal
framework. The presidents authority is limited to proposing constitutional
amendments. She cannot guarantee to any third party that the required
amendments will eventually be put in place nor even be submitted to a plebiscite.
MOA-AD itself presents the need to amend therein.

AN ACT PROVIDING FOR A SYSTEM OF INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM


AND APPROPRIATING FUNDS THEREFOR
Date: 04 August 1989
I. General Provisions

Sec. 1. Title. This Act shall be known as "The Initiative and Referendum Act."

Sec. 2. Statement of Policy. The power of the people under a system of


initiative and referendum to directly propose, enact, approve or reject, in whole
or in part, the Constitution, laws, ordinances, or resolutions passed by any
legislative body upon compliance with the requirements of this Act is hereby
affirmed, recognized and guaranteed.
Sec. 3. Definition of Terms. For purposes of this Act, the following terms shall
mean:
(a) "Initiative" is the power of the people to propose amendments

to the

Constitutions or to propose and enact legislations through an election called for


the

purpose.

There are three (3) systems of initiative, namely:


a.1

Initiative

on

the

Constitution

which

refers

to

petition

proposing

amendments to the Constitution;


a.2 Initiative on statutes which refers to a petition proposing to enact a national
legislation; and
a.3. Initiative on local legislation which refers to a petition proposing to enact a
regional, provincial, city, municipal, or barangay law, resolution or ordinance.
(b)

"Indirect initiative" is exercise of initiative by the people

through a

proposition sent to Congress or the local legislative body for action.


(c)

"Referendum" is the power of the electorate to approve or

reject a

legislation through an election called for the purpose. It may be of two classes,
namely:
c.1. Referendum on statutes which refers to a petition to approve or reject an
act or law, or part thereof, passed by Congress; and
c.2. Referendum on local law which refers to a petition to approve or reject a
law, resolution or ordinance enacted by regional assemblies and local legislative
bodies.
(d) "Proposition" is the measure proposed by the voters.
(e)

"Plebiscite" is the electoral process by which an initiative

on the

Constitution is approved or rejected by the people.


(f)

"Petition" is the written instrument containing the

proposition and the

required number of signatories. It shall be in a form to be determined by and


submitted to the Commission on Elections, hereinafter
Commission.

referred to as the

(g) "Local government units" refers to provinces , cities, municipalities and


barangays.
(h)

"Local legislative bodies" refers to the Sangguniang

Panlalawigan,

Sangguniang Panlungsod, Sangguniang Bayan, and Sangguniang Nayon.


(i) "Local executives" refers to the Provincial Governors, City or Municipal
Mayors and Punong Barangay, as the case may be.
Sec. 4. Who may exercise. The power of initiative and referendum may be
exercised by all registered voters of the country, autonomous regions, provinces,
cities, municipalities and barangays.
Sec. 5. Requirements. (a) To exercise the power of initiative or referendum, at
least ten per centum (10%) of the total number of the registered voters, of which
every legislative district is represented by at least three per centum (3%) of the
registered voters thereof, shall sign a petition for the purpose and register the
same with the Commission.
(b)

A petition for an initiative on the 1987 Constitution must have at least

twelve per centum (12%) of the total number of registered voters as signatories,
of which every legislative district must be represented by at least three per
centum (3%) of the registered voters therein. Initiative on the Constitution may
be exercised only after five (5) years from the ratification of the 1987
Constitution and only once every five (5) years thereafter.
(c)
c.1.

The petition shall state the following:


contents or text of the proposed law sought to be enacted, approved or

rejected,

amended

or

repealed,

c.2.

c.5.

the

case

the

c.3.
c.4.

as

the
that

it

signatures

reason
is

not
of

the

of

be;

proposition;
or

one

may

the

petitioners

reasons
exceptions
or

therefor;

provided

registered

voters;

herein;
and

c.6. an abstract or summary in not more than one hundred (100) words which
shall be legibly written or printed at the top of every page of the petition.
(d) A referendum or initiative affecting a law, resolution or ordinance passed by
the legislative assembly of an autonomous region, province or city is deemed
validly initiated if the petition thereof is signed by at least ten per centum (10%)
of the registered voters in the province or city, of which every legislative district
must be represented by at least three per centum (3%) of the registered voters
therein; Provided, however, That if the province or city is composed only of one

(1) legislative district, then at least each municipality

in a province or each

barangay in a city should be represented by at least three per centum (3%) of


the registered voters therein.
(e) A referendum of initiative on an ordinance passed in a municipality shall be
deemed validly initiated if the petition therefor is signed by at least ten per
centum (10%) of the registered voters in the municipality, of which every
barangay is represented by at least three per centum (3%) of the registered
voters therein.
(f) A referendum or initiative on a barangay resolution or ordinance is deemed
validly initiated if signed by at least ten per centum (10%) of the registered
voters in said barangay.
Sec. 6. Special Registration. The Commission on Election shall set a special
registration day at least three (3) weeks before a scheduled initiative or
referendum.
Sec. 7. Verification of Signatures. The Election Registrar shall verify the
signatures on the basis of the registry list of voters, voters' affidavits and voters
identification cards used in the immediately preceding election.
II. National Initiative and Referendum

Sec. 8. Conduct and Date of Initiative or Referendum. The Commission shall


call and supervise the conduct of initiative or referendum.
Within a period of thirty (30) days from receipt of the petition, the Commission
shall, upon determining the sufficiency of the petition, publish the same in Filipino
and English at least twice in newspapers of general and local circulation and set
the date of the initiative or referendum which shall not be earlier than forty-five
(45) days but not later than ninety (90) days from the determination by the
Commission of the sufficiency of the petition.
Sec.

9. Effectivity

of

Initiative

or

Referendum

Proposition. (a)

the

Proposition of the enactment, approval, amendment or rejection of a national law


shall be submitted to and approved by a majority of the votes cast by all the
registered voters of the Philippines.
If, as certified to by the Commission, the proposition is approved by a majority of
the votes cast, the national law proposed for enactment, approval, or amendment
shall become effective fifteen (15) days following completion of its publication in

the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines. If,


as certified by the Commission, the proposition to reject a national law is
approved by a majority of the votes cast, the said national law shall be deemed
repealed and the repeal shall become effective fifteen (15) days following the
completion of publication of the proposition and the certification by the
Commission in the Official Gazette or in newspaper of general circulation in the
Philippines.
However, if the majority vote is not obtained, the national law sought to be
rejected or amended shall remain in full force and effect.
(b) The proposition in an initiative on the Constitution approved by a majority of
the votes cast in the plebiscite shall become effective as to the day of the
plebiscite.
(c) A national or local initiative propositions approved by majority of the votes
cast in an election called for the purpose shall become effective fifteen (15) days
after certification and proclamation by the Commission.
Sec. 10. Prohibited Measures. The following cannot be the subject of an
initiative or referendum petition:
(a) No petition embracing more than one (1) subject shall be submitted to the
electorate; and
(b) Statutes involving emergency measures, the enactment of which are
specifically vested in Congress by the Constitution, cannot be subject to
referendum until ninety (90) days after its effectivity.
Sec. 11. Indirect Initiative. Any duly accredited people's organization, as
defined by law, may file a petition for indirect initiative with the House of
Representatives, and other legislative bodies. The petition shall contain a
summary of the chief purposes and contents of the bill that the organization
proposes to be enacted into law by the legislature.
The procedure to be followed on the initiative bill shall be the same as the
enactment of any legislative measure before the House of Representative except
that the said initiative bill shall have precedence over the pending legislative
measures on the committee.
Sec. 12. Appeal. The decision of the Commission on the findings of the
sufficiency or insufficiency of the petition for initiative or referendum may be
appealed to the Supreme Court within thirty (30) days from notice thereof.

III. Local initiative and Referendum

Sec. 13. Procedure in Local Initiative. (a) Not less than two thousand (2,000)
registered voters in case of autonomous regions, one thousand (1,000) in case of
provinces and cities, one hundred (100) in case of municipalities, and fifty (50) in
case of barangays, may file a petition with the Regional Assembly or local
legislative body, respectively, proposing the adoption, enactment, repeal, or
amendment, of any law, ordinance or resolution.
(b) If no favorable action thereon is made by local legislative body within (30)
days from its presentation, the proponents through their duly authorized and
registered representative may invoke their power of initiative, giving notice
thereof to the local legislative body concerned.
(c) The proposition shall be numbered serially
Secretary of Local Government or his designated

starting from one (1). The


representative shall extend

assistance in the formulation of the proposition.


(d) Two or more propositions may be submitted in an initiative.
(e)

Proponents shall have one hundred twenty (120) days in case

of

autonomous regions, ninety (90) days in case of provinces and cities, sixty (60)
days in case of municipalities, and thirty (30) days in case of barangays, from
notice mentioned in subsection (b) hereof to collect the required number

of

signatures.
(f) The petition shall be signed before the Election Registrar, or his designated
representative, in the presence of a representative of the proponent, and a
representative of the regional assemblies and local legislative bodies concerned
in a public place in the autonomous region or local government unit, as the case
may be. Signature stations may be established in as many places as may be
warranted.
(g) Upon the lapse of the period herein provided, the Commission on Elections,
through

its office in the local government unit concerned shall certify as to

whether or not the required number of signatures has been obtained. Failure to
obtain the required number is a defeat of the proposition.
(h) If the required number of the signatures is obtained, the Commission shall
then set a date for the initiative at which the proposition shall be submitted to
the registered voters in the local government unit concerned for their approval

within ninety (90) days from the date of certification by the Commission, as
provided in subsection (g) hereof, in case of autonomous regions, sixty (60)
days in case of the provinces and cities, forty-five (45) days in case of
municipalities, and thirty (30) days in case of barangays. The initiative shall
then be held on the date set, after which the results thereof shall be certified
and proclaimed by the Commission on Elections.
Sec. 14. Effectivity of Local Propositions. If the proposition is approved by a
majority of the votes cast, it shall take effect fifteen (15) days after certification
by the Commission as if affirmative action thereon had been made by the local
legislative body and local executive concerned. If it fails to obtain said number of
votes, the proposition is considered defeated.
Sec. 15. Limitations on Local Initiatives. (a) The power of local initiative shall
not be exercised more than once a year.
(b) Initiative shall extend only to subjects or matters which are within the legal
powers of the local legislative bodies to enact.
(c) If at any time before the initiative is held, the local legislative body shall
adopt in toto the proposition presented, the initiative shall be canceled. However,
those against such action may, if they so desire, apply for initiative in the
manner herein provided.
Sec. 16. Limitations Upon Local Legislative Bodies. Any proposition or
ordinance or resolution approved through the system of initiative and referendum
as herein provided shall not be repealed, modified or amended, by the local
legislative body concerned within six (6) months from the date therefrom, and
may be amended, modified or repealed by the local legislative body within (3/4)
of all its members: Provided, however, that in case of barangays, the period shall
be in (1) year after the expiration of the first six (6) months.
Sec. 17. Local Referendum. Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 4 hereof,
any local legislative body may submit to the registered voters of autonomous
region, provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays for the approval or
rejection, any ordinance or resolution duly enacted or approved.
Said referendum shall be held under the control and direction of the Commission
within sixty (60) days in case of provinces and cities, forty-five (45) days in case
of municipalities and thirty (30) days in case of barangays.
The Commission shall certify and proclaim the results of the said referendum.

Sec. 18. Authority of Courts. Nothing in this Act shall prevent or preclude the
proper courts from declaring null and void any proposition approved pursuant to
this Act for violation of the Constitution or want of capacity of the local legislative
body to enact the said measure.
IV. Final Provisions

Sec. 19. Applicability of the Omnibus Election Code. The Omnibus Election
Code and other election laws, not inconsistent with the provisions of this Act,
shall apply to all initiatives and referenda.
Sec. 20. Rules and Regulations. The Commission is hereby empowered to
promulgate such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the
purposes of this Act.
Sec. 21. Appropriations. The amount necessary to defray the cost of the initial
implementation of this Act shall be charged against the Contingent Fund in the
General Appropriations Act of the current year. Thereafter, such sums as may be
necessary for the full implementation of this Act shall be included in the annual
General Appropriations Act.
Sec. 22. Separability Clause. If any part or provision of this Act is held invalid
or unconstitutional, the other parts or provisions thereof shall remain valid and
effective.
Sec. 23. Effectivity. This Act shall take effect fifteen (15) days after its
publication in a newspaper of general circulation.

ABAKADA GURO VS EXECUTIVE SECRETARY


Post under case digests, Political Law at Posted by Schizophrenic Mind
Facts: On May 24, 2005, the President signed into law Republic Act 9337 or the
VAT Reform Act. Before the law took effect on July 1, 2005, the Court issued a
TRO enjoining government from implementing the law in response to a slew of
petitions for certiorari and prohibition questioning the constitutionality of the new
law.

The challenged section of R.A. No. 9337 is the common proviso in Sections 4, 5
and 6: That the President, upon the recommendation of the Secretary of

Finance, shall, effective January 1, 2006, raise the rate of value-added tax to
12%, after any of the following conditions has been satisfied:

(i) Value-added tax collection as a percentage of Gross Domestic Product (GDP)


of the previous year exceeds two and four-fifth percent (2 4/5%);

or (ii) National government deficit as a percentage of GDP of the previous year


exceeds one and one-half percent (1%)

Petitioners allege that the grant of stand-by authority to the President to increase
the VAT rate is an abdication by Congress of its exclusive power to tax because
such delegation is not covered by Section 28 (2), Article VI Consti. They argue
that VAT is a tax levied on the sale or exchange of goods and services which cant
be included within the purview of tariffs under the exemption delegation since this
refers to customs duties, tolls or tribute payable upon merchandise to the
government and usually imposed on imported/exported goods. They also said
that the President has powers to cause, influence or create the conditions
provided by law to bring about the conditions precedent. Moreover, they allege
that no guiding standards are made by law as to how the Secretary of Finance
will make the recommendation.

Issue: Whether or not the RA 9337's stand-by authority to the Executive to


increase the VAT rate, especially on account of the recommendatory power
granted to the Secretary of Finance, constitutes undue delegation of legislative
power? NO

Held: The powers which Congress is prohibited from delegating are those which
are strictly, or inherently and exclusively, legislative. Purely legislative power
which can never be delegated is the authority to make a complete law- complete
as to the time when it shall take effect and as to whom it shall be applicable, and
to determine the expediency of its enactment. It is the nature of the power and
not the liability of its use or the manner of its exercise which determines the
validity of its delegation.

The exceptions are:

(a) delegation of tariff powers to President under Constitution

(b) delegation of emergency powers to President under Constitution

(c) delegation to the people at large

(d) delegation to local governments

(e) delegation to administrative bodies

For the delegation to be valid, it must be complete and it must fix a standard. A
sufficient standard is one which defines legislative policy, marks its limits, maps
out its boundaries and specifies the public agency to apply it.

In this case, it is not a delegation of legislative power BUT a delegation of


ascertainment of facts upon which enforcement and administration of the
increased rate under the law is contingent. The legislature has made the
operation of the 12% rate effective January 1, 2006, contingent upon a specified
fact or condition. It leaves the entire operation or non-operation of the 12% rate
upon factual matters outside of the control of the executive. No discretion would
be exercised by the President. Highlighting the absence of discretion is the fact
that the word SHALL is used in the common proviso. The use of the word SHALL
connotes a mandatory order. Its use in a statute denotes an imperative obligation
and is inconsistent with the idea of discretion.

Thus, it is the ministerial duty of the President to immediately impose the 12%
rate upon the existence of any of the conditions specified by Congress. This is a
duty, which cannot be evaded by the President. It is a clear directive to impose
the 12% VAT rate when the specified conditions are present.

Congress just granted the Secretary of Finance the authority to ascertain the
existence of a fact--- whether by December 31, 2005, the VAT collection as a
percentage of GDP of the previous year exceeds 2 4/5 % or the national
government deficit as a percentage of GDP of the previous year exceeds one and
1%. If either of these two instances has occurred, the Secretary of Finance, by
legislative mandate, must submit such information to the President.

In making his recommendation to the President on the existence of either of the


two conditions, the Secretary of Finance is not acting as the alter ego of the
President or even her subordinate. He is acting as the agent of the legislative
department, to determine and declare the event upon which its expressed will is
to take effect. The Secretary of Finance becomes the means or tool by which
legislative policy is determined and implemented, considering that he possesses
all the facilities to gather data and information and has a much broader
perspective to properly evaluate them. His function is to gather and collate
statistical data and other pertinent information and verify if any of the two
conditions laid out by Congress is present.

Congress does not abdicate its functions or unduly delegate power when it
describes what job must be done, who must do it, and what is the scope of his
authority; in our complex economy that is frequently the only way in which the
legislative process can go forward.

There is no undue delegation of legislative power but only of the discretion as to


the execution of a law. This is constitutionally permissible. Congress did not
delegate the power to tax but the mere implementation of the law.

RALPH P. TUA, Petitioner, v. HON. CESAR A. MANGROBA


On May 20, 2005, respondent Rossana Honrado-Tua (respondent) filed with the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Imus, Cavite a Verified Petition2 for herself and in
behalf of her minor children, Jo for the issuance of a protection order, pursuant to
Republic Act (RA) 9262 or the Anti-Violence Against Women and their Children Act
of 2004, against her husband, petitioner Ralph Tua.
Respondent claimed that

she and her children had suffered from petitioners abusive conduct; that
petitioner had threatened to cause her and the children physical harm for the
purpose of controlling her actions or decisions; that she was actually deprived of
custody and access to her minor children; and, that she was threatened to be
deprived
of
her
and
her
childrens
financial
support.
Respondent and petitioner were married on January 10, 1998 in Makati City.
They have three children, gun and pointed the barrel of his gun to his head as he
wanted to convince her not to proceed with the legal separation case she filed;
she hid her fears although she was scared; RTC issued a Temporary Protection
Order (TPO),4 which we quote in full:chanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Pursuant to the provisions of R.A. 9262, otherwise known as the AntiViolence Against Women and their Children Act of 2004, a Temporary
Protection Order (TPO) effective for thirty (30) days from date of receipt
is
hereby
issued
against
respondent
Ralph
P.
Tua.
ordered to:chanRoblesVirtualawlibrary1. Enjoin from committing and
threatening to commit personally or through another, physical, verbal
and emotional harm or abuse against the herein petitioner (respondent)
and
other
family
and
household
members;
2. Restrain from harassing, annoying, texting, telephoning, contacting or
otherwise communicating with the petitioner (respondent) whether
directly or indirectly or engaged in any psychological form of
harassment;
3. Stay away from the petitioner (respondent) and other family and
household members at a distance of 100 meters radius from the place of
residence of the plaintiff and likewise to stay away from the residence,
school, place of employment and other places frequented by the herein
petitioner (respondent), and other family and household members.
4. Give and deliver the three (3) minor children of the petitioner
(respondent) to the [latter] who shall have their temporary custody
pending the determination of whether or not a permanent protection
order shall issue.VIOLATION OF THIS ORDER IS PUNISHABLE BY
LAW. The Sheriff of this Court, the PNP Imus, Cavite, or any Officers of
the Law are hereby commanded to effect this Order immediately and to
use necessary force and measures under the law to implement this
Order.
petitioner denied respondents allegations and alleged, among others,
that he had been maintaining a separate abode from petitioner since
November 2004; that it was respondent who verbally abused and
threatened him whenever their childrens stay with him was Petitioner
contended that the issuance of the TPO on May 23, 2005 is

unconstitutional for being violative of the due process clause of the


Constitution.
petitioner filed with the CA a petition for certiorari with prayer for the
issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining
order and preliminary injunction and hold departure order assailing the
May
23,
2005
TPO
issued
by
the
RTC.
WHEREFORE, based on the foregoing premises, the instant petition is
hereby DENIED for lack of merit. Accordingly, the assailed Temporary
Protection Order dated May 23, 2002 (sic) issued by the Regional Trial
Court of Imus, Cavite, Branch 22 in Civil Case No. 0464-05 is
UPHELD.10The CA found that the TPO dated May 23, 2005 was validly
issued by the RTC and found no grave abuse of discretion in the
issuance thereof as the same were in complete accord with the provision
of
RA
9262.
Petitioner particularly directs his constitutional attack on Section 15 of
RA 9262 contending that had there been no ex parte issuance of the
TPO, he would have been afforded due process of law and had properly
presented his side on the matter; that the questioned provision simply
encourages arbitrary enforcement repulsive to basic constitutional rights
which
affects
his
life,
liberty
and
property.
We
are
not
impressed.
SECTION 15. Temporary Protection Orders. - Temporary Protection
Orders (TPOs) refers to the protection order issued by the court on the
date of filing of the application after ex parte determination that such
order should be issued. A court may grant in a TPO any, some or all of
the reliefs mentioned in this Act and shall be effective for thirty (30)
days. The court shall schedule a hearing on the issuance of a
[Permanent Protection Order] PPO prior to or on the date of the
expiration of the TPO. chanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
A protection order is an order issued to prevent further acts of
violence against women and their children, their family or household
members, and to grant other necessary reliefs. Its purpose is to
safeguard the offended parties from further harm, minimize any
disruption in their daily life and facilitate the opportunity and ability to
regain
control
of
their
life.
The scope of reliefs in protection orders is broadened to ensure that the
victim or offended party is afforded all the remedies necessary to curtail
access by a perpetrator to the victim. This serves to safeguard the
victim from greater risk of violence; to accord the victim and any
designated family or household member safety in the family residence,
and to prevent the perpetrator from committing acts that jeopardize the
employment and support of the victim. It also enables the court to
award temporary custody of minor children to protect the children from
violence, to prevent their abduction by the perpetrator and to ensure
their
financial
support.

The rules require that petitions for protection order be in writing, signed
and verified by the petitioner thereby undertaking full responsibility,
criminal or civil, for every allegation therein. Since time is of the
essence in cases of VAWC if further violence is to be prevented, the
court is authorized to issue ex parte a TPO after raffle but before notice
and hearing when the life, limb or property of the victim is in jeopardy
and there is reasonable ground to believe that the order is necessary to
protect the victim from the immediate and imminent danger of VAWC or
to
prevent
such
violence,
which
is
about
to
recur.
The grant of a TPO ex parte cannot, therefore, be challenged as violative
of the right to due process. Just like a writ of preliminary attachment
which is issued without notice and hearing because the time in which
the hearing will take could be enough to enable the defendant to
abscond or dispose of his property, in the same way, the victim of VAWC
may already have suffered harrowing experiences in the hands of her
tormentor, and possibly even death, if notice and hearing were required
before such acts could be prevented. It is a constitutional commonplace
that the ordinary requirements of procedural due process must yield to
the necessities of protecting vital public interests, among which is
protection of women and children from violence and threats to their
personal
safety
and
security.
Where no TPO is issued ex parte, the court will nonetheless order the
immediate issuance and service of the notice upon the respondent
requiring him to file an opposition to the petition within five (5) days
from service. The date of the preliminary conference and hearing on the
merits
shall
likewise
be
indicated
on
the
notice.
The essence of due process is to be found in the reasonable opportunity
to be heard and submit any evidence one may have in support of ones
defense. To be heard does not only mean verbal arguments in court;
one may be heard also through pleadings. Where opportunity to be
heard, either through oral arguments or pleadings, is accorded, there is
no denial of procedural due process.1
Section 2 of Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution provides that the
Congress shall have the power to define, prescribe, and apportion the
jurisdiction of the various courts but may not deprive the Supreme Court
of its jurisdiction over cases enumerated in Section 5 hereof. Hence,
the primary judge of the necessity, adequacy, wisdom, reasonableness
and expediency of any law is primarily the function of the legislature.15
The act of Congress entrusting us with the issuance of protection orders
is in pursuance of our authority to settle justiciable controversies or
disputes involving rights that are enforceable and demandable before
the courts of justice or the redress of wrongs for violations of such
rights.16crallawlibrary

As to the issuance of protection order by the Punong Barangay, Section


14 pertinently provides:chanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
SEC. 14. Barangay Protection Orders (BPOs); Who May Issue and How.
- Barangay Protection Orders (BPOs) refer to the protection order issued
by the Punong Barangay ordering the perpetrator to desist from
committing acts under Section 5 (a) and (b) of this Act. A Punong
Barangay who receives applications for a BPO shall issue the protection
order to the applicant on the date of filing after ex parte determination
of the basis of the application. If the Punong Barangay is unavailable to
act on the application for a BPO, the application shall be acted upon by
any available Barangay Kagawad. If the BPO is issued by a Barangay
Kagawad, the order must be accompanied by an attestation by the
Barangay Kagawad that the Punong Barangay was unavailable at the
time of the issuance of the BPO. BPOs shall be effective for fifteen (15)
days. Immediately after the issuance of an ex parte BPO, the Punong
Barangay or Barangay Kagawad shall personally serve a copy of the
same on the respondent, or direct any barangay official to effect its
personal
service.
The parties may be accompanied by a non-lawyer advocate in any
proceeding before the Punong Barangay.
Hence, the issuance of a BPO by the Punong Barangay or, in his unavailability, by
any available Barangay Kagawad, merely orders the perpetrator to desist from (a)
causing physical harm to the woman or her child; and (2) threatening to cause
the woman or her child physical harm. Such function of the Punong Barangay is,
thus, purely executive in nature, in pursuance of his duty under the Local
Government Code to enforce all laws and ordinances, and to maintain public
order
in
the
barangay.17crallawlibrary
Petitioner claims that while the issuance of the TPO is ex parte, there must be a
judicial determination of the basis thereof. He contends that the allegations in
respondents affidavit attached to the petition, and without admitting the same to
be true, are nothing more than normal or usual quarrels between a husband and
wife which are not grave or imminent enough to merit the issuance of a TPO.
We

are

We
quote
again
Section
15
thus:chanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

not
of

RA

9262

persuaded.
for

ready

reference,

SECTION 15. Temporary Protection Orders. - Temporary Protection


Orders (TPOs) refers to the protection order issued by the court on the
date of filing of the application after ex parte determination that such

order should be issued. A court may grant in a TPO any, some or all of
the reliefs mentioned in this Act and shall be effective for thirty (30)
days. The court shall schedule a hearing on the issuance of a PPO prior
to or on the date of the expiration of the TPO. The court shall order the
immediate personal service of the TPO on the respondent by the court
sheriff who may obtain the assistance of law enforcement agents for the
service. The TPO shall include notice of the date of the hearing on the
merits of the issuance of a PPO.
Clearly, the court is authorized to issue a TPO on the date of the filing of the
application after ex parte determination that there is basis for the issuance
thereof. Ex parte means that the respondent need not be notified or be present
in the hearing for the issuance of the TPO. Thus, it is within the courts
discretion, based on the petition and the affidavit attached thereto, to determine
that the violent acts against women and their children for the issuance of a TPO
have been committed.It is settled doctrine that there is grave abuse of discretion
when there is a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to
lack of jurisdiction, such as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary or
despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, and it must be so
patent and gross so as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual
refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law. 18
We find that the CA did not err when it found no grave abuse of discretion
committed
by
the
RTC
in
the
issuance
of
the
TPO.
The factual matters herein raised by petitioner should be presented during the
hearing on the merits on the issuance of the Permanent Protection Order.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
G.R. No. 161658

November 3, 2008

AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, JR., petitioner


vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondents.
Republic Act No. (RA) 9165, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Dangerous
Drugs Act of 2002, insofar as it requires mandatory drug testing of candidates for
public office, students of secondary and tertiary schools, officers and employees
of public and private offices, and persons charged before the prosecutor's office
with certain offenses, among other personalities, is put in issue.
As far as pertinent, the challenged section reads as follows:
SEC. 36. Authorized Drug Testing. - Authorized drug testing shall be done
by any government forensic laboratories or by any of the drug testing
laboratories accredited and monitored by the DOH to safeguard the quality
of the test results. x x x The drug testing shall employ, among others, two

(2) testing methods, the screening test which will determine the positive
result as well as the type of drug used and the confirmatory test which will
confirm a positive screening test. x x x The following shall be subjected to
undergo drug testing:
xxxx
(c) Students of secondary and tertiary schools. - Students of secondary and
tertiary schools shall, pursuant to the related rules and regulations as
contained in the school's student handbook and with notice to the parents,
undergo a random drug testing x x x;
(d) Officers and employees of public and private offices. - Officers and
employees of public and private offices, whether domestic or overseas, shall
be subjected to undergo a random drug test as contained in the company's
work rules and regulations, x x x for purposes of reducing the risk in the
workplace. Any officer or employee found positive for use of dangerous
drugs shall be dealt with administratively which shall be a ground for
suspension or termination, subject to the provisions of Article 282 of the
Labor Code and pertinent provisions of the Civil Service Law;
xxxx
(f) All persons charged before the prosecutor's office with a criminal offense
having an imposable penalty of imprisonment of not less than six (6) years
and one (1) day shall undergo a mandatory drug test;
(g) All candidates for public office whether appointed or elected both in the
national or local government shall undergo a mandatory drug test.
In addition to the above stated penalties in this Section, those found to be
positive for dangerous drugs use shall be subject to the provisions of Section 15
of this Act.
G.R. No. 161658 (Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr. v. Commission on Elections)
On December 23, 2003, the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) issued
Resolution No. 6486, prescribing the rules and regulations on the mandatory drug
testing of candidates for public office in connection with the May 10, 2004
synchronized national and local elections. The pertinent portions of the said
resolution read as follows:
WHEREAS, Section 36 (g) of Republic Act No. 9165 provides:
SEC. 36. Authorized Drug Testing. - x x x
(g) All candidates for public office x x x both in the national or local
government shall undergo a mandatory drug test.WHEREAS, Section 1,
Article XI of the 1987 Constitution provides that public officers and
employees must at all times be accountable to the people, serve them with
utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency;WHEREAS, by
requiring candidates to undergo mandatory drug test, the public will know
the quality of candidates they are electing and they will be assured that

only those who can serve with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and
efficiency would be elected x x x.SECTION 1. Coverage. - All candidates
for public office, both national and local, in the May 10, 2004
Synchronized National and Local Elections shall undergo mandatory
drug test in government forensic laboratories or any drug testing
laboratories monitored and accredited by the Department of Health.
Petitioner Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr., a senator of the Republic and a candidate for
re - election in the May 10, 2004 elections,1 filed a Petition for Certiorari and
Prohibition under Rule 65. In it, he seeks (1) to nullify Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and
COMELEC Resolution No. 6486 dated December 23, 2003 for being
unconstitutional in that they impose a qualification for candidates for senators in
addition to those already provided for in the 1987 Constitution; and (2) to enjoin
the COMELEC from implementing Resolution No. 6486.Pimentel invokes as legal
basis for his petition Sec. 3, Article VI of the Constitution, which states:
SECTION 3. No person shall be a Senator unless he is a natural - born
citizen of the Philippines, and, on the day of the election, is at least thirty five years of age, able to read and write, a registered voter, and a resident
of the Philippines for not less than two years immediately preceding the day
of the election.
According to Pimentel, the Constitution only prescribes a maximum of five (5)
qualifications for one to be a candidate for, elected to, and be a member of the
Senate. He says that both the Congress and COMELEC, by requiring, via RA 9165
and Resolution No. 6486, a senatorial aspirant, among other candidates, to
undergo a mandatory drug test, create an additional qualification that all
candidates for senator must first be certified as drug free. He adds that there is
no provision in the Constitution authorizing the Congress or COMELEC to expand
the qualification requirements of candidates for senator.
The Consolidated Issues
The principal issues before us are as follows:
(1) Do Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and COMELEC Resolution No. 6486 impose an
additional qualification for candidates for senator? Corollarily, can Congress enact
a law prescribing qualifications for candidates for senator in addition to those laid
down by the Constitution? and
(2) Are paragraphs (c), (d), (f), and (g) of Sec. 36, RA 9165 unconstitutional?
Specifically, do these paragraphs violate the right to privacy, the right against
unreasonable searches and seizure, and the equal protection clause? Or do they
constitute undue delegation of legislative power?
Pimentel Petition
(Constitutionality of Sec. 36[g] of RA 9165 and
COMELEC Resolution No. 6486)
In essence, Pimentel claims that Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and COMELEC Resolution
No. 6486 illegally impose an additional qualification on candidates for senator. He

points out that, subject to the provisions on nuisance candidates, a candidate for
senator needs only to meet the qualifications laid down in Sec. 3, Art. VI of the
Constitution, to wit: (1) citizenship, (2) voter registration, (3) literacy, (4) age,
and (5) residency. Beyond these stated qualification requirements, candidates for
senator need not possess any other qualification to run for senator and be voted
upon and elected as member of the Senate. The Congress cannot validly amend
or otherwise modify these qualification standards, as it cannot disregard, evade,
or weaken the force of a constitutional mandate,7 or alter or enlarge the
Constitution.
Pimentel's contention is well - taken. Accordingly, Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 should
be, as it is hereby declared as, unconstitutional. It is basic that if a law or an
administrative rule violates any norm of the Constitution, that issuance is null and
void and has no effect. The Constitution is the basic law to which all laws must
conform; no act shall be valid if it conflicts with the Constitution.8 In the
discharge of their defined functions, the three departments of government have
no choice but to yield obedience to the commands of the Constitution. Whatever
limits it imposes must be observed.9 It ought to be made abundantly clear,
however, that the unconstitutionality of Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 is rooted on its
having infringed the constitutional provision defining the qualification or eligibility
requirements for one aspiring to run for and serve as senator.
confidentiality of the test results."35 Notably, RA 9165 does not oblige the
employer concerned to report to the prosecuting agencies any information or
evidence relating to the violation of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act
received as a result of the operation of the drug testing. All told, therefore, the
intrusion into the employees' privacy, under RA 9165, is accompanied by proper
safeguards, particularly against embarrassing leakages of test results, and is
relatively minimal.
To reiterate, RA 9165 was enacted as a measure to stamp out illegal drug in the
country and thus protect the well - being of the citizens, especially the youth,
from the deleterious effects of dangerous drugs. The law intends to achieve this
through the medium, among others, of promoting and resolutely pursuing a
national drug abuse policy in the workplace via a mandatory random drug test.36
To the Court, the need for drug testing to at least minimize illegal drug use is
substantial enough to override the individual's privacy interest under the
premises. The Court can consider that the illegal drug menace cuts across gender,
age group, and social - economic lines. And it may not be amiss to state that the
sale, manufacture, or trafficking of illegal drugs, with their ready market, would
be an investor's dream were it not for the illegal and immoral components of any
of such activities. The drug problem has hardly abated since the martial law
public execution of a notorious drug trafficker. The state can no longer assume a
laid back stance with respect to this modern - day scourge. Drug enforcement
agencies perceive a mandatory random drug test to be an effective way of
preventing and deterring drug use among employees in private offices, the threat
of detection by random testing being higher than other modes. The Court holds
that the chosen method is a reasonable and enough means to lick the problem.

Taking into account the foregoing factors, i.e., the reduced expectation of privacy
on the part of the employees, the compelling state concern likely to be met by
the search, and the well - defined limits set forth in the law to properly guide
authorities in the conduct of the random testing, we hold that the challenged drug
test requirement is, under the limited context of the case, reasonable and, ergo,
constitutional.
Like their counterparts in the private sector, government officials and employees
also labor under reasonable supervision and restrictions imposed by the Civil
Service law and other laws on public officers, all enacted to promote a high
standard of ethics in the public service.37 And if RA 9165 passes the norm of
reasonableness for private employees, the more reason that it should pass the
test for civil servants, who, by constitutional command, are required to be
accountable at all times to the people and to serve them with utmost
responsibility and efficiency.38
Petitioner SJS' next posture that Sec. 36 of RA 9165 is objectionable on the
ground of undue delegation of power hardly commends itself for concurrence.
Contrary to its position, the provision in question is not so extensively drawn as to
give unbridled options to schools and employers to determine the manner of drug
testing. Sec. 36 expressly provides how drug testing for students of secondary
and tertiary schools and officers/employees of public/private offices should be
conducted. It enumerates the persons who shall undergo drug testing. In the
case of students, the testing shall be in accordance with the school rules as
contained in the student handbook and with notice to parents. On the part of
officers/employees, the testing shall take into account the company's work rules.
In either case, the random procedure shall be observed, meaning that the
persons to be subjected to drug test shall be picked by chance or in an unplanned
way. And in all cases, safeguards against misusing and compromising the
confidentiality of the test results are established.
The validity of delegating legislative power is now a quiet area in the
constitutional landscape.39 In the face of the increasing complexity of the task of
the government and the increasing inability of the legislature to cope directly with
the many problems demanding its attention, resort to delegation of power, or
entrusting to administrative agencies the power of subordinate legislation, has
become imperative, as here.
suspicion. When persons suspected of committing a crime are charged, they are
singled out and are impleaded against their will. The persons thus charged, by
the bare fact of being haled before the prosecutor's office and peaceably
submitting themselves to drug testing, if that be the case, do not necessarily
consent to the procedure, let alone waive their right to privacy.40 To impose
mandatory drug testing on the accused is a blatant attempt to harness a medical
test as a tool for criminal prosecution, contrary to the stated objectives of RA
9165. Drug testing in this case would violate a persons' right to privacy
guaranteed under Sec. 2, Art. III of the Constitution. Worse still, the accused
persons are veritably forced to incriminate themselves.

WHEREFORE, the Court resolves to GRANT the petition in G.R. No. 161658 and
declares Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and COMELEC Resolution No. 6486 as
UNCONSTITUTIONAL;

************ ROMERO II VS ESTRADA CASE**************


https://www.scribd.com/doc/232416343/Romero-v-Estrada

************NERI VS SENATE CASE


ANTONIO BENGSON III, petitioner, vs. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL
TRIBUNAL and TEODORO C. CRUZ, respondents.
DECISION
KAPUNAN, J.:
The citizenship of respondent Teodoro C. Cruz is at issue in this case, in view of
the constitutional requirement that "no person shall be a Member of the House of
Representatives unless he is a natural-born citizen.Respondent Cruz was a
natural-born citizen of the Philippines. He was born in San Clemente, Tarlac, on
April 27, 1960, of Filipino parents. The fundamental law then applicable was the
1935 Constitution. On November 5, 1985, however, respondent Cruz enlisted in
the United States Marine Corps and, without the consent of the Republic of the
Philippines, took an oath of allegiance to the United States. As a consequence, he
lost his Filipino citizenship for under Commonwealth Act No. 63, Section 1(4), a
Filipino citizen may lose his citizenship by, among others, "rendering service to or
accepting commission in the armed forces of a foreign country." Said provision of
law reads:Section 1. How citizenship may be lost. -- A Filipino citizen may lose his
citizenship in any of the following ways and/or events:(4) By rendering services
to, or accepting commission in, the armed forces of a foreign country: (a) The
Republic of the Philippines has a defensive and/or offensive pact of alliance with
said foreign country; or(b) The said foreign country maintains armed forces on
Philippine territory with the consent of the Republic of the Philippines: Whatever
doubt that remained regarding his loss of Philippine citizenship was erased by his
naturalization as a U.S. citizen on June 5, 1990, in connection with his service in
the U.S. Marine Corps.On March 17, 1994, respondent Cruz reacquired his
Philippine citizenship through repatriation under Republic Act No. 2630.[3] He ran
for and was elected as the Representative of the Second District of Pangasinan in
the May 11, 1998 elections. He won by a convincing margin of 26,671 votes over
petitioner Antonio Bengson III, who was then running for reelection. respondent
House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) claiming that respondent Cruz
was not qualified to become a member of the House of Representatives since he

is not a natural-born citizen as required under Article VI, Section 6 of the


Constitution.Petitioner thus filed the present petition for certiorari assailing the
HRET's decision on the following grounds:
The issue now before us is whether respondent Cruz, a natural-born Filipino who
became an American citizen, can still be considered a natural-born Filipino upon
his reacquisition of Philippine citizenship.Petitioner asserts that respondent Cruz
may no longer be considered a natural-born Filipino since he lost his Philippine
citizenship when he swore allegiance to the United States in 1995, and had to
reacquire the same by repatriation. He insists that Article IV, Section 2 of the
Constitution expressly states that natural-born citizens are those who are citizens
from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect such
citizenship.Respondent on the other hand contends that he reacquired his status
as a natural-born citizen when he was repatriated since the phrase "from birth" in
Article IV, Section 2 refers to the innate, inherent and inborn characteristic of
being a natural-born citizen.
The petition is without merit.
The 1987 Constitution enumerates who are Filipino citizens as follows:
(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of this
Constitution;
(2) Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines;
(3) Those born before January 17, 1973 of Filipino mothers, who elect Philippine
citizenship upon reaching the age of majority, and
(4) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.
There are two ways of acquiring citizenship: (1) by birth, and (2) by
naturalization. These ways of acquiring citizenship correspond to the two kinds of
citizens: the natural-born citizen, and the naturalized citizen. A person who at the
time of his birth is a citizen of a particular country, is a natural-born citizen
thereof.[9]
As defined in the same Constitution, natural-born citizens "are those citizens of
the Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect
his Philippine citizenship."[10]
On the other hand, naturalized citizens are those who have become Filipino
citizens through naturalization, generally under Commonwealth Act No. 473,
otherwise known as the Revised Naturalization Law, which repealed the former
Naturalization Law (Act No. 2927), and by Republic Act No. 530.[11] To be
naturalized, an applicant has to prove that he possesses all the qualifications[12]
and none of the disqualifications[13] provided by law to become a Filipino citizen.
The decision granting Philippine citizenship becomes executory only after two (2)
years from its promulgation when the court is satisfied that during the intervening
period, the applicant has (1) not left the Philippines; (2) has dedicated himself to
a lawful calling or profession; (3) has not been convicted of any offense or
violation of Government promulgated rules; or (4) committed any act prejudicial

to the interest of the nation or contrary to any Government announced


policies.[14]
Filipino citizens who have lost their citizenship may however reacquire the same
in the manner provided by law. Commonwealth Act. No. 63 (C.A. No. 63),
enumerates the three modes by which Philippine citizenship may be reacquired by
a former citizen: (1) by naturalization, (2) by repatriation, and (3) by direct act of
Congress.[15]
Naturalization is a mode for both acquisition and reacquisition of Philippine
citizenship. As a mode of initially acquiring Philippine citizenship, naturalization is
governed by Commonwealth Act No. 473, as amended. On the other hand,
naturalization as a mode for reacquiring Philippine citizenship is governed by
Commonwealth Act No. 63.[16] Under this law, a former Filipino citizen who
wishes to reacquire Philippine citizenship must possess certain qualifications[17]
and none of the disqualifications mentioned in Section 4 of C.A. 473.[18]
Repatriation, on the other hand, may be had under various statutes by those who
lost their citizenship due to: (1) desertion of the armed forces;[19] (2) service in
the armed forces of the allied forces in World War II;[20] (3) service in the Armed
Forces of the United States at any other time;[21] (4) marriage of a Filipino
woman to an alien;[22] and (5) political and economic necessity.[23]
As distinguished from the lengthy process of naturalization, repatriation simply
consists of the taking of an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines
and registering said oath in the Local Civil Registry of the place where the person
concerned resides or last resided.Moreover, repatriation results in the recovery
of the original nationality.[26] This means that a naturalized Filipino who lost
his citizenship will be restored to his prior status as a naturalized Filipino citizen.
On the other hand, if he was originally a natural-born citizen before he lost his
Philippine citizenship, he will be restored to his former status as a natural-born
Filipino.
In respondent Cruz's case, he lost his Filipino citizenship when he rendered
service in the Armed Forces of the United States. However, he subsequently
reacquired Philippine citizenship under R.A. No. 2630, which provides:
Section 1. Any person who had lost his Philippine citizenship by rendering service
to, or accepting commission in, the Armed Forces of the United States, or after
separation from the Armed Forces of the United States, acquired United States
citizenship, may reacquire Philippine citizenship by taking an oath of allegiance to
the Republic of the Philippines and registering the same with Local Civil Registry
in the place where he resides or last resided in the Philippines. The said oath of
allegiance shall contain a renunciation of any other citizenship.
Having thus taken the required oath of allegiance to the Republic and having
registered the same in the Civil Registry of Magantarem, Pangasinan in
accordance with the aforecited provision, respondent Cruz is deemed to have
recovered his original status as a natural-born citizen, a status which he acquired
at birth as the son of a Filipino father.[27] It bears stressing that the act of

repatriation allows him to recover, or return to, his original status before he
lost his Philippine citizenship.
Petitioner's contention that respondent Cruz is no longer a natural-born citizen
since he had to perform an act to regain his citizenship is untenable. As correctly
explained by the HRET in its decision, the term "natural-born citizen" was first
defined in Article III, Section 4 of the 1973 Constitution as follows:
Sec. 4. A natural-born citizen is one who is a citizen of the Philippines from birth
without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect his Philippine citizenship.
Two requisites must concur for a person to be considered as such: (1) a person
must be a Filipino citizen from birth and (2) he does not have to perform any act
to obtain or perfect his Philippine citizenship.
Under the 1973 Constitution definition, there were two categories of Filipino
citizens which were not considered natural-born: (1) those who were naturalized
and (2) those born before January 17, 1973,[28] of Filipino mothers who, upon
reaching the age of majority, elected Philippine citizenship. Those "naturalized
citizens" were not considered natural-born obviously because they were not
Filipinos at birth and had to perform an act to acquire Philippine citizenship. Those
born of Filipino mothers before the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution were
likewise not considered natural-born because they also had to perform an act to
perfect their Philippine citizenship.
The present Constitution, however, now considers those born of Filipino mothers
before the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution and who elected Philippine
citizenship upon reaching the majority age as natural-born. After defining who are
natural-born citizens, Section 2 of Article IV adds a sentence: "Those who elect
Philippine citizenship in accordance with paragraph (3), Section 1 hereof shall be
deemed natural-born citizens." Consequently, only naturalized Filipinos are
considered not natural-born citizens. It is apparent from the enumeration of who
are citizens under the present Constitution that there are only two classes of
citizens: (1) those who are natural-born and (2) those who are naturalized in
accordance with law. A citizen who is not a naturalized Filipino, i.e., did not have
to undergo the process of naturalization to obtain Philippine citizenship,
necessarily is a natural-born Filipino. Noteworthy is the absence in said
enumeration of a separate category for persons who, after losing Philippine
citizenship, subsequently reacquire it. The reason therefor is clear: as to such
persons, they would either be natural-born or naturalized depending on the
reasons for the loss of their citizenship and the mode prescribed by the applicable
law for the reacquisition thereof. As respondent Cruz was not required by law to
go through naturalization proceedings in order to reacquire his citizenship, he is
perforce a natural-born Filipino. As such, he possessed all the necessary
qualifications to be elected as member of the House of Representatives.A final
point. The HRET has been empowered by the Constitution to be the "sole judge"
of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the members
of the House.[29] The Court's jurisdiction over the HRET is merely to check
"whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or

excess of jurisdiction" on the part of the latter.[30] In the absence thereof, there
is no occasion for the Court to exercise its corrective power and annul the
decision of the HRET nor to substitute the Court's judgment for that of the latter
for the simple reason that it is not the office of a petition for certiorari to inquire
into the correctness of the assailed decision.[31] There is no such showing of
grave abuse of discretion in this case.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED.

BENGSON VS. HRET AND CRUZ


~ vbdiaz
BENGSON vs. HRET and CRUZ
G.R. No. 142840
May 7, 2001
FACTS: The citizenship of respondent Cruz is at issue in this case, in view of the
constitutional requirement that no person shall be a Member of the House of
Representatives unless he is a natural-born citizen.
Cruz was a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. He was born in Tarlac in 1960
of Filipino parents. In 1985, however, Cruz enlisted in the US Marine Corps and
without the consent of the Republic of the Philippines, took an oath of allegiance
to the USA. As a Consequence, he lost his Filipino citizenship for under CA No. 63
[(An Act Providing for the Ways in Which Philippine Citizenship May Be Lost or
Reacquired (1936)] section 1(4), a Filipino citizen may lose his citizenship by,
among other, rendering service to or accepting commission in the armed forces
of a foreign country.
Whatever doubt that remained regarding his loss of Philippine citizenship was
erased by his naturalization as a U.S. citizen in 1990, in connection with his
service in the U.S. Marine Corps.
In 1994, Cruz reacquired his Philippine citizenship through repatriation under RA
2630 [(An Act Providing for Reacquisition of Philippine Citizenship by Persons Who
Lost Such Citizenship by Rendering Service To, or Accepting Commission In, the
Armed Forces of the United States (1960)]. He ran for and was elected as the
Representative of the 2nd District of Pangasinan in the 1998 elections. He won
over petitioner Bengson who was then running for reelection.
Subsequently, petitioner filed a case for Quo Warranto Ad Cautelam with
respondent HRET claiming that Cruz was not qualified to become a member of the
HOR since he is not a natural-born citizen as required under Article VI, section 6
of the Constitution.
HRET rendered its decision dismissing the petition for quo warranto and declaring
Cruz the duly elected Representative in the said election.

ISSUE: WON Cruz, a natural-born Filipino who became an American citizen, can
still be considered a natural-born Filipino upon his reacquisition of Philippine
citizenship.
HELD: petition dismissed
YES
Filipino citizens who have lost their citizenship may however reacquire the same
in the manner provided by law. C.A. No. 63 enumerates the 3 modes by which
Philippine citizenship may be reacquired by a former citizen:
1. by naturalization,
2. by repatriation, and
3. by direct act of Congress.
**
Repatriation may be had under various statutes by those who lost their citizenship
due to:
1. desertion of the armed forces;
2. services in the armed forces of the allied forces in World War II;
3. service in the Armed Forces of the United States at any other time,
4. marriage of a Filipino woman to an alien; and
5. political economic necessity
Repatriation results in the recovery of the original nationality This means that a
naturalized Filipino who lost his citizenship will be restored to his prior status as a
naturalized Filipino citizen. On the other hand, if he was originally a natural-born
citizen before he lost his Philippine citizenship, he will be restored to his former
status as a natural-born Filipino.
R.A. No. 2630 provides:
Sec 1. Any person who had lost his Philippine citizenship by rendering service to,
or accepting commission in, the Armed Forces of the United States, or after
separation from the Armed Forces of the United States, acquired United States
citizenship, may reacquire Philippine citizenship by taking an oath of allegiance to
the Republic of the Philippines and registering the same with Local Civil Registry
in the place where he resides or last resided in the Philippines. The said oath of
allegiance shall contain a renunciation of any other citizenship.
Having thus taken the required oath of allegiance to the Republic and having
registered the same in the Civil Registry of Magantarem, Pangasinan in
accordance with the aforecited provision, Cruz is deemed to have recovered his
original status as a natural-born citizen, a status which he acquired at birth as the
son of a Filipino father. It bears stressing that the act of repatriation allows him to
recover, or return to, his original status before he lost his Philippine citizenship.