Pembunuhan-Pembunuhan Massal Yang

Terjadi Di Indonesia!
Anti Communist Massacres

Guest Writer Spew It All writes about the nature of the anti-communist massacres of
1965-66.

Misunderstandings

One regular writer for Indonesiamatters.com (Ross) submitted his article on

communism and genocide in Indonesia, a riposte to a piece by Julia Suryakusumah in
the Indonesian English-language newspaper the Jakarta Post. The article succeeded in
provoking much debate, but sadly, some of the discussion still reflects how poorly
misunderstood the killings of 1965/66 are.

History

The massacres of 1965 have been the biggest conundrum in Indonesian history. The
communist members and their partisans were hunted and killed gruesomely by their
fellow Indonesians with support from the military. The killings took place following the
failed coup attempt carried out by several military officers and a few members of the
Communist Party. Parallel to this, transition of power also occurred. Sukarno, who
reigned in the country for more than twenty years, was replaced by Suharto, an army
general who later headed Indonesia for more than thirty years.

Official Accounts

During the Suharto period, the stories of massacres seemed to be forgotten. Official
history only highlights the heroic action of the Indonesian army that successfully
crushed communism in Indonesia. This constructed truth is perpetuated further through
enactments in various museums, films and school history textbooks.

Much worse than that is the New Order’s representation of that bloody event seeing it as
merely horizontal conflicts between the PKI masses and their bitter rivals. Any
alternative interpretation was an anathema in Indonesia during Suharto regime. Gaol
and others sanctions would be the consequence for contesting the New Order version of
history. Books written by scholars were banned and the writers were refused to enter the
country.

Research

Despite these problems, some scholars succeeded in conducting researches on what

happened in 1965 including Hermawan Sulistyo, Iwan Sudjatmiko, Clifford Geertz,
Geoffrey Robinson, Harold Crouch, and John Roosa. Not all these scholars agree with
the idea that the killings were state-sponsored violence.
Horizontal-Spontaneous Conflict

Sulistyo, Sudjatmiko and Geertz are the proponent of “horizontal theory”. There seems
to be no dissimilarity between their conclusions and the official version released by the
government of Indonesia. The Army Information Centre (PUSPENAD), which launched
its report a year after the coup took place, suggested that the mass anger could not be
controlled. [1] Likewise, twenty years later, the Indonesian State Secretary used the
term, “spontaneous mass action against the PKI” to describe the ferocity of the event.
[2]

Military-State Sponsored Violence

A differing view is put forward by another historian, Hilmar Farid, who suggested that
the task of disputing this view is not too intellectually challenging, because blatant
evidence can reveal the involvement of state apparatus. [3]

Early Military Role

There are important factors that should be taken into account, if we want to look at the
military role in the killings. Firstly, the military’s immediate action to control media by
closing down all media except Angkatan Bersenjata and Berita Yudha, which were
owned by the Army. [4] By closing down media outlets, it enabled them to create fear
through propaganda and the fabricated story of the PKI as the main culprit in the
killings of seven generals spread out easily.

Moreover, the military publications also reported that military operations to purge
communism in Indonesia’s outer region had succeeded in seizing firearms, grenades and
documents revealing the coup plans. This would clearly make people under the
impression that the PKI was ready to launch a coup.

Secondly, Suharto was appointed to head the Operational Commander for the
Restoration of Security and Order (Pangkokamtib) and commenced an effective
campaign against the PKI. In conjunction with the military campaign, KAP Gestapu
(Action Front to Crush the Thirtieth of September Movement) was formed by an
alliance of anti-Communist organisations and their overall campaign mantra and
objective was to “crush the PKI down its roots.”

Secret Cable Message

There was also a report that the military was involved in the training of youth
organisations. According to a cable sent by the US embassy in Jakarta to State
Department in November 1965, the Indonesian Army would try to avoid direct
confrontation with the PKI.

In Central Java, Army (RPKAD) is training Moslem Youth [probably either Banser or
HMI] and supplying them with weapons and will keep them out in front against the
PKI. Army will try to avoid as much it can safely do so, direct confrontation with the
PKI “¦ Army is letting groups other than Army discredit them [the PKI] and demand
their punishment. [5]
Having said this, it can be argued that the training was inextricably linked to the
campaign programme and the strategy of avoiding direct confrontation with the PKI.

Bali

The support from the military is significant as in some areas the number of the PKI
members and its opponents seemed to be on a par. For example, the killings in Bali did
not take place until the middle of December 1965. Although tension heightened between
two dominant factions in Bali, the PNI and the PKI, it did not culminate in the
bloodshed. With the arrival of troops from Jakarta, the anti-communist camp held more
sway. [6]

Central Java

In Central Java, the arrests and killings took place not long after the arrival of RPKAD
(the Indonesian Special Forces) headed by Sarwo Edhie Wibowo. The troops arrived in
Semarang on 18th October 1965 and then fanned out to other towns. A witness,
Suparno, recalled what happened before he was accused of planning to overthrow the
head of the region and arrested and imprisoned for decades. He remembered that the
troops paraded in his town Pati, before stopping at the town hall and delivering a speech
on what had happened in Jakarta. The operations were then carried out in the next days.
[7] With the support from civilian militias, the operations were done easily. The military
provided trucks and the militias helped with information or even took part in the
killings.

Rivers of Blood

As many may have heard the colour of the River Brantas in East Java, turned to red
during the horrific months. Rivers were perhaps the “favourite” places for the killers to
dump the bodies. The reason might be practical as the current would take the bodies
away. However, the floating bodies in the river might be containing a powerful message
for Indonesians. As if they liked to say through the river: communists should end up like
this!

Associate Organisations

Noteworthy, not all of victims were actually communists. Even Gerwani and the labour
unions were not officially part of the Communist Party. These organisations worked
together with the PKI on several occasions, unlike Pemuda Rakyat, which was officially
the youth wing of the party.

One survivor admitted that he was a member of an Islamic party, Masyumi, but was
arrested. [8] It is denunciation behind this false accusation.

Chinese people were amongst the victims but they were by no means a majority.

Imprisonment

The fates of victims in prisons were not better than those who were summarily
executed. Tortures and killings could happen even in the prisons. Some commentators
suggested that the number of inmates shrank in several regions. Zakaria, a leader of
youth organisation, who carried out interrogations of prisoners in Lombok, admitted
that after August 1966, the number of communist prisoners had decreased. [9]

In Kediri, this similar method of killings also took place, albeit under the different name
of Operasi Teratur or Organised Operation, and resulted in a greater number of victims.
[10]

For female prisoners, beside tortures, they were also subject to sexual harassments.
Nona, a woman who was arrested, was forced to have sex with the military officer and
then became pregnant and delivered her baby in the camp. [11]

For three decades this horror remained untold. But following the downfall of Suharto,
many stories of the massacres began to emerge. Survivors who were released from
prison wrote their memoirs giving their accounts on that crucial moment in Indonesian
history.

The Future

Discussion on what happened on 1965 is still centred on the mastermind of the coup,
however. The pitfall of this over-attention on mastermind may lead to assuming the
killings as separated from the establishment of the New Order. As Robert Cribb
lamented in his article, the unsolved biggest question is not

“whodunit”

but

“can it happen again?” [12]

It is important for Indonesians to contemplate the later question if they want to build a
more democratic Indonesian in the future.

Anti Komunis Massacres

January 25th, 2008, in Opinion , by Guest Writer 25 Januari 2008, di Opini, oleh
Penulis Tamu

Guest Writer Spew It All writes about the nature of the anti-communist massacres of
1965-66. Penulis Tamu memuntahkan Semua ini menulis tentang sifat yang anti-
komunis massacres dari 1965-66.

Misunderstandings / Kesalahpahaman

One regular writer for Indonesiamatters.com ( Ross ) submitted his article on

communism and genocide in Indonesia , a riposte to a piece by Julia Suryakusumah in
the Indonesian English-language newspaper the Jakarta Post. Biasa satu penulis untuk
Indonesiamatters.com (Samarinda) diajukan artikelnya pada komunisme dan Genosida
di Indonesia, untuk suatu tindakan balasan oleh Julia Suryakusumah di Indonesia
bahasa Inggris-koran Jakarta Post. The article succeeded in provoking much debate, but
sadly, some of the discussion still reflects how poorly misunderstood the killings of
1965/66 are. Artikel berhasil membuat banyak perdebatan, tetapi kurang sehat, beberapa
dari diskusi masih mencerminkan bagaimana disalahfaham yang buruk dari
pembunuhan 1965/66 adalah.

History / Sejarah

The massacres of 1965 have been the biggest conundrum in Indonesian history.
Massacres 1965 yang telah menjadi teka-teki terbesar dalam sejarah Indonesia. The
communist members and their partisans were hunted and killed gruesomely by their
fellow Indonesians with support from the military. Anggota yang komunis dan mereka
dan partisans buruan yang dibunuh oleh mereka gruesomely sesama Indonesia dengan
dukungan dari militer. The killings took place following the failed coup attempt carried
out by several military officers and a few members of the Communist Party.
Pembunuhan yang terjadi setelah gagal membalikkan upaya dilakukan oleh beberapa
pejabat militer dan beberapa anggota Partai Komunis. Parallel to this, transition of
power also occurred. Sejajar dengan ini, transisi kekuasaan juga terjadi. Sukarno, who
reigned in the country for more than twenty years, was replaced by Suharto , an army
general who later headed Indonesia for more than thirty years. Sukarno, yang
memerintah di negara untuk lebih dari dua puluh tahun, diganti oleh Suharto, an army
umum yang kemudian kepala Indonesia selama lebih dari tiga puluh tahun.

Official Accounts / Resmi Account

During the Suharto period, the stories of massacres seemed to be forgotten. Selama
periode Suharto, kisah dari massacres nampaknya akan lupa. Official history only
highlights the heroic action of the Indonesian army that successfully crushed
communism in Indonesia. Sejarah resmi hanya menyoroti tindakan heroik dari tentara
Indonesia yang berhasil dilumatkan komunisme di Indonesia. This constructed truth is
perpetuated further through enactments in various museums, films and school history
textbooks. Ini adalah kebenaran dibangun perpetuated lebih lanjut melalui enactments di
berbagai museum, film dan buku sejarah sekolah.

Much worse than that is the New Order’s representation of that bloody event seeing it as
merely horizontal conflicts between the PKI masses and their bitter rivals. Jauh lebih
buruk daripada yang Orde Baru's keterwakilan yang melihat peristiwa berdarah itu
hanya sebagai konflik horisontal antara massa PKI dan pahit saingan mereka. Any
alternative interpretation was an anathema in Indonesia during Suharto regime. Setiap
alternatif interpretasi adalah anathema di Indonesia selama rezim Soeharto. Gaol and
others sanctions would be the consequence for contesting the New Order version of
history. Penjara dan sanksi lain akan memperhatikan Menyoal Orde Baru versi sejarah.
Books written by scholars were banned and the writers were refused to enter the
country. Buku-buku yang ditulis oleh cendekiawan telah diblokir dan penulis telah
menolak untuk memasuki negara.

Research / Penelitian

Despite these problems, some scholars succeeded in conducting researches on what

happened in 1965 including Hermawan Sulistyo, Iwan Sudjatmiko, Clifford Geertz,
Geoffrey Robinson, Harold Crouch, and John Roosa. Walaupun masalah ini, beberapa
cendekiawan berhasil melakukan penelitian tentang apa yang terjadi di tahun 1965
termasuk Hermawan Sulistyo, Iwan Sudjatmiko, Clifford Geertz, Geoffrey Robinson,
Harold Crouch, dan John Roosa. Not all these scholars agree with the idea that the
killings were state-sponsored violence. Tidak semua beasiswa tersebut setuju dengan ide
bahwa pembunuhan yang disponsori negara-kekerasan.

Horizontal-Spontaneous Conflict / Konflik horizontal-spontan

Sulistyo, Sudjatmiko and Geertz are the proponent of “horizontal theory”. Sulistyo,
Sudjatmiko dan Geertz adalah pendukung dari "horisontal teori". There seems to be no
dissimilarity between their conclusions and the official version released by the
government of Indonesia. Sepertinya tidak ada perbedaan antara mereka dan
kesimpulan versi resmi diluncurkan oleh pemerintah Indonesia. The Army Information
Centre (PUSPENAD), which launched its report a year after the coup took place,
suggested that the mass anger could not be controlled. [1] Likewise, twenty years later,
the Indonesian State Secretary used the term, “spontaneous mass action against the
PKI” to describe the ferocity of the event. [2] Angkatan darat Information Center
(PUSPENAD), yang meluncurkan laporan setelah satu tahun pemerintahan
berlangsung, mengemukakan bahwa massa marah tidak dapat dikontrol. [1] Demikian
pula, dua puluh tahun kemudian, Sekretaris Negara Indonesia istilah yang digunakan,
"spontan massa tindakan terhadap PKI "untuk menjelaskan kekejaman dari acara. [2]

Military-State Sponsored Violence / Militer-negara yang disponsori

kekerasan

A differing view is put forward by another historian, Hilmar Farid, who suggested that
the task of disputing this view is not too intellectually challenging, because blatant
evidence can reveal the involvement of state apparatus. [3] Sebuah tampilan yang
berbeda diletakkan maju lain oleh sejarawan, Hilmar Farid, yang mengemukakan bahwa
tugas disputing pandangan ini tidak terlalu layan menantang, karena ribut bukti dapat
mengungkapkan keterlibatan aparat negara. [3]

Early Military Role / Peran militer awal

There are important factors that should be taken into account, if we want to look at the
military role in the killings. Ada faktor penting yang harus diperhatikan, jika kita ingin
melihat peran militer dalam pembunuhan. Firstly, the military’s immediate action to
control media by closing down all media except Angkatan Bersenjata and Berita Yudha,
which were owned by the Army. [4] By closing down media outlets, it enabled them to
create fear through propaganda and the fabricated story of the PKI as the main culprit in
the killings of seven generals spread out easily. Pertama, militer's tindakan segera untuk
mengontrol media dengan penutupan semua media kecuali Angkatan Bersenjata dan
Berita Yudha, yang dimiliki oleh Angkatan Darat. [4] Dengan penutupan outlet media,
ini memungkinkan mereka untuk membuat takut melalui propaganda dan yg siap untuk
dimakan kisah PKI sebagai jahat utama dalam pembunuhan dari tujuh Umum tersebar
dengan mudah.

Moreover, the military publications also reported that military operations to purge
communism in Indonesia’s outer region had succeeded in seizing firearms, grenades and
documents revealing the coup plans. Selain itu, militer publikasi juga melaporkan
bahwa operasi militer untuk menyingkirkan komunisme di luar wilayah Indonesia telah
berhasil dalam perebutan api, grenades dan dokumen yang mengungkapkan rencana
tindakan. This would clearly make people under the impression that the PKI was ready
to launch a coup. Hal ini jelas akan membuat orang di bawah kesan bahwa PKI telah
siap untuk memulai minggu.

Secondly, Suharto was appointed to head the Operational Commander for the
Restoration of Security and Order (Pangkokamtib) and commenced an effective
campaign against the PKI. Kedua, Suharto diangkat ke kepala Komandan Operasi untuk
Pembangunan Keamanan dan Ketertiban (Pangkokamtib) dan mulai kampanye yang
efektif terhadap PKI. In conjunction with the military campaign, KAP Gestapu (Action
Front to Crush the Thirtieth of September Movement) was formed by an alliance of
anti-Communist organisations and their overall campaign mantra and objective was to
Dalam kaitannya dengan kampanye militer, KAP Gestapu (Front Aksi untuk Crush yang
ketigapuluh September Gerakan) telah dibentuk oleh sebuah aliansi anti-Komunis dan
organisasi wartawan dan keseluruhan kampanye ini bertujuan untuk “crush the PKI
down its roots.” "Crush PKI bawah akarnya."

Secret Cable Message / Rahasia Kabel Pesan

There was also a report that the military was involved in the training of youth
organisations. Ada juga melaporkan bahwa militer telah terlibat dalam pelatihan dari
organisasi pemuda. According to a cable sent by the US embassy in Jakarta to State
Department in November 1965, the Indonesian Army would try to avoid direct
confrontation with the PKI. Menurut sebuah kabel dikirim oleh kedutaan Amerika
Serikat di Jakarta untuk Negara Departemen pada bulan November 1965, Indonesia
Angkatan Darat akan mencoba untuk menghindari konfrontasi langsung dengan PKI.

Bali

The support from the military is significant as in some areas the number of the PKI
members and its opponents seemed to be on a par. Dukungan dari militer yang
signifikan seperti di beberapa daerah jumlah anggota PKI dan lawan nampaknya akan di
par. For example, the killings in Bali did not take place until the middle of December
1965. Misalnya, pembunuhan di Bali tidak berlangsung sampai pertengahan Desember
1965. Although tension heightened between two dominant factions in Bali, the PNI and
the PKI, it did not culminate in the bloodshed. Meskipun heightened ketegangan antara
dua golongan dominan di Bali, yang PNI dan PKI, tidak berujung pada darah. With the
arrival of troops from Jakarta, the anti-communist camp held more sway. [6] Dengan
kedatangan ekspedisi dari Jakarta, anti-komunis kamp diselenggarakan lebih lenggok.
[6]

Central Java Jawa Tengah

In Central Java, the arrests and killings took place not long after the arrival of RPKAD
(the Indonesian Special Forces) headed by Sarwo Edhie Wibowo. Di Jawa Tengah,
penahanan dan pembunuhan berlangsung tidak lama setelah kedatangan RPKAD
(Indonesia Angkatan Khusus) dipimpin oleh Sarwo Edhie Wibowo. The troops arrived
in Semarang on 18th October 1965 and then fanned out to other towns. Pasukan yang
tiba di Semarang pada tanggal 18 Oktober 1965 dan kemudian fanned ke kota-kota lain.
A witness, Suparno, recalled what happened before he was accused of planning to
overthrow the head of the region and arrested and imprisoned for decades. Seorang
saksi, Suparno, mengingat apa yang terjadi sebelum dia dituduh perencanaan untuk
menggulingkan kepala daerah dan ditangkap dan dipenjarakan untuk dekade. He
remembered that the troops paraded in his town Pati, before stopping at the town hall
and delivering a speech on what had happened in Jakarta. Dia diingat bahwa pasukan
paraded di kota Pati, sebelum berhenti di balai kota dan menyampaikan pidato pada apa
yang telah terjadi di Jakarta. The operations were then carried out in the next days. [7]
With the support from civilian militias, the operations were done easily. Operasi ini
kemudian dilakukan pada hari berikutnya. [7] Dengan dukungan dari milisia sipil,
operasi yang dilakukan dengan mudah. The military provided trucks and the militias
helped with information or even took part in the killings. Militer dan truk yang
disediakan milisia membantu dengan informasi atau bahkan ikut serta dalam
pembunuhan.

Rivers of Blood / Sungai dari Darah

As many may have heard the colour of the River Brantas in East Java, turned to red
during the horrific months. Seperti banyak yang memiliki warna mendengar dari Sungai
Brantas di Jawa Timur, menjadi merah selama bulan menyeramkan. Rivers were
perhaps the “favourite” places for the killers to dump the bodies. Sungai yang mungkin
"favorit" tempat bagi orang untuk dump badan. The reason might be practical as the
current would take the bodies away. Sebabnya mungkin praktis seperti saat ini akan
mengambil badan jauh. However, the floating bodies in the river might be containing a
powerful message for Indonesians. Namun, badan apung di sungai mungkin berisi pesan
yang ampuh untuk Indonesia. As if they liked to say through the river: Karena jika
mereka suka mengatakan melalui sungai: communists should end up like this! komunis
harus berakhir seperti ini!

Associate Organisations / Associate Organisasi

Noteworthy, not all of victims were actually communists. Penting, tidak semua korban
yang sebetulnya komunis. Even Gerwani and the labour unions were not officially part
of the Communist Party. Bahkan Gerwani dan serikat pekerja tidak resmi bagian dari
Partai Komunis. These organisations worked together with the PKI on several
occasions, unlike Pemuda Rakyat, which was officially the youth wing of the party.
Organisasi ini bekerja sama dengan PKI pada beberapa kesempatan, tidak seperti
Pemuda Rakyat, yang secara resmi sayap pemuda dari partai.

One survivor admitted that he was a member of an Islamic party, Masyumi, but was
arrested. [8] It is denunciation behind this false accusation. Satu club mengakui bahwa
dia adalah seorang anggota dari sebuah partai Islam, Masyumi, tetapi telah ditangkap.
[8] Ini adalah pengkhianatan di belakang tuduhan palsu ini.

Chinese people were amongst the victims but they were by no means a majority. Orang
Cina di antara para korban, tetapi mereka tidak mayoritas.
Imprisonment / Penjara

The fates of victims in prisons were not better than those who were summarily
executed. Ini nasib korban dalam penjara tidak lebih baik dari orang-orang yang
ringkasnya dilaksanakan. Tortures and killings could happen even in the prisons.
Penyiksaan dan pembunuhan bisa terjadi bahkan dalam penjara. Some commentators
suggested that the number of inmates shrank in several regions. Beberapa komentator
mengemukakan bahwa jumlah kapel shrank di beberapa daerah. Zakaria, a leader of
youth organisation, who carried out interrogations of prisoners in Lombok, admitted
that after August 1966, the number of communist prisoners had decreased. [9] Zakaria,
seorang pemimpin organisasi pemuda, yang dilakukan interrogations narapidana di
Lombok, mengakui bahwa setelah Agustus 1966, jumlah narapidana komunis telah
menurun. [9]

In Kediri, this similar method of killings also took place, albeit under the different name
of Operasi Teratur or Organised Operation, and resulted in a greater number of victims.
[10] Di Kediri, metode ini serupa juga terjadi pembunuhan, walaupun di bawah nama
yang berbeda Operasi Teratur atau diatur Operasi, dan menghasilkan lebih banyak
korban. [10]

For female prisoners, beside tortures, they were also subject to sexual harassments.
Untuk tahanan perempuan, selain Penyiksaan, mereka juga tunduk pada pelecehan
seksual. Nona, a woman who was arrested, was forced to have sex with the military
officer and then became pregnant and delivered her baby in the camp. [11] Nona,
seorang wanita yang telah ditangkap, dipaksa melakukan hubungan seks dengan aparat
militer dan kemudian menjadi hamil dan melahirkan bayinya di kamp. [11]

For three decades this horror remained untold. Untuk tiga dekade ini horor tetap tak
terhingga. But following the downfall of Suharto, many stories of the massacres began
to emerge. Tetapi setelah kejatuhan Suharto, banyak cerita dari massacres mulai
muncul. Survivors who were released from prison wrote their memoirs giving their
accounts on that crucial moment in Indonesian history. Korban yang dilepaskan dari
penjara wrote mereka memberikan riwayat account mereka pada saat yang penting
dalam sejarah Indonesia.

The Future / Masa Depan

Discussion on what happened on 1965 is still centred on the mastermind of the coup,
however. Diskusi tentang apa yang terjadi pada 1965 masih terpusat pada otak dari
pemerintahan, namun. The pitfall of this over-attention on mastermind may lead to
assuming the killings as separated from the establishment of the New Order. Jebakan
yang selama ini-perhatian pada otak dapat mengakibatkan anggap sebagai pembunuhan
yang terpisah dari pembentukan Orde Baru. As Robert Cribb lamented in his article, the
unsolved biggest question is not Seperti Robert Cribb almarhumi dalam artikelnya,
pertanyaan yang belum terjawab terbesar adalah tidak

“whodunit” "Cerita detektif"

but tetapi
“can it happen again?” [12] "Bisa terjadi lagi?" [12]

It is important for Indonesians to contemplate the later question if they want to build a
more democratic Indonesian in the future. Adalah penting untuk Indonesia untuk
memikirkan pertanyaan yang nanti jika mereka ingin membangun Indonesia yang lebih
demokratis di masa depan.

May 1998 Jakarta Riots

May 16th, 2008, in Opinion, by Guest Writer

Spew looks back on the May 1998 riots and the issues of mass rapes, anti-Chinese
sentiment, and how the rioters came to be judged.

It has been a decade since Reformasi (reform) movement took place in Indonesia that
succeeded in forcing Suharto to step down. Every year after the movement, media and
political and social analysts reflect on what has happened and has been happening since
Suharto was ousted. Since reform is the grand theme, these reflections therefore
highlight the progress of reform in Indonesia. Although many topics can be written
regarding reformasi in Indonesia only democracy and political reforms are arguably
having much more attention than other issues.

Having said this, I would like to shift the focus away from political reforms and
democracy and reflect on the riots that took place in Indonesia. The riots shocked the
international community and may have changed their views on the Indonesian people.
To some extent, the riots may have confirmed the wide representation of Indonesian
people as having an amok culture. The friendly, hospitable, and inclusive attitude can
suddenly turn into vicious, violent, and barbaric acts. When one of the Bali Bombing
perpetrators Amrozi had his picture taken in foreign media, people bewildered with his
smile: how can he smile after killing innocent people? There seems no other alternative
to explain this perplexing phenomenon but put it into a cultural category box called
amok.

Not long after the riots which took place in Solo, Medan, Jakarta, and Surabaya,
Indonesians were shocked to know that many people were burnt to death in malls and
shopping centres. The government, however, labelled them looters. Quoting the
government, media outlets played an important role in perpetuating the representation
of people who were burnt to death in malls. In their headlines, looters emerged as a
product of discourse on representation of poor people in Indonesia. Labelling them
looters instead of victims will impact on how big was the state’s responsibility for the
dead people. Looters can be equated with criminals and with their deaths, the state
should not be responsible for dealing with criminals.

Labelling them looters also denies the history of well-being of the poor in Indonesia.
These “looters” are victims of structural violence stemming from unfair economic
development. According to a report released by Jakarta based non-governmental
organisation, Volunteer Team for Humanity, the total death toll was about 1200 people
[1]. The majority of the dead were those who were trapped in the burning shopping
centres.
What made the riot gaining more attention, however, was the rape of the Indonesian
Chinese. The stories of rapes appeared publicly not long after the news of more than a
thousand deaths in malls emerged. It was Jakarta based NGO, Volunteer Team for
Humanity (Tim Relawan untuk Kemanusiaan-TRuK) that brought up the issue about the
rapes. According to their report, hundreds of Chinese women were gangraped. [2] Yet,
this appalling news did not immediately receive sympathetic gestures. In fact, doubts
were voiced publicly as to whether the rapes indeed had taken place.

In response to the rapes issue, the Indonesian Minister of Women’s Affair Tutty
Alawiyah, for instance, contested the data provided by TRuK and asked for concrete
proof regarding the mass rape. [3] Similarly, Roesmanhadi the Chief of the Indonesian
Police contended that the failure of providing “concrete data” meant that NGOs could
be charged with disseminating lies. [4]

Responding to the furore over mass rapes as well as international pressure to deal with
these rapes the Indonesian government formed a joint fact finding commission (Tim
Gabungan Pencari Fakta Kerusuhan Mei 13-15) in which government and NGO were
expected to work together to solve this puzzle. Although working within a strict time
constraint, this commission finally completed its report and suggested that the riot was a
result of political tension at elite level and worsening economic condition. The report,
however, did not draw a conclusion that mass rapes were systematic violence but only
confirmed that such acts happened simultaneously with the riot and that among those
rapes were some that were carried out with particular purposes. [5]

The raging debate over the mass rapes seemed to impact on the representation of the
riots. Once the stories of rapes unfolded, discourse on rapes submerged the other
gloomy stories such as those who were burnt to death in the shopping centres. During
that time, “anti-Chinese” became a lexicon that is often used to understand the riots.

Indeed, anti-Chinese sentiment was played up at that time. But one should bear in mind
that political marginalisation towards Chinese people throughout Indonesian history
may have contributed to Indonesian peoples’ understanding of their identities. Anti-
Chinese sentiments, in this respect were constructed in order to lay foundation of what
constituted Indonesia or pribumi. When the riots took place, the anti-Chinese sentiments
were played up in order to represent the violence as something natural which stemmed
from the tension between pribumi and non-pribumi.

In other words, these urban poor were dead when they would like to loot things from
Chinese stores. And the rapes were merely manifestation of frustration derived from
imbalance economic status between Chinese and non-Chinese.

As one crucial element to understand violence are the victims, the existence of victims
who died in shopping malls and Chinese victims could help us to deconstruct the
representations of May 1998 violence. Yet, in doing so we should not be differentiating
them based on racial lines as this will only perpetuate the New Order logic. What we
should look at regarding the May violence is that race can be a powerful discourse in
producing the knowledge of that violence. Only radical understanding of victims of
May Riots which weighs much on the interrogation of dominant discourse may lead to a
better comprehension on what happened in those three days of atrocities.
* ↑1 Tim Gabungan Pencari Fakta Kerusuhan 13-15 Mei 1998 (TGPF), Laporan Akhir
Kerusuhan 13-15 Mei 1998, Jakarta, 23 Oktober 1998. available from:
http://semanggipeduli.com/tgpf/bab4.html,
[Accessed at 8 May 2008]
* ↑2 Human Rights Watch, Indonesia: The Damaging Debate on Rapes of Ethnic
Chinese Women, 1 September 1999, available from:
http://www.hrw.org/reports98/indonesia3/rapes.htm, [Accessed at 10
May 2008].
* ↑3 Karen Strassler, “Gendered Visibilities and the Dream of Transparency: The
Chinese-Indonesian Rape Debate in Post-Suharto Indonesia”, Gender & History, Vol.16
No.3 November 2004, pp. 689–725.
* ↑4 Ibid.
* ↑5 TGPF, ‘Laporan Akhir’. For more discussion on TGPF, Jemma Purdey provides an
excellent account on the dynamic within the fact finding commission. See, Jemma
Purdey, ‘Problematizing the Place of Victims in Reformasi Indonesia: A Contested Truth
about The May 1998 Violence’, Asian Survey, Vol. 42, No. 4, The Legacy of Violence
in Indonesia, (Jul-Aug, 2002), pp. 605-622.

Kerusuhan Jakarta Mei 1998

16 Mei 2008, di Opini, oleh Penulis Tamu

Memuntahkan terlihat kembali pada Mei 1998 kerusuhan dan isu-isu massa perkosaan,
sentimen anti-Cina, dan bagaimana rioters datang untuk dinilai.

Sudah satu dekade sejak reformasi (reformasi) gerakan terjadi di Indonesia yang
berhasil memaksa Suharto turun. Setiap tahun setelah pergerakan, media dan analis
sosial politik dan mencerminkan pada apa yang telah terjadi dan telah terjadi sejak
Suharto telah ousted. Sejak reformasi adalah grand tema, maka ini tercatat menyorot
kemajuan reformasi di Indonesia. Meskipun banyak topik dapat ditulis mengenai
Reformasi di Indonesia hanya demokrasi dan reformasi politik adalah Rasulullah
memiliki lebih banyak perhatian dari isu-isu lain.

Di bawah ini, saya ingin menggeser fokus dari reformasi politik dan demokrasi dan
mencerminkan pada kerusuhan yang terjadi di Indonesia. Kerusuhan kaget masyarakat
internasional dan mungkin telah berubah pandangan mereka terhadap masyarakat
Indonesia. Untuk beberapa hal, kerusuhan Mei telah dikonfirmasi yang luas dari
perwakilan masyarakat Indonesia yang memiliki budaya amuk. Yang ramah, ramah, dan
termasuk sikap dapat tiba-tiba menjadi ganas, kekerasan, dan tindakan biadab. Ketika
salah satu dari pelaku ledakan bomb di Bali Amrozi telah diambil itu gambar di media
asing, orang limbung dengan tersenyum: bagaimana dapat tersenyum setelah dia
membunuh orang bersalah? Seolah-olah tidak ada alternatif lain untuk menjelaskan
fenomena ini membingungkan tetapi memasukkannya ke dalam kotak yang disebut
kategori budaya amuk.

Tidak lama setelah kerusuhan yang terjadi di Solo, Medan, Jakarta, dan Surabaya,
Indonesia yang terkejut mengetahui bahwa banyak orang mati dibakar di mal dan pusat
perbelanjaan. Pemerintah, namun, label mereka looters. Penawaran pemerintah, outlet
media memainkan peranan penting dalam memperkekalkan dengan perwakilan dari
orang-orang yang dibakar sampai mati di mal. Dalam utama mereka, looters muncul
sebagai produk dari wacana perwakilan dari masyarakat miskin di Indonesia. Label
looters mereka bukan korban akan berdampak pada seberapa besar negara adalah
tanggung jawab untuk orang mati. Looters dapat menyetarakan dengan kriminal dan
dengan kematian mereka, negara tidak harus bertanggung jawab untuk menangani
kriminal.

Label looters mereka juga denies sejarah kesejahteraan masyarakat miskin di Indonesia.
Ini "looters" adalah korban kekerasan struktural berasal dari pembangunan ekonomi
yang tidak adil. Menurut laporan yang dikeluarkan oleh Jakarta berbasis organisasi non-
pemerintah, Tim Relawan untuk Kemanusiaan, jumlah korban jiwa adalah sekitar 1200
orang [1]. Sebagian besar yang mati adalah orang-orang yang terperangkap dalam
pembakaran pusat perbelanjaan.

Apa yang membuat kerusuhan mendapat lebih banyak perhatian, namun, adalah
perkosaan dari Indonesia Cina. Cerita-cerita perkosaan muncul publik tidak lama
setelah berita lebih dari seribu kematian muncul di mal. Ianya Jakarta berbasis LSM,
Tim Relawan untuk Kemanusiaan (Tim Relawan untuk Kemanusiaan-Truk) yang
dinyalakan isu tentang perkosaan. Menurut laporan mereka, ratusan perempuan Cina
gangraped. [2] Namun, berita ini menggemparkan tidak segera menerima bersimpati
gerak gerik. Bahkan, yang meragukan untuk menyampaikan kepada publik sebagai
apakah kasus perkosaan memang telah terjadi.

Menanggapi masalah kasus perkosaan, Indonesia Menteri Perempuan Affair Tutty

Alawiyah, misalnya, mengeluhkan data yang diberikan oleh Truk dan meminta bukti
konkret mengenai perkosaan massa. [3] Demikian pula, Roesmanhadi sebagai Kepala
Polisi Indonesia contended bahwa kegagalan memberikan "beton data" dimaksudkan
LSM yang dapat diisi dengan sosialisasi terletak. [4]

Menjawab kemarahan massa atas kasus perkosaan serta tekanan internasional untuk
menangani kasus perkosaan ini dengan pemerintah Indonesia membentuk komisi
bersama Pencari Fakta (Tim Gabungan Pencari tahta Kerusuhan Mei 13-15) di mana
pemerintah dan LSM tersebut diharapkan akan bekerja sama untuk menyelesaikan
puzzle. Walaupun bekerja dalam waktu yang sangat ketat kendala, komisi ini akhirnya
selesai laporan dan mengemukakan bahwa kerusuhan merupakan hasil dari ketegangan
politik di tingkat elit serta kondisi ekonomi. Laporan Namun, tidak menarik kesimpulan
bahwa massa perkosaan pada kekerasan sistematis tetapi hanya menyatakan bahwa
perbuatan tersebut terjadi bersamaan dengan kerusuhan dan yang di antara mereka ada
beberapa kasus perkosaan yang dilakukan dengan tujuan tertentu. [5]

Perdebatan yang hebat atas kasus perkosaan massa nampaknya terhadap perwakilan dari
kerusuhan. Setelah cerita dari kasus perkosaan yang terbuka, wacana pada kasus
perkosaan yang terendam mendung cerita lain seperti orang-orang yang dibakar sampai
mati di pusat perbelanjaan. Selama masa itu, "anti-Cina" menjadi kosa kata yang sering
digunakan untuk memahami kerusuhan.

Sesungguhnya, sentimen anti-Cina telah diputar di waktu itu. Tetapi kita harus ingat
bahwa politik marginalisation terhadap orang Cina di seluruh Indonesia sejarah
mungkin telah menyumbang kepada masyarakat Indonesia untuk memahami identitas
mereka. Sentimen anti-Cina, dalam hal ini sudah dibangun untuk meletakkan dasar apa
yang pertama atau Pribumi Indonesia. Bila terjadi kerusuhan, maka sentimen anti-Cina
yang diputar dalam rangka untuk mewakili kekerasan sebagai sesuatu yang membatasi
alam dari ketegangan antara Pribumi dan non-Pribumi.

Dengan kata lain, ini miskin perkotaan yang mati ketika mereka ingin menjarah sesuatu
dari toko Cina. Dan perkosaan pada hanya manifestasi dari kekecewaan yang berasal
dari status ekonomi ketidakseimbangan antara Cina dan non-Cina.

Sebagai salah satu elemen penting untuk memahami kekerasan adalah korban,
keberadaan korban yang meninggal di mal dan Cina korban dapat membantu kami
untuk gagas pernyataan kekerasan Mei 1998. Namun, dalam melakukan hal ini, kita
tidak boleh membedakan mereka berdasarkan ras baris seperti ini hanya akan
melanggengkan Orde Baru logika. Apa kita harus melihat tentang kekerasan Mei adalah
ras yang dapat menjadi wacana kuat dalam memproduksi pengetahuan yang kekerasan.
Hanya radikal pemahaman korban Mei Riots Berat yang banyak di interogasi dari
wacana dominan dapat mengakibatkan pemahaman yang lebih baik mengenai apa yang
terjadi dalam tiga hari kerusuhan.

* ↑ 1 Tim Gabungan Pencari tahta Kerusuhan 13-15 Mei 1998 (TGPF), Laporan Akhir
Kerusuhan 13-15 Mei 1998, Jakarta, 23 Oktober 1998. tersedia dari:
http://semanggipeduli.com/tgpf/bab4.html,
[Diakses pada 8 Mei 2008]
* 2 ↑ Human Rights Watch, Indonesia: The Merusak Debat pada perkosaan dari Etnik
Cina Perempuan, 1 September 1999, tersedia dari:
http://www.hrw.org/reports98/indonesia3/rapes.htm, [Diakses pada 10
Mei 2008].
* ↑ 3 Karen Strassler, "Jender dan Visibilities Dream of Transparansi: The Indonesia-
Cina Rape Debat di Post-Suharto Indonesia", Jender & Sejarah, Vol.16 No.3 November
2004, pp. 689-725.
* ↑ 4 Ibid.
* ↑ 5 TGPF, 'Laporan Akhir'. Untuk diskusi lebih pada TGPF, Jemma Purdey
menyediakan akun yang dinamis dalam Pencari Fakta komisi. Lihat, Jemma Purdey,
'Problematizing di Tempat Korban Reformasi di Indonesia: mengeluhkan tentang
kebenaran Mei 1998 Kekerasan', Asian Survey, Vol. 42, No 4, Legacy Kekerasan di
Indonesia, (Juli-Agustus, 2002), pp. 605-622.

Ini tentang penghilangan orang2 ; Political Disappearances

May 19th, 2006, in Opinion, by Sarawut Pratoomraj

Guest writer Sarawut Pratoomraj discusses cases of political disappearances in the last
years of the Suharto regime.

Political Disappearance: A Neverending Story in Reformasi Regime

“I was shocked when I heard that my son was arrested in 1998, eight years ago. I
searched for him everywhere but there was no information. I feel a little hope that he is
still alive somewhere.”

- Pak Dionysius Utomo, 60, father of Bimo Petrus.

“”¦a friend of my son came and told me that my son was arrested by the military in
Tanjung Priok. I immediately went to the military station to ask for Yani Afri’s
whereabouts. The officers said that he was released and no longer in their custody, and
told me to find his friend. I went to look for his friends but they didn’t know. I returned
to the military station crying. The officer said the same and showed me my son’s release
paper”¦”

- Ibu Tuti Koto, 68, mother of Yani Afri.

“About 10 people came into my room - two were in military uniform while most were
in plainclothes. I was taken somewhere, not the police station. I was psychologically
shaken because those who arrested me weren’t police. I was afraid that I would be
killed. I was tortured and electrocuted. I am a lucky guy - I survived and not dead or
disappeared like many friends. Other people still don’t know if their relatives are dead
or alive.”ﾝ

- Mugiyanto, 32, Chairperson of IKOHI.

Above were testimonies of victims and relatives of victims of human rights violations
who suffered under the crackdown of the Soeharto regime in 1997-1998.

Mugiyanto or Mugi, chairperson of the Indonesian Association of Families of the

Disappeared (IKOHI), was a victim of human rights violation. He was an activist in
1998, as many university students were at that time, to campaign to abolish the five
unjust acts issued by the Soeharto government namely: act on political parties, act on
general elections, act on mass organizations, act on the composition of the parliament,
and act on referendums.

Only three political parties were allowed during the Soeharto regime. The activists
demanded the change of the regime as it was against the Dual Function of the Armed
Forces that supported Soeharto’s authoritarian regime. The government banned his
organization by linking it to the Communist Party of Indonesia, an illegal political party
accused of subversive acts. Mugi and many students worked underground. He was
arrested by the military on 13 March 1998 and released three months later on 8 June
1998, when the then President B.J. Habibie was overthrown. He immediately joined his
friend Munir at KontraS, the Commission for Involuntary Disappearance and Victims of
Violation, to bring his case to Europe and the Unites Nations.

Mugi worked as correspondent with a Dutch television network in 2000-2001. In his

mind were his friends and other people who were arrested at the same period but still
missing. He decided to resign from his job and joined IKOHI.

One of Mugi’s friends who disappeared in 31 March 1998 is Bimo Petrus, a student
from the Department of Philosophy at the Driyakara Jakarta University, and Dionysius
Utomo’s son. Dionysius was an administrative officer at Malang Central Mental
Hospital. He immediately searched for him when he learned about his son’s case. He
went to the government house and many military and police stations but found nothing.
Aside from knowing whether his son is dead or alive, when asked for other reasons, he
thinks for a while and said with mournful eyes
“I had a lot of hope in the government during the Reformasi, but it was hopeless. The
President has never set up any independent body to look into my case, no response in
any way. I need to know, I have the right to know. If he is dead, I have to bury him
according to the Catholic custom. I need to charge those who were involved in his
disappearance. I hope that violations would stop now. I don’t want to see it happen
again - not to any single family”ﾝ.

Similarly to Ibu Tuti, her son Yani Afri disappeared on 26 July 1997. She asked every
government agency but failed. When she heard about Kontras, she immediately went to
ask for help. She met Munir who helped her to search for Yani in various military
headquarters and government offices and had a personal dialogue with former President
Abdurrahman Wahid and Armed Forces Chief Wiranto, but still with no results.

“I got assistance from KontraS but I cry every time I went there and saw the street
singers. I always remember my son. He was poor but he was an artist. He liked to play
guitar and sing for me. While my son was still around, he would assist me financially by
working as a driver while pursuing his studies. Now, I don’t have any regular source of
income”¦”ﾝ 1

IKOHI was established in 1998 by Munir and other human rights activists. It held its
2nd Congress in Makassar, South Sulawesi on 7-10 March 2006 and chose Mugiyanto
as Chair. The congress was attended by victims and families of human rights violations
during the Soeharto regime from 1965 to1998. There were about 80 participants from
the west of Indonesia, Aceh, to the east, and Papua. The purposes of the Congress were
to review the constitution, mandate, activities; and election of committee members to
continue the work and to follow-up the disappeared cases.

“”¦ after Soeharto, every Indonesian government can’t resolve the issues of the families
of the disappeared; there were no compensation, no social welfare, and no solution for
the victims of human rights violations. We should do more for our justice. We urge for
government commitment and political will for the victims and families”ﾝ, Mugi
explained and added; “The public is not interested with the victims of human rights
violations now even when we are in the so-called “Reformasi”ﾝ system. There are so
many social crises in our country that human rights is not a priority. Indonesians try to
forget what happened during the New Order period, they have short memory”ﾝ.

The last words “short memory”ﾝ seems like the situation in Thailand. Thai people also
have short memory with what happened on 6 October 1976 or May 1992 were many
disappeared, died or wounded. The disappearance of lawyer Somchai Neelaphaijit in
2004 or those who are still missing in southern most Thailand are also quiet. The pains
and cries of the families have no meaning.

Indonesia and Thailand are in the process of political reform and should learn from each
other. Political reform in Thailand started in late 1990s with the enforcement of the
1997 constitution that stated three main reforms: strengthen the political system (Prime
Minister and Senator system), people participation in every level of administration, and
human rights protection system. The crisis to oust Thaksin is the second stage of reform.
There is still not much progress since political reform in Thailand was initiated more
than 10 years ago.
Indonesia should also question its “Reformasi”ﾝ. IKOHI and strengthening the families
to pressure more politicians to work for justice are good examples for people
participation in political reform. It does not only benefit the families but also the
progress of democracy and human rights in general. “Reformasi”ﾝ means people
participation in every level of administration, state agencies practice the “Rule of
Law”ﾝ, the National Institute undertake its roles efficiently and independently,
politicians respect and disseminate the universal standards of human rights, and the
government develop the country under the concept of “indivisibility”ﾝ, which means the
economic development of the country is parallel with civil and political development.

The IKOHI task is not yet finished. The strength of the people in political reform should
be the strength of human rights. A strengthened people will result to the end of political
disappearances and violations of human rights.

Footnote 1: Tuti Koto, Losing One’s Faith in the Law, Healing Wounds, Mending Scars,
published by AFAD, 2005, page 61.

Terjemahannya ; Politik Kehilangan

19 Mei 2006, di Opini, oleh Sarawut Pratoomraj

Tamu Sarawut Pratoomraj penulis membahas kasus politik Kehilangan di tahun terakhir
dari rezim Soeharto.

Politik Kehilangan: A Neverending cerita dalam reformasi rezim

"Saya kaget ketika saya mendengar bahwa anak saya telah ditangkap pada tahun 1998,
delapan tahun yang lalu. Aku mencari dia di mana-mana tetapi tidak ada informasi.
Saya merasa sedikit berharap bahwa dia masih hidup suatu tempat. "

- Pak Dionysius Utomo, 60, ayah dari Bimo Petrus.

"" | Teman anak saya datang dan mengatakan kepada saya bahwa anak saya telah
ditangkap oleh militer di Tanjung Priok. Saya segera pergi ke stasiun militer untuk
meminta Afri Yani's yang sedang dikerjakan. Pejabat mengatakan bahwa ia telah dirilis
dan mereka tidak lagi di penjara, dan mengatakan kepada saya untuk menemukan
temannya. Aku pergi untuk mencari teman-temannya tetapi mereka tidak tahu. Saya
kembali ke stasiun militer menangis. Kata petugas yang sama dan menunjukkan saya
putra lepaskan kertas "|"

- Ibu Tuti Koto, 68, ibu dari Yani Afri.

"Sekitar 10 orang datang ke kamar saya - dua orang dari seragam militer di saat yang
paling di plainclothes. Saya telah diambil suatu tempat, bukan polisi. Saya psikologis
digoncang karena orang-orang yang ditangkap polisi tidak me. Saya takut bahwa saya
akan dibunuh. Saya telah disiksa dan electrocuted. Saya beruntung penjahat - saya
selamat dan tidak mati atau hilang seperti banyak teman. Orang lain masih tidak tahu
jika saudara mereka yang hidup atau mati. "?
- Mugiyanto, 32, ketua IKOHI.

Di atas adalah bukti dari korban dan keluarga korban pelanggaran hak asasi manusia
yang menderita di bawah tindakan keras dari rezim Soeharto pada 1997-1998.

Mugiyanto atau Mugi, kepala dari Asosiasi Keluarga Indonesia yang hilang (IKOHI),
adalah korban pelanggaran HAM. Beliau adalah aktivis pada tahun 1998, karena banyak
mahasiswa yang pada waktu itu, untuk promosi untuk meniadakan lima tindakan tidak
adil yang dikeluarkan oleh pemerintah Soeharto yaitu: bertindak pada partai politik,
bertindak pada pemilihan umum, bertindak pada ormas, bertindak sesuai dengan
komposisi dari parlemen, dan bertindak pada referendums.

Hanya tiga partai politik yang diperbolehkan selama rezim Soeharto. Para aktivis
menuntut perubahan dari rezim yang seperti ini terhadap Dual Fungsi TNI yang
didukung rezim Soeharto yang otoriter. Pemerintah dilarang oleh organisasi itu
dikaitkan dengan Partai Komunis Indonesia, sebuah partai politik ilegal terdakwa dari
tindakan murtad. Mugi dan banyak siswa bekerja di bawah tanah. Ia ditangkap oleh
militer pada 13 Maret 1998 dan merilis tiga bulan kemudian pada tanggal 8 Juni 1998,
ketika kemudian Presiden BJ Habibie telah terguling. Dia segera bergabung dengan
temannya Munir di KontraS, Komisi untuk secara Kehilangan dan Korban Pelanggaran,
untuk membawa kasus itu ke Eropa dan Amerika Serikat Bangsa-Bangsa.

Mugi bekerja sebagai wartawan dengan jaringan televisi Belanda pada tahun 2000-
2001. Dalam pikiran adalah teman-temannya dan orang lain yang ditangkap pada
periode yang sama tetapi masih hilang. Dia memutuskan untuk mundur dari
pekerjaannya dan bergabung dengan IKOHI.

Salah satu Mugi's yang menghilang pada 31 Maret 1998 adalah Bimo Petrus, seorang
siswa dari Departemen Filsafat di Universitas Driyakara Jakarta, dan Dionysius Utomo
anak. Dionysius adalah petugas administrasi di Malang Rumah Sakit Pusat Mental. Dia
segera mencari dia ketika dia belajar tentang kasus anaknya. Ia pergi ke rumah dan
banyak pemerintah militer dan polisi tetapi tidak ditemukan. Selain dari mengetahui
apakah anaknya sudah mati atau hidup, ketika diminta untuk alasan lain, ia berpikir
untuk sementara waktu dan berkata dengan mata sedih:

Bimo Petrus
Bimo Petrus, salah satu hilang.

"Saya memiliki banyak berharap pada pemerintah selama reformasi, tetapi sia-sia.
Presiden tidak pernah menyiapkan semua badan independen untuk melihat kasus saya,
tidak ada respon dengan cara apapun. Saya perlu tahu, saya memiliki hak untuk tahu.
Jika dia sudah mati, saya harus mengubur dia sesuai dengan adat Katolik. Saya perlu
biaya untuk orang-orang yang terlibat dalam hilangnya. Saya berharap bahwa
pelanggaran akan berhenti sekarang. Saya tidak ingin melihatnya terjadi lagi - tidak
untuk satu keluarga "?.

Dionysius Utomo
Dionysius Utomo, ayah dari Bimo Petrus.
Demikian juga kepada Ibu Tuti, anaknya Yani Afri menghilang pada tanggal 26 Juli
1997. Dia meminta setiap instansi pemerintah tetapi gagal. Ketika ia mendengar tentang
Kontras, dia segera pergi untuk meminta bantuan. Dia bertemu Munir yang membantu
untuk mencari Yani di berbagai markas militer dan kantor-kantor pemerintahan dan
pribadi telah dialog dengan mantan Presiden Abdurrahman Wahid dan TNI Chief
Wiranto, tetapi masih tanpa hasil.

Tuti koko
Tuti koko, ibu Yani Afri.

"Saya mendapat bantuan dari KontraS tetapi saya menangis setiap kali saya pergi dan
melihat ada jalan penyanyi. Saya selalu ingat anak saya. Dia miskin tetapi dia seorang
artis. Dia suka bermain gitar dan bernyanyi untuk saya. Sementara anak saya masih
sekitar, ia akan membantu me finansial dengan bekerja sebagai sopir sambil mencari
dalam kajiannya. Sekarang, saya tidak memiliki sumber pendapatan reguler "|"?? 1

IKOHI didirikan pada tahun 1998 oleh Munir dan aktivis hak asasi manusia. Ini 2nd
kongres yang diadakan di Makassar, Sulawesi Selatan pada 7-10 Maret 2006 dan
memilih Mugiyanto sebagai ketua. Kongres ini diikuti oleh keluarga korban dan
pelanggaran hak asasi manusia selama rezim Soeharto dari 1965 to1998. Ada sekitar 80
peserta dari barat Indonesia, Aceh, ke timur, dan Papua. Tujuan dari kongres adalah
untuk meninjau konstitusi, mandat, kegiatan, dan pemilihan anggota komite untuk
melanjutkan kerja dan untuk menindaklanjuti kasus-kasus yang hilang.

Kongres IKOHI
IKOHI Kongres.

"" | Setelah Soeharto, setiap pemerintah Indonesia tidak dapat menyelesaikan masalah
dari keluarga yang hilang; tidak ada kompensasi, tidak kesejahteraan sosial, dan tidak
ada solusi untuk korban pelanggaran hak asasi manusia. Kami harus berbuat lebih
banyak untuk kami keadilan. Kami mendorong pemerintah untuk komitmen dan politik
bagi korban dan keluarga "?, Mugi dijelaskan dan ditambahkan;" Masyarakat tidak
tertarik dengan korban pelanggaran hak asasi manusia sekarang bahkan ketika kita
berada dalam apa yang disebut "reformasi"? sistem. Ada begitu banyak krisis sosial di
negara kita yang hak asasi manusia bukan merupakan prioritas. Indonesia mencoba
untuk melupakan apa yang terjadi pada masa Orde Baru, mereka memiliki memori
singkat "?.

Terakhir kata "memori pendek"? tampaknya seperti situasi di Indonesia. Orang Thai
juga memiliki memori pendek dengan apa yang terjadi pada tanggal 6 Oktober 1976
atau Mei 1992 banyak yang hilang, meninggal atau luka. Kehilangan Somchai
Neelaphaijit pengacara pada tahun 2004 atau orang-orang yang masih hilang di selatan
Thailand adalah juga paling sepi. Yang payah dan cries dari keluarga tidak memiliki arti.

Indonesia dan Thailand sedang dalam proses reformasi politik dan harus belajar dari
satu sama lain. Reformasi politik di Thailand dimulai pada akhir tahun 1990-an dengan
penegakan konstitusi 1997 yang menyatakan tiga utama reformasi: memperkuat sistem
politik (Perdana Menteri Senator dan sistem), partisipasi masyarakat di setiap tingkat
administrasi, dan sistem perlindungan hak asasi manusia. Krisis untuk mengusir
Thaksin adalah tahap kedua dari reformasi. Ada yang masih belum banyak kemajuan
sejak reformasi politik di Indonesia telah dimulai lebih dari 10 tahun lalu.

Indonesia juga harus sering mempertanyakan "reformasi"?. IKOHI dan keluarga untuk
memperkuat tekanan lebih politisi untuk bekerja untuk keadilan adalah contoh yang
baik bagi partisipasi masyarakat dalam reformasi politik. Ia tidak hanya menguntungkan
keluarga tetapi juga kemajuan demokrasi dan hak asasi manusia pada umumnya.
"Reformasi"? berarti partisipasi masyarakat di setiap tingkat administrasi, lembaga
negara mempraktekkan "Peraturan UU"?, National Institute melakukan peran efisien
dan mandiri, politisi menghormati dan menyebarkan universal standar hak asasi
manusia, dan pemerintah negara berkembang di bawah konsep "tdk dpt dibagi"?, yang
berarti pembangunan ekonomi negara adalah sejajar dengan sipil dan politik
pembangunan.

IKOHI tugas yang belum selesai. Kekuatan masyarakat dalam politik reformasi harus
kekuatan hak asasi manusia. Sebuah masyarakat akan diperkuat dengan hasil akhir
Kehilangan politik dan pelanggaran hak asasi manusia.

Catatan kaki 1: Tuti Koto, Hilangnya Satu's Iman dalam Hukum, Penyembuhan terluka,
baik melalui perbaikan, diterbitkan oleh AFAD, 2005, halaman 61.

Dutch War Crimes

September 9th, 2008, in Opinion, by Lairedion

Lairedion on the Dutch state being sued over war crimes at Rawagede, West Java.

Dutch State sued by Indonesians

On Monday 8 September 2008 10 Indonesian survivors of Dutch post WWII violence

have sued the Dutch State for the assassination of their family members during the First
Police Action (Agresi Militer Belanda I) after WW II. They want financial
compensation, explanations and recognition for their suffering, as announced by their
lawyer Mr. Gerrit Jan Pulles.

According to Pulles it is for the first time Indonesian victims of the fighting of 1945-
1949 hold the Dutch State responsible. Mr. Pulles acts on behalf of ten villagers from
Rawagede, West Java. They survived the bloody attack of the Dutch Army on 9
December 1947. According to the Dutch Honorary Debts Foundation, 431 (almost all
the male) villagers were slaughtered. According to the Dutch Indulgence Note from
1969 150 people were killed. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs has announced they will
study the matter.

Well into 2008, 63 years after Indonesian independence, the Dutch, due to their
stubbornness, ignorance and patronizing behaviour, are being haunted again by their
crimes in the aftermath of Soekarno’s declaration of 17-8-45 and they rightfully should.
Only just being liberated themselves from the Germans the Dutch wanted to continue
the situation as it was before WWII and re-occupy their former territories now being
declared independent and bearing the name Republik Indonesia.
Rawagede is one of the most notorious events in the history of Indonesian struggle for
independence against the Dutch. On 9 December 1947 Dutch forces raided the West
Javanese village to look for weapons and Indonesian freedom fighter Lukas Kustario
who often spent time in Rawagede. They didn’t find any weapons neither did they find
Lukas.

Apparently dissatisfied by their lack of success the Dutch commander directed all males
to be separated from the rest in order to execute all of them, despite the fact there were
some young males of 11-12 years old among them. Indonesian leaders reported the
mass killing to local UN officials. The UN made an inquiry and concluded the killings
were “deliberate” and “ruthless” but failed to prosecute and to have the Dutch punished
and sentenced for these obvious crimes against humanity and this is still the situation
today!

Last month Pulles (of mixed Indo-Dutch blood like yours truly) visited Rawagede
together with people from the “Yayasan Komite Utang Kehormatan Belanda (KUKB)”,
including its chairman Jeffry Pondaag, to collect witness accounts and endorsements
from survivors in order to hold the Dutch State responsible.

While financial compensation is sought after it must be noted that most survivors only
want the Dutch State to take moral responsibility and offer official apologies to the
Indonesian people. Furthermore they do not seek punishments for the people directly
involved in the killings. One survivor just wants the Dutch not to forget what has
happened.

At the same time more and more Dutch veterans, haunted by the crimes and horror they
experienced, are supportive of the Rawagede survivors’ claim. It is very disappointing
to see that of all the Dutch political parties only the left-wing Socialist Party support the
claim while the conservative-liberal VVD on behalf of MP spokesman Hans van Baalen
even denied Dutch crimes against humanity in Indonesia! 63 years of ignorance and
subtle racism have been persistent obviously, a disease many Western nations still suffer
from.

It is because of this the KUKB has been founded by Netherlands-based Indonesian Jeffy
Pondaag in 2005. They demand the Dutch government:

1. to recognize 17 August 1945 as the day Indonesia became independent.

2. to offer apologies to the Indonesian people for its colonialism, slavery, gross
violations of human rights and crimes against humanity.

The foundation is a non-subsidized independent foundation with branches in the

Netherlands and Indonesia and would be happy to accept any donations. They look after
the interests of civilian victims who suffered from violence and war crimes committed
by Dutch military. Their website have more information on the Rawagede story and on
the infamous Raymond Westerling who murdered thousands of innocent people in
South Sulawesi.

Back in 2005 Indonesian Foreign Minister Hassan Wirayuda, obviously speaking on

behalf of the Indonesian people, made it clear Indonesia is not seeking apologies or
compensation from the Dutch. This reaction came after then Dutch Foreign Minister
Ben Bot (who is Jakarta-born) expressed regrets and morally accepted the de-facto
independence of Indonesia on 17-8-45 while he was representing the Dutch government
during the festivities of Independence Day on 17-8-2005. Bot’s remarks were widely
criticized in the Dutch media for being insufficient and way too short of a full apology
and recognition of 17-8-45.

Of course it is irrelevant if Indonesia is demanding apologies or compensation or not. It

should come from the Dutch themselves but their stubbornness and ignorance are still
hindering them anno 2008. The Netherlands have constantly refused to express a full
apology and recognition but were always quick to raise their finger and lecture its
former colony on alleged human rights violations during the Soeharto reign.

I’m fully supportive of the Rawagede villagers and any future similar cases, seeking for
Dutch responsibility, recognition and financial compensation. Evidence is clear,
witnesses and next of kin are still alive, we’re dealing with war crimes, gross violation
of human rights and crimes against humanity and here lies an opportunity for the Dutch
to finally deal with its own past by recognizing and helping those poor villagers.

Sources and links:

News article from Dutch daily “Parool” (Dutch) : Indonesiërs klagen Nederlandse staat
aan

Website of KUKB (Dutch and Indonesian): Yayasan Komite Utang Kehormatan

Belanda

1948 (English) Word document approx. 7.8 MB: Report of the Rawahgedeh observation
team

Broadcast of Dutch news show Netwerk with topic on this story: Netwerk 8 September
2008 (witness accounts from survivors (Dutch-Indonesian-Sundanese). Streaming
media, requires broadband internet access.

Terjemahannya : Belanda kejahatan perang

9 September 2008, di Opini, oleh Lairedion

Lairedion di negara Belanda yang susu atas kejahatan perang di Rawagede, Jawa Barat.

Negara Belanda susu oleh Indonesia

Pada Senin 8 September 2008 10 Indonesia korban Belanda pasca PD II kekerasan telah
susu Negara Belanda untuk pembunuhan anggota keluarga mereka selama Pertama
Polisi Aksi (Agresi Militer Belanda I) setelah WW II. Mereka ingin kompensasi
keuangan, penjelasan dan pengakuan untuk mereka menderita, sebagai pengacara
mereka diumumkan oleh Bapak Gerrit Jan Pulles.

Menurut Pulles ini untuk pertama kalinya Indonesia korban yang memerangi 1945-1949
pegang dari Negara Belanda bertanggung jawab. Bapak Pulles bertindak atas nama dari
sepuluh desa Rawagede, Jawa Barat. Mereka bertahan berdarah serangan dari Tentara
Belanda pada tanggal 9 Desember 1947. Menurut Yayasan Utang Kehormatan Belanda,
431 (hampir semua laki-laki) desa yang dipotong. Menurut Belanda Indulgence Catatan
dari 1969 150 orang tewas. Departemen Luar Negeri telah mengumumkan mereka akan
mempelajari masalah.

Baik ke 2008, setelah 63 tahun kemerdekaan Indonesia, Belanda, karena sikap keras
kepala, kebodohan patronizing dan perilaku, sedang angker lagi oleh mereka dalam
kejahatan setelah Soekarno's Deklarasi 17-8-45 dan mereka harus tepat. Hanya saja
yang liberated diri dari Jerman Belanda ingin melanjutkan situasi seperti ini sebelum
PD II dan kembali bekas-membeset mereka wilayah yang sekarang dinyatakan
independen dan peluru nama Republik Indonesia.

Rawagede adalah salah satu yang paling terkenal jahat dalam peristiwa sejarah
perjuangan Indonesia untuk kemerdekaan melawan Belanda. Pada tanggal 9 Desember
1947 Belanda memaksa raided Jawa Barat desa untuk mencari senjata dan pejuang
kemerdekaan Indonesia Lukas Kustario yang sering menghabiskan waktu di Rawagede.
Mereka tidak menemukan senjata mereka tidak menemukan Lukas.

Tampaknya mereka tidak puas dengan keberhasilan Belanda komandan diarahkan untuk
semua laki-laki dipisahkan dari sisanya untuk melakukan semua itu, meskipun ada
beberapa fakta laki-laki muda dari 11-12 tahun di antara mereka. Indonesia dilaporkan
pemimpin massa lokal untuk membunuh pejabat PBB. PBB telah dijalankan dan
menyimpulkan pembunuhan yang telah "sengaja" dan "buas" tetapi gagal untuk
menuntut dan agar Belanda dihukum dan hukuman ini jelas kejahatan terhadap
kemanusiaan dan ini masih dalam situasi hari ini!

Bulan lalu Pulles (dari campuran Indo-Belanda darah seperti Anda benar-benar)
dikunjungi Rawagede bersama-sama dengan orang-orang dari "Yayasan Komite Utang
Kehormatan Belanda (KUKB)", termasuk ketua JEFFRY Pondaag, untuk
mengumpulkan saksi dan account endorsements dari korban untuk terus Negara
Belanda bertanggung jawab.

Sementara kompensasi keuangan yang dicari itu harus dicatat bahwa kebanyakan
korban hanya ingin Negara Belanda untuk mengambil tanggung jawab moral dan
menawarkan apologies resmi kepada masyarakat Indonesia. Selain itu mereka tidak
mencari hukuman bagi orang-orang yang terlibat langsung dalam pembunuhan. Satu
club hanya ingin Belanda untuk tidak lupa apa yang telah terjadi.

Pada saat yang sama lebih dan lebih Belanda yang terluka, angker oleh kejahatan dan
kengerian yang dialaminya, yang mendukung dari Rawagede korban klaim. Sangat
mengecewakan untuk melihat bahwa semua partai politik Belanda hanya sayap kiri-
Partai Sosialis mendukung klaim sementara konservatif-liberal VVD atas nama MP juru
bicara Hans van Baalen bahkan ditolak Belanda kejahatan terhadap kemanusiaan di
Indonesia! 63 tahun kebodohan dan halus rasisme telah tetap jelas, penyakit banyak
negara-negara Barat masih menderita.

Hal ini karena ini KUKB telah didirikan oleh Belanda berbasis Jeffy Pondaag Indonesia
pada tahun 2005. Mereka menuntut pemerintah Belanda:
1. mengenali 17 Agustus 1945 sebagai hari Indonesia menjadi independen.
2. apologies untuk menawarkan kepada masyarakat Indonesia untuk kolonialisme,
perbudakan, kotor pelanggaran hak asasi manusia dan kejahatan terhadap kemanusiaan.

Yayasan adalah non-subsidi yayasan independen dengan cabang di Belanda dan

Indonesia dan akan senang hati menerima sumbangan. Mereka menjaga kepentingan
korban sipil yang menderita dari kekerasan dan kejahatan perang oleh militer Belanda.
Situs web mereka memiliki lebih banyak informasi mengenai Rawagede cerita dan pada
jahat Raymond Westerling yang bersalah membunuh ribuan orang di Sulawesi Selatan.

Kembali pada tahun 2005 Indonesia Menteri Luar Negeri Hassan Wirayuda, jelas
berbicara atas nama masyarakat Indonesia, menjadikan Indonesia tidak mencari
apologies atau kompensasi dari Belanda. Ini reaksi datang kemudian setelah Menteri
Luar Negeri Belanda Ben Bot (yang lahir di Jakarta) dinyatakan menyesalkan dan moral
mengakui secara de-facto kemerdekaan Indonesia pada 17-8-45 sementara dia mewakili
pemerintah Belanda selama acara-acara dari Hari Kemerdekaan pada tanggal 17 -8-
2005. Bot's tersebut telah dikritik secara luas di media Belanda untuk menjadi kurang
terlalu pendek dan cara yang penuh maaf dan pengakuan dari 17-8-45.

Tentu saja, sudah tidak relevan lagi jika Indonesia menuntut apologies atau kompensasi
atau tidak. Ia harus datang dari Belanda mereka tapi mereka sikap keras kepala dan
kebodohan masih Hambat mereka anno 2008. Belanda telah terus menolak
mengungkapkan penuh maaf dan pengakuan tetapi selalu cepat untuk meningkatkan jari
mereka dan para bekas koloni kuliah pada dugaan pelanggaran hak asasi manusia
selama pemerintahan Soeharto.

Saya mendukung sepenuhnya dari desa Rawagede dan kasus-kasus serupa di masa
depan, Belanda untuk mencari tanggung jawab, pengakuan dan kompensasi keuangan.
Bukti yang jelas, saksi dan keluarga terdekat berikutnya masih hidup, kami berurusan
dengan kejahatan perang, kotor pelanggaran hak asasi manusia dan kejahatan terhadap
kemanusiaan dan terletak di sini kesempatan untuk Belanda akhirnya untuk berurusan
dengan masa lalu sendiri oleh orang-orang yang mengenali dan membantu miskin desa.

Sumber dan link:

Berita artikel dari Belanda harian "Parool" (Belanda): Indonesiërs klagen Nederlandse
staat aan

Situs KUKB (Belanda dan Indonesia): Yayasan Komite Utang Kehormatan Belanda

1948 (Inggris) sekitar dokumen Word. 7,8 MB: Laporan dari pengamatan tim
Rawahgedeh

Menyiarkan berita Belanda Netwerk dengan topik memperlihatkan pada cerita ini:
Netwerk 8 September 2008 (account dari saksi korban (Belanda-Indonesia-Sunda).
Streaming media, membutuhkan akses internet broadband.
Ini tentang Timtim, terjemahannya atur sendiri!
Tortured Beginnings Police Violence and the Beginnings of Impunity in East
Timor Map of East Timor

I. Introduction
Key Recommendations
II. Methodology
III. Background
Establishing the East Timor Police Force
Composition of the East Timor Police Force
Responsibility for Training, Discipline, and Investigating Police Abuse
IV. Police Abuse
Arbitrary Detention
Unauthorized Use of Firearms
Impunity for Rape
Legal Standards on Torture and Other Physical Mistreatment
V. Reforms, Institutions and Practices Needed to Create Police Accountability in East
Timor
A. Addressing Impunity
B. The Development of Oversight Institutions
Professional Ethics and Deontology Unit
The Office of the Provedor
C. Legal Gaps
D. The Need for More and Better Training
E. Problematic Past Training Approaches
F. Current Initiatives
G. Monitoring
VI. Detailed Recommendations
Recommendations to the Government of East Timor
Recommendations to Donors and Others Providing Assistance to the Police
VII. Acknowledgements

I. Introduction

I think that if the police arrest people, they can't beat them. You have to ask first if he is
guilty, then arrest him, and then take him to the court in Dili. But because they [the
police] have a bad attitude, they just arrest and straight away beat people. I think they
should be fired, or arrested themselves.

Carlito Gusmao, victim of police beating, Aldeia Tasmasak, Bobonaro[1]

Carlito Gusmao was arrested by the police after he refused to take part in the national
census. He was accused of threatening the census takers with a knife when they visited
his village. He told Human Rights Watch how uniformed police officers arrived at his
house at about 9:30 in the morning and took him in a police car to Maliana district
police station in the western region of East Timor.[2] He was beaten as soon as he got
out of the car and then put in a cell. While in the cell he said he witnessed police
officers severely beating another detainee, using a bulletproof vest. That evening other
police officers came into his cell and sprayed pepper spray into his eyes. He has not
made a complaint about the abuse he alleges, for fear of retribution, and also because he
believes nothing will come of it.[3]

Over the past two years police abuse has become one of East Timor's most worrying
human rights problems.Police officers regularly use excessive force during arrests, and
beat detainees once they are in custody. This behavior seems to have become so
common that officers rarely try to hide their actions from the general public. Human
Rights Watch experienced no shortage of cases to document wherever we went in East
Timor.

One East Timorese activist working for a nongovernmental organization (NGO) in Dili
that has been monitoring police violence in East Timor told Human Rights Watch:

Beatings during arrest are already prevalent. Why? Because of the attitude of the police
that they are an institution that has to be respected. They do not accept the questioning
of their role or authority. If I am a PNTL officer and say to you that you are guilty, you
have to say, "I am ready to be guilty." Beatings are already routine.[4]

Many of these abuses, as described to Human Rights Watch, rise to the level of torture.
Mario Belo, a twenty-seven-year-old man recounted what happened after he was
arrested in Mulia village, Baucau, for throwing rocks at some people he suspected of
tampering with his fishing boat:

By the time I got to the prison it was about 7:00 p.m.; I think it was June 18. I was ready
to answer [a question], but before I could answer [the police officer] straight away hit
me, kicked me on my chin. My face turned and he hit me again on my left chin and jaw.
He kicked me with his feet, kicked my groin [kemaluan]. He was wearing police boots,
full police uniform. He kicked my right side and I fell. It was inside the examination
room in the prison. I stood up and then straight away he kicked me here [in the mouth].
He cut my lip, both the top and the bottom. For about a week I couldn't eat. They took
me to the hospital in Baucau. The police officer from Laga took me to the hospital. In
the room at the time [the beating took place] there was the officer from the prison, the
perpetrator, two policemen from Laga, and me. They all just watched, didn't try and stop
it. It was about thirty minutes this violence. Finally he took out his gun and threatened
me. He was about one meter away from me. He said, "Later, I will kill you." I answered,
"I haven't done anything wrong. Why do you hit me?" He said, "You be quiet, later I
will shoot you."[5]

Many individuals whom Human Rights Watch interviewed also described their arrest by
the police as illegal. Many said that they were not told what the allegations against them
were, and many were held without charges for more than the seventy-two-hour period
allowed by East Timorese law. Police officers appear to habitually utilize the full
seventy-two hours of detention as a punitive, rather than procedural, measure.

The police and other state institutions have often failed to respond to incidents of police
abuse appropriately. There is a lack of understanding among those investigating
complaints that police officers committing a crime such as assault should be prosecuted
through the criminal justice system as well as through the internal disciplinary system.
The internal police oversight body, the Professional Ethics and Deontology Unit
(PEDU, until recently called the Professonal Ethics Office, PEO), has often failed to
take cases of police abuse seriously, follow up on complaints, or appropriately discipline
the officers involved. Insufficient police training on internal investigations and follow
up, and the absence of a functioning external, independent oversight and accountability
mechanism for the police service have meant that such complaints are often dealt with
inconsistently, or in some cases not at all. Where cases are taken up, victims are usually
left uninformed about developments and outcomes of their cases. Human Rights Watch
spoke to many victims and their families about their attempts to seek accountability for
human rights violations committed by the East Timor police force. Many were
frustrated and perplexed by opaque bureaucratic procedures and long delays.

Within the East Timor government, the portfolio for internal security lies with the
Ministry of Interior. Ultimate responsibility for accountability for policing therefore lies
with the minister of interior, currently Rogerio Lobato. However, while institutionally
subordinate to the Ministry, the East Timor police service also has its own distinct legal
personality and operational structure.[6] This includes a general commander and
deputies, separate heads for each specialized unit, and thirteen district commanders.
Together with two Ministry-appointed officers, this group comprises the Superior Police
Council, which ordinarily convenes every six months to discuss disciplinary matters
such as those arising from rights violations.[7]

Swift and appropriate disciplinary action and prosecutions against police officers
responsible for human rights abuses and abuse of authority are critical indicators of the
commitment of East Timor's government to creating a professional police force. They
are also an indicator of how seriously the government takes its human rights obligations
under the country's constitution and the many human rights treaties it has acceded to. It
is worth noting that the country's leaders often talk about the deficit of human resources
in the country and the need for increased training. This is certainly necessary, but it will
only make a difference if at a political and policy level the kind of violence described in
this report is punished. Otherwise, the failure to penalize human rights violators will
create a climate of impunity that in turn will undermine training as an effective tool to
decrease the level of police violence.

With the legacy of brutal Indonesian policing during the nearly twenty-five-year
occupation that ended in 1999, it is perhaps not surprising that new recruits into East
Timor's police are mirroring past experience in ignorance of professional standards.
However, such behavior also reflects poor training, accountability and oversight, and
can no longer be excused nearly six years after the first new police graduated in July
2000. In fact it is now more likely that the lack of institutionalized responses to police
brutality has been a key factor in the emergence of police abuse as one of East Timor's
most pressing and current human rights problems.

One serious consequence of this emerging pattern of abuse and impunity in East Timor
is the potential for long-term erosion of public respect and support for the police, both
as individual officers and as an institution. With the creation of a new country, the East
Timorese people expected that its police would behave differently than the Indonesian-
controlled forces during the occupation. But ineffective control, inadequate training,
poor accountability mechanisms and lack of proper vetting of police officers have meant
that abuse of powers by police remains a serious challenge to the rule of law in East
Timor. The United Nation's failure to address this issue effectively while it was in
charge during the transition to independence was also a contributory factor.

East Timor is now at a crossroads. While it is recognized that resources in East Timor
are at a premium, the importance of establishing a professional and accountable police
force is crucial to the country's future stability. A lack of accountability for abuses will
undermine trust in the police and therefore its effectiveness and capacity to uphold the
rule of law. Tolerated police abuse will make individuals reluctant to report crime to the
police, or cooperate with them in criminal investigations, either as witnesses or victims.
This in turn may lead to a vicious cycle in which a police force increasingly criticized
for an inability to do its job effectively turns to ever harsher tactics and increasingly
resorts to violence to achieve results. If present violations are not addressed as an
institutional problem, they run the risk of becoming part of an endemic culture of abuse
and impunity in the world's newest national police force, a culture that will be hard to
eliminate once it takes hold.

Key Recommendations

Human Rights Watch found evidence of human rights violations by police officers to be
widespread, although not yet endemic, in East Timor. Now is the time to address this
problem before it becomes endemic. Human Rights Watch urges the East Timor
government to:

* Ensure through public measures and statements that there is a clear, unambiguous and
consistent signal from the top that police use of torture, arbitrary detention, and
excessive force will not be tolerated.
* Ensure that legislation, policy and procedures are all in place so that the police operate
under a coherent and clear legal framework that specifies police powers and their limits.
This should include provisions to hold police publicly accountable in a transparent and
credible manner.
* Support the Provedor's Office in creating a unit dedicated to oversight of the police.
* Task the minister of interior and the police commissioner to strengthen the police
force's Professional Ethics and Deontology Unit by providing strong support for the
unit's authority to enforce its decisions and by penalizing officers who do not comply
with its directives.
* Ensure all oversight mechanisms coordinate and work together.

We also urge the East Timor police service (PNTL) to:

* Take swift and meaningful action against police officers who torture, arbitrarily
detain, or use excessive force against members of the population. This should include
administrative measures up to and including dismissal, and, where appropriate, criminal
prosecution.
* Take appropriate disciplinary action against commanding officers who know or should
know of such acts, and who fail to take action to prevent and punish them. The police
commissioner should issue a directive to each district commander advising that he or
she will be held personally responsible for ensuring the officers under his or her
command comply with the existing disciplinary regulation and Rules of Organization
Procedures (ROPs).

Donors should:

* Raise with the government of East Timor in all official meetings, and at the highest
level, concerns over police violence, including torture. Call on the East Timor
government to ensure that police treatment of all individuals conforms to international
human rights standards.
* Substantially increase support for effective human rights monitoring in East Timor
through existing mechanisms, such as civil society. As an integral part of this strategy,
provide assistance for the development of local human rights groups with the capacity
for independent monitoring of police violence, and to agencies that can provide services
for victims.
* Initiate and support joint meetings between the East Timorese government, NGOs and
the PNTL to coordinate, fund and plan for long-term strategies on capacity building,
training, and other support to the PNTL.

II. Methodology

Human Rights Watch visited East Timor in May-June 2005 and interviewed over eighty
individuals on the issue of police violence and growing impunity. Research interviews
were conducted primarily in Baucau, Bobonaro and Dili districts. All interviews were
conducted by a Human Rights Watch researcher directly in Indonesian or English.

Human Rights Watch interviewed more than thirty victims and witnesses to police
violence. We also interviewed a range of domestic and international NGOs, United
Nations (U.N.) agency and United Nations Mission of Support in East Timor
(UNMISET) representatives, including Special Representative to the Secretary-General
(SRSG) Sukehiro Hasegawa, and staff from the UNMISET Human Rights Unit and
Political Affairs Unit. UNMISET has since been stood down, but many of these staff
now work for the United Nations Office in Timor-Leste (UNOTIL) and have continued
to provide information and assistance to Human Rights Watch. U.N. police in East
Timor extended much cooperation at both national and district levels; Human Rights
Watch is especially grateful to the U.N. Police Senior Advisor Saif Ullah Malik for his
time.

Human Rights Watch met with a range of East Timor government and police officials.
We are grateful for the cooperation of East Timor's Police Commissioner Paulo Martins
and Vice Minister of Interior Alcino Barris for assistance extended during the course of
our research. East Timor's police force extended a high level of cooperation throughout
the research trip, and allowed Human Rights Watch access to several police stations,
detention facilities, and the national training academy.

Despite several written and telephone requests by Human Rights Watch, we regret
having been unable to meet with more members of East Timor's government, including
with a representative from the Prime Minister's Office or the Ministry of Justice.
For the purposes of this report Human Rights Watch has only looked into the conduct of
the regular police force in East Timor, and not the specialized units.

Except where noted, Human Rights Watch offers no conclusions as to the guilt or
innocence of criminal charges of any victim of police abuse described in this report.

III. Background

After almost twenty-five years of brutal occupation of East Timor by Indonesia, in

September 1999 the Indonesian National Army (TNI) and Timorese militias went on a
campaign of extreme violence when the people of East Timor voted for independence in
a U.N.-administered referendum. An estimated 1,400 East Timorese civilians lost their
lives in the months before and the days immediately after the voting. Approximately
half a million people were forced from their homes or fled to seek refuge.

The violence was part of a systematically planned policy by elements of the Indonesian
government and TNI to prevent the people of East Timor from freely participating in the
referendum, and to punish them for voting for independence.The crimes committed
against East Timorese included mass murder, torture, assault, forced disappearance,
mass forcible deportations, the destruction of property, and rape and other sexual
violence against women and children. These crimes were part of a pattern of gross
violations of international human rights and humanitarian law, which, in many cases,
constituted crimes against humanity.

Indonesia's subsequent withdrawal in late 1999 left not only a country devastated and
traumatized by occupation and conflict, but it also left an institutional vacuum at all
levels of civil administration and government. Many of East Timor's former civil
servants were Indonesian or pro-Indonesia, and thousands left the country after the
referendum. After four hundred years of Portuguese and then Indonesian occupation, the
colonial legacy left to East Timor was one of very few functioning institutions, a huge
human resource deficit, and an overwhelming and urgent need to build a government
from scratch.

The most effective environment in which to build functioning public institutions is a

secure and stable one. Although East Timor benefited from a relatively stable and
smooth transition from occupied territory to independent state under the stewardship of
the United Nations, the country still faces a myriad of post-conflict problems. It remains
one of the world's poorest countries and ranks as one of the lowest on the Human
Development Index (HDI).[8] Unemployment and underemployment are estimated to
be approximately 50 percent,[9] while recent figures estimate the annual per capita
gross domestic product (GDP) to be equivalent to only U.S.$370, falling to as low as
U.S.$150 in rural areas.[10] The population is largely rural, and infrastructure for basic
social services, health care, and economic support outside the capital, Dili, is extremely
limited. Much of the population remains traumatized by the Indonesian occupation, and
the six years since it ended have left people dissatisfied and frustrated by the slow pace
of reconstruction and development.
East Timor has made formal commitments to human rights: The constitution includes
important human rights protections and, on the first International Human Rights Day
after independence (December 10, 2002), East Timor's parliament approved accession
to seven major international human rights treaties, including the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights, and the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment.[11] Ratification and reporting on these treaties is a
key priority for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. There is also a human rights advisor
permanently appointed to the Prime Minister's office who, in 2004, convened an
inclusive government and NGO working group to discuss the drafting of a Human
Rights Action Plan for East Timor (to include public consultations on what should be
included). In 2005 East Timor established a Provedor's Office (see below), similar to an
ombudsman institution in other countries.
Establishing the East Timor Police Force

Establishing a new police force for East Timor was one of the priorities for the United
Nations before sovereignty was passed to the new state in May 2002. Under a clear
mandate to provide security and maintain law and order throughout the country,
successive U.N. missions in East Timor were instructed and authorized to help enable
the rapid development of a credible, professional and impartial police service.[12] U.N.
Civilian Police (CivPol) began recruitment drives for the new East Timorese police
service in early 2000 and basic training commenced on March 27, 2000, under the
auspices of the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET).
The initial graduating class of the newly inaugurated PoliceCollege numbered 1,700, the
first fifty of whom took up their functions as police officers on July 12, 2000.[13] Just
over a year later, on August 10, 2001, the East Timor Police Service was officially
established, working alongside CivPol.[14] It later changed its name to the Timor-Leste
Police Service, before finally adopting its current title of the PoliciaNacional de Timor-
Leste (PNTL).

The joint policing arrangement between the new East Timor police and CivPol lasted
into the initial independence period, and it was not until independence, on May 20,
2002, that an agreement was signed outlining the terms and timetable of the handing
over of full policing duties from CivPol to the PNTL. This process started with the
PNTL successively taking over control of policing district by district. Foreseen for a
shorter timeframe, the process eventually took eighteen months, the PNTL finally
assuming responsibility for general day-to-day policing for the whole country on
December 10, 2003, when the handover of policing duties was effected for the
thirteenth and final district, Dili.

UNTAET's successor mission from May 2002, the U.N. Mission of Support in East
Timor (UNMISET), was also mandated to provide interim law enforcement and public
security, and was authorized to assist in the continued development of the PNTL.
Originally envisaged to last one year, UNMISET's mandate was twice extended (in May
and November 2003), partly reflecting the fact that the critical threshold of self-
sufficiency in key government institutions was taking longer than originally anticipated.
It was at this juncture that the East Timorese national government finally assumed full
responsibility for nationwide policing with the transfer of all executive responsibilities
for policing, internal and external security from the U.N. to the Government of East
Timor as of May 20, 2004.[15]
In May 2005 the U.N. Security Council replaced the Support Mission of UNMISET
with a much smaller special political mission, the U.N. Office in Timor-Leste
(UNOTIL).[16]
Composition of the East Timor Police Force

The Organic Decree-Law of the National Police of Timor-Leste was promulgated by the
President in May 2004.[17] It is the legal instrument governing the structure and role of
the Policia Nacional de Timor-Leste (PNTL), and specifies the role of the police in
relation to the army, Falantil-FDTL, in internal and external security. ThePNTL is
divided into the regular police and five specialist units. A July 2005 government press
release stated that the PNTL had a total force strength of approximately three thousand
officers. The focus of this report is the regular police force.

(Two of the special units are nevertheless of particular interest and are mentioned
elsewhere in this report: the Rapid Intervention Unit-Unidade Intervensaun Rapida,
UIR-and the Border Patrol Unit-Unidade de Patrulhamento de Fronteira, UPF.[18]The
function of the UIR is to respond to civil disorder, particularly in urban areas, while, as
its name implies, the Border Patrol Unit is primarily concerned with the security, patrol,
and management of the border regions.[19] Therefore, both internal disturbances and
border security remain under the auspices of the police and the Ministry of Interior
rather than with the military.[20] As of July 2005, there were 292 officers in the Border
Patrol Unit and 217 in the Rapid Intervention Unit.[21])

The passing of the police decree-law was followed by the adoption of a disciplinary
regulation in June 2004.Neither the disciplinary regulation nor the police decree-law
was subject to parliamentary scrutiny or public debate. Instead both pieces of legislation
were submitted to the President by the Council of Ministers and duly promulgated.
Oversight mechanisms (such as those outlined below) are not mentioned in the police
decree-law or the disciplinary regulation.

The police continue to have a number of institutional weaknesses including limited

professional skills and experience, particularly in the areas of policy and law. The force
is hampered by a lack of professional expertise in many administrative and management
functions, and continues to face problems due to a lack of logistical capacity and a
general lack of resources for equipment and infrastructure development.

It is also a very new and fragile police service which remains dependent on foreign aid
for equipment and training support. There is a serious need for institutional
strengthening across the board, but particularly in the area of mainstreaming human
rights and ensuring that all police powers and procedures meet with international
standards, and are implemented in accordance with them. (This is explored in detail in
section V.D of this report).
Responsibility for Training, Discipline, and Investigating Police Abuse

Replacing a Code of Conduct for the East Timor police adopted by the United Nations
administration during UNTAET,[22] the disciplinary regulation of June 2004 sets out
the duties of PNTL officers, imposes limits on police powers and outlines the
disciplinary processes that would follow any breaches of the standards set out in the
regulation. In its own words, the regulation claims to provide "a systematized corpus of
rules and principles to guide the action of [PNTL members] thereby guaranteeing the
professionalism and prestige of the institution."[23] Fifteen Rules of Organisation
Procedures (ROPs) have also been prepared in areas including use of force; community
policing; preliminary investigation of crime; search and seizure; handling of child abuse
cases and handling at-risk children; investigation and reporting of traffic accidents;
police vehicle operation; court duties; and training.[24]

There are three main bodies in East Timor that have responsibility for police oversight.
First, the internal police Professional Ethics and Deontology Office (PEDU, formerly
the Professional Ethics Office, PEO) is charged with investigating allegations of police
misconduct or abuse (which are usually made by members of the public). The results of
any investigations, together with any recommendations for discipline, are sent to the
Minister of Interior, who decides what action should be taken.[25] Second is the office
of the Inspectorate, comprising representatives from the Ministry of Interior, the police,
the office of the human rights advisor to the prime minister, and the prosecutor general's
office. Created in August 2003 in accordance with the Decree Law on the Organic
Structure of the Ministry of Interior,[26] this body has disciplinary competence over all
structures and institutions subordinate to the Ministry of Interior, including the police
(although the legislation is not explicit on the mandate of the Inspectorate to deal with
police disciplinary matters).[27] Third, there is the Office of the Provedor, the only
external oversight mechanism, which has far-reaching powers to investigate and report
on complaints against government officials and institutions, including the police.[28]
(Analysis of the PEO/PEDU and the Office of the Provedor is provided in Section V.B
of this report.)

The Ministry of Interior retains operational control over the police force, and ultimately
all members of the police force, including the police commissioner, are answerable to
the minister of interior.[29] The police commissioner has the authority to recommend
dismissals of members of the police force found guilty of human rights and other
violations, but the power to enact the dismissal lies solely with the minister of interior.

IV. Police Abuse

Since independence in 2002, police abuse has become one of East Timor's most
worrying human rights problems. Police officers regularly use excessive force during
arrests and beat detainees once they are in custody. The police and other state
institutions have often failed to respond to incidents of police abuse with appropriate
disciplinary measures or criminal proceedings.

In the course of our research the number of accounts of severe ill-treatment, including
torture that former detainees and prisoners described to us at the hands of police officers
was striking. Several people whom Human Rights Watch interviewed had had to be
hospitalized because of the severity of their injuries.[30]While this level of severity of
abuse may not yet be systematic or systemic in East Timor, the ease with which we
found illustrative cases was alarming.

In his February 2005 report to the Security Council on the United Nations mission in
East Timor, U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan noted that major problems within the
East Timor police force remained a cause for concern, and that "reports of police
misconduct, including excessive use of force, assaults, negligent use of firearms and
various human rights abuses, have increased since May 2004." He continued that "lack
of transparency and a slow-paced investigation mechanism have contributed to a poor
level of police accountability."[31] Six months later, he again noted that "although the
skills and competencies of the East Timorese police have been considerably enhanced,
instances of excessive use of force and human rights violations by police officers,
including against members of political opposition groups, continue to be reported."[32]

Human Rights Watch interviewed Mario Sarmento, who was badly beaten by police
officers in Dili in January 2005 after a fight between some youths on a bridge. The
police were using a microphone to instruct residents to remain inside their houses while
they searched for the suspects. Mr Sarmento, worried about his son, Justo, went out
looking for him. He described what happened:

I called out for my son two times, called his name. Then the police, two cars, came at
great speed to where I was standing. Both cars stopped right in front of me. [One car
then continued and the other stopped.] They got out of the car straight away. At first two
of them came in my direction. I thought they wanted to ask me some questions but they
punched me straight away in the chest-one person, without any words. After that I was
ready to apologize, and asked what was the matter, and asked them not to hit me. Two
more people got out of the car and one of them punched me again in my chest. Then
they all took out their sticks. They were wearing full police uniforms. I said "I don't
accept actions like this, I ask you to give me your names."

After I said that they got more vicious and then they put one of the sticks under my
neck. Four men, all of them carried out a beating. I was propped up against the wall.
Then because it was so chaotic my wife arrived from the house, heading in my direction
to try and stop what was happening. After my wife arrived she asked for their
forgiveness and said that her husband had not done anything wrong and not to hit him.
The four of them just continued their actions. My wife grabbed my wrist to pull me so
that they would not hit me. One of the policemen grabbed the other wrist and was
pulling me one way, with my wife pulling me in the other. Then the policeman pulled
me strongly so that my wife fell down with my four-year-old child onto the ground.

Then Vincent [another son] arrived to intervene in this incident. He talked to the police
politely and asked them not to hit his father. They didn't listen and hit him, two of them
hit him. They kicked him one time in his chest. Their faces were not clear because it
was dark. So he fell, finally they took out handcuffs, and wanted to handcuff my son,
and started threatening, "This uniform is not scared of anyone!" I went over to my son. I
asked them to help not make him a victim. They released him and they faced me again.
This all lasted about thirty minutes Then the streetlights came on. After the light came
on they stopped their action.[33]

Arbitrary Detention

Arbitrary detention is a recurring problem in East Timor. Human Rights Watch

interviewed many individuals who described their arrest by the police as illegal. Many
were not told by arresting officers what the allegations against them were. East Timor
criminal procedure allows for a suspect to be held without charge for up to seventy-two
hours, whereupon he or she must either be charged or brought before a judge to have the
detention extended. Human Rights Watch found that people were regularly held for
more than the seventy-two-hour period without charge or appearance before a judge.
One young man was picked up by police officers after he had shouted coarsely at them.
It appears that his detention was as punishment for his words, even though he had
committed no recognizable criminal offense. He told Human Rights Watch:

After that they took me to the cell in Baucau. For seventy-two hours I was detained in
the cell in Baucau. On the second night, it was Sunday, [officer D, name withheld]
called for me. After I was called, another police officer, [officer E, name withheld] hit
me in the chest, through the bars of the cell. [Officer D] called for me to come to the
front of the cell and put my hands up. [Officer E] then hit my chest. That night I didn't
eat. My chest was hurting. After that on Monday, after seventy-two hours, I was
released. There was no hearing or investigation. I was just let go and went straight
home. That's it.[34]

Article 9 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights provides that
everyone "has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be subjected to
arbitrary arrest or detention." To ensure freedom from arbitrary detention, Article 9
further requires that detention must be examined for its lawfulness by an impartial
adjudicator.East Timor's constitution also states in Section 30:

2. No one shall be arrested or detained, except under the terms clearly provided for by
applicable law, and the order of the arrest or detention should always be presented for
consideration by the competent judge within the legal time frame.

3. Every individual who loses his or her freedom shall be immediately informed, in a
clear and precise manner, of the reasons for his or her arrest or detention as well as of
his or her rights, and allowed to contact a lawyer, directly or through a relative or a
trusted person.[35]

One reason for illegal detention in East Timor is the failure to implement key training
on this issue. A senior U.N. police advisor, Nuno Anaia, told Human Rights Watch that
some targeted training had been devised to address this issue, and that the result was a
demonstrable decrease in the number of illegal detention complaints that they were
receiving. Anaia told Human Rights Watch:

This is a good example of how provision of resources and training can have an effect. In
the first six months of UNMISET, we received sixty-two complaints about violations of
the seventy-two hour rule. We then designed the training for investigators and called in
the prosecutors etc. to explain that the seventy-two hours was not for investigations So,
in the last six months only three cases have been reported, and those are mostly because
of holidays [causing non-availability of judges] etc.[36]

However, another key problem with meeting the maximum seventytwo-hour detention
rule remains the weakness of East Timor's criminal justice system, and basic lack of
resources. Outside of the capital the courts are seriously understaffed and their workers
under-resourced, and limited availability of judges and public defenders means that
hearings to rule on detention being continued beyond seventy-two hours do not take
place, or take place without the suspect having legal representation. This represents a
real operational problem for the police's compliance with legal provisions for holding
and detaining suspects. At a more basic level a lack of resources such as cars, fuel, and
car maintenance is contributing to unlawful detention and inadequate investigations
simply because, without transportation to meet with victims and witnesses, police may
resort to prolonging a suspect's detention without charge until such time as they can
conduct a basic investigation.[37]

The under-resourcing of the judiciary may affect not only suspects who are held
unlawfully beyond the seventy-two hours without charge, but also persons who are
properly remanded in pre-trial detention. Some accused can spend six months in pre-
trial detention with no judicial oversight, or without an indictment being filed against
them.[38]

Mario's wife also described the incident to Human Rights Watch, adding:

I don't know why they began to hit straight away, I don't understand those people. They
beat a lot that night. That night the back of my husband was all black, he was really
sick. He was bruised all over, from that police stick. There were many witnesses. The
community was standing in the road. There were so many witnesses.The police took out
their guns, took out their sticks, then the lights came on and they left very quickly.[39]

Mario Sarmento has repeatedly tried to find out what is happening with a case he has
lodged against the police. He told Human Rights Watch:

I have already checked four times at the district court but there is not yet any
explanation I like it if you use my name because we want to improve the PNTL so that
they can't do things like this again. I have given a report to the police, the process is
taking a long time. Because the investigation is long I also submitted a complaint to the
Professional Standards Unit. I went to the hospital to get my surat keterangan [doctor's
note],for the bruises on my back. I got some letters asking me to be a witness in a
different case; I believe this is manipulation to stop the process in my case. The process
is still with the prosecutor in Dili district. Last time I went to check he said that my case
was still being processed. The police had been summoned, but the first time they did not
come. Then the keterangan was in Indonesian so it is still being translated [into Tetum]
to go to the court. I have not yet heard if there is a process with the perpetrator; he is
still free, not detained. There has been no action from the commander.[40]

Another man, Cristiano da Costa, thirty-four, told Human Rights Watch about an
incident that happened in November 2004 after some policemen accused him of hitting
a government minister's car with his truck and then not stopping, on a road just outside
Dili. He told Human Rights Watch that there were two policemen who had followed
him to his home in Taibesse, Dili, where they wanted to arrest him. He agreed to go to
the police station with them to try and resolve the matter in the presence of his boss,
who worked for Perkumpulan HAK, a human rights organization in the capital.Cristiano
told us:

They wanted us to all go in the police car and I said it was better if I took my truck to
the station so that we would know better if there was any damage. They said you take
your truck, you in front, us behind. My house is on top of the hill. We drove down until
we got to the river. Everything was dark, it was about 10 or 11 at night. They flashed
their lights and told me to stop there. I thought maybe they wanted to take my truck and
I would go in the police car. That is what I thought. They got out of their car, and I was
still in my truck. They told me to turn off the engine, and turn off the lights. They
ordered me to open the door, saying they wanted me to get out. I opened the door and
before I had even got my foot on the ground I was hit. Once on my [left] cheek and two
times in my chest. It was one of the policemen, with his hand. Then he said, "If you do
anything you will be killed." Then they put me in the police car, one of the policemen
drove my truck to the police station in CaicoliI told the commander that I had to go to
the hospital. My cheek was injured.[41]

Perkumpulan HAK has been assisting Cristiano da Costa with his complaint against the
police for assault and arbitrary detention. They told Human Rights Watch:

The case has already had a hearing in the court. The result of the investigating judge's
decision is that the two perpetrators would have an unconditional release [i.e. charges
dropped]. Until now there has been no action from the PSU [Professional Standards
Unit, now called the Professional Ethics and Deontology Unit]. On March 17, 2005, the
prosecutor's case went to the court. At the time of the hearing Cristiano was not present.
He was not informed, not allowed to attend. Since that hearing there have not been any
further developments in the court, and the perpetrators still continue their duties as
police. There are many cases like this. There is an incident, but then there is no
process.[42]

In August 2004, several men who had been involved in a fight with residents of a rival
village were arrested and taken into police custody in Maliana police station. One
described what happened to him that night in the cell:

At midnight, police from Maliana arrived and called for me in the cell. They said for me
to come out to get some medicine. However, as soon as I started to stand up, then they
hit me-kicked me on the stomach and punched me on the chest. [The interviewee gives
the first names of the first officer to hit him and of two others who hit him when he
came out of the cell.] Then they ordered me to go back into the cell. In the morning I
was taken to Maliana hospital for treatment.[43]

One man who witnessed this told Human Rights Watch:

They took him out of the cell and took him right in front of the cell. I witnessed the
beating. They used their fists and punched him in the stomach. When they ordered him
to leave the cell, it was said it was to take some medicine but after he exited he was
ordered to raise his hands and put his back against the wall. Then he was beaten by
those two policemen. Maybe for about fifteen minutes. We didn't call out. We were just
quiet.[44]

Maliana hospital records seen by Human Rights Watch show that the victim was
admitted to the hospital in August 2004 with a "cut on the head (above the right ear).
Approximately 3cm. Scratches on the left side of the head."[45]

Several of the men submitted a complaint to the police regarding excessive use of force
at the time of their arrest and ill-treatment during their detention in Maliana police
station in August 2004. One of the victims told Human Rights Watch:

The three of us went to Maliana to initiate an investigation against the PNTL in

Maliana. We don't yet know the result. We went again on March 17, 2005, and were told
to wait for the result of the investigation. We are not satisfied with the actions of the
police. We do not accept it because their violence is as if Indonesians are still here in
East Timor.[46]

In August 2004, a man from Dili was detained with about fifty other members of his
martial arts group while on a group visit to the district of Ainaro, about forty kilometers
from Dili. The men believe they were targeted merely for membership in the martial arts
group.[47] They were told they had been arrested on suspicion of burning down a house
in a nearby village the night before. Human Rights Watch talked to one of the men
about what happened. He recounted:

The police met us in the road and immediately searched us. We had knives-they took all
of them. There was a friend of mine who was wearing a PNTL uniform but he is not
PNTL. He was ordered to do push-ups by the police and the UIR [Rapid Intervention
Unit] for about thirty minutes. After that we walked for about a hundred meters. We
passed by the house that had been burnt and they hit us. I was beaten on my back and
kicked. We were handcuffed first and then ordered to run to Ainaro townabout forty-five
of us were handcuffed. When we got to Ainaro police station we were ordered to line up
and take off our clothes-trousers, everything, just left in our underwear. Then we were
ordered to stand on one foot with our arms stretched out to the sides. If we put our foot
down we were beaten. We were also tortured with pepper spray sprayed directly into our
eyes. I was beaten on the chest. I was hit four times. We arrived there at 3:00 p.m. At
10:00 p.m. we were finally put in the cell We were detained for three days, then in the
morning of the fourth day we were released to return [i.e. to be transferred] to Dili. We
went in the cells again in Dili. Forty-five of us were in a cell in Dili for another seventy-
two hours.[48]

Human Rights Watch interviewed several men who were victims and witnesses of
excessive police force at an incident in Bobonaro sub-district on August 13, 2004. A
meeting to settle a land dispute turned violent after a police officer allegedly hit
someone present at the meeting. At least two police officers were attacked and fled the
scene. Police backup was then called into the village. One man told Human Rights
Watch what happened next:.

The [extra] police to arrive were from Bobonaro. They straight way started arresting and
beating people here. The police were kicking my father and beating him with the police
stick. They hit him on the left side of his body. There were about seven or eight men.
After they beat my father, my older brother arrived and told them that there was no need
to beat his father. If they wanted to beat someone they should just beat us. Then the
police let go of my father, didn't beat him anymore, and started beating my brother with
a stick and a bulletproof vest. They beat him on his head, until it started bleeding.[49]

The man's brother told Human Rights Watch what happened to him:

After they let go of my father they started beating us. First they beat me with a
bulletproof vest that they were carrying. The policeman kicked me with his feet, and
beat me with his fist and the vest. Hit me on my head until it was bleeding. He kicked
me in the chest. There were also other people hitting me from behind. Then the police
from Maliana said that they were there to calm the situation not to beat up victims. So,
the police from Maliana were able to save us. I think if the Maliana police had not
arrived, we would have been half dead.[50]

Unauthorized Use of Firearms

The most high profile example of excessive use of force and resort to lethal force
remains the police response to riots in Dili in December 2002. At that time hundreds of
rioters smashed and looted their way through Dili and burnt several buildings to the
ground. In several instances the response of panicked and poorly trained East Timorese
police officers was to use tear gas and open fire on members of the crowd with live
ammunition. This resulted in the death of two young men and the hospitalization of
another thirteen people with gunshot wounds. Several victims of the shootings claimed
that they were shot and wounded when police drove through the streets and fired
directly at suspects.[51]

The government report into the incident was not published until nearly a year later, in
November 2003. It confirmed the number of casualties, but was inconclusive as to the
identities of the perpetrators of the shootings. Although an earlier internal police
investigation had identified and suspended six UIR members who had discharged their
firearms during the riots, they were not held responsible for the fatalities and injuries
caused.[52] The U.N. account of the episode criticized the "high incidence of
contradictory statements" by police, which had hindered resolution of the matter.[53] To
date, there has been no clarity on the status of any disciplinary action against police
officers involved in the riots of December 2002.

Likewise, the fatal police shooting of one man during disturbances in Baucau one
month earlier has yet to be satisfactorily resolved, and to date no one has been held
accountable for the killing.

Although not yet a widespread problem, Human Rights Watch found other more recent
incidents of disproportionate, unnecessary, and illegal use of firearms by police in East
Timor.

One twenty-two-year-old man described his experience to Human Rights Watch. On

July 12, 2004, he had been involved in an early morning fight with other men in the
town of Tilolai. He told Human Rights Watch that the fight had only lasted about twenty
minutes and no one had been injured. That afternoon the police arrived at his village:

We were playing football in the field here at about four o'clock in the afternoon. Then
the police-not with a patrol car, with a normal car-arrived in a passenger minibus. They
got out of the bus and we saw the police. They said, 'Hey! Stop!' then they took out their
guns. We were scared and so we ran. I don't know how many policemen there were. I
just saw one policeman get out of the bus. As soon as I saw the gun I started running.
My friends who had not been involved in the incident did not run. Just the three of us
ran. The police straight away shot at us. They shot four times-I didn't see it because I
was running but I heard it. [None of the three were injured.] We have not yet reported to
the police about the shooting. I'm scared they will want to arrest us again.[54]
Another man described an incident that occurred in January 2005. He and his nephew
were out picking fruit and vegetables when they came across a PNTL officer who
accused them of having stolen cattle. He told Human Rights Watch:

We went up to the hill at about ten o'clock in the morning.It was January 23, 2005 When
we got to the top we met this PNTL man.They [the PNTL officer and family] were
looking for cattle. They said someone had stolen them, and then they met us.When they
came across us he readied his gun. The PNTL, one man, with his family, four of them
altogether. He was wearing normal clothes. He was ready to shoot and told us not to do
anything We were carrying one bag and two umbrellas, and two small machetes. The
PNTL ordered us to give them to him. He put all the things in his waistband. Took all of
it. He also took cigarettes and some tobacco. I had a small amount of tobacco wrapped
in some plastic. He took all of it. After that he told us to walk. He forced us to walk. He
was holding his gun at the ready, behind us. We were in the middle. His family was in
front. After we had walked maybe two hundred meters we saw cattle footprints. Two
sets and we had to follow them. The PNTL was behind, always behind. We were
walking for about twenty minutes and it was raining really hard. We saw the prints
again and then maybe less than one hundred meters later we found the cattle. The PNTL
was maybe half a meter behind me and then he shot his gun. I don't know where he shot
it. I was still looking forward and the PNTL was behind me. He fired his gun one time
and said, "If you don't want to die, then leave." When he fired his gun the two cows ran
off. We were looking for the cows for maybe three hours. It was already afternoon by
the time I went home He is very wrong using a weapon that belongs to the
government.[55]

The man went to file a complaint with the police but later agreed to meet with the police
officer to resolve the matter informally. Had the system been working properly the
officer would have been disciplined by his superior officer, who knew about the case
but took no action.

Regarding the case above, the chief of the PEO office in Bobonaro told Human Rights
Watch that once the perpetrator had made peace with the community then maybe there
would also be a disciplinary measure imposed by the PNTL on this officer (he
suggested that this might be a two-month suspension, or whatever the commander
decided). When asked about the unauthorized use of the firearm, as if to explain, he
responded:

Normally pistols are distributed in the morning and in the afternoon they are returned to
the stock room. In this case the officer came in the morning, received his gun, then went
home for breakfast. He changed his clothes and then heard about the cattle. That's why
he had his gun.[56]

As with other types of violations the failure to discipline and hold officers involved
accountable is undermining efforts to enforce strict adherence to use of firearms policies
in the police force.

The U.N. Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement
Officials state that firearms may only be used in very specific circumstances: "Law
enforcement officials shall not use firearms against persons except in self-defense or
defense of others against the imminent threat of death or serious injury [or] to prevent
the perpetration of a particularly serious crime involving grave threat to life."[57]

According to the Basic Principles, "Governments shall ensure that arbitrary or abusive
use of force and firearms by law enforcement officials is punished as a criminal offence
under their law."[58] Although the Code of Conduct and the Basic Principles on the Use
of Force and Firearms are not binding international law, they constitute authoritative
guidance for interpreting international human rights law regarding policing.

When Human Rights Watch asked the Bobonaro sub-district police commander about
this incident, he stated:

The PSU [Professional Standards Unit] is already investigating this. I have already
given them all of my reports. The result is still being processed in the PSU. It is still
being considered where the truth is. It is not yet resolved Am I a perpetrator or a victim?
This is not a small case, this case has gone all the way up to the minister [of interior].
My members [officers] didn't eat for a week afterwards [i.e. after the incident] because
their faces were so swollen. The community think because it is already a democracy
they have the right to do anything at all. They also have to recognize that the police
have the rights to defend themselves. If the U.N. Human Rights Unit or HAK come here
I don't receive them. They document differently and always conclude that the police are
the perpetrators.[59]

Human Rights Watch then interviewed the head of the Professional Ethics Office in
Bobonaro who was overseeing the case. He told us that the case had already been
processed and they were waiting to send the details to Dili. He confirmed that
allegations had been made against four PNTL officers from Bobonaro sub-district police
station, and one from the Maliana police station.[60]

Elisio Dominggos da Piedade, of Baucau district, told Human Rights Watch about an
experience in late July 2004. He said he was arrested for an incident involving two
policemen and another man who had borrowed his motorbike. On the day in question he
was at work, with his motorbike outside, when two police officers in a patrol car
arrived. He was mistakenly identified as the suspect, handcuffed, and taken to Baucau
police station. He told Human Rights Watch:

All the way there I was asking, "Why are you arresting me?" The two men just told me
to be quiet. [He identified the two officers, one by name.] As soon as they released the
handcuffs, [officer's name withheld] sprayed pepper spray in my eyes. I was standing
and he was nearby, very close to me. He sprayed me once in the eyes. After that they
took me to the interrogation room and I was kicked in the chest. It was [name withheld]
again. He kicked me here [shows chest] and I fell backwards against the wall. Then he
kicked me again. I fell again onto the wall in front of me. I don't know how long he was
kicking me for, maybe for about ten minutes.He didn't ask anything at all, he was still
annoyed [jengkel] with me. Then I was put in a cell for seventy-two hours. It was
completely empty. I didn't report [the assault] to anyone at the station. My eyes are still
sore because of the gas.[61]
Baucau hospital records show that a doctor's note was written for Elisio's case detailing
his injuries. It shows that Elisio was given medication for a medical complaint over a
period of three days in July 2004 for a trauma to his back caused by a beating.[62]

The charges against Elisio were dropped but during the criminal proceedings against
Elisio at a court in Dili he did submit a complaint about his ill-treatment during his time
in police custody. He has subsequently repeatedly sought accountability for the abuse.
He told Human Rights Watch what he did after he was released from detention:

I submitted a complaint about [the policeman whom he alleges beat him and sprayed
him with pepper spray, name withheld]. It is already being investigated by the police but
has not yet finished. At the time of my hearing in Dili I also complained to the court
[about the abuse]. I feel sad because it has not been submitted, and the process is still
ongoing. About the original incident, no one was ever arrested for it. Just me and it was
a mistake. Because I was wrongly arrested I was unconditionally released. After the
decision in my case my defense lawyer Pedro asked the prosecutor and the Baucau
police to investigate the wrongful arrest and abuse. So, after the letter of request to the
police and the prosecutor, they said we have to wait for the process to proceed. Until
now it has not been brought to court. I am dependent on the process. If it is investigated
then [name withheld] has to be brought to justice. My opinion is that I am ready to go to
court.[63]

Elisio's father, who works at the district hospital, complained to Human Rights Watch
about the lack of movement on his son's case:

My son was beaten in the prison (cell) but he was not taken to the hospital. I asked them
to take him to the hospital, to be given medicine, but they didn't take him. Until now we
are still waiting for the case to be resolved. It has not yet been resolved, we have not yet
received any information.[64]

Another young man, who did not wish to be identified, told Human Rights Watch about
what happened to him when he was arrested in his village in Holsa:

On June 25, 2004, I was arrested by the PNTL, and put in a cell for two days and two
nights. I was continuously tortured, sprayed with pepper spray, beaten, and drenched
with water. They constantly threatened me saying, "If you oppose the police then you
will know the consequence." Three police came into the cell, locked the door, took off
their jackets, then hit me. They were all Maliana PNTL. They were the night guards,
and were wearing PNTL uniforms. On the first night they beat me at around 1:00 a.m.,
on the second night they beat me around 3:00 a.m. Both nights were different people,
but both times they were beating me. The first time I was in a cell with my friends. The
three of them arrived and called for me, "[name withheld], you come with us." They
took me alone to another cell. When we got there they started beating me. For about an
hour they were beating me. They hit me with a shoe, and kicked me on my back and on
my feet. They were wearing police boots. The light was off. I was shouting for help but
no one came. When they finished they took me back to the cell. I couldn't walk so they
lifted me into the cell. Then they went back to their office. I was injured.

On the second night we slept until 3:00 a.m., then they came again. They arrived, called
for me again, and took me again to the cell-that torture room. They beat me until I was
unconscious. I collapsed and they took me to the hospital... When we got to the hospital
the doctor said, "This man is almost dead, you are still doing things like this?" The
doctor examined my ribs. Here [points to right side of forehead] my head was cut and
bleeding. The doctor continued examining me and said that I had to spend the night in
the hospital. The police said, "Let him die, die in the police station." Then they took me
back to the police station and put me back in the cell.[65]

One thirty-five-year-old man detailed a traumatic encounter he had with a police officer
in May 2004 in his village in Batugade, Bobonaro. He told Human Rights Watch:

I saw a man standing in front of my door, he was wearing a black top and it had "police"
written on the back of it. I also saw that he was carrying a gun under his left armpit.
After I shone my torch he ran in my direction and took hold of my right hand. He said,
"Do you know me or not?" I saw he had a gun so I told him I knew him and apologized
to him but he straight away hit me once in the chest with his hand. I asked for his
forgiveness three times and then he hit me again and took me from my house to my
brother's. When we got to the front of my brother's house I called for him to come out
and my brother asked the policeman not to beat me anymore. He said if there was a
problem with us then we could resolve it in a manner which was better. And then the
PNTL kicked my brother My brother was scared and ran away. So I was dragged and hit
again in my stomach. It was a severe beating and I fell backwards and my head collided
with the asphalt, and then I was dragged again. I was already unconscious. There was
lots of blood on my head and I only came to when the PNTL dragged me to stand up
again. I was dragged about a hundred meters and I fell. I was unconscious. The
policeman held my hands and stamped on my stomach, and then took out a sangkur
[type of bayonet/knife] and wanted to stab me. He ordered the community to say if
anyone knew me or not, if no one knew me he was going to stab me because I was a
militia [militiaman]. My brother ran forward and said, "I know him. He is my brother."
The policeman released me and my family took me to my brother's house.

The PNTL member left and my brother waited with me until four o'clock in the morning
and then went to rent a car from Balibo to take me to the hospital in Balibo. At the
hospital the healthcare official gave me some medicine. I then went to Balibo police
station [to make a complaint] The police called the PNTL officer and ordered him to go
to the Balibo police station. I heard them do it when I was in the station. My head was
spinning but I heard. Because the PNTL [officer] did not arrive, I went home.[66]

This man is still suffering from trauma brought on by the event. He told Human Rights
Watch that he is too scared to go out by himself now, and therefore a member of his
family has to accompany him everywhere he goes. It appears that the perpetrator may
have been punished for the offense, but the victim has not been given any information
on his complaint. He told Human Rights Watch:

The next morning [after the incident], about 8:00 a.m., the commander from Mota'ain
visited my house. He promised that the next day he would meet me and we would go to
Maliana. After two days I waited, he didn't arrive, and on the third day he arrived. The
police commander together with the perpetrator came to my house to resolve things. At
that time I said that I didn't want to, I am an ordinary citizen, I want the problem to be
resolved from above, in the court. As an ordinary citizen I know the legal process. So, I
went to the Dili court to give a complaint and also to Yayasan [i.e. Perkumpulan] HAK.
The result? I don't know. I don't know where the perpetrator is, I haven't been told. I
came home and until now I only heard that the perpetrator is in prison but I haven't seen
it myself. No one has come here to tell me, not from HAK either.[67]

In April 2004, Baltazar Fatima Correia, a twenty-two-year-old from Mulia village in

Baucau district, was picked up by several drunk police officers, beaten and threatened.
He told Human Rights Watch:

The five police were drinking tuak putih [palm wine] with my father and their friend
[name withheld] at the police checkpoint. After they finished drinking tuak the five
police wanted to return to Baucau. I've known them a long time. They arrived at the
place where I was sitting on the road. I called out to my younger brother in a coarse way
whether or not he also wanted to go to Baucau. But the police thought I was provoking
them, they interpreted me wrongly. The car stopped. One PNTL [officer A, name and
rank withheld] got out from the car. Four of his friends were still in the car. As soon as
he got out of the car he straight away kicked me in my chest. After that I fell to the
ground. There were two other PNTL, they got out of the car. [The interviewee names
these two, officers B and C, names withheld, and a third officer who punched him once
on the back of his neck.[68]]

After that [officers B and C] handcuffed my hands behind my back and put me in the
car and took me to Baucau police station. When we got as far as the river-it's not far,
maybe about a hundred meters-[officer B] said to his friends, "Is there an empty house
here or not? If there is we can let him out and torture him here." There was no response.
About 500 meters later at the cemetery [officer A] said, "Turn the car back," then
[officer C] responded, "No, it's better if we take him to Baucau first." When he replied
he then burned me with his cigarette, under my left wrist [shows scar]. I was at the back
on the floor. They were constantly kicking me. They were sitting above. After he burnt
me, [officer C] shouted at me, "If you do anything I will shoot you." [69]

One man in the village who witnessed the event told Human Rights Watch what he saw:

We were working here for Easter, about nine or ten o'clock in the morning. I was here,
working at the church, and saw the car. I saw [officer A] get out of the car and straight
away hit Baltazar Then he was hit by [officer B] who hit him and grabbed his head and
smashed it on the car. At the time I was about twenty meters away. I saw it and ran over.
I told [officer B], I said, "Why is that kid being hit. What has he done wrong?" After
that they didn't hit him anymore. They put Baltazar in the car. I saw them going to
Baucau but I couldn't say anything because the PNTL were very emotional They were
wearing uniforms and driving a TATA Sumo car with "police" written on it. There were
lots of people around, tens of people.[70]

Over a year after the original incident, Baltazar Fatima Correia is still trying to get some
redress for the treatment he experienced in police custody. He told Human Rights
Watch:

I went to the prosecutor's office and he promised he was ready to take the case to the
police, but there has been no result. Only [Perkumpulan] HAK sent a letter to the PSU
but it has not yet been investigated. This case is already at the prosecutor level, but has
not yet had a hearing [disidang]. It is with the PSU in Dili I often go to the Baucau
police about my case. The police only chase me out [mengusir] and threaten me saying,
"Just go back, go back home, don't come here, if you come here I will shoot you or hit
you." I have already been three times to check my case there. The last time was
September 2004. I'm not afraid to go back, the problem is the money to get to
Baucau.[71]

When Human Rights Watch questioned Baucau's police commander about this case he
stated, "About the Mulia case it has already been resolved. There is no evidence that
they [police officers] were involved. It went all the way to court and there was no
evidence. They were all released. It was a long time ago. All the files are in Dili."[72]

Impunity for Rape

The failure to hold anyone accountable for the rape of a teenaged girl, allegedly by nine
PNTL officers on May 10, 2004, is another example of the effective impunity that
police officers have come to expect in East Timor. In this case, the nine policemen were
originally arrested and charged with rape, accused of taking the girl in an official police
vehicle to a police training compound in the Tasi Tolu area of Dili, where they sexually
assaulted her; there was also a tenth man, a civilian, who was charged in relation to
having "procured" the girl for the police officers.[73] Following preliminary hearings,
six of the suspects were conditionally released pending trial while four (three PNTL and
the civilian) were kept in custody.

The preliminary hearings in June 2004 and the trial in April 2005 were monitored by the
East Timorese NGO Judicial System Monitoring Programme (JSMP), which reported
deep concerns about the unorthodox manner in which the proceedings were conducted
and factors which demonstrated, in their view, that"neither the rights of the accused to
proper legal representation, nor the expectations of the victim and the community to
have an independent tribunal hold a proper trial in regard to her allegations, have been
respected."[74] JSMP noted that during the hearings on the continued detention of the
men, a substantial number of PNTL members were present in the courtroom and court
compound. They also reported that police officers, under questionable authority,
cordoned off the public court building, reportedly harassing and verbally abusing the
victim when she left the courtroom.[75] One report quoted a judge as saying that
"justice was powerless since the government kept intervening in the process."[76] JSMP
has also noted that "[t]he investigating judge assigned to the case told JSMP monitors
that he could not control their [PNTL and UIR officers present at the court]
conduct."[77]

When the case came to trial only the three police officers and the civilian in custody
were tried, with the outstanding charges against the six police officers conditionally
released seemingly ignored. At the trial session of April 13, 2005, both the defense
lawyers and the prosecutor claimed to have had no prior involvement in the case and to
be ignorant of the evidence. The presiding judge then decided that the defendants should
be released due to lack of evidence against them, and the police officers were set free.
No further charges against any accused have been pursued, and no one has been held
accountable for the rape.
The failure to prosecute this case is just one example of an unwillingness to tackle
police abuse, as well as demonstrating that violence against women is often not treated
with appropriate seriousness by the formal justice system.[78]

In its human rights report for 2005, the U.S. Department of State noted that there had
also been "no significant developments in the September 2004 case of an off-duty police
officer who forcibly entered the home of a twelve-year-old girl who had allegedly been
statutorily raped by the officer's nineteen-year-old brother." It appears that the
Professional Ethics Office had initially opened an investigation, but by the end of 2005
no further action had been taken.[79]
Legal Standards on Torture and Other Physical Mistreatment

Even if an individual is guilty of a criminal offence, the use of torture and other forms
of mistreatment against that individual is wholly prohibited under East Timorese and
international law. Few prohibitions in international human rights law are as clear as the
ban on torture and other cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment. A large
body of international legal authority exists that prohibits any derogation from the
prohibition on the use of torture and other cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or
punishment. The prohibition, which forms part of customary international law, is to be
found in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,[80] and is also entrenched in
Article 7 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the
Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment (CAT).[81]East Timor acceded to the CAT in April 2003 and to the ICCPR
in September 2003.

East Timor's constitution also explicitly prohibits the use of torture, stating that "no one
shall be subjected to torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment."[82] The
constitution also specifically refers to East Timor's obligations under the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights and other international treaties.[83]

The Convention against Torture defines torture as intentional acts by public officials
that cause severe physical or mental pain or suffering for the purpose of obtaining
information or a confession, or for punishment, intimidation, or discrimination.[84] In
cases where beatings and humiliation of detainees and prisoners by police do not rise to
the level of torture, they may nevertheless constitute cruel, inhuman, or degrading
treatment or punishment. Cruel and inhuman treatment includes suffering that lacks one
of the elements of torture or that does not reach the intensity of torture. Particularly
harsh conditions of detention, including deprivation of food, water, and medical
treatment, may also constitute inhuman treatment. Degrading treatment includes
treatment that involves the humiliation of the victim or that is disproportionate to the
circumstances of the case.[85]

In addition to binding treaties on torture, cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or

punishment, the United Nations has developed detailed principles, minimum rules, and
declarations on the actions and use of force by police. The U.N. Code of Conduct for
Law Enforcement Officials limits the use of force by police to situations in which it is
"strictly necessary and to the extent required for the performance of their duty."[86]
Similarly, the U.N.'s Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law
Enforcement Officials states that law enforcement officials, in carrying out their duty,
shall, as far as possible, apply nonviolent means before resorting to the use of force and
firearms.[87] When the use of force is unavoidable, law enforcement officials must,
among other things, "(a) exercise restraint in such use and act in proportion to the
seriousness of the offence and the legitimate objective to be achieved; [and] (b)
minimize damage and injury."[88]

V. Reforms, Institutions and Practices Needed to Create Police

Accountability in East Timor

The police are not brave enough to investigate cases where there are police involved.
Cases where there are beatings of civilians are not investigated. Sometimes police who
have beaten or threatened people are not investigated, so they do not want to open an
internal investigation.

Tiago Amaral Sarmento, head of the nongovernmental Judicial System Monitoring

Programme in East Timor[89]

It is clear that police abuse is a serious and pressing problem, yet initiatives to address it
have been inadequate. Existing oversight mechanisms are weak and need further
support and strengthening, and new institutions and practices are needed to effectively
eradicate this problem.

In March 2005 the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights
(OHCHR) identified many of the problems when it stated in its report to the U.N.
Commission on Human Rights that:

Accountability mechanisms remain unclear and inadequate. The result is an emerging

pattern of impunity for PNTL abuses. The Professional Ethics Office (PEO) of PNTL is
increasingly unable to investigate cases of misconduct due to lack of resources for field
work and at times political interference. For unclear reasons, some cases are dealt with
by PEO, while others, sometimes cases with particular sensitivity, are investigated by
the Ministry of Interior. A number of allegations of criminal acts are addressed through
the administrative process only and are not subject to any criminal processes. Delays are
reported in investigations and decisions on disciplinary action. Disciplinary actions are
not always in proportion to misconduct.[90]

Two studies published in 2004 show mixed public views of the police. One survey
commissioned by the Asia Foundation in East Timor encouragingly found that "of the
only 11 percent of respondents who had brought disputes to the police, most did so
because they considered their dispute to be a serious matter and they believed that they
would be treated fairly by the police." However, these perceptions are not likely to
remain static. The survey also found that "many feel the laws are not actually enforced,
particularly those laws enacted to protect anyone arrested and accused of a crime. Less
than half the public (49 percent) believe the law requiring court approval to detain a
suspect for more than three days is respected, and only four in ten think the law
genuinely protects the accused from police brutality or allows them access to a public
defender." Most telling is one of the survey's conclusions that "confidence levels in East
Timor's new and inexperienced police force are likely to drop dramatically unless they
are effectively trained and professionalized."[91]
The second study, undertaken jointly by the Dili Institute of Technology and the United
Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), found that the public's respect for the work of the
police was still quite high at 69.6 percent overall, but much less in the districts of
Baucau, Bobonaro and Viqueque.[92] In Bobonaro the figure was only 32 percent,
perhaps reflecting negative attitudes towards the police in a district with a high number
of reported cases of police brutality.

Although neither study can be used as conclusive indications of public perceptions of

the police, the results do show already mixed feelings toward East Timor's new police
force. One conclusion that could be drawn is a general public reluctance to criticize the
PNTL as a force. However, more specific questions on detention and abuse resulted in
quite negative responses indicating that when people have come into direct contact with
the police their experiences have been less positive. Another caveat is that although
community confidence is generally a good indicator of the level of police abuse, the
results may just reflect an attitude that the PNTL is far less abusive than the Indonesian
police force-a pretty low threshold for professionalism. However, the surveys are useful
in highlighting what communities believe are positive elements within the police force.
The challenge for the East Timor government will be to build and support those positive
elements, whilst also addressing the problem areas.
A. Addressing Impunity

Police abuse can become a serious problem when police officers and their superiors
enjoy impunity for their actions. One of the most common reasons that police abuse can
become commonplace within a police force is the effective impunity enjoyed by police
officers and their superiors who participate in, order, or ignore it. In East Timor
effective institutional mechanisms for accountability are essential if impunity is to be
tackled. More robust and effective enforcement of existing legislation and stronger
media vigilance and independent monitoring of the problem will also be key.

The early indications are that East Timor risks allowing impunity to become a grave and
systematic problem if it does not respond appropriately. In spite of the kinds of abuses
documented in this report, thus far meaningful sanctions for police officers involved in
serious human rights violations have been rare. According to the OHCHR, in March
2005 the East Timor police commissioner reported that ten police officers had been
dismissed from the service.[93] However, it was unclear whether the dismissals were
linked to human rights violations or mere criminal activity. An international advisor to
the minister of interior told Human Rights Watch that for the period from January to
March 2005, fifty-five cases had been reported through the PEO.[94]

The U.S. Department of State, in its annual human rights report on East Timor noted,
for example, that for 2005 "[s]ome officers were punished for relatively minor
misconduct, and in several cases police officers were convicted and sentenced for
assaults committed while on duty; however, by year's end, no action had been taken in a
number of cases involving serious misconduct. There were allegations that personal
connections within the police force or the Ministry of Interior were a factor in some
cases."[95]

The failure to properly investigate police misconduct undermines the police force's
credibility in holding its members accountable. This is as true for high profile incidents
as for day-to-day violations. For example, in July 2004 a group of approximately one
hundred persons, including many Falintil veteran resistance fighters, staged a protest
outside the main government building in Dili. On July 20, the second day of their
protest, police officers, together with members of the elite Rapid Intervention Force,
used tear gas to disperse the crowd, and subsequently arrested over thirty people.
Although many of those held were detained for more than thirty hours, the exact
grounds under which they were held were never clarified. Television footage showed at
least one police officer beating a protester, and there were several other reports that
several detainees were beaten in police custody. Ironically, many of the demonstrators'
banners, trampled under foot by the security services, had proclaimed messages calling
for greater democratization and reform of the police force.

This incident received much attention at the time from the government, the United
Nations in East Timor, and the media. However, once again there has not yet been a
satisfactory outcome either in respect of disciplinary measures against the police
officers responsible for excessive use of force, or in respect of the arbitrary detention of
over thirty protestors. In his February 2005 progress report on UNMISET, the U.N.
secretary-general noted the negative consequences delays in accountability could
produce, commenting: "the report of the special investigation into the incident of 20
July 2004, in which the police used excessive force to disperse a largely peaceful
demonstration, has not yet been completed. These delays are perceived by the
community as voluntary inaction and hence undermine the general trust in the
professionalism of the police."[96]

Yet at least part of this problem is a legacy of the U.N.'s failure to prioritize police
disciplinary measures. Few strategies were implemented at an early stage in the U.N.
transitional administration to stop inappropriate police behaviors before they became
too entrenched. (Deficiencies in the UNPOL training regime are explored in detail in
section V.D of this report.)

Human Rights Watch spoke with Police Commissioner Paulo Martins, who conceded
that there was a problem and that this had implications for creating a culture of
impunity. He was clear in his understanding that proper punishment for violators would
be an effective deterrent:

We are trying to improve this which is not very good within the police. We already have
a police disciplinary regulation and have taken strong measures against those who
commit abuse or violence against the people I don't think it is because of training but an
increase in understanding from the commanders and the communities that the police
have to respect human rights. And also because the police officers realize that sanctions
are heavy if they commit an abuse.[97]

The tardiness of an appropriate response to the police violence at the July 2004
demonstration shows that there is some way to go before the commissioner's words
about internal disciplinary processes translate into concrete measures.

There have, however, been encouraging signs that some things can be done right. For
example, in April 2005 several thousand people joined anti-government demonstrations
in Dili. They were protesting a proposal by East Timor's Council of Ministers to
designate religious education as an optional subject in some primary schools. Police
were deployed to patrol these demonstrations, which they did in a manner widely
regarded as professional and restrained. This display of professionalism has improved
the public image of the police force, and significantly also appears to have given a
confidence boost to the police force itself, which saw the positive outcome from
implementing the standards provided by appropriate training. Looking to the future,
attitudinal change within the police force is going to have to be a priority and will need
a long-term strategy to have impact. Combined with training there needs to be a strong
system of discipline, effective leadership and support by the management of PNTL over
time, together with positive reinforcement for appropriate police behavior, for that
attitudinal change to take place.

B. The Development of Oversight Institutions

Professional Ethics and Deontology Unit

The first port of call for investigating police violations is usually the PNTL's internal
oversight body, the Professional Ethics and Deontology Unit (PEDU, formerly known
as the Professional Ethics Office, PEO, and before that the Professional Standards Unit,
PSU).[98] Staffed by serving police officers and working under the general commander
of the PNTL, the unit is charged with investigating allegations of police misconduct or
abuse. Such allegations are usually made by members of the public, although, according
to the police Organic Decree-Law, the Ministry of Interior can also order the PEDU to
conduct inquiries, especially in sensitive cases. The results of any investigations,
together with any recommendations for discipline, are sent to the minister, who then
decides what action should be taken.[99]

Unfortunately, the PEDU lacks institutional authority over the various branches of the
police. One then-PEO officer in Dili told Human Rights Watch that although in theory
PEO officers could investigate police officers of superior rank to themselves, in practice
it was the district commanders who ultimately decided which cases would be
investigated in the district, which ones would be sent to Dili, and which ones would be
set aside.[100] Another problem is the lack of understanding by police of the rights and
interests of those filing complaints. It seems little thought or consideration has been
given to the rights of the victims in this process, with the PNTL disciplinary regulation
not even envisaging that complaints could come from outside the force.

The PEO/PEDU has also been weak and very slow to take action, if at all. In cases
where complaints have been taken up by the PEO/PEDU, punishments for police
officers have often just been temporary suspensions, transfers, or, in some cases,
transfers followed by promotions. There is no automatic suspension for police officers
under investigation for alleged offenses.

As one example, Simao Lopes, the chief of the then-PEO office for Bobonaro district,
told Human Rights Watch about an incident earlier in 2005 when a uniformed police
officer in his district had fired his gun in the air at the market in Maliana. Lopes
recommended that the officer be discharged from the police force, but instead he was
only transferred to Dili.[101]

At a more basic level the PEO/PEDU continues to be restricted by a lack of human and
financial resources. In some cases PEO/PEDU staff do not have access to transport to
conduct investigations, or to return to complainants to update them on the status of their
case.[102] As Carlos Moniz Maia, the deputy head of the then-PEO national office
commented:

We have several problems. First of all are the limitations in personnel and transport. The
statistics of cases involving the PNTL every year is increasing. Cases from 2001 to 2003
have already finished being investigated, but there are still about 50 percent of cases
from 2004 which have not yet been resolved because of restrictions of transport and
staff. Likewise for 2005 we've finished about twenty cases and still have about seventy
left.[103]

One U.N. police officer in Bobonaro district had a poor opinion of the then-PEO in
Maliana, pointing out to Human Rights Watch that the previous experience of its chief,
as a patrol officer within the occupation-era Indonesian police force, did not provide
him with the skills necessary to lead investigations or manage staff. In his opinion, a
change of personnel in the office would improve the office's strength.[104]

When he was interviewed by Human Rights Watch the chief of the PEO office in
Maliana conceded that he lacked essential experience, but he was keen to stress his
willingness to receive more training in the area of internal investigations. He told
Human Rights Watch:

Before I was with the PEO I was a community police officer. I received just two days'
training from the PNTL. We would be happy to participate in more training. I ask you to
recommend for us to have more training about the role of the PEO so that we can
understand it in more depth. We want to work but we do not get strong enough
support.[105]

It appears that lack of faith in and/or fear of the new police force is already preventing
people going directly to the police to register complaints. One young man who was
severely ill-treated in police detention told Human Rights Watch that he was too scared
to seek accountability for the abuse he suffered at the hands of three police officers in
Maliana police station. He said, "I have not yet submitted a complaint because they
threatened me. I do not want to go back to Maliana police station. I don't want to be
summoned again by the PNTL."[106] A U.N. police advisor told Human Rights Watch
that he heard a district police commander threatening a man who had come to complain
about the police treatment of some people involved in martial groups in the district. The
U.N. officer heard the commander tell the man that they wanted to solve the matter
through traditional dispute mechanisms. When the man protested the commander issued
a stark warning, stating, "Go to the U.N. human rights unit then and see what they will
do. The U.N. will leave soon and then it will just be us." The U.N. advisor told Human
Rights Watch that in his opinion it was clearly a threat.[107]

Tiago Amaral Sarmento from JSMP told Human Rights Watch, "If there are violations
the communities don't know who they can report it to. They are scared and just stay
quiet. The police are a strong institution. The communities don't yet know or understand
that they can report to someone."[108] Where such knowledge exists, the lack of
resources and experience resulting in delays and incompetence of the PEO/PEDU in
dealing with complaints has led to frustration amongst affected communities about lack
of transparency and efficiency in dealing with their cases. This has only further
increased the distrust people have in the impartiality of the office.
The Office of the Provedor

The East Timor constitution provides for a special office to scrutinize human rights
practices throughout the territory. A law to establish such a position, the office of the
Provedor de Direitos Humanos e Justicia, was promulgated in May 2004, although as
parliament initially found it hard to agree on a candidate, the position of provedor was
not filled until Sebastiao Dias Ximenes was inaugurated in the post June 16, 2005. The
Office of the Provedor has far-reaching powers to investigate and report on complaints
against government officials and institutions, including the police. Issues within the
purview of the office include abuse of power, maladministration, lack of due process,
nepotism, collusion and corruption.[109]

In his August 2005 report to the United Nations Security Council on the U.N. Office in
Timor-Leste, the U.N. secretary-general noted that the Provedor's Office "provides an
important legal instrument to address inter alia, the continued reports of human rights
violations by the East Timorese police, including excessive use of force, ill-treatment
and arbitrary arrest and detention."[110]In a previous report he had expressed concern at
the delay in electing the provedor, "especially in light of the recent increase in reported
cases of abuse of police power, including assaults and threats, which are not being
adequately addressed by internal disciplinary processes and are rarely taken up by the
Public Prosecutor for institution of criminal proceedings."[111]

In June 2005 Human Rights Watch met with Sebastiao Dias Ximenes shortly before his
inauguration as provedor. Already aware of the limitations of his new office, he
discussed his main concerns and what he saw as the priority challenges of his new role:

The Provedor has limits. I can give recommendations but not follow up. It's a problem. I
don't have the power to make decisions, just recommendations. We also have limited
human resources. We need training and maybe comparative studies so that we can
increase our experience and knowledge. The budget for the Provedor is small. We are an
independent institution but receive our budget from the government. Our program
cannot go forward if we don't have facilities or a budget. But what is most important is
the people and all the communities. If they don't work with the Provedor, this office
cannot be a success without their support.[112]

By the end of 2005, the Office of the Provedor had still not been fully established or
staffed.

As a relatively new body, it is hard to accurately gauge the effectiveness of the

Provedor's Office. It is to be hoped that the office will contribute to an increased culture
of respect for human rights and accountability. Its strengths are that it can undertake
investigations on its own initiative, without waiting for a complaint, and has the power
to order a person to appear for questioning.

However, there are concerns about the capacity of this new institution to
comprehensively or effectively carry out the role of a police oversight body, considering
the many other functions it has also been tasked with. Another major weakness of the
office is that it does not have the power to make enforceable decisions-any of the
provedor's recommendations can be ignored.The office can also only make
recommendations to the relevant bodies such as the police, offer to act as a mediator
between the complainant(s) and representatives of the public body involved, or refer a
grievance to a competent jurisdiction or other recourse mechanism.

(For comment on the need to formalize coordination and cooperation between the
various institutions entrusted with acting as oversight mechanisms, see below.)
C. Legal Gaps

The process leading to the establishment of the PNTL led to the existence of a range of
different and sometimes competing rules, procedures and practices which govern the
PNTL. The promulgation of the Organic Decree-Law in May 2004 went some way
towards clarifying the legal framework for the police, but there remains little knowledge
and understanding by the police about definition of crimes under the Criminal Code, or
police powers under the Criminal Procedures Code and the Rules of Organization
Procedures.[113] There is also little training on these areas made available to the police
force.

At quite a basic level, the June 2004 disciplinary regulation is only available in
Portuguese, a language not understood by most PNTL personnel; as a result, the
authorities continue to use the previous U.N. Code of Conduct. Even if the disciplinary
regulation were available in Indonesian or Tetum, languages understood by most police
officers, it has been criticized by police experts for being incoherent. Ray Murray,
advisor to the minister of interior, told Human Rights Watch that the disciplinary
regulation "has a formula to determine discipline that is virtually unusable and cannot
be understood by the vast majority of the PNTL including trainers and advisers." [114]

Equally important is for the PNTL to finalize its Rules of Organization Procedures
(ROPs). While many ROPs have been finalized (see above), more need to be finished,
including ROPs on the treatment of vulnerable persons, including persons with mental
illness and victims of gender-based violence.[115]

While there have been some developments at addressing the legal vacuum, including a
new policy introduced in 2003 restricting the use of force, and the 2004 regulation
providing a new disciplinary code for police, there now seems to be an urgent need to
formalize coordination and cooperation between the various institutions entrusted with
acting as oversight mechanisms for the fledgling police force. Legislation or regulations
need to be adopted to clarify the various responsibilities of the PEDU, the Inspectorate
and the Office of the Provedor. There is substantial overlap between the different
agencies, which is not necessarily a problem but leads to a certain amount of confusion
among the public about how to report incidents or hold the PNTL accountable.

The U.N.'s senior police advisor, Saif Ullah Malik, told Human Rights Watch in May
2005 about a working group established to harmonize all the different institutions
including the then-PEO, Provedor and Ministry of Interior, and that this group would
also include participation from the PNTL, the Inspectorate and the U.N. Human Rights
Unit.[116] However, at the time of writing it was understood that this group had not met
since March 2005.
D. The Need for More and Better Training
Although not a solution on its own, police training is an important tool for addressing
human rights violations by the police. Reports of human rights violations and
inappropriate behavior by officers, combined with the lingering legacy of Indonesian
policing techniques, mean that continued strengthening of the human rights dimension
of training for experienced officers, trainees, and police academy graduates is essential.

Unfortunately, during both UNTAET and UNMISET the fledgling police force received
largely inadequate and sometimes contradictory training from UNPOL and CivPol
personnel. The first batch of new cadets received three months of basic training at the
rehabilitated PoliceAcademy in Dili followed by six months of on-the-job training in
the field. Former POLRI officers (members of the Indonesian police force responsible
for security in the territory before the vote for independence in 1999, who comprised
350 of the first 1,700 East Timorese police academy graduates) simply underwent a
four-week "Intensive Transitional Training Course."[117]

Standard training for new recruits is now a four-month training course at the
PoliceTrainingAcademy in Comoro, Dili, followed by nine months of field training. In
these courses, there is some training in specialized areas of investigations, intelligence
gathering, and community policing. The curriculum at the academy has also been
recently re-written by an Australian/U.K. police training team (see also below), with
human rights material incorporated throughout the course. After graduation a further six
months of formal field training is undertaken for probationary officers, who do not
become full PNTL officers until after successful completion of this additional
training.[118]

The U.N. Secretary-General noted in February 2005 that U.N. civilian police advisors
were providing training to the East Timor police through a skills development plan
which was based on the results of a national survey of police officers to identify gaps in
capacity, but that "of the approximately 1,700 police officers who completed the first
phase of the plan in December [2004], only half were able to achieve the desired level
of competence."[119]

There is still a huge lack of management and mentoring capacity in the police force, and
a need for a great deal more specialized skills training, including in the area of internal
investigations of police misconduct.

There is also little awareness of the appropriate treatment of women, children, or other
vulnerable groups, or mainstreaming ideas such as the method of investigation into
gender-based crimes. One child protection officer with UNICEF in East Timor told
Human Rights Watch:

There is a notion that if children are victims there is an awareness of special treatment
from the VPU [Vulnerable Persons Unit] and rights, etc. But, if they are offenders, those
rights are not always recognized It is not entirely clear within the police who is doing
what. Not all children will be dealt with by the VPU, just normal investigators... We are
trying to encourage children to be aware that if they have a problem they can go to the
police, but you run the risk that you are not exposing children to greater risks by going
to the police.[120]
Police in East Timor rely heavily on confessions as their sole means of "solving"
crimes. This inherently creates an incentive to resort to excessive use of force to extract
a purported "confession" from a suspect, and undoubtedly contributes to the current
climate where beating of suspects is routine. More intensive training in basic
investigation and forensic techniques, including the use of other sources of information
and evidence, not only offers the police an alternate and better way to do their job, but
would help reduce abuse of power. To reinforce this message it is essential that the
judiciary rigorously and consistently refuse to allow evidence where there are credible
allegations that it was obtained through illegal use of force by the police.

When Human Rights Watch met with the head of Dili's PoliceTrainingAcademy he was
emphatic about the volume of human rights materials included in the basic training
package taught at the academy, and the good cooperation the Academy had with the
U.N. Human Rights Unit, UNDP and UNICEF, all of whom had provided materials for
the training courses. However, he was also quite frank in admitting how much further
they had to go. He told Human Rights Watch:

There is a Code of Conduct for the PNTL. It has already been socialized [disseminated]
to all the Commanders but not yet fully to all members of the PNTL.[121] Because of
that we are less sure that the Code will hold [be put into practice]. There is not yet a
course about it. We need a course for the PEO [now PEDU] so that they can carry out
their duties well... However we are still new. The education that they receive here is still
a little.[122]

E. Problematic Past Training Approaches

The majority of U.N. training during UNMISET was conducted by UNMISET police
advisors at the district and sub-district level, the focus being on the training of trainers
in the field. A problem affecting this approach is one that is common to most U.N.
police missions around the world: The U.N. civilian police staffing the mission were
from a wide range of countries, each with varying adherence to international standards
on policing. Their experience and consequently their teaching was therefore not
standardized, so PNTL officers were exposed to different approaches to policing and not
all were consistent with what was being taught at the Academy, or with international
standards. There had been a recommendation from the Ministry of Interior that before
this program started the UNPOL officers should be given a "training of trainers" course,
so that the training delivery could be uniform across the country. As most of the
UNPOL were police officers and not trainers, this would have improved some of the
training delivery, but this recommendation was not followed.
A UNOTIL staff member was extremely critical of the support which UNPOL had
previously provided:
I don't think UNPOL knew what they had to do when they were in charge. What we
have now is the result of a lack of training. It would have been better to have one police
force from one country, rather than a mix without any common members to work.
Further problems with the UNPOL training of East Timorese police recruits and officers
included communication difficulties caused by language problems that restricted the
ability for training sessions to be participatory and inclusive, rather than taught lecture-
style. It also limited interaction between U.N. and East Timor police, and
implementation of training scenarios.
Quite crucially the six-month rotations for U.N. police personnel also hindered the
effective development or long-term implementation of policies. For peacekeeping this
approach may be appropriate, but for institutional development it had negative
consequences.
There is a sense that the U.N. was in crisis management with no coherent strategic
development plan for the PNTL. Their key goal was to set up and handover to an East
Timor police force, with no coherent plan for establishing oversight mechanisms and
enforcement of disciplinary measures against police officers. A senior diplomat in East
Timor commented: "The biggest criticism of UNPOL is that they've been here for four
or five years, so you would expect four or five years of training. But they just ticked a
box."
This diplomat identified the further problem that "the government never refuses aid, so
there is a problem in trying to coordinate all the training," and that combined with the
tick-the-box approach of UNPOL meant that "their counterparts don't have a clue."
There are two other main reasons why current training has taken such a long time to halt
police abuses. The first is that current training has failed to address the overall
institutional culture of policing methods. The second is that there are few penalties if the
officers do not implement what they learn in training and few incentives to follow it. In
other words, for training to be meaningful, there must be consequences for failing to
abide by it. Vice Minister of Interior Alcino Barris told Human Rights Watch that
amongst the police force "there is still very little real understanding of what human
rights are."[126] While it is important to teach human rights, it is equally important to
train officers about their responsibilities to act professionally, something that the
minister also acknowledged. Ray Murray, the international advisor to the Ministry of
Interior, told Human Rights Watch, "You should not only teach on what should be done,
but also on why it should be done."
F. Current Initiatives
Recognizing the urgent and ongoing need of the PNTL for further training and
assistance, a large part of UNOTIL's mandate is in the area of continued support and
development of the East Timorese police. In establishing UNOTIL in May 2005, the
Security Council authorized the deployment of up to forty police training advisors,
primarily targeted at the specialist police units such as the Border Patrol Unit and the
Rapid Intervention Unit. Assistance has also been given to the Professional Ethics
Office. Human rights training and courses have already been provided by these advisers.
The UNOTIL Human Rights Unit has also been working in cooperation with the
Ministry of Interior to provide human rights and use of force training to the national
police, most recently through a "training of trainers" course and the launching of a
training manual on human rights for the police in mid-2005.
International funding also plays a critical role in East Timor in all areas, not least the
development of the police service. There is a wide range of bilateral international
assistance to the PNTL, including training programs as well as equipment and
infrastructure support. Amongst the international support, Canada and Japan have both
provided small grants and provided equipment. Indonesia has been hosting a series of
exchange programs for PNTL officers to visit and acquire in-house training with the
Indonesian police force. At various stages Malaysia and Portugal have also extended
training to various units of the PNTL. The United States is funding specialized training
courses for supervisors and investigators.
One of the problems with this approach is that, as with the U.N. under UMISET (see
above), the training is inconsistent in standards, with different countries' domestic
procedures being taught. Recognizing this problem, the U.K. and Australia have
embarked on a joint development program for the PNTL focusing on mainstreaming
international policing standards across the board over the long-term. When UNPOL
leaves (currently scheduled for May 2006), the U.K./Australian initiative will fill the
vacuum on advice and training created by UNPOL's departure.
Part of the joint U.K.-Australian plan is to integrate standard operating procedures into
all aspects of the training. The first phase will concentrate on training of trainers. Noting
the wide variety of bilateral and U.N. training currently underway with the PNTL,
Kevin Raue, team leader for the U.K.-Australian initiative, concedes that "bad" training
was a problem. He commented "There is a problem of inconsistency in the standard of
training. That problem is not yet resolved. There is a need also to avoid duplication of
training and inappropriate training."

G. Monitoring

The presence of human rights officers here, and our readiness to report on human rights
violations to the international community, does constitute a deterrent to perpetrators.

Special Representative of the Secretary-General Sukehiro Hasegawa

A critical issue for the future will be to ensure independent monitoring of police
behavior in East Timor. Though, as noted, there are formal internal and external
oversight mechanisms of the police, for most victims of police brutality the first place
they turn is normally either the U.N. Human Rights Unit or an East Timorese human
rights NGO, primarily Perkumpulan HAK or FOKUPERS, the two biggest rights
organizations in East Timor and the main Timorese bodies in the country monitoring
police abuse.

With the U.N. Human Rights Unit due to close with the end of UNOTIL's mandate
(foreseen for May 2006), the urgency of strengthening civil society mechanisms to
provide human rights monitoring and reporting has never been greater. Training for the
police on the role of civil society, and the valuable place it has as a counterbalance to
government, will also be crucial to ensure mutual respect and cooperation. A lack of
monitoring will create a vacuum in which violations will be committed with impunity.
As the head of the JSMP told Human Rights Watch:

I think that if the U.N. leaves and there are no more advisors the police will increase
committing violations in the future. They will think that their behavior is correct
because there will be no one to give the recommendation that they have to be processed
and brought to justice.

The senior U.N. Police Advisor in East Timor, Saif Ullah Malik, concurred, saying: "We
need support in terms of training, monitoring and in terms of advance training. After the
withdrawal there will be a big gap in monitoring. The U.N. cannot stay forever. Local
civil society needs to be activated." He continued: "As an exit strategy we are
incorporating local NGOs to monitor the human rights situation in each district. The
U.N. Human Rights Unit will be trying to visit districts at least once a week." Indicating
that lessons had been learned from the experience of shortcomings in U.N. training of
PNTL, he added: "We have adopted an approach, consistency of guidance, for example
my technical advisors in the districts are advising the same thing across the board."
NGOs, donors and the East Timor government need to work more closely together to
monitor the broad range of human rights violations, for multiple purposes: to remedy
individual abuses, to identify patterns and perpetrators, and to highlight structural
problems that allow human rights violations to emerge in the first place. Seen in this
light, human rights violations by the PNTL are just one symptom of a much broader
nationwide problem, and until this is analyzed and addressed then the possibility is that
police abuse can only be minimized at best. The weakness of the judiciary, and
emerging corruption issues, are just two areas that directly impact on police abuse and
remedies for it. A participatory, partnership approach including the wide range of actors
in civil society such as the media, communities of interest, and others would be the most
successful way to devise an action plan for ending human rights abuse in East Timor.

40 Years Later The Mass Killings in Indonesia

By JOHN ROOSA and JOSEPH NEVINS

"One of the worst mass murders of the twentieth century." That was how a CIA
publication described the killings that began forty years ago last month in Indonesia. It
was one of the few statements in the text that was correct. The 300-page text was
devoted to blaming the victims of the killings -- the supporters of the Communist Party
of Indonesia (PKI) -- for their own deaths. The PKI had supposedly attempted a coup
d'état and a nationwide uprising called the September 30th Movement (which, for some
unknown reason, began on October 1). The mass murder of hundreds of thousands of
the party's supporters over subsequent months was thus a natural, inevitable, and
justifiable reaction on the part of those non-communists who felt threatened by the
party's violent bid for state power. The killings were part of the "backfire" referred to in
the title: Indonesia * 1965: The Coup that Backfired. The author of this 1968 report,
later revealed to be Helen Louise Hunter, acknowledged the massive scale of the
killings only to dismiss the necessity for any detailed consideration of them. She
concentrated on proving that the PKI was responsible for the September 30th
Movement while consigning the major issue, the anti-PKI atrocities, to a brief,
offhanded comment. [1]

Hunter's CIA report accurately expressed the narrative told by the Indonesian army
commanders as they organized the slaughter. That narrative rendered the September
30th Movement * a disorganized, small-scale affair that lasted about 48 hours and
resulted in a grand total of 12 deaths, among them six army generals * into the greatest
evil ever to befall Indonesia [2]. The commander of the army, Major General Suharto,
justified his acquisition of emergency powers in late 1965 and early 1966 by insisting
that the September 30th Movement was a devious conspiracy by the PKI to seize state
power and murder all of its enemies. Suharto's martial law regime detained some 1.5
million people as political prisoners (for varying lengths of time), and accused them of
being "directly or indirectly involved in the September 30th Movement." The hundreds
of thousands of people shot, stabbed, bludgeoned, or starved to death were labeled
perpetrators, or would-be perpetrators of atrocities, just as culpable for the murder of the
army generals as the handful of people who were truly guilty.

The September 30th Movement was Suharto's Reichstag fire: a pretext for destroying
the communist party and seizing state power. As with the February 1933 fire in the
German parliament that Hitler used to create a hysterical, crisis-filled atmosphere, the
September 30th Movement was exaggerated by Suharto's clique of officers until it
assumed the proportions of a wild, vicious, supernatural monster. The army whipped up
an anti-communist propaganda campaign from the early days of October 1965: "the
PKI" had castrated and tortured the seven army officers it had abducted in Jakarta,
danced naked and slit the bodies of the army officers with a hundred razor blades,
drawn up hit lists, dug thousands of ditches around the country to hold countless
corpses, stockpiled guns imported from China, and so on. The army banned many
newspapers and put the rest under army censorship. It was precisely this work of the
army's psychological warfare specialists that created the conditions in which the mass
murder of "the PKI" seemed justified.

The question as to whether or not the PKI actually organized the September 30th
Movement is important only because the Suharto regime made it important. Otherwise,
it is irrelevant. Even if the PKI had nothing whatsoever to do with the movement, the
army generals would have blamed the party for it. As it was, they made their case
against the PKI largely on the basis of the transcripts of the interrogations of those
movement participants who hadn't already been summarily executed. Given that the
army used torture as standard operating procedure for interrogations, the statements of
the suspects cannot be trusted. Hunter's CIA report, primarily based on those transcripts,
is as reliable as an Inquisition text on witchcraft.

The PKI as a whole was clearly not responsible for the September 30th Movement. The
party's three million members did not participate in it. If they had, it would not have
been such a small-scale affair. The party chairman, D.N. Aidit, however, does seem to
have played a key role. He was summarily and secretly executed in late 1965, as were
two of the three other core Politburo leaders (Lukman and Njoto), before they could
provide their accounts. The one among them who survived the initial terror, the general
secretary of the party, Sudisman, admitted in the military's kangaroo court in 1967 that
the PKI as an institution knew nothing of the September 30th Movement but that certain
leaders were involved in a personal capacity. If the movement's leaders had been treated
as the leaders of previous revolts against the postcolonial government, they would have
been arrested, put on trial, and sentenced. All the members of their organizations would
not have been imprisoned or massacred.

With so little public discussion and so little scholarly research about the 1965-66 mass
killings, they remain poorly understood. Many people outside of Indonesia believe that
the victims were primarily Indonesian Chinese. While some Indonesian Chinese were
among the victims, they were by no means the majority. The violence targeted members
of the PKI and the various organizations either allied to the party or sympathetic to it,
whatever ethnicity they happened to be: Javanese, Balinese, Sundanese, etc. It was not a
case of ethnic cleansing. Many people imagine that the killings were committed by
frenzied mobs rampaging through villages and urban neighborhoods. But recent oral
history research suggests that most of the killings were executions of detainees. [3]
Much more research is needed before one can arrive at definitive conclusions.

President Sukarno, the target of the PKI's alleged coup attempt, compared the army's
murderous violence against those labeled PKI to a case of someone "burning down the
house to kill a rat." He routinely protested the army's exaggerations of the September
30th Movement. It was, he said, nothing more than "a ripple in the wide ocean." His
inability or unwillingness to muster anything more than rhetorical protests, however,
ultimately doomed his rule. In March 1966, Suharto grabbed the authority to dismiss,
appoint, and arrest cabinet ministers, even while maintaining Sukarno as figurehead
president until March 1967. The great orator who had led the nationalist struggle against
the Dutch, the cosmopolitan visionary of the Non-Aligned Movement, was
outmaneuvered by a taciturn, uneducated, thuggish, corrupt army general from a
Javanese village.

Suharto, a relative nobody in Indonesian politics, moved against the PKI and Sukarno
with the full support of the U.S. government. Marshall Green, American ambassador to
Indonesia at the time, wrote that the embassy had "made clear" to the army that
Washington was "generally sympathetic with and admiring" of its actions. [4] U.S.
officials went so far as to express concern in the days following the September 30th
Movement that the army might not do enough to annihilate the PKI. [5] The U.S.
embassy supplied radio equipment, walkie-talkies, and small arms to Suharto so that his
troops could conduct the nationwide assault on civilians. [6] A diligent embassy official
with a penchant for data collection did his part by handing the army a list of thousands
of names of PKI members. [7] Such moral and material support was much appreciated
in the Indonesian army. As an aide to the army's chief of staff informed U.S. embassy
officials in October 1965, "This was just what was needed by way of assurances that we
weren't going to be hit from all angles as we moved to straighten things out here."[8]

This collaboration between the U.S. and the top army brass in 1965 was rooted in
Washington's longstanding wish to have privileged and enhanced access to Southeast
Asia's resource wealth. Many in Washington saw Indonesia as the region's centerpiece.
Richard Nixon characterized the country as "containing the region's richest hoard of
natural resources" and "by far the greatest prize in the South-East Asian area." [9] Two
years earlier, in a 1965 speech in Asia, Nixon had argued in favor of bombing North
Vietnam to protect Indonesia's "immense mineral potential." [10] But obstacles to the
realization of Washington's geopolitical-economic vision arose when the Sukarno
government emerged upon independence in Indonesia. Sukarno's domestic and foreign
policy was nationalist, nonaligned, and explicitly anti-imperialist. Moreover, his
government had a working relationship with the powerful PKI, which Washington
feared would eventually win national elections.

Eisenhower's administration attempted to break up Indonesia and sabotage Sukarno's

presidency by supporting secessionist revolts in 1958.[11] When that criminal escapade
of the Dulles brothers failed, the strategists in Washington reversed course and began
backing the army officers of the central government. The new strategy was to cultivate
anti-communist officers who could gradually build up the army as a shadow
government capable of replacing President Sukarno and eliminating the PKI at some
future date. The top army generals in Jakarta bided their time and waited for the
opportune moment for what U.S. strategists called a final "showdown" with the PKI.
[12] That moment came on October 1, 1965.

The destruction of the PKI and Sukarno's ouster resulted in a dramatic shift in the
regional power equation, leading Time magazine to hail Suharto's bloody takeover as
"The West's best news for years in Asia." [13] Several years later, the U.S. Navy
League's publication gushed over Indonesia's new role in Southeast Asia as "that
strategic area's unaggressive, but stern, monitor," while characterizing the country as
"one of Asia's most highly developed nations and endowed by chance with what is
probably the most strategically authoritative geographic location on earth." [14] Among
other things, the euphoria reflected just how lucrative the changing of the guard in
Indonesia would prove to be for Western business interests.

Suharto's clique of army officers took power with a long-term economic strategy in
mind. They expected the legitimacy of their new regime would derive from economic
growth and that growth would derive from bringing in Western investment, exporting
natural resources to Western markets, and begging for Western aid. Suharto's vision for
the army was not in terms of defending the nation against foreign aggression but
defending foreign capital against Indonesians. He personally intervened in a meeting of
cabinet ministers in December 1965 that was discussing the nationalization of the oil
companies Caltex and Stanvac. Soon after the meeting began, he suddenly arrived by
helicopter, entered the chamber, and declared, as the gleeful U.S. embassy account has
it, that the military "would not stand for precipitous moves against oil companies."
Faced with such a threat, the cabinet indefinitely postponed the discussion. [15] At the
same time, Suharto's army was jailing and killing union leaders at the facilities of U.S.
oil companies and rubber plantations. [16]

Once Suharto decisively sidelined Sukarno in March 1966, the floodgates of foreign aid
opened up. The U.S. shipped large quantities of rice and cloth for the explicit political
purpose of shoring up his regime. Falling prices were meant to convince Indonesians
that Suharto's rule was an improvement over Sukarno's. The regime's ability over the
following years to sustain economic growth via integration with Western capital
provided whatever legitimacy it had. Once that pattern of growth ended with the capital
flight of the 1997 Asian economic crisis, the regime's legitimacy quickly vanished.
Middle class university students, the fruits of economic growth, played a particularly
important role in forcing Suharto from office. The Suharto regime lived by foreign
capital and died by foreign capital.

By now it is clear that the much ballyhooed economic growth of the Suharto years was
severely detrimental to the national interest. The country has little to show for all the
natural resources sold on the world market. Payments on the foreign and domestic debt,
part of it being the odious debt from the Suharto years, swallow up much of the
government's budget. With health care spending at a minimum, epidemic and
preventable diseases are rampant. There is little domestic industrial production. The
forests from which military officers and Suharto cronies continue to make fortunes are
being cut down and burned up at an alarming rate. The country imports huge quantities
of staple commodities that could be easily produced on a larger scale in Indonesia, such
as sugar, rice, and soybeans. The main products of the villages now are migrant
laborers, or "the heroes of foreign exchange," to quote from a lighted sign at the Jakarta
airport.

Apart from the pillaging of Indonesia's resource base, the Suharto regime caused an
astounding level of unnecessary suffering. At his command, the Indonesian military
invaded neighboring East Timor in 1975 after receiving a green light from President
Gerald Ford and his secretary of state, Henry Kissinger. The result was an occupation
that lasted for almost 24 years and left a death toll of tens of thousands of East
Timorese. Within Indonesia proper, the TNI committed widespread atrocities during
counterinsurgency campaigns in the resource-rich provinces of West Papua and Aceh,
resulting in tens of thousands of additional fatalities.
With Suharto's forced resignation in 1998, significant democratic space has opened in
Indonesia. There are competitive national and local elections. Victims of the "New
Order" and their families are able to organize. There is even an official effort to create a
national truth commission to investigate past atrocities. Nevertheless, the military still
looms large over the country's political system. As such, there has not been a thorough
investigation of any of the countless massacres that took place in 1965-66. History
textbooks still focus on the September 30th Movement and make no mention of the
massacres. Similarly, no military or political leaders have been held responsible for the
Suharto-era crimes (or those that have taken place since), thus increasing the likelihood
of future atrocities. This impunity is a source of continuing worry for Indonesia's civil
society and restless regions, as well as poverty-stricken, now-independent East Timor. It
is thus not surprising that the government of the world's newest country feels compelled
to play down demands for justice by its citizenry and emphasize an empty reconciliation
process with Indonesia. Meanwhile in the United States, despite political support and
billions of dollars in U.S. weaponry, military training and economic assistance to
Jakarta over the preceding four decades, Washington's role in Indonesia's killing fields
of 1965-66 and subsequent brutality has been effectively buried, thus enabling the Bush
administration's current efforts to further ties with Indonesia's military, as part of the
global "war on terror." [17] Suharto's removal from office has not led to radical changes
in Indonesia's state and economy.

Sukarno used to indict Dutch colonialism by saying that Indonesia was "a nation of
coolies and a coolie among nations." Thanks to the Suharto years, that description
remains true. The principles of economic self-sufficiency, prosperity, and international
recognition for which the nationalist struggle was fought now seem as remote as ever. It
is encouraging that many Indonesians are now recalling Sukarno's fight against Western
imperialism (first the Netherlands and then the U.S.) after experiencing the misery that
Suharto's strategy of collaboration has wrought. In his "year of living dangerously"
speech in August 1964 * a phrase remembered in the West as just the title of a 1982
movie with Mel Gibson and Sigourney Weaver * Sukarno spoke about the Indonesian
ideal of national independence struggling to stay afloat in "an ocean of subversion and
intervention from the imperialists and colonialists." Suharto's U.S.-assisted takeover of
state power forty years ago last month drowned that ideal in blood, but it might just rise
again during the ongoing economic crisis that is endangering the lives of so many
Indonesians.

John Roosa is an assistant professor of history at the University of British Columbia,

and is the author of Pretext for Mass Murder: The September 30th Movement and
Suharto's Coup d'État in Indonesia (University of Wisconsin Press, forthcoming in
2006).

Joseph Nevins is an assistant professor of geography at Vassar College, and is the author
of A Not-so-distant Horror: Mass Violence in East Timor (Cornell University Press,
2005).

They may be reached at: jonevins@pop.vassar.edu

Notes
1. A former CIA agent who worked in Southeast Asia, Ralph McGehee, noted in his
memoir that the agency compiled a separate report about the events of 1965, one that
reflected its agents' honest opinions, for its own in-house readership. McGehee's
description of it was heavily censored by the agency when it vetted an account he first
published in the April 11, 1981 edition of The Nation. Deadly Deceits: My 25 Years in
the CIA (New York: Sheridan Square, 1983), pp. 57-58. Two articles in the agency's
internal journal Studies in Intelligence have been declassified: John T. Pizzicaro, "The
30 September Movement in Indonesia," (Fall 1969); Richard Cabot Howland, "The
Lessons of the September 30 Affair," (Fall 1970). The latter is available online:
http://www.odci.gov/csi/kent_csi/docs/v14i2a02p_0001.htm

2. In Jakarta, the movement's troops abducted and killed six army generals and a
lieutenant taken by mistake from the house of the seventh who avoided capture. In the
course of these abductions, a five year-old daughter of a general, a teenaged nephew of
another general, and a security guard were killed. In Central Java, two army colonels
were abducted and killed.

3. John Roosa, Ayu Ratih, and Hilmar Farid, eds. Tahun yang Tak Pernah Berakhir:
Memahami Pengalaman Korban 65; Esai-Esai Sejarah Lisan [The Year that Never
Ended: Understanding the Experiences of the Victims of 1965; Oral History Essays]
(Jakarta: Elsam, 2004). Also consider the massacre investigated in Chris Hilton's very
good documentary film Shadowplay (2002).

4. Telegram from the Embassy in Indonesia to Department of State, November 4, 1965,

in United States Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-
1968, vol. 26, p. 354. This FRUS volume is available online at the National Security
Archive website: http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB52/#FRUS

5. Telegram from the Embassy in Jakarta to Department of State, October 14, 1965.
Quoted in Geoffrey Robinson, The Dark Side of Paradise: Political Violence in Bali
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1995), p. 283.

6. Frederick Bunnell, "American 'Low Posture' Policy Toward Indonesia in the Months
Leading up to the 1965 'Coup'," Indonesia, 50 (October 1990), p. 59.

7. Kathy Kadane, "Ex-agents say CIA Compiled Death Lists for Indonesians," San
Francisco Examiner, May 20, 1990, available online at http://www.pir.org/kadane.html

8. CIA Report no. 14 to the White House (from Jakarta), October 14, 1965. Cited in
Robinson, The Dark Side of Paradise, p. 283.

9. Richard Nixon, "Asia After Viet Nam," Foreign Affairs (October 1967), p. 111.

10. Quoted in Peter Dale Scott, "Exporting Military-Economic Development: America

and the Overthrow of Sukarno," in Malcolm Caldwell (ed.), Ten Years' Military Terror
in Indonesia (Nottingham (U.K.): Bertrand Russell Peace Foundation for Spokesman
Books, 1975), p. 241.

11. Audrey R. Kahin and George McT. Kahin, Subversion as Foreign Policy: The Secret
Eisenhower and Dulles Debacle in Indonesia (New York: The New Press, 1995), p. 1.
12. Bunnell, "American 'Low Posture' Policy," pp. 34, 43, 53-54.

13. Time, July 15, 1966. Also see Noam Chomsky, Year 501: The Conquest Continues
(Boston: South End Press, 1993), pp. 123-131.

14. Lawrence Griswold, "Garuda and the Emerald Archipelago: Strategic Indonesia
Forges New Ties with the West," Sea Power (Navy League of the United States), vol.
16, no. 2 (1973), pp. 20, 25.

15. Telegram 1787 from Jakarta to State Department, December 16, 1965, cited in Brad
Simpson, "Modernizing Indonesia: U.S.*Indonesian Relations, 1961-1967," (Ph.D.
dissertation, Department of History, Northwestern University, 2003), p. 343.

16. Hilmar Farid, "Indonesia's Original Sin: Mass Killings and Capitalist Expansion
1965-66," Inter-Asia Cultural Studies, vol. 6, no. 1 (March 2005).

17. For information on U.S.-Indonesia military ties, see the website of the East Timor
Indonesia Action Network at http://www.etan.org/

INDONESIA: BENCANA ALAM ATAU PEMBUNUHAN MASSAL ?

Oleh: Andre Vitchek:[1]

Lain hari, terjadi lagi kehilangan nyawa yang sesungguhnya tidak perlu: 16 orang
terbunuh dan 16 orang masih hilang pada saat banjir dan longsor di Tahuna, sebuah
pulau kecil dekat Sulawesi .
Dengan kecepatan yang mengerikan, Indonesia telah menggantikan Bangladesh dan
India sebagai bangsa yang paling rentan bencana di dunia. Jika nama Indonesia muncul
pada daftar judul utama di berita Yahoo, besar kemungkinan telah terjadi lagi suatu
tragedi besar yang sesungguhnya tidak perlu terjadi di salah satu pulau dari kepulauan
yang tersebar luas ini.
Pesawat terbang hilang atau tergelincir di landasan pacu, kapal-kapal ferry tenggelam
atau rontok di lautan bebas, kereta api bertabrakan atau tergelincir satu kali seminggu,
penumpang yang tak berkarcis berjatuhan dari atap yang berkarat. Tumpukan sampah
yang berbau busuk dan tidak memperoleh izin telah mengubur kelompok pemulung
yang tak berdaya, tanah longsor telah menghanyutkan rumah-rumah kardus ke anak-
anak sungai, gempa bumi serta gelombang pasang telah menghancurkan kota-kota serta
desa-desa pantai.Kebakaran hutan di Sumatra telah menyesakkan nafas penduduk di
daerah yang luas di Asia Tenggara.

Ruang lingkup bencana sebesar ini tidak pernah terjadi sebelumnya dan sungguh aneh
jika kita menyepelekannya sekedar sebagai nasib jelek bangsa atau amarah Tuhan
ataupun karena keganasan alam belaka. Sebagian besar faktor penyebab bencana ini
harus dipersalahkan pada korupsi, inkompetensi atau sekedar ketidakacuhan dari
kelompok elite yang sedang berkuasa dan para pejabat peemrintah. Adalah kemiskinan,
minimnya proyek untuk kepentingan umum, dan kegemaran [para pejabat untuk ]
mencuri yang membunuh ratusan ribu pria, wanita serta anak-anak Indonesia yang tidak
berdaya.
Sejak kudeta militer dalam tahun 1965 yang disponsori Amerika Serikat yang
menjatuhkan Sukarno, dan menaikkan rezim militer yang sangat anti komunis, korup,
dan pro pasar dari diktator Suharto , Indonesia terhindar dari pengawasan yang
sungguh-sungguh dari
media dan pemerintahan negara-negara Barat. Setelah jatuhnya Suharto dalam tahun
1998, Indonesia dipuji oleh media massa sebagai suatu demokrasi yang sedang tumbuh
dan semakin toleran.

Sebagian dari bencana ini adalah buatan manusia; [dan] hampir semuanya malah bisa
dicegah. Dalam penelusuran yang lebih cermat semakin jelas terlihat bahwa orang-
orang mati karena hampir tidak ada upaya pencegahan, kurangnya pendidikan
(Indonesia merupakan negara yang ketiga paling rendah prosentase GDP anggaran
pendidikannya sesudah Equatorial Guinea dan Ecuador) dan suatu sistem ekonomi pro
pasar yang buas yang membiarkan sekelompok kecil orang kaya untuk memperkaya
dirinya sendiri di atas penderitaan orang banyak yang hidup d engan biaya kurang dari
dua dollar sehari. Kesimpulan yang dapat ditarik terhadap bagaimana berfungsinya
masyarakat Indonesia bisa sangat mengerikan. Namun, menghindari pengungkapan hal
ini tidak diragukan lagi akan menyebabkan jatuhnya korban nyawa yang berharga dari
ratusan ribu manusia.

[Kehidupan bernegara di] Indonesia dewasa ini didorong oleh semangat mencari untung
dalam bentuknya yang paling ekstrim. Ia juga merupakan salah satu dari bangsa yang
paling korup di muka bumi. Dan kelihatannya tidak ada keuntungan cepat yang dapat
diperoleh dari mengambil langkah-langkah preventif [terhadap bencana alam ini].

Dimanapun dunia, bendungan dan dinding anti-tsunami dipandang sebagai pekerjaan

umum dan justru perkataan –umum—yang telah hampir lenyap dari kamus mereka yang
membuat keputusan di Indonesia . Keuntungan berjangka pendek bagi sekelompok
khusus orang diberikan prioritas yang lebih tinggi dari kemanfaatan berjangka panjang
bagi seluruh bangsa. Keruntuhan moral dari bangsa ini terbayang dalam skala nilai,
yaitu: orang korup tapi kaya memperoleh penghormatan yang jauh lebih tinggi
dibandingkan dengan mereka yang jujur tapi miskin.

Tenggelamnya kapal-kapal ferry bukanlah "karena angin kencang dan ombak"; kapal-
kapal itu tenggelam karena penuh sesak oleh penumpang dan karena perawatan yang
buruk. Semuanya bisa dijadikan uang, bahkan keselamatan ribuan penumpang.
Perusahaan-perusaha an hanya ingat terhadap keuntungannya sendiri, sedangkan para
pengawas dari pemerintah hanya memperhatikan uang suap belaka. Tenggelamnya
kapal Senopati Nusantara dengan ratusan kurban dan disiarkan secara luas itu hanyalah
salah satu dari ratusan kecelakaan laut yang terjadi setiap tahun di Indonesia . Walaupun
tidak bisa diperoleh angka statistik yang pasti (dengan alasan yang dapat diduga, yaitu
karena pemerintah Indonesia berusaha sekeras-kerasnya untuk mencegah
dipublikasikannya statistik komparatif secara lengkap), beberapa rute pelayaran
kehilangan lebih dari tiga kapal setiap tahun.

Catatan keamanan dari industri penerbangan Indonesia merupakan salah satu yang
paling buruk di dunia. Sejak tahun 1997, sekurang-kurangnya 666 orang telah
meninggal dalam delapan kecelakaan pesawat di Indonesia . Latihan terhadap beberapa
orang pilot sedemikian buruknya sehingga pesawat sering tergelincir di landasan pacu
atau sama sekali tidak bisa menemukan landasan, atau [malah] mendarat di bagian
tengah landasan. Pemeliharaan pesawat adalah masalah lainnya: flaps sering tidak
berfungsi sama sekali; roda tidak dapat dimasukkan setelah take-off, ban yang jarang
diganti cenderung meletus pada saat mendarat. Sungguh merupakan suatu keajaiban
bagaimana beberapa pesawat – khususnya pesawat tua Boeing 737 yang diterbangkan
oleh hampir semua perusahaan penerbangan Indonesia – bisa lolos dari inspeksi.

Setelah mewawancarai pejabat penerbangan sipil lokal (nama yang bersangkutan jelas
tidak mau disebutkan) wartawan Anda mengetahui bahwa sistem navigasi dari beberapa
bandar udara Indonesia berada dalam keadaan yang amburadul, terutama bandar udara
Makasar di
Sulawesi dan Medan di Sumatra.

Rata-rata, telah terjadi satu kecelakaan kereta api setiap enam hari di Indonesia ,
umumnya disebabkan karena kurangnya penjagaan pada 8000 lintasan kereta api.
Sebagai perbandingan, kereta api Malaysia tidak pernah mengalami kecelakaan fatal
selama 13 tahun sampai tahun 2005 (satu kecelakaan terjadi tahun 2006, yang
statistiknya bisa diperoleh).

Walaupun kenyataan menunjukkan bahwa Indonesia secara relatif mempunyai jumlah

mobil per kapita yang kecil, namun jalan-jalannya merupakan jaringan jalan yang
"paling banyak digunakan" di dunia (hanya nomor dua setelah Hongkong yang justru
bukan merupakan negara): 5.7 juta kend eraan-km per tahun dari jaringan jalan. (2003,
The Economist World in Figures, 2007 Edition).
Menurut The Financial Times, walaupun kepadatan yang luar biasa serta lalu lintas yang
bagaikan merangkak ini, lebih dari 80 orang tewas setiap hari di jalan-jalan Indonesia,
umumnya disebabkan oleh karena amat buruknya infrastruktur dan amat lemahnya
penegakan hukum.
Gempa bumi belaka tidaklah membunuh manusia. Faktor penyebab banyaknya jatuh
korban adalah buruknya konstruksi rumah serta bangunan, bersamaan dengan
kurangnya upaya preventif dan pendidikan preventif.
Sudah menjadi pengetahuan umum bahwa Indonesia rentan terhadap bencana; bahwa ia
berada di kawasan yang disebut sebagai 'lingkaran api' (ring of fire). Namun kaum
miskin tidak bisa mengharapkan adanya proyek perumahan umum yang mampu
menahan gempa (seperti yang diban gun di negara tetangga, Malaysia ). Hampir setiap
keluarga harus mengurus nasibnya sendiri: mereka harus merancang dan mendirikan
tempat tinggalnya sendiri.
Gempa besar membunuh ratusan orang, kadang-kadang ribuan orang, dan menyebabkan
ratusan ribu orang kehilangan rumah mereka. Sekurang-kurangnya 5.800 orang
meninggal dan 36.000 luka-luka pada tanggal 27 Mei 2006 sewaktu gempa berkekuatan
6.2 skala Richter menghantam daerah Jawa Tengah dekat kota bersejarah Yogyakarta.
Infrastruktur yang primitif, fasilitas media yang tidak memadai, dan korupsi yang terjadi
pada saat pendistribusian bantuan merupakan faktor yang menyebabkan tingginya
jumlah korban pada saat terjadinya goncangan.

Pembabatan hutan secara tidak sah (illegal logging) dan penggundulan hutan
merupakan alasan utama terjadinya tanah longsor. Semua orang tahu siapa yang
bertanggung jawab terhadap terjadinya kebakaran hutan di Sumatera dan di tempat-
tempat lain, tetapi para pejabat pemerintah enggan sekali melakukan penangkapan, oleh
karena mereka yang bertanggung jawab terhadap penggundulan hutan tersebut biasanya
kaya raya dan mempunyai koneksi dengan [pejabat] negara dimana bahkan keadilan
bisa dijual.

Demikian banyak bentuk penyelesaian terhadap masalah-masalah ini, termasuk

penegakan hukum, inspeksi dan upaya untuk mencari nafkah alternatif bagi masyarakat
yang sedemikian putus asanya, sehingga mereka secara harfiah terpaksa ikut serta
menggali lubang kuburnya sendiri dengan menghancurkan lingkungan, yang
selanjutnya menghancurkan seluruh masyarakat itu sendiri. Namun hampir tidak ada
yang dilakukan sama sekali, oleh karena pembabatan hutan secara tidak sah merupakan
bisnis raksasa dan sangat menguntungkan, yang dapat mengisi demikian banyak telapak
tangan yang menunggunya dengan sukacita.

Bulan lalu, beberapa puluh orang terbunuh kaena tanah longsor dan banjir bandang di
bagian utara pulau Sumatra , yang memaksa 400.000 oang terpaksa mengungsi dari
rumah mereka. Pada bulan Juni 2006, banjir dan tanah longsor yang disebabkan oleh
hutan lebat telah menewaskan lebih dari 200 orang di provinsi Sulawesi Selatan.

Gelombang raksasa, yang terkenal sebagai tsunami, telah menewaskan lebih dari
126.000 orang di provinsi Aceh pada bulan Desember 2004. Bukan saja reaksi dari
pemerintah Indonesia dan militernya amat lamban, sebagian besar dari bantuan luar
negeri yang amat banyak itu lenyap karena korupsi. Jangankan membantu korban,
banyak anggota tentara Indonesia memeras sogokan dari lembaga-lembaga bantuan dan
merusak perbekalan atau air minum yang berharga jika sogokan tidak dibayar.

Dalam suatu kasus menyolok tentang perampasan tanah oleh pemerintah, banyak
korban dihambat pulang ke tanahnya sendiri, sedangkan anak-anak dipisahkan secara
paksa dari orang tuanya (karena kehilangan sertifikat kelahiran) dan 'diadopsi' oleh
organisasi-organisa si keagamaan; beberapa di antaranya menjadi korban perdagangan
manusia (human traficking). Lebih dari dua tahun setelah terjadinya tragedi yang
menghancur-luluhkan Aceh ini, ratusan ribu orang masih tinggal di rumah-rumah
darurat. Masih banyak korban tsunami lainnya, yang menghantam pantai Jawa selatan
pada tanggal 17 Juli 2006 yang masih menunggu bantuan yang berarti. Menurut angka-
angka resmi, sebanyak 600 orang tewas, namun angka yang sebenarnya hampir pasti
jauh lebih tinggi.

Pejabat-pejabat Indonesia < /SPAN> telah menerima peringatan dini dari Jepang namun
tidak mau bertindak, kemudian mengatakan bahwa tidak banyak yang dapat diperbuat
karena daerah tersebut tidak dilengkapi dengan sirene atau pengeras suara. Indonesia
sering menderita berbagai jenis bencana buatan manusia yang sungguh sukar untuk
dimengerti dan diperbandingkan dengan apapun juga. "Banjir lumpur" baru-baru ini
telah menenggelamkan demikian banyak desa di luar Surabaya . Bencana itu terjadi
karena tidak dipatuhinya prosedur secara wajar oleh suatu perusahaan eksplorasi gas
(yang sebagian sahamnya dimiliki oleh salah seorang menteri kabinet). "Kecelakaan"
ini telah menyebabkan lebih dari 10.000 orang menjadi pengungsi, dan merendam lebih
dari 1.000 are tanah dengan lumpur panas, menghancurkan satu-satunya jalan raya dari
Surabaya serta jalan kereta api utama. Sampah telah menguburkan suatu desa pemulung
miskin pada sebuah penimbunan sampah tanpa izin di luar kota Bandung . Banyak lagi
kejadian seperti itu, tapi daftar lengkap akan memenerlukan banyak sekali halaman
surat kabar, bahkan mungkin suatu buku yang khusus ditulis tentang hal itu.
Masalahnya adalah: kapankah rakyat Indonesia akan berkata bahwa sudah cukup apa
yang terjadi itu dan kapankah mereka akan menuntut pertanggungjawaban dan keadilan,
angka-angka statistik yang benar, dan 'cetak biru' yang konkrit untuk
menyelesaikannya? Hampir di semua negara, dua bencana yang terjadi baru-baru ini –
peristiwa tenggelam yang mengerikan dari kapan 'Satria Nusantara" dan 'hilang'-nya
pesawat Boeing 737 Adam Air dengan 102 penumpang – sudah lebih dari cukup untuk
memaksa menteri kabinet untuk mengundurkan diri. Di Indonesia, kedua tragedi ini
dipandang (atau ditampilkan) ha nya sebagai suatu nasib buruk lainnya belaka tanpa
meminta pertanggungjawaban atau akuntabiltas siapa pun juga.

Pers dan media massa Indonesia telah melaporkan secara detail masing-masing dan
setiap bencana itu. Tetapi mereka gagal untuk menegaskan bahwa apa yang terjadi itu
adalah suatu keadaan luar biasa dan tidak dapat ditoleransi, bahwa mungkin tidak ada
negara besar lainnya di dunia yang mengalami demikian banyak korban manusia yang
tidak semestinya terjadi karena bencana buatan manusia atau bencana yang
sesungguhnya bisa dicegah. Upaya mengaitkan demikian banyak bencana dengan
korupsi dan sistem sosial ekonomi telah ditolak sama sekali. Surat kabar Indonesia
terkemuka J akarta Post, baru-baru ini memberangus komentar ini, dan menolak
menerbitkannya di halaman-halamannya.

Sejak Desember 2004, Indonesia telah kehilangan sekitar 200 ribu orang rakyatnya
dalam berbagai bencana, tidak termasuk kecelakaan kenderaan bermotor di jalan raya
dan konflik bersenjata yang terjadi di seluruh kepulauan Indonesia. Jumlah itu lebih
besar dari jumlah korban di Irak pada saat yang sama, juga lebih besar dari korban yang
jatuh di Sri Langka atau di Peru selama perang saudara yang demikian lama. Sungguh,
banyak orang Indonesia yang hidup dalam keadaan berbahaya dan penuh risiko seperti
mereka yang hidup di daerah yang tercabik-cabik oleh perang. Sebagian besar mereka
tidak menyadarinya, oleh karena statistik komparatif atau tidak tersedia atau telah
ditekan.

Indonesia adalah miskin, tetapi masih berada dalam posisi untuk melindungi sebagian
dari warganya yang rentan. Masalah utama adalah tidak adanya kehendak politik
(political will). Cukup banyak semen dan batu bata untuk membuat bendungan dan
dinding untuk menghambat tsunami, untuk memperkuat bukit-bukit di sekitar kota-kota,
yang terancam akan dikuburkan oleh tanah longsor. Suatu penglihatan sekilas di sekitar
Jakarta berlusin-lusin shopping malls baru dibangun di beberapa tempat, dimana istana-
istana mewah dari pejabat-pejabat yang korup telah memakan berhektar-hektar tanah.
Keengganan untuk menyelesaikan masalah mempunyai akarnya pada korupsi. Badan-
badan usaha serta pejabat-pejabat lokal telah mengemban gkan kemampuan khusus
untuk mengeruk keuntungan dari apa pun juga, bahkan dari bencana dan dari
penderitaan berjuta-juta rakyatnya sendiri. Dalam kalimat sederhana, korupsi adalah
pencurian dari publik. Tetapi jika korban yang harus dibayar harus dihitung dengan
hilangnya ratusan ribu nyawa, ia menjadi pembunuhan massal.

------------ --------- --------- --------- --------- --------- ---------

[1] Novelis, jurnalis, produser film, salah

seorang pendiri dari Mainstay Press
(www.mainstaypress. org), Senior Fellow pada Oakland
Institute (www.oaklandinstitu te.org). Saat ini ia
tinggal dan bekerja di Asia Tenggara dan bisa
dihubungi pada alamat email andre-wcn@usa. net. Naskah
aslinya berjudul " Indonesia : Natural Disasters or Mass
Murder?", dimuat dalam International Herald Tribune
dan The Financial Times, 12 Februari 2007, dikirimkan
via e-mail oleh Duta Besar RI di Ceko, Prof Dr Salim
Said , MA ,MAIA, dan diterjemahkan oleh Dr. Saafroedin
Bahar, Komnas HAM.

Another Bosnia Tragedy in Indonesia#

Republika*, Tuesday 4 January 2000

==========================
Three Villages Raided, Women Raped in Halmahera.
In a single night, 800 Muslims massacred

JAKARTA- The worst and the most heartbreaking human tragedy has occurred in North
Maluku on 28 December 1999. Not less than 800 Muslim men in three villages in the
district of Tobelo, Halmahera, North Maluku Province were massacred in a single night,
while the women were raped in the streets.

Yesterday, Thamrin Amal Tomagola of the Faculty of Social and Political Sciences,
Indonesian University, said," I was informed that some 80% of men living in three
Muslim villages of Tobelo were massacred. Mr. Tomagola, who is a sociologist and was
born in Galela, Halmahera, added that each of the villages was inhabited by around 200
to 300 family units. Therefore, the number of the Muslim men killed would be around
800. The massacre happened all of a sudden following social tension which has been
escalating in North Halmahera.

According to the Vice President of Assembly of Muslim Scholars of Indonesia (Majelis

Ulama Indonesia - MUI) H Adjit bin Taher, since the tension sparked up on 26
December 1999, nearly 2000 Muslims from Tobelo were killed and four mosques burnt
down, including Islamic Affair Offices (Kantor Urusan
Agama-KUA) and all buildings associated with Islam. "Muslim women were also raped
in the streets," he said. In this region, Muslims were indeed minority. Out of 50000
Tobelo population, only 5000 are Muslims.

According to Thamrin, the indication that there would be attack on the Muslims in
Tobelo was noticed on 25 December when there was a huge people gathering in Tobelo.
The crowd came from some districts in North Halmahera and Ternate and the number
reached about 10 to 20 thousands people.

Thamrin said that he did not know who provoked them to carry out the attack. "For
sure, on 26 December 1999, they did the attack on the Muslim enclaves in the city of
Tobelo after [Ramadan] break fast," he told.
On 28 December 1999, he continued, a convoy of trucks laden with people were
roaming the streets. They were thought to have come from groups of people who had
celebrated Christmas in Tobelo on 25 December. They came not only from three
districts in North Halmahera (namely Tobelo, Galela and Jailolo) but also from Kao and
Pidiwang districts as well as Christians from Ternate
who had sought refuge in Tobelo.

When the convoy was underway, he said, the convoy leader kept agitating speech using
a loud speaker mounted on the truck. The mobs on the trucks did no action when
passing through Christian villages. But, he said, when coming to the Muslim areas, the
mass immediately got off the trucks and then poured petrol on Muslims' houses before
set on fire. "In this situation, the inhabitants left the houses and went outside. And they
[the Christians] then slain the men," he said.

Apart from victimising Muslims, he added, the Christians also attacked the residents of
Chinese origin. Both the Muslim and Chinese people who were under attack run toward
Jami Mosque in Gamsuni Village and any mosque in Dufa-Dufa village seeking for
refuge. Nonetheless, the Christian mass put the people who were inside the mosques
under their siege. "They then poured the mosques with petrol and burnt the people
inside alive," he said.

Thamrin disclosed that since a sectarian conflict erupted in Makian Malifut district on
18 August 1999, the death toll has reached 2500 people. The tension that built up in
North Halmahera started when Christian community in Kao expelled Muslim
inhabitants of Makian Malifut from their villages to Ternate Island.

The Muslims then took revenge by driving out Christian inhabitants in Ternate who then
took refuge in North Sulawesi and in majority-majority areas of North Halmahera. The
social tension which has currently turned into inter-religious clashes in the upper part of
the northern region of Halmahera island, Thamrin said, is the follow-up of the conflicts
in Makian Malifut district on 18 August.

At present, Thamrin said, the Muslims in North Halmahera were besieged. They were
driven out from Tobelo and Kao districts. Only around 3000 people remains in Galela
district, where Muslims are majority, whereas some 5000 of the inhabitants have fled to
Ternate. About 400 [Muslim] youths have determined to defend Soa Siu City. "Apart
from that, Muslim enclaves in Jaelolo district are currently under siege by Christians,"
he added.

The Indonesian Government and the National Commission for Human Rights (Komnas
HAM): Too luggishÉ!!!!! Although the conflict in North Halmahera was extremely
tragic, with thousands of people dead, Thamrin sees the Government being too slow in
giving response. Indonesian Army (Tentara National Indonesia-TNI), Thamrin admitted,
reacted quickly by sending additional troops from Malang, Solo and
Madiun. But, he continued, no real help from Government has been given to deal with
the social atastrophe in the region. "I have not seen any proper coordination and
arrangement from the Government. Indeed, the real aids came from local NGOs," said
Thamrin.

Furthermore, Thamrin was also dismayed by Komnas HAM which was less responsive
with this extraordinary human right violation in North Halmahera. To illustrate the
enormous scale of the human right violation, Thamrin mentioned that the conflict has
been going on for about five months, yet the
dead victims have reached 2500; whereas Ambon conflict [which is relatively longer]
caused merely 1200 people died. "Komnas HAM just came over during the first conflict
on 18 August 1999, but they did not even set up a special team [to investigate the
following] conflicts on 26 November and end of December 1999," he said.

From the reports he continuously receives, Thamrin said that hostility is still there
despite of the deployment of additional troops. Muslim mujahideen have now gathered
around the corridor regions of North Halmahera to launch a counter attack. They came
from Tidore, Ternate, Bacan, Sanana, Galela and South Halmahera. "The Government
must set up immediately a special team for and investigate this grotesque human rights
violation. It has become a tragedy for humanity," he stressed.

Pangdam XVI/Pattimura (=the Army Chief for Maluku Province), TNI Brigade General
Max Tamaela, the Chief Commander for restoring peace and public order, has vowed to
leave his position if he cannot stop this prolonged bloodshed. "I am ready to run the risk
[of being sacked from my position] as a Pangdam [in my effort] to stop this human
tragedy," he said in Ambon this Monday.

The instruction letter of Kodal numbered TR/1291/1999, dated 28 December 1999 was
implemented on the following Wednesday morning, 29 December 1999. The letter
mentioned that the Indonesian Army Chief had granted permission to allow additional
troops when, based on evaluation in the field, the personnel already deployed were felt
insufficient to stop the clashes and restore the peace and order.

"So, looking at the nature of the present conflicts, it seemed necessary to crush the
attackers, regardless who are they since the facts have told that non-violence and
negotiation approaches are not welcomed by the two sides.

Meanwhile, Sultan Baabulah Airport in Ternate was closed temporarily since Monday to
anticipate any situation caused by the series of sectarian conflicts that have occurred in
North Maluku since last week.[END]

INDONESIA. Suharto — the Australian elite’s favourite mass

murderer

Justin Randell
1 February 2008

Genocidal mass murderer and former Indonesian dictator Suharto died in hospital in
Jakarta on January 27, aged 86, never having faced justice for the millions of people he
killed or the billions of dollars he stole during his three decades in power. While Suharto
may be gone, the hypocrisy of his rich-country supporters — especially Australia —
lives on.

Through a spokesperson, US President George Bush expressed “his condolences to the

people of Indonesia on the loss of their former president”, according to the January 28
Washington Post. In the same article, Australian Prime Minister Kevin Rudd described
Suharto as an “influential leader” who “oversaw a period of significant economic
growth and modernization”.
Rudd characterised Suharto’s record of genocide as merely “controversial”.

Former prime minister Paul Keating, Attorney General Ian McClelland and Australian
ambassador to Indonesia Bill Farmer attended Suharto’s funeral on January 28.
McClelland told AAP that while the Australian government recognised “issues of
controversy”, it also recognised “his achievements É he brought Indonesia from a
country that was subsistence to one with a developing economy É”

Keating told the Australian on January 28 that focusing on Suharto’s crimes was
“missing the point”, because Suharto “devoted himself entirely to the development of
social conditions in Indonesia”.

Mass murder

Keen to secure the great wealth of the Indonesian archipelago for Western corporations,
Australian and US government support for Suharto goes all the way back to his rise to
power via a bloody military coup in 1965.

Suharto, then a top-ranking general, overthrew the nationalist government of president

Sukarno, which had undertaken a number of measures that attempted to protect
Indonesia from the ravages of exploitation by Western corporations.

Even more concerning for Western governments was the rise of the Indonesian
Communist Party (PKI) on the back of mass struggles by workers and peasants. By the
time Suharto took power, the PKI had an estimated 3 million members and 20 million
organised supporters, making it the largest communist party outside of the Soviet Union
and China.

With the active assistance of the CIA and the US embassy, Suharto launched his coup,
utilising the military and
right-wing Islamic fundamentalist militias to carry out a campaign of mass slaughter
against all leftists or suspected leftist sympathisers.

No-one knows the exact number killed, but at least half a million people were butchered
in the space of four months. Some estimates put the figure as high as 2 million.

The PKI was physically exterminated — completely wiped out.

Under Suharto, democratic elections and freedom of speech were completely non-
existent, while opponents were routinely killed, jailed and tortured.

At a New York meeting of the Australian-American Association in July 1966, then-

prime minister Harold Holt expressed his joy at this turn of events, infamously
declaring with satisfaction: “With 500,000 to 1 million communist sympathisers
knocked off É I think it is safe to assume a reorientation has taken place.”

Indonesia was opened for business. Via corruption and nepotism, Suharto and his
cronies became obscenely rich while any attempt by ordinary Indonesians to organise to
defend their rights was brutally suppressed.
Dividing the spoils

London-based Australian journalist John Pilger summed up the benefits of the Suharto
regime for corporate interests in a January 28 article in the British Guardian. “The deal
was
that Indonesia under Suharto would offer up what Richard Nixon had called ‘the richest
hoard of natural resources, the greatest prize in south-east Asia’.”

According to Pilger, Suharto’s “US-trained economists É agreed to the corporate

takeover of their country, sector by sector. The Freeport company got a mountain of
copper in West Papua. A US/European consortium got the nickel. The giant Alcoa
company got the biggest slice of Indonesia’s bauxite. American, Japanese and French
companies got the tropical forests of Sumatra.”

One of Suharto’s greatest crimes was the invasion and annexation of East Timor, also
backed by Western governments — especially Australia. Up to 200,000 people —
around one third of the population — died in East Timor as a result Indonesian
occupation.

Australian ambassador to Indonesia at the time of the invasion, Richard Woolcott,

recommended that Canberra back the invasion, because Australia could “more readily”
negotiate a deal with the Suharto to give Australia access to the oil and gas in the Timor
Sea than with an independent East Timor.

In 1985, Australia became the first country to formally recognise Indonesia’s illegal
annexation of East Timor. The Timor Gap Treaty, signed by Australia and Indonesia in
1989, secured the division East Timor’s gas and oil deposits between the two countries.

Nine months later, the Indonesian military killed or wounded more than 450 young
mourners at the Santa Cruz cemetery in Dili, the capital of East Timor. Then-foreign
minister Gareth Evans, who had signed the treaty, called this “an aberration, not an act
of state policy”.

Soon after the “aberration”, the joint Australian-Indonesian board overseeing

implementation of the treaty awarded 11 contracts to Australian oil and gas companies.

When a mass movement, led by pro-democracy students, forced Suharto from power in
May 1998, then-prime minister John Howard praised Suharto’s time in power as
bringing “stability” to the archipelago.

Suharto’s crimes against humanity were carried out on behalf of Western interests, and
could not have occurred without the support of countries like Australia. The outpouring
of support for Suharto following his death is consistent with Australian foreign policy:
democracy and human rights are only allowable when they don’t interfere with the
profits of big business.

[Justin Randell is a member of the Democratic Socialist Perspective, a Marxist tendency

in the Socialist Alliance. He was active in the solidarity campaign with Indonesia’s
democracy movement struggling against Suharto as a member of Action in Solidarity
with Indonesia and East Timor.]
From: International News, Green Left Weekly issue #738 6 February 2008.

Tanjung Priok 1984

Oleh Rumah Kiri, 15-02-2006 07:00

Dibuka : 990

Rubrik : Arsip,

Kronologi Peristiwa Tanjung Priok Versi HMA Sampurna

Berikut ini adalah kesaksian H.M.A Sampurna --waktu itu berpangkat Letkol dan
menjabat Asintel KodamJaya-- tentang peristiwa Tanjung Priok, yang diungkapkannya
kepada majalah mingguan Tempo. H.MA Sampurna, kini berpangkat Brigadir Jenderal
dan menjabat Wakil Gubernur Jawa Barat, bertutur sebagai berikut.

Jauh sebelum pecahnya peristiwa itu, sudah berlangsung kegiatan dakwah di Masjid al-
A'raf, di Jalan Sindang, Tanjung Priok, yang bernada menghasut. Di antara para
penceramah, yang bersuara keras ialah Amir Biki, Salim Qadar, Syarifin Maloko, Tony
Ardie, dan M. Nasir. Sebelum saya menjadi Asintel, dakwah yang "panas" itu juga
sudah ada. Kemudian, terjadi pembakaran sepeda motor milik ****nsa.

Sebelum peristiwa itu pecah, Amir Biki, yang mengkoordinasi para dai, sering menemui
saya, minta pembebasan anggota jamaah yang ditahan di Kodim atau di Polres. Saya
memang kenal baik dengan dia karena sering bertemu. Akan tetapi, permintaannya yang
terakhir tidak bisa diluluskan karena saya anggap sudah keterlaluan. Kalau masalahnya
kecil, misalnya soal selebaran, biasanya saya minta dia menyelesaikannya secara baik-
baik.

Pada tanggal 12 September itu, sekitar pukul 19.00, saya berada di depan Masjid al-
A'raf. Saya hampir bisa masuk, tetapi karena situasinya kurang menguntungkan, saya
kembali ke Kodim, sedangkan anak buah saya segera siaga di lapangan. Ternyata
situasinya makin panas karena para penceramah mulai menghasut Akhirnya, saya turun
bersama Asisten Operasi Alif Pandoyo, kini ketua DPD Golkar Jawa Tengah.

Pukul 20.30, saya masih memonitor situasi. Karena keadaan makin panas, saya
mencoba maju ke depan, tetapi ternyata massa sudah mulai bergerak maju. Saya segera
mengontak Panglima (ketika itu Try Soetrisno), yang waktu itu berada di rumah.
Kebetulan, dari sumber lain beliau juga mendapatkan informasi, lalu menghubungi
saya. Instruksi beliau waktu itu ialah "cepat atasi". Akan tetapi tiga puluh menit
kemudian, massa sudah ke jalan menuju Polres.

Di depan Polres Jakarta Utara itulah terjadi "kontak" dengan massa. Saya tidak
mengetahui persis berapa jumlah mereka karena massa amat padat. Mungkin seribu
lebih. Sulit pula menghitungnya karena keadaan gelap. Lagi pula sudah terjadi "kontak"
sehingga saya tidak sempat menghitung. Pasukan dari Kodim hanya satu regu, yang
berjumlah 10 orang. Jaraknya amat dekat, pasukan campur dengan massa. Bahkan,
saling mengejar.

Massa itu ada yang di jalan dan ada yang di lapangan. Dalam kegelapan, masih bisa
dilihatgerakan mereka ke berbagai arah. Ada yang menuju Priok, ada yang ke arah
Sampur, ada yang bergerak ke Ancol, ada pula yang ke arah Kodim dan Polres. Malam
itu posisisaya di jalan yang menuju ke arah Kodim dan Polres. Saya mengendarai jip, 10
meter di belakang pasukan.

Pasukan berusaha memberitahu massa agar mereka berhenti, tetapi mereka tidak mau.
Mereka malah mengejar tentara. Tentara gantian mengejar massa. Tidak jelas siapa dari
massa itu yang mengejar atau dikejar. Namanya juga massa. Amir Biki memimpin
mereka ke arah Kodim dan Polres, Salim Qadar memimpin mereka ke arah Priok.
Sambil bertakbir, mereka membawa berbagai macam senjata tajam. Beberapa saat
kemudian Panglima memberi tahu bahwa Pangab (waktu itu Jenderal LB Moerdani)
sebentar lagi akan meninjau ke tempat kejadian. Lalu saya menunggu di Polres. Sekitar
lima belas menit kemudian, beliau bersama panglima datang. Saya lantas melaporkan
kejadiannya. Akan tetapi, di tempat kejadian sudah tidak ada masalah yang berat karena
sudah "dibersihkan" dan sudah selesai, kecuali sejumlah rumah dan toko yang dilempari
batu dan dibakar massa.

Sekitar pukul 02.00 dini hari, saya mengantar Pangab dan Pangdam meninjau para
korban yang dirawat di RSPAD Gatot Subroto, tetapi saya tidak mengetahui persis
berapa jumlah korban yang meninggal. Para korban diangkut dengan truk, dikuburkan
di satu lokasi di desa Ceger, Kampung Rambutan, Jakarta Timur, karena sebagian tidak
dikenali identitasnya. Urusan saya ialah memproses mereka yang terlibat dan ditahan,
tidak mengurusi jenazah.

Sampai pagi saya tidak tidur, menahan, memeriksa, dan memproses mereka yang
ditangkap, jumlahnya sekitar seratus, ditahan di beberapa tempat. Diseleksi siapa
gembongnya untuk diajukan ke pengadilan, sedangkan yang lain dibebaskan. Kalau
sekarang ini ada korban yang minta agar kasus ini dijelaskan, menurut saya tidak
usahlah. Yang sudah, ya sudah.

Sumber: Buku Tanjung Priok Berdarah, Tanggungjawab Siapa: Kumpulan Fakta dan
Data, Yogyakarta: Gema Insani Press.

Kronologi Peristiwa Tanjung Priok Versi Resmi Pemerintah Orde Baru

Versi resmi peristiwa Tanjung Priok dikeluarkan sekitar sepuluh jam setelah peristiwa
ini terjadi. Keterangan resmi pemerintah Orde Baru dikemukakan oleh
Pangab/Pangkopkamtib L.B. Moerdani didampingi oleh Menteri Penerangan Harmoko,
Pangdam V/Jaya Try Soetrisno, dan Kapolda Metro Jaya Drs. Soedjoko. Keterangan
resmi peristiwa Tanjung priok diterima publik diuraikan oleh Pangab sebagai berikut.

Di sekitar Masjid Rawabadak terpasang pamflet dan poster yang menghasut bersifat
SARA. Karena imbauan petugas agar pamflet-pamflet dan poster-poster itu dihapus
atau dicabut tidak dihiraukan, seorang petugas, pada hari jumat tanggal 7 September
1984, menutup tulisan-tulisan yang bersifat menghasut itu dengan warna hitam.
Pada hari senin, 10 September 1984, seorang petugas yang sedang menjalankan
tugasnya di daerah Koja, dihadang dan kemudian dikeroyok oleh sekelompok orang.
Petugas keamanan berhasil menyelamatkan diri, tetapi sepeda motornya dibakar oleh
para penghadang. Aparat keamanan pun menangkap empat orang pelakunya untuk
keperluan pengusutan dan penuntutan sesuai ketentuan hukum yang berlaku.

Pada hari Rabu, 12 September 1984, pukul 19.30 WIB, di Masjid Rawabadak
berlangsung ceramah agama tanpa izin dan bersifat menghasut. Penceramahnya antara
lain Amir Biki (tewas tertembak), Syarifin Maloko (tertangkap setelah semua sidang
perkara Tanjung Priok selesai), M. Nasir (bukan M. Natsir mantan Perdana Menteri dan
ketua DDII), tidak pernah diketahui keberadaannya setelah peristiwa malam itu. Pukul
22.00 WIB aparat keamanan menerima telepon dari Amir Biki yang berisi ancaman
pembunuhan dan perusakan apabila keempat tahanan tidak dibebaskan. Sekitar pukul
23.00 WIB ancaman telepon diulang lagi.

Setelah itu, sekitar 1.500 orang menuju Polres dan Kodim. Lima belas orang petugas
keamanan menghambat kerumunan atau gerakan massa tersebut. Regu keamanan
berusaha membubarkan massa dengan secara persuasif, namun dijawab dengan
teriakan-teriakan yang membangkitkan emosi dan keberingasan massa. Massa terus
maju mendesak satuan keamanan sambil mengayun-ayunkan dan mengacung-acungkan
celurit.

Dalam jarak yang sudah membahayakan, regu keamanan mulai memberikan tembakan
peringatan dan tidak dihiraukan. Tembakan diarahkan ke tanah dan kaki penyerang,
korban pun tidak dapat dihindari. Setelah datang pasukan keamanan lainnya, barulah
massa mundur, tetapi mereka membakar mobil, merusak beberapa rumah, dan apotek.

Sekitar tiga puluh menit kemudian gerombolan menyerang kembali petugas keamanan,
sehingga petugas keamanan dalam kondisi kritis dan terpaksa melakukan penembakan-
penembakan untuk mencegah usaha perusuh merebut senjata dan serangan-serangan
dengan celurit dan senjata tajam lainnya.

Hari Kamis, 13 September 1984, pukul 00.00 WIB, pasukan keamanan Laksusda
(Pelaksana Khusus Daerah) Jaya berhasil mengendalikan situasi, menguasai keadaan,
dan membubarkan massa. Menurut Pangab dalam versi ini, 9 orang meninggal dan 53
luka-luka.

Sumber: Buku Tanjung Priok Berdarah, Tanggungjawab Siapa: Kumpulan Fakta dan
Data, Yogyakarta: Gema Insani Press.

Kronologi Peristiwa Tanjung Priok Versi Intern Aparat Pemerintahan Orde

Baru

Versi kedua ini diungkapkan oleh Pangab/Pangkopkamtib dalam penjelasan kepada

lurah wilayah Jakarta Utara. Penjelasan Pangab/Pangkopkamtib sebagai berikut.

Jumat, 7 September, di sekitar Masjid Rawabadak banyak tertempel pengumuman

tentang ceramah oleh mubalig-mubalig yang terkenal ekstrem, keras, bukan mubalig
ayam sayur. Salah seorang petugas Koramil setempat, yang merasa terhina karena
peringatan-peringatannya pada panitia untuk tidak mengundang penceramah seperti itu
–mubalig keras-- selalu diabaikan, menyiram salah satu pengumuman dengan air
selokan.

Senin, 10 September 1984, petugas yang menyiram pengumuman dengan air selokan itu
lewat di depan sekelompok pemuda yang sedang berada di Pasar Koja. Mereka segera
menghadangnya dan mencoba mengeroyok petugas tersebut. Pada saat itu ada dua
warga yang mencoba menyelamatkan petugas itu. Setelah itu para pengeroyok mencoba
melampiaskan kemarahan mereka dengan membakar sepeda motor dinas yang
digunakan petugas itu. Selanjutnya, sesuai prosedur hukum yang berlaku, Polres Jakarta
Utara terpaksa menahan dua orang penyelamat itu dan dua orang lagi yang diduga
sebagai pelaku pengeroyokan untuk dimintai keterangan. Penahanan sementara
diperlukan oleh aparat keamanan guna penelitian dan pengusutan lebih lanjut serta guna
penuntutan sesuai dengan hukum yang berlaku.

Rabu, 12 September 1984, sekitar pukul 19.30 WIB, di Masjid Rawabadak berlangsung
ceramah agama oleh Amir Biki, Syarifin Maloko, S.H., dan M. Nasir. Para penceramah
melontarkan ucapan-ucapan anti-Pancasila, anti asas tunggal, memecah persatuan dan
kesatuan bangsa, serta mengganggu stabilitas nasional. Di akhir ceramahnya. Amir Biki
yang dikenal masyarakat setempat sebagai tokoh agama dan tokoh masyarakat yang
berpengaruh, mengajak pendengar agar ramai-ramai mendatangi polres Jakarta Utara
untuk menuntut agar empat orang, yang sebenarnya hanya ditahan sementara guna
dimintai keterangan, dibebaskan saat itu juga. Sekitar pukul 23.00 WIB peserta ceramah
beramai-ramai mendatangi Polres Jakarta Utara, dipimpin Amir Biki yang membawa
bendera hijau. Karena gerakan ini sudah tercium sebelumnya, pengamanan Polres
Jakarta Utara diperkuat pasukan Laksusda Jaya. Sesampainya massa di depan Polres,
terjadi perundingan antara Amir Biki dan Komandan Laksusda Jaya dan Danres
(Kapolres) Jakarta Utara.

Sementara itu, para pengikutAmir Biki mulai berteriak-teriak mencaci petugas

keamanan. Mereka memaksa agar empat orang temannya dibebaskan saat itu juga.
Akhirnya, karena massa terus mendesak maju dan karena sakit hati dicaci maki terus
menerus, petugas keamanan sebagai biasanya manusia, hilang kesabarannya. Maka
tanpa dapat dicegah, sebagian petugas keamanan membidikkan senjata mereka ke arah
massa. Terjadilah hal-hal yang tidak diinginkan. Sekitar 40 orang tewas tertembak saat
itu juga, termasuk Amir Biki, serta puluhan lainnya mengalami luka-luka. Selanjutnya,
para peserta ceramah sambil meneriakkan "Allahu Akbar" mengamuk dan membakar
toko-toko milik orang Tionghoa hingga jatuh korban orang-orang Tionghoa yang
mencapai 100 orang lebih.

Kamis,13 September 1984, pukul 00.00 WIB, aparat keamanan Laksusda Jaya berhasil
mengendalikan situasi, menguasai keadaan, dan membubarkan massa.

Sumber: Buku Tanjung Priok Berdarah, Tanggungjawab Siapa: Kumpulan Fakta dan
Data, Yogyakarta: Gema Insani Press.
Kronologi Peristiwa Tanjung Priok Versi Abdul Qadir Djaelani

Abdul Qadir Djaelani adalah salah seorang ulama yang dituduh oleh aparat keamanan
sebagai salah seorang dalang peristiwa Tanjung Priok. Karenanya, ia ditangkap dan
dimasukkan ke dalam penjara. Sebagai seorang ulama dan tokoh masyarakat Tanjung
Priok, sedikit banyak ia mengetahui kronologi peristiwa Tanjung Priok. Berikut adalah
petikan kesaksian Abdul Qadir Djaelani terhadap peristiwa Tanjung Priok 12 September
1984, yang tertulis dalam eksepsi pembelaannya berjudul “Musuh-musuh Islam
Melakukan Ofensif terhadap Umat Islam Indonesia”.

Sabtu, 8 September 1984

Dua orang petugas Koramil (****nsa) tanpa membuka sepatu, memasuki Mushala as-
Sa'adah di gang IV Koja, Tanjung Priok, Jakarta Utara. Mereka menyiram pengumuman
yang tertempel di tembok mushala dengan air got (comberan). Pengumuman tadi hanya
berupa undangan pengajian remaja Islam (masjid) di Jalan Sindang.

Ahad, 9 September 1984

Peristiwa hari Sabtu (8 September 1984) di Mushala as-Sa'adah menjadi pembicaran

masyarakat tanpa ada usaha dari pihak yang berwajib untuk menawarkan penyelesaan
kepada jamaah kaum muslimin.

Senin, 10 September 1984

Beberapa anggota jamaah Mushala as-Sa'adah berpapasan dengan salah seorang petugas
Koramil yang mengotori mushala mereka. Terjadilah pertengkaran mulut yang akhirnya
dilerai oleh dua orang dari jamaah Masjid Baitul Makmur yang kebetulan lewat. Usul
mereka supaya semua pihak minta penengahan ketua RW, diterima.

Sementara usaha penegahan sedang.berlangsung, orang-orang yang tidak bertanggung

jawab dan tidak ada urusannya dengan permasalahan itu, membakar sepeda motor
petugas Koramil itu. Kodim, yang diminta bantuan oleh Koramil, mengirim sejumlah
tentara dan segera melakukan penangkapan. Ikut tertangkap 4 orang jamaah, di
antaranya termasuk Ketua Mushala as-Sa'adah.

Selasa, 11 September 1984

Amir Biki menghubungi pihak-pihak yang berwajib untuk meminta pembebasan empat
orang jamaah yang ditahan oleh Kodim, yang diyakininya tidak bersalah. Peran Amir
Biki ini tidak perlu mengherankan, karena sebagai salah seorang pimpinan Posko 66,
dialah orang yang dipercaya semua pihak yang bersangkutan untuk menjadi penengah
jika ada masalah antara penguasa (militer) dan masyarakat. Usaha Amir Biki untuk
meminta keadilan ternyata sia-sia.

Rabu, 12 September 1984

Dalam suasana tantangan yang demikian, acara pengajian remaja Islam di Jalan Sindang
Raya, yang sudah direncanakan jauh sebelum ada peristiwa Mushala as-Sa'adah, terus
berlangsung juga. Penceramahnya tidak termasuk Amir Biki, yang memang bukan
mubalig dan memang tidak pernah mau naik mimbar. Akan tetapi, dengan latar
belakang rangkaian kejadian di hari-hari sebelumnya, jemaah pengajian mendesaknya
untuk naik mimbar dan memberi petunjuk. Pada kesempatan pidato itu, Amir Biki
berkata antara lain, "Mari kita buktikan solidaritas islamiyah. Kita meminta teman kita
yang ditahan di Kodim. Mereka tidak bersalah. Kita protes pekerjaan oknum-oknum
ABRI yang tidak bertanggung jawab itu. Kita berhak membela kebenaran meskipun kita
menanggung risiko. Kalau mereka tidak dibebaskan maka kita harus memprotesnya."
Selanjutnya, Amir Biki berkata, "Kita tidak boleh merusak apa pun! Kalau adayang
merusak di tengah-tengah perjalanan, berarti itu bukan golongan kita (yang dimaksud
bukan dan jamaah kita)." Pada waktu berangkat jamaah pengajian dibagi dua: sebagian
menuju Polres dan sebagian menuju Kodim.

Setelah sampai di depan Polres, kira-kia 200 meter jaraknya, di situ sudah dihadang
oleh pasukan ABRI berpakaian perang dalam posisi pagar betis dengan senjata otomatis
di tangan. Sesampainya jamaah pengajian ke tempat itu, terdengar militer itu berteriak,
"Mundur-mundur!" Teriakan "mundur-mundur" itu disambut oleh jamaah dengan pekik,
"Allahu Akbar! Allahu Akbar!" Saat itu militer mundur dua langkah, lalu memuntahkan
senjata-senjata otomatis dengan sasaran para jamaah pengajian yang berada di hadapan
mereka, selama kurang lebih tiga puluh menit. Jamaah pengajian lalu bergelimpangan
sambil menjerit histeris; beratus-ratus umat Islam jatuh menjadi syuhada. Malahan ada
anggota militer yang berteriak, "*******! Pelurunya habis. Anjing-anjing ini masih
banyak!" Lebih sadis lagi, mereka yang belum mati ditendang-tendang dan kalau masih
bergerak maka ditembak lagi sampai mati.

Tidak lama kemudian datanglah dua buah mobil truk besar beroda sepuluh buah dalam
kecepatan tinggi yang penuh dengan pasukan. Dari atas mobil truk besar itu
dimuntahkan peluru-peluru dan senjata-senjata otomatis ke sasaran para jamaah yang
sedang bertiarap dan bersembunyi di pinggir-pinggir jalan. Lebih mengerikan lagi, truk
besar tadi berjalan di atas jamaah pengajian yang sedang tiarap di jalan raya, melindas
mereka yang sudah tertembak atau yang belum tertembak, tetapi belum sempat
menyingkir dari jalan raya yang dilalui oleh mobil truk tersebut. Jeritan dan bunyi
tulang yang patah dan remuk digilas mobil truk besar terdengarjelas oleh para jamaah
umat Islam yang tiarap di got-got/selokan-selokan di sisi jalan.

Setelah itu, truk-truk besar itu berhenti dan turunlah militer-militer itu untuk mengambil
mayat-mayat yang bergelimpangan itu dan melemparkannya ke dalam truk, bagaikan
melempar karung goni saja. Dua buah mobil truk besar itu penuh oleh mayat-mayat atau
orang-orang yang terkena tembakan yang tersusun bagaikan karung goni.

Sesudah mobil truk besar yang penuh dengan mayat jamaah pengajian itu pergi, tidak
lama kemudian datanglah mobil-mobil ambulans dan mobil pemadam kebakaran yang
bertugas menyiram dan membersihkan darah-darah di jalan raya and di sisinya, sampai
bersih.

Sementara itu, rombongan jamaah pengajian yang menuju Kodim dipimpin langsung
oleh Amir Biki. Kira-kirajarak 15 meter dari kantor Kodim, jamaah pengajian dihadang
oleh militer untuk tidak meneruskan perjalanan, dan yang boleh meneruskan perjalanan
hanya 3 orang pimpinan jamaah pengajian itu, di antaranya Amir Biki. Begitu jaraknya
kira-kira 7 meter dari kantor Kodim, 3 orang pimpinan jamaah pengajian itu
diberondong dengan peluru yang keluar dari senjata otomatis militer yang
menghadangnya. Ketiga orang pimpinan jamaah itu jatuh tersungkur menggelepar-
gelepar. Melihat kejadian itu, jamaah pengajian yang menunggu di belakang sambil
duduk, menjadi panik dan mereka berdiri mau melarikan diri, tetapi disambut oleh
tembakan peluru otomatis. Puluhan orang jamaah pengajian jatuh tersungkur menjadi
syahid. Menurut ingatan saudara Yusron, di saat ia dan mayat-mayat itu dilemparkan ke
dalam truk militer yang beroda 10 itu, kira-kira 30-40 mayat berada di dalamnya, yang
lalu dibawa menuju Rumah Sakit Gatot Subroto (dahulu RSPAD).

Sesampainya di rumah sakit, mayat-mayat itu langsung dibawa ke kamar mayat,

termasuk di dalamnya saudara Yusron. Dalam keadaan bertumpuk-tumpuk dengan
mayat-mayat itu di kamar mayat, saudara Yusron berteriak-teriak minta tolong. Petugas
rumah sakit datang dan mengangkat saudara Yusron untuk dipindahkan ke tempat lain.

Sebenarnya peristiwa pembantaian jamaah pengajian di Tanjung Priok tidak boleh

terjadi apabila PanglimaABRI/Panglima Kopkamtib Jenderal LB Moerdani benar-benar
mau berusaha untuk mencegahnya, apalagi pihak Kopkamtib yang selama ini sering
sesumbar kepada media massa bahwa pihaknya mampu mendeteksi suatu kejadian
sedini dan seawal mungkin. Ini karena pada tanggal 11 September 1984, sewaktu saya
diperiksa oleh Kepolisian Daerah Metropolitan Jakarta Raya, saya sempat berbincang-
bincang dengan Kolonel Polisi Ritonga, Kepala Intel Kepolisian tersebut di mana ia
menyatakan bahwa jamaah pengajian di Tanjung Priok menuntut pembebasan 4 orang
rekannya yang ditahan, disebabkan membakar motor petugas. Bahkan, menurut
petugas-petugas satgas Intel Jaya, di saat saya ditangkap tanggal 13 September 1984,
menyatakan bahwa pada tanggal 12 September 1984, kira-kira pukul 10.00 pagi. Amir
Biki sempat datang ke kantor Satgas Intel Jaya.

Sumber: Buku Tanjung Priok Berdarah, Tanggungjawab Siapa: Kumpulan Fakta dan
Data, Yogyakarta: Gema Insani Press.

Huru-Hara di Tanjung Priok

Sejak hari Minggu pagi lalu (pertengahan September 1984 - Ed.), corat-coret di
beberapa jalan di daerah Tanjung Priok, Jakarta Utara, telah dihapus. Kapur tebal putih
telah menutupi tulisan-tulisan yang bernada rasial dan anti pemerintah itu.

Suasana Tanjung Priok sendiri sudah pulih. Di beberapa daerah yang Rabu malam
pekan lalu diamuk kerusuhan, memang masih tampak tentara berjaga-jaga. Senin
malam pekan ini tampak terparkir dua panser di depan kampus PTDI (Perguruan Tinggi
Dakwah Islam) di Jalan Tawes, yang ditutup sejak Jumat malam. Namun, kehidupan
sehari-hari bisa dikatakan telah kembali normal.

Peristiwa kerusuhan itu sendiri diungkapkan dan dijelaskan langsung oleh

Pangkopkamtib Jenderal L.B. Moerdani kepada pers Kamis siang, sekitar 14 jam
setelah kejadian. Banyak yang memuji langkah ini, karena gerak cepat tersebut telah
berhasil mengempiskan bermacam kabar angin dan menghindarkan timbulnya berbagai
isu. Yang lebih menarik, Jenderal Benny sama sekali tidak menuduh suatu pihak atau
kelompok mendalangi peristiwa ini. Ia juga tidak menghubungkannya dengan kegiatan
subversif apa pun.
Menurut Pangab Moerdani, pada Rabu malam pekan lalu, sekitar pukul 23.00, satu regu
pengamanan ABRI di Tanjung Priok yang terdiri atas 15 orang telah menghadapi
serangan gerombolan massa yang berjumlah sekitar 1.500 orang. Usaha regu
pengamanan secara persuasif untuk menenangkan dan membubarkan massa tidak
berhasil. Massa bahkan terus mendesak maju dengan teriakan-teriakan yang
menyatakan tidak mengenal kompromi.

Tembakan-tembakan peringatan ke udara tidak mereka acuhkan. "Bahkan, mereka terus

menyerang dengan mengayunkan senjata celurit dan berusaha merebut senjata petugas
keamanan," begitu bunyi siaran pers yang dibacakan Jenderal Benny Moerdani.
"Tembakan terpaksa diarahkan ke tanah dan kekaki para penyerang, hingga jatuhnya
korban tidak dapat dihindari lagi."

Baru setelah bantuan pasukan pengamanan lain datang, gerombolan massa mundur.
"Tapi mereka sempat membakar mobil, merusakkan beberapa rumah dan apotek, serta
membunuh beberapa pemiliknya," kata siaran tersebut. Sekitar setengah jam kemudian,
gerombolan massa kembali menyerang, sehingga regu pengamanan, dalam keadaan
kritis dan terpaksa, melakukan penembakan untuk mencegah usaha mereka merebut
senjata. "Sekitar pukul 00.00 WIB, pasukan pengamanan Laksusda Jaya berhasil
mengendalikan situasi, menguasai keadaan, dan membubarkan massa," ujar Jenderal
Benny, yang dalam konferensi pers di Mabes ABRI itu didampingi oleh Pangdam
V/Jaya Mayjen Try Soetrisno, Menteri Penerangan Harmoko, dan Kapolda Mayjen
Soedjoko.

Menurut Benny Moerdani, oknum-oknum yang mendalangi peristiwa itu: Amir Biki,
Syarifin Maloko, dan M. Nasir, adalah "Penduduk Tanjung Priok yang secara berkala
mengadakan ceramah di Rawabadak". Sementara itu, "Dalam ucapan-ucapan mereka
secara sepihak melontarkan kritik yang tidak sehat kepada sebagian pejabat pemerintah
maupun pemerintah sendiri, serta siapa saja yang tidak berkenan bagi mereka.

Tatkala ditanya tentang jumlah korban yang jatuh, Benny menoleh dan berbisik kepada
Try Soetrisno. Setelah itu ia menyebut: 9 meninggal dan 53 luka-luka. "Mereka itu
campuran antara yang terkena tindakan tegas aparat keamanan, maupun akibat
kerusuhan itu sendiri," kata Benny. Selain itu, 3 mobil sedan, 3 truk, 3 skuter, 3 sepeda
motor, dan 3 rumah (termasuk sebuah apotek) terbakar. "Tapi tidak ada tempat hiburan
yang ikut dibakar," ujarnya menambahkan.

Menurut pelacakan Tempo, asal mula peristiwa itu adalah suatu insiden kecil. Pada
Jumat sore, 7 September, Sertu (Sersan Satu) Hermanu, yang menjadi ****nsa (Bintara
Pembina Desa) di Kelurahan Koja Selatan, menemukan beberapa poster di Mushala as-
Sa'adah. "Sudah 16 bulan saya menjabat ****nsa di sana, " Kata Hermanu. Dengan
santun, sang sersan membuka sepatu, masuk mushala, dan berdialog dengan beberapa
remaja serta jamaah yang ada. "Dia minta agar poster-poster itu dicopot," kata seorang
jamaah. Pamflet itu berisi anjuran agar para wanita memakai pakaian "Islam" termasuk
jilbab (kerudung). Permintaan itu ditolak.

Esok siangnya, Sertu Hermanu kembali datang ke mushala yang terletak di Gang IV
Jalan Raya Pelabuhan itu. Tatkala mengetahui poster itu masih ada, ia mengambil
sehelai koran, mencelupkannya ke selokan di depan mushala, dan melaburkan airnya
yang hitam itu ke tiga poster yang menempel di dinding luar mushala itu. Melihat itu
penghuni gang tadi mulai berdatangan.

Massa pun makin mengumpul. Desas-desus pun menjalar cepat. Mula-mula beredar
cerita, ada sersan masuk masjid tanpa melepas sepatu. Kemudian, berkembang menjadi
tentara mengguyur masjid dengan air comberan. Tiba-tiba suasana memanas setelah
muncul isu "Sersan Hermanu orang kristen", yang tak keruan ujung pangkalnya
(belakangan, kepada Tempo Hermanu mengatakan bahwa agamanya Islam).

Senin pagi 10 September, ketua pengurus Mushala as-Sa'adah, Achmad Sahi, serta
beberapa temannya bertemu dengan Hermanu. Mereka menuntut agar Hermanu
meminta maaf, yang mula-mula ditolaknya. "Waktu ditanya agamanya, Hermanu
mengaku beragama Islam. Tapi ia mengucapkan kala Allah (Alloh) dengan bunyi
"Alah". Jadi, ia pasti bukan Islam," cerita beberapa saksi mata. Massa pun bergerak
akan menghajar Hermanu, tetapi bisa dicegah oleh Sahi dan beberapa kawannya.

Entah siapa yang memulai, tiba-tiba ada yang berteriak "motornya". Maka, massa pun
menyeret sepeda motor Honda GL 100 warna merah milik Sertu Hermanu ke tengah
Jalan Raya Pelabuhan. Jalan pun macet. Melihat kemacetan itu beberapa anggota Polisi
Militer datang. M. Nur (22 tahun), yang sedang menyeret sepeda motor itu, ditangkap.
Massa yang marah lalu membakar motor tersebut. Untunglah bantuan dari Kodim 0502
Jakarta Utara segera tiba dan berhasil membubarkan massa. Achmad Sahi, Syarifudin
Rambe, dan Sofwan pun diangkut petugas.

Selasa siangnya, Amir Biki, seorang tokoh Tanjung Priok yang disegani, yang rupanya
dimintai bantuannya untuk melepaskan keempat pemuda yang ditahan, pergi ke Skogar
untuk mengurus.

Esoknya, Rabu 12 September, sebuah panggung didirikan di Jalan Sindang, persis di

perempatan lorong 102. Di atapnya ditutup dengan tenda terpal warna garis-garis hijau
putih. Puluhan loud speaker diikat di tiang listrik di sepanjang Jalan Sindang yang
lebarnya sekitar 7 meter. Dalam undangan yang disebarkan oleh Remaja Islam Sindang,
acara yang akan diselenggarakan adalah pengajian remaja, yang diisi ceramah beberapa
ustadz, antara lain Syarifin Maloko, Yayan Hendrayana, dan M. Nasir. Pengajian yang
diadakan di persimpangan jalan (yang ditutup untuk lalu lintas), menurut beberapa
sumber, biasa diadakan di kawasan tersebut

Acara malam itu dimulai sekitar pukul 20.00. Ternyata, yang muncul sebagai pembicara
pertama malam itu adalah Amir Biki. Ia mengenakan celana cokelat dan kemeja batik
hitam. Ia juga membawa sebilah badik, yang ditunjukannya kepada massa. Pidato
mengecam berbagai hal, dari gusuran tanah sampai keluarga berencana dan RUU
keormasan. Ia juga menjelek-jelekkan pemerintah. Tampaknya, ia merencanakan
sesuatu, karena beberapa kali ia menegaskan agar massa "menunggu instruksinya", dan
"ceramah saya ini mungkin yang pertama dan terakhir". Puncak pidatonya adalah
tatkala ia menuntut "kepada penguasa" agar melepaskan keempat pemuda yang ditahan.
Ia mengancam akan menggerakkan massa jika mereka tidak dibebaskan sebelum pukul
23.00 malam itu.

Rupanya, Amir Biki pada sekitar pukul 22.00, seperti diungkapkan Jenderal Moerdani,
menyampaikan tuntutan yang sama melalui telepon kepada markas aparatur keamanan.
Amir mengancam "akan melakukan pembunuhan dan perusakan-perusakan apabila
keempat tahanan tersebut tidak dibebaskan". Tuntutan melalui telepon itu diulangi lagi
pada pukul 23.00.

Beberapa pembicara lain setelah Amir Biki, kabarnya tak kurang "keras" suaranya.
Malah ada pembicara yang menghasut massa dan isi hasutannya sangat rasialistis.
"Pembicaraannya ngawur dan jelas bertentangan dengan ajaran Islam," kata sebuah
sumber.

Tatkala pukul 23.00 tiba, dan keempat tahanan tidak dibebaskan, Amir Biki pun
menggerakkan massa. Ia membagi mereka dalam dua kelompok, masing-masing
membawa bendera hijau. Amir sendiri berjalan di depan, memimpin satu kelompok
yang menuju markas Kodim di Jalan Yos Sudarso, melewati Jalan Anggrek, menempuh
jarak sekitar 1,5 km. Namun, setengah perjalanan, di depan kantor Polres di Jalan Yos
Sudarso, mereka dihadang sepasukan tentara.

Pasukan ini mencegah dan berusaha membubarkan massa. Tatkala mereka terus
bergerak, petugas keamanan melepaskan tembakan peringatan. "Tapi Pak Amir rupanya
sudah emosi. Ia malah memegang bendera dan meneriakkan 'maju dan serbu'," kata
seorang yang malam itu berbaris di dekat Amir Biki, dan luput dari tembakan. Jarak
antara petugas dan penyerbu, menurut saksi ini, sekitar dua meter. "Jadi bila petugas tak
menembak, bisa jadi mereka sendiri akan tewas lebih dulu," kata seorang pejabat.
Menurut suatu sumber dari luka-luka mereka yang tewas diketahui, mereka memang
terkena tembak dalam jarak dekat.

Massa tercerai-berai oleh tembakan. Datangnya bantuan pasukan membuat mereka

mundur. Saat itulah perusakan dan pembakaran mulai terjadi, terutama dilakukan oleh
sekelompok lain yang melewati Jalan Jampea.

Sekitar tengah malam itu Riswanto (20 tahun), pembantu yang baru bekerja empat hari
di Toko Tanjung Jaya di Jalan Jampea, terbangun. "Saya lihat asap masuk kamar dan
terdengar suara ribut-ribut," kata pemuda asal Purwokerto. Bersama tiga rekan pria
sesama pembantu, ia menghambur ke luar kamar --dan bertemu pembantu wanita.

Toko Tanjung Jaya, yang menjual onderdil, bahan bakar, dan pelumas, memang menjadi
sasaran amukan massa. Sebelumnya, massa urung membakar Apotek Tanjung di
sebelahnya, setelah diberitahu pemiliknya Cina Islam. Tetapi api yang membakar
Tanjung Jaya ikut meludaskan Apotek Tanjung, yang memang tidak dijaga. Esoknya, di
reruntuhan Tanjung Jaya di temukan delapan mayat keluarga Tan Kio Liem serta
seorang pembantunya.

Dalam waktu singkat, pasukan keamanan bisa menguasai keadaan. Pangab Jenderal LB.
Moerdani sendiri kabarnya ikut memeriksa situasi setempat setelah lewat tengah malam.

Jumlah korban, yang pada hari Kamis tercatat sembilan orang meninggal, kabarnya
bertambah. Sebuah sumber kepolisian menyebutkan, sampai Sabtu pekan lalu, korban
yang meninggal tercatat 28 orang. Sementara itu, sejumlah perusuh dan tokoh yang
diduga terlibat ditahan. Antara lain: Abdul Qadir Djaelani, Tony Ardie, dan Mawardi
Noor. Pemerintah telah menyatakan berduka cita kepada keluarga korban yang jatuh.
Terjadinya Peristiwa Tanjung Priok ini disesalkan semua pihak. DPP Golkar, PPP, dan
PDI mengeluarkan pernyataan yang menyesalkannya seraya memuji tindakan aparatur
keamanan yang tegas. Sekjen DPP Golkar, Sarwono Kusumaatmadja, memuji sikap
Pangab Jenderal Moerdani yang sangat menolong mendudukkan perkara ini sesuai apa
adanya berkat keterangannya yang tidak dibuat-buat dan tidak. didramatisasikan. Di
belakang peristiwa ini, kata Sarwono, seperti terlihat konsep tertentu yang hendak
dipaksakan, meski bertentangan dengan Pancasila.

Pemerintah tampaknya tidak akan menuding suatu golongan mendalangi peristiwa ini.
Itu terlihat dari pernyataan Pangdam V/Jaya Mayjen Try Soetrisno dalam Sarasehan
DPP KNPI pekan lalu. Menurut Try, masyarakat tidak perlu khawatir akan ada golongan
yang harus menerima citra akibat Peristiwa Tanjung Priok. "Kita harus tetap
menyucikan agama," katanya.

Sumber: Majalah Tempo, 22 September 1984

Pembunuhan yang terjadi di Aceh

Mass Murder in Aceh; A Call for Action

from TAPOL, Dec 17, 1990

After trying for more than a year to put down widespread rebellion and protest in Aceh,
on the north-western tip of Sumatra, the Indonesian armed forces, acting on the orders
of regional military commander Major-General Djoko Pramono, have embarked on a
campaign of systematic murder. Regular territorial troops have been withdrawn from
the villages and replaced by four commando units. The number of troops in the area has
been doubled, to 12,000.

According to AFP [The Straits Times, 16 August 1990], an airborne battalion of 600
men was parachuted into the districts of North Aceh, East Aceh and Pidie. This
battalion, based in Bogor, West Java, is part of the notorious red-beret unit known as
Kopassus. It is commanded by Colonel Prabowo, son-in-law of President Suharto, who
saw service last year in East Timor and gained a reputation for extreme brutality. Earlier
in August, 300 marines and about 100 men from the mobile brigade based in East Java
were sent to Sigli, the capital of Pidie.

The military commander has called on the local population to take part in a mass
murder campaign. In an interview with Tempo [17 November, 1990], Pramono said:

"I have told the people here: if you meet GPK members, you should kill them. No need
to investigate.... Just shoot them or knife them. I have told people to arm themselves
with sharp weapons, machetes or whatever. If you encounter the GPK, just kill them."
['GPK' or 'security disruptors' is the term used officially for the Gerakan Aceh Merdeka
or GAM, known in English as the Aceh-Sumatra National Liberation Front.]

In the same interview, Pramono said many people had already been killed and that
killings are occurring almost every day.
On 8 November 1990, Reuter quoted an Indonesian human rights lawyer, recently
returned from Aceh, as saying that residents reported finding mass graves and a steady
flow of decomposed corpses. The bodies of people not known locally have been found
in plantations and by rivers; villagers working on a river bank found eight bodies tied
together, weighted down and drowned. A mass grave was discovered in Akue Mira.
Villagers troubled by a foul smell found an open pit with 200 bodies in it, according to a
western human rights observer.

On 23 November, a Reuter correspondent who visited the area wrote:

"A trickle of deaths over the past year became a torrent in late September, three months
before a deadline set by Pramono to end the conflict... Acehnese are being rounded up
in their hundreds and taken to detention centres, often on the smallest suspicion,
residents said. 'They are taken out of their houses at night. You often have a fifty-fifty
chance of ever coming back,' said a non- government party politician."

A TAPOL contact in Jakarta was told by a senior intelligence officer that the security
forces in Aceh face two options, either to arrest many thousands of people and deal with
them in the courts of law which could take years, or engage in a shoot-to-kill campaign
to exterminate the 'GPK' and strike fear into the entire population. Pramono has clearly
chosen the second option.

Our source reports that many villagers suspected of sympathising with GAM have been
rounded up, taken to nearby military centres and forced to pledge loyalty to the
government; on their way home, some villagers have been set upon, killed, their bodies
grotesquely mutilated and left on the roadside. There is strong evidence that bodies are
deliberately left without burial for greater psychological impact. Many have been found
with hands and feet tied together and a bullet wound in the head. In some cases, bodies
have been buried with a foot or arm exposed. No-one has reported any attempts to
identify the bodies or carry out autopsies to determine the cause of death.

Death toll

It is not possible to quantify the number already slain this year.

The Reuter report [23 November] said that "hundreds of unidentified corpses have been
found and hundreds of people have disappeared."

According to The Economist [15 December 1990],

"Some soldiers admit to killing unarmed people and leaving their corpses in public
places as a 'counter-terrorist' measure.... a senior army doctor puts the toll at more than a
thousand. Mutilated corpses litter the roadsides and ditches. Most of the victims are
local civilians, though several members of the security forces and some of the rebels
have also been killed."

The Aceh National Liberation Front believes that more than five thousand people have
been put to death since the beginning of the year. In a press release issued on 10
December, it listed many large detention centres each of which are being used by the
army to hold up to a thousand people at any one time; according to the Front, as many
as a hundred people may be taken out from each of the camps and killed in a night.
These centres are located in Lammeulo, Sigli, Keudah (Bandar Aceh), Lhok Seumawe,
Rantjong, Tjot Girek, Reudeuep Lhok Sukon, Tualang Tjut, Peureulak, Langsa, Bindjai,
Medan and Takengon.

The Front earlier compiled a dossier of reports naming hundreds of people who had
been arrested or who had disappeared. The reports, most of which were written in June,
July or August this year, before the campaign of mass slaughter began, also give details
of torture methods which include:

- mutilating various parts of the body,

- using cigarettes or hot irons to inflict burns,
- electric shock,
- raping women and mutilating their breasts,
- squeezing a man's testicles with pliers,
- nailing down the hands as if for crucifixion,
- immersing the victim in boiling water,
- hanging the victim upside down,
- placing the victim in filthy water for hours or days,
- placing the feet under the legs of a chair on which a soldier sits until the bones are
broken.

Need for action

The campaign of extermination now under way in Aceh is the latest in a string of crimes
against humanity perpetrated by the Suharto regime. In 1965-66, it was responsible for
the massacre of an estimated one million communist suspects or sypathisers. Its war in
East Timor, launched in 1975, has left an estimated 200,000 people dead, out of a
population of about 700,000. In 1983-84, army death squads killed at least 4,000
people, a campaign which Suharto described in his autobiography as 'shock therapy'
against alleged criminals. Army troops shot at least a hundred Muslims in Tanjung Priok
in September 1984 who were protesting against the arrest of mosque officials. Dozens,
perhaps more than a hundred, villagers were killed in Way Jepara, Lampung, South
Sumatra, in February 1989.

TAPOL most vigorously condemns this latest murder campaign against the people of
Aceh.

It calls on governments and people everywhere to exert pressure on the Suharto

government to put a stop to the slaughter.

It calls on human rights organisations in Indonesia (LPHAM and Infight) and abroad
(Amnesty International and the International Commission of Jurists) to send observers
to Aceh, and urges the Indonesian Legal Aid Institute (LBH) and Asia Watch to make
public without delay the findings of on-the-spot investigations already carried out by
them. This information should be submitted to the February 1991 session of the UN
Human Rights Commission in Geneva.

Western governments should send officials to Aceh to assess the scale of the massacre.
The European Parliament should adopt an emergency resolution calling for an end to
the slaughter.

Those responsible for the killings must be brought to justice. Since this cannot be done
in Indonesia, an International Tribunal on Crimes against Humanity should be convened
to hold the Suharto regime responsible for its campaign of death and mass intimidation
in Aceh.

TAPOL calls on solidarity organisations throughout the world to exert pressure on their
own governments along these lines and make their own approaches to the NGOs
mentioned above.

London 17 December, 1990

Ini tentang Kejahatan Jepang terhadap Indonesia!

Indonesia
WORLD WAR II AND THE STRUGGLE FOR INDEPENDENCE, 1942-50
The Japanese Occupation, 1942-45

[JPEG]

A Japanese soldier watching oil tanks near Jakarta set afire by the retreating Dutch,
March 1942
Courtesy Prints and Photographs Division, Library of Congress

The Japanese occupied the archipelago in order, like their Portuguese and Dutch
predecessors, to secure its rich natural resources. Japan's invasion of North China,
which had begun in July 1937, by the end of the decade had become bogged down in
the face of stubborn Chinese resistance. To feed Japan's war machine, large amounts of
petroleum, scrap iron, and other raw materials had to be imported from foreign sources.
Most oil--about 55 percent--came from the United States, but Indonesia supplied a
critical 25 percent.

From Tokyo's perspective, the increasingly critical attitude of the "ABCD powers"
(America, Britain, China, and the Dutch) toward Japan's invasion of China reflected
their desire to throttle its legitimate aspirations in Asia. German occupation of the
Netherlands in May 1940 led to Japan's demand that the Netherlands Indies government
supply it with fixed quantities of vital natural resources, especially oil. Further demands
were made for some form of economic and financial integration of the Indies with
Japan. Negotiations continued through mid-1941. The Indies government, realizing its
extremely weak position, played for time. But in summer 1941, it followed the United
States in freezing Japanese assets and imposing an embargo on oil and other exports.
Because Japan could not continue its China war without these resources, the military-
dominated government in Tokyo gave assent to an "advance south" policy. French
Indochina was already effectively under Japanese control. A nonaggression pact with
the Soviet Union in April 1941 freed Japan to wage war against the United States and
the European colonial powers.
The Japanese experienced spectacular early victories in the Southeast Asian war.
Singapore, Britain's fortress in the east, fell on February 15, 1941, despite British
numerical superiority and the strength of its seaward defenses. The Battle of the Java
Sea resulted in the Japanese defeat of a combined British, Dutch, Australian, and United
States fleet. On March 9, 1942, the Netherlands Indies government surrendered without
offering resistance on land.

Although their motives were largely acquisitive, the Japanese justified their occupation
in terms of Japan's role as, in the words of a 1942 slogan, "The leader of Asia, the
protector of Asia, the light of Asia." Tokyo's Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere,
encompassing both Northeast and Southeast Asia, with Japan as the focal point, was to
be a nonexploitative economic and cultural community of Asians. Given Indonesian
resentment of Dutch rule, this approach was appealing and harmonized remarkably well
with local legends that a two-century-long non-Javanese rule would be followed by era
of peace and prosperity.

The Japanese divided the Indies into three jurisdictions: Java and Madura were placed
under the control of the Sixteenth Army; Sumatra, for a time, joined with Malaya under
the Twenty-fifth Army; and the eastern archipelago was placed under naval command.
In Sumatra and the east, the overriding concern of the occupiers was maintenance of
law and order and extraction of needed resources. Java's economic value with respect to
the war effort lay in its huge labor force and relatively developed infrastructure. The
Sixteenth Army was tolerant, within limits, of political activities carried out by
nationalists and Muslims. This tolerance grew as the momentum of Japanese expansion
was halted in mid-1942 and the Allies began counteroffensives. In the closing months of
the war, Japanese commanders promoted the independence movement as a means of
frustrating an Allied reoccupation.

The occupation was not gentle. Japanese troops often acted harshly against local
populations. The Japanese military police were especially feared. Food and other vital
necessities were confiscated by the occupiers, causing widespread misery and starvation
by the end of the war. The worst abuse, however, was the forced mobilization of some 4
million--although some estimates are as high as 10 million--romusha (manual laborers),
most of whom were put to work on economic development and defense construction
projects in Java. About 270,000 romusha were sent to the Outer Islands and Japanese-
held territories in Southeast Asia, where they joined other Asians in performing wartime
construction projects. At the end of the war, only 52,000 were repatriated to Java.

The Japanese occupation was a watershed in Indonesian history. It shattered the myth of
Dutch superiority, as Batavia gave up its empire without a fight. There was little
resistance as Japanese forces fanned out through the islands to occupy former centers of
Dutch power. The relatively tolerant policies of the Sixteenth Army on Java also
confirmed the island's leading role in Indonesian national life after 1945: Java was far
more developed politically and militarily than the other islands. In addition, there were
profound cultural implications from the Japanese invasion of Java. In administration,
business, and cultural life, the Dutch language was discarded in favor of Malay and
Japanese. Committees were organized to standardize Bahasa Indonesia and make it a
truly national language. Modern Indonesian literature, which got its start with language
unification efforts in 1928 and underwent considerable development before the war,
received further impetus under Japanese auspices. Revolutionary (or traditional)
Indonesian themes were employed in drama, films, and art, and hated symbols of Dutch
imperial control were swept away. For example, the Japanese allowed a huge rally in
Batavia (renamed Jakarta) to celebrate by tearing down a statue of Jan Pieterszoon
Coen, the seventeenthcentury governor general. Although the occupiers propagated the
message of Japanese leadership of Asia, they did not attempt, as they did in their Korean
colony, to coercively promote Japanese culture on a large scale. According to historian
Anthony Reid, the occupiers believed that Indonesians, as fellow Asians, were
essentially like themselves but had been corrupted by three centuries of Western
colonialism. What was needed was a dose of Japanese-style seishin (spirit; semangat in
Indonesian). Many members of the elite responded positively to an inculcation of
samurai values.

The most significant legacy of the occupation, however, was the opportunities it gave
for Javanese and other Indonesians to participate in politics, administration, and the
military. Soon after the Dutch surrender, European officials, businessmen, military
personnel, and others, totaling around 170,000, were interned (the harsh conditions of
their confinement caused a high death rate, at least in camps for male military prisoners,
which embittered Dutch-Japanese relations even in the early 1990s). While Japanese
military officers occupied the highest posts, the personnel vacuum on the lower levels
was filled with Indonesians. Like the Dutch, however, the Japanese relied on local
indigenous elites, such as the priyayi on Java and the Acehnese uleebalang, to
administer the countryside. Because of the harshly exploitative Japanese policies in the
closing years of the war, after the Japanese surrender collaborators in some areas were
killed in a wave of local resentment.

Sukarno and Hatta agreed in 1942 to cooperate with the Japanese, as this seemed to be
the best opportunity to secure independence. The occupiers were particularly impressed
by Sukarno's mass following, and he became increasingly valuable to them as the need
to mobilize the population for the war effort grew between 1943 and 1945. His
reputation, however, was tarnished by his role in recruiting romusha.

Japanese attempts to coopt Muslims met with limited success. Muslim leaders opposed
the practice of bowing toward the emperor (a divine ruler in Japanese official
mythology) in Tokyo as a form of idolatry and refused to declare Japan's war against the
Allies a "holy war" because both sides were nonbelievers. In October 1943, however,
the Japanese organized the Consultative Council of Indonesian Muslims (Masyumi),
designed to create a united front of orthodox and modernist believers. Nahdatul Ulama
was given a prominent role in Masyumi, as were a large number of kyai (religious
leaders), whom the Dutch had largely ignored, who were brought to Jakarta for training
and indoctrination.

As the fortunes of war turned, the occupiers began organizing Indonesians into military
and paramilitary units whose numbers were added by the Japanese to romusha statistics.
These included the heiho (auxiliaries), paramilitary units recruited by the Japanese in
mid-1943, and the Defenders of the Fatherland (Peta) in 1943. Peta was a military force
designed to assist the Japanese forces by forestalling the initial Allied invasion. By the
end of the war, it had 37,000 men in Java and 20,000 in Sumatra (where it was
commonly known by the Japanese name Giyugun). In December 1944, a Muslim armed
force, the Army of God, or Barisan Hizbullah, was attached to Masyumi.
Data as of November 1992

THE BANKA ISLAND MASSACRE (1942)

Sister Vivian Bullwinkel's Story

On 12 February 1942, with the fall of Singapore to the Japanese imminent, sixty-five
Australian Army nurses, including Sister Vivian Bullwinkel, were evacuated from the
besieged city on the small coastal steamer Vyner Brooke. In addition to the Australian
nurses, the ship was crammed with over two hundred civilian evacuees and English
military personnel. As the Vyner Brooke was passing between Sumatra and Borneo,
Japanese aircraft bombed and strafed the overloaded ship and it sank quickly. The
survivors in lifeboats were strafed by Japanese aircraft but some reached Bangka Island
off the coast of Sumatra. Twelve Australian nurses were either killed in the attack on the
ship or drowned in the sea. The remaining fifty-three nurses reached Bangka Island in
lifeboats, on rafts, or by drifting with the tide.

Wearing their Red Cross armbands, and having protected status as non-combatants by
convention of civilised nations, the nurses expected to be treated in a civilised manner
by the Japanese when they reached shore. Their expectations were short lived. The
lucky survivors were rounded up at gunpoint by the Japanese and herded into a building
that was filthy and overcrowded. All of the survivors were tired, thirsty, and hungry.
Some were suffering from exposure to the sun after many hours immersed in the sea,
and some had been wounded in the attacks on the ship and the lifeboats. The Japanese
were unsympathetic to their plight and only offered the survivors a bucket of water and
a bucket of rice.

The unlucky survivors, including twenty-two Australian nurses, landed in lifeboats on

the northern coast of Bangka Island and lit a bonfire to guide other survivors to them.
Sister Vivian Bullwinkel was in this group of nurses. When the number of survivors at
the bonfire reached about one hundred, it was decided that they should surrender to the
Japanese. A party of male survivors went off to find Japanese. They were accompanied
by civilian women and their children. The twenty-two Australian nurses stayed to look
after the injured, and they made and erected a red cross to indicate to the Japanese that
they were non-combatants.

A patrol of about fifteen Japanese soldiers arrived from the coastal township of Muntok.
While some guarded the Australian nurses, the rest herded the male survivors, about
fifty in number, down the beach and around a headland. The nurses heard gunfire from
this direction, and shortly afterwards, the Japanese soldiers returned alone. Some were
wiping blood from their bayonets.

The twenty-two Australian nurses were then ordered by the Japanese to form a line and
walk into the sea. The women knew what was going to happen to them, but none
panicked or pleaded for mercy. When the water had reached the nurses' waists, the
Japanese opened fire on them. Sister Bullwinkel was hit in the back by a bullet and
knocked off her feet. Upon discovering that she was only wounded, she pretended to be
dead. After some time had passed, she risked a glance at the beach and saw that the
Japanese soldiers had gone. She looked around for the other twenty-one nurses and saw
none. She was the only nurse who had survived the massacre.
When she reached the beach, she was joined by an English soldier who had survived the
massacre behind the headland. Private Kingsley had been bayoneted by the Japanese
and left for dead. They were given food by the local village women, but after two
weeks, they realised that their position was hopeless, and they decided to walk to
Muntok and give themselves up. Shortly afterwards, Private Kingsley died from the
bayonet wound.

Realising that the lives of all survivors of the Vyner Brooke would be at risk if the
Japanese discovered what she had seen, Sister Bullwinkel concealed her wound from
the Japanese and treated it herself. She survived harsh imprisonment to give evidence of
the massacre at a war crimes trial in Tokyo in 1947.

THE PULAU MASSACRE Banka (1942)

Adik Vivian Bullwinkel Cerita

Pada tanggal 12 Februari 1942, dengan jatuhnya Singapura ke Jepang dekat, enam
puluh lima perawat Angkatan Darat Australia, termasuk Sister Bullwinkel Vivian, yang
diungsikan dari terkepung di kota kecil pantai kapal api Vyner Brooke. Selain itu
perawat ke Australia, kapal telah crammed dengan lebih dari dua ratus sipil di daerah
bencana dan personil militer Inggris. Seperti yang telah lulus Vyner Brooke antara
Sumatera dan Kalimantan, Jepang bombed pesawat terbang dan kapal strafed yang
berlebih dan sank dengan cepat. Para korban di lifeboats yang strafed oleh pesawat
terbang Jepang tetapi beberapa mencapai Pulau Bangka di lepas pantai Sumatera. Dua
belas Australia perawat yang baik tewas dalam serangan di kapal atau tenggelam di laut.
Sisa lima puluh tiga perawat mencapai lifeboats di Pulau Bangka, pada rakit, atau oleh
Gerakan dengan air pasang.

Pakaian mereka Palang Merah armbands, dilindungi dan memiliki status sebagai
kombatan dengan non-konvensi dari civilised bangsa, perawat yang diharapkan untuk
diperlakukan dalam cara civilised oleh Jepang ketika mereka mencapai pantai. Harapan
mereka telah berlangsung lama. Yang beruntung korban yang tercakup di ujung laras
senapan oleh Jepang dan herded ke dalam bangunan yang kotor dan terlalu sesak.
Semua dari para korban yang lelah, haus, dan lapar. Beberapa yang menderita terekspos
sampai matahari terbenam setelah banyak jam di laut, dan telah beberapa luka dalam
serangan di kapal dan lifeboats. Jepang telah unsympathetic untuk mereka berjanji dan
hanya ditawarkan para korban ember air dan ember beras.

Naas yang selamat, termasuk dua puluh dua perawat Australia, di lifeboats mendarat di
pantai utara Pulau Bangka dan kesusasteraan bonafiditas yang lain untuk membimbing
korban untuk mereka. Adik Vivian Bullwinkel di grup ini dari perawat. Ketika jumlah
korban di bonafiditas mencapai sekitar seratus, telah diputuskan bahwa mereka harus
menyerah kepada Jepang. Sebuah pihak laki-laki korban pergi off untuk menemukan
Jepang. Mereka diiringi oleh sipil perempuan dan anak-anak mereka. Kedua puluh dua
perawat Australia untuk tinggal setelah terluka melihat, dan mereka yang dibuat dan
palang merah yang didirikan untuk menunjukkan kepada Jepang bahwa mereka non-
kombatan.

Sebuah patroli dari sekitar lima belas tentara Jepang tiba dari pantai negeri dari Muntok.
Sementara beberapa perawat yang dijaga ketat dari Australia, sisanya herded laki-laki
korban, sekitar lima puluh jumlahnya, bawah pantai dan di sekitar tanjung. Gunfire
perawat yang mendengar dari arah ini, dan segera setelah itu, tentara Jepang kembali
sendiri. Beberapa orang dari mereka wiping darah bayonets.

Kedua puluh dua perawat Australia yang kemudian disusun oleh Jepang untuk
membentuk baris dan jalan ke laut. Perempuan yang tahu apa yang akan terjadi kepada
mereka, tetapi tidak panik atau untuk mengaku rahmat. Ketika air telah mencapai
perawat 'pinggang, Jepang api dibuka pada mereka. Saudara Bullwinkel menerima
pukulan di bagian belakang dengan peluru dan terlanda lama dia kaki. Setelah
menemukan bahwa dia hanya luka, dia pura-pura menjadi mati. Setelah beberapa waktu
telah berlalu, dia risked dalam sekejap di pantai dan melihat bahwa tentara Jepang telah
pergi. Aku belajar untuk yang lain sekitar dua puluh satu perawat dan melihat tidak ada.
Dia adalah satu-satunya perawat yang telah bertahan besar-besaran.

Ketika ia mencapai pantai, ia bergabung dengan tentara Inggris yang bertahan di

belakang tanjung besar-besaran. Kingsley swasta telah bayoneted oleh Jepang dan kiri
untuk mati. Mereka diberi makan oleh perempuan desa setempat, namun setelah dua
minggu, mereka menyadari bahwa posisi mereka adalah harapan, dan mereka
memutuskan untuk berjalan kaki ke Muntok dan memberikan diri. Sesaat setelah itu,
Swasta Kingsley meninggal dari luka sangkur.

Mewujudkan kehidupan yang selamat dari semua Vyner Brooke akan beresiko jika
Jepang menemukan apa yang dia lihat, Sister Bullwinkel dia bersembunyi luka dari
Jepang dan dirawat itu sendiri. Dia bertahan keras penjara untuk memberikan bukti
yang besar-besaran di persidangan kejahatan perang di Tokyo tahun 1947.

THE PULAU MASSACRE Banka (1942)

Adik Vivian Bullwinkel Cerita

Pada tanggal 12 Februari 1942, dengan jatuhnya Singapura ke Jepang dekat, enam
puluh lima perawat Angkatan Darat Australia, termasuk Sister Bullwinkel Vivian, yang
diungsikan dari terkepung di kota kecil pantai kapal api Vyner Brooke. Selain itu
perawat ke Australia, kapal telah crammed dengan lebih dari dua ratus sipil di daerah
bencana dan personil militer Inggris. Seperti yang telah lulus Vyner Brooke antara
Sumatera dan Kalimantan, Jepang bombed pesawat terbang dan kapal strafed yang
berlebih dan sank dengan cepat. Para korban di lifeboats yang strafed oleh pesawat
terbang Jepang tetapi beberapa mencapai Pulau Bangka di lepas pantai Sumatera. Dua
belas Australia perawat yang baik tewas dalam serangan di kapal atau tenggelam di laut.
Sisa lima puluh tiga perawat mencapai lifeboats di Pulau Bangka, pada rakit, atau oleh
Gerakan dengan air pasang.

Pakaian mereka Palang Merah armbands, dilindungi dan memiliki status sebagai
kombatan dengan non-konvensi dari civilised bangsa, perawat yang diharapkan untuk
diperlakukan dalam cara civilised oleh Jepang ketika mereka mencapai pantai. Harapan
mereka telah berlangsung lama. Yang beruntung korban yang tercakup di ujung laras
senapan oleh Jepang dan herded ke dalam bangunan yang kotor dan terlalu sesak.
Semua dari para korban yang lelah, haus, dan lapar. Beberapa yang menderita terekspos
sampai matahari terbenam setelah banyak jam di laut, dan telah beberapa luka dalam
serangan di kapal dan lifeboats. Jepang telah unsympathetic untuk mereka berjanji dan
hanya ditawarkan para korban ember air dan ember beras.

Naas yang selamat, termasuk dua puluh dua perawat Australia, di lifeboats mendarat di
pantai utara Pulau Bangka dan kesusasteraan bonafiditas yang lain untuk membimbing
korban untuk mereka. Adik Vivian Bullwinkel di grup ini dari perawat. Ketika jumlah
korban di bonafiditas mencapai sekitar seratus, telah diputuskan bahwa mereka harus
menyerah kepada Jepang. Sebuah pihak laki-laki korban pergi off untuk menemukan
Jepang. Mereka diiringi oleh sipil perempuan dan anak-anak mereka. Kedua puluh dua
perawat Australia untuk tinggal setelah terluka melihat, dan mereka yang dibuat dan
palang merah yang didirikan untuk menunjukkan kepada Jepang bahwa mereka non-
kombatan.

Sebuah patroli dari sekitar lima belas tentara Jepang tiba dari pantai negeri dari Muntok.
Sementara beberapa perawat yang dijaga ketat dari Australia, sisanya herded laki-laki
korban, sekitar lima puluh jumlahnya, bawah pantai dan di sekitar tanjung. Gunfire
perawat yang mendengar dari arah ini, dan segera setelah itu, tentara Jepang kembali
sendiri. Beberapa orang dari mereka wiping darah bayonets.

Kedua puluh dua perawat Australia yang kemudian disusun oleh Jepang untuk
membentuk baris dan jalan ke laut. Perempuan yang tahu apa yang akan terjadi kepada
mereka, tetapi tidak panik atau untuk mengaku rahmat. Ketika air telah mencapai
perawat 'pinggang, Jepang api dibuka pada mereka. Saudara Bullwinkel menerima
pukulan di bagian belakang dengan peluru dan terlanda lama dia kaki. Setelah
menemukan bahwa dia hanya luka, dia pura-pura menjadi mati. Setelah beberapa waktu
telah berlalu, dia risked dalam sekejap di pantai dan melihat bahwa tentara Jepang telah
pergi. Aku belajar untuk yang lain sekitar dua puluh satu perawat dan melihat tidak ada.
Dia adalah satu-satunya perawat yang telah bertahan besar-besaran.

Ketika ia mencapai pantai, ia bergabung dengan tentara Inggris yang bertahan di

belakang tanjung besar-besaran. Kingsley swasta telah bayoneted oleh Jepang dan kiri
untuk mati. Mereka diberi makan oleh perempuan desa setempat, namun setelah dua
minggu, mereka menyadari bahwa posisi mereka adalah harapan, dan mereka
memutuskan untuk berjalan kaki ke Muntok dan memberikan diri. Sesaat setelah itu,
Swasta Kingsley meninggal dari luka sangkur.

Mewujudkan kehidupan yang selamat dari semua Vyner Brooke akan beresiko jika
Jepang menemukan apa yang dia lihat, Sister Bullwinkel dia bersembunyi luka dari
Jepang dan dirawat itu sendiri. Dia bertahan keras penjara untuk memberikan bukti
yang besar-besaran di persidangan kejahatan perang di Tokyo tahun 1947.

sekarang kita sudah merdeka...tapi apa sesungguhnya kita memang sudah merdeka
ya...rakyat kaga sejahtera sejahtera...mirip jaman penjajahan sekarang tapi dengan muka
yang modern hehehe

Rawagede Massacre: An Unpublished Story

Thursday, August 14, 2008

Tonight I received an email from Batara Hutagalung, a leader of Committee of Dutch
Honorary Debts – a group of people that strive for The Netherlands' apology for what
they did to Indonesia years ago. The email said that the committee was planning to stage
a demonstration in front of Dutch Embassy this Friday.

Batara's email reminded me of my story about Rawagede Massacre that didn't get
published, back when I was still an intern reporter at The Jakarta Post. Since it's been
almost a year, I would like to just share the story here. Please tell me what you think
okay :)

##########

Up until now, Imih still could not forget the day when, at four o’clock in the morning,
she saw troops all over her village.

“There were hundreds of them. They opened fire and soon everyone was in panic,” said
the 74-year-old woman, recollecting a horrible day she had 60 years ago.

“I quickly told my husband and my father to stay in the house because I knew it was
safer there, but my husband – he was so frightened he ran away and got shot.”

The tragedy took place on December 9, 1947, after more than 300 hundreds troops of
Netherlands army surrounded Rawagede, a village between Karawang-Bekasi, located
about 60 kilometers to the east of Jakarta.

They were in attempt to capture Mr. Lukas Kustario – an Indonesian soldier who had
previously attacked some Netherlands facilities.

He recently had damaged a train containing weaponry with another train.

Kustario, according to a report the troops received, had entered Rawagede to join the
soldiers force in the city.

However, the wanted soldier actually had left the village for Jakarta the day before.

The troops ordered all residents to get out their houses, gather up in a yard. They
separated male citizens from the crowds and made them stood in line.

They asked the people: “Where is Lukas Kustario?! Where are the soldiers?!”

None of the men said anything.

Pissed off by the response, “The troops started to bombard us,” an 84-year-old soldier
Saih said.

Saih managed to survive by playing dead. “As they shot, I quickly dropped myself to
the ground. A bullet hit my back but I lay still.”

He remembered how the troops continued shooting at all dead bodies to make sure none
is alive before they left the scene. They also chased other male residents who were
hiding in a nearby river, Kali Rawagede, with some tracker dogs they brought.
When he thought it was safe to make a move, Saih stood up and walked home.

“I saw so many victims,” he said.

“Hundreds of man died that day, making there were only women and children in this
village,” said Imih.

All men who were lucky to be alive escaped the village for their lives because the
troops were believed to come back anytime.

“It took us two days to bury all 431 dead bodies,” she said.

It is ironic that the massacre happened just one day after Indonesia and Netherlands
started the “USS Renville” peace talk.

A monument was built in 1996 in the village to “honor the heroes”. The “Rawagede
People Struggle Monument” complex also has a cemetery for the victims.

But not all victims were relocated and buried here. “It’s hard to identify all the victims.
We only managed to identify 181 out of 431 victims,” said head of Rawagede
Foundation Sukarman, who manages the monument complex.

Every year the people of Rawagede hold a ceremony at the monument to commemorate
the tragedy. They sing national anthem. They make moment of silence. They pray for
the heroes, and throw flowers at their graves.

They read the story on how Netherlands troops had tore down the entire life of the
village.

Moreover, a famous poem from a namely poet Chairil Anwar, dedicated to the victims:
“Karawang-Bekasi”.

We, who have lain down between Karawang-Bekasi, cannot shout “Independence!” and
carry weapon any more.

Some elderly people are crying as they hear the poem.

While Netherlands considered what happened in Rawagede “a correctional action” – as

they claimed the area as their territory at the time – a group of people is currently
putting effort on getting Netherlands apology for what they did.

“It was a crime against humanity,” Batara Hutagalung, leader of Committee of Dutch
Honorary Debts said.

“The Netherlands surrendered to Japan in 1942 while Indonesia declared its

independence in 1945 so it was not also war crime as there was no war at all,” said
Batara.

“They should say sorry and pay compensation to the victim’s family to help them
prosper. We should reach reconciliation with dignity.”
Talking about compensation, Imih said she just wished to have her house repaired.
“That’s all.”

As for Saih, he only wished his family a better life.

The big-hearted old man said he had forgiven Netherlands. “I have no hatred in my
heart against them.”

“They were just looking for Mr. Lukas but unfortunately, we really had no idea where
he was.”

“Of course even if we did, we would not tell them anyway.”

Mass Killings Under Suharto Recalled

Februari 1, 2008 pada 7:11 am (soeharto)

Published on Monday, January 28, 2008 by The Boston Globe
by Anthony Deutsch
BLITAR, Indonesia - Hiding out in the dense, humid jungle, Markus Talam watched
Indonesian soldiers herd manacled prisoners from trucks, line them up, and mow them
down with round after round of automatic weapons fire.0128 04It was 1968, and the
killings were part of a final offensive by forces under General Suharto to wipe out the
communist party and secure his position as leader of Indonesia, now the world’s most
populous Muslim nation.“They gunned them down and dumped their bodies in a mass
grave dug by other prisoners. I remember the sound of the guns clearly: tat-tat, tat-tat,
tat-tat . . . over and over again,” said Talam, 68, who was later jailed for 10 years after
being named a leftist sympathizer.

Suharto, who died yesterday at a Jakarta hospital, seized control of the military in 1965
and ruled the country for 32 years, suppressing dissent with force and supported by an
American government at the height of the Cold War.

Estimates for the number killed during his bloody rise to power - from 1965 to 1968 -
range from a government figure of 78,000 to 1 million cited by US historians Barbara
Harff and Ted Robert Gurr, who have published books on Indonesia’s history. It was the
worst mass slaughter in Southeast Asia’s modern history after the Khmer Rouge killing
fields in Cambodia.

A frenzy of anticommunist violence stained rivers with blood and littered the
countryside with the bodies of teachers, farmers, and others.

“They used to dump the bodies here,” recalled Surien, 70, a woman who lived near a
bay used as an execution ground. “People called it the beach of stinking corpses because
of the smell.”

The CIA provided lists of thousands of leftists, including trade union members,
intellectuals, and schoolteachers, many of whom were executed or sent to remote
prisons.
Another 183,000 died due to killings, disappearances, hunger, and illness during
Indonesia’s 1975-1999 occupation of East Timor, according to an East Timorese
commission sanctioned by the UN. Similar abuses left more than 100,000 dead in West
Papua, according to a local human rights group. About 15,000 others died during a 29-
year separatist rebellion in Aceh Province. In recent interviews around the city of Blitar,
a former communist stronghold, survivors of the atrocities recounted a life on the run,
living in caves, being beaten, and seeing beheadings of other captives.

“I am disappointed. I saw great cruelties and am lucky I am not dead,” said Talam,
whose simple two-room home overlooks a valley dotted with overgrown mass graves.

Dragging on a clove-cigarette with trembling hands, he described how he was detained

by police but escaped. He stumbled across dead bodies in shallow graves and slept in
dank caves with hundreds of others, eating what the jungle had to offer for 50 days,
until being picked up.

Talam, a former member of a left-wing union for park rangers, said he was tortured and
beaten repeatedly during interrogations while detained on remote Buru island, where
about 12,000 political prisoners were held, 1,100 miles east of the capital, Jakarta.
“Why has no one been put on trial?” he asked. In fact, the dark era remains largely
unknown to many Indonesians. Those believed responsible still wield influence in
politics and the courts. Details of the communist purge are banned from school books,
and the military has blocked efforts by relatives to unearth mass graves.

Near Blitar, a prominent monument and museum honors the crushing of the communist
threat, and the Communist Party is still banned in Indonesia today.

There is no official record of the shootings Talam said he witnessed by the Indonesian
Army near Blitar, which lies 310 miles east of Jakarta.

Though Suharto was swept from power in a 1998 prodemocracy uprising in this nation
of 235 million people, no one has ever been tried for the bloodletting, in part because
some of Suharto’s former generals remain in power.

“One of the enduring legacies of Suharto’s regime has been the culture of impunity,”
said Brad Adams, the head of Human Rights Watch Asia.

Moreover, public interest in reviving a turbulent past is muted in the largely poor
country, where people are more concerned with day-to-day survival, said Putmuinah,
80, a former communist city council member in Blitar.

“The ones who should be held accountable for those crimes are Suharto, his government
and his regime,” she said. “Suharto ordered the elimination of communists and left-
wing sympathizers.”

Putmuinah hid in a cave south of Blitar before being picked up and detained for 10
years. “They robbed me of the opportunity to raise my seven children,” she said.

“They beheaded many of us because we were members of the union for women,” she
added. “I was spared torture because I knew the commander who arrested me.”
PERISTIWA 13-15 MEI 1998, PUNCAK KEKERASAN ANTI
TIONGHOA DI INDONESIA

(Disampaikan dalam Seminar Memperingati Tragedi Mei 1998 yang diselenggarakan

ICAA di Los Angeles, 13 Mei 2006 dan ICA Net di San Francisco, 14 Mei 2006) Oleh :
Benny G. Setiono

Tanpa terasa tahun ini kita memperingati Tragedi Mei 1998 yang ke delapan kalinya.
Namun sampai saat ini seperti kasus- kasus lainnya seperti Peristiwa G30S, Malari,
Tanjung Priok, Talangsari, Marsinah, Udin, Trisakti, Semanggi, Kalimantan Barat,
Ambon, Poso, Munir, dsb.nya tragedi ini masih diselimuti awan misterius. Memang ada
beberapa kasus yang telah dibawa ke Pengadilan namun ternyata yang disidangkan
hanya oknum-oknum yang dikorbankan tanpa mengungkap siapa yang menjadi otak
atau dalang yang sesungguhnya.

Tindakan anarkis dan kekerasan kali ini merupakan puncak dari berbagai kekerasan anti
Tionghoa yang terjadi di Indonesia sejak zaman penjajahan Belanda sampai di masa
Republik.Ribuan toko dan rumah tinggal milik orang-orang Tionghoa habis dijarah dan
dibakar. Demikian juga ribuan kendaraan bermotor baik roda dua maupun roda empat
hangus dan menjadi bangkai karena dibakar gerombolan anarkis. Demikian juga
sejumlah shopping mall dan pertokoan antara lain Glodok Plaza, Supermarket Hero dan
supermarket Tops, Yogya Department store, Supermall Karawaci dan City hotel berikut
pusat pertokoan Glodok.

Yang paling tragis adalah terjadinya perkosaan massal terhadap puluhan kalau tidak
ratusan perempuan Tionghoa yang dilakukan secara brutal.Akibat aksi kekerasan ini
ribuan warga Tionghoa yang merasa trauma dan ketakutan dengan berbagai jalan
berusaha menyelamatkan diri dengan meninggalkan seluruh harta bendanya untuk
mengungsi ke berbagai tempat yang dianggapnya aman antara lain ke Bali, Menado,
Kalimantan Barat, Singapore, Malaysia, Hongkong, Australia, Eropa bahkan ke
Amerika Serikat. Penyelamatan diri inilah yang dihembus- hembuskan oleh sebagian
orang sebagai "eksodus" dan tindakan anasional. Padahal tindakan menyelamatkan diri
adalah hak paling hakiki dari setiap machluk yang diciptakan Tuhan.

Sementara itu ratusan rakyat kecil yang terdiri dari anak-anak, remaja dan ibu-ibu
rumah tangga yang berhasil diprovokasi, menyerbu berbagai mall, antara lain Yogya
Department Store di Klender dan Super Mall Karawaci. Mereka kemudian disuruh
menjarah apa saja yang ditemukan.Namun apa yang terjadi? Pintu pertokoan tersebut
kemudian dikunci dari luar dan dibakar oleh para provokator. Diperkirakan lebih dari
seribu orang yang tewas akibat dibakar hidup-hidup tersebut. Jumlah seluruh kerugian
diperkirakan paling sedikit Rp.2,5 triliun atau $US 238 juta. Tigabelas pasar, 2.479
ruko, 40 mall dengan 1.604 toko, 45 bengkel, 387 kantor, 9 SPBU, 8 bus dan kendaraan
umum lainnya, 1.119 mobil, 821 sepeda motor dan 1.026 rumah tinggal habis dirusak,
dijarah dan dibakar selama berlangsung aksi anarkis tersebut. [1][1]

Yang sangat disesalkan adalah sikap pihak keamanan yaitu Kapolda Metro Jaya Mayjen
Hamami Nata dan Pangdam Jaya Mayjen Sjafrie Sjamsuddin yang tidak berbuat suatu
apapun untuk mencegah dan mengatasi aksi-aksi anarkis tersebut. Demikian juga
Jenderal Wiranto sebagai Panglima ABRI hanya bersikap wait and see.
Peristiwa ini sangat memprihatinkan dan memalukan serta merusak citra seluruh bangsa
Indonesia di dunia Internasional. Dengan adanya kemajuan teknologi di bidang
komunikasi, seluruh kejadian dengan kasat mata dapat disaksikan secara langsung oleh
jutaan pemirsa TV di seluruh dunia. Terjadi protes-protes dan demonstrasi di muka
Kedutaan atau Perwakilan Republik Indonesia di berbagai negara, antara lain di
Amerika Serikat, Kanada, Eropa, Australia, Hongkong, Taipei, dan Beijing. Untuk
meredamnya Presiden B.J. Habibie membentuk Tim Gabungan Pencari Fakta (TGPF) di
bawah pimpinan Marzuki Darusman, SH dari Komnas HAM. Namun seperti kasus-
kasus sebelumnya, hasil kerja TGPF ini yang berupa rekomendasi dan telah diserahkan
kepada Jaksa Agung dan Menteri Dalam Negeri tidak pernah ditindak lanjuti dan hilang
begitu saja bagaikan debu ditiup angin.

Pada 6 Maret 2003, Komnas HAM telah membentuk tim Ad Hoc Penyelidikan
Perisitiwa Kerusuhan Mei 1998 di bawah pimpinan Salahuddin Wahid, juga dari
Komnas HAM yang telah menyelesaikan tugasnya dengan menyerahkan seluruh hasil
penyelidikannya yaitu berupa rekomendasi dan Berita Acara (BAP) yang bersifat pro
justicia kepada pihak penyidik yaitu Kejaksaan Agung. Rekomendasi Komnas HAM
mengajukan nama Jenderal Wiranto dan Mayjen Sjafrie Sjamsyudin yang layak
dicurigai untuk dimintai pertanggung-jawabannya. Namum hingga saat ini tidak ada
kabar beritanya apakah hasil penyelidikan tersebut akan ditindak lanjuti sesuai dengan
Undang-Undang Nomor 26 Tahun 2000 Tentang Pengadilan HAM atau mungkin akan
dipetieskan saja. Apa sebenarnya yang menyebabkan timbulnya berbagai aksi kekerasan
terhadap orang-orang Tionghoa di Indonesia? Untuk menjawabnya baiklah kita buka
lembaran sejarah kita.

Hubungan Tionghoa dengan pribumi di masa sebelum kemerdekaan Sebelum

kedatangan orang-orang kulit putih ke Nusantara, pendatang- pendatang dari Tiongkok
hidup damai dengan penduduk setempat. Mereka hidup membaur dengan saling
membawa budaya masing-masing. Orang Tionghoa hidup dengan berdagang, bertani
dan menjadi tukang. Mereka tidak membawa istri dari Tiongkok karena memang ada
larangan dari Kaisar membawa perempuan keluar dari daratan Tiongkok, disamping
berbahayanya pelayaran di masa itu.[2][2] Mereka menikah dengan perempuan pribumi
setempat atau membeli budak untuk dijadikan gundik, sehingga lahirlah keturunan
campuran yang biasa disebut peranakan atau babah.

Setelah Belanda (VOC ) dibawah pimpinan Jan Pieterszoon Coen (1587- 1629)
menguasai Jayakarta atau Sunda Kelapa yang lalu dirubah namanya menjadi Batavia, ia
segera membangun koloninya tersebut dengan bantuan orang-orang Tionghoa dibawah
pimpinan Souw Beng Kong yang dibujuk dan diberi janji-janji untuk pindah dari
Banten. Coen segera menjalankan politik monopoli di segala bidang perdagangan dan
melakukan blokade atas pelabuhan Banten. Sejak itu jung-jung dari Tiongkok dilarang
merapat ke pelabuhan Banten. Sebaliknya Coen berusaha mendatangkan sebanyak
mungkin tenaga dari daratan Tiongkok untuk dijadikan kuli, tukang dan pedagang
eceran demi memajukan koloni dan perdagangannya. Pelaut Belanda tidak segan-segan
merompaki jung-jung Tionghoa secara terang-terangan dan menahan awak kapalnya
untuk kemudian dipaksa bekerja di Batavia.

Pada masa itulah terjadi gelombang kedatangan orang Tionghoa secara besar-besaran ke
tanah Jawa yang pada umumnya berasal dari provinsi Hokkian di bagian tenggara
Tiongkok, Jumlah orang Tionghoa naik dengan pesat, dari 3.101 orang pada 1682
menjadi 10.574 orang pada 1739.[3][3]

Namun migrasi perempuan Tiongkok ke Asia Tenggara baru dimulai pertengahan abad
ke-19 dan permulaan abad ke-20. Migrasi perempuan Tiongkok dimungkinkan bertalian
dengan adanya fasilitas penggunaan kapal api dan murahnya tarif angkutan. Sejak itu
migrasi orang-orang Tionghoa, baik laki-laki maupun perempuan meningkat dengan
pesat.[4] [4] Pada permulaan abad ke-19 jumlah penduduk Tionghoa di Batavia saja
hampir 100.000 orang, padahal seluruh penduduk pulau Jawa diperkirakan hanya 5 juta
orang.[5][5]

Akibat dibukanya kembali perdagangan Tiongkok dengan Asia Tenggara oleh Kaisar
dari Dinasti Ch'ing dan berhasilnya pasukan Ch'ing mengamankan Selat Taiwan serta
dimulainya liberalisasi di bidang ekonomi oleh pemerintah Hindia Belanda dengan
diizinkannya pihak swasta membuka perkebunan dan pertambangan, telah mendorong
mengalirnya para imigran dengan deras dari daratan Tiongkok, terutama dari provinsi
Fujian/Hokkian dan Guangdong/Kwangtung.

Dengan terjunnya pihak swasta di sektor perkebunan dan pertambangan dan semakin
stabilnya keamanan, jumlah penduduk di Jawa meningkat dengan pesat. Demikian juga
dengan imigran-imigran dari negara lain seperti dari Arab, India (Keling), Jepang dan
terutama orang-orang Tionghoa dari bagian selatan Tiongkok membanjiri Hindia
Belanda yang menjadi tanah harapan mereka. Jumlah kedatangan jung-jung dari
Tiongkok meningkat pesat. Dari tiga atau empat buah menjadi lebih dari dua puluh buah
dalam setahun. Belum lagi para imigran gelap yang diturunkan di kepulauan Seribu, di
Teluk Jakarta atau di berbagai tempat di pesisir utara Pulau Jawa.[6][6]

Menurut laporan Kolonial Verslag 1895, pada akhir 1893 di seluruh Hindia Belanda ada
443.945 orang Tionghoa, 290.448 orang di antaranya laki-laki. Di pulau Jawa saja
terdapat 248.484 orang Tionghoa dan 235.222 orang di antaranya laki-laki.[7][7]
Selanjutnya berdasarkan hasil sensus pada 1930 seperti dinyatakan dalam Volkstelling
1930, deel VII, Chineezen an andere Vreemde Oosterlingen in Nederlandsch Indie
terbitan Departement van Economische zaken, Batavia 1935, hal.88, data orang
Tionghoa di Hindia Belanda adalah sebagai berikut:

Laki-laki Perempuan

Hokkian 309.253 245.728

Hakka 124.905 75.831

Teo Chew 63.423 24.389

Kongfu 97.740 38.390

Lain-lain 123.941 64.468 [8][8]

Orang-orang Tionghoa ini hidup menyebar ke seluruh pulau Jawa, baik ke daerah
pedalaman maupun di sepanjang pesisir utara. Tujuan utama mereka hanya mencari
kehidupan baru dengan memasuki semua bidang perdagangan dan hidup damai dengan
penduduk setempat. Gubernur Jenderal Johan Van Hoorn (1653-1711) dalam masa
jabatannya,1704-1709, mengungkapkan dalam uraian dan gambaran tentang wilayah
Timur Laut pantai utara pulau Jawa (1700-1703), bahwa sejak 1683 jumlah orang
Tionghoa yang terdapat di daerah tersebut tumbuh dengan pesat. Begitu mereka
diizinkan untuk bermukim di wilayah kekuasaan kerajaan Mataram, mereka langsung
membuktikan diri mereka sebagai orang-orang yang dapat bekerja keras. Bahkan di
dalam pandangannnya, orang-orang Jawa yang baik hati telah menjadi lebih pandai dan
rajin, sebagai akibat kontak-kontak yang sering mereka lakukan dengan para pendatang
baru itu.

Di sepanjang pesisir utara, tidak terdapat sebuah sungai, pelabuhan, teluk ataupun anak
sungai yang masih dapat dipergunakan untuk pelayaran, di mana tidak terdapat sebuah
pos bea cukai (gerbang tol) yang penjaganya pasti seorang Tionghoa. Sunan
Amangkurat II, yang memerintah dari 1677-1703 menikmati penghasilan kira-kira
50.000 ronde realen- uang real yang bulat-bulat-dari pajak-pajak seperti itu. Disamping
itu mereka pun diberi hak untuk membuka rumah judi, pelacuran dan kelak tempat
menghisap candu oleh pemerintah Hindia Belanda. Karena perbuatan segelintir orang
Tionghoa yang telah melakukan kolusi dengan para Sultan dan Pangeran Jawa dan
penguasa Belanda inilah, mulai timbul rasa kurang senang orang-orang Jawa kepada
orang Tionghoa dan menjadi benih sentimen-sentimen dan aksi- aksi kekerasan di
kemudian hari..

Orang-orang Tionghoa tetap bermukim di perantauan sampai beberapa keturunan tanpa

pernah kembali ke negeri asalnya. Mereka membaurkan diri baik dalam soal bahasa,
makanan, pakaian maupun agama. Mereka masuk menjadi Islam dan menolak
memakan daging **** dan memungut seluruh ada-istiadat penduduk asli. Banyak dari
mereka yang memeluk agama Islam sebagai akibat peristiwa Pembantaian 1740 dan
juga untuk menghindari pajak kepala yang khusus dikenakan kepada orang-orang
Tionghoa.

Karena jumlah orang Tionghoa yang memeluk Islam semakin banyak, maka VOC
memisahkan mereka dari masyarakat Tionghoa yang bukan muslim dan menyerahkan
pengurusan dan pengawasan mereka kepada seorang kapiten Tionghoa yang diangkat
dari kalangan mereka sendiri. Tetapi jabatan mayor atau kapiten dalam masyarakat
muslim Tionghoa di Batavia dihapuskan pada 1827,[9][9] setelah mereka menjadi sulit
dibedakan lagi dari penduduk asli yang beragama Islam. Sejak itu istilah "peranakan"
hanya digunakan bagi orang Tionghoa yang lahir di Jawa.[10][10]

Banyak dari para imigran Tionghoa yang datang ke Indonesia pada abad ke –17
terutama orang-orang Hokkian sebagai pelarian, menghindari serbuan bangsa Manchu.
Mereka datang ke Indonesia dengan tetap mempergunakan gaya rambut seperti pada
zaman dinasti Ming. Namun pada masa-masa kemudian, para imigran Tionghoa yang
datang dari Tiongkok telah menggunakan gaya rambut pada zaman dinasti Ch'ing, yaitu
dengan mencukur bersih rambut di kepala, kecuali sisa di bagian belakang kepala yang
dibiarkan tumbuh panjang dan dikepang (tauchang). Hal ini dikarenakan gaya rambut
tersebut memang wajib digunakan di seluruh daratan Tiongkok, ketika dinasti Ch'ing
telah berhasil menegakkan pengendalian sepenuhnya terhadap orang-orang Han.

Timbulnya istilah "Cina kunciran" yang berkonotasi penghinaan, khusus merujuk

kepada orang-orang Tionghoa pendatang baru. Hal ini berlawanan dengan golongan
peranakan yang telah berasimilasi sampai tingkat tertentu ke dalam masyarakat Jawa
asli. Kemudian pejoratif sebutan Cina (berasal dari bahasa Belanda Ch'ina untuk
Tiongkok) tersebut berlanjut dan berkembang terhadap seluruh etnis Tionghoa sehingga
timbulnya gerakan kebangkitan dan berdirinya Tiong Hoa Hwe Koan pada 1900 dan
Chung Hua Ming Kuo atau Republik Tiongkok pada 1911. Kata Chung Hua dalam
dialek Hokkian adalah Tiong Hoa.[11][11] Pada saat berlangsungnya Perang Jawa
(Perang Diponegoro) 1825-1830, gaya rambut orang Tionghoa ini kembali menjadi
suatu masalah ketika Pangeran Diponegoro memerintahkan semua orang Tionghoa yang
ingin bergabung menjadi muslim, harus disunat dan memotong kuncir mereka. [12][12]

Pengaruh kebudayaan Tionghoa.

Kebudayaan Tionghoa kemudian membaur dan beradaptasi dengan kebudayaan

setempat baik bahasa,kesenian, tarian, pengobatan, cara berpakaian, kuliner dan
sebagainya. Terdapat cukup banyak bukti yang dapat kita jumpai dalam kehidupan
sehari-hari, seperti kesenian gambang kromong, cokek, topeng Betawi, Lenong atau di
bidang kuliner seperti tahu, kecap, taoge, bakmi, bakso, bihun dan di bidang pakaian
seperti kebaya encim, baju koko, oto, angkin dan sebagainya. Malahan naga, binatang
legenda Tiongkok juga beradaptasimenjadi naga Jawa, bedanya naga Jawa memakai
mahkota.

Demikian juga mesjid-mesjid dan surau-surau di Indonesia pasti digantungi bedug

seperti yang terdapat di klenteng-klenteng di Tiongkok. Bedanya bedug di Indonesia
dipukul dengan tongkat seperti memukul tambur, sedangkan bedug dan genta di
Tiongkok dipukul dengan mendorong sebatang kayu balok yang digantung di muka
bedug tersebut. Bedug hanya dijumpai di mesjid-mesjid di Indonesia. Di negara-negara
Arab dan Timur Tengah lainnya tak akan kita jumpai bedug-bedug yang digantung di
samping mesjid.[13][13]

Arsitektur mesjid-mesjid di Jawa sangat dipengaruhi kebudayaan Tiongkok yang

bergaya pagoda dan beratap susun, berbeda dengan arsitektur mesjid-mesjid di Timur
Tengah yang beratap dome (bulat) Contohnya mesjid semacam ini sampai saat ini dapat
kita jumpai di sepanjang pesisir utara Pulau Jawa (pantura).

Pendatang-pendatang Tionghoa juga mengajarkan cara menanam padi di sawah yang

dibajak dan diairi yang hasilnya lebih maksimal dibandingkan menanam padi di huma
yang dipelajari penduduk pribumi dari orang-orang India. Demikian juga mereka
mengajarkan penduduk setempat cara berkebun tebu dan cara membuat gula. Mereka
juga mengembangkan budi daya tanaman kacang tanah, kacang hijau, kacang kedelai,
semangka dan nila atau tarum untuk dijadikan bahan pewarna. Sejak 1611 mereka
mengembangkan penyulingan arak yang dibuat dari beras yang difermentasi, tetes tebu
dan nira. Dari kacang hijau dan kedelai mereka menghasilkan taoge, tauco dan kecap.

Mereka juga mengajarkan pembuatan bata dan genting sebagai pengganti batu dan
rumbia untuk membangun rumah. Demikian juga mereka mengajarkan menjahit baju
dan menyamak kulit untuk keperluan busana. Di bidang pengobatan, pengaruh
kebudayaan Tionghoa sangat kental. Seperti kita ketahui, jamu yang sangat terkenal,
yang menjadi pusaka peninggalan dari kraton-kraton Jawa sangat mirip dengan obat-
obatan Tionghoa. Jamu merupakan ramuan yang menggunakan bahan-bahan dari
dedaunan, rempah-rempah dan akar-akaran. Cara penyajiannya dengan merebus daun-
daunan obat atau menumbuk dan menggilingnya, identik dengan obat-obatan Tionghoa
yang telah berusia ribuan tahun. Pengobatan dengan jamu-jamuan ini hanya berasal dari
Jawa dan Madura, tidak berasal dari kepulauan lain di Nusantara.

Belum lagi permainan pencak silat, permainan judi dan kebiasaan membakar petasan
atau mercon pada masa bulan Ramadhan dan menyambut Idul Fitri atau pada upacara-
upacara perkawinan atau khitanan dan sebagainya, yang dilakukan umat Islam di
pedesaan di pulau Jawa, jelas merupakan tradisi yang dipengaruhi tradisi Tionghoa yang
membawa kebiasaan ini dari daratan Tiongkok, tempat asal petasan tersebut. Masih
banyak lagi contoh-contoh pengaruh budaya Tionghoa dalam kehidupan kita sehari-hari
yang tentunya tidak dapat kita tuliskan satu-persatu di makalah ini.

Demikianlah sekilas keadaan masyarakat Tionghoa di masa sebelum kedatangan orang-

orang kulit putih dan di masa penjajahan Belanda baik di bawah VOC maupun di bawah
pemerintahan Hindia-Belanda.

Pembantaian 1740, aksi kekerasan anti Tionghoa di masa VOC Ketika orang-orang
Belanda di bawah pimpinan Cornelis de Houtman pada 23 Juni 1596 berhasil mendarat
di pelabuhan Banten, ternyata orang Portugis telah lama mempunyai kantor dagang di
sana. Ketika tiba di Nusantara orang-orang Belanda dan kemudian Inggris menjumpai
pemukiman-pemukiman Tionghoa di kebanyakan Bandar di Asia Tenggara seperti di
Hoi An, Patani, Banten, Phnom Penh, dan Manila. Pada 1642 di Hoi An terdapat 45.000
orang Tionghoa dan pada 1600 di Banten ada 3.000 orang Tionghoa.[14][14]

Terbukti dalam sejarah bahwa kedatangan Belanda ini mengubah peta poltik di seluruh
Nusantara. Salah satu "jasa" Belanda adalah berusaha menyatukan seluruh wilayah
Nusantara ke dalam genggamannya, yang pada ujungnya melahirkan gerakan
kebangkitan nasional di kemudian hari.

Dengan kedatangan Belanda, hubungan orang-orang Tionghoa yang begitu harmonis

dengan penduduk setempat, berangsur-angsur mulai menjadi renggang. Belanda
memandang hubungan harmonis antara etnis Tionghoa dan penduduk setempat sebagai
"duri" dan suatu bahaya bagi niat mereka menguasai Nusantara.

Belanda kemudian mulai menjalankan politik devide et impera atau pecah belah dan
mengeluarkan berbagai kebijakan dan peraturan yang bertujuan memisahkan orang-
orang Tionghoa dari penduduk setempat. Antara lain dengan "mengekslusifkan" tempat
tinggal mereka melalui "wijkenstelsel dan "passenstelsel". Demikian juga cara
berpakaian orang-orang Tionghoa diatur oleh pihak penguasa kolonial. Ketika itu orang
Tionghoa dilarang memakai pakaian model Eropa (Barat) atau memakai pakaian Jawa
atau pribumi lainnya. Bagi yang melanggar diancam hukuman denda atau kurungan
penjara. Kebijaksanaan memisahkan kelompok-kelompok ini menguatkan sikap acuh
tak acuh di antara kelompok-kelompok, dan bagi Belanda lebih mudah untuk
mengendalikan orang Tionghoa dari pakaiannya, tempat pemukimannya dan tanda-
tanda yang mudah dikenali yang ada pada mereka. Sampai akhir abad ke-19 orang
Tionghoa di Hindia Belanda dilarang memakai pakaian model Eropa, yaitu jas dan
celana pantalon.

Pasal 128 Regeeringreglement 1854 memerintahkan para gubernur jenderal mengatur

sekolah untuk anak-anak negeri, namun tidak termasuk anak-anak Tionghoa, sehingga
mereka tidak dapat diterima baik di Europeesche School maupun Inlandsche School.
Jadi bagi anak- anak Tionghoa tidak disediakan sekolah sama sekali.

Sebaliknya segelintir orang-orang Tionghoa dijadikan alat pemerintah Hindia-Belanda

untuk memeras rakyat dengan menjadikan mereka pachter pajak, pachter judi, pachter
madat dan pachter gadai. Semua ini semakin menguatkan kesan buruk, kebencian dan
sentimen anti Tionghoa sebagian orang Jawa terhadap orang Tionghoa.

Pada 1854, pemerintah Hindia-Belanda melakukan politik segregasi dengan membagi-

bagi penduduk menjadi tiga kelompok. Yang pertama kelompok orang Eropa termasuk
ke dalamnya orang-orang Indo Eropa. Yang kedua kedua kelompok Vreemde
Ooosterlingen atau Orang Timur Asing yang terdiri dari orang Tionghoa, Arab dan
orang Asia lainnya. Yang ketiga kelompok inlander atau pribumi. Peraturan ini dimuat
dalam Staatsblad No. 2, Jo.1 Pasal 131. Jo.61 Wet op de staats inrichting van
NederlandschIndie atau Indische Staats regeling (IS) tahun 1855.

Ketiga kelompok ini tunduk kepada sejumlah buku undang-undang yang berbeda dan
diadili di pengadilan yang berbeda-beda pula. Tetapi khusus untuk masalah
perdagangan, sejak awal VOC, bagi orang Tionghoa diberlakukan Hukum Dagang
Belanda, sepanjang hukum itu masih dapat diterapkan. Selain dari masalah perdagangan
terutama dalam masalah kriminal, status orang Tionghoa disamakan dengan golongan
inlander dan perkaranya diadili di landraad atau politieroll. Dengan diberlakukannya
undang-undang ini lengkap sudah politik pecah belah dan adu domba pemerintah
Hindia-Belanda terhadap penduduk Nusantara terutama di Pulau Jawa.

Aksi kekerasan pertama terhadap orang-orang Tionghoa di Nusantara adalah Peristiwa

Pembunuhan Orang-orang Tionghoa (Chinezenmoord) 1740. Dalam aksi kekerasan
yang berlangsung selama dua minggu tersebut, hampir 10.000 orang Tionghoa tewas,
dibunuh secara kejam oleh tentara Belanda dengan dibantu orang-orang Eropa lainnya,
para kelasi kapal, para gelandangan, orang-orang Sepoy (India), para tukang dan budak.
Pembunuhan yang terjadi di masa pemerintahan Gubernur Jenderal Adriaan Valckenier
ini bertujuan mengeliminasi orang-orang Tionghoa yang jumlahnya dianggap telah
membahayakan posisi orang-orang Belanda. Demikian juga orang-orang Tionghoa ini
dianggap telah mendominasi perdagangan dan perkebunan serta pabrik gula yang
banyak berdiri di seputar Batavia.

Pada 1740 terdapat 2.500 rumah orang Tionghoa di dalam tembok kota Batavia,
sedangkan seluruh jumlah orang Tionghoa termasuk yang berada di luar tembok kota
diperkirakan berjumlah tidak kurang dari 15.000 orang. Jumlah tersebut merupakan
17% dari seluruh jumlah penduduk di daerah tersebut. Ada kemungkinan jumlah orang
Tionghoa sebenarnya jauh lebih besar, karena berdasarkan sensus yang diadakan pada
1778, sebesar 26% dari jumlah penduduk yang berada di luar tembok kota adalah
orang-orang Tionghoa. Sedangkan pada masa pemerintahan Inggris (1811-1816) jumlah
orang Tionghoa merupakan 24% dari seluruh jumlah penduduk yang berdiam di dalam
dan di luar tembok kota.

Namun suatu hal yang jelas sangat berbeda dengan apa yang terjadi dengan Peristiwa
Mei 1998 adalah tindakan pihak VOC yang dengan segera mengambil tindakan dengan
memecat dan kemudian menangkap Gubernur Jenderal Adriaan Valckenier di
Capetown, Afrika Selatan dalam perjalanannya pulang ke Belanda. Ia kemudian dibawa
kembali ke Batavia dan dimasukkan ke penjara Robijn di benteng Batavia. Pemeriksaan
Valckenier berlangsung berbelit-belit dan berkepanjangan sampai hampir sepuluh tahun
lamanya. Akhirnya ia meninggal dunia pada 1751 dan pemeriksaan terhadap dirinya
dihentikan.

Massacre yang dipimpin VOC di Batavia terhadap orang-orang Tionghoa ini,

merupakan lembaran hitam yang mencoreng muka pemerintah Belanda dan merupakan
kejadian pertama dalam sejarah orang Tionghoa di perantauan. Namun ternyata pada
1762, pembunuhan terhadap orang Tionghoa perantauan terjadi kembali. Sekali ini,
penguasa Spanyol di Manila membantai ribuan orang "sangley". Perlu diketahui sampai
pertengahan abad ke-19, orang-orang Spanyol menyebut orang Tionghoa dengan
sebutan sangley bukan "Cina", yang diduga berasal dari dari kata "sengli" yang dalam
bahasa Hokkian berarti dagang. Mungkin karena kebanyakan perantau Tionghoa pada
masa itu adalah pedagang- pedagang yang berasal dari provinsi Hokkian, untuk
gampangnya orang- orang Spanyol menyebut orang –orang Tionghoa sangley.[15][15]

Baru-baru ini kita dikejutkan dengan berita bahwa pada 17 April 2006, aksi kekerasan
meletup di Honiara, ibukota Kepulauan Salomon, sehari setelah anggota parlemen
memilih Snyder Rini sebagai perdana menteri. Akibat kerusuhan tersebut sekitar 150
keluarga Tionghoa kehilangan rumah dan tempat usahanya karena dijarah dan
dirusak/dibakar massa. Pemerintah RRT segera mengirim pesawat charter China
Southern Airline dari Guangzhou untuk mengangkut 300 warganya kembali ke
Tiongkok. Sebaliknya pemerintah Taiwan tidak berbuat apa-apa untuk membantu warga
Tionghoa setempat yang menjadi korban aksi kekerasan tersebut, padahal Taiwanlah
yang mendapat pengakuan diplomatic dari kepulauan Salomon. Aksi kekerasan tersebut
terjadi karena warga setempat menuduh warga asal Tiongkok dan Taiwan menyuap
anggota parlemen untuk mempengaruhi hasil pemilihan perdana menteri, namun warga
Tiongkok maupun Taiwan menolak tuduhan tersebut.[16][16]

Setelah peristiwa pembunuhan di Batavia sekelompok orang Tionghoa yang sakit hati
dan dendam di bawah pimpinan Que Panjang atau Sie Panjang (Oei Panko) menuju
Jawa Tengah dan bersekutu dengan sejumlah Pangeran Jawa untuk melakukan
perlawanan terhadap VOC.

Aksi kekerasan anti Tionghoa semasa Perang Jawa Pada 23 September 1825 yang
merupakan masa awal Perang Jawa, sebuah pasukan berkuda di bawah pimpinan Raden
Ayu Yudakusuma, puteri Sultan Hamengku Buwono I menyerbu Ngawi sebuah kota
kecil di perbatasan Jawa Tengah - Jawa Timur yang terletak di tepi Bengawan Solo.
Tanpa memperdulikan jerit dan tangisan perempuan dan anak-anak yang sangat
memilukan, seluruh anggota masyarakat Tionghoa yang terdapat di Ngawi, habis
dibantai. Tubuh-tubuh yang telah terpotong-potong dibiarkan bergelimpangan di muka
pintu, di jalanan dan di rumah-rumah yang penuh lumuran darah.

Pembantaian di Ngawi tersebut ternyata bukan satu-satunya kejadian pada masa

permulaan Perang Jawa. Di seluruh Jawa Tengah dan di sepanjang Bengawan Solo,
pembantaian orang-orang Tionghoa terjadi berulang-ulang.

Apa yang menyebabkan pembantaian orang-orang Jawa Tengah terhadap orang-orang

Tionghoa? Padahal mereka sebelumnya hidup damai dan rukun serta saling membantu
dengan penduduk Jawa tempat mereka tinggal? Pemimpin pasukan yang melakukan
pembantaian di Ngawi, Raden Ayu Yudakusuma, istri Bupati Wieasari yang sering sakit-
sakitan, sebelumnya mempunyai hubungan yang baik dengan orang-orang Tionghoa
Jawa Timur yang sering meminjaminya uang.

Demikian juga banyak orang-orang peranakan Tionghoa, ikut berjuang bersama-sama

pasukan Pangeran Diponegoro, terutama dalam menyediakan kebutuhan mereka akan
uang perak, senjata, candu dan lain-lainnya. Malahan banyak orang Tionghoa yang ikut
bertempur bahu-membahu melawan Belanda.

Hubungan orang-orang Tionghoa dengan penduduk setempat di Jawa yang telah

berjalan selama ratusan tahun, ternyata mengalami banyak perkembangan.Migrasi
orang-orang Tionghoa yang mengalir dengan deras setelah Belanda membuka pintu
demi kepentingan ekonomi kolonial yang sedang dibangunnya, memasuki segala bidang
kehidupan di Jawa. Peranan orang-orang Tionghoa muslim yang semakin besar di
sejumlah kesultanan Islam yang ikut dibentuknya, yang kemudian berkembang menjadi
kerajaan Mataram, menimbulkan dampak semakin tergantungnya para raja dan pejabat
lainnya kepada mereka. Terutama dalam pekerjaan memungut pajak untuk menjalankan
roda pemerintahan dan memenuhi kebutuhan pribadinya.

Orang-orang Tionghoa juga telah memberikan sumbangan yang besar dalam

pengembangan ketrampilan dan teknologi militer. Pada 1636 ketika Pangeran Pekik dari
Surabaya menaklukkan Giri, banyak laporan yang dibuat orang-orang Jawa bahwa raja
pendeta dari Giri mendapat bantuan dari 200 orang Tionghoa penembak cepat yang
dipimpin oleh seorang anak angkatnya, Tionghoa muslim bernama Endrasena.

Orang-orang Tionghoa di Gresik yang telah berabad-abad bermukim di sana

membangun pusat persenjataan dan memproduksi meriam kuningan berukuran besar
dan panjang, kaliber 18 pon. Demikian juga senjata- senjata api dan mesiu.

Ketika terjadi pemberontakan Pangeran Trunajaya dari Madura, ia dibantu oleh seorang
komandan bangsa Tionghoa yang ahli senjata api. Pada masa itu para sultan, pangeran
dan pejabat kesultanan banyak yang mengambil perempuan peranakan Tionghoa yang
cantik-cantik dan berkulit putih bersih untuk dijadikan selirnya.

Karena para sultan selalu kekurangan uang, maka mereka lalu meminjamnya dari para
rentenir Tionghoa yang dengan senang hati akan selalu membantunya. Demikian juga
tanah-tanah milik kesultanan banyak yang mereka sewakan kepada orang-orang
Tionghoa yang dengan rajin akan mengolah sebaik-baiknya.

Orang-orang Tionghoa juga dijadikan bandar-bandar pemungut pajak di jalan-jalan

utama, jembatan, pelabuhan, pangkalan di sungai-sungai, pasar dan lain-lainnya. Orang-
orang Tionghoa ini berlomba-lomba melakukan penawaran untuk mendapatkan konsesi
pemungutan pajak. Oleh karena semakin banyak yang ingin terjun di bidang yang
dianggap basah ini, sudah tentu semakin mahal pula yang harus dibayarkan kepada para
sultan tersebut. Malahan karena semakin ketatnya persaingan di antara mereka, kadang-
kadang mereka harus membayar sampai dua atau tiga kali lebih besar dari yang
seharusnya mereka bayar.

Akibatnya para Bandar ini mencari jalan untuk memungut pajak yang sebesar-besarnya
dengan cara yang lebih kejam kepada penduduk, terutama para pedagang Tionghoa
sendiri yang kadang-kadang harus membayar sampai tiga kali lebih banyak dari yang
harus dibayar orang Jawa. Sementara itu para Bandar pajak ini mendapatkan
perlindungan hukum dari para Sultan atau pemerintah Hindia-Belanda, sehingga
kedudukan mereka baru dapat diganti setelah ada persetujuan dari pihak kompeni.

Demikian juga pemerintah Hindia-Belanda maupun Inggris yang melihat begitu

efektifnya orang-orang Tionghoa dalam membantu para sultan Jawa dalam memungut
pajak, melakukan hal yang sama di daerah-daerah yang telah dikuasainya.

Malahan mereka juga menunjuk segelintir orang Tionghoa menjadi pachter candu
dengan mengijinkan mereka membuka berbagai tempat pengisapan candu yang
impornya dimonopoli mereka. Rumah-rumah judi yang pengelolaannya dilakukan oleh
orang-orang Tionghoa, juga menjadi sumber penghasilan yang besar, bukan saja bagi
pemerintah, tetapi juga bagi kantung para pejabat setempat. Demikian juga dengan
rumah pelacuran (bordil) yang menyediakan perempuan-perempuan segar dan cantik
untuk para pangeran dan pejabat kompeni Belanda.

Hal ini tentu saja banyak menimbulkan ekses negatif yang berpotensi besar timbulnya
konflik di antara penduduk Jawa dengan orang-orang Tionghoa, para bandar pemungut
pajak tersebut. Menjelang Perang Jawa terjadilah penjarahan dan pembakaran gerbang-
gerbang tol tempat pemungutan pajak di berbagai tempat, yang dilakukan para bandit
setempat, bahkan banyak petugas gerbang tersebut yang dibunuh. Sebagai akibatnya
para penjaga gerbang tol itu mengorganisasi diri dengan membentuk pasukan pengawal
yang terdiri dari orang-orang Jawa, untuk menjaga keselamatan mereka yang
mengakibatkan makin meningkatnya sentimen politik terhadap orang Tionghoa.

Dari sinilah mulai tumbuh "rasa benci" orang-orang Jawa,terutama orang-orang Jawa
Tengah di pedalaman kepada orang-orang Tionghoa yang dianggapnya sebagai pemeras
dan pembawa sial dan kesengsaraan. Padahal mereka hanya menjadi alat dari kekuasaan
yang ada. Baik dari para sultan Jawa maupun dari pemerintah Belanda maupun Inggris.
Banyaknya orang Tionghoa yang masuk Islam selain karena alasan
praktis,menyesuaikan diri dengan masyarakat setempat dan mendekatkan diri dengan
kultur Jawa, sebenarnya lebih banyak disebabkan pertimbangan ekonomi, yaitu untuk
menghindari "pajak konde" dan pajak kepala yang dikenakan pemerintah Belanda
kepada orang-orang Tionghoa. Dengan masuk Islam mereka terbebas dari pajak-pajak
yang dirasa sangat memberatkannya. Pada awal Perang Jawa, orang Tionghoa banyak
yang ingin bergabung dengan pasukan Pangeran Diponegoro, maka sang Pangeran
mengeluarkan instruksi agar mereka masuk Islam terlebih dahulu dengan disunat dan
memotong kuncirnya.

Pembantaian terhadap orang Tionghoa pada awal Perang Jawa telah menimbulkan
kekecewaan dan prasangka yang mendalam pada diri orang- orang Tionghoa terhadap
orang Jawa. Sikap takut dan curiga orang- orang Tionghoa ini dibalas dengan sikap
yang sama oleh orang-orang Jawa. Pangeran Diponegoro juga bersikap sama dengan
melarang para komandannya melakukan hubungan yang akrab dengan orang-orang
Tionghoa. Ia juga melarang mereka mengambil gadis-gadis peranakan Tionghoa
menjadi gundiknya, karena ia berpendapat bahwa hubungan dengan gadis-gadis
Tionghoa hanya akan membawa sial dan malapetaka. Sikap Diponegoro ini disebabkan
oleh pengalamannya sendiri ketika menghadapi kekalahan pertempuran di Gowok, di
luar Surakarta pada 15 Oktober 1826. Sesuai dengan apa yang ditulisnya sendiri di
dalam Babad Dipanegara, ia telah terjebak dan "dihancurkan" oleh kecantikan seorang
gadis Tionghoa yang tertangkap di daerah Panjang dan kemudian dijadikan tukang
pijitnya. Demikian juga ia menyalahkan kekalahan iparnya Sasradilaga, dalam
pertempuran di pesisir utara, di daerah Lasem karena melanggar perintahnya dengan
menggauli seorang perempuan Tionghoa di Lasem.[17][17]

Kenyataan bahwa komandan-komandan pasukannya banyak yang menggauli gadis-

gadis Tionghoa sebagai hiburan dan penggunaan candu secara bebas di antara
prajuritnya, telah menimbulkan anggapan Pangeran Diponegoro bahwa kalahnya dia
dalam pertempuran dengan Belanda disebabkan orang-orang Tionghoa yang membawa
sial dan malapetaka. Pandangannya yang keliru dan bersifat rasis inilah yang seolah-
olah menjadi "mitos" bahwa orang-orang Tionghoa hanya membawa sial, yang sampai
sekarang masih dihembus-hembuskan oleh kalangan tertentu, dengan maksud
memojokkan etnis Tionghoa di Indonesia.[18][18]

Aksi kekerasan anti Tionghoa di masa pemerintahan Hindia-Belanda Berdirinya Sarekat

Dagang Islam (SDI) yang diprakarsai Tirto Adhi Soerjo pada awalnya sebenarnya bukan
bertujuan untuk melawan pedagang Tionghoa yang dianggap pesaing utama para
pedagang Islam.[19][19] SDI kemudian berubah menjadi Sarekat Islam (SI) dan
berkembang dengan pesat sehingga anggotanya mencapai setengah juta orang. Dalam
perkembangannya SI menjadi organisasi yang paling militan pada masa itu dalam
berjuang melawan penjajah Belanda.

Untuk mengalihkan konflik, pemerintah kolonial Belanda melakukan politik adu domba
dan berusaha membenturkan kepentingan pedagang- pedagang Islam yang dipelopori
para pedagang Arab dengan pedagang Tionghoa yang menjadi saingan utamanya.
Persaingan antara pedagang batik dan rokok kretek Arab dengan pedagang-pedagang
Tionghoa sengaja dihembus-hembuskan pemerintah kolonial Belanda dengan para
penasehatnya dari Biro Umum Bumiputera. Terjadilah sejumlah bentrokan kecil antara
kedua kelompok pedagang tersebut yang mencapai puncaknya pada Kamis malam 31
Oktober 1918 di kota Kudus yang terkenal dengan Peristiwa Peroesoehan di Koedoes.

Pada malam itu semua rumah dan toko milik orang Tionghoa di kota Kudus habis
dijarah dan dibakar oleh ribuan massa Sarekat Islam yang datang dari Mayong, Jepara,
Pati, Demak dan daerah sekitarnya. Korban meninggal dunia ada 16 orang yang terdiri
dari orang-orang Tionghoa dan para perusuh. Korban yang luka-luka mencapai ratusan
orang yaitu kaum perusuh yang diserang polisi. Ada 3 mayat orang Tionghoa yang
bertumpuk di kamar mandi, ada mayat yang sudah menjadi arang dan tertimbun puing-
puing rumah yang habis terbakar. Ada mayat gadis yang masuk kedalam bak mandi
namun karena rumahnya terbakar matang terebus. Ada 40 rumah/toko yang habis
dijarah dan dibakar dan sebuah klenteng dirusak. Selain itu sejumlah pabrik rokok dan
batik habis dijarah dan dirusak.

Perisitiwa kerusuhan ini diawali dengan perkelahian antara sejumlah pemuda Tionghoa
yang sedang melakukan prosesi arak-arakan gotong Toapekong dengan sejumlah
pemuda SI. Prosesi ini di selenggarakan sebagai upaya menangkal wabah penyakit
influenza yang menyerang kota Kudus dan telah meminta korban jiwa Karena wabah
penyakit ini dikuatirkan akan meminta lebih banyak korban, masyarakat Tionghoa di
Kudus yang masih percaya akan kebiasaan yang berbau tahayul lalu mengadakan
upacara gotong Toapekong untuk menghentikan wabah tersebut. Namun ada
sekelompok haji yang menjadi pengusaha pabrik rokok kretek yang selama ini merasa
dirugikan, karena kalah bersaing dengan para pengusaha Tionghoa. Mereka
menggunakan kesempatan ini menghasut para pengurus dan anggota SI setempat
dengan melakukan sejumlah provokasi. Ketika berlangsung prosesi, kelompok tersebut
lalu mengganggu dan mengejek para peserta upacara itu. Ternyata para pemuda
Tionghoa tersebut terpancing dan terjadi perkelahian yang kemudian berhasil dilerai.
Namun pada keesokan malamnya terjadilah kerusuhan tersebut. Yang paling disesalkan
masyarakat Tionghoa Kudus, pihak keamanan Belanda tidak segera menghentikan
kerusuhan itu dan setelah jatuh banyak korban baru meminta bantuan polisi dari
Semarang.

Ratusan perusuh yang ditangkap, namun hanya 69 orang saja yang diajukan ke
pengadilan. Pada 25 Pebruari 1919 dibacakan vonis hakim yang menjatuhkan hukuman
terberat 15 tahun dan teringan 9 bulan, beberapa orang dinyatakan bebas karena terbukti
tidak bersalah. Peristiwa kerusuhan di Kudus yang merupakan puncak dari berbagai
kerusuhan kecil yang dimulai di Surabaya dan Solo pada 1912, adalah awal dari
rangkaian kerusuhan rasial anti Tionghoa yang berlangsung selama abad ke-20.
Peristiwa kerusuhan Kudus membuktikan keberhasilan pemerintah kolonial Belanda
dalam mengadu domba etnis Tionghoa dengan golongan pribumi. Pembauran dan
integrasi orang-orang Tionghoa dengan orang-orang Jawa yang selama ratusan tahun
berjalan dengan harmonis berhasil dirusak Belanda dengan menjalankan politik
segregasi di segala bidang, baik politik, ekonomi, hukum, dan kebudayaan. Namun
terlepas dari semuanya, pemerintah kolonial Belanda dalam usahanya menegakkan "law
and order" masih mau menyeret para pelaku dan dalangnya ke pengadilan. Masa
sebelum Perang Dunia II biasa disebut zaman "normal" karena pemerintah Hindia-
Belanda dianggap berhasil menegakkan hukum dan menjaga kemanan sehingga
penduduk merasa aman dari berbagai tindakan kejahatan (kriminal).

Namun situasi ini berubah sepenuhnya pada saat tentara Jepang mendarat di Jawa.
Tentara Belanda yang mengundurkan diri dari kota- kota besar mendobrak dan
menjarah toko-toko P&D yang ditinggalkan pemiliknya untuk mengungsi. Perbuatan ini
telah mendorong rakyat yang hidup serba kekurangan untuk meniru tindakan para
anggota militer Belanda tersebut. Maka terjadilah berbagai aksi perampokan dan
penjarahan toko-toko dan rumah-rumah orang Tionghoa yang ditinggalkan pemiliknya
untuk mengungsi. Kerugian paling banyak dialami orang- orang Tionghoa di Jawa Barat
dan Jawa Tengah. Ratusan pabrik milik orang Tionghoa dihancurkan pasukan Belanda
yang sedang mengundurkan diri. Dari 130 pabrik gula yang berada di pulau Jawa pada
1940, hanya 32 yang selamat dari perusakan.

Untuk mengantisipasi serangan pasukan Jepang, beberapa bulan sebelumnya,

perusahaan-perusahaan Belanda telah memindahkan persediaan barangnya ke kota-kota
kecil di pedalaman. Hal ini juga dilakukan pengusaha-pengusaha Tionghoa di Batavia.
Di Jawa Barat kota- kota kecil seperti Cibadak, Sindanglaya, dan Bogor telah menjadi
pilihan para pengusaha Tionghoa. Evakuasi mencapai puncaknya ketika pemerintah
Hindia-Belanda memerintahkan agar para pengusaha Tionghoa menyingkir dari kota-
kota besar.

Ternyata kebijaksanaan ini keliru, karena ketika pasukan Jepang mendarat di Jawa dan
Sumatera, suasana menjadi chaos dan terjadi penggedoran dan penjarahan terhadap
semua pabrik dan gudang milik Belanda dan Tionghoa oleh orang-orang Indonesia.
Aksi penjarahan tersebut hanya berlangsung beberapa hari karena berhasil diredam
pasukan Jepang yang bertindak tegas terhadap para penjarah tersebut dan hukuman mati
dijatuhkan kepada mereka yang terlibat dalam kerusuhan bersenjata.

Kerugian yang diderita para pengusaha Tionghoa diperkirakan berjumlah 100 juta
gulden. Tjung See Gan seorang importir dan grosir tekstil terbesar yang memindahkan
stok barangnya ke Cibadak menderita kerugian 370.000 gulden. Demikian juga dengan
Hioe Nyan Yoeng, pengusaha tekstil terkemuka lainnya menderita kerugian 280.000
gulden. Tan Hoan Kie, pemilik toko De Zon, department store terbesar yang
memindahkan stok barangnya ke Sukabumi, mengalami nasib yang sama dengan kedua
orang tersebut. Daerah Pintu Kecil, pusat perdagangan pengusaha Tionghoa dan grosir
tekstil menderita kerugian terbesar, diperkirakan jumlah kerugian mencapai dua juta
gulden. Demikian juga di daerah Jembatan Lima, sembilan dari sepuluh toko dijarah
habis. Daerah Tanjung Priok juga mengalami nasib yang sama. Di daerah pedalaman,
beras dijarah habis dari gudang-gudang penggilingan beras. Di daerah Krawang, 70-
80% pengusaha Tionghoa menjadi korban penjarahan.[20][20]

Aksi kekerasan anti Tionghoa di masa Perang Kemerdekaan Pada 1 Maret 1945, Saiko
Syikikan (Panglima Tertinggi Tentara Jepang ke-16 untuk Jawa dan Sematera) Letjen
Kumakichi Harada mengumumkan pembentukan Dokoritu Zunbi Tyoosa Kai atau
Badan Penyelidik Usaha- usaha Persiapan Kemerdekaan Indonesia (BPUPKI) yang
susunan anggotanya diumumkan pada 29 April 1945 dibawah pimpinan Dr. KRT
Radjiman Wedioningrat. Ternyata terdapat empat orang Tionghoa yang diangkat
menjadi menjadi anggota yaitu: Liem Koen Hian, Oei Tjong Hauw, Oei Tiang Tjoei,
dan Tan Eng Hoa. Mereka ini termasuk para founding fathers yang merancang konsitusi
atau UUD 1945 sebagai persiapan dalam menghadapi proklamasi
kemerdekaan.Kemudian pada 7 Agustus 1945 di Jakarta diumumkan terbentuknya
Dokuritu Zunbi Inkai atau Panitia Persiapan Kemerdekaan Indonesia (PPKI) yang
dipimpin Ir.Soekarno sebagai ketua dan Drs. Moh. Hatta sebagai Wakil Ketua. Drs. Yap
Tjwan Bing dipilih menjadi anggota mewakili etnis Tionghoa. Di dalam sidang PPKI
pada 18 Agustus 1945, UUD 1945 disahkan dan Ir. Soekarno diangkat menjadi Presiden
pertama RI dan Drs. Moh. Hatta sebagai wakil Presiden.

Tentara Kerajaan Belanda kemudian berusaha kembali ke Indonesia dengan

mendompleng tentara sekutu dan mendirikan pemerintahan NICA (Netherlandsch
Indies Civil Administration) dibawah pimpinan Letnan Gubernur Jenderal Dr. H.J. van
Mook. Setelah melalui berbagai perundingan yang menghasilkan berbagai perjanjian
yang merugikan Republik antara lain Perjanjian Linggajati dan Perjanjian Renville,
pada 20 Juli 1947 tengah malam, Belanda melancarkan agresi militer atau "aksi
polisionil" yang pertama. Dimulailah periode revolusi bersenjata melawan Belanda
dalam mempertahankan Republik dan mengusir penjajah Belanda untuk selama-
lamanya dari bumi Indonesia. Pasukan- pasukan Belanda bergerak dari Jakarta dan
Bandung untuk menduduki Jawa Barat dan dari Surabaya untuk menduduki Madura dan
ujung timur Jawa. Demikian juga daerah sekitar Semarang diamankan. Di Sumatera,
perkebunan-perkebunan di sekitar Medan, tambang-tambang dan kilang minyak serta
tambang batu bara di sekitar Palembang dan Padang diduduki. DI Jakarta pasukan
Belanda menduduki kantor-kantor Republik Indonesia dan menangkap anggota-anggota
delegasi yang sedang berunding dengan Belanda.
Pasukan Republik dalam keadaan bingung dan panik akibat aksi polisionil Belanda
yang tiba-tiba segera bergerak mundur ke pedalaman dan melakukan taktik bumi
hangus serta menghancurkan segala apa yang dapat dihancurkan. Namun dalam
keadaan kacau dan tidak terkendali terjadi ekses terhadap orang-orang Tionghoa. Di
berbagai tempat di Jawa Barat, Jawa Tengah, dan Jawa Timur terjadi perampokan,
penjarahan dan pembakaran rumah-rumah, toko, bengkel, perusahaan, pabrik, dan
berbagai harta benda milik orang Tionghoa. Malahan di beberapa tempat terjadi
pembunuhan terhadap orang-orang Tionghoa yang tak berdosa dengan tuduhan menjadi
agen atau mata-mata NICA. Di Medan terjadi gelombang pembunuhan, perampokan
dan penjarahan yang dilakukan para gangster dan kriminal yang bekerja sama dengan
oknum- oknum organsasi pemuda, malahan dengan oknum TKR.

Aksi kekerasan anti Tionghoa di Jawa Barat terjadi pada 3 Juni 1946 jauh sebelum aksi
polisionil yang pertama. Terjadi pembunuhan besar- besaran terhadap orang-orang
Tionghoa yang berdiam di daerah sebelah barat sungai Tangerang (Cisedane).Ratusan
orang Tionghoa yang tidak berdosa dibantai dengan kejam, mayatnya ditumpuk dan
hartanya dijarah lalu rumahnya dibakar. The New York Times edisi 6 Juni 1946
melaporkan 600 orang Tionghoa yang dituduh bekerja sama dengan Belanda dibunuh
dan desanya dibakar. Pembunuhan massal tersebut belum berhenti sampai pada 8
Juni.[21][21]

Pada 3 Juni 1946, di desa Panggang (Cilongok), Lim Tjiaw Hie yang telah berusia 71
tahun, Lim Tjoen Nio seorang gadis berusia 20 tahun dan Lim Tiang Tjeng seorang
anak berusia 3 tahun dibakar hidup-hidup. Menurut laporan, sejak tanggal 1 sampai 5
Juni terjadi 28 kasus pembakaran di sekitar Tangerang dimana orang-orang Tionghoa
dibakar hidup-hidup.

Dengan cepat aksi pembunuhan di Tangerang menyebar ke berbagai tempat. Antara lain
kawasan Mauk, Serpong dan Krawang. Di daerah Mauk malah laki-laki Tionghoa
diminta membuka celananya untuk kemudian disunat secara paksa. Demikian juga
perempuan Tionghoa banyak yang diperkosa secara brutal.[22][22]

Dalam keadaan stress, orang-orang Tionghoa mengamati dan mencatat dengan cermat
seluruh kejadian yang menakutkan, termasuk perempuan dan anak-anak yang dibakar
hidup-hidup.

Menurut laporan yang diterima Palang Merah Jang Seng Ie Jakarta, 653 orang Tionghoa
telah dibunuh di daerah Tangerang dan sekitarnya, termasuk 136 perempuan dan 36
anak-anak. 1.268 rumah dibakar habis dan 236 lainnya dirusak. Diperkirakan ada
25.000 orang pengungsi di Jakarta yang datang dari daerah tersebut. Sebagian ada yang
ditampung di gedung perkumpulan Sin Ming Hui, di Molenvliet West (Jl. Gajah Mada
No.188).

Peristiwa keji tersebut menimbulkan kegeraman di kalangan banyak orang. Masyarakat

Tionghoa lalu mengumumkan 11 Juni 1946 sebagai hari Duka Cita.Pada hari itu seluruh
orang Tionghoa menyatakan ikut berkabung dengan menutup semua toko dan
perusahaan miliknya dan sepanjang hari hanya berdiam di rumah.[23][23]

Di Bagan Siapi-api lain lagi. Di kota yang terletak di pantai timur Sumatera yang
penduduknya hampir seluruhnya nelayan Tionghoa, pada September 1946 diserang
orang-orang Indonesia. Sebelum penyerangan tersebut, para nelayan sering diganggu
para perompak yang mendapat bantuan anggota Angkatan Laut Republik. Pada 18
September 1946, sekitar 4.000 orang anggota pasukan Angkatan Laut Republik, dibantu
450 orang tentara menyerbu pemukiman Tionghoa di Bagan Siapi-api. Polisi juga
dengan cepat mengambil bagian dalam serangan tersebut. Menghadapi serangan yang
tiba-tiba, 200 orang Tionghoa meninggal dunia, namun mereka yang selamat melakukan
perlawanan dengan menggunakan senjata seadanya.

Karena serangan tersebut gagal, mereka berusaha mengisolasi kota Bagan Siapi-api
sehingga sekitar 14.000 penduduk Tionghoa menghadapi bahaya kelaparan. Tetapi
banyak juga yang berhasil melarikan diri dan menurut Departemen Sosial Inggris, tidak
kurang dari 2.000 orang menjadi pengungsi di Malaka. Menghadapi perlawanan
tersebut, pihak penyerbu terpaksa mengundurkan diri ke pedalaman sambil melakukan
pembunuhan terhadap orang-orang Tionghoa yang ditemuinya. Di Bangko 20 orang
Tionghoa dibunuh, di Mentaga 40 orang, Di Telok Poelau 34 orang, di Djembra 75
orang. Selanjutnya pada Januari 1947, di Palembang 250 orang Tionghoa yang tidak
berdosa dibunuh dan kerugian yang diderita diperkirakan 20 juta gulden.[24][24]

Selanjutnya untuk memberi gambaran yang lebih jelas mengenai para korban selama
terjadi penjarahan, perampokan, perkosaan dan pembunuhan terhadap orang-orang
Tionghoa sebagai ekses aksi polisionil pada Juli 1947 bisa dilihat laporan yang
dikeluarkan Chung Hua Tsung Hui Batavia pada 15 September 1947 untuk Liga
Bangsa- Bangsa, yaitu Memorandum, Outlining Acts And Inhumanity Perpetrated By
Indonesian Bands, On Innocent Chinese Before And After The Dutch Police Action Was
Enforced On July, 21, 1947.

Dalam Memorandum tersebut dengan jelas dan rinci dilaporkan jumlah korban sebagai
akibat penjarahan, pembakaran, pembunuhan dan perkosaan terhadap penduduk
Tionghoa di daerah-daerah dan kota sebagai berikut:

1. Krawang dan Cikampek. 2. Sukabumi dan Cibadak. 3. Ceracas dan Cilimus. 4.

Jatitujuh. 5. Majalengka. 6. Cikijing, Talaga dan sekitarnya. 7. Maja. 8. Rajagaluh. 9.
Prapatan. 10. Indramayu. 11. Kuningan. 12. Ciawigebang dan daerah sekitarnya. 13.
Kadipaten, Jatiwangi, Jamblang dan Arjawinangun. 14. Jalaksana. 15. Pekalongan. 16.
Tegal. 17. Purwokerto. 18. Sukateja. 19. Wangon. 20. Purbalingga. 21. Bobotsari. 22.
Cilacap. 23. Gombong. 24. Karanganyar. 25. Salatiga. 26. Lumajang. 27. Jember. 28.
Ambulu, Keselir Kulon, Tanjong Rejo dan Wuluhan. 29. Manglis dan Panti. 30.
Kencong, Dembulsari, Gumukmas, dan Puger. 31. Jangawah, Kemuning, Gajasan,
Mengaran dan Jatiroto. 32. Mjang, Simpalan, Tempuran, dan Mumbusari. 33. Kalisat,
Ledokombo, Sukowono, Sumberjambe. 34. Rambipuji, Nogosari, Rawatamtu, Picoro,
Gugut, Kaliwining, Curamalang, dan Rambogudono. 35. Tanggul, Bangsalsarie, Petung,
dan Sekar. 36. Wirolegi dan Aryoso. 37. Malang. 38. Kutobeda dan Buring. 39.
Singosari. 40. Lawang.

Pembakaran,penjarahan,pemerkosaan dan pembunuhan terus berlangsung di berbagai

daerah di Jawa dan Sumatera hingga akhir 1949. Kejadian yang hebat terjadi di
kawasan Jawa Timur, terutama sejak para tahanan penjara Kalisosok, Surabaya
dilepaskan dan dipersenjatai serta direkrut ke dalam sejumlah satuan pasukan. Mereka
ini dipersilahkan melakukan apa saja asal membantu pengosongan kota guna
mendukung politik bumi hangus yang dipilih pihak Republik. Beberapa daerah di mana
mayoritas Tionghoa jadi korban aksi penjarahan dan pembunuhan ini antara lain adalah
daerah Kertosono, Nganjuk, Caruban, Madiun, Blitar, Tulungagung, Kediri, Wlingi dan
Malang.

Kebanyakan pembunuhan dilakukan dengan cara menggiring semua orang Tionghoa

keluar kota dengan mengatakan bahwa kota harus dikosongkan. Orang Tionghoa yang
mengungsi biasa membawa semua anggota keluarga berikut harta bendanya. Begitu
sampai di luar kota, rombongan dipisahkan antara laki-laki dengan perempuan dan
anak-anak. Laki-laki dewasa dibagi dalam kelompok-kelompok lalu digiring ke hutan-
hutan dan pegunungan. Mereka lalu diminta membuat lubang yang kemudian ditumpuki
kayu. Keesokan harinya orang-orang Tionghoa tersebut diminta berkumpul di dalam
lubang tersebut untuk kemudian ditembaki. Harta mereka yang kebanyakan emas dan
permata yang dijahit diujung baju diambili. Semua yang diperoleh lalu dikumpulkan
dan dibagi di antara para pembunuh. Mayat-mayat yang berserakan kemudian ditimbun
dengan tanah.[25][25]

Demikianlah rangkaian penjarahan,pembakaran,penganiayaan,perkosaan dan

pembunuhan yang dialami orang-orang Tionghoa sebagai ekses revolusi kemerdekaan
tahun 1946-1949. Memang revolusi memerlukan pengorbanan, tetapi apa yang diderita
etnis Tionghoa bukanlah pengorbanan tetapi kekonyolan yang sia-sia. Kalau kita
perhatikan dengan seksama, tampak dengan jelas bahwa Belanda melakukan politik adu
domba dengan mengorbankan orang-orang Tionghoa. Karena dalam setiap gerakan
pasukan Belanda, apabila akan memasuki suatu daerah atau kota, sebelum tiba di
sasaran mereka akan menghentikan gerakannya dan beristirahat terlebih dahulu,
memberikan kesempatan kepada laskar-laskar dan gerombolan-gerombolan liar untuk
menjarah dan membakar toko-toko dan rumah-rumah orang-orang Tionghoa, bahkan
menyiksa dan membunuhnya.

Malahan di Sukabumi pasukan Belanda melakukan pemberitahuan terlebih dahulu

dengan menyebarkan pamflet. Tindakan penjarahan dan pembakaran ini bukan saja
usaha Belanda untuk mengadu domba pribumi Indonesia dengan orang Tionghoa, tetapi
lebih dari itu merupakan suatu grand strategi Belanda untuk menghancurkan reputasi
Republik Indonesia di mata Internasional. Dengan segera Belanda menyiarkan seluruh
kejadian yang menimpa orang Tionghoa dengan tujuan memojokkan Republik yang
dianggap barbar dan belum layak untuk merdeka. Sungguh sangat disayangkan para
pemimpin Republik kurang waspada dan secara naïf memakan umpan yang disodorkan
Belanda sehingga terjadi tindakan yang sangat merugikan reputasi Indonesia di mata
dunia dan menyebabkan etnis Tionghoa harus menanggung semua penderitaannya.

Sebenarnya sebelum kedatangan pasukan Belanda, orang Tionghoa yang berdiam di

daerah Republik tidak mengalami gangguan, walaupun penangkapan terhadap orang-
orang yang dicurigai sebagai mata-mata berlangsung dari waktu ke waktu. Baru ketika
menghadapi kedatangan pasukan Belanda, penjarahan dan pembakaran dilakukan oleh
pasukan Indonesia. Hal ini sebagai ekses taktik bumi hangus yang dijalankan oleh TRI
yang dipelopori Divisi Siliwangi. Seharusnya hanya bangunan- bangunan vital saja
yang harus dihancurkan, namun dalam pelaksanaannya terjadi banyak ekses dan
penyelewengan yang dilakukan oknum-oknum TRI yang diikuti laskar-laskar liar yang
sukar dikendalikan. Justeru bangunan-bangunan pabrik, toko dan rumah milik orang
Tionghoa yang tidak berdosa yang menjadi sasaran penjarahan dan pembakaran.
Aksi kekerasan anti Tionghoa di masa Demokrasi Parlementer (1950- 1959) dan
Demokrasi Terpimpin (1959-1965). Pada 17 Agustus 1950, saat memperingati hari
ulang tahun Proklamasi Kemerdekaan, Republik Indonesia Serikat (RIS) sebagai hasil
Konferensi Meja Bundar (KMB) yang berlangsung 23 Agustus-2 Nopember di Den
Haag dibubarkan dan dideklarasikan berdirinya Negara Kesatuan Republik Indonesia
(NKRI) dengan Undang-Undang Dasar Sementara (UUDS) yang selesai disusun pada
24 Juli. UUDS ini berlaku sampai dilaksanakannnya pemilihan umum yang akan
menyusun UUD baru. UUDS 1950 disusun oleh Panitia Bersama yang terdiri dari 14
orang dan dibentuk oleh Badan Pekerja KNIP (Komite Nasional Indonesia Pusat) dan
Pimpinan DPR-RIS. Salah seorang anggotanya adalah Siauw Giok Tjhan. Ternyata
UUDS ini berhasil mengakomodasi seluruh jiwa Proklamasi 17 Agustus 1945 yang
sangat esensial. Antara lain Pancasila dimasukkan kembali ke dalam Mukadimah UUDS
tersebut. Pasal 33 UUD-1945 yang dihapus oleh UUD-RIS, dihidupkan kembali dalam
Pasal 38 UUDS. Hak-hak asasi manusia yang dalam UUD-1945 tidak dinyatakan secara
jelas, dalam UUDS dicantumkan dengan mengambil oper seluruh Universal Declaration
of Human Rights PBB yang telah disahkan oleh Sidang Umum PBB pada 10 Desember
1948. Bentuk negara adalah negara kesatuan menggantikan negara federal UUD-RIS.
Juga dinyatakan dalam UUDS bahwa sistim pemerintahan (kabinet) adalah parlementer
yang tidak bertanggung jawab kepada presiden melainkan kepada parlemen. Sehingga
sebenarnya kekuasaan tidak berada di tangan Presiden Soekarno.

Suatu hal yang sangat penting adalah dihapusnya Pasal 6 ayat 1 UUD-45 (pasal yang
sangat rasialis) yang menyatakan presiden Indonesia adalah orang Indonesia asli.
Ketentuan ini tidak disinggung sedikit pun dalam UUDS. Syukur dalam amandemen
UUD-1945 ke-3 yang dilakukan MPR pada 21 Nopember 2001, pasal ini juga telah
dirubah menjadi presiden dan wakil presiden adalah orang Indonesia sejak kelahirannya
dan tidak pernah menerima kewarganegaraan lain atas kehendaknya sendiri.

Selama berlakunya UUDS-1950 sampai dikeluarkannya Dekrit 5 Juli 1959 untuk

kembali ke UUD-1945 oleh Presiden Soekarno, nyaris tidak terjadi aksi kekerasan anti
Tionghoa yang berarti. Yang terjadi adalah aksi-aksi kekacauan yang dilakukan
gerombolan DI/TII Kartosuwiryo di Jawa Barat–Jawa Tengah, Kahar Muzakkar di
Sulawesi Selatan dan Daud Beureu'eh di Aceh. Disamping itu juga terjadi
pemberontakan Republik Maluku Selatan (RMS) di bawah pimpinan Dr. Soumoukil.
Kartosuwiryo akhirnya berhasil tertangkap dalam sebuah operasi militer di hutan di
Jawa Barat dan pada sidang Mahkamah Angkatan Darat Keadaan Perang untuk Jawa
dan Madura (Mahadper) pada 16 Agustus 1962 dijatuhi hukuman mati. Demikian juga
dengan Dr. Soumoukil yang berhasi ditangkap dan kemudian dijatuhi hukuman mati
oleh Sidang Mahkamah Militer Luar Biasa (Mahmilub). Sementara Kahar Muzakkar
tertembak mati dalam sebuah operasi militer di hutan Sulawesi Selatan.

Kekacauan lain adalah pemberontakan PRRI/PERMESTA yang dimulai pada 15

Pebruari 1958 dengan diprokamirkannya Pemerintah Revolusioner Republik Indonesia
(PRRI) oleh Kolonel Ahmad Husein. Sebelumnya pada 2 Maret 1957 Saleh Sahade
membacakan piagam Perjuangan Semesta Alam (PERMESTA). Pada 17 Pebruari 1958
PERMESTA menggabungkan diri dengan PRRI. Pemberontakan tersebut hanya
bertahan beberapa bulan. Pada pertengahan 1958 praktis pemberontakan tersebut
berhasil dipatahkan walaupun seluruh kekuatan para pemberontak baru berhasil
dihancurkan pada 1961.
Karena keterlibatan Taiwan dalam pemberontakan PRRI/PERMESTA, pada Agustus
1958, kegiatan Kuomintang dilarang di seluruh Indonesia. Seluruh pimpinannya
ditangkap atau melarikan diri ke luar negeri. Semua sekolah Kuomintang di seluruh
Indonesia ditutup dan gedungnya dijadikan sekolah negeri. Demikian juga seluruh
perusahaan milik orang-orang Kuomintang diambil alih militer. Presiden Soekarno
secara de fakto baru benar-benar memegang kekuasaan sejak 5 Juli 1959 dengan
membentuk kabinet gotong royong dan menerapkan doktrin Demokrasi Terpimpin.

Tanpa terduga sebelumnya, Presiden Soekarno pada November 1959 dengan tiba-tiba
menandatangani Peraturan Pemerintah N0.10 atau yang lebih terkenal dengan sebutan
PP-10.Peraturan ini berisi larangan bagi orang-orang asing (terutama ditujukan kepada
orang-orang Tionghoa) untuk berdagang eceran di daerah-daerah pedalaman, yaitu di
luar ibukota daerah swatantra tingkat I dan tingkat II yang berlaku sejak 1 Januari 1960.

Sudah tentu peraturan yang rasialis ini sangat mengejutkan dan menggoncangkan sendi-
sendi kehidupan orang Tionghoa di Indonesia, karena pada masa itu Undang-Undang
Kewarganegaraan Tahun 1958 belum dilaksanakan, sehingga terjadi kesimpang siuran
dalam menentukan yang mana asing dan mana WNI. Para penguasa militer di daerah-
daerah dengan seenaknya mengusir bukan saja orang-orang Tionghoa asing tetapi juga
orang-orang Tionghoa yang berdasarkan UU Kewarganegaraan tahun 1946 telah
menjadi warga negara Indonesia.

Sebenarnya PP-10 ini merupakan kelanjutan dari Peraturan Menteri Perdagangan

Kabinet Djuanda yang dijabat Rachmat Moeljomiseno, seorang tokoh NU yang pernah
aktif di KENSI. Peraturan tersebut dikeluarkan pada Mei 1959, berisi larangan bagi
orang asing untuk tinggal dan berdagang di daerah pedalaman.

Ketika peraturan ini diterbitkan, Siauw Giok Tjhan segera menentangnya di DPR. Ia
menyatakan bahwa peraturan semacam ini tidak bisa dikeluarkan oleh seorang menteri,
melainkan harus merupakan sebuah undang-undang yang disahkan DPR. Siauw Giok
Tjhan menyatakan bahwa orang-orang Tionghoa mempunyai usaha yang legal di
daerah- daerah pedalaman yang otomatis mendapatkan perlindungan hukum
internasional yang harus dipatuhi pemerintah Indonesia. Ia juga memperingatkan kalau
sampai orang-orang Tionghoa tersebut diusir dari tempat kediaman dan usahanya di
daerah pedalaman, akan menimbulkan kemunduran ekonomi Indonesia. Keahlian dan
pengalaman yang dimiliki orang-orang Tionghoa yang telah beberapa generasi lamanya
akan merusak dan melumpuhkan jaringan distribusi di daerah pedalaman. Rupanya
peraturan ini sengaja dikeluarkan pada saat Presiden Soekarno sedang berada di luar
negeri. Ketika kembali dari lawatannya ke luar negeri dan mengetahui adanya peraturan
tersebut, Presiden Soekarno sangat marah kepada Rachmat Moeljomiseno, sehingga
dalam kabinet yang dibentuk setelah 5 Juli 1959 ia tidak diikut-sertakan.

Apa yang sesungguhnya menjadi alasan sehingga Presiden Soekarno akhirnya

menandatangani peraturan tersebut tetap menjadi tanda tanya dan kontroversi. Ada yang
berpendapat bahwa Presiden Soekarno mendapat tekanan dari militer dan partai-partai
Islam.

Pada umumnya perdagangan eceran di daerah pedalaman didominasi para pedagang

Tionghoa yang telah mempunyai pengalaman dan jaringan beberapa generasi. Sudah
tentu hal ini sangat merugikan para pedagang Islam yang baru bermunculan. Para
pedagang Islam yang pada umumnya berkiblat ke NU dan Masjumi merasa sulit
bersaing dengan pedagang Tionghoa. Dengan dikeluarkannya peraturan tersebut mereka
merasa diuntungkan.

Orang Tionghoa dianggap semuanya berstatus dwikewarganegaraan atau asing,

sehingga oleh pihak militer mereka dipaksa meninggalkan tempat kediamannya. Bukan
hanya para pedagang tetapi yang tidak berdagang pun diusir. Tindakan paling buruk
dilakukan pihak militer di Jawa Barat dibawah pimpinan Kolonel Kosasih. Berbagai
insiden menyedihkan terjadi, seperti di Cimahi pada Juli 1960, seorang perempuan
Tionghoa mati tertembak karena ia bersama keluarganya mencoba bertahan dan tidak
mau meninggalkan tempat kediamannya.

Pelaksanaan PP-10 ini menimbulkan ketegangan hubungan diplomatik RI- RRT.

Melalui Duta Besar Huang Chen dan Radio Peking, pemerintah RRT menyampaikan
protes-protesnya dan menyatakan kesediaannya menampung korban PP-10 dengan
mengirimkan beberapa kapalnya dan mengangkut mereka untuk ditempatkan di
berbagai tempat di Tiongkok. Pada saat itu timbul keguncangan dan demam repatriasi di
kalangan masyarakat Tionghoa. Pada awalnya bukan hanya mereka yang menjadi
korban PP-10, tetapi banyak juga pemuda dan pelajar Tionghoa yang menyambut
dengan gembira dan dengan penuh semangat berbekal keranjang-keranjang rotan dan
peti-peti besar berisi berbagai macam keperluan, berbondong- bondong berangkat ke
tanah harapan. Ada juga orang-orang Tionghoa yang memilih pindah ke Singapore,
Serawak, Eropa, Amerika, Brasil dan negara-negara lainnya untuk mencari kehidupan
baru di sana.

Pada masa itu lebih dari 136.000 orang Tionghoa yang meninggalkan Indonesia untuk
bermukim kembali di Tiongkok. Tetapi kondisi dan sistim masyarakat di tempat baru
serta kebiasaan di tempat lama di Indonesia, ditambah lagi dengan kendala bahasa
ternyata menimbulkan banyak kesengsaraan. Merasa tidak betah, akhirnya mereka
berusaha ke luar dari daratan Tiongkok untuk dapat bermukim di Hongkong, Macau dan
negara lainnya. Berbagai cerita yang penuh penderitaan di daratan Tiongkok
menyebabkan menurunnya minat orang-orang Tionghoa untuk kembali ke Tiongkok,
sehingga pada akhir 1960-an, gelombang tersebut surut sama sekali.

Satu-satunya aksi kekerasan anarkis yang terjadi dimasa Demokrasi Terpimpin adalah
peristiwa rasialis 10 Mei 1963 di Jawa Barat. Peristiwa ini meminta korban harta benda
orang Tionghoa yang cukup besar.

Peristiwa ini diawali di Cirebon pada akhir Maret 1963. Terjadi perkelahian di
Pengadilan Negeri Cirebon antara pemuda-pemuda Tionghoa dengan pemuda-pemuda
pribumi. Hal ini terjadi karena Pengadilan menjatuhkan vonis bebas kepada putera Dr.
Murad (seorang aktivis PSI) yang menjadi tertuduh dalam kecelakaan lalu lintas di jalan
raya Gronggong, di pinggiran Cirebon. Dalam kecelakaan tersebut putera Dr. Murad
menabrak seorang pemuda Tionghoa yang kemudian meninggal dunia.

Rupanya vonis hakim yang membebaskan tertuduh tidak memuaskan keluarga korban
dan teman-temannya, lalu terjadi terjadi perkelahian di halaman pengadilan antara
pemuda-pemuda tersebut dengan sekelompok pemuda pribumi. Pada saat pulang dari
pengadilan para pemuda pribumi mulai melakukan perusakan terhadap toko-toko milik
Tionghoa dengan cara melemparinya dengan batu. Sebuah mobil di muka toko Medan,
di jalan Pasuketan dibakar massa menyebabkan terjadi kepanikan di kalangan
masyarakat Tionghoa Cirebon. Namun kejadian tersebut dapat segera diatasi dan tidak
berlanjut, hanya saja pada 5-6 Mei sempat menjalar ke Tegal.

Tetapi anehnya baru pada 10 Mei 1963, aksi kerusuhan anti Tionghoa tersebut menjalar
ke Bandung. Kerusuhan tersebut diawali dengan perkelahian di kampus ITB antara
seorang mahasiswa Tionghoa dengan seorang mahasiswa pribumi karena terjadi
senggolan sepeda motor. Kemudian dipelopori mahasiswa ITB dan mahasiswa
Universitas Padjadjaran, dimulailah aksi perusakan toko-toko, rumah tinggal dan
kendaraan milik orang Tionghoa di Bandung.

Kerusuhan dimulai dari daerah Tegallega. Ratusan toko, rumah tinggal dan kendaraan
milik Tionghoa menjadi korban perusakan para pemuda anarkis. Malahan kabarnya
terdapat korban jiwa dalam aksi kerusuhan itu. Ironis sekali salah seorang yang menjadi
korban adalah Drs. Yap Tjwan Bing, mantan anggota PPKI yang turut mengesahkan
UUD 1945, anggota DPR-RI fraksi PNI, anggota Dewan Pimpinan Pusat PNI, anggota
Dewan Kurator ITB dan anggota Panitia Ujian Fakultas Farmasi Universitas
Padjadjaran.

Sebuah mobil baru milik Yap Tjwan Bing habis dibakar massa pemuda, demikian juga
bungalownya di Lembang di rusak. Kejadian inilah yang menyebabkan Yap Tjwan Bing
dan keluarganya meninggalkan Indonesia untuk menetap di Belanda dan kemudian
pindah ke Amerika Serikat, karena istrinya menjadi trauma dan kuatir apabila kejadian
serupa terulang kembali, rumahnya yang terletak di jalan Cipaganti 32 akan menjadi
sasaran. Padahal salah seorang anaknya menderita lumpuh akibat terkena penyakit
polio.[26][26] Dari Bandung aksi kekerasan anti Tionghoa menjalar ke kota-kota
sekelilingnya antara lain Garut, Tasikmalaya, Cianjur, Bogor, dan Sukabumi. Yang
terparah disamping Bandung adalah Cianjur dan Sukabumi. Peristiwa di Tegal telah
menimbulkan kerugian materiil sebesar 650 juta, sedangkan Peristiwa 10 Mei di
Bandung telah mengakibatkan kerugian pada 500 buah toko, ratusan rumah tinggal, 63
mobil habis dibakar dan puluhan kendaraan lainnya dirusak.

Di Sukabumi 98 kendaraan bermotor habis dibakar, terdiri dari 52 truk, 20 oplet, 12

sedan, 7 bus, 4 jeep, 1 pick-up dan 2 sepeda motor. Di samping itu 2 becak dibakar para
pengemudinya. Kerusakan lainnya 4 pabrik di bakar (1 pabrik kertas, 1 pabrik tenun, 1
pabrik aci atau tapioka dan I pabrik teh). Selanjutnya 40 toko bersama isinya habis
dijarah dan dibakar, 16 rumah tinggal hancur dilempari massa anarkis.Kerugian lainnya
120 ton aci habis dibakar. Di Cianjur 137 kendaraan bermotor habis dibakar, terdiri dari
28 truk, 57 oplet, 30 sedan, 3 bus, 4 mobil tangki minyak, 4 pick-up dan 11 sepeda
motor. Kendaraan lainnya yang menjadi korban, 35 becak dan 167 sepeda hangus
dibakar.Jumlah toko yang dirusak 316 sedangkan barang-barang isi toko tersebut habis
dibakar. Disamping itu 114 rumah dan 2 gedung bioskop dirusak. Sebuah pabrik teh
dibakar. Di luar kota Ciamis selain sebuah pabrik soun di Cisaga, 2 pabrik aci dibakar
yaitu di kampung Cijambu, Banjar dan di kampung Panumbangan. [27][27] Peristiwa
ini menimbulkan banyak reaksi. PKI dan kelompok kiri lainnya dengan segera
mengeluarkan pernyataan bahwa peristiwa ini adalah peristiwa rasialis kontra
revolusioner yang didalangi oleh sisa-sisa Masjumi dan PSI. Demikian juga Baperki
mempunyai pandangan yang sama. Sebaliknya LPKB di bawah pimpinan Sindhunata
mengeluarkan selebaran berisi pernyataan bahwa peristiwa ini disebabkan oleh prilaku
orang Tionghoa yang ekslusif dan suka pamer kemewahan. Sudah tentu para pemimpin
Baperki memprotes para pimpinan LPKB yang dianggap secara provokatif mengipasi
kemarahan massa.

Aksi kekerasan anti Tionghoa di masa Orde Baru Selaras dengan aksi penumpasan
G30S/PKI maka dimulailah kampanye anti "Cina" (Sinophobia) baik yang ditujukan
kepada pemerintah RRT yang secara aktif melalui Radio Peking dan kantor berita
Hsinhua menyerang rezim militer Soeharto-Nasution, maupun kepada orang-orang
Tionghoa di Indonesia.

Kampanyei anti Tionghoa ini disponsori oleh kekuatan asing terutama Inggris dan
Amerika Serikat. Pada masa itu Perang Vietnam sebagai manifestasi perang dingin
antara kubu negara-negara kapitalis Barat dibawah pimpinan Amerika Serikat dan
Inggris dengan kubu negara- negara sosialis Eropa Timur dan Asia dibawah pimpinan
Uni Soviet dan RRT sedang mencapai puncaknya. Terjadi tarik-menarik kedua kekuatan
tersebut hampir di seluruh belahan dunia. Tidak ada satu pun negara di permukaan bumi
yang terhindar dari pengaruh perang dingin. Jadi dapat disimpulkan bahwa kampanye
dan kerusuhan-kerusuhan anti Tionghoa yang terjadi setelah G30S. ditimbulkan oleh
faktor-faktor eksternal dan internal. Pemerintah Amerika dan terutama peemrintah
Inggris merencanakan dan mensponsori kampanye dan aski-aksi antiTionghoa yang
seolah-olah mendapatkan "dukungan" dari kegiatan Radio Peking dan kantor berita
Hsinhua. Di dalam negeri sendiri agen- agen CIA dan MI-6 mendapatkan dukungan dari
LPKB dan perwira-perwira AD dan pimpinan partai politik yang anti Tionghoa dengan
memojokkan Baperki serta mengkondisikan terjadinya aksi-aksi anti Tionghoa. Setelah
PKI dibubarkan dan Presiden Soekarno dikurangi kekuasaannya dengan membentuk
kabinet baru, ternyata masalah kesulitan ekonomi, terutama masalah inflasi tidak dapat
diperbaiki dengan segera. Namun untuk menampung aspirasi dan menjaga mobilitas
para mahasiswa, pemuda dan pelajar yang tergabung dalam KAPPI/KAMI/Laskar
Ampera ARH, harus dicari "kambing hitam".

Dalam kalkulasi Soeharto, kekuatan para mahasiswa dan pemuda merupakan kekuatan
yang ampuh dan masih dibutuhkan dalam menyelesaikan tahap akhir rencananya,
merebut kursi presiden dari Soekarno. Maka hal yang paling mudah adalah dengan
menimpakan segala kesalahan ini kepada orang-orang Tionghopa, baik WNI mau pun
WNA yang dituduh menjadi pengacau dan parasit ekonomi. Orang-orang Tionghoa
dituduh menjadi kolone kelima, tukang timbun dan sama sekali tidak pernah peduli
dengan kepentingan rakyat.Orang-orang Tionghoa dituduh mempunyai loyalitas ganda
dan selalu berusaha mentrasfer uangnya ke luar negeri.

Pemilihan etnis Tionghoa untuk dijadikan kambing hitam dengan pertimbangan bahwa
mereka adalah golongan yang secara politis sangat lemah, tanpa perlindungan dan
mudah dipermainkan. Dalam melakukan operasi-operasi penangkapan dan pengejaran
terhadap pimpinan, kader dan anggota PKI dan ormas-ormasnya yang dituduh terlibat
G30S, pihak militer juga melakukan penangkapan terhadap orang-orang Tionghoa
dengan tuduhan yang sama.

Puluhan ribu orang Tionghoa di seluruh Indonesia baik yang menjadi pengurus atau
anggota PKI, Pemuda Rakyat, CGMI, Baperki, PPI, IPPI, Perhimi, Chung Hua Tsung
Hui, Chiao Chung maupun hanya simpatisan saja atau bukan, kalau dituduh berindikasi
PKI langsung "diciduk" (ditangkap) pihak militer. Sebenarnya tujuan utamanya adalah
untuk memeras uangnya. Namun bagi yang tidak mempunyai uang, banyak juga yang
ditahan sampai bertahun-tahun lamanya, malahan ada yang ikut dibuang ke pulau Buru
bahkan ribuan orang Tionghoa ikut dibunuh.[30] [30]

Seluruh sekolah-sekolah dan universitas-universitas Baperki ditutup dan

disita.Demikian juga seluruh sekolah-sekolah Tionghoa dan gedung- gedung
perkumpulan yayasan-yayasan Tionghoa diduduki pihak militer. [31][31] Dalam
perkembangannya ternyata banyak di antaranya telah berubah menjadi ruko dan gedung
perkantoran.

Disamping itu setelah Peristiwa G30S intensitas kerusuhan anti Tionghoa makin
menjadi-jadi. Penjarahan, perusakan dan pembakaran rumah-rumah, toko-toko, sekolah-
sekolah dan mobil-mobil milik orang Tionghoa terjadi di mana-mana. Kampanye dan
berbagai aksi anti Tionghoa, ditambah tindakan represif penguasa militer inilah yang
menimbulkan kekuatiran dan trauma berkepanjangan dan menjadi salah satu sebab
mengapa orang-orang Tionghoa selama tiga puluh dua tahun mati-matian berusaha
menghindari wilayah politik, dan memusatkan seluruh perhatian dan kegiatannya hanya
di bidang bisnis.

Aksi-aksi kekerasan anti Tionghoa terjadi antara lain di Makassar pada 10 Nopember
1965. Pada awalnya terjadi demonstrasi yang dilakukan mahasiswa dan pemuda
anggota HMI dan Ansor yang ditujukan ke konsulat RRT, tetapi aksi-aksi anarkis
kemudian berlanjut ke pertokoan dan pemukiman orang Tionghoa. Massa demonstran
mengamuk dan kemudian menjarah, merusak dan membakar berbagai toko, rumah dan
mobil milik orang-orang Tionghoa. Menurut nota protes Kedubes RRT, lebih dari 2.000
toko dan rumah milik Tionghoa mengalami kerusakan dan hampir seribu keluarga
bangkrut.

Kerusuhan berikutnya terjadi di Medan pada 10 Desember 1965, Konsulat RRT dihujani
batu, jendela-jendelanya hancur dan 3 orang stafnya mengalami luka-luka. Di tengah
aksi tersebut pihak keamanan melepaskan tembakan ke arah massa demonstran. Hal ini
menimbulkan kemarahan massa yang mengira pihak konsulat lah yang melakukan
penembakan tersebut. Massa demonstran dipimpin gerombolan Pemuda Pancasila
kemudian mengamuk ke seluruh kota Medan. Mereka menjarah toko-toko dan kios-kios
milik orang-orang Tionghoa dan melukai atau membunuh siapa saja yang berani
melawan. Di jalan-jalan raya orang- orang Tionghoa diseret turun dari becak, mobil dan
sepeda motor, kemudian ditikam dengan pisau dan sangkur. Diperkirakan sebanyak
2.000 orang menjadi korban.

Pada 8 Mei 1966, Pangdam Aceh, Brigjen Ishak Djuarsa mengumumkan agar seluruh
orang Tionghoa WNA meninggalkan Aceh sebelum 17 Agustus 1966. Akibatnya lebih
dari 15.000 pengungsi Tionghoa WNA menuju kota Medan dan sekitarnya. Mereka
tinggal di gudang-gudang tembakau, klenteng dan bekas sekolah-sekolah Tionghoa. Di
kota Medan sendiri tembok- tembok penuh coret-coret anti Tionghoa antara lain
"Orang-orang Cina pulang " dan "Sekali Cina Tetap Cina". Pada Agustus 1966 KAPPI
dan KAMI Sumatera Utara menuntut agar sebelum akhir tahun semua warga negara
RRT diusir dari Sumatera Utara. Malahan KAPPI Sumatera Utara kemudian
mengeluarkan pernyataan agar mengusir seluruh orang Tionghoa dari Indonesia atau
KAPPI sendiri yang akan bertindak.
Dalam suatu rapat umum mahasiswa pada 15 Oktober 1966, Pangdam Sumatera Utara
Brigjen Sobiran Mochtar menyatakan bahwa demonstrasi- demonstrasi anti Tionghoa
tidak cukup untuk mematahkan dominasi orang Tionghoa dalam perekonomian
setempat. Para mahasiswa harus memelopori menolak membeli atau menjual barang
kepada orang Tionghoa dan secara aktif mengawasi toko-toko milik Tionghoa agar
orang enggan belanja ke sana.

Selanjutnya pada akhir Oktober dan Nopember 1967 dalam rangka penumpasan
Pasukan Gerakan Rakyat Serawak (PGRS) dan Pasukan Rakyat Kalimantan Utara
(PARAKU), terjadi aksi kekerasan anti Tionghoa di Kalimantan Barat. Orang-orang
Tionghoa yang berdiam di pedalaman Kalimantan Barat atas hasil rekayasa pasukan
RPKAD, diburu dan dibunuhi orang Dayak. Ratusan orang Tionghoa menjadi korban
pembunuhan dan puluhan ribu lainnya terpaksa mengungsi, meninggalkan rumah dan
harta bendanya di daerah pedalaman yang telah ratusan tahun turun-temurun dihuninya,
menuju kota-kota pesisir Kalimantan Barat seperti Singkawang dan Pontianak.

Setelah terjadi peristiwa aksi kekerasan anti Tionghoa di Kalimantan Barat, selaras
dengan kebijaksanaan pemerintah dalam menghadapi masalah Tionghoa dan bekunya
hubungan diplomatik dengan RRT. Kegiatan anti Tionghoa relatif menurun. Namun
pada Januari 1968, terjadi suatu insiden di Glodok, Jakarta. Seorang kopral RPKAD
yang berusaha "memeras" seorang pedagang Tionghoa terlibat perkelahian dengan
beberapa orang pemuda Tionghoa. Dalam perkelahian itu, kopral tersebut bersama
temannya seorang anggota garnisun dipukuli sekelompok pemuda Tionghoa yang
membela temannya sesama pedagang. Beberapa hari kemudian, pada 25 Januari, dua
peleton anggota RPKAD menyerbu Glodok untuk melakukan pembalasan. Karena tidak
dapat menemukan pemuda-pemuda yang terlibat dalam aksi pemukulan kepada teman
mereka, maka dengan menggunakan rantai sepeda dan pisau komando, para anggota
RPKAD tersebut dengan ngawur menyerang setiap orang Tionghoa yang mereka temui.
Empat puluh orang Tionghoa menderita luka-luka dan beberapa toko dirusak ketika
terjadi aksi kekerasan anti Tionghoa tersebut.

Pada 21 Oktober 1968, di Surabaya terjadi kerusuhan anti Tionghoa sebagai ekses dari
suatu demonstrasi KAPPI untuk memprotes digantungnya dua orang KKO di
Singapura. Pada 17 Oktober 1968, kedua orang KKO tersebut menjalani hukum
gantung di penjara Changi, karena tertangkap basah ketika melakukan aksi sabotase di
Orchard Road - Singapura pada masa konfrontasi dengan Malaysia.

Pemerintah Singapura dibawah pimpinan Perdana Menteri Lee Kuan Yew tidak
menghiraukan permintaan Presiden Soeharto yang mengirim Brigjen Tjokropranolo
untuk melakukan pendekatan, agar membatalkan hukuman gantung tersebut. Sungguh
luar biasa, demonstrasi untuk memprotes hukum gantung dua orang KKO berubah
menjadi aksi kekerasan anti Tionghoa. Mobil, sepeda motor dan becak dihentikan
kemudian dibalikkan dan dibakar. Demikian juga toko-toko dan rumah-rumah milik
orang Tionghoa diserbu dan isinya dijarah. Seluruh perabot rumah tangga dilemparkan
ke tengah jalan, kemudian dibakar. Di kawasan Pandaan yang merupakan lintasan jalan
Surabaya-Malang, massa melakukan sweeping. Semua mobil yang dikendarai orang
Tionghoa dihentikan. Pengemudinya diminta keluar dan dipukuli, kemudian mobilnya
dicemplungkan ke sungai.
Aksi perusakan berjalan sehari penuh dan jam malam terpaksa diberlakukan. Korban
akibat perusakan tersebut diperkirakan 98 mobil, 176 sepeda motor/scooter, 4 bemo dan
660 sepeda dirusak atau dibakar. Demikian juga 444 toko, 9 pabrik dan 71 rumah
tinggal beserta isinya dirusak dan dijarah.

Pada Minggu 5 Agustus 1973, masyarakat Tionghoa yang telah merasa tenang dengan
meredanya aksi-aksi anti Tionghoa, tiba-tiba dikejutkan dengan terjadinya huru-hara
anti Tionghoa di Bandung. Aksi penjarahan dan perusakan terhadap toko-toko dan
rumah-rumah milik orang-orang Tionghoa tersebut dipicu oleh sebuah kecelakaan lalu
lintas kecil dimana sebuah VW yang sedang lewat di jalan Astana Anyar, di muka
bioskop Siliwangi disenggol gerobak yang dikendarai Asep bin Tosim. Tiga orang
pemuda Tionghoa turun dari VW tersebut dan terjadi perkelahian yang mengakibatkan
Asep terluka ringan dan dibawa ke rumah sakit. Melihat kejadian tersebut beberapa
orang menjadi marah dan mengeroyok ketiga pemuda tersebut. Namun ketiganya
berhasil menyelamatkan diri, hanya mobilnya hancur dirusak massa.Kemudian beredar
isu bahwa Asep ditusuk dan meninggal dunia. Kebetulan hari itu sedang disiapkan
demonstrasi para tukang becak untuk menentang diberlakukannya daerah bebas becak
di kota Bandung. Massa tukang becak kemudian diprovokasi dan dialihkan melakukan
aksi-aksi anarkis anti Tionghoa.

Aksi penjarahan dan perusakan yang dimulai pukul 4 sore baru berakhir pukul 1 dini
hari. Sebagai akibat aksi tersebut lebih dari 1.500 toko dan rumah milik etnis Tionghoa,
terutama di pusat kota antara lain di Jalan Braga, Asia Afrika, Sudirman, A. Yani, Kopo
dan lainnya habis dijarah dan dirusak para perusuh. Demikian juga ratusan kendaraan
bermotor habis dibakar atau dirusak.

Kerusuhan kembali terjadi pada waktu meletusnya Peristiwa Malari atau Lima Belas
Januari 1974. Demonstrasi anti Jepang pada saat kedatangan Perdana Menteri Kakuei
Tanaka berhasil diprovokasi sehingga berubah menjadi aksi penjarahan dan perusakan
terhadap toko-toko dan kendaraan milik orang Tionghoa di daerah Glodok dan
mencapai puncaknya dengan aksi penjarahan dan pembakaran pertokoan proyek Senen.

Setelah Peristiwa Malari '74 yang meminta korban cukup banyak etnis Tionghoa yang
tidak berdosa, beberapa orang mantan pimpinan LPKB merasa kuatir melihat
perkembangan situasi di mana gap antara yang kaya dan miskin di Indonesia semakin
dalam dan menjurus ke arah rasialisme. Dengan dukungan Gubernur DKI Jaya, Ali
Sadikin pada Agustus 1974 mereka mendirikan Badan Pembinaan Kesatuan Bangsa
(BPKB) yang kemudian pada 18 Oktober 1977 berubah menjadi Badan Komunikasi
Penghayatan Kesatuan Bangsa (Bakom-PKB). Badan yang Ketua Umumnya K.
Sindhunata dengan dibantu oleh Junus Jahya dan Kwik Kian Gie mendapatkan
pengakuan resmi dari Menteri Dalam Negeri yang menjadi pelindungnya pada 31
Desember 1977.

Walaupun telah terbentuk Bakom-PKB,namun karena kebijaksanaan pemerintah Orde

Baru terutama di bidang ekonomi yang diterapkan terhadap etnis Tionghoa dan KKN
yang semakin subur berkembang, sentimen rasialisme dan benih-benih anti Tionghoa
ternyata masih saja hidup di dalam hati sebagian rakyat Indonesia yang mudah
diprovokasi menjadi aksi-aksi anarkis.
Hal ini terbukti dengan terjadinya peristiwa huru-hara anti Tionghoa di Solo, Boyolali,
Salatiga, Semarang yang kemudian menjalar ke Kudus dan beberapa kota kecil lainnya.
Malahan aksi-aksi perusakan toko- toko milik orang Tionghoa juga menjalar ke
beberapa kota di Jawa Timur antara lain Ngawi, Madiun dan Jombang.

Peristiwa penjarahan, perusakan dan pembakaran toko-toko dan kendaraan milik

Tionghoa di Solo yang berlangsung pada 22-23 Nopember 1980, dipicu hanya oleh
sebuah perkelahian antara 3 siswa Sekolah Guru Olahraga (SGO) dengan seorang
pemuda Tionghoa. Ratusan pelajar dengan mengendarai sepeda motor bercampur-baur
dengan menggunakan seragam sekolah secara terbalik sehingga identitasnya tidak bisa
dikenali lagi. Mereka menyerang semua toko dan bangunan milik orang Tionghoa
dengan cara melemparinya dengan bongkahan batu yang telah dipersiapkannya terlebih
dahulu.

Aksi anarkis yang berlangsung beberapa hari lamanya, dimulai dari daerah Coyudan
kemudian menjalar ke daerah-daerah lainnya dan ditunggangi para "gali" (gang anak
liar) yang menjarah toko-toko tersebut.

Dengan cepat kerusuhan menjalar ke Boyolali, Salatiga, Ambarawa, Banyubiru, Candi

dan Semarang. Di kota-kota ini para perusuh melempari semua rumah dan toko
Tionghoa. Beberapa pemuda Tionghoa yang dijumpai diludahi dan dipukuli massa. Aksi
penjarahan, perusakan dan pembakaran yang paling parah terjadi di Semarang mulai
tanggal 25 Nopember 1980. Kerugian dari aksi kerusuhan ini puluhan milyar, antara
lain 15 pabrik besar kecil dirusak atau dibakar. Kerugian terbesar diderita PT Arta
Electronics yang konon berjumlah 1,2 milyar dan PT Standard Battery sebesar 600 juta.

Krisis moneter yang berkembang menjadi krisis ekonomi membuktikan bahwa konsep
pembangunan yang digembar-gemborkan rezim Orde Baru ternyata membawa
kesengsaraan tidak terhingga kepada seluruh rakyat Indonesia. Hanya segelintir
penguasa bersama kroninya, sekelompok konglomerat hitam yang menikmati kue
pembangunan. Seluruh hasil pembangunan ternyata hanya fatamorgana yang dihasilkan
melalui utang dan penjarahan kekayaan alam negara. Selama tiga puluh dua tahun
pemerintahan rezim Orde Baru, negara telah dibuat bangkrut dengan meninggalkan
utang yang luar biasa besarnya.[32][32]

Beberapa tahun menjelang terjadinya krisis moneter yang menimpa Indonesia, muncul
rasa ketidakpuasan di kalangan masyarakat luas terhadap kebijaksanaan ekonomi
pemerintah yang dianggap hanya menguntungkan keluarga Presiden Soeharto dengan
kroninya segelintir konglomerat Tionghoa. Situasi ini dengan mudah digunakan oleh
para provokator untuk melakukan aksi-aksi anarkis anti Tionghoa. Pemicu aksi tersebut
tidak masuk akal, antara lain insiden seorang pemuda Tionghoa yang tidak waras
disuruh menyobek kitab suci Al-Qur'an (Pekalongan) atau seorang perempuan Tionghoa
yang merasa terganggu dan marah-marah kepada sekelompok pemuda pemukul bedug
untuk membangunkan umat Islam melakukan saur (Rengasdengklok), bahkan seorang
santri yang mengalami penganiayaan oleh anggota kepolisian (Tasikmalaya)
menyebabkan terjadinya aksi-aksi anarkis tersebut. Aksi- aksi tersebut kemudian
berkembang bukan hanya ditujukan kepada etnis Tionghoa tetapi juga kepada gereja-
gereja Kristen dan Katolik. Malahan di beberapa tempat kelenteng-kelenteng dan
vihara-vihara Buddha turut dijadikan sasaran perusakan. Aksi-aksi tersebut antara lain
terjadi di Purwakarta (31 Oktober – 2 Nopember 1995), Pekalongan (24 Nopember
1995), Situbondo ( 10 Oktober 1996), Tasikmalaya (26 Desember 1996), Sanggau Ledo
(30 Desember 1995-2 Januari 1996), Tanah Abang (28 Januari 1997), Rengasdengklok
(27 Januari-31 Januari 1997) dan Banjarmasin (23 Mei 1997).

Pada 27 Juli 1996,kantor DPP PDI di jalan Diponegoro diserbu gerombolan yang
mengaku pendukung PDI Kongres Medan dibawah pimpinan Buttu Hutapea cs. Aksi
tersebut telah menyebabkan terjadinya kerusuhan yang mengakibatkan puluhan
bangunan perkantoran, toko dan kendaraan bermotor sepanjang jalan Salemba dan
Kramat Raya habis dirusak atau dibakar massa yang mengamuk. Sudah tentu kembali
etnis Tionghoa yang menjadi korban.

Setelah terjadinya krisis moneter berbagai kerusuhan dan aksi-aksi rasialis anti
Tionghoa masih terjadi antara lain di Makassar (15 September 1997) dan setelah
lengsernya Presiden Soeharto di Kebumen (7 September 1998). Puncak aksi-aksi
kekerasan anti Tionghoa seperti telah disampaikan di halaman pertama makalah ini
adalah Peristiwa 13- 15 Mei 1998.

Satu-satunya aksi anarkis yang meminta korban tokot-toko milik Tionghoa di era
reformasi adalah pada saat Sidang Umum MPR hasil Pemilu 1999 (September 1999)
memilih K.H. Abdurrachman Wahid menjadi Presiden. Pemilihan presiden baru untuk
menggantikan Presiden B.J. Habibie mengalami berbagai rekayasa. Megawati sebagai
calon presiden dari partai pemenang Pemilu mengalami hambatan dari partai-partai
Islam, terutama dari koalisi Poros Tengah pimpinan Amien Rais dengan alasan gender,
agama dan sebagainya. Para pengikut PDIP/ Megawati yang merasa dizalimi
mengamuk dan melakukan aksi-aksi anarkis di Bali dan Solo. Ratusan toko milik orang
Tionghoa hancur, malahan Pasar Besar Solo yang sangat terkenal dan menjadi salah
satu icon kota Solo habis dibakar massa yang menjadi brutal dan sulit dikendalikan.

Masalah Tionghoa adalah bagian dari masalah nasional Setelah dengan jujur
mempelajari sejarah , maka dapat ditarik kesimpulan bahwa masalah Tionghoa adalah
bagian dari masalah nasional yang diwarisi oleh penjajah Belanda. Kebijaksanaan
politik segregasi penjajah Belanda, mengakibatkan bangsa Indonesia terkotak-kotak.
Ingat apa yang dilakukan oleh Van Mook dan KMB yang menghasilkan negara federal
ciptaan mereka yang ingin memecah-belah bangsa Indonesia yang baru saja
memproklamirkan kemerdekaannya.

Kebiasaan dan kebijaksanaan raja-raja Jawa yang diteruskan oleh pemerintah Hindia-
Belanda untuk memelihara segelintir orang Tionghoa yang dijadikan kroninya untuk
memeras rakyat ternyata ditiru dan diterapkan oleh rezim Orde Baru yang juga
memelihara segelintir oknum Tionghoa untuk dijadikan kaki-tangannya dalam
menumpuk kekayaan. Hal ini dilakukan mulai dari pemegang puncak kekuasaan
bersama keluarganya sampai ke tingkat paling bawah, lurah dan Rt/Rw. Sistim upeti
yang menjadi tradisi raja-raja Jawa diterapkan, sehingga gaji pegawai negeri tidak
pernah dicukupi dan mereka diberi kesempatan untuk melakukan korupsi asal
memberikan upeti kepada atasannya. Berbagai kemudahan, HPH, Perbankan dsb.nya
diberikan kepada segelintir konglomerat Tionghoa, malahan sampai detik terakhir
kekuasaannya mereka diberikan kesempatan untuk merampok negara dengan
mengucurkan ratusan trilyun dana BLBI.
Rangkaian aksi-aksi kekerasan anti Tionghoa yang dimulai dari zaman VOC/Hindia-
Belanda sampai mencapai puncaknya dengan terjadinya tragedi 13-15 Mei 1998 adalah
warisan sejarah yang harus diselesaikan bukan saja oleh etnis Tionghoa, tetapi juga oleh
seluruh komponen bangsa, termasuk seluruh kekuatan politik yang ada di Indonesia.
Baik yang berada di eksekutif, legislatif maupun yudikatif dengan seluruh aparat dan
birokrasinya dari pusat sampai ke tingkat Rt/Rw.

Kita tidak bisa berilusi bahwa etnis Tionghoa bisa berjuang dan menyelesaikan masalah
Tionghoa sendirian tanpa menceburkan diri ke dalam mainstream bangsa dan bersama-
sama komponen bangsa lainnya ikut menciptakan masyarakat baru Indonesia seperti
yang kita cita-citakan. Untuk menjadi bangsa yang modern dan berperadaban tinggi kita
harus membangun negara kita menjadi negara yang demokratis, egaliter, menjunjung
tinggi hukum dan hak azasi manusia serta bersih dari segala bentuk KKN dan
diskriminasi. Seluruh warga negara tanpa memandang asal-usul ras, etnis, agama,
kepercayaan, gender, fisik dsb.nya mempunyai hak dan kewajiban yang sama. Untuk itu
baik UUD maupun seluruh Undang-undang, Peraturan Pemerintah, Peraturan Daerah
dsb.nya harus bersih dari unsur-unsur diskriminasi.

Pertanyaannya sekarang adalah bagaimana kita harus bersikap? Apakah kita akan
menerima saja keadaan yang penuh ketidak-pastian bagi hari depan anak cucu kita atau
kita menginginkan perubahan? Jawabannya ada di dalam lubuk hati masing-masing.

----------------------------------------------------------------------
-------------------------------------

[1][1] Damar Harsono "May Riots Still Burns Into Victim's Minds" dalam The Jakarta
Post, Mei 14,2002.

[2][2] Major William Thorn, The Conquest Of Java, 1815, reprinted 1993 by Periplus
Edition (HK) Ltd. Hal.242-244.

[3][3] Adolf Heuken SJ."Tempat-tempat bersejarah di Jakarta",Yayasan Cipta Loka

Caraka, Jakarta, 1997,Hal. 173-174.

[4][4] G.William Skinner, "The Chinese of Java in Colloquium on Overseas Chinese",

dalam Mely G.Tan (ed), Golongan Etnis Tionghoa di Indonesia, PT Gramedia, Jakarta
1979, Hal.1.

[5][5] Menurut Scott Merilles, BATAVIA in Nineteenth Century Photographs,

Archipelago Press, Singapore 2000, Hal.15, penduduk Batavia dan sekitarnya pada
Desember 1866 berjumlah 530.018 orang terdiri dari Eropa 6.253 orang, Pribumi
472.301 orang, Tionghoa 50.583 orang dan lain-lain 881 orang. Sedangkan pada
Desember 1895, penduduk Batavia dan sekitarnya berjumlah 1.268.043 orang terdiri
dari Eropa 12.429 orang,Pribumi 1.169.678 orang,Tionghoa 82.510 orang dan lainnya
3.426 orang. Angka-angka ini diperoleh dari Regeering Almanak voor Nederlandsch-
Indie, Batavia Landdrukkerij 1868 dan 1900.

[6][6] Sejak 1920 sampai 1930 jumlah imigran Tionghoa yang datang ke Hindia
Belanda rata-rata lebih dari 40.000 orang setahun. Pada 1921 jumlahnya kurang lebih
43.000 orang dan pada 1928, kira-kira 41.000 orang.Jumlah rata-rata sejak 1900 sampai
1930 lebih dari 28.000 orang. Sedangkan pada 1932 berjumlah 12.000 orang, 1933
berjumlah 9.000 orang, 1934 berjumlah 12.000 orang, 1935 berjumlah 15.000 orang,
1936 berjumlah 19.000 orang, 1937 berjumlah 31.000 orang dan 1938 berjumlah 20.000
orang.Yang datang pada 1938 terdiri antara lain 3.000 orang anak laki-laki berusia di
bawah 12 tahun, 8.000 orang berusia di atas 12 tahun, 2000 orang anak perempuan
berusia di bawah 12 tahun dan 6.000 orang berusia di atas 12 tahun. Lihat : Victor
Purcell, "The Chinese in Southeast Asia", Second Edition, Oxford University Press,
Kuala Lumpur, 1981, Hal.465.

[7][7] Pada 1875 di Jawa terdapat 8.383 orang Arab dan 14.573 orang Timur Asing
lainnya bukan Tionghoa.Lihat James R.Rush,"Opium to Java, Revenue Farming and
Chinese Enterprise in Colonial Indonesia, 1860- 1910",Cornell University Press, 1990,
catatan kaki hal.14.

[8][8] Nio Joe Lan, "Riwajat 40 Taon T.H.H.K.Batavia", Tiong Hoa Hwe Koan Batavia,
Batavia, 1940,Hal.10.

[9][9] Menurut Dr. De Haan,kapiten Tionghoa peranakan Islam terakhir di Batavia

bernama Muhammad Japar. Ia meninggal pada 1827 dan pada tahun berikutnya
penguasa Belanda di Batavia telah mengakhiri bentukan masyarakat Islam Tionghoa di
Jakarta dengan menyatukannya dalam golongan masyarakat Tionghoa.Lihat Amen
Budiman, "Masyarakat Islam Tionghoa di Indonesia". Tanjung Sari,
Semarang,1979.Hal.34

[10][10] Onghokham,"Kapitalisme Cina di Hindia-Belanda" dalam Yoshihara Kunio,"

Konglomerat Oei Tiong Ham, Kerajaan Bisnis Pertama di Asia Tenggara", PT.Pustaka
Utama Grafiti, Jakarta,1991, Hal. 84-85.

[11][11] Benny G.Setiono "Tionghoa Dalam Pusaran Politik ",ELKASA,Jakarta, 2003.

Hal. 55-58.

[12][12] Amen Budiman "Masyarakat Islam Tionghoa di Indonesia" Tanjung Sari,

Semarang, 1979,Hal.32-35.

[13][13] Menurut Amen Budiman, "Sangat menarik juga untuk dicatat ikhwal
penggantungan bedug-bedug besar di serambi mesjid-mesjid di tanah Jawa, terutama
sekali di daerah pesisir utara tanah Jawa, oleh karena bukan mustahil ikhwal ini pun
merupakan pengaruh dari arsitektur Tiongkok, di mana kita bisa menjumpai adanya
begug-bedug yang tergantung di serambi klenteng." Lihat Amen Budiman, Masyarakat
Islam Tionghoa di Indonesia,Tanjung Sari, Semarang 1979,Hal. 40. Menurut catatran
kaki, ini adalah informasi tertulis dari Ny.Michele Blusse.Lebih lanjut periksa: Welch,
Holmes, The Buddhist Revival in China, 1968. Hal.249.

[14][14] Lynn Pan, "The Encyclopedia of the Chinese Overseas", Archipelago Press,
Landmark Books,Singapore, 1998,Hal.51.

[15][15] Ketika pemerintah Indonesia menginvasi Timor Portugis, pada 7 Desember

1975 pasukan Indonesia berusaha meduduki Dili dengan melakukan penembakan di di
jalan-jalan raya secara mem**** buta kepada siapa saja yang ditemuinya sambil
melakukan penjarahan toko- toko milik orang Tionghoa dan penduduk sipil lainnya.
Pasukan Indonesia yang menjarah dan membunuh orang-orang Tionghoa tersebut
berdalih bahwa mereka adalah pelarian G30S/PKI dari Indonesia yang menyelamatkan
diri dan mengkonsolidasikan diri di daerah jajahan Portugis itu. Pembunuhan tersebut
berlanjut sampai satu minggu lamanya. Menurut laporan seorang pastor Katolok,
diperkirakan 2.000 orang penduduk Dili tewas akibat pembunuhan yang dilakukan
pasukan Indonesia tersebut, 700 orang di antaranya orang Tionghoa. Lihat : Adam
Schwarz, "A Nation in Waiting, Indonesia in the 1990s", Allen & Unwin
Pty.Ltd.,Australia,1994.Hal.204.

[16][16] Harian "Suara Pembaruan", 24 April 2006.Hal.7 dan Harian "Kompas",25

April 2006.Hal.9

[17][17] Dr. Peter Carey, "Orang Jawa dan Masyarakat Cina 1755- 1825 ", Pustaka
Azet, Jakarta 1986.

[18][18] Benny G.Setiono Op cit.Hal. 171-177.

[19][19] Pengantar pendirian SDI yang disampaikan Tirto Adhi Soerjo menyatakan
antara lain, untuk mendapatkan perubahan kedudukan kaum pedagang kita bangsa Islam
di Hindia wajib satu badan yang anggota- anggotanya adalah para saudagar supaya ilmu
sarwat bisa dilakukan dengan sepertinya dan supaya lidi yang mudah dipatahkan itu
tidak mudah dipatahkan, karena dipersatukan sehingga menjadi teguh. Lidi
digabungkan jadi satu menjadi teguh karena tali pengikat, yaitu persarikatan saudagar-
saudagar yang mempunyai badan hukum yang diakui dan dilindungi undang-undang
negeri. Antara saudagar Islam satu dengan yang lain tentu sudah ada yang membikin
kerukunan dalam suatu hal, tetapi kerukunan ini terbikin di bawah tangan,jadi tidak
kekal dan mudah bubar. Lihat Pramoedya Ananta Toer, "Sang Pemula", Hasta Mitra,
Jakarta, 1985. Hal.120-121.

[20][20] Twang Peck Yang,"The Chinese Business Elite in Indonesia and the Transition
to Independence 1940-1950", Oxford University Press, Kuala Lumpur, 1998. Hal.70-72.

[21][21] Victor Purcell. "The Chinese in Southeast Asia", Oxford University Press,
Kuala Lumpur, 1981, Second Edition, Hal.474.

[22][22] Aksi penjagalan,pemerkosaan dan pengusiran warga Tionghoa di kawasan

Bandung Selatan,Tangerang, Mauk dan sekitarnya yang konon mencapai ribuan korban
jiwa ini terjadi sepanjang Mei hingga Juli 1946. Untuk melihat detil pembantaian ini
bisa dilihat Star Weekly No 23 Tahon ke 1 Edisi 9 Juni 1946; Star Weekly No 24 Tahon
ke 1 Edisi 16 Juni 1946; Star Weekly No 25 Tahon ke 1 Edisi 23 Juni 1946 dan Star
Weekly No 26 Tahon ke 1 Edisi 30 Juni 1946.

[23][23] Lihat iklan seruan hari duka cita dalam Star Weekly No.23 Tahon k1, Edisi 9
Juni 1946. Hal.9.

[24][24] Chung Hua Tsung Hui (Federation Of Chinese Associations) in Batavia,

MEMORANDUM, Outlining Acts Of Violence And Inhumanity Perpetrated By
Indonesia Bands On Innocent Chinese Before And After The Dutch Police Action Was
Enforced On July 21,1947, Batavia, 15 September 1947, Hal.6.
[25][25] Kisah ini dikumpulkan berdasarkan hasil wawancara dengan sejumlah anak
korban yang salah satu di antaranya dengan ilmu silat yang dikuasainya berhasil
melompat dan melarikan diri ke hutan. Sumber Dokumen Stanley, Hasil Wawancara
Dengan Sejumlah Keluarga dan Korban Pembunuhan Anti Tionghoa di Malang, Blitar
dan Nganjuk pada Desember 1986 dan Agustus 1987. Di beberapa daerah dengan
mudah bisa ditemukan kuburan massal para korban. Salah satunya adalah sebuah
kuburan masaal yang berlokasi di pinggir hutan di Desa Donomulyo, Kecamatan Bagor,
sekitar 9,5 Km sebelah barat Nganjuk. Di kuburan massal ini dikuburkan 1.250 orang
korban. Proses penggalian dan pencarian jenasah para korban pembunuhan massal yang
terjadi sepanjang 1946-akhir 1949 ini dilakukan oleh berbagai cabang Chung Hua
Tsung Hui di sejumlah kota pada 1951.

[26][26] Yap Tjwan Bing,"Meretas Jalan Kemerdekaan,Otobiografi seorang Pejuang

Kemerdekaan", PT Gramedia, Jakarta 1988. Hal.79.

[27][27] Harian "Warta Bhakti", 26 Mei 1963.

[28][28] Siauw Giok Tjhan,"Lima Jaman,Perwujudan Integrasi Wajar", Yayasan Teratai,

Jakarta, Jakarta-Amsterdam, 1981,Hal.324-325.

[29][29] Budi Setiawanto,Andi Jauhari,Rahmad Nasution dan Unggul Tri Ratomo,

"Menguak Tabir Perjuangan Suripto",Aksara Karunia, Jakarta, 2001,Hal.22.

[30][30] Menurut majalah Life dan Far Eastern Economic Review beratus- ratus ribu
orang Tionghoa telah dibunuh.Robert Shaplen menyebut angka kira-kira 20.000 orang
mati.Sebaliknya kantor berita Hsinhua menyatakan beratus-ratus orang Tionghoa yang
mati selama 6 bulan setelah G30S. Namun menurut Charles Coppel jumlah orang
Tionghoa yang terbunuh hampir tidak mungkin melebihi dua ribu orang. Lihat ; Charles
Coppel, "Tionghoa Indonesia Dalam Krisis", Pustaka Sinar Harapan, Jakarta,1994
Hal.124-125.

[31][31] Seluruh sekolah Tionghoa di Indonesia yang ditutup berjumlah 629 buah
dengan jumlah murid 272.782 orang dan jumlah guru 6.478 orang.

[32][32] Dalam suatu pengumuman yang dikeluarkan Menko Bidang Perekonomian

pemerintahan Megawati Dorodjatun Kuntjoro-Jakti dinyatakan bahwa seluruh utang
dalam negeri dan luar negeri pemerintah berjumlah lebih dari Rp 1.400 trilyun ataus
setara dengan $ US 140 milyar.

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