TESTIMONIAL PRIVILEGE

that the obvious object of the subpoena was to badger her into admitting that
she was Emma Lees mother

G.R. No. 177861 July 13, 2010

* CA: set aside RTCs order;

IN RE: PETITION FOR CANCELLATION AND CORRECTION OF ENTRIES

IN THE RECORD OF BIRTH,

ISSUE: WON to compel Tiu Chuan (Emma Lees stepmother) to testify would
be a violation of Section 25, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, the rule on
parental privilege?

EMMA K. LEE, Petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, RITA K. LEE,

LEONCIO K. LEE, LUCIA K. LEE-ONG, JULIAN K. LEE, MARTIN K. LEE,
ROSA LEE-VANDERLEK, MELODY LEE-CHIN, HENRY K. LEE,
NATIVIDAD LEE-MIGUEL, VICTORIANO K. LEE, and THOMAS K. LEE,
represented by RITA K. LEE, as Attorney-in-Fact, Respondents.

Ruling: NO. Tiu Chuan can be compelled to testify against Petitioner Emma
Lee.

Facts:

Tiu claimed before the trial court the right not to testify against her
stepdaughter, petitioner Emma Lee, invoking Section 25, Rule 130 of the
Rules of Evidence, which reads:

* Spouses Lee Tek Sheng (Lee) and Keh Shiok Cheng (Keh) entered the
Philippines in the 1930s as immigrants from China. They had 11 children,
collectively called herein as the Lee-Keh children.

SECTION 25. Parental and filial privilege.- No person may be compelled to

testify against his parents, other direct ascendants, children or other direct
descendants.

* In 1948, Lee brought from China a young woman named Tiu Chuan (Tiu),
supposedly to serve as housemaid. The respondent Lee-Keh children believe
that Tiu left the Lee-Keh household, moved into another property of Lee
nearby, and had a relation with him.

The above is an adaptation from a similar provision in Article 315 of the Civil
Code that applies only in criminal cases. But those who revised the Rules of
Civil Procedure chose to extend the prohibition to all kinds of actions,
whether civil, criminal, or administrative, filed against parents and other direct
ascendants or descendants.

* Shortly after Keh died in 1989, the Lee-Keh children learned that Tius
children with Lee (collectively, the Lees other children) claimed that they, too,
were children of Lee and Keh. This prompted the Lee-Keh children to request
the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) to investigate the matter. After
conducting such an investigation, the NBI concluded in its report:
[I]t is very obvious that the mother of these 8 children is certainly not KEH
SHIOK CHENG, but a much younger woman, most probably TIU CHUAN.
Upon further evaluation and analysis by these Agents, LEE TEK SHENG is in
a quandary in fixing the age of KEH SHIOK CHENG possibly to conform with
his grand design of making his 8 children as their own legitimate children,
consequently elevating the status of his second family and secure their
future. The doctor lamented that this complaint would not have been
necessary had not the father and his second family kept on insisting that the
8 children are the legitimate children of KEH SHIOK CHENG.1
* The NBI found, for example, that in the hospital records, the eldest of the
Lees other children, Marcelo Lee (who was recorded as the 12th child of Lee
and Keh), was born of a 17-year-old mother, when Keh was already 38 years
old at the time. Another of the Lees other children, Mariano Lee, was born of
a 23-year-old mother, when Keh was then already 40 years old, and so forth.
In other words, by the hospital records of the Lees other children, Kehs
declared age did not coincide with her actual age when she supposedly gave
birth to such other children, numbering eight.
* On the basis of this report, the respondent Lee-Keh children filed two
separate petitions, a Special Proceeding C-1674 for the deletion from the
certificate of live birth of the petitioner Emma Lee, one of Lees other
children, the name Keh and replace the same with the name Tiu to indicate
her true mothers name.
* In April 2005 the Lee-Keh children filed with the RTC an ex parte request for
the issuance of a subpoena ad testificandum to compel Tiu, Emma Lees
presumed mother, to testify in the case. The RTC granted the motion but Tiu
moved to quash the subpoena, claiming that it was oppressive and violated
Section 25, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, the rule on parental privilege, she
being Emma Lees stepmother.3
* On August 5, 2005 the RTC quashed the subpoena it issued for being
unreasonable and oppressive considering that Tiu was already very old and

But here Tiu, who invokes the filial privilege, claims that she is the
stepmother of petitioner Emma Lee. The privilege cannot apply to them
because the rule applies only to "direct" ascendants and descendants, a
family tie connected by a common ancestry. A stepdaughter has no common
ancestry by her stepmother. Article 965 thus provides:
Art. 965. The direct line is either descending or ascending. The former unites
the head of the family with those who descend from him. The latter binds a
person with those from whom he descends.
Consequently, Tiu can be compelled to testify against petitioner Emma Lee.

ADMISSIONS AND CONFESSIONS

HEIRS OF PEDRO CLEMEA Y G.R. No. 155508
ZURBANO,
Petitioners, Present:
vs
HEIRS OF IRENE B. BIEN,
Respondents. Promulgated:

Facts:
* A tract of land about 20,644 square meters was one of three lots[2] involved
in two consolidated cases[3] for recovery of possession and ownership filed
in the 1940s
by respondents predecessor Irene Bien (through her attorney-in-fact
Gregorio Clemea) against petitioners predecessor Pedro Clemea y Zurbano.
* Irene Bien in her complaint averred that she acquired the parcel of land by
purchase from Victoriano Napa as per deed of sale in her favor x x x; and the

said Victoriano Napa in turn acquired the same by purchase from Francisco
Barrameda who also bought the said land from the administrator of the estate
of Pedro Clemea y Conde which sale had been duly authorized and
approved by this Honorable Court in Civil Case No. 3410-In re The Estate of
Pedro Clemea y Conde; that; defendant (Pedro Clemea Y Zurbano) ever
since he was removed as administrator of the Estate of Pedro Clemea y
Conde in the year 1939 deliberately continued to occupy and usurp the
possession and use of the above described parcel of land x x x, and has ever
since refused to relinquish the possession of the same to the lawful owner;
that by reason of this unlawful occupation and usurpation by the defendant,
the plaintiff will suffer damages and in fact has suffered damages beginning
this October 1943 harvest at the rate of 25cavans of palay per harvest or 50
cavans yearly.
* In his answer, Pedro Clemea y Zurbano alleged that the land was his and
that it was in his exclusive possession.[5] His claim of ownership was
similarly based on a sale by the estate of the late Pedro Clemea y Conde to
his predecessor-in-interest.
* Neither one of the original parties lived to see the end of the trial. Both
Plaintiff and Defendant dies. They were substituted by their heirs.

A judicial admission conclusively binds the party making it. He cannot

thereafter contradict it. The exception is found only in those rare instances
when the trial court, in the exercise of its discretion and because of strong
reasons to support its stand, may relieve a party from the consequences of
his admission.[19]
The rule was more forcibly stated by Mr. Justice Street in the 1918 decision
Ramirez v. Orientalist Co.:[22]
An admission made in a pleading can not be controverted by the party
making such admission; and all proof submitted by him contrary thereto or
inconsistent therewith should simply be ignored by the court, whether
objection is interposed by the opposite party or not.[23]
And in Cunanan v. Amparo,[24] the Court declared that:
the allegations, statements, or admissions contained in a pleading are
conclusive as against the pleader. A party cannot subsequently take a
position contrary to, or inconsistent with, his pleadings.[25]

* RTC ruled in a modified decision that the contending parties had failed to
prove their respective claims of ownership and therefore the land in question
still belonged to its original owner, the estate of the late Pedro Clemea y
Conde. RTC also stated that

Petitioners newly-contrived assertion that they were never in possession of

the land cannot hold up against these pronouncements. As substituting
defendants, they were bound by the admission of Pedro Clemea y Zurbano,
their predecessor in the litigation.[26] Without any showing that the admission
was made through palpable mistake or that no such admission was made,
petitioners cannot now contradict it.

since no damages having been proved, no award concerning is awarded

(sic).

Additional Notes:

* From that order, respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA). It was
docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 50912. In a decision dated April 4, 2002,[13]
the CA affirmed the RTCs resolution of the issues relating to the other two
parcels of land but reversed the ruling on the ownership of the land covered
by TD 5299. It proceeded to award respondents P118,000 in damages as
compensation for their having been deprived of possession and the owners
share in the harvest.
* Petitioners no longer dispute respondents ownership of the property
covered by TD 5299. They insist, however, that they cannot be held liable to
respondents for the harvest because (1) they never took possession of the
property declared in TD 5299 and (2) the evidence the CA relied on to
determine the amount of damages, proceeding as it did from one of the
plaintiffs, was self-serving and therefore could not have been a proper basis
for such an award.
Issue: WON the averment of Pedro Clemea y Zurbano (petitioners
predecessor) in his Answer constituted a judicial admission?
Ruling: YES

Self-serving evidence is not to be taken literally to mean any evidence that

serves its proponents interest.[29] The term, if used with any legal sense,
refers only to acts or declarations made by a party in his own interest at
some place and time out of court, and it does not include testimony that he
gives as a witness in court.[30] Evidence of this sort is excluded on the same
ground as any hearsay evidence, that is, lack of opportunity for crossexamination by the adverse party and on the consideration that its admission
would open the door to fraud and fabrication.[31] In contrast, a partys
testimony in court is sworn and subject to cross-examination by the other
party,[32] and therefore, not susceptible to an objection on the ground that it
is self-serving.

G.R. No. 180197 June 23, 2009

FRANCISCO N. VILLANUEVA, Petitioner, vs. VIRGILIO P. BALAGUER
and INTERCONTINENTAL BROADCASTING CORPORATION CHANNEL13, Respondents.
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

Petitioners contention that the land was never in their possession should be
dismissed outright for two reasons, both of them simple and rather obvious.

FACTS:

First, petitioners predecessor Pedro Clemea y Zurbano alleged in his answer

that the land declared in TD 5299 was in his exclusive possession.[16] That
statement, insofar as it confirmed the allegation in the complaint that
petitioners predecessor had retained possession of the land in question,[17]
took on the character of a judicial admission contemplated in Section 4, Rule
129 of the Rules of Court:

On March 31, 1992, petitioner Francisco N. Villanueva, then Assistant

Manager for Operations of Intercontinental Broadcasting CorporationChannel 13 (IBC-13) was dismissed from employment on the ground of loss
of confidence for purportedly selling forged certificates of performance.
Contesting his termination, petitioner filed a complaint for illegal dismissal
before the National Labor Relations Commission.

An admission, verbal or written, made by a party in the course of proceedings

in the same case, does not require proof. The admission may be contradicted
only by showing that it was made through palpable mistake or that no such
admission was made.[18]

During the pendency of the labor case, news articles about irregularities in
IBC-13 were published in the July 18, 1992 issue of the Manila Times and the
Philippine Star, and in the July 19, 1992 issue of the Manila Bulletin.

In these news articles, respondent Virgilio P. Balaguer, then President of IBC13, was quoted to have said that he uncovered various anomalies in IBC-13
during his tenure which led to the dismissal of an operations executive for
selling forged certificates of performance.
In a letter dated July 20, 1992, petitioner urged respondents to confirm or
deny if he was the person alluded to in the news article as the operations
executive of IBC-13 who was dismissed for selling forged certificates of
performance. None of the respondents replied to the letter.
On September 25, 1992, petitioner filed before the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City a complaint for damages against Balaguer. Petitioner claimed
that respondents caused the publication of the subject news articles which
defamed him by falsely and maliciously referring to him as the IBC-13
operations executive who sold forged certificates of performance. He alleged
that in causing these false and malicious publications, respondents violated
Articles 19, 20, 21, and 26 of the Civil Code.
Balaguer denied that he had anything to do with the publications. However,
he argued that the publications are not actionable because they are true and
without malice; are of legitimate public concern and interest because IBC-13
is under sequestration; that petitioner is a newsworthy and public figure; and
that they are privileged communication. Balaguer filed a counterclaim against
petitioner for alleged malicious filing of the civil case.
IBC-13 also denied participation in the publications. It claimed that assuming
press statements were issued during a press conference, the same was
done solely by Balaguer without its authority or sanction. IBC-13 also filed a
counterclaim against petitioner and a cross-claim against Balaguer.
On August 31, 1993, the Labor Arbiter rendered a Decision finding
petitioners dismissal as illegal, which was affirmed by the National Labor
Relations Commission. The Commission, however, declared respondents to
be acting in good faith, hence, it deleted the award of moral and exemplary
damages.
However, on October 29, 2003, the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City held
that petitioner is entitled to an award of damages.
Respondents moved for reconsideration but it was denied. Hence, they
appealed to the Court of Appeals which granted their appeal and reversed
the RTCs decision.
ISSUE:
(1) Whether or not the respondents failure to respond to the letter of the
petitioner constitutes admission on his part that he was the source of the said
defamatory news reports?
(2) Whether or not IBCs cross-claim against Balaguer is an admission
against the latter?
RULING:
The petition lacks merit.
(1) Our Rules of Court state that each party must prove his own affirmative
allegations and that the burden of proof lies on the party who would be
defeated if no evidence were given on either side. Thus, in civil cases, the
burden of proof is generally on the plaintiff, with respect to his complaint.

discharge his burden of proof. As such, the Court of Appeals properly

dismissed the complaint for damages.
Petitioner argues that by not responding to the letter which expressly urged
them to reply if the statements therein contained are untrue, respondents in
effect admitted the matters stated therein, pursuant to the rule on admission
by silence in Sec. 32, Rule 130, and the disputable presumption that
acquiescence resulted from a belief that the thing acquiesced in was
conformable to the law or fact.
Petitioners argument lacks merit. One cannot prove his claim by placing the
burden of proof on the other party. A failure to answer such adverse
assertions in the absence of further circumstances making an answer
requisite or natural has no effect as an admission."
Moreover, the rule on admission by silence applies to adverse statements in
writing if the party was carrying on a mutual correspondence with the
declarant. However, if there was no such mutual correspondence, the rule is
relaxed on the theory that while the party would have immediately reacted by
a denial if the statements were orally made in his presence, such prompt
response can generally not be expected if the party still has to resort to a
written reply.
We also cannot assume an admission by silence on the part of Balaguer by
virtue of his failure to protest or disclaim the attribution to him by the
newspapers that he is the source of the articles. As explained above, the rule
on admission by silence is relaxed when the statement is not made orally in
ones presence or when one still has to resort to a written reply, or when
there is no mutual correspondence between the parties.
As for the publications themselves, newspaper articles purporting to state
what the defendant said are inadmissible against him, since he cannot be
held responsible for the writings of third persons. As correctly observed by
the Court of Appeals, "while the subject news items indicated that Balaguer
was the source of the columnists, proving that he truly made such statements
is another matter." Petitioner failed to prove that Balaguer did make such
statements.
Notably, petitioner did not implead the editorial staff and the publisher of the
alleged defamatory articles. Contrary to petitioners assertion, he should have
at least presented the authors of the news articles as witnesses to prove his
case against respondents in the absence of an express admission by the
latter that the subject news articles have been caused by them.
Petitioner also claims that respondents have admitted that they held a press
conference and caused the publication of the news articles, based on the
following testimony of Balaguer.
ATTY. JIMENEZ:
Okay, Let me ask another question. Now Mr. Balaguer this publication
referred to so called anomalies of 1986 to 1989 now how about the
termination.
A: 1991.
ATTY. JIMENEZ:
Yes.
WITNESS:

In proving his claim, petitioner relied on the July 20, 1992 letter, the
newspaper articles, and the alleged admission of respondents. Based on the
above pieces of evidence, the Court finds that petitioner was unable to

I think the termination of Mr. Villanueva has nothing to do with that press
statement release because the period that covers that report is from specific
date 1986 to 1989. (TSN, 07 November 2000, p. 19)

The Panel of Arbitrators disqualified the petitioners from gaining MPSAs.

McArthur, Narra and Tesoro filed appeals with the Mines Adjudication Board
(MAB).

Admissions, however, should be clear and unambiguous which can hardly be

said of Balaguers above testimony. If Balaguer intended to admit the
allegation that he conducted a press conference and caused the publication
of the news articles, he could have done so. Instead, Balaguer specifically
denied these allegations in paragraphs 4 and 5 of his Answer.

Pending the resolution of the appeal with the MAB, Redmont filed a
Complaint with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), seeking the
revocation of the certificates for registration of petitioners on the ground that
they are foreign-owned or controlled corporations engaged in mining in
violation of Philippine laws. Redmont also filed a Manifestation and Motion to
Suspend Proceeding before the MAB praying for the suspension of the
proceedings on the appeals filed by McArthur, Tesoro and Narra.

(2) Petitioner next argues that IBC-13s Cross-Claim against Balaguer is an

admission by IBC-13, which is admissible against Balaguer pursuant to Sec.
29, Rule 130 as an admission by a co-partner or an agent.
Petitioner is mistaken. IBC-13s cross-claim against Balaguer effectively
created an adverse interest between them. Hence, the admission of one
defendant is not admissible against his co-defendant. Besides, as already
discussed, the alleged acts imputed to Balaguer were never proven to have
been committed, much less maliciously, by Balaguer. Malice or bad faith
implies a conscious and intentional design to do a wrongful act for a
dishonest purpose or moral obliquity. Such must be substantiated by
evidence.42
In sum, we find that petitioner failed to discharge his burden of proof. No
satisfactory evidence was presented to prove by preponderance of evidence
that respondents committed the acts imputed against them. As such, there is
no more need to discuss whether the assailed statements are defamatory.

G.R. No. 195580 April 21, 2014

NARRA NICKEL MINING AND DEVELOPMENT CORP., TESORO MINING
AND DEVELOPMENT, INC., and MCARTHUR MINING, INC., Petitioners,
vs. REDMONT CONSOLIDATED MINES CORP., Respondent.
FACTS:
Sometime in December 2006, respondent Redmont Consolidated Mines
Corp. (Redmont), a domestic corporation organized and existing under
Philippine laws, took interest in mining and exploring certain areas of the
province of Palawan. After inquiring with the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources (DENR), it learned that the areas where it wanted to
undertake exploration and mining activities where already covered by Mineral
Production Sharing Agreement (MPSA) applications of petitioners Narra,
Tesoro and McArthur.
On January 2, 2007, Redmont filed before the Panel of Arbitrators (POA) of
the DENR three (3) separate petitions for the denial of Narra, McArthur, and
Tesoros applications for MPSA.

Subsequently, Redmont filed before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City,
Branch 92 a Complaint for injunction with application for issuance of a
temporary restraining order (TRO) and/or writ of preliminary injunction,
praying for the deferral of the MAB proceedings pending the resolution of the
Complaint before the SEC.
The RTC issued an Order granting Redmonts application for a TRO and
setting the case for hearing the prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction.
Meanwhile, Redmont filed a Motion for Reconsideration on the Order of the
MAB but before the MAB could resolve the same, Redmont filed before the
RTC a Supplemental Complaint.
The RTC issued an Order granting the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction enjoining the MAB from finally disposing of the appeals of
petitioners and from resolving Redmonts Motion for Reconsideration and
Supplement Motion for Reconsideration of the MAB Resolution.
The MAB issued a second Order denying Redmonts Motion for
Reconsideration and Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration and resolving
the appeals filed by petitioners.
Hence, the petition for review filed by Redmont before the CA, to which the
CA rendered a Decision finding that McArthur, Tesoro and Narra are foreign
corporations and the rejection of their applications for Mineral Product
Sharing Agreement should be recommended to the Secretary of the DENR.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the exception of res inter alios acta or the "admission by copartner or agent" rule and "admission by privies" under the Rules of Court are
applicable in the instant case? YES
Whether or not statements coming from MBMI Resources, Inc., which is not
a party to the case, or a partner of the petitioners, be deemed admissible?
YES
RULING:

Redmont alleged that at least 60% of the capital stock of McArthur, Tesoro
and Narra are owned and controlled by MBMI Resources, Inc. (MBMI), a
100% Canadian corporation. Redmont reasoned that since MBMI is a
considerable stockholder of petitioners, it was the driving force behind
petitioners filing of the MPSAs over the areas covered by applications and
are likewise disqualified from engaging in mining activities through MPSAs,
which are reserved only for Filipino citizens.
In their Answers, petitioners averred that they were qualified persons under
Section 3(aq) of Republic Act No. (RA) 7942 or the Philippine Mining Act of
1995.

Petitioners claim that the CA erred in applying Sec. 29, Rule 130 of the Rules
by stating that "by entering into a joint venture, MBMI have a joint interest"
with Narra, Tesoro and McArthur. They challenged the conclusion of the CA
which pertains to the close characteristics of "partnerships" and "joint venture
agreements." Further, they asserted that before this particular partnership
can be formed, it should have been formally reduced into writing since the
capital involved is more than three thousand pesos (PhP 3,000). Being that
there is no evidence of written agreement to form a partnership between
petitioners and MBMI, no partnership was created.
The Court disagreed.

Secs. 29 and 31, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court provide:
Sec. 29. Admission by co-partner or agent.- The act or declaration of a
partner or agent of the party within the scope of his authority and during the
existence of the partnership or agency, may be given in evidence against
such party after the partnership or agency is shown by evidence other than
such act or declaration itself. The same rule applies to the act or declaration
of a joint owner, joint debtor, or other person jointly interested with the party.
Sec. 31. Admission by privies.- Where one derives title to property from
another, the act, declaration, or omission of the latter, while holding the title,
in relation to the property, is evidence against the former.
Petitioners claim that before the above-mentioned Rule can be applied to a
case, "the partnership relation must be shown, and that proof of the fact must
be made by evidence other than the admission itself." Thus, petitioners
assert that the CA erred in finding that a partnership relationship exists
between them and MBMI because, in fact, no such partnership exists.
According to the Supreme Court, a partnership is defined as two or more
persons who bind themselves to contribute money, property, or industry to a
common fund with the intention of dividing the profits among themselves. On
the other hand, joint ventures have been deemed to be "akin" to partnerships
since it is difficult to distinguish between joint ventures and partnerships.
Thus:
[T]he relations of the parties to a joint venture and the nature of their
association are so similar and closely akin to a partnership that it is ordinarily
held that their rights, duties, and liabilities are to be tested by rules which are
closely analogous to and substantially the same, if not exactly the same, as
those which govern partnership. In fact, it has been said that the trend in the
law has been to blur the distinctions between a partnership and a joint
venture, very little law being found applicable to one that does not apply to
the other.
Though some claim that partnerships and joint ventures are totally different
animals, there are very few rules that differentiate one from the other; thus,
joint ventures are deemed "akin" or similar to a partnership. In fact, in joint
venture agreements, rules and legal incidents governing partnerships are
applied.
Accordingly, culled from the incidents and records of this case, it can be
assumed that the relationships entered between and among petitioners and
MBMI are no simple "joint venture agreements." As a rule, corporations are
prohibited from entering into partnership agreements; consequently,
corporations enter into joint venture agreements with other corporations or
partnerships for certain transactions in order to form "pseudo partnerships."
Obviously, as the intricate web of "ventures" entered into by and among
petitioners and MBMI was executed to circumvent the legal prohibition
against corporations entering into partnerships, then the relationship created
should be deemed as "partnerships," and the laws on partnership should be
applied. Thus, a joint venture agreement between and among corporations
may be seen as similar to partnerships since the elements of partnership are
present.
Considering that the relationships found between petitioners and MBMI are
considered to be partnerships, then the CA is justified in applying Sec. 29,
Rule 130 of the Rules by stating that "by entering into a joint venture, MBMI
have a joint interest" with Narra, Tesoro and McArthur.

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. RICARDO

ATENCIO, SILVESTRE COLISAO, and DOMINGO ATENCIO, Defendants.
FACTS:
Bonifacio Gremio agreed to have a good time with Ricardo Atencio, Domingo
Atencio and Silvestre Colisao, accused in this case.
When they reached the vicinity of the house of Gerardo Rapsing, Ricardo
informed Bonifacio that they were going to rob Rapsing, because the latter
had money.
Bonifacio objected to the plan, reasoning that Rapsing is a relative of his
father. But Ricardo warned him that he better go with the group, and if he
(Bonifacio) would inform on them, he would be in a bad fix.
Hence, Bonifacio had to go with the trio.
Bonifacio was instructed by Ricardo to stay on the ground while the other
three (Ricardo, Domingo and Silvestre) would go up the house of Gerardo
Rapsing. Then, after they had gone around the house three times and
became assured that the inmates therein were asleep, they entered through
the kitchen door after removing its bamboo bolt. Thereafter, Bonifacio heard
the voices of two grown-ups and a child from the house, followed by hacking
or chopping sounds. Afraid, he left the place and went home.
At about 7 oclock of the following morning, Constancia Valido, wife of
Gerardo Rapsing, returning from the house of a married daughter where she
had slept the night before, found her husband, his nephew Sebastian and
their helper Daniel Rosita, all dead in their house, and their personal
belongings strewn about the floor.
Ricardo Atencio, who was investigated by the police authorities of Bobon as
a suspect, subscribed to a statement before the Justice of the Peace, Judge
Valila, confessing to the commission of the crime, together with his three
companions.
However, Atencio gave another statement to S/Sgt. Juanito Yrigan,
investigator of the 96th PC Company, and subscribed to before acting
Municipal Mayor Protacio Poso of Bobon, wherein he claimed to have
committed the crime alone and explaining that he had previously blamed his
companions out of personal animosity.
The trial Court rendered judgment against the three accused, finding them
guilty as charged, of robbery with triple homicide attended by five aggravating
circumstances evident premeditation, treachery, dwelling, nocturnity, and
the crime having been committed by a band without any mitigating
circumstance.
Question has been raised against the lower Courts finding that Domingo
Atencio and Silvestre Colisao were co-conspirators of Ricardo Atencio, it
being asserted that there was no adequate proof of the existence of the
conspiracy, as provided in Section 27 (now Sec. 30) of the Revised Rule 130
of the Rules of Court.
Here, the accused were contending that the lone testimony of witness
Bonifacio Gremio was insufficient to convict them because according to Sec.
30:
Section 30. Admission by conspirator. The act or declaration of a
conspirator relating to the conspiracy and during its existence, may be given
in evidence against the co-conspirator after the conspiracy is shown by
evidence other than such act of declaration.

ISSUE:
WON the lone testimony of prosecutions witness, Bonifacio Gremio is
admissible as evidence to prove conspiracy?
RULING:
YES
The rule that The act or declaration of a conspirator relating to the
conspiracy and during its existence, may be given in evidence against the coconspirator after the conspiracy is shown by evidence other than such act or
declaration, applies only to extrajudicial acts or declaration, but not to
testimony given on the stand at the trial, where the defendant has the
opportunity to cross- examine the declarant." When Bonifacio Gremio, in this
case, took the witness stand and testified on the participations of Domingo
Atencio and Silvestre Colisao in the crime, he was not making an
admission or declaration as a co-conspirator; he was an eye-witness
identifying them in connection with the incident, and whose testimony could
have been shaken by cross-examination or disproved by other evidence. As
it happened here, Bonifacios testimony pointing to the existence of
conspiracy among Ricardo Atencio, Domingo Atencio and Silvestre Colisao,
remained and withstood cross-examinations by the separate counsel for the
accused.

HEARSAY EVIDENCE AND EXCEPTIONS

MARISSA R. UNCHUAN, Petitioner, vs. ANTONIO J.P. LOZADA, ANITA
LOZADA and THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF CEBU CITY, Respondents.
FACTS:

Antonio in preparation for their plan to form a corporation. The lots are to be
eventually infused in the capitalization of Damasa Corporation, where he and
Antonio are to have 40% and 60% stake, respectively.
A witness for petitioner, one Dr. Cecilia Fuentes, testified on Peregrinas
medical records. According to her interpretation of said records, it was
physically impossible for Peregrina to have signed the Deed of Sale on
March 11, 1994, when she was reported to be suffering from edema.
Peregrina died on April 4, 1994.
RTC: declared the Deed of Sale void, ordered the cancellation of the new
TCTs in Antonios name
CA: affirmed RTCs ruling
ISSUE:
1.WON the videotaped statement of Anita should be excluded being a
hearsay evidence. No, but it should be excluded because it is not
authenticated
2. WON the medical records were admissible as evidence. NO
RULING:
1. Evidence is hearsay when its probative force depends, in whole or in part,
on the competency and credibility of some persons other than the witness by
whom it is sought to be produced. There are three reasons for excluding
hearsay evidence: (1) absence of cross-examination; (2) absence of
demeanor evidence; and (3) absence of oath.41 It is a hornbook doctrine that
an affidavit is merely hearsay evidence where its maker did not take the
witness stand.42
Verily, the sworn statement of Anita was of this kind because she did not
appear in court to affirm her averments therein.

Sisters Anita Lozada Slaughter and Peregrina Lozada Saribay were the
registered co-owners of two lots in Cebu City.

Yet, a more circumspect examination of our rules of exclusion will show that
they do not cover admissions of a party;43 the videotaped statement of Anita
appears to belong to this class.

The sisters, who were based in the United States, sold the lots to their
nephew Antonio J.P. Lozada (Antonio) under a Deed of Sale. Armed with a
Special Power of Attorney8 from Anita, Peregrina went to the house of their
brother, Dr. Antonio Lozada (Dr. Lozada), located at 4356 Faculty Avenue,
Long Beach California.9

Section 26 of Rule 130 provides that "the act, declaration or omission of a

party as to a relevant fact may be given in evidence against him. It has long
been settled that these admissions are admissible even if they are
hearsay.44

Dr. Lozada agreed to advance the purchase price of US$367,000 or

P10,000,000 for Antonio, his nephew.
The Deed of Sale was later notarized and authenticated at the Philippine
Consuls Office. Dr. Lozada then forwarded the deed, special power of
attorney, and owners copies of the titles to Antonio in the Philippines. Upon
receipt of said documents, the latter recorded the sale with the Register of
Deeds of Cebu. Accordingly, two TCTs were issued in the name of Antonio
Lozada.
Pending registration of the deed, petitioner Marissa R. Unchuan caused the
annotation of an adverse claim on the lots. Marissa claimed that Anita
donated an undivided share in the lots to her under an unregistered Deed of
Donation.
At the trial, respondents presented a notarized and duly authenticated sworn
statement, and a videotape where Anita denied having donated land in favor
of Marissa. Dr. Lozada testified that he agreed to advance payment for

Indeed, there is a vital distinction between admissions against interest and

declaration against interest. Admissions against interest are those made by a
party to a litigation or by one in privity with or identified in legal interest with
such party, and are admissible whether or not the declarant is available as a
witness. Declaration against interest are those made by a person who is
neither a party nor in privity with a party to the
suit, are secondary evidence and constitute an exception to the hearsay rule.
They are admissible only when the declarant is unavailable as a witness.45
Thus, a mans acts, conduct, and declaration, wherever made, if voluntary,
are admissible against him, for the reason that it is fair to presume that they
correspond with the truth, and it is his fault if they do not.46
However, as a further qualification, object evidence, such as the videotape in
this case, must be authenticated by a special testimony showing that it was a
faithful reproduction.47 Lacking this, the court excluded as evidence the
videotaped statement of Anita.

2. Petitioner submits a copy of Peregrinas medical records to show that she

was confined at the Martin Luther Hospital from February 27, 1994 until she
died on April 4, 1994. However, a Certification30 from Randy E. Rice,
Manager for the Health Information Management of the hospital undermines
the authenticity of said medical records.
In the certification, Rice denied having certified or having mailed copies of
Peregrinas medical records to the Philippines.
As a rule, a document to be admissible in evidence, should be previously
authenticated, that is, its due execution or genuineness should be first
shown.31 Accordingly, the unauthenticated medical records were excluded
from the evidence.
Even assuming that Peregrina was confined in the cited hospital, the Deed of
Sale was executed on March 11, 1994, a month before Peregrina reportedly
succumbed to Hepato Renal Failure caused by Septicemia due to
Myflodysplastic Syndrome.32 Nothing in the records appears to show that
Peregrina was so incapacitated as to prevent her from executing the Deed of
Sale. Quite the contrary, the records reveal that close to the date of the sale,
specifically on March 9, 1994, Peregrina was even able to issue checks33 to
pay for her attorneys professional fees and her own hospital bills. At no point
in the course of the trial did petitioner dispute this revelation.

[G.R. NO. 156251 : April 27, 2007] PHILIPPINE REALTY HOLDINGS

CORPORATION v. FIREMATIC PHILIPPINES, INC.
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
Philippine Realty and Holdings Corporation (PRHC), entered into a
Construction Agreement with Firematic Philippines, Inc. (Firematic) for the
installation of a sprinkler system in the proposed Tektite Towers. The project
had two phases - Phase I (Tower I) and Phase II (Tower II).
PRHC informed Firematic that it had decided to delete Phase II (Tower II)
from the original contract, and consequently, the contract price for Phase I
was reduced to P22,153,424.52. However, by reason of the change orders
approved by PRHC, the contract price was increased to P24,773,376.48.
PRHC and Firematic entered into another Construction Agreement under
which the latter undertook to supply, deliver and install the fire alarm system
for Phase I of the Tektite Project for a total contract price of P3,780,000.00.
This agreement contains substantially the same terms and conditions as the
earlier contract for fire sprinklers.
Firematic requested PRHC for financial assistance due to its tight business
credit and rising costs. Consequently, the purchases of materials for the
project were directly paid by PRHC.
Firematic submitted to PRHC the Catalogue of Peerless Fire Pumps, and
PRHC approved the use of 500 GPM (12 LB-F model) Peerless Vertical
Turbine Fire Pumps. To facilitate the purchase of the approved model and
specifications of the fire pumps from Technotrade Industrial Sales, Inc., and
pursuant to the financial assistance earlier requested by Firematic, the latter
presented to PRHC for approval Purchase Order No. 108 dated August 6,
1992. PRHC approved the purchase order. The subject materials were
delivered and eventually installed by Firematic.
The project became operational and was turned over to PRHC, which then
issued the Certificate of Completion.

In the meantime, PRHC requested the Connel Bros. Co., Philippines for a
quotation of the Peerless UL/FU Fire pump similar to those installed by
Firematic in Tektite Tower I. However, Connel Bros. Philippines, Inc. replied
by letter dated September 2, 1993 that it would be difficult for them to trace
whether they had records of transactions with Technotrade-USA, because the
pump model and serial number that PRHC furnished were not of Peerless
origin."
Meanwhile, Firematic billed PRHC P1,402,559.93 for the balance of the
amount of the automatic sprinkler supplies installed. However, PRHC
rejected the claim.
PRHC sent a letter to Firematic claiming that, based on its Purchase Order,
the brand "Peerless" should have been used; however, the manufacturer of
the brand (Peerless Pump Co., USA), did not have any record of having
manufactured the pumps that Firematic delivered and installed on the Tektite
Towers project.
In a letter dated March 2, 1994, Connel Bros. stated that Peerless Pump Co.
never had direct negotiation with Technotrade, and as such, the latter is not a
dealer of "Peerless" pump.
Firematic sent its final billing and a demand letter prepared by its counsel to
PRHC for the payment of the latter's balance of the contract price amounting
to P3,919,283.13, including the unacted charge order attached
thereto.rbl r l l
PRHC denied liability. It informed Firematic that all the fire pumps and
accessories supplied by it shall be removed, and the cost of replacement,
including the labor cost of the installation, would be chargeable to its account.
Again, Firematic failed to respond.
In the meantime, PRHC purchased the replacement for the "defective"
materials installed by Firematic.
Firematic filed a Complaint for Collection for Sum of Money plus Damages
against PRHC.
PRHC filed a Motion for Leave to Amend Answer to Conform to Evidence
which Firematic opposed. In its Amended Answer, PRHC claimed that, with
respect to the fire sprinkler system, the actual works completed by Firematic
amounted to only P20,613,302.45. Thus, it (PRHC) made an overpayment of
P1,485,000.00. As to the fire alarm system, the works actually completed in
accordance with the technical specifications amounted to only
P2,597,966.49. Again, there was an overpayment of P650,000.00.
RTC: ruled in favor of PRHC. Complaint dismissed.
The RTC concluded that in failing to deliver genuine Peerless Pumps as
agreed upon, and to install fire alarm system that could be interfaced with the
system, Firematic failed to comply with the technical specifications of the
contracts.
CA: reversed RTC.
The CA declared that PRHC's belated claim was highly doubtful since PRHC
had ordered the pumps from Technotrade, albeit through the Firematic, and
were inspected and scrutinized by its consultants who are experts in their
fields. The appellate court likewise agreed with Firematic that the documents
presented in evidence by PRHC to prove that the pumps supplied by
Technotrade were not genuine "Peerless" pumps are inadmissible for being
hearsay. According to the CA, it is possible that it was not the appellant but
Technotrade that was guilty of fraud in supplying dubious pumps to PRHC.

ISSUE:
W/N the Court of Appeals committed reversible error when it unjustifiably
disregarded petitioner's evidence showing the supplied pumps as fakes and
not of "Peerless" origin, on the ground that said evidence is hearsay.
(The threshold issue raised is whether or not the fire pumps supplied and
delivered by respondent to petitioner conformed to the technical
specifications of the contract.)
HELD: NO.
Respondent reiterates that the evidence presented by petitioner to prove that
the fire pumps were not genuine is inadmissible in evidence for being
hearsay. Respondent maintains that, as shown by the evidence on record,
petitioner owed it P10,399,418.89 for the fire sprinkler supplies and fire alarm
system.
Petitioner insists that the fire pumps supplied and installed by respondent are
"not of Peerless origin" because of the following: (1) respondent failed to
present proofs of the genuineness of the pumps; (2) respondent failed to
answer petitioner's letters requiring it to present the aforesaid proofs, thus,
estoppel by silence applies; and (3) the manufacturer of the Peerless pumps
verbally informed Connel Bros. that the subject fire pumps "are not of
Peerless origin."
Well-settled is the rule that the party alleging fraud or mistake in a transaction
bears the burden of proof. The circumstances evidencing fraud are as varied
as the people who perpetrate it in each case. It may assume different shapes
and forms; it may be committed in as many different ways. Thus, the law
requires that fraud be established, not just by preponderance of evidence,
but by clear and convincing evidence.
In this case, petitioner relied on the principle of estoppel by silence, as well
as on Letter No. L/93-272 and Letter No. L/94-043 of Connel Bros. to prove
that the fire pumps, which respondent supplied and installed, were not
genuine.
However, petitioner failed to present the signatory of the letters (E.L. Sta.
Maria, Jr.) to testify on the veracity of the contents of the letters; thus,
respondent was not given the opportunity to cross-examine him. It also
appears that the person who signed the letters had no personal knowledge of
the facts stated therein, as he claimed that he had been "verbally advised"
that the manufacturer of Peerless pumps never had direct negotiation with
Technotrade, and as such, the latter is not a dealer of the pumps.
(NOTE: Below is the related ruling, sorry I just followed the flow of the actual
decision mao wala siya sa taas nakabutang after sa ISSUE)
Well-entrenched is the rule that a private certification is hearsay where the
person who issued the same was never presented as a witness. The same is
true of letters. While hearsay evidence may be admitted because of lack of
objection by the adverse party's counsel, it is nonetheless without probative
value. Stated differently, the declarants of written statements pertaining to
disputed facts must be presented at the trial for cross-examination. The lack
of objection may make incompetent evidence admissible, but admissibility of
evidence should not be equated with weight of evidence. Indeed, hearsay
evidence whether objected to or not has no probative value.
Petitioner asserts that respondent impliedly admitted that the fire pumps it
installed were "not of Peerless origin" because of its failure to dispute
petitioner's accusation and to present proofs that the fire pumps delivered
were genuine. Thus, petitioner contends that estoppel by silence applies to
respondent.

The principle of estoppel in pais applies wherein one, by his acts,

representations or admissions, or by his own silence when he ought to speak
out, intentionally or through culpable negligence, induces another to believe
certain facts to exist and such other rightfully relies and acts on such belief,
so that he will be prejudiced if the former is permitted to deny the existence of
such facts.
We find the principle inapplicable in the present case. Acording to
respondent's Managing Director Jojie S. Gador, she did not completely keep
silent on petitioner's accusation. She testified that when petitioner refused to
pay respondent, she went to the Fire Department of the City of Pasig and
made an inquiry regarding the fire incident that took place at the Tektite
project. In answer to this inquiry, the Fire Department issued a Certification
stating, inter alia, that the office was very much delighted because the
management of Tektite Tower had substantially complied with the safety
requirements of Presidential Decree No. 1185. In making such inquiry,
respondent in effect denied petitioner's accusation that the fire pumps it had
installed were defective; as such, the principle of estoppel by silence does
not apply.
Because good faith is presumed, respondent was not obliged to present
proofs of the genuineness of the fire pumps it supplied and installed. The
burden of proof to show that the pumps were not genuine fell upon petitioner.
However, the records show that petitioner failed to discharge this burden.
Clearly, the evidence relied upon is not sufficient to overturn (1) the
presumption of good faith; (2) that private transactions have been fair and
regular; and (3) that the ordinary course of business had been followed.
SC: petition is DENIED for lack of merit.

ORIENTAL SHIPMANAGEMENT CO., INC., VS. ROMY B. BASTOL

[G.R. No. 186289 : June 29, 2010]
OSCI is a domestic manning agency engaged in the recruitment and
placement of Filipino seafarers abroad. Paterco Shipping Ltd. (PSL) is a
foreign shipping company which owned and operated the vessel MV Felicita
and a client of OSCI. Protection & Indemnity Club (PIC) was the insurer of
PSL covering contingencies like illness claims and benefits of seamen.
Pandiman Philippines, Inc. (PPI) is the local representative of PIC. As agent
of PSL, OSCI hired Romy B. Bastol (Bastol) as bosun on November 29, 1995
evidenced by a Contract of Employment. On December 5, 1995, Bastol was
deployed on board the vessel MV Felicita. The genesis of the instant case
emerged when, on February 17, 1997, while on board the vessel, Bastol
suffered chest pains and cold clammy perspiration. He was hospitalized in
Algiers and found to be suffering from anterior myocardial infarction. In short,
he had a heart attack. He was subsequently repatriated due to his illness on
March 7, 1997. Upon arrival here in the Philippines, on March 8, 1997, he
was referred to the Jose L. Gutierrez Clinic in Malate, Manila for a follow-up
examination where Dr. Achilles J. Peralta examined and found him to be
suffering from "T/C Ischemic Heart Disease. Ant. Myocardial Infection." Dr.
Peralta issued a Medical Report certifying that he was "Unfit for Sea Duty."
Thus, PPI referred Bastol for medical treatment to the Metropolitan Hospital
under the care of company-designated physician Dr. Robert D. Lim. Dr. Lim
certified that Bastol had "Coronary artery dse; S/P Ant. wall MP;
Hypercholesterolemia; Hyperglycemia."11 Thereafter, Bastol had regular
laboratory and medical examinations with the company-designated
physician. Unsatisfied with the treatment by Dr. Lim and seeking a second
opinion, he went to Dr. Efren R. Vicaldo, a Cardiologist and Congenital Heart
Disease Specialist of the Philippine Heart Center, who diagnosed him to be

suffering from "Coronary Artery Disease and Extensive Anteriorseptalmia"

with the corresponding remarks: "For Disability, Impediment Grade 1
(120%)." Feeling abandoned and aggrieved with OSCI and PSL, Bastol,
through counsel, sent a November 27, 1997 letter on December 2, 1997 to
Capt. Rosendo C. Herrera, the President of OSCI, for a possible settlement
of his claim for disability benefits. He attached the Medical Certificate issued
by Dr. Vicaldo. His letter did not merit a response from OSCI. Thus, Bastol
was compelled to file a Complaint before the Labor Arbiter on May 8, 1988
for: (a) medical disability benefit (Grade 1) of USD 60,000; (b) illness
allowance until he is deemed fit to work again; (c) medical benefits for the
treatment of his ailment; (d) moral damages of PhP 100,000; and (e)
attorney's fee of 10% of the total monetary award. OSCI countered that
Bastol is not entitled to his indemnity claims, among others, for disability
benefits on account of non-compliance with the requirements of the 1994
revised Standard Employment Contract (SEC) by failing to properly submit
himself for treatment and examination by the company-designated physician
who is the only one authorized to set the degree of disability, i.e., disability
grade.

ratiocinated that Art. 221 of the Labor Code as amended by Sec. 11 of

Republic Act No. (RA) 6715 in relation to Sec. 4, Rule V of the NLRC Rules
of Procedure then prevailing granted the Labor Arbiter discretion to determine
the necessity for a formal hearing or investigation. In the instant case, the CA
found that the Labor Arbiter acted properly and ruled appropriately on the
evidence on record without need for formal hearings.

Labor Arbiter Mayor, Jr. Decision: OSCI and PSI are hereby ordered to jointly
and severally pay complainant.

1. W/N technical rules of procedure apply to labor cases? NO

In the meantime, pending resolution of the instant case, Romy B. Bastol died
on December 13, 2009 from his undisputed ailment of acute myocardial
infarction.
SC RULING:
We deny the appeal for lack of merit.
ISSUES:

W/N clarificatory hearing is mandatory? NO

> Labor Arbiter saw no need to conduct formal hearings. He found that Bastol
was healthy when deployed in December 1995 but subsequently contracted
or suffered heart ailment during his period of employment with OSCI and
PSL.
NLRC: vacating and setting aside the Decision of the Labor Arbiter and
remanding the case back to the Labor Arbiter for further proceedings.
> ruled that Bastol should have presented himself before the Labor Arbiter for
the latter to properly assess his condition, and that Dr. Lim and Dr. Vicaldo
should be presented to determine with certainty the status of Bastol's heart
ailment.
Upon OSCI's motion for inhibition, Labor Arbiter Mayor, Jr. inhibited himself,
and the case was re-raffled to Labor Arbiter Joel S. Lustria.
Labor Arbiter Lustria Decision: similar to that of Labor Arbiter Mayor, Jr. :
Respondents Oriental Shipmanagement Co., Inc. and Paterco Shipping, Ltd.,
to jointly and severally pay complainant Romy Bastol.
> found that Bastol indeed suffered from a heart ailment for which he is
pursuing disability indemnity which was duly proved by the concurring
diagnosis of Dr. Peralta, Dr. Lim, Dr. Varwig and Dr. Vicaldo. He found that
the settlement agreement with PPI was pursuant to the medical findings and
assessments of both company-designated physicians, Dr. Lim and Dr.
Varwig. Thus, the reiteration of the award of Labor Arbiter Mayor, Jr.
NLRC Decision: reversing and setting aside Labor Arbiter Lustria's Decision
and dismissed the instant case
> held that the sworn affidavit of Dr. Vicaldo and the manifestations of Bastol
could not substitute for their presence and testimony, and that of Dr. Lim. It
ruled that since not one clarificatory hearing was conducted, the sworn
affidavit of Dr. Vicaldo is reduced to mere hearsay sans a cross-examination
by OSCI.
CA: reinstated the Decision of Labor Arbiter Mayor, Jr.
> It ruled, first, that the NLRC gravely abused its discretion in remanding the
case back to the Labor Arbiter on the mistaken notion that the determination
of Bastol's health ailment and entitlement to disability benefits under the 1994
revised SEC cannot be ascertained without conducting a formal trial. It

2. W/N sworn affidavits are sufficient? YES

HELD: The primordial reason why the argument of OSCI for the mandatory
conduct of clarificatory hearings requiring the personal appearance of Bastol
and the testimonies of Dr. Lim and Dr. Vicaldo is erroneous is that the law
and the rules do not require such mandatory clarificatory hearings.
Labor Arbiter Has Discretion on the Propriety of Conducting Clarificatory
Hearings Section 9. Nature of Proceedings. -- The proceedings before a
Labor Arbiter shall be non-litigious in nature. Subject to the requirements of
due process, the technicalities of law and procedure and the rules obtaining
in the courts of law shall not strictly apply thereto. The Labor Arbiter may avail
himself of all reasonable means to ascertain the facts of the controversy
speedily, including ocular inspection and examination of well-informed
persons.
Thus, the rules allow the admission of affidavits by the Labor Arbiter as
evidence despite the fact that the affiants were not presented for crossexamination by the counsel for the adverse party. To require otherwise would
be to negate the rationale and purpose of the summary nature of the
administrative proceedings and to make mandatory the application of the
technical rules of evidence. What the other party should do is to present
counter-affidavits instead of merely objecting on the ground that the affidavits
are hearsay. The Court, however, has recognized specific instances of the
impracticality for the Labor Arbiter to follow the position paper method of
disposing cases; thus, formal or clarificatory hearings must be had in cases
of termination of employment: such as, when claims are not properly
ventilated for lack of proper determination whether complainant employee
was a rank-and-file or a managerial employee, that the Labor Arbiter cannot
rely solely on the parties' bare allegations when the affidavits submitted
presented conflicting factual issues, and considering the dearth of evidence
presented by complainants the Labor Arbiter should have set the case for
hearing. In the instant case, we find substantial evidence to support the
decision of Labor Arbiter Lustria. Substantial evidence is such amount of
evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion, even if other equally reasonable minds might conceivably opine
otherwise. Late submission of documentary evidence admissible OSCI
asserts that Labor Arbiter Lustria gravely abused his discretion in admitting
as evidence the belated submissions of Bastol through his
Manifestation/Compliance filed on October 26, 2001 or five months after the
instant case was deemed submitted for decision on May 10, 2001. It
considers suspicious the submission of the Affidavit of Dr. Vicaldo, as Bastol
never provided any explanation for such late submission and much less did
the Labor Arbiter require Bastol for such explanation. OSCI also rues said

admission when Labor Arbiter Lustria did not act on its Motion to Dismiss
filed on July 25, 2001 on the ground of Bastol's failure to present additional
evidence. Neither did Labor Arbiter Lustria give it an opportunity to submit
contrary evidence by setting, at the very least, another hearing. Thus, OSCI
concludes that Labor Arbiter Lustria acted wantonly, whimsically and
capriciously to its grave prejudice by admitting and using the late submission
of Bastol as basis for his decision, and the CA, in turn, gravely erred in
sanctioning the Labor Arbiter by granting Bastol's petition for certiorari. We
cannot agree. The nature of the proceedings before the Labor Arbiter is not
only non-litigious and summary, but the Labor Arbiter is also given great
leeway to resolve the case; thus, he may "avail himself of all reasonable
means to ascertain the facts of the controversy." The belated submission of
additional documentary evidence by Bastol after the case was already
submitted for decision did not make the proceedings before the Labor Arbiter
improper. The basic reason is that technical rules of procedure are not
binding in labor cases. Indeed, technical rules of evidence do not apply if the
decision to grant the petition proceeds from an examination of its sufficiency
as well as a careful look into the arguments contained in position papers and
other documents. And neither can OSCI rely on lack of due process. The
essence of due process lies simply in an opportunity to be heard, and not
that an actual hearing should always and indispensably he held. Considering
that OSCI indeed contested the late submission of Bastol by filing its most
vehement objection thereto on November 27, 2001, it cannot complain of not
being accorded the opportunity to be heard and much less can it demand for
the setting of an actual hearing. What OSCI could have and ought to have
done was to present its own counter-affidavits. But it did not.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we DENY the instant petition for lack of
merit. The Decision of CA is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in that
what is REINSTATED is the Decision of Labor Arbiter LUSTRIA.
Notes:
A job of a bosun, as the position of petitioner, is not exactly a walk in the
park. A bosun manages actual deck work schedules and assignments
directed by the Chief Officer and emergency duties as indicated in the Station
Bill. He attends to maintenance and upkeep of all deck equipment, cargo,
riggings, safety equipment and helps in maintaining discipline of the deck
hands. He assists in ships emergency drills and in any event of emergency
and performs other duties and responsibilities as instructed or as necessary.
Principle of "Law of the Case" inapplicable "Law of the case" has been
defined as the opinion delivered on a former appeal--it is a term applied to an
established rule that when an appellate court passes on a question and
remands the case to the lower court for further proceedings, the question
there settled becomes the law of the case upon subsequent appeal.

GR No. 178989 (March 18, 2010)

EAGLE RIDGE GOLF & COUNTRY CLUB v. CA and EAGLE RIDGE
EMPLOYEES UNION (EREU)
VELASCO, JR., J.

The EREU then filed a petition for certification election in Eagle Ridge Golf &
Country Club. Eagle Ridge opposed this petition, followed by its filing of a
petition for the cancellation of EREUs Reg. Cert. Eagle Ridges petition
ascribed misrepresentation, false statement, or fraud to EREU in connection
with the adoption of its constitution and by-laws, the numerical composition of
the Union, and the election of its officers. [That the EREU declared in its
application for registration having 30 members, when the minutes of its
December 6 organizational meeting showed it only had 26 members. The
misrepresentation was exacerbated by the discrepancy between the
certification issued by the Union secretary and president that 25 members
actually ratified the constitution and by-laws and the fact that 26 members
affixed their signatures on the documents, making one signature a forgery.]
Finally, Eagle Ridge contended that 5 employees who attended the
organizational meeting executed affidavits or Sinumpaang Salaysay attesting
that they arrived late at said meeting; that they did not know that the
documents they signed pertained to the organization of a union; and that they
now wanted to be excluded from the Union. The withdrawal, Eagle Ridge
maintained, reduced the union membership to 20 or 21, below the mandatory
minimum 20% membership requirement under Art. 234(c) of the Labor Code.
Reckoned from 112 rank-and-file employees of Eagle Ridge, the required
number would be 22 or 23 employees.
To rebut the allegations in the affidavits of retraction of the union members,
EREU presented the Sama-Samang Sinumpaang Salaysay dated March 20
of 8 union members; another Sama-Samang Sinumpaang Salaysay, also
bearing date March 20, of 4 other union members; and the Sworn Statement
dated March 16 of the Unions legal counsel, Atty. Domingo T. Aonuevo.
These affidavits attested to the orderly and proper proceedings of the
organizational meeting on December 6, 2005.
DOLE Regional Director: Eagle Ridges petition for cancellation was granted.
EREU was delisted from the roster of legitimate labor organizations.
Bureau of Labor Relations (BLR): Reversal. EREU shall remain in the roster
of legitimate labor organizations.
CA: Dismissed Eagle Ridges MR.
ISSUE: WON the affidavits of retraction are admissible in evidence against
the Union.
HELD:
The probative value of the affidavits cannot overcome those of the supporting
affidavits of 12 union members and their counsel as to the proceedings and
the conduct of the organizational meeting on December 6.
The 6 affiants of the affidavits of retraction were not presented in a hearing
before the Hearing Officer (DOLE Regional Director), as required under the
Rules Implementing Book V of the Labor Code covering Labor Relations.
Said Rules is embodied in Department Order No. (DO) 40-03 and took effect
on March 15, 2003 to replace DO 9 of 1997. Sec. 11, Rule XI of DO 40-03
specifically requires:

December 6, 2005: At least 20% of Eagle Ridges rank-and-file employees

the percentage threshold required under Article 234(c) of the Labor Code for
union registrationhad a meeting where they organized themselves into an
independent labor union, named "Eagle Ridge Employees Union" (EREU or
Union).

Section 11. Affirmation of testimonial evidence. Any affidavit submitted by a

party to prove his/her claims or defenses shall be re-affirmed by the
presentation of the affiant before the Med-Arbiter or Hearing Officer, as the
case may be. Any affidavit submitted without the re-affirmation of the affiant
during a scheduled hearing shall not be admitted in evidence, except when
the party against whom the affidavit is being offered admits all allegations
therein and waives the examination of the affiant.

December 19: EREU formally applied for registration. DOLE RO IV granted

the application and issued EREU its Registration Certificate.

It is settled that affidavits partake the nature of hearsay evidence, since they
are not generally prepared by the affiant but by another who uses his own

language in writing the affiants statement, which may thus be either omitted
or misunderstood by the one writing them. The above rule affirms the general
requirement in adversarial proceedings for the examination of the affiant by
the party against whom the affidavit is offered. In the instant case, it is
required for affiants to re-affirm the contents of their affidavits during the
hearing of the instant case for them to be examined by the opposing party,
i.e., the Union.
Evidently, the allegations in the six affidavits of retraction have no probative
value and at the very least cannot outweigh the rebutting attestations of the
duly re-affirmed affidavits presented by the Union.
Petition DISMISSED.

GR No. 170008 (January 19, 2009)

DUTCH BOY PHILIPPINES, INC. v. RONALD SENIEL substituted by
Ligaya Quimpo and CESARIO SENIEL substituted by Edelmira P. Seniel
NACHURA, J.
Petitioner is a corporation engaged in manufacturing paint products and
selling them through authorized dealers. Jonathan Joyohoy (Joyohoy), on the
other hand, was a sales representative of petitioner for Mindanao, based in
Davao City.
Petitioner conducted an audit of its sales accounts and discovered that its
authorized dealers in Mindanao had outstanding balances consisting of paint
products withdrawn from the Certified Mindanao Marketing Corporation
(CMMC) warehouse. Combining all the dealers accountabilities yielded a
total amount of P1,939,125.16.
Petitioner sent letters of confirmation to the concerned dealers for the latter to
confirm their respective balances. The authorized dealers disclaimed their
alleged accountabilities; and contended instead that the same had already
been paid or that they never ordered or received the goods stated therein. In
view thereof, petitioner issued a Memorandum to Joyohoy (being the sales
representative in the area) requiring the latter to explain the transactions. In
response, Joyohoy explained that the subject stocks were withdrawn from
the warehouse by Ronald and Cesario Seniel, or their representatives and
delivered to Teknik Marketing, a sole proprietorship engaged as a painting
contractor.
Petitioner commenced an action for Collection of Sum of Money against
Joyohoy, Ronald and Cesario. It claimed that the defendants, in conspiracy,
acted fraudulently in preparing sales invoices which were used to withdraw
the subject paint products.
RTC: Ordered defendants to pay.
CA: Reversed. [What was established was simply the withdrawal of the paint
products from petitioners warehouse, upon the order of Joyohoy. Even if
Ronald and Cesario indeed purchased paint products through Joyohoy, no
anomaly can be attributed to the transaction considering that petitioner had
previously done business with persons or entities who were not authorized
dealers. Therefore, liability could attach only to Joyohoy and not to Ronald
and Cesario.]

ISSUE: WON the CA erred in declaring that petitioner was not able to
sufficiently establish conspiracy among Joyohoy and Ronald and Cesario.
HELD:
It was established that the goods were brought out of the warehouse upon
the order of Joyohoy who should have delivered the products to the
authorized dealers, collected their payments, then remitted his collections to
petitioners depositary bank. Unfortunately, Joyohoy used his position and
abused the trust reposed in him, in misappropriating the subject paint
products.
In finding Ronald and Cesario liable, the trial court relied on the testimony of
the warehouseman Romeo Gutierrez (Romeo) that Joyohoy instructed him
on several occasions to release to the former various paint products. The
testimony of Manuel Antolin (Antolin) was also cited to show how the alleged
defraudation was discovered by petitioner. Likewise adduced as evidence
was the handwritten response letter sent by Joyohoy to petitioner stating that
the subject paint products were withdrawn by Ronald and Cesario and/or
their representatives. Said pieces of evidence, however, lack probative value.
A thorough evaluation of the testimony of Romeo shows that, indeed, the
subject paint products were withdrawn from the warehouse upon the
authority and instruction of Joyohoy. However, it is wanting in details as to the
alleged participation of Ronald and Cesario that would make them
conspirators in defrauding petitioner. While petitioner claimed in its complaint
that Ronald and Cesario had a hand in the preparation of fictitious sales
orders and invoices, Romeo admitted in his testimony that he himself was the
one who prepared them upon the instruction of Joyohoy. If at all, Ronald and
Cesarios participation was limited to receiving the subject paint products. But
apart from Romeos bare allegation, there is no iota of evidence to show such
fact of receipt.
The testimony of Antolin establishes a disparity in the accounts, as appearing
in petitioners records and those of the dealers. It shows that Joyohoy was
repeatedly involved in anomalous transactions by preparing fictitious sales
invoices, withdrawing paint products from the warehouse, then selling them
to various establishments in Mindanao with whom petitioner had no dealings.
However, notwithstanding the overwhelming evidence against Joyohoy, no
clear evidence could link Ronald and Cesario to these fraudulent
transactions.
As to the letter of Joyohoy, wherein he narrated the participation of Ronald
and Cesario, considering that he did not testify on the contents thereof, the
same is hearsay. An unverified and unidentified private document cannot be
accorded probative value. It must be rejected because the party against
whom it is presented is deprived of the right and opportunity to crossexamine the person to whom the statements or writings are attributed. Its
executor or author should be presented as a witness to provide the other
party the opportunity to question its contents. The petitioners failure to
present the author of the letter renders its contents suspect and of no
probative value.
In view of the foregoing, Ronald and Cesario cannot be held jointly and
severally liable with Joyohoy. The CA was, therefore, correct in dismissing
the complaint as against Ronald and Cesario.
NOTE: It is a basic rule in civil cases that the party having the burden of proof
must establish his case by preponderance of evidence. Preponderance of
evidence is the weight, credit, and value of the aggregate evidence on either
side and is usually considered to be synonymous with the term greater
weight of the evidence or greater weight of the credible evidence. It is
evidence which is more convincing to the court as worthy of belief than that
which is offered in opposition thereto. Although the evidence adduced by
plaintiff is stronger than that presented by defendant, a judgment cannot be

entered in favor of the former, if his evidence is not sufficient to sustain his
cause of action.

ALLIED BANKING Vs South Pacific Sugar

Gen Razon Vs Tagitis

G.R. No. 178301 April 24, 2009

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff/Appellee, vs. ROLANDO
"Botong" MALIBIRAN Accused, and BEVERLY TIBO-TAN,
Accused/Appellant.
FACTS:
Reynaldo Tan left his common-law wife, Rosalinda Fuerzas (Rosalinda), and
their two (2) children, Jessie and Reynalin, in Davao, and went to Manila to
seek greener pastures. While in Manila, Reynaldo met and had a relationship
with appellant. They eventually married in 1981. Reynaldo and appellant
begot three (3) children Renevie, Jag-Carlo and Jay R. In 1984, Reynaldo's
and Rosalinda's paths crossed again and they resumed their relationship.
This led to the "souring" of Reynaldo's relationship with appellant; and in
1991, Reynaldo moved out of the conjugal house and started living again
with Rosalinda, although Reynaldo maintained support of and paternal ties
with his children.
On February 5, 1995, Reynaldo and appellant were in Greenhills with their
children for their usual Sunday gallivant. After finishing lunch, Reynaldo
proceeded to the parking lot to get his red Honda Accord, while the rest of his
family stayed behind and waited. Immediately thereafter, the family heard an
explosion coming from the direction where Reynaldo parked his car.
Appellant and Renevie got curious and proceeded to the parking lot. There,
they saw the Honda Accord burning, with Reynaldo lying beside the driver's
seat, burning, charred and bleeding profusely. Reynaldo was then rushed to
the Cardinal Santos Medical Hospital where he eventually died because of
the severe injuries he sustained.
An information was filed for Murder against Malibiran (alleged boyfriend of
Beverly; also a policeman) and another information for Parricide against
Beverly.
During trial, the prosecution presented Oswaldo Banaag (the family driver;
also the one who drove for Malibiran and company to plant the bomb in
Reynaldos car) and testified that Beverly told him that she and Malibiran had
a relationship. He testified that Beverly asked him to look for a hired gunman.
That Malibiran blames Beverly of the reason why Reynaldo is still alive and
then volunteered himself to remedy the situation, that he would seek a man
that would kill Reynaldo he made an example of a man they killed and threw
in Antipolo "Bangin" with Beverly, Malibiran and two other persons who
appear to be policeman because they have something budging in their waste
[sic] which is assumed to be a gun, they went to Paombong Bulacan via
Malabon. He heard that they would fetch a man in Bulacan that knows how to
place a bomb in a vehicle. Near the sea they talked to a person thereat. From
Paombong they rode a banca and went to an islet where the planning was

discussed as to how much is the fee and how the killing will be had. They
ordered him to return back to the vehicle and just fetched them in
Binangonan.
On Cross, he testified that he with Beverly went to Hilltop Police Station and
fetched Malibiran and company to go to Paombong Bulacan. When they
reached the bridge near the sea, they rode a banca, about six of them plus
the one rowing the boar towards an Island. In the Island, there was one
person waiting. He stayed there for just for about ten (10) minutes, and
during that period, at about one arms length he overheard their conversation
concerning a man to bring the bomb in the car.
The Prosecution also presented Janet Pascual. She testified that on
December of 1994, Beverly was able to duplicate Reynaldos key at the time
when they have shopped for many things, Reynaldo asked her to bring the
goods to the car in the compartment as the kids would still shop. After having
done so, she proceeded to a key duplicator in Virra Mall and had the key
duplicated. Thereafter on the succeeding days or weeks, she was able to
give the duplicate to Malibiran. That they would use the grenade since
Malibiran has one in his house but his only problem is how to get inside the
car and place the grenade.
As to when the killing would take place, the witness heard that they will do it
during the baptism of the child of Gloria, Rolando Malibirans sister. They
chose that date so that they would not be suspected of anything and that
pictures would be taken in the baptism to reflect that Malibiran took part in
the same. During the wake, witness met Malibiran and told her among others
that on the day he placed a grenade on Reynaldos car he saw a security
guard roving and so what he did was to hurriedly tie the wire in the grenade.
As far as she knows, there were four or five grenades placed. She told this
secret to another friend so that in case something happened to her, it was the
doing of Malibiran and Beverly.
On Cross examination, she was asked whether Malibiran did it alone, she
said that he has a look out as what Malibiran told him. When confronted why
she was testifying only now, she said she was bothered by her conscience.
As to how did she get the information of key duplication, she said that it was
told to her by Beverly.
The Trial Court convicted both the accused of the crime charged. The CA
affirmed the conviction. Reynaldo did not appeal hence the judgment of
conviction as to him because final and executory. Only Beverly now comes
before the SC.
Appellant claims that the circumstantial evidence proven during trial only
shows that there was a possibility that appellant may have conspired with
Rolando, but nevertheless claims that it came short of proving her guilt
beyond reasonable doubt. She further argues that the testimony of Oswaldo
was in some parts hearsay and replete with inconsistencies. Specifically,
appellant contends that the testimony of Oswaldo that "he overheard a
conversation between Malibiran (Rolando) and Beverly (appellant) that they
will fetch a man in Bulacan that knows how to place a bomb in a vehicle" is
hearsay. Likewise, in her Reply Brief, appellant claims that the testimony of
Janet is hearsay.
ISSUE: 1) WHETHER OR NOT THE WITNESS TESTIMONY IS HEARSAY NO
2) WHETHER CONVICTION WAS PROPER BASED ON CIRCUMSTANTIAL
EVIDENCE (you may or may not discuss this issue) - YES
HELD:
1) The testimonies of Oswaldo and Janet are not covered by the hearsay
rule.

The hearsay rule states that a witness may not testify as to what he merely
learned from others either because he was told, or he read or heard the
same. This is derived from Section 36, Rule
130, Revised Rules of Court, which requires that a witness can testify only to
those facts that he knows of or comes from his personal knowledge, that is,
that are derived from his perception. Hearsay testimony may not be received
as proof of the truth of what he has learned.
The law, however, provides for specific exceptions to the hearsay rule. One is
the doctrine of independently relevant statements, where only the fact that
such statements were made is relevant, and the truth or falsity thereof is
immaterial. The hearsay rule does not apply; hence, the statements are
admissible as evidence. Evidence as to the making of such statement is not
secondary but primary, for the statement itself may constitute a fact in issue
or be circumstantially relevant as to the existence of such a fact. The witness
who testifies thereto is competent because he heard the same, as this is a
matter of fact derived from his own perception, and the purpose is to prove
either that the statement was made or the tenor thereof.
In this case, Oswaldo's testimony that he overhead a conversation between
Rolando and appellant that they would fetch a man in Bulacan who knew
how to place a bomb in a vehicle is admissible, if only to establish the fact
that such statement was made and the tenor thereof. Likewise, Janet may
testify on matters not only uttered in her presence, since these may be
considered as independently relevant statements, but also personally
conveyed to her by appellant and Rolando.
2) There is nothing on record to convince the Court to depart from the
findings of the RTC. On the contrary, the testimony of Janet as corroborated
by Oswaldo, though circumstantial, leaves no doubt that appellant had in fact
conspired with Rolando in bringing about the death of her husband Reynaldo.
As a rule of ancient respectability now molded into tradition, circumstantial
evidence suffices to convict, only if the following requisites concur: (a) there
is more than one circumstance; (b) the facts from which the inferences are
derived are proven; and (c) the combination of all the circumstances is such
as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.
AS TO APPELLANTS FLIGHT/EVASION OF ARREST:
What sealed appellant's fate was that, as observed by the RTC, there were
already outstanding warrants of arrest against appellant and Rolando as
early as September 11, 1997; yet they evaded arrest and were only arrested
on December 4, 1998. It is well settled that flight, when unexplained, is a
circumstance from which an inference of guilt may be drawn. "The wicked
flee, even when no man pursueth; but the righteous are as bold as a lion.
Appellant did not even proffer the slightest explanation for her flight.
AS TO HER INDIFFERENCE/LACK OF EMOTIONS:
Appellant's seeming indifference or lack of emotions cannot be categorically
quantified as an indicium of her guilt. There is no hard and fast gauge for
measuring a person's reaction or behavior when confronted with a startling,
not to mention horrifying, occurrence. It has already been stated that
witnesses of startling occurrences react differently depending upon their
situation and state of mind, and there is no standard form of human
behavioral response when one is confronted with a strange, startling or
frightful experience. The workings of the human mind placed under emotional
stress are unpredictable, and people react differently some may shout,
some may faint and others may be shocked into insensibility. Also,
appellant's failure to testify in her defense should not be taken against her.
The Court preserves the rule that an accused has the right to decline to
testify at the trial without any inference of guilt drawn from his failure to be on
the witness stand. The constitutional right to be presumed innocent still
prevails.

G.R. No. L-28655 August 6, 1928

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee, vs.
EUGENIO TOLEDO and SISENANDO HOLGADO, defendants. EUGENIO
TOLEDO, appellant.
FACTS:
Sisenando Holgado and Filomeno Morales had disputes about the
occupation of certain land situated in the municipality of Pinamalayan,
Province of Mindoro. On the morning of June 15, 1927, the two men
happened to meet. The argument was renewed, and they agreed to fight.
They did engage in a bolo duel with a fatal result for Filomeno Morales, who
was killed almost instantly. Sisenando Holgado was also seriously wounded
but was able to proceed to a neighboring house. From there Sisenando
Holgado was taken to the municipal building where he made a sworn
statement before the municipal president, in which he declared that only he
and Filomeno Morales fought. About one month later, Sisenando Holgado
died from the wounds received in the fight.
The prosecution and the defense alike agree on the facts above outlined. The
disputable point is whether the accused Eugenio Toledo intervened in the
quarrel and dealt a mortal blow to Filomeno Morales. For the prosecution,
there was presented the witness Justina Villanueva, the querida of Filomeno
Morales, who testified to the presence and participation of Eugenio Toledo.
Her testimony was partially corroborated by that of the witness Justina Llave.
On the other hand, the theory for the defense was that Toledo was in another
place when the fight between Morales and Holgado occurred and that his
only participation was on meeting Holgado, who was his landlord or master,
in helping him to a nearby house. To this effect is the testimony of the
accused and of Conrado Holgado, the son of Sisenando Holgado. The
defense also relied upon the affidavit of Sisenando Holgado (EXHIBIT 1) ,
which was identified by the municipal president of Pinamalayan.
The Court of First Instance of Mindoro did not appreciate EXHIBIT 1 and
found him guilty of the crime of homicide.
ISSUE: WHETHER THE DECLARATIONS OF A PERSON OTHER THAN
ACCUSED CONFESSING OR TENDING TO SHOW THAT HE COMMITTED
THE CRIME ARE NOT COMPETENT FOR ACCUSED ON ACCOUNT OF
THE HEARSAY DOCTRINE.
HELD: THE CFI FAILED TO APPRECIATE EXHIBIT 1.
Hearsay evidence, with a few well recognized exceptions. One universally
recognized exception concerns the admission of dying declarations. Another
exception permits the reception, under certain circumstances, of declarations
of third parties made contrary to their own pecuniary or proprietary interest.
A dying declaration is admitted of necessity in order, as the Supreme Court of
Mississippi states, "to reach those man slayers who perpetrate their crimes
when there are no other eyewitnesses." But the person accused of a crime,
under the same principle of necessity, is not permitted to free himself by
offering in evidence the admission of another under oath that this other
committed the crime. Again admissions are receivable against either a
pecuniary or a proprietary interest, but not against a penal interest (This was
the rule before; now it is admissible against penal interest). We fail to see
why it can be believed that a man will be presumed to tell the truth in the one
instance but will not be presumed to tell the truth in the other instance. Again
the exhibit would have been admitted against its maker at his trial, if he had
not died. But the document is held inadmissible to exonerate another.

The purpose of all evidence is to get at the truth. The reason for the hearsay
rule is that the extrajudicial and unsworn statement of another is not the best
method of serving this purpose. In other words, the great possibility of the
fabrication of falsehoods, and the inability to prove their untruth, requires that
the doors be closed to such evidence. So long therefore as a declarant is
available as a witness, his extrajudicial statement should not be heard.
Where, however, the declarant is dead or has disappeared, his previous
statements, out of court, if not inadmissible on other grounds, are the best
evidence. But they are not rendered inadmissible by the mere fact that the
declarant is unavailable, something else is necessary. One fact which will
satisfy this necessity is that the declaration is or was against the declarant's
interest, and this is because no sane person will be presumed to tell a
falsehood to his own detriment.

[G.R. No. 111149. September 5, 1997]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. RENATO
BAUTISTA, ARMAN HERNANDEZ, ARNOLD MENDOZA & JESS
SABARIN (At large), defendants-appellants.

perception xxx.[8] Any other testimonial evidence outside the witness

personal knowledge is hearsay and downright inadmissible. In fact, hearsay
evidence, even if not objected to during trial and thus admitted, should carry
no probative value whatsoever.[9] Nevertheless, the Rules and jurisprudence
provide certain well- recognized exceptions to the hearsay rule among which
is a dying declaration found under Section 37, Rule 130:
Dying declaration--- The declaration of a dying person, made under the
consciousness of an impending death, may be received in any case wherein
his death is the subject of inquiry, as evidence of the cause and surrounding
circumstances of such death.
There are two (2) obvious reasons for the admissibility of a dying declaration:
(a) necessity and (b) trustworthiness. Necessity, because the declarants
death renders impossible his taking the witness stand. And trustworthiness,
since the declaration is made in extremity, when the party is at the point of
death and every hope of this world is gone; when every motive to falsehood
is silenced, and the mind is induced by the most powerful consideration to
speak the truth. A situation so solemn and awful is considered by the law as
creating an obligation equal to that which is imposed by an oath administered
in court,[10] There are four (4) requirements for the admissibility of a dying
declaration, to wit:

Facts:
[1] That death is imminent and the declarant is conscious of that fact;
This involves a murder case against one Rodel Yarza who arrived at his
home from Divisoria, and told his wife Zenaida after dinner to play pusoy (a
game of cards) somewhere in their neighborhood.

[2] That the declaration refers to the cause and surrounding circumstances of
such death;

At about 9oclock in the eve, his wife went out to fetch her husband and was
told by the latter to go home ahead and would soon follow her.

[3] That the declaration relates to facts which the victim is competent to testify
to; and

Shortly after the wife reached home, she was informed by her brother (Alex
Tablizo) that her husband was seriously stabbed and was brought to the
nearby hospital.

[4] That the declaration is offered in a case wherein the declarants death is
the subject of inquiry

The wife left immediately to see her husband, and upon arrival, she went
beside him and asked who it was who stabbed him. He replied: Nette, my
playmates and the one who stabbed me was Rene.
Soon after, due to financial reasons, the victim was forced to transfer to
another hospital. At around 2:30 in the morning, he was pronounced dead.
Trial Court issued warrants of arrest against the four accused, but only
Renato Bautista was arrested at his parents home while the other three
remained at large.
Upon arraignment, accused pleaded not guilty and posed different version of
story (read fulltext, not worth repeated, only weak alibis)
Eventually, TC and CA convicted the accused.
Maintaining his innocence, accused-appellant argued that the testimony of
Zenaida Yarza should not be admitted as a dying declaration simply because
it was not made under the consciousness of impending death.
Issue: WON Zenaidas testimony is admissible?
Held:
YES, as an exception to the hearsay rule.
The general rule is that [A] witness can testify only to those facts which he
knows of his personal knowledge; that is, which are derived from his own

In the given case, while it is true that the victim, Rodel Yarza, did not explicitly
mention that he knows or feels that he is about to die, this does not negative
the fact that the victim, who was already pale, weak from a fatal wound, and
perspiring profusely, was conscious of his impending death at the time he
declared to his wife who attacked and stabbed him. He in fact died a few
hours thereafter. The law does not require that the declarant explicitly state
his perception[12] that he has given up the hope of life.[13] It is enough if,
from the circumstances, it can be inferred with certainty that such must have
been his state of mind.[14] Judged by the nature and extent of his wounds,
there can be no other conclusion than that the victim must have realized the
seriousness of his condition. Thus, it can safely be inferred that he made the
declaration under the consciousness of impending death.
Accused-appellant insists that had the victim believed his death was
imminent, he would have immediately given the details of the attack against
him; instead, he acquiesced to his wifes suggestion, while they were at the
hospital, that they talk about it later after his condition be safe first.[19] Thus,
the defense argues, the victim Rodel Yarza, at the time he gave his so-called
dying declaration was confident that he would recover from his wounds.
We are unpersuaded. The hope to survive, as we know, springs eternal in the
human heart, but then the victim knew in this case that his life was,
notwithstanding medical intervention, slowly ebbing away. Contrary to the
contention of the defense, Rodel Yarzas alleged acquiesence to his wifes
suggestion that they talk about the details of the incident later when his
condition be safe first bolsters the position that, indeed, the victim was only
too aware of the seriousness of his condition.
Moreover, the fact that Rodel Yarza did not expire right after his declaration to
his wife at about 10:00 oclock in the evening of December 14, 1989, but
survived until 2:30 oclock the following morning, or about four (4) hours from

the time he made the declaration, will not alter the probative force of his
dying declaration since it is not indispensable that a declarant expires
immediately thereafter. It is the belief in impending death and not the rapid
succession of death, in point of fact, that renders the dying declaration
admissible
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the court a quo is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.
rkd/

G.R. No. 163217 April 18, 2006

CELESTINO MARTURILLAS, Petitioner,
-versusPEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,Respondent.
Facts:
This is a Davao City homicide case against Celestino Marturillas who shot
Artemio Pantinople that led to the latter's untimely death about 7:30 in the
evening of November 4, 1998.
His death was recounted by Lito Santos who was then eating supper in their
kitchen when he heard a gunshot. Moments later, he saw Artemio clasping
his chest and Artemio shouted to him, Tabangi ko Pre, gipusil ko ni kapitan,
meaning Help me, Pre, I was shot by the captain. Lito, however, did not
approach Artemio right after the shooting incident as his wife warned him not
to coz he might also be shot.
Lito did not see the person who shot Artemio because his attention was then
focused on Artemio.
Shortly, Lito saw Ernita Pantinople, the wife of Artemio, coming from her
house towards the direction where Artemio was sprawled on the ground.
Ernita was hysterical, jumping and shouting, Kapitan, bakit mo binaril ang
aking asawa. She also repeatedly cried for help.
At the same instance, Ernita also recounted that while she was preparing
milk for her baby, she suddenly heard the sound of a gunburst followed by a
shout, Help me Pre, I was shot by the captain. She immediately pushed open
the window of their kitchen and saw the suspect (herein Appellant) wearing a
black jacket and camouflage pants running across the street while carrying
with him a long firearm which looked like an M-14 rifle and from there
disappeared.
Ernita had a clear view of appellant at that time because their place was wellillumined by the full moon that night and by the two (2) fluorescent lamps in
their store which were switched on at the time of the incident.
Ernita immediately went out of their house and ran towards Artemio. Artemio
tried to speak to her but he could not do so because his mouth was full of
blood. Upon seeing the pitiful sight of her husband, Ernita shouted several
times, Kapitan, ngano nimo gipatay and akong bana. She also repeatedly
called her neighbors for help but only Lito Santos, Eufemio Antenero,
Norman Libre and some residents of Poblacion Gatungan responded to her
calls and approached them. She noted that no member of the CFO and
CAFGU came to help them. Also, no barangay tanod came to offer them to
help.
While waiting for the police, Ernita did not allow Artemios body to be touched
by anybody. After more than two (2) hours, the police arrived, together with a
photographer who took pictures of the crime scene.
Armed with the information that appellant was the one responsible for the
shooting of Artemio, the police proceeded to the house of appellant and
invited him to go with him to the police station and also to bring along with
him his M-14 rifle. Appellant did not say anything. Appellant did not also give
any statement to anybody about the incident.

The appellant presented different version of story and maintained his

innocence to the charges, considering that his hands do not contain
gunpowder nitrates.
The CA affirmed the findings of the RTC that the guilt of petitioner had been
established beyond reasonable doubt. According to the appellate court, he
was positively identified as the one running away from the crime scene
immediately after the gunshot. This fact, together with the declaration of the
victim himself that he had been shot by the captain, clearly established the
latters complicity in the crime.
On the other hand, the CA also rejected his defenses of denial and alibi.
Hence, this Petition.
Issues
In sum, petitioner raises two main issues: 1) whether the prosecutions
evidence is credible; and 2) whether it is sufficient to convict him of homicide.
Under the first main issue, he questions the (a) positive identification made
by the prosecution witnesses; (b) the alleged inconsistencies between their
Affidavits and court testimonies; and (3) the plausibility of the allegation that
the victim had uttered, Tabangi ko pre, gipusil ko ni kapitan (Help me pre, I
was shot by the captain), which was considered by the two lower courts
either as his dying declaration or as part of res gestae. x x x
Held:
The Petition is unmeritorious.
First Main Issue:
Statements Uttered
Contemporaneous with the Crime
Ernita positively testified that immediately after the shooting, she had heard
her husband say, Help me pre, I was shot by the captain. This statement was
corroborated by another witness, Lito Santos, who testified on the events
immediately preceding and subsequent to the shooting.
It should be clear that Santos never testified that petitioner was the one who
had actually shot the victim. Still, the testimony of this witness is valuable,
because it validates the statements made by Ernita. He confirms that after
hearing the gunshot, he saw the victim and heard the latter cry out those
same words.
Petitioner insinuates that it was incredible for Santos to have seen the victim,
but not the assailant. The CA dismissed this argument thus:
x x x. The natural reaction of a person who hears a loud or startling command
is to turn towards the speaker. Moreover, witnessing a crime is an unusual
experience that elicits different reactions from witnesses, for which no clearcut standard of behavior can be prescribed. Litos reaction is not unnatural.
He was more concerned about Artemios condition than the need to ascertain
the identity of Artemios assailant.[34]
It was to be expected that, after seeing the victim stagger and hearing the cry
for help, Santos would shift his attention to the person who had uttered the
plea quoted earlier. A shift in his focus of attention would sufficiently explain
why Santos was not able to see the assailant.
Dying Declaration
Having established that the victim indeed uttered those words, the question
to be resolved is whether they can be considered as part of the dying
declaration
of
the
victim.
Rule 130, Section 37 of the Rules of Court, provides:
The declaration of a dying person, made under the consciousness of
impending death, may be received in any case wherein his death is the
subject of inquiry, as evidence of the cause and surrounding circumstances
of such death.
Generally, witnesses can testify only to those facts derived from their own
perception. A recognized exception, though, is a report in open court of a
dying persons declaration made under the consciousness of an impending
death that is the subject of inquiry in the case.[37]
Statements identifying the assailant, if uttered by a victim on the verge of
death, are entitled to the highest degree of credence and respect.[38]
Persons aware of an impending death have been known to be genuinely
truthful in their words and extremely scrupulous in their accusations.[39] The
dying declaration is given credence, on the premise that no one who knows

of ones impending death will make a careless and false accusation.[40]

Hence, not infrequently, pronouncements of guilt have been allowed to rest
solely on the dying declaration of the deceased victim.[41]
To be admissible, a dying declaration must 1) refer to the cause and
circumstances surrounding the declarants death; 2) be made under the
consciousness of an impending death; 3) be made freely and voluntarily
without coercion or suggestions of improper influence; 4) be offered in a
criminal case, in which the death of the declarant is the subject of inquiry;
and 5) have been made by a declarant competent to testify as a witness, had
that person been called upon to testify.[42]
The statement of the deceased certainly concerned the cause and
circumstances surrounding his death. He pointed to the person who had shot
him. As established by the prosecution, petitioner was the only person
referred to as kapitan in their place.[43] It was also established that the
declarant, at the time he had given the dying declaration, was under a
consciousness
of
his
impending
death.
True, he made no express statement showing that he was conscious of his
impending death. The law, however, does not require the declarant to state
explicitly a perception of the inevitability of death.[44] The perception may be
established from surrounding circumstances, such as the nature of the
declarants injury and conduct that would justify a conclusion that there was a
consciousness of impending death.[45] Even if the declarant did not make an
explicit statement of that realization, the degree and seriousness of the words
and the fact that death occurred shortly afterwards may be considered as
sufficient evidence that the declaration was made by the victim with full
consciousness of being in a dying condition.[46]
Also, the statement was made freely and voluntarily, without coercion or
suggestion, and was offered as evidence in a criminal case for homicide. In
this case, the declarant was the victim who, at the time he uttered the dying
declaration, was competent as a witness.
As found by the CA, the dying declaration of the victim was complete, as it
was a full expression of all that he intended to say as conveying his meaning.
It [was] complete and [was] not merely fragmentary.[47] Testified to by his
wife and neighbor, his dying declaration was not only admissible in evidence
as an exception to the hearsay rule, but was also a weighty and telling piece
of evidence.
Res Gestae
The fact that the victims statement constituted a dying declaration does not
preclude it from being admitted as part of the res gestae, if the elements of
both are present.[48]
Section 42 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court provides:
Part of the res gestae. -- Statements made by a person while a startling
occurrence is taking place or immediately prior or subsequent thereto with
respect to the circumstances thereof, may be given in evidence as part of the
res gestae. So, also, statements accompanying an equivocal act material to
the issue, and giving it a legal significance, may be received as part of the
res gestae.
Res gestae refers to statements made by the participants or the victims of, or
the spectators to, a crime immediately before, during, or after its commission.
[49] These statements are a spontaneous reaction or utterance inspired by
the excitement of the occasion, without any opportunity for the declarant to
fabricate a false statement.[50] An important consideration is whether there
intervened, between the occurrence and the statement, any circumstance
calculated to divert the mind and thus restore the mental balance of the
declarant; and afford an opportunity for deliberation.[51]
A declaration is deemed part of the res gestae and admissible in evidence as
an exception to the hearsay rule, when the following requisites concur: 1) the
principal act, the res gestae, is a startling occurrence; 2) the statements were
made before the declarant had time to contrive or devise; and 3) the
statements concerned the occurrence in question and its immediately
attending circumstances.[52]
All these requisites are present in this case. The principal act, the shooting,
was a startling occurrence. Immediately after, while he was still under the

exciting influence of the startling occurrence, the victim made the declaration
without any prior opportunity to contrive a story implicating petitioner. Also,
the declaration concerned the one who shot the victim. Thus, the latters
statement was correctly appreciated as part of the res gestae.
Aside from the victims statement, which is part of the res gestae, that of
Ernita -- Kapitan, ngano nimo gipatay ang akong bana? (Captain, why did
you shoot my husband?) -- may be considered to be in the same category.
Her statement was about the same startling occurrence; it was uttered
spontaneously, right after the shooting, while she had no opportunity to
concoct a story against petitioner; and it related to the circumstances of the
shooting.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff, vs. MAJOR EMILIO COMILING,

GIL SALAGUBANG (acquitted), MARIO CLOTARIO (acquitted),
GERALDO GALINGAN, EDDIE CALDERON (at large), BALOT
CABOTAJE (at large) and RICKY MENDOZA (at large), accused.
MAJOR EMILIO COMILING and GERALDO GALINGAN, appellants.
Facts:
Maj. Emilio Comiling, Geraldo Galingan alias Bong and Ricky Mendoza alias
Leo were convicted of the crime of robbery with homicide
The records show that at sundown on September 2, 1995, Ysiong Chua, the
owner of Masterline Grocery and his helper Mario were about to close the
store when someone knocked on the door to buy some cigarettes.
As soon as Mario opened the door, three masked, armed men suddenly
barged into the store and announced a hold-up. One of the robbers shoved
Ysiong into the recesses of the grocery where he threatened to kill him if he
did not give them his earnings. Ysiong retorted that he only had a small
amount, which remark apparently irked the robber who then hit Ysiongs
thumb with the butt of his gun. A simultaneous kick made the grocer fall down
in pain.
As Ysiong lay prostrate on the floor, he saw the two other intruders, and a
little later the robber who hit him, ransacking the drawers of his desk.
Fortunately, he was able to quickly recover from the blows; whereupon he
darted to the adjacent Good Taste Bakery and out to the Tayug Police Station
farther west along Quezon Blvd. to report the incident.
SPO1 Rolando Torio, PO3 Erwil Pastor and SPO4 Emilio Nagui of the Tayug
Police Station rushed to the crime scene where SPO1 Torio chanced upon
Sonny Rimas, a barangay councilman, and his friend Jessie Batalla at the
grocery entrance. He asked them if they knew what was going on inside the
store but the two did not answer. While SPO1 Torio was standing outside the
stores door, he heard three gunshots coming from inside the store, all
directed towards Bonifacio Street. PO3 Pastor was then on the street while
Nagui was some 50 meters away. PO3 Pastor ran and hid behind a concrete
marker, then moved westward as if to return to the police headquarters.
Unfortunately, in his attempt to flee, PO3 Pastor was shot in the face. He was
rushed to the Eastern Pangasinan District Hospital. On September 6, 1995,
PO3 Pastor died from the injury he suffered.
PO3 Erwil Pastor identified Galingan as the robber who shot him. In the
emergency room of the Eastern Pangasinan District Hospital, at around 7:00
p.m. on September 2, 1995, Pastor moaned I might die. I might die. in the
presence of SPO1 Conrado Hidalgo and SPO4 Emilio Nagui. Hence, PO3
Pastors statements were taken down by SPO1 Hidalgo who assisted PO3
Pastor in affixing his thumbmark with his own blood:

Q Who shot you? A Bong Galingan, x x x [19]

G.R. No. 173608 November 20, 2008

On September 26, 1995, bothered by her conscience, prosecution witness

Naty Panimbaan decided to reveal to police authorities what she knew about
the case. During the trial, she testified that she was present in all the four
meetings in which the plan to rob the Masterline Grocery was hatched.

JESUS GERALDO and AMADO ARIATE, petitioners vs. PEOPLE OF THE

PHILIPPINES, respondent.

Trial court rendered its decision:

ACQUITTAL in favor of the accused Gil Salagubang and Mario Clotario alias
Bong.
Maj. emilio comiling, Geraldo galingan and Ricky mendoza were guilty of the
special complex crime of robbery with homicide.
ISSUE: WON PO3 Pastors statement as to the name of the assailant is
considered as a dying declaration?
Ruling:
Under Rule 130, Section 37 of the Rules of Court, the declaration of a dying
person with the consciousness of impending death may be received in any
case wherein his death is the subject of inquiry, as evidence of the cause and
the surrounding circumstances of such death. There are four requisites which
must concur in order that a dying declaration may be admissible: (1) it must
concern the crime and surrounding circumstances of the declarants death;
(2) at the time it was made, the declarant was under the consciousness of an
impending death; (3) the declarant was competent as a witness; and (4) the
declaration is offered in any criminal case for homicide, murder or parricide in
which the declarant was the victim.[20]
(1) The first requisite is present in the ante-mortem statements of deceased
PO3 Pastor. Certainly, the narration made by Pastor at the hospitals
emergency room before SPO1 Hidalgo and SPO4 Nagui concerned the
cause and surrounding circumstances of the declarants death. The two
policemen heard from the declarants own lips his utterance of the name
Bong Galingan as his assailant. This fact was even testified to by these
policemen.
(2) The declarant, at the time he gave the dying declaration, was conscious
of his impending death. PO3 Pastor knew at the time he was being
questioned that his chances of recovery were nil. In fact, he uttered the
words, I might die. I might die. to signify his perception that death was
forthcoming.
(3) PO3 Pastor, at the time he uttered the dying declaration, was competent
as a witness. This fact is too obvious to warrant further discussion.
(4) The dying declaration of PO3 Pastor was offered as evidence in a criminal
case for robbery with homicide in which the declarant was the victim.
Indubitably, PO3 Pastors dying declaration is complete in the sense that it
was a full expression of all that he wanted to say with regard to the
circumstances of his death. An ante-mortem statement is evidence of the
highest order.[21] It is doctrinal that, when a person is at the point of death,
every motive of falsehood is silenced.[22] The mind is induced by the
strongest of reasons to speak the truth the declarants impending meeting
with his Creator.

Facts:
Petitioners Jesus Geraldo and Amado Ariate were charged with Homicide
against the victim ARTHUR U. RONQUILLO (shot with a gun)
In a document dated July 1, 2002 and denominated as "Affidavit"5 which was
subscribed and sworn to before Clerk of Court II Manuel A. Balasa, Sr. on
July 26, 2002, the victim's son Arnel gave a statement in a question and
answer style that herein petitioners Jesus Geraldo and Amado Ariate were
the ones who shot his father.
In another document dated July 4, 2002 also denominated as "Affidavit"6
which was subscribed and sworn to also before the same Clerk of Court II
Balasa on July 26, 2002, Mirasol also gave a statement in a question and
answer style that her father uttered that herein petitioners shot him.
At the witness stand, Mirasol echoed her father's declaration that "Badjing"
and "Amado" shot him. Arnel substantially corroborated Mirasol's statement.7
Upon the other hand, petitioners gave their side of the case as follows:
Petitioner Ariate, a barangay tanod of Bunga, declared that Barangay
Kagawad Omboy Roz (Roz) woke him up at 3:00 a.m. of July 1, 2002 and
informed him that the victim was shot. He and Roz thus borrowed a tricycle,
proceeded to the crime scene and, along with others, brought the victim to
the hospital where he was pronounced dead on arrival. Ariate submitted
himself to a paraffin test and tested negative for gunpowder residue/nitrates.8
Petitioner Geraldo declared that he slept in his house located also in
Barangay Bunga, Lanuza at 9:30 p.m. of June 30, 2002 and woke up at 4:00
a.m. the following day. At 6:30 a.m., on seeing many people in the vicinity of
the 45-meter away house of one Josita Bongabong where the victim's body
was found, he inquired and learned that the victim was shot. Policemen
subsequently went to his house and advised him to take a paraffin test. He
obliged and was tested at the PNP Crime Laboratory and was found negative
for gunpowder residue/nitrates.9
In the course of the testimony of Ariate, his counsel presented the PNP
Chemistry Report reflecting the negative results of the paraffin test on him
and Geraldo.
RTC: convicted accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Homicide. On the nature and weight of the dying declaration of the victim, the
trial court observed:
A dying declaration may be xxx oral or in writing. As a general rule, a dying
declaration to be admissible must be made by the declarant while he is
conscious of his impending death. However, even if a declarant did not make
a statement that he was on the brink of death, the degree and seriousness of
the wound and the fact that death supervened shortly afterwards may be
considered as substantial evidence that the declaration was made by the
victim with full realization that he was in a dying condition; People vs. Ebrada,
296 SCRA 353.
Even assuming that the declaration is not admissible as a dying declaration,
it is still admissible as part of the res gestae since it was made shortly after
the startling occurrence and under the influence thereof, hence, under the
circumstances, the victim evidently had no opportunity to contrive.15
(Underscoring supplied)

CA: affirmed RTC with modification,hence this appeal.

Petitioners argue:
With due respect, herein petitioners disagree with the holding of the
Honorable Court of Appeals that "It is not necessary that the victim further
identify that "Badjing" was in fact Jesus Geraldo or that "Amado" was Amado
Ariate" because, [so petitioners contend], it is the obligation of the
prosecution to establish with moral certainty that indeed the persons they
identified as the as the assailant of Arthur O. Ronquillo were really the ones
who perpetrated the crime.
Admittedly, prosecution witnesses were able to identify positively herein
petitioners as the alleged assailant[s] of Arthur O. Ronquillo. But said
identification is based on the assumption that they were the very same
"BADJING AMADO" and/or "BADJING AND AMADO" referred to by their
deceased father in his dying declaration.
What the Honorable Court of Appeals failed to consider is that, just because
the victim declared that it was "BADJING AMADO" and/or "BADJING AND
AMADO" who shot him does not necessarily follow that herein petitioners
were really the perpetrators in the absence of proof that the "BADJING"
referred to by him is Jesus Geraldo and that the "AMADO" is Amado Ariate. It
would have been a different story had the prosecution witnesses [been]
eyewitnesses because proof that the "BADJING AMADO" and/or "BADJING
AND AMADO" referred to by the victim and the persons identified by the
prosecution witnesses are the same is unnecessary.
Herein petitioners believe, that even assuming that there are no other
"BADJING" or "AMADO" in the barangay, still it does not follow that the
person[s] referred to by the dying declarant as his assailant were Jesus
Geraldo alias "BADJING" and Amado Ariate alias "AMADO". Although, it is
inconceivable how the Honorable Court of Appeals arrived at the said
conclusion that there are no other "BADJING AMADO" and/or "BADJING
AND AMADO" in the barangay absent any proof to that effect from the
prosecution.22
Issue: WON the dying declaration of the victim as recounted by the latters
son and daughter would be sufficient to sustain the accuseds conviction for
the crime of homicide.
Ruling:
A dying declaration is admissible as evidence if the following circumstances
are present: (a) it concerns the cause and the surrounding circumstances of
the declarant's death; (b) it is made when death appears to be imminent and
the declarant is under a consciousness of impending death; (c) the declarant
would have been competent to testify had he or she survived; and (d) the
dying declaration is offered in a case in which the subject of inquiry involves
the declarant's death.23
There is no dispute that the victim's utterance to his children related to the
identities of his assailants. As for the victim's consciousness of impending
death, it is not necessary to prove that he stated that he was at the brink of
death; it suffices that, judging from
the nature and extent of his injuries, the seriousness of his condition was so
apparent to him that it may safely be inferred that such ante mortem
declaration was made under consciousness of an impending death.24 The
location of the victim's two gunshot wounds, his gasping for breath, and his
eventual death before arriving at the hospital meet this requirement.25
It has not been established, however, that the victim would have been
competent to testify had he survived the attack. There is no showing that he
had the opportunity to see his assailant. Among other things, there is no

indication whether he was shot in front, the post-mortem examination report

having merely stated that the points of entry of the wounds were at the "right
lumbar area" and the "right iliac area."26 "Lumbar" may refer to "the loins" or
"the group of vertebrae lying between the thoracic vertebrae and the
sacrum,"27 or to "the region of the abdomen lying on either side of the
umbilical region and above the corresponding iguinal."28 "Iliac" relates to the
"ilium," which is "one of the three bones composing either lateral half of the
pelvis being in man broad and expanded above and narrower below where it
joins with the ischium and pubis to form part of the actabulum."29
At all events, even if the victim's dying declaration were admissible in
evidence, it must identify the assailant with certainty; otherwise it loses its
significance.30
When there is doubt on the identity of the malefactors, motive is essential for
their conviction.33 The Court notes that in their affidavits supporting the
criminal complaint, the victim's wife and children Mirasol and Arnel proffered
not knowing any possible motive for petitioners to shoot the victim.34 At the
trial, no evidence of any motive was presented by the prosecution.
Petitioners' defense of denial and alibi thus assumes importance.

G.R. No. 188124 June 29, 2010

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. JONEL
FALABRICA SERENAS AND JOEL LORICA LABAD, AccusedAppellants.
FACTS:
On 8 December 2002, at around 10:00 oclock in the evening, Nio Noel
Ramos (Nio) had just brought his girlfriend, Dianne Charisse Gavino
(Dianne), home in Sto. Nio, Paraaque City. On his way back to La Huerta,
he passed by a bridge connecting the barangays of Sto. Nio and La Huerta.
Thereat, Nio was stabbed and mauled.
Cesar Ramos (Cesar), Nios brother, was in the vicinity of N. Domingo
Street in La Huerta when he heard a commotion on the bridge. As he was
about to proceed to the bridge, he met Nio and noticed that his brother was
soaked in his own blood. Nio relayed to Cesar that he was stabbed by JoeAn. Cesar immediately brought Nio to the hospital where the latter expired
thirty (30) minutes later. At the police station, Cesar claimed that appellants
told him that they merely "took fancy" on Nio.
Dianne initially related in her affidavit executed at the police station that her
cousin informed her of a commotion on the bridge. Upon reaching the bridge,
she met a friend who told her that her boyfriend, Nio, was stabbed and
brought to the hospital. She added that one day before the incident, she and
Nio were walking along the bridge when they passed by the group of
appellants and heard Joe-An utter the words, "Iyang mama na iyan, may
araw din siya sa akin." In her testimony during the trial however, she narrated
that she actually saw Joe-An stabbing Nio.
PO3 Ramoncito Lipana (PO3 Lipana) was at the police station in La Huerta
on 8 December 2002 when a woman named Dianne came to report a
stabbing incident involving her boyfriend. PO3 Lipana, together with PO2
Jesus Brigola (PO2 Brigola) and PO3 Marlon Golfo, immediately proceeded
to the crime scene. Upon arriving thereat, the police saw two men
scampering away upon seeing them. They chased the two men, later
identified as Joe-An and Joel. The police managed to catch the appellants
while they were hiding near a bangka under the bridge. Appellants were
brought to the police station where Dianne identified them as the assailants
of Nio.

Dr. Valentin T. Bernales (Dr. Bernales), the medico-legal officer who issued
the autopsy report, testified that the victim was stabbed twice at the back and
the assailant was situated within arms length. The victim succumbed from
the stab wounds, both of which, are fatal. Dr. Bernales also noted that there
were contuse abrasions on different parts of the victims body.
Appellants invoked denial and alibi as their defense. Joe-An, a resident of
Wawa, Sto. Nio, alleged that he was at his house on 8 December 2002.
While he was taking his dinner, he saw people running towards the bridge.
He went out of the house to check on what had happened. He approached a
group of people talking about the commotion. Thereafter, he saw the police
and barangay tanods arrive. He was immediately handcuffed and asked to
go with the police. Joe-An alleged that he was physically forced by the police
to admit the killing of Nio. Joe-An denied knowing the victim or his girlfriend,
Dianne, but admitted that Joel is an acquaintance.
Joel likewise denied his participation in killing Nio. He stated that he was
sleeping at around 11 p.m. on 8 December 2002 when he was awakened by
an argument involving his mother and four (4) men outside his room. He then
got out of the room and saw PO3 Lipana, PO2 Brigola, and two other police
"assets." The group invited him for questioning. When the two assets
suddenly grabbed him, Joel resisted but he was forcibly brought to the police
station. He saw Dianne at the station but the latter did not identify him as the
culprit. Instead, Dianne even sought his help to identify the person who killed
her boyfriend. This fact notwithstanding, the police refused to let him go. He
testified that he did not know the victim or Dianne personally.
The RTC rendered judgment convicting appellants, and were sentenced to
suffer the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA pursuant to R.A. 9346 which
repealed the death penalty law. However, pursuant to Sec. 3 thereof, they are
not eligible for parole.
Lending full credence to the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, the
trial court concluded that the appellants conspired in assaulting and stabbing
Nio. It gave full weight to the dying declaration uttered by Nio to his
brother, as well as the statement of Dianne, who allegedly witnessed
appellants threaten Nio the night before the incident. It also appreciated the
aggravating circumstances of treachery and evident premeditation in the
commission of the crime. Furthermore, the trial court regarded the
uncorroborated testimonies of appellants to be "full of inconsistencies and
unworthy of weight and credence."
The Court of Appeals affirmed with modification the decision of the RTC by
awarding exemplary damages in the amount of P25,000.00.
ISSUE:
(1) Whether the testimonies of the witnesses are sufficient to prove
appellants guilt beyond reasonable doubt?
(2) Whether or not Nios dying declaration is admissible in the case at bar?
RULING:
No.
(1) We respect the findings that Jonel Falabrica Serenas is guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of murder not by virtue of identification by Dianne but as
established by the dying declaration of the victim. Upon the other hand, we
reverse the conviction of Joel Lorica Labad.
The trial court, as affirmed by the Court of Appeals, accorded full weight to
the testimony of the prosecution witness, Dianne, who declared on the
witness stand that she actually saw appellants maul and stab the victim.

Diannes testimony is doubtful to say the least. This Court is mindful of the
rule that if there is an inconsistency between the affidavit and the testimony
of a witness, the latter should be given more weight since affidavits being
taken ex-parte are usually incomplete and inaccurate. Corollary to this is the
doctrine that, where the discrepancies are irreconcilable and unexplained
and they dwell on material points, such inconsistencies necessarily discredit
the veracity of the witness' claim. The second rule is apt to the case at bar.
Nowhere in her affidavit did Dianne point to appellants as the perpetrators of
the crime. From the tenor of her affidavit, Diannes suspicion that appellants
committed the crime merely arose from the alleged threats made by
appellants on the victim the day before the incident.
We cannot simply brush aside the fact that while Dianne pointed to the
persons who threatened to do harm on the victim, she failed to identify who
the perpetrators of the crime are. To the mind of the Court, this omission in
Diannes affidavit is so glaring on a material point, i.e., the failure to attribute
authorship to the crime. Therefore, the testimony of Dianne altogether
becomes suspect.
Nevertheless, the prosecutions case did not necessarily crumble. The
victims dying declaration is a most telling evidence identifying Joe-an.
(2) Yes.
Appellants question the alleged dying declaration of the victim in that they
were not sufficiently identified as the persons responsible for Nios death.
Appellants anchor their argument on the utterance of the word "Joe-An"
when the victim was asked on who stabbed him. Appellants advance that the
victim may have been referring to some other person. Moreover, the victim
did not even mention "Joel" or "Joel Labad," the other suspect.
The OSG defends the victims dying declaration and insists that there was no
mistake that the victim was indeed referring to Joe-An, considering that the
latter was familiar to him.
As an exception to the rule against hearsay evidence, a dying declaration or
ante mortem statement is evidence of the highest order and is entitled to
utmost credence since no person aware of his impending death would make
a careless and false accusation.
In order for a dying declaration to be held admissible, four requisites must
concur: first, the declaration must concern the cause and surrounding
circumstances of the declarant's death; second, at the time the declaration
was made, the declarant must be under the consciousness of an impending
death; third, the declarant is competent as a witness; and fourth, the
declaration must be offered in a criminal case for homicide, murder, or
parricide, in which the declarant is the victim.
All requisites for a dying declaration were sufficiently met by the statement of
the victim communicated to Cesar. First, the statement pertained to Nio
being stabbed, particularly pin-pointing Joe-An as the perpetrator. Second,
Nio must have been fully aware that he was on the brink of death
considering his bloodied condition when Cesar met him near the bridge.
Third, the competence of Nio is
unquestionable had he survived the stabbing incident. Fourth, Nios
statement was being offered in a criminal prosecution for his murder.
Note however that based on the testimonies of witnesses, there was no
direct evidence linking appellant Joel to the crime.
While the police officers caught Joel hiding under the bridge, this incident
appears to be circumstantial and cannot stand to prove Joels complicity
without any corroborating evidence. Admittedly, Joels defense of denial and

alibi are inherently weak, however, it is doctrinal that the weakness of the
defense cannot be the basis for conviction. The primary burden still lies with
the prosecution whose evidence must stand or fall on its own weight and who
must establish by proof beyond reasonable doubt the guilt of the accused
before there can be conviction. At this juncture, we acquit appellant Joel.
The Decision of the Court of Appeals was MODIFIED. Appellant JONEL
FALABRICA SERENAS was found GUILTY of the crime of murder and was
sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. For failure of the
prosecution to establish his guilt beyond reasonable doubt, appellant JOEL
LORICA LABAD was ACQUITTED.

superior strength. The appellant, through the Public Attorney's Office (PAO),
appealed the Decision of the CA to the Supreme Court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Analyns statement can be considered a dying declaration
based on Rule 130 of the Rules of Court?
RULING:
Section 37, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, provides:

G.R. No. 178272 March 14, 2011

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee, vs. RODRIGO SALCEDO alias
"DIGOL," Appellant.

The declaration of a dying person, made under the consciousness of

impending death, may be received in any case wherein his death is the
subject of inquiry, as evidence of the cause and surrounding circumstances
of such death.
Generally, witnesses can testify only to those facts derived from their own
perception. A recognized exception, though, is a report in open court of a
dying person's declaration made under the consciousness of an impending
death that is the subject of inquiry in the case.

FACTS:
The evidence of the prosecution follows:
Geraldino Galido (Geraldino) testified that at 9 o'clock in the evening of
November 6, 1994, while he was in his house together with his two brothers,
his brother-in-law and second cousin, they heard three (3) shouts for help
coming from the house of Efren Galido (Efren). They immediately went to the
place and at the distance of about 7 to 8 meters, he saw appellant stab the
victim Analyn twice while she was lying on her back. He was able to identify
the appellant because of the torch being carried by the women near him.
Efren, live-in partner of Analyn, testified that appellant is known as "Digol" in
their place. At 9 o'clock in the evening of November 6, 1994, he was at the
house of his elder brother Geraldino, which is about 100 meters away from
his house. While at the house of his brother, he heard a shout coming from
his niece, Ivy Jean Borra. Upon hearing Ivy, he immediately ran home. When
he arrived home, he saw his son sleeping, so he went downstairs and
proceeded to the road where he met his sister-in-law holding a torch. He got
a torch from his sister-in-law, went ahead and looked for Analyn. He found
Analyn lying and moaning on the grassy portion of the side of the road about
20 meters away from their house. He lifted Analyn and saw blood coming
from her breast. He asked Analyn who did it to her and Analyn answered,
"Digol." He placed Analyn on the ground and tried to run after the person who
did it to her, but he was restrained by his brother.
Dr. Edgardo Jabasa testified that he conducted an autopsy on the body of
Analyn. He found nine (9) stab wounds in the body of Analyn. Two of the stab
wounds penetrated the heart, making it impossible for the victim to survive.
He also testified that Analyn's uterus was enlarged at 6 to 7 months gestation
with a dead male fetus. He further testified that the wounds appear to have
been inflicted by a single sharp bladed and pointed instrument.
Upon the other hand, the defense adduced the testimonies of the appellant,
Felimon Salcedo, Marcelina Lecta and Mario Manatoc. Appellant's main
defense is alibi.
The RTC of San Miguel, Jordan, Guimaras rendered a Decision finding
appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder.
Appellant filed a Notice of Appeal and the case was elevated to the CA for
review. The CA rendered a Decision affirming with modification the decision
of the RTC. It ruled that the appellant is guilty of murder qualified by abuse of

In order for a dying declaration to be held admissible, four requisites must

concur: first, the declaration must concern the cause and surrounding
circumstances of the declarant's death; second, at the time the declaration
was made, the declarant must be under the consciousness of an impending
death; third, the declarant is competent as a witness; and fourth, the
declaration must be offered in a criminal case for homicide, murder, or
parricide, in which the declarant is the victim.
All the requisites for a dying declaration were sufficiently met. First, the
statement of the deceased concerned the cause and circumstances
surrounding her death. When asked who stabbed her, Analyn uttered the
name of the appellant. Further, as proven during trial, appellant was the only
person referred to as "Digol" in their place. Second, the victim must have
been fully aware that she was on the brink of death, considering her bloodied
condition and the gaping wounds on her chest when Efren saw her. True, she
made no express statement showing that she was conscious of her
impending death, however, the degree and seriousness of the wounds and
the fact that death occurred shortly afterwards may be considered as
sufficient evidence that the declaration was made by the victim with full
realization that she was in a dying condition. Third, the declarant, at the time
she uttered the dying declaration, was competent as a witness. Fourth, the
victim's statement was being offered in a criminal prosecution for her murder.
Thus, Analyn's condemnatory ante mortem statement naming appellant as
her assailant deserves full faith and credit and is admissible in evidence as a
dying declaration.
The dying declaration is given credence, on the premise that no one who
knows of one's impending death will make a careless and false accusation.
Going now to the appellant's main defense of alibi, appellant claims that at
the time of the incident he was at the house of his sister Marcelina. Marcelina
corroborated appellant's testimony, while Felimon alleged that before he left
Marcelina's house at around 8:30 in the evening, appellant was still there.
Aside from the foregoing testimonies of the defense witnesses, the defense
was unable to show that it was physically impossible for appellant to be at the
scene of the crime. Basic is the rule that for alibi to prosper, the accused
must prove that he was somewhere else when the crime was committed and
that it was physically impossible for him to have been at the scene of the
crime.Physical impossibility refers to the distance between the place where
the appellant was when the crime transpired and the place where it was
committed, as well as the facility of access between the two places. Where

there is the least chance for the accused to be present at the crime scene,
the defense of alibi must fail.
WHEREFORE, the appeal was DISMISSED. The Decision of the Court of
Appeals was AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS. Appellant Rodrigo Salcedo,
alias Digol, was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder,
and was sentenced to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua without any
benefit of parole under R.A. No. 9346.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ABUNDIO

ROLUNA, accused-appellant.

In the early case of People v. Sasota, 9 the Court affirmed the conviction of
the accused for murder although the body of the victim was not found or
recovered. In said case, the SC ruled that in case of murder or homicide, it is
not necessary to recover the body of the victim or show where it can be
found. It is enough that the death and the criminal agency causing death is
proven. The Court recognized that there are cases where the death and
intervention of the criminal agency that caused it may be presumed or
established by circumstantial evidence.
However, the ruling in the Sasota case cannot be applied to the case at
bench. In the Sasota case, the prosecution witnesses saw the four (4) armed
accused forcibly take the victim from his house to a lake, beating him up all
the way to the boat. While sailing, the accused continued ill-treating the
victim until the latter died. The body of the victim was never found.

In an Information, eight (8) persons including accused Roluna were charged

with the crime of Kidnapping with Murder. The other seven were at-large.

In this case, however, the prosecution witnesses testified that they merely
saw one of the accused, Carlos Daguing, tie up the hands of Moronia. He
was then taken in the direction of barangay Monterico and was never seen or
heard from since. At no point during the trial was it ever established that any
of the eight (8) accused beat up Moronia or in any way laid a violent hand on
him.

The prosecution presented two (2) witnesses, namely, Conrado Sombilon

and Buenaventura Nogalada, both of whom were residents of barangay
Amguhan, Baybay, Leyte.

Nogalada even testified that he did not hear any shot fired by any of the eight
(8) armed accused 10 so as to warrant a reasonable conclusion that Moronia
was killed by accused-appellant or any of his co-conspirators.

CONRADO SOMBILON testified that on May 27, 1984, at around seven

o'clock in the morning, he was on his way to sitio Bungabungan in barangay
Amguhan to attend to the pasture of his carabao. At a distance of thirty (30)
meters, he saw his neighbor, Anatalio Moronia, stopped in his tracks and
taken captive by accused Abundio Roluna. Roluna was then accompanied by
seven (7) other persons who are the other accused in this case. Accused
Roluna was armed with an armalite while his companions were carrying short
firearms. Using an abaca strip, he saw Carlos Daguing tie up the hands of
Moronia at the back. Frightened, he did not shout for help and proceeded on
his way. With the exception of his wife, he did not inform anyone about what
he saw that fateful day.

Indeed, even the possible motive of accused-appellant and his group for
abducting Moronia was not definitively established.

FACTS:

BUENAVENTURA NOGALADA corroborated in substance the testimony of

Sombilon. He testified that on said day, at around nine o'clock in the morning,
he came from his farm in barangay Monterico, Baybay and was on his way
home to barangay Amguhan. At a distance of about twenty-five (25) meters,
he saw Moronia walking along a human trail in barangay Amguhan, with his
hands tied by a rope behind his back. Moronia was followed by accused
Roluna, Carlos Daguing and five (5) other persons whom he did not
recognize. Accused Roluna was carrying an armalite while Carlos Daguing
was armed with a pistol. Frightened, Nogalada immediately left the place.
From that time on, both witnesses testified that Moronia was never seen or
heard from.
RTC: Roluna is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the complex crime of
Kidnapping With Murder
Hence this appeal.
ISSUE:
WON the evidence presented by the prosecution surrounding the events of
that fateful day are sufficient to establish the alleged liability of accusedappellant for the death of Moronia
RULING:
No.

There being no evidence to the contrary, the disputable presumption under

Section 5 (x) (3), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court would apply, but only insofar
as to establish the presumptive death of Moronia.
Whether accused-appellant is responsible for the death of Moronia is a
different matter.
The Rules did not authorize that from this disputable presumption of death, it
should be further presumed that the person with whom the absentee was last
seen
shall
be
responsible
for
the
subsequent
unexplained
absence/disappearance of the latter.
It is a well-entrenched principle in criminal law that an accused is presumed
innocent until proven otherwise. No less than proof beyond reasonable doubt
is required to convict him. On the whole, the evidence adduced by the
prosecution would not prove beyond a shadow of a doubt that accusedappellant should be convicted for the serious crime of kidnapping with
murder.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
Since none of the circumstances mentioned in Article 267 of the Revised
Penal Code (kidnapping with serious illegal detention) was proved and only
the fact of kidnapping of Anatalio Moronia was established, we find that the
crime committed is slight illegal detention under Article 268 of the Revised
Penal Code. In the execution of the crime, more than three (3) armed
malefactors acted together in its commission. Thus, since the generic
aggravating circumstance of band 11 attended the commission of the crime
and there being no mitigating circumstance present, the penalty of reclusion
temporal in its maximum period as maximum and prision mayor as minimum
should be imposed on accused-appellant. 12

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ALEX PADRONES

And JOSEPH BIARE @ "JOJO" BIARE, accused-appellants.
FACTS:
The two accused, Padrones and Biare, appealed from the judgment of the
Regional Trial Court, 1 finding them guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the
murder of Lorenzo Sison.
The above conviction was based principally on the testimony of an alleged
eyewitness, Antonio Llaneta, the testimony of Dr. Jose Velasquez, and an
alleged ante-mortem statement of the late Lorenzo Sison.

could render succor or save him;" 21 (4) the deceased could not have
threatened the accused, Alex Padrones, or accost him challengingly, because
"[dluring one's birthday one is engrossed with his friends and no doubt did
never (sic) think or prepare for any trouble; 22 and that (5) Padrones could
not have been the victim of a mauling because "he did not submit [himself]
for treatment. (read the full text kay lingaw ang findings sa RTC :p )
ISSUE:
1. WON the handwritten statement of deceased Sison is admissible as
evidence. NO
2. WON Biare shall be convicted? NO

The records of the case disclose that the victim was at the MGR Family
Disco and Restaurant MGR for brevity), at Surallah, South Cotabato,
celebrating his birthday over beer and refreshment with about fourteen
nephews and nieces, 3 whereupon the two accused-appellants arrived, one
after the other. Joseph Biare arrived at about 12:30 or one o'clock in the
morning of August 4, 1986, and about ten minutes later, Alex Padrones
appeared.
The two accused were friends who had not met for six months. They
exchanged pleasantries and separated thereafter. Padrones sat at a table
where he met certain women with one of whom he danced. Biare meanwhile
sat alone on another table.
The victim then approached Padrones, squeezed his mouth, and uttered
challenging words: "Are you not afraid of the Sisons?" 6 (In apparent
reference to the Sisons of South Cotabato, a family with a long history of
local and national political authority and clout).
Padrones blocked the victim's hand and alleged that he saw a knife shining
amidst blinking disco lights.7 He likewise alleged that the Victim began
attacking him with his knife, which he was able to parry with his left hand.
Antonio Llaneta, who was with the victim, struck him (Padrones) on the left
cheek.
When the brawl ended, Biare brought Padrones to the latters home.
On August 6, 1986, the authorities commenced frustrated homicide charges
against Alex Padrones only.
On August 13, 1986, Lorenzo Sison signed a handwritten statement in his
hospital bed to the Surallah police accusing Padrones of having inflicted one
stab wound on him. He also implicated Biare and charged him with stabbing
him once. 15
On August 21, 1986, he expired on account of respiratory failure and internal
bleeding.
Fiscal Isaac Moran of the Provincial Fiscal's office filed an amended
information accusing both accused of murder, qualified by treachery and
evident premeditation.
RTC convicted both accused of murder.
RTCs findings:
(1) the two accused-appellants went to MGR on August 3, 1986 in a wellplanned conspiracy to eliminate the deceased; (2) they pretended that they
had just met there by chance, but had all along plotted to kill the victim; (3)
the accused-appellant, Joseph Biare, deliberately positioned himself so that
"no one of the several companions of the victim who celebrated his birthday

RULING:
1. It constitutes hearsay evidence and is inadmissible.
The victim's alleged antemortem statement is not in fact, an antemortem
statement. 41 It was executed on August 13, 1986, when the deceased died
on August 21, 1986. A dying declaration, to be one, must have been "under
the consciousness of an impending death. 42 At the time he rendered it, he
could not say that he was on the pangs of death, based on his actual
condition at that time, and that he believed that death was soon at hand. 43
It bears to stress that a mere cursory examination of the three signatures
appearing on the three-page statement, in bold and clear strokes with two of
them occupying four inches of the page, and in grand flourishes, pronounced
and considered by the trial judge as a dying declaration, precludes any
indication that the signer thereof was under an impending death. Further, if
the deceased were truly on the point of death, he could not have had the
strength to affix three signatures as above described.
2. The testimony of Antonio Llaneta suggests that both accused lunged at the
victim once each giving rise to two injuries.
In the stand, Llaneta testified that he believed that it was Jojo Biare who
was the other person who stabbed Sison since he was near with their group.
While he was categorical that Alex Padrones did inflict a stabbing wound on
Lorenzo Sison, he could not say the same thing as far as Joseph Biare was
concerned. It was his opinion or belief that Biare did make a thrust on the
victim, but evidently that was his opinion. Our law on evidence, however,
excludes opinions, as a general rule, and allows only facts. 33 What is
important is that he did not see Biare in the act of thrusting his knife.
It is also noteworthy that in his sworn statement to the police 34 executed the
morning after the incident, Llaneta did not implicate Biare, but confessed
having seen Padrones only, stabbing the victim twice. In addition, the
prosecution itself never pressed him, Llaneta, in naming Biare; apparently the
latter's name cropped up upon the very prodding of the trial judge. The record
indeed shows that upon His Honor's questioning, "In your doubt, who was
that person?" 35 the defense objected, "We object, he said he was not sure,"
36 although His Honor overruled the latter: "Let that be on record. " 37
DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
WHEREFORE, the accused, Joseph Biare, is ACQUITTED on reasonable
doubt. The accused, Alex Padrones, is convicted of homicide, with no
modifying circumstances, and is sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of
eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor to seventeen (17) years and
four (4) months of reclusion temporal

Appellant Pioquinto de Joya visited the wake only once. During the second
day of the four-day wake, Herminia saw herein appellant Pioquinto de Joya
enter the kitchen and peep under the cabinet of the (Valencias) house.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. PIOQUINTO DE
JOYA y CRUZ, Defendant-Appellant. [G.R. No. 75028. November 8,
1991.]
FELICIANO, J.:
Pioquinto de Joya y Cruz, 72 y.o. was charged before the Regional Trial
Court of the crime of robbery with homicide. He pleaded not guilty.
FACTS:
"The spouses Arnedo Valencia and Herminia Salac-Valencia, together with
their ten (10) year old son Alvin Valencia and Herminia Valencias 88-year old
mother, Eulalia Diamse, are residents of Balagtas St., Baliuag, Bulacan. Both
spouses are teachers by profession. In the afternoon of January 31, 1978,
Herminia Salac-Valencia left for school to teach. Her mother Eulalia Diamse,
88 y.o. was then [sitting] at their sofa watching the television set. Her Son
Alvin likewise left for school at 1:00 oclock. And at 3:00 oclock in the
afternoon, his classes were dismissed and he proceeded home.
At around 3:00 oclock in the afternoon of that same day, the spouses
Valencias neighbor by the name of Gloria Capulong, together with a friend,
went out of the formers house to visit a friend. While at her yard, Gloria
Capulong looked back to the direction of the Valencias house. She noticed
appellant Pioquinto de Joya standing and holding a bicycle at the yard of the
Valencias.
When Alvin reached home, he saw his grandmother Eulalia Diamse lying
down prostrate and drenched with her own blood. He immediately threw his
bag and ran towards her. He then held her hands and asked her: "Apo, Apo,
what happened?"

On February 3, 1978, a post-mortem examination was conducted by Dr.

Romulo Madrid, a medico-legal officer of the National Bureau of
Investigation. Per examination, the cause of the death arrived by Dr. Madrid
was shock, secondary to punctured wound neck (Exhibit "D-1") situated at
the right side of the neck, just below the right ear wherein it went out thru and
thru, opposite, almost in the same location, from one side of the neck to the
opposite side."
RTC: convicted De Joya of the crime charged Sentences the accused to
LIFE IMPRISONMENT.
It based its decision on the ff:
1. The dying statement made by the deceased victim to her grandson Alvin
Valencia a 10-year old boy: Si Paqui" ; 2. The quarrel, which, according to
Herminia Valencia, daughter of the deceased victim, took place two weeks
before the robbery and homicide, between the appellant and the deceased
over the use of a bicycle which appellant allegedly took from the Valencias
house without the consent of the victim; 3. The rubber slipper, one of a pair,
("step-in beach walk type") which according to Herminia, she found near a
cabinet in their house one (1) meter away from the body of the victim, and
which Herminia identified as one of the pair that she had given to the wife of
the accused the previous Christmas Season; 4. Accused was seen by one
Gloria Capulong around 3:00 p.m. in the afternoon of 31 January 1978 in the
yard of the Valencias, standing and holding a bicycle and doing nothing; 5.
The statement of appellant that he did not visit the deceased during the fourday wake.
ISSUE: w /n the dying statement of the deceased is sufficient to convict the
accused?
HELD: NO

. . . [Eulalia Diamse held his hand and after which said: "Si Paqui." After
saying these words, she let go of Alvins hand and passed away.
Dr. Tolentino arrived at around 4:00 oclock that same afternoon and
examined the body of Eulalia Diamse. Said doctor declared that said Eulalia
Diamse had a heart attack which caused her death. When asked by Herminia
Valencia why her mothers ears were punctured, no reply was given by said
doctor. Herminia requested for a death certificate, but Dr. Tolentino did not
issue one and instead immediately left.
Herminia found out that the two (2) gold rings worn by her mother were
missing. The right earring of her mother was likewise missing. All of these
were valued [at] P300.00
That same afternoon, Herminia saw the room of the groundfloor ransacked.
The contents of the wardrobe closet (aparador) were taken out. Its secret
compartment/box was missing. And the lock of the aparador was destroyed.
On the same night, Herminia found a beach walk step-in (Exhibit "B") by the
side of the cabinet near the door of their room downstairs, more or less one
meter from where the victim was lying prostrate.
Herminia was able to recognize the said step-in because of its color and size,
as the other half of the pair she bought for her husband Arnedo but which she
gave to Socorro de Joya, the wife of herein appellant, before Christmas of
1977 when she saw the old and wornout pair of slippers of the latter.

It has been held that a dying declaration to be admissible must be complete

in itself. To be complete in itself does not mean that the declarant must recite
everything that constituted the res gestae of the subject of his statement, but
that his statement of any given fact should be a full expression of all that he
intended to say as conveying his meaning in respect of such fact. The
doctrine of completeness has also been expressed in the following terms in
Prof. Wigmores classic work:jnrobles.com.ph "The application of the doctrine
of completeness is here peculiar. The statement as offered must not be
merely a part of the whole as it was expressed by the declarant; it must be
complete as far it goes. But it is immaterial how much of the whole affair of
the death is related, provided the statement includes all that the declarant
wished or intended to include in it. Thus, if an interruption (by death or by an
intruder) cuts short a statement which thus remains clearly less than that
which the dying person wished to make, the fragmentary statement is not
receivable, because the intended whole is not there, and the whole might be
of a very different effect from that of the fragment; yet if the dying person
finishes the statement he wishes to make, it is no objection that he has told
only a portion of what he might have been able to tell." The reason upon
which incomplete declarations are generally excluded, or if admitted,
accorded little or no weight, is that since the declarant was prevented (by
death or other circumstance) from saying all that he wished to say, what he
did say might have been qualified by the statements which he was prevented
from making. That incomplete declaration is not therefore entitled to the
presumption of truthfulness which constitutes the basis upon which dying
declarations are received. It is clear to the Court that the dying declaration of
the deceased victim here was incomplete. In other words, the deceased was
cut off by death before she could convey a complete or sensible
communication to Alvin. The trial court simply assumed that by uttering the
words "Si Paqui", the deceased had intended to name the person who had
thrust some sharp instrument through and through her neck just below her

ears. But Eulalia herself did not say so and we cannot speculate what the
rest of her communication might have been had death not interrupted her.

ALEJANDRO FUENTES, JR., Petitioner, v. COURT OF APPEALS and

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents

We are unable to regard the dying statement as a dying declaration naming

the appellant as the doer of the bloody deed. The other elements taken into
account by the trial court are purely

[G.R. No. 111692. February 9, 1996.]

circumstantial in nature. When these circumstances are examined one by

one, none of them can be said to lead clearly and necessarily to the
conclusion that appellant had robbed and killed the deceased Eulalia
Diamse. The quarrel over the use of the bicycle which was supposed to have
taken place two weeks before Eulalias death does not, in our view, constitute
adequate proof of a motive capable of moving a person to slay another in
such a violent and gory manner. Failure to prove a credible motive where no
identification was shown at all, certainly weakens the case of the prosecution.
additional info:
"SECTION 24. Offer to compromise not admission. An offer of compromise is
not an admission that anything is due, and is not admissible in evidence
against the person making the offer. However, in criminal cases which are not
allowed by law to be compromised, an offer of compromise by the accused
may be received in evidence as an implied admission of guilt."
We do not, however, feel justified in concluding from the above testimony
from a member of the (extended) family of the deceased victim that "an offer
of compromise" had been made "by the accused" nor that "an implied
admission of guilt" on the part of the appellant may be reasonably inferred in
the instant case. The trial court itself made no mention of any attempt on the
part of appellant to settle the criminal case amicably through the defense
counsel; we must assume that the trial court either did not believe that
appellant had tried to compromise the criminal case or considered that
appellant could not fairly be deemed to have impliedly admitted that he had
indeed robbed and killed Eulalia Diamse. A much higher level of explicitness
and specific detail is necessary to justify a conclusion that an accused had
impliedly admitted his guilt of a crime as serious as robbery with homicide.
The totality of the case made out against appellant De Joya thus consists of
an incomplete, aborted, dying declaration and a number of circumstances
which, singly or collectively, do not necessarily give rise to a compelling
inference that appellant had indeed robbed and slain Eulalia Diamse. We
consider, after prolonged scrutiny, that the sum total of the evidence in the
instant case is insufficient to induce that moral certainty of guilt which
characterizes proof beyond reasonable doubt. The conscience of the Court
remains uneasy and unsettled after considering the nature and speculative
character of the evidence supporting the judgment of conviction. The Court
must, accordingly, hold as it hereby holds that appellants guilt of the crime of
robbery and homicide was not shown beyond reasonable doubt.
ACCORDINGLY, the decision of the trial court dated 16 May 1986 is hereby
REVERSED and appellant Pioquinto de Joya is hereby ACQUITTED on
grounds of reasonable doubt.

HEARSAY Continued.

1. REMICDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; CREDIBILITY; NOT ADVERSELY

AFFECTED BY INCONSISTENCIES ON MINOR DETAILS. Petitioner
points to, an alleged inconsistency between the testimonies of prosecution
witnesses Alberto Toling and Honorio Osok to the effect that they saw
petitioner stab Malaspina on the right lumbar region, and the testimony of the
attending physician that the victim was stabbed on the left lumbar region.
This discrepancy is inconsequential. What is material is that Malaspina was
stabbed to death and that three (3) prosecution witnesses positively identified
petitioner as the knife wielder. It must be stressed that these witnesses had
known petitioner for quite some time and never had any personal
misunderstanding nor altercation with the latter as to create any suspicion
that they were impelled by ill motives to falsely implicate him.
2. ID.; ID.; DECLARATION AGAINST INTEREST, EXCEPTION TO THE
HEARSAY RULE. One of the recognized exceptions to the hearsay rule is
that pertaining to declarations made against interest. (Sec. 38 of Rule 130 of
the Rules of Court) The admissibility in evidence of such declaration is
grounded on necessity and trustworthiness.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; REQUISITES FOR ADMISSIBILITY. There are three (3)
essential requisites for the admissibility of a declaration against interest: (a)
the declarant must not be available to testify; (b) the declaration must
concern a fact cognizable by the declarant; and (c) the circumstances must
render it improbable that a motive to falsify existed.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; CASE AT BAR. In the instant case, we find that the
declaration particularly against penal interest attributed to Zoilo Fuentes Jr. is
not admissible in evidence as an exception to the hearsay rule. One striking
feature that militates against the acceptance of such a statement is its patent
untrustworthiness. Zoilo who is related to accused-appellant had every
motive to prevaricate. The same can be said of accused-appellant and his
uncle Felicisimo. But more importantly, the far weightier reason why the
admission against penal interest cannot be accepted in the instant case is
that the declarant is not "unable to testify." There is no showing that Zoilo is
either dead, mentally incapacitated or physically incompetent which Sec. 38
obviously contemplates. His mere absence from the jurisdiction does not
make him ipso facto unavailable under this rule. For it is incumbent upon the
defense to produce each and every piece of evidence that can break the
prosecution and assure the acquittal of the accused. Other than the
gratuitous statements of accused-appellant and his uncle to the effect that
Zoilo admitted having killed Malaspina, the records show that the defense did
not exert any serious effort to produce Zoilo as a witness. Thus, for this case
at least, exclusion is the prudent recourse.
BELLOSILLO, J.:
At four o clock in the morning of 24 June 1989 Julieto Malaspina together
with Godofredo Llames, Honorio Osok and Alberto Toling, was at a benefit
dance at Dump Site, Tudela, Trento, Agusan del Sur. Petitioner called
Malaspina and placed his right arm on the shoulder of the latter saying,
"Before, I saw you with a long hair but now you have a short hair." Suddenly
petitioner stabbed Malaspina in the abdomen with a hunting knife. Malaspina
fell to the ground and his companions rushed to his side. Petitioner fled.
Before the victim succumbed to the gaping wound on his abdomen he
muttered that Alejandro Fuentes, Jr., stabbed him. Dr. Porfirio L. Salubre, the
Rural Health Physician who autopsied the cadaver of Julieto Malaspina on 24
July 1989, reported that death was due to "stab wound at left lumbar region
1-1/2 in. in length with extracavitation of the small and large intestines."
Petitioner claims on the other hand that it was his cousin Zoilo Fuentes, Jr.,
alias "Jonie" who knifed Malaspina; that when the victim was killed he was
conversing with him; that he was compelled to run away when he heard that
somebody with a bolo and spear would "kill all those from San Isidro"

because "Jonie," the killer, was from that place; that since he was also from
San Isidro he sought refuge in his brothers house where he met "Jonie;" that
"Jonie" admitted spontaneously that he stabbed Malaspina because after a
boxing match before the latter untied his gloves and punched him; that as
there were many persons milling around the house "Jonie" jumped out and
escaped through the window; that he was arrested at eight oclock in the
morning of 24 June 1989 while he was in a store in the barangay. RTC:
petitioner guilty of murder qualified by treachery

there was ample testimonial evidence to support an acquittal. The second

group considered Exh. 1 as part of the res gestae as it was made on the
same morning when the fight occurred. A third group, to which Justice
Malcolm belonged, opined that the court below erred in not admitting Exh. 1
as the statement of a fact against penal interest. For all its attempt to
demonstrate the arbitrariness behind the rejection in certain cases of
declarations against penal interest, the Toledo case cannot be applied in the
instant case which is remarkably different.

CA: affirmed RTC

Consider this factual scenario: the alleged declarant Zoilo Fuentes Jr., a
cousin of accused-appellant, verbally admitted to the latter, and later to their
common uncle Felicisimo Fuentes, that he (Zoilo) killed the victim because of
a grudge, after which he disappeared. One striking feature that militates
against the acceptance of such a statement is its patent untrustworthiness.
Zoilo who is related to accused-appellant had every motive to prevaricate.
The same can be said of accused-appellant and his uncle Felicisimo.
Secondly, we need not resort to legal rhetorics to find that the admission of
such a statement may likewise be, according to Wigmore, "shocking to the
sense of justice." Let us assume that the trial court did admit the statement of
Zoilo and on that basis acquitted Accused-Appellant. Let us assume further
that Zoilo was subsequently captured and upon being confronted with his
admission of guilt readily repudiated the same. There is nothing, absolutely
nothing, that can bind Zoilo legally to that statement. But more importantly,
the far weightier reason why the admission against penal interest cannot be
accepted in the instant case is that the declarant is not "unable to testify."

Thus, this petition for review.

ISSUE: W/N the declaration against penal interest attributed to Zoilo Fuentes
Jr. is admissible in evidence as an exception to the hearsay rule?
HELD: no
Petitioner would make much of the alleged confession of Zoilo Fuentes, Jr.,
since it is a declaration against penal interest and therefore an exception to
the hearsay rule. The so-called confession of Zoilo was allegedly given to
Felicisimo Fuentes, the uncle of petitioner and Zoilo, who in turn relayed the
matter to P/Sgt. Benjamin Conde, Jr. Felicisimo testified that on 24 June
1989 while
he was at Barangay San Isidro, Zoilo Fuentes, Jr., confessed that he killed
Malaspina in "retaliation;" that he even showed him the knife he used and
asked his help in finding a lawyer, in securing bail and, if possible, in working
out a settlement with the relatives of the deceased. The following day
however he learned that the self-confessed killer was gone and that
petitioner had been arrested for a crime he did not commit. For his part,
Station Commander P/Sgt. Conde, Jr., testified that after the criminal
information for murder was filed on 26 July 1989, petitioner met Felicisimo
who informed him of the disclosure by Zoilo. Conde then advised Felicisimo
that if it was true that it was Zoilo who fatally stabbed Malaspina Felicisimo
must persuade Zoilo to surrender. Conde then personally went to Barangay
San Isidro to investigate. There he was told by the townsfolk that Zoilo had
already fled.
One of the recognized exceptions to the hearsay rule is that pertaining to
declarations made against interest. Sec. 38 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court
provides that" (t)he declaration made by a person deceased, or unable to
testify, against the interest of the declarant, if the fact asserted in the
declaration was at the time it was made so far contrary to declarants own
interest, that a reasonable man in his position would not have made the
declaration unless he believed it to be true, may be received in evidence
against himself or his successors in interest and against third persons." The
admissibility in evidence of such declaration is grounded on necessity and
trustworthiness.
There are three (3) essential requisites for the admissibility of a declaration
against interest: (a) the declarant must not be available to testify; (b) the
declaration must concern a fact cognizable by the declarant; and (c) the
circumstances must render it improbable that a motive to falsify existed.
We are not unaware of People v. Toledo, a 1928 case, where Justice
Malcolm writing for the Court endeavored to reexamine the declaration of
third parties made contrary to their penal interest. In that case, the
protagonists Holgado and Morales engaged in a bolo duel. Morales was
killed almost instantly. Holgado who was seriously wounded gave a sworn
statement (Exh. 1) before the municipal president declaring that when he and
Morales fought there was nobody else present. One (1) month later Holgado
died from his wounds. While the Court was agreed that Toledo, who
reportedly intervened in the fight and dealt the mortal blow, should be
exonerated on reasonable doubt, the members did not reach an accord on
the admissibility of Exh. 1. One group would totally disregard Exh. 1 since

There is no showing that Zoilo is either dead, mentally incapacitated or

physically incompetent which Sec. 38 obviously contemplates. His mere
absence from the jurisdiction does not make him ipso facto unavailable under
this rule. For it is incumbent upon the defense to produce each and every
piece of evidence that can break the prosecution and assure the acquittal of
the accused. Other than the gratuitous statements of accused-appellant and
his uncle to the effect that Zoilo admitted having killed Malaspina, the records
show that the defense did not exert any serious effort to produce Zoilo as a
witness. Lest we be misunderstood, the Court is always for the admission of
evidence that would let an innocent declaration of guilt by the real culprit. But
this can be open to abuse, as when the extrajudicial statement is not even
authenticated thus increasing the probability of its fabrication; it is made to
persons who have every reason to lie and falsify; and it is not altogether clear
that the declarant himself is unable to testify. Thus, for this case at least,
exclusion is the prudent recourse as explained in Toledo The purpose of
all evidence is to get at the truth. The reason for the hearsay rule is that the
extrajudicial and unsworn statement of another is not the best method of
serving this purpose. In other words, the great possibility of the fabrication of
falsehoods, and the inability to prove their untruth, requires that the doors be
closed to such evidence. The Court of Appeals as well as the trial court
correctly determined the crime to be murder qualified by treachery.
WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from finding petitioner ALEJANDRO
FUENTES JR. guilty of MURDER and directing him to indemnify the heirs of
Julieto Malaspina in the amount of P50,000.00 plus costs is AFFIRMED with
the modification that the penalty imposed should be as it is corrected to
reclusion perpetua, and the award of actual damages is deleted.

GR No. 161434 (March 3, 2004)

MARIA JEANETTE C. TECSON and FELIX B. DESIDERIO, JR. v. The
COMELEC, RONALD ALLAN KELLY POE (aka FERNANDO POE, JR.)
and VICTORINO X. FORNIER
x-----------------------------x
GR No. 161634 (March 3, 2004)

ZOILO ANTONIO VELEZ v. RONALD ALLAN KELLEY POE, aka

FERNANDO POE, JR.
x-----------------------------x
GR No. 161824 (March 3, 2004)
VICTORINO X. FORNIER v. COMELEC and RONALD ALLAN KELLEY
POE, ALSO KNOWN AS FERNANDO POE JR.
VITUG, J.
31 December 2003: Respondent Ronald Allan Kelly Poe, also known as
Fernando Poe, Jr. (hereinafter "FPJ"), filed his COC for the position of
President of the Philippines under the Koalisyon ng Nagkakaisang Pilipino
(KNP) Party. In his COC, FPJ, representing himself to be a natural-born
citizen of the Philippines, stated his name to be "Fernando Jr.," or "Ronald
Allan" Poe, his date of birth to be 20 August 1939 and his place of birth to be
Manila.
Victorino X. Fornier, petitioner in GR No. 161824 initiated a petition to
disqualify FPJ upon the thesis that FPJ made a material misrepresentation in
his COC by claiming to be a natural-born Filipino when in truth, his parents
were foreigners; his mother, Bessie Kelley Poe, was an American, and his
father, Allan Poe, was a Spanish national, being the son of Lorenzo Pou, a
Spanish subject. Granting that Allan Poe was a Filipino, he could not have
transmitted his Filipino citizenship to FPJ, the latter being an illegitimate child
of an alien mother. Petitioner based the allegation of the illegitimate birth of
respondent on two assertions - first, Allan Poe contracted a prior marriage to
a certain before his marriage to Bessie Kelley and, second, even if no such
prior marriage had existed, Allan Poe, married Bessie Kelly only a year after
the birth of respondent.
COMELEC: Dismissed Forniers petition. His MR was denied by the
COMELEC en banc.
The other petitions, GR No. 161434 and GR No. 161634 both challenged the
jurisdiction of the COMELEC and asserted that, under Article VII, Section 4,
paragraph 7, of the 1987 Constitution, only the SC had original and exclusive
jurisdiction to resolve the basic issue on the case.
ISSUE: WON in establishing paternity or filiation of an illegitimate child, the
mandatory rules under Civil Law must be used.
HELD:
[For reference re: Civil Law rules, see Articles 172, 173, and 175 of the
Family Code.]
The proof of filiation or paternity for purposes of determining citizenship
status should be deemed independent from and not inextricably tied up with
that prescribed for civil law purposes. The Civil Code or Family Code
provisions on proof of filiation or paternity, although good law, do not have
preclusive effects on matters alien to personal and family relations. The
ordinary rules on evidence could well and should govern. For instance, the
matter about pedigree is not necessarily precluded from being applicable.

`pedigree includes relationship, family genealogy, birth, marriage, death, the

dates when and the places where these facts occurred, and the names of the
relatives. It embraces also facts of family history intimately connected with
pedigree."
For the above rule to apply, it would be necessary that (a) the declarant is
already dead or unable to testify, (b) the pedigree of a person must be at
issue, (c) the declarant must be a relative of the person whose pedigree is in
question, (d) declaration must be made before the controversy has occurred,
and (e) the relationship between the declarant and the person whose
pedigree is in question must be shown by evidence other than such act or
declaration.
Thus, the duly notarized declaration made by Ruby Kelley Mangahas, sister
of Bessie Kelley Poe, might be accepted to prove the acts of Allan Poe,
recognizing his own paternal relationship with FPJ, i.e, living together with
Bessie Kelley and his children (including respondent FPJ) in one house, and
as one family "I, Ruby Kelley Mangahas, of legal age and sound mind, presently residing in
Stockton, California, U.S.A., after being sworn in accordance with law do
hereby declare that:
"1. I am the sister of the late Bessie Kelley Poe.
"2. Bessie Kelley Poe was the wife of Fernando Poe, Sr.
"3. Fernando and Bessie Poe had a son by the name of Ronald Allan Poe,
more popularly known in the Philippines as `Fernando Poe, Jr., or `FPJ.
"4. Ronald Allan Poe `FPJ was born on August 20, 1939 at St. Luke's
Hospital, Magdalena Street, Manila.
"x x x x x x x x x
"7. Fernando Poe Sr., and my sister Bessie, met and became engaged while
they were students at the University of the Philippines in 1936. I was also
introduced to Fernando Poe, Sr., by my sister that same year.
"8. Fernando Poe, Sr., and my sister Bessie had their first child in 1938.
"9. Fernando Poe, Sr., my sister Bessie and their first three children,
Elizabeth, Ronald, Allan and Fernando II, and myself lived together with our
mother at our family's house on Dakota St. (now Jorge Bocobo St.), Malate
until the liberation of Manila in 1945, except for some months between 19431944.
"10. Fernando Poe, Sr., and my sister, Bessie, were blessed with four (4)
more children after Ronald Allan Poe.
"x x x x x x x x x
"18. I am executing this Declaration to attest to the fact that my nephew,
Ronald Allan Poe is a natural born Filipino, and that he is the legitimate child
of Fernando Poe, Sr.

Section 39, Rule 130, of the Rules of Court provides -

"Done in City of Stockton, California, U.S.A., this 12th day of January 2004.

"Act or Declaration about pedigree. The act or declaration of a person

deceased, or unable to testify, in respect to the pedigree of another person
related to him by birth or marriage, may be received in evidence where it
occurred before the controversy, and the relationship between the two
persons is shown by evidence other than such act or declaration. The word

The petitions are DISMISSED.

GR No. 121027 (July 31, 1997)

CORAZON DEZOLLER TISON and RENE R. DEZOLLER v. CA and
TEODORA DOMINGO
REGALADO, J.
The dispute involves a parcel of land with a house and apartment located at
San Francisco del Monte, Quezon City and which was originally owned by
the spouses Martin Guerrero and Teodora Dezoller Guerrero. Petitioners
Corazon and Rene are the niece and nephew, respectively, of the deceased
Teodora who is the sister of petitioners father, Hermogenes. Teodora died on
March 5, 1983 and was survived only by her husband, Martin Guerrero and
petitioners. Petitioners' father, Hermogenes, died on October 3, 1973, hence
they seek to inherit from Teodora by right of representation.

American jurisprudence has it that a distinction must be made as to when the

relationship of the declarant may be proved by the very declaration itself, or
by other declarations of said declarant, and when it must be supported by
evidence aliunde. The general rule is that where the party claiming seeks
recovery against a relative common to both claimant and declarant, but not
from the declarant himself or the declarant's estate, the relationship of the
declarant to the common relative may not be proved by the declaration itself.
There must be some independent proof of this fact. As an exception, the
requirement that there be other proof than the declarations of the declarant
as to the relationship, does not apply where it is sought to reach the estate of
the declarant himself and not merely to establish a right through his
declarations to the property of some other member of the family.
The present case is one instance where the general requirement on evidence
aliunde may be relaxed. Petitioners are claiming a right to part of the estate
of the declarant herself. Conformably, the declaration made by Teodora
Dezoller Guerrero that Corazon is her niece, is admissible and constitutes
sufficient proof of such relationship.

Upon the death of Teodora, her surviving spouse, Martin, executed an

Affidavit of Extrajudicial Settlement adjudicating unto himself, allegedly as
sole heir, the land in dispute. Martin sold the lot to private respondent.

CA judgment REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and petitioners and private

respondent are declared co-owners of the subject property with an undivided
one-fourth (1/4) and three-fourths (3/4) share therein, respectively.

Petitioners filed an action for reconveyance, claiming that they are entitled to
inherit one-half of the property in question by right of representation.

------------------------------------------------------------------NOTE: As regards the other evidence presented

During the hearing, petitioner Corazon was presented as the lone witness,
with the following documentary evidence offered to prove petitioners' filiation
to their father and their aunt, to wit: a family picture; baptismal certificates of
Teodora and Hermogenes Dezoller; certificates of destroyed records of birth
of Teodora and Hermogenes Dezoller; death certificates of Hermogenes and
Teodora; certification of destroyed records of live birth of Corazon and Rene
Dezoller; joint affidavits of Pablo Verzosa and Meliton Sitjar attesting to the
parents, date and place of birth of Corazon and Rene Dezoller; joint affidavit
of Juliana Cariaga and Manuela Cariaga attesting to the fact of marriage
between Martin Guerrero and Teodora Dezoller; and the marriage certificate
of Martin and Teodora Guerrero.

The Certificate of Marriage wherein it is indicated that the parents of Teodora

Dezoller are Isabelo Dezoller and Cecilia Calpo, as well as the Certificates of
Baptism of Teodora Dezoller and Hermogenes Dezoller which both reflect the
names of their parents as Isabelo Dezoller and Cecilia Calpo, to show that
Hermogenes Dezoller is the brother of Teodora Dezoller Guerrero; and the
Death Certificate of Hermogenes Dezoller the entries wherein were made by
petitioner Corazon Dezoller Tison as his daughter, together with the Joint
Affidavits of Pablo Verzosa and Meliton Sitjar, to prove that herein petitioners
are the children of Hermogenes Dezoller these can be deemed to have
sufficiently established the relationship between the declarant and herein
petitioners. This is in consonance with the rule that a prima

RTC: Dismissed Complaint for Reconveyance.

CA: Upheld dismissal.
ISSUE: WON petitioners failed to prove their legitimate filiation with the
deceased Teodora.

facie showing is sufficient and that only slight proof of the relationship is
required. Finally, it may not be amiss to consider as in the nature of
circumstantial evidence the fact that both the declarant and the claimants,
who are the subject of the declaration, bear the surname Dezoller.

HELD:
The primary proof to be considered in ascertaining the relationship between
the parties concerned is the testimony of Corazon to the effect that Teodora
Dezoller Guerrero in her lifetime, or sometime in 1946, categorically declared
that the former is Teodora's niece. Such a statement is considered a
declaration about pedigree which is admissible, as an exception to the
hearsay rule, under Section 39, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, subject to the
following conditions: (1) that the declarant is dead or unable to testify; (2) that
the declarant be related to the person whose pedigree is the subject of
inquiry; (3) that such relationship be shown by evidence other than the
declaration; and (4) that the declaration was made ante litem motam, that is,
not only before the commencement of the suit involving the subject matter of
the declaration, but before any controversy has arisen thereon.
There is no dispute with respect to the first, second and fourth elements.
What remains for analysis is the third element, that is, whether or not the
other documents offered in evidence sufficiently corroborated the declaration
made by Teodora in her lifetime regarding the pedigree of petitioner Corazon
or, if at all, it is necessary to present evidence other than such declaration.

JISON vs CA

PP vs LLANITA

G.R. No. 132164 October 19, 2004

CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, petitioner, vs. ALLYSON BELAGAN,
respondent.

When the credibility of a witness is sought to be impeached by proof of his

reputation, it is necessary that the reputation shown should be that which
existed before the occurrence of the circumstances out of which the litigation
arose, or at the time of the trial and prior thereto, but not at a period remote
from the commencement of the suit. This is because a person of derogatory
character or reputation can still change or reform himself.
FACTS:
The instant case stemmed from two (2) separate complaints filed respectively
by Magdalena Gapuz, founder/directress of the "Mother and Child Learning
Center," and Ligaya Annawi, a public school teacher at Fort Del Pilar
Elementary School, against respondent Dr. Allyson Belagan, Superintendent
of the Department of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS), all from Baguio
City. Magdalena charged respondent with sexual indignities and harassment,
while Ligaya accused him of sexual harassment and various malfeasances.
Magdalenas sworn complaint alleges that sometime in March 1994, she filed
an application with the DECS Office in Baguio City for a permit to operate a
pre-school. One of the requisites for the issuance of the permit was the
inspection of the school premises by the DECS Division Office. Since the
officer assigned to conduct the inspection was not present, respondent
volunteered his services. Sometime in June 1994, respondent and
complainant visited the school. In the course of the inspection, while both
were descending the stairs of the second floor, respondent suddenly placed
his arms around her shoulders and kissed her cheek. Dumbfounded, she
muttered, "Sir, is this part of the inspection? Pati ba naman kayo sa DECS
wala ng values?" Respondent merely sheepishly smiled. At that time, there
were no other people in the area. Several days later, Magdalena went to the
DECS Division Office and asked respondent, "Sir, kumusta yung application
ko?" His reply was "Mag-date muna tayo." She declined, explaining that she
is married. She then left and reported the matter to DECS Assistant
Superintendent Peter Ngabit.
On the part of Ligaya Annawi, she alleged in her complaint that on four
separate occasions, respondent touched her breasts, kissed her cheek,
touched her groins, embraced her from behind and pulled her close to him,
his organ pressing the lower part of her back.
The DECS conducted a joint investigation of the complaints of Magdalena
and Ligaya. Respondent claimed that the numerous cases filed against
Magdalena cast doubt on her character, integrity, and credibility. He
presented evidence showing that during 1980-1991, Magdalena was charged
with 22 criminal cases varying from oral defamation, unjust vexation, slight
physical injuries and malicious mischief. Also, he presented evidence of 23
complaints against Magdalena filed with the Barangay Chairmen of Barangay
Gabriela Silang and Barangay Hillside, both in Baguio City, of like offenses.
The DECS Secretary rendered a Joint Decision finding respondent guilty of
four (4) counts of sexual "indignities or harassments" committed against
Ligaya; and two (2) counts of "sexual advances or indignities" against
Magdalena. He was ordered dismissed from the service.
Upon appeal, the Civil Service Commission (CSC), promulgated a Resolution
affirming the Decision of the DECS Secretary in the case filed by Magdalena
but dismissing the complaint of Ligaya.
ISSUE: WHETHER COMPLAINING WITNESS, MAGDALENA GAPUZ, IS
CREDIBLE. - YES

respondent, i.e., Section 51 (a) 3, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules on

Evidence, which we quote here:
"SEC. 51. Character evidence not generally admissible; exceptions.
(a) In Criminal Cases:
xxxxxx
(3) The good or bad moral character of the offended party may be proved if it
tends to establish in any reasonable degree the probability or improbability of
the offense charged."
It will be readily observed that the above provision pertains only to criminal
cases, not to administrative offenses. And even assuming that this technical
rule of evidence can be applied here, still, we cannot sustain respondents
posture.
Not every good or bad moral character of the offended party may be proved
under this provision. Only those which would establish the probability or
improbability of the offense charged. This means that the character evidence
must be limited to the traits and characteristics involved in the type of offense
charged. Thus, on a charge of rape - character for chastity, on a charge of
assault - character for peaceableness or violence, and on a charge of
embezzlement - character for honesty. In one rape case, where it was
established that the alleged victim was morally loose and apparently uncaring
about her chastity, we found the conviction of the accused doubtful.
In the present administrative case for sexual harassment, respondent did not
offer evidence that has a bearing on Magdalenas chastity. What he
presented are charges for grave oral defamation, grave threats, unjust
vexation, physical injuries, malicious mischief, etc. filed against her. Certainly,
these pieces of evidence are inadmissible under the above provision
because they do not establish the probability or improbability of the offense
charged.
Obviously, in invoking the above provision, what respondent was trying to
establish is Magdalenas lack of credibility and not the probability or the
improbability of the charge. In this regard, a different provision applies.
Credibility means the disposition and intention to tell the truth in the testimony
given. It refers to a persons integrity, and to the fact that he is worthy of
belief. A witness may be discredited by evidence attacking his general
reputation for truth, or integrity. Section 11, Rule 132 of the same Revised
Rules on Evidence reads:
"SEC. 11. Impeachment of adverse partys witness. A witness may be
impeached by the party against whom he was called, by contradictory
evidence, by evidence that his general reputation for truth, honesty, or
integrity is bad, or by evidence that he has made at other times statements
inconsistent with his present testimony, but not by evidence of particular
wrongful acts, except that it may be shown by the examination of the witness,
or the record of the judgment, that he has been convicted of an offense."
Although she is the offended party, Magdalena, by testifying in her own
behalf, opened herself to character or reputation attack pursuant to the
principle that a party who becomes a witness in his own behalf places himself
in the same position as any other witness, and may be impeached by an
attack on his character or reputation.

HELD:
Generally, the character of a party is regarded as legally irrelevant in
determining a controversy. One statutory exception is that relied upon by

With the foregoing disquisition, the Court of Appeals is correct in holding that
the character or reputation of a complaining witness in a sexual charge is a
proper subject of inquiry. This leads us to the ultimate question is
Magdalenas derogatory record sufficient to discredit her credibility?

A careful review of the record yields a negative answer.

First, most of the twenty-two (22) cases filed with the MTC of Baguio City
relate to acts committed in the 80s, particularly, 1985 and 1986. With respect
to the complaints filed with the Chairmen of Barangay Gabriela Silang and
Barangay Hillside, the acts complained of took place in 1978 to 1979. In the
instant administrative case, the offense was committed in 1994. Surely, those
cases and complaints are no longer reliable proofs of Magdalenas character
or reputation. The Court of Appeals, therefore, erred in according much
weight to such evidence. Settled is the principle that evidence of ones
character or reputation must be confined to a time not too remote from the
time in question. In other words, what is to be determined is the character or
reputation of the person at the time of the trial and prior thereto, but not at a
period remote from the commencement of the suit. Hence, to say that
Magdalenas credibility is diminished by proofs of tarnished reputation
existing almost a decade ago is unreasonable. It is unfair to presume that a
person who has wandered from the path of moral righteousness can never
retrace his steps again. Certainly, every person is capable to change or
reform.
Second, respondent failed to prove that Magdalena was convicted in any of
the criminal cases specified by respondent. The general rule prevailing in a
great majority of jurisdictions is that it is not permissible to show that a
witness has been arrested or that he has been charged with or prosecuted
for a criminal offense, or confined in jail for the purpose of impairing his
credibility. This view has usually been based upon one or more of the
following grounds or theories: (a) that a mere unproven charge against the
witness does not logically tend to affect his credibility, (b) that innocent
persons are often arrested or accused of a crime, (c) that one accused of a
crime is presumed to be innocent until his guilt is legally established, and (d)
that a witness may not be impeached or discredited by evidence of particular
acts of misconduct. Significantly, the same Section 11, Rule 132 of our
Revised Rules on Evidence provides that a witness may not be impeached
by evidence of particular wrongful acts. Such evidence is rejected because of
the confusion of issues and the waste of time that would be involved, and
because the witness may not be prepared to expose the falsity of such
wrongful acts. As it happened in this case, Magdalena was not able to
explain or rebut each of the charges against her listed by respondent.

G.R. No. 98196 January 31, 1995

suddenly hacked at him with a bolo but that he was not hit. Eleuterio
retaliated by stabbing Benedicto with a knife, inflicting a single though mortal
wound on the deceased. Eleuterio claimed that Benedicto had stood in front
of his house, intoxicated and challenging passersby to a fight moments
before his death. He was charged with murder and pleaded not guilty .
The defense also presented evidence to prove the bad moral character and
quarrelsome disposition of the deceased. Barangay Captain Uldarico
Gobangco testified that "whenever the victim got drunk, he would challenge
anybody to a fight and that he was also [known] to steal a carabao." The
Barangay Captain also stated that, per the notebook where the customarily
recorded all incidents occurring in their barangay, a complaint for theft had
been lodged against the deceased Basas. The trial court, however, noted that
the statements of the Barangay Captain Gobangco that the deceased had
habitually challenged other people to a fight whenever he was drunk found
no support in his own notebook.
ISSUE: WHETHER THE TESTIMONY OF THE BARANGAY CAPTAIN
COULD BE GIVEN CREDENCE BY THE COURT. - NO
HELD: No.
While the accused may prove the bad moral character of the victim, the proof
must be of his general reputation in the community and not merely of isolated
and specific acts. Thus, the mere allegation that a complaint for theft had
been filed against the victim cannot establish his general reputation. Besides,
there was no showing that Basas was ever convicted of that charge,
assuming it had ever been filed.
Moreover, as the trial court held, no evidentiary value can be attributed to the
Barangay Captain's notebook. That notebook can hardly be considered an
official record, for record-keeping is vested in the Barangay Secretary and not
in the Barangay Captain. Moreover, an incomplete record, especially one
with blank or torn pages allowing the inclusion or deletion of certain matters,
lacks reliability; its contents are open to the suspicion that they are reflective
not of all actual events, but only of those which the recorder, for reasons of
his own, wanted to record.
Even if it had been proved by competent evidence that the deceased was of
a quarrelsome disposition, such evidence would only have established a
probability that he had indeed started an unlawful assault on Eleuterio. This
probability cannot overcome the positive statement of the prosecution
witnesses during trial that the accused-appellant had assaulted Basas
without any provocation.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ELEUTERIO

ADONIS alias "TANDANG," accused-appellant.
FACTS:
At about 7:00 pm on 10 June 1985, after Benedicto Basas had finished his
dinner in his home, he went down to their front yard together with his wife
and son. Benedicto sat on a bench with his
back against the street. His wife and 14-year old son also sat down, one
somewhat to the right and the other somewhat to the left of Benedicto, but
both facing Benedicto. The accused Eleuterio Adonis, also known as
"Tandang," suddenly appeared behind Benedicto Basas and stabbed the
latter once with a knife known as "pisao," killing him. Benedicto stood up and
then fell down. Thereafter, Eleuterio ran away from the shocked wife and son
of his victim.
For his part, the accused Eleuterio invoked self-defense and controverted the
version of the prosecution witnesses. Eleuterio testified that while he and
Bienvenido Arguta were passing by the house of Benedicto Basas, the latter

LUIS CHITO BUENSOCESO LOZANO,Petitioner, - versus - PEOPLE OF

THE PHILIPPINES,Respondent. G.R. No. 165582 July 9, 2010
Facts:
This involves a theft case filed by Paz Gonzales who around 8oclock in the
morning parked her Nissan Car along Cuenco Street, Airport View,
Paranaque City and later discovered that her tires, car stereo, speakers,
sunglasses, tapes and calculator were stolen, all amounting to 27,000php
this incident she immediately reported to the authorities in Barangay.
The following day, Barangay Tanod (Jose Lazaro Jr.) received an information
that two male persons on board a Toyota Cressida would be getting two
stolen tires from the house of one Willie Callanga (who happened to be his
neighbor) on this very same day. Immediately, said Barangay Tanod
positioned himself on the second floor of the house overlooking the house of

Callanga. From there, he saw Lozano and Tubis enter the said house. After a
few minutes, he saw Lozano and Tubis come out of the house carrying two
tires which they placed inside the baggage compartment of the Toyota
Cressida. He called his fellow tanods and they intercepted the Cressida. The
two tires were recovered and Lozano and Callanga were arrested. Tubis was
able to escape. Thereafter, Paz Gonzales was summoned to the Barangay
Office where she identified the two tires as the same tires which were stolen
from her.
TC: The stolen tires were recovered in the possession of accused Luis Chito
Lozano, Willie Callanga and Lorenzo Tubis. There can be no other
conclusion that they are the thieves. Hence, they were found guilty to the
theft.
On appeal, Accused-appellant posits the view that since both witnesses (Paz
Gonzales and Jose Lazaro Jr.) had no personal knowledge that the said tires
were recovered in the possession of the accused, their testimonies are purely
hearsay, hence without any probative value. CA nevertheless convicted the
accused. Hence this case.
Issue: WON the witness testimonies are admissible?
Held:
YES, as an exception to the hearsay rule.
The Court of Appeals did not err in convicting accused Lozano and his coaccused. They are guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of theft.
There was no direct evidence pointing to accused Lozano and his coaccused in stealing the missing items, not even for the actual taking of the
two tires. All that was established was that they were in possession of the two
(2) tires. It appears, therefore, that the TC and the CA relied on circumstantial
evidence with respect to the other items. (Recall requisites of circumstantial
evidence, all of it was complied in this case)
Moreover, the information conveyed to Lazaro, Jr. by one of his fellow tanods
regarding the arrest of appellant and his cohorts and the recovery of the tires
is admissible to prove that the stolen tires were actually found in the
possession of appellant and his partners. While said information may have
consisted of out-of-court statements by an out-of-court declarant (Lazaro,
Jr.), this person could have testified thereon (as he in fact did), as a present
sense impression.
A statement describing or explaining an event or condition made while the
declarant was perceiving the event or condition, or immediately thereafter, is
not barred by the rule against hearsay. The rationale for the present sense
impression exception is that (1) There is no substantial danger
that defects in the declarants memory will affect the value of the statement;
(2) the declarant would not have had much time to fabricate before making
the statement; and (3) in many cases, the person to whom the statement was
addressed would have been in a position to check its accuracy; hence, the
declarant could speak with care.
In the present case, there is no doubt that the barangay tanod who reported
the arrest and recovery to Lazaro, Jr. did not have the opportunity to fabricate
his statement as he instantly transmitted the information to Lazaro, Jr. who
verified the correctness and truthfulness of such account.
Pertinent portions of his testimony are hereby quoted:
Q: Could you tell us if up to present you are a member of the Barangay
Tanod?

A: Yes, sir.
Q: On July 26, 1997 at about 7:20 in the morning, could you still remember
where were you?
A: I was in my house, sir.
Q: When you are in your house, could you still remember what happened?
A: Somebody called me, a male person called me, sir.
Q: Could you tell us the reason why he called you?
A: He gave me the information, sir.
Q: Could you tell us the information that he gave to you?
A: With regards to the white Toyota Cressida, sir.
Q: After receiving that information, what did you do?
A: According to the person they entered the house of Willie Bong Callanga,
sir.
Q: What did you do?
A: He told me that I might need some informations with regards to the two (2)
tires which were stolen because the two (2) persons were acting suspectedly,
sir.
COURT:
Who was that person given that information?
A: Your Honor, I would not tell it to the Court anymore, because he does not
want to be involved in this case.
COURT:
Proceed.
Q: Did you give the information as requested?
A: Because the place where the car was nearby my place.
COURT:
What did you do after you got the information given to you and you saw the
white car?
A: Your Honor, I went up to the second floor of my house, and in that place I
was able to see the yard of Willie Bong Callanga, Your Honor.
COURT:
What did you see after you went up?
A: I saw three (3) male persons talking, Your Honor.
COURT:
Who were these three (3) male persons?
A: Willie Bong Callanga, Lorenzo Tubis, and Chito Lozano, Your Honor.
COURT:
What did you find after you saw them.
A: After their conversation, Your Honor, the three (3) of them went inside the
house, and after that went out the house, and two (2) of them were carrying
the tires each.
COURT:
Who was carrying the tires?
A: Luis Chito Lozano and Lorenzo Tubis, Your Honor.
COURT:
What kind of tires?
A: Tires of the car, Your Honor.
COURT:
What did they do with the two (2) tires of the car? What happened at the
Barangay Hall?
A: We arrived there at the same time with the Toyota Cressida together with
the two (2) persons who were arrested and it was then Pas Gonzales
identified the two (2) tires, Your Honor, as she was the owner of the two (2)
tires.
COURT:
Who were on boarded at Toyota Cressida?
A: It was only Luis Chito Lozano who was boarded the car, Your Honor.
COURT:
Do you know what happened to Lorenzo Tubis and Willie Bong Callanga?
A: According to my fellow barangay tanod, Lorenzo Tubis was able to
escape, Your Honor.
COURT:
How about Willie Bong Callanga?
A: After we conducted the investigation on Chito Lozano the Police officer
arrested Willie Bong Callanga, Your Honor.
COURT:
Where was this house of Willie Bong Callanga located when you saw him at
his yard together with Lozenzo Tubis and Chito Lozano conversing?
A: My neighbor, Your Honor.
COURT:
What place?
A: Airport View Subdivision, Barangay Moonwalk, Paraaque, your Honor.[

Clearly, the testimony of Jose Lazaro, Jr. was not merely hearsay. He
personally witnessed the incident as reported by his fellow tanod.
Immediately thereafter, Paz Gonzales confirmed that the tires recovered from
accused Lozano and his co-accused were the same tires stolen from her car.
[24]

was the result of a fall from a building x x x" However, as to what would be
the more credible cause of death, this is what he had to say:
x
x
x
FISCAL
RAMOS:
Q So as far as the probabilit(ies) are concerned, are you looking for a
possibility
that
he
fell
on
(sic)
a
high
place?
A All in all the fall of (sic) a high place is very remot(e). x x x
Both TC and CA ruled for the conviction of Accused-Appellant. The latter
raised that the prosecution's primary evidence is hearsay hence inadmissible
in evidence.
Issue: WON Josephine's testimony is a mere hearsay? NO.

[G.R. No. 119359. December 10, 1996]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ROBERT CLOUD,
accused-appellant.
Facts:
This case involves a little boy (John Albert), just barely two and a half years
old, who was beaten to death by his own father (Robert). The case was filed
not by any relatives of the victim but a certain person Josephine Aguilar
whose conscience was bothered by what she had witnessed at the hospital
around 11oclock in the morning on August 2, 1988.
While she was at the emergency room taking care of her daughter, her
attention was called by a limpid boy being carried by a man followed by an
old woman who was shouting hysterically. She noticed that the face of the
boy was swollen and bruised and his body covered with dry blood. The nurse
inferred the boy must have been struck by a truck.
But the words of the old woman (Rufina Alconyes) showed the cause of the
injury to be otherwise for she was repeatedly saying in a potpourri of cries
and tears: Pinatay siya ng sariling ama! The old woman told the people
inside the Emergency Room that the boys father Robert Cloud wouldnt allow
John Albert to come with her and when the boy started to cry and wouldnt
stop crying his father began to beat the boy hard, tied his hands, and made
tusok, tusok in his body. The father continued beating the boy even when
excrements were already coming out from the boys anus.
The male companion (Herminio Acosta) of the boy said to the old woman:
Hoy, tigil ka na! Wag kang maingay. And told the people at E.R.: Sira ang ulo
ng matanda, eh! But the old woman wouldnt stop and continued to say:
Putang-ina ang ama niya . . . Hayop siya!
Eventually, the doctor pronounced the boy deaddead, then the old woman
knelt before him and cried.
The prosecutions primary evidence was the testimony of its principal witness
Josephine Aguilar (See fulltext for Q&A) who declared that she heard
appellants grandmotherherself shouting that it was appellant who killed his
own son by beating him to death. The grandmother, Rufina Alconyes, was
not presented in court, since at the time of the trial she was already dead.
The defense presented different version of story stating that the child died by
falling down the staircase and that the accused was not in the house when
the incident happened. It presented himself as the witness and the driver,
Herminio Acosta. (See fulltext for Q&A)
On this aspect, Dr. Alberto M. Reyes, the medical specialist at the NBI who
examined the exhumed body of the little boy, was presented as a prosecution
witness. He did give hypothetical concession "that it was also possible that it

Held:. SC affirmed the lower courts decision in toto.

The Solicitor General posits the view that the outbursts of that grandmother
constituted exceptions to the hearsay rule since they were part of the res
gestae. These inculpatory and spontaneous statements were: (1) Pinatay
siya ng kanyang ama (he was killed by his own father); (2) Putang ina ang
ama niya . . . . walang awa sa anak niya . . . hayop siya (His father is a son of
a bitch . . . without pity for his son . . . he is an animal); and (3) Appellant did
not allow his son, John Albert, to accompany her and when the boy started to
cry and would not stop, appellant beat his son very hard, tied his hands, and
continued beating him until excreta came out of his anus.
The trial court was of the opinion that what Ms. Aguilar heard or saw does not
merely constitute an independently relevant statement which it considered as
an exception to the hearsay rule, only as to the tenor rather than the intrinsic
truth or falsity of its contents. We will clarify this. Insofar as the statements of
Rufina Alconyes are concerned, they are admissible as part of the res gestae
they having been caused by and did result from the startling, if not gruesome,
occurrence that she witnessed; and these were shortly thereafter uttered by
her with spontaneity, without prior opportunity to contrive the same. The
report made thereof by Josephine Aguilar is not hearsay since she was
actually there and personally heard the statements of Alconyes which she
recounted in court. Her account of said statements of Alconyes are
admissible under the doctrine of independently relevant statements, with
respect to the tenor and not the truth thereof, since independent of the truth
or falsity of the same they are relevant to the issue on the cause of the death
of the victim.
The Court is not unaware of the caution to be observed when circumstancial
evidence is to be considered as inculpatory indicia in a criminal prosecution.
That is why it has spent unusual time and effort to reflect upon all facets of
the circumstances which the lower court accepted as an unbroken chain of
events, reinforced by corroboration and yielding a conclusion of guilt, all
consonant with the requisites therefor.[25] But, from whatever angle we take
the view, the catena of facts cannot but produce an inference consisent with
guilt and not with innocence. All these, even aside from the tenet that flight
bespeaks guilt, a further strike against appellant in addition to the cover-up
running the gamut from falsification to false testimony.
From such ruminations, we are fully convinced that the conscience of the
Court can rest easy only by doing justice to an innocent child whose parents
had heartlessly failed him. Somehow, a mystical cause may have called upon
two good Samaritans -- a mother with a sense of humanity and a lady lawyer
with a passion for justice -- to seek redress for his untimely death.

G.R. NO. 147039 January 27, 2006

DBP POOL OF ACCREDITED INSURANCE COMPANIES, Petitioner, vs.

RADIO MINDANAO NETWORK, INC., Respondent.
Facts:
The assailed decision originated from Civil Case No. 90-602 filed by Radio
Mindanao Network, Inc. (respondent) against DBP Pool of Accredited
Insurance Companies (petitioner) and Provident Insurance Corporation
(Provident) for recovery of insurance benefits
In the evening of July 27, 1988, respondents radio station was razed by fire
causing damage in the amount of P1,044,040.00. Respondent sought
recovery under the two insurance policies but the claims were denied on the
ground that the cause of loss was an excepted risk excluded under condition
no. 6 (c) and (d), to wit:
6. This insurance does not cover any loss or damage occasioned by or
through or in consequence, directly or indirectly, of any of the following
consequences, namely:
(c) War, invasion, act of foreign enemy, hostilities, or warlike operations
(whether war be declared or not), civil war.
(d) Mutiny, riot, military or popular rising, insurrection, rebellion, revolution,
military or usurped power.3
The insurance companies maintained that the evidence showed that the fire
was caused by members of the Communist Party of the Philippines/New
Peoples Army (CPP/NPA); and consequently, denied the claims. Hence,
respondent was constrained to file Civil Case No. 90-602 against petitioner
and Provident.
RTC rendered a decision in favor of respondent. In upholding respondents
claim for indemnity, the trial court found that:
The only evidence which the Court can consider to determine if the fire was
due to the intentional act committed by the members of the New Peoples
Army (NPA), are the testimony [sic] of witnesses Lt. Col. Nicolas Torres and
SPO3 Leonardo Rochar who were admittedly not present when the fire
occurred. Their testimony [sic] was [sic] limited to the fact that an
investigation was conducted and in the course of the investigation they were
informed by bystanders that "heavily armed men entered the transmitter
house, poured gasoline in (sic) it and then lighted it. After that, they went out
shouting "Mabuhay ang NPA" (TSN, p. 12., August 2, 1995). The persons
whom they investigated and actually saw the burning of the station were not
presented as witnesses. The documentary evidence particularly Exhibits "5"
and "5-C" do not satisfactorily prove that the author of the burning were
members of the NPA. Exhibit "5-B" which is a letter released by the NPA
merely mentions some dissatisfaction with the activities of some people in
the media in Bacolod. There was no mention there of any threat on media
facilities.8
CA affirmed the decision.
Issue: WON the testimonies of Lt. Col Torres and SFO II Rochar that the
bystanders they interviewed claimed that the perpetrators were members of
the CPP/NPA fall as an exception to the hearsay rule (as part of res gestae).
Ruling: NO
A witness can testify only to those facts which he knows of his personal
knowledge, which means those facts which are derived from his
perception.19 A witness may not testify as to what he merely learned from
others either because he was told or read or heard the same. Such testimony

is considered hearsay and may not be received as proof of the truth of what
he has learned. The hearsay rule is based upon serious concerns about the
trustworthiness and reliability of hearsay evidence inasmuch as such
evidence are not given under oath or solemn affirmation and, more
importantly, have not been subjected to cross-examination by opposing
counsel to test the perception, memory, veracity and articulateness of
the out-of-court declarant or actor upon whose reliability on which the worth
of the out-of-court statement depends.20
Res gestae, as an exception to the hearsay rule, refers to those exclamations
and statements made by either the participants, victims, or spectators to a
crime immediately before, during, or after the commission of the crime, when
the circumstances are such that the statements were made as a
spontaneous reaction or utterance inspired by the excitement of the occasion
and there was no opportunity for the declarant to deliberate and to fabricate a
false statement. The rule in res gestae applies when the declarant himself did
not testify and provided that the testimony of the witness who heard the
declarant complies with the following requisites: (1) that the principal act, the
res gestae, be a startling occurrence; (2) the statements were made before
the declarant had the time to contrive or devise a falsehood; and (3) that the
statements must concern the occurrence in question and its immediate
attending circumstances.21
The Court is not convinced to accept the declarations as part of res gestae.
While it may concede that these statements were made by the bystanders
during a startling occurrence, it cannot be said however, that these
utterances were made spontaneously by the bystanders and before they had
the time to contrive or devise a falsehood. Both SFO III Rochar and Lt. Col.
Torres received the bystanders statements while they were making their
investigations during and after the fire. It is reasonable to assume that when
these statements were noted down, the bystanders already had enough time
and opportunity to mill around, talk to one another and exchange information,
not to mention theories and speculations, as is the usual experience in
disquieting situations where hysteria is likely to take place. It cannot therefore
be ascertained whether these utterances were the products of truth. That the
utterances may be mere idle talk is not remote.
At best, the testimonies of SFO III Rochar and Lt. Col. Torres that these
statements were made may be considered as independently relevant
statements gathered in the course of their investigation, and are admissible
not as to the veracity thereof but to the fact that they had been thus
uttered.22
Furthermore, admissibility of evidence should not be equated with its weight
and sufficiency.23 Admissibility of evidence depends on its relevance and
competence, while the weight of evidence pertains to evidence already
admitted and its tendency to convince and persuade.24 Even assuming that
the declaration of the bystanders that it was the members of the CPP/NPA
who caused the fire may be admitted as evidence, it does not follow that
such declarations are sufficient proof. These declarations should be
calibrated vis--vis the other evidence on record.
While the documentary evidence presented by petitioner, i.e., (1) the police
blotter; (2) the certification from the Bacolod Police Station; and (3) the Fire
Investigation Report may be considered exceptions to the hearsay rule, being
entries in official records, nevertheless, as noted by the CA, none of these
documents categorically stated that the perpetrators were members of the
CPP/NPA.26 Rather, it was stated in the police blotter that: "a group of
persons accompanied by one (1) woman all believed to be CPP/NPA more
or less 20 persons suspected to be CPP/NPA,"27 while the certification from
the Bacolod Police station stated that " some 20 or more armed men
believed to be members of the New Peoples Army NPA,"28 and the fire
investigation report concluded that "(I)t is therefore believed by this
Investigating Team that the cause of the fire is intentional, and the armed
mensuspected to be members of the CPP/NPA where (sic) the ones
responsible "29 All these documents show that indeed, the "suspected"

executor of the fire were believed to be members of the CPP/NPA. But

suspicion alone is not sufficient, preponderance of evidence being the
quantum of proof.
Additional notes:
Anent the letter (claiming that NPA was responsible for the fire) of a certain
Celso Magsilang, who claims to be a member of NPA-NIROC, being an
admission of person which is not a party to the present action, is likewise
inadmissible in evidence under Section 22, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.
The reason being that an admission is competent only when the declarant, or
someone identified in legal interest with him, is a party to the action.

G. R. No. 172326 January 19, 2009

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff vs. ALFREDO PASCUAL Y
ILDEFONSO Accused-Appellant.
Accused-appellant Alfredo Pascual y Ildefonso aliasBOYET was found
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Rape with Homicide by RTC.
The incident xxx happened in a room at the second floor of House No. 724.
The sketch of the house shows it has three (3) rooms; on the first floor, one
occupied by Arlene Gorospe and family; the second, by Alfredo Pascual and
his family (Exh. A-2); and the third is the residence of Rodolfo Jundos, Jr. and
his family. On the second floor is another room occupied by the family of the
victim Lorelyn Pacubas y Tamayo (alias Ling-Ling) and her siblings.
Last December 24, 2000, at around 10:00 oclock in the evening, Rodolfo
Jundos, Jr. was preparing to celebrate noche buena with his son and the
accused-appellant, Alfredo Pascual who was with Christopher, his 2-year old
youngest child. Alfredo Pascual appeared to have had liquor already. For
three (3) instances, the accused would ask permission to go inside the house
as he was already sleepy and drunk but nonetheless will return 10 to 15
minutes later, twice still with the child and only to continue drinking every time
he returned. On the third time, he was without the child anymore and partake
(sic) of liquor until 1:00 oclock a.m. when he left, leaving Rodolfo Jundos, Jr.
alone just outside the aforesaid house at 724 Ballesteros St. (Exh. A-8).
Twenty (20) minutes later, Divina Pascual, appellants wife, came out the
house looking for her husband. When informed that the latter had already
left, Divina started looking for him inside the house and later in the billiard hall
10 or 15 minutes away. Moments later, Divina went passed (sic) the place
where Rodolfo Jundos, Jr. was drinking, rushing upstairs to the second floor
of the house. Soon after, Jundos saw Divina chasing Alfredo running out
towards the gate at the same time asked (sic) Jundos for help saying Kuya,
tulungan mo ako, si Boyet (referring to Alfredo Pascual)). Thinking that
Alfredo Pascual was making trouble, Rodolfo Jundos, Jr. joined the chase but
could not catch up as Alfredo was running very fast. So Divina told him to
instead go upstairs as the accused might have done something wrong to
Ling-ling (Lorelyn) [T.S.N. pp. 4-11, October 24, 2002]. Rodolfo Jundos, Jr. is
the husband of appellants older sister, Laarni.
Together, Jundos and Divina rushed to the second floor. As the place was
dark, they switched on the light and there they saw Ling-ling (Lorelyn
Pacubas) flat on her back on the floor almost naked with arms and legs open,
her panty and shorts down to her ankle and t-shirt pulled up above the breast
with blood on the right breast. They tried to wake up Ling-ling but the latter
was already dead. Rodolfo Jundos, Jr. was shocked at what he saw. Divina

got hysterical and repeatedly told Arlene Gorospe what happened. It did not
take long before policemen from the Southern Command (SOCO) arrived.
During the trial, the unfortunate incident was candidly narrated by Rodolfo
Jundos, Jr.
xxx
Q - When you first enter that room where you find the body of the victim
Lorelyn Bacubas, what was the condition of the room?
A - Nakita ko po na magulo yong kama tapos yong drawer na lagayan ng
mga damit kasi salamin po yong ibaba may mga basag po at may mga patak
ng dugo.
Q - What else did you find?
A - May scissor po sa left side ng braso nya, sa gilid po.
xxx
Q - What did you do when you saw the victim in this case already sprawled
on the floor?
A - Nung nakita na naming hindi na gumagalaw si Ling-Ling at ang
pagkaalam namin ay patay na, bumaba na po kami.
xxx
Q - After you went down, what did you do next?
A - Pag-baba po namin ni Divina, tumakbo po kami don sa pinto, sa bahay
po ng bayaw ko at humingi po kami ng tulong.
Q - Who is your brother-in-law?
A - Arleen Gorospe sir.
xxx
Q - What did you do with Arleen Gorospe?
A - Pag-bukas po ng pinto, una pong pumasok si Divina at nag-hysterical na
nagsisigaw na Manang Rose, yong asawa po ni Arleen Gorospe, si Ling-Ling
ginahasa at pinatay ni Boyet.
Q - And what next happened?
A - Sinalaysay po ni Divina, pero ako poy na shock at napaupo na lang ako
sa sopa, umakyat din po si Arleen sa taas at may tumawag na rin ng
pulis.24 (Emphasis Ours)
Arlene Gorospe corroborated the testimony of Jundos that in the early
morning of December 25, 2000, Jundos and the accused-appellants wife,
Divina, knocked at his door to inform him of the incident after which he
immediately proceeded upstairs and saw the victim naked and lifeless with
her t-shirt pulled up.25
Issue: WON the statement of the accused-appellants wife immediately after
the fateful incident is part of res gestae?
Ruling:
The statements of accused-appellants wife, Divina, immediately after the
fateful incident all the more convince the Court as to accused-appellants
guilt. Part of the res gestae and admissible in evidence as an exception to
the hearsay rule were Divinas utterances to Gorospe after seeing the dead
and raped body of the victim, i.e., May nagyari sa itaas at galing doon si
Boyet, and her subsequent narration of seeing the accused-appellant going
out of the victims room and running away therefrom.33 In People v
Cantonjos34the Court held that:
Res gestae utterances refer to those exclamations and statements made by
either the participants, victims, or spectators to a crime immediately before,
during, or after the commission of the crime, when the circumstances are
such that the statements were made as a spontaneous reaction or utterance
inspired by the excitement of the occasion and there was no opportunity for
the declarant to deliberate and to fabricate a false statement. A declaration is
deemed part of the res gestae and thus admissible in evidence as an
exception to the hearsay rule when the following requisites concur: (1) the
principal act, the res gestae, is a startling occurrence; (2) the statements
were made before the declarant had time to contrive or devise; and (3) the
statements must concern the occurrence in question and its immediately
attending circumstances.

The aforementioned requisites are present in this case. The res gestae or the
startling event is the rape and death of the victim. The statements of Divina to
Gorospe were made spontaneously and before she had the time to contrive
or devise such declarations, and said statements all concerned the
occurrence in question or the immediately attending circumstances thereof.
In the absence of evidence that the witnesses for the prosecution were
actuated by improper motive, the presumption is that they were not so
actuated and their testimonies are entitled to full faith and credit.35

G.R. No. 176768 January 12, 2009

GOLDEN (ILOILO) DELTA SALES CORPORATION, Petitioners, vs. PRESTRESS INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION, ZEON SETIAS and JERRY
JARDIOLIN, Respondents.
FACTS:
Petitioner Golden (Iloilo) Delta Sales Corporation (Golden Delta) is a
domestic corporation engaged in the business of selling hardware and
construction materials. Mr. Cembrano is its Vice-President and General
Manager.
Respondent Pre-Stress International Corporation (PSI) is also a domestic
corporation engaged in the fabrication of pre-stress concrete pipes and precase concrete, while respondents Jerry Jardiolin and Zeon Setias are
officers of PSI.
Sometime in 1990, Cembrano was introduced by Jardiolin to the PSI Board
of Directors, among whom was Setias. Since then, Golden Delta supplied
PSI with its construction materials on credit and at times helped finance the
latters construction projects through Golden Deltas sister financing
company.
Initially, the construction materials delivered by Golden Delta to PSI were
taken from the formers warehouse located in Dungon A, Jaro, Iloilo City,
which was situated some kilometers away from the PSI compound at
Barangay Maliao. Sometime in March 2000, for convenience of both parties,
the officers of PSI allegedly offered Golden Delta to store its construction
materials at the PSI compound in Pavia, Iloilo. At that time, Golden Deltas
warehouse in Dungon A, Jaro, Iloilo City, was being rented by Wewins
Bakeshop.

On December 8, 2001, Golden Delta sent a Letter addressed to Setias, the

General Manager of PSI, demanding the release of the construction
materials. PSI allegedly refused to release or
allow Golden Delta to enter the compound and withdraw the materials.
Golden Delta filed a Complaint for Recovery of Personal Property with Prayer
for Replevin with Damages before the RTC of Iloilo City against PSI, Jardiolin
and Setias. In its complaint, Golden Delta averred that respondents refusal
to allow it to withdraw the construction materials inside the PSI compound
constituted unlawful taking of possession of personal properties.
In their Answer with Affirmative Defense and Counterclaim, PSI and Setias
contended that Golden Deltas action for recovery of personal property with
prayer for replevin with damages has no factual and legal basis.
They averred that they came to know Cembrano when Jardiolin introduced
him to them and that they are familiar with Golden Delta since they used to
buy construction materials from it. In addition, they do not interfere with the
affairs and activities of Jardiolin as his operations do not interfere with their
own operations. Although Golden Delta also delivers construction materials
to Jardiolin, their transaction is exclusively between the two of them and they
have no participation in it whatsoever.
In his own Answer with Affirmative Defenses and Counterclaim, Jardiolin
maintained that he did not agree or allow, impliedly or explicitly, Golden Delta
or any of its representatives to store any construction materials in his
designated area inside the PSI compound. He averred that neither he, PSI
nor Setias agreed to the withdrawal of any of the alleged stocks because the
stocks inside the PSI compound were not owned by Golden Delta. He added
that the construction materials inside the PSI compound being claimed by
Golden Delta were his personal properties.
The RTC rendered a Decision against Golden Delta. It ratiocinated that
Golden Delta was not able to prove its ownership of the subject materials and
its entitlement to their possession. Aggrieved, Golden Delta sought recourse
before the CA, but the latter agreed with the RTCs decision.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there was propriety in the CAs ruling that ownership belongs
to the respondent in the case at bar?
RULING:
NONE.

Golden Delta accepted the proposal and began utilizing a portion of the PSI
compound as its warehouse and bodega, stacking and storing its
construction materials there. Golden Delta claimed that the arrangement
went smoothly from March 2000 to December 2001.
Before December 5, 2001, however, Golden Delta decided to resume its
operations at its own warehouse. Thereafter, Golden Delta started to retrieve
and transfer its stocks from the PSI compound to its own warehouse in
Dungon A. Golden Deltas employees were able to load three out of four
trucks with assorted construction materials, but were only able to bring out
two loaded trucks from the PSI compound to its warehouse in Dungon A.
When Golden Deltas people returned to retrieve the remaining materials,
they were prevented from doing so by the guards of PSI, allegedly upon the
instructions of Jardiolin. Despite numerous telephone calls by Golden Delta
to the officers and personnel of PSI, the latter allegedly refused to allow
Golden Delta to withdraw its remaining stocks.

The findings of the CA are contrary to the evidence, which it grossly

misappreciated, and to the judicial admissions of respondents.
There is sufficient basis in both respondents judicial admissions and the
evidence on record that indeed construction materials were delivered by
petitioner in the PSI compound. Allegations, statements and admissions
made by a party in his pleadings are binding upon him. He cannot
subsequently take a position contradictory or inconsistent with his
admissions. Respondents PSI and Setias admitted in their Answer that
Petitioner Golden Delta clearly delivered construction materials to the PSI
compound. There is sufficient basis in both respondents judicial admissions
and the evidence on record that indeed construction materials were delivered
by petitioner in the PSI compound.
The CA stated that the petitioner failed to prove as to how much or how
many of these construction materials were actually stored at the PSI
compound. The CA simply ignored the evidentiary impact of the voluminous

withdrawal slips and inventory lists prepared and testified to by petitioners

personnel proving the exact quantity and specifications of these construction
materials stored at the PSI compound. Furthermore, a list of these
construction materials with their respective quantities and descriptions, was
annexed to the petitioners complaint for replevin. This list was never denied
by respondents in their respective Answers, much less refuted by them
during the trial.
The CAs findings that these inventory lists that were testified to by
petitioners witnesses were not signed or acknowledged by any of
respondents personnel do not militate against their evidentiary value. As
correctly pointed out by petitioner, the withdrawal slips and inventory lists do
not bear the signature of any PSI officer/personnel because, as admitted by
PSI and Setias in their Answer, they do not interfere with the affairs and
activities of Golden Delta and Jardiolin as their operations do not interfere
with their companys operation and that although Golden Delta delivers
construction materials to Jardiolin, the transaction is purely between the two
of them and that they have no participation in their transactions whatsoever.
Nor can it be contended that the inventory lists are self-serving simply
because they were prepared by petitioners employees. These documents
were prepared ante litem motam, and without anticipation that any litigation
between the parties may ensue in the future. Statements, acts or conducts
accompanying or so nearly connected with the main transaction as to form
part of it, and which illustrate, elucidate, qualify or characterize the act, are
admissible as part of the res gestae.
In the present case, the withdrawal slips and inventory lists were prepared by
the petitioners employees who were detailed at the PSI compound, in the
regular course of its business, made contemporaneously with the transaction,
and in the performance of their regular duties without anticipation of any
future litigation which may arise between petitioner and PSI. They should
have been afforded great weight and credence as evidence.
Petitioners voluminous documentary evidence consisting of certifications and
invoices of its purchase and shipment to it of construction materials by its
suppliers prove that the subject construction materials belong to it. The
admissions of respondents that they bought construction materials from
petitioner which were stocked at its own compound proved that petitioner
owned the materials and such ownership was recognized by respondents by
the mere fact that they purchased some of the construction materials from
petitioner.
The CA found that there was an agreement between petitioner and Jardiolin
with respect to the construction materials stored at the PSI compound, but
the specifics of the agreement were not clear. Hence, the CA concluded that
Jardiolin was the presumed owner of the construction materials. This
conclusion is based on pure conjecture and not on the evidence.
From all the foregoing, it is evident that the findings of the CA are contrary to
the evidence and the admissions in the pleadings.

G.R. No. 178063 April 5, 2010 [Formerly G.R. No. 149894]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. TIRSO SACE y
MONTOYA, Accused-Appellant.
FACTS:

On September 9, 1999, at around seven (7) oclock in the evening, AAA was
inside their house with her 10-year-old brother BBB and a nephew, who was
still a toddler, when appellant suddenly showed up. As admitted by appellant,
he came from a drinking spree that began at about eleven (11) oclock in the
morning. AAA told appellant to leave and go home, but he did not heed her.
Appellant then made sexual advances on AAA.
AAA was able to evade appellant when he tried to embrace her, but appellant
pulled a bladed weapon from his pocket. Sensing danger, AAA ran upstairs to
the second level of their house. Appellant followed AAA, leaving BBB and the
toddler in the first floor of the house. BBB heard appellant ordering AAA to
remove her clothes, otherwise, he will stab her. Scared with the turn of
events, the two (2) children hid at the lower portion of the house for around
twenty (20) minutes, and came out only when CCC, the mother of AAA and
BBB, arrived.
CCC, together with her elder daughter DDD and a certain Abelardo Motol
(Abelardo), was on her way home when she and her companions heard AAA
scream. They hurried towards the house and searched it but found it to be
empty. As they searched further, appellant came out from somewhere in the
kitchen area of the house. They noticed that he was bloodied and he told
them that he was chasing someone. Appellant then joined in the search for
AAA. Before long, Abelardo found the lifeless body of AAA lying on the
ground nearby. AAA was half-naked and she appeared to have been ravished
when they found her. Immediately, Abelardo called the barangay officials and
the police.
Barangay Kagawad Carmelita Mawac and other barangay officials and
tanods, arrived. They noticed the bloodstains on appellants clothing.
Carmelita asked appellant what he did, but appellant denied any knowledge
of what happened. Carmelita then went to the half-naked body of AAA and
again asked appellant why he did such a thing to his cousin. At that point,
appellant admitted to the barangay officials and tanods that he was the one
(1) who committed the crime. He admitted that he raped and killed AAA. The
other Barangay Tanod also obtained the same confession from appellant
when he interviewed him in front of other people.
On the part of the defense, appellant denied participation in the crime. He
likewise denied that he confessed to the crime.
The RTC found appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the rape and
killing of AAA.The trial court did not give credence to appellants alibi since he
even categorically admitted that he was at the crime scene and saw AAAs
lifeless body. Because the crime occurred more or less around the time
appellant left the drinking session, the trial court held that it was not
impossible for appellant to accomplish his bestial act shortly after he left the
drinking session as he had to pass by AAAs house on his way home. Also,
other than his bare denial, appellant did not offer any evidence to support his
alibi.
The trial court further pointed out that during the trial, appellant was positively
identified by the 10-year-old brother of AAA, BBB, as the culprit who chased
AAA with a bladed weapon and threatened to kill her if she would not remove
her clothes. BBB, who was only an arms length away from AAA and
appellant, was able to describe vividly the appearance of appellant that night,
his attire, and how appellant tried to embrace and chase AAA.
The trial court found no improper motive on the part of BBB to testify falsely
against appellant. BBBs testimony was notably straightforward and
spontaneous and considering his age, the trial court held that it was
improbable for him to concoct such a terrifying story against his own cousin.
Lastly, the RTC also took into consideration the confession of appellant that
he was the one (1) who raped and killed AAA. The trial court noted that the
confession was made voluntarily and spontaneously in public, and witnessed
by prosecutions witnesses, who were not shown to have any ill motive

against appellant. Thus, appellants declaration was admissible as part of res

gestae, his statement concerning the crime having been made immediately
subsequent to the rape-slaying before he had time to contrive and devise.
The Court of Appeals upheld the decision of the RTC, except insofar as
Republic Act No. 9346 retroactively reduced the penalty for heinous crimes
from death to reclusion perpetua. The death penalty imposed by the trial
court was consequently REDUCED to reclusion perpetua.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the confession made by the accused right after the
occurrence of the crime be admissible as evidence and could be the basis of
his conviction in the commission of the same?
RULING:
The Court affirmed the appellants conviction.
In this case, as found by the RTC, the following chain of events was
established by prosecutions evidence: (a) a drunken appellant came to
AAAs house; (b) appellant tried to embrace AAA but when the latter resisted
and ran away, he chased her with a knife; (c) when appellant caught up with
AAA at the upper portion of the house, he was heard uttering the words "Pag
hindi daw po naghubad ay asaksakin"; (d) appellant was hiding when CCC
and her companion searched the house for AAA, then he suddenly appeared
from his hiding place with bloodied apparels; (e) when asked by CCC,
appellant denied any knowledge of the whereabouts of AAA and what
happened to her; and (f) appellant voluntarily confessed to having committed
the rape with homicide in front of many witnesses then he submitted himself
to police custody.
BBBs candid and unequivocal narration, which positively identified appellant
as the culprit who tried to force himself on AAA, debunks appellants denial of
any participation in the crime.
It is axiomatic that a witness who testifies in a categorical, straightforward,
spontaneous and frank manner and remains consistent on cross-examination
is a credible witness. We see no justification to reverse the RTCs
appreciation of the testimony of BBB. Having observed the witnesss
deportment while testifying, the trial courts assessment of the credibility of
BBB deserves our highest respect.
Also, the facts in this case clearly show that appellant admitted the
commission of the crime to the prosecutions witnesses. According to their
testimonies, appellant admitted having raped and killed AAA. Their
testimonies were not rebutted by the defense. Appellants statements infront
of the prosecution witnesses are admissible for being part of the res gestae.
Under the Revised Rules on Evidence, a declaration is deemed part of the
res gestae and admissible in evidence as an exception to the hearsay rule
when the following requisites concur: (1) the principal act, the res gestae, is a
startling occurrence; (2) the statements were made before the declarant had
time to contrive or devise; and (3) the statements must concern the
occurrence in question and its immediately attending circumstances. All
these requisites are present in this case.
Appellant had just been through a startling and gruesome occurrence, AAAs
death. His admission was made while he was still under the influence of said
startling occurrence and before he had an opportunity to concoct or contrive
a story. In addition, he was still under the influence of alcohol at that time,
having engaged in a drinking spree from 1:00 p.m. to 7:00 p.m. that day. His
confession concerned the rape and killing of AAA. Appellants spontaneous
statements made to private persons, not agents of the State or law enforcers,
are not covered by the constitutional safeguards on custodial investigation
and, as res gestae, admissible in evidence against him.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-appellee, vs. DANILO

FELICIANO, JR., JULIUS VICTOR MEDALLA, CHRISTOPHER SOLIVA,
WARREN L. ZINGAPAN, and ROBERT MICHAEL BELTRAN ALVIR,
Accused-appellants.
Leonen
This case involves a brawl between members of Sigma Rho and Scintilla
Juris, fraternities in UP Diliman.
In this case, a total of eleven (11) witnesses for the prosecution and forty-two
(42) witnesses for the defense were put on the stand from 1995 to 2001.
On December 8, 1994, at around 12:30 to 1:00 in the afternoon, seven (7)
members of the Sigma Rho fraternity were eating lunch at the Beach House
Canteen, near the Main Library of the University of the Philippines, Diliman,
when they were attacked by several masked men carrying baseball bats and
lead pipes. Some of them sustained injuries that required hospitalization.
One of them, Dennis Venturina, died from his injuries. An information1 for
murder was filed against several members of the Scintilla Juris fraternity
which included herein accused.
The facts according to the prosecution are as follows:
Leandro Lachica, Derinis Venturina, and four other men, are all members of
the Sigma Rho Fraternity. On December 8, 1994, at around 12:30 to 1 :00
p.m., they were having lunch at Beach House Canteen, located at the back of
the Main Library of the University of the Philippines, Diliman, Quezon City.8
Suddenly, Dennis Venturina shouted, "Brads, brods!"9
According to Leandro Lachica, Grand Archon of Sigma Rho Fraternity, he
looked around when Venturina shouted, and he saw about ten (10) men
charging toward them.10 The men were armed with baseball bats and lead
pipes, and their heads were covered with either handkerchiefs or shirts.11
Within a few seconds, five (5) of the men started attacking him, hitting him
with their lead pipes.12 During the attack, he recognized one of the attackers
as Robert Michael Beltran Alvir because his mask fell off.13
Lachica tried to parry the blows of.his attackers, suffering scratches and
contusions.14
He was, however, able to run to the nearby College of Education.
Other members of Sigma Rho corroborated Lachicas testimony.
On the other hand, the witnesses for the defense, who included a member of
the UP police, utility worker of the canteen, and UP students, among others,
testified that the masks of the assailants had not fallen off, hence there was
no way to identify the assailants.
The brawl resulted to the death of one of the members of Sigma Rho, Dennis
Venturina, due to injuries.
RTC: herein accused are guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder and
attempted murder and were sentenced to, among other penalties, the penalty
of reclusion perpetua
CA: affirmed

ISSUE:
According to the testimony of U.P. Police Officer Salvador,139 when he
arrived at the scene, he interviewed the bystanders who all told him that they
could not recognize the attackers since they were all masked.
The issue is whether or not the testimony of the UP police officer who elicited
his information from the bystanders are admissible as evidence.

There is no doubt that a sudden attack on a group peacefully eating lunch on

a school campus is a startling occurrence. Considering that the statements of
the bystanders were made immediately after the startling occurrence, they
are, in fact, admissible as evidence given in res gestae. In People v.
Albarido,144 however, this court has stated that "in accord to ordinary human
experience:"

Note: this is a big deal because if the malefactors were all masked, their
identities wont be established, hence the accused herein must be acquitted

x x x persons who witness an event perceive the same from their respective
points of reference. Therefore, almost always, they have different accounts of
how it happened. Certainly, we cannot expect the testimony of witnesses to a
crime to be consistent in all aspects because different persons have different
impressions and recollections of the same incident. x x x145

RULING:

(Emphasis supplied)

Yes, it is admissible but have little persuasive value in this case.

The statements made by the bystanders, although admissible, have little

persuasive value since the bystanders could have seen the events
transpiring at different vantage points and at different points in time. Even
Frisco Capilo, one of the bystanders at the time of the attack, testified that
the attackers had their masks on at first, but later on, some remained masked
and some were unmasked.

As a general rule, "[a] witness can testify only to the facts he knows of his
personal knowledge; that is, which are derived from his own perception, x x
x."140 All other kinds of testimony are hearsay and are inadmissible as
evidence. The Rules of Court, however, provide several exceptions to the
general rule, and one of which is when the evidence is part of res gestae,
thus:
Section 42. Part of res gestae. - Statements made by a person while a
starting occurrence is taking place or immediately prior or subsequent thereto
with respect to the circumstances thereof, may be given in evidence as part
of res gestae. So, also, statements accompanying an equivocal act material
to the issue, and giving it a legal significance, may be received as part of the
res gestae.141 In People v. Rodrigo Salafranca,142 this court has previously
discussed the admissibility of testimony taken as part of res gestae, stating
that:
A declaration or an utterance is deemed as part of the res gestae and thus
admissible in evidence as an exception to the hearsay rule when the
following requisites concur, to wit: (a) the principal act, the res gestae, is a
startling occurrence; (b) the statements are made before the declarant had
time to contrive or devise; and (c) the statements must concern the
occurrence in question and its immediately attending circumstances.
xxxx
The term res gestae has been defined as "those circumstances which are the
undersigned incidents of a particular litigated act and which are admissible
when illustrative of such act." In a general way, res gestae refers to the
circumstances, facts, and declarations that grow out of the main fact and
serve to illustrate its character and are so spontaneous and
contemporaneous with the main fact as to exclude the idea of deliberation
and fabrication.
The rule on res gestae encompasses the exclamations and statements made
by either the participants, victims, or spectators to a crime immediately
before, during, or immediately after the commission of the crime when the
circumstances are such that the statements were made as a spontaneous
reaction or utterance inspired by the excitement of the occasion and there
was no opportunity for the declarant to deliberate and to fabricate a false
statement.
The test of admissibility of evidence as a part of the res gestae is, therefore,
whether the act, declaration, or exclamation is so intimately interwoven or
connected with the principal fact or event that it characterizes as to be
regarded as a part of the transaction itself, and also whether it clearly
negatives any premeditation or purpose to manufacture testimony.143

When the bystanders' testimonies are weighed against those of the victims
who witnessed the entirety of the incident from beginning to end at close
range, the former become merely corroborative of the fact that an attack
occurred. Their account of the incident, therefore, must be given considerably
less weight than that of the victims.
============================
Concluding words of ponente:
This is not the first fraternity-related case to come to this court; neither will it
be the last. Perhaps this case and many cases like it can empower those
who have a better view of masculinity: one which valorizes courage, sacrifice
and honor in more life-saving pursuits.
"Giting at dangal" are words of the anthem of the University of the
Philippines. It colors the stories of many who choose to expend their energy
in order that our people will have better lives. Fraternity rumbles are an
anathema, an immature and useless expenditure of testosterone. It fosters a
culture that retards manhood. It is devoid of "giting at dangal."
============================

SECURITY BANK AND TRUST COMPANY, Petitioner, vs. ERIC GAN,

Respondent.
FACTS:
Petitioner Bank alleged that it had an agreement with respondent Gan
wherein the latter would deposit an initial amount in his current account and
he could draw checks on said account provided there were sufficient funds to
cover them. Furthermore, under a special arrangement with petitioners
branch manager then, Mr. Qui,4 respondent was allowed to transfer funds
from his account to another persons account also within the same branch.5
Respondent availed of such arrangement several times by depositing checks
in his account and even before they cleared, he withdrew the proceeds
thereof and transferred them to the other account. These transactions were

covered by what were known as "debit memos" since respondent had no

sufficient funds to cover the amounts he transferred.

was, therefore, neither justification nor necessity for the presentation of the
entries as the person who made them was available to testify in court.16

Later on, respondent purportedly incurred an overdraft or negative balance in

his account amounting to P297,060.01.

Moreover, Mercado had no personal knowledge of the facts constituting the

entries, particularly those entries which resulted in the negative balance. He
had no knowledge of the truth or falsity of these entries.

Respondent failed to satisfy his obligation despite demand. Hence, petitioner

filed a complaint for sum of money against respondent to recover the sum of
money.
To prove its claim, petitioner presented Patricio Mercado who was the
bookkeeper who handled the account of respondent and recorded his
transactions in a ledger. Based on this ledger, respondent allegedly had a
negative balance of P153,757.78. This resulted from transfers of funds from
respondents current account to another persons account. These transfers
were made under the authority of Qui.11
RTC: dismissed; It held that petitioner was not able to prove that respondent
owed it the amount claimed considering that the ledger cards it presented
were merely hearsay evidence

As a subordinate, Mercado could not have done more than record what was
reported to him by his superior the branch manager, and unless he was
allowed to be privy to the latters dealings with the defendant, the information
that he received and entered in the ledgers was incapable of being confirmed
by him.
In the fac[e] of the denial by the defendant of the existence of any such
agreement, and the absence of any document reflecting it, the testimony of a
party to the transaction, i.e., Mr. [Q]ui, or of any witness to the same, would
be necessary.
Thus, petitioner was not able to prove that respondent had incurred a
negative balance in his account. Consequently, there was nothing to show
that respondent was indebted to it in the amount claimed.

CA: affirmed
ISSUE:
WON the entries in the ledger, as testified to by Mercado, were competent
evidence to prove how and when the negative balance was incurred

SPOUSES QUIRINO V. DELA CRUZ AND GLORIA DELA CRUZ v.

PLANTERS PRODUCTS, INC. [G.R. No. 158649, February 18, 2013]

RULING:

BERSAMIN, J.: Spouses Quirino V. Dela Cruz and Gloria Dela Cruz,
petitioners herein, operated the Barangay Agricultural Supply, an agricultural
supply store in Aliaga, Nueva Ecija engaged in the distribution and sale of
fertilizers and agricultural chemical products, among others. At the time
material to the case, Quirino, a lawyer, was the Municipal Mayor of Aliaga,
Nueva Ecija. On March 23, 1978, Gloria applied for and was granted by
respondent Planters Products, Inc. (PPI) a regular credit line of P200, 000 for
a 60-day term, with trust receipts as collaterals. Quirino and Gloria submitted
a list of their assets in support of her credit application for participation in the
Special Credit Scheme (SCS) of PPI. On August 28, 1978, Gloria signed in
the presence of the PPI distribution officer/assistant sales representative two
documents labelled Trust Receipt/Special Credit Scheme, indicating the
invoice number, quantity, value, and names of the agricultural inputs (i.e.,
fertilizer or agricultural chemicals) she received upon the trust of PPI.

No, it is not competent evidence.

Section 43 of Rule 130 provides that:
Entries in the course of business. Entries made at, or near the time of the
transactions to which they refer, by a person deceased, or unable to testify,
who was in a position to know the facts therein stated, may be received as
prima facie evidence, if such person made the entries in his professional
capacity or in the performance of duty and in the ordinary or regular course of
business or duty.
Under this exception to the hearsay rule, the admission in evidence of entries
in corporate books required the satisfaction of the following conditions:
1. the person who made the entry must be dead, or unable to testify;
2. the entries were made at or near the time of the transactions to which they
refer;
3. the entrant was in a position to know the facts stated in the entries;
4. the entries were made in his professional capacity or in the performance of
a duty, whether legal, contractual, moral or religious; and
5. the entries were made in the ordinary or regular course of business or
duty.15
The ledger entries did not meet the first and third requisites.
Mercado, petitioners bookkeeper who prepared the entries, was presented
to testify on the transactions pertaining to the account of respondent. It was
in the course of his testimony that the ledger entries were presented. There

Gloria further expressly agreed that her obligation as stipulated in the

contract would continue in force and be applicable to all transactions,
notwithstanding any change in the individuals composing any firm, parties to
or concerned x x x whether such change shall arise from accession of one or
more new partners or from the death or cession of any partner or partners;
In consideration of PPI complying with the foregoing we jointly and severally
agree and undertake to pay on demand to PPI all sums of money which PPI
may call upon us to pay arising out of or pertaining to and/or in any event
connected with the default of and/or non-fulfillment in any respect of the
undertaking of the aforesaid.
Gloria executed three more documents on September 14, 1978, and one
document each on September 28, 1978, September 18, 1978, and
September 20, 1978. On the corresponding dates, Gloria filled up customer
order forms for fertilizer and agricultural chemical products.
The products were released to Gloria under the supervision of Cristina G.
Llanera of PPI. The 60-day credit term lapsed without Gloria paying her
obligation under the Trust Receipt/SCS. PPI warned that should she fail to do
so, PPI would file the necessary civil and criminal cases against her based
on the Trust Receipts.

PPI brought against Quirino and Gloria in the CFI a complaint for the
recovery of a sum of money with prayer for a writ of preliminary attachment.
PPI alleged that Gloria had violated the fiduciary undertaking in the Trust
Receipt agreement covering product withdrawals under the Special Credit
Scheme which were subsequently charged to defendant dealers regular
credit line; therefore, she is guilty of fraudulently misapplying or converting to
her own use the items delivered to her as contained in the invoices. It
charged that Gloria did not return the goods indicated in the invoices and did
not remit the proceeds of sales. In her answer, the petitioners alleged that
Gloria was only a marketing outlet of PPI under its SCS Program, not a
dealer primarily obligated to PPI for the products delivered to her; that she
had not collected from the farmers participating in the SCS Program because
of the October 27-28, 1979 typhoon Kading that had destroyed the
participating farmers crops; and that she had paid P50,000.00 to PPI despite
the failure of the farmers to pay.
RTC decision: ordering the petitioners to pay the plaintiff PPI
The RTC found that based on the terms and conditions of the SCS Program,
a creditor-debtor relationship was created between Gloria and PPI; that her
liability was predicated on Section 4 of the Trust Receipts Law (Presidential
Decree No. 115) and on the ruling in Robles v. Court of Appeals to the effect
that the failure of the entrustee (Gloria) to turn over to the entruster (plaintiff)
the proceeds of the sale of goods covered by the delivery trust receipts or to
return the goods constituted estafa and that the petitioners could not use as a
defense the occurrence of typhoon Kading because there was no privity of
contract between the participating farmers and PPI.
CA: affirmed the judgment of the RTC
The CA held the petitioners liable to PPI for the value of the fertilizers and
agricultural chemical products covered by the trust receipts because a
creditor-debtor relationship existed between the parties when, pursuant to the
credit line of P200,000.00 and the SCS Program, the petitioners withdrew
several fertilizers and agricultural chemical products on credit; that the
petitioners then came under obligation to pay the equivalent value of the
withdrawn goods, or to
return the undelivered and/or unused products within the specified period.
Moreover, Defendants-appellants cannot pass their obligation to pay the
equivalent value of the undelivered and/or unused fertilizers and agricultural
chemical products under the trust receipts to the farmers-participants
considering that the contract was between plaintiff-appellee Planters
Products Inc. and defendants-appellants Quirino and Gloria Dela Cruz, and
the farmers-participants were never privy to the said transaction.
Issues: W/N the CA erred in affirming the decision of the RTC
notwithstanding that the award to PPI of the amount of P240,335.10 plus
16% interest per annum was based on hearsay evidence, leaving absolutely
no other evidence to support the award.

proof of their total liability for P240,355.10, the amount stated therein. We do
not agree with the petitioners. With Exhibit V being a private document,
authentication pursuant to the rules on evidence was a condition for its
admissibility. Llanera, admittedly the person who had prepared the document,
was competent to testify on the due execution and authenticity of Exhibit V.
Such authentication was done in accordance with Rule 132 of the Rules of
Court, whose Section 20 states:
Section 20. Proof of private document. Before any private document offered
as authentic is received in evidence, its due execution and authenticity must
be proved either: (a) By anyone who saw the document executed or written;
or (b) By evidence of the genuineness of the signature or handwriting of the
maker. Any other private document need only be identified as that which it is
claimed to be.
Further, the petitioners dispute the contents of Exhibit V by invoking Section
43, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, to wit:
Section 43. Entries in the course of business. Entries made at, or near the
time of the transactions to which they refer, by a person deceased, or unable
to testify, who was in a position to know the facts therein stated, may be
received as prima facie evidence, if such person made the entries in his
professional capacity or in the performance of duty and in the ordinary or
regular course of business.
The invocation of the rule is misplaced, however, because the rule speaks of
a situation where the person who made the entries is dead or unable to
testify, which was not the situation here. Regardless, we have to point out
that entries made in the course of business enjoy the presumption of
regularity.53 If properly authenticated, the entries serve as evidence of the
status of the account of the petitioners. In Land Bank v. Monets Export and
Manufacturing Corporation,54 the Court has explained that such entries are
accorded unusual reliability because their regularity and continuity are
calculated to discipline record keepers in the habit of precision; and that if the
entries are financial, the records are routinely balanced and audited; hence,
in actual experience, the whole of the business world function in reliance of
such kind of records. Nor have the petitioners proved that the entries
contained in Exhibit V were incorrect and untruthful. They cannot be
permitted to do so now at this stage of final appeal, especially after the lower
courts found and accepted the statement of account contained therein to be
properly authenticated and trustworthy. Indeed, the Court is in no position to
review and overturn the lower courts unanimous finding and acceptance
without strong and valid reasons because they involved an issue of fact.
WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the Decision promulgated on April 11,
2003 by the Court of Appeals, subject to the MODIFICATIONS that: (a) the
rate of interest is 12% per annum reckoned from the filing of the complaint
until full payment; and (b) the award of attorneys fees is deleted.

Ruling: The appeal has no merit.

Statement of account was not hearsay
G.R. No. 176897, December 11, 2013
The petitioners insist that they could not be held liable for the balance stated
in Exhibit V due to such document being hearsay as a mere statement of
account. They argue that Cristina Llanera, the witness of PPI on the matter,
was only a warehouse assistant who was not shown to be either an
accountant, or bookkeeper, or auditor or a person knowledgeable in
accounting. They posit that Llaneras testimony on Exhibit V was limited to
stating that she had prepared the statement of account contained therein;
that she did not affirm the correctness or veracity of the contents of the
document; and that, consequently, Exhibit V had no evidentiary value as

ADVANCE PAPER CORPORATION AND GEORGE HAW, IN HIS

CAPACITY AS PRESIDENT OF ADVANCE PAPER CORPORATION,
Petitioners, v. ARMA TRADERS CORPORATION, MANUEL TING, CHENG
GUI AND BENJAMIN NG, Respondents. ANTONIO TAN AND UY SENG
KEE WILLY, Respondents.
BRION, J Petitioner Advance Paper is a domestic corporation engaged in the
business of producing, printing, manufacturing, distributing and selling of

various paper products. Petitioner George Haw (Haw) is the President while
his wife, Connie Haw, is the General Manager. Respondent Arma Traders is
also a domestic corporation engaged in the wholesale and distribution of
school and office supplies, and novelty products. Respondent Antonio Tan
(Tan) was formerly the President while respondent Uy Seng Kee Willy (Uy) is
the Treasurer of Arma Traders. They represented Arma Traders when dealing
with its supplier, Advance Paper, for about 14 years. On the other hand,
respondents Manuel Ting, Cheng Gui and Benjamin Ng worked for Arma
Traders as Vice-President, General Manager and Corporate Secretary,
respectively. On various dates from September to December 1994, Arma
Traders purchased on credit notebooks and other paper products amounting
to P7,533,001.49 from Advance Paper. Upon the representation of Tan and
Uy, Arma Traders also obtained three loans from Advance Paper to settle its
obligations to other suppliers because its own collectibles did not arrive on
time. Because of its good business relations with Arma Traders, Advance
Paper extended the loans. As payment for the purchases on credit and the
loan transactions, Arma Traders issued 82 postdated checks payable to cash
or to Advance Paper. Tan and Uy were Arma Traders authorized bank
signatories who signed and issued these checks which had the aggregate
amount of P15,130,636.87. Advance Paper presented the checks to the
drawee bank but these were dishonored either for insufficiency of funds or
account closed. Despite repeated demands, however, Arma Traders failed
to settle its account with Advance Paper.
Petitioners filed a complaint for collection of sum of money with application
for preliminary attachment against Arma Traders, Tan, Uy, Ting, Gui, and Ng.
RTC Ruling : the purchases on credit and loans were sufficiently proven by
the petitioners. Ordered Arma Traders to pay Advance Paper .
The RTC held that the respondents failed to present hard, admissible and
credible evidence to prove that the sale invoices were forged or fictitious, and
that the loan transactions were personal obligations of Tan and Uy.
Nonetheless, the RTC dismissed the complaint against Tan, Uy, Ting, Gui
and Ng due to the lack of evidence showing that they bound themselves,
either jointly or solidarily, with Arma Traders for the payment of its account.
CA Ruling: set aside the RTCs order. It affirmed the RTC decision dismissing
the complaint against respondents Tan, Uy, Ting, Gui and Ng. Petitioners
failed to prove by preponderance of evidence the existence of the purchases
on credit and loans based on the following grounds: First, Arma Traders was
not liable for the loan in the absence of a board resolution authorizing Tan
and Uy to obtain the loan from Advance Paper. The CA acknowledged that
Tan and Uy were Arma Traders authorized bank signatories. However, the
CA explained that this is not sufficient because the authority to sign the
checks is different from the required authority to contract a loan. Second, the
CA also held that the petitioners presented incompetent and inadmissible
evidence to prove the purchases on credit since the sales invoices were
hearsay. The CA pointed out that Haws testimony as to the identification of
the sales invoices was not an exception to the hearsay rule because there
was no showing that the secretaries who prepared the sales invoices are
already dead or unable to testify as required by the Rules of Court. Further,
the CA noted that the secretaries were not identified or presented in court.
Hence, The Petition.
SC Ruling : RTC Decision reinstated
ISSUE: W/N Haws testimony is hearsay?
HELD: YES, but the respondents failed to object to the admissibility of the
sales invoices on the ground that they are hearsay. The rule is that failure to
object to the offered evidence renders it admissible, and the court cannot, on
its own, disregard such evidence. When a party desires the court to reject the
evidence offered, it must so state in the form of a timely objection and it
cannot raise the objection to the evidence for the first time on appeal.
Because of a partys failure to timely object, the evidence becomes part of
the evidence in the case. Thereafter, all the parties are considered bound by

any outcome arising from the offer of evidence properly presented. In Heirs of
Policronio M. Ureta, Sr. v. Heirs of Liberato M. Ureta, however, we held:
Hearsay evidence whether objected to or not cannot be given credence for
having no probative value. This principle, however, has been relaxed in cases
where, in addition to the failure to object to the admissibility of the subject
evidence, there were other pieces of evidence presented or there were other
circumstances prevailing to support the fact in issue.
We agree with the respondents that with respect to the identification of the
sales invoices, Haws testimony was hearsay because he was not present
during its preparation and the secretaries who prepared them were not
presented to identify them in court. Further, these sales invoices do not fall
within the exceptions to the hearsay rule even under the entries in the
course of business because the petitioners failed to show that the entrant
was deceased or was unable to testify. But even though the sales invoices
are hearsay, nonetheless, they form part of the records of the case for the
respondents failure to object as to the admissibility of the sales invoices on
the ground that they are hearsay. Based on the records, the respondents
through Ng objected to the offer for the purpose [to] which they are being
offered
only

not
on
the
ground
that
they
were
hearsay.ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary The petitioners have proven their claims
for the unpaid purchases on credit by preponderance of evidence. We are not
convinced by the respondents argument that the purchases are spurious
because no less than Uy admitted that all the checks issued were in
payments of the contractual obligations of the Arma Traders with Advance
Paper. Moreover, there are other pieces of evidence to prove the existence of
the purchases other than the sales invoices themselves. For one, Arma
Traders postdated checks evince the existence of the purchases on credit.
Moreover, Haw testified that within one or two weeks, Arma Traders paid the
purchases in the form of postdated checks. He personally collected these
checks on Saturdays and upon receiving the checks, he surrendered to Arma
Traders the original of the sales invoices while he retained the duplicate of
the invoices. The respondents attempted to impugn the credibility of Haw by
pointing to the inconsistencies they can find from the transcript of
stenographic notes. However, we are not persuaded that these
inconsistencies are sufficiently pervasive to affect the totality of evidence
showing the general relationship between Advance Paper and Arma Traders.
Additionally, the issue of credibility of witnesses is to be resolved primarily by
the trial court because it is in the better position to assess the credibility of
witnesses as it heard the testimonies and observed the deportment and
manner of testifying of the witnesses. Accordingly, its findings are entitled to
great respect and will not be disturbed on appeal in the absence of any
showing that the trial court overlooked, misunderstood, or misapplied some
facts or circumstances of weight and substance which would have affected
the result of the case. WHEREFORE, premises considered, we GRANT the
petition. The decision dated March 31, 2006 and the resolution dated March
7, 2007 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 71499 are REVERSED
and SET ASIDE. The Regional Trial Court decision in Civil Case No. 9472526 dated June 18, 2001 is REINSTATED. No costs.

GR No. 179709 (July 6, 2010)

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. FILOMENO MAYINGQUE, GREGORIO
MAYINGQUE, and TORIBIO MAYINGQUE y SANICO
BERSAMIN, J.
The appellants Filomeno, Gregorio, and Toribio Mayingque and one Edwin
Macas were indicted for the murder of Edgardo Sumalde Tusi. On
arraignment, appellants pleaded not guilty. Edwin remained at large.
Prosecution:

Salvacion Tusi, wife of Edgardo, testified that she knew appellants because
they usually had their drinking sessions at Edwins place, which was beside
her residence; that in one such drinking session, Edgardo, annoyed by the
noise made by the appellants and Edwin, was prompted to admonish them to
tone down their voices; that the appellants and Edwin resented Edgardos
admonition; that while she and Edgardo were resting in front of their house at
around 5 pm on May 30, 1999, Toribio arrived and without saying anything
stabbed Edgardo twice on his side; that she shouted for help, but her cousin
Ruben Bernal could not do anything because Edwin, Filomeno and Gregorio
had meanwhile joined Teofilo in assaulting Edgardo
Ruben Bernal and Jaime Bernal corroborated Salvacions recollection of the
assault on Edgardo. According to them, the appellants ganged up on
Edgardo, with Teofilo wielding a kitchen knife with which he stabbed Edgardo
twice and Gregorio hacking Edgardo on the head with a bolo while Filomeno
and Edwin restrained Edgardo. They heard Edwin tell the appellants to
ensure that Edgardo was lifeless before leaving him.
Dr. Romeo T. Salen, Medico Legal Officer of the Western Police District (now
Manila Police District) Crime Laboratory, appeared in court in representation
of Dr. Emmanuel L. Aranas, and brought the following documents: (a)
Request for Examination on the Cadaver of the deceased transmitted by the
Las Pias Police and received by Dr. Aranas; (b) Certification of Identification
and Consent for Autopsy signed by the brother of Edgardo; (c) Post Mortem
Examination or Anatomical Sketch; (d) Medico Legal Report; and (e) Death
Certificate of Edgardo prepared by Dr. Aranas.
Dr. Salen explained that based on Dr. Aranas written findings, Edgardo had
sustained 12 wounds in the head, neck and chest, eight of which had been
fatal.
Defense:

The findings on the wounds sustained by Tusi as found on the medico legal
report was written in a technical language which is not well understood by the
lower court, and said matter required the special knowledge, skill, experience
or training possessed by Dr. Salen as a Medico Legal Officer of the WPD
Crime Laboratory to give to the lower court the meaning of the technical
language used, particularly, whether or not the wounds described therein
were fatal. Hence, the lower court could receive in evidence Dr. Salens
interpretation of Dr. Aranas findings.
The testimony of an expert witness is not indispensable to a successful
prosecution for murder. While the autopsy report of a medico legal expert in
cases of murder, or homicide, is preferably accepted to show the extent of
the injuries suffered by the victim, it is not the only competent evidence to
prove the injuries and the fact of death. The testimonies of credible witnesses
are equally admissible regarding such injuries and the surrounding
circumstances thereof.
On the non-offer of evidence, notwithstanding the fact that the medical legal
report and the anatomical sketch were not formally offered, they are
nonetheless, admissible because
Evidence not formally offered can be considered by the court as long as they
have been properly identified by testimony duly recorded and they have
themselves been incorporated in the records of the case. All the documentary
and object evidence in this case were properly identified, presented and
marked as exhibits in court
In this case, the counsel of accused-appellants had the opportunity to crossexamine Dr. Salen, but did not do so, insisting that the latter is not qualified
as a medico legal expert, and that his testimony is hearsay.
Judgment of conviction AFFIRMED.

Toribio self-defense
Filomeno and Gregorio denial and alibi
RTC: Found appellants guilty of murder. Reclusion perpetua.
CA: Affirmed RTC judgment.
ISSUE: WON THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING
CREDENCE TO HEARSAY EVIDENCE WHICH BECAME THE BASIS FOR
THE CONVICTION OF THE ACCUSED-APPELLANTS.
HELD:
The testimony of Dr. Salen as regards the Anatomical Sketch, and Medico
Legal Report, among other things, prepared by Dr. Aranas falls under the
exception to the hearsay rule because the said sketch and report are entries
in official records made by Dr. Aranas in the performance of his duty as a
Medico Legal Officer of the WPD Crime Laboratory. Dr. Aranas had personal
knowledge of the facts stated by him the said sketch and report relative to the
nature and number of wounds sustained by Tusi because he was the one
who performed the autopsy on the cadaver of Tusi. Dr. Salen acquired such
facts from the sketch and report made by his predecessor, Dr. Aranas, who
had a legal duty to turn over the same to him as his successor. Such entries
were duly entered in a regular manner in the official records, hence, the
entries in said sketch and report are prima facie evidence of the facts therein
stated and are admissible under Section 44, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.
As an officer having legal custody of the said sketch and report, Dr. Salen
attested that the copies presented in the lower court were the original ones
prepared by Dr. Aranas.

GR No. 164457 (April 11, 2012)

ANNA LERIMA PATULA v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
BERSAMIN, J.
[This case gives a thorough discussion on the importance of the rule
excluding hearsay as evidence].
Petitioner was charged with estafa under an information filed in the RTC in
Dumaguete that averred:
That during the period from March 16 to 20, 1997 and prior thereto, the
accused, being then a saleswoman of Footluckers Chain of Stores, Inc.,
having collected and received the total sum of P131,286.97 from several
customers under the express obligation to account for the proceeds of the
sales and deliver the collection to the said company, with intent to defraud,
did, then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously fail to deliver the said
collection but instead, did, then and there willfully unlawfully and feloniously
misappropriate, misapply and convert the proceeds of the sale to her own
use and benefit.
The Prosecutions first witness was Lamberto Go, who testified that he was
the branch manager of Footluckers Chain of Stores, Inc.

The only other witness was Karen Guivencan, whom Footluckers employed
as its store auditor. She declared that Go had requested her to audit
petitioner after some customers had told him that they had already paid their
accounts but the office ledger had still reflected outstanding balances for
them; that she first conducted her audit by going to the customers; that she
discovered in the course of her audit that the amounts appearing on the
original copies of receipts in the possession of around 50 customers varied
from the amounts written on the duplicate copies of the receipts petitioner
submitted to the office; that upon completing her audit, she submitted to Go a
written report denominated as "List of Customers Covered by Saleswoman
LERIMA PATULA w/ Differences in Records as per Audit Duly Verified March
16-20, 1997" marked as Exhibit A; and that based on the report, petitioner
had misappropriated the total amount ofP131,286.92.
The Prosecution marked the ledgers of petitioners various customers
allegedly with discrepancies as Exhibits B to YY and their derivatives,
inclusive.
RTC: Found petitioner guilty of estafa.
ISSUE: WON Guivencans testimony on the ledgers and receipts (Exhibits B
to YY, and their derivatives, inclusive) to prove petitioners misappropriation
or conversion was inadmissible for being hearsay.

It is apparent, too, that a person who relates a hearsay is not obliged to enter
into any particular, to answer any question, to solve any difficulties, to
reconcile any contradictions, to explain any obscurities, to remove any
ambiguities; and that she entrenches herself in the simple assertion that she
was told so, and leaves the burden entirely upon the dead or absent author.
Thus, the rule against hearsay testimony rests mainly on the ground that
there was no opportunity to cross-examine the declarant. The testimony may
have been given under oath and before a court of justice, but if it is offered
against a party who is afforded no opportunity to cross-examine the witness,
it is hearsay just the same.
Moreover, the theory of the hearsay rule is that when a human utterance is
offered as evidence of the truth of the fact asserted, the credit of the assertor
becomes the basis of inference, and, therefore, the assertion can be received
as evidence only when made on the witness stand, subject to the test of
cross-examination. However, if an extrajudicial utterance is offered, not as an
assertion to prove the matter asserted but without reference to the truth of
the matter asserted, the hearsay rule does not apply. For example, in a
slander case, if a prosecution witness testifies that he heard the accused say
that the complainant was a thief, this testimony is admissible not to prove that
the complainant was really a thief, but merely to show that the accused
uttered those words. This kind of utterance is hearsay in character but is not
legal hearsay. The distinction is, therefore, between (a) the fact that the
statement was made, to which the hearsay rule does not apply, and (b) the
truth of the facts asserted in the statement, to which the hearsay rule applies.

HELD:
Testimonial and documentary evidence, being hearsay, did not prove
petitioners guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
Guivencan conceded having no personal knowledge of the amounts actually
received by petitioner from the customers or remitted by petitioner to
Footluckers. This means that persons other than Guivencan prepared
Exhibits B to YY and their derivatives, inclusive, and that Guivencan based
her testimony on the entries found in the receipts supposedly issued by
petitioner and in the ledgers held by Footluckers corresponding to each
customer, as well as on the unsworn statements of some of the customers.
Accordingly, her being the only witness who testified on the entries effectively
deprived the RTC of the reasonable opportunity to validate and test the
veracity and reliability of the entries as evidence of petitioners
misappropriation or conversion through cross-examination by petitioner. The
denial of that opportunity rendered the entire proof of misappropriation or
conversion hearsay, and thus unreliable and untrustworthy for purposes of
determining the guilt or innocence of the accused.
To elucidate why the Prosecutions hearsay evidence was unreliable and
untrustworthy, and thus devoid of probative value, reference is made to
Section 36 of Rule 130, Rules of Court, a rule that states that a witness can
testify only to those facts that she knows of her personal knowledge; that is,
which are derived from her own perception, except as otherwise provided in
the Rules of Court. The personal knowledge of a witness is a substantive
prerequisite for accepting testimonial evidence that establishes the truth of a
disputed fact. A witness bereft of personal knowledge of the disputed fact
cannot be called upon for that purpose because her testimony derives its
value not from the credit accorded to her as a witness presently testifying but
from the veracity and competency of the extrajudicial source of her
information.
In case a witness is permitted to testify based on what she has heard another
person say about the facts in dispute, the person from whom the witness
derived the information on the facts in dispute is not in court and under oath
to be examined and cross-examined. The weight of such testimony then
depends not upon the veracity of the witness but upon the veracity of the
other person giving the information to the witness without oath. The
information cannot be tested because the declarant is not standing in court
as a witness and cannot, therefore, be cross-examined.

Section 36, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court is understandably not the only rule
that explains why testimony that is hearsay should be excluded from
consideration. Excluding hearsay also aims to preserve the right of the
opposing party to cross-examine the original declarant claiming to have a
direct knowledge of the transaction or occurrence. If hearsay is allowed, the
right stands to be denied because the declarant is not in court. It is then to be
stressed that the right to cross-examine the adverse partys witness, being
the only means of testing the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies, is
essential to the administration of justice.
ACQUITTAL. The prosecution failed to prove petitioners guilt beyond
reasonable doubt.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------ADDTL:
To address the problem of controlling inadmissible hearsay as evidence to
establish the truth in a dispute while also safeguarding a partys right to
cross-examine her adversarys witness, the Rules of Court offers two
solutions. The first solution is to require that all the witnesses in a judicial trial
or hearing be examined only in court under oath or affirmation. Section 1,
Rule 132 of the Rules of Court formalizes this solution, viz:
Section 1. Examination to be done in open court. - The examination of
witnesses presented in a trial or hearing shall be done in open court, and
under oath or affirmation. Unless the witness is incapacitated to speak, or the
question calls for a different mode of answer, the answers of the witness shall
be given orally. (1a)
The second solution is to require that all witnesses be subject to the crossexamination by the adverse party. Section 6, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court
ensures this solution thusly:
Section 6. Cross-examination; its purpose and extent. Upon the termination
of the direct examination, the witness may be cross-examined by the adverse
party as to any matters stated in the direct examination, or connected
therewith, with sufficient fullness and freedom to test his accuracy and
truthfulness and freedom from interest or bias, or the reverse, and to elicit all
important facts bearing upon the issue. (8a)

presentation in evidence. Respondents counter that since the police report

was never

MIRO vs MENDOZA

confirmed by the investigating police officer, it cannot be considered as part

of the evidence on record.
ISSUE: WHETHER THE CA ERRED IN REFUSING ADMISSIBILITY OF THE
POLICE REPORT SINCE THE POLICE INVESTIGATOR WHO PREPARED
THE SAME DID NOT ACTUALLY TESTIFY IN COURT THEREON

DIMAGUILA vs MONTEIRO
HELD:

G.R. No. 194320 February 1, 2012

MALAYAN INSURANCE CO., INC., Petitioner, vs. RODELIO ALBERTO
and ENRICO ALBERTO REYES, Respondents.
FACTS:
An accident occurred at the corner of EDSA and Ayala Avenue, Makati City,
involving four (4) vehicles. Based on the Police Report issued by the on-thespot investigator, Senior Police Officer 1 Alfredo M. Dungga, the Isuzu Tanker
was in front of the Mitsubishi Galant with the Nissan Bus on their right side
shortly before the vehicular incident. All three (3) vehicles were at a halt
along EDSA facing the south direction when the Fuzo Cargo Truck
simultaneously bumped the rear portion of the Mitsubishi Galant and the rear
left portion of the Nissan Bus. Due to the strong impact, these two vehicles
were shoved forward and the front left portion of the Mitsubishi Galant
rammed into the rear right portion of the Isuzu Tanker.
Malayan Insurance, being subrogated to the rights and interests of the
assured (owner of the Mitsubushi Galant) by operation of law upon its
payment to the latter sent several demand letters to respondents Rodelio
Alberto (Alberto) and Enrico Alberto Reyes (Reyes), the registered owner and
the driver, respectively, of the Fuzo Cargo Truck, requiring them to pay the
amount it had paid to the assured. When respondents refused to settle their
liability, Malayan Insurance was constrained to file a complaint for damages
for gross negligence against respondents.
In their Answer, respondents asserted that they cannot be held liable for the
vehicular accident, since its proximate cause was the reckless driving of the
Nissan Bus driver. They alleged that the speeding bus, coming from the
service road of EDSA, maneuvered its way towards the middle lane without
due regard to Reyes right of way. When the Nissan Bus abruptly stopped,
Reyes stepped hard on the brakes but the braking action could not cope with
the inertia and failed to gain sufficient traction. As a consequence, the Fuzo
Cargo Truck hit the rear end of the Mitsubishi Galant, which, in turn, hit the
rear end of the vehicle in front of it. Respondents also controverted the
results of the Police Report, asserting that it was based solely on the biased
narration of the Nissan Bus driver.
The RTC favored for Malayan. On Appeal CA reversed the decision. The CA
held that the evidence on record has failed to establish not only negligence
on the part of respondents, but also compliance with the other requisites and
the consequent right of Malayan Insurance to subrogation. It noted that the
police report, which has been made part of the records of the trial court, was
not properly identified by the police officer who conducted the on-the-spot
investigation of the subject collision.
Malayan Insurance contends that, even without the presentation of the police
investigator who prepared the police report, said report is still admissible in
evidence, especially since respondents failed to make a timely objection to its

Under the rules of evidence, a witness can testify only to those facts which
the witness knows of his or her personal knowledge, that is, which are
derived from the witness own perception. Concomitantly, a witness may not
testify on matters which he or she merely learned from others either because
said witness was told or read or heard those matters. Such testimony is
considered hearsay and may not be received as proof of the truth of what the
witness has learned. This is known as the hearsay rule.
"Hearsay is not limited to oral testimony or statements; the general rule that
excludes hearsay as evidence applies to written, as well as oral statements."
There are several exceptions to the hearsay rule under the Rules of Court,
among which are entries in official records. Section 44, Rule 130 provides:
Entries in official records made in the performance of his duty by a public
officer of the Philippines, or by a person in the performance of a duty
specially enjoined by law are prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated.
In Alvarez v. PICOP Resources, this Court reiterated the requisites for the
admissibility in evidence, as an exception to the hearsay rule of entries in
official records, thus:
(a) that the entry was made by a public officer or by another person specially
enjoined by law to do so;
(b) that it was made by the public officer in the performance of his or her
duties, or by such other person in the performance of a duty specially
enjoined by law; and
(c) that the public officer or other person had sufficient knowledge of the facts
by him or her stated, which must have been acquired by the public officer or
other person personally or through official information.
Notably, the presentation of the police report itself is admissible as an
exception to the hearsay rule even if the police investigator who prepared it
was not presented in court, as long as the above requisites could be
adequately proved.
Here, there is no dispute that SPO1 Dungga, the on-the-spot investigator,
prepared the report, and he did so in the performance of his duty. However,
what is not clear is whether SPO1 Dungga had sufficient personal knowledge
of the facts contained in his report. Thus, the third requisite is lacking.
Respondents failed to make a timely objection to the police reports
presentation in evidence; thus, they are deemed to have waived their right to
do so. As a result, the police report is still admissible in evidence.
DISCUSSION ON RES IPSA LOQUITUR:
(The court applied this doctrine in favor of Malayan. Respondents claim that
since Malayan Insurance did not present any witness who shall affirm any

negligent act of Reyes in driving the Fuzo Cargo truck before and after the
incident, there is no evidence which would show negligence on the part of
respondents. The court thus held that, applying the said doctrine, the burden
to show the lack of negligence is on the respondents. See discussion)
While negligence is not ordinarily inferred or presumed, and while the mere
happening of an accident or injury will not generally give rise to an inference
or presumption that it was due to negligence on defendants part, under the
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, which means, literally, the thing or transaction
speaks for itself, or in one jurisdiction, that the thing or instrumentality speaks
for itself, the facts or circumstances accompanying an injury may be such as
to raise a presumption, or at least permit an inference of negligence on the
part of the defendant, or some other person who is charged with negligence.
Requisites for the application of the res ipsa loquitur rule:
(1) the accident was of a kind which does not ordinarily occur unless
someone is negligent;
(2) the instrumentality or agency which caused the injury was under the
exclusive control of the person charged with negligence; and
(3) the injury suffered must not have been due to any voluntary action or
contribution on the part of the person injured.
One of the theoretical bases for the doctrine is its necessity, i.e., that
necessary evidence is absent or not available.
The res ipsa loquitur doctrine is based in part upon the theory that the
defendant in charge of the instrumentality which causes the injury either
knows the cause of the accident or has the best opportunity of ascertaining it
and that the plaintiff has no such knowledge, and therefore is compelled to
allege negligence in general terms and to rely upon the proof of the
happening of the accident in order to establish negligence. The inference
which the doctrine permits is grounded upon the fact that the chief evidence
of the true cause, whether culpable or innocent, is practically accessible to
the defendant but inaccessible to the injured person.
It has been said that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur furnishes a bridge by
which a plaintiff, without knowledge of the cause, reaches over to defendant
who knows or should know the cause, for any explanation of care exercised
by the defendant in respect of the matter of which the plaintiff complains. The
res ipsa loquitur doctrine, another court has said, is a rule of necessity, in that
it proceeds on the theory that under the peculiar circumstances in which the
doctrine is applicable, it is within the power of the defendant to show that
there was no negligence on his part, and direct proof of defendants
negligence is beyond plaintiffs power. Accordingly, some courts add to the
three prerequisites for the application of the res ipsa loquitur doctrine the
further requirement that for the res ipsa loquitur doctrine to apply, it must
appear that
the injured party had no knowledge or means of knowledge as to the cause
of the accident, or that the party to be charged with negligence has superior
knowledge or opportunity for explanation of the accident.

G.R. No. 107518 October 8, 1998

PNOC SHIPPING AND TRANSPORT CORPORATION, petitioner, vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and MARIA EFIGENIA FISHING
CORPORATION, respondents.

FACTS:
M/V Maria Efigenia XV, owned by Maria Efigenia Fishing Corporation on its
way to Navotas, Metro Manila collided with the vessel Petroparcel owned by
the Luzon Stevedoring Corporation (LSC). After investigation was conducted
by the Board of Marine Inquiry, Philippine Coast Guard Commandant Simeon
N. Alejandro rendered a decision finding the Petroparcel at fault. Based on
this finding by the Board and after unsuccessful demands on petitioner,
private respondent sued the LSC and the Petroparcel captain, Edgardo
Doruelo, before the CFI of Caloocan City. In particular, private respondent
prayed for an award of P692,680.00, allegedly representing the value of the
fishing nets, boat equipment and cargoes of M/V Maria Efigenia XV, with
interest at the legal rate plus 25% thereof as attorney's fees. Meanwhile,
during the pendency of the case, petitioner PNOC Shipping and Transport
Corporation sought to be substituted in place of LSC as it had already
acquired ownership of the Petroparcel.
Private respondent later sought the amendment of its complaint on the
ground that the original complaint failed to plead for the recovery of the lost
value of the hull of M/V Maria Efigenia XV. In the amended complaint, private
respondent averred that M/V Maria Efigenia XV had an actual value of
P800,000.00 and that, after deducting the insurance payment of
P200,000.00, the amount of P600,000.00 should likewise be claimed.
Furthermore, on account of the sinking of the vessel, private respondent
supposedly incurred unrealized profits and lost business opportunities that
would thereafter be proven.
Private respondent presented exhibits which were mere price quotations
issued personally to Del Rosario who requested for them from dealers of
equipment similar to the ones lost at the collision of the two vessels.
On the other hand, petitioner only presented Lorenzo Lazaro, senior
estimator at PNOC Dockyard & Engineering Corporation, as sole witness and
it did not bother at all to offer any documentary evidence to support its
position. Lazaro testified that the price quotations submitted by private
respondent were "excessive" and that as an expert witness, he used the
quotations of his suppliers in making his estimates. However, he failed to
present such quotations of prices from his suppliers.
The RTC ruled in favor of private respondent. CA affirmed in toto.
ISSUE: WHETHER THE PRICE QUOTATIONS SHOULD BE GIVEN
PROBATIVE WEIGHT
HELD:
If no objection is made, hearsay becomes evidence by reason of the want of
such objection even though its admission does not confer upon it any new
attribute in point of weight. Its nature and quality remain the same, so far as
its intrinsic weakness and incompetency to satisfy the mind are concerned,
and as opposed to direct primary evidence, the latter always prevails.
The failure of the defense counsel to object to the presentation of
incompetent evidence, like hearsay evidence or evidence that violates the
rules of res inter alios acta, or his failure to ask for the striking out of the
same does not give such evidence any probative value. But admissibility of
evidence should not be equated with weight of evidence. Hearsay evidence
whether objected to or not has no probative value.
Private respondent did not present any other witnesses especially those
whose signatures appear in the price quotations that became the bases of
the award. We hold, however, that the price quotations are ordinary private
writings which under the Revised Rules of Court should have been proffered
along with the testimony of the authors thereof. Del Rosario could not have
testified on the veracity of the contents of the writings even though he was

the seasoned owner of a fishing fleet because he was not the one who
issued the price quotations. Section 36, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of
Court provides that a witness can testify only to those facts that he knows of
his personal knowledge.
For this reason, Del Rosario's claim that private respondent incurred losses
in the total amount of P6,438,048.00 should be admitted with extreme
caution considering that, because it was a bare assertion, it should be
supported by independent evidence. Moreover, because he was the owner of
private respondent corporation whatever testimony he would give with regard
to the value of the lost vessel, its equipment and cargoes should be viewed in
the light of his self-interest therein. We agree with the Court of Appeals that
his testimony as to the equipment installed and the cargoes loaded on the
vessel should be given credence considering his familiarity thereto. However,
we do not subscribe to the conclusion that his valuation of such equipment,
cargo and the vessel itself should be accepted as gospel truth. We must,
therefore, examine the documentary evidence presented to support Del
Rosario's claim as regards the amount of losses.
The price quotations presented as exhibits partake of the nature of hearsay
evidence considering that the persons who issued them were not presented
as witnesses. Any evidence, whether oral or documentary, is hearsay if its
probative value is not based on the personal knowledge of the witness but on
the knowledge of another person who is not on the witness stand. Hearsay
evidence, whether objected to or not, has NO PROBATIVE VALUE unless
the proponent can show that the evidence falls within the exceptions to the
hearsay evidence rule. On this point, we believe that the exhibits do not fall
under any of the exceptions provided under Sections 37 to 47 of Rule 130.
It is true that one of the exceptions to the hearsay rule pertains to
"commercial lists and the like" under Section 45, Rule 130 of the Revised
Rules on Evidence. In this respect, the Court of Appeals considered private
respondent's exhibits as "commercial lists." This rule states:

the occupation." These are simply letters responding to the queries of Del
Rosario.

SPECIAL FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 127598 February 22, 2000
MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY, petitioner, vs. Hon. SECRETARY OF
LABOR LEONARDO QUISUMBING and MERALCO EMPLOYEES and
WORKERS ASSOCIATION (MEWA), respondent.
Facts:
This involves a labor decision regarding wage incease. The increase was
based on an information provided in the All Asia Capital Report.
Petitioner warns that if the wage increase of P2,200.00 per month as ordered
by the Secretary is allowed, it would simply pass the cost covering such
increase to the consumers
through an increase in the rate of electricity. This is a non sequitur. The Court
cannot be threatened with such a misleading argument. An increase in the
prices of electric current needs the approval of the appropriate regulatory
government agency and does not automatically result from a mere increase
in the wages of petitioner's employees. Besides, this argument presupposes
that petitioner is capable of meeting a wage increase
Issue: WON there is a sufficient basis for wage increase?

Commercial lists and the like. Evidence of statements of matters of

interest to persons engaged in an occupation contained in a list, register,
periodical, or other published compilation is admissible as tending to prove
the truth of any relevant matter so stated if that compilation is published for
use by persons engaged in that occupation and is generally used and relied
upon by them there.

Held:
The All Asia Capital report upon which the Union relies to support its position
regarding the wage issue cannot be an accurate basis and conclusive
determinant of the rate of wage increase. Section 45 of Rule 130 Rules of
Evidence provides:

Under Section 45 of the aforesaid Rule, a document is a commercial list if:

(1) it is a statement of matters of interest to persons engaged in an
occupation;
(2) such statement is contained in a list, register, periodical or other published
compilation;
(3) said compilation is published for the use of persons engaged in that
occupation, and
(4) it is generally used and relied upon by persons in the same occupation.
Based on the above requisites, it is our considered view that the price
quotations presented are not "commercial lists" for these do not belong to the
category of "other published compilations" under Section 45 aforequoted.
The exhibits mentioned are mere price quotations issued personally to Del
Rosario who requested for them from dealers of equipment similar to the
ones lost at the collision of the two vessels. These are not published in any
list, register, periodical or other compilation on the relevant subject matter.
Neither are these "market reports or quotations" within the purview of
"commercial lists" as these are not "standard handbooks or periodicals,
containing data of everyday professional need and relied upon in the work of

Commercial lists and the like. Evidence of statements of matters of

interest to persons engaged in an occupation contained in a list, register,
periodical, or other published compilation is admissible as tending to prove
the truth of any relevant matter so stated if that compilation is published for
use by persons engaged in that occupation and is generally used and relied
upon by them therein.
Under the afore-quoted rule, statement of matters contained in a periodical,
may be admitted only "if that compilation is published for use by persons
engaged in that occupation and is generally used and relied upon by them
therein." As correctly held in our Decision dated January 27, 1999, the cited
report is a mere newspaper account and not even a commercial list. At most,
it is but an analysis or opinion which carries no persuasive weight for
purposes of this case as no sufficient figures to support it were presented.
Neither did anybody testify to its accuracy. It cannot be said that
businessmen generally rely on news items such as this in their occupation.
Besides, no evidence was presented that the publication was regularly
prepared by a person in touch with the market and that it is generally
regarded as trustworthy and reliable. Absent extrinsic proof of their accuracy,
these reports are not admissible.6 In the same manner, newspapers
containing stock quotations are not admissible in evidence when the source
of the reports is available.7 With more reason, mere analyses or projections
of such reports cannot be admitted. In particular, the source of the report in
this case can be easily made available considering that the same is
necessary for compliance with certain governmental requirements.

Nonetheless, by petitioner's own allegations, its actual total net income for
1996 was P5.1 billion.8 An estimate by the All Asia financial analyst stated
that petitioner's net operating income for the same year was about P5.7
billion, a figure which the Union relies on to support its claim. Assuming
without admitting the truth thereof, the figure is higher than the P4.171 billion
allegedly suggested by petitioner as its projected net operating income. The
P5.7 billion which was the Secretary's basis for granting the P2,200.00 is
higher than the actual net income of P5.1 billion admitted by petitioner. It
would be proper then to increase this Court's award of P1,900.00 to
P2,000.00 for the two years of the CBA award.
The Court takes judicial notice that the new amounts granted herein are
significantly higher than the weighted average salary currently enjoyed by
other rank-and-file employees within the community. It should be noted that
the relations between labor and capital is impressed with public interest

which must yield to the common good.11 Neither party should act
oppressively against the other or impair the interest or convenience of the
public.12 Besides, matters of salary increases are part of management
prerogative.13

AUGUSTO SAMALIO VS CA

DOROTEO TOLEDO Vs PP