Before
Lynch, Chief Judge,
Torruella and Howard, Circuit Judges.
Leon A. Blais, with whom Blais & Parent, was on brief for
appellant.
Jeffrey S. Michaelson, with whom Michaelson & Michaelson, was
on brief for appellees.
February 3, 2015
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TORRUELLA,
Circuit
Judge.
Plaintiff-Appellant
Joe
Klunder was removed from Brown University1 and suspended for three
semesters after a number of students and staff submitted complaints
regarding Klunder's behavior.
eleven-count
complaint
Brown
individuals
associated
against
with
(collectively, "Appellees").
are
allegations
proceeding
and
that
his
Brown
and
its
and
police
numerous
department
Appellees'
removal
University
handling
from
campus
of
his
disciplinary
violated
both
his
finding that Brown University was not a state actor subject to suit
under 42 U.S.C. 1983; (2) allowing Appellees' motion to amend
their answer to include a statute of limitations defense; and (3)
ignoring a Rhode Island tolling statute which would have brought
Klunder's
claims
limitations.
within
the
applicable
three-year
statute
of
affirm.
I.
A.
Background
Factual background
In the fall of 2003, Klunder traveled from his family
conservative
upbringing
in
California
and
the
liberal
were
having
"man
trouble."
Klunder
then
reportedly
her second run-in with Klunder, who had made inappropriate comments
on the previous occasion as well.
After receiving these complaints, Associate Dean of
Student Life Terry Addison wrote to Klunder to notify him that the
complaints would be the subject of a hearing upon Klunder's return
to campus in the fall of 2005.
He eventually
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control
himself
if
disturbed
by
noisy
students
again.
He
diminished
capacity
to
avoid
serious
criminal
charges.
Klunder informed the group that he had repeatedly "beat the shit"
out of his father, and he proceeded to advise the students that if
they shot someone in California, they should do it on their own
property, or drag the body there after the fact, in order to get a
reduced punishment.
After receiving these additional complaints, Dean Addison
sent Klunder a second notice saying that new complaints had been
received and that an investigation would take place.
At the same
Dean Addison
-6-
where
he
provided
with
non-lawyer
advisor
to
He
Vice President
Procedural background
On
October
5,
2010,
Klunder
filed
an
eleven-count
Because
Appellees
had
overlooked
the
statute
of
-8-
IX,
which
alleged
false
arrest
and
false
imprisonment,
his
breach
of
contract
claim,
reasoning
that
Klunder's
allegations were not properly supported and that Klunder had failed
to demonstrate entitlement to relief.
As to Klunder's remaining
district
court
denied
Klunder's
motion
for
-9-
II.
A.
Discussion
We review
"We will affirm only if the record, so viewed, discloses that there
is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law."
Santiago v.
Estades-
"In other
Id.
Under this
encouragement,
either
overt
or
covert,
that
the
Id. (alterations in
original) (quoting Bass v. Parkwood Hosp., 180 F.3d 234, 242 (5th
Cir. 1999)).
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Black's Law
State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 69 (1989); see also Trs. of Dartmouth
Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 524, 657, 701 (1819)
(finding that Dartmouth College was a private corporation despite
being defined in its charter as a "body corporate and politic").
303
(R.I.
1896)
(stating
that
corporation
is
body
politic).
While we assume arguendo that a body politic may be a
state actor, we agree with the district court that the designation
is not determinative but rather that "the facts and circumstances
particular to the specific corporate entity" determine whether a
corporate body politic is a private corporation or a state actor
subject to federal jurisdiction under 1983. See also Kennelly v.
Kent
Cnty.
Water
Auth.,
89
A.2d
188,
191
(R.I.
1952)
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effective
to
clothe
the
Authority
with
the
distinguishing
the
exclusive
prerogative
of
the
State,"
thus
with
Amendments
Notes
(1945),
available
at
http://www.brown.edu/about/administration/corporation/sites/brown
.edu.about.administration.corporation/files/uploads/charter-of-br
own-university.pdf (hereinafter "Brown's Charter").
Education,
See Rendell-Baker
v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 842 (1982) (holding that the education of
maladjusted high school students, although a public function, is
not the exclusive prerogative of the state); Berros v. Inter Am.
Univ., 535 F.2d 1330, 1333 (1st Cir. 1976) ("Higher education is
not generally regarded as exclusively a function 'traditionally
associated with sovereignty.'"); cf. City of Pawtucket v. Sundlun,
662 A.2d 40, 50 (R.I. 1995) ("It is thus clear that the General
Assembly's plenary and exclusive power over public education in
-14-
Rhode Island has not changed since the adoption of the State
Constitution in 1842." (emphasis added)).
And
while
Klunder
focuses
on
Brown's
authority
to
Colony,
literature."
for
promoting
See id. at 8.
the
liberal
arts
and
universal
id.
at
13-14,
instruction
this
and
ability
government
is
of
limited
said
to
College
"the
or
Coll.,
17
U.S.
at
631-32,
636,
638
(finding
Cf.
that
-15-
without
governmental
internal administration.
interference
in
the
schools'
Rule
11
interferes
with
autonomous
decisionmaking
by
also
Zelman
v.
Simmons-Harris,
536
U.S.
639,
701
n.9
See Krohn v.
Harvard Law Sch., 552 F.2d 21, 24 (1st Cir. 1977) (finding that the
receipt of state financial assistance, the regulation by a public
accreditation council, and the authority of that council to oversee
disciplinary procedures "were insufficient attributes of government
involvement to render the university's disciplinary proceedings
'state action' for section 1983 purposes"); see also Doe v. Heck,
327 F.3d 492, 523 (7th Cir. 2003) ("The right of parents to
discipline their children . . . preclude[s] state officials from
interfering with the right of parents . . . to delegate the
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authority
to
[discipline
their
children]
to
private
school
officials . . . ."); Albert v. Carovano, 851 F.2d 561, 571 (2d Cir.
1988) ("Hamilton's decision to suspend the appellants 'ultimately
turn[ed] on . . . [a] judgment made by [a] private part[y]
according to professional standards that were not established by
the state.'
neither
private
education,
corporate
self-
years
--
Brown
cannot
be
classified
as
private
party
With no action
See id. at 4
In
-17-
Finding
552
F.2d
at
23.
Like
Harvard's
relationship
with
("one
body
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On appeal, Klunder
the answer was properly amended, his claims were not time barred
due to the tolling provision in Rhode Island General Laws section
9-1-18.
We
review
the
district
court's
decision
to
grant
Interstate Litho
That decision
Jurez v.
Select Portfolio Servicing, Inc., 708 F.3d 269, 276 (1st Cir. 2013)
(quoting Hatch v. Dep't for Children, 274 F.3d 12, 19 (1st Cir.
2001)).
Rule 15 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure governs
amendments to pleadings, and it instructs courts to "freely give
leave" to amend.
explained,
In the absence of any apparent or declared
reason -- such as undue delay, bad faith or
dilatory motive on the part of the movant,
repeated failure to cure deficiencies by
amendments previously allowed, undue prejudice
to the opposing party by virtue of allowance
of the amendment, futility of amendment, etc.
-- the leave sought should, as the rules
require, be "freely given."
Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962); see also Interstate Litho
Corp., 255 F.3d at 25; Acosta-Mestre v. Hilton Int'l of P.R., Inc.,
156 F.3d 49, 51 (1st Cir. 1998).
We find no error in the district court's decision to
permit the amendment.
See, e.g.,
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prejudice
to
resulting
from
re-opening
of
Though he
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explain how.
At the time the motion to amend was filed, discovery was ongoing.
Klunder had only taken two depositions, and subsequently took
others, and thus had ample opportunity -- almost two months -- to
explore the statute of limitations question. Additionally, nothing
prevented
afforded
Klunder
to
all
from
utilizing
litigants
--
the
various
discovery
interrogatories,
tools
requests
for
That
Rule
15's
liberal
policy
and
the
lack
of
2.
587
F.3d
43,
46
(1st
Cir.
2009);
Lpez-Gonzlez
v.
54
adopted
Id. at 851.
It
to
explained
substituted
that
if
service,"
"defendant
the
statute
other
interpretation
Id.
"would
is
amendable
does
not
apply
suit
and
by
the
permit
the
unnecessary
and
Id. at
851-52.
Under
this
numerous reasons.
plaintiffs.
framework,
Klunder's
argument
fails
for
See id.
Rhode Island at the time the causes of action accrued (and indeed
he very likely may have been one), there is no evidence in the
record to support (or reject) this contention.
The burden is on
See Kelly v.
Marcantonio, 187 F.3d 192, 198 (1st Cir. 1999) ("[P]laintiffappellants bear the burden of proving the applicability of the
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tolling provisions contained in [R.I. Gen. Laws] 9-1-19 and 9-120."); Bonilla-Avils v. Southmark San Juan, Inc., 992 F.2d 391,
393 (1st Cir. 1993) ("Since the plaintiffs have the burden to
support their claim that the statute was tolled, their failure to
introduce into the record the letters upon which they based that
claim was fatal to that claim.").
See
all Appellees were served and appeared before the district court
without any difficulty.
He did
are
time
barred,
and
the
Klunder's claims,
district
court
properly
III.
Conclusion
Brown
neither
its
ability
to
enact
internal
statutes
and
Additionally,
the district court did not abuse its discretion in granting Brown's
motion to amend its answer to include a statute of limitations
defense in light of the lack of demonstrable prejudice to Klunder.
Having been properly added to Brown's answer, the defense bars
Klunder's claims, as they were filed outside of Rhode Island's
three-year statute of limitations and Rhode Island General Laws
section 9-1-18 is inapplicable to toll the claims.
AFFIRMED.
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