TORTS AND DAMAGES

7TH BATCH
EMMA ADRIANO BUSTAMANTE, in her own behalf as Guardian-AdLitem of minors: ROSSEL, GLORIA, YOLANDA, ERIC SON and EDERIC,
all surnamed BUSTAMANTE, Spouses SALVADOR JOCSON and
PATRIA BONE-JOCSON, Spouses JOSE RAMOS and ENRIQUETA
CEBU-RAMOS, Spouses NARCISO-HIMAYA and ADORACION
MARQUEZ-HIMAYA, and Spouses JOSE BERSAMINA and MA.
COMMEMORACION PEREA-BUSTAMANTE, petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, FEDERICO DEL PILAR AND
EDILBERTO MONTESIANO,respondents.
FACTS:
A gravel and sand truck collided with a passanger bus.
During the incident, the cargo truck was driven by defendant Montesiano
and owned by defendant Del Pilar; while the passenger bus was driven by
defendant Susulin. The vehicle was registered in the name of defendant
Novelo but was owned and/or operated as a passenger bus jointly by
defendants Magtibay and Serrado, under a franchise, with a line from Naic,
Cavite, to Baclaran, Paranaque, Metro Manila, and vice versa, which Novelo
sold to Magtibay on November 8, 1981, and which the latter transferred to
Serrado (Cerrado).
Immediately before the collision, the cargo truck and the passenger bus
were approaching each other, coming from the opposite directions of the
highway. While the truck was still about 30 meters away, Susulin, the bus
driver, saw the front wheels of the vehicle wiggling. He also observed that
the truck was heading towards his lane. Not minding this circumstance due
to his belief that the driver of the truck was merely joking, Susulin shifted
from fourth to third gear in order to give more power and speed to the bus,
which was ascending the inclined part of the road, in order to overtake or
pass a Kubota hand tractor being pushed by a person along the shoulder of
the highway. While the bus was in the process of overtaking or passing the
hand tractor and the truck was approaching the bus, the two vehicles
sideswiped each other at each other's left side. After the impact, the truck
skidded towards the other side of the road and landed on a nearby
residential lot, hitting a coconut tree and felling it.
RTC: the liability of the two drivers for their negligence must be solidary
CA: the appealed judgment was REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the
complaint dismissed insofar as defendants-appellants Federico del Pilar and
Edilberto Montesiano, owner and driver, respectively, of the sand and gravel
truck. It based its ruling on the doctrine of last clear chance.
ISSUE: WON respondent court was correct in absolving the owner and
driver of the cargo truck from liability. NO
WON the doctrine of last clear chance applies in this case. NO

RULING:
The respondent Court committed an error of law in applying the doctrine of
last clear chance as between the defendants, since the case at bar is not a
suit between the owners and drivers of the colliding vehicles but a suit
brought by the heirs of the deceased passengers against both owners and
drivers of the colliding vehicles.
The SC cited the case of Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. v. Intermediate
Appellate Court, et al which ruled that the principle of "last clear chance"
applies "in a suit between the owners and drivers of colliding vehicles.
It does not arise where a passenger demands responsibility from the
carrier to enforce its contractual obligations.
NOTES:

The respondent court adopted the doctrine of "last clear chance." The
doctrine, stated broadly, is that the negligence of the plaintiff does not
preclude a recovery for the negligence of the defendant where it
appears that the defendant, by exercising reasonable care and
prudence, might have avoided injurious consequences to the plaintiff
notwithstanding the plaintiff's negligence. In other words, the doctrine of
last clear chance means that even though a person's own acts may have
placed him in a position of peril, and an injury results, the injured person is
entitled to recovery. As the doctrine is usually stated, a person who has the
last clear chance or opportunity of avoiding an accident, notwithstanding the
negligent acts of his opponent or that of a third person imputed to the
opponent is considered in law solely responsible for the consequences of
the accident. (Sangco, Torts and Damages, 4th Ed., 1986, p. 165).
The practical import of the doctrine is that a negligent defendant is held
liable to a negligent plaintiff, or even to a plaintiff who has been grossly
negligent in placing himself in peril, if he, aware of the plaintiffs peril, or
according to some authorities, should have been aware of it in the
reasonable exercise of due case, had in fact an opportunity later than that of
the plaintiff to avoid an accident.

The doctrine cannot be extended into the field of joint tortfeasors as a test of
whether only one of them should be held liable to the injured person by
reason of his discovery of the latter's peril, and it cannot be invoked as
between defendants concurrently negligent. As against third persons, a
negligent actor cannot defend by pleading that another had negligently failed
to take action which could have avoided the injury."

[G.R. Nos. 79050-51. November 14, 1989.]

PANTRANCO NORTH EXPRESS, INC., Petitioner, v. MARICAR BASCOS
BAESA, thru her personal guardian FRANCISCA O. BASCOS, FE O.
ICO, in her behalf and in behalf of her minor children, namely ERWIN,
OLIVE,
EDMUNDO
and
SHARON
ICO,
Respondents.

Facts:
At about 7:00 oclock in the morning of June 12, 1981, the spouses Ceasar
and Marilyn Baesa and their children Harold Jim, Marcelino and Maricar,
together with spouses David Ico and Fe O. Ico with their son Erwin Ico and
seven other persons, were aboard a passenger jeepney on their way to a
picnic at Malalam River, Ilagan, Isabela.
The group, numbering fifteen (15) persons, rode in the passenger jeepney
driven by David Ico, who was also the registered owner thereof. From Ilagan,
Isabela, they proceeded to Barrio Capayacan to deliver some viands to one
Mrs. Bascos and thenceforth to San Felipe, taking the highway going to
Malalam River. Upon reaching the highway, the jeepney turned right and
proceeded to Malalam River at a speed of about 20 kph. While they were
proceeding towards Malalam River, a speeding PANTRANCO bus from
Aparri, on its regular route to Manila, encroached on the jeepneys lane while
negotiating a curve, and collided with it.
As a result of the accident, David Ico, spouses Ceasar Baesa and Marilyn
Baesa and their children, Harold Jim and Marcelino Baesa, died while the
rest of the passengers suffered injuries. The jeepney was extensively
damaged. After the accident the driver of the PANTRANCO Bus, Ambrosio
Ramirez, boarded a car and proceeded to Santiago, Isabela. From that time
on up to the present, Ramirez has never been seen and has apparently
remained in hiding.
All the victims and/or their surviving heirs except herein private respondents
settled the case amicably under the "No Fault" insurance coverage of
PANTRANCO.
Maricar Baesa through her guardian Francisca O. Bascos and Fe O. Ico for

herself and for her minor children, filed separate actions for damages arising
from quasi-delict against PANTRANCO in the CFI of Pangasinan.

the evidence on record which clearly shows that there was enough space to
swerve the bus back to its own lane without any danger.

PANTRANCO, aside from pointing to the late David Icos alleged negligence
as the proximate cause of the accident, invoked the defense of due diligence
in the selection and supervision of its driver, Ambrosio Ramirez.

Moreover, both the trial court and the Court of Appeals found that at the time
of the accident the Pantranco bus was speeding towards Manila. By the time
David Ico must have realized that the bus was not returning to its own lane,
it was already too late to swerve the jeepney to his right to prevent an
accident. The speed at which the approaching bus was running prevented
David Ico from swerving the jeepney to the right shoulder of the road in time
to avoid the collision. Thus, even assuming that the jeepney driver perceived
the danger a few seconds before the actual collision, he had no opportunity
to avoid it. The last clear chance doctrine "can never apply where the
party charged is required to act instantaneously, and if the injury
cannot be avoided by the application of all means at hand after the
peril is or should have been discovered".

The CFI of Pangasinan rendered a decision against PANTRANCO awarding

the total amount of Two Million Three Hundred Four Thousand Six Hundred
Forty-Seven (P2,304,647.00) as damages, plus 10% thereof as attorneys
fees and costs to Maricar Baesa and the total amount of Six Hundred Fifty
Two Thousand Six Hundred Seventy-Two Pesos (P652,672.00) as
damages, plus 10% thereof as attorneys fees and costs to Fe Ico and her
children.
On appeal, the cases were consolidated and the Court of Appeals modified
the decision of the trial court by ordering PANTRANCO to pay the total
amount of One Million One Hundred Eighty-Nine Thousand Nine Hundred
Twenty Seven Pesos (P1,189,927.00) as damages, plus Twenty Thousand
Pesos (P20,000.00) as attorneys fees to Maricar Baesa, and the total
amount of Three Hundred Forty-Four Thousand Pesos (P344,000.00) plus
Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00) as attorneys fees to Fe Ico and her
children, and to pay the costs in both cases.
PANTRANCO filed a motion for reconsideration of the Court of Appeals
decision but was denied. Hence, this petition for review.

Issue No. 2:
Whether or not David Ico was negligent. -NO
Ruling:
Petitioner insists that David Ico was negligent in failing to observe Section 43
(c), Article III Chapter IV of Republic Act No. 4136 which provides that the
driver of a vehicle entering a through highway or a stop intersection shall
yield the right of way to all vehicles approaching in either direction on such
through highway.

Issue No. 1:
Whether or not the doctrine of last clear chance applies in this case. -NO
Ruling:
The doctrine of the last clear chance simply, means that the negligence of a
claimant does not preclude a recovery for the negligence of defendant where
it appears that the latter, by exercising reasonable care and prudence, might
have avoided injurious consequences to claimant notwithstanding his
negligence.
The doctrine applies only in a situation where the plaintiff was guilty of prior
or antecedent negligence but the defendant, who had the last fair chance to
avoid the impending harm and failed to do so, is made liable for all the
consequences of the accident notwithstanding the prior negligence of the
plaintiff. The subsequent negligence of the defendant in failing to exercise
ordinary care to avoid injury to plaintiff becomes the immediate or proximate
cause of the accident which intervenes between the accident and the more
remote negligence of the plaintiff, thus making the defendant liable to the
plaintiff.
Generally, the last clear chance doctrine is invoked for the purpose of
making a defendant liable to a plaintiff who was guilty of prior or antecedent
negligence, although it may also be raised as a defense to defeat claim for
damages.
Contrary to the petitioners contention, the doctrine of "last clear chance"
finds no application in this case. For the doctrine to be applicable, it is
necessary to show that the person who allegedly had the last
opportunity to avert the accident was aware of the existence of the
peril or should, with exercise of due care, have been aware of it. One
cannot be expected to avoid an accident or injury if he does not know
or could not have known the existence of the peril. In this case, there is
nothing to show that the jeepney driver David Ico knew of the impending
danger. When he saw at a distance that the approaching bus was
encroaching on his lane, he did not immediately swerve the jeepney to the
dirt shoulder on his right since he must have assumed that the bus driver will
return the bus to its own lane upon seeing the jeepney approaching from the
opposite direction. There was nothing to indicate to David Ico that the bus
could not return to its own lane or was prevented from returning to the
proper lane by anything beyond the control of its driver. Leo Marantan, an
alternate driver of the Pantranco bus who was seated beside the driver
Ramirez at the time of the accident, testified that Ramirez had no choice but
to swerve the steering wheel to the left and encroach on the jeepneys lane
because there was a steep precipice on the right. However, this is belied by

The abovementioned law itself provides that it applies only to vehicles

entering a through highway or a stop intersection. At the time of the accident,
the jeepney had already crossed the intersection and was on its way to
Malalam River. Petitioner itself cited Fe Icos testimony that the accident
occurred after the jeepney had travelled a distance of about two (2) meters
from the point of intersection.
Considering the foregoing, the Court finds that the negligence of
petitioners driver in encroaching into the lane of the incoming jeepney
and in failing to return the bus to its own lane immediately upon seeing
the jeepney coming from the opposite direction was the sole and
proximate cause of the accident without which the collision would not
have occurred. There was no supervening or intervening negligence on
the part of the jeepney driver which would have made the prior
negligence of petitioners driver a mere remote cause of the accident.
Issue No. 3:
Whether or not petitioner is liable as an employer. -YES
Ruling:
Petitioner claims that it had observed the diligence of a good father of a
family to prevent damage, conformably to the last paragraph of Article 2180
of the Civil Code.
When an injury is caused by the negligence of an employee, there
instantly arises a presumption that the employer has been negligent
either in the selection of his employees or in the supervision over their
acts. Although this presumption is only a disputable presumption
which could be overcome by proof of diligence of a good father of a
family, this Court believes that the evidence submitted by the
defendant to show that it exercised the diligence of a good father of a
family in the case of Ramirez, as a company driver is far from
sufficient. No support evidence has been adduced.
The finding of negligence on the part of its driver Ambrosio Ramirez gave
rise to the presumption of negligence on the part of petitioner and the burden
of proving that it exercised due diligence not only in the selection of its
employees but also in adequately supervising their work rests with the
petitioner. Contrary to petitioners claim, there is no presumption that the
usual recruitment procedures and safety standards were observed. The
mere issuance of rules and regulations and the formulation of various
company policies on safety, without showing that they are being complied
with, are not sufficient to exempt petitioner from liability arising from the

negligence of its employee. It is incumbent upon petitioner to show that in

recruiting and employing the erring driver, the recruitment procedures and
company policies on efficiency and safety were followed. Petitioner failed to
do this.
Issue No. 4:
Whether or not the CA erred in fixing the damages for the loss of earning
capacity of the deceased victims. -NO
Ruling:
The Court of Appeals committed no reversible error in fixing the amount of
damages for the loss of earning capacity of the deceased victims. While it is
true that private respondents should have presented documentary
evidence to support their claim for damages for loss of earning
capacity of the deceased victims, the absence thereof does not
necessarily bar the recovery of the damages in question. The testimony
of Fe Ico and Francisca Bascos as to the earning capacity of David Ico, and
the spouses Baesa, respectively, are sufficient to establish a basis from
which the court can make a fair and reasonable estimate of the damages for
the loss of earning capacity of the three deceased victims. Moreover, in
fixing the damages for loss of earning capacity of a deceased victim, the
court can consider the nature of his occupation, his educational attainment
and the state of his health at the time of death.
In the instant case, David Ico was thirty eight (38) years old at the time of his
death in 1981 and was driving his own passenger jeepney. The spouses
Ceasar and Marilyn Baesa were both thirty (30) years old at the time of their
death. Ceasar Baesa was a commerce degree holder and the proprietor of
the Cauayan Press, printer of the Cauayan Valley Newspaper and the Valley
Times at Cauayan, Isabela. Marilyn Baesa graduated as a nurse in 1976 and
at the time of her death, was the company nurse, personnel manager,
treasurer and cashier of the Ilagan Press at Ilagan, Isabela. Respondent
court duly considered these factors, together with the uncontradicted
testimonies of Fe Ico and Francisca Bascos, in fixing the amount of
damages for the loss of earning capacity of David Ico and the spouses
Baesa.
However, the Court of Appeals committed error in fixing the
compensatory damages for the death of Harold Jim Baesa and
Marcelino Baesa. Respondent court awarded to Maricar Baesa Thirty
Thousand Pesos (P30,000.00) as "compensatory damages for the death of
Harold Jim Baesa and Marcelino Baesa.". In other words, the Court of
Appeals awarded only Fifteen Thousand Pesos (P15,000.00) as indemnity
for the death of Harold Jim Baesa and another Fifteen Thousand Pesos
(P15,000.00) for the death of Marcelino Baesa. This is clearly erroneous. In
the case of People v. de la Fuente, the indemnity for the death of a
person was fixed by this Court at Thirty Thousand Pesos (P30,000.00).
Plaintiff Maricar Baesa should therefore be awarded Sixty Thousand
Pesos (P60,000.00) as indemnity for the death of her brothers, Harold
Jim Baesa and Marcelino Baesa or Thirty Thousand Pesos (P30,000.00) for
the death of each brother.
The petition is DENIED. The decision of respondent Court of Appeals is
hereby AFFIRMED with the modification that the amount of compensatory
damages for the death of Harold Jim Baesa and Marcelino Baesa are
increased to Thirty Thousand Pesos (P30,000.00) each.

[G.R. NO. 137772 July 29, 2005]

AMADOR CORPUZ and ROMEO GONZALES, Petitioners, v. EDISON
LUGUE and CATHERINE BALUYOT, Respondents.
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
An Isuzu KC-20 passenger jeep (KC-20), then being driven by Jimmy
Basilio, was traversing the right side of the road, it collided with a tanker
truck driven by Gerardo Lim, which was then moving from the right shoulder
of the highway. As a result of the collision, the KC-20 was thrown towards
the left lane of the highway where it was bumped by a Mazda minibus
(minibus) being driven by herein petitioner Gonzales who was then trying to
overtake
the
KC-20.
At that point, the KC-20 spun and bumped a Transcon service truck parked

on the left side of the highway. As a result of the impact, the KC-20 was
thrown across the highway where it was again hit by the minibus pushing the
former towards a deep portion on the left side of the road. As a consequence
of the accident, passengers of the KC-20, including respondent Lugue,
suffered physical injuries.
Respondent Lugue then filed an action for damages arising from the
vehicular incident before RTC against herein petitioners Amador Corpuz and
Romeo Gonzales, owner and driver of the minibus, respectively, and Oscar
Jaring and Gerardo Lim, owner and driver of the tanker truck, respectively.
Therein defendants filed a third-party complaint against Ricardo Santiago
and Jimmy Basilio, owner/operator and driver of the KC-20, respectively.
RTC: decision holding jointly and severally liable Ricardo Santiago, Jimmy
Basilio, Oscar Jaring, Gerardo Lim, Amador Corpuz, and Romeo Gonzales.
There are two (2) versions of the accident in question respectively espoused
by the several parties in the instant case. One version is that put forth by
plaintiff Edison Lugue (including his witness Remigio Gervacio) and also by
defendants and third-party plaintiffs Amador Corpuz and Romeo Gonzales.
The other version is that advanced by defendants and third-party plaintiffs
Oscar Jaring and Gerardo Lim.
From the respective two versions of the subject accident and the evidence
adduced, it would appear that (1) The tanker truck owned by defendant Oscar Jaring, whose authorized
driver at the time of the accident was defendant Gerardo Lim, was not
actually parked completely (if it was parked at all) on the right shoulder of the
national highway where the accident took place, witness Ricardo Puno
testified or as defendant Jaring's photographed marked as Exhibits "1,""1-A"
and "1-B" would tend to show. If it was parked at all, the plausible likelihood
was that it was so parked that while its right front and rear wheels were
touching the right asphalted shoulder of that highway, however its left front
and rear wheels were actually on the concrete right lane of said highway,
with its left front fender and bumper protruding well into said right lane, thus
constituting a stumbling block to vehicles traveling on such right lane facing
the direction where plaintiff Edison Lugue was going then.
This conclusion is bolstered by the obvious fact that from said photograph
Exhibit "1" it can be seen that the right bumper of the tanker truck appears to
have detached from its former connection to the left front portion of the
tanker truck and such left end now appears to have been bent forward. The
fender of the same truck also appears to have been damaged on the same
left side, with a vertical long portion cut from said fender.
If said tanker truck was thus parked as posted in the two foregoing
paragraphs, then it had been parked in a negligent manner by its driver, who
thereby did not exercise ordinary or simple human prudence or foresight to
avoid any portion of said truck from obstructing the way of any oncoming
motor vehicle being driven on said right or proper lane of the highway. Any
normal or average human being, especially a motor vehicle driver, ought to
know that the concrete lanes of highways are intended to be traversed by
motor vehicles and are not intended to be used as parking areas. Even in
case of emergency, only the shoulders of such highways may be used for
parking purposes.
(3) There was also the possibility testified to by plaintiff Edison Lugue, his
witness Remigio Gervacio and defendant Romeo Gonzales to the effect that
the tanker truck was not actually parked but was actually already moving or
being driven from its former parked position and its left front wheel (and
perhaps even the left rear wheels) had occupied a portion of the concrete
right lane of the highway which was also being traversed then by the KC-20.
This possibility is silently corroborated by the condition of the front bumper
and fender of the tanker truck depicted in the photograph marked as Exhibit
"1," as already described hereinbefore, having in mind the fact that not a
single witness testified to having seen the Isuzu KC-20 leave the concrete
right lane and occupy the asphalted shoulder.
On the plane of logic, this version is also supported by the undisputed fact
testified by practically all the witnesses who testified that after the physical
contact between the tanker truck and the KC-20, the latter vehicle was
shoved from its proper right lane to the left lane as a result of the impact.
Such resulting shoving effect could have been the consequence of the push
it got from the tanker truck which was already moving then toward the
concrete right lane.
(4) On the other hand, neither may the Lugue-Corpuz version on the
physical contact between the KC-20 and the tanker truck be swallowed or

considered as entirely correct. This version attempts to show that the tanker
truck, while being initially driven away from the right asphalted shoulder of
the highway into the concrete right lane of said highway, bumped with its left
side the right middle portion of the body of said KC-20, thus causing the
latter to be shoved to the left concrete lane of said highway, where it was
bumped by the passing or overtaking Mazda minibus.
In such a situation, wherein there was a truck starting to crawl on the right
lane traversed by the KC-20 and there was a minibus trailing it, and in the
process of passing or overtaking the KC-20, the driver of the minibus (sic)
was expected to exercise caution and prudence to avoid hitting or being hit
by either or both other motor vehicles before it or trailing it, the fact that the
driver of the KC-20 did not either slacken his speed or even swerve his
steering wheel, however slightly, to avoid hitting or being hit by the tanker
truck bespeaks reckless imprudence on the part of third-party defendant
Jimmy Basilio as driver of said KC-20. Had he even only slackened the
speed of the KC-20, he could have avoided any contact between it and the
tanker truck, given that distance of "25 to 35 meters" from said truck when
the latter was first seen. He chose not to do so.
"Reckless imprudence consists in the doing or failing to do an act,
voluntarily, but without malice, from which material damage results by reason
of inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of the person performing or
failing to perform such act, taking into consideration his employment or
occupation, degree of intelligence, physical condition and other
circumstances regarding persons, time and place. (Art. 365, Revised Penal
Code)"
Defendant Gerardo Lim, as driver of the subject tanker truck with Plate No.
CVC-563 Phil. '84 on the date in question, has been shown to have been
grossly negligent in either (a) improperly parking his said truck on the right
lane of the national highway instead of totally on the asphalted shoulder of
said highway, or (b) driving said tanker truck from said shoulder of the
highway into the right lane of said highway without previously carefully
observing and making sure that no other vehicle was coming from the rear of
his vehicle so as to avoid any possible accident from such direction, which
gross negligence constituted the proximate cause of the accident in
question.
Otherwise stated, had he not parked his truck improperly, or had he made
sure that there was no oncoming vehicle from the direction of the rear of his
truck, the initial bumping between the said tanker truck and the Isuzu KC-20
would not have taken place and the subsequent bumpings by and among
the other vehicles involved in the subject accident would not have occurred.
( RTC rationale)
Aggrieved by said decision of the trial court, Oscar Jaring and Gerardo Lim,
owner and driver of the tanker truck respectively, and Amador Corpuz and
Romeo Gonzales, owner and driver of the minibus respectively, filed an
appeal before the appellate court. Third-party defendants Santiago and
Basilio, owner and driver of the KC-20 respectively, did not interpose an
appeal.
CA:
WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment is MODIFIED as follows:
1.) Defendants Ricardo Santiago and Jimmy Basilio are declared jointly and
severally liable with defendants-appellants Amador Corpuz and Romeo
Gonzales; and
2.) Defendants-appellants Oscar Jaring and Gerardo Lim are absolved from
liability and the Complaint as against them is DISMISSED.
Hence, the instant petition by Amador Corpuz and Romeo Gonzales.
ISSUE: whether or not the appellate court erred in holding them liable for
damages based on the findings of facts adduced by the trial court. yes
HELD: We find merit in the petition.
It is clear that the proximate cause of the injuries suffered by respondent
Lugue was the collision between the KC-20 and the tanker truck. As
correctly pointed out by the lower court, proximate legal cause is that acting
first and producing the injury either immediately or by setting other events in
motion, all constituting a natural and continuous chain of events, each
having a close causal connection with its immediate predecessor, the final
event in the chain immediately effecting the injury as a natural and probable
result of the cause which first acted, under such circumstances that the
person responsible for the first event should, as an ordinarily prudent and
intelligent person, have reasonable ground to expect at the moment of his
act or default that an injury to some person might probably result therefrom.

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ISSUE: who between the drivers of the two colliding vehicles was negligent
and thus liable for damages brought about by the injuries suffered by Edison
Lugue.
HELD: It is clear that it was the reckless imprudence of the driver of the KC20, Jimmy Basilio that set the other events in motion which eventually led to
the
passengers
of
the
KC-20
sustaining
physical
injuries.
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Issue: w/n Romeo Gonzales (minibus driver) is negligent and thus liable?
NO
Held: This conclusion of the appellate court of recklessness on the part of
petitioner Gonzales is, however, unwarranted. Based on the unchallenged
testimony of petitioner Gonzales, he signaled to overtake the KC-20
because the way was clear. That despite his best effort to do everything to
avoid hitting the KC-20, petitioner failed to do so because the KC-20 had
moved to a position blocking the way of the minibus as a result of the tanker
bumping the KC-20.
Certainly, even assuming that petitioner Gonzales had a few seconds before
actual collision, he no longer had any opportunity to avoid it. Petitioner
Gonzales cannot be deemed negligent for failing to prevent the collision
even after applying all means available to him within the few instants when
he had discovered the impending peril.
In a similar case where a jeepney bound for Isabela collided with a bus on its
regular route to Manila when the latter encroached upon the jeepney's lane
while it was negotiating a curve, the Court declared that:
[E]ven assuming that the jeepney driver perceived the danger a few seconds
before the actual collision, he had no opportunity to avoid it. This Court has
held that the last clear chance doctrine "can never apply where the party
charged is required to act instantaneously, and if the injury cannot be
avoided by the application of all means at hand after the peril is or should
have been discovered.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The
Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 37085, finding
petitioners Amador Corpuz and Romeo Gonzales liable, is hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. In all other respects, the Court of Appeals
Decision is hereby AFFIRMED.
G.R. No. L-68102 July 16, 1992
GEORGE MCKEE and ARACELI KOH MCKEE, petitioners,
vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, JAIME TAYAG and ROSALINDA
MANALO, respondents.
G.R. No. L-68103 July 16, 1992
FACTS: Petitioners in G.R. No. 68102, parents of the minors George Koh
McKee, Christopher Koh McKee and the deceased Kim Koh McKee, were
the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 4478, while petitioner Carmen Dayrit Koh and
her co-petitioners in G.R. No. 68103, who are the wife and children,
respectively, of the late Jose Koh, were the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 4477.
Upon the other hand, private respondents are the owners of the cargo truck
which figured in the mishap; a certain Ruben Galang was the driver of the
truck at the time of the accident.
Between nine and ten o'clock in the morning of 8 January 1977, in Pulong
Pulo Bridge along MacArthur Highway, between Angeles City and San
Fernando, Pampanga, a head-on-collision took place between an
International cargo truck, Loadstar, owned by private respondents, and
driven by Ruben Galang, and a Ford Escort car driven by Jose Koh. The
collision resulted in the deaths of Jose Koh, Kim Koh McKee and Loida
Bondoc, and physical injuries to George Koh McKee, Christopher Koh
McKee and Araceli Koh McKee, all passengers of the Ford Escort.
Immediately before the collision, the cargo truck, which was loaded with two
hundred (200) cavans of rice weighing about 10,000 kilos, was traveling
southward from Angeles City to San Fernando Pampanga, and was bound
for Manila. The Ford Escort, on the other hand, was on its way to Angeles
City from San Fernando. When the northbound car was about (10) meters
away from the southern approach of the bridge, two (2) boys suddenly
darted from the right side of the road and into the lane of the car. The boys
were moving back and forth, unsure of whether to cross all the way to the

other side or turn back. Jose Koh blew the horn of the car, swerved to the
left and entered the lane of the truck; he then switched on the headlights of
the car, applied the brakes and thereafter attempted to return to his lane.
Before he could do so, his car collided with the truck. The collision occurred
in the lane of the truck, which was the opposite lane, on the said bridge.
In his statement to the investigating police officers immediately after the
accident, Galang admitted that he was traveling at thirty (30) miles (48
kilometers) per hour.
As a consequence of the collision, two (2) cases, Civil Case No. 4477 and
No. 4478, were filed on 31 January 1977 before the then Court of First
Instance of Pampanga. On 1 March 1977, an Information charging Ruben
Galang with the crime of "Reckless Imprudence Resulting to (sic) Multiple
Homicide and Physical Injuries and Damage to Property" was filed with the
trial court (docketed as Criminal Case No. 3751).
In their Answer with Counterclaim in Civil Case No. 4477, private
respondents asserted that it was the Ford Escort car which "invaded and
bumped (sic) the lane of the truck driven by Ruben Galang and, as
counterclaim, prayed for the award of P15,000.00 as attorney's fees,
P20,000.00 as actual and liquidated damages, P100,000.00 as moral
damages and P30,000.00 as business losses. In Civil Case No. 4478,
private respondents first filed a motion to dismiss on grounds of pendency of
another action (Civil Case No. 4477) and failure to implead an indispensable
party, Ruben Galang, the truck driver. Petitioners filed their Answers to the
Counterclaims in both cases.
On 1 October 1980, Judge Capulong rendered a decision against the
accused Ruben Galang in the aforesaid criminal case. The decision was
promulgated only on 17 November 1980; on the same day, counsel for
petitioners filed with Branch III of the court where the two (2) civil cases
were pending a manifestation to that effect and attached thereto a copy of
the decision.
Upon the other hand, Judge Mario Castaeda, Jr. dismissed the two (2) civil
cases on 12 November 1980 and awarded the private respondents moral
damages, exemplary damages and attorney's fees.
Accused Ruben Galang appealed the judgment of conviction to the Court of
Appeals(docketed as C.A.-G.R. Blg. 24764-CR). Plaintiffs in Civil Cases
Nos. 4477 and 4478 likewise separately appealed the 12 November 1980
decision to the appellate court(docketed as C.A.-G.R. No. 69041-R and
C.A.-G.R. No. 69040-R).
On 4 October 1982, the respondent Court promulgated its decision 20 in
C.A.-G.R. Blg. 24764-CR affirming the conviction of Galang.
On 29 November 1983, respondent Court, by then known as the
Intermediate Appellate Court, promulgated its consolidated decision in A.C.G.R. CV Nos. 69040 and 69041 : WHEREFORE, the decision appealed
from it hereby reversed and set aside. (RTC decision dated 12 Nov. 1980)
A motion for reconsideration alleging improper appreciation of the facts was
subsequently filed by private respondents on the basis of which the
respondent Court, in its Resolution of 3 April 1984, 29 reconsidered and set
aside its 29 November 1983 decision and affirmed in toto the trial court's
judgment of 12 November 1980.
ISSUE: whether or not respondent Court's findings in its challenged
resolution (Resolution of 3 April 1984) are supported by evidence or are
based on mere speculations, conjectures and presumptions.
RULING:
In the assailed resolution, the respondent Court held that the fact that the car
improperly invaded the lane of the truck and that the collision occurred in
said lane gave rise to the presumption that the driver of the car, Jose Koh,
was negligent. On the basis of this presumed negligence, the appellate court
immediately concluded that it was Jose Koh's negligence that was the
immediate and proximate cause of the collision. This is an unwarranted
deduction as the evidence for the petitioners convincingly shows that the car
swerved into the truck's lane because as it approached the southern end of
the bridge, two (2) boys darted across the road from the right sidewalk into
the lane of the car. Jose Koh's entry into the lane of the truck was necessary
in order to avoid what was, in his mind at that time, a greater peril death
or injury to the two (2) boys. Such act can hardly be classified as negligent.

NEGLIGENCE is the omission to do something which a reasonable man,

guided by those considerations which ordinarily regulate the conduct of
human affairs, would do, or the doing of something which a prudent and
reasonable man would not do, or as Judge Cooley defines it, "(T)he failure to
observe for the protection of the interests of another person, that degree of
care, precaution, and vigilance which the circumstances justly demand,
whereby such other person suffers injury."
On the basis of the foregoing definition, the test of negligence and the facts
obtaining in this case, it is manifest that no negligence could be imputed to
Jose Koh. Any reasonable and ordinary prudent man would have tried to
avoid running over the two boys by swerving the car away from where they
were even if this would mean entering the opposite lane. Avoiding such
immediate peril would be the natural course to take particularly where the
vehicle in the opposite lane would be several meters away and could very
well slow down, move to the side of the road and give way to the oncoming
car. Moreover, under what is known as the EMERGENCY RULE, "one who
suddenly finds himself in a place of danger, and is required to act without
time to consider the best means that may be adopted to avoid the impending
danger, is not guilty of negligence, if he fails to adopt what subsequently and
upon reflection may appear to have been a better method, unless the
emergency in which he finds himself is brought about by his own
negligence."
Considering the sudden intrusion of the two (2) boys into the lane of the car,
We find that Jose Koh adopted the best means possible in the given
situation to avoid hitting them. Applying the above test, therefore, it is clear
that he was not guilty of negligence.
In any case, assuming, arguendo that Jose Koh is negligent, it cannot be
said that his negligence was the proximate cause of the collision.
PROXIMATE
CAUSE
has
been
defined
as:
. . . that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any
efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the result
would not have occurred. And more comprehensively, the proximate legal
cause is that acting first and producing the injury, either immediately or by
setting other events in motion, all constituting a natural and continuous chain
of events, each having a close causal connection with its immediate
predecessor, the final event in the chain immediately effecting the injury as a
natural and probable result of the cause which first acted, under such
circumstances that the person responsible for the first event should, as an
ordinary prudent and intelligent person, have reasonable ground to expect at
the moment of his act or default that an injury to some person might
probably result therefrom.
Applying the above definition, although it may be said that the act of Jose
Koh, if at all negligent, was the initial act in the chain of events, it cannot be
said that the same caused the eventual injuries and deaths because of the
occurrence of a sufficient intervening event, the negligent act of the truck
driver, which was the actual cause of the tragedy. The entry of the car into
the lane of the truck would not have resulted in the collision had the latter
heeded the emergency signals given by the former to slow down and give
the car an opportunity to go back into its proper lane. Instead of slowing
down and swerving to the far right of the road, which was the proper
precautionary measure under the given circumstances, the truck driver
continued at full speed towards the car.
The truck driver's negligence is apparent in the records. He himself said that
his truck was running at 30 miles (48 kilometers) per hour along the bridge
while the maximum speed allowed by law on a bridge 52 is only 30
kilometers per hour. Under Article 2185 of the Civil Code, a person driving a
vehicle is presumed negligent if at the time of the mishap, he was violating
any traffic regulation. It was the truck driver's subsequent negligence in
failing to take the proper measures and degree of care necessary to avoid
the collision which was the proximate cause of the resulting accident.
ISSUE: whether or not the doctrine of last clear chance is applicable.
RULING: YES.
Even if Jose Koh was indeed negligent, the doctrine of last clear chance
finds application here. Last clear chance is a doctrine in the law of torts
which states that the contributory negligence of the party injured will not
defeat the claim for damages if it is shown that the defendant might, by the
exercise of reasonable care and prudence, have avoided the consequences
of the negligence of the injured party. In such cases, the person who had the
last clear chance to avoid the mishap is considered in law solely responsible
for
the
consequences
thereof.
The DOCTRINE OF THE LAST CLEAR chance simply, means that the

negligence of a claimant does not preclude a recovery for the negligence of

defendant where it appears that the latter, by exercising reasonable care and
prudence, might have avoided injurious consequences to claimant
notwithstanding his negligence.
The doctrine applies only in a situation where the plaintiff was guilty of prior
or antecedent negligence but the defendant, who had the last fair chance to
avoid the impending harm and failed to do so, is made liable for all the
consequences of the accident notwithstanding the prior negligence of the
plaintiff
[Picart
v.
Smith,
37
Phil.
809
(1918).
Applying the foregoing doctrine, it is not difficult to rule, as We now rule, that
it was the truck driver's negligence in failing to exert ordinary care to avoid
the collision which was, in law, the proximate cause of the collision. As
employers of the truck driver, the private respondents are, under Article 2180
of the Civil Code, directly and primarily liable for the resulting damages. The
presumption that they are negligent flows from the negligence of their
employee. That presumption, however, is only juris tantum, not juris et de
jure. 59 Their only possible defense is that they exercised all the diligence of
a
good
father
of
a
family
to
prevent
the
damage.
The diligence of a good father referred to means the diligence in the
selection and supervision of employees. 60The answers of the private
respondents in Civil Cases Nos. 4477 and 4478 did not interpose this
defense. Neither did they attempt to prove it.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The assailed Resolution of
the respondent Court of 3 April 1984 is SET ASIDE while its Decision of 29
November 1983 in C.A.-G.R. CV Nos. 69040-41 is REINSTATED, subject to
the modification that the indemnity for death is increased from P12,000.00 to
P50,000.00 each for the death of Jose Koh and Kim Koh McKee.

ROGELIO ENGADA, petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, Former

Fourteenth Division, Manila, and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
respondents.
[G.R. No. 140698. June 20, 2003.]
Facts:
Edwin Iran was driving a Toyota Tamaraw jeepney bound for Iloilo City where
Sheila Seyan was a passenger. While traversing the road along Barangay
Acquit, Barotac Nuevo, the Tamaraw passengers allegedly saw from the
opposite direction a speeding Isuzu pick-up, driven by Rogelio Engada. The
pick-up had just negotiated a hilly gradient on the highway. When it was just
a few meters away from the Tamaraw, the Isuzu pick-up's right signal light
flashed, at the same time, it swerved to its left, encroaching upon the lane of
the Tamaraw and headed towards a head-on collision course with it. Seyan
shouted at Iran to avoid the pick-up. Iran swerved to his left but the pick-up
also swerved to its right. Thus, the pick-up collided with the Tamaraw, hitting
the latter at its right front passenger side. The impact caused the head and
chassis of the Tamaraw to separate from its body. Seyan was thrown out of
the Tamaraw and landed on a ricefield. The pick-up stopped diagonally
astride the center of the road.
Issue: W/N the doctrine of last clear chance is applicable in the instant case.

loss of the Tamaraw jeepney. It also did not err in imposing on petitioner the
sentence of four (4) months of arresto mayor.
Iran could not be faulted when in his attempt to avoid the pick-up, he
swerved to his left. Petitioner's acts had put Iran in an emergency situation
which forced him to act quickly. An individual who suddenly finds himself in a
situation of danger and is required to act without much time to consider the
best means that may be adopted to avoid the impending danger, is not guilty
of negligence if he fails to undertake what subsequently and upon reflection
may appear to be a better solution, unless the emergency was brought by
his own negligence
G.R. No. 153076

June 21, 2007

LAPANDAY AGRICULTURAL and DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION

(LADECO), HENRY BERENGUEL, and APOLONIO R.
DEOCAMPO, petitioners,
vs.
MICHAEL RAYMOND ANGALA, respondent.
FACTS:
A Datsun crewcab driven by Deocampo bumped into a Chevy
pick-up owned by Angala (respondent) and driven by Borres. LADECO
owned the crewcab which was assigned to its manager Mendez. Deocampo
was the driver and bodyguard of Mendez. Both vehicles were running along
Rafael Castillo St., Agdao, Davao City heading north towards Lanang, Davao
City.
Respondent alleged that his pick-up was slowing down to about five to ten
kilometers per hour (kph) and was making a left turn preparatory to turning
south when it was bumped from behind by the crewcab which was running
at around 60 to 70 kph. The crewcab stopped 21 meters from the point of
impact. Respondent testified that Borres made a signal because he noticed
a blinking light while looking at the speedometer.
Deocampo alleged that the pick-up and the crewcab he was driving were
both running at about 40 kph. The pick-up was running along the outer lane.
The pick-up was about 10 meters away when it made a U-turn towards the
left. Deocampo alleged that he tried to avoid the pick-up but he was unable
to avoid the collision. Deocampo stated that he did not apply the brakes
because he knew the collision was unavoidable. Deocampo admitted that he
stepped on the brakes only after the collision.
Petitioners allege that since Borres was violating a traffic rule at the time of
the accident, respondent and Borres were the parties at fault. Petitioners cite
Article 2185 of the Civil Code, thus:
Art. 2185. Unless there is proof to the contrary, it is presumed that
a person driving a motor vehicle has been negligent if at the time
of the mishap, he was violating any traffic regulation.

Held:
The doctrine of last clear chance states that a person who has the last clear
chance or opportunity of avoiding an accident, notwithstanding the negligent
acts of his opponent, is considered in law solely responsible for the
consequences of the accident. 19 But as already stated on this point, no
convincing evidence was adduced by petitioner to support his invocation of
the abovecited doctrine. Instead, what has been shown is the presence of an
emergency and the proper application of the emergency rule. Petitioner's act
of swerving to the Tamaraw's lane at a distance of 30 meters from it and
driving the Isuzu pick-up at a fast speed as it approached the Tamaraw,
denied Iran time and opportunity to ponder the situation at all. There was no
clear chance to speak of. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals did not err in
holding petitioner responsible for the vehicular collision and the resulting
damages, including the injuries suffered by Mrs. Sheila Seyan and the total

The trial court found that the crewcab was running very fast while following
the pick-up and that the crewcabs speed was the proximate cause of the
accident. The trial court ruled that Deocampo had the last opportunity to
avoid the accident.
The Court of Appeals affirmed in toto the trial courts decision. It also
sustained the solidary liability of LADECO and Deocampo. The Court of
Appeals ruled that under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, the negligence of the
driver is presumed to be the negligence of the owner of the vehicle.
ISSUE:. WHETHER RESPONDENT IS ENTITLED TO DAMAGES

RULING:
Both Drivers are Negligent
We rule that both parties were negligent in this case. Borres was
at the outer lane when he executed a U-turn. Following Section 45(b) of RA
4136, Borres should have stayed at the inner lane which is the lane nearest
to the center of the highway. However, Deocampo was equally negligent.
Borres slowed down the pick-up preparatory to executing the U-turn.
Deocampo should have also slowed down when the pick-up slowed down.
Deocampo admitted that he noticed the pick-up when it was still about 20
meters away from him. Vehicular traffic was light at the time of the incident.
The pick-up and the crewcab were the only vehicles on the road. Deocampo
could have avoided the crewcab if he was not driving very fast before the
collision, as found by both the trial court and the Court of Appeals
Doctrine of Last Clear Chance Applies
Since both parties are at fault in this case, the doctrine of last clear
chance applies.
The doctrine of last clear chance states that where both parties
are negligent but the negligent act of one is appreciably later than that of the
other, or where it is impossible to determine whose fault or negligence
caused the loss, the one who had the last clear opportunity to avoid the loss
but failed to do so is chargeable with the loss. In this case, Deocampo had
the last clear chance to avoid the collision. Since Deocampo was driving the
rear vehicle, he had full control of the situation since he was in a position to
observe the vehicle in front of him. Deocampo had the responsibility of
avoiding bumping the vehicle in front of him. A U-turn is done at a much
slower speed to avoid skidding and overturning, compared to running
straight ahead. Deocampo could have avoided the vehicle if he was not
driving very fast while following the pick-up. Deocampo was not only driving
fast, he also admitted that he did not step on the brakes even upon seeing
the pick-up. He only stepped on the brakes after the collision.
Petitioners are Solidarily Liable
LADECO alleges that it should not be held jointly and severally
liable with Deocampo because it exercised due diligence in the supervision
and selection of its employees. LADECO did not show its policy in hiring its
drivers, or the manner in which it supervised its drivers. LADECO failed to
substantiate its allegation that it exercised due diligence in the supervision
and selection of its employees. Hence, we hold LADECO solidarily liable
with Deocampo.
Respondent is Entitled to Moral Damages
We sustain the award of moral damages. Moral damages are
awarded to allow a plaintiff to obtain means, diversion, or amusement that
will serve to alleviate the moral suffering he has undergone due to the
defendants culpable action. The trial court found that respondent, who was
on board the pick-up when the collision took place, suffered shock, serious
anxiety, and fright when the crewcab bumped his pick-up. We sustain the
trial court and the Court of Appeals in ruling that respondent sufficiently
showed that he suffered shock, serious anxiety, and fright which entitle him
to moral damages.
Both the trial court and the Court of Appeals failed to give any
justification for the award of attorneys fees. Awards of attorneys fees must
be based on findings of fact and of law and stated in the decision of the trial
court. Further, no premium should be placed on the right to litigate. Hence,
we delete the award of attorneys fees.

G.R. No. 112160

FACTS:

Sometime in August, 1982, petitioner Osmundo S. Canlas, and private

respondent, Vicente Maosca, decided to venture in business and to raise
the capital needed therefor. Canlas executed a Special Power of Attorney
authorizing Maosca to mortgage two parcels of land owned by him and his
wife, Angelina Canlas.

Subsequently, Osmundo Canlas agreed to sell the said parcels of land to

Vicente Maosca, for and in consideration of P850,000.00, P500,000.00 of
which payable within one week, and the balance of P350,000.00 to serve as
his (Osmundo's) investment in the business.

Thus, Osmundo Canlas delivered to Vicente Maosca the transfer

certificates of title of the parcels of land involved. Vicente Maosca, as his
part of the transaction, issued two post-dated checks in favor of Osmundo
Canlas in the amounts of P 40,000.00 and P460,000.00, respectively, but it
turned out that the check covering the bigger amount was not sufficiently
funded.

On September 3, 1982, Vicente Maosca mortgaged the parcels of land for

P500,000.00 to the respondent Asian Savings Bank (ASB), with the help of
impostors who misrepresented themselves as the spouses, Osmundo
Canlas and Angelina Canlas.

When the loan it extended was not paid, respondent bank extrajudicially
foreclosed the mortgage.

On January 15, 1983, Osmundo Canlas wrote a letter informing the ASB that
the execution of subject mortgage over the lands in question was without
their (Canlas spouses) authority, and request that steps be taken to annul
and/or revoke the questioned mortgage.

Petitioner Osmundo Canlas also wrote the office of Sheriff Maximo O.

Contreras, asking that the auction sale on the land be cancelled or held in
abeyance. But respondents Contreras and ASB refused to heed petitioner
Canlas' stance and proceeded with the scheduled auction sale.

February 28, 2000

OSMUNDO S. CANLAS and ANGELINA CANLAS, petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, ASIAN SAVINGS BANK, MAXIMO C.
CONTRARES and VICENTE MAOSCA, respondents.

Petitioners instituted a case for annulment of deed of real estate mortgage

with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction. The trial court
issued an Order restraining the respondent sheriff from issuing the
corresponding Certificate of Sheriff's Sale.

ASB appealed to the CA, which reversed the findings of the trial court.

ISSUE: Whether or not ASB exercised due diligence in ascertaining the real
identity of the couple who introduced themselves as the Canlas
spouses relative to the mortgage transaction it had with respondent
Maosca?

RULING:

The Petition is impressed with merit.

Art. 1173 of the Civil Code, provides:

Art. 1173. The fault or negligence of the obligor consist in the

omission of that diligence which is required by the nature of the
obligation and corresponds with the circumstances of the persons,
of the time and of the place. When negligence shows bad faith,
the provisions of articles 1171 and 2201, paragraph 2, shall apply.

If the law or contract does not state the diligence which is to be

observed in the performance, that which is expected of a good
father of a family shall be required. (1104)

The degree of diligence required of banks is more than that of a good

father of a family; in keeping with their responsibility to exercise the
necessary care and prudence in dealing even on a registered or titled
property. The business of a bank is affected with public interest,
holding in trust the money of the depositors, which bank deposits the
bank should guard against loss due to negligence or bad faith, by
reason of which the bank would be denied the protective mantle of the
land registration law, accorded only to purchasers or mortgagees for
value and in good faith.

In the case under consideration, from the evidence on hand it can be

gleaned unerringly that respondent bank did not observe the requisite
diligence in ascertaining or verifying the real identity of the couple who
introduced themselves as the spouses Osmundo Canlas and Angelina
Canlas. It is worthy to note that not even a single identification card
was exhibited by the said impostors to show their true identity; and
yet, the bank acted on their representations simply on the basis of the
residence certificates bearing signatures which tended to match the
signatures affixed on a previous deed of mortgage to a certain Atty.
Magno, covering the same parcels of land in question.

The efforts exerted by the bank to verify the identity of the couple posing as
Osmundo Canlas and Angelina Canlas fell short of the responsibility of the
bank to observe more than the diligence of a good father of a family. The
negligence of respondent bank was magnified by the fact that the previous
deed of mortgage (which was used as the basis for checking the
genuineness of the signatures of the supposed Canlas spouses) did not
bear the tax account number of the spouses, as well as the Community Tax
Certificate of Angelina Canlas. But such fact notwithstanding, the bank did
not require the impostors to submit additional proof of their true identity.

Under the doctrine of last clear chance, which is applicable here, the
respondent bank must suffer the resulting loss. In essence, the
doctrine of last clear chance is to the effect that where both parties are
negligent but the negligent act of one is appreciably later in point of
time than that of the other, or where it is impossible to determine
whose fault or negligence brought about the occurrence of the
incident, the one who had the last clear opportunity to avoid the
impending harm but failed to do so, is chargeable with the
consequences arising therefrom. Stated differently, the rule is that the
antecedent negligence of a person does not preclude recovery of
damages caused by the supervening negligence of the latter, who had
the last fair chance to prevent the impending harm by the exercise of
due diligence.

Assuming that Osmundo Canlas was negligent in giving Vicente Maosca

the opportunity to perpetrate the fraud, by entrusting to latter the owner's
copy of the transfer certificates of title of subject parcels of land, it cannot
be denied that the bank had the last clear chance to prevent the fraud,
by the simple expedient of faithfully complying with the requirements
for banks to ascertain the identity of the persons transacting with
them.

For not observing the degree of diligence required of banking institutions,

whose business is impressed with public interest, respondent Asian Savings
Bank has to bear the loss sued upon.

Settled is the rule that a contract of mortgage must be constituted only

by the absolute owner on the property mortgaged; a mortgage,
constituted by an impostor is void. Considering that it was established
indubitably that the contract of mortgage sued upon was entered into
and signed by impostors who misrepresented themselves as the
spouses Osmundo Canlas and Angelina Canlas, the Court is of the
ineluctible conclusion and finding that subject contract of mortgage is
a complete nullity.

G.R. No. 70493 May 18, 1989

GLAN PEOPLE'S LUMBER AND HARDWARE, GEORGE LIM, FABIO S.
AGAD, FELIX LIM and PAUL ZACARIAS y INFANTE, petitioners,
vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, CECILIA ALFEREZ VDA. DE
CALIBO, Minors ROYCE STEPHEN, JOYCE JOAN, JANISE MARIE,
JACQUELINE BRIGITTE JOCELINE CORAZON, JULIET GERALDINE,

JENNIFER JILL, all surnamed CALIBO, represented by their mother,

CECILIA A. VDA. DE CALIBO,respondents.
Facts:
Engineer Orlando T. Calibo, Agripino Roranes, and Maximo Patos were on
the jeep owned by the Bacnotan Consolidated Industries, Inc., with Calibo at
the wheel, as it approached from the South Lizada Bridge going towards the
direction of Davao City. At about that time, the cargo track, loaded with
cement bags, GI sheets, plywood, driven by defendant Paul Zacarias y
Infants, coming from the opposite direction of Davao City and bound for
Glan, South Cotabato, had just crossed said bridge. After crossing the
bridge, the cargo truck and the jeep collided as a consequence of which
Engineer Calibo died while Roranes and Patos sustained physical injuries.
Zacarias was unhurt. After the impact, the jeep fell and rested on its right
side on the asphalted road a few meters to the rear of the truck, while the
truck stopped on its wheels on the road.
Case for damages was filed by the surviving spouse and children of the late
Engineer Calibo who are residents of Tagbilaran City against the driver and
owners of the cargo truck.
For failure to file its answer to the third party complaint, third party
defendant, which insured the cargo truck involved, was declared in default.
A case was filed by the heirs of Engineer Calibo his widow and minor
children, private respondents Named defendants in the complaint were
"Felix S. Agad, George Lim and Felix Lim . . . (who) appear to be the coowners of the Glan People's Lumber and Hardware . . . (and) Paul Zacarias
y Infante." 4 The defendants' answer however alleged that the lumber and
hardware business was exclusively owned by George Y. Lim, this being
evidenced by the Certificate of Registration issued by the Bureau of
Domestic Trade; Fabio S. Agad was not a co-owner thereof but "merely
employed by . . . George Y. Lim as bookkeeper"; and Felix Lim had no
connection whatever with said business, "he being a child only eight (8)
years of age." 5
RTC: dismissed the complaint (and defendants' counterclaim) "for
insufficiency of evidence." Likewise dismissed was third-party complaint
presented by the defendants against the insurer of the truck.
CA: reversed the decision of the Trial Court. It found Zacarias to be negligent
on the basis of the following circumstances, to wit:
1) "the truck driven by defendant Zacarias occupied the lane of the jeep
when the collision occurred,' and although Zacarias saw the jeep from a
distance of about 150 meters, he "did not drive his truck back to his lane in
order to avoid collision with the oncoming jeep . . .;" 11 what is worse, "the
truck driver suddenly applied his brakes even as he knew that he was still
within the lane of the jeep;" 12 had both vehicles stayed in their respective
lanes, the collision would never have occurred, they would have passed
"along side each other safely;" 13
Issue: WON Zacarias was negligent? NO, a perusal of the facts revealed
that Zacarias was not negligent, rather, it was the driver of the jeep who had
the last clear chance to avoid the accident but failed to do so
Ruling:
The finding that "the truck driven by defendant Paul Zacarias occupied the
lane of the jeep when the collision occurred" is a loose one, based on
nothing more than the showing that at the time of the accident, the truck
driven by Zacarias had edged over the painted center line of the road into
the opposite lane by a width of twenty-five (25) centimeters. It ignores the
fact that by the uncontradicted evidence, the actual center line of the road

was not that indicated by the painted stripe but, according to measurements
made and testified by Patrolman Juanita Dimaano, one of the two officers
who investigated the accident, correctly lay thirty-six (36) centimeters farther
to the left of the truck's side of said stripe.
Not only was the truck's lane, measured from the incorrectly located center
stripe uncomfortably narrow, given that vehicle's width of two (2) meters and
forty-six (46) centimeters; the adjacent road shoulder was also virtually
impassable, being about three (3) inches lower than the paved surface of the
road and "soft--not firm enough to offer traction for safe passage besides
which, it sloped gradually down to a three foot-deep ravine with a river
below. 18 The truck's lane as erroneously demarcated by the center stripe
gave said vehicle barely half a meter of clearance from the edge of the road
and the dangerous shoulder and little room for maneuver, in case this was
made necessary by traffic contingencies or road conditions, if it always kept
to said lane. It being also shown that the accident happened at or near the
point of the truck's approach to a curve, 19 which called for extra precautions
against driving too near the shoulder, it could hardly be accounted negligent
on the part of its driver to intrude temporarily, and by only as small as a
twenty-five centimeter wide space (less than ten inches), into the opposite
lane in order to insure his vehicle's safety. This, even supposing that said
maneuver was in fact an intrusion into the opposite lane, which was not the
case at all as just pointed out.
Nor was the Appellate Court correct in finding that Paulino Zacarias had
acted negligently in applying his brakes instead of getting back inside his
lane upon qqqespying the approaching jeep. Being well within his own lane,
as has already been explained, he had no duty to swerve out of the jeep's
way as said Court would have had him do. And even supposing that he was
in fact partly inside the opposite lane, coming to a full stop with the jeep still
thirty (30) meters away cannot be considered an unsafe or imprudent action,
there also being uncontradicted evidence that the jeep was
"zigzagging" 20 and hence no way of telling in which direction it would go as it
approached the truck.
The evidence not only acquits Zacarias of any negligence in the matter;
there are also quite a few significant indicators that it was rather Engineer
Calibo's negligence that was the proximate cause of the accident. Zacarias
had told Patrolman Dimaano at the scene of the collision and later confirmed
in his written statement at the police headquarters 23 that the jeep had been
"zigzagging," which is to say that it was travelling or being driven erratically
at the time. The other investigator, Patrolman Jose Esparcia, also testified
that eyewitnesses to the accident had remarked on the jeep's
"zigzagging." 24 There is moreover more than a suggestion that Calibo had
been drinking shortly before the accident. The decision of the Trial Court
adverts to further testimony of Esparcia to the effect that three of Calibo's
companions at the beach party he was driving home from when the collision
occurred, who, having left ahead of him went to the scene when they heard
about the accident, had said that there had been a drinking spree at the
party and, referring to Calibo, had remarked: "Sabi na huag nang mag drive .
. . . pumipilit," (loosely translated, "He was advised not to drive, but he
insisted.")
It was Calibo whose driver's license could not be found on his person at the
scene of the accident, and was reported by his companions in the jeep as
having been lost with his wallet at said scene, according to the traffic
accident report, Exhibit "J". Said license unexplainedly found its way into the
record some two years later.
Even, however, ignoring these telltale indicia of negligence on the part of
Calibo, and assuming some antecedent negligence on the part of Zacarias
in failing to keep within his designated lane, incorrectly demarcated as it
was, the physical facts, either expressly found by the Intermediate Appellate
Court or which may be deemed conceded for lack of any dispute, would still
absolve the latter of any actionable responsibility for the accident under the
rule of the last clear chance.

Both drivers, as the Appellate Court found, had had a full view of each
other's vehicle from a distance of one hundred fifty meters. Both vehicles
were travelling at a speed of approximately thirty kilometers per hour. 26 The
private respondents have admitted that the truck was already at a full stop
when the jeep plowed into it. And they have not seen fit to deny or impugn
petitioners' imputation that they also admitted the truck had been brought to
a stop while the jeep was still thirty meters away. 27 From these facts the
logical conclusion emerges that the driver of the jeep had what judicial
doctrine has appropriately called the last clear chance to avoid the
accident, while still at that distance of thirty meters from the truck, by
stopping in his turn or swerving his jeep away from the truck, either of
which he had sufficient time to do while running at a speed of only
thirty kilometers per hour. In those circumstances, his duty was to
seize that opportunity of avoidance, not merely rely on a supposed
right to expect, as the Appellate Court would have it, the truck to
swerve and leave him a clear path.
The doctrine of the last clear chance provides as valid and complete a
defense to accident liability today as it did when invoked and applied in the
1918 case of Picart vs. Smith, supra, which involved a similar state of facts.

CRESENCIO LIBI and AMELIA YAP LIBI, Petitioners, v. HON.

INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, FELIPE GOTIONG and SHIRLEY
GOTIONG, Respondents.

FACTS:
Respondent spouses are the legitimate parents of Julie Ann Gotiong who, at
the time of the deplorable incident which took place and from which she died
on January 14, 1979, was an 18-year old first year commerce student of the
University of San Carlos, Cebu City; while petitioners are the parents of
Wendell Libi, then a minor between 18 and 19 years of age living with his
aforesaid parents, and who also died in the same event on the same date.
For more than two (2) years before their deaths, Julie Ann Gotiong and
Wendell Libi were sweethearts until December, 1978 when Julie Ann broke
up her relationship with Wendell after she supposedly found him to be
sadistic and irresponsible. During the first and second weeks of January,
1979, Wendell kept pestering Julie Ann with demands for reconciliation but
the latter persisted in her refusal, prompting the former to resort to threats
against her. In order to avoid him, Julie Ann stayed in the house of her best
friend, Malou Alfonso.
On January 14, 1979, Julie Ann and Wendell died, each from a single
gunshot wound inflicted with the same firearm, a Smith and Wesson revolver
licensed in the name of petitioner Cresencio Libi, which was recovered from
the scene of the crime inside the residence of private respondents.
Private respondents, bereaved over the death of their daughter, submitted
that Wendell caused her death by shooting her with the aforesaid firearm
and, thereafter, turning the gun on himself to commit suicide. On the other
hand, Petitioners, puzzled and likewise distressed over the death of their
son, rejected the imputation and contended that an unknown third party,
whom Wendell may have displeased or antagonized by reason of his work
as a narcotics informer of the Constabulary Anti-Narcotics Unit (CANU),
must have caused Wendells death and then shot Julie Ann to eliminate any
witness
and
thereby
avoid
identification.

1.
2.

WON petitioners (parents of the boy) are guilty vicariously liable.

YES
What is the liability of the petitioners? Primary

RULING:
1.

Petitioner Amelita Yap Libi, mother of Wendell, testified that her

husband, Cresencio Libi, owns a gun which he kept in a safety
deposit box inside a drawer in their bedroom. Each of these
petitioners holds a key to the safety deposit box and Amelitas key
is always in her bag, all of which facts were known to Wendell.
They have never seen their son Wendell taking or using the gun.
She admitted, however, that on that fateful night the gun was no
longer in the safety deposit box. 16 We, accordingly, cannot but
entertain serious doubts that petitioner spouses had really been
exercising the diligence of a good father of a family by safely
locking the fatal gun away. Wendell could not have gotten hold
thereof unless one of the keys to the safety deposit box was
negligently left lying around or he had free access to the bag of his
mother where the other key was.

The diligence of a good father of a family required by law in a parent

and child relationship consists, to a large extent, of the instruction and
supervision of the child.
Petitioners were gravely remiss in their duties as parents in not diligently
supervising the activities of their son, despite his minority and immaturity, so
much so that it was only at the time of Wendells death that they allegedly
discovered that he was a CANU agent and that Cresencios gun was missing
from the safety deposit box. Both parents were sadly wanting in their duty
and responsibility in monitoring and knowing the activities of their children
who, for all they know, may be engaged in dangerous work such as being
drug informers, 17 or even drug users. Neither was a plausible explanation
given for the photograph of Wendell, with a handwritten dedication to Julie
Ann at the back thereof, 18 holding upright what clearly appears as a
revolver and on how or why he was in possession of that firearm.
2.

The parents are and should be held primarily liable for the
civil liability arising from criminal offenses committed by their
minor children under their legal authority or control, or who
live in their company, unless it is proven that the former acted
with the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent such
damages.

That primary liability is premised on the provisions of Article 101 of the

Revised Penal Code with respect to damages ex delicto caused by their
children 9 years of age or under, or over 9 but under 15 years of age who
acted without discernment; and, with regard to their children over 9 but
under 15 years of age who acted with discernment, or 15 years or over but
under 21 years of age, such primary liability shall be imposed pursuant to
Article 2180 of the Civil Code.
Under said Article 2180, the enforcement of such liability shall be effected
against the father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother. This
was amplified by the Child and Youth Welfare Code which provides that the
same shall devolve upon the father and, in case of his death or incapacity,
upon the mother or, in case of her death or incapacity, upon the guardian,
but the liability may also be voluntarily assumed by a relative or family friend
of the youthful offender. 32 However, under the Family Code, this civil liability
is now, without such alternative qualification, the responsibility of the parents
and those who exercise parental authority over the minor offender. 33 For
civil liability arising from quasi-delicts committed by minors, the same rules
shall apply in accordance with Articles 2180 and 2182 of the Civil Code, as
so modified.

As a result of the tragedy, the parents of Julie Ann filed Civil Case in the then
Court of First Instance of Cebu against the parents of Wendell to recover
damages arising from the latters vicarious liability under Article 2180 of the
Civil Code.

Petitioners failed to duly exercise the requisite diligentissimi patris familias to

prevent such damages. Hence, they are liable for damages.

CFI: dismissed the case; insufficiency of the evidence

MACARIO TAMARGO, CELSO TAMARGO and AURELIA TAMARGO,

petitioners,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, THE HON. ARISTON L. RUBIO, RTC Judge,

CA: reversed
ISSUE:

10

Branch 20, Vigan, Ilocos Sur; VICTOR BUNDOC; and CLARA BUNDOC,
respondents.
Facts:
On 20 October 1982, Adelberto Bundoc, then a minor of 10 years of age,
shot Jennifer Tamargo with an air rifle causing injuries which resulted in her
death. Accordingly, a civil complaint for damages was filed with the RTC of
Vigan by petitioner Macario Tamargo, Jennifer's adopting parent, and
petitioner spouses Celso and Aurelia Tamargo, Jennifer's natural parents
against respondent spouses Victor and Clara Bundoc, Adelberto's natural
parents with whom he was living at the time of the tragic incident. In addition
to this case for damages, a criminal information or Homicide through
Reckless Imprudence was filed against Adelberto Bundoc. Adelberto,
however, was acquitted and exempted from criminal liability on the ground
that he had acted without discernment.
Prior to the incident, or on 10 December 1981, the spouses Sabas and
Felisa Rapisura had filed a petition to adopt the minor Adelberto Bundoc and
the same was granted on 18 November 1982, that is, after Adelberto had
shot and killed Jennifer.
Respondent spouses Bundoc, Adelberto's natural parents, reciting the result
of the foregoing petition for adoption, claimed that not they, but rather the
adopting parents, namely the spouses Sabas and Felisa Rapisura, were
indispensable parties to the action since parental authority had shifted to the
adopting parents from the moment the successful petition for adoption was
filed.
Petitioners contended that since Adelberto Bundoc was then actually living
with his natural parents, parental authority had not ceased nor been
relinquished by the mere filing and granting of a petition for adoption.
The trial court dismissed petitioners' complaint, ruling that respondent
natural parents of Adelberto indeed were not indispensable parties to the
action. Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration but the same was
denied. They then filed a notice of appeal with the trial court but was again
dismissed for being filed beyond the reglementary period.
Petitioners went to the Court of Appeals on a petition for mandamus and
certiorari questioning the trial court's Decision but the CA dismissed the
petition ruling that petitioners had lost their right to appeal.
Hence, this Petition for Review.
Petitioners contention: Respondent spouses Bundoc are the indispensable
parties to the action for damages caused by the acts of their minor child,
Adelberto Bundoc.

The father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are
responsible for the damages caused by the minor children who
live in their company.
The responsibility treated of in this Article shall cease when the
person herein mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence
of a good father of a family to prevent damage.
This principle of parental liability is a species of what is frequently
designated as vicarious liability, or the doctrine of "imputed
negligence" under Anglo-American tort law, where a person is not only
liable for torts committed by himself, but also for torts committed by
others with whom he has a certain relationship and for whom he is
responsible. Thus, parental liability is made a natural or logical
consequence of the duties and responsibilities of parents their
parental authority which includes the instructing, controlling and
disciplining of the child.
The basis for the doctrine of vicarious liability was explained by the Court in
Cangco v. Manila Railroad Co. in the following terms:
With respect to extra-contractual obligation arising from negligence,
whether of act or omission, it is competent for the legislature to elect
and our Legislature has so elected to limit such liability to cases
in which the person upon whom such an obligation is imposed is
morally culpable or, on the contrary, for reasons of public policy. to
extend that liability, without regard to the lack of moral culpability, so
as to include responsibility for the negligence of those persons whose
acts or omissions are imputable, by a legal fiction, to others who are
in a position to exercise an absolute or limited control over them. The
legislature which adopted our Civil Code has elected to limit extracontractual liability with certain well-defined exceptions to cases
in which moral culpability can be directly imputed to the persons to be
charged. This moral responsibility may consist in having failed to
exercise due care in one's own acts, or in having failed to exercise
due care in the selection and control of one's agent or servants, or in
the control of persons who, by reasons of their status, occupy a
position of dependency with respect to the person made liable for their
conduct.
The civil liability imposed upon parents for the torts of their minor children
living with them, may be seen to be based upon the parental authority
vested by the Civil Code upon such parents. The civil law assumes that
when an unemancipated child living with its parents commits a tortious acts,
the parents were negligent in the performance of their legal and natural duty
closely to supervise the child who is in their custody and control. Parental
liability is, in other words, anchored upon parental authority coupled with
presumed parental dereliction in the discharge of the duties accompanying
such authority. The parental dereliction is, of course, only presumed and the
presumption can be overtuned under Article 2180 of the Civil Code by proof
that the parents had exercised all the diligence of a good father of a family to
prevent the damage.

Issue:

Ruling:

In the instant case, the shooting of Jennifer by Adelberto with an air

rifle occured when parental authority was still lodged in respondent
Bundoc spouses, the natural parents of the minor Adelberto. It would
thus follow that the natural parents who had then actual custody of the
minor Adelberto, are the indispensable parties to the suit for damages.

It is not disputed that Adelberto Bundoc's voluntary act of shooting Jennifer

Tamargo with an air rifle gave rise to a cause of action on quasi-delict
against him. As Article 2176 of the Civil Code provides:
Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there
being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done.
Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual
relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict . . .

The natural parents of Adelberto, however, stoutly maintain that because a

decree of adoption was issued by the adoption court in favor of the Rapisura
spouses, parental authority was vested in the latter as adopting parents as
of the time of the filing of the petition for adoption that is, before Adelberto
had shot Jennifer which an air rifle. The Bundoc spouses contend that they
were therefore free of any parental responsibility for Adelberto's allegedly
tortious conduct.

Upon the other hand, the law imposes civil liability upon the father and, in
case of his death or incapacity, the mother, for any damages that may be
caused by a minor child who lives with them. Article 2180 of the Civil Code
reads:
The obligation imposed by article 2176 is demandable not only for
one's own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for
whom one is responsible.

The Court is not persuaded. As earlier noted, under the Civil Code, the basis
of parental liability for the torts of a minor child is the relationship existing
between the parents and the minor child living with them and over whom, the
law presumes, the parents exercise supervision and control.

Whether or not respondent spouses are indispensable parties to the action

for damages caused by the acts of their minor child. YES

The Supreme Court does not believe that parental authority is properly
regarded as having been retroactively transferred to and vested in the
adopting parents, the Rapisura spouses, at the time the air rifle
shooting happened. We do not consider that retroactive effect may be

11

giver to the decree of adoption so as to impose a liability upon the

adopting parents accruing at a time when adopting parents had no
actual or physically custody over the adopted child. Retroactive affect
may perhaps be given to the granting of the petition for adoption where such
is essential to permit the accrual of some benefit or advantage in favor of the
adopted child. In the instant case, however, to hold that parental authority
had been retroactively lodged in the Rapisura spouses so as to burden them
with liability for a tortious act that they could not have foreseen and which
they could not have prevented (since they were at the time in the United
States and had no physical custody over the child Adelberto) would be unfair
and unconscionable. Such a result, moreover, would be inconsistent with the
philosophical and policy basis underlying the doctrine of vicarious liability.
Put a little differently, no presumption of parental dereliction on the part of
the adopting parents, the Rapisura spouses, could have arisen since
Adelberto was not in fact subject to their control at the time the tort was
committed.

(
rationale
of
trial
court)
this article of the Code is not applicable to the case at bar, since this
contemplates the situation where the control or influence of the teachers and
heads of school establishments over the conduct and actions by the pupil
supersedes those of the parents.
CIVIL LAW: DAMAGES ART 2180. NEW CIVIL CODE CONSTRUED:
The clause "so long as they remain in their custody" contained in Article
2180 of the new civil code contemplated a situation where the pupil lives and
boards with the teacher, such that the control or influence on the pupil
supersedes those of the parents. In those circumstances the control or
influence over the conduct and actions of the pupil as well as the
responsibilities for their sort would pass from the father and mother to the
teachers. (Ciriaco L. Mercado, Petitioner vs. the Court of Appeals, Manuel
Quisumbing, Jr., et al., respondents, G.R. No. L-14862, May 30, 1960). 5
There is no evidence that the accused Daffon lived and boarded with his
teacher or the other defendant officials of the school. These defendants
cannot therefore be made responsible for the tort of the defendant Daffon.
Hence, this plaintiffs' appeal.

EN BANC G.R. No. L-29025 October 4, 1971

Spouses MOISES P. PALISOC and BRIGIDA P. PALISOC, plaintiffsappellants,
vs.
ANTONIO C. BRILLANTES and TEODOSIO V. VALENTON, owner and
President, respectively, of a school of arts and trades, known under the
name and style of "Manila Technical Institute" (M.I.T.), VIRGILIO L.
DAFFON and SANTIAGO M. QUIBULUE, defendants-appellees.
TEEHANKEE, J.:
Plaintiffs-appellants as parents of their sixteen-year old son, Dominador
Palisoc, and a student in automotive mechanics at the Manila Technical
Institute, Quezon Boulevard, Manila, had filed an action below for damages
arising from the death of their son at the hands of a fellow student,
defendant Virgilio L. Daffon, at the laboratory room of the said Institute. .
Defendants,
are:
Antonio C. Brillantes, at the time when the incident which gave rise to his
action occurred was a member of the Board of Directors of the institute;
Teodosio
Valenton,
the
president
thereof;
Santiago M. Quibulue, instructor of the class to which the deceased
belonged;
and
Virgilio L. Daffon, a fellow student of the deceased.
At the beginning the Manila Technical Institute was a single proprietorship,
but lately on August 2, 1962, it was duly incorporated."
Facts:
The deceased Dominador Palisoc and the defendant Virgilio L. Daffon were
classmates, and on the afternoon of March 10, 1966, between two and three
o'clock, they, together with another classmate Desiderio Cruz were in the
laboratory room located on the ground floor. At that time the classes were in
recess. Desiderio Cruz and Virgilio L. Daffon were working on a machine
while Dominador Palisoc was merely looking on at them. Daffon made a
remark to the effect that Palisoc was acting like a foreman. Because of this
remark Palisoc slapped slightly Daffon on the face. Daffon, in retaliation,
gave Palisoc a strong flat blow on the face, which was followed by other fist
blows on the stomach. Palisoc retreated apparently to avoid the fist blows,
but Daffon followed him and both exchanged blows until Palisoc stumbled on
an engine block which caused him to fall face downward. Palisoc became
pale and fainted. First aid was administered to him but he was not revived,
so he was immediately taken to a hospital. He never regained
consciousness; finally he died. The foregoing is the substance of the
testimony of Desiderio Cruz, the lone witness to the incident."
Trial court: Sentencing the defendant Virgilio L. Daffon to pay the plaintiffs as
heirs of the deceased Dominador Palisoc and absolved from liability the
three other defendants-officials of the Manila Technical Institute, in this wise:
It ruled that: Their liabilities are based on the provisions of Article 2180 of the
New Civil Code which reads:
Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be liable
for damages caused by their pupils and students and apprentices, so long
as they remain in their custody.

ISSUE: w/n the trial court erred in absolving the defendants-school officials
instead of holding them jointly and severally liable as tortfeasors, with
defendant Daffon, for the damages awarded them as a result of their son's
death. (YES)
RULING: appeal meritorious.
1. The lower court absolved defendants-school officials on the ground that
the provisions of Article 2180, Civil Code, which expressly hold "teachers or
heads of establishments of arts and trades ... liable for damages caused by
their pupils and students and apprentices, so long as they remain in their
custody," are not applicable to to the case at bar, since "there is no evidence
that the accused Daffon [who inflicted the fatal fistblows] lived and boarded
with his teacher or the other defendants-officials of the school. These
defendants cannot therefore be made responsible for the tort of the
defendant Daffon."
The lower court based its legal conclusion expressly on the Court's dictum in
Mercado vs. Court of Appeals, that "(I)t would seem that the clause "so long
as they remain in their custody," contemplates a situation where the pupil
lives and boards with the teacher, such that the control, direction and
influence on the pupil supersedes those of the parents. In these
circumstances the control or influence over the conduct and actions of the
pupil would pass from the father and mother to the teacher; and so would
the responsibility for the torts of the pupil. Such a situation does not appear
in the case at bar; the pupils appear to go to school during school hours and
go back to their homes with their parents after school is over." This dictum
had been made in rejecting therein petitioner father's contention that his
minor son's school, Lourdes Catholic School at Kanlaon, Quezon City [which
was not a party to the case] should be held responsible, rather than him as
father, for the moral damages of P2,000.00 adjudged against him for the
physical injury inflicted by his son on a classmate. [A cut on the right cheek
with a piece of razor which costs only P50.00 by way of medical expenses to
treat and cure, since the wound left no scar.] The moral damages award was
after all set aside by the Court on the ground that none of the specific cases
provided in Article 2219, Civil Code, for awarding moral damages had been
established, petitioner's son being only nine years old and not having been
shown to have "acted with discernment" in inflicting the injuries on his
classmate. .
The dictum in Mercado was based in turn on another dictum in the earlier
case of Exconde vs. Capuno, where the only issue involved as expressly
stated in the decision, was whether the therein defendant-father could be
civilly liable for damages resulting from a death caused in a motor vehicle
accident driven unauthorizedly and negligently by his minor son, (which
issue was resolved adversely against the father). Nevertheless, the dictum in
such earlier case that "It is true that under the law abovequoted, teachers or
directors of arts and trades are liable for any damage caused by their pupils
or apprentices while they are under their custody, but this provision only
applies to an institution of arts and trades and not to any academic
educational institution" was expressly cited and quoted in Mercado.
SC
ruled:
The lower court therefore erred in law in absolving defendants-school
officials on the ground that they could be held liable under Article 2180, Civil
Code, only if the student who inflicted the fatal fistblows on his classmate
and victim "lived and boarded with his teacher or the other defendants

12

officials of the school." As stated above, the phrase used in the cited article
"so long as (the students) remain in their custody" means the protective
and supervisory custody that the school and its heads and teachers exercise
over the pupils and students for as long as they are at attendance in the
school, including recess time. There is nothing in the law that requires that
for such liability to attach the pupil or student who commits the tortious act
must live and board in the school, as erroneously held by the lower court,
and the dicta in Mercado (as well as in Exconde) on which it relied, must
now be deemed to have been set aside by the present decision. .
2. The case at bar was instituted directly against the school officials and
squarely raises the issue of liability of teachers and heads of schools under
Article 2180, Civil Code, for damages caused by their pupils and students
against fellow students on the school premises. Here, the parents of the
student at fault, defendant Daffon, are not involved, since Daffon was
already of age at the time of the tragic incident. There is no question, either,
that the school involved is a non-academic school, the Manila Technical
Institute being admittedly a technical vocational and industrial school. .
Issue: w/n defendants head and teacher of the Manila Technical Institute
(defendants Valenton and Quibulue, respectively) are liable jointly and
severally for damages to plaintiffs-appellants for the death of the latter's
minor son at the hands of defendant Daffon at the school's laboratory room.
Ruling: Yes.
The rationale of such liability of school heads and teachers for the tortious
acts of their pupils and students, so long as they remain in their custody, is
that they stand, to a certain extent, as to their pupils and students, in loco
parentis and are called upon to "exercise reasonable supervision over the
conduct of the child."
This is expressly provided for in Articles 349, 350 and 352 of the Civil Code.
In the law of torts, the governing principle is that the protective custody of the
school heads and teachers is mandatorily substituted for that of the parents,
and hence, it becomes their obligation as well as that of the school itself to
provide proper supervision of the students' activities during the whole time
that they are at attendance in the school, including recess time, as well as to
take the necessary precautions to protect the students in their custody from
dangers and hazards that would reasonably be anticipated, including injuries
that some student themselves may inflict willfully or through negligence on
their fellow students. .
As tersely summarized by Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes in his dissenting opinion
in Exconde, "the basis of the presumption of negligence of Art. 1903 [now
2180] is some culpa in vigilando that the parents, teachers, etc. are
supposed to have incurred in the exercise of their authority" and "where the
parent places the child under the effective authority of the teacher, the latter,
and not the parent, should be the one answerable for the torts committed
while under his custody, for the very reason that the parent is not supposed
to interfere with the discipline of the school nor with the authority and
supervision of the teacher while the child is under instruction." The school
itself, likewise, has to respond for the fault or negligence of its school head
and teachers under the same cited article.
3. No liability attaches to defendant Brillantes as a mere member of the
school's board of directors. The school itself cannot be held similarly liable,
since it has not been properly impleaded as party defendant. While plaintiffs
sought to so implead it, by impleading improperly defendant Brillantes, its
former single proprietor, the lower court found that it had been incorporated
since August 2, 1962, and therefore the school itself, as thus incorporated,
should have been brought in as party defendant.

Decisive here is the touchstone provision of Article 2231, Civil Code, that "In
quasi-delicts, exemplary damages may be granted if the defendant acted
with gross negligence." No gross negligence on the part of defendants was
found by the trial court to warrant the imposition of exemplary damages, as
well as of interest and increased attorney's fees, and the Court has not been
shown in this appeal any compelling reason to disturb such finding. .
ACCORDINGLY, the judgment appealed from is modified so as to provide as
follows: .
1. Sentencing the defendants Virgilio L. Daffon, TeodosioV. Valenton and
Santiago M. Quibulue jointly and severally to pay plaintiffs as heirs of the
deceased Dominador Palisoc (a) P12,000.00 for the death of Dominador
Palisoc; (b) P3,375.00 for actual and compensatory expenses; (c) P5,000.00
for moral, damages; (d) P10,000.00 for loss of earning power and (e)
P2,000.00 for attorney's fee, plus the costs of this action in both instances; 2.
absolving defendant Antonio C. Brillantes from the complaint; and 3.
dismissing defendants' counterclaims. .

G.R. No. L-47745 April 15, 1988

JOSE S. AMADORA, et. al,petitioners
vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, et. al, respondents.
FACTS:
On April 13, 1972, Alfredo Amadora, while they were in the auditorium of
their school, the Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos, a classmate, Pablito
Daffon, fired a gun that mortally hit Alfredo, ending all his expectations and
his life as well. The victim was only seventeen years old.
Daffon was convicted of homicide thru reckless imprudence. Additionally, the
herein petitioners, as the victim's parents, filed a civil action for damages
under Article 2180 of the Civil Code against the Colegio de San JoseRecoletos, its rector the high school principal, the dean of boys, and the
physics teacher, together with Daffon and two other students, through their
respective parents. The complaint against the students was later dropped.
After trial, the Court of First Instance of Cebu held the remaining defendants
liable to the plaintiffs in the sum of P294,984.00, representing death
compensation, loss of earning capacity, costs of litigation, funeral expenses,
moral damages, exemplary damages, and attorney's fees . On appeal to the
respondent court, however, the decision was reversed and all the
defendants were completely absolved.
In its decision, the respondent court found that Article 2180 was not
applicable as the Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos was not a school of arts
and trades but an academic institution of learning. It also held that the
students were not in the custody of the school at the time of the incident as
the semester had already ended, that there was no clear identification of the
fatal gun and that in any event the defendant, had exercised the necessary
diligence in preventing the injury.
The petitioners contend that their son was in the school to show his physics
experiment as a prerequisite to his graduation; hence, he was then under
the custody of the private respondents. The private respondents submit that
Alfredo Amadora had gone to the school only for the purpose of submitting
his physics report and that he was no longer in their custody because the
semester had already ended.

Final Note:

ISSUE: Whether or not Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos, an academic

school, is liable under Article 2180 of the Civil Code for the tortuous act of its
students.

Defendants Valenton and Quibulue as president and teacher-in-charge of

the school must therefore be held jointly and severally liable for the quasidelict of their co-defendant Daffon in the latter's having caused the death of
his classmate, the deceased Dominador Palisoc. The unfortunate death
resulting from the fight between the protagonists-students could have been
avoided, had said defendants but complied with their duty of providing
adequate supervision over the activities of the students in the school
premises to protect their students from harm, whether at the hands of fellow
students or other parties. At any rate, the law holds them liable unless they
relieve themselves of such liability, in compliance with the last paragraph of
Article 2180, Civil Code, by "(proving) that they observed all the diligence of
a good father of a family to prevent damage." In the light of the factual
findings of the lower court's decision, said defendants failed to prove such
exemption from liability. .

RULING:
NO.
The Supreme Court also ruled that such liability does not cease when the
school year ends or when the semester ends. Liability applies whenever the
student is in the custody of the school authorities as long as he is under the
control and influence of the school and within its premises, whether the
semester has not yet begun or has already ended at the time of the
happening of the incident. As long as it can be shown that the student is in
the school premises in pursuance of a legitimate student objective, in the
exercise of a legitimate student right, and even in the enjoyment of a
legitimate student right, and even in the enjoyment of a legitimate student
privilege, the responsibility of the school authorities over the student
continues. Indeed, even if the student should be doing nothing more than
relaxing in the campus in the company of his classmates and friends and
enjoying the ambience and atmosphere of the school, he is still within the

13

custody and subject to the discipline of the school authorities under the
provisions of Article 2180.

Facts:

During all these occasions, it is obviously the teacher-in-charge who must

answer for his students' torts, in practically the same way that the parents
are responsible for the child when he is in their custody. The teacher-incharge is the one designated by the dean, principal, or other administrative
superior to exercise supervision over the pupils in the specific classes or
sections to which they are assigned. It is not necessary that at the time of
the injury, the teacher be physically present and in a position to prevent it.
Custody does not connote immediate and actual physical control but refers
more to the influence exerted on the child and the discipline instilled in him
as a result of such influence. Thus, for the injuries caused by the student, the
teacher and not the parent shag be held responsible if the tort was
committed within the premises of the school at any time when its authority
could be validly exercised over him.

Baguio Colleges Foundation (BCF) is an academic institution. Within the

premises of the BCF is an ROTC Unit, the Baguio Colleges Foundation
Reserve Officers Training Corps (ROTC) Unit, which is under the full control
of the Armed Forces of the Philippines. The Baguio Colleges Foundation
ROTC Unit had Jimmy B. Abon as its duly appointed armorer. As armorer of
the ROTC Unit, Jimmy B. Abon received his appointment from the AFP. Not
being an employee of the BCF, he also received his salary from the AFP, as
well as orders from Captain Roberto C. Ungos, the Commandant of the
Baguio Colleges Foundation ROTC Unit. Jimmy B. Abon was also a
commerce student of the BCF.

In any event, it should be noted that the liability imposed by this article is
supposed to fall directly on the teacher or the head of the school of arts and
trades and not on the school itself. If at all, the school, whatever its nature,
may be held to answer for the acts of its teachers or even of the head
thereof under the general principle ofrespondeat superior, but then it may
exculpate itself from liability by proof that it had exercised the diligence of
abonus
paterfamilias.
Such defense is, of course, also available to the teacher or the head of the
school of arts and trades directly held to answer for the tort committed by the
student. As long as the defendant can show that he had taken the necessary
precautions to prevent the injury complained of, he can exonerate himself
from the liability imposed by Article 2180, which also states that:
The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the Persons
herein mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a good father
of a family to prevent damages.
In this connection, it should be observed that the teacher will be held liable
not only when he is acting in loco parentis for the law does not require that
the offending student be of minority age. Unlike the parent, who wig be liable
only if his child is still a minor, the teacher is held answerable by the law for
the act of the student under him regardless of the student's age.
The Supreme Court however clarified that the school, whether academic or
not, should not be held directly liable. Its liability is only subsidiary.
At any rate, the REMEDY of the teacher, to avoid direct liability, and for the
school, to avoid subsidiary liability, is to show proof that he, the teacher,
exercised the necessary precautions to prevent the injury complained of,
and the school exercised the diligence of a bonus pater familias.
Finally, as previously observed, the Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos cannot
be held directly liable under the article because only the teacher or the head
of the school of arts and trades is made responsible for the damage caused
by the student or apprentice. Neither can it be held to answer for the tort
committed by any of the other private respondents for none of them has
been found to have been charged with the custody of the offending student
or has been remiss in the discharge of his duties in connection with such
custody.
NOTES:
For non-academic schools, it would be the principal or head of school who
should be directly liable for the tortuous act of its students. This is because
historically, in non-academic schools, the head of school exercised a closer
administration over their students than heads of academic schools. In short,
they are more hands on to their students.

On 3 March 1977, at around 8:00 p.m., in the parking space of BCF, Jimmy
B. Abon shot Napoleon Castro a student of the University of Baguio with an
unlicensed firearm which the former took from the armory of the ROTC Unit
of the BCF. As a result, Napoleon Castro died and Jimmy B. Abon was
prosecuted for, and convicted of the crime of Homicide by Military
Commission No. 30, AFP. Jimmy Abon was not attending any class or school
function at the time of the shooting incident.
Issue: W/N BCF can be held solidarity hable with Jimmy B. Abon for
damages under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, as a consequence of the
tortious act of Jimmy B. Abon.
Held:
Under the penultimate paragraph of Art. 2180 of the Civil Code, teachers or
heads of establishments of arts and trades are liable for "damages caused
by their pupils and students or apprentices, so long as they remain in their
custody." The phrase used in [Art. 2180 'so long as (the students) remain
in their custody means the protective and supervisory custody that the
school and its heads and teachers exercise over the pupils and students for
as long as they are at attendance in the school, including recess time.
In line with the case of Palisoc vs Brillantes, a student not "at attendance in
the school" cannot be in "recess" thereat. A "recess," as the concept is
embraced in the phrase "at attendance in the school," contemplates a
situation of temporary adjournment of school activities where the student still
remains within call of his mentor and is not permitted to leave the school
premises, or the area within which the school activity is conducted. Recess
by its nature does not include dismissal. 18 Likewise, the mere fact of being
enrolled or being in the premises of a school without more does not
constitute "attending school" or being in the "protective and supervisory
custody' of the school, as contemplated in the law.
Upon the foregoing considerations, we hold that Jimmy B. Abon cannot be
considered to have been "at attendance in the school," or in the custody of
BCF, when he shot Napoleon Castro. Logically, therefore, petitioners cannot
under Art. 2180 of the Civil Code be held solidarity liable with Jimmy B. Abon
for damages resulting from his acts.

For academic schools, it would be the teacher-in-charge who would be

directly liable for the tortuous act of the students and not the dean or the
head of school.
G.R. No. 143363
BENJAMIN SALVOSA and BAGUIO COLLEGES
FOUNDATION, petitioners,
vs.
THE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, EDUARDO B. CASTRO,
DIOMEDES B. CASTRO, VIRGINIA B. CASTRO and RODOLFO B.
CASTRO., respondents.

February 6, 2002

ST. MARY'S ACADEMY, petitioner,

vs.
WILLIAM CARPITANOS and LUCIA S. CARPITANOS, GUADA DANIEL,
JAMES DANIEL II, JAMES DANIEL, SR., and VIVENCIO
VILLANUEVA, respondents.
FACTS:

G.R. No. 70458 October 5, 1988

14

St. Mary conducted an enrolment drive and as part of this drive,

they campaign to different schools for prospective students. On that
fortunate day, one named Sherwin Carpitanos--student of St. Mary and part
of the campaign group went to a particular school with his classmates riding
in a mitsubishi jeepney owned by one named Vivencio Villanueva and driven
by his classmate who was a minor. Allegedly the latter droved the jeepney in
a reckless manner and as a result the jeepney turned turtle.
As a result Sherwin Carpitanos died due to
sustained from the accident

the injuries he

The lower court held St. Mary solidarily Liable under article 218
and 219 of the family code and the guardians of the minor driver and the
owner of the jeepney as subsudiarily liable. on appeal to CA the owner of the
jeepney was freed from liabilities.
ISSUE:

(1) WHETHER ST. MARY IS LIABLE - NO

(2) WHETHER VIVENCIO VILLANUEVA IS LIABLE -YES

1)
Under Article 218 of the Family Code, the following shall have
special parental authority over a minor child while under their supervision,
instruction or custody: (1) the school, its administrators and teachers; or (2)
the individual, entity or institution engaged in child care. This special parental
authority and responsibility applies to all authorized activities, whether inside
or outside the premises of the school, entity or institution. Thus, such
authority and responsibility applies to field trips, excursions and other affairs
of the pupils and students outside the school premises whenever authorized
by the school or its teachers.9
Under Article 219 of the Family Code, if the person under custody is a minor,
those exercising special parental authority are principally and solidarily liable
for damages caused by the acts or omissions of the unemancipated minor
while under their supervision, instruction, or custody.
However, for petitioner to be liable, there must be a finding that the act or
omission considered as negligent was the proximate cause of the
injury caused because the negligence must have a causal connection
to the accident.
"In order that there may be a recovery for an injury, however, it must be
shown that the injury for which recovery is sought must be the legitimate
consequence of the wrong done; the connection between the negligence
and the injury must be a direct and natural sequence of events, unbroken by
intervening efficient causes. In other words, the negligence must be the
proximate cause of the injury. And the proximate cause of an injury is
that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any
efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the result
would not have occurred."
In this case, the respondents failed to show that the negligence of petitioner
was the proximate cause of the death of the victim. The immediate cause
of the accident was not the negligence of petitioner or the reckless
driving of James Daniel II, but the detachment of the steering wheel
guide of the jeep.
Significantly, respondents did not present any evidence to show that the
proximate cause of the accident was the negligence of the school
authorities, or the reckless driving of James Daniel II. there was no evidence
that petitioner school allowed the minor James Daniel II to drive the jeep of
respondent Vivencio Villanueva. It was Ched Villanueva, grandson of
respondent Vivencio Villanueva, who had possession and control of the jeep.
He was driving the vehicle and he allowed James Daniel II, a minor, to drive
the jeep at the time of the accident.

petitioner St. Marys Academy was only a remote cause of the accident.
Between the remote cause and the injury, there intervened the
negligence of the minors parents or the detachment of the steering
wheel guide of the jeep.
Consequently, we find that petitioner likewise cannot be held liable for moral
damages in the amount of P500,000.00. Moral damages may be
recovered if they are the proximate result of the defendants wrongful
act or omission. In this case, the proximate cause of the accident was not
attributable to petitioner.
2)
Incidentally, there was no question that the registered owner of the
vehicle was respondent Villanueva. He never denied and in fact admitted
this fact. We have held that the registered owner of any vehicle, even if
not used for public service, would primarily be responsible to the
public or to third persons for injuries caused the latter while the vehicle
was being driven on the highways or streets." Hence, with the
overwhelming evidence presented by petitioner and the respondent Daniel
spouses that the accident occurred because of the detachment of the
steering wheel guide of the jeep, it is not the school, but the registered
owner of the vehicle who shall be held responsible for damages for the
death of Sherwin Carpitanos.

G.R. No. 182353

June 29, 2010

ST. JOSEPH'S COLLEGE, SR. JOSEPHINI AMBATALI, SFIC, and

ROSALINDA
TABUGO,
Petitioners,
vs.
JAYSON MIRANDA, represented by his father, RODOLFO S. MIRANDA,
Respondent.

(As per Sir Lamans instruction, please cross-reference this case with that of
St. Marys)

FACTS:

Inside St. Joseph Colleges [SJCs] premises, the class to which [respondent
Jayson Val Miranda] belonged was conducting a science experiment about
fusion of sulphur powder and iron fillings under the tutelage of [petitioner]
Rosalinda Tabugo, she being the subject teacher and employee of
[petitioner] SJC.

The adviser of [Jaysons] class is Estefania Abdan.

Tabugo left her class while it was doing the experiment without having
adequately secured it from any untoward incident or occurrence.

Hence, liability for the accident, whether caused by the negligence of the
minor driver or mechanical detachment of the steering wheel guide of the
jeep, must be pinned on the minors parents primarily. The negligence of

15

In the middle of the experiment, [Jayson], who was the assistant leader of
one of the class groups, checked the result of the experiment by looking into
the test tube with magnifying glass. The test tube was being held by one of
his group mates who moved it close and towards the eye of [Jayson]. At that
instance, the compound in the test tube spurted out and several particles of
which hit [Jaysons] eye and the different parts of the bodies of some of his
group mates. As a result thereof, [Jaysons] eyes were chemically burned,
particularly his left eye, for which he had to undergo surgery and had to
spend for his medication.

RULING:

The Court found no reason to depart from the uniform rulings of the lower
courts that petitioners were "negligent since they all failed to exercise the
required reasonable care, prudence, caution and foresight to prevent or
avoid injuries to the students."

On the other hand, [petitioners SJC, Sr. Josephini Ambatali, SFIC, and
Tabugo] alleged that [Jayson] and his classmates were given strict
instructions to follow the written procedure for the experiment and not to look
into the test tube until the heated compound had cooled off. [Jayson],
however, violated such instructions which led to the accident.

(1) Petitioners maintain that the proximate cause of Jaysons injury was his
own negligence in disregarding the instructions given by Tabugo prior to the
experiment and peeking into the test tube.

The parents of [Jayson], through counsel, wrote SJC a letter demanding that
it should shoulder all the medical expenses of [Jayson] that had been
incurred and will be incurred further arising from the accident caused by the
science experiment.

Petitioners invoked the ruling in St. Marys Academy v. Carpitanos which

absolved St. Marys Academy from liability for the untimely death of its
student during a school sanctioned activity, declaring that "the negligence of
petitioner St. Marys Academy was only a remote cause of the accident."

SJC explained that the school cannot accede to the demand because the
accident occurred by reason of [Jaysons] failure to comply with the written
procedure for the experiment.

The Court was not convinced.

Jaysons father, on jaysons behalf, sued petitioners for damages, due to

their sleepless nights, mental anguish and wounded feelings as a result of
their sons injury which was due to petitioners fault and failure to exercise
the degree of care and diligence incumbent upon each one of them. They
also contend that the school should be held liable for moral damages.

It affirmed the RTC ruling that the immediate cause of the accident was
not the negligence of [Jayson] when he curiously looked into the test
tube when the chemicals suddenly exploded which caused his injury,
but the sudden and unexpected explosion of the chemicals
independent of any intervening cause. [Petitioners] could have
prevented the mishap if they exercised a higher degree of care, caution
and foresight.

The RTC rendered judgment in favor of [Jayson] and against [petitioners

The court a quo correctly ruled that:

Petitioners appealed to the CA, however, the latter affirmed the ruling of the
RTC.

"All of the [petitioners] are equally at fault and are liable for negligence
because all of them are responsible for exercising the required
reasonable care, prudence, caution and foresight to prevent or avoid
injuries to the students. The individual [petitioners] are persons charged
with the teaching and vigilance over their students as well as the supervision
and ensuring of their well-being. Based on the facts presented before this
Court, these [petitioners] were remiss in their responsibilities and
lacking in the degree of vigilance expected of them.

ISSUE:

(1) Whether or not the proximate cause of jaysons injury was his alleged
contributory negligence which was in complete disregard of instructions
given prior to the experiment? NO

No evidence was presented to establish that [petitioner] Tabugo was inside

the classroom for the whole duration of the experiment. It was unnatural in
the ordinary course of events that [Jayson] was brought to the school clinic
for immediate treatment not by [petitioner] subject teacher Rosalinda Tabugo
but by somebody else.

(2) Whether or not Jayson is entitled to moral damages in the case at bar?
NO

16

Estefania Abdan is equally at fault as the subject adviser or

charge because she exercised control and supervision over
Tabugo and the students themselves. It was her obligation to
nothing would go wrong and that the science experiment
conducted safely and without any harm or injury to the students.

teacher in
[petitioner]
insure that
would be

[Petitioner] Sr. Josephini Ambatali is likewise culpable under the doctrine of

command responsibility because the other individual [petitioners] were
under her direct control and supervision. The negligent acts of the other
individual [petitioners] were done within the scope of their assigned tasks.

Article 218 of the Family Code, in relation to Article 2180 of the Civil Code,
bestows special parental authority on the following persons with the
corresponding obligation, thus:

Art. 218. The school, its administrators and teachers, or the individual, entity
or institution engaged in child care shall have special parental authority and
responsibility over the minor child while under their supervision, instruction or
custody.

Authority and responsibility shall apply to all authorized activities whether

inside or outside the premises of the school, entity or institution.
The defense of due diligence of a good father of a family raised by
[petitioner] St. Joseph College will not exculpate it from liability because it
has been shown that it was guilty of inexcusable laxity in the supervision of
its teachers and in the maintenance of what should have been a safe and
secured environment for conducting dangerous experiments.

[Petitioner] school is still liable for the wrongful acts of the teachers and
employees because it had full information on the nature of dangerous
science experiments but did not take affirmative steps to avert damage and
injury to students

Schools should not simply install safety reminders and distribute safety
instructional manuals but should provide protective gears and devices to
shield students from expected risks and anticipated dangers.

Ordinarily, the liability of teachers does not extend to the school or university
itself, although an educational institution may be held liable under the
principle of RESPONDENT SUPERIOR. It has also been held that the
liability of the employer for the [tortuous] acts or negligence of its employees
is primary and solidary, direct and immediate.

Petitioners make much of the fact that Tabugo specifically instructed her
students at the start of the experiment not to look into the heated test tube
before the compound had cooled off. Petitioners would allocate all liability
and place all blame for the accident on a twelve (12)-year-old student, herein
respondent Jayson.

Art. 2180. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for
ones own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is
responsible.

Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be liable

for damages caused by their pupils and students or apprentices, so long as
they remain in their custody.

Moreover, petitioners cannot simply deflect their negligence and liability by

insisting that petitioner Tabugo gave specific instructions to her science class
not to look directly into the heated compound.

Neither does our ruling in St. Marys preclude their liability in this case.
Unfortunately for petitioners, St. Marys is not in point. In that case,
respondents thereat admitted the documentary exhibits establishing that the
cause of the accident was a mechanical defect and not the recklessness of
the minor, James Daniel II, in driving the jeep. We held, thus:

Significantly, respondents did not present any evidence to show that the
proximate cause of the accident was the negligence of the school
authorities, or the reckless driving of James Daniel II.

x x x.
As found by both lower courts, the proximate cause of Jaysons injury
was the concurrent failure of petitioners to prevent the foreseeable
mishap that occurred during the conduct of the science experiment.
Petitioners were negligent by failing to exercise the higher degree of
care, caution and foresight incumbent upon the school, its
administrators and teachers.

Further, there was no evidence that petitioner school allowed the minor
James Daniel II to drive the jeep of respondent Vivencio Villanueva. It was
Ched Villanueva, grandson of respondent Vivencio Villanueva, who had
possession and control of the jeep. He was driving the vehicle and he
allowed James Daniel II, a minor, to drive the jeep at the time of the
accident.

17

Hence, liability for the accident, whether caused by the negligence of the
minor driver or mechanical detachment of the steering wheel guide of the
jeep, must be pinned on the minors parents primarily. The negligence of
petitioner St. Marys Academy was only a remote cause of the accident.
Between the remote cause and the injury, there intervened the negligence of
the minors parents or the detachment of the steering wheel guide of the
jeep.

(2) The Court held that the proximate cause of [Jaysons] injury was the
explosion of the heated compound independent of any efficient intervening
cause, however, [Jayson] is partly responsible for his own injury, hence, he
should not be entitled to recover damages in full but must likewise
bear the consequences of his own negligence. [Petitioners], therefore,
should be held liable only for the damages actually caused by their
negligence.

Given the foregoing ruling, the SC affirmed the lower courts award of actual
and moral damages, and grant of attorneys fees.

G.R. No. 84698 February 4, 1992

PHILIPPINE SCHOOL OF BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION, JUAN D. LIM,
BENJAMIN P. PAULINO, ANTONIO M. MAGTALAS, COL. PEDRO
SACRO and LT. M. SORIANO, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, HON. REGINA ORDOEZ-BENITEZ, in her
capacity as Presiding Judge of Branch 47, Regional Trial Court, Manila,
SEGUNDA R. BAUTISTA and ARSENIA D. BAUTISTA, respondents.

FACTS: Carlitos Bautista was a third year student at the Philippine School of
Business Administration. Assailants, who were not members of the schools
academic community, while in the premises of PSBA, stabbed Bautista to
death. This incident prompted his parents to file a suit against PSBA and its
corporate officers for damages due to their alleged negligence, recklessness
and lack of security precautions, means and methods before, during and
after the attack on the victim.
The defendants filed a motion to dismiss, claiming that the compliant states
no cause of action against them based on quasi-delicts, as the said rule
does not cover academic institutions. The trial court denied the motion to
dismiss. Their motion for reconsideration was likewise dismissed, and was
affirmed by the appellate court. Hence, the case was forwarded to the
Supreme Court.
ISSUE: Whether or not PSBA is liable for the death of the student.
RULING: Because the circumstances of the present case evince a
contractual relation between the PSBA and Carlitos Bautista, the rules on
quasi-delict do not really govern. A perusal of Article 2176 shows that
obligations arising from quasi-delicts or tort, also known as extra-contractual
obligations, arise only between parties not otherwise bound by contract,
whether express or implied. However, this impression has not prevented this
Court from determining the existence of a tort even when there obtains a
contract.

Article 2180, in conjunction with Article 2176 of the Civil Code, establishes
the rule in in loco parentis. Article 2180 provides that the damage should
have been caused or inflicted by pupils or students of the educational
institution sought to be held liable for the acts of its pupils or students while
in its custody. However, this material situation does not exist in the present
case for, as earlier indicated, the assailants of Carlitos were not students of
the PSBA, for whose acts the school could be made liable. But it does not
necessarily follow that PSBA is absolved form liability.
When an academic institution accepts students for enrollment, there is
established a contract between them, resulting in bilateral obligations
which both parties is bound to comply with. For its part, the school
undertakes to provide the student with an education that would presumably
suffice to equip him with the necessary tools and skills to pursue higher
education or a profession. This includes ensuring the safety of the students
while in the school premises. On the other hand, the student covenants to
abide by the school's academic requirements and observe its rules and
regulations.
In the circumstances obtaining in the case at bar, however, there is, as yet,
no finding that the contract between the school and Bautista had been
breached thru the former's negligence in providing proper security
measures. This would be for the trial court to determine. And, even if there
be a finding of negligence, the same could give rise generally to a breach of
contractual obligation only. Using the test of Cangco, supra, the negligence
of the school would not be relevant absent a contract. In fact, that
negligence becomes material only because of the contractual relation
between PSBA and Bautista. In other words, a contractual relation is a
condition sine qua nonto the school's liability. The negligence of the school
cannot exist independently of the contract, unless the negligence occurs
under the circumstances set out in Article 21 of the Civil Code.

MAXIMINO SOLIMAN, JR., represented by his judicial guardian

VIRGINIA C. SOLIMAN, petitioner,
vs.
HON. JUDGE RAMON TUAZON, Presiding Judge of Branch LXI,
Regional Trial Court of Region III, Angeles City, and the REPUBLIC
CENTRAL COLLEGES, represented by its President, respondents.
FACTS:
Petitioner Soliman, Jr. filed a civil complaint for damages against private
respondent Republic Central Colleges ("Colleges"), the R.L. Security Agency
Inc. and one Jimmy B. Solomon, a security guard, as defendants.
Herein petitioner minor was in the campus ground of defendant school when
he was shoot with a revolver by the security guard, Solomon.
Solomon is employed by R.L. SECURITY AGENCY, INC., headed by Mr.
Benjamin Serrano.
Private respondent argued that it is free from any liability for the injuries
sustained by petitioner student for the reason that private respondent school
was not the employer of the security guard charged, Jimmy Solomon, and
hence was not responsible for any wrongful act of Solomon. Private
respondent school further argued that Article 2180, 7th paragraph, of the
Civil Code did not apply, since said paragraph holds teachers and heads of
establishment of arts and trades liable for damages caused by their pupils
and students or apprentices, while security guard Jimmy Solomon was not a
pupil, student or apprentice of the school.
RTC: dismissed the case; holding that security guard Jimmy Solomon was
not an employee of the school which accordingly could not be held liable for
his acts or omissions.
ISSUE:

18

WON respondent school is liable under Art. 2180. NO, but the SC held that
the school is not entirely without liability

peace and order within the campus premises and to prevent the
breakdown thereof.

RULING:

However, a contractual relation is a condition sine qua non to the

school's liability. The negligence of the school cannot exist
independently of the contract, unless the negligence occurs under
the circumstances set out in Article 21 of the Civil Code.

There being no employer-employee relationship between the Colleges and

Jimmy Solomon, petitioner student cannot impose vicarious liability upon the
Colleges for the acts of security guard Solomon.
The employer of Jimmy Solomon was the R.L. Security Agency Inc., while
the school was the client or customer of the R.L. Security Agency Inc. It is
settled that where the security agency, as here, recruits, hires and
assigns the work of its watchmen or security guards, the agency is the
employer of such guards or watchmen. 2 Liability for illegal or harmful
acts committed by the security guards attaches to the employer
agency, and not to the clients or customers of such agency. 3
As a general rule, a client or customer of a security agency has no hand in
selecting who among the pool of security guards or watchmen employed by
the agency shall be assigned to it; the duty to observe the diligence of a
good father of a family in the selection of the guards cannot, in the ordinary
course of events, be demanded from the client whose premises or property
are protected by the security guards. The fact that a client company may
give instructions or directions to the security guards assigned to it, does not,
by itself, render the client responsible as an employer of the security guards
concerned and liable for their wrongful acts or omissions. Those instructions
or directions are ordinarily no more than requests commonly envisaged in
the contract for services entered into with the security agency.
Since there is no question that Jimmy Solomon was not a pupil or student or
an apprentice of the Colleges, he being in fact an employee of the R.L.
Security Agency Inc., the other above-quoted paragraph of Article 2180 of
the Civil Code is similarly not available for imposing liability upon the
Republic Central Colleges for the acts or omissions of Jimmy Solomon.
Persons exercising substitute parental authority are made responsible for
damage inflicted upon a third person by the child or person subject to such
substitute parental authority. In the instant case, as already noted, Jimmy
Solomon who committed allegedly tortious acts resulting in injury to
petitioner, was not a pupil, student or apprentice of the Republic Central
Colleges; the school had no substitute parental authority over Solomon.
HOWEVER, the school cannot escape liability.
The SC cited the case of Philippine School of Business Administration
(PSBA) v. Court of Appeals:
When an academic institution accepts students for enrollment,
there is established a contract between them, resulting in bilateral
obligations which parties are bound to comply with. For its part, the
school undertakes to provide the student with an education that would
presumably suffice to equip him with the necessary tools and skills to
pursue higher education or a profession. On the other hand, the student
covenants to abide by the school's academic requirements and observe
its rules and regulations.
Institutions of learning must also meet the implicit or "built-in" obligation
of providing their students with an atmosphere that promotes or assists
in attaining its primary undertaking of imparting knowledge. Certainly,
no student can absorb the intricacies of physics or higher mathematics
or explore the realm of the arts and other sciences when bullets are
flying or grenades exploding in the air or where there looms around the
school premises a constant threat to life and limb. Necessarily, the
school must ensure that adequate steps are taken to maintain

As PSBA, however, states, acts which are tortious or allegedly tortious in

character may at the same time constitute breach of a contractual, or other
legal, obligation. Respondent trial judge was in serious error when he
supposed that petitioner could have no cause of action other than one based
on Article 2180 of the Civil Code. Respondent trial judge should not have
granted the motion to dismiss but rather should have, in the interest of
justice, allowed petitioner to prove acts constituting breach of an
obligation ex contractu or ex lege on the part of respondent Colleges.
This case is REMANDED to the court a quo for further proceedings
consistent with this Resolution.

G.R. No. L-1120

August 31, 1948
INOCENCIO ROSETE, petitioner, vs.
respondent.

THE

AUDITOR

GENERAL,

Facts:
This is an appeal from the decision of the Insular Auditor denying the claim
of Inocencio Rosete and others against the Government in the amount of
P35,376, for damages caused to buildings belonging to the claimant, which
according to the appellant's claim were destroyed by fire that came from the
contiguous warehouse of the Emergency Control Administration, ECA,
located at No. 2262 Azcarraga, due to the negligence of a certain Jose
Frayno y Panlilio in igniting recklessly his cigarette-lighter near a five gallon
drum into which gasoline was being drained, and of the officers of the said
ECA, which is an office or agency of the Government, in storing gasoline in
said warehouse contrary to the provisions of Ordinances of the City of
Manila.
Petitioners Contention: The Auditor General erred in not finding that the
government agency or instrumentality known as the Emergency Control
Administration of the officers thereof, were guilty of negligence in storing a
highly combustible and inflammable substance in its warehouse on bodega
in Manila in violation of City Ordinances, and therefore the government is
liable for the damages sustained by the claimant under article 1903 of the
Civil Code, which in its pertinent part reads as follows:
ART. 1903. The obligation imposed by the preceding article is
enforceable not only for personal acts and omissions but also for
those persons for whom another is responsible.
xxx
The state is liable in the scene when it acts through a special
agent, but not when the damage should have been caused by the
official to whom it properly pertained to do the act performed, in
which case the provisions of the preceding article shall be
applicable.
Issue:
Whether or not the Insular Auditor erred in denying or dismissing the
appellant's claim against the government. -NO
Ruling:
The obligation to indemnify for damages which a third person causes to
another by his fault or negligence is based, as is evidenced by the same

19

Law 3, Title 15, Partida 7, on that the person obligated, by his own fault or
negligence, takes part in the act or omission of the third party who caused
the damage. It follows therefrom that the state, by virtue of such
provisions of law, is not responsible for the damage suffered by private
individuals in consequence of acts performed by its employees in the
discharge of the functions pertaining to their office, because neither
fault nor even negligence can be presumed on the part of the state in
the organization of branches of the public service and the appointment
of its agents; on the contrary, we must presuppose all foresight humanly
possible on its part in order that each branch of service serves the general
weal and that of private persons interested in its operation. Between these
latter and the state, therefore, no relations of a private nature governed by
the civil law can arise except in a case where the state acts as a judicial
person capable of acquiring rights and contracting obligations.
The responsibility of the state is limited by article 1903 to the case wherein it
acts through a special agent (and a special agent, in the sense in which
these words are employed, is one who receives a definite and fixed order or
commission, foreign to the exercise of the duties of his office if he is a
special official) so that in representation of the state and being bound to act
as an agent thereof, he executes the trust confided to him. This concept
does not apply to any executive agent who is an employee of the active
administration and who on his own responsibility performs the
functions which are inherent in and naturally pertain to his office and
which are regulated by law and the regulations.
There being no showing that whatever negligence may be imputed to
the Emergency Control Administration or its officers, was done by an
special agent, because the officers of the Emergency Control
Administration did not act as special agents of the government within
the above defined meaning of that word in article 1903 of the Civil Code
in storing gasoline in warehouse of the ECA, the government is not
responsible for the damages caused through such negligence.
The decision appealed from is affirmed.

G.R. No. 74431 November 6, 1989

PURITA MIRANDA VESTIL and AGUSTIN VESTIL, petitioners, vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, DAVID UY and TERESITA UY,
respondents.
CRUZ, J.:
Little Theness Tan Uy was dead at the age of three. She was bitten by a dog
of the petitioner while she was playing with a child of the petitioners in the
house of the late Vicente Miranda, the father of Purita Vestil. She was
rushed to the Cebu General Hospital, where she was treated for "multiple
lacerated wounds on the forehead and administered an anti-rabies vaccine.
She was discharged after nine days but was readmitted one week later due
to "vomiting of saliva." The following day, on August 15, 1975, the child died.
The cause of death was certified as broncho-pneumonia.
Uys sued for damages, alleging that the Vestils were liable to them as the
possessors of "Andoy," the dog that bit and eventually killed their daughter.
The Vestils rejected the charge, insisting that the dog belonged to the
deceased Vicente Miranda, that it was a tame animal, and that in any case
no one had witnessed it bite Theness.
CFI: dismissed the complaint.
CA: It found that the Vestils were in possession of the house and the dog
and so should be responsible under Article 2183 of the Civil Code for the
injuries caused by the dog. Accordingly, the Vestils were ordered to pay the
Uys damages in the amount of P30,000.00 for the death of Theness,
P12,000.00 for medical and hospitalization expenses, and P2,000.00 as
attorney's fees.
Hence, the petition.
ISSUE: W/N petitioners are liable for the death of the child? Yes
What must be determined is the possession of the dog that admittedly was
staying in the house in question, regardless of the ownership of the dog or of
the house.
HELD:

Article 2183. The possessor of an animal or whoever may make use of the
same is responsible for the damage which it may cause, although it may
escape or be lost. 'This responsibility shall cease only in case the damages
should come from force majeure from the fault of the person who has
suffered damage.
While it is true that Purita is not really the owner of the house, which was still
part of Vicente Miranda's estate, there is no doubt that she and her husband
were its possessors at the time of the incident in question. She was the only
heir residing in Cebu City and the most logical person to take care of the
property, which was only six kilometers from her own house. Moreover, there
is evidence showing that she and her family regularly went to the house,
once or twice weekly, according to at least one witness, and used it virtually
as a second house. Interestingly, her own daughter was playing in the house
with Theness when the little girl was bitten by the dog. The dog itself
remained in the house even after the death of Vicente Miranda in 1973 and
until 1975, when the incident in question occurred. It is also noteworthy that
the petitioners offered to assist the Uys with their hospitalization expenses
although Purita said she knew them only casually.
The petitioners also argue that even assuming that they were the
possessors of the dog that bit Theness there was no clear showing that she
died as a result thereof. On the contrary, the death certificate declared that
she died of broncho-pneumonia, which had nothing to do with the dog bites
for which she had been previously hospitalized. The Court need not involve
itself in an extended scientific discussion of the causal connection between
the dog bites and the certified cause of death except to note that, first,
Theness developed hydrophobia, a symptom of rabies, as a result of the dog
bites, and second, that asphyxia broncho-pneumonia, which ultimately
caused her death, was a complication of rabies.
We also reiterate our ruling in Sison v. Sun Life Assurance Company of
Canada, that the death certificate is not conclusive proof of the cause of
death but only of the fact of death. Indeed, the evidence of the child's
hydrophobia is sufficient to convince us that she died because she was
bitten by the dog even if the death certificate stated a different cause of
death.
The petitioner's contention that they could not be expected to exercise
remote control of the dog is not acceptable. In fact, Article 2183 of the Civil
Code holds the possessor liable even if the animal should "escape or be
lost" and so be removed from his control. And it does not matter either that,
as the petitioners also contend, the dog was tame and was merely provoked
by the child into biting her. The law does not speak only of vicious animals
but covers even tame ones as long as they cause injury. As for the alleged
provocation, the petitioners forget that Theness was only three years old at
the time she was attacked and can hardly be faulted for whatever she might
have done to the animal.
According to Manresa the obligation imposed by Article 2183 of the Civil
Code is not based on the negligence or on the presumed lack of vigilance of
the possessor or user of the animal causing the damage. It is based on
natural equity and on the principle of social interest that he who possesses
animals for his utility, pleasure or service must answer for the damage which
such animal may cause.
We sustain the findings of the Court of Appeals and approve the monetary
awards except only as to the medical and hospitalization expenses, which
are reduced to P2,026.69, as prayed for in the complaint. While there is no
recompense that can bring back to the private respondents the child they
have lost, their pain should at least be assuaged by the civil damages to
which they are entitled.
WHEREFORE, the challenged decision is AFFIRMED as above modified.

G.R. No. L-9010 March 28, 1914

J. H. CHAPMAN, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
JAMES M. UNDERWOOD, defendant-appellee.
MORELAND, J.:
FACTS:
The facts of the case took place in the 1910s. J.H. Chapman visited a friend
in Santa Ana and while he was about to ride a vehicle to take him home he
was struck by a car owned by James Underwood and driven by his
chauffeur. Chapman was on the correct lane. Underwood was riding in the

20

car when the incident happened. Apparently, the chauffeur, coming from the
opposite direction and was driving straight ahead and when the automobile
about to be boarded by Chapman was in front of him, he [the chauffeur]
instead of swerving left he suddenly swerved right to the direction of
Chapman thereby hitting and running over him.

accident Marcial Caedo and several members of his family were injured they
filed this suit for recovery of damages from Yu Khe Thai and Rafael
Bernardo.

The judgment of the trial court was for defendant.

Issue: W/N Rafael Bernardos employer, Yu Khe Thai, is solidarily liable with
him.

ISSUE: Whether or not Underwood is liable for the negligent act of his
chauffeur.

Held: His employer solidarily liable with him.

RULING:
NO.
A careful examination of the record leads us to the conclusion that the
defendant's driver was guilty of negligence in running upon and over the
plaintiff. He was passing an oncoming car upon the wrong side. The plaintiff,
in common out to board the car, was not obliged, for his own protection, to
observe whether a car was coming upon him from his left hand. He had only
to guard against those coming from the right. He knew that, according to the
law of the road, no automobile or other vehicle coming from his left should
pass upon his side of the car. He needed only to watch for cars coming from
his right, as they were the only ones under the law permitted to pass upon
that side of the street car.
The defendant, however, is not responsible for the negligence of his driver,
under the facts and circumstances of this case. As we have said in the case
of Johnson vs. David (5 Phil. Rep., 663), the driver does not fall within the
list of persons in article 1903 of the Civil Code for whose acts the defendant
would be responsible.
Although in the David case the owner of the vehicle was not present at the
time the alleged negligent acts were committed by the driver, the same rule
applies where the owner is present, unless the negligent act of the driver are
continued for such a length of time as to give the owner a reasonable
opportunity to observe them and to direct his driver to desist therefrom. An
owner who sits in his automobile, or other vehicle, and permits his driver to
continue in a violation of the law by the performance of negligent acts, after
he has had a reasonable opportunity to observe them and to direct that the
driver cease therefrom, becomes himself responsible for such acts.
On the other hand, if the driver, by a sudden act of negligence, and without
the owner having a reasonable opportunity to prevent the acts or its
continuance, injures a person or violates the criminal law, the owner of the
automobile, although present therein at the time the act was committed, is
not responsible, either civilly or criminally, therefor.
In the case before us it does not appear from the record that, from the time
the automobile took the wrong side of the road to the commission of the
injury, sufficient time intervened to give the defendant an opportunity to
correct the act of his driver. Instead, it appears with fair clearness that the
interval between the turning out to meet and pass the street car and the
happening of the accident was so small as not to be sufficient to charge
defendant with the negligence of the driver.

MARCIAL T. CAEDO, et.al., plaintiffs-appellants, vs. YU KHE THAI and

RAFAEL BERNARDO, defendants-appellants.

G.R. No. L-20392. December 18, 1968

Facts:
Marcial Caedo, with his family, was driving his Mercury car to the airport.
Coming from the opposite direction was the Cadillac of Yu Khe Thai, with his
driver Rafael Bernardo at the wheel. Ahead of the Cadillac, going in the
same direction, was a carretela owned by a certain Pedro Bautista.
Bernardo, instead of slowing down or stopping altogether behind the
carretela until that lane was clear, veered to the left in order to pass. As he
did so the curved end of the Cadillacs right rear bumper caught the forward
rim of the carretela's left wheel wrenching it off and carrying it along as the
car skidded obliquely to the other lane, where it collided with the oncoming
vehicle, the Mercury driven by Caedo. It was found out that the collision was
directly traceable on Rafael Bernardo's negligence. As a result of a vehicular

ART. 2184.
In motor vehicle mishaps, the owner is solidarily liable
with his driver, if the former, who was in the vehicle, could have, by the use
of due diligence, prevented the misfortune. It is disputably presumed that
driver was negligent, if he has been found guilty of reckless driving or
violating traffic regulations at least twice within the next preceding two
months."
Under the foregoing provision, if the causative factor was the driver's
negligence, the owner of the vehicle who was present is likewise held liable
if he could have prevented the mishap by the exercise of due diligence. In
Chapman vs. Underwood (1914) 27 Phil. 374, the Supreme Court held:
". . . An owner who sits in his automobile, or other vehicle, and permits his
driver to continue in a violation of the law by the performance of negligent
acts, after he has had a reasonable opportunity to observe them and to
direct that the driver cease therefrom, becomes himself responsible for such
acts.
The basis of the master's liability in civil law is not respondeat superior but
rather the relationship of pater familias. The theory is that ultimately the
negligence of the servant, if known to the master and susceptible of timely
correction by him, reflects his own negligence if he fails to correct it in order
to prevent injury or damage.

G.R. No. 61516 March 21, 1989

FLORENTINA A. GUILATCO, petitioner,
vs.
CITY OF DAGUPAN, and the HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS, respondents.
Florentina Guilatco was about to board a tricycle at a sidewalk
located at Perez Blvd. (a national road) when she accidentally fell into an
open manhole which was partially covered by a concrete flowerpot and
leaving a gaping hole. Her right leg was fractured, resulting in her
hospitalization and continuing difficulty in locomotion. Because of her
accident, Guilatco was unable to go to work, thereby losing her income. She
also lost weight, and she is now no longer her former jovial self since she is
unable to perform her religious, social, and other activities. She filed an
action for damages against the City of Dagupan.
The City of Dagupan denied liability on the ground that the
manhole was located on a national road, which was not under the control or
supervision of the City of Dagupan thru the City Engineer.
ISSUE:

WHETHER THE CITY OF DAGUPAN IS LIABLE TO GUILATCO.

HELD:
Yes, the City of Dagupan is liable. For Article 2189 to apply, it is
not necessary for the defective road or street to belong to the province,
city or municipality. The article only requires that either control or
supervision is exercised over the defective road or street. In this case,
this control or supervision is provided for in the charter of Dagupan and is
exercised through the City Engineer, whose duties include the care and
custody of the public system of waterworks and sewers. The charter of
Dagupan provides that the laying out, construction, and improvement of

21

streets, avenues, and alleys and sidewalks and the regulation of the use
thereof may be legislated by the Municipal Board. Thus, the charter clearly
indicates that the city indeed has supervision and control over the sidewalk
where the open drainage hole is located.
There is, therefore, no doubt that the City Engineer exercises
control or supervision over the public works in question. Hence, the liability
of the city to the petitioner under article 2198 of the Civil Code is clear.
ON DAMAGES:
Be all that as it may, the actual damages awarded to the petitioner in the
amount of P 10,000.00 should be reduced to the proven expenses of P
8,053.65 only. The trial court should not have rounded off the amount. In
determining actual damages, the court can not rely on "speculation,
conjecture or guess work" as to the amount. Without the actual proof of loss,
the award of actual damages becomes erroneous.
Moral damages may be awarded even without proof of pecuniary loss,
inasmuch as the determination of the amount is discretionary on the court.
Though incapable of pecuniary estimation, moral damages are in the nature
of an award to compensate the claimant for actual injury suffered but which
for some reason can not be proven. However, in awarding moral damages,
the following should be taken into consideration:

G.R. No. 150304

June 15, 2005

QUEZON CITY GOVERNMENT and Engineer RAMIR J. TIAMZON,

Petitioners,
vs.
FULGENCIO DACARA*, Respondent.

FACTS:

Fulgencio Dacara, Jr., while driving, rammed into a pile of earth/street

diggings found at Matahimik St., Quezon City, which was then being repaired
by the Quezon City government. As a result, Dacara Jr. sustained bodily
injuries and the vehicle he was driving suffered extensive damage.

(1) First, the proximate cause of the injury must be the claimee's acts.
(2) Second, there must be compensatory or actual damages as
satisfactory proof of the factual basis for damages.

Indemnification was sought from the city government which however, yielded
negative results.

(3) Third, the award of moral damages must be predicated on any of

the cases enumerated in the Civil Code.
In the case at bar, the physical suffering and mental anguish suffered by the
petitioner were proven. Witnesses from the petitioner's place of work testified
to the degeneration in her disposition-from being jovial to depressed. She
refrained from attending social and civic activities.
Nevertheless the award of moral damages at P 150,000.00 is excessive. Her
handicap was not permanent and disabled her only during her treatment
which lasted for one year. Though evidence of moral loss and anguish
existed to warrant the award of damages, the moderating hand of the law is
called for. The Court has time and again called attention to the reprehensible
propensity of trial judges to award damages without basis, resulting in
exhorbitant amounts. The amount of moral damages should be reduced to P
20,000.00 based on jurisprudence.
As for the award of exemplary damages, the trial court correctly pointed
out the basis:
To serve as an example for the public good, it is high time that the
Court, through this case, should serve warning to the city or cities
concerned to be more conscious of their duty and responsibility to their
constituents, especially when they are engaged in construction work or
when there are manholes on their sidewalks or streets which are
uncovered, to immediately cover the same, in order to minimize or
prevent accidents to the poor pedestrians.
Too often in the zeal to put up "public impact" projects such as beautification
drives, the end is more important than the manner in which the work is
carried out. Because of this obsession for showing off, such trivial details as
misplaced flower pots betray the careless execution of the projects, causing
public inconvenience and inviting accidents.

Consequently, Dacara Jr.s father, Fulgencio P. Dacara (hereinafter referred

to as FULGENCIO), for and in behalf of his minor son, filed a Complaint for
damages against the Quezon City and Engr. Ramir Tiamzon, as defendants,
before the RTC in Quezon City and prayed that the amount of not less than
P20,000.00 actual or compensatory damages, P150,000.00 moral damages,
P30,000.00 exemplary damages, and P20,000.00 attorney's fees and costs
of the suit be awarded to him.

In petitioners answer, they alleged that they exercised due care by providing
the area of the diggings all necessary measures to avoid any accident, it
being barricaded with reflectorized traffic paint which was visible during the
incident. The respondents claimed that it was Fulgencio Dacara, Jr.s
negligence and failure to exercise due care which caused him to fall in the
diggings.

The RTC rendered its Decision in favor of the respondent.

Petitioners appealed to the CA, however, the latter agreed with the RTC's
finding that the petitioners' negligence was the proximate cause of the
damage suffered by respondent.

ISSUES:

22

(1) Whether or not the petitioners were negligent in the case at bar? YES

(2) Whether or not the respondent is entitled to moral damages in the case
at bar? NO

(3) Whether or not the respondent is entitled to exemplary damages? YES

RULING:

danger known or reasonably anticipated, the greater is the degree of care

required to be observed.

xxxxxxxxx

The provisions of Article 2189 of the New Civil Code capsulizes the
responsibility of the city government relative to the maintenance of roads
and bridges since it exercises the control and supervision over the same.
Failure of the defendant to comply with the statutory provision found in the
subject-article is tantamount to negligence per se which renders the City
government liable. Harsh application of the law ensues as a result thereof
but the state assumed the responsibility for the maintenance and repair of
the roads and bridges and neither exception nor exculpation from liability
would deem just and equitable.

(1) Negligence

Proximate cause is defined as any cause that produces injury in a

natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient
intervening cause, such that the result would not have occurred
otherwise. Proximate cause is determined from the facts of each case,
upon a combined consideration of logic, common sense, policy and
precedent.

Both the trial and the appellate courts' findings, which are amply
substantiated by the evidence on record, clearly point to petitioners'
negligence as the proximate cause of the damages suffered by
respondent's car. No adequate reason has been given to overturn this
factual conclusion.

(2) Moral Damages

That the negligence of petitioners was the proximate cause of the accident
was aptly discussed in the lower court's finding, which we quote:

Facts obtaining in this case are crystal clear that the accident of February
28, 1988 which caused almost the life and limb of Fulgencio Dacara, Jr.
when his car turned turtle was the existence of a pile of earth from a digging
done relative to the base failure at Matahimik Street nary a lighting device or
a reflectorized barricade or sign perhaps which could have served as an
adequate warning to motorist especially during the thick of the night where
darkness is pervasive.

Contrary to the testimony of the witnesses for the defense that there were
signs, gasera which was buried so that its light could not be blown off by the
wind and barricade, none was ever presented to stress the point that
sufficient and adequate precautionary signs were placed at Matahimik
Street. If indeed signs were placed thereat, how then could it be explained
that according to the report even of the policeman which for clarity is quoted
again, none was found at the scene of the accident.

Petitioners argue that moral damages are recoverable only in the instances
specified in Article 2219 of the Civil Code. Although the instant case is an
action for quasi-delict, petitioners contend that moral damages are not
recoverable, because no evidence of physical injury were presented before
the trial court.

To award moral damages, a court must be satisfied with proof of the

following requisites: (1) an injury -- whether physical, mental, or
psychological -- clearly sustained by the claimant; (2) a culpable act or
omission factually established; (3) a wrongful act or omission of the
defendant as the proximate cause of the injury sustained by the
claimant; and (4) the award of damages predicated on any of the cases
stated in Article 2219.

Article 2219(2) specifically allows moral damages to be recovered for quasidelicts, provided that the act or omission caused physical injuries. There can
be no recovery of moral damages unless the quasi-delict resulted in physical
injury.

xxxxxxxxx

Negligence of a person whether natural or juridical over a particular set of

events is transfixed by the attending circumstances so that the greater the

In the present case, the Complaint alleged that respondent's son Fulgencio
Jr. sustained physical injuries. The son testified that he suffered a deep cut
on his left arm when the car overturned after hitting a pile of earth that had
been left in the open without any warning device whatsoever.

23

whether exemplary damages may be awarded in addition to compensatory

damages.
It is apparent from the Decisions of the trial and the appellate courts,
however, that no other evidence (such as a medical certificate or proof
of medical expenses) was presented to prove Fulgencio Jr.'s bare
assertion of physical injury.

Thus, there was no credible proof that would justify an award of moral
damages based on Article 2219(2) of the Civil Code.

Moral damages are not punitive in nature, but are designed to compensate
and alleviate in some way the physical suffering, mental anguish, fright,
serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock,
social humiliation, and similar injury unjustly inflicted on a person. Intended
for the restoration of the psychological or emotional status quo ante, the
award of moral damages is designed to compensate emotional injury
suffered, not to impose a penalty on the wrongdoer.

Furthermore, well-settled is the rule that moral damages cannot be awarded

-- whether in a civil or a criminal case-- in the absence of proof of physical
suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation,
wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, or similar injury. The
award of moral damages must be solidly anchored on a definite showing that
respondent actually experienced emotional and mental sufferings. Mere
allegations do not suffice; they must be substantiated by clear and
convincing proof.

(3) Exemplary Damages

Exemplary damages cannot be recovered as a matter of right. While

granting them is subject to the discretion of the court, they can be awarded
only after claimants have shown their entitlement to moral, temperate or
compensatory damages. In the case before us, respondent sufficiently
proved before the courts a quo that petitioners' negligence was the
proximate cause of the incident, thereby establishing his right to actual or
compensatory damages. He has adduced adequate proof to justify his claim
for the damages caused his car. The question that remains, therefore, is

Article 2231 of the Civil Code mandates that in cases of quasi-delicts,

exemplary damages may be recovered if the defendant acted with
gross negligence. Gross negligence means such utter want of care as
to raise a presumption that the persons at fault must have been
conscious of the probable consequences of their carelessness, and
that they must have nevertheless been indifferent (or worse) to the
danger of injury to the person or property of others. The negligence
must amount to a reckless disregard for the safety of persons or
property.

The facts of the case show a complete disregard by petitioners of any

adverse consequence of their failure to install even a single warning device
at the area under renovation. Considering further that the street was dimly lit,
the need for adequate precautionary measures was even greater. By
carrying on the road diggings without any warning or barricade, petitioners
demonstrated a wanton disregard for public safety. Indeed, the February 28,
1988 incident was bound to happen due to their gross negligence. It is clear
that under the circumstances, there is sufficient factual basis for a finding of
gross negligence on their part.

Article 2229 of the Civil Code provides that exemplary damages may be
imposed by way of example or correction for the public good. The
award of these damages is meant to be a deterrent to socially
deleterious actions. Public policy requires such imposition to suppress
wanton acts of an offender. It must be emphasized that local
governments and their employees should be responsible not only for
the maintenance of roads and streets, but also for the safety of the
public. Thus, they must secure construction areas with adequate
precautionary measures.

Not only is the work of petitioners impressed with public interest; their very
existence is justified only by public service. Hence, local governments have
the paramount responsibility of keeping the interests of the public foremost
in their agenda. For these reasons, it is most disturbing to note that the
present petitioners are the very parties responsible for endangering the
public through such a rash and reckless act.

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