No. 12-1694
MANUEL RUIZ-SNCHEZ ET AL.,
Plaintiffs, Appellants,
v.
THE GOODYEAR TIRE & RUBBER COMPANY,
Defendant, Appellee.
Before
Lynch, Chief Judge,
Torruella and Selya, Circuit Judges.
Nearly
year
later,
he reversed
The plaintiff
direction and
The
The
to
answer
prematurely
the
vexing
-2-
question
of
statutory
BACKGROUND
"Because this case was decided below on a motion to
general manager.
On April 7, 2009, Goodyear's human resources manager,
Emily Baranek, signaled the end of the plaintiff's long career when
she informed Kelly Springfield's work force that the plant would
cease operations at month's end.
-3-
The
arrangement
constructed
forty-five
day
window
within which an employee could "review and consider" the offer and
the release.
In
In the same
inquiry
was
apparently
prompted
by
the
fact
that
some
Baranek responded
verbally;
severance
she
rejected
the
more
munificent
payment
April
30
(the
day
that
the
plant
closed),
the
The seven-day
-4-
contention.
prejudice.
This
timely
appeal
ensued.
In
it,
the
plaintiff
ANALYSIS
The district court's dismissal of the Law 80 claim
-5-
We normally
This
issue
of
whether
the
release,
which
was
annexed
to
the
-6-
Rico
law
generally
allows
for
release
or
See P.R.
Laws Ann. tit. 31, 4821; see also id. 4 ("Rights granted by the
laws [of Puerto Rico] may be renounced, provided such renunciation
be not contrary to law, to public interest or public order, or
prejudicial to the interest of a third person.").
The type of
S.E.,
1995
P.R.-Eng.
(1995).
validly
Citibank v.
Dependable Ins. Co., 21 P.R. Offic. Trans. 496, 505-06 (1988). The
release at issue here satisfies these prerequisites.
With respect to the first prerequisite, the termination
of the plaintiff's employment necessarily created an uncertain
legal relationship.
surrounds
the
non-consensual
termination
of
employment
release
manifests
uncertainties.
an
obvious
intent
to
eliminate
those
In this
claims that he may have had arising out of the aborted employment
relationship; Goodyear agreed to give the plaintiff a severance
payment to which he otherwise may not have been entitled.
-8-
Indeed, the
In the same
-9-
of
the
"duress"
argument
are
afforded
only
We have said
brings
us
to
the
much
harder
question
that
stating that:
The right of an employee who is discharged
from his employment without just cause, to
receive the compensation provided in 185a of
this
title, is
hereby
declared to
be
unwaiveable.
Any contract or part thereof in which the
employee waives the compensation to which he
is entitled to, pursuant to 185a-185m of
this title, shall be null and void.
P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 29, 185i.
are
the
Generally
at-will
contours
speaking,
employees
of
that
Law
80
who
-10-
are
relationship
requires
discharged
readily
employers
without
to
just
cause.2
Id. 185a.
Cir.
2009).
Section
185b
describes
the
reasons
that
If an employee
protect
at-will
employees
from
"the
inequality
To
of
185i
provides
that
an
employee
may
not
waive
the
an
agreement
litigation."
posttermination
in
order
to
avoid
the court held that the anti-waiver provision did not override the
release executed by the plaintiff.
Id. at 228-29.
Because the
Id.; see
considerations,
see,
e.g.,
id.
point
in
different
directions.
On the one hand, it is evident that Law 80 was designed
to provide economic protection from the ravages of arbitrary
dismissals; and the text of section 185i contains no distinction
between prospective waivers and waivers of previously accrued
claims.
By
like
token,
section
185i's
reference
to
"[a]ny
the
other
hand,
of
these
conclusions
is
none
distinction
between
prospective
waivers
and
waivers
of
On
at least one other occasion when the Puerto Rico legislature sought
to limit the availability of extrajudicial compromises, it did so
explicitly.
-13-
enacting Law 80, did not intend to interfere with the rights of
employers and employees to settle previously accrued claims through
extrajudicial compromises.
The short of it is that the push and pull of these
competing centrifugal and centripetal forces muddy the waters as to
how the
Puerto
Rico
legislature
intended
section
185i
to
be
See Acadia
Ins. Co. v. McNeil, 116 F.3d 599, 605 (1st Cir. 1997) ("[W]hen the
meaning of a state law depends on the decisionmaker's ability to
discern the state legislature's intent from an array of mixed
signals, considerations of federalism, comity, and practicality
suggest that the state's highest tribunal is best positioned to
make an informed and authoritative judgment.").
-14-
into
the
difficult
interpretive
question
about
the
In its
of
this
case.
It
rested
this
contention
on
believe that the wisest and most practical course is to vacate the
order dismissing the Law 80 claim and remand so that the parties
may undertake the further factual development necessary to inform
a decision as to whether Law 80 applies.
with that question, the court can certify it to the Supreme Court of Puerto
Rico.
See P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 32, app. III, Rule 53.1(f); P.R. Sup. Ct.
CONCLUSION
We need go no further. For the reasons elucidated above,
No costs.
majority's result and its reasoning that we need not reach the
question of law regarding waiver of appellant's Law 80 claim.
However, I concur to briefly note my disagreement with
the majority's conclusion that Section 185i -- Law 80's anti-waiver
provision -- is ambiguous.
of
an
employee's
Law
80
rights
to
compensation,
Further,
the
right
that
"is
hereby
declared
to
be
that "any" contract waiving the right to compensation due under Law
80 shall be null and void.
includes
all
contracts
its
scope,
rejecting
any
-17-