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490 F.3d 27
BOWEN INVESTMENT, INC., Plaintiff, Appellant,Honey Dew Associates, Inc., Plaintiff,v.CARNEIRO DONUTS, INC. and Manuel M. Carneiro,Defendants, Appellees.
 No. 06-2100.
United States Court of Appeals, First Circuit.
 Heard April 5, 2007. Decided June 12, 2007.
Jack J. Mikels, with whom Michael A. Wirtz, and Jack Mikels &Associates, LLP, was on brief, for appellant.Kevin R. McCarthy, for appellees.Before LIPEZ, Circuit Judge, TASHIMA,
*
 Senior Circuit Judge, andHOWARD, Circuit Judge.HOWARD, Circuit Judge.1The plaintiffs, Honey Dew Associates, Inc. and Bowen Investments, Inc., werethe franchisors of the defendants, Carneiro Donuts, Inc. (CDI) and its owner,Manuel Carneiro. The plaintiffs sued the defendants in the District of Massachusetts for breach of their franchise agreement. Honey Dew also suedthe defendants for trademark infringement. The defendants counterclaimed,asserting,
inter alia,
 breach of contract, fraud, and a violation of Mass. Gen.Laws ch. 93A. After a jury trial, the plaintiffs prevailed on their claims and thedefendants were unsuccessful on their counterclaims.
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 The jury awarded the plaintiffs $11,944.26 on the breach of contract claim and Honey Dew Donuts$1 on the trademark infringement claim.2After the jury verdict, the plaintiffs moved for an award of attorney's fees pursuant to a provision in the parties' franchise agreement that provided that the breaching party would be responsible for costs incurred in enforcing the
 
agreement, including "reasonable attorney's fees." The district court denied themotion because the plaintiffs were only "marginally victorious," in the light of the small amount of damages awarded. The district court then entered a final judgment against CDI in the amounts awarded by the jury. Almost six monthslater, the plaintiffs moved to correct the judgment, pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P.60(a), to have Carneiro added as jointly and severally liable for damages on thecontract claim. The district court denied the motion, concluding that Carneirohad been intentionally omitted from the claims and the judgment. Bowenappeals, challenging the denial of its Rule 60(a) motion and its request for attorney's fees. We consider these challenges in turn.3Bowen claims that the judgment accidentally omitted Carneiro as a partyresponsible for the breach of contract damages. It acknowledges that the verdictform submitted to the jury identified CDI as the only defendant on the contractclaim but maintain that this was done based on an understanding that, if the jury found for the plaintiffs, Carneiro would be held jointly and severally liablefor the contract damages.4The defendants assert that the plaintiffs' motion was properly denied because itwas untimely. They claim that, while the plaintiffs styled their motion as arequest for relief under Rule 60(a), which can be filed at any time after  judgment enters, the motion was, in fact, a motion for the amendment of the judgment, under Fed. R.Civ.P. 59(e), which must be filed within ten days of the judgment's entry.
See Garcia-Velazquez v. Frito Lay Snacks Caribbean,
 358F.3d 6, 9 (1st Cir.2004). The defendants also claim that, even if the motion was properly filed under Rule 60(a), it was correctly denied because the omission of Carneiro from the judgment was not a clerical mistake or omission.5Rule 60(a) provides that "clerical mistakes in judgments ... arising fromoversight or omission may be corrected by the court at any time...." A motionunder this rule is appropriate where the "the judgment failed to reflect thecourt's intention."
 Morgan Guar. Trust Co. v. Third Nat'l Bank,
 545 F.2d 758,759-60 (1st Cir. 1976). It does not, however, provide for the correction of "thedeliberate choice of the district judge."
 Elias v. Ford Motor Co.,
 734 F.2d 463,466 (1st Cir.1984). As the Fifth Circuit has explained6The relevant test for the applicability of Rule 60(a) is whether the changeaffects substantive rights of the parties . . . or is instead a clerical, or a copyingor computational mistake, which is correctable under the Rule. As long as theintentions of the parties are clearly defined and all the court need do is employthe judicial eraser to obliterate a mechanical or mathematical mistake, themodification will be allowed. If, on the other hand, cerebration or research into
 
the law or planetary excursions into the facts is required, Rule 60(a) will not beavailable.7
 In re W. Tex. Marktg. Corp.,
 12 F.3d 497, 504-05 (5th Cir.1994).8Here, Bowen contends that there was an understanding that Carneiro wouldappear in the judgment as jointly and severally responsible for the breach of contract damages. Rule 60(a) is properly employed where "the intention toinclude a particular provision in the judgment was clear, but the judge neglectedto include the provision." 11 Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller & MaryKay Kane,
 Federal Practice & Procedure,
 § 2854 (2d ed.1995). This is precisely the plaintiffs' assertion, and therefore they correctly brought their motion under Rule 60(a).9The district court's denial of a Rule 60(a) motion on the merits is reviewed for an abuse of discretion.
See In re Walter,
 282 F.3d 434, 440 (6th Cir.2002). Thedistrict court concluded that the plaintiffs were incorrect in their belief thatthere was an understanding that Carneiro would be included in the judgmentand that, in fact, he was intentionally omitted. The record amply supports thisruling.10The jury charge conference between the parties and the court is not reasonablysusceptible to Bowen's interpretation. At the conference, the plaintiffs stressedtheir desire to avoid having Carneiro receive damages if defendants prevailedon their contract counterclaim because CDI was the only franchisee. Defensecounsel then argued the inequity of requiring Carneiro to remain potentiallyliable on the plaintiffs' contract claim but not being able to collect on thecounterclaim. The plaintiffs responded that they desired joint and severalliability for Carneiro because CDI was defunct and therefore could not pay onany judgment. The district court then gave the plaintiffs the following choiceregarding the contract claims: "[Carneiro]'s either going to be in for everythingor out of everything.... Which is your request?" The plaintiffs' counsel replied"Out." There was no further discussion of the matter.
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11If the court's expressed words were not enough to resolve this matter against the plaintiffs, the other evidence also supports the conclusion that Carneiro was notaccidentally omitted from the judgment. The verdict form included Carneiro asa defendant on the trademark claim, and his continued presence in that capacitycasts doubt on the plaintiffs' assertion that he was removed from the contractcount solely to simplify matters for the jury and not because he was beingeliminated entirely from the contract claim. Moreover, any remaining

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